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### \*\*\*Environment 1nc\*\*\*

#### **The aff’s approach transportation infrastructure is grounded in a managerial ontology – their drive to maximize efficiency of transit reveals the earth as a mechanical system, concealing all other forms of relationality to the non-human environment and enframing it as human knowledge**

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(Ladelle, “Guilt as Management Technology: A Call to Heideggerian Reflection” Heidegger and the Earth, pg. 5-7)

The noted physicist Stephen Hawking, in his popular book A Brief History of Time, writes, “The eventual goal of science is to provide a single theory that describes the whole universe.”5 Such a theory, many people would assert, would be a systematic arrangement of all knowledge both already acquired and theoretically possible. It would be a theory to end all theories, outside of which no information, no revelation could, or would need to, occur. And the advent of such a theory would be as the shining of a light into every corner of being. Nothing would remain concealed. This dream of Hawking’s is a dream of power; in fact, it is a dream of absolute power, absolute control. It is a dream of the ultimate managerial utopia. This, Heidegger would contend, is the dream of technological thought in the modern age. We dream of knowing, grasping everything, for then we can control, then we can manage, everything. But it is only a dream, itself predicated, ironically enough, upon concealment, the self-concealing of the mystery. We can never control the mystery, the belonging together of revealing and concealing. In order to approach the world in a manner exclusively technological, calculative, mathematical, scientific, we must already have given up (or lost, or been expelled by, or perhaps ways of being such as we are even impossible within) other approaches or modes of revealing that would unfold into knowledges of other sorts. Those other approaches or paths of thinking must already have been obliterated; those other knowledges must already have concealed themselves in order for technological or scientific revelation to occur. The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows — not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission — but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human management. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything. What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Bestand, standing-reserve. All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. This managerial, technological mode of revealing, Heidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of Western culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Now it is well on its way to extinguishing all other modes of revealing, all other ways of being human and being earth. It will take tremendous effort to think through this danger, to think past it and beyond, tremendous courage and resolve to allow thought of the mystery to come forth; thought of the inevitability, along with revealing, of concealment, of loss, of ignorance; thought of the occurring of things and their passage as events not ultimately under human control. And of course even the call to allow this thinking — couched as it so often must be in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent — is itself a paradox, the first that must be faced and allowed to speak to us and to shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions, directions of which we have not yet dreamed, directions of which we may never dream.

#### Management causes extinction – reduction of the environment to resources flattens the earth, enframing it within a single way of knowing – that produces Eurocentric environmental approaches that end in extinction

Lander ‘2,

(Edgardo, Prof. of Sociology and Latin American studies at the Venezuelan Central University in Caracas, Eurocentrism, Modern Knowledges, and the “Natural” Order of Global Capital, Nepantla: Views from South 3.2, muse)

The “freedom of commerce” that the interests of these transnational companies increasingly impose on peasants throughout the world is leading to a reduction in the genetic variety of many staple food crops. This reduction in genetic diversity, associated with a engineering view of agriculture and based on an extreme, industrial type of control over each phase of the productive process—with genetically modified seeds and the intensive use of agrochemicals—drastically reduces the auto-adaptive and regenerative ability of ecological systems. And nevertheless, the conservation of biodiversity requires the existence of diverse communities with diverse agricultural and medical systems that utilize diverse species in situ. Economic decentralization and diversification are necessary conditions for biodiversity conservation. (Shiva 1997, 88) Agricultural biodiversity has been conserved only when farmers have total control over their seeds. Monopoly rights regimens for seeds, either in the form of breeders’ rights or patents, will have the same impact on in situ conservation of plant genetic resources as the alienation of rights of local communities has had on the erosion of tree cover and grasslands in Ethiopia, India and other biodiversity-rich regions. (99)12 As much as for preserving genetic diversity—an indispensable condition of life—as for the survival of rural and indigenous peoples and cultures all over the planet—a plurality of ways of knowing must coexist, democratically. Current colonial trends toward an intensified, totalitarian monoculture of Eurocentric knowledge only lead to destruction and death.

#### **Text: the judge should vote negative to do nothing**

#### **Doing nothing de-activates managerial thinking by removing a clear pragmatic end for thought – this re-thinking of thinking produces a more reflective relationship to the earth that allows it to disclose itself based upon everyday materiality**

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(Ladelle, “Guilt as Management Technology: A Call to Heideggerian Reflection” Heidegger and the Earth, pg. 1-4)

Heidegger calls us to give thought to — or give ourselves over to thought of — the strangeness of our technological being within the world. His works resound with calls for human beings to grow more thoughtful, to take heed, to notice and reflect upon where we are and what we are doing, lest human possibility and the most beautiful of possibilities for thought be lost irretrievably in forces we do not understand and only pretend we can control. Heidegger’s admonitions are sometimes somewhat harsh. “Let us not fool ourselves,” he wrote in 1955. “All of us, including those who think professionally, as it were, are often enough thought-poor; we all are far too easily thought-less. Thoughtlessness is an uncanny visitor who comes and goes everywhere in today’s world. For nowadays we take in everything in the quickest and cheapest way, only to forget it just as quickly, instantly.”1 Some might find this unnecessarily harsh. We academicians may wish to contest the accusation. Surely, in the universities of all places, thinking is going on. But Heidegger had no respect for that or any other kind of complacency. The thinking he saw as essential is no more likely, perhaps unfortunately, to be found in universities or among philosophers than anywhere else. For the thinking he saw as essential is not the simple amassing and digesting of facts or even the mastering of complex relationships or the producing of ever more powerful and inclusive theories. The thinking Heidegger saw as essential, the thinking his works call us to, is not a thinking that seeks to master anything, not a thinking that results from a drive to grasp and know and shape the world; it is a thinking that disciplines itself to allow the world — the earth, things — to show themselves on their own terms. Heidegger called this kind of thinking ‘reflection’. In 1936 he wrote, “Reflection is the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question.”2 Reflection is thinking that never rests complacently in the conclusions reached yesterday; it is thinking that continues to think, that never stops with a satisfied smile and announces: We can cease; we have the right answer now. On the contrary, it is thinking that loves its own life, its own occurring, that does not quickly put a stop to itself, as thinking intent on a quick solution always tries to do. Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn — on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even the most casual of conversations everywhere — we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly, painful, and impoverishing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint, of at least a century of disastrous “natural resource management” policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution — consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced ecological devastation; the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet’s climate has been altered, probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chloro¬fluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mind-boggling fact that it may now be within humanity’s power to destroy all life on this globe. Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them~ or, when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by ecological disaster followed by human intervention followed by a new disaster of another kind. In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do? Heidegger’s work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger’s call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking’s only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities. Heidegger apparently calls us to do — nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox; how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate. But of course, those drives and those conceptual dichotomies are part of the very structure of our self-understanding both as individuals and as a tradition and a civilization. Hence, Heidegger’s call is a threatening one, requiring great courage, “the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question.”3 Heidegger’s work pushes thinking to think through the assumptions that underlie both our ecological vandalism and our love of scientific solutions, assumptions that also ground the most basic patterns of our current ways of being human.

### 2nc Link/FW - Environment

#### New transportation infrastructure is grounded in guilt – “humans do so many bad things to the earth – how can we stand by and watch it happen?!” – this ontology only re-affirms a belief that blocks attempts at transformations in thinking by submitting the earth to human mastery

#### This is a new link and a DA to their framework arguments – their args that debate should revolve around policy action assume all problems are submissable to human management and blackmail ontological criticism by holding it ethically responsible for the status quo

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(Ladelle, “Guilt as Management Technology: A Call to Heideggerian Reflection” Heidegger and the Earth, pg. 7-9)

Those configurations of forces will resist this thinking. Their resistance will occur in many forms. However, one of the most common ways that modern calculative selfhood will attempt to reinstate itself in the face of Heidegger’s paradoxical call to think the earth is by employing a strategy that has worked so well so many times before: it will feel guilty. Those of us who are white know this strategy very well. Confronted with our racism, we respond not by working to dismantle the structures that perpetuate racism but rather by feeling guilty. Our energy goes into self-rebuke, and the problems pointed out to us become so painful for us to contemplate that we keep our distance from them. Through guilt we paralyze ourselves. Thus guilt is a marvelous strategy for maintaining the white racist self. Those of us who are women have sometimes watched this strategy employed by the caring, liberal-minded men in our lives. When we have exposed sexism, pressed our criticisms and our claims, we have seen such men — the ‘good’ men, by far the most responsive men — deflate, apologize, and ask us to forgive. But seldom have we seen honest attempts at change. Instead we have seen guilt deployed as a cry for mercy or pity on the status quo; and when pity is not forthcoming we have seen guilt turn to rage, and we have heard men ask, “Why are you punishing us?” The primary issue then becomes the need to attend to the feelings of those criticized rather than to their oppressive institutions and behaviors. Guilt thus protects the guilty. Guilt is a facet of power; it is not a reordering of power or a signal of oppression’s end. Guilt is one of the modern managerial self’s maneuvers of self-defense. Of course guilt does not feel that way. It feels like something unchosen, something we undergo. It feels much more like self-abuse than self-defense. But we are shaped, informed, produced in our very selves by the same forces of history that have created calculative, technological revealing. Inevitably, whenever we are confronted with the unacceptability of what is foundational for our lives, those foundations exert force to protect themselves. The exertion, which occurs as and in the midst of very real pain, is not a conscious choice; but that does not lessen — in fact it strengthens — its power as a strategy of self-defense. Calculative, technological thinking struggles to defend and maintain itself through us and as us. Some men feel guilty about sexism; many white people feel guilty shout racism; most of us feel guilty about all sorts of habits and idiosyncracies that we tell ourselves we firmly believe should be changed. For many of us guilt is a constant constraint upon our lives, a seemingly permanent state. As a result, guilt is familiar, and, though somewhat uncomfortable at times, it comes to feel almost safe. It is no surprise, then, that whenever caring people think hard about how to live with/in/on the earth, we find ourselves growing anxious and, usually, feeling guilty about the way we conduct ourselves in relation to the natural world. Guilt is a standard defense against the call for change as it takes root within us. But, if we are to think with Heidegger, if we are to heed his call to reflect, we must not respond to it simply by deploring our decadent life-styles and indulging ourselves in a fit of remorse. Heidegger’s call is not a moral condemnation, nor is it a call to take up some politically correct position or some privileged ethical stance. When we respond to Heidegger’s call as if it were a moral condemnation, we reinstate a discourse in which active agency and its projects and responsibilities take precedence over any other way of being with the earth. In other words, we insist on remaining within the discourses, the power configurations, of the modern managerial self. Guilt is a concept whose heritage and meaning occur within the ethical tradition of the Western world. But the history of ethical theory in the West (and it could be argued that ethical theory only occurs in the West) is one with the history of technological thought. The revelation of things as to-be-managed and the imperative to be in control work themselves out in the history of ethics just as surely as they work themselves out in the history of the natural and human sciences. It is probably quite true that in many different cultures, times, and places human beings have asked the question: How shall I best live my life? But in the West, and in relatively modern times, we have reformulated that question so as to ask: How shall I conduct myself? How shall I behave? How shall I manage my actions, my relationships, my desires? And how shall I make sure my neighbors do the same? Alongside technologies of the earth have grown up technologies of the soul, theories of human behavioral control of which current ethical theories are a significant subset. Ethics in the modern world at least very frequently functions as just another field of scientific study yielding just another set of engineering goals. Therefore, when we react to problems like ecological crises by retreating into the familiar discomfort of our Western sense of guilt, we are not placing ourselves in opposition to technological thinking and its ugly consequences. On the contrary, we are simply reasserting our technological dream of perfect managerial control. How so? Our guilt professes our enduring faith in the managerial dream by insisting that problems — problems like oil spills, acid rain, groundwater pollution, the extinction of whales, the destruction of the ozone, the rain forests, the wetlands — lie simply in mismanagement or in a failure to manage (to manage ourselves in this case) and by reaffirming to ourselves that if we had used our power to manage our behavior better in the first place we could have avoided this mess. In other words, when we respond to Heidegger’s call by indulging in feelings of guilt about how we have been treating the object earth, we are really just telling ourselves how truly powerful we, as agents, are. We are telling ourselves that we really could have done differently; we had the power to make things work, if only we had stuck closer to the principles of good management. And in so saying we are in yet a new and more stubborn way refusing to hear the real message, the message that human beings are not, never have been, and never can be in complete control, that the dream of that sort of managerial omnipotence is itself the very danger of which Heidegger warns. Thus guilt — as affirmation of human agential power over against passive matter — is just another way of covering over the mystery. Thus guilt is just another way of refusing to face the fact that we human beings are finite and that we must begin to live with the earth instead of trying to maintain total control. Guilt is part and parcel of a managerial approach to the world. Thinking along Heidegger’s paths means resisting the power of guilt, resisting the desire to close ourselves off from the possibility of being with our own finitude. It means finding “the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question.” It means holding ourselves resolutely open for the shattering power of the event of thinking, even if what is shattered eventually is ourselves.

### 2nc Impact Calc

#### **Their impact calculus is a new link and enframing precedes it – they rely on a process of metaphysical calculation that has already reduced life to bare biological existence – that screens out whole regimes of violence, allowing politics to run on autopilot – this is the largest impact – the very horizon for human choice and meaning is eclipsed by their move to shut-down the question of violence itself**

Hägglund ‘4

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Thus, a rigorous deconstructive thinking maintains that we are always already inscribed in an "economy of violence" where we are both excluding and being excluded. No position can be autonomous or absolute but is necessarily bound to other positions that it violates and by which it is violated. The struggle for justice can thus not be a struggle for peace, but only for what I will call "lesser violence." Derrida himself only uses this term briefly in his essay "Violence and Metaphysics," but I will seek to develop [End Page 47] its significance.12 The starting point for my argument is that all decisions made in the name of justice are made in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. If there is always an economy of violence, decisions of justice cannot be a matter of choosing what is nonviolent. To justify something is rather to contend that it is less violent than something else. This does not mean that decisions made in view of lesser violence are actually less violent than the violence they oppose. On the contrary, even the most horrendous acts are justified in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. For example, justifications of genocide clearly appeal to an argument for lesser violence, since the extinction of the group in question is claimed to be less violent than the dangers it poses to another group. The disquieting point, however, is that all decisions of justice are implicated in the logic of violence. The desire for lesser violence is never innocent, since it is a desire for violence in one form or another, and there can be no guarantee that it is in the service of perpetrating the better. Consequently, my argument is not that the desire for lesser violence answers to a normative ideal or that it is inherently good. Such an argument presupposes that there is a way to objectively define and measure violence, which is an untenable presupposition. Every definition and every measure of violence is itself violent, since it is based on decisions that are haunted by what they exclude. The criteria for what counts as violence are therefore always open to challenge. Indeed, there would be no chance to pursue political critique and to transform the law if the definitions of violence were not subject to possible alteration. A contemporary example is the extension of animal rights. What formerly went unrecognized as violence in the juridical sense—the abuse and killing of animals—has begun to be recognized as an illegal violence. A similar transformation of the criteria for what counts as violence is still underway with regard to subordinated classes, races, and genders. If there were an objective norm for what is less violent, the range of such political critique would be limited in advance and there would be an end to politics. In contrast, Derrida argues that politics is endless since any definition of violence is itself violent and given over to possible contestation. Deconstruction cannot teach us what the "lesser violence" is in any given case. On the contrary, deconstruction spells out why the question of violence remains forever undecidable. The supposed lesser violence may always be more violent than the violence it opposes, and there can be no end to the challenges that stem from the impossibility of calculation. Derrida's argument here is neither negative nor positive; it neither deplores nor celebrates the constitutive violence. Rather, it accounts for violence as the condition for both the desirable and the undesirable. Due to the economy of violence, there is always the possibility of less violence (and the risk of more violence). Otherwise there would be no politics in the first place. If there were not the chance of less violence (and the threat of more violence) there would be no reason to engage in political struggle, since nothing could ever be changed.13 [End Page 48] A possible objection here is that we must strive toward an ideal origin or end, an arkhe or telos that would prevail beyond the possibility of violence. Even if every community is haunted by victims of discrimination and forgetting, we should try to reach a state of being that does not exclude anyone, namely, a consummated presence that includes everyone. However, it is precisely with such an "ontological" thesis that Derrida's hauntological thinking takes issue. At several places in Specters of Marx he maintains that a completely present life—which would not be "out of joint," not haunted by any ghosts—would be nothing but a complete death.14 Derrida's point is not simply that a peaceful state of existence is impossible to realize, as if it were a desirable, albeit unattainable end. Rather, he challenges the very idea that absolute peace is desirable. In a state of being where all violent change is precluded, nothing can ever happen. Absolute peace is thus inseparable from absolute violence, as Derrida argued already in "Violence and Metaphysics." Anything that would finally put an end to violence (whether the end is a religious salvation, a universal justice, a harmonious intersubjectivity or some other ideal) would end the possibility of life in general. The idea of absolute peace is the idea of eliminating the undecidable future that is the condition for anything to happen. Thus, the idea of absolute peace is the idea of absolute violence.

### Supply Chains/Dams Link

#### Supply chains like dams reduce rivers to resources that are reduced to quantifiable entities like energy – this process of reduction replaces everyday experience with a simulation of the earth, reflected in human knowledge

Soufalis ‘5

(Zoe, Adjunct Research Fellow and associate member at the Centre for Cultural Research, “Big Water, Everyday Water: A Sociotechnical Perspective”, Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies Vol. 19, No. 4, December 2005, pp. 445–463)

For the history of Big Water is also the history of big dams, a fad in the nineteenth century tradition of the Grand Project that peaked in the mid-twentieth century in Australia, as well as abroad, where, as part of aid and development programmes, they were often spectacular concretisations of colonial and/or dependency relations. Like many other suburban Australians, as a child in the 1960s I was taken on family excursions and group picnics to various dams in catchments beyond the city’s periphery (in my case, Perth, Western Australia). Dams are tremendous feats of technoscience and engineering and grand poetic expressions of human power and will. The dam’s very giganticism (Heidegger, 1977, p. 135), and the huge potential force of the dammed up water behind it, invite awed contemplation of technical expertise embodied and exalted to something like a force of god or nature: a technological sublime (Marx, 1965; Nye, 1994, esp. pp. 136–142). The dam and its attendant aqueducts, pipelines, treatments plants and so on, through to the household tap that gushes water on demand, is an assemblage that exemplifies the epochal modern project of technology and instrumental rationality, as Heidegger delineates in his essay on ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ (1977). A hydroelectric scheme on the Rhine is one example of how part of the world, such as a flow of water, can be turned into a calculable quantity of resource, such as hydroelectricity (Heidegger, 1977, p. 16) and becomes part of the Bestand, the standing-reserve or ‘resource well’ (Zimmerman, 1990), available for mobilisation by complex and large-scale energy, transport, communications and delivery systems, and ‘switched about ever anew’, to serve an ever more extended logic of supply (Sofia, 2000).

### Environmental Infrastructure Link

#### Environmental infrastructure enframes ecology as resources – it reduces the environment to a resource base, terraforming it through networks of consumption like highways and airports – that ensures separation from nature and produces new strategies of social control

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(Timothy W., “The (Un)Wise (Ab)Use of Nature: Environmentalism as Globalized Consumerism” http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim528.PDF)

An environmental act, even though the connotations of most contemporary greenspeak suggests otherwise, is a disciplinary move.33 Environmentalism in these terms strategically polices space in order to encircle sites and subjects captured within these enveloping maneuvers, guarding them, standing watch over them, or even besieging them. And, each of these actions aptly express the terraforming programs of sustainable development. Seen from the astropanopticon, Earth is enveloped in the managerial designs of global commerce, which environmentalize once wild Nature as now controllable ecosystems. Terraforming the wild biophysical excesses and unoptimized geophysical wastes of the Earth necessitates the mobilization of a worldwatch to maintain nature conservancies and husband the worldwide funds of wildlife. Of course, Earth must be put first; the fully rational potentials of second nature's terraformations can be neither fabricated nor administered unless and until earth first is infrastructuralized.34 This is our time's Copernican revolution: the anthropogenic demands of terraforming require a biocentric worldview in which the alienated objectivity of natural subjectivity resurfaces objectively in managerial theory and practice as "ecosystem" and "resource base" in "the environment." Terraforming the Earth environmentalizes a once wild piece of the cosmos, domesticating it as "humanity's home" or "our environment." From narratives of world pandemics, global warming, or planetary pollution, global governance from the astropanopticon now runs its risk analyses and threat scenarios to protect Mother Earth from home-grown and foreign threats, as the latest security panics over asteroid impacts or X-File extraterrestrials in the United States express in the domains of popular culture. Whether it is space locusts from Independence Day or space rocks snuffing out Dallas in Asteroid, new security threats are casting their shadows over our homes, cities, and biomes for those thinking geo-economically in the astropanopticon. From such sites of supervision, environmentalists see from above and from without, like the NASA-eyed view of Earth from Apollo spacecraft, through the enveloping astropanoptic designs of administratively controllable terraformed systems.35 Encircled by enclosures of alarm, environments can be disassembled, recombined, and subjected to expert managers' disciplinary designs. Beset and beleaguered by these all-encompassing interventions, environments as ecosystems and terraformations can be redirected to fulfill the ends of new economic scripts, managerial directives or administrative writs.36 How various environmentalists might embed different instrumental rationalities into the policing of ecosystems is an intriguing question, which will be explored below.

### Sustainability Link/Epistemology DA

#### The aff enframes the earth through sustainability – their desperate calls for action are guided by belief in an ideal environmental equilibrium to which we can return, organizing consumption and movement around an ecological center – be suspicious of their data because their metaphysical assumptions structure their author’s research

Swyngedouw 6

Erik Swyngedouw [Professor of Environment and Development at the University of Manchester] “Impossible ‘Sustainability’ and the Post-Political Condition” September 2006

Environmentalists (whether activists or scientists) invariably invoke the global physical processes that threaten our existence, and insist on the need to re-engineer nature, so that it can return to a ‘sustainable’ path. Armed with their charts, formulas, models, numbers, and grant applications, to which activists usually add the inevitable pictures of scorched land, factories or cars emitting carbon fumes, dying animals and plants, suffering humans, apocalyptic rhetoric, and calls for subsidies and financial support, scientists, activists, and all manner of assorted other human and non-human actants enter the domain of the social, the public, and, most importantly, the political. Thus “natures” enter the political. A particular and symbolically enshrined nature enters the parliament of politics, but does so in a duplicitous manner. It is a treacherously deceitful Nature that enters politics, one that is packaged, numbered, calculated, coded, modelled, represented by those who claim to possess, know, understand, speak for the “real Nature”. In other words, what enters the domain of politics is the coded and symbolised versions of nature mobilised by scientists, activists, industrialists and the like. This is particularly evident in examples such as the debate over GMOs, global climate change, BSE, biodiversity loss, and other equally pressing issues. Invariably, the acting of Nature -- as scripted by the bearers of nature’s knowledge – enters the political machinery as coded language that also already posits its political and social solution and does not tolerate, in the name of Nature, dissent other than that framed by its own formulations. It is in this sense of course that the argument about climate change is exclusively formulated in terms of believers and non-believers, as a quasi-religious faith, but the weapons of the struggle in this case are matters of fact like data, models, and physico-chemical analysis. And the solutions to the question of sustainability are already pre-figured by the way in which nature is made to speak. Creeping increases in long term global temperatures, which will cause untold suffering and damage, are caused by CO2 output. Hence, the solution to future climate ills resides in cutting back on CO2 emissions. Notwithstanding the validity of the role of CO2 in co-constituting the process of climate change, the problematic of the future calamities the world faces is posited primarily in terms of the physical acting of one of nature’s components, CO2 as is its solution found in bringing CO2 within our symbolic (socio-economic) order, futilely attempted with the Kyoto agreement or other neo-liberal market-based mechanisms. Questioning the politics of climate change in itself is already seen as an act of treachery, as an unlawful activity, banned by ‘Nature’ itself.

### AT Permutation – Environment Specific

#### The link overwhelms the perm – discourse of sustainability governs politics with the image of an ideal “state of nature” to which we must return – that shuts down political debate about the environment and transforms environmental policy into mastery

Swyngedouw 6

Erik Swyngedouw [Professor of Environment and Development at the University of Manchester] “Impossible ‘Sustainability’ and the Post-Political Condition” September 2006

This chapter seeks to destabilise some of the most persistent myths about nature, sustainability and environmental politics. First, I shall argue that there is no such thing as a singular Nature around which a policy of ‘sustainability’ can be constructed. Rather, there are a multitude of natures and a multitude of existing or possible socio-natural relations. Second, the obsession with a singular nature that requires ‘sustaining’ is sustained by an apocalyptic imaginary that forecloses asking serious political questions about possible socio-environmental trajectories, particularly in the context of a neo-liberal hegemony. Third, and most importantly, I shall argue that environmental issues and their political ‘framing’ contribute to the making and consolidation of a post-political and post-democratic condition, one that actually forecloses the possibility of a real politics of the environment. I conclude with a call of a politicization of the environment, one that is predicated upon the recognition of radically different possible socio-environmental futures and the proliferation of new socio-environmental imaginaries.

### GPS Link

#### GPS distances humanity from the earth by reducing it to pure navigational data – that replaces everyday living spaces with navigational coordinates, creating a flat surface for human management and intervention

Joronen ‘8

Joronen, Mikko. Department of Geography, University of Turku. 2008. “The Age of Planetary Space: On Heidegger, Being, and Metaphysics of Globalization.” https://www.doria.fi/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10024/66733/AnnalesAII257Joronen.pdf?sequence=1

From all of the ways modern technology has transformed us, the world, and the earth, spatial magnitude may be the one having consequences most comprehensive and pervasive. In the appendix to one of his best-known essays, The Age of the World Picture, German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) describes this technological transformation in terms of what has apparently become known as the process of globalization, an increasingly spreading globe-wide connectedness of things from societal practices to the use of natural entities. We are now faced with the “planetary imperialism of technologically organized man”, Heidegger writes, with a technology of “organized uniformity” that has become “the surest instrument of total rule over the earth” (Heidegger 1977d:152). Although it has become somewhat self-evident that after a couple of decades of rapid intensification this technological conquest of planetary space has grown in monumental heights, it is equally apparent that the issue of globalization is not solely emptied into recent speeding up of the loss of the sense of distance. The globe rather seems to provide a symbol for an entire age of technological conquest and ordering. In fact, it is this technological conquest, as Heidegger points out in his other much sited essay Question Concerning Technology, which is not a mere “order of a machine” but a way of revealing, that constitutes an entire era of ‘gigantic’ ‘enframing’ (Gestell) of the terrestrial globe, the planetary earth (1977a:23). In a fundamental sense of the word, we contemporaries are being caught up in a “cyber-world of the real”, thrown into a world governed by technical command revealing the whole of the earth as nothing but a reserve on call for the networks of its commanding orderings. By implicitly indicating fundamental levelling and ever-heightening possession of the space of the earth, such ordering of things has turned the earth into a planetary resource to be used up by the manipulative powers of technological societies. It is this technological power, which evermore reaches ahead by calculating and arranging things as functions according to its own ordering power that defines the fundamental outcome of the technological revealing of planetary space: the uniform capturing and positioning of spatial relations of things into a framework of total orderings.

GPS enframe the earth as a strategic object – navigational data creates the fiction of the earth as a single internally consistent object and erase the history of colonialism that conditions Third World underdevelopment, ending in racially violent resource extraction

Kato ’93

(Masahide, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, “Nuclear Globalismi Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze,”  Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 339-360, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644779](http://www.jstor.org/stable/40644779" \t "_blank), AM)

As mentioned earlier, the absolute point of the strategic gaze abolishes the historical contestation over perspectives, giving way to a total monopoly of interpretative media. The camera's eye from outer space produced what had been long sought since the invention of camera and the rocket: ahistorical or transcendental "rectitude."8 An aerial photographer captures the emergence of such rectitude very succinctly  The advantage of hyperaltitude space photographs is that each one shows vast terrains in correct perspective, from one viewpoint and at one moment of time. Thus they are far more accurate than mosaics of the same area pieced together from photographs taken from the constantly shifting points of view of conventional aircraft at random periods of time, extending from dawn to sunset or even over weeks and months, depending upon clear weather.9 The pursuit of rectitude in the field of aerial photography has been none other than a constant battle against the three-dimensional existence of forms and volumes that allow more than a single point of view. With the vantage point of hyperaltitude from outer space, "three-dimensional forms are reduced to texture, line and color."10 Rendering the totality of Earth a two-dimensional surface serves no purpose other than for technostrategic interpretation of the earth as data and maps, thereby disqualifying "other" points of view (i.e., spatiolocality). In this way, with the back-up of technoscientific reason, the "absolute" point of the strategic gaze manifests uncontestable control as far as the interpretation of surface of the earth is concerned. Flattening the surface of the earth has also brought about a radical change in the regime of temporality. As the words of the aerial photographer quoted earlier reveal, the notion of rectitude also depends on the construction of the single privileged moment. The image of every part of the earth is now displaced onto that "absolute" moment. In other words, the "absolute" point of the strategic gaze produces a homogeneous temporal field (i.e., an a-temporal field, or to use common vocabulary, "real time") in which "juxtaposition of every locality, all matter" becomes viable.11 The so-called "real time" is therefore the very temporality of the strategic gaze, that is, the absolute temporality that presides over other forms of constructing time (i.e., chronolocality). Such construction of temporality did not suddenly emerge with the advent of the new mode of communication. It is a historical tendency of capitalism to displace geographical distance onto temporal distance. As Karl Marx pointed out, development of transportation and communication displaces spatial distance onto temporal distance, which is arranged and hierarchized in relation to the métropoles.12 Therefore, to borrow Paul Virilio's term, the development of transportation and communication transforms geopolitics into "chronopolitics." The "instantaneous transmission" produced by satellite communication has rendered metropolitan centers capable of pushing chronopolitics further to the absolute level in which temporal distance reflects nothing but the strategic networking of capital. Let us now tie this configuration of transcendental space and time to the process of transnational capitalist formation, specifically in its conquest of the periphery. In 1962, TNCs such as AT&T, ITT, RCA, and General Telephone inaugurated the state-sponsored monopoly business (Comsat Corporation) in the field of communication satellites. During the Vietnam War, the technology of communication satellites played a critical role in the so-called "remote control warfare." Through various sensorial devices, every movement in the hinterland of Southeast Asia (although they couldn't distinguish liberation armies from lay villagers or water buffaloes) were transmitted to the absolute gaze of the commander positioned at Kissinger's office.13 The words of Retired General Schriever (who was appointed as an adviser on space and science policy by the Reagan administration) accurately summarize the "absoluteness" of the power of surveillance by satellites: What I want is a radar surveillance system which allows you to spot everything that's moving, either on the surface or above the surface of the earth. . . . You could pin your enemy down on earth. What would they do? If I control the high ground and you can't move, what are you doing to do? You're going to negotiate a surrender. That's what it's all about.14  Politically speaking, the image recapitulation of the earth by transnational capital and imperial states bespeaks their effort to reterritorialize/contain the spatial movements of excolonies (the so-called "Third World movements"). Through an objectification process of the periphery, TNCs have attempted to make the Third World disappear from their screen by reclassifying it in the cognitive category of "natural resources." The same process has taken place in the case of the Green Revolution, in which the strenuous recolonization of the peripheral space was none other than a counterrevolutionary attempt to destroy the hegemonic recomposition of the periphery (the Third World movements). In both cases, what was at great stake was the sovereignty of the Third World, that is, the relative autonomy of Third World space and time. By the objectification of the periphery through the eye of the absolute strategic gaze, the sovereignty of the Third World has been nullified without involving any conventional battles. The Declaration of Bogota in 1976 signed by eight equatorial nations (Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire) protested the First World monopoly over satellite surveillance.18 It was a desperate attempt by the Third World nations, who were faced with the invisible invasion and destruction of their sovereignty by the TNCs and imperial states. The final transfer of Landsat to a private corporation, the Earth Observation Satellite Company (EOSAT), in 1984 consolidated an era of transnational capitalization of the strategic gaze. France joined the competition for the remote-sensing satellite information market with SPOT (satellite pour l'observation de la terre), which produced images with 10-meter resolution (as opposed to the 30-meter resolution provided by Landsat).19 The images reproduced by SPOT have further liquefied national configurations, replacing them with the configurations of transnational capital. With the dissolution of the superpower rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union, their terrain of competition has shifted to launching commercial satellites on converted intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) rockets. Herein, the integration of the First World imperial states and TNCs has become total as far as satellite surveillance is concerned. For example, Satelife, which is a private venture run by U.S. and former Soviet specialists, aims to "give physicians in remote areas of developing countries access to major centers of medical information located in industrialized countries." Planet Earth, a U.S., Japanese, and West European project, is designed to monopolize "a relatively detailed and accurate picture of the changes and interactions occurring in the planet ecosphere."20 Behind the rhetoric of such humanitarian postures, it is very clear the TNCs and imperial states have secured a monopoly over transcendental space and time, traversing and penetrating the Third World with impunity**.21** Outer space **thus** has become the space of transnational capital par excellence. One could say that satellite surveillance perfected one of Sun Tzu's axioms, "supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."

### Economy Link

#### The aff enframes urban environments – mediation of cities through neoliberal logic re-codes all social space in terms of economic value, understood as proximity to bus stops or rail stations – the impact is massive social inequality through marginalization of alternative communities

Cook ‘10

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It is crucial to note that all activity within and through the city has a spatial correlation. Zukin (1992) distinguishes space through two categories: the vernacular, the local neighborhood spaces of everyday life; and landscape, the spaces of power created and managed by commercial and state institutions. This juxtaposition within urban form can be observed in cities throughout much of the world. From global and gateway cities to provincial cities in interior regions, commercial and financial centers that are spatially contiguous but functionally disjointed from the spaces of everyday living are now common. This all reflects a particular pattern of debt- financed urbanization that has come to dominate urban development since the 1970s (Harvey 2005). The system reached its apex with the explosion of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and over the counter (OTC) derivative contracts that allowed the very largest global financial institutions to extract the monetary value of urban real estate and repackage it into complex financial instruments that corporations, institutional investors and hedge funds could use to hedge risk or seek speculative profits. Constructed on the false premise of perfect markets and a logic of perpetual growth, global financial capitalism found within the contemporary city a spatial and regulatory configuration that has perpetuated its most destructive forces. Harvey (2008) explores the relationship between the urbanization process and global capitalism and shows how urban restructuring processes have been critical stabilizers to regional crashes and crises since the 1970s. While financial expansion and contraction were general corollaries to the urbanization process from the 1970s to the present, there were other more acute forces intervening in the city during this period. Reagan and Thatcher’s neoliberal revolution was exported around the globe: strategic domestic price controls were abandoned, currencies were devalued to promote exports, and public expenditures were drastically cut across the board as structural adjustment became the governing doctrine of both national and urban economies. This led not only to volatile swings in municipal finances but also distortions in the inter-urban distribution of public expenditures through increased competition for scarce public resources. In Buenos Aires in 1991, for example, it was found that 11.5% of the population received 68% of public investment in infrastructure and 26.1% in education (Cohen and Debowicz 2001). Returning to Luke (2003), a necessary but not mutually exclusive distinction must be made between the planning processes within the few Global Cities a la Saskia Sassen (1992) and the numerous globalizing cities throughout the world. The employment of scale theory (Brenner 2001) is useful in moving past the hierarchical conceptualizations of global integration, in which power and change flow along a straight line of cause and effect, to dynamic spatial models of global economic interaction. The historical need for global financial centers with centralized control functions over the global economy has always existed (Arrighi 1994) and the interaction between the global economy and these cities is well-documented in the urban literature (Friedmann and Wolff 1982; Friedmann 1986; Fainstein 2001). However, a cursory appraisal of cities throughout the developing world, with minimal fiscal resources to meet rapidly increasing demand for essential services, much less public education and transportation, would show that most do not fit the Global City typology. Yet it is in these very cities that the dominant logic of global capitalism frequently informs a very peculiar planning dogma, illustrated by the rampant zoning of commercial and business districts to attract highly mobile capital flows, that shows little or no concern for the long-term socio-economic consequences of urban restructuring. Logically, urban scholars and policy makers assert that context matters. However, typologies derived from hierarchy often obscure as much as they explain. As the current global economic crisis persists, we are beginning to observe new ways in which the impacts of economic globalization get woven between and spread diffusely among cities that are not financial centers. In short, how global integration is shaping the new urban reality. It is now apparent that the linkages global urbanization has created and through which the processes of globalization have flowed over the past forty years have become channels through which risk could be distributed beyond traditional geographic boundaries.4 The scale and intensity of penetration by contemporary globalization into all cities, particularly aspects of financial globalization though not exclusively, have created a distinct landscape of inequality within the city.5 Capitalism’s tendency to produce periodic crises has been manifested regularly throughout its history as an economic system yet we are just beginning to see the cumulative effect of these crises’ impacts on the city and the residents that inhabit them. Indeed, as the frequency of crises over the past forty years has increased, high income countries and developing countries with open economies alike are increasingly exposed to this phenomenon. Empirical evidence shows that economic crises tend to increase inequality as wealthy individuals own multiple classes of assets to mobilize during recessionary periods while the poor have little to none (CEPAL 1997). Miller (2005) found that during crises in both Mexico and Indonesia in the 1990s, urban wage workers suffered disproportionately negative impacts on income, pushing many of them into the informal sector where they lost job security and faced increased competition, driving down wages and welfare.

### Infrastructure Bank Link/DA

#### The infrastructure bank enframes transit within economic logic, reducing social relations to pure cost-benefit analysis – decisions about relationality between communities are formed on the efficiency of their circulation, rather than a genuine dialogue between individuals inhabiting a common living space

Sturup ’9 [Sophy, World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology “Mega Projects and Governmentality” http://www.waset.org/journals/waset/v54/v54-176.pdf]

The first problem identified above related to project selection. The point was made that the selection of projects is in general not a result of normative needs analysis. The discussion on the development of the art of government showed that in Foucault’s understanding of the world, problems and their solutions arise in a dynamic relationship, and that problem definition is determined by the art of government available in which to solve it. In this sense art of government is being used as a particular type of Heidiggerian episteme: a way of being which determines what we see [102]. This provides an explanation for the observed phenomena that problems come to be defined according to the technical solutions available [103]. As a technology, MUTPs are a particularly constructed solution which provides for the constitution of particular problems and needs that they are the solution of. There are several pointers to the nature of the art of government of MUTP in the literature already. Boyce [104] notes that at one level mega projects are much more about doing something rather than doing the right thing, and that they have a distinctly pharaonic flavour to them. This pharaonic flavour is described in a similar way to the notion of sovereign power; that which could be described as the mentality of ‘I am the king and my will be done’. Certainly the problems associated with displacement of persons in favour of these projects suggest a form of power where the imposition of the will of The Government on the people, or a group of people is justified. The fact that project proponents feel they need The Government investment and regulation to get these projects done indicates more of this type of mentality. There is clear evidence that at any point in time there are multiple arts of government operate at any one time. If the art of government of MUTP is primarily sovereignty, then this could provide insight into a number of problems for MUTPs. The other art of government strongly in play in advanced In governmentality, individuals are empowered as managers of their own conduct. This is achieved through proper education, and development of a variety of systems which enforce proper behaviour (disciplines) and punish deviation (sovereignty). At its pinnacle, this logic is reflected in advanced liberalism where the individual is reconditioned to entrepreneurial behavior through making everything conditional upon that behavior, life becomes a cost/benefit analysis [105]. Thus in governmentality the logic of power is that power is located in the individual. Governmentality is a logical threat to the development of MUTPs. It threatens the likelihood of their occurring and blurs their function where they are implemented. This is because, in governmentality, the State is increasingly expected to remove itself from activity, because the ‘will of the people’ becomes almost impossible to identify. The ‘people’ are now individuals who have been given the conditions to manage themselves, their individual will is identified through the market and their choices as consumers. In this logic, MUTP would only occur with the agreement of all individuals affected or in response to a truly consumer driven market demand. De Bruijn & Leijten’s [106] work on the increase in contestation of information can be reinterpreted as a function not of the vibrancy of democracy but rather from the increasing application of governmentality demonstrating how this logic plays out. Governmentality, increases peoples sense of needing to rely on their own judgement as they are increasingly individuated and increasingly responsible for their actions and beliefs. This leads to a decrease in the ability to “take other’s word for it”, and therefore to act collectively, which would logically lead to a decrease in the number of mega projects and contestation of them.

### Inland Waterways Link

#### Inland waterways reduce rivers to resources for human consumption – this process of revealing interprets water only in terms of its potential for trade and exchange, removing its intrinsic potential

Beckman ‘00

[Professor at Harvey Mudd College] “MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS” http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html

The essence of technology originally was a revealing of life and nature in which human intervention deflected the natural course while still regarding nature as the teacher and, for that matter, the keeper. The essence of modern technology is a revealing of phenomena, often far removed from anything that resembles "life and nature," in which human intrusion not only diverts nature but fundamentally changes it. As a mode of revealing, technology today is a challenging-forth of nature so that the technologically altered nature of things is always a situation in which nature and objects wait, standing in reserve for our use. We pump crude oil from the ground and we ship it to refineries where it is fractionally distilled into volatile substances and we ship these to gas stations around the world where they reside in huge underground tanks, standing ready to power our automobiles or airplanes. Technology has intruded upon nature in a far more active mode that represents a consistent direction of domination. Everything is viewed as "standing-reserve" and, in that, loses its natural objective identity. The river, for instance, is not seen as a river; it is seen as a source of hydro-electric power, as a water supply, or as an avenue of navigation through which to contact inland markets. In the era of techne humans were relationally involved with other objects in the coming to presence; in the era of modern technology, humans challenge-forth the subjectively valued elements of the universe so that, within this new form of revealing, objects lose their significance to anything but their subjective status of standing-ready for human design. [(8)](http://www2.hmc.edu/%7Etbeckman/personal/Heidart.html#N_8_) At this point, we have almost completed the analysis of modern technology in its essence. Only one final aspect of this analysis remains; it is an understanding of the overarching context in which technology came to proceed along this path. Heidegger named this context by the German word 'Ge-stell,' which has been translated to the English word, 'enframing.' In Heidegger's words, "enframing [Ge-stell] means the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve." {[7], p. 20} But, "where Enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense." {[7], p. 28}

### Highway System Link

#### **The highway system divides life into systems of resources, separating the suburban “home” from urban “work” – these divisions create violent individual self-management**

Taylor 6

(James Michael, MA Thesis – Texas A&M Dept of Philosophy, THE QUESTION CONCERNING HEIDEGGER: TECHNOLOGY AND BEING, A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING, repository.tamu.edu/bitstream/1969.1/4247/1/etd-tamu-2006B-PHIL-Taylor.pdf)

In the face of a technological world the four areas of technological influence and interference that Dias outlined in chapter I spring readily to mind (Dias, 392). In his first category he outlined machines that may do us direct and irreversible physical harm. The nuclear weapon remains one of the most striking example of such a machine. Diasí second category is that of the tendency of technology to promote injustice (Dias, 393). An insidious use of machines and resources seems to reveal the polarization of classes based on technology. New class structures are being established around the technologically savvy, and the technologically ignorant. Dias’ third category is that technology has profound sociological impacts (Dias, 393). One need only look at the highway system in America to understand the impact technology can have on how society is formed. An authentic sense of community can be lost when community becomes another resource to be accessed on the end of a long drive. Despite these examples the most troubling category is Dias’ last, that of the psychological (Dias, 393). Technology changes humanity itself from the inside out. Devices like the digital clock have altered our perceptions of time. Life can be divided out into discrete, separable, and infinitely reducible segments.

#### **Highways enframe the environment as petrotopia, a streamlined connection between spaces that makes them available for immediate consumptive penetration – this fantasy conceals everyday violence within those communities, while revealing society as a factory of material production**

LeMenager 12

(Stephanie, Assoc Prof of English @ U of Cal Santa Barbara, “The Aesthetics of Petroleum, after Oil!”, *American Literary History* January (2012), http://alh.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/01/16/alh.ajr057.full)

The inescapability of petroleum infrastructures in the twentieth century has entered literature in the form of both dystopian and utopian imagery. This imagery became of particular literary interest in the 1950s and 1960s, when petromodernity reached its classic phase within the US-built environment. I use the term “petrotopia,” signifying petroleum-utopia, to refer to the now ordinary US landscape of highways, low-density suburbs, strip malls, fast food and gasoline service islands, and shopping centers ringed by parking lots or parking towers. My inclusion of the term “utopia” in a description of a far from ideal environment draws upon David Harvey's critical assessment of utopianism as a hegemonic “spatial ordering” (160). Harvey recognizes the implementation of utopianism to result in political systems that “strictly regulate a stable and unchanging social process,” such that “the dialectic of social process is repressed” and “no future needs to be envisaged because the desired state is already achieved.” The building of the auto-highway-sprawl complex has been a utopian project. We can recognize its origins in the Radiant City of Le Corbusier or the massive highway projects of Robert Moses—disasters on the human scale, for the most part, born of what Corbu called the “rapture of power … and speed” (xxiii), often racially inflected schemes to eliminate urban “blight,” and more broadly the potential of traffic, né commerce, to expand the band-width of information and pleasure.8 As utopia, petrotopia represents itself as an ideal end-state, repressing the violence that it has performed upon, for example, south Bronx neighborhoods leveled for freeway development or the wetlands below New Orleans which were filled to build suburban homes. While petrotopia represses the dialectics of social and ecological process, it foregrounds a temporal schema that serves its goals. Sprawl and spread suggest movement outward, in time, but minus an ethical imperative that ascribes notions of consequence to time. In its amoral, monstrous reproduction of itself in its own image, petrotopia resembles the species of utopia Harvey describes as the processual utopia of free market ideology, which, when it “comes to ground,” produces space to restlessly destroy and reorganize it in the service of (petro) capital (177). This relentless production of space creates problems of scale that, in turn, invite the return of repressed consequences, irreversible damage. The points at which utopian imagining, “the infinite work of the imagination's power of figuration,” in theorist Louis Marin's terms, meet a discrete unit of narrative time, something that happened and cannot be undone, can be instructive of how petrotopia betrays itself, tipping back into the more solid proposition of socio-ecological disaster (413). Temporally discrete “event” produces rents in the petrol screen. This essentially formal problem of narrative structure challenging an ideology reliant upon iconicity and image has been discussed in philosophical terms as the bad faith of technocractic modernity. Environmental philosopher Barbara Adam names the fantasy of temporal “reversibility” as a fundamental principle of the technoscientific optimism growing out of the Cold War (41). The damage wrought by technoscience can be undone, in other words—that is the fantasy. It is my purpose here to consider a few events in cultural history where the specter of the irreversible interrupts petromodern ebullience, and the media environments sustained by petroleum infrastructure break to static. This static, the brief interruption of the message, may be the closest analogue to hope that we inherit from the twentieth century.

### Economic Enframing Bad Impact

#### Economic enframing reduces the world to self-interest and monetary value, enabling structural violence, environmental destruction, and collapse of value to life

Nhanenge 7

[Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, paper submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts in the subject Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT]

Generation of wealth was an important part of the Scientific Revolution and its modem society. The scientific discipline of economics therefore became a significant means for wealth creation. However, since it is founded on similar dualised premises as science, also economics became a system of domination and exploitation of women, Others and nature. The following discussion is intended to show that. The way in which economics, with its priority on masculine forces, becomes dominant relates to web-like, inter-connected and complex processes, which are not always clearly perceived. The below discussions try to show how the dualised priority of the individual over society, reason over emotion, self-interest over community-interest, competition over cooperation, and more pairs, generate domination that leads to the four crises of violence and war, poverty, human oppression and environmental degradation. The aim in sum is to show how the current perspective of economics is destroying society (women and Others) and nature. The following discussion is consequently a critique of economics. It is meant to highlight some elements that make economics a dominant ideology, rather than a system of knowledge. It adopts a feministic view and it is therefore seen from the side of women, poor people and nature. The critique is extensive, but not exhaustive. It is extensive because economics is the single most important tool used by mainstream institutions for development in the South. Thus if we want to understand why development does not alleviate poverty, then we first need to comprehend why its main instrument, economics, cannot alleviate poverty. A critical analysis of economics and its influence in development is therefore important as an introduction to next chapter, which discusses ecofeminism and development. However, the critique is not exhaustive because it focuses only on the dualised elements in economics. It is highly likely that there are many more critical issues in economics, which should be analyzed in addition to the below mentioned. However, it would exceed this scope. Each of the following 10 sections discusses a specific issue in economics that relates to its dualised nature. Thus, each can as such be read on its own. However, all sections are systemically interconnected. Therefore each re-enforces the others and integrated, they are meant to show the web of masculine forces that make economics dominant towards women, Others and nature. The first three sections intend to show that economics sees itself as a neutral, objective, quantitative and universal science, which does not need to be integrated in social and natural reality. The outcome of this is, however, that economics cannot value social and environmental needs. Hence, a few individuals become very rich from capitalising on free social and natural resources, while the health of the public and the environment is degraded. It also is shown that the exaggerated focus on monetary wealth does not increase human happiness. It rather leads to a deteriorating quality of life. Thus, the false belief in eternal economic growth may eventually destroy life on planet Earth. The next section shows that economics is based on dualism, with a focus solely on yang forces. This has serious consequences for all yin issues: For example, the priority on individualism over community may in its extreme form lead to self-destruction. Similarly, the priority on rationality while excluding human emotions may end in greed, domination, poverty, violence and war. The next section is important as a means to understanding “rational” economics. Its aim is to clarify the psychological meaning of money. In reality, reason and emotion are interrelated parts of the human mind; they cannot be separated. Thus, economic “rationality” and its focus on eternal wealth generation are based on personal emotions like fears and inadequacies, rather than reason. The false belief in dualism means that human beings are lying to themselves, which results in disturbed minds, stupid actions with disastrous consequences. The focus on masculine forces is consequently psychologically unhealthy; it leads to domination of society and nature, and will eventually destroy the world.

### Environmental Management Impact

#### Environmental management causes ecological degradation – disengagement from the natural world and alternative modes of revealing create ontological diversity necessary for environmental resilience

Katz ‘00

(Eric Katz, associate professor of philosophy and director of the Science, Technology, and Society Program, New Jersey Institute of Technology; recognized pioneer, environmental ethics, 2K, Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community)

Even more important, the question arises whether or not Nature can heal these wounds of human oppression. Consider the reverse process, the human attempt to heal the wounds of Nature. We often tend to clean up natural areas polluted or damaged by human activity, such as the Alaskan coast harmed by the Exxon Valdez oil spill. But we also attempt to improve natural areas dramatically altered by natural events, such as a forest damaged by a massive brush fire, or a beach suffering severe natural erosion. In most of these kinds of cases, human science and technology are capable of making a significant change in the appearance and processes of the natural area. Forests can be replanted, oil is removed from the surface of bays and estuaries, sand and dune vegetation replenish a beach. But are these activities the healing of Nature? Has human activity—science and technology—restored Nature to a healthy state? No. When humans modify a natural area they create an artifact, a product of human labor and human design. 12 This restored natural area may resemble a wild and unmodified natural system, but it is, in actuality, a product of human thought, the result of human desires and interests. All humanly created artifacts are manifestations of human interests—from computer screens to rice pudding. An ecosystem restored by human activity may appear to be in a different category—it may appear to be an autonomous living system uncontrolled by human thought—but it nonetheless exhibits characteristics of human design and intentionality: it is created to meet human interests, to satisfy human desires, and to maximize human good. Consider again my examples of human attempts to heal damaged natural areas. A forest is replanted to correct the damage of a fire because humans want the benefits of the forest—whether these be timber, a habitat for wildlife, or protection of a watershed. The replanting of the forest by humans is different from a natural re-growth of the forest vegetation, which would take much longer. The forest is replanted because humans want the beneficial results of the mature forest in a shorter time. Similarly, the eroded beach is replenished—with sand pumped from the ocean floor several miles offshore—because the human community does not want to maintain the natural status of the beach. The eroded beach threatens oceanfront homes and recreational beaches. Humanity prefers to restore the human benefits of a fully protected beach. The restored beach will resemble the original, but it will be the product of human technology, a humanly designed artifact for the promotion of human interests. After these actions of human restoration and modification, what emerges is a Nature with a different character than the original. This is an ontological difference, a difference in the essential qualities of the restored area. A beach that is replenished by human technology possesses a different essence than a beach created by natural forces such as wind and tides. A savanna replanted from wildflower seeds and weeds collected by human hands has a different essence than grassland that develops on its own. The source of these new areas is different—man—made, technological, artificial. The restored Nature is not really Nature at all. A Nature healed by human action is thus not Nature. As an artifact, it is designed to meet human purposes and needs—perhaps even the need for areas that look like a pristine, untouched Nature. In using our scientific and technological knowledge to restore natural areas, we actually practice another form of domination. We use our power to mold the natural world into a shape that is more amenable to our desires. We oppress the natural processes that function independent of human power; we prevent the autonomous development of the natural world. To believe that we heal or restore the natural world by the exercise of our technological power is, at best, a self-deception and, at worst, a rationalization for the continued degradation of Nature— for if we can heal the damage we inflict we will face no limits to our activities. This conclusion has serious implications for the idea that Nature can repair human destruction, that Nature can somehow heal the evil that humans perpetuate on the earth. Just as a restored human landscape has a different causal history than the original natural system, the reemergence of Nature in a place of human genocide and destruction is based on a series of human events that cannot be erased. The natural vegetation that covers the mass grave in the Warsaw cemetery is not the same as the vegetation that would have grown there if the mass grave had never been dug. The grass and trees in the cemetery have a different cause, a different history, that is inextricably linked to the history of the Holocaust. The grassy field in the Majdanek parade ground does not cover and heal the mud and desolation of the death camp—it rather grows from the dirt and ashes of the site's victims. For anyone who has an understanding of the Holocaust, of the innumerable evils heaped upon an oppressed people by the Nazi regime, the richness of Nature cannot obliterate nor heal the horror. In this essay I question the environmentalists' concern for the restoration of nature and argue against the optimistic view that humanity has the obligation and ability to repair or reconstruct damaged natural systems. This conception of environmental policy and environmental ethics is based on a misperception of natural reality and a misguided understanding of the human place in the natural environment. On a simple level, it is the same kind of "technological fix" that has engendered the environmental crisis. Human science and technology will fix, repair, and improve natural processes.

### AT Management Good

#### **Management good args are grounded in flawed truth claims – they assume the earth is a mechanistic system whose causal relations are already pre-determined – that places humans at the center of the universe and creates an anthropocentric relation to nature – this description writes out the temporal embodiedness of human experience and inevitably produces environmental violence**

Padrutt ’92,

(Hanspeter, Member of the Daseinsanalytisches Institut in Zurich, *Heidegger and Ecology* in Heidegger and the Earth ed. Ladelle McWhorter, pgs. 19-21)

The place of consciousness is the place of the objectifying Cartesian subject. This subject, the "thinking substance" of the "I think therefore I am," tyrannically brings objects before itself. It stands in the center, surveys, and examines on all sides - sees in perspective - from its own point of view. It is no accident that construction from a central perspective was discovered by two architects in the early Renaissance and soon took its place victoriously in painting. This perspectival relationship of the primary (human) subject to the perspectivally observed world (a relationship that emerged in the Renaissance) - this perspectival "worldview" - is inextricably linked with the emergence of the method of natural science grounded in mathematics. The self-certain domination of the subject and the objectifying method that yields certainty belong together; together they form what I would call 'objectifying subjectivism'. The objectifying method - wanting to measure and calculate everything, for the sake of certainty - has to reduce everything that is to measurable and calculable quantities. Weight, distance, and duration were most easily available to exact measurement; but then the objectifying method reduced nature, too, to a coherence of motions of a whole series of points in a three-dimensional, geometric space, coursing in a one-dimensional time, thought as a 'time-axis', and reduced things to geometric substances with defined extension. Since this reduction robbed events of their singularity, a repeatable reeling off of the same event became thinkable; repeatable experimenting and engineering set forth on its triumphal procession, and along with it the interpretation of nature and the whole world as a machine. In objectifying subjectivism human beings see themselves as "master and owner of nature" and the world as a large machine. Finally, the objectifying turns back to the subject and, with the supremacy of the machine, itself gets interpreted more and more exclusively as a functional, psychosomatic apparatus. In order to get closer to the “meaning of being,” the meaning of the little word *is* – which gets said in manifold ways (Aristotle) and which also oscillates unsaid in everything that is and in all that happens – Heidegger in *Being and Time* in a certain sense beings where Descartes left off. I think, therefore I am; but what does ‘I am’ mean? In order to get closer to the everyday Dasein, which in any case has in its being a relation to its being (and to being in general). Dasein is in the world, not as an item of clothing is in the closet, but rather - thrown into the world - it has the task of being its being as its own being. Dasein is "my own" "thrown projection" in connection with what encounters it: care (Sorge). But Dasein is not a substance that is merely at hand, not a thinking substance, and not a psychosomatic apparatus. And, respectively, Dasein is also not merely a specimen of a living organism or of the species animal rationale, rational animal. In Dasein there takes place a disclosure or opening of being - in the disclosure of self in singular manner as well as of the world. But this disclosure is through and through 'ec-static', outside itself, not closed up in itself, but 'outside' - out there, as the Freiburg Cathedral earlier. This being-out-there refers not only to the present, but also and equally to the world horizon of the future and of the past. What Heidegger in Being and Time called the horizonal-existential disclosure of being in Dasein - in the disclosure of self and of the world - later, after the so-called "turning" in his thinking, he spoke of more and more as the indwelling opening-out of the clearing of being, as indwelling in the temporal, threefold open and the opening-out of this indwelling through the whole of Dasein. Ex-sistenz then meant indwelling opening-out of the open expanse of the Da. The shifting from the objectifying subject to the open expanse of the Da leads us away from the standpoint of the subject which stands in the center of the world, to the mystery of the world itself, to the Ereignis of being and of time, which we do not have at our disposal, but into which we are let. This shift is a re-thinking and a re-tuning all in one, a leap into the open expanse of the Da. The re-tuning is nothing else but the re-tuning already mentioned, from the dreadful, shortsighted Uf3pl<; into the pain-filled, buoyant, spirited, released coming-forth holding-in-reserve. And the re-thinking leads away from objectifying calculating and measuring to phenomenological. meditative thinking, from natural science's reduction of phenomena to the upholding of their fullness, from the perspectival worldview to a regard for the inseparable interconnectedness of thinking, world, human, death, sky, earth, and language: to mindfulness of Ereignis of being and time, of Ereignis of the world-fourfold: Rethinking leads away from progress to "overture:' This shift has many further consequences that have varied significance for various disciplines. For ecology the following consequences seem to me to be of fundamental importance: The world now is no longer the universe, 'all of the world', the sum of everything, but rather the play of world" in which we are inseparably connected co-players. What we call space and time also belong in this play of the world. However, space is now no longer the three-dimensional, calculable. geometric space, but rather the play of places, the playing together of the places of a region;" And time is no longer a one-dimensional time-axis, but the play of time, which grants presence and absence in the three dimensions of future, past, and present.

#### New link – even well-meaning conservationism still reduces the environment to a single, calculable unit like “energy” in order to motivate its politics – that produces domination of nature and closes us to its processes of revealing

Padrutt ’92,

(Hanspeter, Member of the Daseinsanalytisches Institut in Zurich, *Heidegger and Ecology* in Heidegger and the Earth ed. Ladelle McWhorter, pgs. 27)

A few years after the Americans landed on the moon, the Club of Rome published those famous computer predictions, entitled "The Limits of Growth," which showed that, if things continue the way they have gone on "spaceship earth," soon it could not go on. Better founded and more oppressing still was the study commissioned by President Jimmy Carter, which appeared in 1980 with the title Global 2000 Study. Both studies are honest appraisals and cautious predictions, which can shake up humankind. However, since they take for granted the basis of "world-models" or "spaceship earth," they can also solidify the opinion that the world is a machine. Spaceship earth and the world model correspond to a worldview of objectifying subjectivism and are snares along the way of descent from the throne of master and owner of nature. Actually the question emerges whether the objectifying reductionism of natural science - which can be detected in many notions of the ecological movement - should not also become questionable for this movement. As sensible and correct as the demand to save energy is, still the concept of energy remains reductionist and ambiguous, because it reduces the light and warmth of the sun, the waterfall in the mountain stream, the roaring of the wind, the burning of wood, and the power of the horse, reduces this whole world to kilowatt hours. Is it not noteworthy that the concept of energy comes from the way language got used in the eighteenth century and, in the historical unfolding of being in this language, is connected with Aristotelian energeia, the work-character of beings? Just as problematic as natural science's reduction of all beings in the concept of energy is, so too is the economic reduction of all beings to a monetary value problematic. Certainly the proposals for economic decentralization and for the development of a softer technology made by the British economist E. F. Schumacher (author of Small is BeautifuQ are as relevant today as ever. Certainly the provocative theses of an Ivan Illich are in many ways very pertinent. And probably an ecological economy will develop presumably in the direction of James Robertson's "alternatives worth living." But one cannot overlook the fact that an ecological accounting still reduces things to a monetary value and that many concepts of these authors are characterized by the economy of objectifying subjectivism, by a worldview of the retailers - as, for example, the concept of a "qualitative growth:::J

### \*\*\*Security 1nc\*\*\*

#### The aff’s approach to international relations is grounded in security – management of relations between states attempts to immunize the risk of spontaneous decisionmaking through hegemonic descriptions of human behavior – that crushes agency and ensures violence in the name of security itself

Mitchell ‘5,

(Andrew J., Stanford Univresity, “Heidegger and Terrorism.” Research in Phemonenology)

There can be no security. If being is what threatens then security as the absence of terror would be the absence of being. But the absence of being is precisely the threat. Obviously, security is just as little to be found in the absence of danger as it is in the consummation of the danger, total annihilation. Instead, security is to be found within the danger and threat of being. But how? Heidegger likewise provides us endangered ones with a way of thinking security and preservation. This is his fourth contribution to a thinking of terrorism. Security and assurance, both equally apt translations of the German Sicherung, are indissociable from certainty (Gewissheit) for Heidegger. In the course of the 1968 seminar in Le Thor, Heidegger provides a brief history of this relation between security and certainty: "the quest for certainty appears first in the domain of faith, as the search for the certainty of salvation (Luther), then in the domain of physics as the search for the mathematical certainty of nature (Galileo)" (VS, 30/13). Heidegger unites these two concerns for certainty within a single concept: assurance (Sicherung), "In the quest for mathematical certainty, what is sought is the assurance of ~~man~~ in nature, in the sensible, in the quest for the certainty of salvation, what is sought is the assurance of man in the supra-sensible world" (VS, 30/14).(FN22) Certainty is in the service of assurance or security and is only the epistemological aspect of a greater ontological condition of security. Security is freedom from uncertainty in all of its forms, sensible, super-sensible, and ontological. Salvation and the mathematical certainty of nature are themselves to be understood as instances of an ontological assurance against uncertainty. Ontological uncertainty would be found in conceptions of singularity, where the uniqueness of a thing renders it irreplaceable and thus opens us to the possibility of loss, or in conceptions of alterity, where the other is not anticipated and confined in advance to the strictures of categorical thought. Uncertainty in this broader sense is eliminated in security. One is securely insulated against these differences of the world. For modern thought, the securing of representations for representational thinking provided the backdrop for the arrival of certainty (see GA 7: 82; EP, 98). Modern metaphysics itself, according to Heidegger, "means the securing of the human being by itself and for itself" (GA 67: 167). Such a policy must be abandoned as the human becomes more and more a piece of the standing-reserve like everything else. This postmodern security is accomplished through bestowal and appraisal of value, "Securement, as the obtaining of security, is a grounding in valuation" (GA 5: 262/195; tm). What is valued can be replaced by something of equal value, and this fact lies at the center of our conception of security today. Securement, as a giving of value, assures us against loss by making the world replaceable. In this respect, security is nothing other than total availability, imagined as a world of utter transparency where all resources, human and otherwise, are constantly surveilled and traced through their paths of circulation. The transformation in being coincident with the end of modern warfare likewise puts an end to modern politics and establishes in its place an impersonal commitment to the furthering of planned replacement. Security is only possible when everything works according to these plans, and this requires "leaders," whose true function now becomes evident. For the plan, "the necessity of 'leadership', that is, the planned calculation of the securing of the whole of beings, is required" (GA 7: 89-90/EP, 105; tm). The demand for security is always a call for such Führers. Planning is a matter of ensuring the smooth and "frictionless" circulation of resources along channels and pipelines of order and delivery. The plan's success is assured from the outset, because beings are now in essence planable. The mathematical tracking of stock and supplies becomes a total tracking when things have become completely available. Nothing is concealed from this taking of inventory, with the effect that the mathematical model of the thing is no different from the thing itself. The mathematical modeling of things, an operation that Heidegger traces back to Ockham and the nominalist split between word and thing (see VS, 30-31/13-14), is paradigmatic for the disappearance of identifiably discrete beings under the rule of technology. The model is no longer a representation of what is modeled but, in a paradoxical manner, the thing itself. Nothing beyond the thing's mathematical model is recognized. Everything essential to the thing is contained in the model, without remainder. Such is the truth of the standing-reserve; it is a collapse of the distances that made possible representation. Without that spacing, there is only the suffocating rush of the standing-reserve along the circuitry of the plan. The plan makes manifest the self-willing nature of technology, in that the plan has no purpose other than to assure its own expansion and increase. For the plan to function, it is therefore necessary that beings be consumed and their replacements follow right upon them. The plan plans for consumption, outlining the paths and channels that the standing-reserve will occupy in its compelled obedience to order. The world wars have pointed towards this end, according to Heidegger, for "They press toward a securing of resources [Bestandsicherung] for a constant form of consumption" (GA 7: 88; EP, 103-4; tm). This consumption is synonymous with replacement, since there is nothing lost in consumption that is not immediately replaced. The plan is to protect itself from loss by completely insulating itself from uncertainty. The plan seeks "the 'all-inclusive' [restlose] securing of the ordering of order" (GA 7: 92; EP, 107; tm). Order is only secured when there is nothing that resists it, nothing that remains in "disorder." Any remainder would stand outside of the prevailing order, as would any difference, in complete disorder. There is another Nietzschean intimation in this, as Heidegger reads the will to power as a drive to secure and order all chaos. Without remainder (restlose), without rest, the standing-reserve threatens to encompass everything in a monotonous, swirling sameness. The more secure the world becomes, the greater is the abandonment of being as it is further enframed within the plan. Homeland security is thus an oxymoron, since one of the most prominent effects of planning is the elimination of national differences and "homelands." Security itself is precisely the planned elimination of differences, and as for "homeland," it is ever more difficult to conceive of a homeland that would be nationally distinct from another. This is not to be understood as a complaint against internationalism either, for "Just as the distinction between war and peace has become untenable, the distinction between 'national' and 'international' has also collapsed" (GA 7: 92; EP, 107). We have already seen that Heidegger attributes a will to the annihilation of homeland to Americanism; what needs to be added to this view is that there is not one form of government any different; each is run by leaders: The uniformity of beings arising from the emptiness of the abandonment of Being, in which it is only a matter of the calculable security of its order, an order which it subjugates to the will to will, this uniformity also conditions everywhere in advance of all national differences the uniformity of leadership [Führerschaaft], for which all forms of government are only one instrument of leadership among others. (GA 7: 93; EP, 108; tm) Government and politics are simply further means of directing ways of life according to plan; and no one, neither terrorist nor politician, should be able to alter these carefully constructed ways of life. Ways of life are themselves effects of the plan, and the predominant way of life today is that of an all-consuming Americanism. National differences fall to the wayside. The homeland, when not completely outmoded, can only appear as commodified quaintness. All governments participate in the eradication of national differences. Insofar as Americanism represents the attempt to annihilate the "homeland," then under the aegis of the abandonment of being, all governments and forms of leadership become Americanism.

#### You should prioritize ontology in your decisionmaking – enframing mandates violence because it treats humans and non-humans as resources, uprooting them from their embedded, everyday context – only a shift away from managerial thinking can re-activate the political

Burke ‘7

(Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

#### Text: the judge should vote negative to refuse an ontology of security

#### Refusal produces new forms of relationality outside of enframing, creating openness towards otherness – only difference conceived as ethical limit, rather than a problem to be resolved produces effective politics

Burke, ‘2

(Anthony, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland , Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27.1)

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available--and where they are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired--which creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing. (60) This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse what we are. (61 ) Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, it is at these levels that we can intervene. We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web. This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of rebellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." We must, he says, "observe how an individual may be able to escape the discursive order and influence its shifting boundaries.... By doing so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible." (62) Pushing beyond security requires tactics that can work at many levels--that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cultural, and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection, and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society, and the international that security seeks to imagine and police. The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity that security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Conolly, and Moira Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship that thinks difference not on the basis of the same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for a "debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics"--an encounter that involves a transformation of the self rather than the other. (63) Thus while the sweep and power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order, and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on "ourselves"--a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. It would be to ask if there is a world after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be.

### 2nc Link/FW – Security

#### Security practices reduce life to standing-reserve, revealing and enframing humans as units of risk – the aff’s performance of impact calculation is an attempt to eliminate the anxiety of decision-making and citizen-engagement, producing the fiction of certainty while steamrolling other forms of everyday relationality

#### Their FW steamrolls the question “why are we doing this?” by overdetermining “how” we do it, reducing politics to questions of efficiency – only transformations in thinking can produce debaters as citizens capable of opening themselves to each other and engaging in dialogic discussion

Amoore & de Goede 8

(Marieke, Senior Lecturer in the Department of European Studies at the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands-Louise, Lecturer in Political Geography in the Department of Geography at Durham University, UK, “Managing the War on Terror” , Risk and War on Terror Pgs 12-13)

The paradigm of governing enabled in the risk society depends upon what a number of authors have called neoliberal governmentality (Dean 1999; Larner and Walters 2004; O’Malley 2004; Simon 2007a). As summarized by Deborah Lupton (2006: 14), this paradigm holds that ‘‘more and more risk avoiding practices are required of the ‘good citizen.’ Risk avoidance has become a moral enterprise relating to issues of self-control, self-knowledge and self-improvement.’’ Understanding risk as a practice of governmentality, clearly, is indebted to Foucault’s conceptualizations of modern power as operating through the self-governing and self-assessing capacities of citizen/ subjects (Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991; Foucault 1991). ‘‘Marked by a diffuse set of strategies and tactics’’, Butler explains (2004: 52), ‘‘governmentality gains its meaning and purpose from no single source, no uniﬁed sovereign subject. Rather, the tactics characteristic of governmentality operate diffusely, to dispose and order populations, and to produce and reproduce subjects, and their beliefs.’’ In the war on terror, such individual responsibility for risk avoidance has manifested itself in national programs that encourage citizens to be ready for disaster, by, for example, keeping emergency kits, being aware of catastrophe risks and taking everyday precautions like not opening post that has no return address. As Ericson (2007: 63) writes of such programs: ‘‘the citizen must be ready for the malicious demon of terrorism in all places at all times’’ (see also Hay and Andrejevic 2006). Such ‘‘readiness’’ may also entail monitoring for ‘‘suspicion’’ throughout routine, everyday activity, such as shopping, traveling and driving. Citizens are encouraged to engage ‘‘vigilant visualities’’ in their daily lives, looking out for the ‘‘out of the ordinary’’ and reporting unusual sightings to ‘‘anti-terror hotlines’’ (Amoore 2006, 2007a). At the same time, however, the deployment of risk in the war on terror does not ﬁt seamlessly into a paradigm of neoliberal governmentality. The politics of preemption diffuses and defers responsibility for catastrophe, and at 12 Louise Amoore and Marieke de Goedeleast partly legitimates a return of collective ‘‘risk management’’ or indeed preemptive intervention by state institutions. For James Hay and Mark Andrejevic (2006: 335), homeland security is the new ‘‘social security,’’ whereby sovereignty rules through ‘‘strategies of security,’’ while simultaneously rendering citizens individually accountable. We have seen that Steinhardt worries about unlimited new government access to personal data in the name of terrorism risk monitoring. Others point to the preemptive strike in Iraq and signal the strengthening of borders against transnational ﬂows of goods, money and people (Andreas and Snyder 2000). A burgeoning literature on the return of imperialism discusses and analyzes such interventions as a manifestation of the return of (state) sovereignty in the post-9/11 era (Andreas and Biersteker 2003; Harvey 2003). This literature, however, fails to take into account adequately the ways in which risk technologies, private expertise and commercial datasets play an unprecedented role in contemporary security interventions.

### 2nc Impact Calc

#### **The aff produces intertwined lines of domination – their desire to preserve human life requires an answer to the question “who or what is humanity?” – framing this question in terms of risk creates humanity as contingent and changing, represented as probability – each new attempt to save humanity thus produces new forms of dangerousness, creating a cyclical process of violence that ends in extinction**

Dillon and Reid ‘9,

(Michael, Prof. of IR @ Lancaster University, Julian, Lecturer in IR @ King’s College London, The Liberal Way of War: Killing to make life live, pgs. 30-33)

One way of expressing the core problematic that we pursue in this book is, therefore in the form of a question posed back to Paine on account of that definitive claim. What happens to the liberal way of rule and its allied way of war when liberalism goes global in pursuit of the task of emancipating the species from way, by taking the biohuman as its referent object of both rule and way? What happens to war, we ask, when a new form of governmental regime emerges which attempts to make war in defense and promotion of the entire species as opposed to using war in service of the supposedly limited interests of sovereigns? For the liberal project of the removal of species life from the domain of human enmity never in practice entailed an end to war, or to the persistence of threats requiring war. Paine makes this clear in his original formulation. Under liberal regimes, Paine observes, war will still be defined by relations between the human and its enemies. The enemies of the human will simply no longer be ‘its species’ (Paine 1995: 595). What that meant, in practice, was that the liberal way of rule had to decide what elements, and what expressions, of human life best served the promotion of the species. Those that did not were precisely those that most threatened it; those upon which it was called to wage war. Deciding on what elements and expression of the human both serve and threaten is the definitive operation by which liberalism constitutes its referent object of war and rule: that of the biohuman. Whatever resists the constitution of the biohuman is hostile and dangerous to it, even if it arises within the species itself. Indeed, as we shall show, since life is now widely defined in terms of continuous emergence and becoming, it is a continuous becoming-dangerous to itself. The locus of threat and danger under the liberal way of rule and war progressively moves into the very morphogenic composition and re-composablity of living systems and of living material. The greatest source of threat to life becomes life. It is very important to emphasize that this discourse of danger is precisely that which commonly arises in the political anthropologies of human cupidity of early modern political theory going back classically, for example, to Hobbes and Locke, which was nonetheless still formulated in a context still circumscribed by the infinity of divine providence, however obscure this was becoming, and however much this obscurity helped fuel the crisis of their times. The analytics of finitude, rather than the analytics of redemption, circumscribe late modern discourses of governance and danger now, instead. Biology, one might therefore also say, itself arose as a science of finitude; of the play of species life and death outwith the play of human life and redemption. The same might very well be said for modern ‘political science’. Biology does not, of course, recognize cupidity. Cupidity arises in a different, anthro-political, order of things. These days, especially, biology recognizes only the dynamics of complex adaptive evolutionary emergence and change of living systems, whose very laws of formation it increasingly understands in informational terms. These additionally, empower it to re-compose living material according to design rather than nature in order to rectify the infelicities of nature, rather than merely negating existing nature. Pre-emption here is not negative, it is positive. It is not precaution, so much as creative production. The discourse of danger being elaborated throughout the liberal way of rule and war, in the age of life as information, is therefore related to the possibility that complex adaptive emergence and change can go acerbic The possibility of catastrophe lies, immanently, in the very dynamics of the life process itself. Neither is this a discourse of danger which revolves around traditional othering practices alone, however pervasive and persistent these politically toxic devises remain. This is a discourse of danger which hyperbolicizes fear in relation to the radically contingent outcomes upon which they very liveliness of life itself is now said to depend. Biohumanity- itself an expression of the attempt to give concrete form to finitude politically- is therefore both threat and promise. The corollary is therefore also clear: enemies of the species must be cast out from the species as such. ‘Just war’ in the cause of humanity here- a constant liberal trope (Douzinas 2003)- takes a novel turn when the humanity at issue is biohumanity. For just war has constantly to be waged for biohumanity against the continuous becoming-dangerous of life itself; and less in the form of the Machiavellian or Hobbesian *Homo Iupus* than in the form of continuously emergent being, something which also prompts the thought that Foucault’s analytics of finitude might itself have to be revised to take account of the infinity of becoming which now also characterizes the contemporary ontology of the life sciences. Since the object is to preserve and promote the biohuman, and such war to end war becomes war without end; this turning Walzer’s arguments concerning the justification of liberal war inside out (Walzer 200: 329-35). The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and unending process. In a way, as a matter of its biopolitical logic, there is a little particularly startling about this claim Immanent in the biopoliticization of liberal rule, it is only a matter of where, when and how it finds expression. As the very composition and dynamics of species life become the locus of the threat to species life, so properties of species life offer themselves in the form of a new kind of promise: war may be removed from the species should those properties be attended to differently. Consider for example, Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History’: if he lives among others of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master… he requires a master to break his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid willl under which everyone can be free. But where is he to find such a master? *Nowhere else but in the human species.* (Kant 2005: 46; emphasis added) ‘Nowhere else but in the human species.’ Here Kant, too, discloses the circumscription of his reflections by the analytics of finitude. Put simply, liberalism’s strategic calculus of necessary killing has, then, to be furnished by the laws and dynamics, the exigencies and contingencies, derived from the properties of the biohuman itself. Making life live becomes the criterion against which the liberal way of rule and war must seek to say how much killing is enough. In a massive, quite literally terrifying, paradox, however, since the biohuman is the threat it cannot, itself, adjudicate how much self-immolation would be enough to secure itself against itself without destroying itself. However much the terror of the liberal way of rule and war currently revolves around the ‘figure’ of Al-Qaeda, the very *dispositif* of terror which increasingly circumscribes the life of the biohuman at the beginning of the twenty-first century is the fear induced by its very own account of life. No specific manner or form is proper, then, to the biohuman other than this: its being continuously at work instrumentally reassigning itself in order, it is said, to survive, but in fact to secure itself against its own vital processes. Within the compass of this biopolitical imaginary of species existence, the biohuman becomes the living being to whom all manner of self-securing work must be assigned. The task thus posed through the liberal way of rule and war by its referent object of rule and war- the biohuman- is not longer that, classically, of assigning the human its proper nature with a view of respecting it. The proper nature of the biohuman has become the infinite re-assignability of the very pluripotency of which it is now said to be compromised, against the threat of that very pluripotency itself. This is the strategic goal of the liberal way of war because it has become the strategic goal of the liberal way of rule. From the analytics of finitude, politically, has thus arisen an infinity of securitization and fear.

### Security/Terror Link

#### Security and the war on terror reduce the world to standing reserve – the aff’s impact claims are perfomances of risk that flatten both the threat of death and the singularity of individuals, reducing them to units of risk that can be manipulated as insurance – produces new lines of domination

Amoore & de Goede ‘8

(Marieke, Senior Lecturer in the Department of European Studies at the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands-Louise, Lecturer in Political Geography in the Department of Geography at Durham University, UK, “Managing the War on Terror”, Risk and War on Terror Pgs 8-10)

The central question for risk society, as Ulrich Beck sees it, is ‘‘how to feign control over the uncontrollable’’ (2002: 4). Although this book departs substantially from Beck’s thesis, for us it is precisely this feigning of control that has dominated the rise in risk discourses in the war on terror. Risk in this sense is categorically not about reducing risk, achieving control, or even about ensuring safety or security – what matters instead is that the appearance of securability and manageability is sustained. We do not see the signiﬁcance of the idea of risk within the war on terror, then, residing in life ‘‘in a world risk society,’’ in which potentially catastrophic and uninsurable risks proliferate (Beck 1999: 4; see also Beck 1992, 2000). Instead, following a growing critical body of scholarship on the discourses and practices of risk, risk is a construction, a ‘‘way in which we govern and are governed’’ (Adam and van Loon 2000: 2; O’Malley 2000: 458). As these critical risk studies remind us, risk cannot be isolated as a tangible entity or event, for it is performative – it produces the effects that it names (Butler 1990, 1993). It is not strictly the case that observable new risks have come into being, but that society has come to understand itself and its problems in terms of risk management (Ewald 1991). To consider risk as the dominant technology of the war on terror, then, is to engage with the practices that are enacted in the name of managing risk and uncertainty (Amoore 2004; O’Malley 2004; de Goede 2005). The proliferation of risk techniques in the war on terror, then, is essentially about a particular mode of governing – a means of making an uncertain and unknowable future amenable to intervention and management. Despite a growing focus on new articulations of risk governance across the academy, however, there has largely been silence on the speciﬁcs of risk as a practice of governing in the war on terror (but see Rasmussen 2004; Spence 2005; Ericson 2007). Yet, what we see happening here has fundamental implications for how we think about risk and how we theorize security. The practices that are discussed in this book differentiate ever more ﬁnite categories of risk across diverse spheres, deﬁning new and mobile exceptions, exclusions and special zones. As Mariana Valverde and Michael Mopas argue, practices of ‘‘targeted governance’’ shift the arts of government from discipline to risk, where ‘‘discipline governs individuals individually, risk management, by contrast, breaks the individual up into a set of measurable risk factors.’’ These means of governing by risk, then, permit the mobile drawing of lines within and between individuals, with knowledge data giving the impression of a ‘‘smart, speciﬁc, side-effects-free, information driven utopia of governance’’ (Valverde and Mopas 2004: 239). Perhaps the most signiﬁcant aspect of the techno-expert deployment of risk in the war on terror is what Michael Levi and David Wall call dataveillance or ‘‘the proactive surveillance of what effectively become suspect populations, using new technologies to identify risky groups’’ (2004: 200). The war on terror involves the classiﬁcation, compilation and analysis of data – on airline passenger manifests, ﬁnancial transactions or social security information, for example – on an unprecedented scale (Salter 2004; Amoore and de Goede 2005; Sparke 2006). These techniques rely heavily on Introduction 9sophisticated computer technology and mathematical modeling to mine data and map ‘‘normal’’ patterns of behavior so that deviations can be singled out and targeted. For contemporary geopolitics, such techniques have important implications: in what ways are practices of knowledge and intelligence changing post 9/11? How are particular patterns of behavior designated as the ‘‘norm?’’ In what ways do commercial applications such as frequent ﬂier schemes and ﬁnancial instruments become useful to the construction of the ‘‘risky’’ or ‘‘at risk’’ body? What are the political implications of using privately collected data for the purposes of public governance and law enforcement? What counts as evidence in extra-legal judgments made in advance of the event?

### Security/Terror Epistemology DA

#### **Security and the war on terror are self-fulfilling prophecies – their worst case scenario planning prioritizes worst case scenarios, overblowing the need and proportion of response – that causes pre-emptive violence and turns the case**

Amoore & de Goede 8

(Marieke, Senior Lecturer in the Department of European Studies at the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands-Louise, Lecturer in Political Geography in the Department of Geography at Durham University, UK, “Managing the War on Terror” , Risk and War on Terror Pgs 11)

In a system such as ATS, then, we ﬁnd precisely the modes of risk management that foster new and imaginative ways of dealing with uncertainty, amounting to an intensiﬁcation of the search for anticipatory decisionmaking across all domains of social life. As Aradau and van Munster discuss in this volume, and following Foucault’s insights, the deployment of risk in the war on terror is to be understood through the dispositif of Precaution: in which a desire for zero risk joins a vision of worst case scenarios in order to enable preemptive action against perceived terrorist threats. Terrorism, in other words, is understood to be ‘‘a risk beyond risk, of which we do not have, nor cannot have, the knowledge or the measure’’ (Ewald 2002: 294, emphasis added). If no longer based on the appearance of science and calculation, what then provides the basis for security decisions in a politics of preemption? Precautionary risk practices exceed the logic of (statistical) calculability and involve, instead, imaginative or ‘‘visionary’’ techniques such as stress testing, scenario planning and disaster rehearsal (O’Malley 2004: 5). Such imaginative new ways of dealing with uncertainty continue to deploy the language of risk, while outstripping, in practice, established technologies of risk calculation. Certainly, there is historical precedent of the incorporation of various uncertainties into risk governing practices. Bougen’s (2003) analysis of the new governability and proﬁtability of catastrophe risk (including earthquakes, hurricanes, strikes and terrorism) is one relevant example. Bougen (2003: 258) notes that rendering catastrophe insurable involves the deployment of techniques with ‘‘a particularly fragile connection to statistical technologies’’ that are perhaps better understood as ‘‘a special kind of alchemy’’ (cf. O’Malley 2002).

### Hegemony Link

#### Hegemony is grounded in a drive towards global management and security – their politics elevates American institutions to the universal end-goal of history, producing massive violence

Spanos ‘00

(William V., Prof. of Comparative Lit @ Suny-Binghamton, America’s Shadow, pgs. xvii-xviii)

This accommodational strategy of representation, for example, is epitomized by Richard Haass, a former official in the Bush adminis- tration and now director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, in his book The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War (1997).4 Eschewing Fukuyama's Hegelian eschatologi- cal structure in favor of theorizing the actual practices of the United States in the international sphere — Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Iraq, and so forth — Haass frames the post-Cold War conjuncture in the totalizing image of a "deregulated world" (in contrast to the world "regulated" by the Cold War scenario) and the role of the United States in the trope of a sheriff leading posses (the appropriate members of the United Nations) to quell threats to global stability and peace posed by this international deregulation. Despite Haass's acknowledgment that conflict is inevitable (which, in fact, echoes Fukuyama), the triumphant idea of liberal capi- talist democracy remains intact in his discourse. That is, his commitment to the "laissez-faire" polity (deregulation) — to the fictional concept of the sovereign subject — continues to be grounded in the metaphysics that informed America's global errand in the "wilderness" of Southeast Asia. Indeed, Haass gives this representational framework far more his- torical power than Fukuyama's disciplinary discourse of political science is able to muster. For, unlike the Fukuyamans, Haass informs his repre- sentation of the United States's historically determined and determining exceptionalist mission in the post-Cold War era with the teleological metaphorics that have been from the beginning fundamental to the con- stitution and power of the American globally oriented national identity. The metaphor of the sheriff/posse derives from the history of the Amer- ican West and constitutes a variation of the pacification processes of westward expansion. As such it brings with it the entire baggage of the teleological metanarrative of the American frontier from the Puri- tans' "errand in the ['New World'] wilderness" to the myth of Manifest Destiny. As the "New Americanist" countermemory has persuasively shown, this is the myth that has saturated the cultural discourse of America, both high and low, since its origins: whether in the form of the American jeremiad, which, from the Puritans through Daniel Webster to Ronald Reagan, has always functioned to maintain the national con- sensus vis-a-vis its providentially ordained mission to domesticate (and dominate) what is beyond the frontier5 or in the form of the Hollywood western, which has functioned to naturalize what one New American- ist has called the American "victory culture."6 Reconstellated into this context, Haass's more "realistic" analysis of the post-Cold War oc- casion comes to be seen not simply as continuous with Fukuyama's, but as a more effective imperial global strategy. The utter immunity to criticism of the Clinton administration's "humanitarian" war against Serbia in the spring of 1999 — which perfectly enacted the Haassian scenario — bears witness to this. In the following chapters of this book I will, by and large, refer to Fukuyama's version of the post-Cold War American end-of-history discourse. But I wish to make it clear at the beginning that, in doing so, I am referring not to a particular theory, but to a fundamental American tradition whose theorization extends from de Tocqueville through Frederick Jackson Turner to Fukuyama and Haass.

### Metaphysics Bad Impact

#### **Metaphysical management produces endless violence – requires eradication of difference as it pushes towards its historical end-point**

Spanos ‘5,

(William V., Prof. of Comp. Lit. @ NYU-Binghamton, Humanism and the Studia Humanitatis After 9/11/01, *symploke* vol.13 Nos. 1-2, pgs. 219-262)

In 1991, following the disintegration and demise of the Soviet Union and its empire, Francis Fukuyama published an essay (later expanded to book length) which announced “the end of history” and the advent of a “new [global] world order” under the aegis of American liberal capitalist democracy.4 This annunciation was justified by appealing not to history but to History, that is, to a Hegelian/Kojèvian ontology which assumes that history is characterized by a directional dialectic process that, in the end, precipitates a world in which historical contradictions have been sublimated into a harmonious and conflict free totality. To arrive at this Quixotically optimistic and brutally reductive—world picture, Fukuyama, as Derrida and others have shown,5 was compelled by the binarist logic of this metaphysical ontology, this representation of history from after or above its disseminations (meta ta physika)—to overlook and discount the volatility that has characterized modern history, and, more important, the violence that the West, not least America, has perpetrated to produce this global volatility. I am not simply referring to the sustained practice of Western imperialism vis a vis its “Other” that began in the heady age of exploration. This was the predatory history that bore witness to the virtual extinction of the natives of North and South America, the African slave trade, the ruthless colonization and exploitation of the Middle East and India, and the destabilization of China and Japan, and, in its culminating phase, to the wholesale slaughter of World War I and, following World War II, to the carnage of the “small” hot wars of the Cold War, not least the one undertaken by the United States in Southeast Asia, in the name of “saving” it for “the free world,” a “hot war” during which approximately two million Vietnamese were killed, their land destroyed by bombs and chemicals, their rice culture shattered, and their organic community reduced to a society of refugees. I am also referring to the modern Western interpretation of being, which was simultaneous and indissolubly complicitous with this devastating global imperial practice: specifically, its supplanting of the Word of the Christian God (the theo- logos) by the Word of Man—the anthropologos—as the measure of all things, spatial and temporal, and the mode of inquiry and learning endemic to this apotheosis of Man which came to be called humanist studies, Studia Humanitatis.

### AT Realism

#### The conflation of natural and human sciences in the form of realism results in genocide

Burke, 7

(Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, *Theory and Event*, 10.2, Muse)

We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said: ..envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62 This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty -- the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge. As Kissinger's claims about the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65 Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics, which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb. Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy.66 Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the advancement of empirical science: anyone making this comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man'.68 We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate, and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam: For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his bread...69 There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70 And what would be mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation.

#### Inevitability claims deny the will and create a ahistorical politics that become SELF-Propelling—this arbitrary moment of rejection is CRUCIAL to reclaiming ethics and the political

Brincat, 2k9

(Shannon, U of Queensland, “Reclaiming the Utopian imaginary in IR theory”, *Review of International Studies (2009), 35, 581-609*)

Mannheim does not, of course, explicitly implicate realism as part of the dominant ideology as his work was not concerned with the field of IR theory specifically. However, by showing that those forms of thought that support thestatus quo and which tend to denigrate as ‘utopian’ any ideas that seek to alter it are ‘ideologies’, the logical inference can be drawn that realism constitutes such an ‘ideology’ within Mannheim’s typology – a position which the arguments of Cox, Ashley and others in the Third Great Debate support.40 For Mannheim, what is touted as ‘utopian’ is that which is judged so by those ‘representatives of the given order’ and whether they consider the idea to be unrealisable.41 So while ideology and utopia are both clearly incongruous with reality, the point to take from Mannheim is that it is the representatives of the given order who serve the privileged function of determining what is considered utopian and ipso facto possible or impossible in world politics. We can see part of this role being assumed subsequently by specific realist and neo-realist theorists in the discipline – the aptly named ‘doorkeepers’ to borrow from Blieker42 – who alone determine what approaches are to be labelled as utopian in the pejorative sense, to be thus excluded from the agenda of IR ‘proper’. Mannheim clearly warned us of the dangers of the dominance of ideologies. For him, such domination would mean the complete disappearance of all ‘reality transcending doctrines’ from political study and ultimately lead to a ‘matter-offactness’, a ‘decay of the human will’ and a ‘static state of affairs’. The paradox would result that while humanity would have achieved a high degree of ‘rational mastery’ in the world, it would be left without any ideals or the will to ‘shape history’.43 Nevertheless, Mannheim held out hope for the capacity of humanity to become aware of ‘the necessity of wilfully choosing our course’ and emphasised the need for ‘an imperative (a utopia) to drive us onward.’ For him, it is only when we know what our ‘interests’ are and make a transition towards them, that we are in a position to inquire into ‘the possibilities of the present situation, and thus to gain our first insight into history’.44

### \*\*\*Mechanics\*\*\*

### Ontology 1st

#### Ontology grounds knowledge practices and shapes the direction of politics – only interrogating thinking can open the individual towards otherness

Burke, 7

(Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, *Theory and Event*, 10.2, Muse)

What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22 The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the wpath of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made.

### AT Permutation

#### **Perm still links – (A) Method 1st – severing the ontology underpinning the 1ac links to all of our framework impacts and collapses education**

#### (B) Action – only doing nothing and resisting the guilty and egoistic urge to manage the earth can produce a shift in our modes of thinking and relationality – means the perm still links

#### Sequencing DA – only first displacing managerial thought avoids enframing, combining the two methods ignores the hegemonic status of metaphysics and levels the playing field too early to produce change

Spanos ‘00

(William V., Prof. of Comparative Lit @ Suny-Binghamton, America’s Shadow, pgs. xxii-xxiii)

Pressed to the extreme, as it is by most of these critics, the complaint against Said's "homogenizing and totalizing" representation of Orientalism has resulted in a disabling irony. In overdetermining the historical exceptions that resist Said's "metanarrative" (I put quotation marks around the term to suggest that he, unlike his critics, understands his representation as a forestructure), this argument reinscribes the liberal humanist problematic, which assumes that the terms of the agon between the Occident and the Orient have the same weight and thus can be "negotiated" in a parliamentary arena. Which is to say, they are dehistoricized, dislocated into a transcendental realm. Power in this historical world, however, is always uneven, always, that is, a matter of injustice. In the case of the provenance of Said's book, the Orient he would retrieve against the dominant Orientalist discourse was, patently, virtually powerless to effect a radical change in the Occident's colonialist representation of the Orient, to say nothing of the imperial practices it enables. In the case of my intervention, the idea of the West I am trying to put back into play — that its imperial origins lie in the Roman reduction of an originative thinking (a-letheia) to a derivative and calculative (metaphysical) thinking that would facilitate its imperial project — is also virtually powerless to displace the prevailing assumptions about the origins of the identity of the West. To overdetermine the exceptions to this rule, therefore, would be tantamount to accepting the pluralist terms of the very truth discourse I am interrogating. This is not to say that there are no exceptions or that the exceptions are irrelevant. It is to say, rather, that it is first necessary to emphasize the strategic tendentiousness of the dominant discourse's representational practices — the inordinate degree to which its underlying ontological principle has selected the historical evidence in order to legitimate itself — before addressing these exceptions. Said's Orientalism, largely because of its "monolithically imposed" metanarrative, has instigated a massive, various, and productive field of study called "postcolonialism." I do not presume as much. But precisely by proffering the "monolithic" character of the Western representation of being as a forestructure to guide my inquiry, I think my study should, however modestly, contribute to a deeper, if not different, understanding of the anatomy of the global politics of the post-Cold War occasion than those oppositional discourses that overlook or consciously avoid its ontological ground in favor of more "practical" or "political" sites of interrogation. And, by way of attending to the exceptions that the Western imperial project has not been able to accommodate, it should also contribute something useful to the vexed problem of resisting its apparently irresistible power.

### AT Cede the Political/Ontology Kills Politics

#### **The aff cedes the ontological – failure to prioritize re-thinking thinking leaves politics within a history of imperial violence, only directly engaging the structure of thought can create a new basis for politics**

Marzec ‘1,

(Robert, Teaches Postcolonial Studies @ State U of New York @ Fredonia, An Anatomy of Empire, symploke 9.1-2 (2001) 165-168, muse)

Retrieving crucial foundational shifts in history that determine the order of existence in our present marks the first aspect of this archival study of empire, or, to use Spanos's term, "anatomy." The second involves the interrogation of not only accepted discourses, but cutting-edge movements of critical thought as well, an aspect of scholarship that good cautious scholars take as a principal charge. In the work of Edward Said, for instance, Spanos traces a movement of thought that inadvertently leads to a major oversight in the field of postcolonial criticism empowered by Said's insights. Fleshing out the influence of colonization along the full continuum of being, Spanos throws into relief the repercussions of Said's emphasis on geopolitical imperialism and subsequent failure to give full weight to the ontological origins of occidental imperialism. This gesture enables Spanos to reveal the extent to which the relay of imperial ideologies is enabled by a centuries-long colonization of the notion of "truth" itself, a colonization governed by a logic of mastery that stems from Imperial Rome and that "derives from thinking being meta-ta-physica ["above," "beyond," or "outside" things in contextual, temporal flux]." Similarly, Spanos finds it highly disabling that critics have come to take Foucault's emphasis on the period of the Enlightenment as evidence for concluding this moment in history to be a "mutation" in thinking resulting in Western Imperialism proper." Consequently, postcolonial theory in general heedlessly contributes to a failure to consider the full jurisdiction of imperialism. The widespread impulse to emphasize the period of the Enlightenment as if it were the cradle of true imperial practices is symptomatic of the very disciplinarity that Foucault calls into question. This reconfiguration of critical thought enables Spanos to "unconceal" the ontological force of American contemporary imperialism, and to resituate the war in Vietnam as an event that reveals the violent metaphysical imperative of "mastering" informing the idea of America. In constructing his counter-memory archive, Spanos finds the origins of this impulse to master reality in the Roman transformation of Greek thinking. The early Greek thinking of being as temporal and groundless (notable in philosophers such as Parmenides and Anaxemander) undergoes a hardening process that results in the colonization of lived events for purposes of intellectual manipulation: the Greek logos as legein (words) is transformed into Logos as Ratio (the Word of Reason); the agonistic Greek [End Page 166] understanding of truth as a-letheia is annulled in favor of the Roman circumscription of truth as correctness (veritas). More than a challenge to accepted periodizations of imperialism, Spanos's compelling insight here shows how colonization begins at the site of thought itself, that it has been a way of thinking holding dominion for far longer than commonly considered. Thinking, he reveals, has come to be governed by an impulse to reify being as a thoroughly controlled spatial image, "a 'field' or 'region' or 'domain' to be comprehended, mastered, and exploited" (191). This change naturalizes and universalizes an instrumentalism that transforms the "uncalculability of being" into a utility, into a "world picture" that can be grasped in a technological age that conceals the nothing at the heart of the social order for purposes of reducing being to a disposable commodity. Consequently, the instability and the antagonism offered by the heterogeneity disseminated by the movement of temporality is re-presented as a problem to be surmounted and eventually "solved" with the imposition of "a final and determinate solution" (191). The power of this triumph of instrumentalist thinking lies in its ability to throw all foundational inquiry into oblivion. In its ubiquity, this instrumentality affects the very people attempting to offer opposition to the dominant order, for within the problematic of contemporary criticism, one is either characterized as engaging in a form of "high theory" that uses a language that fails to speak to the world at large, or one resists by taking "real political action." Thus, ontological analyses are doubly ostracized. This constitutes an incredible handicap to oppositional thinking in the post-Cold War era. Spanos writes: [F]or an opposition that limits resistance to the political, means a time of defeat. But for the oppositional thinker who is attuned to the ontological exile to which he/she has been condemned by the global triumph of technological thinking it also means the recognition that this exilic condition of silence constitutes an irresolvable contradiction in the "Truth" of instrumental thinking --the "shadow" that haunts its light--that demands to be thought. In the interregnum, the primary task of the margin-alized intellectual is the re-thinking of thinking itself . . [I]t is the event of the Vietnam War--and the dominant American culture's inordinate will to forget it--that provides the directives for this most difficult of tasks not impossible. (193) This "silencing" of an ontological engagement--what Heidegger referred to as "the forgetting of being"--parallels the silence surrounding the event of Vietnam on the part of American media and the intellectual deputies of the dominant Cold-War culture. If represented at all in the dominant American imaginary, the war appears as an embarrassment, a failure on the part of America to maintain its exceptionalist national self-image that has been part of the character of American identity as far back [End Page 167] as the Puritan "errand in the wildnerness." This prevailing view of Vietnam--made manifest most explicitly when President George Bush announced that the American people had "kicked the Vietnam syndrome" by "winning" the Gulf War--is part and parcel of the reigning philosophical view of the American order: the Hegelian-informed view that we have reached the "end of history" with the form of democracy known as "free-market" capitalism (an economy of ordering that not only governs Western nation-states, but seeks to rule "Third World" cultures as well). Having "reached the end" implies that one has solved and mastered the contradictions hindering the socio-political domain, that one "stands above" the fray and movement of difference. It is at this point that we come to see Spanos's most significant contribution to critical inquiry. His building of a counter-memory archive, through the refusal to separate the ontological from the sociopolitical, enables him to reveal the full reign and power of an American exceptionalism that presents itself as benign. The power of this current order of reality lies in its ability to separate the many "sites" that constitute the continuum of being. By presenting Vietnam, free-market democracy, Puritanism, the Hegelian "end of history," and the Roman transformation of Greek thinking as unrelated, the order disables the critical thinker from "unconcealing" the depth of its control. This disciplined split--the logic of the "interregnum"--continues to consume and disable the full potential of resistance. The split afflicts the most formidable thinkers, even Spanos's own intellectual master guides, Heidegger (who's emphasis on ontology overlooks the socio-political) and Foucault (who's primary focus on the socio-political register generates its own blindness to the power of ontological domination). Questioning this logic of the interregnum demands what one would hope scholarly research to always offer as a matter of course--a reconsideration of the ways in which we think in the present. This requires that the scholar who wishes to rub against the imperatives of the interregnum rethink the very movement of thought. In that rethinking we must confront without apology the increasing rapaciousness of not only the self-congratulatory nature of American rhetoric, but the growing, insidious neo-imperial movement of transnational corporations that have come to extend the logic of mastery beyond national borders. As such, living in the interregnum presents the critical scholar with a singular intellectual burden--one, according to Spanos, "most difficult but not impossible."

#### The alternative does not preclude politics – it revolutionizes activism and coalition building, allowing politics to tailor itself to context, rather than grounding itself in enframing

Joronen ‘10

(Mikko, Dept of Geography and Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, U of Turku, The Age of Planetary Space: On Heidegger, Being, and Metaphysics of Globalization, pg 223)

In spite of the revolutionary sense of ‘power-free-letting-be’, our role as the ones who let being to make its transformation poses number of questions concerning our part in this radical turning from the ontological violence to the other beginning of abyssal being. What is exactly our relation to the finitude of being? Should we only wait for the end of the prevailing mode of being and thus hope a new sending of being? At least Heidegger’s comment in his posthumously published Der Spiegel interview about “only god” (i.e. a new sending of being) being capable of “saving us” seems to imply this, apparently leaving little room for human activism (Heidegger 1976:107; see also Schatzki 2007:32). Hence, is our part just to question the prevailing unfolding and so to wait for the new sending, the other beginning, the new arrival of being? First of all, it is crucial to recognize that waiting for the world-historical turning is not inactivity but a revolution that turns power-free thinking into praxis. It is a non-violent revolution, which can take many forms of activism such as disobedience and protests. In fact, Fred Dallmayr even compares this praxis of non-violent resistance with the paths of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. (2001:267). Altogether, as Malpas writes, there is no reason why the world-historical turning of being cannot be waited through political activism, as long as such activism avoids being taken up by a machinational mode of unfolding and thus remains non-violent and aware of its limitedness and finitude (Malpas 2006:300; see also Irwin 2008:170, 188–189)

### AT Util Good

#### **Util causes error replication and violence – it frames politics solely in terms of efficiency and erases questions of goal orientation, reproducing management and strategy as ends in themselves**

Burke 5

(Anthony, Politics and IR—University of New South Wales, Iraq: Strategy's burnt offering', Global Change, Peace & Security, 17:2, 191 – 213]

Yet Hannah Arendt, in The Human Condition, had already sounded a warning - pointing to the emptiness of a utilitarianism that gets caught in an 'unending chain of means and ends' in which 'all ends are bound to be of short duration and to be transformed into means for some further ends'.[116](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a713997285&fulltext=713240928" \l "FN0116" \t "_blank) This perfectly describes the rolling disaster of the United States' policy towards Iraq, from the time the Reagan administration decided to make of Saddam a 'strategic asset', then sought his removal through a decade of failed and ever more destructive policy, until only the invasion and occupation of the country could seemingly achieve US goals. It perfectly describes the geopolitical panic and ambition of the Bush neoconservatives, who have sought to build one illusory strategic 'victory' on another (Afghanistan, Iraq, then) without consideration of what counts as victory, its manifest failures and its unbearable human, economic and political costs. Strategy, seeking one proliferating end after another, becomes an end in itself and the ultimate, narcissistic source of meaning. To use Arendt's words, it 'defies questioning about its own use utility established as meaning generates meaninglessness'

### AT FW

#### Framework enframes debate such that its values are coopted by technology—this produces MORE unpredictability when confronted with its inherent ontological finitude

Joronen, 2k10

(Mikko, Dept of Geography and Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, U of Turku, The Age of Planetary Space: On Heidegger, Being, and Metaphysics of Globalization, pg 183-84)

It is interesting that, even though the intensification of planetary development took place centuries later, already this sort of ordering involved a certain possibility for a disappearance of space: distance itself becomes something entirely caught up by the functions of calculations (Malpas 2006:295). In other words, the spatial consequence of the ‘world’ changing into a modern ‘world picture’, into a set of representable and calculable images produced as a one coherent panoptic system under the axioms of selfcertain subject, is the starting point for a growing loss of the distance. Such calculable moulding, as already mentioned, does not just make once unsurmountable distances to disappear; it equally destroys the nearness of things, their site of unfolding. When all things are positioned into calculable Framework and thus replaced by images and representations of ‘ground plan’, the sense about their original sites of gathering is totally lost. Such drive towards total calculation and ordering of things hence constitutes an essential homelessness incapable of conceiving the finite happening of be-ing, its Appropriation from the open abyss. In the face of the technological drive the abyssal realm of be-ing is necessarily conceived as “irrational” and the finitude as “superable”, because finitude and open abyssality always escape the drive of total control and transparency of technological rationality. However, it is precisely by concealing its own lack of total possession that technological revealing conceals those limits that define its functioning: the total ordering of things as producible resources set ready under calculative orderings. As the last two sub-sections have shown, calculative casting of things (and their spatial relatedness) is constitutive for the rise of the modern understanding of being, which in spite of its crucial differences to early Greek and Medieval intelligibilities, was fundamental prepared and enabled by these earlier developments. However, before drawing together the basic dispositions of such change, the following sub-section further explicates the spatial characteristics of the rise of such calculative ordering of things.

### AT Tech Good

#### Technological thought is not use of technology – it’s a question of viewing the earth as a mechanistic system and unthinkingly adopting models of behavior – our alt incorporates use of technology productively by allowing it to disclose itself to us in our everyday practices

#### Their obsession with technology creates a closure towards the earth that ends in violence and destruction – even new innovation can’t resolve the effects of their arrogance

Zimmerman ‘08

Mark Zimmerman, Aug 16th 2008 (student of Rav Michael Laitman, PhD and English content editor for the Ashlag Research Institute and the [Bnei Baruch Kabbalah Education and Research Institute](http://www.kabbalah.info), and editor for the monthly *Kabbalah Today* publication.“Transhumanism's Cause and Alternative” http://kabbalah.suite101.com/article.cfm/transhumanism\_its\_cause\_and\_alternative

While transhumanists claim to be forging new ground using technology, it is really just repeating an age-old story. Since the day a caveman invented the wheel, man has believed that progress in technology would produce a better world and enable him to live a happier life. Technology Sparks Global Crises But our track record speaks for itself. As humanity grows in knowledge and power, the problems of the world grow in parallel. Many of the economic, environmental and humanitarian crises facing the world today can be directly linked to our technological progress. Einstein’s definition of insanity is “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” The reliance on technology to improve the human condition is the same thing that has been done by generations of scientists and inventors, and the results this time will be no different. Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute hosted the world’s first conference on global catastrophic risks last week. Several sessions were devoted to the risks associated with new technologies. The stakes are very high. According to Dr. Nick Bostrom, director of the institute, “If we get something wrong, you could imagine the consequences would involve the extinction of the human species.”

### AT Science Good

#### Their science good args conflate the universe and the world- the social world cannot be reduced to its physical parts, it is only revealed through experience and everyday practices – you should defer to our ethics since they’re grounded in comportment rather than causally derived social science

Wrathall ‘6

(Mark, Prof. of Philosophy @ UC-Riverside, How to Read Heidegger, pgs. 20-22)

Or is it? Does the success of the sciences in explaining and modelling the behaviour of the physical universe really support the conclusion that all the meanings we find in the world are a kind of subjective projection? To reach this conclusion, Heidegger argues, is to confuse the universe with the world (see The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 165). The physical universe, he is willing to grant, is best explored through the natural sciences. In this day and age, no one could really believe that we could discover the nature of physical reality— for example, the properties of electrons and quarks and the such — by exploring our everyday understanding of things. But there is a legitimate sense in which we use the word 'world' to name something quite different, something like a particular style of organizing our activities and relations with the things and people around us. The world understood in this way simply doesn't lend itself to be studied using the methodology of the physical sciences. Instead, we only understand a world by somehow finding a way into it and the experience of the things it gives birth to. Whole books are devoted to helping us get a feel for foreign worlds — The World of the Reformation or The World of Texas Politics, or The World of the Maya or The World of the Suicide Bomber. Despite the fact that the very same physical and chemical laws apply to both Texas politicians and suicide bombers, there is a very real sense in which they inhabit different worlds. Heidegger thinks that the world, understood in this sense, is a genuine phenomenon in its own right, and can't be reduced to a mere collection of physical objects. A world that we understand, that makes sense to us, that gives structure to and organizes all the things we encounter in our everyday lives — such a world makes it possible for us to act on, think about and experience things in the world. As the extract above indicates, Heidegger believes that it is an essential feature of Dasein (the kind of being we are) that it understands the world, and that it is always comporting itself towards the world. If, swayed by the success of the physical sciences, we insist that what really exists are brute physical objects, then we will fail to recognize how everything we do is shaped by a world. And that means we will ultimately fail to understand ourselves. So what is the world, if it is not a physical entity? How does the world shape the things that we encounter and the activities we perform? And what does it mean to understand the world? The passage above begins with the claim that an essential feature of Dasein's being, of what it is to be Dasein, is having an understanding of the world. That means that something only is a Dasein provided that it understands how to 'comport itself towards the world'. We sometimes think that our understanding consists in knowing particular facts or propositions. If that were what Heidegger had in mind here, then his claim would be that every Dasein, in addition to knowing some facts about particular objects, also knew facts about its world. Then we could understand, for example, the world of the suicide bomber simply by knowing what facts suicide bombers believe (perhaps that Allah rewards martyrs). But, of course, such a world is so foreign to our own that no matter how many facts we learn about it, we still have a hard time really making sense of it. This is why Heidegger says specifically that 'any understanding (Verst'dndnis) has its being in an act of understanding (Verstehen). For Heidegger, an understanding isn't something we possess (a collection of facts or bits of knowledge), but something we do. Dasein's understanding is found in the way that Dasein does things. My understanding of cooking, for example, is found in the way I handle food, kitchen implements, stoves and ovens, cookbooks. It is not found in my ability to produce true assertions about cooking, or my readiness to assent to true propositions about cooking. In just the same way, a true understanding of a world doesn't amount to knowing facts about it, but knowing how to live in it. Indeed, it might be the case that the more at home we are in our world, the fewer 'facts' we know about the world — what we understand becomes so obvious that we have a hard time noticing it, let alone articulating it. As Heidegger notes, 'familiarity with the world does not necessarily require that the relations which are constitutive for the world as the world should be theoretically transparent'. Rather, familiarity with the world is found in intuitively understanding why things are done the way that they are.

## \*\*\*Aff Answers\*\*\*

### Permutation

#### The permutation links the public and private – transportation infrastructure policymaking discloses the everyday world of bus drivers and commuters, producing ontological freedom by bringing new lines of social existence into relief – the alternative’s lack of specific solutions ignores these lines of critique

Thiele ‘94

(Leslie Paul, teaches political theory and serves as Director of Sustainability Studies at the University of Florida, “Heidegger On Freedom: Political Not Metaphysical”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2 June 1994, pp. 278-291)

We observe that Heidegger's notion of disclosive freedom philosophically buttresses Arendt's political theorizing. Perhaps more importantly, his understanding may also remedy the shortcomings of Arendt's analysis. Arendt wishes to claim that the divorce between freedom and necessity-the public and the private-is irreconcilable and complete. Anything that speaks to the demanding necessities of life does not partake of freedom and ipso facto cannot be considered the stuff of politics. But as Heidegger demonstrates, freedom is evidenced whenever and wherever we open ourselves to the world of beings. Political freedom, then, is evidenced whenever speech and action disclose the world of beings, including our social being-in-the-world, publicly. There seems little reason to exclude from this category, as Arendt unfortunately does, most aspects of worldly life simply because they pertain to the unheroic realm of social, physical, or economic need. Changing a baby's diapers or the oil in one's car, going to the marketplace or out of town for a holiday, do not in themselves evidence much political freedom, to be sure. But the provision of day-care facilities and parental leave from work, the promulgation of laws for the mandatory recycling of motor oil, the regulation of the sales of goods according to health and environmental standards, and the provision and maintenance of transportation infrastructure are important political concerns. What makes something political-in these cases and in general-has less to do with whether it pertains to our (basic) needs than to whether and how these needs are collectively addressed and fulfilled. Politics, in other words, may be in evidence whenever the world of beings and the with-world of human beings remain open to public interrogation and disclosure. Political freedom, then, emerges most fundamentally in the caretaking of this public realm. And such caretaking, accomplished in words and deeds, is both preservative and creative in nature. Arendt teaches us that sovereignty, personal or national in scope, is antagonistic to freedom. In the same vein, Heidegger teaches us that grand words and deeds, if carried out in the willful and forgetful pursuit of mastery, may also preclude freedom's greatest exercise. In today's world, where the caretaking of local and global ecologies becomes an increasingly important task, such a Heideggerian understanding of freedom bears obvious political significance.

#### The permutation solves best – the alt fails to immerse itself in the intricacies of infrastructural planning, collapsing urban transformation – adoption of an infrastructural perspective uses calculation to create new connections and openness between disparate everyday practices

Allen ‘99

(Stan, dean of the School of Architecture at Princeton University, “Infrastructural Urbanism”, *Center 14: On Landscape Urbanism*, Center for American Architecture and Design)

This turn toward a semiotic architecture at the end of the six- ties and the beginning of the seventies has itself been subject to intense critical scrutiny-from both a formal and an ideological point of view. But even the most radical critiques have left the fundamental assumption that architecture behaves like a discursive system intact. Deconstruction's radical claim to contest the very possibility of meaning in architecture, for example, was a claim carried out over the territory of meaning and representation, and pays little attention to architecture's instrumentality, or to the complex traffic between representation and materiality. Meaning today may be multiple, contested, contaminated, and partial, but meaning is still the issue. Nevertheless, an architecture that works exclusively in the semiotic register and defines its role as critique, commentary, or even "interrogation" (laying bare of the intricacies of architecture's complicity with power and politics) has, in some fundamental way, given up on the possibility of ever intervening in that reality. Under the dominance of the representational model, architecture has surrendered its capacity to imagine, to propose, or to construct alternative realities. As Robin Evans has remarked, a building was once "an opportunity to improve the human condition;" now it is conceived as "an opportunity to express the human condition." Architecture is understood as a discursive system that expresses, critiques, or makes apparent the hard realities of a world that is held safely at arm's length. One effect of this shift toward images and signs is that architecture's disciplinary frame shifts. It finds itself in competition with other discursive media-painting, film, literature, the Internet, performance art-a field in which architecture often seems to come up short. What these other media lack, of course, is architecture's powerful instrumentality-its capacity not only to critique, but also to actually transform reality. Architecture's relationship to its material is, however, indirect. Unlike activities such as gardening or woodworking, where something concrete is made by direct contact with the material, the architect (like the engineer, the urbanist, or the ecologist) operates on reality at a distance, and through the mediation of abstract systems such as notation, projection, or calculation. Indirect contact is the necessary counterpart to the larger scale of intervention. Architecture works simultaneously with abstract images and with material realities, in complex interplay. It is a material practice . It is not entirely coincidental that the twenty-five year period coinciding with the rise of postmodernism in architecture has seen a massive defunding of urban infrastructure. In the United States, public investment in civic works-highways, railroads, water supply and control, land reclamation, mass transit—is at an all time low. While architects cannot logically be held accountable for these complex political and economical shifts, it might be argued that by the production of a theoretical framework to justify an architecture of surface and sign, architects have, consciously or not, participated in their own marginalization. If architects assert that signs and information are more important than infrastructure, why would bureaucrats or politicians disagree? As much as they have been excluded from the development of the city, architects themselves have retreated from questions of function, implementation, technique, finance, and material practice. And while architects are relatively powerless to provoke the changes necessary to generate renewed investment in infrastructure, they can begin to redirect their own imaginative and technical efforts toward the questions of infrastructure. A toolbox of new and existing procedures can be expanded by reference to architecture's traditional alliance with territorial organization and functionality. This is the context within which I want to situate the shift in recent practice toward infrastructure. Going beyond stylistic or for- mal issues, infrastructural urbanism offers a new model for practice and a renewed sense of architecture's potential to structure the future of the city. Infrastructural urbanism understands architecture as material practice-as an activity that works in and among the world of things, and not exclusively with meaning and image. It is an architecture dedicated to concrete proposals and realistic strategies of implementation and not distanced commentary or critique. It is a way of working at the large scale that escapes suspect notions of master planning and the heroic ego of the individual architect. Infrastructural urbanism marks a return to instrumentality and a move away from the representational imperative in architecture. This does not imply a simple return to the now discredited certainties of modernism. Two claims can be made; first, that architecture's instrumentality can be reconceived-not as a mark of modernity's demand for efficient implementation but as the site of architecture's contact with the complexity of the real. By immersing architecture in the world of things, it becomes possible to pro- duce what Robin Evans, paraphrasing Lyotard, has referred to as a "volatile, unordered, unpoliceable communication that will always outwit the judicial domination of language."\* The second claim is for a practice engaged in time and process—a practice not devoted to the production of autonomous objects, but rather to the production of directed fields in which program, event, and activity can play themselves out. In an interview conducted fifteen years ago, Michel Foucault noted that "Architects are not the engineers or technicians of the three great variables: territory, communication and speed."5 While it is hard to argue Foucault's point as an assessment of the current condition, it deserves to be pointed out that historically this has not been the case. Land surveying, territorial organization, local ecologies, road construction, shipbuilding, hydraulics, fortification, bridge building, war machines, and networks of communication and transportation were all part of the traditional competence of the architect before the rise of disciplinary specialization. Territory, communication, and speed are properly infrastructural problems, and architecture as a discipline has developed specific technical means to deal effectively with these variables. Mapping, projection, calculation, notation, and visualization are among architecture's traditional tools for operating at the very large scale. These procedures can be reclaimed for architecture, and supplemented with new technologies of design and simulation now available. But rethinking infrastructure is only one aspect of a larger move away from the representational model, one of the many implications of architecture understood as a material practice. Material practices (ecology or engineering for example) are concerned with the behavior of large scale assemblages over time. They do not work primarily with images or meaning, or even with objects, but with performance: energy inputs and outputs, the calibration of force and resistance. They are less concerned with what things look like and more concerned with what they can do. Although these material practices work instrumentally, they are not limited to the direct manipulation of given material. Instead they project transformations of reality by means of abstract techniques such as notation, simulation, or calculation. Material practices organize and transform aggregates of labor, materials, energy and resources, but they work through necessarily mediated procedures-operations of drawing and projection, for example-that leave their trace on the work. Material practices deploy an open catalog of techniques without preconceived formal ends. In architecture and urbanism, technique does not belong to an individual but to the discipline as a whole. As Foucault has reminded us, techniques are social before they are technical. Hence, to think of architecture as a material practice does not mean leaving questions of meaning entirely behind. Architecture works with cultural and social variables as well as with physical materials, and architecture's capacity to signify is one tool available to the architect working in the city. But material practices do not attempt to control or predetermine meaning. Instead, they go beyond the paradoxes of the linguistic to examine the effects of signifying practices on performance and behavior. Material practices are not about expression-expressing either the point of view of an author or of the collective will of a society; rather they condense, transform, and materialize concepts.6 Architecture is uniquely capable of structuring the city in ways not available to practices such as literature, film, politics, installation art, or advertising. Yet because of its capacity to actualize social and cultural concepts, it can also contribute something that strictly technical disciplines such as engineering cannot. When Walter Benjamin writes that "construction fulfills the role of the unconscious," he articulates the capacity of certain structures to act as a scaffold for a complex series of events not anticipated by the architect-meanings and affects existing outside of the control of a single author that continuously evolve over time.

### Cede the Political DA

#### Failure to engage urban planning causes rapid climate change and massive poverty – transportation infrastructure produces public goods that resolve violent self-interest

Cook ‘10

(Mitchell, freelance research consultant specializing in issues of urban planning, local governance and international development, he has consulted for the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, visiting scholar studying urban development strategy and local governance at the National Research Center for the Economy of the Upper Reaches of the Yangtze in Chongqing, China “Toward a Sustainable Urbanism: Globalization, Urban Planning and the New Urban Reality”. *GPIA Student Working Paper Series 2010-2*. New York: Graduate Program in International Affairs, The New School, www.gpia.info/files/u900/\_Mitchell\_Cook\_GPIA\_Student\_WPS\_Updated\_5-19.pdf)

While urban growth over the last century has led to major advances in productivity and personal wealth, agglomeration and technological change were met with increasingly complex and interdependent externalities. The unprecedented density achieved in cities led to a burgeoning list of negative externalities in the form of pollution, crime, and congestion which all have led, in some cases, to a drastic reduction in urban productivity. Increasing carbon dioxide emissions, an enduring byproduct of industrial urbanization, have contributed substantially to an accelerated rate of global climate change, raising sea levels and threatening urban centers along the world’s coastal lines through increased exposure to volatile weather patterns and catastrophic meteorological events. Most recently, the financial innovation that spurred much of the urban restructuring in the United States served to spark a global economic crisis, pushing the global economy into recession while managing to threaten the very global financial architecture that sustained it. Things do not look much better at the micro-scale either. A billion urban residents now live in slums, delinked from trunk infrastructure, with little or no land tenure, unable to access municipal resources, often officially unrecognized on maps and invisible to urban policymakers. For an increasing number of urban residents around the world, harmony is hardly a state that adequately describes the urban environment in which they reside. The UN-Habitat’s rapid shift in themes is, however, reflective of a larger sense of urgency in building capacity to mitigate the pernicious consequences of the rapid urbanization of the planet. It is also indicative of a deficit in urban knowledge and a conceptual divorce of planning theory from the city. This paper seeks to explore the gap between planning theory and the city under contemporary globalization and articulate ways to redress this deficiency through a more explicit integration of social justice and public wealth, two fields of inquiry underrepresented in urban planning literature.1 \*\*\*Begin Footnote\*\*\*1 I define the notion of public wealth as the total stock of public goods and services available for local consumption. Public goods and services include essential infrastructure, public education facilities, and public housing as well as more discretionary local goods like libraries, museums, parks and recreational facilities. When equitable access is guaranteed, the production of public wealth through the financing of investments in transportation, electricity, sanitation and clean water supply is a critical channel through which everyone can benefit from agglomeration. Indeed, without these investments in core infrastructure, the gains to productivity from agglomeration are muted or even reversed for poor workers who, for example, are forced to pay expensive rates for even minimal access to clean water or sanitation facilities and whose employment opportunities are geographically limited, resulting in higher unemployment rates due to an absence of accessible transportation infrastructure.\*\*\*End Footnote\*\*\* It proceeds as follows. In the next section I unpack the notion of a new urban reality, including a brief literature analysis of city planning theory in relationship to the patterns of urbanization under contemporary globalization. I identify contemporary globalization as the period beginning around 1970 and ending with the economic crisis beginning in the fourth quarter of 2007. This sets the context for prioritizing social justice and public wealth as a value base for planning practice. In the third section I link urban planning practice to the equitable allocation and optimization of space through a new conceptualization of sustainability amenable to city planning theory based on the new urban reality. I conclude with implications for urban policy.

#### The plan is key to resolve the worst excesses of management – normative description of city planning is key to avoid catastrophic collapse of globalization and generate social equality

Cook ‘10

(Mitchell, freelance research consultant specializing in issues of urban planning, local governance and international development, he has consulted for the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, visiting scholar studying urban development strategy and local governance at the National Research Center for the Economy of the Upper Reaches of the Yangtze in Chongqing, China “Toward a Sustainable Urbanism: Globalization, Urban Planning and the New Urban Reality”. *GPIA Student Working Paper Series 2010-2*. New York: Graduate Program in International Affairs, The New School, www.gpia.info/files/u900/\_Mitchell\_Cook\_GPIA\_Student\_WPS\_Updated\_5-19.pdf)

A fundamental distinction must be made between globalization and the city. Jepson discusses the scientific basis for sustainability through the literature on system dynamics and shows “the built-in tendency for systems to become ever larger and more complex (i.e., too many connections, too many agents) until lag times and systemic interdependencies leave them virtually unmanageable and prone to catastrophic collapse” (2001, 501). This systemic tendency for cause and effect to become blurred was recently experienced with the global economic crisis, beginning with the collapse of the housing market in the United States and spreading throughout the global financial sector and real economy as a result of overleveraging of sovereign and institutional balance sheets. The city, as the spatial correlation to globalization, has the potential to manage these lag times and interdependencies and build an urban system that contains globalization instead of facilitating its most pernicious impacts. While popular notions of sustainability have tended to center on the environment, I would argue that sustainability as it relates to the city cannot be fully addressed without extending the discussion to the distribution of equity within the city, which can only come from a more normative planning theory rooted in social justice, based on increased equity in the city through the production of public wealth. Sanyal argues that as a result of their professional responsibilities, urban planners tend to locate themselves somewhat in the middle of the ideological spectrum which, at one end, is occupied by pro-globalization cheerleaders and at the other by anti-globalization skeptics. He states that these two groups “rely on neatly interconnected sets of theoretical propositions which have very little room for ambiguity, surprises and moral hesitation” (2002, 118). For Sanyal, this ideological middle ground that planners occupy should be recognized as a strength, forged in the spirit of compromise and the only “fair and rational way of reaching an agreement between different points of view” (Ibid., 118). However, there are a set of unintended consequences that have arisen from the trend toward an ideological middle ground and a lack of normative planning theory that are evident in the most common form of interaction between planners and the city – incrementalism. In answering the question of whether or not planners should intervene in the city to improve performance in transportation, environment and employment sectors for the poor, Bertaud writes, “a planner disposes of three tools to influence city shape: land use regulations, infrastructure investments and taxation. However, to be able to use these tools coherently, clearly established objectives must have been formulated by elected officials” (2004, 2). Because the use of “objectives” is never value-neutral, by extension, urban planning practice and theory can never be value-neutral. What then are to be the central values that guide planning theory and practice as it negotiates the conflict within and between cities and regions that has been created by globalization? The simple delineation of the planner’s toolkit – land use regulations, infrastructure investments and taxation – says nothing of how the planner is to utilize these tools to produce sustainable cities. The deficiency in urban planning theory and practice is that the debate has remained for too long in the descriptive realm, within the contours of negotiation and moderation, and has shied away from normative prescriptions of what the city is to look like and how it should operate. While there may be no optimum spatial form, there must be an optimum distribution of opportunity throughout the city. This critical importance of equity must be considered if sustainability is to be operationalized as a solution to the negative urban impacts of globalization. “Opportunity” in the context of the city is defined as “the right to change ourselves by changing the city” (Harvey 2008, 23). Harvey’s invocation of a right to the city is based upon collective power reshaping the whole horizon of opportunities in the city. However, it must be noted that collective action, in relationship to rapidly evolving urban form and function, has been at times muted by acquiescence to an unsustainable status quo. For example, the collective inaction by urban residents around the planet on issues of environmental sustainability, in the context of carbon dioxide emissions from private vehicle ownership, has been a major contributing factor to climate change and insecurity. Americans, coerced by a seemingly unceasing extension of consumer credit, were more than happy to accelerate the suburban transformation of their cities to dependency on cheap oil, fueling for decades the global production of automobiles which continues to undermine public or zero-emission modes of transportation. Consequently, this same suburbanization of the city seems to be gaining traction in many of the world’s most rapidly urbanizing regions, including in India and China.6 I hold no illusions regarding the allure of private rather than communal forms of consumption and private rather than communal urban shapes and places. Therefore, I argue that urban planners are presented with an opportunity to reassert themselves in the management of space and place to temper the advances of individualism and the logic of global capitalism in the city and become more active in the production of local public wealth. If, according to the 2009 World Development Report, “place is the most important correlate of a person’s welfare” (World Bank 2009, 1) and urban planners are fundamentally concerned with the allocation and optimization of space, then a substantial opportunity exists to contribute to the remaking of sustainable cities.

### AT Ontology 1st

#### Ontology doesn’t come first: ontological unity is a mirage and judging the impacts of our actions is key to environmental ethics, and human survival

Norton, 96 – Professor of Philosophy at the Georgia Institute of Technology

Bryan, “Environmental Pragmatism,” Edited by Light and Katz, pg. 106

Thus ends my explanation of, and please for, a practical environmental ethic that seeks to integrate pluralistic principles across multiple levels/dynamics. Rather than reducing pluralistic principles by relating them to an underlying value theory that recognizes only economic preferences or “inherent” value as the ontological stuff that unifies all moral judgments. I have sought integration of multiple values on three irreducible scales of human concern and valuation, choosing pluralism over monism, and attempting to integrate values within an ecologically informed, multi-scalar model of the human habitat. I believe that the non-ontological, pluralistic approach to values can better express the inductively based values and management approach of Leopold’s land ethic, which can be seen as a precursor to the tradition of adaptive management. And, if the problem of environmentalism is the need to support rationally the goals of environmental protection – the problem Callicott misconceived as the need for a realist moral ontology to establish the “objectivity” of environmental goals – then I endorse the broadly Darwinian approach to both epistemology and morals proposed by the American pragmatists. The environmental community is the community of inquirers; it is the community of inquirers that, for better or worse, must struggle, immediately as individuals and indefinitely as a community, both to survive and to know. In this struggle useful knowledge will be information about how to survive in a rapidly evolving culture and habitat. It is in this sense that human actors are a part of multi-layered nature; our actions have impacts on multiple dynamics and multiple scales. We humans will understand our moral responsibilities only if we understand the consequences of our action as they unfold on multiple scales; and the human community will only survive to further evolve and adapt if we learn to achieve individual welfare and justice in the present in ways that are less disruptive of the processes, evolving on larger spatio-temporal scales, essential to human and ecological communities.

#### **Ontology 1st creates passivity and ignores corporate destruction of the environment – only analysis of specific scenarios with empirical trends can create an ethical method for politics**

Graham 99

Phil Graham, Graduate School of Management , University of Queensland, Heidegger’s Hippies: A dissenting voice on the “problem of the subject” in cyberspace, Identities in Action! 1999, http://www.philgraham.net/HH\_conf.pdf

Societies should get worried when Wagner’s music becomes popular because it usually means that distorted interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy are not far away. Existentialists create problems about what is, especially identity (Heidegger 1947). Existentialism inevitably leads to an authoritarian worldview: this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of twofold voluptuous delight, my “beyond good and evil,” without a goal, unless the joy of the circle itself is a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will towards itself – do you want a name for this world? A solution to all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? – This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides! (Nietzsche 1967/1997). Armed with a volume of Nietzsche, some considerable oratory skills, several Wagner records, and an existentialist University Rector in the form of Martin Heidegger, Hitler managed some truly astounding feats of strategic identity engineering (cf. Bullock, 1991). Upon being appointed to the Freiberg University, Heidegger pronounced the end of thought, history, ideology, and civilisation: ‘No dogmas and ideas will any longer be the laws of your being. The Fuhrer himself, and he alone, is the present and future reality for Germany’ (in Bullock 1991: 345). Heidegger signed up to an ideology-free politics: Hitler’s ‘Third Way’ (Eatwell 1997). The idealised identity, the new symbol of mythological worship, Nietzsche’s European Superman, was to rule from that day hence. Hitler took control of the means of propaganda: the media; the means of mental production: the education system; the means of violence: the police, army, and prison system; and pandered to the means of material production: industry and agriculture; and proclaimed a New beginning and a New world order. He ordered Germany to look forward into the next thousand years and forget the past. Heidegger and existentialism remain influential to this day, and history remains bunk (e.g. Giddens4, 1991, Chapt. 2). Giddens’s claims that ‘humans live in circumstances of … existential contradiction’, and that ‘subjective death’ and ‘biological death’ are somehow unrelated, is a an ultimately repressive abstraction: from that perspective, life is merely a series of subjective deaths, as if death were the ultimate motor of life itself (cf. Adorno 1964/1973). History is, in fact, the simple and straightforward answer to the “problem of the subject”. “The problem” is also a handy device for confusing, entertaining, and selling trash to the masses. By emphasising the problem of the ‘ontological self’ (Giddens 1991: 49), informationalism and ‘consumerism’ confines the navel-gazing, ‘narcissistic’ masses to a permanent present which they self-consciously sacrifice for a Utopian future (cf. Adorno 1973: 303; Hitchens 1999; Lasch 1984: 25-59). Meanwhile transnational businesses go about their work, ~~raping~~ the environment; swindling each other and whole nations; and inflicting populations with declining wages, declining working conditions, and declining social security. Slavery is once again on the increase (Castells, 1998; Graham, 1999; ILO, 1998). There is no “problem of the subject”, just as there is no “global society”; there is only the mass amnesia of utopian propaganda, the strains of which have historically accompanied revolutions in communication technologies. Each person’s identity is, quite simply, their subjective account of a unique and objective history of interactions within the objective social and material environments they inhabit, create, and inherit. The identity of each person is their most intimate historical information, and they are its material expression: each person is a record of their own history at any given time. Thus, each person is a recognisably material, identifiable entity: an identity. This is their condition. People are not theoretical entities; they are people. As such, they have an intrinsic identity with an intrinsic value. No amount of theory or propaganda will make it go away. The widespread multilateral attempts to prop up consumer society and hypercapitalism as a valid and useful means of sustainable growth, indeed, as the path to an inevitable, international democratic Utopia, are already showing their disatrous cracks. The “problem” of subjective death threatens to give way, once again, to unprecedented mass slaughter. The numbed condition of a narcissistic society, rooted in a permanent “now”, a blissful state of Heideggerian Dasein, threatens to wake up to a world in which “subjective death” and ontology are the least of all worries.

### AT Do Nothing Alt

#### Doing nothing makes the extinction inevitable – nuclear war is worse than ontological damnation

Santoni 85 – Professor of Philosophy

Ronald E. Santoni, Phil. Prof @ Denison, 1985, Nuclear War, ed. Fox and Groarke, p. 156-7

To be sure, Fox sees the need for our undergoing “certain fundamental changes” in our “thinking, beliefs, attitudes, values” and Zimmerman calls for a “paradigm shift” in our thinking about ourselves, other, and the Earth. But it is not clear that what either offers as suggestions for what we can, must, or should do in the face of a runaway arms race are sufficient to “wind down” the arms race before it leads to omnicide. In spite of the importance of Fox’s analysis and reminders it is not clear that “admitting our (nuclear) fear and anxiety” to ourselves and “identifying the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses” represent much more than examples of basic, often. stated principles of psychotherapy. Being aware of the psychological maneuvers that keep us numb to nuclear reality may well be the road to transcending them but it must only be a “first step” (as Fox acknowledges), during which we Simultaneously act to eliminate nuclear threats, break our complicity with the ams race, get rid of arsenals of genocidal weaponry, and create conditions for international goodwill, mutual trust, and creative interdependence. Similarly, in respect to Zimmerman: in spite of the challenging Heideggerian insights he brings out regarding what motivates the arms race, many questions may be raised about his prescribed “solutions.” Given our need for a paradigm shift in our (distorted) understanding of ourselves and the rest of being, are we merely left “to prepare for a possible shift in our self-understanding? (italics mine)? Is this all we can do? Is it necessarily the case that such a shift “cannot come as a result of our own will?” – and work – but only from “a destiny outside our control?” Does this mean we leave to God the matter of bringing about a paradigm shift? Granted our fears and the importance of not being controlled by fears, as well as our “anthropocentric leanings,” should we be as cautious as Zimmerman suggests about out disposition “to want to do something” or “to act decisively in the face of the current threat?” In spite of the importance of our taking on the anxiety of our finitude and our present limitation, does it follow that “we should be willing for the worst (i.e. an all-out nuclear war) to occur”? Zimmerman wrongly, I contend, equates “resistance” with “denial” when he says that “as long as we resist and deny the possibility of nuclear war, that possibility will persist and grow stronger.” He also wrongly perceives “resistance” as presupposing a clinging to the “order of things that now prevails.” Resistance connotes opposing, and striving to defeat a prevailing state of affairs that would allow or encourage the “worst to occur.” I submit, against Zimmerman, that we should not, in any sense, be willing for nuclear war or omnicide to occur. (This is *not* to suggest that we should be numb to the possibility of its occurrence.) Despite Zimmerman’s elaborations and refinements his Heideggerian notion of “letting beings be” continues to be too permissive in this regard. In my judgment, an individual’s decision not to act against and resist his or her government’s preparations for nuclear holocaust is, as I have argued elsewhere, to be an early accomplice to the most horrendous crim against life imaginable – its annihilation. The Nuremburg tradition calls not only for a new way of thinking, a “new internationalism” in which we all become co-nurturers of the whole planet, but for resolute actions that will sever our complicity with nuclear criminality and the genocidal arms race, and work to achieve a future which we can no longer assume. We must not only “come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought” (Fox) but must act now - with a “new consciousness” and conscience - to prevent the unthinkable, by cleansing the earth of nuclear weaponry. Only when that is achieved wll ultimate violence be removed as the final arbiter of our planet’s fate.

### AT Science/Truth Claims DA

#### Defer to best evidence to resolve impacts – only way to avoid dogmatism and create effective policy analysis

Sil ‘2k

Rudra Sil, assistance professor of Political Science @ the University of Pennsylvania. “Beyond boundaries?: disciplines, paradigms, and theoretical integration in International Studies. 2001. P. 161.

In the end, there may be no alternative to relying on the judgment of other human beings, and this judgment is difficult to form in the absence of empirical findings. However, instead of clinging to the elusive idea of a uniform standard for the empirical validation of theories, it is possible to simply present a set of observational statements—whether we call it "data" or "narrative"—for the modest purpose of rendering an explanation or interpretation more plausible than the audience would allow at the outset. In practice, this is precisely what the most committed positivists and inter-pretivists have been doing anyway; the presentation of "logically consistent" hypotheses "supported by data" and the ordering of facts in a "thick" narrative are both ultimately designed to convince scholars that a particular proposition should be taken more seriously than others. Social analysis is not about final truths or objective realities, but nor does it have to be a meaningless world of incommensurable theories where anything goes. Instead, it can be an ongoing collective endeavor to develop, evaluate, and refine general inferences—be they in the form of models, partial explanations, descriptive inferences, or interpretations—in order to render them more "sensible" or "plausible" to a particular audience. In the absence of a consensus on the possibility and desirability of a full-blown explanatory science of international and social life, it is important to keep as many doors open as possible. This does not require us to accept each and every claim without some sort of validation, but perhaps the community of scholars can be more tolerant about the kinds of empirical referents and logical propositions that are employed in validating propositions by scholars embracing all but the most extreme epistemological positions.

### Predictions/Exn Reps Good

#### Extinction-level ecological representations spark a new social ethic and solve their cooption args

Epstein and Zhao 9 – Lab of Medicine @ Hong Kong

Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao ‘9 – Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of Hong Kong, The Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name; Human Extinction, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse

Final ends for all species are the same, but the journeys will be different. If we cannot influence the end of our species, can we influence the journey? To do so—even in a small way—would be a crowning achievement for human evolution and give new meaning to the term civilization. Only by **elevating the topic** [End Page 121] **of human extinction** to the level of serious professional discourse can we begin to prepare ourselves for the challenges that lie ahead. Table 3.   Human Thinking Modes Relevant to Extinction: from Ego-Think to Eco-Think  The difficulty of the required transition should not be underestimated. This is depicted in Table 3 as a painful multistep progression from the 20th-century philosophical norm of Ego-Think—defined therein as a short-term state of mind valuing individual material self-interest above all other considerations—to Eco-Think, in which humans come to adopt a broader Gaia-like outlook on themselves as but one part of an infinitely larger reality. Making this change must involve communicating the non-sensationalist message to all global citizens that “things are serious” and “we are in this together”—or, in blunter language, that the road to extinction and its related agonies does indeed lie ahead. Consistent with this prospect, the risks of human extinction—and the cost-benefit of attempting to reduce these risks—have been quantified in a recent sobering analysis (Matheny 2007).  Once complacency has been shaken off and a sense of collective purpose created, the battle against self-seeking anthropocentric human instincts will have only just begun. It is often said that human beings suffer from the ability to appreciate their own mortality—an existential agony that has given rise to the great religions— but in the present age of religious decline, we must begin to bear the added burden of anticipating the demise of our species. Indeed, as argued here, there are compelling reasons for encouraging this collective mind-shift. For in the best of all possible worlds, the realization that our species has long-term survival criteria distinct from our short-term tribal priorities could **spark a new social ethic** to upgrade what we now all too often dismiss as “human nature” (Tudge 1989). [End Page 122]

#### This ethos averts extinction – transforms social relations

Kurasawa ‘4

(Fuyuki, Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight,” Constellations, 11:4, p. 455-6)

This brings us to the transnational character of preventive foresight, which is most explicit in the now commonplace observation that we live in an interdependent world because of the globalization of the perils that humankind faces (nuclear annihilation, global warming, terrorism, genocide, AIDS and SARS epidemics, and so on); individuals and groups from far-flung parts of the planet are being brought together into “risk communities” that transcend geographical borders.5 Moreover, due to dense media and information flows, knowledge of impeding catastrophes can instantaneously reach the four corners of the earth – sometimes well before individuals in one place experience the actual consequences of a crisis originating in another. My contention is that civic associations are engaging in dialogical, public, and transnational forms of ethico-political action that contribute to the creation of a fledgling global civil society existing ‘below’ the official and institutionalized architecture of international relations.6 The work of preventive foresight consists of forging ties between citizens; participating in the circulation of flows of claims, images, and information across borders; promoting an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism; and forming and mobilizing weak publics that debate and struggle against possible catastrophes. Over the past few decades, states and international organizations have frequently been content to follow the lead of globally- minded civil society actors, who have been instrumental in placing on the public agenda a host of pivotal issues (such as nuclear war, ecological pollution, species extinction, genetic engineering, and mass human rights violations). To my mind, this strongly indicates that if prevention of global crises is to eventually rival the assertion of short-term and narrowly defined rationales (national interest, profit, bureaucratic self-preservation, etc.), weak publics must begin by convincing or compelling official representatives and multilateral organizations to act differently; only then will farsightedness be in a position to ‘move up’ and become institutionalized via strong publics. Since the global culture of prevention remains a work in progress, the argument presented in this paper is poised between empirical and normative dimensions of analysis. It proposes a theory of the practice of preventive foresight based upon already existing struggles and discourses, at the same time as it advocates the adoption of certain principles that would substantively thicken and assist in the realization of a sense of responsibility for the future of humankind. I will thereby proceed in four steps, beginning with a consideration of the shifting socio-political and cultural climate that is giving rise to farsightedness today (I). I will then contend that the development of a public aptitude for early warning about global cataclysms can overcome flawed conceptions of the future’s essential inscrutability (II). From this will follow the claim that an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism – of solidarity that extends to future generations – can supplant the preeminence of ‘short-termism’ with the help of appeals to the public’s moral imagination and use of reason (III). In the final section of the paper, I will argue that the commitment of global civil society actors to norms of precaution and transnational justice can hone citizens’ faculty of critical judgment against abuses of the dystopian imaginary, thereby opening the way to public deliberation about the construction of an alternative world order (IV).

### AT Management Bad

#### Management is inevitable- it’s only a question of what kind of intervention is used. Past interventions will result in extinction unless actively reversed

Levy 99- PhD @ Centre for Critical Theory at Monash

Neil, “Discourses of the Environment,” ed: Eric Darier, p. 215

If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our use of resources, we are, nevertheless unable simply to leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for space, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse or at least limit the effects of our previous interventions. Moreover, there is another reason why our behavior towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very **unequal access to their resources and their consolations** (Soper 1995: 207).in fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is not us, **but the poor** of Brazil, **who will bear the brunt** of the misery which would result from a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternatives which **we require**, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by ecologists, environmentalists, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impact which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province of Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the hate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided?

#### Anti-management results in mass extinctions

Soule 95 - Professor of Environmental Studies

Michael E., Professor and Chair of Environmental Studies, UC-Santa Cruz, REINVITING NATURE? RESPONSES TO POSTMODERN DECONSTRUCTION, Eds: Michael E. Soule and Gary Lease, p. 159-160

Should We Actively Manage Wildlands and Wild Waters? The decision has already been made in most places. Some of the ecological myths discussed here contain, either explicitly or implicitly, the idea that nature is self-regulating and capable of caring for itself. This notion leads to the theory of management known as benign neglect – nature will do fine, thank you, if human beings just leave it alone. Indeed, a century ago, a hands-off policy was the best policy. Now it is not. Given natures`s current fragmented and stressed condition, neglect will result in an accelerating spiral of deterioration. Once people create large gaps in forests, isolate and disturb habitats, pollute, overexploit, and introduce species from other continents, the viability of many ecosystems and native species is compromised, resiliency dissipates, and diversity can collapse. When artificial disturbance reaches a certain threshold, even small changes can produce large effects, and these will be compounded by climate change. For example, a storm that would be considered normal and beneficial may, following widespread clearcutting, cause disastrous blow-downs, landslides, and erosion. If global warming occurs, tropical storms are predicted to have greater force than now. Homeostasis, balance, and Gaia are dangerous models when applied at the wrong spatial and temporal scales. Even fifty years ago, neglect might have been the best medicine, but that was a world with a lot more big, unhumanized, connected spaces, a world with one-third the number of people, and a world largely unaffected by chain saws, bulldozers, pesticides, and exotic, weedy species. The alternative to neglect is active caring – in today`s parlance, an affirmative approach to wildlands: to maintain and restore them, to become stewards, accepting all the domineering baggage that word carries. Until humans are able to control their numbers and their technologies, **management is the only viable alternative** to massive attrition of living nature. But management activities are variable in intensity, something that antimanagement purists ignore. In general, the greater the disturbance and the smaller the habitat remnant, the more intense the management must be. So if we must manage, where do we look for ethical guidance?

### Management Good

#### Domination of the physical universe is key to solve poverty, promote nanotech and space control

Zey 1 – Professor of Business

Michael, professor at Montclair State University School of Business and executive director of the Expansionary Institute, a research and consulting organization focusing on future trends in technology, society, the economy, politics, “MAN'S EVOLUTIONARY PATH INTO THE UNIVERSE” The Futurist, Vol. 35, May 2001

We must examine the many ways such developments impact the individual, society, and the economy. And we must explore the underlying reasons why our species is feverishly working to advance the planet and ourselves and transform all we encounter. When we truly understand the depth and strength of man's overwhelming imperative to grow and progress, we can more clearly anticipate the future. At first blush, it would seem that there is little mystery about the impulses driving the human species in this quest: We engage in such productive activities merely to enhance our material condition. We invent technologies that will improve our standard of living and make our lives more pleasant and comfortable. Our species from the earliest periods of prehistory seems compelled not just to survive, but to grow, progress, and enhance itself and its environment. At each new level of our development, we endeavor to master our environment as well as the physical dynamics governing our universe. Humanity's activities, including the entire scientific and technological enterprise, represent a unified attempt by the species to spread "humanness" to everything we encounter. Over the centuries, we have labored to improve planet Earth, and we are now preparing to transform the universe into a dynamic entity filled with life. We will accomplish this by extending our consciousness, skills, intellect, and our very selves to other spheres. I label the sum total of our species' endeavors to improve and change our planetary environment--and ultimately the universe itself-vitalization. Vitalization is a force that is conditioning human behavior. The drive to vitalize--to imbue our planet and eventually the cosmos with a consciousness and intelligence--is a primary motivation behind all human productive activity. Vitalization is the primary force shaping human behavior. However, in order to pursue vitalization successfully, the human species must master four other forces, what I label the "building blocks of vitalization." These four processes encompass the extraordinary advances in areas such as space, medicine, biogenetics, engineering, cybernetics, and energy. The four supporting forces are: \* Dominionization: control over physical forces, such as energy. \* Species coalescence: unity through built systems, such as transportation and communications. \* Biogenesis: improvement of the physical shell, such as through bioengineering. \* Cybergenesis: interconnection with machines to advance human evolution. Each of these forces plays a critical catalytic role in the achievement of vitalization. Dominionization: Controlling Nature The term dominionization refers to the process whereby humankind establishes control over several key aspects of its physical universe. With each passing decade, we enhance our ability to manipulate matter, reshape the planet, develop innovative energy sources, and control fundamental aspects of the physical universe, such as the atom and electromagnetism. Someday, we will learn to influence weather patterns and climate. In a host of ways, dominionization helps humanity vitalize the planet and eventually the universe. As we master the basic dynamics of nature, we are more able to shepherd the evolution of our planet as well as others. As we develop novel and powerful forms of energy, we can rocket from one sphere to another. Moreover, by improving our already formidable skills in moving mountains and creating lakes, we will be better able to change both the topography and the geography of other planets. Examples of dominionization abound. Major macroengineering projects attest to man's ability to transform the very surface of the earth. By constructing man-made lakes, we will be able to live in previously uninhabitable areas such as intenor Australia. Shimizu Corporation envisions a subterranean development called Urban Geo Grid--a series of cities linked by tunnels--accommodating half a million people. In the emerging Macro-industrial Era, whose framework was established in the 1970s and 1980s, we will redefine the concept of "bigness" as we dot Earth's landscape with immense architectural structures. Takenaka, a Japanese construction firm, has proposed "Sky City 1000," a 3,000-foot tower, to be built in Tokyo. Another firm, Ohbayashi, plans to erect a 500-story high-rise building featuring apartments, offices, shopping centers, and service facilities. We will establish dominion over the very heart of physical matter itself. Through nanotechnology, our species will attain control over the atom and its tiniest components. Such control will enable us to effortlessly "macromanufacture" from the bottom up, one atom at a time, any material object. This will enable us to permanently eradicate age-old problems such as scarcity and poverty.

#### Space is key – failure to get off the rock makes extinction inevitable

Thomas ‘2

George Christopher Staff Writer, Ventura County Star, July 22, p. b7,

In the future, the world economy will be based upon space exploration and travel. It is the only way to save life on this planet. If we continue to destroy ourselves and our planet, then we will end up just like the dinosaurs. This is not to say the extinction of the dinosaurs came as a result of depleting the natural resources of this world or mutually assured destruction from nuclear warfare, but the end result is the same, not existing.

#### Preventing resource destruction by MNC’s is key to averting every major impact and runaway globalization

-MNCs will damage the environment beyond repair

-Checks runaway globalization and neoliberal order

WEJ 6

World Economic Justice, http://www.worldeconomicjustice.blogspot.com/

Below is a preview of a Documentary Film titled "NIRMO". NIRMO is about the link between natural resource plunder and poverty, diseases, environmental collapse, wars NIRMO exposes the links between natural resource plunder by multinational corporations, and resultant mass poverty, pandemics, environmental degradation, social collapse, and wars in the world today. This documentary follows a WEJ movement that starts with a walk to Toronto from Montreal. The documentary follows the two friends as the struggle to educate the world that there is an alternative to the abject poverty in the world. A major cause of poverty is that these nations which are rich in resources are being robbed by multinational companies. Although a threat to Multinational Corporations, NIRMO is the start to the beginning of ending poverty. NIRMO will bring the countries resource revenue to the hands of it's people and not corporations. [Expected Release Date: September 2007] NIRMO will highlight the world's economic history and the role of the multinational corporation in natural resource extraction from the 16th century, through colonialism, to the present day of multilateral institutions such as the World Bank's MIGA. Viewers will witness the vicious cycle of natural resource depletion within which nations are trapped, which if not checked now, will leave most countries devoid of any life-sustaining resources, by the middle of this century. The crisis amounts to economic genocide. The Issue – Mass Poverty: Poverty outranking smoking and AIDS as the world's leading killer. One third of deaths - some 18 million people a year or 50,000 per day - are due to poverty-related causes. That is 270 million people since 1990, roughly equal to the population of the United States. Poverty amid Immense Natural Resource Wealth Yet, a casual examination of "poor" countries and ‘poor’ communities reveals that they actually possess immense wealth in the form of natural resources. Other urgent issues resulting from resource plunder are climate change, water pollution, soil erosion, fish stock collapse, lakes/river system drying, environmental diseases and other pandemics etc. A new international **resource management order** [NIRMO] is therefore the basis for 21st century sustainable living, empowering people to take charge of social, economic, political, and ecological governance within their respective communities. It is the **perfect antidote to runaway** **globalization** that leaves dead children in its wake, destroys the natural environment beyond repair, and causes wars and pandemics that threaten world peace, security and biospheric integrity. Once the new international resource management protocol is adopted, countries would be bound to be signatories to it and apply its principles to natural resource management practices. This would have the effect of reducing mass poverty to negligible levels within a few years of adopting the protocol. The new international resource management protocol will be presented to the United Nations for discussion in July 2007, along with a petition of 100,000 signatures from around the world.

### AT Hegemony Bad

#### Blanket kritik of hegemonic (economic) power is ethically unjustifiable. Reigning in war creation while preserving hegemony is the most peaceful

Reus-Smit 4 – Professor of IR @ ANU

Christian REUS-SMIT IR @ Australian Nat’l ‘4 American Power and World Order p. 109-115

The final ethical position — the polar opposite of the first — holds that the exercise of hegemonic power is never ethically justifiable. One source of such a position might be pacifist thought, which abhors the use of violence even in unambiguous cases of self-defence. This would not, however, provide a comprehensive critique of the exercise of hegemonic power, which takes forms other than overt violence, such as economic diplomacy or the manipulation of international institutions. A more likely source of such critique would be the multifarious literature that equates all power with domination. Postmodernists (and anarch­ists, for that matter) might argue that behind all power lies self-interest and a will to control, both of which are antithetical to genuine human freedom and diversity. Rad­ical liberals might contend that the exercise of power by one human over another transforms the latter from a moral agent into a moral subject, thus violating their in­tegrity as self-governing individuals. Whatever the source, these ideas lead to radical scepticism about all institutions of power, of which hegemony is one form. The idea that the state is a source of individual security is replaced here with the idea of the state as a tyranny; the idea of hegem­ony as essential to the provision of global public goods is A framework for judgement Which of the above ideas help us to evaluate the ethics of the Bush Administration's revisionist hegemonic project? There is a strong temptation in international relations scholarship to mount trenchant defences of favoured para­digms, to show that the core assumptions of one's pre­ferred theory can be adapted to answer an ever widening set of big and important questions. There is a certain discipline of mind that this cultivates, and it certainly brings some order to theoretical debates, but it can lead to the 'Cinderella syndrome', the squeezing of an un­gainly, over-complicated world into an undersized theor­etical glass slipper. The study of international ethics is not immune this syndrome, with a long line of scholars seeking master normative principles of universal applic­ability. My approach here is a less ambitious, more prag­matic one. With the exceptions of the first and last positions, each of the above ethical perspectives contains kernels of wisdom. The challenge is to identify those of value for evaluating the ethics of Bush's revisionist grand strategy, and to consider how they might stand in order of priority. The following discussion takes up this challenge and arrives at a position that I tentatively term 'procedural solidarism'. The first and last of our five ethical positions can be dismissed as unhelpful to our task. The idea that might is right resonates with the cynical attitude we often feel to­wards the darker aspects of international relations, but it does not constitute an ethical standpoint from which to judge the exercise of hegemonic power. First of all, it places the right of moral judgement in the hands of the hegemon, and leaves all of those subject to its actions with no grounds for ethical critique. What the hegemon dictates as ethical is ethical. More than this, though, the principle that might is right is undiscriminating. It gives us no resources to determine ethical from unethical hegemonic conduct. The idea that might is never right is **equally unsatisfying**. It is a principle implied in many critiques of imperial power, including of American power. But like its polar opposite, it is utterly **undiscriminating**. No matter what the hegemon does we are left with one blanket assessment. No procedure, no selfless goal is worthy of ethical endorsement. This is a **deeply impoverished ethical posture,** as it raises the **critique of power above all other human values**. It is also completely counter-intuitive. Had the United States intervened militarily to **prevent the Rwandan genocide**, would this not have been ethically justifiable? If one answers no, then one faces the difficult task of explaining why the exercise of hegemonic power would have been a greater evil than allowing almost a million people to be massacred. If one answers yes, then one is admitting that a more discriminating set of ethical principles is needed than the simple yet enticing propos­ition that might is never right.

### AT Radical IR/Security Bad

#### Rejection of securitization leads to instability and international intervention – doesn’t enable radical democracy – turns their impact

McCormack 10 – Lecturer in International Politics

Tara McCormack, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, pg. 127-129

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a **more interventionary role**, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have **any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation**. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a **barbarous life of inhuman bare survival**. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to create self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks **cannot** **be empowering,** and ultimately lead to **more power for powerful states,** we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

#### Anti-securitization is ahistorical

**Desch 99 – Professor @ UK**

Michael C., Assoc. Prof of International Commerce at Univ. of Kentucky, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 156-180

I appreciate the opportunity to respond to the comments on “Culture Clash”1 by John Duffield, Theo Farrell, and Richard Price.2 I begin by briefly summarizing the main claims of my original article and pointing out several issues about which we more or less agree. The bulk of my response, however, examines what I see as the central issue in this debate—whether culturalism can supplant realism—and indicates why I and their arguments unconvincing. My main objective in writing “Culture Clash” was to assess the latest wave of cultural approaches to security studies. As the letters by Duffield, Farrell, and Price make clear, scholars who employ cultural approaches see themselves as challenging— and ultimately replacing—the dominant realist paradigm. By contrast, I concluded that although cultural theories might be able to supplement realism, there is little reason to believe they will supplant it. This is because cultural theories do not do a better job than realism at explaining how the world works. The letters by Duffield, Farrell, and Price raise four issues about which we do not in fact disagree. One charge is that I regard comparing theories as a “zero-sum game, where there is room for one, and only one, theory that must be declared the ‘best’ and ‘prevail’” (Price, p. 169). However, my argument that cultural theories could supplement realism explicitly acknowledges that both approaches may be of value. A second charge is that I employ a “double standard in assessing the relative merits of cultural and realist approaches” (Duffield, p. 156). In fact, I believe that rival theories should be held to the same standard.3 My preference for realism rests on its ability to outperform cultural theories even in those cases where cultural approaches should be at an advantage. The third charge is that I reject cultural theories because they exhibit various conceptual flaws (e.g., vague definitions of key terms, lack of generalizability, and contradictions within the cultural family of theories) while failing to acknowledge that realist theories display similar weaknesses. I did mention these potential conceptual problems in my article, but I explicitly stated that “they do not present insurmountable obstacles” to the development and testing of cultural theories.4 Moreover, I freely acknowledge that realism too has conceptual problems that I also believe can be surmounted through careful scholarship. A final charge (Farrell, p. 162) is that I advocate single case studies, a position supposedly incompatible with Imre Lakatos’s method of assessing rival research programs through “sophisticated falsiacation.”5 I did not advocate single cases instead of large-n studies but simply argued that when comparing rival theories, scholars must be sure to include cases in which competing theories make distinct predictions. This is a widely accepted principle among methodologists and not at all incompatible with Lakatos’s approach.6 The real issue in this debate is whether culturalism can supplant or merely supplement realism in explaining the real world of international politics. In other words, which approach is most consistent with the typical behavior of states?

### AT Security Constructed

#### The fact that international relations is constructed doesn’t deny the accuracy of our impact claims – violence still exists

Jarvis 2k – Lecturer in IR @ U of Sydney

Darryl Jarvis (Director of the Research Institute for International Risk and Lecturer in International Relations, The University of Sydney) 2000 “International relations and the challenge of postmodernism” p. X

Just because we acknowledge that the state is a socially fabricated entity, or that the division between domestic and international society is arbitrary inscribed **does not make** the reality of the state disappear or render invisible international politics. Whether socially constructed or objectively given, the argument over the ontological status of the state is no particular moment. Does this change our experience of the state or somehow diminish the political-economic-juridical-military functions of the state? To recognize that states are not naturally inscribed but dynamic entities continually in the process of being made and reimposed and are therefore culturally dissimilar, economically different, and politically atypical, while perspicacious to our historical and theoretical understanding of the state, in no way detracts form its reality, practices, and consequences. Similarly, few would object to Ashley’s hermeneutic interpretivist understanding of the international sphere as an artificially inscribed demarcation. But, to paraphrase Holsti again, so what? This does not make its effects any less real, diminish its importance in our lives, or excuse us form paying serious attention to it. That international politics and states would not exist without subjectivities is a banal tautology. The point, surely, is to move beyond this and study these processes. Thus while intellectually interesting, constructivist theory is not an end point as Ashley seems to think, where we all throw up our hands and announce that there are no foundations and all reality is an arbitrary social construction. Rather, it should be a means of recognizing the structurated nature of our being and the reciprocity between subjects and structures through history. Ashley, however, seems not to want to do this, but only to deconstruct the state, international politics, and international theory on the basis that none of the is objectively given fictitious entities that arise out of modernist practices of representation. While an interesting theoretical enterprise, it is of **no great consequence** to the study of international politics. Indeed, structuration theory has long taken care of these ontological dilemmas that otherwise seem to preoccupy Ashley

### State-Centrism Good

#### State-centrism is the only way to produce human security and limit everyday injustice – material change should be preferred

-alternatives to the state will not be democratically accountable – can’t give content to rights claims

-key to value to life

McCormack 10 – PhD in IR

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Critical and emancipatory theorists fail to understand that there must be a **political content** to emancipation and new forms of social organisation. Critical theorists seek emancipation and argue for new forms of political community above and beyond the state, yet there is nothing at the moment **beyond the state that can give real content** to those wishes. There is no democratic world government and it is simply nonsensical to argue that the UN, for example, is a step towards global democ- racy. Major international institutions are essentially controlled by powerful states. To welcome challenges to sovereignty in the present political context **cannot hasten** any kind of more just world order in which **people really matter** (to para- phrase Lynch). Whatever the limitations of the state, and there are many, at the moment the state represents the only framework in which people might have a chance to have some meaningful control over their lives. Critical theorists who argue for more cosmopolitan international frameworks of universal human rights or more global democratic organisations in order to emancipate the oppressed fail to understand that in the current political context they are arguing for **fictional rights and communities**. In this context, these rights can only be given at the behest of a more powerful state or international organisation. This, however, leads to a relationship between the rights recipient and the rights giver which is not a political relationship of control and accountability, but one closer, as Emma Rothschild has perceptively argued, to charity (Rothschild, 1995). In order to illustrate this problem from another angle, let us consider briefly the concept of Children’s Rights (this example is taken from Norman Lewis, 1998) or gender inequality. Without a doubt in many parts of the world children and women suffer greatly and have many unfair burdens upon them. It may seem therefore that the UN Convention on Children’s Rights, for example, or a framework of universal human rights codified in international law might be seen as a good and progressive thing in order to decrease inequality and empower women and children. Certainly for many critical and emancipatory theorists, as we have seen, the emerging rights regime is part of a potentially more just world order. However, as James Heartfield (1996) has argued, this is to understand that rights are a purely legal matter, rather than a product of prior social and political struggle which is then given legal form. Rights derive from subjects who are capable of exercising them and giving content to them (Heartfield, 1996; Lewis, 1998). Without the social and political struggle and the development of the rights-bearing individual who gives the legal rights their content, rights are fictions. Of course in reality a person in Britain (for example) does not directly exercise his or her rights, rather they are enforced by the existing state. If, for example, a women is denied employment because of her gender this infringes her rights. These rights are codi- fied in state law. She may then go to court in order to force the company to abide by the law and her rights will be upheld. This is not, however, simply an esoteric point for political theorists but one with major implications for people. If we return to the example of the UN Convention on Children’s Rights we can begin to see what the problematic implications of rights without content are. Children’s rights cannot be exercised by children, they do not have the capacity, they are dependent upon other people in order to survive. Their rights are fictions which must be exercised on behalf of them (Lewis, 1998: 93). In reality this means that the state, for example, is empowered here, not the child. In the broader context of contemporary international relations it tends to mean that the developing coun- try in which children’s rights are seen to be lacking (for example a country in which child labour is common) is subject to greater intervention and regulation from a more ‘enlightened’ international community. This also has the effect of turning what are essentially consequences of serious poverty and a low level of development into problems of law and morality. Again, more powerful ‘enlightened’ states are empowered to intervene and regulate developing states in the name of interna- tional law and human rights (Lewis, 1998: 95–98). As the problems, however, are not matters of law but of development they cannot be resolved through law. Not only is state sovereignty eroded but the idea of law also. We could also consider the problem of gender inequality in a developing state. A woman in Afghanistan, for example, clearly does not have the civil rights that a woman in another state might have. Yet of course, these are rights that she cannot claim against the government of her state, or rather the government cannot give content to these rights as the government’s control in the case of Afghanistan does not go much further than Kabul. Rather, the only way in which there may be a way for her to have these rights would be through the intervention of another state (indeed women’s rights formed part of the rationale for the military intervention in Afghanistan) whether military or tied to aid. Here, there will be no political relationship between the Afghan woman and, for example, NATO. There will be no mechanism of control and accountability for the woman, her rights are in the gift of power external forces and therefore not rights that can empower as they are not con- trolled by her. Friedrich Kratochwil argues that critical theory has to address ‘what types of constitutive understanding authorise particular practices and this creates specific types of authority’ (2007: 36). I argue that critical and emancipatory approaches have a certain unrealised constitutive understanding which is **abstract and idealised**, leading ultimately to forms of power and political practice that are disempowering. Critical theorists separate the rights bearer from the rights claimant. In the absence of any constitutive body that can give content to those rights or even agreed norms that can derive from that political body, these rights are at best meaningless and at worst empower precisely those practices which critical theorists wish to resolve. It is in this respect that in contemporary context critical and emancipatory approaches reproduce and authorise the constitutive particular practices of contemporary powers.

### Realism Good

#### Realism is the most accurate theory of international relations – minor counter-examples don’t disprove the overarching predictive nature of anarchic sovereign states\*

-it doesn’t preclude alliance-building

-it accurately explains economic leadership and some components of liberalism

Amin et al 11 – PhD Candidate @ Institute of International Studies, in People’s Republic of China

Musarat, Rizwan Naseer, PhD Candidate @ Institute of International Studies, in People’s Republic of China, Tilak Ishtiaq, MA in IR @ University of Sargodha, Pakistan, “Realism - Dominating Theory in International Relations: An analysis,” Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 7

Realism is sometimes described as dominant theory in the field of International Relations. Realism has been implicated in almost every major debate over the last half century. ‘Theory of Political Realism’ is differentiated from other theories in its explanation of events around the world. Some of the scholars opine that Realists take a pessimistic view of international relations. The roots of realism can be traced back to antiquity in the famous works from Greece, Rome, India and China. Realist’s arguments can be found in Kautiliya’s Arthshastra.Kautilya focuses on the position of potential conqueror who always tries to maximize his power even at the expense of others. 1 Political realism in the twenty first century can be dated from 1939 when Edwar Hellet Carr’s book Twenty Years Crisis dominated the other schools of thought in the field of international Relations. For reinforcing Carr’s classical realism other eminent scholars added more thoughtful work to the theory of realism. The eminent contributors of realism were Shuman(1933) ,Nicolson(1939) ,Niebuhr(1940), Schwarzenberger(1941),Wight(1946),Morgantha u(1948),Kennan(1951) and Butterfield(1953) invigorated realist approach and disagreed with the claim of liberal approach as dominating in that era. But the book by Hans J Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace received more prominence and emerged as standard bearer for ‘Theory of Political Realism’, as it went through six editions between 1948 1985. 2 To assess the dominance of realism we can examine events happened during cold war and post cold war era. Cold war era simply testified that **realism dominated all the alternative theories** in explaining the events between USA and USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republic).Cold war divided world into two ideological camps i.e. Capitalist bloc led by United States and Communist bloc, led by USSR. Both the superpowers engaged in intense struggle for power that ranged from making alliances to waging war. Whatever happened (peace, proxy war) between the relations of both US and USSR during the cold war time is explained by realist school of thought very nicely. The term “Cold War” was first used in 1947 by Bernard Baruch, senior advisor to Harry Truman, the 33rd president of the United States. 3 Scholars disagree on the time of commencement of cold war. The Cold War can be said to have begun in 1917, with the emergence of a revolutionary Bolshevik regime in Soviet Union, devoted to spread communism throughout the industrialized world. The Cold War was the most significant political and diplomatic issue of the latter half of the 20th Century. In this era diplomacy saw new horizons. The main cold war enemy states were the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold war got its name because both sides were afraid of fighting each other directly. Their fear was that in such a "hot war," nuclear weapons might destroy everything in each other’s territory. So, instead, they preferred to fight each other indirectly with the help of allies and proxy wars. They played havoc with conflicts in different parts of the world. They used all types of weapons propaganda, diplomacy, arms and other tactics to malign and debilitate each other. They threatened and denounced each other in almost every front. According to an estimate, the cold war began in the 1945-1948 timeframe, and ended in 1989, having been a dispute over the division of Europe. Over the years, leaders many things changed on both sides politically, economically but the Cold War continued despite change of regimes. It was the major force in world politics for most of the second half of the twentieth century. Some historians disagree about the timeframe of cold war but a few believe it ended when the United States and the Soviet Union improved relations during the nineteensixties and early nineteen-seventies. The era of détente reduced several tensions between world’s biggest rivals and pushed them to show flexibility to avert bigger crisis. Others believe it ended when the Berlin Wall was pulled down in 1989, or when the Soviet Union collapsed ultimately in late 1991 resulting in disintegration of Soviet Union. 4 In this article this is not an issue when did the cold war initiated or came to an end but to examine that all developments in field of diplomacy and alliance formation were aiming at strengthening oneself and weakening the other power. The events of Korean War, Truman doctrine, Marshal Plan, Cuban missile crisis, Vietnam War, thaw in Sino-US relation and Afghan war were purely serving realist paradigm’s fundamental postulates. With the end of cold war era scholars thought that realism may not be dominating theory in the field of international relations because of the change in world order **but** **that could not happen**. United States emerged as the world’s biggest power (politically, economically and technologically) with no other parallel rival in world arena. But the idea of essentiality of US hegemony to maintain peace and order of the world did not stop conflict even in post cold war era.US involvement in Gulf war 1991, Iraq war 2003 and the most significant event in recent history September 11, 2001, pushed US to combat global terrorist networks. War against terrorism seems to be an unending war for the United States. Because terrorist networks globally are hard to locate and destroy them is near impossible task. The reason of unending war is collateral damage that generates more Anti-American sentiments and they are easily tamed by terrorists to use them against American interest. Conclusion can be reached by evaluating US success in war against Iraq and Afghanistan. No stable democratic government has been installed in both states and worst law and order situation speaks louder than words. Unless United Stated rethinks its strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq the situation seems to be unchanged over course of time. States in international arena develop relations with other international actors (states).No state can survive alone in the competitive world without making friends and countering enemies. The most important desirable thing for each stronger and weaker state is the attainment of security against internal and external threats. States make allies (friends) for satisfying their needs of security and prosperity. Like an individual in the world cannot survive alone, he/she needs other fellow beings around him to fulfill his/her psychological, biological and economic needs. States behave on similar pattern as the human beings do, because states are constructed by human beings for the fulfillment of their needs of survival, safety, identity, economy and polity. ‘Anarchy’ is the significant feature of international system of states. There is no central authority over states that could regularize relations among states. So relations among states take place in an anarchic environment (absence of a world government).Realist call this characteristic as international anarchic system. Theoretically, all the states have formal legal equality despite diversity in size, power and resources, whereas in practice, the powerful dominates over weaker states as the current international order reflects. The uneven distribution of power means the arena of international relations is a kind of power politics with all actors pursuing to maximize their power for the safe and secure accomplishment of their national interest. States gather and wield power to survive in competitive and sometimes inimical environment. There has not been discovered any instrument to measure power that make it hard to measure and is unevenly distributed among states. Powers among states changes over time, some states grow strong and some go weaker and there has not been any consensus among states about the distribution of power. 5 The claim that there is no world government over all the nation-states, and this situation is called anarchy, is universally accepted among the scholars and practitioners of international relations so all the nation-states in the world are not under control of any supreme authority who could implement its orders over states. It means all the states are sovereign and enjoy absolute independence in their internal and external affairs. Because there is no higher authority that a state must obey, states are said to have international independence for exercising their sovereign duties. The most widely accepted version of anarchy myth was put forward by Kenneth Waltz; international anarchy is the permissive cause of war. 6 E.H Carre and Hans Morgenthau are crucial figures who played a vital role in development of Realist paradigm. They are said to be among the pioneer scholars who coined the term ‘realism’. Both the scholars did a great deal of elaboration in making fundamental assumption clear in contrast to the ‘Idealist Theory’. They explained the weird nature of world politics and put forward the idea that there is no harmony of interest among states, each state has different national objectives and adopts heterogeneous policies for the accomplishment of their national goals. For them **it is a silly hope** to believe that the struggle for power can be overcome by international morality, international institutions and democratization. They are aware of the reality that national interest cannot be compromised at any cost. The scholars dismissed the idealist approach as an adequate one to bring peace and order. These realists justify their argument by pointing at the failure of League of Nations in failing to stop the outbreak of World War II. 7 This resulted in the shattering of hopes for those who were thinking that idealism can prevail to curtail war or the circumstances that lead to war. Some of the realist scholars blame strange human nature for the reason of war and conflict. Nicolo Machiavelli, author of The Prince (1532) and Thomas Hobbes, author of Leviathan (1651), figured out human nature as a root-cause of the conflict. They presumed that human beings are basically driven by their self-interest, human being are bound to satisfy their appetites, intrinsic in their instinct. But to them the most dangerous appetite among others is human being’s lust for power. With the attainment of power human beings can safely satisfy their appetites. In their view, states as a core actor in international relations struggle hard for maximization of their power. This constant struggle for power does not mean that they are always busy in waging wars but always on a risk to go to war. So in such a competitive and anarchic international environment the only prudent strategy of a state should be to acquire as much power as it can and wielding that power for the successful accomplishment of their national interest. Only a powerful state can defend its national interest among other competitors. For this objective, military power couple with commerce and industry (wealth) is seen as a **key requirement** to enhance effective power. 8 If the struggle for power for the accomplishment of human appetites is intrinsic in their instinct, then states engagement in similar power struggle is not an unusual behavior. It was human beings who constructed state for fulfillment of their needs and would be responsible for its demolition. Realists are blamed by other school of thoughts for being pessimist and showing the darker side of the picture, whereas they are not pessimist but assess the circumstances in the light of all the possible variables that can result in undesirable outcomes. Primary interest for every state is survival and security against possible external threats to its existence. States may cooperate with each other to minimize enemies and strengthening friendly relations with other counterparts. For this purpose states engage themselves in making alliances and conclude pacts with other states. But states always watch their interest carefully and remain very much cautious about relative gains. States demand a stable distribution of power in international system. Despite cooperation among states, they are always concerned if other player (state) achieves relatively greater gain from their join action. While going for joint venture, states that feel insecure must ask will both of us gain. If yes! Who will gain more? Suppose the expected gain is divided between two with the ration of 1and 2, the state with less gain may perceive the other (state with more gain) can use its disproportionate gain to formulate a policy that may be aiming against the national interest of former (with less gain).Because in international politics no state is trustworthy. That’s why this relative gain causes problem sometime among states when a state feels its partners are likely to achieve disproportionate gain from the common endeavor. 9 States carve out their strategies after a prolonged thinking; they always try their best to avoid any loopholes which can subsequently result in the failure of their strategy. States’ strategies are formulated rationally, taking into account cost-benefit calculations. Policy makers estimate almost all possible outcomes of their course of action. In 1970’s realism’s prominence in the field of international relations started fading away but to some an extant. With the work of Keohane and Nye, whose focus were interdependence and non-state actors. Their ideas got popularity but could little to diminish realism. As Morgenthau’s classical realism relied on the assumption that leaders of the states are motivated by their natural lust for power, this very assumption of Morgenthau had a contrast with Waltz’ assumption that omits leader’s motivations and state characteristic as causal variables for international outcome. 10 Waltz says state behavior can be product of competition (for survival, preserving and promoting national interest) among states because they know how to gain and survive in the system, if they don’t behave this way **would be expelled from the system**. Waltz’s Work Theory of International Politics proved remarkably an influential book; it triggered new discussions and debates that gave impetus to the existing theoretical grounds. For example, the book initiated a debate over the relative gains among states, whether states’ concerns over relative gains hinder cooperation among them. Another question arose whether Bipolar or multipolar international systems are more unstable and war prone. Waltz’s Theory of International Politics became a prominent target. As time went by, Neorealist work, in particular neoliberal institutionalism and investigations of the democratic peace, became more popular while Realism’s decline in the 1990s was amplified by international events. Almost the ending phase of twentieth century started introducing new and alternative approaches in the field of international relations. With the demise of USSR, the rivalry between US and USSR came to an end, this change couple with other phenomena at international arena debilitated strength of realism. These popular events include Demise of USSR with absence of US-USSR intense competition, West European Integration into single entity(European Community),wave of democratization around the world particularly in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, least chances of war between great powers debilitated realism’s valor in the field of International relations. Contemporary theorist started thinking that alternative theories (liberal, constructivist) could explain the world politics in more nice way than realism. 11 If we take stock of history to the contemporary times, it is replete with the events, supported by realist theory. Frequent wars between states and absence of peace validate applicability of political realism. But cold war era is said to be the most important phase in international relations theory and practice. The reason is, in this era states acquired weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), got the capability to destroy their enemy within moments. This situation put more challenges ahead for states to deal with nuclear actors. Diplomacy (preventive) was the tool employed by both the superpowers to de-escalate impending crisis. Both the powers i.e. United States and Soviet Union confronted at every issue that could be of national prestige but were compelled to cooperate when faced a serious situation which could trigger war (hot) between them. Cuban Missile Crisis is the best example to explain their behavior. If we take stock of different stages in cold war and post cold war era, we reach at the conclusion that realism **was, is and will be the dominating theory** in the field of international relations. The first counter-move of United States started on Feb21, 1947 when British government informed United States that due to its own difficulties, it was no longer in a position to continue it military and economic aid for Greece and Turkey .British government announced the deadline for disconnecting its military and economic aid by April1, 1947.President Truman realized United States did so Greece would be taken over by communists with the active support of USSR. On the other side Turkey would also find it in untenable position against communist force and that the eastern Mediterranean and the Near East in that event would inevitably fall under communist domination. In this challenging situation Truman took an immediate and resolute action to support Greece and Turkey. The objective of the assistance to Greece and Turkey was to assist the countries of free world who are resisting communist aggression. The military aid provided to Greece and Turkey, accomplished its desired objectives. 12 After Truman Doctrine another economic package, Marshall Plan was announced for Western European countries to reconstruct war torn countries. Unites States needed allies that time to curb peril of expansion of communism. During cold war times diplomacy took new turns and twists. This assumption is not wrong if we say it was diplomacy that kept both the nuclear armed superpowers away from direct nuclear war. Whatever diplomacy was played either preventive or offensive was aiming at maximizing their power and minimizing the influence of other actor in international arena. The most crucial phase in cold war was Cuban missile crisis, when both nuclear armed superpowers were in “eyeball to eyeball “competition and likely to trigger a nuclear war. But the crisis was averted by realizing its atrocious consequences. Cuban missile crisis checked both the countries’ willingness to initiate nuclear war, while neither was willing to risk whole nation’s lives. This crisis turned serious when On Oct, 14, upon the report of intelligence resources, U2 spy-plane took pictures of the site in Cuba where USSR had established Missile bases to launch nuclear attack against US. A team of experts informed and warned President Kennedy that he had 10 days before they (Missile) go operational. On Oct, 16 Kennedy took up this matter of national security seriously and constituted a Committee of the National Security Council (NSC) to advise him on the concerning issue. Six days later, Kennedy mounted naval blockade of Cuba for that B52 nuclear bombers were deployed, so that one-eighth of them were airborne all the time. The same night, a Western spy operating in Russia was arrested. His last message traced was; ‘Soviet attack imminent’. Khrushchev explained that the Soviet backed missile sites in Cuba were ‘primarily to defend Cuba against the attack of an aggressor’. As the US had clamped a naval blockade of Cuba, the first Russian ship carrying oil reached the naval blockade, was allowed through. All the other Russian ships (carrying missiles) had to turn back. On the other hand US as a retaliatory act had established similar Missile bases in Turkey to hit USSR, in case of war. The US government offered to remove US missiles in Turkey in exchange for those in Cuba. Russia was still busy in building the missile bases, and Kennedy planned a military offensive on Cuba .Khrushchev sent a telegram to Kennedy, he offered dismantling the nuclear sites if Kennedy would lift the blockade and cancel plan to attack Cuba. Before Kennedy could reply, Khrushchev sent another letter, demanding that Kennedy also dismantle American missile bases in Turkey. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed to dismantle missile bases and crisis came to an end. Resultantly Russian bombers left Cuba and Kennedy ordered removal of blockade. 13 This reflects that both sides were quite aware of the consequences of nuclear war. If war could happen definitely it would have been a nuclear war or collective death for both actors.Thats why crisis was averted with active diplomacy. Other important events during cold war were Vietnam war, Iranian revolution and Arab-Israel war validate that use of force still persists against the targets where there is a less sear of mutually assured destruction. Ultimately the cold war came to end after the disintegration of USSR. United States emerged as a single global power with overarching effects globally. World politics transformed, world order got shift from bipolar to unipolar, democratization of newly established and preexisting states started taking place alike, means everything changed slightly or fully but one thing that didn’t change was practice of political realism by the hands of superpower. Until the national interest is supreme for nations, sovereignty is relevant and borders matter, political realism will remain the dominant theory in the field of international relations despite enhanced cooperation among states, and they don’t compromise on their national interest. United States as the most powerful state in the world faced many more challenges ahead. One event of Sep11, 2001, changed recent history .United States initiated a global war against terrorism to dismantle terrorist networks across the globe. The Bush administration in mid september2002, issued a formal national security doctrine that United States will not hesitate to strike its enemies preemptively and will never allow any other superpower to challenge or threaten United States’ military supremacy. In the United States and Europe, media criticized this new strategy of Washington to curb terrorism and eliminate threats against United States. A stream of critical articles poured forth, this strategy was a product of neoconservatives in Washington and most significant neoconservatives Vice President Dick Cheney and deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz were advocating strategies of unilateralism, preemption and military hegemony. David Armstrong in Harpers’ magazine wrote that US exercises Unilateralism but ultimately it’s the game f domination. 14 Until today there is no end of war is in sight, this war against global terrorism is a prolonged war of history against a non state actor. Even during the past ten years United States, is struggling to maintain order in Afghanistan and Iraq but results are disappointing. According to Professor Barry Buzan this war against global terrorism will be a long war. This long global war against terrorism is explicitly compared to cold war and is a similar zero-sum against anti-liberal ideological extremists who are maneuvering to dominate the world. Donald Rumsfeld says about terrorist’s ideology that either they will succeed in changing our way of life or we will change theirs. 15 In sum it can be argued that until the state entity exists, its security cannot be an irrelevant issue. Army shall remain the indispensable state institution against internal and external threats. War will be recurring event in international relations, in name of security or national interest. Cooperation among states is not permanent when their national interest or security is endangered they give up cooperation. In the light of all above discussed events it can be concluded that realism was, is and will remain the dominating theory in international relations.

### Security Good

#### Fear appeals are key to motivation – uses discourse that informs effective political change

Witte and Allen 2k

Kim, Prof. Comm. – MSU, and Mike, Prof. Comm. – U. Wisconsin Milwaukee, Health Education & Behavior, “A Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeals: Implications for Effective Public Health Campaigns”, 27:5, October, Sage Journals

At least three meta-analyses have been conducted on the fear appeal literature. Boster and Mongeau8 and Mongeau9 examined the influence of a fear appeal on perceived fear (the manipulation check; i.e., did the strong vs. weak fear appeals differ significantly in their influence on measures of reported fear), attitudes, and behaviors. They found that on average, fear appeal manipulations produced moderate associations between reported fear and strength of fear appeal (r = .36 in Boster and Mongeau and r = .34 in Mongeau) and modest but reliable relationships between the strength of a fear appeal and attitude change (r = .21 in Boster and Mongeau and r = .20 in Mongeau) and the strength of a fear appeal and behavior change (r = .10 in Boster and Mongeau and r = .17 in Mongeau). Sutton7 used a different meta-analytic statistical method (z scores) and reported significant positive effects for strength of fear appeal on intentions and behaviors. None of the meta-analyses found support for a curvilinear association between fear appeal strength and message acceptance. Overall, the previous meta-analyses suggested that fear appeal manipulations work in producing different levels of fear according to different strengths of fear appeal messages. Furthermore, the meta-analyses suggest that the stronger the fear appeal, the greater the attitude, intention, and behavior change.

#### Prefer our evidence – cites best studies

Witte and Allen 2k

Kim, Prof. Comm. – MSU, and Mike, Prof. Comm. – U. Wisconsin Milwaukee, Health Education & Behavior, “A Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeals: Implications for Effective Public Health Campaigns”, 27:5, October, Sage Journals

Meta-analysis is a quantitative method that synthesizes the results of a particular group of studies. Researchers gather all available studies on a topic and then combine these studies statistically to produce an average effect for different variables across the literature. It allows one to see the “big picture.”38 Meta-analysis provides a thorough and objective synthesis of the literature that is needed as the literature becomes larger and the issues become more complex. For example, a quantitative analysis not only allows one to establish that one message strategy (or even a level of a message strategy) is more persuasive but also suggests certain explanations as to why some message designs are more effective than others. Furthermore, meta-analysis allows one to examine combinations of message features in a systematic way. Meta-analysis, by establishing consistency in research, can eliminate some possibilities and point outways of assessing or comparing theories, determine future research agendas by identifying areas of weak or insufficient literature that require additional exploration, and call attention to areas that need further theorizing to explain conflicting results.

#### Security is good – deterrence is necessary to solve conflict and is the only

Moore 4 – Dir. Center for Security Law and Professor of Law @ University of Virginia, Editor of the American Journal of International Law

John Norton, “Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace,” pg. 41-43

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not independent the  existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the **circumstances** permitting or **encouraging high risk decisions**leading to war **that is the key to** more effectively **controlling war**. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to **doom us to war for generations** to come. A useful framework in thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the State, and War,12 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision for war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant. I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who may be disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposing to high risk behavior. We should keep before us, however, the possibility, indeed probability, that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders, and systematically applying other findings of cognitive psychology, as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence in context. A post-Gulf War edition of Gordon Craig and Alexander George's classic, Force and Statecraft,13 presents an important discussion of the inability of the pre-war coercive diplomacy effort to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait without war.14 This discussion, by two of the recognized masters of deterrence theory, reminds us of the many important psychological and other factors operating at the individual level of analysis that may well have been crucial in that failure to get Hussein to withdraw without war. We should also remember that nondemocracies can have differences between leaders as to the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, we should also keep before us that major international war is predominantly and critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three, specifically an absence of democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way **internalizes the costs** to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk.I5 VI Testing the Hypothesis Theory without truth is but costly entertainment. HYPOTHESES, OR PARADIGMS, are useful if they reflect the real world better than previously held paradigms. In the complex world of foreign affairs and the war puzzle, perfection is unlikely. No general construct will fit all cases even in the restricted category of "major interstate war"; there are simply too many variables. We should insist, however, on testing against the real world and on results that suggest enhanced usefulness over other constructs. In testing the hypothesis, we can test it for consistency with major wars; that is, in looking, for example, at the principal interstate wars in the twentieth century, did they present both a nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence?' And although it is by itself not going to prove causation, we might also want to test the hypothesis against settings of potential wars that did not occur. That is, in nonwar settings, was there an absence of at least one element of the synergy? We might also ask questions about the effect of changes on the international system in either element of the synergy; that is, what, in general, happens when a totalitarian state makes a transition to stable democracy or vice versa? And what, in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?