# Call Me Mayport Negative

## Case Frontlines

### Naval Power/Heg Frontline

#### Carriers fail—asymmetric warfare

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Conventional threats notwithstanding, carriers are also vulnerable to unconventional or asymmetric threats. 5 These potentially include terrorism, sabotage, infiltration, denial and subterfuge (information operations [IO], including cyber and psychological operations), interdiction, and homeport or logistics hub attacks, among others. While many admirals discount such threats outright, again, one need only recall the shock and confusion following the 9/11 attacks. One reason these threats make military leaders uncomfortable is that they are vague and indiscriminate. Another is that few weapons in the Carrier Strike Group arsenal can directly address them. Indeed, the strike group's inherent capabilities are usually irrelevant against asymmetric threats. Finally, since an unconventional adversary may seek any of these means-and perhaps yet unknown methods-to achieve a mission kill (i.e., not necessarily a catastrophic kill), leaders often swear off as impractical the vouchsafing of every potential carrier vulnerability. Just as operational art demands a rigorous assessment of adversary center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, one cannot assume away the enemy's ability to do the same. The 2006 Israeli experience in Lebanon is a recent example of a hybrid conflict, wherein an unconventional enemy knew its opponent well, exploited technology to defeat its armor, directed a sophisticated IO campaign to manage perceptions, and threatened the homeland with incessant rocket and missile barrages. Gone are the days when the most serious unconventional threats were ignorant, lightly armed fanatics conducting improvised attacks on hardened targets. As such, it is a relatively simple task with readily available information to evaluate the carrier as a system, with critical elements of varying dependency, many of which could degrade mission capability if assailed. Admittedly, adversaries require global reach and significant capability to threaten some elements over the longer-term, but a creative opponent could still seriously limit a carrier's effectiveness, at least temporarily. Any neophyte can generate a basic list of forward-deployed military unit vulnerability: communications, logistics/lines of communication, crew readiness/morale, mobility, etc. Because the CSG cannot protect everything, the aggressor has the advantage in target selection and surprise.

#### No carrier attack—Tracking and layered defenses

Thompson 2009 (Loren, Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy. Prior to holding his present positions, he was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and taught graduate-level courses in strategy, technology and media affairs at Georgetown. He has also taught at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Mr. Thompson holds doctoral and masters degrees in government from Georgetown University and a bachelor of science degree in political science from Northeastern University, “AIRCRAFT CARRIER (IN)VULNERABILITY: What It Takes To Successfully Attack an American Aircraft Carrier”, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/aircraft-carrier-invulnerability.pdf>, Hemanth)

The first step in attacking a carrier is to find it. Most potential adversaries would have difficulty doing this as long as the carrier remains in the open sea, takes prudent evasive actions, and actively counters efforts at detection. If a carrier is actually detected, the next step an enemy must take is to establish a continuous target track. That is necessary because a carrier is likely to be far from the location where it was first detected by the time weapons arrive there. Few if any nations today possess an assured capacity to track carriers continuously. All of the relevant methods — radar, electronic eavesdropping, electro-optical and acoustic sensors — have major drawbacks such as high cost, vulnerability to preemption, and inability to precisely discriminate. While that may change over time, aggressors will still face a daunting task in penetrating the layered defenses of a carrier battle group. The most significant threats to carriers are cruise missiles, wake-homing torpedoes, ballistic missiles and mines. But cruise missiles are unlikely to penetrate the battle group’s integrated air defenses, and few potential adversaries are capable of employing submarines or torpedoes effectively. Ballistic missiles lack necessary targeting features and mines are easily dealt with using a variety of existing and prospective methods. The intrinsic resilience of large-deck carriers further mitigates the threat posed by adversaries.

#### This advantage confuses capability with intent—no incentive for another nation to attack Norfolk

#### Alt causes to readiness

Ewing 11 (Philip, Staff Writer, DOD Buzz, “Surface Navy: ‘We’re not good to go’”, <http://www.dodbuzz.com/2011/07/12/surface-navy-were-not-good-to-go/>, Hemanth)

A pair of top Navy officials admitted Tuesday that its endemic readiness problems are basically unresolved — and may keep getting worse — before the service’s plans to fix its surface fleet finally take effect. Vice Adm. Bill Burke, the Navy’s top maintenance officer; and Vice Adm. Kevin McCoy, head of Naval Sea Systems Command, told a House Armed Services Committee panel that it took so many years, and so many interconnected decisions, to put the surface Navy in its current state that it would take a lot of time and effort to get it right again. “We have a good plan,” McCoy told committee chairman Rep. Randy Forbes, a Virginia Republican, “We’re not good to go right now.” In fact, he said some negative indicators “may turn a little harsher.” Over the past five years and beyond, Navy inspections have found that a growing number of the Navy’s surface warships aren’t ready to fight: The ships are in bad physical shape, carry broken equipment, insufficient spare parts, and can’t even rely upon their advanced weapons and sensors. But despite years of embarrassing reports in the press and harangues from Congress and top DoD officials, the fleet has been slow to recover, given the wide range of causes for its woes. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the “running government like a business” craze swept the Pentagon, top leaders rewarded commanders who could get the job done for less money, which then sparked a flurry of inter-related decisions that had the net effect of reducing the readiness of the surface Navy: The Navy fielded smaller crews, making fewer hands available for regular maintenance; it cut human-led, hands-on instruction, preferring to teach sailors their jobs using “computer-based instruction,” which meant they weren’t qualified to do their jobs at sea. And simple budget cuts meant ships didn’t get the regular maintenance or spare parts they needed. On top of all this, Navy commanders blame an increase in operational tempo, which meant more demands on their smaller, poorly maintained fleet, which meant less time and money to do the full-scale repairs ships need to keep them in service for their design lives. Crews realized all these problems at the operational level, but it has taken years to get the top brass to acknowledge the failures of initiatives such as “top 6 roll-down,” “lean manning,” and the “fleet response plan.” According to Tuesday’s hearing, all those problems are more or less still in effect, although Burke and McCoy told Forbes they acknowledge what’s wrong and they know what they have to do to fix it. The surface Navy is doing the inconvenient, expensive maintenance it has long put off, McCoy said, because it now accepts the need to keep ships around for their full lives — something the Navy traditionally has not done. McCoy gave the example of the cruiser USS Chosin, now in dry-dock in Hawaii: Initially the repair bill for that ship was estimated at $35 million, McCoy said, but when engineers did their deep inspections and discovered the state of its tanks, pipes and other equipment, they realized they would have to spend $70 million to get the ship into the best shape they could. This is why McCoy and Burke warned the Navy could continue to have bad results on its inspections, as long-hidden problems finally come into view. McCoy and Burke said that about 70 percent of the Navy’s hoped-for fleet of 313 ships is in service today, but the service can only get to that goal if all its destroyers and cruisers, for example, actually serve for their full 40 or 35 years. But Congress has heard Navy leaders give this explanation many times before, Forbes said. He pointed to statistics that showed an ever-growing number of Navy warships were being found unready each year — from 12 percent in 2009 to 24 percent last year, and 22 percent already this year. What is the Navy’s target for that number? Forbes asked. McCoy and Burke said the service is in the process of formulating one, but it’s a complicated situation. Forbes complained that defense witnesses always come before Congress with a plan for how they’ll get better, but they seldom appear to be able to act on it; as when DoD was unable to even conduct the basic audits of itself that officials promised they would. McCoy and Burke repeated that the Navy is “stretched” by the number of forces it must provide to combatant commanders, who Burke said want more carriers, aircraft and submarines than the Navy can deploy in answer. Burke, a submariner, said that combatant commanders want between 16 and 18 nuclear attack submarines at any one time, but the Navy only has enough to deploy 10. He and McCoy said the Navy wasn’t forcing commanders to miss missions, but that the rate of operations today was affecting the surface fleet’s ability to do maintenance and could hurt the service lives of its ships. Overall, the admirals warned, today’s operational tempo is “unsustainable.” But Forbes alluded to a classified report from the combatant commanders that he suggested found the Navy was forcing them to miss missions, although he said he and the witnesses couldn’t talk about it in open session. Forbes also blasted the Navy’s decision to under-fund its depot maintenance for ships and aircraft, a calculated risk by service officials to defer work in order to afford other priorities. Forbes hinted at a high “cannibalization” rate in the surface force, alluding to the practice in which crews’ swap their ships’ equipment when inspectors are due so they aren’t dinged for non-functional gear. Although surface sailors quietly talk about this practice among themselves, it’s very seldom broached publicly, and the Navy brass denies it happens.

#### Strategic dispersal sufficient now

Daily Press 2008 (Daily Press, “Norfolk Vs. Mayport”, <http://articles.dailypress.com/2008-11-21/news/0811200173_1_carrier-hampton-roads-navy>)

The Navy has raised the issue of security, and the advisability of what it calls "strategic dispersal": not having too many resources concentrated in a single place that might be hit by terrorists or a natural disaster. This is certainly legitimate, if hardly a comfort to Hampton Roads residents. But the risk is based on the assumption that those assets - in this case aircraft carriers - will actually all be in the place where they're based. Navy vessels fulfill their mission when they're deployed, not when they're tied up. There may be four carriers based in Norfolk, but the likelihood that they'll all be in port at the same time is slim, short of an unprecedented bliss of peace breaking out. So the analysis should consider how many vessels are actually likely to be present, as opposed to out at sea. And how well the deployment rotation can be managed to avoid having too many ships in port at one time. There are other operational issues to consider in the Norfolk vs. Mayport analysis. Such as the fact that Naval Station Norfolk has adequate capacity, recently upgraded at considerable expense. And it's close to the East Coast Master Jet Base at Oceana, Norfolk Naval Shipyard and to the carriers' birthplace and overhaul shop, the Northrop Grumman Newport News shipyard. The national security argument crumbles, and the budgetary argument favors Norfolk. But it's good to review the argument from regional interest, too, if that helps motivate the political powers and others in the community to make the compelling case.

#### No impact to naval power

Goure 10 (Daniel, Vice President, Lexington Institute, PhD, “Can The Case Be Made For Naval Power?”, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/can-the-case-be-made-for-naval-power-?a=1&c=1171>, Hemanth)

 This is no longer the case. The U.S. faces no great maritime challengers. While China appears to be toying with the idea of building a serious Navy this is many years off. Right now it appears to be designing a military to keep others, including the United States, away, out of the Western Pacific and Asian littorals. But even if it were seeking to build a large Navy, many analysts argue that other than Taiwan it is difficult to see a reason why Washington and Beijing would ever come to blows. Our former adversary, Russia, would have a challenge fighting the U.S. Coast Guard, much less the U.S. Navy. After that, there are no other navies of consequence. Yes, there are some scenarios under which Iran might attempt to close the Persian Gulf to oil exports, but how much naval power would really be required to reopen the waterway? Actually, the U.S. Navy would probably need more mine countermeasures capabilities than it currently possesses. More broadly, it appears that the nature of the security challenges confronting the U.S. has changed dramatically over the past several decades. There are only a few places where even large-scale conventional conflict can be considered possible. None of these would be primarily maritime in character although U.S. naval forces could make a significant contribution by employing its offensive and defensive capabilities over land. For example, the administration’s current plan is to rely on sea-based Aegis missile defenses to protect regional allies and U.S. forces until a land-based variant of that system can be developed and deployed. The sea ways, sometimes called the global commons, are predominantly free of dangers. The exception to this is the chronic but relatively low level of piracy in some parts of the world. So, the classic reasons for which nations build navies, to protect its own shores and its commerce or to place the shores and commerce of other states in jeopardy, seem relatively unimportant in today’s world.

#### Amphibious assault ships in Mayport now—solves shipbuilding and military stimulus

Brumley 2012 (Jeff, Staff Writer for the Florida-Times Union, February 17 “Mayport's future: amphibious assault ships, destroyers, littoral combat ships and patrol craft”, <http://jacksonville.com/news/metro/2012-02-17/story/mayports-future-amphibious-assault-ships-destroyers-littoral-combat>, Hemanth)

Word that the president’s budget slashed money to bring a carrier to Jacksonville came with some groans but also with a silver — or in this case, grey — lining: a slew of amphibious assault ships, destroyers, littoral combat ships and patrol craft. The precise make up of those ships became clear Friday in a letter from U.S. Rep. Ander Crenshaw’s office to the region’s ship repair industry. The document asks those companies to help convince the Navy they are ready to receive the new ships starting as soon as 2013. “It would be a godsend if that is the way it works,” J. Michael McGrath, executive director of the Jacksonville Area Ship Repair Association, said of the letter’s time-line. McGrath provided a copy of the letter to the Times-Union. On the way are some of the Navy’s largest non-aircraft carrier ships, including an amphibious assault ship, a dock landing ship and amphibious transport dock ship, according to the letter. Those three ships, expected in Mayport in 2015, comprise an amphibious ready group, which by itself has 2,000 sailors. Its job is to haul Marine Corps infantry, armor, aircraft and supplies into combat around the world. The Navy also plans to send three new destroyers to Mayport, which currently has four of the Arleigh Burke class warships. One of the current destroyers, the USS Carney, is scheduled to leave permanently for Spain in 2015. Jacksonville will also get eight of the new littoral combat ships, or LCSs, and three patrol craft, with the latter being the first to arrive next year. The base’s current fleet of frigates and three of its cruisers are scheduled for decommissioning, so the net gain of ships from 2012 to 2020 is five and the overall number of personnel at Mayport will go from 4,435 to 5,026. The letter does not give the names of any of the ships to be dispersed to Jacksonville and emphasizes the time-line is not finalized. Even so, ship repair companies in Northeast Florida said they are excited about the Navy’s decision and are prepared to perform the kind of maintenance work all those ships — especially the bigger, older amphibious ships — require, McGrath said.

#### These solve the aff best—new carriers trade off

Ottens 2011 (Nick, published in Asia Times Online and The Seoul Times and is a contributing analyst for the geostrategic consultancy Wikistrat, “Amphibs vs Carriers: Which Has the Future?”, <http://atlanticsentinel.com/2011/07/amphibs-vs-carriers-which-has-the-future/>, Hemanth)

In the battle for increasingly tight defense budgets, the US Navy may be hard pressed to continue to operate almost a dozen supercarriers well into this century whereas smaller and cheaper amphibious assault ships could actually expand America’s strategic presence around the world. So much argued Marine Corps Commandant General James Amos this week when he warned against cutting “amphibs” in favor of more expensive shipbuilding programs like destroyers, submarines and especially aircraft carriers. Amphibious ships, particularly of the landing helicopter dock type like the Wasp class, are able to deploy fighter jets, helicopters and Marines anywhere in the world at a moment’s notice, said Amos. They can project American military force faster and at much lower cost. Whereas total cost of construction for each Nimitz carrier was around $4.5 billion, it takes just $750 million to build a Wasp. The recent intervention in Libya proved Amos’ point. None of the Navy’s eleven supercarriers were involved in the operation. Instead, the American contribution to Operation Odyssey Dawn was spearheaded by the USS Kearsarge and its four Harrier jump jets. The ship was on a routine deployment to the Indian Ocean when orders came to sail for the Mediterranean. Of course, Kearsarge‘s capabilities pale in comparison to the fifty fixed wing aircraft that a carrier brings to the fore but for a military effort that was supposed to be limited in time and scope, it did the job. There’s good reason to question the future role of the supercarrier on its own merits. As Navy Captain Henry J. Hendrix and retired Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel J. Noel Williams pointed out in Proceedings this May, improved long range strike and increasingly sophisticated area denial capabilities undermine the carrier’s effectiveness. “The march of technology,” they believe, “is bringing the supercarrier era to an end, just as the new long range strike capabilities of carrier aviation brought on the demise of the battleship era in the 1940s.” Construction and development of the newest supercarrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, is estimated to cost some $12.5 billion although the Navy reckons that there’s a good change that it will end up costing at least a billion more. For comparison, the Congressional Budget Office estimated last month that the cost for new ship construction under the Navy’s current planning would average about $18 billion per year, or a total of $539 billion through 2041. The expense of refueling aircraft carriers as well as outfitting new ships raises that average to about $19.8 billion per year. While the era of the supercarrier draws to a close, the United States will probably soon be challenged, for the first time in nearly a generation, for control of the seas. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, no single power has come close to matching America’s naval supremacy. China may now seek to. To balance sea control and power projection capabilities requires an updated fleet composition, according to Hendrix and Williams; one that relies more heavily on large amphibious assault ships that are practically light aircraft carriers. The America class, currently in development, could fill that role. At 45,000 tons’ displacement, she will slide into the water larger than her World War II predecessors and larger even than the modern French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. Designed without an amphibious well deck, she will put to sea with a Marine Air Combat Element and key elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit. Stripped of her rotorcraft, the America could hold up to thirty F-35B short takeoff vertical landing (STOVL) attack aircraft compared to the four that are standard aboard the Wasp—a more appropriate capacity for engagement missions. That and the fact that the Navy could buy three America ships for the price of a supercarrier makes the amphib option a very attractive one. “Those ships would be the utility infielders of the fleet, providing a tremendous platform for engagement missions and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief response at one end and amphibious operations and sea control at the other.”

#### No impact to heg

Richard Haas (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 2008 “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask_the_expert.html>

Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war, i.e., one involving the major powers of the day, is remote and likely to stay that way. This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a contributing factor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons, but again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids large-scale conflict. The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conflicts involving terrorist groups, militias, rogue states, etc

#### No conflicts now—their job to prove those conflicts will happen; not just that carriers solve

#### Alt cause—space attacks

Mike Wall 2/28 – Space.com senior writer, PHD from the University of Sydney (“China's Space Advances Worry US Military” 28 February 2012 Space.com http://www.space.com/14697-china-space-program-military-threat.html)

The rise of China's space program may pose a potentially serious military threat to the United States down the road, top American intelligence officials contend. China continues to develop technology designed to destroy or disable satellites, which makes the United States and other nations with considerable on-orbit assets nervous. Even Beijing's ambitious human spaceflight plans are cause for some concern, since most space-technology advances could have military applications, officials say. "The space program, including ostensible civil projects, supports China's growing ability to deny or degrade the space assets of potential adversaries and enhances China's conventional military capabilities," Army Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, wrote in testimony presented before the U.S. Senate's Armed Services Committee Feb. 16. Burgess was delivering the DIA's annual assessment of threats to U.S. security and interests around the globe. China's big space dreams China has made no secret of its ambitious space goals. In 2003, it became the third nation — after the United States and the Soviet Union — to independently launch a person into orbit. In November 2011, China successfully docked two robotic spacecraft in Earth orbit, a key step in its quest to have a manned space station up and running by 2020. Beijing also hopes to land an astronaut (called a "taikonaut") on the moon sometime after its planned 60-ton orbital outpost is operational. [Photos: China's First Space Station] This past December, China joined the United States and Russia as the only nations with operational homegrown satellite navigation systems. China's Beidou system — whose name translates as "Big Dipper" — is somewhat rudimentary at the moment, consisting of just 10 satellites and covering a swath of the Asia-Pacific region from Australia in the south to Russia in the north. However, China envisions a global system with 35 satellites by 2020. The emergence of Beidou should eventually make China far less dependent on the GPS constellation, which is operated by the United States military and is currently the world's dominant satnav network. Beidou "will enable subscribers outside of China to purchase receivers and services that give civilian and military applications greater redundancy and independence in a conflict scenario that employs space assets," Burgess wrote. China operates many other satellites, for research, weather monitoring, communications and reconnaissance purposes. But it's tough to know exactly what the nation is getting out of these spacecraft, even the seemingly innocuous ones, according to Burgess. "Beijing rarely acknowledges direct military applications of its space program and refers to nearly all satellite launches as scientific or civil in nature," Burgess wrote. While the United States has at least nominally separate civil and military space programs, China's space activities are driven almost entirely by the People's Liberation Army, experts say. Anti-satellite technology China is developing some space technology with indisputably military applications. In January 2007, the nation shot down one of its own weather satellites with a missile, spawning thousands of new pieces of space junk. The test drew strong criticism from the United States and other countries. But China has continued to develop its anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities in the years since, aided by advances across various sectors of its space program, according to Burgess. Beijing "is developing jammers and directed-energy weapons for ASAT missions," he wrote. "A prerequisite for ASAT attacks, China's ability to track and identify satellites is enhanced by technologies from China's manned and lunar programs as well as technologies and methods developed to detect and track space debris." [Top 10 Space Weapons] The United States has long enjoyed playing a dominant role in space, giving the nation the "ultimate high ground" in military conflicts for decades, experts say. ASAT capabilities — whether they're developed by China or other nations — represent a genuine threat to this dominance, Burgess and other analysts contend. "From the counter-space perspective, Russia and China continue developing systems and technologies that can interfere with or disable vital U.S. space-based navigation, communication, and intelligence collection satellites," Burgess wrote

#### Western Pacific vulnerability—aff can’t solve

Marvin 6/11/12 (Taylor, Writer for Prospect, Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, “PRC Area-Denial Capabilities and American Power Projection, Part 2”, <http://prospectjournal.ucsd.edu/blog/index.php/prc-area-denial-capabilities-and-american-power-projection-part-2/>, Hemanth)

In addition to carriers, US power projection in the Western Pacific is dependent on huge military bases, a vulnerability often neglected in discussions of US force staging.[24] These bases, the most important of which are located in Japan, South Korea, and Guam, allow US land and air forces to operate in areas that would otherwise to be unavailable to non-naval assets. These sanctuaries are also vital for logistics build-up and staging, a vital consideration in the distant Western Pacific theater.[25] Rapid Chinese strikes against these bases would reduce the US’s ability to build up land and air forces in theater during hostilities, and the PLA has heavily invested in the short-range ballistic missile and strike aircraft forces necessary to conduct these attacks.[26] Both the US Air Force and Navy are accustomed to operating from “sanctuaries” largely off limits to enemy attack, as rear operating air bases or ports have not been extensively targeted by an enemy force since World War II.[27] If large bases are no longer a safe haven, US force structures and doctrine will be forced to change; for example, USAF aircraft would be forced to fly into the theater from distance airbases out of PLA missile range, reducing their available time on station.[28] It is not clear if the US would be able to fight a sustained war in the Western Pacific if Chinese anti-access strikes degraded the operational capability of large rear bases.

### ----Ext. Asymmetric Warfare

#### Area denial—aff doesn’t resolve this

Marvin 6/11/12 (Taylor, Writer for Prospect, Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, “PRC Area-Denial Capabilities and American Power Projection, Part 2”, <http://prospectjournal.ucsd.edu/blog/index.php/prc-area-denial-capabilities-and-american-power-projection-part-2/>, Hemanth)

Anti-access/area-denial capabilities are the core strategic challenge facing the United States. Proliferating weapons technologies have democratized lethal force, giving unsophisticated opponents the ability to deny superior opponents the ability to project power. The Pentagon’s challenge is to overcome anti-access/area-denial systems “no matter where they are or how they’re presented,” a Department of Defense briefer recently remarked. “To that end, for example, we see state actors with well-funded militaries that possess the most advanced kinds of anti-access/area-denial capabilities and technologies—in some cases, multilayered across all of the war-fighting domains.” Of course, recognizing the challenge of anti-access/area-denial capabilities is not the same as actually finding a way around them. Surviving in an A2/AD environment is an unaddressed strategic challenge, and one that will only grow more difficult as the lethality and proliferation of anti-access/area-denial platforms increases. China seeks the ability to credibly threaten to destroy key US assets in the Western Pacific, raising the risk and potential cost of US opposition to Chinese interests and removing US leaders’ ability to coerce China through military threats, a strategic goal that favors an asymmetric strategy. Despite its rapid military modernization, China will not be able to evenly match US assets in the Western Pacific in the near future.[1] The Chinese military leadership understands that attempting to evenly match the US military is the wrong way to approach the problem of American hegemony in the Western Pacific; instead, China should bypass the American military’s strengths and attack its weaknesses—the central principal of asymmetric warfare.[2] “No one intends to bankrupt themselves by challenging the US to a shipbuilding competition akin to the Dreadnought arms race prior to World War I,” then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates explained in a 2009 speech. “Instead, we’ve seen their investments in weapons geared to neutralize our advantages—to deny the US military freedom of movement and actions while potentially threatening our primary means of projecting power: our bases, sea and air assets, and the networks that support them.”[3] While the Chinese military follows no single overarching policy, asymmetric warfare is understood to be China’s core strategy for opposing the United States,[4] an “active defense” the PLA defines as a “strategic counterattack.”[5] Anti-access/area-denial capabilities are part of but distinct from the broader notion of asymmetric warfare—asymmetric warfare is a strategy, while A2/AD capabilities are platforms used to execute that strategy. More specifically, Chinese A2/AD strategies seek to prevent the United States from controlling key areas like straits, littorals or choke points, denying US forces the ability to operate from large bases in the region, and prevent the US Navy from projecting power from the sea.[6] Barring the ability to completely deny the US effective operation in the Western Pacific, Chinese area-denial strategy aims to deter American intervention in the region by increasing the risk to US fleets that venture too close to China’s shores.[7] Chinese enthusiasm for asymmetric strategies is not new. During the Cold War the PLAN was structured around an asymmetric defense of Chinese littorals against an invading Soviet amphibious force.[8] Chairman Mao’s doctrine of an asymmetric “People’s War” and the example of Soviet sea denial strategy heavily influenced the early PLAN and its focus on littoral shore defense and, in Mao’s words, “maritime guerrilla operations.”[9] While the PLAN’s focus on asymmetric warfare was partially a product of limited resources, it was also a rational response to external threats. China’s geography is uniquely suited for asymmetric naval warfare: unlike other many other maritime nations the Chinese mainland does not actually border an ocean, but instead partially enclosed seas.[10] This geography creates littoral choke points that restrict the movements of an intruding naval force, empowering a prepared asymmetric defender.[11

### ----Ext. No Tracking

#### A. Maneuverability

Thompson 2009 (Loren, Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy. Prior to holding his present positions, he was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and taught graduate-level courses in strategy, technology and media affairs at Georgetown. He has also taught at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Mr. Thompson holds doctoral and masters degrees in government from Georgetown University and a bachelor of science degree in political science from Northeastern University, “AIRCRAFT CARRIER (IN)VULNERABILITY: What It Takes To Successfully Attack an American Aircraft Carrier”, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/aircraft-carrier-invulnerability.pdf>, Hemanth)

The first step in attempting to attack an aircraft carrier is to find it. Given the carrier's size – longer than three football fields, as tall as a twenty-story building – that might seem like a simple task. It is not, especially in wartime. The Navy's plan when confronting major littoral adversaries is initially to operate the carriers at least 200 nm from shore, using submarines, unmanned vehicles and various joint assets to collect information about potential threats. Operating far out to sea would not greatly constrain the use of the carrier's strike aircraft, since both its F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets and next-generation Joint Strike Fighters are expected to have unrefueled combat ranges of about 600 nm. During the early stages of conflict, both the aircraft and cruise missiles from other warships in the carrier's battle group would be used to destroy enemy sensors, weapons and communications (including satellite downlinks) posing an immediate threat to the battle group. As those threats are gradually eliminated, the carrier can move closer to land without fear of detection, expanding the coverage of strike aircraft over enemy territory. So long as the carrier remains in the open sea, the capacity of most adversaries to find it will be limited. In addition to the battle group's efforts to suppress enemy sensors and communications, the carrier will be moving constantly, and much of that movement will be designed to avoid areas of potential vulnerability. The fact that all of the Navy's carriers but one will be nuclear-powered by the end of the current decade is important in eluding detection, because nuclear propulsion enables the ship to maneuver at maximum speed for weeks without having to accommodate the complex logistics of frequent refuelings at sea. The most basic protection the carrier has against being detected, though, is distance. The areas in which carriers typically operate are so vast that adversaries would be hard-pressed to find them even in the absence of active countermeasures by the battle group. Consider, for example, the South China Sea, where China recently held hostage a Navy EP-3 electronic-intelligence aircraft and its crew on Hainan Island. Even though it comprises less than five percent of the Western Pacific, the sea measures over a million square miles. The most practical way to conduct surveillance over such expanses is with satellites, which have a much wider field of vision than sensors operating inside the atmosphere. However, China does not presently possess military reconnaissance satellites capable of finding a carrier, and the commercial satellites to which it might turn take days or weeks to task and deliver imagery -- making them useless for finding a continuously moving vessel.

#### B. Tech gap

Thompson 2009 (Loren, Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy. Prior to holding his present positions, he was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and taught graduate-level courses in strategy, technology and media affairs at Georgetown. He has also taught at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Mr. Thompson holds doctoral and masters degrees in government from Georgetown University and a bachelor of science degree in political science from Northeastern University, “AIRCRAFT CARRIER (IN)VULNERABILITY: What It Takes To Successfully Attack an American Aircraft Carrier”, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/aircraft-carrier-invulnerability.pdf>, Hemanth)

The value of another passive tracking approach, electronic intelligence gathering (or electronic eavesdropping), is also unclear. Aircraft carriers generate numerous electronic emissions from their sensors, communications equipment, and other onboard systems which at least in theory might be exploited to establish a target track. However, the Navy has developed methods for managing its electronic emissions in wartime, and passive sensors are subject to a variety of countermeasures such as jamming and deception. Like acoustic monitoring, electronic intelligence gathering is a sub-optimal way of tracking surface vessels. The same cannot be said of space-based or airborne electro-optical sensors, which are the method of tracking carriers most frequently discussed in open literature. The United States and several other countries already operate constellations of photographic reconnaissance satellites that could one day evolve into tracking systems. However, it is important to recognize how costly and complex such systems would need to be in order to continuously track a carrier. In the case of the South China Sea, three bands of 46 satellites each (138 spacecraft in all) operating in 40-degree inclined polar orbits would be required to provide constant monitoring. The size of the satellite constellation is driven by the need for continuous coverage and high resolution. High resolution dictates low-earth orbits. Low-earth orbits in turn dictate how many satellites must be in each band to avoid gaps in coverage, and also how many bands there must be to cover the whole sea given a 300 nm field of view per band. Continuous coverage could be achieved from higher altitudes using fewer satellites, but resolution would deteriorate to a point where it was no longer suitable for use as targeting data. There is very little likelihood that any country, including the United States, will deploy such a constellation of reconnaissance satellites over the next twenty years. If it did, it would still be able to cover only a portion of the Western Pacific. And if it were an enemy of the United States, both its spacecraft and its links to them would be subject to attack in wartime. As noted earlier, commercial satellites are unlikely any time soon to offer the resolution, coverage or immediacy necessary to track a carrier. One day, unmanned aerial vehicles may offer an alternative to orbital platforms for the deployment of electro-optical sensors that can monitor carriers. However, their greater vulnerability to preemption combined with their more limited field of vision makes this a less-than-ideal solution. In any event, no country other than the U.S. today has the technology to make such a solution work, and that is likely to remain true for many years to come.

### ----Ext. Cyberattacks

#### Cyberattacks exploit a key vulnerability and destroy military capabilities—no solvency

Marvin 6/11/12 (Taylor, Writer for Prospect, Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, “PRC Area-Denial Capabilities and American Power Projection, Part 2”, <http://prospectjournal.ucsd.edu/blog/index.php/prc-area-denial-capabilities-and-american-power-projection-part-2/>, Hemanth)

Centralized Power Projection America’s power projection capabilities are dependent on centralized assets whose vulnerability is an important weakness of the US military.[20] This centralization would allow China to partially mitigate its force asymmetry with the US by focusing on targeting and destroying these assets in a conflict, bypassing the bulk of US strength. If China wisely elects to avoid challenging the US on an even, ship-on-ship basis, then it should focus on attacking other vulnerabilities in America’s force structure, eroding US capabilities while avoiding its strengths. The Chinese term for anti-access/area-denial strategies, shashoujian or “assassin’s mace”, hints at this logic;[21] like an assassin, in the event of hostilities Chinese forces will seeks to strike and destroy exposed vulnerabilities in US force structures, while denying their opponent the same opportunity. For example, US forces are much more dependent on satellite reconnaissance and communication than the PLA. Accordingly, China has developed anti-satellite weapons to attack this US vulnerability

### ----Ext. Attacks Fail

#### Only four direct attacks; these are the only ones the aff can claim to solve

Thompson 2009 (Loren, Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy. Prior to holding his present positions, he was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and taught graduate-level courses in strategy, technology and media affairs at Georgetown. He has also taught at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Mr. Thompson holds doctoral and masters degrees in government from Georgetown University and a bachelor of science degree in political science from Northeastern University, “AIRCRAFT CARRIER (IN)VULNERABILITY: What It Takes To Successfully Attack an American Aircraft Carrier”, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/aircraft-carrier-invulnerability.pdf>, Hemanth)

The priority mission of U.S. aircraft carriers during the next twenty years will be to enforce access to Eurasia – the center of global population and commerce, and the historic source of all major external threats to American democracy. Future adversaries seeking to deny the U.S. such access will probably employ four types of weapons against the carriers: long-range cruise missiles launched from aircraft, ships or land bases; ballistic missiles launched from ships or land bases; diesel-electric submarines employing wakehoming and other advanced torpedoes; and drifting or tethered mines.

#### No successful ballistic missile attack

Thompson 2009 (Loren, Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy. Prior to holding his present positions, he was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and taught graduate-level courses in strategy, technology and media affairs at Georgetown. He has also taught at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Mr. Thompson holds doctoral and masters degrees in government from Georgetown University and a bachelor of science degree in political science from Northeastern University, “AIRCRAFT CARRIER (IN)VULNERABILITY: What It Takes To Successfully Attack an American Aircraft Carrier”, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/aircraft-carrier-invulnerability.pdf>, Hemanth)

The U.S. Navy expects to deploy effective defenses against all classes of tactical and theater ballistic missiles by the end of the current decade, largely through the upgrade of existing sensors and weapons. For example, upgrading software for the Aegis combat system and equipping Hawkeye early-warning aircraft with an infrared search-and-track sensor would greatly reduce the challenge of tracking hostile ballistic missiles – particularly when networked with other joint assets already in place or under development. Moreover, the threat posed to carriers by ballistic missiles over the next 20 years appears relatively minor. The ballistic warheads of potential adversaries lack the terminal guidance or maneuvering capability that would enable them to home in on carriers during the final moments of flight. Such warhead/seekers are very difficult to build due to the high temperatures and speeds associated with atmospheric reentry. But without those features, attackers would have to use thousands of warheads in barrages in order to have some hope of harming a moving aircraft carrier – unless nuclear warheads were used, a step few enemies are likely to be able or willing to take. No prospective adversary has the resources required to expend thousands of ballistic-missile warheads in attacking a single aircraft carrier. Even if one did, it would be a poor tactic, possibly costing more to execute than the price of the carrier itself. Until the very challenging task of developing a terminal guidance and maneuver capability for ballistic missiles is solved by some rival, this is probably the least important threat carriers face. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said concerning the danger posed to land bases by ballistic missiles, owing to the larger size and greater vulnerability of such bases.

#### Submarine and torpedo attacks fail

Thompson 2009 (Loren, Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy. Prior to holding his present positions, he was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and taught graduate-level courses in strategy, technology and media affairs at Georgetown. He has also taught at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Mr. Thompson holds doctoral and masters degrees in government from Georgetown University and a bachelor of science degree in political science from Northeastern University, “AIRCRAFT CARRIER (IN)VULNERABILITY: What It Takes To Successfully Attack an American Aircraft Carrier”, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/aircraft-carrier-invulnerability.pdf>, Hemanth)

A more serious undersea threat to aircraft carriers is presented by submarines equipped with advanced munitions, especially wakehoming torpedoes. Although the nuclear-powered submarine threat of Cold War years has been greatly diminished by the decline of the Russian Navy, countries such as China and Iran are acquiring very quiet diesel-electric submarines and modern torpedoes in international markets. Tracking and neutralizing such submarines in the shallow waters adjacent to these countries' coastlines is a complex challenge. However, the U.S. Navy has invested extensively in shallow-water antisubmarine systems that can be employed from aircraft, surface combatants, and its own undersea warships. Among the most promising new systems are unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV's) and the Advanced Deployable System, a portable hydrophone array that detects even the quietest subs. When these systems are combined with the formidable undersea-warfare capabilities of the latest U.S. nuclear attack submarines and the extensive antisubmarine capabilities of the surface fleet, it is not hard to see why the Navy expects to retain underwater supremacy through 2020.

#### Mines fail

Thompson 2009 (Loren, Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy. Prior to holding his present positions, he was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and taught graduate-level courses in strategy, technology and media affairs at Georgetown. He has also taught at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Mr. Thompson holds doctoral and masters degrees in government from Georgetown University and a bachelor of science degree in political science from Northeastern University, “AIRCRAFT CARRIER (IN)VULNERABILITY: What It Takes To Successfully Attack an American Aircraft Carrier”, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/aircraft-carrier-invulnerability.pdf>, Hemanth)

The most ubiquitous seaborne threat to aircraft carriers is drifting or tethered mines. Virtually every littoral power has some capacity to employ mines, and over a dozen countries export them. Mines are cheaper to buy and easier to use than other munitions, but under the right circumstances can do comparable damage. And although they tend to be fairly simple mechanisms, the performance of newer mines benefits from the same digital technologies enhancing other categories of weapons. However, mines suffer from several intrinsic limitations. Bottom mines are ineffective in water deeper than 600 feet – the depth typically found more than 100 miles from shore – and floating mines tethered to the bottom are relatively easy to detect in water of that depth. Moreover, tens or hundreds of thousands of mines are required to effectively “seed” a carrier operating area in the open sea. Once released, the mines pose at least as great a threat to an adversary's vessels as they do to the warships in a U.S. carrier battle group. Mines present a greater threat in shallow water where they are harder to detect, and in chokepoints like the Straits of Hormuz. The Navy plans to operate its carriers in such areas only when they have been cleared of mines, and has made extensive investments in various mine detection and neutralization systems. By the end of the current decade, every carrier battle group will include helicopters equipped with the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS), the Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS), the Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS), the Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS), and the Towed Mine Detection System. Battle groups will also deploy unmanned underwater vehicles capable of autonomously finding and destroying mines. With so many mine-countermeasure systems organic to battle groups, there is little chance a mine will actually strike a carrier. Even if it did, the likelihood of serious damage is minimal. Nimitz-class carriers have thousands of separate compartments and heavy side armor that would deflect or contain the explosive force of mines. Larger ships are generally able to absorb more damage without being disabled, and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are the biggest warships ever built. So while the proliferation of mines among potentially hostile littoral powers is a real problem, it poses less danger to aircraft carriers than to other types of warships.

### Economy Frontline

#### Military spending is bad and takes money *away* from infrastructure spending

**Pollin 8**- Robert N. Pollin is an American economist and activist. He is a professor of economics at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst and founding co-director of its Political Economy Research Institute (“ECONOMIC PROSPECTS Why Militarism Hurts the U.S. Economy” New Labor Forum Spring 2008 <http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/other_publication_types/NLF--Why_Militarism_Hurts_US_Economy_final_proof_Spring_08.pdf>)

Contrary to Baran and Sweezy, other analysts have argued that huge military budgets produce far more harm than good for the U.S. economy. The most influential author to develop this position was the late Seymour Melman, whose writings on this topic included his 1970 book Pentagon Capitalism and the 1998 study, The Demilitarized Society: Disarmament and Conversion. Melman focused on the fact that military spending was draining resources from the U.S. public treasury. This was all money not being spent on civilian research and development, health care, education, and public infrastructure projects such as highquality mass transportation, water management, and public parks. Which of these positions is right? Here I will risk invoking the economist’s classic twohanded cop-out (“on the one hand, he’s right, but on the other hand, she’s got a point. . . .”). In my view, both positions are actually correct. This is because the two positions present two sides of the same reality. Baran and Sweezy stressed that the U.S. economy—like all capitalist economies—is not sustainable if it relies, as its primary engine of growth, on private capitalists making investment decisions driven by their pursuit of everhigher profits. Large-scale public investments are also necessary to promote stability and productivity improvements. However, it also happens that military spending—as opposed to primary school buildings in poor communities or municipal water-management systems—is the only form of large-scale public investment that can consistently win political support from mainstream politicians. But this hard reality also invokes the other side of the story emphasized by Melman: that alternative forms of public investment would generate much higher levels of public welfare— more and better jobs, better civilian technologies, and a safer, more reliable infrastructure—than the military. We now know all too well that the New Orleans levee system was among the large-scale public water management projects that suffered from years of severe neglect. Melman therefore argued that we needed to mobilize politically to shift the government’s spending priorities away from the Pentagon.

#### Military spending is horrible for the economy and means the aff can’t solve hegemony

**Swanson 11- David L. Swanson** is an [American](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_of_America) activist, blogger and author. Swanson obtained a [Master of Philosophy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Master_of_Philosophy) degree from the [University of Virginia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Virginia). From 2000 to 2003, Swanson was the communications coordinator for [Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_of_Community_Organizations_for_Reform_Now) He served as press secretary for [Dennis Kucinich](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dennis_Kucinich)'s 2004 presidential campaign. Following the [2004 elections](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_election%2C_2004), Swanson served for a year as media coordinator for the [International Labor Communications Association](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Labor_Communications_Association). (“It’s Jobs or War, Not Both” June 4, 2011 <http://economyincrisis.org/content/its-jobs-or-wars-not-both>)

Contrary to partisan myths and stereotypes, U.S. military spending has been on the rise these past two years. And military towns have seen a boom this past decade. But spending money on the military, even in the United States, hurts the U.S. economy. Spending money on foreign wars is even worse, but all military spending is economically destructive. It’s worse, economically, than doing nothing. Failing to spend that money and instead cutting taxes would create more jobs than investing it in the military. Investing it in useful industries like mass transit or education would have a much stronger impact and create many more jobs. But even nothing, even cutting taxes, would do less harm than military spending. And that’s domestic military spending; spending on foreign wars, funding the Taliban, funding Karzai, misplacing $17 billion, etc., all does even more economic harm. Yes, harm. Every military job, every weapons industry job, every war-reconstruction job, every mercenary or torture consultant job is as much a lie as any war justification. It appears to be a job, but it is not a job. It is the absence of more and better jobs. It is public money wasted on something worse for job creation than nothing at all and much worse than other available options. Robert Pollin and Heidi Garrett-Peltier, of the Political Economy Research Institute, have collected the data. Each billion dollars of government spending invested in the military creates about 12,000 jobs. Investing it instead in tax cuts for personal consumption generates approximately 15,000 jobs. But putting it into healthcare gives us 18,000 jobs, in home weatherization and infrastructure also 18,000 jobs, in education 25,000 jobs, and in mass transit 27,700 jobs. In education the average wages and benefits of the 25,000 jobs created is significantly higher than that of the military’s 12,000 jobs. In the other fields, the average wages and benefits created are lower than in the military (at least as long as only financial benefits are considered), but the net impact on the economy is greater due to the greater number of jobs. The option of cutting taxes does not have a larger net impact, but it does create 3,000 more jobs per billion dollars. There is a common belief that World War II spending ended the Great Depression. That seems very far from clear, and economists are not in agreement on it. What I think we can say with some confidence is, first, that the military spending of World War II at the very least did not prevent recovery from the Great Depression, and second, that similar levels of spending on other industries would very likely have improved that recovery. We would have more jobs and they would pay more, and we would be more intelligent and peaceful if we invested in education rather than war. But does that prove that military spending is destroying our economy? Well, consider this lesson from post-war history. If you had that higher paying education job rather than the lower paying military job or no job at all, your kids could have the free quality education that your job and your colleagues’ jobs provided. If we didn’t dump over half of our discretionary government spending into war, we could have free quality education from preschool through college. We could have several life-changing amenities, including paid retirements, vacations, parental leave, healthcare, and transportation. We could have guaranteed employment. You’d be making more money, working fewer hours, with greatly reduced expenses. How can I be so sure this is possible? Because I know a secret that is often kept from us by American media: there are other nations on this planet. Steven Hill’s new book “Europe’s Promise: Why the European Way Is the Best Hope in an Insecure Age” has a message we should find very encouraging. The European Union (EU) is the world’s largest and most competitive economy, and most of those living in it are wealthier, healthier, and happier than most Americans. Europeans work shorter hours, have a greater say in how their employers behave, receive lengthy paid vacations and paid parental leave, can rely on guaranteed paid pensions, have free or extremely inexpensive comprehensive and preventative healthcare, enjoy free or extremely inexpensive educations from preschool through college, impose only half the per-capita environmental damage of Americans, endure a fraction of the violence found in the United States, imprison a fraction of the prisoners locked up here, and benefit from democratic representation, engagement, and civil liberties unimagined in the land where we’re teased that the world hates us for our rather mediocre “freedoms.” Europe even offers a model foreign policy, bringing neighboring nations toward democracy by holding out the prospect of EU membership, while we drive other nations away from good governance at great expense of blood and treasure.

#### Economy is resilient

**Zumbrun & Varghese 5/9** 2012,- Joshua Zumbrun and Romy Varghese are writers for Bloomberg Businessweek,(“Fed’s Plosser Says U.S. Economy Proving Resilient to Shocks,” http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-05-09/fed-s-plosser-says-u-dot-s-dot-economy-proving-resilient-to-shocks)

Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank President Charles Plosser said the U.S. economy has proven “remarkably resilient**”** to shocks that can damage growth, including surging oil prices and natural disasters. “The economy has now grown for 11 consecutive quarters,” Plosser said today according to remarks prepared for a speech at the Philadelphia Fed. “Growth is not robust. But growth in the past year has continued despite significant risks and external and internal headwinds.” “The U.S. economy has a history of being remarkably resilient,” said Plosser, who doesn’t have a vote on policy this year. “These shocks held GDP growth to less than 1 percent in the first half of 2011, and many analysts were concerned that the economy was heading toward a double dip. Yet, the economy proved resilient and growth picked up in the second half of the year.”

#### Economic collapse doesn’t cause instability

Fareed Zakaria 9 was named editor of Newsweek International in October 2000, overseeing all Newsweek editions abroad, December 12, 2009, “The Secrets of Stability,” http://www.newsweek.com/2009/12/11/the-secrets-of-stability.html

Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all.

### Colombia Frontline

#### <<AT: Power Projection—insert>>

#### No impact – Amazon

**NEW YORK POST 6-9-2005** (Posted at Cheat Seeking Missiles, date is date of post, http://cheatseekingmissiles.blogspot.com/2005/06/stop-global-whining-2.html)

"One of the simple, but very important, facts is that the rainforests have only been around for between 12,000 and 16,000 years. That sounds like a very long time but, in terms of the history of the earth, it's hardly a pinprick. "Before then, there were hardly any rainforests. They are very young. It is just a big mistake that people are making. "The simple point is that there are now still - despite what humans have done - more rainforests today than there were 12,000 years ago." "This lungs of the earth business is nonsense; the daftest of all theories," Stott adds. "If you want to put forward something which, in a simple sense, shows you what's wrong with all the science they espouse, it's that image of the lungs of the world. "In fact, because the trees fall down and decay, rainforests actually take in slightly more oxygen than they give out. "The idea of them soaking up carbon dioxide and giving out oxygen is a myth. It's only fast-growing young trees that actually take up carbon dioxide," Stott says. "In terms of world systems, the rainforests are basically irrelevant. World weather is governed by the oceans - that great system of ocean atmospherics. "Most things that happen on land are mere blips to the system, basically insignificant," he says. Both scientists say the argument that the cure for cancer could be hidden in a rainforest plant or animal - while plausible - is also based on false science because the sea holds more mysteries of life than the rainforests. And both say fears that man is destroying this raw source of medicine are unfounded because the rainforests are remarkably healthy. "They are just about the healthiest forests in the world. This stuff about them vanishing at an alarming rate is a con based on bad science," Moore says.

#### Environment is resilient

Easterbrook 95 (Gregg, Distinguished Fellow – Fullbright Foundation, A Moment on Earth, p. 25)

In the aftermath of events such as Love Canal or the Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. The environment that contains them is close to indestructible. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

#### Rainforests are empirically proven to be resilient – no impact

K. J. Willis, and L. Gillson, April 2004, “How ‘Virgin’ is Virgin Rainforest?” Science Magazine, The authors are in the Oxford Long-term Ecology Laboratory,

Beyond pure interest in the antiquity of tropical rainforests and how humans may have shaped them, these studies have important implications for conservation biology. First, they indicate that it is no longer acceptable to suggest that land loss caused by previous human activities was too small to have had a major impact and therefore cannot be compared to present-day losses. This point is reinforced by current estimates suggesting that the main agent of deforestation in the tropical forests, accounting for up to two-thirds of the annual loss, is slash-and-burn farming (12). Thus, although the rate and extent of forest clearance might be much greater today, in many cases, the process is comparable to prehistoric losses. Second, in most examples of prehistoric disturbance there was subsequent forest regeneration. These tropical ecosystems are not as fragile as often portrayed and in fact are quite resilient. Left for long enough, forests will almost certainly regenerate.

#### Their evidence is hype motivated by economic and political agendas- not based in science

Marc Morana and Kent Washburn, June 26, 2000, co-producers of Amazon Rainforest: Clear-Cutting the Myths, World Net Daily, "Shaky science behind save-rainforest effort," http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\_ID=17543

The Amazon is actually the least endangered forest in the world," states Moore in American Investigator's television newsmagazine documentary, "Clear-cutting the myths," hosted by former CBS and CNN newsman Reid Collins. Moore explains that, in the 20 years of warnings about deforestation, "only 10 percent of the Amazon has been converted to date from what was original forest to agriculture and settlement." The finding that the Amazon rainforest threat is a myth based on bad science and political agendas -- especially by unlikely critics such as Moore, other scientists and inhabitants of the region -- is not expected to sit well with a movement that has enlisted schoolchildren throughout the United States and celebrities ranging from Sting to Alec Baldwin to Chevy Chase to Tom Jones and Tony Bennett. And which has also raised tens of millions of dollars for environmental activist groups. "This is where I really have a problem with modern-day environmentalism," says Moore. "It confuses opinion with what we know to be true, and disguises what are really political agendas with environmental rhetoric. The fact of the matter is: There is a larger percentage of the Amazon rain forest intact than there are most other forests in this world."

#### 9/11 was the anomaly – terrorist attacks don’t cause retaliation.

Mueller, Chair of National Security Studies and Professor of Political Science Ohio State University, 05(John, “Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence,* p.500-501)

Although it is often argued that it is imperative that public officials ‘‘do something’’— which usually means overreact—when a terrorist event takes place, there are many instances where no reaction took place and the officials did not suffer politically or otherwise. Ronald Reagan’s response to a terrorist bomb in Lebanon in 1983 that killed 241 American Marines was to make a few speeches and eventually to pull the troops out. Bill Clinton responded similarly after an unacceptable loss of American lives in Somalia ten years later. Although there werethe (apparently counterproductive) military retaliations after the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa in 1998 as noted earlier, there was no notable response to terrorist attacks on American targets in Saudi Arabia (Khobar Towers) in 1996 or to the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000. The response to the anthrax attacks of 2001 was the same as to terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in 1993 and in Oklahoma City in 1995— the dedicated application of police work to try to apprehend the perpetrator—and this proved to be politically acceptable. The demands for retaliation tend to be more problematic in the case of suicide terrorists since the direct perpetrators of the terrorist act are already dead. Nonetheless, the attacks in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and against the Cole were all suicidal, yet no direct retaliatory action was taken. Thus, despite short-term demands that some sort of action must be taken, experience suggests politicians can often successfully ride out this demand after the obligatory (and inexpensive) expressions of outrage are issued.

#### Very few terrorists and they aren't that deadly. The odds of dying are VERY low.

Mueller ‘9 (John, Prof. Pol. Sci. – Ohio State U., in “American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear Threat inflation since 9/11”, Ed. A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer, p. 194)

Although there are some who worry that al-Qaeda has been able to reconstitute itself and is now on the march (see Bergen 2007; Hoffman 2008; Mazzetti and Rohde 2008),2 estimates of the size of al-Qaeda central generally come in with numbers in the same order of magnitude as those suggested by Sageman. Egyptian intelligence, for example, puts the number at less than 200, while American intelligence estimates run from 300 to upwards of 500 (Wright 2008). One retired U.S. intelligence officer suggests it could be "as many as 2000" (Mazzetti and Rohde 2008), but that number should obviously be taken essentially to define the upper range of contemporary estimates. Another way to evaluate the threat is to focus on the actual amount of violence perpetrated around the world by Muslim extremists since 9/11 outside of war zones. Included in the count would be terrorism of the much-publicized and fearinducing sort that occurred in Bali in 2002, in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Turkey in 2003, in the Philippines, Madrid, and Egypt in 2004, and in London and Jordan in 2005. Three think-tank publications have independently provided lists of such incidents. Although these tallies make for grim reading, the total number of people killed comes to some 200 or 300 per year. That, of course, is 200 or 300 per year too many, but it hardly suggests that the perpetrators present a major threat, much less an existential one. For comparison: over the same period far more people have drowned in bathtubs in the United States alone. Another comparison comes from the consequences of policies instituted by the Transportation Security Administration. Increased delays and added costs at airports due to new security procedures provide incentive for many short-haul passengers to drive to their destination rather than flying. Since driving is far riskier than air travel, the extra automobile traffic generated by increased airport security screening measures has been estimated to result in 400 or more fatalities per year (Ellig et al. 2006: 35). Another assessment comes from astronomer Alan Harris. Using State Department figures, he estimates a worldwide death rate from international terrorism outside of war zones of 1,000 per year—that is, he assumes in his estimate that there would be another 9/11 somewhere in the world every several years. Over an 80 year period under those conditions some 80,000 deaths would occur which would mean that the probability that a resident of the globe will die at the hands of international terrorists is about one in 75,000 (6 billion divided by 80,000). In comparison, an American's chance of dying in an auto accident over the same time interval is about one in 80. If there are no repeats of 9/11, the probability of being killed by an international terrorist becomes more like one in 120,000.

#### No risk of a terrorist attack inside the US

Mueller, 2006 (John, Professor of political science at Ohio state University, “Is there still a terrorist threat?” Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct, Vol. 85, Issue 5)

Instead, Americans are told--often by the same people who had once predicted imminent attacks--that the absence of international terrorist strikes in the United States is owed to the protective measures so hastily and expensively put in place after 9/11. But there is a problem with this argument. True, there have been no terrorist incidents in the United States in the last five years. But nor were there any in the five years before the 9/11 attacks, at a time when the United States was doing much less to protect itself. It would take only one or two guys with a gun or an explosive to terrorize vast numbers of people, as the sniper attacks around Washington, D.C., demonstrated in 2002. Accordingly, the government's protective measures would have to be nearly perfect to thwart all such plans. Given the monumental imperfection of the government's response to Hurricane Katrina, and the debacle of FBI and National Security Agency programs to upgrade their computers to better coordinate intelligence information, that explanation seems far-fetched. Moreover, Israel still experiences terrorism even with a far more extensive security apparatus. It may well have become more difficult for terrorists to get into the country, but, as thousands demonstrate each day, it is far from impossible. Immigration procedures have been substantially tightened (at considerable cost), and suspicious U.S. border guards have turned away a few likely bad apples. But visitors and immigrants continue to flood the country. There are over 300 million legal entries by foreigners each year, and illegal crossings number between 1,000 and 4,000 a day--to say nothing of the generous quantities of forbidden substances that the government has been unable to intercept or even detect despite decades of a strenuous and well-funded "war on drugs." Every year, a number of people from Muslim countries-perhaps hundreds--are apprehended among the illegal flow from Mexico, and many more probably make it through. Terrorism does not require a large force. And the 9/11 planners, assuming Middle Eastern males would have problems entering the United States legally after the attack, put into motion plans to rely thereafter on non-Arabs with passports from Europe and Southeast Asia. If al Qaeda operatives are as determined and inventive as assumed, they should be here by now. If they are not yet here, they must not be trying very hard or must be far less dedicated, diabolical, and competent than the common image would suggest. Another popular explanation for the fact that there have been no more attacks asserts that the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, although it never managed to snag bin Laden, severely disrupted al Qaeda and its operations. But this claim is similarly unconvincing. The 2004 train bombings in Madrid were carried out by a tiny group of men who had never been to Afghanistan, much less to any of al Qaeda's training camps. They pulled off a coordinated nonsuicidal attack with 13 remote-controlled bombs, ten of which went off on schedule, killing 191 and injuring more than 1,800. The experience with that attack, as well as with the London bombings of 2005, suggests that, as the former U.S. counterterrorism officials Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon have noted, for a terrorist attack to succeed, "all that is necessary are the most portable, least detectable tools of the terrorist trade: ideas." It is also sometimes suggested that the terrorists are now too busy kilting Americans and others in Iraq to devote the time, manpower, or energy necessary to pull off similar deeds in the United States. But terrorists with al Qaeda sympathies or sensibilities have managed to carry out attacks in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in the past three years; not every single potential bomb thrower has joined the fray in Iraq. Perhaps, some argue, terrorists are unable to mount attacks in the United States because the Muslim community there, unlike in many countries in Europe, has been well integrated into society. But the same could be said about the United Kingdom, which experienced a significant terrorist attack in 2005. And European countries with less well-integrated Muslim communities, such as Germany, France, and Norway, have yet to experience al Qaeda terrorism. Indeed, if terrorists are smart, they will avoid Muslim communities because that is the lamppost under which policing agencies are most intensely searching for them. The perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were ordered generally to stay away from mosques and American Muslims. That and the Madrid plot show that tiny terrorist conspiracies hardly need a wider support network to carry out their schemes. Another common explanation is that al Qaeda is craftily biding its time. But what for? The 9/11 attacks took only about two years to prepare. The carefully coordinated, very destructive, and politically productive terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 were conceived, planned from scratch, and then executed all within six months; the bombs were set off less than two months after the conspirators purchased their first supplies of dynamite, paid for with hashish. (Similarly, Timothy McVeigh's attack in Oklahoma City in 1995 took less than a year to plan.) Given the extreme provocation of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, one would think that terrorists might be inclined to shift their timetable into higher gear. And if they are so patient, why do they continually claim that another attack is just around the corner? It was in 2003 that al Qaeda's top leaders promised attacks in Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Yemen. Three years later, some bombs had gone off in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan (as well as in the unlisted Turkey) but not in any other of the explicitly threatened countries. Those attacks were tragic, but their sparseness could be taken as evidence that it is not only American alarmists who are given to extravagant huffing and puffing

## DAs

### Navy Budget DA

#### FY 2013 Navy modernization budget stable

AIAA 6/11/12 (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, “Deconstructing the defense budget”, <http://www.militaryaerospace.com/news/2012/06/11/deconstructing-the-defense-budget.html>, Hemanth)

Early this year, the Obama administration issued guidelines for a new national defense strategy that breaks with the past by focusing less on Europe and more on the Asia-Pacific and Middle East theaters. In short order, the Pentagon brought forth a $613-billion FY13 defense budget that favors the weapons and forces best suited to putting its new strategy into play. The budget is $45.3 billion lower than planned before fiscal austerity took hold throughout the government. It presages defense spending cuts of $259 billion over the next five years and of $487 billion over the next 10 years, as mandated by the Budget Control Act of 2011. It sets in motion substantial cuts for some weapons and forces, but also maintains or raises levels of spending on selected others (primarily those of the Air Force and Navy) that are synonymous with long-range projection of strategic firepower. This means, among other things, that the tried-and-true nuclear triad of bombers, ICBMs, and sea-launched ballistic missiles will be sustained. For the foreseeable future, there will be enough money to preserve the Air Force's current fleet of B-2, B-52, and B-1 bombers and to proceed with development of the service's next-generation bomber. Missiles and high-priority initiatives Air-launched tactical air-to-air missiles account for $10.2 billion of the proposed expenditures. Funding will be shared among Raytheon advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles, AIM-9X heat-seeking air-to-air missiles, and joint standoff weapons; Lockheed Martin joint air-to-surface standoff missiles; and Boeing joint direct attack munitions and small-diameter bombs. Proposed investments in DOD's 'high-priority initiatives' include $11.9 billion for science and technology, $9.7 billion for ballistic missile defense, $10.4 billion for special operations forces, $8 billion for space programs, $3.7 billion for unmanned air systems, $3.4 billion for new and improved cyber capabilities, and $1.8 billion for the Air Force/Boeing KC-46 tanker. Upgrading tactical sensors and other electronic warfare equipment will account for $1.8 billion. Funding for missile defense will include $778 million for Lockheed Martin's terminal high altitude area defense program, $903 million for the Boeing ground-based midcourse defense system, $763 million for 84 more Raytheon Patriot PAC-3 interceptor missiles, and $401 million for the medium extended air defense system. Space systems and operations fare well in the FY13 budget, despite their spotty recent history of acquisition and cost problems. Their funding covers $1.7 billion for four United Launch Alliance EELVs, $1.3 billion for two Lockheed Martin GPS III satellites, $786 million for the Lockheed advanced extremely high frequency satellite program, and $950 million for the Lockheed space-based infrared system program. The only major space program to be axed is Northrop Grumman's defense weather satellite system, which DOD calls "premature" and extraneous for now "due to the availability of existing satellites." Navy programs The Navy, slated for a more prominent role in the new defense strategy, will come into enough money to sustain and upgrade its existing fleet of 11 aircraft carriers and 10 air wings, and its fleet of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The sea service has budgeted $1.5 billion for Lockheed's Trident II ballistic missile program, and $320 million for 196 additional sea-launched Raytheon Tomahawk cruise missiles. The Navy also will spend $100 million in FY13 to begin modifying its next and future Virginia-class cruise missile submarines to carry more land-attack missiles for nonnuclear inland strikes; develop a new SSBN-X submarine but stretch the program by two years; add one more ship to the current fleet of nine big-deck amphibious vessels; and develop a massive seagoing platform to serve as an "afloat staging base" for special operations forces; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms; and countermine missions. Plans for the seaborne staging base had been around but went nowhere until the Pentagon trained its sights more firmly on the Asia-Pacific theater. The base is designed to accommodate helicopters, Boeing tilt-rotor V-22 Osprey troop carriers, and STOVL strike fighters such as the Lockheed Martin F-35 variant being developed for the Marines. The new budget proposes funding 17 Ospreys for the Marines and four for the Air Force. Carrier-based air power is clearly at a premium in Pentagon plans. "We've maintained the 11 carriers in the Navy in order to ensure that we have sufficient forward presence," Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told the Senate Armed Services Committee. "There's nothing like a carrier to be able to allow for quick deployment...and that will give us a great capacity to be able to show our force structure in the Pacific." The Pentagon has budgeted $22.6 billion for new ships in FY13, including $3.5 billion for two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, $2.2 billion for four littoral combat ships, and $966 million for the Navy's CVN 21 carrier replacement program. But the Navy will lose some ships, too, in the early retirement of seven cruisers and two outdated amphibious ships. Procurement of one Virginia-class submarine and two littoral combat ships will be deferred beyond the Pentagon's five-year-defense plan. Operating in coastal waters, the littoral combat ships will be fast, with top speed of about 40 knots, lethal, and capable of performing such missions as antipiracy, antisubmarine warfare, and special operations. The Navy is negotiating with Singapore for permission to base two of these ships there at all times. The Navy will invest amply in carrier-based air power. The service proposes to spend $2.2 billion for 26 Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters, $1.2 billion for five Northrop Grumman E-2D Hawkeye air control and reconnaissance systems, and $1.1 billion for 12 Boeing EA-18 Growler electronic warfare aircraft.

#### Plan trades off with Naval modernization—turns case

Peterson 2009 (Gordon, Capt. Gordon I. Peterson, U.S. Navy (Ret.) has served as the military legislative assistant for Senator Jim Webb of Virginia since January 2007. He is responsible for liaison to the Senate Armed Services Committee and oversight of military issues relating to all branches of the U.S. armed forces, the senior editor of Sea Power magazine since 1998, “The U.S. Navy’s Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, Florida: A Critical Assessment”, <http://webb.senate.gov/issuesandlegislation/upload/CriticalAssessmentMayportHomeporting.pdf>, Hemanth)

Given this extraordinary financial crisis, the need to reduce non-critical federal spending, and the compelling requirement to fund higher-priority Navy budget requirements, the Navy’s homeporting proposal for Mayport is fiscally irresponsible. Last year, the Navy identified $4.6 billion in Fiscal Year 2009 unfunded budget requirements. Its unfunded budget requirements for Fiscal Year 2010 will be made known to Congress when the new administration’s defense budget request is proposed. Homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Mayport at a cost that could approach $1 billion is a luxury the Navy simply cannot afford. Issue 1: The Navy is substantially under-investing in its shipbuilding and aircraft procurement accounts. Expensive investments in duplicative nuclear-support infrastructure in Mayport are opportunity costs the Navy cannot afford in the face of the compelling requirement to reset, modernize, and recapitalize its ships and aircraft. Attaining the goal of a 313-ship Navy is already in doubt owing to a combination of factors, including an underfunded Navy shipbuilding plan, unrealistic cost estimates, a steady growth in the cost of shipbuilding programs, and mission-requirements creep. The Navy’s long-range shipbuilding plan for 313 ships should be considered a floor—the minimum number of ships necessary for the Navy and Marine Corps team to meet its global commitments. Recapitalizing today’s deployable battle force of 283 ships is encountering new affordability problems. For example, the costs of the commodities needed to build ships skyrocketed between 2001 and 2007-including a 109 percent increase in the price for carbon steel, a 360 percent increase for copper, and a 535 percent increase for nickel. Such unprecedented cost increases are beyond the ability of the Navy to control, Seapower magazine reported recently. "No one has been able to model this," the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for Ship Programs (Research, Development, and Acquisition) said. The Navy also faces a significant shortfall in the number of strike-fighter tactical aircraft needed for its 10 carrier air wings. The Navy’s own estimate is that it will be more than 125 strike-fighters short by 2014 due to the retirement of F/A-1 8 Hornet aircraft before the F-35C Joint Strike Fighter is operational. A more responsible operational alternative for spending the estimated $600 million the Navy projects for homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Mayport is to use this funding to address the Navy's strike-fighter shortfall. The typical air wing aboard a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier includes four F/A-18 squadrons totaling roughly 44 aircraft. If the current tactical aircraft shortfall is not reversed, there is a real concern that a major portion of the Navy's aircraft carrier fleet will be rendered hollow. Of the Navy's 10 carrier air wings, one-Carrier Air Wing 17, home-based at Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia-has only one of its required four squadrons of F/A-18 Hornets assigned owing to the Navy's current tactical aircraft shortfall. When CVW-17 deploys to sea on an aircraft carrier, it must "crossdeck" (i.e., borrow) F/A-18 aircraft from other squadrons on the East or West Coasts. Unavoidably, this cross-decking of squadron aircraft, pilots, and support personnel poses adverse consequences to their operational and personnel tempo. Issue 2: Good stewardship of taxpayer dollars demands that the Navy should find its shortfalls in shore-readiness requirements rather than expand its footprint ashore with duplicative facilities. There is no economic logic to the Navy 's proposal for Mayport. Before creating excess infrastructure and nuclear-Warship capacity in Mayport, the Navy should complete a large number of critical unfunded, backlogged military construction and modernization projects. Q Owing to the chronic underfinding of modernization at its four public naval shipyards, the Navy continued a $791 million backlog in sustainment, restoration, and modernization projects at its four naval shipyards during Fiscal Year 2008: Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard: $183 million Puget Sound Naval Shipyard: $208 million Portsmouth Naval Shipyard: $176 million Norfolk Naval Shipyard: $224 million Within the last several years, NAVSTA Norfolk has undergone approximately $400 million in facility upgrades to allow it to better support nuclear powered aircraft carriers. This investment included a $155 million project to demolish and rebuild Pier 11 for the station's assigned aircraft carriers. Before duplicating Norfolk's existing capital-intensive facilities in Mayport, the Navy should make the fiscally sound decision to optimize past investments at Norfolk and preserve scarce resources to address the near crisis in budget shortfalls for its people, shipbuilding program, aircraft procurement, and installations. As noted previously, the Navy's proposal for Mayport also runs counter to its current Shore Investment Strategy, which calls for consolidating tl1e Navy's shore footprint to save money and improve physical security. New military instruction construction costs in Mayport can only be funded at the expense of existing military construction and modernization projects.

### 2NC Overview

#### Turns heg and China war—modernization is key

O’Rourke 6/14/12 (Ronald, specialist in naval affairs at CRS, He is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the Johns Hopkins University and was valedictorian of his class at the Hopkins Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where he obtained a master’s degree, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress”, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf>, Hemanth)

The question of how the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in U.S. defense planning. The question is of particular importance to the U.S. Navy, because many U.S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy’s budget. Two DOD strategy and budget documents released in January 2012 state that U.S. military strategy will place a renewed increased emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, and that as a result, there will be a renewed emphasis on air and naval forces in DOD plans. Administration officials have stated that notwithstanding reductions in planned levels of U.S. defense spending, the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region will be maintained and strengthened. Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or possible outcome of a potential U.S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U.S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere.

### ----Ext. Turns China

#### Navy modernization cuts cause war over Taiwan

Lowther 12 (William, Staff Writer for the Taipei Times, March 21, “US Navy cuts may endanger Taiwan: report”, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/03/31/2003529153>, Hemanth)

A US Congressional report warns that cutting US Navy programs could affect the “likelihood or outcome” of a military conflict with China over Taiwan. The report adds that the US-China military balance in the Pacific could also influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries on whether to align their policies more closely with Beijing or Washington. “The question of how the US should respond to China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has emerged as a key issue in US defense planning,” the report says. Entitled China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities, the report by the Congressional Research Service was released this week. The report says that the Pentagon believes that the near-term focus of China’s military modernization effort has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, the report says that China wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force — a force that can deter US intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening US naval and air forces. The report comes as the US Congress is under increasing pressure during this presidential election year to make ever-deeper spending cuts. It says that in addition to Taiwan, the Chinese military is being tasked with defending territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea and displacing US influence in the Pacific. These tasks are significant, the report adds, because “they imply that if the situation with Taiwan were somehow resolved, China could find continuing reasons to pursue its naval modernization effort.”

### 2NC Link Wall

#### The Mayport homeport is uniquely expensive—construction costs

Peterson 2009 (Gordon, Capt. Gordon I. Peterson, U.S. Navy (Ret.) has served as the military legislative assistant for Senator Jim Webb of Virginia since January 2007. He is responsible for liaison to the Senate Armed Services Committee and oversight of military issues relating to all branches of the U.S. armed forces, the senior editor of Sea Power magazine since 1998, “The U.S. Navy’s Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, Florida: A Critical Assessment”, <http://webb.senate.gov/issuesandlegislation/upload/CriticalAssessmentMayportHomeporting.pdf>, Hemanth)

The Navy’s stated purpose for this proposed action is to ensure effective support of fleet operational requirements through efficient use of waterfront and shore side facilities at NAVSTA Mayport. In 2010 the Navy will begin to decommission frigates currently homeported at Mayport. While budgetary decisions drive a Navy trend to consolidate or reduce the number of Navy bases overall, the Service maintains that retaining bases in dispersed locations nationwide and around the world supports its Fleet Response Plan and its operational battle forces. The EIS states, “The Navy needs to utilize the available facilities at NAVSTA Mayport, both pierside and shoreside, in an effective and efficient manner, thereby minimizing new construction.”1 Contrary to the Navy’s professed goal to identify a homeporting alternative that would minimize new Navy military construction, permanently assigning a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to Mayport is one of the most expensive alternatives that the Navy evaluated. (Three more expensive options included variants of homeporting cruisers, destroyers, an amphibious assault ship (LHA), and a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.) Homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Mayport will require extensive dredging, infrastructure and wharf improvements, and construction of expensive nuclear propulsion plant maintenance facilities needed for the performance of depot-level maintenance.

#### And we have link uniqueness—The Navy is cutting homeports now—Shore Investment Strategy

Peterson 2009 (Gordon, Capt. Gordon I. Peterson, U.S. Navy (Ret.) has served as the military legislative assistant for Senator Jim Webb of Virginia since January 2007. He is responsible for liaison to the Senate Armed Services Committee and oversight of military issues relating to all branches of the U.S. armed forces, the senior editor of Sea Power magazine since 1998, “The U.S. Navy’s Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, Florida: A Critical Assessment”, <http://webb.senate.gov/issuesandlegislation/upload/CriticalAssessmentMayportHomeporting.pdf>, Hemanth)

Despite the potential for increased military risk, in 2005 the Navy recommended the closure of Naval Submarine Base New London, Connecticut. (as part of Department of Defense BRAC actions) and relocation of its assigned submarines to NAVSTA Norfolk and Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia. This proposal was consistent with its Shore Investment Strategy.  The Navy’s primary justification for closing its submarine base in New London was the material contribution it would make to the maximum reduction of excess capacity (i.e., berthing capacity) while increasing the military value of the remaining bases affected by the proposal.14  One of the main elements in the Navy’s Shore Investment Strategy is to reduce cost and improve physical security by eliminating any excesses in the Navy’s shore footprint. “While fiscal imperatives across the Navy currently prevent full funding of shore-readiness requirements in the near term, we are making smart investments to support the fleet, fighter, and families,” the Navy has stated.  By contrast, building duplicative nuclear-support shore infrastructure in Mayport runs counter to the objectives of the Navy’s Shore Investment Strategy and will, in the long term, only continue to degrade the Navy’s ability to provide full funding for other higher priority shore-readiness requirements.

#### Link framing args:

#### A) DOD cost overruns—reject their specific figures

Edwards 2009 (Chris, Chris Edwards is the director of tax policy studies at Cato. He is a top expert on federal and state tax and budget issues. Before joining Cato, Edwards was a senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, a manager with PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an economist with the Tax Foundation. Edwards has testified to Congress on fiscal issues many times, and his articles on tax and budget policies have appeared in the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and other major newspapers. He is the author of Downsizing the Federal Government and co-author of Global Tax Revolution. Edwards holds a B.A. and M.A. in economics, and he was a member of the Fiscal Future Commission of the National Academy of Sciences, “Government Cost Overruns”, <http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/government-cost-overruns>, Hemanth)

Defense. The Pentagon is infamous for its wasteful procurement record. Former comptroller general David Walker said that the Pentagon has "a long-standing track record of over-promising and under-delivering with virtual impunity."13 The problem certainly is long-standing: the Pentagon building itself "was built upon a foundation of lies, secrecy, and cost overruns" in the 1940s.14 The building cost $75 million to build, more than double the originally planned $35 million. Pentagon procurement problems have been widely reported. For example, the Washington Post reported in 2007 on the "litany of program delays and cost overruns" on a Navy ship program, which had the result that "the cost for the initial two ships was estimated at about $220 million each but now appear to cost up to double that."15 Or consider a 2007 Bloomberg story on new Air Force cargo planes: Four of the Air Force's largest transport plane programs are behind schedule and over their target cost by a total of almost $1 billion, federal auditors said yesterday. Three Lockheed Martin programs and one Boeing program are still in early stages, and their combined cost is already $962 million, or more than 35 percent, over the target of $2.7 billion … these programs do not "involve huge technological leaps," yet all four "failed at basic systems-engineering practices," the [GAO] analysts said.16 Finally, here is the Wall Street Journal on a Navy helicopter program in 2008: Despite billions of dollars in cost overruns and years of delay, Lockheed Martin Corp. and U.S. Navy officials are confident they will hang on to next year's funding for development of a new presidential helicopter … The program initially called for about $6.1 billion in spending to develop and build the next generation of so-called Marine One choppers…. [B]ut the expected cost of the program has now ballooned to an estimated $11.2 billion.17 In 2008, the GAO completed a review of the costs and schedules of 72 weapons programs. It found that the average cost overrun for development of the systems was 40 percent.18 Compared with prior findings on defense procurement, the GAO concluded that "DoD's acquisition outcomes appear increasingly suboptimal."19 A recent study by Deloitte Consulting concurs that defense cost overruns are getting worse.20 Another recent GAO report concluded "weapon programs continue to take longer, cost more, and deliver fewer capabilities than originally planned," and it noted that "systematic problems both at the strategic and at the program level" were to blame.21 Some problems are that weapon requirements and project managers are frequently changed during development, which makes cost control and accountability very difficult. A bigger problem appears to be that when weapon systems are conceived, there is a tendency for project supporters to low-ball the costs in order to squeeze as many projects into the procurement pipeline as possible. The GAO noted that the military branches "overpromise capabilities and underestimate costs to capture the funding needed to start and sustain development programs."22 Adding to the problem is the fact that projects that turn out to be duds are hard to kill. Not only do defense contractors lobby to extend dubious programs, they are usually not punished for their failures and cost overruns. Indeed, the Pentagon has provided bonus payments, or "award fees," to contactors even if projects are behind schedule and over-budget.23 Still, Congress, not the Pentagon, deserves the main blame for cost overruns since it holds the purse strings. Rather than looking out for taxpayer interests, most members of Congress fight attempts to reduce defense spending in their districts, including spending on weapons that the Pentagon doesn't even want.

#### That independently turns solvency

GAO 2005 (Government Accountability Office, Report to the DOD, “Improved Management Practices Could Help Minimize Cost Growth in Navy Shipbuilding Programs”, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-183>, Hemanth)

For the eight ships GAO assessed, the Congress has appropriated $2.1 billion to cover the increases in the ships' budgets. The GAO's analysis indicates that total cost growth on these ships could reach $3.1 billion or even more if shipyards do not maintain current efficiency and meet schedules. Cost growth for the CVN 77 aircraft carrier and the San Antonio lead ship (LPD 17) has been particularly pronounced. Increases in labor hour and material costs together account for 77 percent of the cost growth on the eight ships. Shipbuilders frequently cited design modifications, the need for additional and more costly materials, and changes in employee pay and benefits as the key causes of this growth. For example, the San Antonio's lead ship's systems design continued to evolve even as construction began, which required rebuilding of completed areas to accommodate the design changes. Materials costs were often underbudgeted, as was the case with the Virginia class submarines and Nimitz class aircraft carriers. For the CVN 77 carrier, the shipbuilder is estimating a substantial increase in material costs. Navy practices for estimating costs, contracting, and budgeting for ships have resulted in unrealistic funding of programs, increasing the likelihood of cost growth. Despite inherent uncertainties in the ship acquisition process, the Navy does not account for the probability of cost growth when estimating costs. Moreover, the Navy did not conduct an independent cost estimate for carriers or when substantial changes occurred in a ship class, which could have provided decision makers with additional knowledge about a program's potential costs. In addition, contract prices were negotiated and budgets established without sufficient design knowledge and construction knowledge. When unexpected events did occur, the incomplete and untimely reporting on program progress delayed the identification of problems and the Navy's ability to correct them.

#### B) No adaptation—Cuts now are spread out—the aff is an immediate opportunity cost

Weisgerber 11 (Marcus, Defense News, Nov. 11, “U.S. Modernization Cut 'Manageable' If Gradual: Dempsey”, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20111118/DEFSECT05/111180304/U-S-Modernization-Cut-Manageable-Gradual-Dempsey>, Hemanth)

An expected reduction in U.S. Defense Department modernization spending is manageable if it is spread out over a number of years, according to the Pentagon's top military officer. The Pentagon is gearing up for $260 billion in cuts to planned spending over the next five years as part of a $450 billion reduction over the next decade. Modernization accounts, which include procurement and research and development, are expected to bear about half of the $260 billion, according to defense analysts. "If we're able to do it over 10 years, it'll be affected in a manageable way," Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said of the modernization cuts at a Nov. 18 military reporters and editors conference in Arlington, Va. "If we do it in five [years], it'll be much, much more difficult." Dempsey did not provide a breakdown of how the Pentagon would cut $450 billion in planned defense spending over the next 10 years. The cuts were mandated by the Budget Control Act, which was passed in August.

### ----Ext. Flawed Studies

#### Flawed studies

Bartell 2011 (Bill, The Virginian-Pilot, “Report: Moving carrier to Mayport may cost half of estimate”, <http://hamptonroads.com/2011/03/report-moving-carrier-mayport-may-cost-half-estimate>, Hemanth)

The GAO report also criticized the Navy's methods of evaluating costs, saying that in some cases there was no evidence the service used verifiable and accredited methods to develop its estimates. GAO officials said Navy leaders need to make "fundamental changes" in how they determine the cost of the Mayport project. Otherwise, the report states, "Congress cannot have reasonable confidence that it has a complete understanding and an accurate and realistic determination of the projected costs to evaluate and make decisions."

### Whales DA

#### you kill whales :(

Peterson 2009 (Gordon, Capt. Gordon I. Peterson, U.S. Navy (Ret.) has served as the military legislative assistant for Senator Jim Webb of Virginia since January 2007. He is responsible for liaison to the Senate Armed Services Committee and oversight of military issues relating to all branches of the U.S. armed forces, the senior editor of Sea Power magazine since 1998, “The U.S. Navy’s Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, Florida: A Critical Assessment”, <http://webb.senate.gov/issuesandlegislation/upload/CriticalAssessmentMayportHomeporting.pdf>, Hemanth)

Issue 2: The Navy 's proposal to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Mayport would increase the amount of military and commercial traffic in and around the Naval Station and require the collection and disposal of 5.2 million cubic yards of dredged material. Owing to the greater draft of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, increased dredging will result in thousands of additional vessel trips to and from dredge disposal areas. The Navy's proposed action presents potential risks to species and habitat protected under the Endangered Species Act, particularly the North American right whale and the Florida manatee, and their respective habitats. Both species are particularly susceptible to ship-strikes, which could increase should the Navy homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Mayport.

#### They’re a keystone species

Zimmer et al 2007 (Richard, Ryan Ferrer, Professors of Biology at UCLA, “Neuroecology, Chemical Defense, and the Keystone Species Concept”, <http://www.biolbull.org/content/213/3/208.full>, Hemanth)

Consumption of STX-laden zooplankton or their incapacitated predators can have dramatic effects on top pelagic predators. Vertebrates such as fish (Adams et al., 1968; White, 1980, 1981), seabirds (Nisbet, 1983; Shumway et al., 2003), and marine mammals (Geraci et al., 1989; Reyero et al., 1999; Doucette et al., 2006) are much more sensitive to STX and its derivatives than are invertebrate grazers. Consequently, after dinoflagellate blooms, large-scale vertebrate mortality arises from ingestion of STX-laden planktonic organisms. Massive die-offs of top pelagic predators such as right whales (Doucette et al., 2006), monk seals (Reyero et al., 1999), and several species of fish (White, 1980, 1981) can lead to dramatic cascading effects throughout entire planktonic communities (Carpenter et al., 1985; Myers and Worm, 2003; Bruno and O'Connor, 2005).

#### Spills over to cascading biodiversity loss

McKinney 2003 (Michael, Director of Environmental Studies, University of Texas, PHD from Yale, <http://books.google.com/books?id=NJUanyPkh0AC&pg=PA274&lpg=PA274&dq=manatees+%22keystone+species%22&source=bl&ots=rB1vju6y6v&sig=isIAuB81-ZM_Hv4PAMp2EKt4lH8&hl=en&sa=X&ei=kaX7T_GoEYiorQHfrZ2LCQ&ved=0CGgQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=manatees%20%22keystone%20species%22&f=false>, Hemanth)

Are All Species Equally Important? With so many species at risk, triage decisions cannot be made on the basis of risk alone. Conservation biologists therefore often ask whether one species is more important than another. Ethically, perhaps one could argue that all species are equal; an insect may have as much right to live as a panther. But in other ways, in particular. In ecological and evolutionary importance, all species are not equal. Ecological importance reflects the role a species plays in its ecological community. Keystone species play large roles because they affect so many other species. Large predators, for example, often control the population dynamics of many herbivores. When the predators, such as wolves, are removed, the herbivore population may increase rapidly, overgrazing plants and causing massive ecological disruption. Similarly, certain plants are crucial food for many animal species in some ecosystems. Extinction of keystone species will often have cascading effects on many species, even causing secondary extinctions. Many therefore argue that saving keystone species should be a priority.

#### Environment collapse Increases risk of extinction

 Major David N. Diner , JAG – US Army, MILITARY LAW REVIEW, Winter 1994, http://www.stormingmedia.us/14/1456/A145654.html

 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined effects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

### Elections Link—Plan Popular

#### Florida would love the aff (1AC)

Ronald O’Rourke, a specialist in naval affairs at CRS, 2012 (He is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the Johns Hopkins University and was valedictorian of his class at the Hopkins Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where he obtained a master’s degree. “Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport: Background and Issues for Congress,” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R40248.pdf>, Accessed June 25, 2012, ZR)

Serving as the home port for a CVN can generate substantial economic activity in the home port area. This activity includes, among other things, the ship’s crew of more than 3,000 sailors spending its pay at local businesses, the Navy purchasing supplies for the ship from local businesses, and Navy expenditures for performing maintenance on the ship while it is in the home port. Various estimates have been reported of the value of homeporting a CVN to the economy of the home port area. The FEIS estimates that transferring a CVN at Mayport would result in 2,900 more jobs, $220 million more in direct payroll, $208 million more in disposable income, and $10 million more in local tax contributions for the Mayport area. An August 2007 press report stated that “some reports put the [earlier] loss of the [aircraft carrier] George Washington at $450 million in payroll and 8,200 military and civilian jobs in Norfolk.” A November 2008 press report from a Norfolk newspaper stated that “The regional chamber of commerce estimates a carrier creates 11,000 jobs and $650 million in annual economic activity.” Another November 2008 press report states that “Jacksonville mayor John Peyton said the new carrier would bring about 3,190 military jobs and pump about $500 million a year into the north Florida economy in salaries and spending.” 30 Another November 2008 press report states that “Virginians calculate that the economic activity related to one carrier can reach $1 billion a year.” 31 The Navy estimated that the initial $426 million in military construction work at Mayport would generate a total of $671 million in initial economic activity

## Critiques

### Security K—Link

#### The aff rests on a flawed epistemology—their solvency and advantages are constructed

Peterson 2009 (Gordon, Capt. Gordon I. Peterson, U.S. Navy (Ret.) has served as the military legislative assistant for Senator Jim Webb of Virginia since January 2007. He is responsible for liaison to the Senate Armed Services Committee and oversight of military issues relating to all branches of the U.S. armed forces, the senior editor of Sea Power magazine since 1998, “The U.S. Navy’s Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, Florida: A Critical Assessment”, <http://webb.senate.gov/issuesandlegislation/upload/CriticalAssessmentMayportHomeporting.pdf>, Hemanth)

Issue 1: There is no indication the Navy conducted a formal intelligence-based Threat/survivability analysis that specifically addressed force dispersal. Absent a more rigorous and documented threat survivability assessment, it is impossible to validate the Navy 's alleged claim that dispersing a single CVN to Mayport will reduce risk and increase operational readiness. There is an emotional appeal to the concept of reducing security risk through fleet dispersal. In today's budget-constrained environment, however, a formal threat analysis is essential to allow the Department of Defense and Congress to make informed decisions regarding the relative level of military risk (low, medium, high) and if the security benefits that will be supposedly be achieved through a proposed course of action are worth the costs. A classified version of the Navy's November 18 briefing did not address this issue. Subsequently, then-Senator John Warner and Senator Jim Webb asked the Navy to provide the classified "threat assessment" for NAVSTA Norfolk and NAVSTA Mayport that guided the Navy's selection of its preferred homeporting alternative.

## CPs

### 1NC Dispersal CP

#### Text: The United States federal government should build and operate a fleet of flattop aircraft carriers dispersed throughout the US coasts.

#### Supercarriers are obsolete—spreading the fleet into a number of small flattops solves the aff

Axe 2011 (David, an independent military correspondent based in South Carolina. He has reported from Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor, Lebanon, Somalia, Chad and other conflict zones, “Are Aircraft Carriers Slowly Becoming Obsolete?”, <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06/are-aircraft-carriers-slowly-becoming-obsolete/>, Hemanth)

For seven decades, they’ve been the ultimate symbol of American power. When conflicts break out across the globe, U.S. Navy aircraft carriers — fast, mobile and each packing more firepower than most countries’ entire air force — have been the first responders, more often than not. “When word of crisis breaks out in Washington, it’s no accident the first question that comes to everyone’s lips is: where is the nearest carrier?” Bill Clinton famously said. But today’s 1,000-foot-long, nuclear-powered supercarriers and their air wings are expensive, costing up to $15 billion just to build. Plus, the latest anti-ship missiles could render them vulnerable to attack. It’s for those reasons that one influential Navy officer is proposing the Pentagon rethink its approach to building and deploying carriers. Instead of today’s small number of gigantic carriers, the Navy of the future should operate a larger number of smaller flattops, Capt. Jerry Hendrix asserts in the pages of Proceedings magazine. “Moving away from highly expensive and vulnerable supercarriers toward smaller, light carriers would bring the additional benefit of increasing our nation’s engagement potential.” It would also spread out U.S. naval air power instead of concentrating it in just a few places, where it can be more easily knocked out. Hendrix’s controversial argument is the subject of my first piece for AOL’s new military website. To be clear: no one, including Hendrix, is claiming big carriers will become totally obsolete overnight. Besides the U.S., Britain, India and especially China are all building brand-new large carriers, though none quite as big as America’s 11 Nimitz- and Enterprise-class ships, each displacing around 100,000 tons. Hendrix insists the Navy keep some of its nuclear supercarriers as a “heavy surge force” capable of steaming into action during a major crisis. Outgoing secretary of defense Robert Gates echoed that sentiment in a speech last year. But for routine patrols, the Navy should have a larger number of smaller flattops. Hendrix doesn’t propose a specific number, but he does point out that three, 40,000-ton light carriers could be had for the price of one supercarrier. A light carrier is viable because of a shift in the way air power is used. During the Cold War, the Navy’s focus was generating at many fighter sorties as possible within the first few days of a full-scale conflict. After all, big shooting wars weren’t expected to last very long. Supercarriers are optimized for that kind of “big and fast” fighting. Today, conflicts tend to be drawn-out, low-intensity affairs requiring fewer but longer sorties by sea-launched planes. Carriers don’t need to embark as many fighters, or launch them as often. That’s why a smaller carrier is possible, according to Hendrix.

### 2NC CP Solves

#### Mayport not key—dispersal solves and spending is a net benefit

Politico 12 (“Aircraft carrier stays in Virginia -- for now”, <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/73459.html>, Hemanth)

Last year’s budget included funds to upgrade a wharf at Mayport, a Navy base in Jacksonville, to prepare it to handle an aircraft carrier and its crew. Under the plan, the carrier would have arrived in 2019. Instead, under the most recent budget proposal, Mayport will get a three-ship amphibious-ready group, possibly from Virginia. The carrier move, if it happens at all, could be extended well into the next decade. Since the decision was announced, Virginia lawmakers have been basking in the glow of victory. “If you look at priorities and at where dollars need to be spent, I think it’s a wise decision,” Wittman said. “I consider it a win for the country,” Forbes added, accusing Obama and George W. Bush of backing the move for purely political reasons, saying he doesn’t buy the strategic dispersal argument. “Instead of spending a billion dollars, just change the scheduling around and you’d never have those carriers bunched up at one time,” Forbes said. Asked to predict how the other side would respond, Forbes quipped, “They normally don’t invite me into their planning sessions when they’re talking about moving that carrier down to Florida.”

#### Light carriers solve the aff—strategic flexibility

Axe 2011 (David, David Axe, a member of the AOL Defense Board of Contributors, is a freelance war correspondent and author. David is a contributing editor at World Politics Review, “America's Third Air Force: Future of the Marines”, <http://defense.aol.com/2011/06/17/americas-third-air-force-future-of-the-marines/>, Hemanth)

There's clearly demand for air power that's lighter than what the Navy provides with its supercarriers, and more flexible than land-based Air Force jets are capable of. The Marines can meet that need with their Harriers, but barely. There are fewer than a hundred of the aging jump jets ready for combat at any one time. Eyeing a growing need for fast-reacting, sea-based warplanes, the Marines have invested heavily in new jump jets and the ships to carry them. Today, the Corps is on the cusp of its own air-power revolution, carried on the backs of two programs: the tri-service, "fifth-generation" Joint Strike Fighter and the LHA-6 assault ship. The F-35B version of the Lockheed Martin-built JSF -- the Marines want more than 400 of them -- is meant to be a stealthy, more lethal replacement for the Harrier. Like the EFV, the Marines' JSF wants to do everything at once: take off in a short distance, fly far and fast with a heavy weapons load while evading enemy radars, then land vertically. Not surprisingly, the F-35B, with two motors -- one each for forward and vertical flight -- has struggled with weight, heat and parts failures. In January, Gates placed the new jump jet on a two-year "probation." If the F-35B doesn't improve in that time, "then I believe it should be canceled," Gates said. But Amos says he is "absolutely confident" that the STOVL plane will be fixed and promised to personally oversee the new warplane's development. The plane, he said, will be worth the investment. "With a fully-fielded fleet of F-35Bs, the nation will maintain 22 capital ships - 11 carrier and 11 [big-deck] amphibious assault - with fifth-generation strike assets aboard." "Every indication is, this will be a phenomenal capability," Lt. Col. David Wilbur said of the F-35. Wilbur was commander of Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 332, an F/A-18D unit shuttered in 2006 and slated to reactivate once the F-35B is available. The LHA-6 America class is the other missing piece of this future Marine air force. Kearsarge and the rest of today's "big-deck" assault ships balance aviation facilities with floodable well-decks for carrying amtracks. The next two assault ships under construction have more hangar space in place of the well-decks. America and her sister will be able to carry and support 30 jump jets, compared to the four that are standard today. "It is, for all intents and purposes, a light aircraft carrier," Navy Capt. Jerry Hendrix said of America. In an article in Naval Institute's Proceedings magazine, Hendrix proposed that the Navy reduce its force of $14-billion supercarriers in favor of a larger number of $2-billion light carriers like America. "Right now we have narrowed our approach options down to 11 big carriers on how to penetrate an anti-access, area-denial environment," Hendrix said. "We need to multiply our options." That's a view Gates, in principle, shares -- despite his hard stance on the F-35B's development. The military "must have the maximum possible flexibility to deal with the widest possible range of scenarios and conflicts," Gates said last year. He expressed concern over concentrating striking power in supercarriers, each of which "could represent potentially a $15- to $20-billion set of hardware at risk," he said. Only the Marine Corps is in a position to institutionalize a light-carrier capability and diversify America's air-power options. Libya proved that the Marines could turn a gator into a light carrier. But can the Corps successfully develop and field the hardware that might help permanently establish this capability? And can it gently put the storied amphibious warfare traditions of Iwo Jima, Tarawa and Inchon on the shelf and begin building new ones steeped in just as much pride?

###  ----AT: Perm

#### Vulnerability DA—continued dependence on supercarriers leaves us vulnerable

Hendrix 2011 (Henry, Captain, US Navy, Lieutenant Colonel J. Noel Williams, US Marine Corps, “Twilight of the Superfluous Carrier”, <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-05/twilight-uperfluous-carrier>, Hemanth)

As always, the future is behind an opaque veil we cannot see clearly beyond, so we will never be able to prepare with complete assurance for what awaits us. However, we can take stock of our historical interests and the present strategic environment and then decide where we need to invest and build on our existing national-security foundation. When considering future Fleet composition, it is critical to explore with clarity the Fleet’s peacetime and wartime roles. In wartime, the Fleet must be capable of consolidating its power in a coherent fashion to control the seas and project power ashore against enemy centers of gravity. In peacetime, it must be able to disperse globally to operate as a deterrent and engagement force. Continuing to invest in platforms such as the supercarrier—which are expensive to build, cost-prohibitive to operate, and increasingly vulnerable in anti-access/area denied environments—is to repeat the mistakes of the battleship admirals who failed to recognize air power’s potential in the 1930s. No less authority than Pacific Commander Admiral Robert Willard has stated that China’s DF-21D antiship ballistic missile has reached initial operational capability. We must recognize the new environments in which we will be operating, as well as the profound impact unmanned systems will have on future operations, and adjust our Fleet accordingly if we are to avoid a Pearl Harbor of our own making. We must reallocate science-and-technology, research-and-development, and acquisition resources toward this new Fleet paradigm. It is neither necessary nor advisable to suddenly suspend supercarrier operations. Those already in commission and the Gerald R. Ford now under construction will last for decades. And extending the F/A-18 Super Hornet line will maintain that aircraft’s viability and provide the bridge to an unmanned future. In the meantime, we should be moving to light carriers of the 45,000-ton range that can accommodate the STOVL variant of the F-35 as well as the new UCLASS unmanned attack vehicle. We should also be developing a new generation of combatants with flight decks and well-decks that can carry platforms for deployment into subsurface, surface, and aerial environments. All of this will provide regional combatant commanders with the ability to respond to a rapidly evolving security environment. Moving away from highly expensive and vulnerable supercarriers toward smaller, light carriers would bring the additional benefit of increasing our nation’s engagement potential. This type of force structure would allow the United States to increase its forward presence, upholding its interests with a light engagement force while maintaining, at least for the next 50 years, a heavy surge force of supercarriers. Geopolitics and technology are rapidly evolving the future security environment, and we must make decisions today to adapt the Fleet away from its current course to a new design for a new era.

### 1NC Seabasing CP

#### The United States federal government should shift to a seabasing strategy for relevant naval operations

#### Seabasing solves power projection, humanitarian aid, and naval readiness best

Parker 10 (CMDR. GREGORY J. Parker is a career naval aviator and recent Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He works on the OPNAV (Navy) staff at the Pentagon, “The future of seabasing”, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/12/4997685/>, Hemanth)

2010 was an important milestone for the concept of seabasing. Eclipsed in recent years by large-scale ground campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, seabasing once again occupied the limelight in January when a powerful earthquake struck Haiti, closing the main seaport and limiting air traffic to an antiquated and quickly overwhelmed airfield. The Navy and Marine Corps responded quickly by dispatching considerable assets to the scene, including an aircraft carrier, an amphibious assault ship and a hospital ship. By hosting extensive relief efforts offshore, the Haiti naval operation seemed to validate the seabasing concept in its entirety. Yet less than a month later, the Navy effectively canceled the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), the most significant seabasing acquisition program to date and a pillar of the Marine Corps’ 21st-century vision. What was once billed as revolutionary and transformational met an anticlimactic end, described as a concept that is “valid but not currently within the Navy’s fiscal reach.” This contradictory turn of events suggests it is time to take a fresh look at a pivotal post-Cold War concept. WHAT IS SEABASING? At its core, seabasing purports to move traditional land-based functions to sea — functions such as billeting, logistics and even the employment of force. It was a concept that became popular again in the 1990s when diminishing overseas bases and politically hesitant allies created impediments — perceived and real — to military plans for force projection. Chafing at these restrictions, planners viewed the sea as a vast maneuver space on which the U.S. could position and deploy its aircraft, artillery and ground forces. A sea base uses the sea as a base, and that is a compelling vision. After all, the sea covers 75 percent of the world’s surface while approximately two-thirds of the world’s population lives within 400 kilometers of a coast. Operating from the sea, you can almost always get near the action. Seabasing has deep historical roots. By mid-1945, for example, the U.S. was capable of landing more than 1 million troops on a foreign shore and supporting them with integrated aircraft and logistics from the sea. In the 1990s, as the Soviet Union imploded and took the U.S. Navy’s central blue-water mission with it, the Navy looked to this World War II legacy to transition from a fleet that would fight on the seas to a fleet that would fight from the seas. With the seeming obsolescence of overseas garrisons and the increasing concern about the proliferation of missile technology, seabasing rose like a phoenix from the ashes to offer a basing solution for the 21st century. But war, as Clausewitz said, is simply a continuation of politics, and seabasing also served as a remarkably accurate barometer of post-Cold War foreign policy. Specifically, while planners during the 1990s highlighted sea-based forces’ inherent freedom of maneuver, a more fundamental, thinly veiled concept of freedom lay just beneath the surface: freedom from allies. Such freedom resonated with two very different administrations during two very different decades of conflict. To a Clinton administration wary of military intervention in foreign conflicts — epitomized by the withdrawal from Somalia, the limited missile strikes into Sudan and Afghanistan, and the vow not to use ground forces in Bosnia — seabasing’s ability to choose the time and place of U.S. involvement was very attractive. Similarly, to a Bush administration that reserved the right to act unilaterally and pre-emptively — and that inaugurated the Afghanistan operation by inserting Marines and special operations forces from a sea base in the North Arabian Sea — seabasing was the epitome of U.S. strength and resolve. Indeed it was this freedom to act unilaterally that lay at the core of the president’s November 2001 proclamation, “You are either with us or against us.” Such confidence in American conventional capability gathered steam in the early years of the last decade, bolstered by the apparent quick and decisive victories in Afghanistan and Iraq. As secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld used these successes to push an aggressive “transformation” agenda that impacted every aspect of defense — from bases to personnel to equipment. At its core, transformation involved smaller and lighter military formations, the extensive use of air power and information technology as a replacement for the cumbersome military of the previous decades. It also relied heavily on rapid mobilization and the use of forward-deployed expeditionary forces in an insatiable “need for speed.” All of this was music to a seabasing advocate’s ears. As this heady optimism ground to a halt in the protracted insurgencies overseas, however, seabasing’s allure began to wane. Starting with the 2005 National Defense Strategy, official language about U.S. allies became very conciliatory — a marked shift from the almost condescending tone of the 2002 National Security Strategy (often labeled the “Bush Doctrine”). Subsequent documents followed suit. In addition, the troubling wars overseas seemed to turn a decade of consensus on its head: Instead of the “smaller, lighter, faster” mantra of the transformation years, counterinsurgency doctrine ruled the day — along with its need for large ground forces, the use of heavily armored vehicles, and a focus on long-term stability and governance. In this environment, seabasing’s claims to revolutionize 21st-century warfare seemed about as credible and relevant as the “Mission Accomplished” banner that flew aboard the carrier Abraham Lincoln in May 2003. Seabasing’s fall from grace has been anathema to the Marine Corps. Determined not to become a second land army, the Corps has made seabasing the central pillar in the conceptual transformation it began in earnest in the 1990s. Most importantly, the Marines want to avoid the “iron mountain” of supplies ashore that accompanies traditional amphibious landings, and they want to be free of the deep-water ports that current pre-positioning ships require. The 14-vessel MPF(F) was thus designed to support a brigade of Marines afloat and enable all supply and sustainment for two more Marine Expeditionary Brigades deployed via amphibious ships. The MPF(F) would keep the entire force at sea. It was the Marines’ vision to float the iron mountain. By the decade’s end, the Marines had circled the wagons around “Marine Corps Seabasing,” a service-specific interpretation focused on high-end amphibious assault. The Navy fretted over runaway shipbuilding costs and instead focused its efforts on emergent missions like Ballistic Missile Defense, Maritime Domain Awareness and efforts to oppose a rising, resource-hungry China. As Congress expressed doubt over seabasing, the two services placed the $14 billion MPF(F) on hold for two years until canceling it in early 2010. By all appearances, seabasing appeared to be on the ropes. PUTTING THE BASE BACK IN SEABASING The first step in righting this ship is to deconstruct seabasing concepts from the last two decades to determine what is salvageable and what should rightly be discarded. Significantly, Marine Corps concepts for the MPF(F) had foundations in four key areas: at-sea logistics, pre-positioning, amphibious lift, and employment. Permeating all four issues were assumptions about speed and scale. When we examine these conceptual roots, we can begin to see why the MPF(F) assumed such a strange, hybrid character — and begin to separate the wheat from the chaff. The first area, at-sea logistics, really lies at the heart of the seabasing concept. Deployed amphibious ships have little ability to tailor their equipment while underway, meaning their pierside loadout essentially determines their capability. Additionally, the Marines’ current maritime pre-positioning ship squadron (MPSRON) vessels are dense-packed and designed to Cold War constructs in which the U.S. intended to rapidly reinforce allies by unloading equipment and personnel in prepared ports. The MPF(F), conversely, was designed to act as a port and airfield at sea with corresponding connectors. It would allow the Marines to assemble and selectively tailor forces underway and then support forces ashore without reliance on ports — or even a beachhead. Essentially, it would make operations on land independent from that land. During the transformation years, however, the escalating need for speed led planners to equate such at-sea logistics with pre-positioning. Quite simply, there was no other way to satisfy the desire to commence combat operations in the prescribed 10-14 days without using forward-deployed (i.e. pre-positioned) vessels. As a replacement for the MPSRONs, the MPF(F) was thus designed to absorb the third of three 15,000-member Marine expeditionary brigades while simultaneously supporting two more brigades deployed via traditional amphibious ships for a major combat operation. In effect, it would move traditional pre-positioning to a position off the coast. Such speed and scale, however, pose a fundamental question: What is pre-positioning for? If the intent is to quickly reinforce allies (as during the Cold War), is it reasonable to assume that the same speed and scale can be achieved at sea? After all, the MPF(F)’s accompanying task force of traditional amphibious ships would be hard-pressed to achieve such speeds, taking as long as 60 days to arrive from the continental U.S. Conversely, if pre-positioning is intended simply to provide speed and flexibility to U.S. forces, what scenario would call for such a rapid, large-scale amphibious assault — especially if an ally ashore had already been overrun? Amphibious lift poses similar ambiguities. No significant study on amphibious lift has been performed since 1990’s Department of the Navy Lift II, itself commissioned during the Cold War and organized around the planning metric of the Soviet motorized rifle division. For nearly two subsequent decades, the Navy and Marine Corps agreed on paper to support the “fiscally constrained” capacity of 2.5 expeditionary brigades, but the latest consensus is for a 33-ship amphibious force to support a bare minimum two-brigade lift capacity. The MPF(F) was intended to house a third brigade on its vessels, bringing the Marines back up to their long-stated three-brigade goal. But this debate about lift is as much about strategy as about shipbuilding programs. A 20-year hiatus is too long. Certainly it is high time for a comprehensive review of amphibious lift — and of amphibious missions. Finally, the MPF(F) was also designed to employ forces, primarily in low-end scenarios. As such, it helped make seabasing synonymous with amphibious warfare. But amphibious ships already employ amphibious forces. As civilian-military hybrids, the MPF(F) vessels blurred the line between combatants and logistics vessels, posing countless ethical and legal issues. As the nation struggles with the prevalence of contractors in war zones, a plan to launch combat operations from “up-armored” commercial vessels should warrant pause. In short, seabasing has become tied to several critical issues — including pre-positioning, amphibious lift and amphibious employment — that are all due for re-evaluation. But that doesn’t necessarily mean that the concept of seabasing need be held hostage by them. Seabasing does already exist to various degrees, and seabasing of any sort relies on robust at-sea logistics. Therefore, by focusing on such logistics — and putting the base back in seabasing — we can disentangle the host from its missions and critically examine what the seabase is supposed to do. So what is the right model for seabasing, then? Perhaps the most powerful emerging concept of naval organization is modularity, or “boxes.” Indeed, Robert Work, the undersecretary of the Navy and spokesman for the Navy’s most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan, has described all of the Navy’s ships — from the littoral combat ship to the aircraft carriers — as boxes or capability containers able to individually deploy and act as motherships for wider congregations of vessels and aircraft. This emerging ethos builds on the “plug and fight” capability of the LCS, elevating it to a broader view of naval forces in general. If we apply modularity to seabasing, the concept takes on much greater depth and power. Seabasing then is about assembling a wide variety of vessels, containers and organizations into infinite combinations. There are already signs of this emerging. The Global Fleet Station, for example, is a low-end seabase that conducts training and builds partner capacity. The middle is comprised of surface action groups, disaggregated amphibious readiness groups, ballistic missile defense SAGs and independently steaming submarines. At the high end, the Navy still deploys large, concentrated strike groups centered on major capital ships like aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships. Without explicitly stating so, the Navy has begun to create a force of modular seabases that bridges the large and the small. The Marine Corps is evolving in a similar fashion. As mentioned, the Corps designed its seabasing constructs around a three-brigade capability. In experiments, however, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab has reduced the lowest-level Marine Corps fighting unit from a reinforced battalion, as we see in today’s Marine expeditionary unit, to a reinforced company, creating a small amphibious operations force that can fit on one ship. The Marines also are planning to deploy from the LCS and the Joint High Speed Vessel. This trend toward organizational modularity mirrors the Army’s own reorganization begun in 2004, encapsulated by then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker’s claim that he “had too many $100 bills and not enough 20s.” The Navy and Marine Corps, it would seem, are in need of some fives and ones. A modular organizational focus does not necessarily entail a fundamentally different force structure. It does, however, require thinking differently about forces at sea and about ways to combine them. Much of this already exists in contemporary naval writing, but it remains to be consolidated into cohesive doctrine. In short, it’s not necessarily about building new ships, but rather about creatively employing what already exists. Why such a force? The answer is that it is an impending geostrategic necessity. More than half of the world’s population now lives in urban areas, and most of those cities lie in a coastal region only 120 miles wide. Such high population densities coupled with massive urban slums create a possibility of littoral conflict that could make current counterinsurgency campaigns seem tame by comparison. Significantly, such trends also constitute an inversion of 20th-century conflicts in which the U.S. sought to contain continentalist “heartland” powers, including Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Increasingly, the littorals aren’t just the sideshow in the main conflict; they are center stage themselves. Conflict in this area, however, promises to be very different from traditional amphibious assault. Indeed, Marine Corps Gen. Charles Krulak stated over a decade ago that future conflicts were less likely to be the beloved “son of Desert Storm” than the “unwanted stepchild of Chechnya.” Extrapolating to the coastal regions, littoral combat is less likely to be the son of Iwo Jima than the unwanted stepchild of Mogadishu. When it comes to large-scale U.S. basing, however, these regions, especially in the widely discussed “arc of instability,” offer few options. Informal arrangements have emerged in places like India, Singapore and the UAE, but these are more consistent with the recent “places, not bases” philosophy than of long-term alliances. Most fundamentally, no comprehensive approach to the world’s green and brown waters has yet emerged; there is no Littoral Battle Doctrine comparable to the emerging AirSea Battle Doctrine. Thus, a concept that could provide persistent presence at some of the most troubling spots on Earth seems warranted. The Navy in 2005 began to address this shift in geostrategy, and its staggering implications for capacity, with the concept of the thousand-ship Navy — subsequently rebranded the more benign Global Maritime Partnership. The GMP is old enough now to have lost some of its new-car smell, and it often is misinterpreted as a rebranding of “good neighbors at sea.” But the intent was something far more profound: “a free-form, self-organizing network of maritime partners.” Strikingly, such partnerships complete a tripartite model that may constitute the template for 21st-century security: modular platforms, modular organizations and now, modular regional alliances. The world has gone plug-and-play. If this is indeed the de facto new mantra of 21st-century coalitions, the most important modules likely will be the ones external to the U.S. maritime force. In other words, the Navy and Marine Corps will need to plug and play with other nations’ assets at all levels. Seabasing concepts will need to incorporate the Army into the littorals — ideally in something like an integrated “SeaLand Battle.” The Navy’s at-sea logistics force will have to draw together partnerships that together are more than a sum of their parts. And rather than just seeking independence from the land, seabasing will need to augment and complement the shifting network of shore-based infrastructure in a comprehensive and coherent manner. We have come full circle from those heady, post-Cold War days of unilateral power projection and obsession with strike warfare. To remain relevant, and to reflect this change, seabasing must also evolve. Rooted in World War II concepts of amphibious assault and nurtured in post-Cold War foreign policy that treasured freedom from allies, seabasing needs a total makeover for the 21st century security environment. A revised concept of seabasing built around an emerging modular construct has the potential to be a powerful and unifying vision for global maritime forces. Formulated in such a manner, seabasing would not be about freedom from allies but about uniting allies in an innovative approach to emerging geostrategy. It would also incorporate joint forces and even bases ashore into a comprehensive framework. As the nexus of global conflict moves inexorably toward the littorals, the Navy and Marine Corps need to unite behind a common seabasing vision that addresses this critically important region. It is time to send foreign policy back to sea. AFJ

### 2NC CP Solves

#### Solves vulnerability and power projection—carriers fail

Barnard 2004 (Richard, Editor in Chief, Navy League of the United States, cites Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore Jr, “Sea Basing Concept Promises a Revolution in Power Projection”, <http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/jun_04_10.php>, Hemanth)

Sea Basing Concept Promises a Revolution in Power Projection Ten days to the next world hot spot. That goal sums up a vision of the future shared by Navy and Marine Corps officials who intend to revolutionize the way the United States manages its forces, plans its operations and projects power ashore. Marine Lt. Gen. Edward Hanlon Jr., commander of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, said it once took 30 to 45 days to move a Marine Expeditionary Brigade of about 16,000 Marines, their equipment and aircraft from the United States to a distant theater of operations. In the 1980s, that timeline was cut to approximately 17 to 20 days, due in part to the creation of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) of 16 ships based in Diego Garcia, Guam, Saipan and the Mediterranean. The force comprises three squadrons, each capable of supporting a Marine brigade for a month. Packaging the materiel for a brigade and basing the ships at strategic spots around the globe helped cut deployment times by half. But 17 to 20 days is no longer good enough. “Wouldn’t it be nice if we could … make it 10 to 14 days,” Hanlon said. In fact, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld wants all of the services to be able to conduct forcible entry operations over strategic distances in about 10 days. And the nation’s top sea service admirals and generals believe sea basing is the warfighting concept that will get them there. Vice Adm. Charles W. Moore Jr., deputy chief of naval operations for fleet readiness and logistics, said, “There is probably nothing we are doing in the Navy today that excites us more than the potential and opportunity that sea basing presents to us.” Moore and others are excited because sea basing does much more than cut their deployment timelines. It allows them, working in concert with other U.S. military services, to overcome political barriers between their forces and a battle area, such as nearby nations denying access routes to U.S. forces. Sea basing, which officials view as a concept for joint operations, also rids military forces of one of their biggest handicaps, the iron mountain of weapons and materiel unloaded from the Navy’s transport ships and moved ashore where it must be guarded, allocated to staging areas and integrated with the force structure being constituted nearby. Sea basing enables the military to move troops tailored for specific missions globally and at high speed, Hanlon said. It fosters the use of maneuver warfare to create uncertainty, forcing the enemy into a reactive posture. The essence of sea basing is that U.S. military forces sent to world trouble spots typically will no longer establish beachheads, iron mountains or huge headquarters operations similar to that which now exists in Kuwait in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. All of those facilities and functions — and more — will be moved from land to a sea base at least 25 miles offshore. However, adversaries that search for a fortress at sea will not find one. The sea base is a concept, not a facility or location. The Navy’s nominal plan for a sea base comprises an Expeditionary Strike Group, a Carrier Strike Group and Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships. The centerpiece of future sea bases will be a new MPF ship to be built beginning in 2007. Components may include a flight deck, accommodation for troops and a joint command-and-control center. When deployed, the sea base would be geographically dispersed but linked by an information network. The sea base is scalable to each mission, capable of fast deployment and able to operate independently of in-theater ports or air bases. It must be able to sustain a fighting force 2,000 miles from the nearest friendly base. The Defense Science Board’s (DSB) August 2003 report, “Sea Basing,” states that, “Special operations forces, soldiers and Marines would assemble, together with their equipment, on the sea base to match the mission’s needs. … It entails the projection of land forces substantially beyond the beachhead …[and support] of such forces for prolonged periods.” At the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Exposition in Washington, D.C., in April, Hanlon said Rumsfeld had directed all of the services to find ways “to go faster, farther and deeper than we’ve ever done before.” Vice Adm. John B. Nathman, deputy chief of naval operations for warfare requirements and programs, described Rumsfeld’s dictate as “a 10-30-30” strategy under which the services would deploy to a world hot spot within 10 days, defeat an enemy in 30 days and be ready to fight again in another 30 days. Hanlon noted that “whatever we do in the future is going to be a joint fight,” and that the maneuver and speed now expected of joint forces will be easier to achieve because they no longer will be tied to their iron mountain of materiel. “We’ll be able to access things very rapidly from our sea base, take what we need, do our mission and get out of there.” The sea base and maneuver warfare that it fosters will expand the range of options available to tactical units. “It just expands our maneuver space and enables us to strike the enemy in places where you can’t even believe,” Hanlon said. Sea basing is not new. Hanlon’s briefing on sea basing includes episodes from conflicts that occurred decades ago. More recently, the Navy moved the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk into the Arabian Gulf during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for use by Task Force Sword, a joint special operations force that conducted operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the war. Navy officials came out of that war convinced that they needed to “leverage this tremendous capability that we had demonstrated so well in OEF,” Moore said. The concept is part of the Sea Power 21 strategy of Adm. Vern Clark, chief of naval operations. Other elements include Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Enterprise. What is new is that sea basing provides the conceptual foundation for a wide range of military operations by joint forces. It would make new uses of existing assets by, for example, possibly incorporating elements of the Army’s 101st Airborne Division in operations from a sea base, enabling the U.S. forces to project power ashore “with less political cost and reduced vulnerability,” the DSB report states. However, the sea basing concept is a work in progress with major components of the sea base still to be developed under the direction of Moore and Marine Lt. Gen. Richard Kelly, deputy commandant for installations and logistics. Reporting to them are numerous concept of operations (ConOps) groups developing elements of the sea basing scheme. Included are ConOps groups on logistics, the Maritime Prepositioning Force ship of the Future (MPF(F)), and medical operations.