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# 2ac hotness

**Realism is true and inevitable – a shift away collapses into chaos.**

**Mearsheimer** 200**1** [professor of political science at University of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pg. 361]

The optimists' claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. In fact, all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves for the foreseeable future. Consequently, realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other's expense, because international anarchy-the driving force behind greatpower behavior-did not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon. States remain the principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a major shift in the global distribution of power. But it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries.Indeed, considerable evidence from the 1990s indicates that power politics has not disappeared from Europe and Northeast Asia, the regions in which there are two or more great powers, as well as possible great powers such as Germany and Japan. There is no question, however, that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. Still, there is potential for intense security competion among the great powers that might lead to a major war. Probably the best evidence of that possibility is the fact that the United States maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Europe and in Northeast Asia for the explicit purpose of keeping the major states in each region at peace.

\*\*\*UNIQUENESS\*\*\*

\*Human nature debate\*

# Realism inev- generic

**Egotism and Domination are inevitable in the international system**

**Thayer 2k** (Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124-151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”)

The second ultimate cause of egoistic and dominating behavior is given by Morgenthau: Humans behave as they do because they possess an animus dominandi.24 They seek power because human nature is fundamentally egoistic and malignant. Thus conflict and war occur because human nature is bad.25 Thomas Hobbes provided the foundation for this second, secular, pillar of real- ist thought: Humans are ruled by an insatiable desire for power.26 This lust for power has created a state of war in which humans live in reciprocal and per- manent fear of violent death, and in which peace is always precarious. According to Morgenthau, the "desire for power ... concerns itself not with the individual's survival but with his position among his fellows once his sur- vival has been secured.... His lust for power would be satisfied only if the last became an object of his domination, there being nobody above or beside him, that is, if he became like God."27 So encompassing is this desire for power that the tendency to dominate "is an element of all human associations, from the family through fraternal and professional associations and local political orga- nizations, to the state."28 Two types of behavior are the proximate causes of the realist argument: ego- ism and domination.29 Egoism will cause an individual to place his interests before those of others, the interests of himself and his family before those of more distant relatives, and the interests of relatives before those of his commu- nity, state, and so on.30 The desire to dominate, realists believe, is inherent and often leads to physical aggression against those who oppose n of the primitive cell into ever larger components, organs, and so on to create what Dawkins calls "sur- vival machines." He explainsone's objectives. State leaders are expected to mirror this ordering by putting the interests of their state before those of others or of the world community, and by striving to dominate other states. Realists argue that only by possessing power can indi- viduals attack and conquer others as well as deter and defend themselves from attack. The principal result of this process is that balances of power will form and reform cyclically, producing both periods of stability and intense security competition in international politics

# Realism inev- generic

**Realism is inevitable**

**Guzzini,** - Senior Research Fellow at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute and Associate Professor of Political Science, International Relations, and European Studies at the Central European University in Budapest, 19**98** (Stefano, Realism in International Relations, p. 212)

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.

**Realism inevitable – states will always seek to maximize their power.**

**Mearsheimer** 200**1** [professor of political science at University of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pg. 2]

The sad fact is that **international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way**. Although the intensity of their competition waxes and wanes, great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power. The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system.

# realism inevitable--nature

**Realism and the self-help theory are rooted in human nature – anarchic worlds from the dawn of time to today created an impetus for realist thought.**

Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 75-76 //adi]

The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior. The fact that there is no world government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security, such as striving to have a powerful military, aggressing when forced to do so, and forging and maintaining alliances. This is what neorealists call a self-help system: leaders of states arc forced to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that evolutionary theory also offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment were great—so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet high—without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift—survived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions. This environment produced the behaviors examined here: egoism, domination, and the in-group/out-group distinction. These specific traits arc sufficient to explain why leaders will behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to behave. That is, even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, defined as either control over others (for example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their family's or tribes need for food, shelter, or other resources).

**Human inherently realist – early humans were force by their natural environment**

**Spegele 96** (Robert D Political realism in international theory ed. Cambridge University Press p. 161 JSTOR)

As alternative, Alexander advances the idea that 'at some early point in our history the actual function of human groups - the significance for their individual members - was protection from the predatory effects of other groups'.28 Early life was, on this view, a brand of warfare, a hunt in which people were treated as prey - deceived, ensnared and forcibly run to ground just as in a chase. To protect themselves, individuals would have joined groups which, despite their costs, were worth it in the biological sense of enabling them to enhance their reproductive success. Alexander calls this 'the Balance-of-Power hypothesis', and it is easy to see why a term from the lexicon of international relations is appropriate in accounting for the rise of large states. For suppose we have three non-kin related societies A, B and C. And suppose two societies A and B are in competition with one another for food, shelter and other resources necessary to survival and differential reproduction. Then if, say, A makes an alliance with C in order to conquer B and succeeds, it will have significantly expanded its relative resource base. Those societies in the past which learned how to engage successfully in balance of power politics would have been naturally selected for and have expanded from smaller groups to larger groups. The guiding thought here, in any event, provides biological content to Martin Wight's incisive observation: 'The idea of balance arises *naturally* in considering any relationship between com- peting human units, groups or institutions .. 29

# realism inevitable—nature

**Realism inevitable – biological nature.**

**Mearsheimer** 200**1** [professor of political science at University of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pg. 15]

Human nature realism, which is sometimes called “classical realism,” dominated the study of international relations from the late 1940s, when Morgenthau’s writings began attracting a large audience, until the early 1970s. It is based on the simple assumption that states are led by human beings who have a “will to power” hardwired into them at birth. That is, states have an insatiable appetite for power, or what Morgenthau calls “a limitless lust for power, “ which means that they constantly look for opportunities to take the offensive and dominate other states. All states come with an “animus dominandi,” so there is no basis for discriminating among more aggressive and less aggressive states, and there certainly should be no room in the theory for status quo states. Human nature realists recognize that international anarchy—the absence of a governing authority over the great powers—causes states to worry about the balance of power. But that structural constraint is treated as a second-order cause of state behavior. The principal driving force in international relations is the will to power inherent in every state in the system, and it pushes each of them to strive for supremacy.

Evolution supports realism.

Thayer 2k [Assistant Professor of Political Science @ University of Minnesota-Duluth

(Bradley A. “Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics” *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2. Autumn. JSTOR p. 130)]

Contemporary evolutionary theorists offer excellent arguments for explaining some of the human behavior expected by realism. Particularly interesting are those in the subdiscipline of evolutionary theory known as sociobiology, the study of human behavior from the perspective of evolutionary theory.31 Thus far, however, realists have not used evolutionary theory to place realism on a stronger foundation.32 After briefly reviewing the evolutionary process, I discuss how it can explain the origins of egoism and domination and why it is a better ultimate cause of realist behavior than those put forth by Niebuhr and Morgenthau.33

**Survival instincts make conflict and egotism inevitable**

**Thayer 2k** (Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124-151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”)

Humans and other primates evolve a mental architecture to address the difficulties they encounter when in dominance hierarchies. As result of this, Wilson submits: "Human beings are absurdly easy to indoctrinate-they seek it. "56 Three factors contribute to the ease of indoctrination. First, survival in a hostile world dictates membership in a group and produces a fear of ostracism from it. Second, acceptance of, or conformity to, a particular status quo lowers the risk of conflict in a dominance hierarchy. Third, conformity helps keep groups together.57 If group conformity becomes too weak, the group could fall apart and become extinct because of predation from one's own or another species.58 The consequences for the study of politics are great. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Somit and Peterson, Wilson, and psychologist Donald Campbell, among others, sug- gest that humans readily give allegiance to the state, or embrace religion or ideologies such as liberalism or communism, because evolution has produced a need to belong to a dominance hierarchy.59 An overview of human history provides context. Much of it is a record of threats of force or wars to gain terri- tory and resources.60 Political institutions, whether monarchies or aristocracies, and leaders such as Julius Caesar, Louis XIV, and Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid typify dominance hierarchies-as do the modern state and its many institutions, including government bureaucracies and the military.61

# realism inevitable—nature

Evolution makes realism inevitable

Thayer, Assistant Professor of Political Science @ University of Minnesota-Duluth, 2k

(Bradley A. “Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics” *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2. Autumn. JSTORp. 131-132)

Evolutionary theory offers two sufficient explanations for the trait of egoism. The first is a classic Darwinian argument: In a hostile environment where re-sources are scarce and thus survival precarious, organisms typically satisfy their own physiological needs for food, shelter, and so on before assisting others.41 In times of danger or great stress, an organism usually places its life-its survival-before that of other members of its group, be it pack, herd, or tribe. For these reasons, egoistic behavior contributes to fitness.

Selfish genes make realism inevitable

Thayer, Assistant Professor of Political Science @ University of Minnesota-Duluth, 2k

(Bradley A. “Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics” *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2. Autumn. JSTORp. 132)

Evolutionary theorist Richard Dawkins's selfish gene theory provides the second sufficient explanation for egoism. A conceptual shift is required here because Dawkins's level of analysis is the gene, not the organism. As Dawkins explains, at one time there were no organisms, just chemicals in a primordial "soup.i42 At first, different types of molecules started forming by accident, including some that could reproduce by using the constituents of the soup-carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and oxygen. Because these constituents were in limited supply, molecules competed for them as they replicated. From this competition, the most efficient copy makers emerged. The process, however, was never perfect. Sometimes mistakes were made during replication, and occasionally these accidents resulted in more efficient replication or made some other contribution to fitness. One such mistake might have been the formation of a thin membrane that held the contents of the molecule together-a primitive cell. A second might have involved the division of the primitive cell into ever larger components, organs, and so on to create what Dawkins calls "survival machines."He explains, "The first survival machines probably consisted of nothing more than a protective coat. But making a living got steadily harder as new rivals arose with better and more effective survival machines. Survival machines got bigger and more elaborate, and the process was cumulative and progressive."43 From a genetic perspective, there is no intentionality in this process, but it continued nonetheless because of evolution. Dawkins makes clear, however, that the interests of the gene and the organism need not coincide at different stages in an organism's life, particularly after reproduction.' In general, however, the selfishness of the gene increases its fitness, and so the behavior spreads.

**Realism is inevitable—biology**

*Solomon 96 (Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)*

The answer to this question obviously relates to the fact that it is not in South Africa’s interest to have millions of illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries (irrespective of their contribution to the ‘struggle’) entering South Africa. Moreover, biological research has demonstrated how self-interest on the part of states is readily explicable from a consideration of biological and cultural forces that have shaped human history from the beginnings of time.94 For instance, Hatcher95 delineates the biological roots of self-interest, and reveals how self-interest at the group or national level is a logical outgrowth of biological considerations. Moreover, it is argued that many of the factors which limit selfishness at the individual level are absent at the intergroup or international level. According to Hatcher this leads to unbridled self-interest at these levels, practically guaranteeing a world of conflict between groups and nations.

# realism inevitable—nature

**Evolutionary Biology proves Realism**

**Thayer 2k** (Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124-151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”)

Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and domi- nating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as "realist," is a product of the evolutionary process.5 I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics.6 I also argue that evolutionary theory may be applied not only to realism, but also to some of the central issues in international politics including the origins of war and ethnic conflict. An evolutionary perspective allows scholars of in- ternational politics to understand that war is not unique to humans, but is characteristic of other species in the animal kingdom as well. It also helps ex- plain the role that war has played in human evolution, and why xenophobia and ethnocentrism are contributing causes of ethnic conflict. These arguments are significant for two reasons. First, evolutionary theory offers a firm intellectual foundation for the realist argument that egoistic and dominating behavior is the result of human evolution. Realist scholars can use evolutionary theory to construct verifiable scientific explanations and thus ex- pand realism's explanatory range,7 which may help to reinvigorate realist scholarship.8 Scholars who are attracted to realism but are not persuaded to ground their arguments based on animus dominandi or anarchy will find a sound scientific substructure in evolutionary theory. Second, as the scholarship of Masters, Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Wilson, and others demonstrates, evolutionary theory provides an anchor for the study of much of human behavior.9 For example, Masters uses evolutionary theory to explain the origins of the state.10 Somit and Steven Peterson argue that it pro- vides a basis for specific forms of government.11 This article is intended to build on their work by "bringing in Darwin," that is, applying evolutionary theory to realism and international politics.

# realism inevitable—nature

**Human desire for domination explains power politics**

**Thayer 2k** (Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124-151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”)

Evolutionary theory can also explain the trait of domination. In evolutionary theory, domination usually means that particular individuals in social groups have regular priority of access to resources in competitive situations. For most social mammals, a form of social organization called a "dominance hierarchy operates most of the time.45 The creation of a dominance hierarchy may be vio- lent and is almost always competitive. A single leader, almost always male (the alpha male), leads the group. The ubiquity of this social ordering strongly sug- gests that such a pattern of organization contributes to fitness. Two principal types of behavior are evident among social mammals in a dominance hierarchy: dominant and submissive. Dominant mammals have enhanced access to mates, food, and territory, thus increasing their chances of reproductive success.46 Acquiring dominant status usually requires aggres- sion. Dominance, however, is an unstable condition; to maintain it, dominant individuals must be willing to defend their privileged access to available re- sources as long as they are able. Ethologists Richard Wrangham and Dale Pe- terson explain why an individual animal vies for dominant status: "The motivation of a male chimpanzee who challenges another's rank is not that he foresees more matings or better food or a longer life."47 Rather "those rewards explain why. . . selection has favored the desire for power, but the immediate reason he vies for status .... is simply to dominate his peers."48 Dominant animals often assume behavior reflecting their status. For exam- ple, dominant wolves and rhesus monkeys hold their tails higher than do other members of their group in an effort to communicate dominance. A domi- nant animal that engages in such displays is better off if it can gain priority of access to resources without having to fight for it continuously.49 Submissive social mammals recognize what is permitted and forbidden given their place in the hierarchy. They often try to be as inconspicuous as pos- sible. This behavior signals that the subordinate accepts its place in the domi- nance hierarchy and at least temporarily will make no effort to challenge the dominant animal. Ethologists and sociobiologists argue that dominance hierarchies evolve be- cause they aid defense against predators, promote the harvesting of resources, and reduce intragroup conflict.50 A species that lives communally has two choices: either it accepts organization with some centralization of power, or it engages in perpetual conflict over scarce resources, which may result in seri- ous injury and thus deprive the group of the benefits of a communal exist- ence.51 Ethological studies have confirmed that a hierarchical dominance sys- tem within a primate band minimizes overt aggression; aggression increases, however, when the alpha male is challenged. The dominance hierarchy has had a profound effect on human evolution. As cognitive psychologist Denise Dellarosa Cummins argues, "The fundamental components of our reasoning architecture evolved in response to pressures to reason about dominance hierarchies, the social organization that characterizes most social mammals."52 Her study and others have found that dominance hi- erarchies contribute to the evolution of the mind, which in turn contributes to fitness. According to Cummins, submissive individuals have the ability to detect, exploit, and circumvent the constraints of domination. If an animal can take what it wants by force, it is sure to dominate the available resources-unless its subordinates are smart enough to outwit it. A subordinate must use other strategies-deception, guile, appeasement, bartering, alliance formation, or friendship-to survive. Thus intelligence is particularly important to the sur- vival of subordinates. "The evolution of mind emerges," Cummins writes, "as a strategic arms race in which the weaponry is ever-increasing mental capacity to represent and manipulate internal representations of the minds of others."53 From their studies of chimpanzee societies, ethologists have learned that the struggle for survival is best characterized as a struggle between those who are dominant and those seeking to outwit them (i.e., between recognizing an op- ponent's intentions and hiding one's own). The following example illustrates how a subordinate chimpanzee, Belle, who knows the location of hidden food, attempts to deceive Rock, who is dominant.

# power=human nature

**The drive for power is the very essence of human existence**

**Donnelly ‘00**

[Jack, Ph. D University of California – Berkley in Political Science, Professor of IR at Korbel School, “Realism and International Relations”, Cambridge England, p.47]

Most states are indeed strongly inclined to seek power. Pursuing goals other than the national interest defined in terms of power often is dangerous, even counterproductive. But even Morgenthau's case for these lesser (although still important) claims is undermined by an exaggerated emphasis on a one-sided account of human nature. The pursuit of power, Morgenthau argues, is an inescapable consequence of the “elemental bio-psychological drives … to live, to propagate, and to dominate [that] are common to all men” (1948: 16–17). “All men lust for power” (1962a: 42). “Man's aspiration for power is not an accident of history; it is not a temporary deviation from a normal state of freedom; it is an all-permeating fact which is of the very essence of human existence” (1948: 312). This appeal to a natural will to power – “the animus dominandi, the desire for power” (1946: 192) – puts a particularly stark face on Morgenthau's realism. “It is this ubiquity of the desire for power which, besides and beyond any particular selfishness or other evil purpose, constitutes the ubiquity of evilness in human action” (1946: 194). Even if we could overcome the Hobbesian drives of competition, diffidence, and glory, we would still lust after power.

# yes human nature

**Evolutionary psychology provides a basis for realist claims about human nature—prefer our standards of scientific methodology**

Thayer 2k [Assistant Professor of Political Science @ University of Minnesota-Duluth

(Bradley A. “Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics” *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2. Autumn. JSTOR p. 137-138)]

Evolutionary theory provides a better foundation for realism than the theological or metaphysical arguments advanced by Niebuhr or Morgenthau for three reasons. First, it is superior as judged by the common metrics in philosophy of science developed by Carl Hempel and Karl Popper.64 Evolutionary theory meets all of Hempel's criteria of the deductive-nomological (D-N) model of scientific explanation, unlike Niebuhr's evil or Morgenthau's animus dominandi.65 Measured by Popper's criteria-developed in his theory of critical rationalism-evolutionary theory is also superior because it is falsifiable.66 That is, scholars know what evidence would not verify the theory.67 Niebuhr's and Morgenthau's ultimate causes are noumenal (i.e., outside the realm of scientific investigation). Second, evolutionary theory offers a widely accepted scientific explanation of human evolution, thus giving realism the scientific foundation it has lacked.

**There is such a thing as human nature**

**Danninger 2k2**, Brent, review of Steven Pinker's "The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature", Viking, New York)

In many cases, our culture refuses to recognize what psychology, anthropology and sociology can amply demonstrate about “human nature.” Instead, we cling to three outdated concepts of human nature: 1) that people are infinitely malleable by social influences (dubbed the “blank slate” or empiricism); 2) that people are inherently good but become warped by society (romanticism or the “noble savage”); and 3) that mind and body are entirely separate realms and that a spirit/soul/homunculus animates the mind (dualism or the “ghost in the machine”). These concepts are either demonstrably false, or the subject of religious belief and insusceptible to scientific analysis. A more nuanced view of human nature suggests plausible answers to some of society’s seemingly intractable problems. Prof. Pinker is particularly adept at relating human nature to issues in politics, the arts, gender, violence and child rearing.

# yes human nature

**Evolutionary Biology proves that there is an inherent human nature**

**Pinker 2k2** (Steven, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University, professor emiritus Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT, "The Blank Slate: the Modern Denial of Human Nature", Chapter 20)

It should come as no surprise that I think that there’s a huge problem with all of this, beginning with the blank slate. The main problem is that blank slates don’t do anything. It’s not that any sane person can deny the central importance of learning, culture, and socialization in all aspects of human experi- ence. The question is, how do they work? When Locke wrote that “there’s nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses,” the appropriate reply came from Leibniz, who said, “Except for the intellect itself.” Today the sciences of human nature have threatened the blank slate by trying to delineate what has to be present in the mind in order for learning to occur in the first place. My own field, cognitive science, has tried to explicate the innate mechanisms that have to be in place in order to do the learning that obviously gets done. They include: the basic concept of an enduring object and lawful causation, which can be seen even in young infants; a number sense that allows us to grasp quantity of number; a number of spatial representations that allow us to negotiate the world and recognize objects and faces; a “theory of mind” or intuitive psychology with which we understand the mental states of other people; a language instinct that allows us to communicate our own thoughts and feelings via words; and the executive systems of the frontal lobes of the brain, which receive information from the rest of the brain and execute decision rules that determine how the person as a whole behaves.

**Behavioral Patterns prove the Blank Slate is false**

**Pinker 2k2** (Steven, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University, professor emiritus Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT, "The Blank Slate: the Modern Denial of Human Nature", Chapter 20)

Evolutionary psychology has challenged the blank slate in at least two ways. One is by documenting that beneath the undeniable fact of cross-cultural variation there is a bedrock of human universals: ways of thinking and feeling and behaving that can be seen in all of the cultures documented by ethnography. The anthropologist Donald Brown a few years ago compiled a list of them, and they number some 300, everything from Aesthetics, Affection, and Anthropomorphization all the way to Vowel contrasts, Weapons, attempts to control the Weather, and a word for the color White. Evolutionary psychology has challenged the blank slate in another way: by showing that many human drives can’t really be understood as ways people maximize their well-being in their own lifetimes but can only be interpreted as adaptations to survival and reproduction in an ancestral environment, namely the foraging lifestyle that characterized our species through 99 percent of its evolutionary history, until the very recent invention of agriculture and then industrialization. An obvious example, very much in the news, is our taste for sugar and fat, which drives many people to an early grave from a diet too rich in junk food. The obvious explanation is that we evolved in a world in which these nutrient-packed substances were in short supply and we could never consume too many of them. Very recently, we developed the technology to crank out mass quantities of this stuff. Our tastes haven’t changed, and so we eat more of them than is good for us. Another example is the thirst for revenge, which is the source of much human misery in the form of vendettas and blood feuds and cycles of violence but which had a rationale in a world in which you couldn’t dial 911 to get Leviathan to show up to settle your scores for you but in which a reputation for toughness and a resolve to retaliate was one’s only defense against becoming a permanent punching bag.

# human nature violent

**Aggression and Violence are inherited traits**

**Pinker 2k2** (Steven, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University, professor emiritus Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT, "The Blank Slate: the Modern Denial of Human Nature", Chapter 20)

The noble savage has also been threatened by findings in the sciences of mind, brain, genes, and evolution. Behavioral genetics has shown that among the heritable traits are having an antagonistic personality, a tendency toward violent crime, and a lack of conscience, or psychopathy. Neuroscience has identified brain mechanisms associated with aggression. And evolutionary psychology and anthropology have underscored the ubiquity of conflict in human affairs, as one would expect from the outcome of a Darwinian process. I’ll give you a couple of examples. The archaeologist Lawrence Keeley has calculated the percentage of male deaths due to warfare in a number of societies—that is, if you’re a man, what are the chances that you will die at the hands of another man, as opposed to passing away of natural causes in your sleep? Among pre-state societies, such as hunter-gatherer and hunter-horticultural societies in the New Guinea highlands and the Amazon rainforest, the figures range from a low of about a 15 percent chance that a man will die at the hands of another man to almost a 60 percent chance. These figures dwarf the corresponding statistics for the United States and Europe in the 20th century, even if you include all of the casualties from both world wars. Not to put too fine a point on it, but when it comes to life in a state of nature, Hobbes was right; Rousseau was wrong. What about our society? How did we get to enjoy this state of peace and harmony? Is it because all violent impulses have somehow been socialized out of us? Probably not. A number of social psychologists have asked people the following question: Do you ever fantasize about killing someone you don’t like? They typically find that about 15 percent of women, and a third of men, frequently think about killing people they don’t like, especially romantic rivals, stepparents, and people who have humiliated them in public. And more than 60 percent of women and about three-quarters of men at least occasionally think about killing people they don’t like. And the rest of them are lying.

# human nature violent

**Group Selection Theory favors violent traits**

**Thayer 2k** (Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124-151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”)

The second argument is that war evolved through a process of group selec- tion that favors the self-sacrificing tendencies of some warriors.94 This may seem curious, but according to some evolutionary theorists, altruistic or self- sacrificing attributes can evolve through natural selection even though they may appear to cause more individual costs than benefits.95 From a strictly evo- lutionary (individual selection) or inclusive fitness perspective, individuals from one tribe may be willing to fight individuals from other tribes for the sake of small bands of relatives in which humans have lived through most of their evolutionary history. Fighting for the tribe, either aggressing or defending, would be fighting to preserve family and the warrior's genes. But individuals, in general, should not fight absent these circumstances. Evolutionary theorist David Sloan Wilson's argument for group selection suggests why individuals would choose self-sacrifice. According to Wilson, group selection is the component of natural selection that operates on the differential productivity of local populations within a global population.96 That is, individual selection favors traits that maximize fitness within single groups, but group selection favors traits that maximize the relative fitness of groups.97 As human groups grew to include more distant relatives and unrelated indi- viduals, wars to aggress and to defend the population were still necessary- warriors were still required. Some of these individuals were willing to sacrifice more for the group. But for this to happen, four conditions were needed: (1) there had to be more than one group; (2) there had to be variance among groups for a particular trait, so some groups had to have more altruists than others; (3) there had to be a direct relationship between the proportion of altruists in the group and the offspring of the group; and (4) the altruists had to reproduce with other groups.98 In conflict, the group that prevailed could conquer others because it had more warriors. It had more warriors because the population had more altruists. Because the warriors reproduced, the "warrior" genetic type continued, though it may have declined relative to the other mem- bers of the group during episodes of warfare. Thus group selection explains how altruism contributes to warfare.

# Violence inevitable

**Violence inevitable**

**Mearshheimer 09**- Professor of Political Science and the co-director of International Security Policy at the University of Chicago (John J. Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics xi-xii)

This cycle of violence will continue far into the new millennium. Hopes for peace will probably not be realized, because the great powers that shape the [international](http://inieniaiion.il) system fear each other and compete for power as a result. Indeed, their ultimate aim is to gain a position of dominant power over others, because having dominant power is the best means to ensure one's own survival. Strength ensures safety, and the greatest strength is the greatest insurance of safety. States facing this incentive are fated to clash as each competes for advantage over the others. This is a tragic situation in that there is no escaping it unless the stales that make up the system agree to form a world government. Such a vast transformation is hardly a realistic prospect, however, so conflict and war are bound to continue as large and enduring features of world politics.

# Us/Them Dichotomy Inevitable

**In-Group/Out-Group distinctions are human nature – two reasons.**

**1. Resource conflicts**

Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 77-78 //adi]

Humans make in-group/out-group distinctions for three reasons. First, humans seek resources—food, water, and shelter—to care for themselves and relatives, and they seek mates to reproduce their genotype; in sum, they are egoistic for the reasons advanced by Darwin, William Hamilton, and other evolutionary theorists, as I described in chapter 1 and in the discussion above. They are unlikely to assist those who are not related, but may do so occasionally, expecting reciprocal behavior. Humans behave in these ways because resources were scarce in the late-Pliocene, Pleistocene, and Holoccne environments in which we evolved. In that environment, it is easy to understand why humans would prefer more resources to fewer: more strength is preferable to less strength, more wealth to less wealth, domination to being dominated. Most people do indeed prefer more resources to fewer; the rich want even more wealth, and seldom say they are too wealthy. Rather, they seem to worry about protecting their wealth from those who may take it from them, such as revolutionaries or the government. In essence, in prehistoric times when there was too little to go around, humans discriminated between self and others, family and others, tribe and others, in-groups and out-groups. This behavior remains today. We humans are likely to perceive out-groups as threats to our resources, the resources we need to maintain ourselves and our families and extended in-groups such as the tribe or state.

**2. Threat assessment**

Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 78 //adi]

Second, living and evolving in dangerous environments, humans, like other animals, need the ability to assess threats rapidly and react quickly. The in-group/out-group distinction may be thought of as the human minds immediate threat assessment. It is a mechanism for determining whether or not nonrelated conspecifics presented a threat. In sum, our mind rapidly debates: no threat/threat. Is the outsider a threat to oneself or to ones family? As a result, over the course of human evolution, strangers were first likely to fear one another, at least until they became familiar.

# realism inev- submission

Nation-state formation inevitable – humans inherently submit to authority

Thayer 2k [Assistant Professor of Political Science @ University of Minnesota-Duluth

(Bradley A. “Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics” *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2. Autumn. JSTOR p. 135-136)]

Humans and other primates evolve a mental architecture to address the difficulties they encounter when in dominance hierarchies. As result of this, Wilson submits: "Human beings are absurdly easy to indoctrinate-they seek it." Three factors contribute to the ease of indoctrination. First, survival in a hostile world dictates membership in a group and produces a fear of ostracism from it. Second, acceptance of, or conformity to, a particular status quo lowers the risk of conflict in a dominance hierarchy. Third, conformity helps keep groups together. If group conformity becomes too weak, the group could fall apart and become extinct because of predation from one's own or another species. The consequences for the study of politics are great. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Somit and Peterson, Wilson, and psychologist Donald Campbell, among others, suggest that humans readily give allegiance to the state, or embrace religion or ideologies such as liberalism or communism, because evolution has produced a need to belong to a dominance hierarchy. An overview of human history provides context. Much of it is a record of threats of force or wars to gain territory and resources.60 Political institutions, whether monarchies or aristocracies, and leaders such as Julius Caesar, Louis XIV, and Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid typify dominance hierarchies-as do the modern state and its many institutions, including government bureaucracies and the military.

# thayer good- falsifiable

Prefer Thayer’s analysis – it’s the only one that’s falsifiable and proven through scientific fact – theories that are not shouldn’t even be considered.

Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 68 //adi]

Evolution provides a better ultimate causal foundation according to the D-N model because it tightly fits this model on two levels. First, it explains how life evolves through the evolutionary processes (natural selection, gene mutation, etc.) described in chapter 1 that provide the general laws of evolution and specific antecedent conditions affecting these laws. This theory of how nature evolves may be applied and tested against specific evidence, for example, about how early primates and humans lived and continue to do so, which may confirm evolutionary processes. Second, proximate causes of human (or other animal) behavior may be deduced from it. That is, if the evolutionary process is valid, then much of human behavior must have evolved because the behavior contributed to fitness in past environments. Accordingly, evolutionary theory provides an adequate causal explanation for realism because if the antecedent conditions arc provided the ultimate cause logically produces the proximate causes (egoism and domination) of realism. Measured by Poppers method of falsification, evolutionary theory is also superior to the ultimate causes of Niebuhr and Morgenthau because it is fal-sifiable.41 That is, scholars know what evidence would not verify the theory. Popper argued that if a theory is scientific, then we may conceive of observations that would show the theory to be false. His intent was to make precise the idea that scientific theories should be subject to empirical test. In contrast to good scientific theories that can be falsified, Popper suggested that no pattern of human behavior could falsify Marxism or Freudian psychoanalytic theory. More formally, Poppers criterion of falsifiability requires that a theory contain "observation sentences," that is, "proposition P is falsifiable if and only if P deductively implies at least one observation sentence O"2 Falsifiable theories contain predictions that may be checked against empirical evidence. So according to Popper, scientists should accept a theory\* only if it is falsifiable and no observation sentence has falsified it.

**Prefer evolutionary arguments—only we have defensible methodologies**

Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 68-69 //adi]

Evolutionary theory is falsifiable. That is, the conditions under which the theory would be disproved can be derived from the fundamental theory, along with the empirical evidence that would show it to be false. However, Popper himself once charged that evolutionary theory was "not a testable scientific theory."41 Popper's argument with respect to evolutionary theory is incorrect and seems to have stemmed from confusion about its complete contents.44 He later reversed himself and declared it to be falsifiable.45 Indeed, evolutionary theory is a testable scientific theory that possesses many falsifi-able claims. For example, the key components of evolution, natural selection and genetic variation, have been shown to be falsifiable by Michael Ruse, Elliott Sober, and Mary Williams, among others.46 Natural selection has been tested against alternative theories of evolution, such as Lamarckism, saltationism, creationism, and orthogenesis and found to possess more logical coherence and to account better for empirical evidence.47 Although scholars may find this hard to appreciate today, an intense struggle occurred among these competing theories a century ago.48 However, genetic variation within populations and between and among species has been demonstrated beyond doubt. Thus, in the marketplace of ideas, natural selection has properly won its predominant place.

# human nature answers k’s

**If we win biological justification for realism, that make the theory of realism objectively true**

**Freyberg-inan -** Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam as well as the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research 20**04** (Annette, What Moves Man The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature pg. 158)

One important trend in this context is the recent rise of attempts to base realist arguments directly on sociobiological, rather than implicitly or explicitly psychological, foundations. In his study of the role of power in social evolution, Andrew Schmookler has attempted to show how intersocietal conflicts have necessarily developed as human societies evolved.5In a recent article, Bradley Thayer employs such evolutionary theory to explain egoism and domination, two human traits that he rightly considers critical components of any realist explanation.6The crucial caveat for such research is that social Darwinist determinism as well as the use of selective evidence to bolster it must be avoided at all cost if realists are not to dig themselves in any deeper. It seems highly unlikely at this point that greater realism will be achieved for the paradigm by employing sociobiological assumptions, even as combined with an evolutionary as opposed to a static view of human nature. On the other side of the revisionist spectrum, a number of economists and philosophers have recently attempted to draw on the disciplines of both economics and moral philosophy in an effort to reintroduce a more comprehensive concept of reason into the study of social interaction.7This, it seems to me, is a step in the right direction, which might serve as an example for those contemporary international relations theories that rely on a dubious cognitive model of man which has been un- critically borrowed from the field of economics. It is important for political scientists operating within any paradigm to periodically reevaluate the psychological assumptions on which their theories are based. If these can be shown to be too restrictive, some degree of parsimony might have to be sacrificed to make the theory more useful. The motives underlying human behavior are complex and hardly allow for much stipulation. While it is certainly not impossible to predict action based on motivation, this complexity must be taken into account in any viable theory of international relations. A broadening of motivational as well as cognitive assumptions would both reflect current psychological knowledge and deliver more complete explanations of political behavior, while at the same time countering the unjustified and potentially harmful dominance of the realist paradigm in the theory and conduct of international relations and foreign policy.

**The only question on whether realism is truth or not is whether human nature is inherently self motivated**

**Freyberg-inan -** Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam as well as the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research 20**04** (Annette, What Moves Man The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature pg. 91 -92)

The realist view of human nature is distinguished by three basic characteristics. To begin with, realists view human nature and motivation as both universal and stable. The realist view of human nature is egalitarian in the sense that realism does not distinguish, for example, between more or less selfish or evil human beings. Instead, it holds that all human beings are identically motivated and thus cannot be judged by their basic motives. The realist view of human nature is also nonevolutionary, or static. Realism expects that the basic elements of human nature and motivation will not change with time. The third characteristic of the realist psychology is its profound pessimism. Realism perceives human motivation to be essentially conflictual and thereby destructive of idealist hopes for peace and justice. Realists believe that human motivation is at the root of conflict among human beings, and that, since such motivation is always and everywhere the same, conflict is an indelible feature of social life.

# rejecting human nature bad

**Denying Human Nature is the same logic of dictatorial regimes**

**Pinker 2k2** (Steven, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University, professor emiritus Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT, "The Blank Slate: the Modern Denial of Human Nature", Chapter 20)

I have emphasized that there are downsides to the blank slate. The belief in perfectibility, despite its rosy and uplifting connotation, has a number of dark sides. One of them is the invitation to totalitarian social engineering. Dictators are apt to think: “If people are blank slates, then we damn well better control what gets written on those slates, instead of leaving it up to chance.” Some of the worst autocrats of 20th century explicitly avowed a belief in the blank slate. Mao Tse-tung, for example, had a famous saying, “It is on a blank page that the most beautiful poems are written.” The Khmer Rouge had a slogan, “Only the newborn baby is spotless.”

**Accepting Human Nature is key to Democracy**

**Pinker 2k2** (Steven, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University, professor emiritus Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT, "The Blank Slate: the Modern Denial of Human Nature", Chapter 20)

In contrast, democracy, which I think we would agree has had a more benevolent outcome, is based on a jaundiced view of human nature, perhaps best captured in the famous quotation of James Madison: “If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.” It is this jaundiced view that led to the idea of the permanent need of “a government of laws and not men” and for the checks and balances built into democracies, which were explicitly designed to counteract human ambition and self-deception, thought to be a permanent part of human nature

# Human nature turns “zero point”

**Denying human nature results in totalitarianism and devalues life**

**Pinker 2k2** (Steven, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University, professor emiritus Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT, "The Blank Slate: the Modern Denial of Human Nature", Chapter 20)

Finally, I’ve argued that grounding values in a blank slate is a mistake. It’s a mistake because it makes our values hostages to fortune, implying that some day, discoveries from the field or lab could make them obsolete. And it’s a mistake because it conceals the downsides of denying human nature, including persecution of the successful, totalitarian social engineering, an exaggeration of the effects of the environment (such as in parenting and the criminal justice system), a mystification of the rationale behind responsibility, democracy, and morality, and the devaluing of human life on Earth.

# No alt to realism

##### No Alternative to Realism

##### Solomon 96 (Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)

##### We have seen a great many criticisms levelled against the state-centric bias of realists, but what would be an alternative form of political community? In answer to this question Booth makes the following observation: "Modern states are too large to satisfy some human needs, and too small to cope with the requirements of guidance for an increasingly interdependent planet. The logical conclusion of this argument is that power should be more diffuse. It is desirable to take it away from states to more local communities (to cater for cultural diversity, for example), while wider problems such as economic and environmental issues, could be more effectively dealt with by designated regional or global function organisations."104 If this is an alternative to the State, then it is indeed a poor substitute. Consider the idea that power should be more diffuse. Whether one talks of a strongly centralised unitary state or a federal state with the devolution of power (thereby empowering local communities), it is still a state. Thus, it is not an argument against the State, it is an argument against a specific type of state (unitary) in favour of another type of state (federal). If Booth is talking about even greater autonomy to cater for cultural diversity, how might this apply to the South African scenario? Apartheid South Africa justified its bantustan policies following a similar type of logic. More recently, Inkatha has been using a similar kind of logic in order to entrench itself in the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature; and the possibility of another Biafra or Katanga developing in that troubled region is becoming increasingly real. Booth’s other idea that ‘wider problems such as economic and environmental issues could be more effectively dealt with by regional or global function organisations’ should also be questioned. In the first instance, economic regimes like the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade And Tariffs (GATT) which led to the formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have failed to achieve its stated objective of ‘tariff disarmament’ as trade relations between the US and Japan indicate. Neither is this an isolated incident, if the ‘chicken wars’ between South Africa and the US are anything to go by. On the question of environmental regimes one may simply point out how global environmental concerns floundered in the high seas of national self-interest at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.105 To emphasise the point, both brutally and simply, there is no practical alternative to the State. Walker says that "[t]he state is a political category in a way that the world, or the globe, or the planet, or humanity is not."106 Also stressing the centrality of the State, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali observes: "The foundation-stone of this work [ie. peace and economic development] is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress."107 But, the most powerful argument for the State comes not from its many and varied successes, but rather from its failure. State collapse, as in Somalia, has not been met by cries of jubilation from its ‘emancipated’ inhabitants as Booth would have us believe.108 Rather, tragedy and misery has greeted Somalians with its collapse. This is why the State must and should remain the primary referent in domestic and international affairs. The principle of state sovereignty is the most plausible way of reconciling claims about the universal and the particular, society and the individual. Without the apparatus of a strong state, the way becomes clear for the Mohammed Farah Aideeds of the world to appear. Without the apparatus of a strong state, the world will be plunged into Somali-style warlordism of the Dark Age variety.

##### Alternatives Fail

##### Solomon 96 (Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)

The post-modern/critical theory challenge to realism has been tested, and proved wanting. Realism remains the single most reliable analytical framework through which to understand and evaluate global change. Post-modernism can provide no practical alternatives to the realist paradigm. We know what a realist world looks like (we are living in one!); but what does a post-modernist world look like? As long as humanity is motivated by hate, envy, greed and egotism, realism will continue to be invaluable to the policy-maker and the scholar. In this regard it has to be pointed out that from the end of World War II until 1992, hundreds of major conflicts around the world have left some twenty million human beings dead.109 Neither has the end of the Cold War showed any sign that such conflict will end. By the end of 1993 a record of 53 wars were being waged in 37 countries across the globe.110 Until a fundamental change in human nature occurs, realism will continue to dominate the discipline of international relations. The most fundamental problem with post-modernism is that it assumes a more optimistic view of human nature. Srebrenica, Bihac, Tuzla, Zeppa, Goma, Chechnya, Ogoniland, and KwaZulu-Natal all bear testimony to the folly of such a view.

# rejection fails

**Rejecting Realism is impossible—others states won’t follow**

**Murray,** - Professor Politics at the University of Wales, 19**97** (Alastair Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 181-2)

This highlights the central difficulty with Wendt's constructivism. It is not any form of unfounded idealism about the possibility of effecting a change in international politics. Wendt accepts that the intersubjective character of international institutions such as self-help render them relatively hard social facts. Rather, What is problematic is his faith that such chance, if it could be achieved, implies progress. Wendt's entire approach is governed by the belief that the problematic elements of international politics can be transcended, that the competitive identities which create these elements can be reconditioned, and that the predatory policies which underlie these identities can be eliminated. Everything in his account, is up for gabs: there is no core of recalcitrance to human conduct which cannot be reformed, unlearnt, disposed of. This venerates a stance that so privileges the possibility of a systemic transformation that it simply puts aside the difficulties which it recognises to be inherent in its achievement. Thus, even though Wendt acknowledges that the intersubjective basis of the self-help system makes its reform difficult, this does not dissuade him. He simply demands that states adopt a strategy of 'altercasting', a strategy which 'tries to induce alter to take on a new identity (and thereby enlist alter in ego's effort to change itself) by treating alter as if it already had that identity'. Wendt's position effectively culminates in a demand that the state undertake nothing less than a giant leap of faith. The fact that its opponent might not take its overtures seriously. might not be interested in reformulating its own construction of the world. or might simply see such an opening as a weakness to be exploited. are completely discounted. The prospect of achieving a systemic transformation simply outweighs any adverse consequences which might arise from the effort to achieve it. Wendt ultimately appears, in the final analysis, to have overdosed on 'Gorbimania'.

# Realism true- generic

**Realism best explains War**

**Thayer 2k** (Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124-151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”)

Scholars of international politics may use evolutionary theory to generate new understanding of important issues in international politics, such as the origins of war and ethnic conflict.70 Evolutionary theory suggests why some humans organize attacks and why others organize to defend against such attacks. It also explains why suspicion of strangers contributes to fitness in the course of human evolution. IMPLICATIONS FOR WARFARE War is a phenomenon that has been usefully studied from multiple, often inter- disciplinary, perspectives-psychological, regime type, and systemic, among others.71 Although the causes of modern war are often complex, its prevalence throughout human history suggests that it is not caused principally by modern developments, such as imperialism or militarism, although these no doubt contribute to the scope, if not necessarily the intensity, of conflict.72 The human capacity for aggression and warfare has been widely studied by eminent psychologists such as Sigmund Freud and Erich Fromm. Freud inter- preted aggressive human behavior as the outcome of a drive that constantly seeks release.73 For Freud, war results from many motives, "some of which are openly declared and others which are never mentioned," but "a lust for ag- gression and destruction is certainly among them."74 Building on Freud's work, Fromm argued that humans are subject to a unique death instinct that leads to pathological forms of aggression beyond those found in other animals.75

# Realism true – Resource Competition

**Realism is proven because of resource competition**

Thayer 2k [Assistant Professor of Political Science @ University of Minnesota-Duluth

(Bradley A. “Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics” *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 2. Autumn. JSTOR p. 141-143)]

Evolutionary theory suggests that groups may go to war to increase inclusive fitness. Doing so is logical for offensive and defensive reasons. A group becomes more fit if it can successfully attack to take the resources of others. Also, it must be able to wage a defensive war when competitors threaten its resources.86 Evolutionary theorist William Durham argues that intergroup aggression develops as a behavioral adaptation to conditions of competition for resources. War is one means by which individuals "may improve the material conditions of their lives and thereby increase their ability to survive and reproduce.i88 According to Durham's research, a group can expand its resource base by aggressively seizing resources from other groups. Pressure might be particularly acute if population size is increasing faster than resources. Ethnographer Andrew Vayda's classic study of the Iban of Borneo and the Maori of New Zealand is instructive here. According to Vayda, the than case "shows the warlike extension of territory as a means whereby a group can avoid experiencing any very great privations due to the pressure of population upon available resources."89 For the Maori, conquest of neighboring groups was easier than expanding into new areas to cultivate resources: "If the time and effort required for clearing new virgin land were considerably more than were necessary for ... conquest and the preparation of previously used land for cultivation, it follows that territorial conquests, such as some of those re-corded in Maori traditional history, would have added more efficiently to the prosperity of particular groups than would peaceful dispersion."90 Wilson's explanation of the origins and continuation of warfare dovetails with Durham's argument and Vayda's ethnography. According to Wilson, warfare may have begun when one group of early humans considered "the significance of adjacent social groups and [how] to deal with them in an intelligent, organized fashion. A band might then dispose of a neighboring band, appropriate its territory, and increase its own genetic representation in the metapopulation.i91 Furthermore, this band would retain the memory of the event and by repeating it would increase its control of resources.92 The victories of the original band "might propel the spread of the genes through the genetic constitution of the metapopulation. Once begun, such a mutual reinforcement could be irreversible."93

**Groups go to War for materialistic gain**

**Thayer 2k** (Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124-151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”)

WARFARE AND FITNESS. For humans, there are two sufficient explanations for war: inclusive fitness and group selection. William Hamilton's inclusive fitness theory (also called kin selection) suggests that reproductive success is measured not only in terms of individual animals but also in terms of their rel- atives.81 Masters summarizes how inclusive fitness modifies traditional Dar- winian evolutionary theory: "natural selection favors the ability of individuals to transmit their genes to posterity.... however, an organism's reproductive success can sometimes be furthered by assisting others, instead of by mat- ing."82 Thus understood, an individual's self-interest can be served by assist- ing genetically related individuals.83 Evolutionary theory suggests that groups may go to war to increase inclu- sive fitness.84 Doing so is logical for offensive and defensive reasons. A group becomes more fit if it can successfully attack to take the resources of others. Also, it must be able to wage a defensive war when competitors threaten its re- sources. 86 Evolutionary theorist William Durham argues that intergroup ag- gression develops as a behavioral adaptation to conditions of competition for resources.87 War is one means by which individuals "may improve the mate- rial conditions of their lives and thereby increase their ability to survive and re- produce."88 According to Durham's research, a group can expand its resource base by aggressively seizing resources from other groups. Pressure might be particularly acute if population size is increasing faster than resources

# Realism true- fear

**Realism true- fear**

**Mearshheimer 09**- Professor of Political Science and the co-director of International Security Policy at the University of Chicago (John J. Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 32-33)

Great powers fear each other. They regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might be in the offing. They anticipate danger. There is little room for trust among slates. For sure, the level of fear varies across lime and space, but it cannot be reduced to a trivial level. From the per­spective of any one great power, all other great powers are potential ene­mies. This point is illustrated by the reaction of the United Kingdom and France to German reunification at the end of the Cold War. Despite the fact that these three slates had been close allies for almost forty-five years, both the United Kingdom and France immediately began worrying about the potential dangers of a united Germany.10 The basis of this fear is that in a world where great powers have the capability to attack each other and might have the motive to do so, any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and reluc­tant to trust them. Add to this the "911" problem—the absence of a cen­tral authority to which a threatened state can turn for help—and states have even greater incentive to fear each other. Moreover, there is no mechanism, other than the possible self-interest of third parties, for pun­ishing an aggressor. Because it is sometimes difficult to deter potential aggressors, states have ample reason not to trust other states and to be prepared for war with them. The possible consequences of falling victim to aggression further ampli­fy the importance of fear as a motivating force in world politics. Great pow­ers do not compete with each other as if international politics were merely an economic marketplace. Political competition among states is a much more dangerous business than mere economic intercourse; the former can lead to war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefield as well as mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the destruction of states. The horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to view each other not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies. Political antagonism, in short, tends to be intense, because the stakes are great.

# realism true- anarchy

**Realism true- anarchy**

**Mearshheimer 09**- Professor of Political Science and the co-director of International Security Policy at the University of Chicago (John J. Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 33)

States in the international system also aim to guarantee their own sur­vival. Because other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911, states can­not depend on others for their own security. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own sur­vival. In international politics, God helps those who help themselves. This emphasis on self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances." But alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: today's alliance partner might be tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance partner. For example, the United States fought with China and the Soviet Union against Germany and Japan in World War II, but soon thereafter flip-flopped enemies and partners and allied with West Germany and Japan against China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the inter­ests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international com­munity. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short term as well as in the long term, because if a state loses in the short run, it might not be around for the long haul.

Apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of other states, and aware that they operate in a self-help system, states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system. The stronger a state is relative to its potential rivals, the less likely it is that any of those rivals will attack it and threaten its survival. Weaker stales will he reluctant 10 pick fights with more powerful slates because the weaker states are likely to suffer military defeat. Indeed, the bigger the gap in power between any two states, the less likely it is that the weaker will attack the stronger

# realism true- empirics

**Millennia of human history support realism**

**Solomon 96** (Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)

Realists have been attacked by post-modernists for according the role of primary referent in international affairs to the State.82The State as an ‘a-historical given’ One aspect of this criticism relates to the fact that realists see the State as an ‘a-historical given in the global system’.83 Post-modernists posit the notion that the State is a relatively recent historical figure (that the birth of the State is to be found in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 which ended the Thirty Years War). It is argued that the State historically evolved from set circumstances, and that in the present era of massive global change it shows every indication to be on the wane.84 However, such a view is extremely problematic. Does this mean that Julius Caesar did not rule over a State? Does this mean that the rulers of ancient Han China did not rule over a state? Does this mean that Montezuma’s sophisticated Aztec polity was not a state? And what of King Solomon’s Israel, rulers of the mighty kingdoms of Mali and Ghana, Atahualapa’s vast Inca empire, and the sophisticated Indus Valley polity which existed millennia before the birth of Christ? These questions necessitate a more fundamental question: what exactly is a state? The classic political science definition of a state is a people occupying a specific territory, having rulers (government) who pass laws which are binding on those people.85 By this definition, all the above historical examples are indeed states. More importantly, it illustrates a deep Eurocentric bias among those scholars who claim that the State is a relatively recent historical phenomenon which began with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 Those who argue that the State is withering away lack an understanding of human history which proves that states are complex social structures and have always been changing in response to new historical conditions. As such, the State as defined above will always be with us in one form or another. After all, somebody has to see to the need of citizens, ranging from protection from the mugger in the dark alley to the army of a foreign government.

**Empirical examples are on the side of realism – and even examples of non-aggression were because of deterrence**

**Synder** – Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of North Carolina- 20**02**(Glenn H.“Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay” MIT Press International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer, 2002), pp. 149-173 JSTOR)

Mearsheimer tests and demonstrates the empirical validity of his theory by examining six cases of great power behavior: Japan from 1868 to 1945; Germany from 1862 to 1945; the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1991; Italy from 1861 to 1943; Great Britain from 1792 to 1945; and the United States from 1800 to 1990. He seeks to show that "the history of great-power politics involves primarily the clashing of revisionist states" and that "the only status quo powers that appear in the story are regional hegemons." The evidence must also show that great powers "do not practice self-denial when they have the wherewithal to shift the balance in their favor, and that the appetite for power does not decline once states have a lot of it" (pp. 168-169). The cases of Japan, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy strongly support Mearsheimer's theory. These states were constantly alert for opportunities to expand and took advantage of them. Further, they became more aggressive the more power they accumulated. The primary motive in all four cases was increasing security. Their leaders "talked and thought" like offensive realists (p. 170). There were a few exceptions, but according to Mearsheimer, these are mostly explainable in the theory's terms. Thus instances of nonexpansion were largely the result of successful deterrence, rather than a disappearance of the motive to expand (p. 169). Germany between 1871 and 1900, for example, was a nonaggressive state, but this was because any further expansion beyond the unification of Germany would have triggered a great power war that Germany would lose. So, as the theory predicts, it accepted the status quo, lying low until 1903, by which time it had become a potential hegemon, possessing both more wealth and a more powerful army than any other European state. The aggressive policy of Weltpolitik soon followed. A reasonable question can be raised, especially in the case of Nazi Germany, as to whether these states were driven chiefly by security aspirations or by other values, such as economic ag-grandizement, prestige, or power as an end in itself. Moreover, it is not con- vincing that states that were temporarily nonaggressive, such as late nineteenth-century Germany, nevertheless entertained secret aggressive aims. Such an interpretation tends to make the theory nonfalsifiable because any state that desisted from power maximization could be said to be merely biding its time.

# offensive realism true

**Offensive realism is the most likely theory to affect decisions of the state – leaders grab for power in egoistic manners.**

Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 80 //adi]

It is also important to address whether anchoring offensive realist behavior on evolutionary theory or on the anarchic state system is significant for the study of international relations. This book makes an important theoretical contribution to this issue, but we will need focused, empirical testing to determine which insights arise from an offensive realism based on evolutionary theory.\*" In particular, offensive realism based on evolutionary theory is likely to inform explanations, for example, of the conditions in which state leaders choose to aggress or expand their power. The reasons they choose to expand are often complicated, but they seek more power for their own egoism or vainglory as well as for the security of their state. Cortez sought glory and riches for himself, as well as for his king; a CEO seeks to expand his corporation's market share to increase the shareholder value but also, one suspects, to prove that he can personally conquer and expand markets.

\*\*\*A2 REALISM INDICTS\*\*\*

# a2 states are moral

**Morality is for suckers**

**Hersberger 04**- a financial representative with Northwestern Mutual. (10/8/04 “Realism” <http://users.manchester.edu/Student/EJHersberger/MyPage2/Realism.pdf>)

Power optimization is essential to the theory of realism. It is the mode of realism by which international relations should be managed. This idea of power politics leads a nation to focus primarily upon its own interests. Thus, national interest takes precedence over interdependence among nations. As a result of this, morality is either set aside as a hindrance to obtaining power or used as a guise to obtain the national interest. As Burchill states in the second edition of Theories of International Relations, “There is no room for moral or ethical concerns, prejudice, political philosophy or individual preference in the determination of foreign policy because actions are constrained by the relative power of the state. Thus, the national interest ought to be the sole pursuit of statesmen” (Burchill, 79). This struggle for power and pursuit of the national interest is brought to equilibrium through a balance of power among nations.

# a2 institutions matter

**International institutions don’t disprove realism**

**Mearshheimer 09**- Professor of Political Science and the co-director of International Security Policy at the University of Chicago (John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism” 2009, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0048.pdf>)

Realists also recognize that states sometimes operate through institutions. However, they believe that those rules reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power. The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it. In this view, institutions are essentially "arenas for acting out power rela­tionships."33 For realists, the causes of war and peace are mainly a function of the balance of power, and institutions largely mirror the distribution of power in the system. In short, the balance of power is the independent variable that explains war; institutions are merely an intervening variable in the process. NATO provides a good example of realist thinking about institutions. NATO is an institution, and it certainly played a role in preventing World War III and helping the West win the Cold War. Nevertheless, NATO was basically a manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War, and it was that balance of power, not NATO *per se,* that provided the key to maintaining stability on the continent. NATO was essentially an American tool for managing power in the face of the Soviet threat. Now, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, realists argue that NATO must either disappear or reconstitute itself on the basis of the new distribution of power in Europe.34 NATO cannot remain as it was during the Cold War.

**Institutions have insignificant effects, states will maintain a short-term power maximizing behavior**

**Mearsheimer ‘95**

[John J., Ph. D. Cornell International Relations, Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago, “A Realist Reply”, International Security, vol. 20, No. 1, p.82]

Realists answer no. They believe that institutions cannot get states to stop behaving as short-term power maximizers. For realists, institutions reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on concerns about relative power; as a result, institutional outcomes invariably reflect the balance of power. Institutions, realists maintain, do not have significant independent effects on state behavior. However, realists recognize that great powers sometimes find institutions – especially alliances – useful for maintaining or even increasing their share of world power. For example, it was more efficient for the United States and its allies to balance against the Soviets through NATO than through a less formal and more *ad hoc* alliance. But NATO did not force its member states to behave contrary to balance-of-power logic.

# A2: ANARCHY BAD

**They Conflate Anarchy with Disorder-International Competition is an inevitable faucet of the international order preventing cooperation**

**Solomon 96** (Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html>)

##### Anarchy is a central pillar in realist thought. Its literal meaning is ‘absence of government’. However, this should not be interpreted as disorder, confusion and chaos (as George wrongly does). Thus, anarchy and order, are not necessarily mutually exclusive in traditional international relations theory. States, realists note, do in fact form a primitive society with rules, norms and values (such as respect for the territorial sovereignty of states).78 However, these rules, norms and values are not as well developed between states as they are within states. The cases cited earlier regarding the US mining Nicaragua’s harbours, the bombing of the ‘Rainbow Warrior’, and the alleged Libyan involvement in the bombing over Lockerbie demonstrate the tentative nature of what is termed ‘international law’. Thus anarchy exists between states (referring to an absence of world government and where states answer to no higher authority but themselves), but there is also a form of primitive society co-existing with this anarchy. This led Hedley Bull to describe the interstate system as "the anarchical society".79 The concept of anarchy, however, holds other implications. The lack of a common government or a universally recognised common external authority is what distinguishes the international from the domestic realms of politics and law. The notions of sovereignty and independence in this way are either a consequence of, or a reason for this condition.80 However, demarcating domestic from international politics, does not necessarily mean seeing one in isolation from another; they are rather seen as interrelated. For example, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Prussia’s Metternich and other conservative monarchies, fearing the spread of the ideas of the French Revolution decided to band together to stop this. Thus Metternich’s ‘Concert system’ proposed a kind of international policing regime for he feared that revolutionary French ideas such as the notion of equality might become a factor in the domestic politics of conservative Prussia. The example cited above is also instructive for another reason: it explains why states co-operate that are of necessity in conflict and competition with each other. States, history emphasises, co-operate with each other when it is in their interest to do so. After the conservative monarchies of Europe weathered the storm of the populist 1848 revolutions, very little commonality remained between them, and the ‘Concert system’ all but fell into disarray. When the Crimean War broke out in 1854 it officially sealed the death of the ‘Concert system’.81 The predominance of the concept of national self-interest in the "anarchical society" will be returned to in the next section.

**Realism can exist absent the concept of anarchy**

**Thayer 2k** (Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124-151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”)

Third, realists can use evolutionary theory to advance arguments supporting offensive realism without depending on the anarchic international system. Of- fensive realists argue that states seek to maximize power because competition in the international system to achieve security compels them to do so.68 Real- ism based on evolutionary theory reaches the same conclusion, but the causal mechanism is at the first image (the individual) rather than the third image (the international system). State decisionmakers are egoistic and strive to dom- inate others. In international politics they do so by maximizing state power.69 Focused, empirical testing is required to determine which insights an offensive realism based on evolutionary theory provides. This in turn may inform expla- nations of why state leaders choose to expand and why they are often able to generate popular support for expansion with relative ease, or why external or internal threats have been such powerful motivators in building national soli- darity and mobilizing a society's resources.

# A2: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

**Social Movements don’t disprove Realism**

##### Solomon 96 (Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)

##### Another aspect of the critique relates to the ‘fact’ that the State is seen to be withering away with proof being found in the tremendous growth of social movements, non-government organisations (NGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs) and the like.8 Unfortunately for the post-modernists, however, the situation is far more nuanced. History has shown that state and non-state actors have always co-existed: sometimes they have been in opposition to each other, and in other cases they have worked together; at times the power of the State was predominant and at other times the power of non-state actors was predominant. More importantly, however, where the power of non-state actors have been predominant it did not mean a death-knell to the existence of the State. Consider here the case of some of the earliest TNCs - the English East India Company (EEIC) and the Dutch East India Company (DEIC). The EEIC set about to conquer India and ‘members of its board’ became governors of the various Indian provinces. Similarly, the DEIC set about to conquer Java (later renamed Dutch Batavia) and it was members of its board - the Council of Seventeen - who ordered Jan van Riebeeck to come to the Cape in 1652. Both companies had their own warships and wielded considerable power. It is important to note that the power of the State in each of the above instances was enhanced by the activities of private capital. Indications today are that not much has changed. Consider the case of Lonhro, the British conglomerate, who while operating in several countries, cannot escape the label `British’. More importantly, the British State benefits from Lonrho’s activities as can be seen in the assistance the company’s overseas activities gets from the British State. The same could be said about Anglo-American and Toshiba.

Realism absorbs Social Movements-no risk of state demise

Solomon 96 (Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)

##### What happens when social movements actually capture state power? Does the State "wither away’? Quite the opposite is true: where social movements capture state power, the State is imbued with greater legitimacy which enhances its power vis-à-vis citizens and other social formations within the territorial boundaries of the State. Such was the case when Engelbrecht Engelbrechtsen led a peasant revolt in Sweden which resulted in King Eric VII fleeing and Engelbrechtsen occupying the throne. Such was the case, too, in Gaur in India when African slaves revolted and put their own leader on the throne. Such was the case of the trade union movement Solidarity in Poland in the 1980s. The case of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa can also be said to fit this pattern. It could be argued that the ANC from its inception in 1912 till just prior to coming to power on 27 April 1994 was more a social and nationalist movement than a political party. It fought for a South African nationalism blind to the colour of a person’s skin and fought for the upliftment of what Frantz Fanon termed ‘the wretched of the earth’. Vale puts it that "... [t]he embodiment of the state was the ostensible issue around which, to all intents and purposes, the entire contest for South Africa was waged. As much as the National Party may have wished it to be different, the real contest for the country was for the right to be called South African. And although it might have been dressed up in different ideologies by those who opposed - and those who defended - minority rule, the immediate struggle for South Africa was a fight for the state, for political power."87 The above also demonstrates the fact that social movements, trade unions, and the like do not view the State as an empty husk or shell; rather it is viewed as the repository of real power that has to be captured or influenced in order to effect the desired changes. Vale unwittingly emphasises the importance of the State to academics by stating that "[i]f progressive intellectuals are to promote the prospects for a better world - and, I believe they must - they will have to anticipate and help shift debates within the resulting spaces, by changing the way policy-makers think about the region. To repeat the overall point in a causal chain we need to change the way bureaucrats think in order to change their behaviour in order to secure a different future for the region’s people."88

# A2: INTERDEPENDENCE

**Realism is compatible with Interdependence**

**Solomon 96** (Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)

Post-modernists launch yet another attack which ‘proves’ the withering away of the State: regional integration and global interdependence, they assert, undermine state sovereignty.89 However, one finds that the reality is far more nuanced than the post-modernists allege. In post-modern accounts of interdependence the structural disparities and exclusions which form part of the process of interdependence and integration in modern world politics are often missing. Consider the level of interdependence between the US and Mexico within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Can one argue that the US is just as dependent on Mexico as Mexico is on the US? An example closer to home is the interdependence between South Africa and Lesotho within the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Can one argue that South Africa is as dependent on Lesotho as Lesotho is on South Africa? The point is that post-modern accounts of interdependence invariably attempt to show it occurring in a harmonious, horizontal and equitable manner. Reality, however, indicates that interdependence occurs in precisely the opposite way. Vertical or unequal relations guided by national self-interest has been the norm. States will co-operate with each other on a specific issue because it is in the national interest to do so. However, where such co-operation comes into conflict with the interest of the State, it would cease rather quickly. Such interdependence has been with us for millennia and will be with us for millennia to come. Consider the temporary alliance between the antagonists Persia and Sparta on the question of Athenian supremacy at sea during the Peloponnesian war around 420 BC. Or consider Rome’s dependence on gold from Africa to maintain its hegemony, especially during the Punic wars when it faced Hannibal’s forces. Regional interdependence and integration, or inter-state co-operation in general, should not be seen as the forerunner of some sort of global polity; rather it should be seen as the workings of national self-interest. Consider in this regard the US’ ambivalent position within the Pacific Community, the disintegration of the East African Community, Nigeria’s behaviour within ECOWAS, or the fears of smaller SADCC states of Zimbabwean hegemony in the 1980s.90 As SADCC evolved into the SADC, these fears have shifted to South Africa as a possible regional hegemon. Other examples also prove the point. For more than four decades, the marriage between the US and Western Europe was a good one. The US led the West and protected Western Europe against the Soviet threat. In return, grateful Western Europe followed the US lead. Rows (over Suez, Vietnam, US missiles stationed in Europe) were not unknown, but were rapidly solved. Since the demise of the Soviet threat, however, the marriage is looking increasingly rocky. In December 1994 events in Bosnia showed increasing signs of tension. The US blamed Europe for refusing to let NATO do more than wag its finger at the Bihac-bashing Serbs. Europe chastised America for threatening to arm the Bosnian Muslims and, at the same time refusing to commit troops itself. To compound matters, Senator Robert Dole shouted from the sidelines that NATO broke down completely.91 One suspects that the reason for the air-strikes against Serb targets had more to do with maintaining the credibility of the threats issued by its constituent members Neither is this an isolated occurrence. Consider Norway’s ‘no’ to membership of the European Community (EC). The major reason for Oslo’s refusal is that membership would mean giving up farm subsidies and embracing free trade. Open markets and free competition would sound the death knell for its agricultural sector. However, Norway’s refusal to join the EC does not mean, to paraphrase Samir Amin, ‘delinkage’ from the European colossus: Norway remains a member of the European Economic Area and of NATO. Norway’s soldiers will still patrol Western Europe’s only border with Russia. Its lobsters will still be served in Belgian restaurants.92 What the above case demonstrates, is that states will choose to co-operate with certain other states if they derive benefit from it. However, where such co-operation is not in the national interest, they will either refrain from or qualify the nature of such co-operation

# A2: INTERDEPENDENCE

**Self-preservence Is inevitable even in seemingly cooperative actions**

**Solomon 96** (Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)

##### Those who are still unconvinced of the predominance of national self-interest in global politics should simply ponder the following question: can they provide an example of one country which conducts it foreign policy without considering its national interest? What the above demonstrates is that interdependence and integration are not some forerunner of the emergence of a global polity heralding the disappearance of the State. It must rather be viewed simply as the workings of the national interest. Concomitant to this there can be no talk of a ‘waning state’.

**Globalization doesn’t disprove Realism**

##### Solomon 96 (Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)

##### Another argument is levelled against the utility of the State in this contemporary period. This relates to the so-called communications revolution which has transformed planet Earth into a ‘global village’,96 which, it is argued, has undermined state sovereignty. Three criticisms, however, can be levelled against this statement. In the first instance, one can question the extent of this supposedly global communications revolution, when more than half the world’s population have no access (let alone ownership) to a telephone or television.97 Thus, while the telephone has been superseded by the fax machine and e-mail in Johannesburg, residents of Nongoma have to rely on the daily bus to the ‘big city’ of Ulundi. Other rural areas in South Africa cannot even boast a bus to show that they are also part of the global communications revolution. In other words, while 89 per cent of white South Africans have a telephone, only eight per cent of black South Africans have the same privilege.98 Secondly, one should not confuse advances in ‘global’ communications with a decrease in sovereignty. Post-modernists posit, for instance, that CNN broadcasts into a foreign state result in the penetration of that country’s sovereignty. However, such penetration has always been with us - it is only its current form that differs - with no reduction in state sovereignty. Consider the limited success a French official would have had in intercepting carrier pigeons from Prussian agents inside France giving the exact positions and strengths of Louis Napoleon’s armies at Sedan and Metz before the Franco-Prussian war in 1870. Or consider the success of apartheid’s civil servants in sealing off ordinary South Africans from the rest of the world. More prosaically, one may well ask when a successful penetration does occur - as in CNN broadcasts during the Gulf War (1990-1991) - whether this necessarily influence the local population in any fundamental way. After all, Saddam Hussein still watches CNN in his presidential palace in Baghdad! Finally, the prevalent benign view of the world communications revolution may be challenged and far more sinister things may be read into it. Consider the role of SKY television during the Falklands War, or CNN’s reportage of the alleged Libyan bombing of the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, and its ‘global objectivity’ may rightfully be questioned. In fact, it may be concluded in both these instances, that London and Washington benefited from the coverage. Can this be seen as a new kind of ‘imperialism of the airwaves’? After all, one cannot foresee a global news giant like CNN emerging from the world’s poorest country, Mozambique, whether it is privately or state-owned. As such, can the global communications revolution not be viewed as one more way in which stronger states continue to control the destinies of weaker states - as has been the case for ages?

# A2: GLOBal culture

**Global permeation of culture doesn’t break down Realism**

##### Solomon 96 (Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)

##### Walker99 posits the notion of an emergent global culture which once more undermines sovereignty; and thereby the State. Two criticisms, however, can be levelled against this view. Firstly, the State has been faced historically with such penetration, but it has proved to be adaptable and resistant: there is no historical evidence to prove that the introduction of a foreign culture has resulted in the weakening of the State. For instance, the introduction of Zen Buddhism to Japan by Aesai in 1191 AD showed no indication of weakening the State. Secondly, contemporary developments suggest that we should be more cautious when talking of a ‘global culture’. The world is seeing the emergence (or re-emergence) of various cultural chauvinisms. Recently, the French government has decided to urge its civil servants to limit the use of English in official correspondence. In addition, Paris has seen fit to complain to Washington about the dumping of Hollywood movies in France. Paris claimed that the plethora of American movies in the country would adversely affect French culture. The emergence of a narrow-minded ethnic nationalism also belies the notion of a ‘global culture’. This can be seen in the various ethnic secessionist movements in Africa, India, Eastern Europe, Canada, Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Brazil. It can be seen in the tremendous support for nationalistically narrow-minded politicians - Vladimir Zhirinovsky in Russia, Jean-Marie le Pen in France, Pat Buchanan and David Duke in the US. It can also be seen in the xenophobia sweeping through much of Western Europe, the US and South Africa on the issue of illegal immigrants. It can be seen in the attacks on foreigners in the streets of Johannesburg, in the back alleys of Birmingham and Minneapolis, as well as throughout Europe and Asia.100 The above would render talk of a ‘global culture’ as a precursor to a global polity, as superfluous.

# A2 terrorism

**Evolutionary Biology explains terrorist Actions**

**Thayer and Hudson 10** (Braldey A., Professor of Political Science at Baylor University., Valerie M. , Professor of Political Science at Brigham Young University. MIT Press Journals, Spring 2010, Vol. 34, No. 4, Pages 37-62, March 17)

Theoretical insights from evolutionary psychology and biology can help academics and policymakers better understand both deep and proximate causes of Islamic suicide terrorism. The life sciences can contribute explanations that probe the influence of the following forces on the phenomenon of Islamic suicide terrorism: high levels of gender differentiation, the prevalence of polygyny, and the obstruction of marriage markets delaying marriage for young adult men in the modern Middle East. The influence of these forces has been left virtually unexplored in the social sciences, despite their presumptive application in this case. Life science explanations should be integrated with more conventional social science explanations, which include international anarchy, U.S. hegemony and presence in the Middle East, and culturally molded discourse sanctioning suicide terrorism in the Islamic context. Such a consilient approach, melding the explanatory power of the social and life sciences, offers greater insight into the causal context of Islamic fundamentalist suicide terrorism, the motivation of suicide terrorists, and effective approaches to subvert this form of terrorism.

# a2 ethnic conflicts

**Realism best describes Ethnic Conflicts**

**Thayer 2k** (Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124-151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”)

The frequency of ethnic conflict since the end of the Cold War, including conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Kosovo, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Tur- key, has led to considerable research into its causes.111 Clearly the slaughter of 800,000-1 million Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda, and the widespread ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, demonstrate the need to understand ethnic conflict. Referring to the Serb ethnic cleansing of Kosovo in 1999, Presi- dent Bill Clinton said that a bright future for humanity is threatened "by the oldest problem of human society: our tendency to fear and dehumanize people who are different from ourselves."112 This comment is understandable if it is perceived as a justification to a liberal society of NATO's actions against Serbia. Considered from the perspective of evolutionary theory, however, Clinton's words seem to suggest that only if humans stop being human can they enjoy the bright future he envisions. Clinton has identified the problem. Xenophobia-the fear of strangers-and ethnocentrism-the belief in the superiority or preference for members of one's own ethnic group-exist among almost all peoples, and both contribute to the ubiquity and scale of ethnic violence.113 Evolutionary theory permits stu- dents of ethnic conflict to understand xenophobia and ethnocentrism as ulti- mate, though not direct, causes of ethnic conflict, which, like war, may result from multiple causes. Also like war, xenophobia is found in nonhuman animals, which suggests that evolutionary theory can help explain xenophobic behavior.114 The empiri- cal evidence for this is strong. Barash has found in his studies of humans and other animals that "both ... tend to reserve their most ferocious aggression to- ward strangers."115 Biologist John Fuller concludes that "xenophobia is as characteristic of humans as of ants, mice, or baboons."116

# A2: biology = HIERARCHIES

**Human Nature does not create hierarchies**

**Pinker 2k2** (Steven, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University, professor emiritus Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT, "The Blank Slate: the Modern Denial of Human Nature", Chapter 20)

Let me begin with the fear of inequality. The idea is that if we’re blank slates, we must be equal. That follows from the mathematical truism that zero equals zero equals zero. But if the mind has any innate organization, according to this fear, then different races, sexes, or individuals could be biologically different, and that would condone discrimination and oppression. I think it’s easy to see the non sequitur here. It confuses the value of fairness with the claim of sameness. When the Declaration of Independence said, “We hold these truths to be self- evident, that all men are created equal,” it surely did not mean “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are clones.” Rather, a commitment to political equality means two things. First, it rests on a theory of universal human nature, in particular, universal human interests, as when the declaration continues by saying that “people are endowed . . . with certain inalienable rights, and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” It’s also a commitment to prohibit public discrimination against individuals based on the average of certain groups they belong to, such as their race, ethnicity, or sex. And as long as we have that policy, it doesn’t matter what the average statistics of different groups turns out to be. I mentioned that there are downsides of believing in the blank slate. In the case of individual differences, the downside to denying that they exist is the tendency to treat more successful people as larcenous. That is, if you really believe that everyone starts out identical, and you look around and you see that some people have more stuff than others, the temptation is to think that they must have stolen more than their fair share. Many of the worst instances of 20th-century persecution have been aimed at ethnic and social groups in cultural conditions that allowed their more talented members to prosper, with the result that they were viewed as parasites or bloodsuckers and subjected to expulsions, persecutions, and sometimes genocide. Famous examples include the overseas Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia, the Indians .

# A2: COMPLACENCY

**Human Nature does not prevent a race to improve standards of living**

**Pinker 2k2** (Steven, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University, professor emiritus Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT, "The Blank Slate: the Modern Denial of Human Nature", Chapter 20)

The second fear is the fear of imperfectability: the dashing of the ancient dream of the perfectibility of humankind. It runs more or less as follows: If ignoble traits are innate, such as selfishness, violence, or prejudice, that would make them unchangeable, so attempts at social reform and human improvement would be a waste of time. Why try to make the world a better place if people are rotten to the core and will just foul it up no matter what you do? But this, too, is unsound. Even if people do harbor ignoble motives, they don’t automatically lead to ignoble behavior, as we saw from the ubiquity of homicidal fantasies, which needless to say rarely result in homicidal behavior. That disconnect is possible precisely because the human mind is a complex system of many parts, some of which can counteract others, such as a moral sense, cognitive faculties that allow us to learn lessons from history, and the executive system of the frontal lobes of the brain that can apply knowledge about consequences and moral values to inhibit behaviors.

# A2: DETERMINISM

**No Link and Impact to Determinism-They link to their own argument and the entire 1NC is an impact turn to this**

**Pinker 2k2** (Steven, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University, professor emiritus Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT, "The Blank Slate: the Modern Denial of Human Nature", Chapter 20)

What is the suitable response to the fear of determinism? First, we have to think about what we mean when we say we “hold someone responsible.” Ultimately, what it means is that we impose contingencies on their behavior—reward, punishment, credit, blame. For example: “If you rob the liquor store, we’ll put you in jail.” These contingencies are *themselves* causes of behavior—environmental causes, to be sure, but causes nonetheless—and we impose them because we think that they will change behavior in the future. For example, they will lead to fewer people robbing liquor stores. This logic does not appeal to an immaterial soul or a capricious ghost or some strange entity called free will but rather to parts of the brain that can anticipate the consequences of behavior and inhibit it accordingly. We can accept this influence on the brain systems for inhibition even as we come to understand the brain systems for temptation. Second, most of the bogus defenses for bad behavior that have been concocted by ingenious defense lawyers are more likely to be environmental than biological in the first place. Examples are the “abuse excuse” that was offered during the Menendez trial, when the brothers’ lawyer claimed that they 20.28 steven pinker killed their parents because they had suffered a history of emotional abuse in childhood; the so-called Black Rage Syndrome that was offered to defend the Long Island Railroad gunman, who supposedly exploded one day under the pressure of living in a racist society and started to shoot white passengers in the train at random; the “patriarchy-made-me-do-it” defense offered by some defenders of rapists, who supposedly were inflamed by misogynistic images from pornography and advertising. Finally, there’s the fear of nihilism: the fear that biology strips life of meaning and purpose. It says that love, beauty, morality, and all that we hold precious are just figments of a brain pursuing selfish evolutionary strategies. For most people who ask the question “Why am I here,” the answer “To pass on your genes” is less than comforting.

# A2: MORALITY- realism solves

**Realism is a prerequisite to morality**

**Solomon** **96** (Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)

The realist position was clear: order was the prerequisite for justice. This was not a negation of human rights in foreign policy. Niebuhr had worked out the argument years before when he had pointed out that human rights could hardly flourish in conditions of war, anarchy, or revolution. "Some balance of power is the basis of whatever justice is achieved in international relations" he wrote in 1942.73 Henry Kissinger embraced this as Secretary of State: "The true task of citizenship is to draw from the balance of power a more positive capacity to better the human condition." Or, as he put it in his memoirs: "If history teaches anything it is that there can be no peace without equilibrium and no justice without restraint."74 But, the opposite view of human rights as the primary American interest, overwhelmed the realist position, more for domestic political reasons than intellectual ones. The most forceful proponent of such a view was Jimmy Carter, who during the 1976 presidential campaign declared: "We’ve seen a loss of morality ... and we’re ashamed of what our government is as we deal with other nations around the world. What we seek is ... a foreign policy that reflects the decency and generosity and common sense of our own people."75 The result was that during the Carter presidency, human rights gained a much higher priority than at any other point in the history of the Cold War. Ironically, the effect of this was to intensify the Cold War rather than to provide a possibility to move beyond it, as Carter had hoped to do. Complaints about human rights violations in the Soviet Union undermined the atmosphere of relative goodwill that had developed between Washington and Moscow during the Nixon and Ford administrations. The most prominent casualty was progress in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II). Carter’s preoccupation with human rights, meanwhile, induced the Soviets to exploit what they saw as American weaknesses in places like Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Afghanistan. Moreover, Carter’s attempts to disassociate the US from authoritarian regimes in Iran and Nicaragua backfired when these governments gave way to outspokenly anti-American regimes, who, in addition, were not too sympathetic on the question of human rights.76 That the above demonstrates is the disastrous consequences of making human rights both ends and means of foreign policy, rather than allowing human rights to flow from order as the realists propose. But let us concretise this more by creating a hypothetical future scenario.The year is 2000. On the SABC’s eight o’ clock news we hear that President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe has cancelled the presidential elections, imprisoned opposition leaders and declared himself as "Emperor of New Harare". An anti-realist position would immediately slam the Mugabe government for gross human rights abuses, possibly break off diplomatic relations, and provide some sort of assistance to the ‘oppressed’. The repercussions of this would be disastrous. South Africa would lose a valuable trading partner, adversely affecting the country’s economy. The possibility of regional integration would be dealt a severe blow. Other countries in the region would view South Africa with suspicion: is Pretoria’s anti-Mugabe stance really motivated by a concern for human rights or does South Africa want to marginalise Harare with the intention of maintaining total control over SADC? More importantly, how are other countries, such as Swaziland, with poor human rights records, supposed to feel about South Africa’s new role as protector of human rights? A realist view would proceed along a different route to arrive at the same objective - the end of human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. The project of regional integration - which after all would be to the benefit of the region’s people - will continue. The question of human rights abuses can be privately raised with the Mugabe administration. One could also offer Harare various carrots (for example, trade incentives) to nudge (as oppose to push) it along the human rights route. This would result in a good marriage between human rights and foreign policy; between morality and the national interes***t.***

# A2 ONTOLOGY

Communicative and social actions are central to the nature of ontology

Patomäki ’02 – Professor of International Relations at the University of Helsinki

[Heikki Patomäki, After International Relations, p. 100]

In this chapter, I shall try to show some of the weaknesses and inadequacies of both theories. My aims are, however, reconstructive. I try to clarify the subject matter and elaborate further on the CR concepts of 'action', 'structure' and 'power'. A central ontological theme is the nature of, and the relationship between, internal and external relations. First, I develop the point that to explain the (re)production of internal relations, we also need a theory of practical and communicative action. Second, I argue that an adequate theory of external relations requires an iconic model of different modes of social action. One of these modes, it is argued, is indeed communicative action. Third, I attempt to detach Giddens's concept of power-which connects action essentially to power as transformative capacity-from its Weberian undertone and incorporate into it an important insight of Michel Foucault.

**Evaluating ontology fails**

Patomäki ’02 – Professor of International Relations at the University of Helsinki

[Heikki Patomäki, After International Relations, p. 109]

Ontology in the philosophical sense should be addressed to the most abstract constitutive potentials of social life: the generic human capacities and fundamental conditions through which the course and outcomes of social processes and events are generated and shaped in manifold ways (Cohen 1987:279). There is a strict limit to philosophical ontology. Does this limit contradict the idea that, in order to grasp the nature of external relations and regulative rules, we need a general theory of social action? No-rather it reveals that models of action must be as historical as the modes of social action. In order to grasp thoroughly the relationship between action and structures it is not possible to stay at a meta-level. Social action-types are historically constituted. 'No general, transhistorical or purely philosophical resolution of these problems is possible' (Bhaskar 1983:87).

\*\*\*REALISM GOOD\*\*\*

# key to policy

**Realism is true and key to effective policy formation.**

**Mearsheimer** 200**1** [professor of political science at University of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pg. 2]

There are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals. Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor. They almost always have revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be done at a reasonable price. At times, the costs and risks of trying to shift the balance of power are too great, forcing great powers to wait for more favorable circumstances. But the desire for more power does not go away, unless a state achieves the ultimate goal of hegemony. Since no state is likely to achieve global hegemony, however, **the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition**. This unrelenting pursuit of power means that great powers are inclined to look for opportunities to alter the distribution of world power in their favor. They will seize their opportunities if they have the necessary capability. Simply put, great powers are primed for offense. But not only does a great power seek to gain power at the expense of other states, it also tries to thwart rivals bent on gaining power at its expense. Thus, a great power will defend the balance of power when looming change favors another state, and it will try to undermine the balance when the direction of change is in its own favor. Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other. Three features of the international system combine to cause states to fear one another: 1) the absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them from each other, 2) the fact that states always have some offensive military capability, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain about other states’ intentions. Given this fear—which can never be wholly eliminated—states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival. Indeed, the best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon, because no other state can seriously threaten such a mighty power. This situation, which no one consciously designed or intended, is genuinely tragic. Great powers that have no reason to fight each other—that are merely concerned with their own survival—nevertheless have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other states in the system. This dilemma is captured in brutally frank comments that Prussian statesman Otto von Bismarck made during the early 1860s, when it appeared that Poland, which was not an independent state at the time, might regain its sovereignty. “Restoring the Kingdom of Poland in any shape or form is tantamount to creating an ally for any enemy that chooses to attack us,” he believed, and therefore he advocated that Prussia should “smash those Poles till, losing all hope, they lie down and die; I have every sympathy for their situation, but if we wish to survive we have no choice but to wipe them out.” Although it is depressing to realize that great powers might think and act this way, **it behooves us to see the world as it is, not as we would like it to be**. For example, one of the key foreign policy issues facing the United States is the question of how China will behave if its rapid economic growth continues and effectively turns China into a giant Hong Kong. Many Americans believe that if China is democratic and enmeshed in the global capitalist system, it will not act aggressively; instead it will be content with the status quo in Northeast Asia. According to this logic, the United States should engage China in order to promote the latter’s integration into the world economy, a policy that also seeks to encourage China’s transition to democracy. If engagement succeeds, the United States can work with a wealthy and democratic China to promote peace around the globe. Unfortunately, **a policy of engagement is doomed to fail.** If China becomes an economic powerhouse it will almost certainly translate its economic might into military might and make a run at dominating Northeast Asia. Whether China is democratic and deeply enmeshed in the global economy or autocratic and autarkic will have little effect on its behavior, because democracies care about security as much as non-democracies do, and hegemony is the best way for any state to guarantee its own survival. Of course, neither its neighbors nor the United States would stand idly by while China gained increasing increments of power. Instead, they would seek to contain China, probably by trying to form a balancing coalition. The result would be an intense security of great-power war hanging over them. In short, China and the United States are destined to be adversaries as China’s power grows.

# prevents atrocities

**Rejecting Realism results in the worst atrocities**

**Thayer 2k** (Bradley, political scientist and an associate professor in Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, the MIT Press, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2(Autumn 2000), pp. 124-151, "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics”)

Irrespective of the ultimate causes of ethnic conflict, both the international system and individual states can work to suppress it. The bipolar international system of the Cold War helped to control ethnic conflict; and the deleterious ef- fect of systemic change (i.e., the end of the Cold War) in promoting ethnic conflict has been well analyzed.125 State policies may also help prevent or ame- liorate ethnic conflict. Michael Brown summarizes the principal finding of his and Sumit Ganguly's survey of ethnic relations in sixteen Asian and Pacific states by noting that government policies "are often decisive in determining whether ethnic problems, which are inherent in multiethnic societies, are re- solved peacefully and equitably."126 Nonetheless, given the contribution of xe- nophobia and ethnocentrism to fitness during human evolution, ethnic conflict is likely to be a recurring social phenomenon. Therefore ethnic conflict, like war and peace, is part of the fabric of international politics

# transition away violent

**The transition away from realism will cause violence**

**Murray**, Professor Politics at the University of Wales, 19**97** (Alastair J.H., Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 185-6)

Yet Linklater concedes that ‘it is not at all clear that any strand of social and political thought provides a compelling account of “strategies of transition”’. Indeed, where he has attempted to engage with this issue himself, he as proved manifestly unable to provide such an account. Although he has put forward some ideas of what is needed – a fundamental recognition of political relations, establishing a global legal order to replace the sovereign state, and a fundamental rearrangement of economic relations, establishing an order in which all individuals have the means as well as the formal rights of freedom – his only suggestion as to how such objectives should be achieved seems to be that ‘[s]ocial development entails individuals placing themselves at odds with their societies as they begin to question conventional means of characterizing outsiders and to criticize customary prohibitions upon individual relations with them’. His critical theoretical “transitional strategies amount to little more than the suggestion that individuals must demand recognition for themselves as men as well as citizens, must demand the right to enter into complex interstate relations themselves, and must act in these relations as beings with fundamental obligations to all other members of the species”. More recently, he has proposed a vision in which ‘substantial and transnational citizenships are strengthened and in which mediating between the different loyalties and identities present within modern societies is one central purpose of the post-Westphalian state’. Such an objective is to be reached by a discourse ethics along the lines of that proposed by Habermas. Yet such an ethics amounts to little more than the suggestions that human beings need to be reflective about the ways in which they include and exclude outsiders from dialogue, scarcely going beyond Linklater’s earlier emphasis on individuals acting as men as well as citizens. Realism does at least propose tangible objectives which, whilst perhaps the visionary appeal of Linklater’s proposals, ultimately offer us a path to follow, and it does at least suggest a strategy of realization, emphasising the necessity of a restrained, moderate diplomacy, which, if less daring than Linklater might wish, provides us with some guidance. It is this inability to articulate practical strategies which suggests the central difficulty with such critical theoretical approaches. The progressive urge moves a stage further here, leading them to abandon almost entirely the problems of establishing some form of stable international order at this level in favour of a continuing revolution in search of a genuine cosmopolis. It generates such an emphasis on the pursuit of distant, ultimate objectives that they prove incapable of furnishing us with anything but the most vague and elusive of strategies, such an emphasis on moving towards a post-Westphalian boundary-less world that they are incapable of telling us anything about the problems facing us today. If, for theorists such as Linklater, such a difficulty does not constitue a failure for critical theory within its own terms of reference, this position cannot be accepted uncritically. Without an ability to address contemporary problems, it is unable to provide strategies to overcome even the immediate obstacles in the way of its objective of a genuinely cosmopolitan society. And, without a guarantee that such cosmopolitan society is even feasible, such a critical theoretical perspective simply offers us the perpetual redefinition of old problems in a new context and the persistent creation of new problems to replace old ones, without even the luxury of attempting to address them.

# rejection bad

**Rejection of realism fails – leads to dissent killing any effective change**

**Agathangelou**, Director of the Global Change Institute, 19**97** (Anna M., Studies in Political Economy, v. 54, p. 7-8)

Yet, ironically if not tragically, dissident IR also paralyzes itself into non-action. While it challenges the status quo, dissident IR fails to transform it. Indeed, dissident IR claims that a “coherent” paradigm or research program — even an alternative one — reproduces the stifling parochialism and hidden powermongering of sovereign scholarship. “Any agenda of global politics informed by critical social theory perspectives,” writes Jim George “must forgo the simple, albeit self-gratifying, options inherent in readymade alternative Realisms and confront the dangers, closures, paradoxes, and complicities associated with them. Even references to a “real world, dissidents argue, repudiate the very meaning of dissidence given their sovereign presumption of a universalizable, testable Reality. What dissident scholarship opts for, instead, is a sense of disciplinary crisis that “resonates with the effects of marginal and dissident movements in all sorts of other localities.” Despite its emancipatory intentions, this approach effectively leaves the prevailing prison of sovereignty intact. It doubly incarcerates when dissident IR highlights the layers of power that oppress without offering a heuristic, not to mention a program, for emancipatory action. Merely politicizing the supposedly non-political neither guides emancipatory action nor guards it against demagoguery. At best, dissident IR sanctions a detached criticality rooted (ironically) in Western modernity. Michael Shapiro, for instance, advises the dissident theorist to take “a critical distance” or “position offshore’ from which to “see the possibility of change.” But what becomes of those who know they are burning in the hells of exploitation, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like while the esoteric dissident observes “critically” from offshore? What hope do they have of overthrowing these shackles of sovereignty? In not answering these questions, dissident IR ends up reproducing despite avowals to the contrary, the sovereign outcome of discourse divorced from practice, analysis from policy, deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving.

# rejection bad

**Altruism dooms individuals to be taken advantage of by others – and there’s no avoiding this, it’s genetic.**

**Oakley 2007** [Barbara Oakley, Ph.D., P.E.. Associate Professor of Engineering. Oakland University, Evil Genes: Why Rome Fell, Hitler Rose, Enron Failed, and My Sister Stole My Mother’s Boyfriend, pg. 254-256]

Reaching broadly across disciplines, Mealey knit together related ideas of researchers from a variety of disciplines, all pointing toward the fact that psychopaths or Machiavellians can obtain long-term benefits by acting in me-first fashion that hurts others. In fact, the more sinister among us can reproduce and live quite nicely by taking advantage of others, thereby perpetuating any genes that might have played a role in their Machiavellian characteristics. It might not be nice, for example, to steal food from your baby brother’s mouth during a famine—but which of the two of you has a better chance of surviving? In a more pointed example, it might violate profound social mores to insinuate yourself into your neighbors’ life, and then rape their daughter. But even if you might get caught and killed, the pregnant girl could very well end up giving birth to a child who will possess your genes—the same genes that contributed strongly to your committing the deeply antisocial behavior involved in the rape in the first place. (If the girl was exceptionally kind and caring, her child would have an even better than usual chance of surviving. **Kind-hearted naivete puts one at risk of being taken advantage of by a psychopath**, which is perhaps why sweet-tempered Laci Peterson, brutally murdered by her husband while eight months pregnant with their first child, had previously dated a man who eventually received a fifteen year prison sentence for shooting another girlfriend in the back.) Just as the cuckoo has found an evolutionary niche laying its eggs in the nest of other birds (taking advantage of their nurturing instincts), psychopaths and Machiavellians have found their evolutionary niche in taking advantage of the natural altruism of other humans. Such variation in human emotional outlook is bred into our very genes. Research has progressed since Mealey wrote her seminal paper in 1995. But the essential idea she reviewed and synthesized is unchanged—that is, congenitally deceptive individuals—cheaters—can thrive and reproduce in society. How much these cheaters succeed depends on how many of them there are. If their numbers are tiny, they can easily find victims to dupe, and so they thrive. If their numbers grow large, however, the surrounding population grows more wary. In this more savvy population, it’s harder to find a gullible target, and so the duplicitous have a more difficult time being successful—and being able to reproduce successfully. Thus there are fewer cheaters in the subsequent generation. And so it goes in a seesaw of counterbalancing activities, much like a predator-prey relationship.

# alt fails- expansionism/violence

**States are inherently expansionist; the alt creates a incentive for other countries to expand through violence**

**Synder** – insert quals 20**02**(Glenn H.“Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay” MIT Press International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer, 2002), pp. 149-173 JSTOR)

It is only fair to point out that Mearsheimer's vision seems less radical when one takes into account various qualifiers. Great powers try to expand only when opportunities arise. They will do so only when the benefits clearly exceed the risks and costs. They will desist from expansion when blocked and wait for a "more propitious moment" (p. 37). In a 1990 article, Mearsheimer stated that one reason hegemony was rare was that "costs of expansion usually outrun the benefits before domination is achieved."1l The term "expansion" appears to mean, although it is never explicitly stated, increased power through increased control of territory. Mearsheimer devotes considerable space to arguing, and demonstrating with historical data, that offensive action often succeeds and that conquest does or can "pay" economically and strategically. He does not emphasize that expansion may contribute

(positively or negatively) to values other than power and security. Mearsheimer's offensive realism seems to predict much more conflict and war than does Waltz's defensive realism. States are never satisfied; they keep reaching for more power, and these power urges seem bound to collide. Mearsheimer's states seem perilously close to Arnold Wolfers's "hysterical Caesars"-states that, "haunted by fear," pursue "the will-of-the-wisp of absolute security."" Waltz's states are less fearful, more accepting of risks, more oriented toward particular nonsecurity interests, and more willing to live with only a modest amount of security. Sensible statesmen seek only an "appropriate" amount of realismpower, given their security needs, says Waltz.'2

\*\*\*A2 OTHER THEORIES\*\*\*

# a2 Neoliberalism- realm of security

**A2 Liberalism- Ignores the realm of security**

**Mearshheimer 09**- Professor of Political Science and the co-director of International Security Policy at the University of Chicago (John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism” 2009, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0048.pdf>)

Liberal institutionalism does not directly address the question of whether institutions cause peace, but instead focuses on the less ambitious goal of explaining cooperation in cases where state interests are not fundamentally opposed.36 Specifically, the theory looks at cases where states are having difficulty cooperating because they have "mixed" interests; in other words, each side has incentives both to cooperate and not to cooper­ate.37 Each side can benefit from cooperation, however, which liberal institutionalists define as "goal-directed behavior that entails mutual policy adjustments so that all sides end up better off than they would otherwise be."38 The theory is of little relevance in situations where states' interests are fundamentally conflictual and neither side thinks it has much to gain from cooperation. In these circumstances, states aim to gain advantage over each other. They think in terms of winning and losing, and this invariably leads to intense security competition, and sometimes war. But liberal insti-tutionalism does not deal directly with these situations, and thus says little about how to resolve or even ameliorate them. Therefore, the theory largely ignores security issues and concentrates instead on economic and, to a lesser extent, environmental issues.39 In fact, the theory is built on the assumption that international politics can be divided into two realms—security and political economy—and that liberal institutionalism mainly applies to the latter, but not the former. This theme is clearly articulated by Charles Lipson, who writes that "sig­nificantly different institutional arrangements are associated with international eco­nomic and security issues.'"10 Moreover, the likelihood of cooperation is markedly different within these two realms: when economic relations are at stake, "cooperation can be sustained among several self-interested states," whereas the prospects for coop­eration are "more impoverished ... in security affairs."41 Thus, the theory's proponents pay little attention to the security realm, where questions about war and peace are of central importance.

# A2 neoliberalism- democracy leads to war

**The spread of democracy is a justification for war – Vietnam and the Gulf War prove**

**Mearsheimer ‘05**

[John J., Ph. D. Cornell International Relations, Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago, “Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism versus Neo-Conservatism”, Open Democracy, p.5]

There is another problem with democracies portraying themselves as the white hats in the world: it encourages them to go on crusades to crush nondemocracies and transform the world into one giant zone of democracies. This tendency was definitely on display in the United States during the first half of the 1960s, when intervention in Vietnam was being debated. Not surprisingly, Morgenthau warned about the dangers of pursuing global crusades in making his case against the war in Vietnam. This same tendency was in play again in the run-up to the second Gulf war of 2003 when the Bush administration laid out its case for transforming the middle east with the mailed fist. Morgenthau almost certainly would have criticised that policy and the impending war loudly and clearly.

# a2 collective security- uncertainty

**Can’t distinguish victim from agressor**

**Mearshheimer 09**- Professor of Political Science and the co-director of International Security Policy at the University of Chicago (John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism” 2009, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0048.pdf>)

First, for collective security to work, states must be able to distinguish clearly between aggressor and victim, and then move against the aggressor. However, it is sometimes difficult in a crisis to determine who is the troublemaker and who is the victim.104 Debates still rage about which European great power, if any, bears responsibility for starting World War I. Similar disputes have followed most other wars.

**Won’t work- bonds and hatred between countries prevent**

**Mearshheimer 09**- Professor of Political Science and the co-director of International Security Policy at the University of Chicago (John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism” 2009, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0048.pdf>)

Third, some states are especially friendly for historical or ideological reasons. Should a state with close friends be labeled an aggressor in a collective security system, its friends are probably going to be reluctant to join the coalition against it. For example, it is difficult to imagine the United States using military force against Britain or Israel, even if they were branded aggressors by the international community. Fourth, historical enmity between states can also complicate collective security ef­forts. Consider that a European collective security system would have to depend heavily on Germany and Russia, the two most powerful states on the continent, to maintain order. However, the idea of Germany, which wrought murder and destruction across Europe in 1939-45, and Russia, which was the core of the Soviet empire, main­taining order in Europe is sure to meet significant resistance from other European states.

**Won’t work- buck passing**

**Mearshheimer 09**- Professor of Political Science and the co-director of International Security Policy at the University of Chicago (John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism” 2009, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0048.pdf>)

Fifth, even if states agree to act automatically and collectively to meet aggression, there would surely be difficulty determining how to distribute the burden. States will have strong incentives to pass the buck and get other states to pay the heavy price of confronting an aggressor.105 During World War I, for example, Britain, France, and Russia each tried to get its allies to pay the blood price of defeating Germany on the battlefield.106 Rampant buck-passing might undermine efforts to produce the prepon­derant military power necessary to make collective security work.

**Can’t work- slow response**

**Mearshheimer 09**- Professor of Political Science and the co-director of International Security Policy at the University of Chicago (John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism” 2009, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0048.pdf>)

Sixth, it is difficult to guarantee a rapid response to aggression in a collective security system. Planning beforehand is problematic because "it is impossible to know what the alignment of states will be if there is an armed conflict."107 There are also significant coordination problems associated with assembling a large coalition of states to fight a war. Rapid response becomes even more problematic if the responsible states must deal with more than one aggressor. It took more than six months for the United States to put together a coalition to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein. As impressive as the American effort was, threatened states are not likely to have much faith in a security system that tells them help is likely to come, but will only arrive months after they have been conquered.

# A2 critical Theory- contradictions/ no outcome

**Critical theory is contradictory and not tied to an outcome**

**Mearshheimer 09**- Professor of Political Science and the co-director of International Security Policy at the University of Chicago (John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism” 2009, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0048.pdf>)

It would be understandable if realists made such arguments, since they believe there is an objective reality that largely determines which discourse will be dominant. Critical theorists, however, emphasize that the world is socially constructed, and not shaped in fundamental ways by objective factors. Anarchy, after all, is what we make of it. Yet when critical theorists attempt to explain why realism may be losing its hegemonic position, they too point to objective factors as the ultimate cause of change. Discourse, so it appears, turns out not to be determinative, but mainly a reflection of developments in the objective world. In short, it seems that when critical theorists who study inter­national politics offer glimpses of their thinking about the causes of change in the real world, they make arguments that directly contradict their own theory, but which appear to be compatible with the theory they are challenging.159 There is another problem with the application of critical theory to international relations. Although critical theorists hope to replace realism with a discourse that emphasizes harmony and peace, critical theory *per se* emphasizes that it is impossible to know the future. Critical theory, according to its own logic, can be used to undermine realism and produce change, but it cannot serve as the basis for predicting which discourse will replace realism, because the theory says little about the direction change takes. In fact. Cox argues that although "utopian expectations may be an element in stimulating people to act. .. such expectations are almost never realized in practice."160 Thus, in a sense, the communitarian discourse championed by critical theorists is wishful thinking, not an outcome linked to the theory itself. Indeed, critical theory cannot guarantee that the new discourse will not be more malignant than the discourse it replaces. Nothing in the theory guarantees, for example, that a fascist discourse far more violent than realism will not emerge as the new hegemonic discourse.

# a2 critical theory- empirics

**Critical discourse doesn’t cause change- empirically proven**

**Mearshheimer 09**- Professor of Political Science and the co-director of International Security Policy at the University of Chicago (John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism” 2009, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0048.pdf>)

Second, a close look at the international politics of the feudal era reveals scant support for the claims of critical theorists. Markus Fischer has done a detailed study of that period, and he finds "that feudal discourse was indeed distinct, prescribing unity, functional cooperation, sharing, and lawfulness."166 More importantly, however, he also finds "that while feudal actors observed these norms for the most part on the level of form, they in essence behaved like modern states." Specifically, they "strove for exclu­sive territorial control, protected themselves by military means, subjugated each other, balanced against power, formed alliances and spheres of influence, and resolved their conflicts by the use and threat of force."167 Realism, not critical theory, appears best to explain international politics in the five centuries of the feudal era.

# A2 critical theory- impossible

**Genuine peace and stability can never be reached on the International level**

**Donnelly ‘00**

[Jack, Ph. D University of California – Berkley in Political Science, Professor of IR at Korbel School, “Realism and International Relations”, Cambridge England, p. 53]

Mearsheimer, however, also poses a quite unreasonable test, reformulating the issue as “whether institutions cause peace” (1994/95: 15). And he defines “peace” in such a way that this test becomes absurd. “Genuine peace, or a world where states do not compete for power, is not likely” (1994/95: 9). “Peace, if one defines that concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concord, is not likely to break out in this world” (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 12). Many hierarchical political orders also lack tranquility and mutual concord. This does not imply that domestic political institutions have no effects. Likewise, the absence of “genuine peace” tells us nothing about the effects of international institutions on stability and security relations. Security competition, even war, can persist in a world in which institutions have extensive and important effects on international stability. To have an effect is to produce some change or result; as the Oxford English Dictionary puts it, to have an “operative influence. ” In a somewhat stronger sense of the term, we often speak of an actor being effective only if the result produced was intended (or at least desirable even if unintended). “Genuine peace, ” however, requires not merely that international institutions be effective but that they completely transform the character of international relations. This is an absurd stipulation - as is underscored by the fact that by this criterion balance of power politics has no effect on international peace or stability.

# a2 critical theory- doesn’t cause peace

**Cooperation among has limits preventing peace**

**Donnelly ‘00**

[Jack, Ph. D University of California – Berkley in Political Science, Professor of IR at Korbel School, “Realism and International Relations”, Cambridge England, p. 135]

“Cooperation among states has its limits, mainly because it is constrained by the dominating logic of security competition, which no amount of cooperation can eliminate” (1994/95: 9). On its face, this too seems irrelevant to the no effects thesis: cooperation may remain limited while institutions have independent effects. But if the difficulty of cooperation prevents institutions from being formed, there will be no institutions to have any effects. Mearsheimer advances this narrow version of the no effects thesis when he argues that liberal institutionalism “is of little relevance in situations where states'interests are fundamentally conflictual and neither side thinks it has much to gain from cooperation” (1994/95: 15).

# A2 critical theory- no blueprint/realism key

**Alt- gives us no blue-print to deal with issue realism is necessary to keep the balance of power necessary to stop violence**

**Murray,** Professor Politics at the University of Wales, 19**97** (Alastair J.H., Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 188-9)

His disagreement with realism depends on a highly contestable claim - based on Herz's argument that, with the development of global threats, the conditions which might produce some universal consensus have arisen - that its 'impossibility theorem' is empirically problematic, that a universal consensus is achievable, and that its practical strategy is obstructing its realisation. In much the same way, in `The poverty of neorealism', realism's practical strategy is illegitimate only because Ashley's agenda is inclusionary. His central disagreement with realism arises out of his belief that its strategy reproduces a world order organised around sovereign states, preventing exploration of the indeterminate number of - potentially less exclusionary - alternative world orders. Realists, however, would be unlikely to be troubled by such charges. Ashley needs to do rather more than merely assert that the development of global threats will produce some universal consensus, or that any number of less exclusionary world orders are possible, to convince them. A universal threat does not imply a universal consensus, merely the existence of a universal threat faced by particularistic actors. And the assertion that indeterminate numbers of potentially less exclusionary orders exist carries little weight unless we can specify exactly what these alternatives are and just how they might be achieved. As such, realists would seem to be justified in regarding such potentialities as currently unrealizable ideals and in seeking a more proximate good in the fostering of mutual understanding and, in particular. of a stable balance of power. Despite the adverse side-effects that such a balance of power implies, it at least offers us something tangible rather than ephemeral promises lacking a shred of support. Ultimately, Ashley's demand that a new, critical approach be adopted in order to free us from the grip of such 'false conceptions depends upon ideas about the prospects for the development of a universal consensus which are little more than wishful thinking, and ideas about the existence of potentially less exclusionary orders which are little more than mere assertion. Hence his attempts, in 'Political realism and human interests', to conceal these ideas from view by claiming that the technical base of realism serves only to identify, and yet not to reform, the practical, and then, in 'The poverty of neorealism', by removing the technical from investigation altogether by an exclusive reliance on a problem of hermeneutic circularity. In the final analysis, then, Ashley's post-structuralist approach boils down to little more than a critique which fails. It is predicated on the assumption that the constraints upon us are simply restrictive knowledge practices, such that it presumes that the entirety of the solution to our problems is little more than the removal of such false ways of thinking. It offers nothing by way, of alternative - no strategies, no proximate goals, indeed, little by way of goals at all. If, in constructivism, the progressive purpose leads to strategies divorced from an awareness of the problems confronting transformatory efforts, and, in critical theoretical perspectives, it produces strategies divorced from international politics in their entirety, in post-structuralism it generates a complete absence of strategies altogether. Critique serves to fill the void, yet this critique ultimately proves unsustainable. With its defeat, post-structuralism is left with nothing. Once one peels away the layers of misconstruction, it simply fades away. If realism is, as Ashley puts it, 'a tradition forever immersed in the expectation of political tragedy'. it at least offers us a concrete vision of objectives and ways in which to achieve them which his own position. forever immersed in the expectation of deliverance- is manifestly unable to provide."

# a2 critical theory- revolution didn’t happen

**Realism didn’t disappear it’s still in place**

**Mearshheimer 09**- Professor of Political Science and the co-director of International Security Policy at the University of Chicago (John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism” 2009, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0048.pdf>)

A close look at the sources of this purported revolutionary change in world politics provides further cause for skepticism. For critical theorists, "the Cold War was funda­mentally a discursive, not a material, structure."168 Thus, if the United States and the Soviet Union had decided earlier in the Cold War that they were no longer enemies, it would have been over sooner.169 Mikhail Gorbachev, critical theorists argue, played the central role in ending the Cold War. He challenged traditional Soviet thinking about national security, and championed ideas about international security that sounded like they had been scripted by critical theorists.170 In fact, critical theorists argue that Gorbachev's "new thinking" was shaped by a "transnational liberal internationalist community [epistemic community] comprising the U.S. arms control community, West­ern European scholars and center-left policy makers, as well as Soviet institutchiks."171 These new ideas led Gorbachev to end the Soviet Union's "imperial relationship with Eastern Europe/' which led to a fundamental change in "the norms of bloc politics and thereby the rules governing superpower relations."172 In essence, "the changed practices of one of the major actors . . . [had] system-wide repercussions."173 Both superpowers "repudiated the notion of international relations as a self-help system and . . . tran­scended the consequences of anarchy as depicted by realism/'174 Gorbachev surely played the key role in ending the Cold War, but there are good reasons to doubt that his actions fundamentally transformed international politics. His decision to shut down the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe can very well be explained by realism. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union was suffering an economic and political crisis at home that made the costs of empire prohibitive, especially since nuclear weapons provided the Soviets with a cheap and effective means of defense. Many empires collapsed and many states broke apart before 1989, and many of them sought to give to dire necessity the appearance of virtue. But the basic nature of international politics remained unchanged. It is not clear why the collapse of the Soviet Union is a special case. Furthermore, now that Gorbachev is out of office and has little political influence in Russia, the Russians have abandoned his "new thinking."175 In fact, they now have an offensively-oriented military doctrine that emphasizes first use of nuclear weapons. More importantly, since the end of 1992, the Russians have been acting like a traditional great power toward their neighbors. The former Soviet Union seems to be an arena for power politics, and Boris Yeltsin's Russia appears to be fully engaged in that enter­prise.176

# A2: POSTMODERNISM- doesn’t understand realism

**Their critique of Realism is reliant on simplistic assertions that fail to recognize the complexity of Realism**

**Solomon 96** (Hussein, Senior Researcher, Human Security Project, Institute for Defence Policy, African Security Review Vol 5 No 2, 1996, "In Defence of Realism: Confessions of a Fallen Idealist", http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html)

##### What is clear from the above is that realism, both in theory and practice, is not as simple as the post-modernists claim it to be. This fact, however, has serious implications for the post-modernist critique of realism. George47 posits the notion that realism leads to war and devastation. Vale implies that realism drove apartheid’s foreign and domestic policies, and in particular the notion of the ‘Total Onslaught’.48 However, if one accepts the complexity of realism in theory and practice, one would find such an oversimplified causal relationship between realism and war, or realism and apartheid difficult to sustain.

# A2 POSTMODERNISM- generic

**Postmodernism destroys the vision of political order and progress in international relations**

**Williams ‘05**

[Michael C., Professor International Relations University of Ottawa, “The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations”, Cambridge University, p.159-160]

Debates surrounding ‘postmodernism’ have been subject to even more intense forms of the same divisive dichotomisation as other aspects of theoretical debate in International Relations. Most commonly, ‘postmodernism’ has become the bogey-man of the field, the subject of a set of (largely undefined and inadequately articulated and argued) charges about how in challenging the canons of science and destroying the value of Truth (and the truth of Values), it disavows the entire Western rationalist tradition, and risks destroying the vision of political order, progress, and responsibility with which that tradition is associated. Yet despite clear attempts to distance themselves from questions raised by the relationship between modernity and postmodernity – part of the general tendency in rationalist International Relations to sideline the question of the dilemmas of modernity and politics more generally – the analysis above suggests that no aspect of contemporary International Relations theory can remain immune from their consideration via cosy self-assurances of social scientific legitimacy, or analytic and political responsibility.70 Moreover, if an ironic conclusion of this reassessment of the Realist tradition is that the liberal–realist and rationalist–constructivist divides are fundamentally misleading, then an even more ironic conclusion is that the wilful Realist tradition has much in common with certain aspects of postmodern thinking.

# a2 states irrational

**This misunderstand the nature of rationality – the decision to go to war is rational, but not based on perfect information**

Mearsheimer ‘99

[John J., Ph. D. Cornell International Relations, Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago, “Is Major War Obsolete?” 1999, http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/index.html]

The whole subject of rationality is a fascinating subject. I want to emphasize here that when I say states behave rationally, that doesn’t mean that they can’t then go out and make moves that produce catastrophes. The fact of the matter is that states behaving rationally oftentimes miscalculate and end up shooting themselves in the foot. One very important aspect of international politics is the fact that when states make decisions, not only are they making those decisions based on imperfect information, but in many cases they are dealing with other states that are going to considerable lengths to fool them, to confuse them, to provide them with information that is incorrect misinformation. Because you’re working with imperfect information and because you’re oftentimes being confused by the adversary, you often times goof in a big way. I would make the argument just to highlight that when Hitler decided to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941, although it fortunately ended up with him shooting himself in a bunker in Berlin in April 1945, when he went into the Soviet Union, in my opinion, it was the result of a relatively rational decision-making process. They just miscalculated; they just guessed wrong.

\*\*\*OTHER\*\*\*

# a2 withdrawal contradicts with realism

**Troop decrease can be in line with realism**

**Synder** – Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of North Carolina- 20**02**(Glenn H.“Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay” MIT Press International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer, 2002), pp. 149-173 JSTOR)

Nor does Mearsheimer have much to say about conciliatory policies toward an adversary. Appeasement is "fanciful and dangerous" because, like bandwagoning, it "shifts the balance of power" in the aggressor's favor and thus "contradicts the dictates of offensive realism" (pp. 163-164). Mearsheimer explicitly rejects a definition of appeasement as "a policy designed to reduce tensions with a dangerous adversary by eliminating the cause of conflict between them" (p. 463, n. 58). As in his definition of bandwagoning, this insistence on defining cooperation with an adversary as involving power sacrifice seems to reflect the author's theoretical commitment to power maximization. He does allow for "special circumstances" in which a great power might concede power to another state without violating balance-of-power logic: making concessions to one so as to concentrate resources against another, or to buy time to mobilize resources internally (pp. 164-165). But these seem to be reluctant qualifications of a general bias toward a hard-line offensive stance. One can think of other ways in which conciliatory policies might be useful even to an expansionary state. For example, conciliatory tactics short of appeasement might appeal to an offensive-minded state as a means of discouraging the formation of balances against it, or of weakening opposing alliances. Diplomatic detente could be a useful policy during periods when a state's power buildup has been frustrated by opposition. Mearsheimer's brief treatment (five page on "creating world order" and"cooperation among states" stands in conspicuous contrast to Morgenthau's two chapters on "diplomacy" and Waltz's whole chapter on "management" of the system by the great powers.29

# Terrorism disproves realism

**Terrorism disproves realism**

**Sümer 2k6** (Gültekin, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations and EU Studies, Maltepe University, "9/11 and Its Impact On Realism", http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Gultekin-september\_11.pdf)

The impact of 9/11 has been well beyond than a terrorist attack. By these attacks, power notion of realism has lost its credibility. A non-state actor by its ‘network’ type of power, has demonstrated how it could challenge a superpower. As there is no specific location that can be a target, the concept of threat has taken on a more ambiguous character. Islam has risen as a non-traditional power, having no distinct boundaries, no central authority and no armed forces. The United States cannot fight radical Islam just like fighting communism. Because the religion itself cannot wither away like communism or any other ideology. The rise of transcendental values cannot agree with the immanent values of the realism. The domestic policy/foreign policy distinction of classic realism is not valid concerning the Islamic world. Security requirements of the states cannot be fulfilled by traditional instruments like armed forces. Even a superpower has become helpless with the loss of monopoly on technology. International relations cannot be identified with international politics so easily as in the past. The impact of globalization has weakened realism. Despite all, it is also possible to find some points in favour of realism concerning 9/11.Standards on behalf of international norms have dramatically fallen with the increasing security concerns of the United States. The pessimistic character of realism has increased with the rising security concerns in the international order. The question is how hard the actors of globalization will continue to exert pressure on states and how realism will react to them.

# Evolution Explains Egotism

**Evolution sufficiently explains egoism – two reasons.**

**1. Selfishness is preferred by the survival of the fittest.**

Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 70 //adi]

Evolutionary theory offers two sufficient explanations for the trait of egoism. The first is a classic Darwinian argument: Darwin argued that an individual organism is concerned for its own survival in an environment where resources are scarce. It has to ensure that its physiological needs—for food, shelter, and so on—are satisfied so that it can continue to survive. The concern for survival in a hostile environment also requires that in a time of danger or great stress an individual organism usually places its life, its survival, above that of other members of the social group, the pack, herd, or tribe." For these reasons, egoistic behavior contributes to fitness. The selfish gene theory of evolutionary theorist Richard Dawkins pro vides the second sufficient explanation for egoism. As I discussed in chapter 1, Dawkins focuses his analysis on the gene, not the organism. Beginning with chemicals in a primordial "soup," different types of molecules started forming, and in time efficient copy makers emerged.54 They made mistakes, however, and these contributed to fitness, such as the formation of a thin membrane that held the contents of the molecule together to become a primitive cell. Over time, these "survival machines" became more sophisticated due to evo lution. Some cells became specialized, creating organs and ultimately animal bodies. But again, as I stressed in the previous chapter, there is no intentional- ity in this process. Genes did not want to create or inhabit people, but the process continued nonetheless. The fundamental point here is that "selfish ness" of the gene increases its fitness, and so the behavior spreads.

**2. Non-genetically related actors are** never **preferred through evolution.**

Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 70-71 //adi]

As a result of the ideas of Darwin, Dawkins, and Hamilton, evolutionary theory provides an explanation for what is commonly known, that individuals favor those who are close genetic relatives. Consequently, complex social behavior among unrelated individuals can be seen as the interaction of selfish individuals, and most evolutionary theorists expect no tendency toward solidarity, cooperation, or altruism beyond what is in the interests of the animals. Similarly, realists and, as we will see below, rational choice theorists also do not expect individuals or states to show this type of behavior beyond their own self-interest. Thus, evolutionary theory can explain egoism and suggests why cooperation between unrelated individuals is very often difficult and remarkably unlike the behavior one encounters within the family.

# Evolution Explains Domination

**Evolution explains domination – the rewards associated with domination motivate the actor towards creating subordinates to control**

Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 71-72 //adi]

Evolutionary theory can also explain domination. Like egoism, the desire to dominate is a trait. In the context of evolutionary theory, domination usually means that particular individuals in social groups have regular priority of access to resources in competitive situations. For most social mammals, a form of social organization called a dominance hierarchy operates most of the time. The creation of the dominance hierarchy may be violent and is almost always competitive. A single leader, almost always male (the alpha male), leads the group. The ubiquity of this social ordering strongly suggests that such a pattern of organization contributes to fitness. Ethologists categorize two principal types of behavior among social mammals in a dominance hierarchy: dominant and submissive.56 Dominant mammals have enhanced access to mates, food, and territory, increasing their chances of reproductive success.'7 Acquiring dominant status usually requires aggres-sion.ss Dominance, however, is an unstable condition; to maintain it, dominant individuals must be willing to defend their privileged access to available resources as long as they are able. Evolutionary anthropologist Richard Wrangham and ethologist Dale Peterson explain why an individual animal is motivated to vie for dominant status: "The motivation of a male chimpanzee who challenges another's rank is not that he foresees more matings or better food or a longer life."'' Rather, "those rewards explain why ... selection has favored the desire for power, but the immediate reason he vies for status ... is simply to dominate his peers."60