Plan Text Possibilities

The United States Department of Transportation should provide a public transit system.

The United States federal government should substantially increase its investment in free and accessible public transit.

The United States Army Corps of Engineers should substantially increase its investment in free and accessible public transit.

The United States Department of Transportation should substantially increase its investment in free and accessible public transit with no funding from the State or Private companies. (Federal Transit Administration)

1AC Neolib Adv

Current mass transit systems make decisions based off of profit maximization. Their decision to exclude poor, traditionally racially diverse areas is a calculated neoliberal decision to put economic self-interest before equality.

Farmer 11

Farmer Sociology Dep’t Roosevelt University 2011 Stephanie Uneven public transportation development in neoliberalizing Chicago, USA Environment and Planning <http://envplan.com/epa/fulltext/a43/a43409.pdf>, KB

Contemporary urbanization processes are strongly shaped by the logic and policies of neoliberalism. Neoliberal ideology advocates the extension of market-based principles in the arena of the state in order to `liberate' both public services from so-called `state inefficiencies' and capital `squandered' by taxation that could be more profitability deployed by private actors. Accordingly, neoliberal regulatory frameworks promote market discipline over the state, usually achieved by such policy mechanisms as lowering taxes on businesses and the wealthy, shrinking or dismantling public services, and subjecting public services to the logic of markets through public - private partnerships or outright privatization. The creative-destructive processes of neoliberal state strategy reconfigure the territorial organization of accumulation, and consequently produce new forms of uneven geographic development.

The literature on neoliberal urbanization establishes the broader processes of political, economic, and social restructuring and rescaling in response to declining profitability of the Fordist accumulation regime (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002). The roll-back of Fordist regulatory configurations and the roll-out of neoliberalization transformed the sociospatial hierarchy of regulatory frameworks with the nation-state as the center of state regulation to a more multiscalar regulatory framework articulated by the interactions of global, national, and local scales (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Cities emerged as crucial sites of neoliberalization and institutional restructuring. In the United States, neoliberal policies restructured Fordist forms of territorial organization by devolving the relatively centralized, managerial -redistributive system of urban planning and financing at the federal level to subregional states and municipalities (Eisinger, 1998; Harvey, 1989). Thus localities were forced to finance local infrastructure, transit, housing, and other forms of collective consumption on their own or abandon them altogether. By starving cities of revenues, neoliberal state restructuring rendered states and municipalities more dependent upon locally generated tax revenues as well as intensifying intercity competition (Harvey, 1989).

Cities starved by neoliberal state restructuring responded to their fiscal troubles by adopting entrepreneurial norms, practices, and institutional frameworks. Entre-preneurial municipal governments prioritize policies that create a good business climate and competitive advantages for businesses (Harvey, 1989; Smith, 2002) by “reconstituting social welfare provisions as anticompetitive costs'', and by implementing ``an extremely narrow urban policy repertoire based on capital subsidies, place promotion, supply side intervention, central-city makeovers and local boosterism'' (Peck and Tickell, 2002, pages 47 ^ 48). In effect, neoliberal urbanization encourages local governments to retreat from social redistribution and integrated social welfare policies in favor of bolstering business activity (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Swyngedouw et al, 2002). As a consequence, entrepreneurial mayors emerged in the 1980s to forge alliances between government and business leaders (what I refer to as the `global city growth machine') under the banner of urban revitalization (Judd and Simpson, 2003). City space is mobilized ``as an arena both for market-oriented economic growth and for elite consumption practices'' (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, page 21). The abandonment of Fordist planning, privileging a more integrated urban form in favor of selective investment in privileged places, has resulted in what scholars have variously deemed as a fragmented, polarized, splintered, or quartered urbanity (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Marcuse and van Kempen, 2000; Sassen 1991; Swyngedouw et al, 2002). The business-friendly policies and practices pursued by entrepreneurial urban governments must also be understood in relation to the global reorganization of production. Global cities emerged as the command and control nodes of the global economy, where multinational headquarters, producer services, and FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) firms cluster (Sassen, 1991). To lure multinational corporate headquarters, producer services, professional ^ managerial workers, and tourists to their city, municipal governments recreate urban space by prioritizing megaprojects and infrastructure that help businesses gain competitive advantages and keep them connected within global networks as well as providing financing and amenities for gentrification, tourism, and cultural consumption (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Fainstein, 2008; Graham and Marvin, 2001; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Swyngedouw et al, 2002). These urban development strategies are ideologically and discursively legitimized by the global city growth machine as necessary for `global city' or `world-class city' formation (McGuirk, 2004; Wilson, 2004).

Public transportation policy is one dimension of spatial restructuring deployed by entrepreneurial governments to create place-based competitive advantages for global capital. Transportation represents a fixed, place-based geographic element where the local and the global interact; where global processes shape local geographies and where local politics shape global networks. As Keil and Young (2008) suggest, transportation should now be considered in relation to globalized trade and economic networks and consumption-oriented patterns of everyday life. Growth demands in cities experiencing gentrification, the development of luxury consumption spaces, and a surge of tourism have placed pressure on local agencies to expand airports, roads, and rail and public transit capacities. Large-scale urban redevelopment plans have made a comeback as city planners conceive of megaprojects that concentrate new public transit investment in the revalorized core (Fainstein, 2008; Keil and Young, 2008; Swyngedouw et al, 2002).

Air transportation has become the leading form of global connectivity, influencing the decisions of global, national, and regional elites to create air-transportation infrastructure (Cidell, 2006; Erie, 2004; Keil and Young, 2008; Phang, 2007). For instance, there is a growing network of world-class cities (Shanghai, London, and Tokyo) that enables air travelers to connect seamlessly from one global city core to the next, with direct express train service from the downtown business core to the city's international airports (Graham and Marvin, 2001). These specialized public transit systems more closely integrate a city into global markets, thereby making the city more attractive for business activities (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Graham, 2000). The resulting “premium network spaces'' are ``geared to the logistical and exchange demands of foreign direct investors, tourist spaces or socioeconomically affluent groups'' (Graham and Marvin, 2001, page 100). Interactions with the surrounding residential districts are carefully managed by filtering `proper' users through nonstop services or prohibitively expensive fares. In addition, premium transport services tend to be bundled with upscale shopping centers, entertainment spectacles, hotels, or office spaces to form a giant, integrated bubble of luxury. Subsequently, sociospatial relations are reconfigured as premium infrastructure bypasses devalorized places and exclude economically disadvantaged users from accessing the transit service. The neoliberal trend towards premium public transportation deployed for the purposes of constructing competitive advantages in the global capitalist system privileges profit making for capital, or exchange-value purposes, and not necessarily for everyday use, or use-value purposes (Keil and Young, 2008; Logan and Molotch, 1987).

The government’s failure to act in the realm of mass transit is a manifestation of the neoliberal control over the public sphere. Forcing equality in mass transit unveils the current structural violence and frees society from neoliberalism’s control.

Springer 08 (Simon Springer, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, “The nonillusory effects of neoliberalisation: Linking geographies of poverty, inequality, and violence,” July 2008, Geoforum, vol. 39 issue 4, pages 1520 – 1525) , KB

Furthermore, if conditions among the lower classes deteriorate under neoliberalism, this failure is implied to be a product of personal irresponsibility or cultural inferiority (Harvey, 2005), an argument epitomised by Harrison and Huntington’s (2000) rightist call to arms ‘Culture Matters: How Values *Shape Human Progress*’. More subtly, neoliberal ideology’s suspicion of the poor as morally suspect turns the social suffering wrought by neoliberal capitalism into a ‘public secret’ (Taussig, 1992; see also Watts, 2000), allowing ‘symbolic violence’ – or that violence which accomplishes itself through misrecognition thus enabling violence to go unperceived as such – to prevail (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2004), so that the poor are blamed, and indeed blame themselves for their ongoing poverty (Bourgois, 2004). Accumulation by dispossession operates in much the same capacity insofar as the erasure of the originary and ongoing ‘violences of property’ (Blomley, 2003) serves to legitimise the exclusionary claims of the landowning elite. The property system entails violent ‘acts’ of dispossession at its founding moment, as well as enduring violent ‘deeds’ – which need not be physicalised to be operative, as self policing becomes reflexive – that (re)enforce the exclusionary basis of private property (Blomley, 2000). Working in concert, these ‘acts’ and ‘deeds’ purposefully disregard the violence to which the poor have been subjected, while resistance and subsequent attempts at reclamation are typically treated as both proscribed and manifestly violent. It is in this way that these decidedly nonillusory effects of neoliberalisation can be seen as deliberately ‘choking the south’ (Wade, 2006) or ‘attacking thepoor’ (Cammack, 2002), where we can view Polanyi’s contention that the dominance of market rationality was a fundamental cause of the savagery characteristic of the first half of the twentieth century (Dunford, 2000) as being carried forward into a new context. Neoliberals are quick to point out how absolute poverty has declined under the global neoliberal regime, a claim that may or may not actually be tenable (Wade, 2004). Regardless of this assertion, following Rapley (2004) we can view the global neoliberal regime as inherently unstable because it assumes that absolute rather than relative prosperity is the key to contentment, and while absolute poverty may have declined under neoliberalism, relative inequality has risen (Uvin, 2003). Building on this notion, Rapley (2004) suggests the events of 11 September 2001 were a symbolic moment of crisis, where those on the ‘losing end’ of the neoliberal regime’s unequal distribution made their discontent with systemic poverty and glaring inequality emphatically clear (see also [Tetreault, 2003] and [Uvin, 1999], who suggest similar expressions of resentment ultimately led to the Rwandan violence under the auspice of what Harvey (2003) calls the ‘New Imperialism’ led by the current Bush administration. Contra [Larner’s (2003)](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718508000067#bib33) claim that this new military might is anything but neoliberal in character, the rhetorical ‘war on terror’ currently being waged by the Bush regime uses militarism to enforce the neoliberal order most overtly in those spaces where the geostrategic imperative for oil converge with the failure of Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex (Wade, 1998) economic prescriptions, namely in Afghanistan and Iraq ([Gregory, 2004] and [Harvey, 2003]). United States military power thus serves as a bulwark for enforcement of an American concept of ‘new world order’ (i.e. neoliberalism-cum-Pax Americana) which as a renewed strategy of accumulation by dispossession is shared to varying degrees by other governments, particularly members of the G8 (Cox, 2002). The precedent set by the New Imperialism has seen many third world states, informed by the rhetoric of their own war on terror, using violence more readily as a tool of control (Canterbury, 2005). While such repression is not entirely new, as Glassman and Samatar (1997) point to it as a commonplace feature of the ‘post’-colonial era, novelty rests in the ease of its legitimation via the discourse of ‘security’ (Springer, 2008). Indeed, such neoauthoritarianism is readily extended under neoliberalism as both a means to maintain the social order necessary for the extraction of economic surplus from those countries recently incorporated into the global capitalist system (Canterbury, 2005), and as a response to the supposedly inherent violent tendencies of the lower classes, who now faced with mounting unemployment, slashed wages, forced evictions, and all the other associated hallmarks of accumulation by dispossession, must resort to other means of survival, being ultimately forced into the underground economy as a street vendor, or worse, prostitution and drug trafficking. Thus, the neoliberal imperative for the inalienable right of the individual and his/her property, trumps any social democratic concern for an open public space, equality, and social solidarity (Harvey, 2005). Yet one is left to wonder whether Barnett (2005) would extend his argument to consider such attempts at collective empowerment and redistribution as mere ideological ploys by the Left, inviting us to take solace in an image of individualism as practically and normatively unproblematic? The parody here should be apparent. Finally, by relegating Marxian political economy perspectives to the intellectual dustbin as Hudson (2006) contends Amin and Thrift (2005) have done, and in suggesting that neoliberalism is a ‘necessary illusion’ or that ‘there is no such thing’ as Castree (2006) and Barnett (2005) respectively do, albeit from two very different theoretical perspectives, is to run the perilous risk of obviating ourselves from the contemporary reality of structural violence ([Bourgois, 2001], [Farmer, 2004] and [Uvin, 2003]). Without theorising capital as a class project and neoliberalism as an ‘actually existing’ circumstance (Brenner and Theodore, 2002), structural violence, and the associated, if not often resultant direct violence (Galtung, 1990), becomes something ‘out there’ and far away in either spatial proximity or class distance, so that it is unusual, unfamiliar, and unknown to the point of obscurity and extraordinarity. Arming ourselves with a Marxian political economy approach, and a theoretical toolkit that includes neoliberalism, allows us to bring global capitalism’s geographies of violence into sharp focus, alerting us to the realities of poverty and inequality as largely outcomes of an uneven capitalist geography, and furthermore to recognise the ways in which the ‘out there’ of violence has occurred and continues to proliferate and be (re)produced in a plentitude of spaces, including ‘in here’. It is only through recognition of such symbolic violence that human emancipation may be offered, and without such acknowledgement, what’s left? Just a future of ensuing violence.

The suffering from neoliberalism’s everyday structural violence far outweighs that of a singular war.

Fischer and Brauer 02 (Dietrich Fischer, Pace University, and Jurgen Brauer, Augusta State University, Georgia, “Twenty Questions for Peace Economics: A Research Agenda,” Defence and Peace Economics, April 2002, <http://www.aug.edu/~sbajmb/paper-DPE.PDF>), KB

Poverty and high unemployment, especially in the presence of conspicuous wealth, contribute to frustration, social unrest, and sometimes civil war. It is easy to design an economy that produces luxuries for a few. Far more challenging is to design an economic system that satisfies the human needs for food, clothing, homes, education, and medical care of all. What are the characteristics of such an economy? What obstacles prevent it from emerging,and how can they be overcome? Galtung coined the notion of “structural violence” (as opposed to direct violence) for social conditions that cause avoidable human suffering and death, even if there is no specific actor committing the violence. Köhler and Alcock (1976) have estimated that structural violence causes about one hundred times as many deaths each year as all international and civil wars combined. It is as if over 200 Hiroshima bombs were dropped each year on the children of the world, but the media fail to report it because it is less dramatic than a bomb explosion. How can we estimate the loss of life resulting from poverty and unequal income distribution? How can we reduce it?

1AC Solvency

Current discriminatory transportation policy in the hands of powerful elites excludes the people who don't produce a profit. Free and accessible public transit allows for a transition from the mindset of maximum profit to a policy that produces the greatest public benefit.

Schein 11

Schein Assistant Prof Human Rights – The Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies at Carleton 2011 Rebecca Free Transit and Social Movement Infrastructure: Assessing the Political Potential of Toronto’s Nascent Free Transit Campaign Alternate Routes volume 22 <http://www.alternateroutes.ca/index.php/ar/article/view/14421>, KB

The demand for free and accessible public transit has the potential not only to develop into a broad-based movement, but also to drive the development of the new kind of organization that the Assembly aspires to become. The Assembly is committed to its call for the outright abolition of transit fares, not merely a fare-freeze or fare-reduction. What is exciting to me about the free transit campaign is that the expression of a radical anti-capitalist principle—the outright de-commodification of public goods and services—actually serves in this instance to invite rather than foreclose genuine political dialogue about values, tactics, and strategies. While still in its early stages, the free transit campaign is already pushing us to elaborate both analytical and strategic links between commodification, environmental justice, the limits and capacities of public sector unions, and the interlocking forms of exclusion faced by people marginalized by poverty, racism, immigration status, or disability. Free transit could represent a site of convergence between many distinct activist circles in the city and foster greater integration and collaboration between environmental advocacy, anti-poverty work, and diverse human rights organizations. If the free transit campaign does succeed in bringing diverse and distinct activist cultures into conversation with each other, it will force the Assembly to grapple with strategic questions about its relationship to less radical organizations in the city. Given the marginalization and isolation that have long plagued leftist groups in Toronto and elsewhere, this should be a welcome challenge, particularly if the Assembly hopes to become an effective left pole in a broad alliance.

Among the strengths of the free transit campaign is the concreteness of vision. Within the left, efforts to elaborate a broad anti-capitalist vision too often run aground at the level of abstractions, generalities, and platitudes. Most Toronto residents would draw a blank if asked to “imagine a world without capitalism,” but what Torontonian who has ever waited for a bus can’t begin to imagine an alternate future for the city, built on the backbone of a fully public mass transit system? The invitation to imagine free transit is an invitation for transit riders to imagine themselves not simply as consumers of a commodity, but as members of a public entitled to participate in conversations about the kind of city they want to live in. Without devolving into abstract and alienating debates over the meaning of, say, socialism, the call for free transit invokes the things we value: vibrant neighbourhoods; clean air and water; participatory politics; equitable distribution of resources; public space where we are free to speak, gather, play, create, and organize. Even the most skeptical response to the idea of free transit—“how will you fund it?”—is the opening of a productive conversation about taxation and control over public resources. The call for free transit can effectively open a space for an unscripted political dialogue about the meaning of fair taxation, public goods, collective priorities, and public accountability for resource allocation.

But perhaps more fundamentally, the free transit campaign is a rare example of a political project on the left that is not reactive, defensive, nostalgic, or alarmist, but hopeful, proactive, and forward-looking. “Crisis talk” is pervasive in much of contemporary culture, but in left circles, it has become difficult to imagine a mode of organizing that is not oriented around predicting or responding to punctuated calamities of various kinds—whether a financial meltdown, an un/natural disaster, the latest wave of layoffs and service cuts, or the systematic violation of basic civil liberties on a weekend in downtown Toronto. In the case of free transit, however, we are free to move ahead with the campaign on our own timeline, to seek out and develop the kinds of relationships and democratic spaces that are necessary to sustain grassroots movements over the long term. For the Assembly, this will mean having the space and time to realistically assess its own capacities and to organically develop its own strategies and priorities.

The Assembly does not have modest ambitions: it hopes to nurture a broad based anti-capitalist movement and to vitalize a new working class politics (Rosenfeld & Fanelli, 2010; Dealy, 2010). Its members are, I think, tired of listening to militant rhetoric unanchored to any genuine hope of winning. The push for an excellent, fully public and accessible transit system is a radical demand with immense popular appeal, an ambitious, long-range goal for which clear, achievable interim political victories are possible along the way. Free transit is not a crazy idea. Arguments in favour of free transit have surfaced sporadically in Toronto over the years, whether in an editorial by CAW economist Jim Stanford in The Globe and Mail or in a CBC interview with Deborah Cowen, a professor of geography at the University of Toronto (Stanford, 2005; Cowen, 2010). Some cities already have free transit systems, and many have partially free systems—in the downtown core, during holiday seasons or off-peak hours, or on “spare the air” days when smog levels are high. But in Toronto there has not yet been an initiative focused on building a broad-based movement dedicated to the eventual abolition of transit fares in the name of social, economic, and environmental justice.

Without abandoning or compromising its radicalism, the Assembly can push for concrete steps in the direction of de-commodified transit and build productive relationships with individuals and organizations who do not necessarily identify themselves as anti-capitalist. It will be in the process of pushing for interim reforms along the way to a de-commodified transit system that the Assembly will most need to articulate its political principles and its analysis of the spatialization of race and class in Toronto. Free transit in the downtown core may, for instance, be good for Toronto’s tourism industry, but will it benefit the immigrant and working class communities in transit-poor areas of the inner suburbs, who spend proportionately more of their income to access poorer quality services than those available downtown?

Proposals to pay for free transit through suburban road tolls will similarly hit hardest those working class communities whose neighbourhoods are so underserved by transit that they have no choice but to drive into the city for work. The process of developing interim priorities will not, in other words, postpone the challenge of articulating and popularizing a class-based and anti-racist argument for public infrastructure. Instead, the Assembly will be forced to pursue its most radical aspirations by cultivating a sustained dialogue about the interim remedies and strategies that will both address real needs in our communities and help build a broad-based movement over the long term.

It will be through this process of dialogue, I hope, that a new articulation of a politicized working class identity might emerge. Our earliest discussions of the free transit campaign are already pushing us to think about the social complexities that will need to be navigated if we are to build an effective free transit movement. Success will depend on our capacity to carve out and sustain a space for dialogue and negotiation among transit workers and riders, within unions, and across neighbourhoods and communities that have been unevenly affected by fare hikes and inadequate services. Questions of tactics and strategy cannot be divorced from the process of identifying, developing, and strengthening the complex connections between the people who need and use public goods and services and the workers who provide them. We will need to recognize the different ways in which our various constituencies are powerful and vulnerable and learn how to defend and protect each other. The free transit campaign lends itself to the kind of intensely local organizing through which honest dialogue, trust, and long-term relationships can be developed and nurtured—within and across neighbourhoods and among transit riders and workers. And of course, without these things, the campaign will go nowhere.

Among the strengths of the free transit campaign is its potential to foreground and develop an analysis of our collective stake in the protection of public goods. It is not difficult to talk about public goods in the context of mass transportation infrastructure. The shared benefits of public transportation are difficult to deny, particularly in a city as large and as sprawling as Toronto. Even setting aside the obvious ecological imperatives that should be driving public investment in greener infrastructure, there are powerful economic reasons to support a massive re-investment in Ontario’s transportation sector. A serious effort to expand the reach and accessibility of the public transit system would serve not only to ease the burden of Toronto’s most vulnerable residents and reduce the economic and health costs associated with air pollution and traffic congestion: such an investment could re-direct the wasted skills and resources embodied in Ontario’s laid-off auto-workers and silent auto-plants, which could be converted to the production of high efficiency mass transit vehicles. As Sam Gindin and Leo Panitch (2010) argued recently in the Toronto Star, public borrowing to finance such investments represents not a wasteful burden on future generations, but a commitment to securing them a future. The real squandering of our collective resources lies not in public borrowing or benefits packages for public employees, but in our failure to direct existing skills, knowledge, and material capacities into a coherent strategy for building sustainable communities.

The idea of a free transit movement immediately foregrounds a number of thorny strategic questions for the left in Toronto: how to build trust, dialogue, and support for a free transit movement within the transit union; how to address and re-focus the widespread anger, mistrust, and resentment directed at the public sector in the current climate; how to sustain and advance anti-capitalist principles while building productive relationships within broader progressive milieux. Navigating these questions will be challenging, and the Assembly is still a long way from a coherent and systematic approach to answering them. But the fact that these questions surface so quickly and urgently is a positive sign of the ambition and seriousness with which the Assembly is approaching the organization of a free transit movement. The free transit campaign will push the Assembly to develop further its internal organizational and decision-making capacities, but it will also demand an outward-looking, inclusive process, in which the Assembly’s role is to open space for debate, dialogue, and collective strategizing.

In fact, the transit system itself can provide the venue for us to stage public discussions about our collective resources and to share alternative visions for our city: the transit system is a readymade classroom, theatre, and art gallery, attended every day by people who could come to recognize their stake in the de-commodification of public goods of many kinds. My hope is that Toronto’s buses, streetcars, and subway platforms could be places for experimentation, places to develop the new tactics, organizing skills, and relationships that might permit us to really depart from the prevailing script.

Challenging the deadly polices of the neoliberal state comes before anything else because the state assumes a mindset of profit maximization, which allows for a policy of exclusion.

Brown 03, Brown, professor of political theory at Berkeley, 2003 Wendy, Theory and Event 7:1 project muse

What remains for the Left, then, is to challenge emerging neo-liberal governmentality in EuroAtlantic states with an alternative vision of the good, one that rejects homo oeconomicus as the norm of the human and rejects this norm's correlative formations of economy, society, state and (non)morality. In its barest form, this would be a vision in which justice would not center upon maximizing individual wealth or rights but on developing and enhancing the capacity of citizens to share power and hence, collaboratively govern themselves. In such an order, rights and elections would be the background rather than token of democracy, or better, rights would function to safeguard the individual against radical democratic enthusiasms but would not themselves signal the presence nor constitute the central principle of democracy. Instead a left vision of justice would focus on practices and institutions of shared popular power; a modestly egalitarian distribution of wealth and access to institutions; an incessant reckoning with all forms of power -- social, economic, political, and even psychic; a long view of the fragility and finitude of non-human nature; and the importance of both meaningful activity and hospitable dwellings to human flourishing. However differently others might place the accent marks, none of these values can be derived from neo-liberal rationality nor meet neo-liberal criteria for the good. The development and promulgation of such a counter rationality -- a different figuration of human beings, citizenship, economic life, and the political -- is critical both to the long labor of fashioning a more just future and to the immediate task of challenging the deadly policies of the imperial U.S. state.

Neoliberalism has manifested itself within public transportation. The starting steps to a breakdown of neoliberalism have to originate from the mass transit sphere. Transportation shapes both local and global policy.

Farmer 11

Farmer Sociology Dep’t Roosevelt University 2011 Stephanie Uneven public transportation development in neoliberalizing Chicago, USA Environment and Planning <http://envplan.com/epa/fulltext/a43/a43409.pdf>, KB

Taken together, Chicago's public transportation system and the unfolding transformations in Chicago's housing market reveal how neoliberal accumulation is restructuring uneven geographic development and the right to the city for working people and minorities. Chicago's neoliberal public transit and housing projects may improve the exchange value of its Central Area real estate, create place-based advantages to lure highly mobile capital and elevate its global-city status by tying it more closely into global air-transport networks. However, these policies have limited use-value for working-class and minority residents living outside the privileged Central Area who endure a transit system which is unreliable and sluggish for want of access or basic maintenance. I am not suggesting that the Central Area transit projects are without merit: Chicago needs more transit investment, not less. However, the proposed allocation of transit investment in the Central Area reflects the interests of growth-machine elites over and against the interests of the majority of Chicagoans. These trends also demonstrate the changing social role of public transportation in the neoliberal era. Urban public transit in the USA historically served as an instrument aimed at industrial development, mitigating labor costs, and ameliorating inequalities (Grengs, 2004; Weiner, 1999). This share of the social surplus has been redirected to construct premium network transit for capital and the affluent, thus securing their revanchist rights to the city. In effect, the CTA and the Daley administration's transportation and housing policies are contributing to the widening inequality gap between affluent groups and working-class residents, and between Whites and Blacks and Latinos. Unequal access to transportation resources parallels the broader widening of socioeconomic inequality in the era of neoliberalism. Therefore, a complete under-standing of growing inequality and uneven geographic development of the neoliberal accumulation regime should include a public infrastructure

2AC Impacts

**Neoliberalism causes pervasive market failures, economic stagnation, social polarization, and inequality**

Brenner and Theodore 02 (Neil Brenner, Professor Department of Sociology and Metropolitian Studies Program at NYU and Nik Theodore, Professor Urban planning and Policy Program and Center for Urban Economic Development at University of Illinois at Chicago, 2002, “Cities and the Geographies of Actually Existing Neoliberalism,” http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/1467-8330.00246/asset/1467-8330.00246.pdf?v=1&t=h4qaihxi&s=5a0d1880f35c26a4b0d3d41c9d344ee0a6f56d7a)

Among activists and radical academics alike, there is considerable agreement regarding the basic elements of neoliberalism as an ideological project. For instance, Moody (1997:119–120) has described neoliberalism concisely as “… a mixture of neoclassical economic fundamentalism, market regulation in place of state guidance, economic redistribution in favor of capital (known as supply-side economics), moral authoritarianism with an idealized family at its center, international free trade principles (sometimes inconsistently applied), and a thorough intolerance of trade unionism.” However, as Moody and others have emphasized, there is also a rather blatant disjuncture between the ideology of neoliberalism and its everyday political operations and societal effects. On the one hand, while neoliberalism aspires to create a “utopia” of free markets liberated from all forms of state interference, it has in practice entailed a dramatic intensification of coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to impose market rule upon all aspects of social life (see Keil this volume; MacLeod this volume). On the other hand, whereas neoliberal ideology implies that self-regulating markets will generate an optimal allocation of investments and resources, neoliberal political practice has generated pervasive market failures, new forms of social polarization, and a dramatic intensification of uneven development at all spatial scales. In short, as Gill (1995:407) explains, “the neoliberal shift in government policies has tended to subject the majority of the population to the power of market forces whilst preserving social protection for the strong.” During the last two decades, the dysfunctional effects of neoliberal approaches to capitalist restructuring have been manifested in diverse institutional arenas and at a range of spatial scales (see Amin 1997; Bourdieu 1998; Gill 1995; Isin 1998; Jessop and Stones 1992; Peck and Tickell 1994). As such studies have indicated, the disjuncture between the ideology of self-regulating markets and the everyday reality of persistent economic stagnation intensifying inequality, destructive interplace competition, and generalized social insecurity has been particularly blatant in precisely those political-economic contexts in which neoliberal doctrines have been imposed most extensively.

Neoliberal enclosure commodifies all aspects of human life, furthering patriarchy, poverty, and ecological crisis

Johnston 03, Josée, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, “Who Cares about the Commons?” December 2003, KB

The goal of these civil commons is not to maximize money, but to maximize access to life goods; this "life code" stands in stark opposition to the hegemonic "money code," as expressed in the equation of capitalist expansion, M-C-M'. Civil commons discourse is echoed in feminist political economy, where it is noted that human labors in the "subsistence economy" of reproduction — including the feeding and nurturing ofchildren, workers, and families — have always been about nurturing life. As Mies and Vennhold-Thomsen write: there exists a different conception of "economy," which is both older and younger than the capitalist patriarchal one which is based on the ongoing colonization of women, of other peoples, and nature. This "other" economy puts life and everything necessary to produce and maintain life on this planet at the center of economic and social activity and not the never-ending accumulation of dead money. The civil commons emphasis on "life goods" re-focuses analytic attention on questions of human sustenance and biospheric capacity needed to meet human needs. These questions are frequently dismissed as unfashionable in contemporary academic circles, even while millions face hunger, food deficits, and water shortages. While these practical questions remain politically critical, any analysis of their promotion through a civil commons must be historicized and contextualized to avoid ahistorical, and ethnocentric discussions on human needs. This makes it critical to understand more specifically how the civil and natural commons have been enclosed under late capitalism. This enclosure has encouraged a rigid separation of the natural and social worlds, and is connected to the development of minimalist, and impoverished conceptualization of the commons as a limited sphere outside private property, or a realm of global resources best managed by elite global experts. These discursive struggles will be addressed in the next two sub-sections. This is followed by a discussion that fills out details of this competing discourse of the civil commons: on what scales does it operate, what are the strengths and limits of local commons, and where is agency located? A. Enclosing the commons How have the life generating capacity and traditions of the civil and natural commons been enclosed, and why do they need to be reclaimed? Disparate global movements share a defense against capitalist enclosure of the commons, understood as "extinction, with or without a physical fencing of land, of common and customary use rights on which manypeople depended for their livelihood." While in early English capitalism the enclosure of common grazing land dispossessed the rural poor, forcing them into factory labor, contemporary enclosure can be conceived broadly and metaphorically, referring to both an ethical and a material enclosure. With enclosure, the means of life are increasingly regulated through the market, rather than through community-based or family-based means of provisioning. Enclosure is not simply about the extension of private property, and is characteristic of not just capitalism, but modernity more generally; it represents both a property space and a moral space that extends the colonization of modern forms of control, commodification and instrumental rationality to increasing domains of the lifeworld. The phenomenon of enclosure under globalized capitalism obeys a similar dynamic to that of classic English capitalism, but with an intensification that threatens to exhaust the social and natural substratum (otherwise conceived as a civil and natural commons) on which all human life depends. As a report from the International Forum on Globalization notes, the "more essential the good or service in question to the maintenance of life, the greater its potential for generating monopoly profits and the more attractive its ownership and control becomes to global corporations." Contemporary enclosure expands to establish commodity rights to water, the genetic structure of living beings, indigenous knowledge, and plants through processes of bio-prospecting. Through enclosure, the hegemonic instrumental rationality of modern science dominates moral-practical and aesthetic rationality, at the same time marketization regulates increasing domains of social life. Wendell Berry refers to this enclosure process as creating a "total economy," where all life forms are potential commodities, characterized by the "unrestrained taking of profits from the disintegration of nations, communities, households, landscapes, and ecosystems." Intensified capital accumulation requires heightened control of reproductive resources, and when resources are held in common — as is still the case in many areas of the globe and in fundamental aspects of reproductive labor — this necessarily involves a process of dispossession, expropriation, and extinction of collective use rights and civil commons traditions. Even though the civil commons are indispensable contributors to the survival of human life, the ideology of the capitalist money sequences makes these contributions invisible and perpetuates an illusion of infinite commodification and perpetual growth. Complex societies are reduced to economies, a shift which "undermines a society's capacity to secure well-being without joining unconditionally the economic race." Feminist economists have identified the invisibility of women's reproductive labor in traditional accounting mechanisms, where depletion of natural resources (e.g., deforestation, an oil spill, fossil-fuel usage) is actually referred to as a "gain" in terms of the hegemonic capitalist logic. Yet outside the national accounting measures, competing data sources demonstrate an inverse relationship between the maximization of capital accumulation, and the degradation of life in the civil and natural commons. A comprehensive study of "ecological overshoot," for example, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (written by a "who's who" of ecologists and economists), conservatively calculated that since the 1980s, humans have been taking more resources from the planet than it can replenish; by 2002 humans were using 125 percent of the earth'spotential biological productivity. Yet with continued discursive prominence given to economic growth, and the lack of a popular vocabulary to identity how the civil commons are required to preserve access to life goods, the losses incurred by capitalist enclosure are obscured from the dominant public sphere. McMurtry writes: society's life-ground of reproduction has been effectively lost in a conceptual amnesia. At the root of the blindness is a dominant economic paradigm which has no life coordinates in its econometrics of input and output revenues. While its ruling value of monetized growth escalates velocities and volumes of private money demand and strip-mines ecosystems and domestic economies across the planet, its value calculus cannot discern any problem.

2AC: Author Indict

Neoliberal Policies are misrepresented and destructive – their Authors are biased

Brenner and Theodore 02 (Neil Brenner, Professor Department of Sociology and Metropolitian Studies Program at NYU and Nik Theodore, Professor Urban planning and Policy Program and Center for Urban Economic Development at University of Illinois at Chicago, 2002, “Cities and the Geographies of Actually Existing Neoliberalism,” http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/1467-8330.00246/asset/1467-8330.00246.pdf?v=1&t=h4qaihxi&s=5a0d1880f35c26a4b0d3d41c9d344ee0a6f56d7a)

For purposes of this essay, we shall describe these ongoing neoliberalization processes through the concept of actually existing neoliberalism. This concept is intended not only to underscore the contradictory, destructive character of neoliberal policies, but also to highlight the ways in which neoliberal ideology systematically misrepresents the real effects of such policies upon the macroinstitutional structures and evolutionary trajectories of capitalism. In this context, two issues deserve particular attention. First, neoliberal doctrine represents states and markets as if they were diametrically opposed principles of social organization, rather than recognizing the politically constructed character of all economic relations. Second, neoliberal doctrine is premised upon a “one size fits all” model of policy implementation that assumes that identical results will follow the imposition of market-oriented reforms, rather than recognizing the extraordinary variations that arise as neoliberal reform initiatives are imposed within contextually specific institutional landscapes and policy environments.

K of DA

All of your impact turns and advantages are based on a flawed epistemology – they are constructed using untested and unverifiable models that incite fear to uphold the neoliberal utopia

Bourdieu 98 (Pierre. French sociologist. December 1998. http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu.)

Economists may not necessarily share the economic and social interests of the true believers and may have a variety of individual psychic states regarding the economic and social effects of the utopia which they cloak with mathematical reason. Nevertheless, they have enough specific interests in the field of economic science to contribute decisively to the production and reproduction of belief in the neoliberal utopia. Separated from the realities of the economic and social world by their existence and above all by their intellectual formation, which is most frequently purely abstract, bookish, and theoretical, they are particularly inclined to confuse the things of logic with the logic of things. These economists trust models that they almost never have occasion to submit to the test of experimental verification and are led to look down upon the results of the other historical sciences, in which they do not recognise the purity and crystalline transparency of their mathematical games, whose true necessity and profound complexity they are often incapable of understanding. They participate and collaborate in a formidable economic and social change. Even if some of its consequences horrify them (they can join the socialist party and give learned counsel to its representatives in the power structure), it cannot displease them because, at the risk of a few failures, imputable to what they sometimes call "speculative bubbles", it tends to give reality to the ultra-logical utopia (ultra-logical like certain forms of insanity) to which they consecrate their lives.

Neoliberalism constructs false threats to justify the market – we take arbitrary actions to avoid a perceived ‘threat’ – do not play into this neoliberal ideology

Stewart 99 (Kathleen Anthropology – UT Austin, & Susan Harding, Anthropology – UCSC,

Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 28: 285-310, “BAD ENDINGS: American Apocalypsis”)

Modernity is both a condition of possibility for the contemporary apocalyptic field and an example of its sensibility. Rapid, large-scale technological and industrial developments and the explosion of a mass consumer culture transformed the texture of experience; the phenomenal world became more chaotic, fragmented, and disorienting; sensory stimulation took on a new intensity (Schivelbusch 1979). A new sensational fascination with spectacles of catastrophe in the media developed as an aesthetic counterpart to the radical transformations of space, time, and industry, by apocalyptic-millennial vacillations between utopian and dystopian visions in which antimodern nostalgia for origins and simpler times meets dreams of enlightenment and progress, instrumental rationality meets avant-garde experimentation with form, and oppositions between the rational and the irrational, center and margin, and order and disorder become charged (Buell 1998, Ivy 1995, Lears 1994, Marx 1964). The modern world is characterized by simultaneous overstimulation and numbness, alarm and anesthesia (Berlant 1996, Buck-Morss 1995, Feldman 1994, Ivy 1993, Terkel 1988), and it is imagined in terms of dialectical extremes, of heaven and hell, or of dreamworld and catastrophe. In the omnipresent media, world events are presented as a state of constant, tautological crisis. Talk shows suggest that social and psychological problems are everywhere, and that our job, as an audience, is to recognize them in everything we see (Mellencamp 1992:150). In movies so scripted they can only be described as mythic, superhuman (and heavily armed) heroes avert imminent social, moral, and/or environmental collapse in a final battle, leaving a budding nuclear family standing in the ashes to begin the world again (Lapham 1996). "Reality" TV shows (such as COPS, 911, America's Most Wanted, and Unsolved Mysteries) take us inside the houses of the stigmatized poor and marginal for a glimpse of personal and social collapse, while shows about glamorous media stars and the lifestyles of the rich and famous present the millennial dream of a sudden twist of fate. Finally, critiques of the media, like critiques of modernity, are themselves often apocalyptic and millennial, depicting the media as conspiratorial, totalitarian, and contagious, or as a technological means of promoting universal education, common citizenship, global religious conversion, or utopian global community (Bray 1996, O'Leary 1998). The dialectic is unstable and subject to sudden shifts. In 1997, for instance, the utopian view of the internet as a tele-democracy and information superhighway gave way, for some, to darker themes of paranoia and conspiracy, with images of child pornography and sex cults trying to recruit new members online (Dean 1998:14). Mediation itself raises questions of control. Fears of cover-ups or of disinformation campaigns easily slide into full-blown conspiracy theories, and millennial hopes often turn on the dream of a return to direct action, direct, unmediated communication, and simple, authoritative truths imagined as a premodern state of being (Stewart 1999).and as compensation for their alienating effects (B Singer 1995). But modernity itself is also already structured The transition to advanced capitalist, or neo- or post-Fordist economics (processes of deregulation, privatization, franchise, and differentiation, and a shift from a product economy to a service and information economy) has produced down-sizing, reengineering, volatile markets, corporate mergers, transformations in the relationship between governments and corporations, growing inequality of income and control, and global dependence on huge communications industries (Mellencamp 1992). The new complex, or "flexible," systems are large, diffuse, dynamic networks that are unpredictable and subject to sudden collapse or sudden shifts of control from one part of the system to another (Davis 1998, Martin 1994). Global scale means both unprecedented power and intense vulnerability to disruptions and outbreaks anywhere in the world, giving rise to fears of anarchy, terrorism, scarcity, crime, and overpopulation (R Kaplan 1994). Power and insecurity are expressed in apocalyptic and millennial idioms of breakthroughs and breakdowns, stock market crashes, and a New World Order. Contemporary "risk society" (Beck 1992, 1995) produces alarming worst-case scenarios in the very effort to calculate precise risks in order to insure against them (Buell 1998, Douglas 1985, Lupton 1993). Advertising commodifies both fear and the dream of personal, exceptional safety in selling everything from insurance to schools to cars to high-priced skin creams such as Charles of the Ritz "Disaster Cream," Estee Lauder "Skin Defender Cream," and Golden Door "Crisis Cream" (Mellencamp 1992). A nostalgia for a simple past and the figure of a utopian future are modeled, concretely, in master-planned and gated communities. The figure of a middle class has become a norm or ideal that signals safety, while the poor have dropped out of view except as criminals, spectacular "failures" as individuals, and dangerous urban mobs. Violence and abjection are seen as a contagion, like a virus: Self-control and social containment are the only known vaccine (W Brown 1995, Davis 1998). Brown (1995) argues further that we are seeing changes in the very conditions of democracy, including depoliticized, or naturalized, modes of domination; a state more obviously invested in particular economic interests, political ends, and social formations; the disintegration and fragmentation of forms of association other than those organized by the commodity market and the classificatory schemes of disciplinary society; an unparalleled powerlessness over the fate and direction of one's life coupled with an unrelieved individual responsibility without insulation from failure; and a politics of ressentiment, which takes suffering as a measure of social value. These changes challenge the presumption that there is a public that shares a notion of reality, a concept of reason, and a set of criteria by which claims to reason and rationality are judged (Dean 1998). The ideal of a central public sphere still sometimes animates the dream of a transcendent voice of reason, but it is no longer possible to deny fundamental differences between particular publics and counter-publics based on gender, race, class, sexuality, religion, and myriad other identities and socialities (B Robbins 1993, Gibbs 1996). These publics vie for a more general public voice and legitimacy (Dean 1998) through claims of suffering and heroism. Death, disaster, and impending catastrophe becomes the only thing that can unite a general "public" (Martin 1994), especially when apocalyptic threat is followed by millennial amnesia in the form of dreams of love and freedom achieved and miraculous new beginnings.

2AC: Privatization and PPP CP

Ext the first Farmer card from the 1AC. She is very specific when she says that it has to be the USfg funding and doing the plan and only the USfg because private corporations and even public-private partnerships are ways of continuing the neoliberal ideology through profit maximization.

**Privatization and PPP are the prime examples of neoliberal policy. They only work for the profit which causes exclusive of the non affluent segment of the population**

Farmer 11

Farmer Sociology Dep’t Roosevelt University 2011 Stephanie Uneven public transportation development in neoliberalizing Chicago, USA Environment and Planning <http://envplan.com/epa/fulltext/a43/a43409.pdf>, KB

In order to finance new urban transit projects, cash-strapped entrepreneurial governments are increasingly entering into long-term partnerships with the private sector, or public- private partnerships (PPPs), in which the public sector pays for services and infrastructure delivered by the private sector (Phang, 2007; Siemiatycki, 2006; Solin¬o and Vassallo, 2009). In studies of PPPs used both for large-scale urban redevelopment projects and urban rail projects, scholars have noticed that planning agencies are increasingly favoring infrastructure projects favoring affluent segments of the population that have greater potential for profitability rather than delivering the largest public benefit (Fainstein, 2008; Siemiatycki, 2006; Swyngedouw et al, 2002).

By privileging market-based metrics of efficiency, entrepreneurial administrations have profoundly changed the function of public transportation. In the Fordist era, public transportation involved a modicum of centralized planning aimed at industrial development, mitigating labor costs and alleviating the effects of uneven development produced by the highly subsidized highway system (Grengs, 2004; Weiner, 1999). Neoliberal statecraft abandons the Fordist strategy of territorial redistribution mobilizing public transportation to enhance economically disadvantaged groups' access to the city. In its place, socially regressive neoliberal practices favor market-oriented growth and elite consumption patterns (Boschken, 2002; Grengs, 2004; Young and Keil, 2010). Thus, public transportation service has become a battleground in the global city growth machine's revanchist claims to the city (Smith, 1996).

As municipalities sink their meager financial resources into lumpy global city public transportation infrastructure, residents outside the myopic global city vision are finding it increasingly difficult to obtain development dollars for their communities (Judd, 2003). In this regard, entrepreneurial public transportation policies are reshaping the contours of race-based social exclusion. As real estate developers and creative class workers mobilize their political and financial power to outcompete lower income groups for rights to the (central) city, they are pushing working-class and minority residents to the margins of the city and into the devalorized inner-suburban ring where affordable housing can be found but public transit service is meager (Dreier et al, 2004). These deepening patterns of exclusion are also reinforced by policies dismantling and disbursing public housing out of the central area and away from public transit. And yet, poor urban African-Americans are more structurally dependent on public transportation to access jobs, services, and cultural amenities (Bullard and Johnson, 1997; Kasarda, 1989). In a more egalitarian policy-making environment, public transportation policy can be a means to reduce the effects of hyper sociospatial racial segregation (Wilson, 1990). However, in the neoliberal approach to urban planning and economic development, public transportation is but one of a constellation of institutions that create and reproduce spatialized racial inequalities.

2AC Cede the Political

2AC: Elections

The extreme popularity of Map-21 proves that public transportation is popular

Lemon, Rapoport, and Wojnar 7/2/12

(Marcus Lemon, Chief Counsel to the Federal Highway Administration, Michael Wojnar, senior partner and Chair of the Global Infrastructure and Public-Private Partnerships practice, and Frank Rapoport, a member of the Government Affairs team where he advises clients on transportation and infrastructure policy, 7/2/12, “Map-21 passes Congress, Key to provisions on p3s,” http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=fd0f4c33-eeb9-4b9f-91b0-87cce7c35d2b)

On Friday afternoon, the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate approved the final conference report on the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), legislation to reform and reauthorize surface transportation programs through 2014. MAP-21 finally replaces the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) bill, which was enacted in 2005 and extended nine times since its expiration in 2009. President Obama is expected to sign MAP-21 into law, and could do so as early as this evening.

Prominent conservative groups urged Republicans to vote against the final agreement, while the U.S. Chamber of Commerce pushed strongly for its passage. The final vote in the House was 373-52, with all Democrats voting in favor. The Senate vote was 74-19 with one Senator voting present. The massive conference report is likely to be the last major piece of legislation passed by Congress until after the November elections.

2AC: PTX

No internal link – their theory of political capital is wrong.

Dickinson 9

Matthew Dickinson, professor of political science at Middlebury College, “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power,” 5/26/2009, <http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/>, KB

As for Sotomayor, from here the path toward almost certain confirmation goes as follows: the Senate Judiciary Committee is slated to hold hearings sometime this summer (this involves both written depositions and of course open hearings), which should lead to formal Senate approval before Congress adjourns for its summer recess in early August. So Sotomayor will likely take her seat in time for the start of the new Court session on October 5. (I talk briefly about the likely politics of the nomination process below). What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee.

The extreme popularity of Map-21 proves that public transportation is popular

Lemon, Rapoport, and Wojnar 7/2/12

(Marcus Lemon, Chief Counsel to the Federal Highway Administration, Michael Wojnar, senior partner and Chair of the Global Infrastructure and Public-Private Partnerships practice, and Frank Rapoport, a member of the Government Affairs team where he advises clients on transportation and infrastructure policy, 7/2/12, “Map-21 passes Congress, Key to provisions on p3s,” http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=fd0f4c33-eeb9-4b9f-91b0-87cce7c35d2b)

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2AC: States CP

CP Framework

If we can prove that the net benefit to the CP is flawed then that is a reason to reject the CP.

50 State Fiat Bad

1. Not real world – the 50 states have never coordinated or cooperated on something together before. No research comparsion saying which one of the two options is better because real policymakers don't chose between the states and the federal government.
2. No literature basis – none of the solvency evidence says that ALL THE STATES together can solve the plan
3. Limits – the neg can find any number of actors they want and fiat that all would cooperate and solve which kills aff research and the neg would win every debate
4. Voter for fairness and education

No solvency - the CP can’t solve in any of the United States territories or in Washington DC, reason to reject the CP

Federal funding shapes state and local policies – key to burden sharing and states fail without Federal investment

The Economist 11

The Economist 4/28/2011 <http://www.economist.com/node/18620944>, KB

The federal government is responsible for only a quarter of total transport spending, but the way it allocates funding shapes the way things are done at the state and local levels. Unfortunately, it tends not to reward the prudent, thanks to formulas that govern over 70% of federal investment. Petrol-tax revenues, for instance, are returned to the states according to the miles of highway they contain, the distances their residents drive, and the fuel they burn. The system is awash with perverse incentives. A state using road-pricing to limit travel and congestion would be punished for its efforts with reduced funding, whereas one that built highways it could not afford to maintain would receive a larger allocation.

Formula-determined block grants to states are, at least, designed to leave important decisions to local authorities. But the formulas used to allocate the money shape infrastructure planning in a remarkably block-headed manner. Cost-benefit studies are almost entirely lacking. Federal guidelines for new construction tend to reflect politics rather than anything else. States tend to use federal money as a substitute for local spending, rather than to supplement or leverage it. The Government Accountability Office estimates that substitution has risen substantially since the 1980s, and increases particularly when states get into budget difficulties. From 1998 to 2002, a period during which economic fortunes were generally deteriorating, state and local transport investment declined by 4% while federal investment rose by 40%. State and local shrinkage is almost certainly worse now.

States can make bad planners. Big metropolitan areas—Chicago, New York and Washington among them—often sprawl across state lines. State governments frequently bicker over how (and how much) to invest. Facing tight budget constraints, New Jersey’s Republican governor, Chris Christie, recently scuttled a large project to expand the railway network into New York City. New Jersey commuter trains share a 100-year-old tunnel with Amtrak, a major bottleneck. Mr Christie’s decision was widely criticised for short-sightedness; but New Jersey faced cost overruns that in a better system should have been shared with other potential beneficiaries all along the north-eastern corridor. Regional planning could help to avoid problems like this.

State control allows re-entrenchment of neoliberal private control

MacKinnon, et al. 9

 (Danny MacKinnon Department of Geographical and Earth Sciences, University of Glasgow, Department of Management, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, Scotland, Centre for Sustainable Transport and School of Geography, University of Plymouth)

ii. Management improvements may accompany devolution There are various reasons to suppose that infrastructure management may be more effective under independent entities. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS – 29 TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT: OPTIONS FOR EFFICIENCY – ISBN 978-92-821-0155-1 - © OECD/ITF, 2008 To begin with, greater independence is usually accompanied by increased de-politicisation of operational decision-making processes. Although elected officials should have a decisive influence over how much public money is spent in different sectors of the economy, their input into the planning process should first and foremost be in terms of high-level priority setting. Project planning should, in turn, be based on expert advice regarding the relative efficiencies of the different options to deliver the objectives established at the political level. More operational decisions – such as how works are executed, and by whom – should be taken at an entirely non-political level. Secondly, if an independent entity does not have to rely on the government’s annual budgeting process, it is in a position to take a longer-term, strategic approach to the management of assets. This independence may come in several forms and various degrees. With the exception of the government agency, all of the models of devolution can borrow from private sources, which can impose additional discipline based on the need to retain a high credit rating, at least as long as the government does not underwrite their debt. Where independent entities are financed by tolls or earmarked charges and taxes, and not totally dependent on public-sector financing, they can take a longer-term perspective on investment than would be possible under government budgeting rules. Independent entities should also be free from some of the more bureaucratic aspects of public sector decision-making and management.

States are entrenched in neoliberal ideology. They encourage private sector control over public goods

Bell et al. 05 , George Washington Institute of Public Policy (Mike Bell, David Brunori, Royce Hanson, Chanyong Choi, Lori Metcalf, and Bing Yuan, 11-5- 05 ‘State and Local Infrastructure Financing,’ Pg 1, http://www.gwu.edu/~gwipp/papers/wp028.pdf]

With an attempt to shift the burden of financing away from taxpayers to the beneficiaries of any given improvement or construction of infrastructure, state and local governments have been encouraging a greater private sector role in capital financing (Feldman, Mudge, and Rubin ¶ 1988; Merna and Njiru 2002). Public-private partnerships represent “the fastest-growing tool” of infrastructure finance (Feldman, Mudge, and Rubin 1988, p. 55), which in its simplest form, combines public ownership and private operation of public works facilities. Transportation projects, in particular, exemplify an area in which states and localities have been successful in attracting private sector participation (Morris 2001; NCSL 2005). Private firms may take on the finance, design, and construction of a toll road, while governments are responsible for authorizing the collection of tolls, assessing workmanship, and ensuring that environmental standards are met (Morris 2001). Acknowledging the importance of private involvement in capital finance, Mudge (1996) in the meantime cautions that public sector must retain a leading role in privatizing public works for the approach to be effective.

2AC: Generic K

Any K fails without a policy alternative – they succumb to spectatorship

McClean 1 (David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm 10/2/11 NBM)

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

2AC: Cap K

Neoliberalism is an extreme form of capitalism – destroys the institutions that balance profit with the common good.

Giroux 04, Henry, Prof of Comm @ McMaster, 2004, The Terror of Neoliberalism, p. xxii-xxiii, KB

As a public pedagogy and political ideology, the neoliberalism of Friediich Hayek and Milton Friedman is far more ruthless than the classic liberal economic theory developed by Adam Smith and David Ricardo in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Neoliberalism has become the current conservative revolution because it harkens back to a period in American history that supported the sovereignty of the market over the sovereignty of the democratic state and the common good. Reproducing the future in the image of the distant past, it represents a struggle designed to roll back, if not dismantle, all of the policies put into place over seventy years ago by the New Deal to curb corporate power and give substance to the liberal meaning of the social contract. The late Pierre Bordieu captures what is new about neoliberalism in his comment that neoliberalism is a new kind of conservative revolution that] appeals to progress, reason and science (economics in this case) to justify the restoration and so tries to write off progressive thought and action as archaic. hr sets up as the norm of all practices, and therefore as ideal rules, the real regularities of the economic world abandoned to its own logic, the so—called laws of the market.It reifies and glorifies the reign of what are called the financial markets, in other words the return to a kind of radical capitalism, with no other law than that of maximum profit, an unfettered capitalism without any disguise, hut rationalized, pushed to the limit of its economic efficacy by the introduction of modern forms of domination, such as “business administration,” and techniques of manipulation, such as market research and advertising.

Neoliberalism destroys markets and increases economic volatility, killing growth

Martorell 2

Martorell, contributor at Marxist.com, 10/15/02 p. <http://www.marxist.com/neo-liberalism-globalisation-left151002.htm>, KB

However, the anarchic character of capitalist production reaffirmed itself in a number of crises that started in 1997 and which started to shatter the myth of the viability of these "neo-liberal" policies. Thus we saw the collapse of the South East Asian "tigers" (which had been presented as models of capitalist success) in 1997 (The First Tremors, Ted Grant, 1997), the collapse of the Russian economy in the summer of 1998, the collapse of the "new economy" stock exchange bubble in April 2001 (Bulls, bears and bust, Michael Roberts, 2000),the devaluation of the Brazilian real in 2000, which in turn led to the massive devaluation of the Turkish lira in February 2001, the collapse of the Argentinean economy in December 2001, which led to the revolutionary events currently taking place in that country (Argentina - The Revolution has Begun, Alan Woods, 2001), the biggest corporate bankruptcies in history (Enron and Worldcom - See: Enrongate, Mick Brooks, 2002), and so on and so forth...In fact it is increasingly clear that these "neo-liberal" policies have failed to deliver what they promised. For instance privatisation of public services was supposed to bring about cheaper and more efficient service delivery. If we have a look at the results of the privatisation of the railways in Britain we can see that this has been an unmitigated disaster. Train services in Britain are now more expensive, less reliable, less safe and one of the private companies, Railtrack, has just gone bankrupt and the state has had to intervene to save it! No wonder that more than 75% of the population in Britain is now in favour of renationalising the railways (Rail privatisation in Britain - a warning, Socialist Appeal, 2001). Argentina was a country that was presented as one of the best "pupils of the IMF". The country's government followed faithfully all the advice coming from the IMF and the World Bank, privatising all public companies, opening up its trade barriers, reducing public spending and basically pursuing "sound economic policies" and "fiscal prudence". As a result, Argentina defaulted on its foreign debt, is suffering a massive economic depression and 40% of its population now live under the poverty line, all this in a country which used to compare itself to Europe and look down on its Latin American neighbours.

2AC: Anthro K

1. The impact is inevitable and only the aff solves – in a world of neoliberalism the environment is reduced to nothing – that’s Johnston – only the affirmative can solve.
2. Alt can’t solve – won’t be adopted

De-Shalit, 2000. Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. “The Environment: Between Theory and Practice,” p. 49-50, KB

One may ask: so what? Does it matter that Deep Ecology uses the term 'environment' differently from science? My answer is: it may not matter, as long as we recognize that this is indeed the case, that Deep Ecology is a political (or psychological) theory whose goals do not always seek to reform our attitudes about the environment, but rather seek to replace politics by a non-political system. If, however, Deep Ecology claims to respect the environment and treat it 'as it is', then this claim may be deceptive because environmental attitudes become a means of changing the 'system'. Their theory, then, is not about the moral grounds for respecting the environment, but about non-environmental goals. 19 If we understand this, it is clear at least why Deep Ecology has rarely, if at all, served as a rationale for environmental policies. The general public, including activists, may have sensed that, when they want to justify recycling or the treatment of sewage, talks about the new psyche will not do. The deeper problem, I fear, is that, since Deep Ecology is rather dominant in environmental philosophy, many people in the general public conclude that 'this is environmental philosophy' and therefore that 'arguments taken from environmental philosophy in general will not suffice in real cases'.

1. The alternative embraces inhumane forms of population control that fall most heavily on the Third World – turns the alt and can’t solve the case.

Warren and Wells 94

Karen Warren and Barbara Wells-Howe, 94. Professor of Philosophy at Macalester College. “Ecological Feminism,” p. 93, Google Scholar. KB

From a Deep Ecological perspective, thinking humanely is problematic insofar as doing so is human centered. Of course, if humaneness is merely kindness and compassion, it is not anthropocentric to reflect or act humanely. Naess seems here to conflate humaneness with human-centeredness, as though application of the ethics of human interactions with each other (such as being kind) is anthropocentric. Is this merely a matter of interpretation? Is it true that the overall tone of Naess’s work evidences benevolent foundations; his reader would find that he would condone inhumane methods of population reduction. My point is to identify a vagueness, or lack of clarity in Deep Ecological thinking concerning human interactions with each other. Despite Naess’ apparent benevolent sensibilities, the writings and recommendations of a number of Deep Ecologists have sometimes verged on the inhumane, and others have put forth the view that phenomena such as the global AIDS epidemic and Third World famine are “necessary solutions” to the “population problem.”

1. Perm: do both. We must be human-centered to be probably biocentric—ignoring human needs is still a mismanagement of ecology – turns the K.

Schmidtz 2K

David Schmidtz, Philosophy, University of Arizona, Environmental Ethics, 2000, p. 379-408

Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about equilibria and perturbations that keep systems from converging on equilibria. Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about competition and unintended consequences, and the internal logic of systems, a logic that dictates how a system responds to attempts to manipulate it. Environmental activism and regulation do not automatically improve the environment. It is a truism in ecology, as in economics, that well-intentioned interventions do not necessarily translate into good results. Ecology (human and nonhuman) is complicated, our knowledge is limited, and environmentalists are themselves only human. Intervention that works with the system’s logic rather than against it can have good consequences. Even in a centrally planned economy, the shape taken by the economy mainly is a function not of the central plan but of how people respond to it, and people respond to central plans in ways that best serve their purposes, not the central planner’s. Therefore, even a dictator is in no position simply to decide how things are going to go. Ecologists understand that this same point applies in their own discipline. They understand that an ecology’s internal logic limits the directions in which it can be taken by would-be ecological engineers. Within environmental philosophy, most of us have come around to something like Aldo Leopold’s view of humans as plain citizens of the biotic community.[[21]](http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/hsr.php?id=41&print=1" \l "_ftn22) As Bryan Norton notes, the contrast between anthropocentrism and biocentrism obscures the fact that we increasingly need to be nature-centered to be properly human-centered; we need to focus on "saving the ecological systems that are the context of human cultural and economic activities." If we do not tend to what is good for nature, we will not be tending to what is good for people either. As Gary Varner recently put it, on purely anthropocentric grounds we have reason to think biocentrically.

I completely agree. What I wish to add is that the converse is also true: on purely biocentric grounds, we have reason to think anthropocentrically. We need to be human-centered to be properly nature-centered, for if we do not tend to what is good for people, we will not be tending to what is good for nature either. From a biocentric perspective, preservationists sometimes are not anthropocentric enough. They sometimes advocate policies and regulations with no concern for values and priorities that differ from their own. Even from a purely biocentric perspective, such slights are illegitimate. Policy makers who ignore human values and human priorities that differ from their own will, in effect, be committed to mismanaging the ecology of which those ignored values and priorities are an integral part.

Perm: Do the plan and the alternative. Solves the link to the K because we can do the plan while also challenging the humanist assumption of sovereignty over nature.

Zimmerman 91 (Michael E., Heideggerean Scholar Tulane Univ. “Deep Ecology, Ecoactivism, and Human Evolution” published in ReVision Winter 1991 13.3. PDF accessed July 6, 2008 p. 123-127).

Deep ecologists such as Arne Naess affirm the uniqueness of humankind and its potential for contributing to the Self-realization of all beings. Naess (1984) discusses humanity's potentialities for evolving into a species whose unique capacity involves appreciating the won­der of creation: It may sound paradoxical, but with a more lofty image of maturity in humans, the appeal to serve deep, specifically human interests is in full harmony with the norms of deep ecology. But this is evident only if we are careful to make our termi­nology clear. This terminology is today far from common, but it may have an illu­minating impact. It proclaims that essen­tially there is at present a sorry underesti­mation of the potentialities of the human species. Our species is not destined to be the scourge [or cancer—M.E.Z.] of the earth. If it is bound to be anything, per­haps it is to be the conscious joyful appre­ciator of this planet as an even greater whole of its immense richness. This may be its "evolutionary potential" or an ineradicable part of it. (p. 8) Insofar as Naess speaks of the "evo­lutionary potential" of humanity to become appreciators of the planet, he has something in common with the evo­lutionary views of Murray Bookchin. Bookchin (1990) argues even more emphatically (than Naess) that humani­ty's evolutionary potential includes the capacity for intervening in natural processes, even to the point of shaping aspects of evolution on Earth. Clearly, there is room for negotiation and com­promise in the hitherto somewhat unsa­vory debate between deep ecologists and social ecologists in that both hold to some version of a "progressive" and "evolutionary" view of humankind. Deep ecologists cannot reasonably hope for a move toward nondualistic, nonan­thropocentric attitudes without simulta­neously affirming the notion that humankind has the capacity for evolu­tion to a more mature stage of con­sciousness. Social ecologists are quite right in pointing out the dangers involved in rejecting out of hand the whole of modernity, especially its emancipatory political dimensions.

2AC: State Good

Participation in the public sphere is essential – rejecting the state is false liberation that leads to extinction or tyranny.

Boggs 97, Carl, professor at the National University in Los Angeles, “The great retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in late twentieth-century America,” December, Volume 6, number 26, http://www.springerlink.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/content/m7254768m63h16r0/fulltext.pdf, p. 773-774, KB

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here ^ localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post- modernism, Deep Ecology ^ intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their di¡erent outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and over- come alienation. 773 The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved ^ perhaps even unrecognized ^ only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, ¢nance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side- step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impo- tence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today,Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger num- bers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be ¢lled by authoritarian and reactionary elites ^ an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise ^ or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec- tive interests that had vanished from civil society.

And, we don’t have to win the state itself is good in every instance – we just say using the state for a specific act would be a good way to resist neoliberalism. Just because we use the state doesn’t mean we endorse statism. And, the reason the state is oppressive in the first place is because it’s controlled by the neoliberals – taking over the state to use it for liberation turns all their arguments.

2AC: Coercion

2AC: Oil DA