# Link – The State

The modern nation state is defined by what it opposes and excludes, it uses difference to enshrine a collective national identity.

**Gaard, 97** educator, writer, scholar and activist working at the intersections of literature, feminism, and environmental justice, 97 (Greta, ‘Toward A Queer Ecofeminism’, Hypatia. Volume: 12. Issue: 1. Publication Year: 1997. Page Number: 114.LRP)

In her study of race and gender in international politics, Cynthia Enloe finds important connections between the conceptions of nationalism and of masculinity. In colonialist discourses of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the subordinated countries are feminized, the subordinated men are emasculated, and the colonized women are often depicted as sex objects by foreign men. One male writer described colonialism as the condition wherein a man's women are "turned into fodder for imperialist postcards. Becoming a nationalist requires a man to resist the foreigner's use and abuse of his women" ( Enloe 1989 , 44). in her study of U.S. polar expeditions, Lisa Bloom finds that "the explorations symbolically enacted the men's own battle to become men,**"** and the recorded narratives left by the explorers present "U.S. national identity as essentially a white masculine one" ( Bloom 1993 , 6, 11). Both Enloe's and Bloom's texts reprint popular colonial postcard images of naked or partially clothed native women reclining on the ground in what Bloom calls the "odalisque pose" ( Bloom 1993 , 104). **Like** **the colonizers of three and four centuries past, the explorers and imperialists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have used the perceived eroticism of native peoples as a justification for their colonization. Serving as a foundation for all imperialist exploits, colonial nationalism offers a definition of identity that is structurally similar to the master identity. Enloe defines a nation as "a collection of people who have come to believe that they have been shaped by a common past and are destined to share a common future. That belief is usually nurtured by a common language and a sense of otherness from groups around them"** ( Enloe 1989 , 45; emphasis added). **Nationalism, then, is "a set of ideas that sharpens distinctions between 'us' and 'them'. It is, moreover, a tool for explaining how inequities have been created between 'us' and 'them'** " ( Enloe 1989 , 61**).** Similarly, the editors of Nationalisms and Sexualities explain that "**national identity is determined not on the basis of its own intrinsic properties but as a function of what it (presumably) is not"** ( Parker et al. 1992 , 5). **Inevitably "shaped by what it opposes," a national identity that depends on such differences is "forever haunted by [its] various definitional others"** ( Parker et al. 1992 , 5).   The feature of masculine identity that Enloe and Bloom seem to overlook and that Plumwood does not explicitly address is sexuality. Here again, feminist and ecofeminist theories fall short without a queer perspective. As Gayle Rubin has noted, "Feminism is the theory of gender oppression. To automatically assume that this makes it the theory of sexual oppression is to fail to distinguish between gender, on the one hand, and erotic desire, on the other" (1989, 307). Queer theorist Eve Sedgwick argues that gender and sexuality are "inextricable . . . in that each can be expressed only in terms of the other . . . in twentieth-century Western culture gender and sexuality represent two analytic axes that may productively be imagined as being as distinct from one another as, say, gender and class, or class and race" (1990, 30).  From a queer ecofeminist perspective, then, it is clear that **notions of sexuality are implicit within the category of gender. Simply stated, the masculinity of the colonizer** and of Plumwood's master **identity is neither homosexual, bisexual, nor transgendered**. Heterosexuality -- and a particular kind of heterosexuality as well, a **heterosexuality contained within certain parameters** -- **is implicit in conceptions of** both **dominant masculinity** and Plumwood's master model. In the preceding examples, the discourse of nationalist colonialism contains specific conceptions not only of race and gender but also of sexuality. The **native feminized other of nature is not simply eroticized but also queered and animalized, in that any sexual behavior outside the rigid confines of compulsory heterosexuality becomes queer and subhuman. Colonization becomes an act of the nationalist self asserting identity and definition over and against the other -- culture over and against nature, masculine over and against feminine, reason over and against the erotic.** T**he metaphoric "thrust" of colonialism has been described as the rape of indigenous people and of nature because there is a structural** -- not experiential -- **similarity between the two operations**, though colonization regularly includes rape.

**Space Security derives from the state**

**School of Sociology 10** , Politics and International Studies10 **[**"The Growing ‘securitization’ of Outer Space." *Space Policy* 26.4 (2010): 205-08. *Science Direct*. Web. 26 June 2011. AMB]

**At its most fundamental the idea of national security assumes that the state must be protected, therefore it is necessary for the state to maintain standing armies, weapons production and procurement, intelligence agencies, and so on. One of the ways we can distinguish an existential threat, then, is by the level of response it generates. When an issue or development is successfully presented as an existential threat, it legitimises the use of exceptional political measures. A classic military example in international relations is a state’s right to self-defence. If a state is under attack, it claims the legitimate use of extraordinary measures that go beyond normal day-to-day politics: the declaration of a state of emergency or martial law, the rationing of certain goods and services, closure of roads and schools, and so on.** Commonly, then, the identification of existential threats sets in chain a number of effects that characterize the specific quality of security problems: urgency – the issue takes priority; and extraordinary measures – authorities claim powers that they would not otherwise have, or curtail rights and liberties that might otherwise apply. **In short, securitization is a style of argumentation used in attempts to legitimate the application of extraordinary measures by positioning an issue as equivalent to a threat to national security as it is more traditionally understood. By attempting to portray an issue as a security issue, a *securitizing move* is made; that is, a move to class an issue in the same category as national defence.**

# Link – International Relations

**International Relations are constructed through collective identities based around the territorial state. The movement towards IR removes all forms of difference at the expense of security.**

Scholte 1996 [Jan Aart Scholte. “The Geography of Collective Identities in a Globalizing World” Review of International Political Economy. Vol 2 No 4. Winter 1996. Pg 565-607]

Preoccupations with identity, in its interrelated personal and collective senses, have figured pervasively and crucially in modern social life. Issues of self/group identification have had significant bearing on a full spectrum of human interests, activities, norms and social structures. Past centuries are replete with instances where people have killed and been killed in the assertion of their senses of being and belonging. A need for recognition - to define oneself (or who one wants to become) and to have that identity acknowledged by others - persists as a first-order concern in contemporary social relations. Certainly under conditions of modernity - and possibly in other sociohistorical contexts as well, although this cannot be assumed4 - the pursuit of identity has ranked alongside, and has been deeply interconnected with, core social issues of subsistence, power, communion and knowledge. In spite of this significance, matters of identity have until recently received little attention in international studies. IR has concentrated on the hows and whys of war, diplomacy, commerce, integration, law and human rights. Although questions of collective identification are deeply implicated in each of these issues, students of world affairs have gener- ally regarded identity as an unproblematic aspect of international life. IR researchers across the various traditional theoretical persuasions - real- ism, liberalism, marxism - have presumed that ambiguous and fluctuat- ing identities arose only at the levels of individuals and localities. As a 'personal' or 'domestic' matter, problems of identity were a concem for Psychology and Sociology rather than IR. When it came to social relations on a world scale (so the prevailing supposition went) identity boiled down to nationality and loyalty to the corresponding territorial state. The very name of the discipline - 'Intemational Relations' - implied as much Articulating this consensus, the realist theologian Reinhold Niebuhr declared sixty years ago that the nation was 'the most absolute of all human associations'.5 At most, an occasional writing in IR investigated the causes and consequences of nationalism, or competition between con- tending constructions of nationality.6 However, such discussions gave little if any consideration to possible alternative frameworks of collective identity. Prior to the 1970s, only an incidental publication (in IR or any other field) explored transnational racial, gendered, religious, genera- tional, ethnic, sexual or professional identities.7 This fixation on nationality, and the corresponding neglect of other identity forms, is somewhat curious given that nationhood is a compar- atively recent historical phenomenon. True, many contemporary nations have developed from premodern antecedents, and various labels such as 'Vietnamese' and 'Flemish' already served to distinguish certain groups many centuries ago.8 However, this was not a fully-fledged sense of national identity: deeply rooted in and constantly at the fore of con- sciousness; spread across all provinces, classes and religions in a coun- try; and central to political organization and aspirations. Such nationalism did not consolidate anywhere in the world before the second half of the nineteenth century. Even the population of France, often depicted as the birthplace of the national idea, was not comprehensively 'nationalized' until this relatively recent historical juncture.9 Bastille Day did not become an annual public holiday in France until 1880.10 Nations have been timeless and 'natural' only in the imaginations of those who insist, against all contrary evidence, on inventing an immutable primordial com- munity for their sense of security in the modern, international world.

**National identity and solidarity to IR construct outsiders who threaten the homeland. The 1AC utilizes the same nationalism of the US, which justified the Nazi holocaust and ethnic cleansing**

**Scholte** 19**96 [**Jan Aart Scholte. “The Geography of Collective Identities in a Globalizing World” Review of International Political Economy. Vol 2 No 4. Winter 1996. Pg 565-607]

National identity and solidarity were and remain very much a product of, among other things, 'inter-national' relations.12 Nationality is at the same time internationality.13 Historically, national distinctiveness (in terms of language, gestures, customs, sensibilities, art forms, race, religion, heritage, shared destiny or whatever) was not accentuated and insisted upon until internationalization set in train processes of reciprocal national self-definition. It is no coincidence that most of the numerous national projects across the world consolidated more or less simultane- ously (albeit to varying degrees) during the same hundred-year period after the middle of the nineteenth century. Identity is constructed in relation to difference, and the rise of nationhood depended on an awareness of differences spread over distance that could only be perceived in the context of wide-ranging and extended close encounters with other nations. For example, Acton's quip that 'exile is the nursery of nationality' suggests that immersion in the land of 'outsiders' has produced some of the deepest national consciousness and affections.14 Many an immigrant, tourist, trader, exchange student and diplomat will concur. In another of their inter-national attributes, national groupings have been constructed as much from without as from within. For instance, it was 'foreigners' who in the 1850s first applied the label of 'Indonesian' to the populace of the South-East Asian archipelago.15 Most nationalist strivings have enjoyed significant support from outside, for example from Napoleon Ill in the case of Italian unification, the Bolsheviks in regard to Central Asia, Wilson's Fourteen Points in respect of eastern Europe, or the United Nations in post-1945 decolonization. Indeed, in such scenarios one group has arguably sought to confirm its national self in part by encouraging the construction of the other in similar, national terms. Even persons who regard themselves as nationless find that, through everything from laws to casual conversation, others force them into a national category all the same. Nations have also been intrinsically inter-national insofar as they have frequently taken shape and been sustained through acts of collective self-protection of the 'homeland' against intrusion from 'outside'. The articulation of external dangers has been pivotal to forging and sustaining many a nation. In this vein Michael Howard has suggested that 'it is in fact very difficult to create national self-consciousness with- out a war'.16 Silviu Brucan has argued that a nation's existence has depended on struggles in the international realm 'either to maintain or to expand its common language, territory, economy and culture'.17 For Terry Eagleton, 'the need for national definition is felt more by the under- dogs, who have to define themselves against the dominant forces'.18 Accelerated internationalization, especially from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, threatened established - localized - group identities. These small-scale collectivities generally lacked the means for effective self-assertion against 'foreign' states, companies, armies, mass media, languages, churches and so on. However, people from various localities could attempt to resurrect self-determination by bonding together in a nation, with their own national government, national currency, national schools, national symbols, etc. Paradoxically, of course, the resulting processes of state building, industrialization, secularization and the like generally further undermined preexistent 'traditional' cultures, but the reconstructed sense of distinctiveness and autonomy gave substantial comfort nevertheless. At the same time as defending a collective self, national projects have very often involved internationality through their violence against the foreigner. Nation building has on the whole not been an exercise in cross-national empathy and cooperation. James Der Derian has in this vein highlighted 'the traditional gambit of defining and unifying a national identity through the alienation of others'.'9 Nationality has been a question of privilege within the world system. 'Insiders' have enjoyed certain entitlements that have simultaneously been denied to 'outsiders', for example in respect of residence, passport, suffrage, welfare provi- sions, etc. Discrimination of this kind has not only operated between citizens of different countries, but has also often extended to 'strangers' within, including racial, linguistic and religious minorities, indigenous peoples, women, homosexuals and the disabled. At its most brutal, this dynamic of nationalist exclusion has manifested itself in Nazi extermi- nations, 'ethnic cleansing' in the Balkans, 'pacification' in East Timor and other genocides. Nationhood has thus generally involved complemen- tary assertions and suppressions of identities, whereby the elevation of one construction of the self has entailed the marginalization and silencing of others.

# Link – Security Discourse

**The securitizing rhetoric of the 1AC constructs static identities. Under the guise of U.S. Action, the 1AC's insecurities only re-enforce the very structure it fights.**

Mark Neocleous, Professor of Critique of Political Economy @ Brunel University (UK), 2008 (“Critique of Security.” Pg. 106-108. )

On 26 October 2001, President Bush signed into law a rather substantial bill, running to over 340 pages, specifying roles for some 40 federal agencies and carrying 21 legal amendments, called the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act. The Act changed criminal law and immigration procedures to allow people to be held indefinitely once charged, altered intelligence-gathering procedures to allow for the monitoring of people’s reading habits through surveillance of library and bookshop records, and introduced other new measures to allow for greater access to property, e-mail, computers and financial and educational records; all for the purpose of defeating the new terrorist enemy. The Act, in other words, was about national security: how to get it, how to maintain it, how to defend it. But it was also immediately notable for the somewhat wordy title, clearly designed for the acronym it would produce: USA PATRIOT. The implication was clear: this was an Act for American patriotism; to oppose it would be unpatriotic. In other words, it was not just about national security, but also very much about national identity. If we set the Act alongside the wider outburst of patriotism within the U.S. since 11 September 2001, it becomes clear that the attacks on that date were seen as a crisis in national identity as well as national security. And one of the most notable features of the subsequent ‘war on terror’ has been its grounding in ‘identity’ – in the construction of both the ‘evil’ ‘alien’ enemy and the ‘good’ American. In this chapter I am to explore this connection between security and identity. I do so by shifting the focus to the ways in which security is both cultivated and mobilized internally. Benedict Andersons’ insight that the nation is an imagined community has generated a whole range of important work on national identity: its origins, construction, myths and practices. What interests me here is that if national identity is integrally linked with the imagination and, as we also know, one of the things about the imagination is that it plays around with fears, dangers and insecurities, then what if the nation is imagined as insecure? And if it is imagined as insecure, then what does this tell us about the links between security and identity – between an imagined national identity and an imagined national (in)security? To deal with these questions this chapter explores the ways that domestic order has been cultivated through the logic of national security by examining the shaping of identity during and through the rise of the national security state. The central argument is that security and identity are inextricably linked, not in the obvious existential or ontological ways discussed by sociologists and psychoanalysts, but in a far more political way: that the fabrication of national security goes hand in hand with the fabrication of national identity, and vice versa. Thus as well as being a form of political discourse centred on the state, as we have seen in previous chapters, the ideology of security also serves as a form of identity-construction, a construction which in turn reinforces the security measures enacted in its name. To develop this argument, and build on some of the insights from work in this field, I return to some of the formative texts and practices during the rise of the national security state to tease out the mutually constitutive relationship between a particular national identity and the claims of national security. To capture this mutual constitution I draw on the idea of loyalty as a key political technology for simultaneously gauging identity and reaffirming security. The hope – which I will keep at arms length – is that tracing the historical emergence of this security-identity-loyalty complex might shed some light on current political practices in the ‘war on terror’.

**The attempt to make peace through security results in more nuclear insecurities**

Sandy & Perkins 01 Leo R., co-founder of Peace Studies at Plymouth State College and Ray, teacher of philosophy at Plymouth State College, The Nature of Peace and Its Implications for Peace Education Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolutions, 4.2

In its most myopic and limited definition, peace is the mere absence of war. O'Kane (1992) sees this definition as a "vacuous, passive, simplistic, and unresponsive escape mechanism too often resorted to in the past - without success." This definition also commits a serious oversight: it ignores the residual feelings of mistrust and suspicion that the winners and losers of a war harbor toward each other. The subsequent suppression of mutual hostile feelings is not taken into account by those who define peace so simply. Their stance is that as long as people are not actively engaged in overt, mutual, violent, physical, and destructive activity, then peace exists. This, of course, is just another way of defining cold war. In other words, this simplistic definition is too broad because it allows us to attribute the term "peace" to states of affairs that are not truly peaceful (Copi and Cohen, p. 194). Unfortunately, this definition of peace appears to be the prevailing one in the world. It is the kind of peace maintained by a "peace through strength" posture that has led to the arms race, stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and the ultimate threat of mutually assured destruction. This version of peace was defended by the "peacekeeper" - a name that actually adorns some U.S. nuclear weapons deployed since 1986.

Also, versions of this name appear on entrances to some military bases. Keeping "peace" in this manner evokes the theme in Peggy Lee's old song, "Is That All There is?" What this really comes down to is the idea of massive and indiscriminate killing for peace, which represents a morally dubious notion if not a fault of logic. The point here is that a "peace" that depends upon the threat and intention to kill vast numbers of human beings is hardly a stable or justifiable peace worthy of the name. Those in charge of waging war know that killing is a questionable activity. Otherwise, they would not use such euphemisms as "collateral damage" and "smart bombs" to obfuscate it.

**The 1AC secures the self while constructing elements of otherness. We secures ourselves in order to control others.**

**Campbell 98**, professor of international politics and the University of Newcastle,(Campbell, Professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle, 1998 [David, Writing Security, p. 47-48])

To talk of the endangered nature of the modern world and the enemies and threats that abound in it is thus not to offer a simple ethnographic description of our condition; it is to invoke a discourse of danger through which the incipient ambiguity of our world can be grounded in accordance with the insistences of identity. Danger (death, in its ultimate form) might therefore be thought of as the new god for the modern world of states, not because it is peculiar to our time, but because it replicates the logic of Christendom's evangelism of fear. Indeed, in a world in which state identity is secured through discourses of danger, some low tactics are employed to serve these high ideals. These tactics are not inherent to the logic of identity, which only requires the definition of difference. But securing an ordered self and an ordered world—particularly when the field upon which this process operates is as extensive as a state—involves defining elements that stand in the way of order as forms of "otherness."50 Such obstructions to order "become dirt, matter out of place, irrationality, abnormality, waste, sickness, perversity, incapacity, disorder, madness, unfreedom. They become material in need of rationalization, normalization, moralization, correction, punishment, discipline, disposal, realization, etc."51 In this way, the state project of security replicates the church project of salvation. The state grounds its legitimacy by offering the promise of security to its citizens who, it says, would otherwise face manifold dangers. The church justifies its role by guaranteeing salvation to its followers who, it says, would otherwise be destined to an unredeemed death. Both the state and the church require considerable effort to maintain order within and around themselves, and thereby engage in an evangelism of fear to ward off internal and external threats, succumbing in the process to the temptation to treat difference as otherness. In contrast to the statist discourse of international relations, this understanding proffers an entirely different orientation to the question of foreign policy. In addition to the historical discussion above, which suggested that it was possible to argue that the state was not prior to the interstate system, this interpretation means that instead of regarding foreign policy as the external view and rationalist orientation of a preestablished state, the identity of which is secure before it enters into relations with others, we can consider foreign policy as an integral part of the discourses of danger that serve to discipline the state. The state, and the identity of "man" located in the state, can therefore be regarded as the effects of discourses of danger that more often than not employ strategies of otherness. Foreign policy thus needs to be understood as giving rise to a boundary rather than acting as a bridge. (47-48)

# Link – Surveillance

Surveillance transforms space into a geostrategic arena to be weaponized and securitized against

Felicity **Mellor 7**, Lecturer in Science Communication at Imperial College London, Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space, Social Studies of Science 37: 499, http://sss.sagepub.com/content/37/4/499.full.pdf

In contrast to traditional astronomical systems, which passively watched the skies, asteroid detection systems were to be surveillance systems that actively hunted the skies for objects of human import. The Spaceguard Survey was predicated on a will to action in a way in which the earlier Spacewatch Survey was not. Similarly, when it fired its impactor at Comet Tempel 1, NASA’s Deep Impact mission took a far more active intervention in space than did earlier generations of probes. This was not far from Edward Teller’s call for ‘experimentation’ with near-Earth objects to test defence technologies (Tedeschi & Teller, 1994; Teller, 1995), an idea dismissed at the time as extreme by some civilian scientists (Chapman, 1998). Likewise, one of the recommendations of the 2004 Planetary Defense Conference was that deflection techniques should be demonstrated on an actual asteroid (Ailor, 2004: 5).28 The technologization of space promoted in both the fictional works and the scientists’ technical proposals, also formed an integral part of the imagery and rhetoric that surrounded SDI, as its detractors highlighted when they re-named the project Star Wars. SDI was always premised on a vision of space as a technologized theatre of war. In the hands of a technoenthusiast such as Edward Teller, SDI was configured as a space-based technological extravaganza with few limits.29 In SDI, as in asteroid research and science fiction, space became a dynamic arena through which our technologies would move, in which our weapons would be placed, and across which our wars were to be waged.30 As discussed in the introduction to this paper, narrative is an inherently teleological form. In conventional narratives, the action is moved towards closure by the heroes of the story. In the impact narratives, the heroes are technological heroes set the task of saving the world. By drawing on these narratives and following the call for human agency inherent in the narrative structure, the scientists implicitly accepted this role as a necessary one. Having shifted apocalypse from the realm of nuclear politics to that of natural science, the impact-threat scientists were able to position themselves as heroes whose combined far-sightedness and technological know-how would save us all. Emphasizing the role of the unacknowledged hero in a foreword to a volume of conference proceedings, astronomer Tom Gehrels (2002: xiii) claimed: ‘There is a beauty also in hazards, because we are taking care of them. We are working to safeguard our planet, even if the world does not seem to want to be saved.’ In a paper in another volume of conference proceedings, astrophysicist Eugene Levy was even more explicit about the scientists’ expanded role: In the arms race, the motivating dynamic was a political one. A dynamic in which scientists and engineers provided the technical tools, but, as a group, brought no special and unique wisdom to the table in making judgements about what to do. In the present case, the dynamic is different. The adversary is not another nation; the calculus is not one of political fears, anxieties, and motivations, for which we scientists have no special expertise. Rather the ‘adversary’ is the physical world. In assessing this adversary, we scientists have special and unique expertise. (Levy, 1994: 7; italics in original) Eclipsing the political dimension of the impact threat with their appeals to the natural, the scientists appropriated for themselves a heroic role. This technological hero was a moral hero – he would warn us of the danger and save us despite ourselves. Thus the scientists frequently quoted Representative George Brown’s opening statement to a Congressional hearing when he warned that if we were to do nothing about the impact threat, it would be ‘the greatest abdication in all of human history not to use our gift of rational intellect and conscience to shepherd our own survival and that of all life on Earth’.31 Through such claims, the issue of planetary defence became a moral frame through which other threats of more human origin could also be addressed. Increased knowledge and surveillance of asteroids, the scientists insisted, would help stop mistakes by the military decision-makers by preventing the misidentification of asteroid airbursts as enemy nuclear warheads (Chapman & Morrison, 1994: 39). At the same time, destroying asteroids would provide us with a way of using up those unwanted bombs. As John Lewis (1997: 215) put it: ‘The net result of the asteroid deflection is really a twofold benefit to Earth: a devastating impact would be avoided and there would be one less nuclear warhead on Earth.’ Similarly, Duncan Steel saw the use of SDI technologies in asteroid missions such as Clementine II as ‘a prime example of beating swords into ploughshares’ (quoted in Matthews, 1997). Furthermore, the international tensions that led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the first place, would also be resolved by uniting against the common enemy of the asteroid. Thus Carl Sagan and Steve Ostro, although largely critical of the promotion of the impact threat, suggested that: In an indirect way the threat of interplanetary collision may have a political silver lining. They represent a common enemy to all nations and ethnic groups. By posing two different classes of danger to the human species, one natural and the other of our own making, Earth-approaching objects may provide a new and potent motivation for maturing international relations, ultimately helping to unify the human species. (Sagan & Ostro, 1994b: 72; see also Gehrels, 1988: 303) Even for Sagan and Ostro, then, as for the other civilian scientists, the impact threat offered hope of salvation.

# Link – Threat Construction

**By characterizing an object as an enemy, objectivity is destroyed, and violence is justified in the name of “protecting” the public from an evil threat.**

Shapiro 93 (Michael J, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, “That obscure object of violence: Logistic and Desire in the Gulf War” *The political subject of violence* p.126-130)

Within a Lacanian frame, the objects of desire are substitutable signs related to the subject's self-constitution and coherence. They are thus never destined to provide the self with satisfaction. Accordingly, during the recent Gulf War, discursively engendered understandings and desires found distant objects of attention, not only for those involved in combat – however technologically mediated that involvement was – but also for the viewing public, who watched the war on television and experienced the destruction of people and things at another technological level of remove. The highly mediated relationship, in which linguistic, and weapons technologies intervened, rendered the relationship between viewing and fighting subjects complex, for the targets of violence were rarely available to anyone's direct vision and were hardly ever available for direct contact. There was very little actual touching. It was indeed telling when one airforce pilot praised his sighting devices and weapons by remarking of his recently vanquished enemy, 'we could reach out and touch him, but he could not touch us' (a bit of discursive flotsam left over from AT&T's advertisement) one service remote touching of 'someone' was involved. In most senses, then, the objects of violence in the Gulf War were obscure and remote, both in that they were removed from sight and other human senses and that they emerged as appropriate targets through a tortuous signifying chain. More generally, they were remote in terms of the meanings they had for their attackers and the attackers' legitimating and logistical supporters. To place the implications for how hostile actions can be understood in such a peculiar, modern condition, it is appropriate to turn to Luis Bunuel's film Cet Obscur Objet du Desir (This/That Obscure Object of Desire), which contains not only a structure and dynamic that fits the array of subjects acting, in as well as following, the story of the Gulf War but also is implicitly structured within a Lacanian frame that fits the approach to interpreting the Gulf War to follow. This/that obscure object of desire At the level of its primary narration, Bunuel's film is the story of a failed seduction, told in flashbacks by the middle-aged Mathieu Fabert to his (accidental?) travelling companions, sharing a compartment in a train to Paris. At a more abstract level, the film is governed by a Lacanian view of the opacity or deeply encoded non-comportment between desire and its objects. Ambiguities abound from the outset, not the least of which is the absence of a designation in the title that a woman is the object in question, which adds to the this/that (close or remote) ambiguity of the Cet in the French title. Moreover, as is shown (but necessarily evident to all viewers of the film) Conchita, whom Fabert names as the object of his amorous quest, is two different women (she is represented by two different actresses), and this is seemingly never apparent to Fabert or his listeners in the train compartment. Apart from the various mediations between the various desiring subjects and objects in the film, however (Fabert's audience in his train compartment are straining with attention to the narrative), as viewers, we also have desires, and they remain unconsummated as the narrative and images frustrate our attempt to attain completion, to grasp a coherent episode unless we work to help make it coherent. Despite the seeming confidence with which Fabert delivers his story, what one sees, especially the dualistic Conchita and other enigmatic images and events, deprive us of confidence that we have a story we can understand. Ultimately, the imposition of meaning (by the viewers among others) on the ambiguous and arbitrary aspects of Fabert's story are organised within the frame of a Lacanian view of the functioning of desire. Bunuel leaves many hints that Lacan hovers in the background, and most significant for thepurposes at hand, the lessons of the film transfer to the US actions in the Gulf for it developed narrative of the derealisation of the targets of violence developed above. Because Lacanian desire operates through a series of substitutions, there is a compatibility between the functioning of desire and logistical abstraction as they work together to locate targets of violence in modern warfare, despite how recalcitrant those targets may actually be to the meaning frames that direct the enemy-perceiving gaze. The operation of desire in a war works on the basis of a different process from that of an individual's search for erotic completion. It is connected to a national-level rather than individual-level work on the production of a coherent self. As has already been suggested in the analysis of Clausewitz's duplicitous discourse, what is represented as a quest for accomplishing political and military objectives obfuscates a more fundamental, ontological quest, the attempt for the national subject at completion through the display of courage and the lack of inhibition against using force in a violent confrontation with an enemy. For a deeper appreciation of how desire complements the historically emerging, logistical narrative in which the enemy/object has been derealised, it is necessary to recognise that within the Lacanian view, desire is formed at the time when the subject first enters the realm of the symbolic. Residing as an infant in the domain of the imaginary, where there is no recognition of oneself as separate from others, the subject's entry into the symbolic is a dual alienation. First, it is a separation from the maternal source of satisfaction and, second, through becoming a named beings withal language, it is a loss of control over meaning and the bonds of affect; it amounts to a subjugation to the law of the signifier. The compensation for this alienation is of course the ability to participate in the domain of the symbolic, but it is also the birth of desire, which, given the unlawfulness of achieving the satisfactions longed for but lost, takes the form of a series of substitutions. It is the always-obscuring acts, based on the ways in which the subject is divided from itself, that impose significance on the objects of desire, and within the Lacanian model, these impositions follow the twists and turns of linguistic, figural mechanisms. More specifically, Lacan notes in one place, 'desire is metonymy, however funny people may find the idea'.' The metonymical structure of desire is displayed unambiguously in Bunuel's film when Conchita gets in bed with Fabert in a chastity-protecting undergarment tied tightly with little knots that he cannot undo. As he weeps in frustration, she names the various parts of her that he already possesses and expresses puzzlement that he is so resolute in his quest for the one part denied him. During the Gulf War, President Bush and many television commentators seemed caught in a similar signifying structure. What eluded final consummation in their case was not someone's maidenhead. It was Saddam Hussein's destruction. All the parts associated with him were possessed. Kuwait was freed, his army was routed, his 'weapons of mass destruction' largely eliminated. But as long as Saddam remained the ruling leader of Iraq, the 'victory in the desert' seemed empty. The narrative was left uncompleted. But perhaps 'Saddam Hussein' (the 'Hitler', the 'Arab fanatic', the 'ruthless dictator') needs to survive. Without him, there would remain no arch-enemy. Without Saddam Hussein, perhaps the US would not be .able to justify remaining so armed and alert. Indeed, this is precisely what Fabert says in response to his cousin, the arbiter/judge who asks why he doesn't just marry Conchita. Fabert says, Si je'epousais, je serais desarme.' (If Saddam had been destroyed or removed, no sense of fulfilment would have lasted because the conditions of possibility for producing desire would re-emerge. For example, of late in the United States there is a national debate over towards whom the reduced nuclear weapons arsenal ought to be aimed. National desire is searching for new dangerous objects).At this moment, at least, Fabert seems to understand much of what is driving his narrative, but there is also much evidence that the more fundamental part, remains obscure, for his story continually turns the incredible - e.g. encountering Conchita almost everywhere - into the credible. This is because the object of desire for Fabert (Mathieu for one Conchita and Mateo for another), like the enemy/object of violence for the United States, is in part a product of a damaged subjectivity in search of reestablishing a coherence as an effective and virile male entity. In the case of the United States, the damaged collective subjectivity (often called the 'Vietnam syndrome') is a result of a lost and muddled war in the recent past**.** In the case of Fabert his manly subjectivity is similarly uncertain. First, his wife of many years is recently deceased and he has had no substitute prior to his pursuit of Conchita. Second, he is a law-abiding, obviously well-established and well-off citizen and, in his pursuit of Conchita uses his spending power rather than his male strength (until the very end when driven to the limit with frustration). Meanwhile, all around him, he witnesses a series of acts of violence, car bombings, political assassinations, etc., apparently carried out by terrorist groups. At one point we overhear a radio report claiming that the bombings, which are randomly dispersed in his narrative, are attributed to coalitions of political groups that form the acronyms, PRIQUE and RUT.The virile young terrorists, with which one version of Conchita seems to be associated, serve as an affront to Fabert, who cannnot show his potence (cannot use his prick). Similarly, the collective subjectivity of the US prior to the Gulf War (the Vietnam syndrome) and its leader's potence (the 'wimp factor') had been affronted by the violence of others not restricted by law-abiding inhibitions. Hence the increasingly frenzied complaints from the White House against terrorists (similar complaints issue from Fabert about the terrorist acts around him). Thus the comparison—two levels of incomplete and increasingly provoked subjectivity in need of an episode of completion.But perhaps, major similarity that suggests the Gulf War is the similarity in the dynamics governing the meanings of the objects of attention. In Fabert's narrative, Conchita appears as both lack (as an elusive object ofdesire) and excess (she appears everywhere Fabert goes). At one point, Fabert's servant likens women to a sac d'excrement. Rather than simply a sexist disparagement, this can be read as reference to the object of desire's excess, of all that is imposed on it by a restless, driven subjectivity. Conchita flees Fabert's employ as a servant after his initial advances, and then he encounters her as a restaurant coatcheck person, as part of a youthful gang in Switzerland, as a flamenco dancer in Seville. She is excessive, inexplicably appearing everywhere. With each encounter, she seems to promise herself to Fabert and then does something extraordinary to frustrate him. Similarly, as the Gulf War progressed, Saddam's resistance capability was easily overcome, but the superiority in the air and the decisive land battle left Saddam where he was, a defiant leader of an Iraqi nation that was badly bruised but had never been completely possessed, never made to totally capitulate. What substitutes for a final and telling violence in the Gulf War, is a fitful and ambiguous attempt to force the object, Saddam, to comply with the law (the United Nations resolution). Within a Lacanian frame and, accordingly, in Bunuel's film, the relationship between the law and desire is complex. The law cannot still the operation of desire in the direction of seeking consummation may -even provoke it. In a telling episode, Fabert attempts to use the law, his cousin the judge, to send the object of desire away. His cousin uses his influence to have the police exile Conchita and her mother, sending them back to Spain. As the decree is read, we learn that Conchita is a name related to her official/legal name which is Concepcion, and that her mother's name is Encarnacion, deepening our suspicion that their existence and significance is largely a function of the work of the subject, Fabert, and his desire-driven imagination. Fabert decides to take an arbitrary trip to forget his frustration, but after he chooses Singapore by pointing to a map while blindfolded, he ends up travelling to Seville, where Conchita is. The arbitrary is always controlled at some level by desire. It is not wholly clear what the signifying elements are that turn Singapore (etymologically, 'Lion city') into Seville (etymologically, merely 'city'). Perhaps it is that the lion represents virility and reminds Fabert of his quest to consummate it. What energes most significantly is the need for a woman to complete the self for Fabert (in the way that the US needed an enemy and Bush needed to get tough for self-completion), and here again the law does not quiet desire; it seems only to inflame it. Moreover, the love or violent object is arbitrary inasmuch as it does not summon on the basis of what is intrinsic to it. It acquires its force from the signifying practices that erupt out of a subjectivity pursuing it, a subjectivity that lacks a reflective rapport with itself.

# Link- Technology

Framing is key – narratives of technological salvation necessitate militarization

Felicity **Mellor 7**, Lecturer in Science Communication at Imperial College London, Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space, Social Studies of Science 37: 499, http://sss.sagepub.com/content/37/4/499.full.pdf

Over the past 20 years a small group of astronomers and planetary scientists has actively promoted the idea that an asteroid might collide with the Earth and destroy civilization. Despite concerns about placing weapons in space, the asteroid scientists repeatedly met with scientists from the Strategic Defense Initiative to discuss mitigation technologies. This paper examines the narrative context in which asteroids were constructed as a threat and astronomy was reconfigured as an interventionist science. I argue that conceptualizing asteroids through narratives of technological salvation invoked a ‘narrative imperative’ that drew the astronomers towards the militaristic endings that their stories demanded. Impact-threat science thus demonstrates both the ways in which scientific research can be framed by fictional narratives and the ideological ends that such narratives can serve.

# Link – Fear

Constant fear for the purpose of security embeds the ideology of security in paranoia

(Mark Neocleous, 08, “Critique of Security”, Brunel University in the Department of Government)

It is this project of total war, total security and permanent Emergency that requires the constant reiteration of the existence of fear and danger. Key figures in the national security state such as Nitze and Acheson came to use the various drafts of NSC documents, and especially NSC-68, to simultaneously promote more aggressive foreign policies and to frighten Americans into supporting those policies By 1949 one Cold Warrior could openly employ a Kierke- gaurdian frame and state that the ’reign of insecurity’ means that ’anxiety is the official emotion of our time’.“ This anxiety permeated all the way through the national security state in the early Cold War and after. From panic over the Soviet Union to concern over the ’l0ss’ of China all the way down to ’the posture of the world’s most powerful state in the 1980s, a sumo wrestler, as it were, perched on a chair at the sight of a socialist Nicaraguan mouse appearing "on its doorstep" (which is to say, approximately the distance which separates London from Albania)’," the national security state has constantly exhibited one insecurity fear or anxiety after another, turning the entire social symbolic system surrounding national security into the alter image of a collectively anticipated spectacle of disaster." In peddling the fear of disintegration and crisis, the ideology of security is the paranoid style in politics writ large. Writing about this paranoid style, both Richard Hofstadter and E. H. Gombrich have noted that unlike the clinically paranoid person who sees the hostile and conspiratorial world in which he is living as directed against him, the spokespersons of the paranoid style find it directed against a nation, a culture, a way of life. In its most abstract mode this style involves the constant scanning of the social and political environment for signs confirming the wicked threat, and involves imaginative leaps conjuring up a vast and sinister conspiracy, a huge and hidden machinery of influence set in motion to undermine and destroy a way of life. The style also tends to be convinced that the nation is infused with a terror network of enemy agents taking over the institutions of civil society in a concerted effort to paralyse the resistance of loyal citizens.” If we see in paranoia a type of investment of a social formation, as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari suggest, then one can read a politics structured around security as deeply paranoid."° I have shown elsewhere how this style also operates with the metaphor of disease, with the health of the body politic supposedly being mined by the ’disease’ of communism; 'world communism is like a malignant parasite', says Kennan, ’which feeds only on diseased tissue' while the Soviet Union ’bear[s] within itself germs of creeping disease’.“ We might add here that such disease is also a form of dis-ease — a profound insecurity about the state, its mode of accumulation, and its place in world order. The ideology of national security is in this sense both hypochondriac and paranoid.

The affirmative engages in fear mongering discourse to obtain state control

Altheide and Michalowski 99 (David L., Professor of Justice and Social Inquiry @ ASU, R. Sam, graduate student of Sociology @ City University of New York, “Fear in the News: Discourse of Control”)

The prevalence of fear in public discourse can contribute to stances and reactive social policies that promote state control and surveillance. Fear is a key element of creating "the risk society," organized around communication oriented to policing, control, and prevention of risks (Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Staples 1997). A constitutive feature of this emerging order is a blanket reminder of fear. "Fear ends up proving itself, as new risk communication and management systems proliferate" (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, p. 6). While fear is commonly associated with crime, we suggest that fear provides a discursive framework of expectation and meaning within which crime and related "problems" are expressed. Media practices and major news sources (e.g., law enforcement agencies) have cooperatively produced an organizational "machine," fueled by entertainment and selective use of news sources, that simultaneously connects people to their effective environments even as it generates entertainment-oriented profits (Altheide 1997). As one law enforcement official stated about Arizona's televised "crimes toppers" dramatizations, "If you can have a little entertainment and get your man, too, that's great."T his discourse resonates through public information and is becoming a part of what a mass society holds in common: We increasingly share understandings about what to fear and how to avoid it. The consequences are felt in numerous ways but particularly in accelerated negative perceptions about public order (e.g., the streets are not safe, strangers are dangerous, the state must provide more control and surveillance). In commenting on everyday life features of mass society, Stanford M. Lyman (1997, p. 294) observes, "Such a fearful disunity undermines the general conditions of trust and order, encouraging intrigues, deceptions and interactions that are strategic rather than spontaneous."

Dangers are created entirely by sociopolitical practices in defining threats.

**Huysmans and Tsoukala 8** (Jef, Anastassia, Open University, UK, University of Paris, France, *Alternatives* 33, p. 133)

Underlying these analyses is a widely defined social-constructivist approach in security studies. The claim is that insecurities are politically and technologically constructed, hence dependent on the political, social, and economic contexts in which they are contested. The political significance and effects of violence depend on the logics, stakes, and methods of securitizing, rather than the act of violence itself. Therefore, the meaning of insecurity and danger is always a question rather than a given. This special issue begins with two contributions that address the evolving interactions between counterterrorism policies and the control of alleged security-threatening groups. These articles demonstrate how insecurity is, to a considerable degree, the product of sociopolitical processes. Processes of defining the threat, and the subsequent targeting of certain social groups according to risk- focused criteria and technologies, cannot be understood without considering the stakes involved in the functioning of domestic political and security fields. The question of identity that lies at the heart of these interactions is raised in both discursive and nondis- cursive ways. For example, identity is considered both the object of a discursive construction of sameness and otherness in contempo- rary Western societies, and as the legitimizing basis for the imple- mentation of an increasing control apparatus that covers delin- quent, deviant, and even ordinary behavior.

THEIR AUTHOR’S PREDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL THREATS ARE ROOTED IN THE FEAR OF THE UNKNOWN AND TRYING TO CREATE A “SECURE” WORLD

**Lipschutz 95** [Ronnie Lipschutz is a professor of politics at UC Santa Cruz. “On Security” Chapter 8, Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium’s End. (p. ???)]

What then, is the form and content of this speech act? The *logic* of security implies that one political actor must be protected from the depredations of another political actor. In international relations, these actors are territorially defined, mutually exclusive and nominally sovereign states. A state is assumed to be politically cohesive, to monopolize the use of violence within the defined jurisdiction, to be able to protect itself from other states, and to be potentially hostile to other states. Self-protection may, under certain circumstances, extend to the suppression of domestic actors, if it can be proved that such actors are acting in a manner hostile to the state on behalf of another state (or political entity). Overall, however, the logic of security is exclusionist: It proposes to exclude developments deemed threatening to the continued existence of that state and, in doing so, draws boundaries to discipline the behavior of those within and to differentiate within from without. The right to define such developments and draw such boundaries is, generally speaking, the prerogative of certain state representatives, as Wæver points out.[3](#note3) Of course, security, the speech act, does draw on material conditions "out there." In particular, the logic of security assumes that state actors possess "capabilities," and the purposes of such capabilities are interpreted as part of the speech act itself. These interpretations are based on indicators that can be observed and measured--for example, numbers of tanks in the field, missiles in silos, men under arms. It is a given within the logic--the speech act--of security that these capabilities exist to be used in a threatening fashion--either for deterrent or offensive purposes--and that such threats can be deduced, albeit incompletely, without reference to intentions or, for that matter, the domestic contexts within which such capabilities have been developed. Defense analysts within the state that is trying to interpret the meanings of the other state's capabilities consequently formulate a range of possible scenarios of employment, utilizing the most threatening or damaging one as the basis for devising a response. Most pointedly, they do not assume either that the capabilities will *not* be used or that they might have come into being for reasons other than projecting the imagined threats. Threats, in this context, thus become what *might* be done, not, given the "fog of war," what *could*  or *would*  be done, or the fog of bureaucracy, what might *not*  be done. What we have here, in other words, is "worst case" interpretation. The "speech act" security thus usually generates a proportionate *response* , in which the imagined threat is used to manufacture real weapons and deploy real troops in arrays intended to convey certain imagined scenarios in the mind of the other state. Intersubjectivity, in this case, causes states to read in others, and to respond to, their worst fears.

# Link – Death

The affirmatives anxiety towards death is only intelligible from a position of ontological anxiety. Their impact scenarios prevent an authentic relationship to death which makes the fear their 1ac inspires inevitable

**Park 01**. James Park, University of Minnesota and activist in Unitarian Church, 2K1Our existential predicament; loneliness, depression, anxiety & death pg. 183-184

**The 'fear of death' is a composite experience encompassing**: (1) **the abstract**, objective, external, empirical **fact of** **biological death;**(2) **our personal**, subjective, emotional **fear of ceasing-to-be**, **which arises from our awareness of our own finitude;** & (3) **our own most ontological anxiety**, our Existential Predicament **disguised as the fear of ceasing-to-be**. **This least understood and most repressed existential dimension of death** (which has also been called "being-towards-death" and "the anxiety of nonbeing"), will be the focus of this phenomenological investigation. **Whenever "death" is mentioned**, **we think first of biological death, but this tendency to focus exclusively on the objective, terminal fact of dying might well be a trick of thought designed to protect us from noticing our fear of ceasing-to-be or our even deeper ontological anxiety**. We have other protective techniques as well: religious illusions, philosophical desensitization, & diversionary small-talk. Most of **these distracting ploys amount to seeing death exclusively as an objective event**, **which befalls all plants, animals, & people** eventually. **All such attempts to picture and talk about death as a fact are** (at least in part) **attempts to evade the two deeper dimensions of death by interpreting death only from the point of view of a spectator**. Even our scholarly symposia about death often provide only an objective understanding of death. **Such approaches keep death outside of ourselves -a phenomenon we know about only as observers, never as participants**. **Here,** however, **we will push in the opposite direction**: First, we will attempt **to get beyond the objective fact of death** **to our** deeper, **subjective response to finitude-our fear of ceasing-to-be**. **And,** not being satisfied with that dimension, **we will seek to probe even deeper behind our fear of ceasing-to-be to uncover our repressed ontological anxiety -the threatening inner state-of-being that possesses us continuously from the time we become aware of ourselves but which has very little connection with the fact of death**. It will be relatively easy to move beyond the objective, public, external, spectator's vision of death as a once-in-a-life-time event-in fact, the end-event of life to feeling subjectively our deep fear of ceasing-to-be. But it will be more difficult to separate the deeper dimensions of death: our terrifying fear of ceasing-to-be and our underlying ontological anxiety. If we probe even below our personal fear of ceasing-to-be-in-the-world, we might discover the cause of much of our evasive talk and deceptive posturing; we might pull the covers off our trembling, naked ontological anxiety. If we find ways to look deeply into ourselves, exposing even our most clever tricks of thought, then not only will we begin truly to fear our own deaths, but we might even confront our underlying ontological anxiety. This ontological anxiety is obscurely felt by all of us as a subjective awareness drifting up from our inner depths, a pervasive haunting of our whole being, which we are reluctant to confront because we have no easy way to handle it. This continuous inner state-of-being is not the result of the fact of dying; it is not worry arising from the inevitability of actual death. Rather, **our ontological anxiety is the deepest truth of our existence, obviously deeper than the external, objective, empirical fact of biological death, but even deeper than our inward, subjective, personal fear of ceasing-to-be.** **Our ontological anxiety does not arise from the fact of death, but much of our concern about death arises from our ontological anxiety**! (This paradoxical statement should become clear in the next 70 pages.) If our ontological anxiety truly grips us, **we can go either of two possible ways:** (1) **We can organize our lives around this all-pervasive 'threat', courageously embracing our ontological anxiety,** moving ourselves toward "Authentic Existence". **Or** (2) **we can be freed from our ontological anxiety after having fully acknowledged it (and attained some Authenticity), thereby coming into the new inner state-of-being "Existential Freedom".**

# Link – Discovery

**The affirmative’s proposals of discovery are entrenched in securitizing ideals which perpetuate the idea that only with new discoveries and new lands can people of a single nation be protected**

**Mancall 98**( [Peter C.](http://muse.jhu.edu/search/results?action=search&searchtype=author&section1=author&search1=%22Mancall,%20Peter%20C.%22) Professor of History and Anthropology at USC, and the Director of the USC-Huntington Early Modern Studies Institute. The Age of Discovery. Project Muse. [Reviews in American History, Volume 26, Number 1, March 1998](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/reviews_in_american_history/toc/rah26.1.html), pp. 26-53. Accessed 6/25/11. EL)

The notion of discovery as an expansion of intellectual and cultural horizons constitutes one of the most important contributions of modern historians to our understanding of the long sixteenth century. Of equal importance is the growing recognition that there was no single act of discovery. Instead, as the historian James Axtell has pointed out, this was an "age of mutual discovery." [47](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/reviews_in_american_history/v026/26.1mancall.html#FOOT47) Columbus's landfall marked a decisive moment, to be sure, but it was one of many encounters that took place when Europeans landed in America and, to a lesser extent, when Native Americans arrived, as a few did in the sixteenth century, in Europe. To speak of "discovery" as a single act is to miss the point; each group involved in the encounter--each European nation, each American nation--drew its own conclusions about the nature of the other. The Mayans' experience of the encounter was very different from the experience of the Aztecs or the Incas. [48](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/reviews_in_american_history/v026/26.1mancall.html#FOOT48) When the Spanish moved into North America, their experiences in northern New Spain differed from Florida to the territory they named "New Mexico." [49](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/reviews_in_american_history/v026/26.1mancall.html#FOOT49) When the Dutch, the Swedes, the Finns, and the English joined the French and the Spanish in North America, each tried to understand Indians from their own perspective; each native group they encountered from the Iroquois and Hurons in the north to the Choctaws and Cherokees in the south, did the same thing. [50](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/reviews_in_american_history/v026/26.1mancall.html#FOOT50)What is more, the arrival of Europeans in the Americas led to such far-reaching changes that, as the historian James Merrell put it succinctly, the Indians too inhabited a "new world": new societies formed in North America in response to the forces unleashed after 1492. [51](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/reviews_in_american_history/v026/26.1mancall.html#FOOT51) Overall patterns emerge in the literature, to be sure, but the diversity of responses reveals the persistence of local distinctions. The same point could be made about individuals; a spate of recent biographies suggest, when taken together, that the encounter held very different meanings for the people involved. [52](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/reviews_in_american_history/v026/26.1mancall.html#FOOT52) Some of those individual Europeans involved in the encounter had a desire to do more than learn about the Western Hemisphere: they wanted to possess it. They thus collected American artifacts, and occasionally native peoples as well, as Columbus and some of his followers did. Literary critics, anthropologists, historians, and museum curators have recently argued that this lust for possession bordered on the fetishistic, a yearning to own and display anything that could reveal a direct, tangible connection to the Americas. The possessor of an artifact could revel in the reflected glory heaped upon him or her by those who came to observe the marvellous. When crowds gathered in Spain and Portugal to see Taino men and women whom Columbus had [End Page 33] captured and transported back across the ocean, or when English courtiers traveled to see natives from Newfoundland brought to Europe almost a century later, each individual European man or woman who went to bear witness to the moment had a direct connection to the age of discovery, a tangible link to what the organizers of one quincentennial museum show termed the "new world of wonders."

# Link – Get off the Rock

**The 1AC’s rhetoric about “Getting off the rock” is embedded in the false narratives framed by scientists creating artificial threats under a pretense of protecting humans**

Mellor 7 (Felicity, PhD in theoretical physics from Newcastle University, Colliding worlds: asteroid research and legitimization of war in space, Social Studies of Science, pg. 515-519) DF

The asteroid impact threat was thus articulated within a narrative context that was closely aligned to science fiction and was shared by both civilian scientists and defence experts. As Veronica Hollinger (2000: 216–17) has noted, traditional science fiction is driven by an Aristotelian plot characterized by ‘a valorisation of the logic of cause and effect’. Impact narratives conformed to this traditional narrative logic: asteroids and scientists act by causing a series of events to unfold, from the approach of an asteroid and recognition of the threat through attempts at technological mitigation to resolution in salvation. These narratives configured asteroids as acting agents in human affairs and brought to asteroid science a structure in which human agents (and their technological proxies) solve the problem posed in the narrative and in so doing achieve closure. Allusions to impact narratives implied a direction and human-centredness to events that, once the narratives had been evoked, could not easily be suppressed. Despite their attempts to distance themselves from the weapons scientists, the civilian scientists experienced a ‘narrative imperative’ that drew them towards the same technologized ends as those promoting SDI. A sense of narrative agency was evoked even in texts that were not primarily narratival. Crucially, asteroids were no longer seen as signifiers of the mathematically exacting Newtonian system, distant objects moving through the empty backdrop of space. Rather, they were configured as proximate beasts, acting subjects that could turn against humanity at any moment. Thus in their many popular books on the subject, the scientists described asteroids as belonging to a ‘menagerie’ or a ‘cosmic zoo’ (Steel, 2000a: 120); they were ‘menacing’ (Kring, 2000: 171) and had ‘teeth’ (Clube & Napier, 1990: 154); they were ‘global killers’ (Lewis, 1997: 209) that could unleash ‘ferocious assaults’ (Steel, 1995: 247) on the Earth; they were the ‘enemy’ (Steel, 2000a: 153). Likewise, in their paper in *Nature*, Chapman & Morrison (1994: 33) stated that Earth ‘resides in a swarm of asteroids’. The construction of asteroids as the enemy was accompanied by a range of other militaristic metaphors. In the popular books, asteroids became ‘missiles’, ‘pieces of ordnance’ or ‘stealth weapons’ (Lewis, 1997: 37), which bombard the Earth with a ‘death-dealing fusillade’ (Clube & Napier, 1990: 7). In a technical paper, too, they were construed as ‘astral assailant[s]’ (Simonenko et al., 1994: 929). Where the military and the politicians talked of rogue states,27 the scientists talked of ‘rogue asteroids’ (Steel, 1995; Ailor, 2004: 3). This analogy was further reinforced by the construction of scenarios in which a small impact might be mistaken for the detonation of a nuclear warhead. One technical paper speculated on what would have happened during the first Gulf War if an atmospheric explosion that had been caused by a meteor burning up over the Pacific had actually occurred over Baghdad or Israel (Tagliaferri et al., 1994). The authors suggested that such an event would have been mistaken for a missile detonation by the opposing state. In such scenarios, the actions of interplanetary bodies were not just compared with those of rogue states but came to be identified with them. With the swarming asteroids filling space, space itself was also resignified. What had been an abstract mathematical space became a narrative place, the location where particular and contingent events occurred. Although the scientists continued to appeal to the predictability of celestial dynamics – it was this that would enable a survey of near-Earth objects to identify any that might pose a threat – they also noted that chaotic processes disturbed the orbits of comets and also, to a lesser degree, asteroids (for example, Yeomans & Chodas, 1994; Milani et al., 2000). The inherent unpredictability of the orbits was enhanced by the current state of scientific uncertainty. These chaotic and uncertain processes were projected onto space itself, construed as a place of random violence. In the popular books, the Solar System became a ‘dangerous cosmic neighbourhood’ (Sumners & Allen, 2000b: 3), ‘a capricious, violent place’ (Verschuur, 1996: 217), a place of ‘mindless violence’ (Verschuur, 1996: 18) and ‘wanton destruction’ (Levy, 1998: 13). Even in a peer-reviewed paper, Chapman (2004: 1) described space as a ‘cosmic shooting gallery’. Despite the agency attributed to the asteroids themselves, in the narratives of technological salvation it was the human agents, acting through new technologies, who moved the narratives forward. Narrative progression was thus generated through an assumption of technological progress. Through technology, humans intervene in space and become agents of cosmic events. The scientists’ promotion of the impact threat shared this assumption of technological progress. Like the US Air Force study, their technical papers on mitigation systems considered speculative technologies such as solar sails and mass drivers as well as more established explosive technologies (for example, Ahrens & Harris, 1992; Melosh & Nemchinov, 1993; Ivashkin & Smirnov, 1995; Gritzner & Kahle, 2004). Even those scientists who warned that it was too early to draw up detailed blueprints of interception technologies accepted the narratival implication that there was a problem that needed addressing, that the problem could be addressed by human action, and that this action would involve a technological solution. Technology, in this picture, was configured as inherently progressive. As Morrison & Teller (1994: 1137) put it: ‘The development of technology in the past few centuries has been towards increasing understanding and control of natural forces in an effort to improve human life.’ Those scientists who argued against the immediate development of mitigation technology shared with its proponents a belief in the inexorable progress of technology. Future generations, they argued, would be better equipped than we are at the moment to meet the technological challenge of an impacting asteroid (for example, Ahrens & Harris, 1992). In contrast to traditional astronomical systems, which passively watched the skies, asteroid detection systems were to be surveillance systems that actively hunted the skies for objects of human import. The Spaceguard Survey was predicated on a will to action in a way in which the earlier Spacewatch Survey was not. Similarly, when it fired its impactor at Comet Tempel 1, NASA’s Deep Impact mission took a far more active intervention in space than did earlier generations of probes. This was not far from Edward Teller’s call for ‘experimentation’ with near-Earth objects to test defence technologies (Tedeschi & Teller, 1994; Teller, 1995), an idea dismissed at the time as extreme by some civilian scientists (Chapman, 1998). Likewise, one of the recommendations of the 2004 Planetary Defense Conference was that deflection techniques should be demonstrated on an actual asteroid (Ailor, 2004: 5).28 The technologization of space promoted in both the fictional works and the scientists’ technical proposals, also formed an integral part of the imagery and rhetoric that surrounded SDI, as its detractors highlighted when they re-named the project Star Wars. SDI was always premised on a vision of space as a technologized theatre of war. In the hands of a technoenthusiast such as Edward Teller, SDI was configured as a space-based technological extravaganza with few limits.29 In SDI, as in asteroid research and science fiction, space became a dynamic arena through which our technologies would move, in which our weapons would be placed, and across which our wars were to be waged.30 As discussed in the introduction to this paper, narrative is an inherently teleological form. In conventional narratives, the action is moved towards closure by the heroes of the story. In the impact narratives, the heroes are technological heroes set the task of saving the world. By drawing on these narratives and following the call for human agency inherent in the narrative structure, the scientists implicitly accepted this role as a necessary one. Having shifted apocalypse from the realm of nuclear politics to that of natural science, the impact-threat scientists were able to position themselves as heroes whose combined far-sightedness and technological know-how would save us all. Emphasizing the role of the unacknowledged hero in a foreword to a volume of conference proceedings, astronomer Tom Gehrels (2002: xiii) claimed: ‘There is a beauty also in hazards, because we are taking care of them. We are working to safeguard our planet, even if the world does not seem to want to be saved.’ In a paper in another volume of conference proceedings, astrophysicist Eugene Levy was even more explicit about the scientists’ expanded role: In the arms race, the motivating dynamic was a political one. A dynamic in which scientists and engineers provided the technical tools, but, as a group, brought no special and unique wisdom to the table in making judgements about what to do. In the present case, the dynamic is different. The adversary is not another nation; the calculus is not one of political fears, anxieties, and motivations, for which we scientists have no special expertise. Rather the ‘adversary’ is the physical world. In assessing this adversary, we scientists have special and unique expertise. (Levy, 1994: 7; italics in original) Eclipsing the political dimension of the impact threat with their appeals to the natural, the scientists appropriated for themselves a heroic role. This technological hero was a moral hero – he would warn us of the danger and save us despite ourselves. Thus the scientists frequently quoted Representative George Brown’s opening statement to a Congressional hearing when he warned that if we were to do nothing about the impact threat, it would be ‘the greatest abdication in all of human history not to use our gift of rational intellect and conscience to shepherd our own survival and that of all life on Earth’.31 Through such claims, the issue of planetary defence became a moral frame through which other threats of more human origin could also be addressed. Increased knowledge and surveillance of asteroids, the scientists insisted, would help stop mistakes by the military decision-makers by preventing the misidentification of asteroid airbursts as enemy nuclear warheads (Chapman & Morrison, 1994: 39). At the same time, destroying asteroids would provide us with a way of using up those unwanted bombs. As John Lewis (1997: 215) put it: ‘The net result of the asteroid deflection is really a twofold benefit to Earth: a devastating impact would be avoided and there would be one less nuclear warhead on Earth.’ Similarly, Duncan Steel saw the use of SDI technologies in asteroid missions such as Clementine II as ‘a prime example of beating swords into ploughshares’ (quoted in Matthews, 1997). Furthermore, the international tensions that led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the first place, would also be resolved by uniting against the common enemy of the asteroid. Thus Carl Sagan and Steve Ostro, although largely critical of the promotion of the impact threat, suggested that: In an indirect way the threat of interplanetary collision may have a political silver lining. They represent a common enemy to all nations and ethnic groups. By posing two different classes of danger to the human species, one natural and the other of our own making, Earth-approaching objects may provide a new and potent motivation for maturing international relations, ultimately helping to unify the human species. (Sagan & Ostro, 1994b: 72; see also Gehrels, 1988: 303)

# Link – Space Colonization

**The affirmative posits human exploration and colonization of space as the only way to prevent certain disaster on the planet- this perpetuates securitizing rhetoric.**

Kaplinsky 6 (Joe, writer for Spiked, “Hawking, we have a problem,” <http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/article/404/)DF>

Two aspects of Hawking’s speech are noteworthy. The first is that he, like many other scientists and public figures today, seems capable of putting the case for progress (in this case, space travel) only by flagging up the doom and disaster that will occur if we don’t take that progressive path. So instead of arguing that humans should conquer and colonise space because it is in our nature to explore and because that would enable us to expand and develop, he posits space travel as a way of escaping almost certain disaster on a planet that we have apparently already ruined. Just as UK prime minister Tony Blair puts the case for nuclear power by raising the spectre of manmade global warming, so Hawking and others make the argument for space travel through fearmongering about the future of planet Earth. The second noteworthy thing is how Hawking completed his list of potential catastrophes: apparently we are in peril from ‘other dangers we have not yet thought of’. Well, perhaps – and perhaps not. It’s a bit hard to say much more about dangers that we have not yet thought of. ‘Dangers we have not yet thought of’ are surely the realm, not of science, but of the precautionary principle. It seems that what is animating Hawking’s concerns, and the concerns of so many others these days, is not a scientific analysis but a fear of the unknown. No doubt there are scientific discussions to be had about the problems of global warming, nuclear war and engineered viruses. But science starts with what is known, and works outwards from there. Precaution works in the opposite direction: it starts from the unknown where, by definition, science is helpless. That is what makes precaution an unscientific approach. Unfortunately, the criticism of Hawking’s speech all seems to have come from the wrong direction, chastising him not for being pessimistic, but for not being pessimistic enough. So the cosmologist Alan Guth upbraided Hawking for his lack of realism. Since we don’t have the means to evacuate the earth, said Guth, a giant underground bunker in the Antarctic would be a better bet for escaping disaster on Earth. I guess it all depends on what you mean by ‘realistic’. Another line of criticism came from ‘GrrlScientist’, a blogger on the widely-read website, scienceblogs.com. She attacked Hawking for trying to avoid the consequences of human beings wrecking the Earth, and said we should put forward solutions for repairing our mess: ‘According to Hawking’s scenario, I envision humans as the rats of the universe; filthy, violent, rapacious, travelling from one planet to another just as rats hitchhiked on ships from one oceanic island to another, destroying everything until the last habitable island (planet) within reach has been ruined. Is that the sort of legacy that we, as a species, want to be known for? At least rats did not actively plan out their next conquest, as humans seem to be doing.’ (2) No wonder manned space exploration is out of fashion, when both those, like Hawking, who support space travel and those who oppose it are motivated by the same conviction: that humans have screwed up on Earth. Both sides seem to agree that we have despoiled our planet, and the only real argument is over whether we should stay and patch things up or abandon the Earth and take flight to the moon. In reality, we will only get to a destination like Mars if we are driven by a positive vision and purpose, such as the quest for knowledge. Looking for life on Mars is one such quest. If Mars has life, even bacterial life, which is independent of life forms on Earth, then it will show that life arises easily and is most likely spread across the universe. If life is found that somehow relates to life as we know it on Earth, that will suggest that life can survive the journey through space – and also raise the possibility that life came to Earth from outside. If Mars is found to be barren, it will shorten the odds that the Earth is truly unique. It is people who have a passion for such knowledge who will make a mission to Mars a reality – people who are consumed by the need to know; who are tormented by the limitations of robot explorers; for whom pictures of red rocks are simply not enough. It is those who have new ideas for new experiments on Mars, and who cannot wait years for the next robotic lander to get there, who will make the case for humans venturing there instead. In short, a positive view of humanity might spur us to further explore space, whereas arguments for space travel as a means of saving us from our own self-destructive tendencies are likely to have the unintended consequence of making us less willing to explore and take risks.

# Link – Space Exploration

Space Exploration uses security and survival to justify expansionary policies and weaponization

**School of Sociology 10**, Politics and International Studies**[**"The Growing ‘securitization’ of Outer Space." *Space Policy* 26.4 (2010): 205-08. *Science Direct*. Web. 26 June 2011. AMB]

**The reasoning behind this introduction of securitization theory here into debates on space policy is that the militarization/weaponization debate only partially captures (at best) the multiple ways in which outer space is being linked to security in the space policy discourses of leading states and international organizations – ways that encompass not only ‘traditional’ military security but also the security of economic, environmental, scientific and technical infrastructures.** **As is discussed below, space policy is one of the areas where we have seen a rapid proliferation of ‘securitizing moves’ that identify *space as crucial to national security and survival* in a variety of ways.** Even if some of these moves might be argued to be more successful than others in terms of their actual political effects, **the sheer prevalence of attempted securitization within space policy provides a rationale for revisiting the question of whether militarization/weaponization is a sufficient way of framing the analysis of space policy in relation to security.**

# Link – Asteriods

Not only is the chance of an asteroid strike amazingly small, but the fear of that strike both won’t cause any action and will deepen the rift between ordinary citizens and scientists, thus increasing the threat

Britt 2 (Robert Roy, writer for space.com, ttp://ww.space.com/scienceastronomy/solarsystem/asteroid\_fears\_020326-2.html)

"They're expectation was, well, it's not going to happen in my lifetime," Slovic says. If astronomers were to announce an imminent collision, asteroids would suddenly develop a high Dread Factor, Slovic figures. But because none of us has any direct experience whatsoever with deadly space rocks, "People don't get worked up about it. There's too many things to worry about. Scientists find it similarly difficult to generate much public worry for other potential calamities, like horrible storms, droughts and coastal flooding that might result over the next century due to climate change, but which are seen as remote in time. There is little chance that the complacent attitude of the public, and of some government officials, will ever elevate to the level of concern maintained by asteroid experts. As Slovic says, it's common for scientists and technicians to have a different and more rational understanding of the risks involved in their area of study. Many astronomers, it must be noted, believe present asteroid search efforts are fairly adequate, notwithstanding the lack of a southern telescope. With time, they say, the worst threats will be rooted out, which is to say the largest asteroids. And, they argue, the odds are that if any globally destructive object is found to be on a collision course with Earth, there will probably be years of warning. A more vocal group of astronomers and other proponents of increased spending tend to worry about smaller asteroids that could cause regional devastation. And they tend to make more frightening statements. Here are just a few that have come from the mouths of respected experts just in the past 10 days: "If it were over a populated area, like Atlanta, it would have basically flattened it," asteroid cataloguer Gareth Williams told CNN in discussing the potential of asteroid 2002 EM7. "We live in a cosmic shooting gallery," said Duncan Steel of Salford University. "We're talking about a million megaton explosion," said author and physicist Paul Davies of Macquarie University, in discussing a typical impact on another recent television program. "That's a million city-bursting bombs all going off at once." While such statements are often softened with the reminder that the world probably won't end tonight -- Davies said in the next breath, "I don't want people to lie awake at night worrying about it" -- the effort is clear: Get you and the politicians to act on this threat. Yet in a world remade by a single day of terrorism, fear may be doomed as a sales pitch, just as it was in Australia. Fear is not something that can necessarily be instilled by scientists. Instead, it tends to be generated by whatever rears its ugly head and shouts loudest, explains Robert Butterworth, a psychologist at International Trauma Associates in Los Angeles. Nothing right now, globally speaking, can measure up to the fear of terrorism and the associated potential of a nuclear attack. While there are plenty of things for a 21st Century human to worry about, we all have our limits. "In order for us not to have these things on our minds, we use a device that's been maligned in last few years, which is denial and repression," Butterworth says. "We push it back, because we couldn't function if we didn't." Asteroids, like a fear of bugs or concern over a missed appointment, can be lost in a shuffle of frightening thoughts. Some things just aren't as significant as they seemed last summer. Butterworth puts it this way: "If we had been walking with a limp and all of a sudden were shot in the stomach, the limp fades away." No place has been hit in the stomach like New York City. Psychologist Janice Yamins, whose patients include victims of the terrorist attacks, says residents are stunned by their own change in views, such as newfound support for defense spending "instead of other things that won't help preserve our world." Where fear leaves off, anger and revenge step in. Natural disasters don't generate similar sea changes in philosophy. Californians suffer tremendously from earthquakes every few years. They pick up and move on. Southeast coastal residents rebuild time and again after hurricanes. People there shrug off the threat. Butterworth figures an asteroid impact would generate similar reactions. "What do we do, shake our fist at God?" he asks. "Who can we be angry at?" All this psychology lends support to a notion that has already formed in the heads of many astronomers: Their call for more funding will fall on a whole lot of deaf ears until another asteroid makes real noise. The last serious impact was in 1908, when a rock about the same size as 2002 EM7 exploded above the surface of Siberia. Roughly 1,200 square miles (3,108 square kilometers) of forest were flattened in a remote region known as Tunguska. There were no known deaths, because almost no one lived there. The odds of a similar event, which could easily destroy a large city or a small state with miles of extra destruction to boot, are about 1-in-20 over the next 50 years. In the past decade, about 500 very large space rocks have been found to wander near the space shared by Earth's orbit. These so-called Near Earth Asteroids, all larger than 1 kilometer (0.6 miles), represent about half the expected total. Millions of smaller asteroids are almost entirely uncatalogued. The larger rocks are the ones many scientists fear most. If one hit Earth, civilization would be pushed to the brink and perhaps beyond. Deaths could easily be counted in millions, possibly even billions. Many species of plants and animals would disappear. As more asteroids are discovered and publicized, public awareness of the threat grows. But the information is not always accurate. In a couple of high-profile cases, most prominently four years ago with an asteroid called 1997 XF11, the public was warned of potentially devastating impacts before further calculations showed the newly found rocks to be no threat at all. Worse, late-night radio programs and various web sites spout all sorts of unscientific claims of impending asteroid doom, reports that spread like tsunami radiating outward from an ocean impact. Any reporter who covers the subject has gotten more than a few frantic e-mails from concerned citizens who heard this or that and were worried about the planet-destroyer coming next June, or whenever. Movies like Armageddon only enhance "wild inaccuracies" in some minds, says Taylor of the Probability Research Group. All of this -- the fact, the fiction, the unfounded fears and the genuine threats that some people don't fear at all -- create a gulf of apathy and misunderstanding that may well prevent asteroid experts from convincing you to see the world as they see it.

**The rhetoric used to descried asteroids has lead to the justification of space weapons and allows U.S arms to slide under the arms treaties**

“**Mellor 7** – Research and the Legitimization of War in Space” Felicity +html is a Lecturer in Science Communication at Imperial College London (http://sss.sagepub.com/content/37/4/499.full.pdf, DF)

Even as the scientists themselves attempted to pull back from concrete proposals for weapons systems, their own discourse irresistibly drew them towards the militaristic intervention demanded by the narrative imperative. The identification of asteroids as a threat required a military response. Astronomer Duncan Steel (2000b), writing about the impact threat in The Guardian newspaper, put it most clearly when he stated that ‘we too need to declare war on the heavens’. Just as the overlap between science and science fiction was mutually supportive, so the overlap between impact science and defence helped legitimize both. The civilian scientists could draw on a repertoire of metaphors and concepts already articulated by the defence scientists to help make the case for the threat from space. They would no longer be a marginalized and underfunded group of astronomers, but would take on the ultimate role of defending the world. Similarly, in the context of the impact threat, the defence scientists could further develop their weapons systems without being accused of threatening the delicate nuclear balance of mutually assured destruction or, in the period between the fall of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 attacks, of irresponsibly generating a climate of fear in the absence of an identifiable enemy. The civilian scientists attempted to still their consciences in their dealings with the defence scientists by suggesting that, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of SDI, the latter had lost their traditional role. This argument was naive at best. In fact, as we have seen, the US defence scientists had taken an interest in the impact threat since the early 1980s, from the time that SDI had greatest political support during the defence build-up of the Reagan era. Even at the time of the fractious Interception Workshop, George H.W. Bush was maintaining SDI funding at the same level as it had been during the second Reagan administration. If outwardly the Clinton administration was less supportive when it took office in 1993 and declared that SDI was over, many of those involved in the program me felt that it would actually go on much as before (FitzGerald, 2000: 491). SDI was renamed, and to some extent reconceived, but funding continued and was soon increased when the Republicans gained a majority in Congress.33 After George W. Bush took office in 2001, spending on missile defence research was greatly increased, including programmer to follow on from Brilliant Pebble Thus the defence scientists had shown an interest in the impact threat from the time of the very first meeting onwards, regardless of the state of funding for missile defence, which in any case continued throughout the period. This is not to suggest that the impact threat was not used by the defence scientists as a means of maintaining the weapons establishment. Indeed, the impact threat offered a possible means of circumventing or undermining arms treaties.34 But it does mean that the attempt to access new sources of funding, while being an important factor in the promotion of asteroids as a threat, did not fully explain either the weapons scientists’ interests or the civilian scientists’ repeated meetings with them. The asteroid impact threat offered a scientifically validated enemy onto which could be projected the fears on which a militaristic culture depends. Far from providing a replacement outlet for weapons technologies, the promotion of the asteroid impact threat helped make the idea of war in space more acceptable and helped justify the continued development of space based weaponry. Arguably, with the Clementine and Deep Impact missions, the asteroid impact threat even facilitated the testing of SDI-style systems. The asteroid impact threat legitimized a way of talking, and thinking, that was founded on fear of the unknown and the assumption that advanced technology could usher in a safer era. In so doing, it resonated with the politics of fear and the technologies of permanent war that are now at the center of US defence policy. In this post-Cold War period, scholars of the relation between military and civilian science need to examine carefully claims about ‘ploughshare’ or ‘conversion’ technologies. New technologies arise not just out of funding and policy decisions, but also out of the social imaginaries in which new weapons can be imagined and construed as necessary. Concepts such as ‘dual use’ or ‘cover’ also need to be assessed critically.35 One way of characterizing the Clementine missions would be as dual-use technologies whose scientific aims served as cover for the testing of SDI technologies. Yet this fails to reveal the ways in which these missions were just one concrete output of a more fundamental conceptual alliance between weapons designers and astronomers. In this paper, I have attempted to show that by also considering the narrative context in which such initiatives are located, it is possible to throw some light on the cultural web that binds civilian science to military programmes.

Doomsday asteroids are a cultural production that fit within an apocalyptic ideology of U.S.-as-savior --- justifies imperial expansion and militarization

**Mellor 7** (Felicity, Lecturer in Science Communication – Imperial College (UK), “Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space”, Social Studies of Science, 37(4), August, p. 511)DF

*Narratives of Technological Salvation*

Despite their disagreements over technical details and funding priorities, both civilian and defence **scientists appealed to narratives of technological salvation. In his study of the superweapon in the American imagination,** Bruce **Franklin** (1988) **has shown how a century-long tradition of futurewar fiction shaped an apocalyptic ideology in which American technological genius was to put an end to all war and fulfil America’s manifest destiny**. Franklin argues that **this cultural fantasizing has been materially significant in producing actual superweapons and developing defence policy**. As David Seed (1999) has also shown, **SDI was made imaginable**, and was explicitly defended, **by** science fiction **writers. The impact-threat scientists took this cultural fantasizing a step further as they attempted to establish the reality of that threat. It was now nature**, rather than any human foe, **which was configured as the warring enemy whose technological defeat would bring Earthly harmony. Until the** 19**70s, most science fiction stories about asteroids imagined them as objects to be exploited for their mineral wealth**. Scientists’ writings would occasionally reflect this interest. Indeed, the only paper in the 1979 volume Asteroids to allude to a future impact of an asteroid with Earth was framed in terms of the exploitation of asteroids. In a bizarre paper, which had been rejected for an earlier publication after being judged ‘outrageously innovative’ and ‘premature’, Samuel Herrick (1979) proposed that portions of the asteroid Geographos could be targeted at specific points on the Earth to produce ‘constructive’ effects, such as the excavation of a new Central American canal to join the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

**Precautionary thinking about asteroid threats are the worst manifest of the security paradox that creates an inability to act.**

**Morris 00** [Morris, Julian. *Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle*. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2002. Print. AMB]

**It has been noted that the prospect of asteroid impacts stands at the crux of two factors that are important to people’s risk perceptions. On the one hand, it is very rare, and rare risks tend to be ignored. On the other hand, it is quite dreadful and in some sense unknown. Despite the face that the threat is better understood scientifically than many other threats to nature (Chapman and Morrison, 1194, p. 39), we have no experience of the most serious catastrophic results. That can lead to overestimation of risk (ibid., p. 38). Through their desire to grab the public’s attention, many MEO authors have highlighted the dreadfulness, through construction and promotion of worst-case scenarios, in order to overcome the problem of rarity. But that may prove too much, and promote a perceived need for more aggressive preventive measures than are deemed necessary. So worst-case thinking is applied again via the deflection of dilemma.** When there are plausible but diametrically opposed worst cases, how is one to decide between them? **Within such a framework, quantitative risk assessment and risk/risk analysis lose their discriminatory power, which is just another way of saying that precautionary thinking undermines their very legitimacy.** (For an example of the muddleheadedness that results from this juxtaposition of ration risk assessment procedures with precautionary presumptions, see Chapman’s Congressional testimony.)

The discourse of danger and threats that surround asteroids is a form of self-perpetuating securitization

**Mellor 7**, Lecturer in Science Communication at Imperial College London, Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space, Social Studies of Science 37: 499, http://sss.sagepub.com/content/37/4/499.full.pdf

Even as the scientists themselves attempted to pull back from concrete proposals for weapons systems, their own discourse irresistibly drew them towards the militaristic intervention demanded by the narrative imperative. The identification of asteroids as a threat required a military response. Astronomer Duncan Steel (2000b), writing about the impact threat in The Guardian newspaper, put it most clearly when he stated that ‘we too need to declare war on the heavens’. Just as the overlap between science and science fiction was mutually supportive, so the overlap between impact science and defence helped legitimize both. The civilian scientists could draw on a repertoire of metaphors and concepts already articulated by the defence scientists to help make the case for the threat from space. They would no longer be a marginalized and underfunded group of astronomers, but would take on the ultimate role of defending the world. Similarly, in the context of the impact threat, the defence scientists could further develop their weapons systems without being accused of threatening the delicate nuclear balance of mutually assured destruction or, in the period between the fall of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 attacks, of irresponsibly generating a climate of fear in the absence of an identifiable enemy.

# Link – Satellites

**Surveillance satellites by the power of the United States perpetuate the idea of a “will to know” – this perpetuates the securitizing rhetoric that the USFG uses to justify action**

Virilio 84 (Paul, Professor of philosophy at the European Graduate School, War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception, pg. 1-3) DF

This essay investigates the systematic use of cinema techniques in the conflicts of the twentieth century. It is an approach that has never been adopted before, or hardly ever. Yet the strategic and tactical necessities of cartography were known long ago, and in the line from the emergence of military photography in the American Civil War to today's video surveil­lance of the battlefield, the intensive use of film sequences in aerial recon­naissance was already developing during the First World War. The general staffs had no other means of regularly updating their picture of reality, as artillery constantly turned the terrain upside down and removed the topographical references crucial to the organization of battle. On board an aeroplane, the camera's peep-hole served as an indirect sighting device complementing those attached to the weapons of mass destruction. It thus prefigured a symptomatic shift in target-location and a growing derealization of military engagement. For in industrialized warfare, where the representation of events outstripped the presentation of facts, the image was starting to gain sway over the object, time over space. Soon a conflict of strategic and political interpretation would ensue, with radio and then radar completing the picture. As it laid the ground for a veritable logistics of military perception, in which a supply of images would become the equivalent of an ammunition supply, the 1914-18 war compounded a new 'weapons system' out of combat vehicle and camera — a kind of advanced cinema dolly, one might say. After the Second World War, it became possible to sketch out a strategy of global vision, thanks to spy-satellites, drones and other video-missiles, and above all to the appearance of a new type of headquarters. The central electronic-warfare administration — such as the so-called '3Ci' (control, command, communication, intelligence) in place in each major power — can now attend in real time to the images and data of a planetary conflict. Thus, alongside the army's traditional 'film department' respon­sible for directing propaganda to the civilian population, a military 'images department' has sprung up to take charge of all tactical and stra­tegic representations of warfare for the soldier, the tank or aircraft pilot, and above all the senior officer who engages combat forces. Leaving aside the systematic use of simulators in preparations for land, sea and air missions, we should also mention the radical change in nuclear deterrence itself with the recent East—West disarmament initiatives. The gradual elimination of medium- and short-range 'theatre' weapons, and their replacement by light, 'smart' missiles such as the Midgetman, Stinger or Smart-Gun, are the harbingers of a final shift that will probably lead in turn to the disappearance of these latest weapons too. What will take their place will be directed-beam weapons using laser energy, charged particles or electro-magnetic forces, which will function at the speed of light, after the fashion of the high-resolution cameras aboard military observation satellites. When that stage is reached, probably at the end of the century, the deterrence strategy geared to nuclear weapons will give way to one based upon ubiquitous orbital vision of enemy territory. Rather like in a Western gun-duel, where firepower equilibrium is less important than reflex response, eyeshot will then finally get the better of gunshot. It will be an optical, or electro-optical, confrontation; its likely slogan, 'winning is keeping the target in constant sight'. 'Winning' here means the status quo of a new balance of forces, based not on explosives and delivery systems but on the instant power of sensors, interceptors and remote electronic detectors. As Merleau-Ponty once wrote: 'The problem of knowing who is the subject of the state and war will be of exactly the saint kind as the problem of knowing who is the subject of perception.' However, it is not human observers or military analysts themselves who will have this ubiqui­tous and surgically precise vision: rather, a 'sight machine' aboard an intelligent satellite will automate perception of enemy territory in the finest derail, helping the missile's 'expert system' to reach its decision at the speed of electronic circuitry. With this assumption of cybernetics into the heavens, we seem to have moved far away from military cinematography. Yet the innovation of eyeless vision is directly descended from the history of the line of aim. The act of taking aim is a geometrification of looking, a way of technically aligning ocular perception along an imaginary axis that used to be known in French as the 'faith line' (ligne de jot). Prefiguring the numerical optics of a computer that can recognize shapes, this 'line of aim anticipated the automation of perception — hence the obligatory reference to faith, belief, to denote the ideal alignment of a look which, starting from the eye, passed through the peep-hole and the sights and on to the target object. Significantly, the word 'faith' is no longer used in this context in contem­porary French: the ideal line appears thoroughly objective, and the seman­tic loss involves a new obliviousness to the element of interpretative subjectivity that is always in play in the act of looking. If we tried to write a history of this 'line of force', of this perceptual 'faith', it would have to take account of quite a few vicissitudes, particularly since the invention of photography in the first half of the nineteenth century, followed by cinema, and then by videos, computer graphics and the active optics of the synthetic image. By the seventeenth century the emergence of the astronomical telescope had revolutionized the way in which the world was seen, and this ‘faith line’ had been broken or refracted in the passive optics of Galileo’s lenses. In fact, by upsetting geocentric cosmology, this reverberation of the human look called perceptual faith into question, and ‘remote perception’ anticipated the grave philosophical problems that have recently been posed by ‘electro-optical television’, as a preliminary to a new science of ‘visionics’ concerned with the automated interpretation of reality. Thus, alongside the ‘war machine’, there has always existed an ocular (and later optical and electro-optical) ‘watching machine’ capable of providing soldiers, and particularly commanders, with a visual perspective on the military action under way. From the original watch-tower through the anchored balloon to the reconnaissance aircraft and remote-sensing satellites, one and the same function has been indefinitely repeated, the eye’s function being the function of the weapon. However great the area of the battlefield, it is necessary to have the fastest possible access to pictures of the enemy’s forces and reserves. Seeing and foreseeing therefore tend to merge so closely that the actual can no longer be distinguished from the potential. Military actions take place ‘out of view’, with radio-electrical images substituting in real time for a now failing optical vision.

# Link – Dual Use

**The 1AC operates under the guise that developments in space will be used for the benefit of civilians, however, this securitizing rhetoric later justifies the intervention of the military.**

**Early 10** – Bryan( Sharing Space? Explaining the Proliferation of Civil Space Programs and Capabilities pg. 17-18, DF)

With respect to rocketry technology, the transmission of technology and capabilities appears to work in the opposite direction: states apply their missile-related knowledge and capabilities to the acquisition of civil space capabilities. While the overlap in dual-use technologies means that advancements in civil rocketry technology (e.g., the development of sounding rockets) can easily contribute to ballistic missile programs, many states’ initial motives to become involved in rocketry-related research are military in nature. In the Soviet Union’s case, it had an ongoing military rocketry research program that extended back decades before it decided that it wanted to launch a satellite into orbit. Knowledge from these programs had been applied to the Soviets’ efforts to develop long range ballistic missiles, which in turn became the basis for its space program. According to McDougall (1982: 1014), “Soviet leaders could not have been midwives to an ICBM in ten years but for Russian rocket expertise rooted in the 1920s and the extraordinary budgetary and political force-feeding of research and development dating from 1918.” The space launch vehicle that put Sputnik was a slightly modified version of a ballistic missile (the “R-7 ICBM”) that emerged from the Soviets’ military R&D program (Van Riper 2004: 81). The Soviet Union eventually developed a separate, dedicated line of space launch vehicles, but once again there were significant technological overlap with the rocketry technology used in its ballistic missiles. Thus, the Soviets’ early space launch efforts drew extensively on its accumulated, rocketry-related knowledge and expertise and the resources provided by its pre-existing ballistic missile arsenal. This was true of the first-generation of U.S. and British SLVs as well (DeVorkin 1993; Moltz 2007: Chapter 3). All this suggests that if a country possesses LRBMs and a long-running military rocketry R&D program, a significant portion of the facilities, equipment, technologies, and knowledge can readily be repurposed towards the acquisition of space capabilities. The presence of military rocketry research programs and long-range ballistic missile capabilities thus increase the likelihood that a state will gain space capabilities.

# Link – Soft Power

The benevolence of the United States is another form of imperialism.

Kaplan in 4 (Amy, President of the American Studies Association, American Quarterly, Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today Presidential Address to the American Studies Association, 56(1), p. 4-5)pl

Another dominant narrative about empire today, told by liberal interventionists, is that of the “reluctant imperialist.”10 In this version, the United States never sought an empire and may even be constitutionally unsuited to rule one, but it had the burden thrust upon it by the fall of earlier empires and the failures of modern states, which abuse the human rights of their own people and spawn terrorism. The United States is the only power in the world with the capacity and the moral authority to act as military policeman and economic manager to bring order to the world. Benevolence and self-interest merge in this narrative; backed by unparalleled force, the United States can save the people of the world from their own anarchy, their descent into an uncivilized state. As Robert Kaplan writes—not reluctantly at all—in “Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World”: “The purpose of power is not power itself; it is a fundamentally liberal purpose of sustaining the key characteristics of an orderly world. Those characteristics include basic political stability, the idea of liberty, pragmatically conceived; respect for property; economic freedom; and representative government, culturally understood. At this moment in time it is American power, and American power only, that can serve as an organizing principle for the worldwide expansion of liberal civil society.”11 This narrative does imagine limits to empire, yet primarily in the selfish refusal of U.S. citizens to sacrifice and shoulder the burden for others, as though sacrifices have not already been imposed on them by the state. The temporal dimension of this narrative entails the aborted effort of other nations and peoples to enter modernity, and its view of the future projects the end of empire only when the world is remade in our image.

Usage of soft power is the basis of imperialism.

Mabee in 4 (Bryan, Sr. lecturer at Oxford Brookes Institute, Third World Quarterly, Discourses of Empire: The US 'Empire', Globalisation and International Relations, 25(8), p. 1365-1366)pl

In terms of the first, the present system of economic globalisation is often compared to the open international economy of the late-nineteenth century: as Krugman puts it, 'it is a late twentieth-century conceit that we invented the global economy yesterday'.43 This has been primarily discussed in terms of the level of international trade, the mobility of capital and the overall high interdependence of the era of the Gold Standard. As Hirst and Thompson summarise, 'the level of autonomy under the Gold Standard up to the First World War was much less for the advanced economies than it is today. This is not to minimise the level of that integration now ... but merely to register a certain scepticism over whether we have entered a radically new phase in the internationalisation of economic activity' .4 However, narrowly focusing on the economic openness misses the connection between economic power and globalisation. Ferguson has described the period as 'Anglobalisation', pointing specifically to the connection between empire and an open international economy.45 While similar arguments have been made within international relations regarding the development of hegemonic power, these arguments tend to avoid the questions concerning the imperial nature of Britain's hegemony in comparison to today.46 While it is certainly not the case that all historical empires were 'empires of trade', the comparison between the present system and the nineteenth century is useful for the parallels with the global economy and the ideology surrounding the pursuit of an open economy. The guiding role of British informal rule in the nineteenthc entury was to 'open up' states to British commerce47 A nd the role of this facet of globalisation is no different, according to both proponents and critics. Along these lines as well, the force of American 'soft power', as Nye has described it, should not be seen as detrimental to empire, but conducive of it.48 Soft power, in essence, also forms one part of a drive to gain a legitimate basis for imperial rule.

Diplomatic measures of the US disguise neo-imperialism.

Kennedy and Lucas in 5 (Liam and Scott, Dir. of the Clinton Institute for American Studies and dir. Of Center for US foreign policy, American Quarterly, Enduring Freedom: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy, 57(2), p. 310-311)pl

“Public diplomacy—which consists of systematic efforts to communicate not with foreign governments but with the people themselves—has a central role to play in the task of making the world safer for the just interests of the United States, its citizens, and its allies.”5 In the last few years, U.S. public diplomacy has undergone intensive reorganization and retooling as it takes on a more prominent propaganda role in the efforts to win the “hearts and minds” of foreign publics. This is not a new role, for the emergent ideas and activities of public diplomacy as the “soft power” wing of American foreign policy have notable historical prefigurations in U.S. international relations. In this essay we situate the history of the cold war paradigm of U.S. public diplomacy within the broader framework of “political warfare” that combines overt and covert forms of information management.6 However, there are distinctive features to the “new public diplomacy” within both domestic and international contexts of the contemporary American imperium. It operates in a conflicted space of power and value that is a crucial theater of strategic operations for the renewal of American hegemony within a transformed global order. We consider the relation of this new diplomacy to the broader pursuit of political warfare by the state in its efforts to transform material preponderance (in terms of financial, military, and information capital) into effective political outcomes across the globe. In a post-9/11 context, we argue, public diplomacy functions not simply as a tool of national security, but also as a component of U.S. efforts to manage the emerging formation of a neoliberal empire. The term “public diplomacy” was coined by academics at Tufts University in the mid-1960s to “describe the whole range of communications, information, and propaganda” under control of the U.S. government.7 As the term came into vogue, it effectively glossed (through the implication of both “public” and diplomatic intent) the political valence of both its invention and object of study through emphasis on its role as “an applied transnational science of human behaviour.”8 The origin of the term is a valuable reminder that academic knowledge production has itself been caught up in the historical foundations and contemporary conduct of U.S. public diplomacy, with the American university a long-established laboratory for the study of public opinion and of cross-cultural knowledge in service of the state.9 American studies, of course, has had a particularly dramatic entanglement with public diplomacy and the cold war contest for “hearts and minds,” and legacies of that entanglement still haunt the field imaginary today.10 We do not intend to directly revisit that history here, but we do contend that the current regeneration of public diplomacy by the U.S. government is an important topic for critical study by American studies scholars, in particular as they negotiate the “internationalization” of their field in the context of post- and transnational impulses, now conditioned by the new configurations of U.S. imperialism. In this essay we posit a need to retheorize the modes and meanings of public diplomacy in order to reconsider the ways in which the power of the American state is manifested in its operations beyond its national borders, and to examine the conditions of knowledge-formation and critical thinking shaped by the operations of this power. At issue is not so much the way in which American studies has been shaped internationally through diplomatic patronage (though this remains an important and underexamined issue) but rather the articulation of field identities in the expanding networks of international and transnational political cultures.

# Link – Miscalc

Their accidents and miscalc args frames Western nations as rational actors, but actors in the East inherently become dangerous to them.

Gusterson ’99 (Gusterson, Hugh,”Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination” Cultural Anthropology, 14.1 Feb 1999 http://www.jstor.org/stable/656531 Aug 17/2009, p.120-21)NAR

The discourse on proliferation assumes that the superpowers' massive interlocking arsenals of highly accurate MIRVed missiles deployed on hair-trigger alert and designed with first-strike capability backed by global satellite capability was stable and that the small, crude arsenals of new nuclear nations would be unstable, but one could quite plausibly argue the reverse. Indeed, as mentioned above, by the 1980s a number of analysts in the West were concerned that the MIRVing of missiles and the accuracy of new guidance systems were generating increasing pressure to strike first in a crisis. Although the strategic logic might be a little different, they saw temptations to preempt at the high end of the nuclear social system as well as at the low end (Aldridge 1983; Gray and Payne 1980; Scheer 1982). There were also concerns (explored in more detail below) that the complex computerized early-warning systems with which each superpower protected its weapons were generating false alarms that might lead to accidental war (Blair 1993; Sagan 1993). Thus one could argue-as former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1986) and a number of others have-that deterrence between the United States and Russia would be safer and more stable if each side replaced their current massive strategic arsenals with a small force of about one hundred nuclear weapons-about the size India's nu-clear stockpile is believed to be, as it happens. Further, Bruce Blair (Blair, Feiveson, and von Hippel 1997), a former missile control officer turned strategic analyst, and Stansfield Turner (1997), a former CIA director, have suggested that the readiness posture of American and Russian nuclear forces makes them an accident waiting to happen. The United States and Russia, they argue, would be safer if they stored their warheads separate from their delivery vehicles-as, it so happens, India and Pakistan do.1" In the words of Scott Sagan, a political scientist and former Pentagon official concerned about U.S. nuclear weapons safety, The United States should not try to make new nuclear nations become like the superpowers during the Cold War, with large arsenals ready to launch at a moment's notice for the sake of deterrence, instead, for the sake of safety, the United States and Russia should try to become more like some of the nascent nuclear states, maintaining very small nuclear capabilities, with weapons components separated and located apart from the delivers systems, and with civilian organizations controlling the warheads. [Sagan 1995:90-91 ]12 Given, as I have shown, that the crisis stability of large nuclear arsenals can also be questioned and that it is not immediately self-evident why the leader of, say, India today should feel any more confident that he would not lose a city or two in a preemptive strike on Pakistan than his U.S. counterpart would in attacking Russia, I want to suggest that an argument that appears on the surface to be about numbers and configurations of weapons is really, when one looks more closely, about the psychology and culture of people. Put simply, the dominant discourse assumes that leaders in the Third World make decisions differently than their counterparts in the West: that they are more likely to take risks, gambling millions of lives, or to make rash and irresponsible calculations.

# Link – Good v Evil

**Rhetoric of GOOD & EVIL creates binaries – those are exploited to insure continued violence & conflict**

**Kellner 07** Professor, Ph.D., Philosophy, Columbia University (Douglas Kellner, “Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying: Presidential Rhetoric in the ‘War on Terror’” Presidential Studies Quarterly, 626)

In his September 20 talk to Congress, Bush drew a line between those who supported terrorism and those who were ready to fight it. Stating “You’re either with us, or against us,” Bush declared war on any states supporting terrorism and laid down a series of nonnegotiable demands to the Taliban who ruled Afghanistan, while Congress wildly applauded. Bush’s popularity soared with a country craving blood-revenge and the head of Osama bin Laden. Moreover, Bush also asserted that his administration held accountable those nations that supported terrorism—a position that could nurture and legitimate military interventions for years to come. Bush administration discourses, like those of bin Laden and radical Islamists, are fundamentally Manichean, positing a binary opposition between Good and Evil, Us and Them, civilization and barbarism. Bush’s Manichean dualism replicates as well the Friend/Enemy opposition of Carl Schmidt upon which Nazi politics were based. Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and “the Terrorist” provided the face of an enemy to replace the “evil Empire” of Soviet communism, which was the face of the Other in the Cold War.17 The terrorist Other, however, does not reside in a specific country with particular military targets and forces, but is part of an invisible network supported by a multiplicity of groups and states. This amorphous terrorist enemy, then, allows the crusader for good to attack any country or group that is supporting terrorism, thus promoting a foundation for the Bush Doctrine of preemptive and perennial war. The discourse of good and evil can be appropriated by disparate and opposing groups and generates a highly dichotomous opposition, undermining democratic communication and consensus and provoking violent militaristic responses. It is assumed by both sides that “we” are the good, and the “Other” is wicked, an assertion that Bush made in his incessant assurance that the “evil-doers” of the “evil deeds” will be punished. Projecting evil onto the Other constructs the opponent of evil as “good” and elevates the struggle to a cosmic battle between good and evil. All traits of aggression and wickedness are thus projected onto the Other while constituting oneself as good and pure. Such hyperbolic rhetoric is a salient example of Bushspeak that communicates through codes to specific audiences, in this case domestic Christian right-wing groups that are Bush’s preferred recipients of his discourse.18 But demonizing terms for bin Laden both elevate his status in the Arab world as a mythical superhero who stands up to the West and help marshal support among those who feel anger toward the West and intense hatred of the West. Bush and the global media helped produce a mythology of bin Laden, elevating him to almost superhuman status, while generating fear and hysteria that legitimated Bush administration militarism geared toward the “Evil One,” as Bush has called bin Laden, equating him with Satan. The discourse of “evil” is totalizing and absolutistic, allowing no ambiguities or contradictions. It assumes a binary logic where “we” are the forces of goodness and “they” are the forces of darkness. Such discourse legitimates any action undertaken in the name of good, no matter how destructive, on the grounds that it is attacking “evil.” The discourse of evil is cosmological and apocalyptic, evoking a cataclysmic war with mythi- cal stakes. In this perspective, evil cannot be just attacked one piece at a time, through incremental steps, but must be totally defeated, eradicated from the earth if good is to reign. This discourse of evil raises the stakes and violence of conflict and nurtures more apocalyptic and catastrophic politics, fueling future cycles of hatred, violence, retribu- tion, and wars.

# Link – Terrorism

The discourse of terrorism and threats makes it impossible to differentiate between real threats and made up threats

Der Derian 95 (James, Director of the Global Security Program and Research Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, “Arms, Hostages, and the Importance of Shredding in Earnest: Reading the National Security Culture (II),” Facts, Factoids, and the Factotum of Terrorism, Duke University Press, JSTOR, AD: 7/10/09) AN

Just as Nietzsche alleged the precession of meaning to facts, North-the factotum of terror and counter-terror-preceded the factoids of terrorism. To be sure, there are some commonly accepted "facts" about international terrorism. A selection of Rand corporation documents on international terrorism reveals the following: over the last ten years terrorists have seized over fifty embassies and consulates, held the oil ministers of eleven states hostage; kidnapped hundreds of diplomats, businessmen and journalists; made several hundred million dollars in ransom money; assassinated Lord Mountbatten and President Sadat and the former premier of Italy, attempted to assassinate the president of France, the Pope, and Alexander Haig (a near miss with a rocket launcher when he was supreme allied commander of NATO). Terrorist incidents and their severity have increased over the last ten years, but most terrorist actions involve few or no casualties: they are symbolic acts of violence. Com-pared to the ruthlessness and destructiveness of states, or even to natural disasters, terrorism is a mere nuisance. Yet it is cause for crises of state, media spasms on a seismic scale, and the hyper-production of institutes, conferences, and books on terrorism. Why is this? International terrorism does represent a crisis, but not in terms of body-counts or a revolutionary threat to the states-system. On a political level, the simulacrum of terrorism, that is, the production of a hyperreal threat of violence, anticipates a crisis of legitimation.9W hat this means is that international terrorism is not a symptom or a cause or an effect of this systemic crisis: it has become a spectacular, micro-cosmic simulation. International terrorism simulates a legitimating crisis of the international order; conversely, counter-terrorism is a counter-simulation, an attempt to engender a new disciplinary order which can save the dominant legitimacy principle of international relations.10O n a representational level, the spectacle of terrorism displace-and distracts us from-the signs of a pervading international disorder. As a result, much of what is read and written of terrorism displays a superficiality of reasoning and a corruption of language which effects truths about terrorism without any sense of how these truths are produced by, and help to sustain official discourses of international relations. This was repeatedly evidenced by the proceedings and documents of the Iran-contra hearings, in which our reason of state was exposed as ideological expediency and redressed as principled policy. If the reader of terrorism is to break out of the dominant cultural economy, in which each of us acts as a factotum of factoids, that is, a transmitter of official truths, then some critical interpretive skills must be deployed. Along with an empirical study of the salient sources of disorder around us, we need a genealogy of our knowledge of international terrorism and legitimacy, of how consumers in this cultural economy arrive at some shared assumptions about the exchange-value of both. One goal, then, of a cultural reading is to reach a better under-standing of whether these assumptions or constructions of terrorism and legitimation serve to preserve principles and practices beneficial to the international order, or whether they forestall the knowledge necessary to deal effectively with an increasing fragmentation, a diffusion of power, and a sustained challenge to the sovereign state's once-natural monopoly of force: in short, the neo-medievalism alluded to earlier.

By securitizing and acting against “terror” without clear evidence of a risk, the 1AC perpetuates the fear of the public which allows for true terror groups to take advantage of humans.

O’Neill 5 (Brendan, deputy editor of Spiked, “Exploiting our nuclear fears,” <http://www.spiked-online.com/articles/0000000CAE65.htm>)

So in essence, the rise of the nuclear-reactor-as-terror-target-and-harbinger-of-doom scenario was not a result of Osama bin Laden issuing a diktat about attacking reactors or the discovery of evidence that al-Qaeda-style groups have the means to execute such an assault; rather, it was first thrust into the public arena by nuclear watchdog types who watched the events of 9/11 and thought to themselves: 'How much worse those attacks would have been if the target were nuclear reactor!?' In the weeks and months after 9/11, these reactor-terror scenarios snowballed and became bound up in anti-nuclear and environmentalist groups' broader campaigns against the development of nuclear power. In October 2001, the NCI and Greenpeace even protested against the plan to ship mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuel from Japan to Britain, because 'given the tragic events of 11 September, we believe that assessments of the terror threat and proliferation risk must be prepared before any decision is made with respect to the proposed transfer' (7). The protesters claimed that 'the theft of [this] plutonium would be an attractive target for those seeking to obtain nuclear weapons materials', possibly including 'terrorist groups' (8). The nuke-worriers quickly went from arguing that nuclear reactors were a sitting target for terrorists to claiming that even transporting nuclear materials could potentially pose a terror threat. More than a year ago, Greenpeace used the politics of terror to describe nuclear reactors as tragedies waiting to happen, as if the means for the West's destruction lurked within these very installations and were just waiting to be triggered by some loon from over there. 'Each nuclear reactor has the potential to devastate the region in which it operates', Greenpeace said. 'If a meltdown were to occur either in the reactor or in the spent fuel pool, the accident could kill and injure tens of thousands of people, leaving large regions uninhabitable…. Now that terrorists [may target] nuclear plants, these reactors are not merely a dangerous and complicated way to boil water but also constitute a national security threat.' (9) Here, green groups cynically exploited the politics of fear, and the general concern about terrorism post-9/11, to give a kick to their anti-nuclear campaigning. They ratcheted up fear about death and destruction at the hands of bomb-wielding or plane-driving terrorists as opportunistically as did President Bush and UK prime minister Tony Blair: Bush and Blair did it to justify wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; Greenpeace and others did it to sow further doubts about nuclear power and to call for reactors to be shut down before they cause 'catastrophe'. Indeed, even those who were critical of Bush and Blair's exploitation of the politics of terror were only too happy to do the same when it came to casting doubts on nuclear power. In March 2003, one radical anti-war website ran a piece titled 'Nuclear reactors as terror weapons: the nightmare waiting at the back door', which argued that 'while the world is watching the war in Iraq, no one seems to be paying attention to the likelihood of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power station. The horror and economic consequences of breaching a nuclear power reactor would certainly exceed 9/11.' (10) From the NCI's calls for certain nuclear reactors to be shut down lest terrorists attack them to radical environmentalists' claims that such reactors could unleash a terror that would dwarf 9/11, the message to any terrorist seeking to do precisely that - to 'exceed 9/11' - was pretty clear: attack a nuclear installation! This fear of nuclear reactors and what they might do to us goes back to the 1980s and 90s, predating the emergence of al-Qaeda and before the vast majority of us had even heard the name Osama bin Laden. It has its origins, not in the aims or dastardly aspirations of terrorists from over there, but rather in a sense of doubt and uncertainty over here. Following the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the Ukraine in 1986, nuclear power in general, and nuclear reactors in particular, became a focus for a rising climate of fear about the future, about new technologies, and about the apparently unacceptable risks posed by modern development to everyday life. In his reflections on Chernobyl and nuclear power in *Risk Society*, Ulrich Beck argued that our fears were not linked to any clear evidence that nuclear is more dangerous than other energy sources, but rather were the result of a generalised and perceived sense of risk. He said that the non-visible character of nuclear radiation meant that this perception of risk could become even more detached from the facts of the matter (11). In short, post-Chernobyl, nuclear power became a kind of metaphor for a sense of risk in Western society - and nuclear reactors came to be seen as a deadly threat lurking within our own societies. Post-9/11, the fear of nuclear power has mixed with the fear of terrorism, leading to the telling of wild horror stories about terrorists potentially killing thousands of us, destroying our homes and habitats, and giving thousands more of us cancer and other deadly diseases. The terrorists haven't done this, of course, and there is still little clear evidence that they ever could. Rather, earlier concerns about nuclear power are being projected on to terrorists from afar; Western society's own doubt about new technologies has been transformed into apocalyptic visions of handfuls of madmen triggering the massive bombs that apparently are situated in our own countrysides and deserts. Such visions were first spelled out by nuclear-concerned and green campaigners, but they have since been cynically co-opted by political and military leaders who now cite the alleged threat posed to nuclear reactors as further justification for their 'war on terror'. So it is perhaps not surprising that a bunch of guys in Australia should allegedly have considered a nuclear reactor as a terror target. This latest development would seem to demonstrate that terrorists (or alleged terrorists) merely feed off our fears. Far from being the terrible enemy that we have been led to believe - who are planning a 'holocaust' against us, as one particularly overexcited author put it - today's terror groups tend to be ragbags of deluded nihilists and opportunists who thrive on tapping into our worst fears. And the fear of terrorists dwarfing and exceeding 9/11 by attacking a reactor has been doing the rounds for years now. If some Australians were considering such an attack, then we gave them the idea; if a terrorist were to attack a reactor then it could surely be viewed as the phsyical expression of a fear and loathing about nuclear that has its origins very much in the West.

# Link – Proliferation

Proliferation is based within Western discourses of nuclear power while provoking dichotomies of normalization

Gusterson, associate professor of Anthropology, 99

(Hugh Gusterson, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, *Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination*, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY, February 1999, JSTOR)

In the following pages I examine four popular arguments against horizontal nuclear proliferation and suggest that all four are ideological and orientalist. The arguments are that (1) Third World countries are too poor to afford nuclear weapons; (2) deterrence will be unstable in the Third World; (3) Third World regimes lack the technical maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons; and (4) Third World regimes lack the political maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons. Each of these four arguments could as easily be turned backwards and used to delegitimate Western nuclear weapons, as I show in the following commentary. Sometimes, in the specialized literature of defense experts, one finds frank discussion of near accidents, weaknesses, and anomalies in deterrence as it has been practiced by the established nuclear powers, but these admissions tend to be quarantined in specialized discursive spaces where the general public has little access to them and where it is hard to connect them to the broader public discourse on nuclear proliferation. In this article I retrieve some of these discussions of flaws in deterrence from their quarantined spaces and juxtapose them with the dominant discourse on the dangers of proliferation in order to destabilize its foundational assumption of a secure binary distinction between "the West" and "the Third World." It is my argument that, in the production of this binary distinction, possible fears and ambivalences about Western nuclear weapons are purged and recast as intolerable aspects of the Other. This purging and recasting occurs in a discourse characterized by gaps and silences in its representation of our own nuclear weapons and exaggerations in its representation of the Other's. Our discourse on proliferation is a piece of ideological machinery that transforms anxiety-provoking ambiguities into secure dichotomies. I should clarify two points here. First, I am not arguing that there are, finally, no differences between countries in terms of their reliability as custodians of nuclear weapons. I am arguing that those differences are complex, ambiguous, and crosscutting in ways that are not captured by a simple binary division between, on the one hand, a few countries that have nuclear weapons and insist they are safe and, on the other hand, those countries that do not have nuclear weapons and are told they cannot safely acquire them. It is my goal here to demonstrate the ways in which this simple binary distinction works as an ideological mechanism to impede a more nuanced and realistic assessment of the polymorphous dangers posed by nuclear weapons in all countries and to obscure recognition of the ways in which our own policies in the West have often exacerbated dangers in the Third World that, far from being simply the problems of the Other, are problems produced by a world system dominated by First World institutions and states.

Proliferation discourse constructs some WMD’s as unproblematic producing a hierarchy of state power

Cohn in 2003 Director of the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, & Ruddick, taught philosophy, peace studies, and feminist theory at the New School University, 03 (Carol & Sara, ‘A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Boston Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights, www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/director.htm

“Proliferation, ” as used in Western political discourse, does not simply refer to the “multiplication” of weapons of mass destruction on the planet. Rather, it constructs some WMD as a problem, and others as unproblematic. It does so by assuming pre-existing, legitimate possessors of the weapons, implicitly not only entitled to those weapons, but to “modernize” and develop new “generations” of them as well. The “problematic” WMD are only those that “spread” into the arsenals of other, formerly non-possessor states. This is presumably the basis for the “licit/illicit” distinction in the question; it does not refer to the nature of the weapons themselves, nor even to the purposes for which they are intended – only, in the case of nuclear weapons, to who the possessor is, where “licitness” is based on the treaty-enshrined “we got there first.” Thus, use of the term “proliferation” tends to locate the person who uses it within a possessor state, and aligns him or her with the political stance favoring the hierarchy of state power enshrined in the current distribution of WMD. The framing of Question Four. “... is it proper to deny [WMD] possession to others for the same purposes?”, seems similarly based in a possessor state perspective, as it is presumably the possessor states who must decide whether it is proper to deny possession to others.

# Link – EU

**EU is uniquely securitizing space, and the environment**

School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies **10 [**"The Growing ‘securitization’ of Outer Space." *Space Policy* 26.4 (2010): 205-08. *Science Direct*. Web. 26 June 2011. AMB]

**In this respect the European Union stands out as a ‘securitizing actor’ *par excellence*, with an ever-increasing range of activities deemed as issues of space security that demand new and intensified levels of regional cooperation. The President of the EU, José Manuel Barroso, has, in this vein, argued that Europe needs ‘more security *in* and *from* space’, defining this not only in ways that encompass traditional fears of attacks on space assets as an ‘existential threat’, but also by including a range of other issues:**“Our space assets and infrastructure are indispensable for our economy and security and we need to protect them. The EU should develop an independent capacity to monitor satellites and debris orbiting the Earth and the space environment, and tackle possible hazards. We should also exploit the potential of space infrastructure (already available, for example, through GMES [Global Monitoring for Environment and Security]) to protect our citizens and our ground infrastructure against natural and manmade hazards and to be at the service of European Security and Defence Policy goals. These capacities should be developed in partnership with Member States.” **Here security is understood in a more expansive and comprehensive sense than the traditional conception of military security, in a manner that parallels the ‘broad’ understanding of security in EU policy discourse more generally.** **Thus, as well as citing the role of space in European Defence, the existential threats identified here also include the prospects of environmental disaster and economic meltdown. Similarly, the European Space Agency has argued that security needs are ‘connected to […] technological progress’, and ‘Space systems are a fundamental aspect of “technological security”: they offer extremely versatile solutions in a global, international dimension.’**[5](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026596461000086X" \l "fn5) **Both these arguments complement a final ‘security’ function, which is that space can become a catalyst of further European integration, thus preserving the political security of the Union: ‘Security applications provided by space technologies are a linchpin of European policy. But Space security goes far beyond this utilization logic: Space technologies directly contribute to the building of an EU political project.’**

# Link – Russia

**The affirmatives construction of Russia as a threat turns the world into an item that must be defended – in the global drive to eliminate danger we otherize Russia and turn everyone into a soldier in the war against the Russian enemy**

**Jæger** Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute **2k** (Øyvind “Securitizing Russia: Discurisve Practices of the Baltic States” http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf)

The Russian war on Chechnya is one event that was widely interpreted in the Baltic as a ominous sign of what Russia has in store for the Baltic states (see Rebas 1996: 27; Nekrasas 1996: 58; Tarand 1996: 24; cf. Haab 1997). The constitutional ban in all three states on any kind of association with post-Soviet political structures is indicative of a threat perception that confuses Soviet and post-Soviet, conflating Russia with the USSR and casting everything Russian as a threat through what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) call a discursive "chain of equivalence". In this the value of one side in a binary opposition is reiterated in other denotations of the same binary opposition. Thus, the value "Russia" in a Russia/Europe-opposition is also denoted by "instability", "Asia", "invasion", "chaos", "incitement of ethnic minorities", "unpredictability", "imperialism", "slander campaign", "migration", and so forth. The opposite value of these markers ("stability", "Europe", "defence", "order", and so on) would then denote the Self and thus conjure up an identity. When identity is precarious, this discursive practice intensifies by shifting onto a security mode, treating the oppositions as if they were questions of political existence, sovereignty, and survival. Identity is (re)produced more effectively when the oppositions are employed in a discourse of in security and danger, that is, made into questions of national security and thus securitised in the Wæverian sense.In the Baltic cases, especially the Lithuanian National Security Concept is knitting a chain of equivalence in a ferocious discourse of danger. Not only does it establish "[t]hat the defence of Lithuania is total and unconditional," and that "[s]hould there be no higher command, self-controlled combat actions of armed units and citizens shall be considered legal." (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 1, 2) It also posits that [t]he power of civic resistance is constituted of the Nation’s Will and self-determination to fight for own freedom, of everyone citizen’s resolution to resist to [an] assailant or invader by all possible ways, despite citizen’s age and [or] profession, of taking part in Lithuania’s defence (National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 7, Sc. 4). When this is added to the identifying of the objects of national security as "human and citizen rights, fundamental freedoms and personal security; state sovereignty; rights of the nation, prerequisites for a free development; the state independence; the constitutional order; state territory and its integrity, and; cultural heritage," and the subjectsas "the state, the armed forces and other institutions thereof; the citizens and their associations, and; non governmental organisations,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 2, Sc. 1, 2) one approaches a conception of security in which the distinction between state and nation has disappeared in all-encompassing securitisation. **Ev**eryone is expected to defend everything with every possible means. And when the list of identified threats to national security that follows range from "overt (military) aggression", via "personal insecurity", to "ignoring of national values,"(National Security Concept, Lithuania, Ch. 10) the National Security Concept of Lithuania has become a totalising one taking everything to be a question of national security. The chain of equivalence is established when the very introduction of the National Security Concept is devoted to a denotation of Lithuania’s century-old sameness to "Europe" and resistance to "occupation and subjugation" (see quotation below), whereby Russia is depicted and installed as the first link in the discursive chain that follows.In much the same way the "enemy within" came about in Estonia and Latvia. As the independence-memory was ritualised and added to the sense of insecurity – already fed by confusion in state administration, legislation and government policy grappling not only with what to do but also how to do it given the inexperience of state institutions or their absence – unity behind the overarching objective of independence receded for partial politics and the construction of the enemy within. This is what David Campbell (1992) points out when he sees the practices of security as being about securing a precarious state identity. One way of going about it is to cast elements on the state inside resisting the privileged identity as the subversive errand boys of the prime external enemy.

# Link – Environment

The 1AC’s engagement in green rhetoric and crisis construction in context of environmental security only serves to maintain the legitimacy of state military against Otherness.

Jon Barnett, Fellow in the School of Social and Environmental Enquiry at University of Melbourne, 2001, The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era, pg. 87 p1 – pg. 88 p3)

The NSS, DOD and State Department interpret environmental security in a way that maintains the legitimacy of the US government in the face of pressing environmental problems. By deploying a green rhetoric the state makes enough of a token gesture to placate the concerns of the general public and to forestall a crisis of legitimacy. This completely fails to engage with environmental problems themselves, for while envi­ronmental insecurity is a product of capitalism, militarism and industriali­sation, the approach of these agencies is to deploy ‘a complex repertoire of responsibility and crisis-displacement strategies’ (Hay 1994: 217). The US approach to environmental security maintains legitimacy by: a combination of symptom amelioration, token gesturism, the ‘greening’ of legitimating political ideology, and the displacement of the crisis in a variety of different directions: either downward into civil society; or upward onto a global political agenda: or, indeed, sideways in presenting the crisis as another body’s (e.g., state’s) legitimization problem. (Hay 1994: 221) Most of these tactics are evident in US environmental security policy discourse. The lethargic effort to clean up domestic contaminated bases but not those abroad is indicative of the ‘symptom amelioration’ tactic. The ‘greening of political ideology’ is most clearly manifest in the envi­ronment—conflict discourse, which is fundamentally consistent with realist international relations theory. There is little displacement down­wards into civil society, but the tactic of displacing problems up to the global level is clear, particularly in Christopher’s pronouncements. That this global rhetoric also opens up the possibility of the US as global manager and policeman further enhances the lure of this tactic. Finally, displacement sideways to present environmental degradation as someone else’s problem is also clearly apparent in the references to instability and political upheaval which intertwine with the environment—conflict discourse. For the US government, then, environmental security is used to preserve legitimacy, avoid radical reform and distract attention from the contradictions of the modern world for which the US is inextricably responsible. Hay calls such continued strategies of displacement ‘dysfunc­tional long-term tendencies’ which in this case make the United States ‘a profound threat to global security’ (Hay 1994: 227). All of these approaches to environmental security interpret the environment as a direct or indirect threat to US interests. Talking in terms of threats in this way confuses environmental problems with military problems. This is an inappropriate way to understand environ­mental problems, particularly given that ‘threat’ in security discourse is a potent symbol of deliberate and malignant danger to the inside emanating from the outside. In this respect the environment becomes another danger which helps constitute the sense of Us necessary for the popular acceptance of the nation-state. Talking in terms of global threats helps to blur the distinctions between subject and object, and cause and effect, and this obscures US complicity in environmental degradation. This environ­mental security policy discourse evades the most salient point about national security and environmental degradation: that the country most complicit in ‘global’ environmental degradation is the United States itself. Talking in terms of threats is thus a discursive tactic that simultane­ously downgrades the interdependence of environmental problems whilst excluding from consideration the role of US businesses, consumers and government in generating environmental problems. Campbell is succinct about this discourse of threats and Others: One of the effects of this interpretation has been to reinscribe East—West understandings of global politics in a period of international transformation by suggesting that the ‘they’ in the East are technologically less sophisticated and ecologically more dangerous than the ‘we’ in the West. This produces a new boundary that demarcates the ‘East’ from the ‘West’…. But environmental danger can also be figured in a manner that challenges traditional forms of identity inscribed in the capitalist economy of the ‘West’. As a discourse of danger which results in disciplinary strategies that are deterritorialized, involve communal co-operation, and refigure economic relationships, the environ­ment can serve to enframe a different reading of ‘reasoning man’ than that associated with the subjectivities of liberal capitalism, thereby making it more unstable and undecidable than anticommunism. (Campbell 1992: 197) It is precisely these implications, of deterritorialization, communal co‑operation and refiguring economies that threaten the US security elite, and so are denied and excluded in their environmental security pronouncements.

Crisis overload—while ecological fear may have worked in the past, people are tired of it… applying crisis discourse to new fields like fossil fuels engenders psychological backlash—this devastates the credibility of environmentalism

*New York Times* 11/6/*94*

THE 1990's could hardly have begun better for the national environmental movement. A new Clean Air Act to clear the skies of toxic chemicals became law. Polls indicated that Americans overwhelmingly supported tough environmental rules and said they would pay more for them. Democrats elected a new team to the White House, in part because the Vice President was sympathetic to ecological concerns and wrote a best-selling book on the subject. But midway through, the decade is shaping up as a period of turmoil for the environmental movement. Membership and budgets have dropped for most of the national groups. A well-organized counter-movement of landowners, city officials and industrial executives steamed into Washington and halted Congressional work this year on strengthening environmental laws. They argued that environmentalists were exaggerating and using inconclusive data to frighten people and influence lawmakers. Those criticisms, and its own frustration, have brought the movement to a state of self-doubt it never faced before. The Problem With Congress. In Washington, environmental leaders blamed poisonous partisanship for what Blakeman Early, a Sierra Club lobbyist, called "the worst environmental Congress in two decades." Another Capitol Hill veteran, Representative Mike Synar, Democrat of Oklahoma, who was one of the strongest environmental voices in Congress for eight terms, was defeated in the primary in part because of his steadfast support for tougher rules on a range of environmental issues. But Mr. Synar said something more basic than politics and legislative strategy is at work, and that is the environmental movement's message that every problem is a crisis, an emergency worthy of public alarm. "If I could give the environmental community one piece of advice, it is to do outreach to people who have not traditionally been part of their movement," he said. "They need to establish relationships with cities, with rural water districts, with county commissioners. They are not going to be able to do what they want by sowing fear." Since Earth Day in 1970, environmentalists have built a movement and achieved legislative and judicial successes by showing that industrial development produced polluted water and air, nuclear radiation, abandoned toxic waste dumps, destruction of forests, loss of species and erosion of farmland. By the 1990's, though, a web of statutes written in part and advocated by environmental groups had sharply reduced air and water pollution and alleviated other problems. The vocabulary of devastation was applied to new issues --electromagnetic radiation, genetic engineering, global warming and overpopulation -- that were said to be even more threatening. The language of emergency that suffused debate about the environment has become institutionalized in large part because it was effective in reaching the public and Congress. But now some observers are noting psychological and political problems with the message itself. "I agree with the urgency of the issues, but my judgment is that the environmental movement got grounded in a one-dimensional psychology," said Theodore Roszak, a history professor at California State University in Hayward and author of "The Voice of the Earth -- An Exploration of Ecopsychology" (Simon & Schuster, 1992). "The movement wants a lot of change very rapidly and tries to get this by scaring people and shaming people. It's bad psychology. People resent being talked to that way, and if you continue to talk that way without helping them understand and make the changes, they stop listening. That's what is happening. My concern is that they need a better way to talk to the public.

**Securitizing the environment hurts their cause in the long term and is politically un-strategic**

**Waever 1998** [Ole, professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html]

These observations point back toward a more general question: Is it a good idea to frame as many problems as possible in terms of security? Does not such a strategy present the negative prospect of, in a metaphorical sense, militarizing our thinking and seeing problems in terms of threat-vulnerability-defense, when there are good reasons for not treating them according to this formula? 51 Use of the slogan "environmental security" is tempting, because it is an effective way of dramatizing environmental problems. In the longer run, however, the practices resulting from the slogan might lead to an inappropriate social construction of the environment, as a threat/defense problem. We might find it more constructive, instead, to thematize the problem in terms of an economy-ecology nexus, where decisions are actually interlinked. 52 Use of the security label does not merely reflect whether a problem is a security problem, it is also a political choice, that is, a decision for conceptualization in a special way. When a problem is "securitized," the act tends to lead to specific ways of addressing it: Threat, defense, and often state-centered solutions. This, of course, leaves the environmental agenda, with its labelling problem, unresolved. One alternative is to view the emerging values of environmentalism as establishing their own moral basis. As his basis for optimism, for example, Buzan suggests that such values are already emerging as new norms of international society. 53 Deudney, more lyrically, talks about ecological awareness being linked to "a powerful set of values and symbols" that "draw upon basic human desires and aspirations," and argues that this, and not regressive security logic, should be the basis for mobilization. 54

# Link – Global Warming

Securitization of the global warming makes solvency impossible because we focus on how it hurts us and not how we cause it

Rasa **Ostrauskaite**, EU Political Advisor in the Office of the High Representative for BiH, December, **2001** Environmental Security as an Ambiguous Symbol[1]: Can We Securitize the Environment? Rubikon, <http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/rasa2.htm>

Having demonstrated the ambiguities of the environmental security discourse, I shall specify the link between environment and security, arguing against this linkage. According to supporters of the environment-security linkage, environmental degradation is as severe as the military threats and thus deserves to be lifted to the “high politics”; i.e. environmental degradation should be placed under the umbrella of national security. Yet tacking the security label to environmental issues deserves more than a word of caution.  First, in the environmental security discourse, whose interests should be secured: those of the state, humanity, the future generations or the nature? As we have seen in the previous sections, these interests can be and usually are in conflict.  It could be pointed out, however, that once a link between environmental degradation and violent conflict is established, the answer to the question whose interest should be secured becomes self-evident. It is at these crucial junctures of conflict that the issue of environmental degradation becomes worthy of a “security” label. Nevertheless, the linkage between environmental degradation and violent conflict could not be easily established, and even those who maintain the existence of such linkages, albeit indirect, subtle and not always predictable, admit that environmental degradation is not very likely to cause interstate conflicts[47]. Therefore, it is “analytically misleading to think of environmental degradation as a national security threat, because the traditional focus of national security has little in common with either environmental problems or solutions”[48].  Second, since one state’s unilateral efforts may have little effect, if at all, states may choose to cooperate to prevent or minimize environmental threats for which they share responsibility. To agree upon collective strategies to reduce environmental vulnerabilities would be easier, however, if decision-makers first desecuritized environmental degradation. As rightly pointed out by Waever, while to securitize an issue is to declare it being “off limits”, to desecuritize an issue is to remove it from the realm of the politics of survival and to allow for a more open and fruitful debate on it[49]. Thus, desecuritization renders the issue amenable to more cooperative forms of behavior. And this could be applicable to the logic of international environmental relations among the states. Moreover, the collective approach frequently entails negotiating treaties that commit states to limit certain activities within their jurisdiction, which, if the issue is declared to be “off limits”, might prove to be more difficult to achieve. The only reason to feel tempted to keep environment “off limits”, however, would be the possibility to have more resources allocated from the state budget, which, unless environment is securitized, might prove to be a complicated task. Yet the question remains whether the benefits of increased attention of environmental issues to be gained through association with security are worth the harms caused by negative connotation and effect.  It is probably accurate to say that one of the biggest difficulties for securitization of environment is posed by the fact that causes and effects of environmental issues differ in time and space. If one of the motives for speaking of environmental degradation as a threat to national security is rhetorical: to make people respond to environmental threats with a sense of urgency, effects rather than causes tend to be securitized. As Buzan et al. point out, “in terms of politicizing causes, much is happening, but most of the threats are too distant to lead to securitization”[50]. With the exception of already discussed securitization of the threats posed by nuclear plants in Central and Eastern Europe, which are close in both time and space to the European states, slow progress has been made towards addressing the causes rather than effects of environmental threats. Even climate change, which is a global problem that requires a coordinated global response, has recently been defined as “at least a 100-year problem,”[51] signaling that, inter alia, asymmetries in causes and effects might seriously impede securitization moves at the global level. Another motive for securitization of effects rather than causes is a recognition that crises call for resolution during which the patience of society can be mobilized. Unfortunately, it is very unlikely that permanent patterns of environmentally sound behavior could be supported for a long time, especially if requires some personal sacrifice[52]. For this reason, it seems that environmental concerns could be better addressed if they constitute part of ‘normal politics’, rather than if enveloped in the national security, since the focus should be on the causes, rather than effects.

# Impact – No V 2 the L

The drive toward security causes no value to life – We live life in our seatbelts instead of embracing the unknown which gives meaning to our lives. Their method only locks us in a cycle of violence and counter-violence

Der Derian 98 (James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html, AD: 7/10/09)

The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" [37](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note37) The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols : The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. [38](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note38) A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." The unknowabl[39](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note39)e which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god." [40](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note40) For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error : in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes." [41](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note41) Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to one's ancestors: The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists --and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength. [42](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note42)

The securitizing rhetoric apparent in the context of the 1AC destroys the value to life and meaning apparent in the existence of humans

Beres 94. Louis Rene Beres, Professor of International Law at Purdue, Self-Determination, International Law and Survival on Planet Earth, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, Spring 1994

Humankind is different. Of course, the spectacle of catastrophe and annihilation has been with us from the beginning, and the seeming insignificance of individual life appears to be confirmed by every earthquake or typhoon, by every pestilence or epidemic, by every war or holocaust. Yet, each of us is unwilling to accept a fate that points not only to extinction, but also to extinction with insignificance. Where do we turn? It is to promises of immortality. And from where do we hear such promises? From religion, to be sure, but also from States that have deigned to represent God in his planetary political duties, **[46](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=266a48fa07f0758488d7236cb18d5f61&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAA&_md5=63bc0c71fa436f929b1ee3d2fc723b56" \l "n46#n46" \t "_self)** and that cry out for "self-determination." How do these States sustain the promise of immortality? One way is through the legitimization of the killing of other human beings. And why is such killing the ostensible protection of one's own life? An answer is offered by Eugene Ionesco as follows: I must kill my visible enemy, the one who is determined to take my life, to prevent him from killing me. Killing gives me a feeling of relief, because I am dimly aware that in killing him, I have killed death. My enemy's death cannot be held against me, it is no longer a source of anguish, if I killed him with the approval of society: that is the purpose of war. Killing is a way of relieving one's feelings, of warding off one's own death. **[47](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=266a48fa07f0758488d7236cb18d5f61&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAA&_md5=63bc0c71fa436f929b1ee3d2fc723b56" \l "n47#n47" \t "_self)** There are two separate but interdependent ideas here. The first is the rather pragmatic and mundane observation that killing someone who would otherwise kill you is a life-supporting action. Why assume that your intended victim would otherwise be your assassin? Because, of course, your own government has  [\*17]  clarified precisely who is friend and who is foe. The second, far more complex idea, is that killing in general confers immunity from mortality. This idea, of death as a zero-sum commodity, is captured by Ernest Becker's paraphrase of Elias Canetti: "Each organism raises its head over a field of corpses, smiles into the sun, and declares life good." **[48](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=266a48fa07f0758488d7236cb18d5f61&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAA&_md5=63bc0c71fa436f929b1ee3d2fc723b56" \l "n48#n48" \t "_self)** Or, according to Otto Rank, "The death fear of the ego is lessened by the killing, the Sacrifice, of the other; through the death of the other one buys oneself free from the penalty of dying, of being killed."

# Impacts- Self-Fulling Prophecy

The innocence the affirmative preserves keeps us from re-evaluating failed policies – This authorizes infinite violence

Chernus 1 (Ira, PROFESSOR OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER,“FIGHTING TERROR IN THE NATIONAL INSECURITY STATE,” http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.htm, AD: 7/10/09)

The only path to security, it seems, is to prevent change by imposing control over others. When those others fight back, the national insecurity state protests its innocence: we act only in self-defense; we want only stability. The state sees no reason to re-evaluate its policies; that would risk the change it seeks, above all, to avoid. So it can only meet violence with more violence. Of course, the inevitable frustration is blamed on the enemy, reinforcing the sense of peril and the demand for absolute control through violence. The goal of total control is self-defeating; each step toward security becomes a source of, and is taken as proof of, continuing insecurity. This makes the logic of the insecurity state viciously circular. Why are we always fighting? Because we always have enemies. How do we know we always have enemies? Because we are always fighting. And knowing that we have enemies, how can we afford to stop fighting? In the insecurity state, there is no way to talk about security without voicing fears of insecurity, no way to express optimism without expressing despair. On every front, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy; a self-confirming and self-perpetuating spiral of violence; a trap that seems to offer no way out

# Impacts- Otherization = War

The construction of the dangerous Other mobilizes the populace and legitimizes violence in the name of security.

Tsoukala 8 (Anastassia, Associate Professor of Criminology at the University of Paris V, “Boundary-creating Processes and the Social Construction of Threat, Alternatives, 33(2), AD: 7-8-9)

Despite their differences, the two principal moral-panics models, elaborated by Cohen and Goode and Ben-Yehuda, present similarities that are to a large extent shared by many analyses of the construction of political enemies.23 First, though the focus may change significantly from one model to another, there are no divergent views as to the identity of the actors involved in that process. Then, when it comes to defining the objective of that process, the construction of social enemies is seen as essential to the defining of the mainstream society and to fostering social bonds. As Jef Huysmans has put it, threat definition creates a self and an other in a process in which the definition of the self depends on the definition of the other.24 The members of the mainstream society and the values they share are better defined through an oppositional pattern, according to which their attributes are shaped in negative rather than positive terms; that is, through the constant confrontation with what they are not. The "other," as the necessary conceptual boundary and, at the same time, inversed mirror of the community's ideal image, becomes then the condition sine qua non of the very existence of that image. In other words, good, virtue, and beauty cannot possibly exist without evil, vice, and ugliness. This ordinary defining process is strengthened in times of crisis when the community and/or its values are, or are thought to be, in danger. Never do the members of a community feel closer to each other than when called to face a common threat to their shared values. Besides, the very process of getting closer strengthens the internal cohesion of the group in that it presumes a wide sharing of common values or, at least, imposes it de facto as a taken-for-granted reality. Differences then have to be forgotten or disregarded as if they had never existed. At the same time, this transnational and to some extent atemporal consensus-making process through the designation of moral boundaries cannot be dissociated from an array of spatially and temporally definable political, bureaucratic, and economic stakes.25 While politicians may seek to strengthen their position in the political and security realms by opposing themselves to the social enemies of the day, security professionals may associate their preventive and coercive policies with budget claims and/or the ongoing repositioning of their agencies in the security field, and sensationalist media campaigns guarantee an economically quantifiable rise in their audience. When it comes to analyzing the way these social outcasts are created, it is acknowledged that their efficient exclusion from mainstream society rests upon a rupturing process, liable to draw a clear line between the perpetrator of the allegedly threatening acts and the rest of the community,26 as part of a process of establishing guilt.27 This boundary-creating process allows, moreover, the expulsion of all the moral ambiguity from the measures to be adopted against the wrongdoers and from the values thus defended. It is the exclusion of the other from the mainstream society that makes possible the unreserved implementation on him or her of a series of coercive measures, going from various control devices to detention, torture, and even death.28 It is the symbolic banning of the other from the community that legitimizes the imposition on the other of numerous privacy-intrusive proactive measures, in the name of the protection from the probable future risk he or she is believed to represent for the common well-being. The doubt-dispelling binary logic this exclusion rests upon is also a useful hegemonic device that simplifies complex issues. In setting up the other as a "hypersignifier of all that is bad and immoral,"29 it hushes the complex causes of their actions and, hence, avoids putting any possible blame on the mainstream society.

# Impact – War

**Cognitive constraints and predispositions elevate threat perception and anxiety – promotes hostility towards perceived perpetrator**

**Schweller 6** (Randall L., “Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power”, editorial board of International Security, John M. Olin Post-Doctoral Fellowship in National Security at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, p. 41-42)

Aside from the inherent uncertainties and complexities of the international environment that may prevent decision makers from recognizing change, there are various ways by which cognitive constraints can impair threat assessment an prudent strategic adjustment to environmental incentives, First, decision making in a crisis situation often induces high levels of stress and associated psychological dysfunctions, such as defensive avoidance, selective search of information, and premature cognitive closure. These so-called motivated biases cause elites to distort or selectively interpret incoming information according to what they want to see, not on what they should see. Second, people are predisposed to see what they expect to be present, and they interpret information in a way that is consistent with their preexisting beliefs. This process of drawing inferences based on predispositions and expectations (or evoked sets) often means that discrepant information is a) consciously ignored or simply goes unnoticed, b) distorted so that it confirms, or at least, does not contradict one’s preexisting beliefs, or c) discounted or written off entirely as invalid. And yet this way of perceiving is rational. Intelligent decision-making in any sphere is impossible unless significant amounts of information are assimilated to pre-existing beliefs. Hence, the normal and rational way to process information is ambiguous and can be understood only through subjective inferential logic. Third, and related to the first two, a predisposition to perceive threat may be caused by personal or group anxiety. As Dean Pruitt points out: “There is an obvious relationship between expectant dread and threat perception. When people are anxious, they cast about for some concrete object to fear; they become predisposed to perceive threat…In times of national dislocation, when anxieties rise, an entire population may begin to overinterpret minimal evidence of threat from another nation.”

# Impact – Anxiety O/W Extinction

**This confrontation with anxiety outweighs their extinctions scenarios because destruction has already occurred in the inner-space**

**Davis 01**. Walter a. Davis, Professor of English at Ohio State, 2001, Deracination: historocity, hiroshima, and the tragic imperative, p. 103-104

We begin with an effort to describe what is the deepest experience—the one most deeply denied. **Catastrophic anxiety is that fear that haunts us from within**,7 **the fear that one has already been annihilated**; that, like Beckett, one has “never been born properly” and never will be because inner paralysis is the psyche’s defining condition—a truth attested each time when, striving to cohere as a subject, one collapses before the tidal wave of an aggression against oneself that rises up from within. **An unspeakable dread weds the psyche to terror.** All other forms of anxiety are pale after-thoughts. There **is a threat worse than extinction. The deepest self-knowledge we harbor, the knowledge that haunts us as perhaps our deepest self-reference is the fear that our inner world is ruled by a force opposed to our being.** **Death is the icy wind that blows through all we do. This is the anxiety from which other anxieties derive as displacements, delays, and vain attempts to deny or attenuate our terror before a dread that is nameless and must remain so lest despair finalize its hold on us.** In catastrophic anxiety the destruction of one’s power to be and the ceaseless unraveling of all attempts to surmount this condition is experienced as an event that has already happened. That event forms the first self-reference: the negative judgment of an Other on one’s being—internalized as self-undoing. Postmodern posturing before the phrase “I am an other” here receives the concretization that shatters “free play.” There is a wound at the heart of subjectivity, a self-ulceration that incessantly bleeds itself out into the world. The issue of the wound is a soul caked in ice, in a despair that apparently cannot be mediated: the nightmare state of a consciousness utterly awake, alone and arrested, all exits barred, facing inner paralysis as the truth of one’s life. **We ceaselessly flee this experience because if it ever comes down full upon us an even more terrifying process begins: an implosion in which one’s subjective being is resolved into fragments of pure anxiety that leave one incapable of existing as subject except in the howl to which each suffered state descends in a final, chilling recognition—that everything one has done and suffered is but sound and fury, signifying nothing. One has become a corpse with insomnia. Identity and self-reference thereafter ceaselessly circle about that void.**This is the hour of the wolf, where one is arrested before the primary fact: at the deepest register of the psyche one finds a voice of terror. Fear **of psychic dissolution is the ground condition of our being as subjects. Subjectivity is founded in anguish before the dread of becoming no more than bits and pieces of pure horror, fleeing in panic a voice that has already overtaken us, resolving our subjective being into traumatic episodes of pure persecution. At the heart of inwardness a malevolent spirit presides**. To put it in nuclear metaphors**: catastrophic anxiety is the threat of implosion into the other’s unlimited destructiveness.** To complete the picture we need only add Winnicott’s point: **people live in dread of this situation, projecting fear of a breakdown into the future, because the breakdown has already occurred**.8

# Impact Turns Case – Fear

**Fear of danger and threats has lead to mass killing in the name of protection and security**

**Burke 06** – Anthony is Senior Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales (“Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence” pg.2, DF), Sydney

There were plenty more occasions like that at school, but such experiences are trivial in comparison to those that lie at the heart of this book’s moral and political concerns: East Timorese being chased down the streets of Dili and Maliana by Indonesian troops and militia, to be murdered with machetes and gunfire; organised gangs raping and hunting Chinese in Jakarta, as the currency bottoms out and an aged president resists relinquishing a rule built on surveillance, propaganda and mass murder; Palestinians arguing with Israeli checkpoint police as a baby dies in its mother’s arms, or watching helplessly as their houses are demolished before their eyes; kids dancing at a disco on the beach at Tel Aviv, caught on freeze-frame just before their lives are shattered by a suicide bomber; asylum seekers held at gunpoint by the Australian SAS on a container ship, or going slowly mad while being held indefinitely in desert immigration prisons; Iraqis dying under US missile strikes and bombs, torn apart by the car bombs of the ‘resistance’, or tortured in police cells and vast prisons, all in the cause of freedom; office workers in New York, finding their computer screens suddenly replaced by flying glass, ripped metal, choking smoke and burning flesh. These are glimpses of a world addicted to suffering – to a rational, functional suffering embedded in the very patterns of politics and order that regulate global life. My experience and theirs are barely comparable, but they are connected by a long, glowing filament of **fear** and dread. I learned much from those formative years: how it felt to be displaced, torn from what is familiar and comforting and placed in a strange and ambivalent environment, where one is watched and nurtured yet exposed to vulnerability and horror; how the social, intellectual and ethical environment of the school, a conduit to the demands and values of society, coexisted with the terrorist violence of the gang; how power could be loving and nurturing, but also flawed and abusive. I learned about the selfish possibilities of parental authority, the seeming permanence of insecurity, and the nearness of cruelty. I learned, in my craving for love and protection and home, about my desire for security; I learned, in the gap between my experience and the comforting, paradoxical wisdom of Christ, about the ambivalence and fragility of ethics; and I learned, in the experience of discipline and the predations of the other boys, about the ever-present possibility of violence. In short, in the fissure between the promises of my world and my experiences of it I learned the necessity of critique.

# Impacts Turn Case – Security

**The implementation of security rhetoric leads to the weaponization of other nations**

**ZHANG** **11** – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Ling nan University, Hong Kong (BAOHUI, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship”, **DF**)The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship pg.5 . )

According to Robert Jervis, “the heart of the security dilemma argument is that an increase in one state’s security can make others less secure, not because of misperceptions or imagined hostility, but because of the anarchic context of international relations.” In this context, “Even if they can be certain that the current intentions of other states are benign; they can neither neglect the possibility that the others will become aggressive in the future nor credibly guarantee that they themselves will remain peaceful.”11 Inevitably, when one state seeks to expand its military capability, others have to take similar measures.

# Impact Turns Case – Backlash

**Krepon 03** – Center (Michael, 20, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The case against weapon zing”, http://www.stimson.org/space/pdf/spacebook.pdf, DF)

Engagement in Space militarization allows competition in military dominance Given the extraordinary and growing differential in power that the United States enjoys in ground warfare, sea power, and air power, it is hard to propound compelling arguments for seeking to supplement these advantages by weaponizing space. The current U.S. lead in the military utilization of space has never been greater and is unchallenged.3 If the united States pushes to extend its pronounced military dominance into space, others will view this through the prism of the Bush administration’s national security strategy, which places emphasis on preventive war and preemption. Foreign leaders will not passively accept U.S. initiatives to implement a doctrine of space dominance. They will have ample, inexpensive means to take blocking action, as it is considerably easier to negate U.S. dominance in space than on the ground, at sea, and in the air. The introduction of space weaponry and ASAT testing are therefore likely to introduce grave complications for th terrestrial military advantages that the United States has worked so hard, and at such expense, to secure. 2

**[space weapons backlash]**

. **Krepon 03** – Center (Michael, 20, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The case against weaponizing”, http://www.stimson.org/space/pdf/spacebook.pdf, DF)

Space weapons will escalate not deter enemies The presumed additional deterrent value of U.S. space weapons is also questionable . If existing U.S. conventional military and nuclear superiority prove insufficient to deter, it is doubtful that the addition of space warfare capabilities would make a un appreciable difference in an adversary’s calculus of decision . The search to strengthen or supplant nuclear deterrence by means of space warfare capabilities will therefore appear to many as a quest to escape from, rather than “enhance,” deterrence. When viewed though this lens, the pursuit of space weapons appears designed less for strengthening deterrence and more for negating the deterrents of potential adversaries. To the extent that this perception holds, the flight-testing and deployment of space weapons is unlikely to raise the nuclear threshold, as proponents claim. To the contrary, the use of conventionally armed " space-strike" weapons could prompt unwanted escalation by threatening the nuclear forces of a weaker foe. In this event, the United States will receive little or no applause of the choice of weaponry used in preemptive strikes

# Impact Turns Case – Weaponization

**Striving for space technology and hegemony causes other nations to proliferate in their use of the same space weapons**

**(Early 10** – Bryan( Sharing Space? Explaining the Proliferation of Civil Space Programs and Capabilities pg. 6, DF)

Another incentive that countries might have to initiate space programs extends from the potential threat posed by their rivals’ possession of space capabilities. In the United States, the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik and the comparative U.S. capabilities gap created significant security concerns among U.S. policymakers that the Soviets could exploit their monopoly on space power to their advantage (McDougal 1985: 141-209). The motives justifying the Indian and Chinese Governments’ efforts to acquire space launch are also linked to security concerns over their rivals’ possession of space launch capabilities (Singh 2008). The more recent efforts of both the South Korean and North Governments to gain space launch capabilities can also likely be explained in part by this dynamic. For authors concerned about the militarization of space, the potential for space-based arms races between the United States and Soviet Union during Cold War and, more recently, between the United States and China, have been topics of significant discussion (DeBlois et al. 2004; Dolan 2002; Caldicott and Eisendrath 2007; Moltz 2007; Johnson-Freese 2010). Competition for both power and prestige vis-à-vis rivals have thus been signaled out within the literature as powerful incentives for states to seek space-capabilities. More attention within the literature has been given to the factors affecting the ability of states to obtain space-capabilities than the motives that drive their behavior. Especially in evaluations of early space programs, strong connections have been drawn between the presence of military rocketry programs and civil space programs (McDougal 1985; DeVorkin 1993).

This leads to accidental nuclear war

Beljac 03

Marco is a PhD student at Monash University in Melbourne (6 22 11, “The Political Economy of Hegemony, Survival and Self-Deterrence”, http://dissidentvoice.org/Articles9/Beljac\_Military-Economy.htm, DF)

Why, then, is the militarization of space so dangerous? Firstly, one must appreciate that in order to attain a global first strike capability, as a part of “full spectrum” or “escalation” dominance, warfighters must be able to strike against a set of strategic nuclear targets before the targeted state is able to launch its missiles upon confirmation of warning. It is for this reason that the world’s nuclear forces are on hair trigger alert, ready to be launched upon warning. A key facet in the early warning systems of Russia and, increasingly, China would be space based early warning satellites. These satellites are based in specialized orbits in order to provide real time imagery of US missile launch sites on land and likely missile launch areas at sea. Now, if Russia or China's early warning system accidentally indicates that a US attack is underway national command authorities would have very little time (say 10 minutes in the case of Russia) to receive a confirmation of warning and fire its retaliatory strike. A false alarm can be ascertained by the use of early warning satellites. If the alarm is raised but real time satellite imagery demonstrates to commanders that there has been no launch catastrophe is thereby avoided. This is not a hypothetical scenario. This happened in 1995 when the Russian strategic alarm system indicated that the US was launching a nuclear first strike. Calamity was averted, by a few minutes at the most, because early warning satellites would have been able to demonstrate to Russian commanders that the alarm was a false one. Militarizing space presents the world with a new ball game, because these early warning satellites will become targets. This is most likely because the militarization of space is intimately linked with US strategic nuclear forces, for the previous command covering space, known as Space Command, has merged with the command responsible for nuclear forces, Strategic Command. Upon merger, the commander of Strategic Command stated, "United States Strategic Command provides a single war fighting combatant command with a global perspective, focused on exploiting the strong and growing synergy between the domain of space and strategic capabilities." The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff added, "this new command is going to have all the responsibilities of its predecessors, but an entirely new mission focus, greatly expanded forces and you might even say several infinite areas of responsibility." To attack the early warning satellites of Russia or China is to fire the first shot in a nuclear first strike, as Moscow and Beijing would be well aware. Of course, astronauts will not man any offensive space weapons. They will be controlled remotely from the ground. This represents the addition of a dangerous impersonal, and critical, link in the whole chain of strategic nuclear causation. If US attack satellites were to destroy Russia and China's early warning satellites inadvertently then Moscow and Beijing would most likely take this as the first shot in a US first strike, especially if they have little confidence in their ground based radar systems. Paul Bracken, an expert on strategic command and control, recognizes that accidental nuclear war may occur because of random technical failure, "in the world in which people live, power grids fail, trains derail, bridges and dams fall down, DC-10 engines fall off, and nuclear power plants come close to meltdown. These things don't happen often, but they do occur". Writing in 1988 he goes on, "a 1965 power failure in the American Northeast was traced to a single inexpensive switch. It was said repeatedly after 1965 that such a cascading power blackout could never occur again, since the freak accident had been carefully considered in new designs based on the lessons of 1965. But it did happen again, in 1977, in New York". A sobering thought.

# Alternative – Rejection

Our alternative is a rejection of the affirmative's securitized politics. This act is a radical examination that recognizes the role of language in constructing collective feelings of insecurity. We must understand these epistemologies prior to politics.

Lott 04

Anthony D, Assistant Professor at St Olaf College in Northfield, USA. “Creating Insecurity: Realism, Constructivism, and US Security Policy” Critical Security Series.

At the most general level of a security analysis it is necessary to recognize the role that language plays in the process of threat construction and the collective feelings of insecurity. The ‘objectivist’ features of traditional security studies rest on shaky epistemological foundations. The materialist ontology and empiricist epistemology that pervade neo-realism seek to understand real threats and dangers that exist in an extra-linguistic universe. Against this approach, we can agree with Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde that security issues are made so ‘by acts of securitization.’ While the language they employ is somewhat difficult, their understanding of the importance of ‘speech-acts’ is central to the development of a coherent security analysis. Emphasizing the constructed nature of our world, these authors do much to influence the direction of security studies. They articulate an understanding of security threats that recognizes the central role played by human interpretation in their creation. We do not try to peek behind this to decide whether it is really a threat (which would reduce the entire securitization approach to a theory of perceptions and misperceptions). Security is a quality actors inject into issues by securitizing them, which means to stage them on the political arena…and then to have them accepted by a sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary defensive moves. Here, we can be even more direct. It is not simply that we do not try to peek behind particular threats to decide whether they warrant such a label, it is the impossibility of such an endeavor that sets for us the parameters of our security framework. Here, Nicholas Onuf is most clear: ‘[we] are always within our constructions, even as we choose to stand apart from them, condemn them, reconstruct them.’ Similarly, Karin Fierke writes, ‘we connot get behind our language to compare it with that which it describes.’ In a very real and meaningful way the limits of our language define the limits of our threats.

# Alternative – Solvency

Rejecting security logic is prerequisite to any real political change

Mark Neocleous in 2008, Professor of Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University (UK), 2008 (“Critique of Security.” Pg. 185-186. )

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favor of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that cannot be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalizes all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritizing of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics, dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimizes state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text *Critical Security Studies*, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: there is no hole. The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilized or gendered or humanized or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitizing of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centered on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipator in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognizing that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognizing that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.

# Alternative – Space Cooperation Solves

[Global cooperation of space law solves space weaponization and security]

**Gallagher 05**(Nancy, Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy.) AV

Rather than assuming that conflict in space is inevitable and then taking unilateral actions that turn that dire assumption into a self-fulfilling prophecy, the United States could lead international efforts to update the rules for space so that they fit the changing circumstances of global security. As the dominant power in space and in world politics, the United States could be confident that an expanded and elaborated set of formal and informal rules would reflect its preferences and could be widely accepted as long as the rules also enhanced the security and prosperity of others. Of course, the United States could only return to its traditional position as champion of an approach to space security based on peaceful cooperation, freedom of access, equitable benefits, and transparency if its political leaders accepted something that a majority of the public already knows: competing for national advantage by deploying anti-satellites weapons, space-based missile defense interceptors, and other expanded military uses of space is no more likely to bring lasting security now than during the Cold War.60 Key trends associated with globalization and the information revolution strengthen, rather than undermine, the logic of restraint that shaped US space security preferences in the 1950s and 1960s. They also pose new challenges that are best addressed through a comprehensive effort to formalize, operationalize, and institutionalize new rules for space within the broader strategic context of global security. Globalization Strengthens the Logic of Mutual Restraint For proponents of the SPACECOM vision, technological change and diffusion strengthen the case for space weapons by increasing American dependence on military and commercial satellites and by expanding potential threats to them. Their selective analysis ignores other countervailing effects of technological change and diffusion that strengthen traditional arguments for space weapons restraint:

# Alternative – Global Space History

**Rethinking solves**

**Siddiqi 10** (Asif A. Siddiqi assistant professor of history at Fordham University and member of advisory board at Shahjalal University of Science and Technology. wrote Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 is widely considered to be the best English-language history of the Soviet space program in print and was identified by the Wall Street Journal as "one of the five best books" on space exploration.[2][3][4] This book was later published in paperback in two separate volumes, Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge and The Soviet Space Race with Apollo. Competing Technologies, National(ist) Narratives, and Universal Claims: Toward a Global History of Space Exploration, Technology and Culture, Volume 51, Number 2, April 2010, pg 438-440, DA:6/21/11, CP)

**By rethinking the relationship between modernity and the postcolonial state, postcolonial thought challenges us to rethink the connection between modernity and spaceflight, and, ultimately, to replace the “national” with the “global” when thinking of space exploration, an exercise that has become doubly important as dozens of developing countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East are now spending money on space exploration**. Writing on the history of nuclear power, Itty Abraham has noted that “practically no state travelled alone.”31 Further, Abraham adds: **One of the most enduring tropes of nuclear histories is the idea that atomic energy programs are always national programs. The close relation between nuclear power and national power has led to the assumption that, for reasons of security especially, nuclear programs must be uniquely identified with particular countries.** Official histories and scientists encourage this belief, for obvious parochial reasons, but it is rarely true. **No atomic program anywhere in the world has ever been purely indigenous**.32 Abraham’s argument in favor of moving toward a global history of nuclear energy has much to offer to the case of rocketry and space exploration. The available evidence points strongly to similar processes of knowledge flows in the evolution of ballistic missiles and space technology. **33 Every nation engaged in this technology has been a proliferator and has benefited from proliferation; this process of proliferation began in the 1920s when an informal and international network of spaceflight enthusiasts in Europe**—particularly in Germany, Austria, France, Poland, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union—and in the United States generated the first substantive exchange on topics related to rocketry and space exploration.34 The development of sophisticated German ballistic missiles in the 1930s benefited from this discourse, as did parallel but less ambitious Soviet efforts to build rockets. In the aftermath of WorldWar II, the remainder of the German missile program—the most developed effort at that point— then fed into several different postwar missile programs, including, of course, those of the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain. The Soviet Union in turn passed both German and “indigenous” technology to the Chinese while the Americans did the same for the Japanese. By the mid-1970s, the “space club” included all of these countries, joined in the 1980s by India and Israel, both of which depended on flows from the United States,Western Europe, and the Soviet Union**. Europe itself—in the form of international agreements—had many cooperative efforts that blurred distinctions of ownership, even as it gained the “indigenous” capacity for space activity in 1979.35 I am not suggesting that we should ignore nations, national identity, or vital indigenous innovation. But I believe that nation-centered approaches, useful and instructive as they were, occlude from view important phenom- ena in the history of space exploration.** My hope is that **by deemphasizing ownership and national borders, the invisible connections and transitions of technology transfer and knowledge production will be become clear in an abundantly new way**. Such an approach would inform a project encompassing the entire history of modern rocketry and space exploration, from the late nineteenth century to the present, focusing on Europe, America, Russia, and Asia. **Most important, a global history of rocketry and space exploration would avoid the pitfalls of the “discursive battles” between nation-centered histories and open up the possibility to revisit older debates in the historiography of space exploration in entirely new ways. Taking a global history approach, one that favors decentering the conventional narrative, would allow historians to redirect their attentions in three ways: we can shift our gaze from nations to communities, from“identification” to identities, and from moments to processes**. These three strategies, in one way or another, are inspired by the problems posed by historicizing the ambitions and achievements of emerging space powers, which operate in a postcolonial context where categories such as indigenous, modern, and national are problematic. I offer some brief examples of each below**. In the space imagination, nations typically represent airtight constituencies despite evidence to the contrary that communities cutting across borders and cultures—national, institutional, and disciplinary—represent important actors and actions**. The most obvious example here, of course, is the German engineers who formed the core of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in the United States in the 1950s and who later directed the development of the Saturn V rocket that put Americans on the surface of the Moon. Wernher von Braun’s team represented a unique mix of Germans and Americans who worked together with several different communities, from Boeing, North American Aviation (including its separate Space and Rocketdyne divisions), Douglas Aircraft Company, and International Business Machines. **These communities represented scientists and engineers, the government and private industry, and customers and contractors. In the rush to draw up airtight national narratives, we inevitably tend to gloss over the ambiguities and flows among each of these communities**. **By highlighting communities, we can also avoid the reductive problems of essentialization** (another way of talking about “national styles” of science and technology) **that aspire to explain everything but fail to elucidate much at all**.36 Instead, one might think in terms of fluid identities of scientists and engineers engaged in particular projects, identities which are not only tied to national identification but also regional, professional, cultural, religious, and educational markers, to name only a few categories. **Using the perspective of mutable identity— able to understand more clearly the ways in which space exploration has not only been a project of national consideration but also the result of communities (or individuals) who identify with a whole host of other markers that are not connected to national claims.** In other words**, it is a way to problematize the notion that space exploration represents national aspirations. Finally, space historians have tended to focus on moments in history that define the story**. For example, **we use the notion of “achieving a capability”** (the space equivalent of “going nuclear**”) as shorthand for encompassing a variety of complex processes**. Whether it be the first indigenous launch of a satellite or the first test of a liquid hydrogen rocket engine, these moments become historical signposts, turning points, bereft of the messiness inherent in the process of innovation. As a result, space history slips into the comfort mode of “what and when” instead of the more illuminating path of “how and why.” **The focus on process would highlight the ambiguities instead of the binary poles (success, failure) inherent in isolated moments, thus encompassing both the material event and how the event becomes constructed as a historical moment**. **All of these approaches also reinforce and foster the kind of social history that has become fundamental to most histories of technology but is largely absent in the literature on spaceflight**, a lacuna explicable **by the fetish for nation-centered cold-war geopolitics as the central organizing framework for most histories of space exploration**. Barring a few notable examples, space historians have avoided in-depth inquiries into the lived experiences of large demographics such as engineers, servicemen and -women, military and intelligence personnel, launch crews, staff workers, and spouses and families of engineers. Likewise**, little work has been done on public enthusiasm for the space program,mass campaigns in support of space exploration, and popular participation in programs usually identified with state-centered institutions**.37 Finally, **using analytical categories such as communities, identities, and processes would direct our attention to the problem of “consumption” in the history of space technology.** Despite a recent surge of scholarship on the role of consumers in shaping technology and technological systems, we have traditionally focused on production rather than consumption in chronicling the history of spaceflight.38 Who has “consumed” the space different in different circumstances—wemight be program? How do we ascribe identities to them as “consumers”? How and where do producers and consumers of the space program interact? Exploring these questions would open up new areas of investigation and enrich our understanding of the cold-war space race.

# Alternative – Environment

Only the alternative – which steps away from govern security – can solve for the environment

Bührs 09

(Ton, Dr. Ton Bührs is a CSGR Visiting Fellow from Lincoln University, New Zealand, where he is a Senior Lecturer and the Convenor for Postgraduate Studies in Environmental Management and Policy in the Environmental Management Group, Environmental Space as a Basis for Legitimating Global Governance of Environmental Limits, Global Environmental Politics, Volume 9, Number 4, November 2009, pp. 111-135 Article, Published by The MIT Press. Accessed: 6/21/11 EL)

Limiting resource consumption does not necessarily imply a reduction of human well-being or happiness, as was pointed out long ago by John Stuart Mill.13 More recently, evidence has been provided that beyond a certain level, increased resource consumption does not contribute to a higher level of human well-being, happiness, or quality of life.14 Nonetheless, most people are trapped on the consumption treadmill, which is driven by the capitalist imperative of continuous economic growth, and which states have adopted as a core imperative. Reducing resource consumption, therefore, requires changing value systems and political-economic institutions above the level of individuals. Environmental space advocates emphasize that the deanition of quality of life should be left to communities within their own cultures.15 Given these imperatives and the rather radical implications of the adoption of these principles, it is not surprising that governments have shown little enthusiasm for the concept. Although some governments, notably in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway, have expressed an interest in and commitment to adopting it, and/or acknowledge the need to reduce global resource consumption to the level of a “one planet economy,”16 in practice, its implementation has been very limited. The most comprehensive application of the environmental space approach has been undertaken outside the sphere of government. In the 1990s, Friends of the Earth, in the context of its Sustainable Europe Campaign, produced a series of country reports that calculated the environmental space used by each country and compared this with the space to which they are entitled on a population basis.17 No government has formally accepted such a report, however, or adopted and implemented environmental space as an overarching framework for its environmental policies. Apart from the challenging nature of the environmental space principles, the considerable issues associated with their interpretation and application, and the predictable opposition to their adoption, there is also the broader “collective action” impediment. Even if within a country there was much sympathy and support for adopting the environmental space approach, it would make little sense to do so if other countries did not do so as well. Reductions in resource consumption achieved by some countries can easily and quickly be negated by other countries that continue to expand their use of resources. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the environmental space approach will make much headway unless it is adopted at the international or even global level. However, the adoption of the environmental space approach at these levels seems equally, if not more, problematic and unlikely, given the formidable political-economic obstacles associated with the imperatives of capitalism, the competitive state system, deeply entrenched socio-cultural patterns and differences, and the relatively weak basis of support and agency for the approach.18 Given the obstacles to systemic change, and with the continuing build-up of multiple pressures in an increasingly interconnected world, a breakdown of cur- rent systems seems inevitable.19 Building and strengthening international support for ideas, values, and norms that can provide the basis for a new international order is crucial if systemic change in a positive direction, or recovery, is to occur.

# Alternatives – Embrace Insecurity

Embracing insecurity solves – it leaves behind the desire for mastery over the international sphere

Der Derian 98 (James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Cianet, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html, AD: 7/10/09) jl

One immediate response, the unthinking reaction, is to master this anxiety and to resecure the center by remapping the peripheral threats. In this vein, the Pentagon prepares seven military scenarios for future conflict, ranging from latino  small-fry to an IdentiKit super-enemy that goes by the generic acronym of REGT ("Reemergent Global Threat"). In the heartlands of America, Toyota sledge-hammering returns as a popular know-nothing distraction. And within the Washington beltway, rogue powers such as North Korea, Iraq, and Libya take on the status of pariah-state and potential video bomb-site for a permanently electioneering elite. There are also prodromal efforts to shore up the center of the International Relations discipline. In a newly instituted series in the International Studies Quarterly , the state of security studies is surveyed so as to refortify its borders. [3](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note3) After acknowledging that "the boundaries of intellectual disciplines are permeable," the author proceeds not only to raise the drawbridge but also to caulk every chink in the moat. [4](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note4) Recent attempts to broaden the concept of "security" to include such issues as global environmental dangers, disease, and economic and natural disasters endanger the field by threatening "to destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems." [5](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note5) The field is surveyed in the most narrow and parochial way: out of 200-plus works cited, esteemed Third World scholars of strategic studies receive no mention, British and French scholars receive short shrift, and Soviet writers do not make it into the Pantheon at all. The author of the essay, Stephen Walt, has written one of the better books on alliance systems; [6](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note6) here he seems intent on constructing a new alliance within the discipline against "foreign" others, with the "postmodernist" as arch-alien. The tactic is familiar: like many of the neoconservatives who have launched the recent attacks on "political correctness," the "liberals" of international relations make it a habit to base their criticisms on secondary accounts of a category of thinking rather than on a primary engagement with the specific (and often differing) views of the thinkers themselves. [7](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note7) In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " [8](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note8) By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." [9](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note9) Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative . My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. [10](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note10) The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference.

# A2 Language/Representations Not Shape Reality

Our argument is that the 1AC's justifications for voting affirmative are the advantages. The negative should be able to criticize the construction of threats and security. This is just an epistemology first argument.

Lipschutz 98 (Ronnie D, Professor, Department of Politics @ The UC Santa Cruz, "8. Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End," Cioanet,http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz18.html, AD: 7/10/09) jl

"Intersubjectivity" among the actors in international relations includes not only the mutually constituted relationship between two actors--in terms of the logic  of the state system, between potentially hostile states--but also interpretations of position  and responses to interpretations  that arise from the logic of that relationship. In other words, the structure of the system as it is commonly understood provides the setting within which interpretations take place. So far, this is not very different from the neorealist notion that anarchy and self-help require the state to ensure its own security. What the condition of intersubjectivity adds to this is the idea that there is nothing "objective" about this arrangement; it grows out of the mutual interpretations and responses to one another by the actors constituting the system. The logic, the interpretation and the response together comprise the "speech act" of security. As Ole Wæver has put it, With the help of language theory, we can regard "security" as a speech act . In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more "real"; it is the utterance itself  that is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering "security," a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.

The political discourse of the 1AC is an agenda-charged methodology that fails to recognize the existence of alternative realities. The prior question of the alternative creates better politics.

Barnett 1 (Jon, Fellow in the School of Social and Environmental Enquiry at University of Melbourne, The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era, May 4, pg 6)

A discourse of social power describing the world in a particular way which makes possible certain claims to truth, hence justifying certain forms of action (Foucault 1977). In the way they depict the world, discourses fail to recognise the existence of certain aspects of reality (for example a neoliberal discourse fails to acknowledge the causes of poverty), and they may construct alter­native truths (the neoliberal discourse argues that private sector growth will benefit the poor by the 'trickle down' effect, when experience provides little evidence for this). In so doing, discourses write out of con­sideration possible courses of action (the neoliberal discourse excludes the possibility of stronger state intervention to prevent poverty and protect the poor). In the realm of policy, discourses do not accurately explain that which they purport to know, yet they have considerable influence.

Representations must be used in policy making. The 1AC's knowledge production are the basic building block of politics. Questioning the 1AC must be dealth with before blindly walking into policymaking.

Bleiker 00 (Roland, Senior lecturer, peace and conflict studies, Contending images of World Politics, pg 228)

Various implications follow from an approach that acknowledges the metaphorical nature of our understanding of world politics. At the begin­ning is perhaps the simple recognition that representation is an essential aspect of the political process. Political reality, F. R. Ankersmit stresses, 'is not first given to us and subsequently represented; political reality only comes into being after and due to representation' (1996, p. 47). What this means for an analysis of world politics is that before being able to move to any other question, one has to deal with how the representation has struc­tured the object it seeks to represent. The concrete relevance of metaphor and representation for the study of world politics will be demonstrated through several examples, including the phenomenon of international terrorism. The essay shows not only that terrorism is a metaphor, but also, and more importantly, that the types of representations which are embedded in this metaphor are reflective of very particular perceptions of what terrorism is and how it ought to be dealt with. These perceptions have become objectified through existing linguistic practices even though they express very specific cultural, ideological and political values - values, one must add, that have come to circumvent the Range if options available to decision makers who deal with the phenomenon of terrorism.

Representations are not neutral—they convey their status as “threat” to security

Williams 3 (Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, 47(4), p. 526-527, AD: 7-28-9) JT

First, as Ronald Deibert insightfully illustrated, to understand the importance of this shift in communicative action it is necessary to understand it as a shift of medium.40 Different mediums (speech, print, and electronic, or—as Deibert terms it—“hypermedia’’) are not neutral in their communicative impact. The conditions of the production and reception of communicative acts are influenced fundamentally by the medium through which they are transmitted. In the aftermath of the extraordinary images of September 11, this point is obvious to the point of banality, but it raises complex questions of explanation. How, for example, is it possible to assess the events following September 11 without an appraisal of the impact that the extraordinary (and repeated) images of that event had on reactions to it? Similarly, how has the role of images—particularly the desire to avoid images of mass destruction and civilian casualties, and the representation of the goals of the military campaign—been involved in structuring understandings of the ‘‘appropriate’’ response? Analogously, in an area of long-standing concern to the Copenhagen School, the rise of migration on the ‘‘security’’ agenda in Europe must be viewed in the context of how migration is ‘‘experienced’’ by relevant publics. This experience is inevitably constructed in part by the images (and discussions based around them) of televisual media: nightly images of shadowy figures attempting to jump on trains through the Channel Tunnel between France and the UK, for example, or of lines of ‘‘asylum seekers’’ waiting to be picked up for a day’s illicit labor (both common on UK television), have—whatever the voiceover—an impact that must be assessed in their own terms, constituting as they do a key element of the experience of many people on the issue of immigration and its status as a ‘‘threat.’’ Clearly, the issues involved here are beyond the scope of this treatment. But it seems clear that any theory that is premised on the social impact of communicative action must assess the impact that different mediums of communication have on the acts, their impacts, and their influence on the processes of securitization.

Securitization discourse creates false truths. Only the alternative exposes the potential for good policies and reveal essential historocities.

Luke 95 [Timothy W. Prof. of Poli Sci Virginia Tech, “On Environmentality: Geopower and EcoKnowledge in the Discourses of Contemporary

Environmentalism, Cultural Critique, No. 31 Fall JSTOR AD 07/11/09] JL

Governmental discourses methodically mobilize particular assumptions, codes, and procedures in enforcing specific understandings about the economy and society. As a result, they generate "truths" or "knowledges" that also constitute forms of power with significant reserves of legitimacy and effectiveness. Inasmuch as they classify, organize, and vet larger understandings of reality, such discourses can authorize or invalidate the possibilities for constructing particular institutions, practices, or concepts in society at large. They simultaneously frame the emergence of collective subjectivities (nations as dynamic populations) and collections of subjects (individuals) as units in such nations. Individual subjects as well as collective subjects can be reevaluated as "the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power" (Foucault, Discipline and Punish 29). Therefore, an environmentalizing regime must advance eco-knowledges to activate its command over geo-power as well as to re-operationalize many of its notions of governmentality as environmentality. Like governmentality, the disciplinary articulations of environmentality must center upon establishing and enforcing "the right disposition of things."

# A2 Realism

The affirmative engages in realist discourse that uses fear to control the masses—that’s a tool of securization

Altheide and Michalowski 99 (David L., Professor of Justice and Social Inquiry @ ASU, R. Sam, graduate student of Sociology @ City University of New York, “Fear in the News: Discourse of Control”)

Fear pervades popular culture and the news media.Whether used as a noun, verb, adverb, or adjective, an ongoing study finds that the word "fear" pervades news reports across all sections of newspapers, and is shown to move or "travel" from one topic to another. The use of fear and the thematic emphases spawned by entertainment formats are consistent with a "discourse of fear," or the pervasive communication, symbolic awareness and expectation that danger and risk are a central feature of the effective environment**.** A qualitative content analysis of a decade of news coverage in The Arizona Republic and several other major American news media (e.g., the Los Angeles Times, and ABC News) reveals that the word "fear" appears more often than it did several years ago, particularly in headlines, where its use has more than doubled. Comparative materials obtained through the Lexis/Nexis information base also reveals that certain themes are associated with a shifting focus of fear over the years (e.g., violence, drugs, AIDS), with the most recent increases associated with reports about children. Analysis suggests that this use of fear is consistent with popular culture oriented to pursuing a "problem frame" and entertainment formats, which also have social implications for social policy and reliance on formal agents of social control. No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear. Edmund Burke Nearly everyone knows how to read the news of the day. But using news as a resource for everyday life is different from treating it as a topic to understand how social reality is ordered, maintained, and repaired. On the one hand, news reports as resources serve to set emotional tones for the rhythms of life and reminders of ideals of the order and disorder that threaten peaceful neighborhoods and the cosmologies of "normal order."On the other hand, news reports as topics provide a window into organizational frameworks of reality maintenance and their relevance for broader societal definitions of situations, courses of action, and assessments of a life world. News reports, as a feature of popular culture, become intertwined in everyday life, political speeches, and other entertainment forms such as movies. This article reports on the way fear is being used to provide entertaining news that also benefits formal agents of social control and promotes distrust among the audience. The way the production of entertaining news shapes the content of news can be clarified by looking at the role and use of fear over time across social issues. When fear is the prevailing framework for looking at social issues, then other competing frames and discourses lose out. When President Franklin Roosevelt said, in the context of the Great Depression, "Let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself," he had not envisioned American news media! Roosevelt cautioned against fear; today fear is embraced and constitutes a major public discourse through which numerous problems and issues are framed. A discourse of fear may be defined as the pervasive communication, symbolic awareness, and expectation that danger and risk are a central feature of the effective environment, or the physical and symbolic environment as people define and experience it in everyday life (Pfuhl and Henry 1993, p. 53). We report on the expanded use of fear in news reports and reflect on its significance for social order.

Turn – reliance on salvation narratives corrupts scientists’ objectivity and causes researchers to construct the dangers of outer space as existential threats

Felicity **Mellor 7**, Lecturer in Science Communication at Imperial College London, Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space, Social Studies of Science 37: 499, http://sss.sagepub.com/content/37/4/499.full.pdf

During the 1980s and 1990s, a small group of planetary scientists and astronomers set about actively promoting the asteroid impact threat. They drew on an expanded empirical base, but also on narratives of technological salvation. Despite their concerns that their warnings were greeted by a ‘giggle factor’ and that funding remained too low, they succeeded in capturing the attention of the media and of some policy-makers and in establishing the impact threat as a legitimate and serious topic for scientific study. By the eve of the new millennium, the meaning of asteroids had undergone a significant transformation. Asteroids had gone from being distant relics of Solar System history to being a hidden enemy that could strike at any time with catastrophic consequences. The reconceptualization of asteroids was accompanied by a reconceptualization of both space and astronomy. In Newtonianism, space had been conceived as an empty geometrical abstraction in which God’s handiwork was displayed to the knowing observer. Space was both predictable and distant. Now, with the promotion of the impact threat, space was configured as the source of an enemy against which we must defend ourselves. This threatening conception of space matched the conception of space as a theatre of war promoted by the supporters of SDI. Space had become a place, a technologized location for human action where wars could be fought and human salvation sought. Thus astronomy was also reconceptualized. Further developing the violent metaphors already appropriated by impact–extinction theory (Davis, 2001), astronomers recast their role as impassioned prophets of doom and saviours of mankind rather than as cold calculators of cosmic order. Traditionally, Solar System astronomy had dealt with the grand narratives of planetary history and the timeless certainties of celestial dynamics. The technologies of astronomy – telescopes and, later, space probes – were the tools through which new knowledge had been sought. They were not, on the whole, instruments of action. Now, however, astronomy was to be prophetic and interventionist. As comets had been in a far earlier period, both asteroids and comets were now treated as ‘monsters’ – portents of Earthly calamities. It was the purpose of planetary astronomy to watch for these portents. Equally, it was the duty of astronomers to warn the unsuspecting public and to intervene to save the world. Planetary astronomy was transformed from the passive observation of the heavens to the active surveillance of the heavens, and the instruments of astronomy were to be supplemented with the technologies of war. By the 1980s and 1990s, asteroid science, defence science and science fiction all presented space as an arena for technological intervention where an invisible enemy would be defeated for the greater good of mankind. Science fiction provided a culturally available resource that could give concrete form to the ideas of both asteroid scientists and weapons designers. Through narrative, the timeless and universal speculations of science could be converted into a specific sequence of events. By drawing on narratives of technological salvation, asteroid scientists made their case more compelling, but they also became dependent on narrative scenarios shared by the defence scientists.

Realism can’t explain motivation

Broughton 5 (Public Policy Program, @ Australian Nat U, *Millennium - Journal of International Studies Vol 33*, p. 886-867, ET)

One particular strength of What Moves Man is the focus on recent advances in psychology and cognitive science to our understanding of ‘motivation’. Drawing on this literature, Freyberg-Inan introduces three motivational attitudes as relevant to understanding state behaviour and decision-making, in contrast to realism’s theoretical dependence solely on power. These sources of motivation are categorised as ‘power’, ‘achievement’ and ‘affiliation’ according to the primary need pursued. Together they can account for reasons of behaviour in more situations than could power alone. This includes situations for which an observer would otherwise struggle to provide a meaningful explanation (if relying solely on ‘power’), or where rational behaviour would otherwise seem irrational when viewed only against the power conception of motivation. What Moves Man presents a wide-ranging and interdisciplinary overview of the relevant literature. The book is presented on intertextual lines, with heavy use of quotation. Much of its critique of realism is not new. Nevertheless, it does an exemplary job of drawing together various veins of criticism to present a cogent assessment of the paradigm on two levels. The first is realism’s claim to be a serious scientific theory—with its resultant reputation and aura of legitimacy/ credibility—and what this means for its explanatory or predictive power. The second is realism’s reductionist psychological base, which is further confused by an alleged contradictory theoretical aim (‘descriptive’ versus ‘prescriptive’). Interestingly, Freyberg-Inan draws on realism’s hoariest old stalwarts to support her case. What Moves Man provides a sympathetic reading of Hobbes, Thucydides and even Machiavelli—deriding many realist readings of these seminal authors as naïve and out of context. Thucydides is given particular emphasis as an early writer who acknowledged the same three bases for motivation in foreign affairs (power, achievement and affiliation) that have been supported by the modern research Freyberg-Inan cites. The writings of Hobbes and Machiavelli are claimed as misunderstood normative works taken by modern realists as positivist studies.

Realism misreads psychological concepts like motivation and incentives – The theory is anti-scientific

Broughton 5 (Public Policy Program, @ Australian Nat *U,Millennium - Journal of International Studies Vol 33*, p. 885, ET)

In What Moves Man, Annette Freyberg-Inan contends that realism (including classical, structural, offensive, and other variants) has developed into the dominant ‘Kuhnian’ paradigm of IR, and that this is detrimental to the study and practice of the discipline. She argues that as a result of attaining paradigmatic status realism has dissipated its claims to ‘scientificicity’ as a falsifiable set of theories. She also argues that realism’s assumptions concerning human nature and motivation are biased in ways that adversely affect explanations of, and guidance for, the conduct of international politics. This bias ‘supports the selffulfilling prophecy of the realist paradigm’, and is maintained and escapes persistent scrutiny precisely because of realism’s paradigmatic status. She concludes: ‘It encourages distorted judgements of the motives of others and creates incentives to respond to their behaviour in exactly the ways predicted by the paradigmatic worldview’ (p. 151). Freyberg-Inan is not ‘anti-realist’, nor a proselytiser for one of realism’s rivals. Rather, she protests that no contemporary theory adequately explains international relations, and more importantly, that none offer an adequate guide for political action and decision-making. She suggests that the discipline needs new integrative frameworks crossing theoretical and disciplinary boundaries. Such integrative frameworks are essential to break the current paradigm, to avoid the bias identified in realism, and to keep pace with developments in other fields and their impact on our understanding of international relations. Freyberg-Inan sees some merit in aspects of the realist framework, but her concerns are for what she sees as substantial theoretical weaknesses that are hidden, or routinely protected, through ad hoc adjustments to its broad theoretical base. The example given concerns the continually adjusted definition of the concept of ‘power’, which is wielded in different ways by realists according to the phenomena they are purporting to explain. Such adjustments serve to obscure the ‘boldness’ of realism’s motivational assumptions, leading it to ignore all other possibly relevant motives for state action that do not fit the ‘fear-power’ nexus for determining national interest and the likely behaviour of other states.

**Realism is a flawed foreign policy, and Mersheimer is empirically wrong.**

**Garib 05** [Garib, Andrew. "Questioning the Realist Critique of International Institutions." 13 May 2005. Web. 27 June 2011. AMB]

Today international institutions properly reflect the balance of power in the world: when the United States, China and the European Union wish not to act in the realms of the Andrew Garib asg29 17 United Nations, then nothing happens; the World Trade Organization, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are heavily influenced by American interests; and institutions like NATO are of less relevance today as they were during the Cold War. It should be noted that these organizations had at their core the interests of one particular power – the United States – in a particular era of less interdependence and more realist strategy. But this does not mean that real international institutions could be established in the image of just institutions Keohane recommends. Today, the pure conditions of Realist foreign policy simply no longer exist. They may have in the past, but the web of interdependence that Shue and Keohane recognize create the conditions necessary for a new international set of institutions which better coordinate the world arena. What were once Rambo games are now Dilemma games: the international interdependence we now see make it possible and desirable for there to be new mechanisms to manage these relations for the sakes of peace, justice and efficiency. Today, the pure conditions of Realist foreign policy simply no longer exist. They may have in the past, but the web of interdependence that Shue and Keohane recognize create the conditions necessary for a new international set of institutions which better coordinate the world arena. What were once Rambo games are now Dilemma games: the international interdependence we now see make it possible and desirable for there to be new mechanisms to manage these relations for the sakes of peace, justice and efficiency. Moreover, even Mearsheimer’s very definition of international institutions is faulty given our sensitivity to norms and beliefs and values. Mearsheimer defines institutions as “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other.” (Mearsheimer 8) As Mearsheimer quotes from Charles Lipson on page 9, institutions call for “the decentralized cooperation of individual sovereign states, without any effective mechanism of command [i.e., world government].” But Lipson and Mearsheimer pretend as if norms, values and beliefs mean nothing to wily states; in fact they do. International institutions are more than agreements, but are repeatedly reinforced by the respect members give to their rules. Rules without respect and the expectation of respect are nothing. (See the definition of ‘regime’, List Rittberger 89) As an analogy, the U.S. Constitution is not a simple contract between United States Americans, but a document with heightened normative power given its history and the respect it has and continues to be given. This is similar to what Shue describes as the difference between convention and custom. Custom is much stronger because of the genuine normative strength of the institution and the expectation of compliance by other actors. (Shue 344) With these considerations, Mearsheimer is incorrect to assume that liberal institutionalism could only deal with issues such as the environment and the economy (and not well, due to the threat of relative gains in the economic arena) and not with world peace; for what we have today are interactions that are not a product of the fear of existential violence but of a desire to resolve other conflicts and increase efficiency in world commerce. Because of the multifarious nature (which is increasingly so) of state interactions and the influence that states have on each other’s domestic situations, it seems less rational for states to worry about Realist competition and more rational to invest in cooperative schemes that encourage short-term sacrifices for long-term gains of stability, safety and economic prosperity. The world is increasingly a Prisoner’s Dilemma; the world’s states are progressively less concerned about relative gains in power and more about coordinating systems of international institutions, mitigated by accountability in the democratic, legal and economic realms and in the maintenance of norms and (for the wily state, perhaps projection of) beliefs and principles. The richer definition of a global institution only lends credibility to the idea that international relations is and will be a coordination of interests, not a reaction to power structure.

Realism, by ontologically privileging the state and ordering, links to the k and becomes an ideology of death.

Der Derian 99 (James, Brown U, research professor of international studies and professor of political science, *Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities* 4:2 pg. 54-55)

Nietzsche and Derrida offer a penetrating critique of sovereignty, yet ... it lives, most demonstrably in international theory and diplomatic statecraft, as, no less, the realist perspective. What do we mean by "realism"? It encompasses a world-view in which sovereign states, struggling for power under conditions of anarchy, do what they must to maintain and promote their own self-interests. But what do "we" mean by "realism"? We realists, constituted by and representing disciplinary schools of thought, diplomatic corps, intelligence bureaucracies, depict things as they really are, rather than as idealists might wish them to be. And what do "we" mean by "realism"? We mean what we say and say what we mean, in that transparent way of correspondence that provides the veridical, commonsensical, deadly discourses of realism, like mutual assured destruction assures our security, or "we had to destroy the village in order to save it." But with the end of the Cold War, and pace Nietzsche, why beat a dead horse? Precisely because realism does death so well, by refusing to acknowledge not only its ongoing complicity in the death of others but also the fact that it gave up the ghost a long time ago. How many times, after how many "revolutionary" transitions, have we heard that sovereignty is at bay, at an end, dead? There is always the easy deflection, that sovereignty is an "essentially contested concept," a "convenient fiction," that changes with the times. But the frequency of such death-notices, from politicians, military strategists and pundits, as well as academicians, leads one to suspect that something other than funerary oration, philosophical speculation, or a topic for a special issue is at work. Is there a darker, even gothic side to the sovereign state, a hidden power which resides in its recurrent morbidity? Take a look at some of the principle necroses. Realism has built a life out of the transformation of fictions, like the immutability of human nature and the apodictic threat of anarchy, into facticity. With a little digging, realism comes to resemble nothing so much as the undead, a perverse mimesis of the living other, haunting international politics through the objectification of power, the fetishisation of weaponry, the idealisation of the state, the virtualisation of violence, and the globalisation of new media. Now the fact of its own death lives on as a powerful fiction, as the morbid customs, characteristics, and habits of the living dead.

# A2 Author Indicts/Facts

Astronomers deliberately manipulate asteroids stats to get research funding

Felicity **Mellor 10**, Lecturer in Science Communication at Imperial College London, “Negotiating uncertainty: asteroids, risk and the media”, Public Understand. Sci. 19(1) (2010) 16–33

Despite frequently referring to impacts as low frequency/high consequence events, NEO scientists failed to acknowledge that this meant that annual averages were statistically meaningless. 3 Instead, by offering comparisons with such things as deaths from car crashes, they implied an equivalence between the impact risk and other death rates whose averages are statistically valid. When other scientists did criticize Chapman and Morrison’s comparisons, they did so by offering alternative comparisons—such as worldwide death rates from childhood diseases or smoking (Weissman, 1994; Sagan and Ostro, 1994)—rather than criticizing the actuarial approach itself.Yet, like the comparison between the Torino scale and the Richter scale, these risk comparisons compared quantities derived from historical data—events which have actually happened—with those based on a predicted event (the destruction of human civilization by an asteroid impact) that has never happened. As Chapman and Morrison (1994) admitted, there have never actually been any authenticated deaths from asteroid impacts. In an e-mail to the Cambridge Conference Network in the days after the XF11 affair, astronomer Duncan Steel (1998a) pushed the manipulation of statistics even further. After bemoaning the public’s “lack of understanding of probabilities” and their failure to take seriously impacts which occurred on average once every 50,000 or 500,000 years, he reasoned that car accidents, which are taken seriously, had a similar timescale: Averaged over industrialized nations I believe that the car accident rates indicate a probability of dying that way of about one in 120. For the same nations the average life expectancy is about 80 years. Thus the timescale for dying in a car crash is of order 120 × 80 ~ 10,000 years. In fact, for the US, approximately 39,000 fatalities in car crashes each year means there is the equivalent of one fatality every 13 minutes. This is the most meaningful measure for the timescale of deaths from car crashes. Since the “probability of dying” already factors in the average life expectancy, Steel’s figure is actually the time needed to kill the entire population through car crashes assuming the population to be otherwise static.4 The problems associated with the statistical framing of the impact threat mean that it should not be seen as a cognitive strategy to aid understanding. Rather, like the presumed demarcation between scientist and public, it functioned as a discursive strategy to aid the denotation of asteroids as risky and the positioning of NEO scientists as the appropriate experts to manage the risk. Among other things, this could help secure funding for NEO research. Some of the critics of the Torino scale were explicit about funding being the core issue at stake. Astronomer Mark Kidger (1999) worried that with so few objects registering on the scale at all, media interest would fall off and the public might assume the problem had gone away. “The truth is that the problem still exists, will not go away, and can only get more serious if a reduced public profile of the issue leads to a serious reduction in funding for NEO programs.” He suggested that to maintain public interest the lower end of the scale should be expanded so that it registered more objects more frequently. Another commentator, although not himself a NEO researcher, was even more explicit. Jens Kiefer-Olsen (2000) claimed that any impact scale “must serve primarily as a vehicle to extract funding from politicians. Hence the scale should produce a one-dimensional figure, namely the amount of $$$ to be allocated immediately, or over a specific period.” Brian Marsden (2003a) thought that media exposure had indeed helped secure funds for NEO research and suggested that without the XF11 coverage “NASA would have put less money into NEO searches than it now does (yes, there could yet be more!)”. Despite the scientists’ concerns about the quality of media reports on the impact threat, journalists rarely, if ever, challenged the claims made by the scientists and they accepted the statistical framing of the issue which the scientists promoted. Most journalists included statements about uncertainty in their news reports, their stories were derived from statements issued by scientific sources and they often quoted relevant experts or institutions. When revised data were released implying a downgraded risk for a specific asteroid, some news reports presented this as meaning that the scientists had made mistakes but most did not take this angle. Thus journalists were accepting of the NEO scientists’ claims and were willing to reproduce them in their reports. However, the scientists’ attachment of specific numbers and dates to possible impact solutions enabled journalists to frame their stories in terms of certain knowledge. When later reports presented equally certain, but different, knowledge claims the scientists worried that they would lose credibility. As Clark Chapman (1998b) said after the XF11 affair: “All of us, not just the MPC [Minor Planet Center], lost some credibility a few weeks ago when failures in the peer-review process at the MPC led to the XF11 scare.” Others, such as Italian astronomer Andrea Milani (1999), worried that delaying an announcement would also damage the researchers’ credibility. If the people not belonging to the rather exclusive club of specialists of orbit determination get the impression that they are not being informed, on an issue as critical as the orbits of the NEO (and their close approaches to the Earth), the credibility of the scientific community as a whole could be undermined, and this is a more subtle but very dangerous version of the crying wolf story.

Scientists’ predictions are exaggerated

Felicity **Mellor 10**, Lecturer in Science Communication at Imperial College London, “Negotiating uncertainty: asteroids, risk and the media”, Public Understand. Sci. 19(1) (2010) 16–33

Natural scientists often appear in the news media as key actors in the management of risk. This paper examines the way in which a small group of astronomers and planetary scientists have constructed asteroids as risky objects and have attempted to control the media representation of the issue. It shows how scientists negotiate the uncertainties inherent in claims about distant objects and future events by drawing on quantitative risk assessments even when these are inapplicable or misleading. Although the asteroid scientists worry that media coverage undermines their authority, journalists typically accept the scientists’ framing of the issue. The asteroid impact threat reveals the implicit assumptions which can shape natural scientists’ public discourse and the tensions which arise when scientists’ quantitative uncertainty claims are re-presented in the news media.

Your scientists empirically ignore reality

Felicity **Mellor 7**, Lecturer in Science Communication at Imperial College London, Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space, Social Studies of Science 37: 499, http://sss.sagepub.com/content/37/4/499.full.pdf

Similarly, astronomer Duncan Steel (1995: 234) recalled that the members of the Detection Committee had been ‘outraged’ by a paper presented at the San Juan Capistrano conference by Nicholas Colella, a Lawrence Livermore scientist who had called for the development of a multimilliondollar satellite-based detection system, and that Lowell Wood had been ‘roundly booed’ after criticizing NASA space missions in an afterdinner speech. Steel said that he found the Interception Workshop ‘very interesting and stimulating’, but that it was also ‘bizarre in that some of the presentations paid little regard to the laws of physics and less to any laws of economic reality’ (Steel, 1995: 232). According to Steel, some of the talks were ‘wildly in error’ and David Morrison had complained that the defence scientists lived in a ‘parallel universe’ and that they seemed to draw on science fiction rather than the laws of physics (Steel, 1995: 234–35). They did indeed draw on science fiction, but, as we will see, so too did the civilian scientists.

The aff’s “science” conforms to a narrative structure, not vice versa

Felicity **Mellor 7**, Lecturer in Science Communication at Imperial College London, Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space, Social Studies of Science 37: 499, http://sss.sagepub.com/content/37/4/499.full.pdf

The asteroid impact threat was thus articulated within a narrative context that was closely aligned to science fiction and was shared by both civilian scientists and defence experts. As Veronica Hollinger (2000: 216–17) has noted, traditional science fiction is driven by an Aristotelian plot characterized by ‘a valorisation of the logic of cause and effect’. Impact narratives conformed to this traditional narrative logic: asteroids and scientists act by causing a series of events to unfold, from the approach of an asteroid and recognition of the threat through attempts at technological mitigation to resolution in salvation. These narratives configured asteroids as acting agents in human affairs and brought to asteroid science a structure in which human agents (and their technological proxies) solve the problem posed in the narrative and in so doing achieve closure. Allusions to impact narratives implied a direction and human-centredness to events that, once the narratives had been evoked, could not easily be suppressed. Despite their attempts to distance themselves from the weapons scientists, the civilian scientists experienced a ‘narrative imperative’ that drew them towards the same technologized ends as those promoting SDI. A sense of narrative agency was evoked even in texts that were not primarily narratival. Crucially, asteroids were no longer seen as signifiers of the mathematically exacting Newtonian system, distant objects moving through the empty backdrop of space. Rather, they were configured as proximate beasts, acting subjects that could turn against humanity at any moment. Thus in their many popular books on the subject, the scientists described asteroids as belonging to a ‘menagerie’ or a ‘cosmic zoo’ (Steel, 2000a: 120); they were ‘menacing’ (Kring, 2000: 171) and had ‘teeth’ (Clube & Napier, 1990: 154); they were ‘global killers’ (Lewis, 1997: 209) that could unleash ‘ferocious assaults’ (Steel, 1995: 247) on the Earth; they were the ‘enemy’ (Steel, 2000a: 153). Likewise, in their paper in Nature, Chapman & Morrison (1994: 33) stated that Earth ‘resides in a swarm of asteroids’. The construction of asteroids as the enemy was accompanied by a range of other militaristic metaphors. In the popular books, asteroids became ‘missiles’, ‘pieces of ordnance’ or ‘stealth weapons’ (Lewis, 1997: 37), which bombard the Earth with a ‘death-dealing fusillade’ (Clube & Napier, 1990: 7). In a technical paper, too, they were construed as ‘astral assailant[s]’ (Simonenko et al., 1994: 929). Where the military and the politicians talked of rogue states,27 the scientists talked of ‘rogue asteroids’ (Steel, 1995; Ailor, 2004: 3). This analogy was further reinforced by the construction of scenarios in which a small impact might be mistaken for the detonation of a nuclear warhead. One technical paper speculated on what would have happened during the first Gulf War if an atmospheric explosion that had been caused by a meteor burning up over the Pacific had actually occurred over Baghdad or Israel (Tagliaferri et al., 1994). The authors suggested that such an event would have been mistaken for a missile detonation by the opposing state. In such scenarios, the actions of interplanetary bodies were not just compared with those of rogue states but came to be identified with them. With the swarming asteroids filling space, space itself was also resignified. What had been an abstract mathematical space became a narrative place, the location where particular and contingent events occurred. Although the scientists continued to appeal to the predictability of celestial dynamics – it was this that would enable a survey of near-Earth objects to identify any that might pose a threat – they also noted that chaotic processes disturbed the orbits of comets and also, to a lesser degree, asteroids (for example, Yeomans & Chodas, 1994; Milani et al., 2000). The inherent unpredictability of the orbits was enhanced by the current state of scientific uncertainty. These chaotic and uncertain processes were projected onto space itself, construed as a place of random violence. In the popular books, the Solar System became a ‘dangerous cosmic neighbourhood’ (Sumners & Allen, 2000b: 3), ‘a capricious, violent place’ (Verschuur, 1996: 217), a place of ‘mindless violence’ (Verschuur, 1996: 18) and ‘wanton destruction’ (Levy, 1998: 13). Even in a peer-reviewed paper, Chapman (2004: 1) described space as a ‘cosmic shooting gallery’. Despite the agency attributed to the asteroids themselves, in the narratives of technological salvation it was the human agents, acting through new technologies, who moved the narratives forward. Narrative progression was thus generated through an assumption of technological progress. Through technology, humans intervene in space and become agents of cosmic events. The scientists’ promotion of the impact threat shared this assumption of technological progress. Like the US Air Force study, their technical papers on mitigation systems considered speculative technologies such as solar sails and mass drivers as well as more established explosive technologies (for example, Ahrens & Harris, 1992; Melosh & Nemchinov, 1993; Ivashkin & Smirnov, 1995; Gritzner & Kahle, 2004). Even those scientists who warned that it was too early to draw up detailed blueprints of interception technologies accepted the narratival implication that there was a problem that needed addressing, that the problem could be addressed by human action, and that this action would involve a technological solution. Technology, in this picture, was configured as inherently progressive. As Morrison & Teller (1994: 1137) put it: ‘The development of technology in the past few centuries has been towards increasing understanding and control of natural forces in an effort to improve human life.’ Those scientists who argued against the immediate development of mitigation technology shared with its proponents a belief in the inexorable progress of technology. Future generations, they argued, would be better equipped than we are at the moment to meet the technological challenge of an impacting asteroid (for example, Ahrens & Harris, 1992).

And, their best studies cite science fiction novels

Felicity **Mellor 7**, Lecturer in Science Communication at Imperial College London, Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space, Social Studies of Science 37: 499, http://sss.sagepub.com/content/37/4/499.full.pdf

Despite their disagreements over technical details and funding priorities, both civilian and defence scientists appealed to narratives of technological salvation. In his study of the superweapon in the American imagination, Bruce Franklin (1988) has shown how a century-long tradition of futurewar fiction shaped an apocalyptic ideology in which American technological genius was to put an end to all war and fulfill America’s manifest destiny. Franklin argues that this cultural fantasizing has been materially significant in producing actual superweapons and developing defence policy. As David Seed (1999) has also shown, SDI was made imaginable, and was explicitly defended, by science fiction writers. The impact-threat scientists took this cultural fantasizing a step further as they attempted to establish the reality of that threat. It was now nature, rather than any human foe, which was configured as the warring enemy whose technological defeat would bring Earthly harmony. Until the 1970s, most science fiction stories about asteroids imagined them as objects to be exploited for their mineral wealth.24 Scientists’ writings would occasionally reflect this interest.25 Indeed, the only paper in the 1979 volume Asteroids to allude to a future impact of an asteroid with Earth was framed in terms of the exploitation of asteroids. In a bizarre paper, which had been rejected for an earlier publication after being judged ‘outrageously innovative’ and ‘premature’, Samuel Herrick (1979) proposed that portions of the asteroid Geographos could be targeted at specific points on the Earth to produce ‘constructive’ effects, such as the excavation of a new Central American canal to join the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. However, by the time of Herrick’s technical fantasy, science fiction writers had begun to explore the more destructive consequences of an asteroid impacting with Earth. Most notably, Arthur C. Clarke, in his 1973 novel Rendezvous with Rama (Clarke, 1991 [1973]) described an asteroid impact in 2077. A detection survey called ‘Spaceguard’ is established in response to the impact and the rest of the story deals with the investigation of what actually turns out to be an alien spacecraft that is detected by the Spaceguard survey some 60 years later. Clarke developed the Spaceguard idea further in another novel, Hammer of God (Clarke, 1995) [1993] after writing a short story on the same theme for Time magazine the previous year (Clarke, 1992b). Clarke’s impact novels were well regarded by the scientists promoting the impact threat and were cited in some of their peer-reviewed papers and policy documents as well as in their popular books. For instance, in their influential paper in Nature, Chapman & Morrison (1994: 38) introduced the idea of deflecting a possible impactor with a reference to Hammer of God, noting that: ‘Just such a scenario … is the theme of a recent novel’ (see also Morrison et al., 1994: 84; Atkinson, 2000: 36). Indeed, the scientists named their own international survey the Spaceguard Survey and their promotional organization the Spaceguard Foundation in tribute to Clarke, as they acknowledged in their technical papers (for example, Milani et al., 2002: 55). Clarke became a Trustee Member of Spaceguard, and he was a personal friend of Duncan Steel and Tom Gehrels, and wrote the foreword for one of Steel’s popular books on the impact threat and the afterword for another one (Gehrels, 1988: 236; Steel, 1995, 2000a). As Clarke himself remarked in the acknowledgements for one of his novels, ‘the strands of fact and fiction are becoming inextricably entwined’ (Clarke, 1995 [1993]: 247). Also mentioned by the scientists was Larry Niven and Jerry Pournelle’s Lucifer’s Hammer. This 1977 novel is essentially a survivalist tale about the aftermath of a comet impact. In the lawless devastation following the impact, a former Senator sets up a community that attempts to re-establish a civilized, technologized society. This predominantly white community is attacked by various predominantly violent black gangs, one of which has turned to cannibalism as an initiation rite. Despite its racism, which always went unacknowledged in the scientists’ comments, they praised this novel in their popular books. For instance, planetary scientist John Lewis (1997: 151) stated that no novel had better visualized the effects of ocean impacts, and Steel cited it as an example of ‘good science fiction’ based on ‘real science’ (Steel, 2000a: 124). Acknowledging limits to the expertise of natural scientists, Clark Chapman and David Morrison (1989: 279) suggested that ‘estimating sociological responses to catastrophe are more nearly in the purview of sciencefiction writers, like Jerry Pournelle and Larry Niven, who addressed these matters in Lucifer’s Hammer (see also Morrison et al., 2004: 378). Like Clarke, Niven had direct contact with the scientists promoting the impact threat, attending the 2004 Planetary Defense Conference in California. Despite their very different political affinities, Clarke, Niven and Pournelle all portrayed technology as a force for good. With his proposal for a Spaceguard survey in Rendezvous with Rama and with the action of Hammer of God based on board a research space vessel charged with deflecting the incoming asteroid, Clarke’s impact novels promoted salvation through technology. Despite his earlier criticisms of SDI, in 1992 Clarke gave ‘two faint cheers for Son-of-SDI’, given certain provisos, because the technology might be needed to deflect an asteroid (Clarke, 1992a: 12). Niven and Pournelle also promoted an ideology of technological salvation in their novel, despite setting Lucifer’s Hammer in the technologically compromised aftermath of an impact. The story’s denouement has the Senator’s group defending a nuclear power station, which they see as offering the means to recover civilization – a civilization fully attainable only through its technological artefacts. In this, as in other impact narratives, technology offers not the source of destruction but the means of salvation.

# A2 Violence Inevitable

**Humans are inclined to cooperation, not aggression**

**Goldstein, ’87** - Professor Emeritus of International Relations, American University (Washington, DC) Research Scholar, University of Massachusetts and Nonresident Sadat Senior Fellow, CIDCM, University of Maryland (Joshua S., International Studies Quarterly (1987) 31, 36, “The Emperor’s New Genes: Sociobiology and War,” University of Southern California)

Humans are not inherently aggressive but are more often cooperative. Dobzhansky (1962) suggests that "the fittest may also be the gentlest." 15 Morgan (1972: 58-59) and others point out that most human beings, even most males, never participate in wars (and even the participants act more like "sheep" than "wolves")-thus to "write of war as . . . a biological imperative like breathing and eating . . . is absurd." Montagu (1976: 3) rejects the idea that "human beings are inescapably killers" or "genetically and instinctively aggressive. '16 Indeed, the bias of biology is not toward aggression but cooperation, as Montagu (1976: 87, 185) states: In humans, cooperation and altruism have been at a much higher selective premium than in other primates. . Aggression, the existing evidence suggests, occurs only in cultures in which the individual is conditioned in aggressive behavior.

# A2 Link turn

Securitization is the military interventionism in fields unrelated to the military, for the sake of a perceived “safety”, and space is not immune

School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies **10 [**"The Growing ‘securitization’ of Outer Space." *Space Policy* 26.4 (2010): 205-08. *Science Direct*. Web. 26 June 2011. AMB]

What, then, is ‘securitization’, and why should it be regarded as anything other than another ‘-ation’ to be added to the pot? **Recent decades have seen a rapid and extensive ‘broadening’ of the contexts in which the concept of security is applied and in the range of issues it is seen to cover. From a relatively circumscribed historical association with military threats and issues, the concept of security is increasingly used in reference to ‘non-traditional’ issues, such as migration and environmental degradation. In both policy and academic discourse non-military issues are now frequently referred to as ‘security’ issues by policy makers. Space policy has been far from immune from this wider trend.** **Such moves to widen the spectrum of security issues can be classified as attempts at ‘securitization’, a term coined by the group of scholars within security studies commonly referred to as the ‘CopenhagenSchool’.**[2](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026596461000086X" \l "fn2) **Securitization is, in broad terms, the process through which a non-military issue comes to be seen as an issue of security. When an issue comes to be treated as an issue of national security, it is justifiable to use exceptional political measures to deal with it. It is ‘securitized’: that is, it is treated with the same degree of urgency as military threats to the very existence of a state (as traditionally captured in the concept of ‘national security’), or what the Copenhagen School labels ‘existential threats’.**

# A2 Russia is a Threat

**Since the dissolving of the USSR, Russia has incurred profound changes which have allowed it’s assimilation into contemporary society.**

**Petro 07**( Nicolai N, Professor of Political Science at the University of Rhode Island specializing in Russian Affairs. Speaking Freely.) AV

So it is with Russia today. Compared with the USSR of 30 years ago, Russia's decimated army, which even with recent increases spends no more than 5% of the US military budget, is no military threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Moreover, Russia's overarching economic and political ambition since 1991 has not been global conquest, but integration into the global market economy(incidentally, making Moscow the world's fifth-largest stock market). And yet despite having undergone changes that would have been inconceivable a generation ago, many Western pundits seem to fear Russia even more than they feared the USSR, and routinely compare Putin to Joseph Stalin, Benito Mussolini, even Adolf Hitler! Such an intense level of fear must be linked to self-image - to a cultural identity so deeply ingrained that many in the West simply cannot imagine parting with it. That cultural identity, based on separating Russia from the West, served the West quite well during the Cold War by bolstering its psychological defenses against an implacable ideological foe. Now, however, it is hampering our ability to see the profound changes that have occurred in Russian society, and we must let it go. Among the many factors that shape perception of the world around us, the mass media play a singularly important role. Sociologists tell us that we see people as "informed" when their opinions match the categories established by the media. When one challenges these categories, therefore, one literally runs the risk of being seen as taking positions that are "against all common sense". In reporting about Russia, we see all too often that as reality diverges from our preconceptions, media reports serve to reinforce our stereotypes. The sad truth is that the more negative a story is about Russia, the more we know it to be true - a toxic axiom that has resulted in a surreal picture of contemporary Russia. Here are just a few of the choicest examples

**Although some officials believe that Russia is still a threat, Russia’s new willingness to open to the West has shown that it is not a danger to other nations anymore.**

**Valeev 03** (Ruslan, Operations Manager at San Francisco State University (NSRC), Mathematics tutor/Lab manager at San Francisco State University. The International Relations Journal) AV

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Western scholars have searched continuously for a logical explanation of Russian foreign policy. The discussion has centered around the question of the degree of Russia’s potential hostility or friendliness towards the West. Western scholars’ attempts to explain Russian foreign policy have been frustrated by the oftentimes contradictory actions of the Russian government. In 1991and for several years thereafter, Russia’s relations with the West were characterized by euphoria and amicability, which, however, later turned into increasing alienation, causing some observers to refer to it as a “Cold Peace.” And yet, with the ascension of Vladimir Putin to the presidency the direction of foreign policy changed again. Many scholars have been very cautious of the new Russia, considering it a “resting bear” that can rise at any moment. Stephen Blank, a professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, argues in “Putin’s Twelve-Step Program” that Putin has a concrete program, which intends to isolate Russia from the West, rebuild the empire and eventually confront the West.1 In “The Post-Soviet States and Post-Saddam Middle East,” Blank states that Russia deliberately challenges U.S. power by supplying weapons, including Weapons of Mass Destruction, to Iraq and Iran.2 Blank speculates that Russia could “furnish support, either overt of covert, for attacks upon the U.S. positions in Central Asia.”3 Thus he proposes that Russia is a real threat, specifically to the U.S. and, by extension, to the remainder of the West. Moreover, some governmental officials still believe that Russia is a clear and present danger. Kurt Weldon, a chairman of the House Armed Services Committee expressed the opinion that Russian “intelligence services still regard the United States as the enemy and consider war with the U.S. as ‘inevitable.’”4 In addition there is suspicion that there is already a Russian “suitcase nuclear device” in the continental U.S.5This paper argues that Russia is not a threat, either to international security or to the West specifically. Russia is currently too pre-occupied with rebuilding its economy after the Soviet collapse and twelve years of post-Soviet mismanagement. Russian military is in no condition to sustain even a small localized conflict. However, the extent of Russia’s unwillingness to oppose the West is not measured merely by its lack of capabilities, but also by its deep dependence on the West for trade, capital and investment. Russia will be self-deterred until it achieves both military proficiency and economic independence.

# A2 Obama not Securitizing

**Obama is just as, if not more, securitizing toward space than President Bush**

School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies **10 [**"The Growing ‘securitization’ of Outer Space." *Space Policy* 26.4 (2010): 205-08. *Science Direct*. Web. 26 June 2011. AMB]

**Even US space policy appears to have moved towards securitization of an ever greater range of issues that include** – but also extend well beyond – **a narrow military definition of security. The US National Space Policy of 2006 identified US military capabilities as ‘critically dependent upon space capabilities’, but equally cited space capabilities as ‘critical’ to ‘…a wide range of civil, commercial, and national security users’, thus assuming wider security implications of space as well as its more direct military uses**.[11](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026596461000086X" \l "fn11) This stated centrality of space to *both* military and civilian infrastructures was subsequently used to justify the exceptional, unilateralist stance taken by the George W. Bush administration towards any proposals for new legal regimes on outer space or restrictions on military research and development. **Although the National Space Policy of 2010 is diametrically opposed in its attitude towards international cooperation, space law and arms control (‘The United States will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies’****[12](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026596461000086X" \l "fn12)), the Obama administration nevertheless shares with its predecessor the assumption that space security is more than just military**, as is exemplified in its National Security Strategy: Across the globe, we must work in concert with allies and partners to optimize the use of shared sea, air, and space domains. These shared areas, which exist outside exclusive national jurisdictions, are the connective tissue around the globe upon which all nations’ security and prosperity depend. The United States will continue to help safeguard access, promote security, and ensure the sustainable use of resources in these domains.[13](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026596461000086X" \l "fn13)

\*\*\* AFF ANSWERS \*\*\*

# Aff – Space Threats Real

**China, the EU, and Japan are the most securitized international actors.**

**School of Sociology 10**, Politics and International Studies10 **[**"The Growing ‘securitization’ of Outer Space." *Space Policy* 26.4 (2010): 205-08. *Science Direct*. Web. 26 June 2011. AMB]

**Although securitization is a prevalent feature of EU space policy discourse, it is by no means Europe’s sole preserve. In its overview of global space policies, the Space Security Index report Space Security 2009 explicitly noted that ‘National space policies consistently emphasize international cooperation and the peaceful uses of outer space’, but equally that there is a ‘Growing focus within national policies on the security uses of outer space’**. **As well as developments in EU space policy, the report notes that national security has become a central principle of China’s emerging space programme,** and that France’s White Paper on Defence and National Security calls for an overhaul of its national space strategy. 7 **Another prominent instance in this regard is Japan’s 2008 ‘Basic Law of Space Activities’, the ﬁrst signiﬁcant alteration to the Japanese space policy framework established in 1969. Whereas the latter studiously adhered to the ‘peaceful purposes’ of the Outer Space Treaty (interpreting this strictly to mean ‘non-military’ purposes), the 2008 framework has lifted the previous ban on military space activities by citing the importance of ‘national security’, thus potentially allowing a greater space role for Japan’s Ministry of Defence in this regard.** The move attracted controversy given Japan’s ‘Peaceful Constitution’ 8 and the strict interpretation of ‘peaceful purposes’ in the 1969 framework. Japan has used ‘multi-purpose’ Information Gathering Satellites (IGS) for tasks such as monitoring North Korean missile programmes long prior to 2008 but, as Kazuto Suzuki notes, ‘It was [previously] difﬁcult eve to mention the term “dual-use” because that would imply the possibility of participation of the MoD.’

# Aff – Environment

The plan’s emphasis on solving for democracy and a free nation solves for a free environment and a more conscious population.

Bührs 09

(Ton, Dr. Ton Bührs is a CSGR Visiting Fellow from Lincoln University, New Zealand, where he is a Senior Lecturer and the Convenor for Postgraduate Studies in Environmental Management and Policy in the Environmental Management Group, Environmental Space as a Basis for Legitimating Global Governance of Environmental Limits, Global Environmental Politics, Volume 9, Number 4, November 2009, pp. 111-135 Article, Published by The MIT Press. Accessed: 6/21/11 EL)

Already, several instances of growing global agreement on the need to respect environmental limits can be identiaed. However, these developments are mostly conaned to areas of environmental space that can be referred to as “common pool” resources, or in which alternatives are more or less readily available at relatively low cost. Creating international agreements on areas of environmental space that are owned and controlled by the business sector or governments, and that are strategically important or for which alternatives are costly or not readily available, however, appears problematic. With regard to the latter, environmental space is gradually but inexorably eroded through a process that may be referred to as the tragedy of serial depletion. With globalization, and in the context of dominant political and economic rationality, re- sources (and their substitutes) are eroded and ultimately depleted one-by-one, and from place to place, only to become regarded as problematic when total demand starts to outstrip supply on an ongoing basis. By then, ecologically sustainable resource management may no longer be feasible, or only at a much lower level of available resources. Often, the erosion of environmental space leads to a sharpening of com- petition and conoict and the imposition of limits (including by force) that protects the position of the rich and powerful at the expense of the poor. To prevent these outcomes, it is necessary to enhance democracy. Enhancing democracy, from an environmental space perspective, implies not only extending the principles of liberal democracy to the global level but also creating institutions and processes that grant people, within appropriate ecological-geographical con- texts, a material stake in and formal rights and control over speciac areas of environmental space. Depending on the resource or area of environmental space, a variety of forms of economic democracy may be designed. Which forms may be more desirable and feasible is a question that is best addressed by analysis of the political-economic constellations associated with particular areas of environmental space or resources and the development of strategies and coalitions on that basis. Ultimately, whether the potential to use the notion of environmental space in positive ways will be exploited depends on the building and strengthening of a basis of social support and agency aimed at realizing this potential. The prospects of building such a basis are likely to vary from resource to resource and from country to country. But given the linkages between resources and countries, such support must also be built at the global level. This is a daunting task, but vital if the bleak and self-defeating scenario of the “securitization of environmental limits” is to be avoided.

**Saving the environment requires effective political engagement—environmental philosophers must abandon abstract theorizing in order to build the public.**

**De-Shalit**, **2000**. Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. “The Environment: Between Theory and Practice,” Avner p. 4-6, Questia.

However, it would be wrong, if not dangerous, to blame the 'other'. From the prophets in biblical times to the French revolutionaries and the early Fabians, history is full of examples of theorists and philosophers who abandoned all hope of persuading others through deliberation, and became impatient and hence more radical in their ideas. This explains why the shift from humanistic to misanthropic attitudes has been rapid. Perhaps the 'easiest' way to solve a problem is to lose faith in a form of gradual change that can still remain respectful of humans. Such an attitude, I believe, **only brings about a new series of problems encompassing dictatorship, totalitarianism, and lack of personal freedom**. In this book I seek to maintain the philosophical impetus, not to point the finger at the politicians or the activists. Rather, I wish to examine ourselves—the philosophers who engage in discussing the environment—to discover how we might construct a theory that is much more accessible to the activists and the general public (without relinquishing any of our goals), and which can be harnessed to the aims of political philosophy. Here, the counter-argument would go something like this: 'OK, so the argumentation supplied by environmental philosophers is so removed from that used by activists and governments. So what? The only outcome of this is that more arguments, or, if you like, a pluralistic set of arguments, will emerge. Some arguments are relevant to academia alone; others can be used in politics. Thus, for example, in the university we could maintain an ecocentric environmental philosophy, 7 whereas in politics anthropocentric 8 arguments would dominate.' In response to this, it could be argued that plurality of argument is indeed welcome. Moreover, as we saw earlier, the divergence between, say, ecocentric environmental philosophy and anthropocentric environmental philosophy is not so vast in terms of the policies they recommend. In fact, as John Barry argues, 'reformed naturalistic humanism' is capable of supporting a stewardship ethics just as well (J. Barry 1999 : ch. 3). But my point is that **saving the environment is not just a matter of theory: it is an urgent political mission**. In a democratic system, however, one cannot expect policies to be decided without giving any thought to **how these policies should be explained to the public**, and thereby gain legitimacy. In other words, the rationale of a policy is an increasingly important, if not inseparable, part of the policy; in particular, the openness and transparency of the democratic regime makes the rationale a crucial aspect of the policy. A policy whose rationale is not open to the public, or one that is believed to be arrived at through a process not open to the public, is considered a-democratic (cf. Ezrahi 1990). Consequently, a policy's legitimacy is owed not only to its effectiveness, but also to the degree of moral persuasion and conviction it generates within the public arena. So, when constructing environmental policies in democratic regimes, there is a need for a theory that can be used not only by academics, but also by politicians and activists. Hence the first question in this book is, Why has the major part of environmental philosophy failed to penetrate environmental policy and serve as its rationale? The first part of this book, then, discusses this question and offers two explanations in response. These explanations are based on the premiss that environmental ethics and political theory should be differentiated and well defined so that later on they may join hands, rather than that they should be united in a single theory. It is assumed that they answer two questions. Environmental ethics is about the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. Political theory with regard to the environment relates to the institutions needed to implement and support environmental policies. Thus, the failure to distinguish properly between environmental ethics and political theory underlies the failure of the major part of environmental philosophy to penetrate environmental policy and provide its rationale. In Chapter 1 it is claimed that in a way environmental philosophers have moved too rapidly away from anthropocentrism—mainstream ethical discourses—towards biocentrism and ecocentrism. 9 My argument is that **the public on the whole is not ready for this**, and therefore many activists and potential supporters of the environmental movement become alienated from the philosophical discourse on the environment. In addition, I suggest that the reason for the gap between on the one hand environmental philosophers and on the other activists and politicians is that environmental philosophers have applied the wrong approach to political philosophy. I claim that all moral reasoning involves a process of reflective equilibrium between intuitions and theory. I distinguish between 'private', 'contextual', and 'public' modes of reflective equilibrium, arguing that environmental philosophers use either the first or second mode of reasoning, whereas political philosophy requires the third: the public mode of reflective equilibrium. The latter differs from the other two models in that it weighs both the intuitions and the theories put forward by activists and the general public (and not just those of professional philosophers). The argument for this being so is that reasoning about the environment needs to include political and democratic philosophy. And yet, most of environmental philosophers' efforts so far have focused on such questions of meta-ethics as 'intrinsic value theories' and 'biocentrism'. Environmental philosophers have been pushed in this direction out of a genuine desire to seek out the 'good' and the truth, in an effort to ascertain the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. I suggest that **environmental philosophers** should not limit themselves to discussing the moral grounds for attitudes, or to trying to reveal the good and the truth, although these are important and fascinating questions. At least some of them **should instead go beyond this and address the matter of the necessary institutions for implementing policies, and finally, and of no less importance, find a way to persuade others to act on behalf of the environment**. In other words, while there is a place for meta-ethics, it should not be the only approach to philosophizing about the environment; it should not replace political philosophy.

**Abstract philosophy cannot save the environment—human-centered justifications can motivate people to support pragmatic protections.**

**Light**, **02**. Associate professor of philosophy and environmental policy, and director of the Center for Global Ethics at George Mason University. “Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy,” Metaphilosophy Andrew July 33.4, Ebsco.

Even with the ample development in the field of various theories designed to answer these questions, I believe that environmental ethics is, for the most part, not succeeding as an area of applied philosophy. For while the dominant goal of most work in the field, to find a philosophically sound basis for the direct moral consideration of nature, is commendable, it has tended to engender two unfortunate results: (1) debates about the value of nature as such have largely **excluded discussion of the beneficial ways in which arguments for environmental protection can be based on human interests**, and relatedly (2) the focus on somewhat abstract concepts of value theory has pushed environmental ethics **away from discussion of which arguments morally motivate people to embrace more supportive environmental views**. As a consequence, those agents of change who will effect efforts at environmental protection – namely, humans – have oddly been left out of discussions about the moral value of nature. As a result, environmental ethics has been less able to contribute to cross-disciplinary discussions with other environmental professionals (such as environmen- tal sociologists or lawyers) on the resolution of environmental problems, especially those professionals who also have an interest in issues concern- ing human welfare in relation to the equal distribution of environmental goods. But can environmental philosophy afford to be quiescent about the public reception of ethical arguments over the value of nature? The original motivations for environmental philosophers to turn their philosophical insights to the environment belie such a position. Environmental philosophy evolved out of a concern about the state of the growing environmental crisis and a conviction that a philosophical contribution could be made to the resolution of this crisis. If environmental philosophers spend most of their time debating non-human-centered forms of value theory, **they will arguably never be able to make such a contribution**.

**Environmental pragmatism is the only way to prevent ecological catastrophe.**

**Light and** **Katz**, **96**. Director of the Science, Technology and Society Program at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, teaches environmental philosophy, engineering ethics and the philosophy of technology, and a research fellow in the Environmental Health Program and Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alberta. “Environmental Pragmatism,” p. 1-2, Andrew and Eric, Google Books.

The problematic situation of environmental ethics greatly troubles us, both as philosophers and as citizens. We are deeply concerned about the precarious state of the natural world, the environmental hazards that threaten humans, and the maintenance of long-term sustainable life on this planet. The environmental crisis that surrounds us is a fact of experience. It is thus imperative that environmental philosophy, as a discipline, address this crisis – its meaning, its causes and its possible resolution. Can philosophers contribute anything to an investigation of environmental problems? Do the traditions, history and skills of philosophical thought have any relevance to the development of environmental policy? We believe that the answer is yes. Despite the problematic (and, heretofore, ineffectual) status of environmental ethics as a practical discipline, the field has much to offer. But the fruits of this philosophical enterprise **must be directed towards the practical resolution of environmental problems** – environmental ethics cannot remain mired in long-running theoretical debates in an attempt to achieve philosophical certainty. As Mark Sagoff has written: [W]e have to get along with certainty; we have to solve practical, not theoretical, problems; and we must adjust the ends we pursue to the means available to accomplish them. Otherwise, method becomes an obstacle to morality, dogma the foe of deliberation, and **the ideal society we aspire to in theory will become a formidable enemy of the good society we can achieve in fact**. In short, environmental ethics must develop for itself a methodology of environmental pragmatism – fueled by a recognition that theoretical debates are problematic for the development of environmental policy. This collection is an attempt to bring together in one place the broad range of positions encompassed by calls for an environmental pragmatism. For us, environmental pragmatism is the open-ended inquiry into the specific real-life problems of humanity’s relationship with the environment. The new position ranges from arguments for an environmental philosophy informed by the legacy of classical American pragmatist philosophy, to the formulation of a new basis for the reassessment of our practice through a more general pragmatist methodology.

# Aff – Calculative Thought Good

**Viewing calculative thought as equivalent to domination ensures total political paralysis.**

**Bronner, 04** Stephen Eric Bronner, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, 2004, Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement, p. 3-5

“Instrumental reason” was seen as merging with what Marx termed the “commodity form” underpinning capitalist social relations. Everything thereby became subject to the calculation of costs and benefits. Even art and aesthetic tastes would become defined by a “culture industry”—intent only upon maximizing profits by seeking the lowest common denominator for its products. Instrumental rationality was thus seen as stripping the supposed­ly “autonomous” individual, envisioned by the philosophes, of both the means and the will to resist manipulation by totalitarian movements. En­lightenment now received two connotations: its historical epoch was grounded in an anthropological understanding of civilization that, from the first, projected the opposite of progress. This gave the book its power: Horkheimer and Adorno offered not simply the critique of some prior his­torical moment in time, but of all human development. This made it possi­ble to identify enlightenment not with progress, as the philistine bourgeois might like to believe, but rather—unwittingly—with barbarism, Auschwitz, and what is still often called “the totally administered society.” Such is the picture painted by Dialectic of Enlightenment.. But it should not be forgotten that its authors were concerned with criticizing enlightenment generally, and the historical epoch known as the Enlightenment in particular, from the standpoint of enlightenment itself: thus the title of the work. Their masterpiece was actually “intended to prepare the way for a positive notion of enlightenment, which will release it from entanglement in blind domina­tion.”4 Later, in fact, Horkheimer and Adorno even talked about writing a se­quel that would have carried a title like “Rescuing the Enlightenment” (Ret­tung der Aufklarung).5 This reclamation project was never completed, and much time has been spent speculating about why it wasn’t. The reason, I be­lieve, is that the logic of their argument ultimately left them with little positive to say. Viewing instrumental rationality as equivalent with the rationality of domination, and this rationality with an increasingly seamless bureaucratic order, no room existed any longer for a concrete or effective political form of opposition: Horkheimer would thus ultimately embrace a quasi-religious “yearning for the totally other” while Adorno became interested in a form of aesthetic resistance grounded in “negative dialectics.” Their great work initiated a radical change in critical theory, but its metaphysical subjectivism sur­rendered any systematic concern with social movements and political insti­tutions. Neither of them ever genuinely appreciated the democratic inheritance of the Enlightenment and thus, not only did they render critique independent of its philosophical foundations,6 but also of any practical inter­est it might serve. Horkheimer and Adorno never really grasped that, in contrast to the sys­tem builder, the blinkered empiricist, or the fanatic, the philosophe always evidenced a “greater interest in the things of this world, a greater confidence in man and his works and his reason, the growing appetite of curiosity and the growing restlessness of the unsatisfied mind—all these things form less a doctrine than a spirit.”7 Just as Montesquieu believed it was the spirit of the laws, rather than any system of laws, that manifested the commitment to jus­tice, the spirit of Enlightenment projected the radical quality of that commit­ment and a critique of the historical limitations with which even its best thinkers are always tainted. Empiricists may deny the existence of a “spirit of the times.” Nevertheless, historical epochs can generate an ethos, an existen­tial stance toward reality, or what might even be termed a “project” uniting the diverse participants in a broader intellectual trend or movement. The Enlightenment evidenced such an ethos and a peculiar stance toward reality with respect toward its transformation. Making sense of this, howev­er, is impossible without recognizing what became a general stylistic com­mitment to clarity, communicability, and what rhetoricians term “plain speech.” For their parts, however, Horkheimer and Adorno believed that re­sistance against the incursions of the culture industry justified the extreme­ly difficult, if not often opaque, writing style for which they would become famous—or, better, infamous. Their esoteric and academic style is a far cry from that of Enlightenment intellectuals who debated first principles in pub­lic, who introduced freelance writing, who employed satire and wit to demol­ish puffery and dogma, and who were preoccupied with reaching a general audience of educated readers: Lessing put the matter in the most radical form in what became a popular saying—”Write just as you speak and it will be beautiful”—while, in a letter written to D’Alembert in April of 1766, Voltaire noted that “Twenty folio volumes will never make a revolution: it’s the small, portable books at thirty sous that are dangerous. If the Gospel had cost 1,200 sesterces, the Christian religion would never have been established.”9 Appropriating the Enlightenment for modernity calls for reconnecting with the vernacular. This does not imply some endorsement of anti-intellectualism. Debates in highly specialized fields, especially those of the natural sciences, obviously demand expertise and insisting that intellectuals must “reach the masses” has always been a questionable strategy. The sub­ject under discussion should define the language in which it is discussed and the terms employed are valid insofar as they illuminate what cannot be said in a simpler way. Horkheimer and Adorno, however, saw the matter differ­ently. They feared being integrated by the culture industry, avoided political engagement, and turned freedom into the metaphysical-aesthetic preserve of the connoisseur. They became increasingly incapable of appreciating the egalitarian impulses generated by the Enlightenment and the ability of its advocates—Ben Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Thomas Paine, and Rousseau—to argue clearly and with a political purpose.1’ Thus, whether or not their “critical” enterprise was “dialectically” in keeping with the impulses of the past, its assumptions prevented them from articulating anything positive for the present or the future.

# Aff – Fear Good

**Fear spurs compassion, mobilizing people to protect each other and giving meaning to life.**

Greenspan, 03 (Miriam Greenspan – Pioneer in the Area of Women’s Psychology – 2003 (“An Excerpt from Healing through the Dark Emotions: The Wisdom of Grief, Fear, and Despair by Miriam Greenspan,” [www.spiritualityhealth.com/newsh/excerpts/bookreview/excp\_5513.html](http://www.spiritualityhealth.com/newsh/excerpts/bookreview/excp_5513.html#_blank))

"Fear is a very powerful emotion. When you feel fear in your body, it's helpful to relate to it as an energy that can be mobilized for life. It may feel like a constriction in your chest, throat, or abdomen. Breathe through it without judgment and allow yourself to feel it as a very strong force. If you pray for help, you can begin to expand this energy we call 'fear' and use it for healing and transformation. "In this regard, we can take our model from the heroes of Flight 93 who. realizing that they were bound for death, stormed the plane and brought it down without hitting a civilian target. One cannot even imagine being able to do this without fear. Fear for the lives of others was the energy that mobilized them to do something meaningful with their last moments of life. Some of these people said good-bye to their husbands and wives and wished them happiness before they left this earth. They had found some peace in their last moments, peace in the midst of turbulence. And they found it through their last wish, which they heroically put into action: to help others live. "Perhaps there is nothing that can redeem the dead but our own actions for the good. This is a time to find out what we want to do for the world and do it. And, as every trauma survivor knows, this is the way to make meaning out of pain, perhaps the most effective way: to draw something good out of evil. The heroes of September 11 point us to the choice we each have: to help create a state of global peace and justice that we, like they, will not see before we die. It is in giving ourselves to this vision, out of love for this world that we inhabit together, that we stand a chance of transcending the human proclivity to damage life. And that we honor those we have brought into this world and who must inherit it. . . . "Our only protection is in our interconnectedness. This has always been the message of the dark emotions when they are experienced most deeply and widely. Grief is not just "my" grief; it is the grief of every motherless child, every witness to horror in the world. Despair is not just "my" despair; it is everyone's despair about life in the twentyfirst century. Fear is not just 'my' fear; it is everyone's fear — of anthrax, of nuclear war, of truck bombs, of airplane hijackings, of things falling apart, blowing up, sickening and dying. "If fear is only telling you to save your own skin, there's not much hope for us. But the fact is that in conscious fear, there is a potentially revolutionary power of compassion and connection that can be mobilized en masse. This is the power of fear. Our collective fear, which is intelligent, is telling us now: Find new ways to keep this global village safe. Find new forms of international cooperation that will root out evil in ways that don't create more victims and more evil. Leap out of the confines of national egos. Learn the ways of peace. Find a ceremony of safety so that not just you and I but all of us can live together without fear."

**Fear of Death is key to human survival – confronting death is key to state and individual existence.**

Beres 96 (Louis Rene, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Feb., [http://www.freeman.org/m\_online/](http://www.freeman.org/m_online/#_blank) feb96/ beresn.htm).

Fear of death, the ultimate source of anxiety, is essential to human survival. This is true not only for individuals, but also for states. Without such fear, states will exhibit an incapacity to confront nonbeing that can hasten their disappearance. So it is today with the State of Israel. Israel suffers acutely from insufficient existential dread. Refusing to tremble before the growing prospect of collective disintegration - a forseeable prospect connected with both genocide and war - this state is now unable to take the necessary steps toward collective survival. What is more, because death is the one fact of life which is not relative but absolute, Israel's blithe unawareness of its national mortality deprives its still living days of essential absoluteness and growth. For states, just as for individuals, confronting death can give the most positive reality to life itself. In this respect, a cultivated awareness of nonbeing is central to each state's pattern of potentialities as well as to its very existence. When a state chooses to block off such an awareness, a choice currently made by the State of Israel, it loses, possibly forever, the altogether critical benefits of "anxiety."

# Aff – Terrorism stinks

**Terrorists are inherently evil—The war on terror and spread of democracy are the only ways to prevent extinction**

**Neyanatu 02** (Binyamin, Prime Minister of Israel, 4/27, <http://www.aish.com/ci/s/48898622.html>)

Do not be fooled by the apologists of terror. These apologists tell us that the root cause of terrorism is the deprivation of national and civic rights, and that the way to stop terror is to redress the supposed grievances that arise from this deprivation. But the root cause of terrorism, the deliberate targeting of civilians, is not the deprivation of rights. If it were, then in the thousands of conflicts and struggles for national and civil rights in modern times we would see countless instances of terrorism. But we do not. Mahatma Gandhi fought for the independence of India without resorting to terrorism. So too did the peoples of Eastern Europe in their struggle to bring down the Berlin Wall. And Martin Luther King's campaign for equal rights for all Americans eschewed all violence, much less terrorism. If the deprivation of rights is indeed the root cause of terrorism, why did all these people pursue their cause without resorting to terror? Put simply, because they were democrats, not terrorists. They believed in the sanctity of each human life, were committed to the ideals of liberty, and championed the values of democracy. But those who practice terrorism do not believe in these things. In fact, they believe in the very opposite. For them, the cause they espouse is so all-encompassing, so total, that it justifies anything. It allows them to break any law, discard any moral code and trample all human rights in the dust. In their eyes, it permits them to indiscriminately murder and maim innocent men and women, and lets them blow up a bus full of children. There is a name for the doctrine that produces this evil. It is called totalitarianism. Indeed, the root cause of terrorism is totalitarianism. Only a totalitarian regime, by systemically brainwashing its subjects, can indoctrinate hordes of killers to suspend all moral constraints for the sake of a twisted cause. That is why from its inception totalitarianism has always been wedded to terrorism -- from Lenin to Stalin to Hitler to the ayatollahs to Saddam Hussein, right down to Osama bin Laden and Yasser Arafat. Those who fight as terrorists rule as terrorists. It is not merely that the goals of terrorists do not justify the means they choose, it is that the means they choose tell us what their true goals are. Osama bin Laden is not seeking to defend the rights of Muslims but to murder as many Americans as possible, and ultimately to destroy America. Saddam Hussein is not seeking to defend his people but to subjugate his neighbors. Arafat is not seeking to build a state but to destroy a state; the many massacres of Jews he sponsors tells us what he would do to all the Jews of Israel if he had enough power. Those who fight as terrorists rule as terrorists. People who deliberately target the innocent never become leaders who protect freedom and human rights. When terrorists seize power, they invariably set up the darkest of dictatorships -- whether in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan or Arafatistan. In short, the reason why some resort to terror and others do not is not any absence of rights, but the presence of a tyrannical mindset. The totalitarian mind knows no limits. The democratic mind sets them everywhere. The essential steps to defeat international terrorism are being courageously undertaken by President Bush. By declaring that terrorism is never justified, and by deterring or destroying those regimes that support terror, President Bush has bravely charted a course that will lead the free world to victory. But to assure that this evil does not re-emerge a decade or two from now, we must not merely uproot terror but also plant the seeds of freedom. Only under tyranny can a terrorist mindset be widely cultivated. It cannot breed in a climate of democracy and freedom. The open debate of ideas and the respect for human life that are the foundation of all free societies are a permanent antidote to the poison that the terrorists seek to inject into the minds of their recruits. That is why it is imperative that once the terrorist regimes in the Middle East are swept away, the free world, led by America, must begin to build the institutions of pluralism and democracy in their place. This will not happen overnight, and it is not likely to result in liberal, Western-style democracies. But given an option between Turkish-style freedom and Iranian-style tyranny, the choice is clear. We simply can no longer allow parts of the world to remain cloistered by fanatic militancies. Such militancies, once armed with nuclear weapons, could destroy our civilization. We must begin immediately to encourage the peoples of the Arab and Islamic world to embrace the idea of pluralism and the ideals of freedom -- for their sake, as well as ours.

**Labeling any threat to the nation as a terrorist is key to fighting the war on terror.**

Ganor, 01 (Boaz, Director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism “Defining Terrorism,” http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm, May 16)

We face an essential need to reach a definition of terrorism that will enjoy wide international agreement, thus enabling international operations against terrorist organizations. A definition of this type must rely on the same principles already agreed upon regarding conventional wars (between states), and extrapolate from them regarding non-conventional wars (betweean organization and a state). The definition of terrorism will be the basis and the operational tool for expanding the international community’s ability to combat terrorism. It will enable legislation and specific punishments against those perpetrating, involved in, or supporting terrorism, and will allow the formulation of a codex of laws and international conventions against terrorism, terrorist organizations, states sponsoring terrorism, and economic firms trading with them. At the same time, the definition of terrorism will hamper the attempts of terrorist organizations to obtain public legitimacy, and will erode support among those segments of the population willing to assist them (as opposed to guerrilla activities). Finally, the operative use of the definition of terrorism could motivate terrorist organizations, due to moral or utilitarian considerations, to shift from terrorist activities to alternative courses (such as guerrilla warfare) in order to attain their aims, thus reducing the scope of international terrorism. The struggle to define terrorism is sometimes as hard as the struggle against terrorism itself. The present view, claiming it is unnecessary and well-nigh impossible to agree on an objective definition of terrorism, has long established itself as the “politically correct” one. It is the aim of this paper, however, to demonstrate that an objective, internationally accepted definition of terrorism is a feasible goal, and that an effective struggle against terrorism requires such a definition. The sooner the nations of the world come to this realization, the better.

**Debates about threats in the academic world result in better policy-making—real threats can be confronted and risks can be weighed.**

**Walt 91** – Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago – 1991 (Stephen, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, p. 229-30)

A recurring theme of this essay has been the twin dangers of separating the study of security affairs from the academic world or of shifting the focus of academic scholarship too far from real-world issues. The danger of war will be with us for some time to come, and states will continue to acquire military forces for a variety of purposes. Unless one believes that ignorance is preferable to expertise, the value of independent national security scholars should be apparent. Indeed, history suggests that countries that suppress debate on national security matters are more likely to blunder into disaster, because misguided policies cannot be evaluated and stopped in time. As in other areas of public policy, academic experts in security studies can help in several ways. In the short term, academics are well placed to evaluate current programs, because they face less pressure to support official policy. The long-term effects of academic involvement may be even more significant: academic research can help states learn from past mistakes and can provide the theoretical innovations the produce better policy choices in the future. Furthermore, their role in training the new generation of experts gives academics an additional avenue of influence.

# Aff – State Good

**Representations of state action cannot change realism, and even if they could, we have no way of knowing if they new system would be any better.**

**Mearsheimer, 95** – Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago – 1995 (John, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, p. 91-2)

The most revealing aspect of Wendt’s discussion is that he did not respond to the two main charge leveled against critical theory in “False Promise.” The first problem with critical theory is that although the theory is deeply concerned with radically changing state behavior, it says little about how change comes about. The theory does not tell us why particular discourses become dominant and other fall by the wayside. Specifically, Wendt does not explain why realism has been the dominant discourse in world politics for well over a thousand years, although I explicitly raised the question in “False Promise” (p. 42). Moreover, he shed no light on why the time is ripe for unseating realism, nor on why realism is likely to be replaced by a more peaceful, communitarian discourse, although I explicitly raised both questions. Wendt’s failure to answer these questions has important ramifications for his own arguments. For example, he maintains that if it is possible to change international political discourse and alter state behavior, “then it is irresponsible to pursue policies that perpetuate destructive old orders [i.e., realism], especially if we care about the well-being of future generation.” The clear implication here is that realists like me are irresponsible and do not care much about the welfare of future generations. However, even if we change discourses and move beyond realism, a fundamental problem with Wendt’s argument remains: because his theory cannot predict the future, he cannot know whether the discourse that ultimately replaces realism will be more benign than realism. He has no way of knowing whether a fascistic discourse more violent than realism will emerge as the hegemonic discourse. For example, he obviously would like another Gorbachev to come to power in Russia, but a critical theory perspective, defending realism might very well be the more responsible policy choice.

# Aff – Reelism

The realist balance of power is a concept created from diplomatic necessity – no alternative system can fill that same role.

Guzzini 98 (Stefano, Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy*, pp. 231)

Hedley Bull (1977) writes that although we do, of course, know that there is no such a thing as a balance of power, it is a concept we cannot do without. He is right in a double sense. First, the balance of power is a concept that diplomats use to make their trade. Second, for the first reason and only this, the observer cannot do without it. Power might not be fungible, but diplomats work on measures to give power a translatable meaning. Traditional compensation politics must rely on some measure across different power sectors. Before diplomats can count, they must decide what counts. Hence, the balance of power or any equilibrium idea of this kind is based upon a social construction, sometimes an agreemen,. of the diplomatic community. They share a common measure of power although they would be hard-pressed to define it exactly. Hence, as with the security discourse, measurement of power is a political act. The diplomats who represent states endowed with one particular power resource will do their best to enhance the Uitler's value. The Soviet government's stress on military, and not economic, factors was a case in point. The rush for mass-destructive weapons is as much a concern of security as a question of power in the sense of acquiring a resource which is commonly considered to be at the top rank. The prestige, in turn, is traded for particular compensations or attentions. Sometimes, such agreements on measures and treatments, if generally shared, might diplomatically recreate something similar to the supposedly mechanical balance of power (Kivi 1996). On the second level of observation, the existence of balance of power as a social construct means that we cannot simply forget about it because we found out that no mechanical balance exists. The concept does not refer to anything in the objective structures of the international system. It is a fallacy to think that since it is reproduced in the diplomatic culture, it must correspond to an objectified reality, a fallacy which has daunted much realist writings, both scientific and classical. But it is a device used by diplomats, and as such it exists, and is consequential for international politics. In his inaugural lecture in Zurich, the Swiss scholar Daniel Frei (1969) urged his fellow political scientists to help practical policy with a neutral and measurable concept of power. He was perfectly aware both of the practical needs of such a concept and of its difficult scientific underpinning. This lucid text shows the political value of concepts which travel between the academic and the political community. Power is a device used by academics and as such has effects on the production of knowledge and the reproduction of the traditional diplomatic culture.

The power politics of realism enter into any possible system – even a critical approach leads back into realism.

Murray 97 (Alastair J.H., Prof. of Poli. Theory at Univ. of Edinburgh, *Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics*, pp. 130)

The other members of the group varied in their emphases, but there are clear parallels to this formulation in their conceptions which suggest its employment as a framework to assist understanding. The extent to which power infuses all social relations, the extent to which all social structures are marred by relations of domination and subordination, forms a pervasive theme throughout their work. It was this awareness of the intrusion of power into all social relations that generated their emphasis on 'the inevitable imperfections of any organization that is entangled with the world. l 1 " As Morgenthau once put it, the ideal 'can never be fully translated into political reality but only at best approximated ... there shall always be an element of political domination preventing the full realization of equality and freedom'. "9 The principal focus of this critique of the corrupting influence of power was, of course, international relations. Here, economic and legal mechanisms of domination are ultimately reduced to overt violence as the principal mechanism of determining political outcomes. The diffusion of power between states effectively transforms any such centrally organized mechanisms into simply another forum for the power politics of the very parties that it is supposed to restrain. As Kennan put it: ‘The realities of power will soon seep into anv legalistic structures which we erect to govern international life. They will permeate it. They will become the content of it; and the structure will replace the form.' 1:1 The repression of such power realities is, however, impossible; the political actor must simply 'seek their point of maximum equilibrium'. This conception of the balance of ultimately aimed, in Morgenthau’s words, 'to maintain the stability of the system without destroying the multiplicity of the elements composing it'. First, it was designed to prevent universal domination, to act as a deterrent to the ambitions of any dominant great power and as a safeguard against any attempt to establish **its** sway over the rest of the system.]-'4 Second, it was designed to preserve the independence and freedom of the states of the system, particularly the small states. **1"** I Only through the operation of the balance of power between great powers can small powers gain any genuine independence and any influence in the international system.1-" However, as Morgenthau pointed out, whilst, in domestic society, the balance of power operates in a context characterized by the existence of a degree of consensus and by the presence of a controlling central power, these factors are lacking in international relations and, thus, the balance is both much more important and yet much more flawe

States inherently compete with each other through any means necessary – realism is the only possible system.

Mearsheimer 1 (John, Prof. of Poli Sci at the Univ. of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*,  
pp. 35)

All states are influenced by this logic, which means that not only do they look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, they also work to ensure that other states do not take advantage of them. After all, rival states are driven by the same logic, and most states are likely to recognize their own motives at play in the actions of other states. In short, states ultimately pay attention to defense as well as offense. They think about conquest themselves, and they work to check aggressor states from gaining power at their expense. This inexorably leads to a world of constant security competition, where states are willing to lie, cheat, and use brute force if it helps them gain advantage over their rivals. Peace, if one defines that concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concord, is not likely to break out in this world.

States naturally act based upon external influences of competition – this forces realism to be the only viable system of international relations.

Mearsheimer 1 (John, Prof. of Poli Sci at the Univ. of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*,  
pp. 17)

This gloomy view of international relations is based on three core beliefs. First, realists, like liberals, treat states as the principal actors in world politics. Realists focus mainly on great powers, however, because these **states dominate and shape international politics and they also cause the deadliest wars.** Second, realists believe that **the behavior of great powers is influenced mainly by their external environment, not by their internal characteristics**. The structure of the international system, which all slates must deal with, largely shapes their foreign policies. Realists tend mint to draw sharp distinctions between “good” and “bad” states, because **all great powers act according to the same logic regardless of their culture, political system, or who runs the government**.27 It is therefore difficult to discriminate among states, save for differences in relative power. In essence, great powers are like billiard balls that vary only in size.28 Third, realists hold that **calculations about power dominate states’ thinking, and** that **states compete for power among themselves. That competition sometimes necessitates going to war,** which is considered an acceptable instrument of statecraft. To quote Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century military strategist, **war is a continuation of politics by other means**.29 Finally, a zero-sum quality characterizes that competition, sometimes making it intense and unforgiving. **States may cooperate with each other on occasion, but at root they have conflicting interests.**

Realism is the best decision making system for international relations, it focuses on morals without creating stagnation

Murray 97 (Alastair J.H., Prof. of Poli. Theory at Univ. of Edinburgh, *Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics*, pp. 108 AMB)

These strategies are considered from two perspectives: in terms of the evaluation of actions, and in terms of the direction of action. **In each of these, it is apparent that the continued relevance of universal moral principles is central to realism, but that, give the difficulties of employment in a realm recalcitrant to the straightforward application of such principles, consequentialist considerations must be adopted to take into account the dissonance between intentions and outcomes.** **This generates a pervasive emphasis on humility in realism – humility of knowledge on the one hand, and power on the other. This moral perspective is then brought together whit its theory of power politics to determine what this means in terms of the categories which dominate international politics and, in particular, the national interest. This leads to the conclusion that realism emphasized a firmly non-perfectionist morality, one in which, while moral principles continue to hold, they must continually be breached if action is to accord with the rules of political success and not become utterly self-destructive, such that the essential requirement of any political actor becomes moral fortitude. Finally, this position is related to practical issues – in particular, the problems of achieving a just international order - in order to determine how this tension between moral principles and political realities is worked out in practice.**

# Aff – Epistemology Bad

**Epistemological indictments of international relations theory ignore the specific contexts in which the affirmative operates – we should priviledge specificity over sweeping indictments**

**Tuathail 1996** (Gearoid, Department of Geography, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) The patterned mess of history and the writing of geopolitics: a reply to Dalby. Political Geography, 15: 6-7, p. 663-4. )

Dalby’s third point builds upon what he suggests earlier about discourses of IR as a powerful part of the Cold War, an argument he inflates even further in pointing to their importance in ‘policing the global order and maintaining injustice, poverty and violence’. The crucial point that I apparently miss is ‘the function of the discipline’s knowledges as practices of hegemony’. There are two points to be made in response to these exceedingly general claims. First, I would argue that evocations of ‘hegemony’ and ‘power’ often function in decontextualizing ways in some poststructuralist writing. Pronouncing something as hegemonic does not tell us very much about the nature and mechanisms of hegemony; in fact, it seems to substitute for the necessity of documenting the precise nature of hegemony in many instances. I recognize that this is not always possible but, in this case at least, the claim is so broad as to be meaningless. Certainly, the concept of hegemony needs to be carefully considered within critical geopolitics. Second, if we get more precise and examine the specific case of IR, there is an argument to be made that this subfield was actually not as powerful a discursive support for Cold War policies as Dalby claims. The number of top-level US foreign-policy decision-makers with PhDs in international relations is actually quite tiny. Most have backgrounds in industry, finance, law, diplomatic service and the military. The disciplining significance of IR and of academia in general is overestimated by Dalby.

**Plan is necessary for their Kritik to function**

**Niarguinen 2001** (Dmitri, professor of International Relations at Central European University. “Transforming realism: Irreducible core gives life to new interpretations and flexible incarnations.” Rubikon E-Journal, December, accessed online at http://web.archive.org/web/20060503234134/http:// venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/ dmitri.htm)

Has, indeed, Realism become anachronistic? If it were a monolithic rigid theory, the answer would probably be 'yes.' I have argued, however, that Realism is not homogeneous; rather, it has an irreducible core which is able to create flexible incarnations. At minimum, Realism offers an orienting framework of analysis that gives the field of security studies much of its intellectual coherence and commonality of outlook[64]. This is true even if Realism stays on the extreme polar of positivism. However, positivism/rationalism in a pure form is of little value. In the words of the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, “the approach of ‘rational behavior,’ as it is typically interpreted, leads to a remarkably mute theory…”[65]. Realism needs not be predestined to remain stagnant[66]. At maximum, thus, when Realism operates in the shades of gray between positivism and reflectivism, its strength is paramount. Consequently, there are good reasons for thinking that the twenty-first century will be a Realist century[67]. Once again I want to stress that Realism should not be perceived as dogmatic. And this is why we do need reflectivist approaches to problematize what is self-evident, and thus to counterbalance naive Realism[68]. In doing so, however, we are more flexible in keeping the 'middle ground' and not in sliding to the other extreme. As Wendt believes, in the medium run, sovereign states will remain the dominant political actors in the international system[69]. While this contention is arguable, it is hardly possible to challenge his psychological observation, …Realist theory of state interests in fact naturalizes or reifies a particular culture and in so doing helps reproduce it. Since the social practices is how we get structure – structure is carried in the heads of agents and is instantiated in their practices – the more that states think like “Realist” the more that egoism, and its systemic corollary of self-help, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy[70]. Even strong constructivists admit that we cannot do away with Realism simply because it is “a still necessary hermeneutical bridge to the understanding of world politics”[71].

**The permutation of traditional, positivist international relations theories and critical international relations theories offers the best hope for solutions to IR dilemmas**

**Kurki 2007** (Milja, Lecturer, Department of Int’l Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth. “Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34(5), accessed via Sage Journals Online.)

There are a number of defences that critical realism would resort to against the positivist criticisms. However, need the relationship between critical realism and positivism be acrimonious? While critical realists disagree with the positivist legacies that inform much of contemporary social science, they do not think that positivist knowledge is ‘useless’ in IR, but simply that it does not exhaust the analysis of complex causes in world politics and needs to be complemented by more holistic ontological and methodological avenues. Critical realism emphasises that positivists need to open their minds to different ways of doing causal analysis in IR and engage with alternative causal methodologies and questions in a more serious manner. Yet much room for dialogue with the positivists also remains: both views recognise the importance of science and causal analysis in shaping our understandings of the world around us, value critical evaluation of existing explanations and emphasise importance of empirical evidence gathering (though with different methodological emphasis). Critical realism, as an anti-positivist philosophy, does not support a positivist view of science of IR; however, it can understand the partial relevance of positivist knowledge claims, provide tools for complementing these claims with more pluralistic methods and introduce positivists to the possibility of a more open and reflective model of science.

# Aff – Representations are dumb

**Changing representations won’t alter the material reality of state practices or help create better policy for the oppressed**

**Jarvis, 00** (Darryl, lecturer in IR at the University of Sydney, International relations and the challenge of postmodernism, 2000, p. 128-130)

Perhaps more alarming though is the outright violence Ashley recom-mends in response to what at best seem trite, if not imagined, injustices. Inculpating modernity, positivism, technical rationality, or realism with violence, racism, war, and countless other crimes not only smacks of anthropomorphism but, as demonstrated by Ashley's torturous prose and reasoning, requires a dubious logic to malce such connections in the first place. Are we really to believe that ethereal entities like positivism, mod-ernism, or realism emanate a "violence" that marginalizes dissidents? Indeed, where is this violence, repression, and marginalization? As self- professed dissidents supposedly exiled from the discipline, Ashley and Walker appear remarkably well integrated into the academy-vocal, pub-lished, and at the center of the Third Debate and the forefront of theo-retical research. Likewise, is Ashley seriously suggesting that, on the basis of this largely imagined violence, global transformation (perhaps even rev-olutionary violence) is a necessary, let alone desirable, response? Has the rationale for emancipation or the fight for justice been reduced to such vacuous revolutionary slogans as "Down with positivism and rationality"? The point is surely trite. Apart from members of the academy, who has heard of positivism and who for a moment imagines that they need to be emancipated from it, or from modernity, rationality, or realism for that matter? In an era of unprecedented change and turmoil, of new political and military configurations, of war in the Balkans and ethnic cleansing, is Ashley really suggesting that some of the greatest threats facing humankind or some of the great moments of history rest on such innocu-ous and largely unknown nonrealities like positivism and realism? These are imagined and fictitious enemies, theoretical fabrications that represent arcane, self-serving debates superfluous to the lives of most people and, arguably, to most issues of importance in international relations. More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating the-ory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our lmowledge.37 But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and des-titute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary-or is in some way bad-is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, "So what?" To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judged pertinent, relevant, help-ful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholasti-cally excited by abstract and recondite debate.38 Contrary to Ashley's assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than ana-lyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render an intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places. If the relevance of Ashley's project is questionable, so too is its logic and cogency. First, we might ask to what extent the postmodern "empha-sis on the textual, constructed nature of the world" represents "an unwar-ranted extension of approaches appropriate for literature to other areas of human practice that are more constrained by an objective reality. "39 All theory is socially constructed and realities like the nation-state, domestic and international politics, regimes, or transnational agencies are obviously social fabrications. But to what extent is this observation of any real use? Just because we acknowledge that the state is a socially fabricated entity, or that the division between domestic and international society is arbitrar-ily inscribed does not make the reality of the state disappear or render invisible international politics. Whether socially constructed or objectively given, the argument over the ontological status of the state is of no particular moment. Does this change our experience of the state or somehow diminish the political-economic-juridical-military functions of the state? To recognize that states are not naturally inscribed but dynamic entities continually in the process of being made and reimposed and are therefore culturally dissimilar, economically different, and politically atypical, while perspicacious to our historical and theoretical understanding of the state, in no way detracts from its reality, practices, and consequences. Similarly, few would object to Ashley's hermeneutic interpretivist understanding of the international sphere as an artificially inscribed demarcation. But, to paraphrase Holsti again, so what? This does not malce its effects any less real, diminish its importance in our lives, or excuse us from paying serious attention to it. That international politics and states would not exist with-out subjectivities is a banal tautology. The point, surely, is to move beyond this and study these processes. Thus, while intellectually interesting, con-structivist theory is not an end point as Ashley seems to think, where we all throw up our hands and announce there are no foundations and all real-ity is an arbitrary social construction. Rather, it should be a means of rec-ognizing the structurated nature of our being and the reciprocity between subjects and structures through history. Ashley, however, seems not to want to do this, but only to deconstruct the state, international politics, and international theory on the basis that none of these is objectively given but fictitious entities that arise out of modernist practices of representa-tion. While an interesting theoretical enterprise, it is of no great conse- quence to the study of international politics. Indeed, structuration theory has long talcen care of these ontological dilemmas that otherwise seem to preoccupy Ashley.40

**Representations are irrelevant—they still default to objectivity and don’t change how we conceive IR just recognize past changes.**

**Mearsheimer, 95.** John (International Relations professor at the University of Chicago), *The False Promise of International Institutions* in International Security Vol 19 Number 3 Winter, pp 43-44.

The main goal of critical theorists is to change state behavior in fundamental ways, to move beyond a world of security competition and war and establish a pluralistic security community. However, their explanation of how change occurs is at best incomplete, and at worst, internally contradictory.155 Critical theory maintains that state behavior changes when discourse changes. But that argument leaves open the obvious and crucially important question: what deter- mines why some discourses become dominant and others lose out in the marketplace of ideas? What is the mechanism that governs the rise and fall of discourses? This general question, in turn, leads to three more specific questions: 1) Why has realism been the hegemonic discourse in world politics for so long? 2) Why is the time ripe for its unseating? 3) Why is realism likely to be replaced by a more peaceful communitarian discourse? Critical theory provides few insights on why discourses rise and fall. Thomas Risse- Kappen writes, "Research on. . . 'epistemic communities' of knowledge-based transna- tional networks has failed so far to specify the conditions under which specific ideas are selfected and influence policies while others fall by the wayside." 156 Not surprisingly, critical theorists say little about why realism has been the dominant discourse, and why its foundations are now so shaky. They certainly do not offer a well-defined argument that deals with this important issue. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the fate of realism through the lens of critical theory. Nevertheless, critical theorists occasionally point to particular factors that might lead to changes in international relations discourse. In such cases, however, they usually end up arguing that changes in the material world drive changes in discourse. For example, when Ashley makes surmises about the future of realism, he claims that "a crucial issue is whether or not changing historical conditions have disabled longstanding realist rituals of power." Specifically, he asks whether "developments in late capitalist society;" like the "fiscal crisis of the state," and the "internationalization of capital," coupled with "the presence of vastly destructive and highly automated nuclear arsenals [has] de- prived statesmen of the latitude for competent performance of realist rituals of power?" 157 Similarly, Cox argues that fundamental change occurs when there is a "disjuncture" between "the stock of ideas people have about the nature of the world and the practical problems that challenge them." He then writes, "Some of us think the erstwhile dominant mental construct of neorealism is inadequate to confront the chal- lenges of global politics today."158 It would be understandable if realists made such arguments, since they believe there is an objective reality that largely determines which discourse will be dominant. Critical theorists, however, emphasize that the world is socially constructed, and not shaped in fundamental ways by objective factors. Anarchy, after all, is what we make of it. Yet when critical theorists attempt to explain why realism may be losing its hegemonic position, they too point to objective factors as the ultimate cause of change. Discourse, so it appears, turns out not to be determinative, but mainly a reflection of developments in the objective world. In short, it seems that when critical theorists who study inter- national politics offer glimpses of their thinking about the causes of change in the real world, they make arguments that directly contradict their own theory, but which appear to be compatible with the theory they are challenging.159 There is another problem with the application of critical theory to international relations. Although critical theorists hope to replace realism with a discourse that emphasizes harmony and peace, critical theory per se emphasizes that it is impossible to know the future. Critical theory, according to its own logic, can be used to undermine realism and produce change, but it cannot serve as the basis for predicting which discourse will replace realism, because the theory says little about the direction change takes. In fact, Cox argues that although "utopian expectations may be an element in stimulating people to act ... such expectations are almost never realized in practice."