# Navy Bad

### Navy Bad – 1NC

#### Carrier doctrine in Japan risk China war

GOODENOUGH ‘10 (Patrick, is CNSNews.com’s international editor, July 12, “China Bristles at Prospect of U.S. Aircraft Carrier in the Yellow Sea”, http://www.cnsnews.com/node/69237)

Plans for joint U.S.-South Korean naval exercises that may involve an American aircraft carrier are drawing growing criticism in China, where many view the drill as insulting to their country despite its intended goal of deterring North Korean aggression. The proposed anti-submarine exercises are part of a range of responses to the sinking earlier this year of a South Korean warship which an international investigation blamed on a North Korean torpedo. Forty-six sailors died. Officials in Seoul said at the weekend the plans to hold the drills later this month were discussed during U.S.-South Korean security talks held in Washington on Friday. The intended location is near the inter-Korean maritime border in the Yellow Sea, a stretch of water between the west coast of the Korean peninsula and the coast of northeast China. Initially scheduled for several weeks ago, the exercises were postponed in late June until after the U.N. Security Council finalized its response to the sinking of the Cheonan. On Friday the council adopted a statement which condemned the sinking but, at China’s insistence, did not directly blame North Korea. With the U.N. response out of the way, China is stepping up its criticism of the upcoming exercises. The U.S. Navy has been involved in war games in the Yellow Sea in the past, but bristling commentators in official Chinese media outlets say things have changed. “The United States may believe that since it conducted military drills in the Yellow Sea in the past, it can do that now and in the future,” the Communist Party organ People’s Daily said in an editorial published Monday. “But the United States should understand, with China’s increasing national strength, Chinese nationals will get more sensitive to the provocative actions the U.S. navy takes in a place so close to their home.” People’s Daily said China does not object to the presence of the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific and understands that some countries need the U.S. military to provide them with a sense of security. “But, this does not mean the United States can ignore China’s self-esteem and drive their aircraft carrier straight to the front of China's doorstep to flex their muscles.” The Pentagon has yet to confirm reports, citing South Korean officials, about the involvement of the USS George Washington. But the possibility that the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier may take part in the exercise is provoking particular criticism. In an online poll run by Global Times, a paper affiliated with People’s Daily, 96 percent of Chinese respondents agreed that a drill involving an aircraft carrier would pose a threat to China. Based in Yokosuka, Japan since May 2008, the USS George Washington is the U.S. Navy’s first permanently forward-deployed nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. It recently returned to port for the July 4 holiday but according to the Navy sailed again on Friday. In its own editorial, Global Times said China would likely send ships and aircraft to monitor the drill, and warned of the implications for bilateral relations of any misunderstanding or unintended incident involving U.S. and Chinese forces. “The entire West Pacific is not the backyard of the U.S.” it said. “The U.S. must consider the impact its military presence would have on public perception and the delicate strategic balance in the area. It must give up the idea of constantly aggravating another important cornerstone of security in the region.” Li Hongmei, a People’s Daily columnist, described a surge of nationalist sentiment reflected by posts on the Internet by ordinary Chinese calling on China to attack U.S. warships deployed close to its territorial waters.

#### China-US War results in global nuclear annihilation

**Straits Times ‘00**

(6-25, Lexis, No one gains in war over Taiwan)

THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be **set on fire**. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the **destruction of civilisation**. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a **nuclear** **Armaggedon** over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

### China – 2NC

**The future sinking of the carrier would usher in a new balance of power and kill hegemony – we have predictive evidence**

KRASKA ‘9 (Winter 2009 How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015 James Kraska is a guest investigator at the Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and the former Oceans Policy Adviser for the Director of Strategic Plans & Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff http://www.fpri.org/orbis/5401/kraska.navalwar2015.pdf)

By 2015, U.S. command of the global commons could no longer be taken for granted. The oceans and the airspace above them had been the exclusive domain of the U.S. Navy and the nation’s ediﬁce of military power for seventy-ﬁve years. During the age of U.S. supremacy, the Navy used the oceans as the world’s largest maneuver space to outﬂank its enemies. Maritime mobility on the surface of the ocean, in the air and under the water was the cornerstone of U.S. military power. 1 The United States was able to utilize its maritime dominance to envelop and topple rogue regimes, as it demonstrated in Grenada and Panama, and use the maritime commons to ferry huge ground armies to the other side of the world and sustain them indeﬁnitely, as it did in Vietnam and twice in Iraq. The unique capability to project decisive power rapidly in any corner of the world gave the United States deterrent power and unrivalled military inﬂuence. All that changed in 2015, when the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington, forward-deployed to Yokosuka, Japan, sunk to the bottom of the East China Sea. More than 4,000 sailors and airmen died and the Navy lost eighty aircraft. A ship that would take seven years and $ 9 billion to replace slipped into the waves. The incident upset not just the balance of naval power in Asia, but ushered in a new epoch of international order in which Beijing emerged **to displace the U**nited States. Red Sky in Morning—Sailor’s Warning The warning signs—the series of political, diplomatic and strategic missteps—had been unfolding for more than two decades. Globalization, developments in the international law of the sea, and the revolution in military affairs aided the emergence of China and other new naval powers. Globalization was a democratizing force among navies. The wealth effect of expanding trade and rising economies combined with the spread of doctrine, training and operational art, serving as a force multiplier. The result of globalization was a vastly improved Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in terms of its force structure and warﬁghting skills. The proliferation of advanced weapons technology helped nations that historically had never exercised naval power to make generational leaps in precision-guided munitions. Already, a number of regional states had developed or acquired sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles and super-quiet diesel electric submarines armed with sensitive wakehoming torpedoes. A collection of unfriendly coastal states had invested heavily in asymmetric anti-access technologies and strategies to counter the power of U.S. naval forces. In 1991, Iraq used a mixture of crude pre-World War I contact navalmines and sophisticatedmagnetic and acoustic inﬂuencemines launched fromsmall rubber boats. The country deployed over 1,100mines in the ﬁrst Gulf War, but most of them were either inoperable or improperly positioned. Yet Baghdad still reaped success in using mines to secure its seaside ﬂank off Kuwait City. The USS Tripoli struck a moored contact mine, which ripped a 16 20 foot cavern below the waterline; hours later, and despite proceedingwith deliberate caution to avoidmines, the USS Princeton struck a mine that cracked her superstructure and caused severe deck buckling. 2 The Persian Gulf is a relatively small, semi-enclosed body ofwater, and in narrow seas mines are an effective anti-access weapon. The Paciﬁc Ocean, in contrast, is a vast, seemingly limitless expanse haunted by the tyranny of time, distance and space. While Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Ahmadinejad’s Iran borrowed weapons from the past, China was developing weapons of the future. PLA Chief Naval Commander admiral Liu Huaqing promised the twenty-ﬁrst century would be the ‘‘century of the sea.’’ Fueled by a dynamic economy and impressive ingenuity, Beijing developed and ﬁelded a bevy of asymmetric weapons. One game-changing weapon, an anti-ship ballistic missile, could hit an underway aircraft carrier. 3 And that is what happened. Without warning, a Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile – a variant of the 1,500 km-plus range DF-21/CSS-5 solid propellant medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) speciﬁcally designed to decapitate U.S. carrier strike groups operating in East Asia – struck the USS George Washington causing the ship to erupt in a cataclysm. The Chinese Navy made uncanny progress in the two decades preceding the attack, transitioning from an obsolete1950s-style coastal defense force into a balanced blue water ﬂeet. Beijing was outﬁtting its second domesticallyproduced aircraft carrier in 2015. For decades, Beijing had studied the Australian carrier HMAS Melbourne and had tinkered with three Russian carriers, ﬁnally placing the former Ukrainian carrier, Varyag—renamed the Shi Lang—in operation after years of refurbishment at Dalian shipyards. Against these three carriers, the commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet sometimes had operational control over asmany as three carriers at once, but this ﬁgure included U.S. strike groups transiting fromSanDiego and Seattle en route toor fromthe PersianGulf. These ships could be days or weeks fromthe East China Sea. Still smarting from the surge of the Nimitz and Independence carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait by President Clinton in the spring of 1996, China timed its attack against the George Washington so that the forward-deployed carrier was the only U.S. ﬂat-top in the Western Paciﬁc. A speaking invitation from Cornell University to Taiwanese president, Lee Teng-hui was the source of the Taiwan Crisis of 1995-96. Viewing the president’s visit as a move away from the One China policy, Beijing conducted missile exercises in the waters surrounding Taiwan. The more lasting impact, however, was that China embarked on massive naval buildup, ﬁrst ordering Sovremmeny-class destroyers and Kilo submarines from Russia, and then developing more advanced ships and aircraft domestically. In 1999, the PLA Navy introduced the sophisticated Song-class diesel electric submarine. Reportedly quieter than the fast attack the U.S. Los Angeles-class boats, the Song was equipped with wake-homing torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. In one incident in October 2006, one of the ultra-quiet Song submarines surfaced inside the protective screen of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk. Admiral Gary Roughead, who was commander of the U.S. Paciﬁc Fleet and who would later go on to serve as Chief of Naval Operations, was visiting China at the time of the incident. 4 In 1996, at the end of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, PLA General Xiong Guangkai warned a visiting U.S. envoy, ‘‘. . . you care more about Los Angeles than you do about Taipei.’’ While the U.S. Paciﬁc Fleetwas in panic after the KittyHawk embarrassment over its vulnerability to Chinese diesel-electric boats, Navy Pentagon had just briefed President Bush on its new strategy. The ‘‘Thousand Ship Navy,’’ would evolve into the concept of a ‘‘globalmaritimepartnership’’ and the service chiefs for theNavy,Marine Corps and CoastGuardwould jump on board in 2007 and sign the ‘‘Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.’’ These cooperative maritime concepts were meant to be accessible to all nations, inclusive and inviting. Partnerships were sought for maritime humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and counter-piracy operations. Fleet commanders searched for opportunities to build partnership capacity along the littoral regions—small boat engine repair for the Jamaican coast guard, ﬁsheries enforcement training in the Gulf of Guinea. Paciﬁc Partnership ﬂoated one of the large hospital ships throughout ports in Asia, dispensing free medical care to thousands of grateful patients. The Navy and Coast Guard signed agreements with dozens of nations to share merchant ship tracking and monitoring data. Nations that had little respect for offshore or littoral freedom of navigation were courted, and regional commanders favored the beneﬁts of partnership over the value of preserving navigational rights. Winning ‘‘hearts and minds’’ trumped age-old principles. The U.S. Navy struggled with how to conduct combined, lower-order maritime security operations. China was concentrating on how to win a naval war. The United States Navy was living off its legacy. The incessant search for naval ‘‘partnerships’’—‘‘no nation can do it alone’’—was tacit recognition that President Reagan’s 600-ship Navy was a shell of its former glory. The country lay under the illusion of naval superiority, but itwas amirage. The selfdelusion emerged from an emotional investment in the past and wishful thinking about the future, rather than a calculation of the correlation of forces at sea. In 2012, when the country reduced its ﬂeet of aircraft carriers to ten, down from ﬁfteen during the 1980s, Secretary of Defense Gates assured Congress that the force was as large as the next fourteen navies combined. 5 Furthermore, most of the other nations with large navies were allies. While technically true when measured in ﬂeet tonnage and missile tubes, his testimony obscured the fact that while the U.S. Navy perhaps could outmatch any other navy in a fair ﬁght, her rivals were not looking for a fair ﬁght. Allies would prove unreliable partners, more intent on avoiding war than deterring it. U.S. adversaries were thinking asymmetrically. The fourteen-to-one advantage in naval power also assumed that the United States had time to collect and concentrate its far-ﬂung ships against a single foe. The ephemeral 313-ship force structure was never achieved, but it called for eleven carriers, eighty-eight cruisers and destroyers, forty-eight submarines, ﬁfty-ﬁve littoral combat ships and thirty-one amphibious warfare ships. But these forces were spread thinly throughout the world maintaining a bewildering and multi-tasked agenda. Given that a 1.0 force presence— maintaining one ship on station—typically requires three ships—one in work-ups and evaluation, getting ready to deploy, one on deployment, and one in the yard being refurbished after deployment—the 313 ships never really promised more than about 100 ships at sea at any given time, and these would be spread over the entire globe. In 2015, China’s navy was somewhat smaller, numbering only a handful of aircraft carriers, sixty submarines and seventy major surface combatants. Beijing also operated hundreds of fast offshore patrol vessels, many that packed a punch with anti-ship cruise missiles. Whereas an adversary like China could marshal its entire national ﬂeet for a crisis immediately off its shore, as well as land-based missiles and aircraft, to face down the United States, the U.S. Navy would have to ﬁght with the forces that happened to be in the region. Additional U.S. naval forces would be siphoned from other theaters, exposing new vulnerabilities for a nation with global responsibilities. By the time reinforcements would arrive—it could be weeks later—worldwide clamor for a ceaseﬁre and peace talks could mean the war was already over. In the decades after the end of the Cold War, China closed the gap in naval capability, even surpassing the United States in some areas in terms of both quantity and quality of platforms. For example, China concentrated on advancing its large diesel-electric submarine force. Sweden became the ﬁrst nation to develop a diesel-electric submarine with air-independent propulsion (AIP), which extended underwater endurance from a few days to one month. The ﬁrst in class of these vessels, the HMS Gotland,was leased by the U.S. Navy for two years in order to practice anti-submarine warfare. The Gotland proved extremely quiet and effective, and AIP submarines are able to sprint underwater—greatly increasing their attack radius. China integrated AIP technology into the Type 041 Yuan-class boats, which followed the Song. Having launched several of these smaller, stealthy boats each year since 2004, a decade later, the U.S. Seventh Fleet could never be certain whether China was shadowing U.S. vessels. The U.S. Navy also suffered problems in readiness and proﬁciency. Diversion of thousands of ofﬁcers and enlisted sailors to ﬁll Army shortfalls in Iraq and Afghanistan deprived the service of years of training and operational experience at sea. Promotions were tied to disassociated augmentation tours for stability operations and reconstruction rather than excellence aﬂoat. An entire generation of mid-career commissioned and noncommissioned ofﬁcers tried to learn counterinsurgency land warfare in the desert and mountains of central Asiawhile their counterparts in China conducted ﬂeet exercises to learn how to destroy them. In ﬁlling a critical gap between means and ends in ground combat in Central Command, a seam between the two was created in naval warfare in Paciﬁc Command. The Day After Americans woke up to a different world the day after the attack. The war was over almost as soon as it had started. Outmaneuvered tactically and strategically, the United States suffered its greatest defeat at sea since Pearl Harbor. The incident—could it really be called a ‘‘war’’?—had been preceded by a shallow diplomatic crisis between the two great powers. No one in the West expected the dispute to spiral out of control. George Washington was conducting routine patrols off the coast of China **to send a signal of U.S. resolve. China responded with a signal of its own—sinking the massive ship**. The ship broke in two and sank in twenty minutes. The Chinese medium-range ballistic missile had a penetrator warhead that drilled through all fourteen decks of the ship and punched a cavernous hole measuring twenty-feet wide from the ﬂat-top landing deck through to the bottom of the hull. Ammunition stores ignited secondary explosions. Two million gallons of JP-5 jet fuel poured into the sea. The attack was calamitous and damage control was pointless. While the Pentagon was reeling to determine exactly what happened, a well-orchestrated and pre-planned ‘‘rescue’’ effort was already underway by a ﬂotilla of ﬁrst responders from China. The Chinese media reported on the bravery of Chinese naval forces, ﬁsheries enforcement police and common ﬁshermen who happened to be in the vicinity of the disaster and were able to save numerous lives. The massive warship had a crew of 3,200 sailors, and there were nearly 1,800 additional sailors and airmen embarked with the wing of aircraft on board the ship. Among this ﬂoating city, thousands of souls either incinerated or drowned. In the end, China saved hundreds of desperate survivors ﬂoating in the water. Chinese state television ﬁlmed distraught young U.S. navy personnel, weeping, grateful to be alive as they were plucked from the oily water. Family members back in the States rushed to Beijing to reunite with their sons and daughters, hosted by the Chinese government and state media. Beijing denied the attack. China shuttled to the Security Council, claiming that an accident on board the aircraft carrier had created a ‘‘radioactive incident’’ in its ﬁshing zone, spreading nuclear fallout throughout the air and water in the region. The International Maritime Organization had declared the area of the attack a marine sanctuary one year earlier, and China had publicly warned that foreign warships posed an environmental risk to the naturalmarine environment. The United States, it was suggested, was liable for damage to China’s living and nonliving resources in the oceans, in accordance with the Law of the Sea Convention. Beijing also rushed to the area activists from environmental NGOs to monitor the situation. Expressing solidarity and sorrow for the U.S. loss, China ﬂatly denied that it had anything to do with the catastrophe. The Pentagon was stunned, immediately ordering warships and aircraft toward the East China Sea. B-2 bombers repositioned to Guam. Submarines in Guam and the West Coast got underway. One Aegis destroyer operating off Hawaii broke away from high seas driftnet enforcement duty to begin the week-long trip to the area. No sooner had warships from the U.S. Second Fleet in Norfolk gotten underway, however, than did Cosco, the Chinese company operating the Panama Canal, declare the passageway closed for fourweeks for urgent repairs to the Atlantic and Paciﬁc locks. Closure of the 40-mile long canal added 3,000 miles to transits from the East coast of the United States to the Far East. 6 The alternative was to take the laborious route through the Strait ofMagellan in southern Chile. Considerably safer than Drake Passage, Magellan was still difﬁcult to navigate. The narrow passage was dogged by ﬁerce winds and the inhospitable climate. Half the U.S. ﬂeet anchored in Norfolk was temporarily cut off from the Paciﬁc. At the same time, street protests to stop the impending transit of U.S. warships through the Suez Canal stung the government in Cairo. The Suez Canal shaves 40 percent of the distance off a trip from the Sixth Fleet operating area in the Mediterranean Sea to the Far East. In March 2008, a U.S. Navy security detail embarked on a chartered commercial ship killed a concessionaire plying the canal, mistaking the waterborne merchant for a small boat threat. Cairo kept the Canal open, but the 2008 shooting and an earlier decision to allow Israeli Dolphin-class submarines to transit the Canal fed dissension and elevated the risk of terrorist attack. Only sixty meters wide at some points, the United States and Egypt initiated a heightened security presence along the route, slowing ship trafﬁc. All of the activity further antagonized the Arab street. A number of U.S. Navy ships on patrol with the Fifth ﬂeet in the Persian Gulf began the two-week transit back to Asia, but to what end? It became apparent that China was doing all that it could to provide assistance to the crew of the George Washington—showcasing to the world a kind, benevolent and proactive rescue effort. At the same time, China repeatedly denied blame for the incident. Nationalists honked car horns in China, and the Chinese government funded ‘‘spontaneous’’ rallies of support in selected Chinatown districts in Asia and the U.S. West Coast. With Chinese naval, air and rocket forces on alert in response to U.S. ﬂeet activation, the issue was placed squarely in Washington’s lap. Much as Secretary of State Colin Powell had delivered evidence of Iraq’s secret weapons of mass destruction at the Security Council in February 2003, the U.S. ambassador to the UN provided details on Chinese missile telemetry to prove Beijing’s complicity. But U.S. credibility was low, and China was in ascent. China’s narrative shaped global media and public opinion: the incident was unfortunate and simply demonstrated to Japan and to the world the volatility and danger of U.S. nuclear-powered warships. The explosion was an accident and it would not have happened if the carrier had not been trying to intimidate China. In South America and the Middle East, and even in Europe, the feeling was strong that the ship was an instrument of imperialist power projection, operating in an area where it did not belong. Most Asians were inclined to think the United States should have been minding its own business. Dumbfounded, the White House churned without direction. A month would pass before the United States was able to position more than three aircraft carriers in the region, and then what? Many Asian governments tacitly supported the United States, but were afraid to do so publicly for fear of angering China. The highly capable ﬂeet of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force rested at anchor in Yokosuka, Sasebo and a handful of other bases throughout the country. Tokyo’s four escort ﬂotillas formed around a core of superlative Kongo-class guided missile destroyers, which feature the phased-array Aegis anti-air warfare and integrated combat system. But Japan was constitutionally prohibited from taking action on behalf of the United States, and realistically, what could it do? In Delhi, the growing sense of a U.S.-Indian naval condominium, and a common Chinese foe could not overcome the strength of the communists in the government who restrained Indian support for the United States. A dilemma confronted the White House—would it start awar, claiming China had sunk the carrier? Responsible opinion-makers warned of a holocaust; surely, there was time for cool heads to prevail. Oceans Policy Blindness How did the United States arrive at this place? The 2008 DOD Capstone Concept for Joint Operations described the new ocean operating environment: Foreign sensitivities to U.S. military presence have steadily been increasing. . . . Diminished access will complicate the maintenance of forward presence, a critical aspect of past and current U.S. military strategy, necessitating new approaches to responding quickly to developments around the world as well as more robust exploitation of existing U.S. advantages to operate at sea and in the air, space and cyberspace. Assuring access to ports, airﬁelds, foreign airspace, coastal waters and host-nation support in potential commitment areas will be a challenge and will require active peacetime engagement with states in volatile areas. In War, this challenge may require forcible-entry capabilities designed to seize andmaintain lodgments in the face of armed resistance. The once robust U.S. ‘‘freedom of navigation’’ program, which sent warships and military aircraft to operate freely on the seas, had atrophied by 2015. First, with a declining U.S. ﬂeet, there were fewer vessels and aircraft available to show the ﬂag. More importantly, after the 2001 EP-3 incident, in which a Chinese ﬁghter jet intercepted and collided with a U.S. Navy surveillance aircraft in the airspace seventy-ﬁve miles off the coast, the Department of State deemed naval operations near China to be too overt, too provocative. The mere possibility of sparking a crisis with China had made the Pentagon and Department of State shy about exercising navigational rights and freedoms in the East China Sea. Gradually, fewer U.S. warships and naval aircraft were operating in the area in deference to Beijing’s sensitivities. As the Seventh Fleet became less visible in the East China Sea, China’s sense of ownership over the littoral waters grew. On the occasions when the U.S. did assert its right to exercise high seas freedoms, China reacted by condemning U.S. naval operations as an ‘‘escalation,’’ designed to keep China weak and to ‘‘occupy’’ Chinese ‘‘maritime territory.’’ During the 1990s, the demise of the Soviet Union produced a ‘‘psychological distortion,’’ tempting the United States to become more assertive about equating its national goals with universal values. 7 But by the 2000s, beginning with the worldwide unpopularity of the Bush administration and the apologizing Obama administration, the United States lost the position of the planet’s self-proclaimed tutor. 8 Challengers no longer accepted the U.S.constructed post-war world, questioning everything from the primacy of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency to U.S. counter-proliferation policy against Iran. The international lawof the seawas no different. Three of the four rising ‘‘BRIC’’ nations—Brazil, India and China—rejected the notion that U.S. warships could freely operate within 200 miles off their coastline without their permission. These nations did not accept the traditional understanding that freedom of the high seas exists in the coastal zone, extending out to 200 miles from the beach. 9 For decades China asserted that both the quantity and quality of navigational freedoms available to foreign warships and aircraft was very different within 200 miles from the coast. 10 When China was weak, it suffered the indignity of routine U.S. and foreign naval operations off its shores. But as the U.S. Navy declined and the Chinese Navy became more powerful, China became less willing to tolerate the ‘‘foreign invasions.’ The Lesson of History: Tectonic Shifts Occur Quickly History shows how the maritime balance of power can shift suddenly, **rearranging global order.** Naval power has been particularly – indeed, even uniquely – associated with the rapid, as opposed to evolutionary, rise of new major powers. Historically, even great shifts in global politics have occurred rapidly: ‘‘In 1480, Spain was a collection of little kingdoms, as eager to ﬁght each other as to defend their common interests. Twenty years later, Spain held title to half the globe.’’ 11 Similarly, ‘‘[i]n 1935, with no armed forces to speak of and an economy in decline, the United States wanted nothing more than for the world to leave it alone. Within ten years, ﬂush with victory, economically prosperous, and in sole possession of the atomic bomb, the United States became the single most powerful nation on earth. 12

### A2: Regular China Defense

**Carrier doctrine in Asia overwhelms all other alt-causes and proves escalation ---- turns all of case**

YOSHIHARA ‘10 (Dr. Toshi Yoshihara, Associate Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, former Visiting Professor at the U.S. Air War College, Ph.D. International Relations, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, M.A. International Relations, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, B.S. International Relations, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Operational View from Beijing,” Naval War College Review, 7-1-2010, http://www.faqs.org/periodicals/201007/2046727461.html)

.Equally troubling is growing evidence that China has turned its attention to Japan, home to some of the largest naval and air bases in the world. Beijing has long worried about Tokyo's potential role in a cross-strait conflagration. In particular, Chinese analysts chafe at the apparent American freedom to use the Japanese archipelago as a springboard to intervene in a Taiwan contingency. In the past, China kept silent on what the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would do in response to Japanese logistical support of U.S. military operations. Recent PLA publications, in contrast, suggest that the logic of missile coercion against Taiwan could be readily applied to U.S. forward presence in Japan. The writings convey a high degree of confidence that China's missile forces could compel Tokyo to limit American use of naval bases while selectively destroying key facilities on those bases. These doctrinal developments demand close attention from Washington and Tokyo, lest the transpacific alliance be caught flat-footed in a future crisis with Beijing. This article is a first step toward better understanding how the Chinese evaluate the efficacy of missile coercion against American military targets in Japan. This article focuses narrowly on Chinese assessments of U.S. naval bases in Japan, excluding the literature on such other key locations as the Kadena and Misawa air bases. The writings on the American naval presence are abundant and far more extensive than studies on the land and air components of U.S. basing arrangements. The dispatch of two carrier battle groups to Taiwan's vicinity during the 1996 cross-strait crisis stimulated Beijing's reevaluation of its military strategy toward the island. Not surprisingly, the Chinese are obsessed with the U.S. aircraft carrier, including the facilities and bases that support its operations. It is against this rich milieu that this study explores how the Chinese conceive their missile strategy to complicate American use of military bases along the Japanese archipelago. This article first explores the reasons behind Beijing's interest in regional bases and surveys the Chinese literature on the U.S. naval presence in Japan to illustrate the amount of attention being devoted to the structure of American military power in Asia. Chinese analysts see U.S. dependence on a few locations for power projection as a major vulnerability. Second, it turns to Chinese doctrinal publications, which furnish astonishing details as to how the PLA might employ ballistic missiles to complicate or deny U.S. use of Japanese port facilities. Chinese defense planners place substantial faith in the coercive value of missile tactics. Third, the article assesses China's conventional theater ballistic missiles that would be employed against U.S. regional bases. Fourth, it critiques the Chinese writings, highlighting some faulty assumptions about the anticipated effects of missile coercion. Finally, the study identifies some key operational dilemmas that the U.S.-Japanese alliance would likely encounter in a PLA missile campaign. EXPLAINING CHINA'S INTEREST IN REGIONAL BASES Taiwan remains the animating force behind China's strategic calculus with respect to regional bases in Asia. Beijing's inability to respond to the display of U.S. naval power at the height of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis proved highly embarrassing. There is evidence that the PLA had difficulty in monitoring the movement of the two carrier battle groups, much less in offering its civilian leaders credible military options in response to the carrier presence. This galling experience steeled Beijing's resolve to preclude U.S. naval deployments near Taiwan in a future crisis. Notably, the Yokosuka-based USS Independence (CV 62) was the first carrier to arrive at the scene in March 1996, cementing Chinese expectations that Washington would dispatch a carrier from Japan in a contingency over Taiwan. Beyond Taiwan, other territorial disputes along China's nautical periphery could involve U.S. naval intervention. A military crisis arising from conflicting Sino-Japanese claims over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands northwest of Taiwan could compel an American reaction. While doubts linger in some Japanese policy circles as to whether foreign aggression against the islands would trigger Washington's defense commitments as stipulated by the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, joint allied exercises and war games since 2006 suggest that the U.S. military is closely watching events in the East China Sea. Farther south, Chinese territorial claims over large swaths of the South China Sea could also be sources of regional tensions. If a local tussle there escalated into a larger conflagration that threatened international shipping, the U.S. Navy might be ordered to maintain freedom of navigation. In both scenarios, the U.S. carrier based in Japan and other strike groups operating near Asian waters would be called upon as first responders. Concrete territorial disputes that have roiled Asian stability are not the only reasons that American naval power would sortie from regional bases to the detriment of Chinese interests. More abstract and esoteric dynamics may be at work. For example, Chinese leaders fret about the so-called Malacca dilemma. China's heavy dependence on seaborne energy supplies that transit the Malacca Strait has set off Chinese speculation that the United States might seek to blockade that maritime choke point to coerce Beijing. 6 This insecurity stems less from judgments about the possibility or feasibility of such a naval blockade than from the belief that a great power like China should not entrust its energy security to the fickle goodwill of the United States. If the U.S. Navy were ever called upon to fulfill an undertaking of such magnitude, forward basing in Asia would undoubtedly play a pivotal role in sustaining what could deteriorate into a protracted blockade operation. Chinese analysts have also expressed a broader dissatisfaction with America's self-appointed role as the guardian of the seas. Sea-power advocates have vigorously pushed for a more expansive view of China's prerogatives along the maritime periphery of the mainland. They bristle at the U.S. Navy's apparent presumption of the right to command any parcel of the ocean on earth, including areas that China considers its own nautical preserves. Some take issue with the 2007 U.S. maritime strategy, a policy document that baldly states, "We will be able to impose local sea control wherever necessary, ideally in concert with friends and allies, but by ourselves if we must." 7 Lu Rude, a former professor at Dalian Naval Academy, cites this passage as evidence of U.S. "hegemonic thinking." He concludes, "Clearly, what is behind 'cooperation' is America's interests, having 'partners or the participation of allies' likewise serves America's global interests."8 Some Chinese, then, object to the very purpose of U.S. sea power in Asia, which relies on a constellation of regional bases for its effects to be felt (see map). Long-standing regional flash points and domestic expectations of a more assertive China as it goes to sea suggest that Beijing's grudging **acceptance of U.S. forward presence could be eroding even more quickly** than once thought. Against this backdrop of increasing Chinese ambivalence toward American naval power, U.S. basing arrangements in Japan have come into sharper focus. CHINESE VIEWS OF U.S. NAVAL BASES IN JAPAN Some Chinese strategists appraise Washington's military posture in the Asia-Pacific region in stark geopolitical terms. Applying the "defense perimeter of the Pacific" logic elaborated by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the early Cold War, they see their nation enclosed by concentric, layered "island chains." The United States and its allies, they argue, can encircle China or blockade the Chinese mainland from island strongholds, where powerful naval expeditionary forces are based. Analysts who take such a view conceive of the island chains in various ways. Yu Yang and Qi Xiaodong, for example, describe U.S. basing architecture in Asia as a "three line configuration [...]."9 The first line stretches in a sweeping arc from Japan and South Korea to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, forming a "zone of forward bases[...]." This broad notion that the U.S. presence in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean constitutes a seamless, interlocking set of bases is widely shared in Chinese strategic circles.10 The second line connects Guam and Australia. The last line of bases runs north from Hawaii through Midway to the Aleutians, terminating at Alaska. While these island chains may bear little resemblance to actual U.S. thinking and planning, that the Chinese pay such attention to the geographic structure of American power in Asia is quite notable. These observers discern a cluster of mutually supporting bases, ports, and access points along these island chains. Among the networks of bases in the western Pacific, those located on the Japanese archipelago-the northern anchor of the first island chain-stand out, for the Chinese. Modern Navy, a monthly journal published by the Political Department of the People's Liberation Army Navy, produced a seven-part series on Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force in 2004 and 2005. Notably, it devoted an entire article to Japan's main naval bases, including Yokosuka, Sasebo, Kure, and Maizuru.11 The depth of the coverage of these bases is rather remarkable, especially when compared to the sparse reporting on similar topics in the United States and in Japan. Perhaps no other place captures the Chinese imagination as much as Yokosuka, which analysts portray as the centerpiece of U.S. basing in Asia. 12 One analysis depicts a "Northeast Asian base group [...]" radiating outward from Yokosuka to Sasebo, Pusan, and Chinhae.13 Writers provide a wide range of details about the Yokosuka naval base, including its precise location, the surrounding geography, the number of piers (particularly those suitable for aircraft carriers), the types and number of maintenance facilities, and the storage capacity of munitions, fuel, and other supply depots.14 Wu Jian, for instance, finds the geographic features of Yokosuka comparable to those of Dalian, a major base of the Chinese navy's North Sea Fleet.15 Beyond physical similarities, Yokosuka evokes unpleasant memories for the Chinese. One commentator recalls the U.S. transfer of 203 mm heavy artillery from Yokosuka to Nationalist forces on Jinmen during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis.16 Tracking more recent events, another observer notes that the Kitty Hawk Strike Group's deployments from Yokosuka to waters near Taiwan invariably coincided with the presidential elections on the island, in 2000, 2004, and 2008.17 As Pei Huai opines, "Yokosuka has all along irritated the nerves of the Chinese people."18 Moreover, Chinese analysts are keenly aware of Yokosuka's strategic position. As Du Chaoping asserts: Yokosuka is the U.S. Navy's main strategic point of concentration and deployment in the Far East and is the ideal American stronghold for employing maritime forces in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions. A carrier deployed there is akin to the sharpest dagger **sheathed in the Western Pacific by the U.S. Navy.** It can control the East Asian mainland to the west and it can enter the Indian Ocean to the southwest to secure Malacca, Hormuz, and other important thoroughfares.19 Ma Haiyang concurs: The Yokosuka base controls the three straits of Soya, Tsugaru, Tsushima and the sea and air transit routes in the Indian Ocean. As the key link in the "island chain," it can support ground operations on the Korean Peninsula and naval operations in the Western Pacific. It can support combat in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions while monitoring and controlling the wide sea areas of the Indian Ocean. Its strategic position is extremely important.20 It is notable that both Du and Ma conceive of Yokosuka as a central hub that tightly links the Pacific and Indian oceans into an integrated theater of operations. Intriguingly, some Chinese commentators view Yokosuka as the front line of the U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation on missile defense. They worry that Aegisequipped destroyers armed with ballistic-missile-defense (BMD) systems based in Yokosuka could erode China's nuclear deterrent. Indeed, analysts see concentrations of sea-based BMD capabilities falling roughly along the three island chains described above. Ren Dexin describes Yokosuka as the first line of defense against ballistic missiles, while Pearl Harbor and San Diego provide additional layers.21 Yokosuka is evocatively portrayed as the "forward battlefield position" (...), the indispensable vanguard for the sea-based BMD architecture.22 For some Chinese, these concentric rings or picket lines of sea power appear tailored specifically to bring down ballistic missiles fired across the Pacific from locations as diverse as the Korean Peninsula, mainland China, India, or even Iran.23 Specifically, Aegis ships in Yokosuka, Pearl Harbor, and San Diego would be positioned to shoot down missiles in their boost, midcourse, and terminal phases, respectively.24 Chinese observers pay special attention to Aegis deployments along the first island chain. Some believe that Aegis ships operating in the Yellow, East, and South China seas would be able to monitor the launch of any long-range ballistic missile deployed in China's interior and perhaps to intercept the vehicle in its boost phase. Dai Yanli warns, "Clearly, if Aegis systems are successfully deployed around China's periphery, then there is the possibility that China's ballistic missiles would be destroyed over their launch points."25 Ji Yanli, of the Beijing Aerospace Long March Scientific and Technical Information Institute, concurs: "If such [seabased BMD] systems begin deployment in areas such as Japan or Taiwan, the effectiveness of China's strategic power and theater ballistic-missile capabilities would weaken tremendously, severely threatening national security."26 Somewhat problematically, the authors seemingly assume that Beijing would risk its strategic forces by deploying them closer to shore, and they forecast a far more capable Aegis fleet than is technically possible in the near term. The indispensability of the ship-repair and maintenance facilities at Yokosuka emerges as another common theme in the Chinese literature. Analysts in China often note that Yokosuka is the only base west of Hawaii that possesses the wherewithal to handle major carrier repairs. Some have concluded that Yokosuka is irreplaceable as long as alternative sites for a large repair station remain unavailable. Li Daguang, a professor at China's National Defense University and a frequent commentator on naval affairs, casts doubt on Guam as a potential candidate, observing that the island lacks the basic infrastructure and economies of scale to service carriers.27 China's Jianchuan Zhishi (Naval and Merchant Ships) published a translated article from a Japanese military journal, Gunji Kenkyu (Japan Military Review), to illustrate the physical limits of Guam as a permanent home port for carriers.28 Chinese analysts also closely examine Sasebo, the second-largest naval base in Japan. Various commentators call attention to its strategic position near key sea-lanes and its proximity to China.29 As Yu Fan notes, "This base is a large-scale naval base closest to our country. Positioned at the intersection of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan, it guards the southern mouth of the Korea Strait. This has very important implications for controlling the nexus of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan and for blockading the Korea Strait."30 It is clear, then, that Chinese strategists recognize the importance of U.S. naval bases in Japan for fulfilling a range of regional and extraregional responsibilities. Indeed, some believe that the American strategic position in Asia hinges entirely on ready military access to bases on the Japanese islands. Tian Wu argues that without bases in Japan, U.S. forces would have to fall back to Guam or Hawaii. Tian bluntly asserts: If the U.S. military was ever forced to withdraw from Okinawa and Japan, then it would be compelled to retreat thousands of kilometers to set up defenses on the second island chain. Not only would it lose tremendous strategic defensive depth, but it would also lose the advantageous conditions for conducting littoral operations along the East Asian mainland while losing an important strategic relay station to support operations in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East through the South China Sea.31 This emerging discourse offers several clues about Beijing's calculus in regard to U.S. naval basing arrangements in Japan. Chinese strategists see these bases as collectively representing both a threat to Chinese interests and a critical vulnerability for the U**nited** S**tates**. Bases in Japan are the most likely locations from which the United States would sortie sea power in response to a contingency over Taiwan. At the same time, the Chinese are acutely aware of the apparent American dependence on a few bases to project power. Should access to and use of these bases be denied for political or military reasons, they reason, Washington's regional strategy could quickly unravel. While the commentaries documented above are by no means authoritative in the official sense, they are clearly designed to underscore the strategic value and the precariousness of U.S. forward presence in Japan. U.S. BASES IN JAPAN AND CHINESE MISSILE STRATEGY Authoritative PLA documents correlate with this emerging consensus that U.S. bases on the Japanese home islands merit close attention in strategic and operational terms. Indeed, Chinese doctrinal writings clearly indicate that the American presence in Japan would likely be the subject of attack if the United States were to intervene in a cross-strait conflict. The unprecedented public availability of primary sources in China in recent years has opened a window onto Chinese strategic thought, revealing a genuinely competitive intellectual environment that has substantially advanced Chinese debates on military affairs. This growing literature has also improved the West's understanding of the PLA. In an effort to maximize this new openness in China, this article draws upon publications closely affiliated with the PLA, including those of the prestigious Academy of Military Science and the National Defense University, that address coercive campaigns against regional bases in Asia.32 Some are widely cited among Western military analysts as authoritative works that reflect current PLA thinking. Some likely enjoy official sanction as doctrinal guidance or educational material for senior military commanders. The authors of the studies are high-ranking PLA officers who are either leading thinkers in strategic affairs and military operations or boast substantial operational and command experience. These works, then, collectively provide a sound starting point for examining how regional bases in Asia might fit into Chinese war planning. Among this literature, The Science of Military Strategy stands out in Western strategic circles as an authoritative PLA publication. The authors, Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, advocate an indirect approach to fighting and prevailing against a superior adversary in "future local wars under high-technology conditions."33 To win, the PLA must seek to avoid or bypass the powerful field forces of the enemy while attacking directly the vulnerable rear echelons and command structures that support frontline units. Using the human body as an evocative metaphor for the adversary, Peng and Yao argue, "As compared with dismembering the enemy's body step by step, destroying his brain and central nerve system is more meaningful for speeding up the course of the war."34 To them, the brain and the central nervous system of a war machine are those principal directing and coordinating elements without which the fighting forces wither or collapse. The aim, then, is to conduct offensive operations against the primary sources of the enemy's military power, what the authors term the "operational system." They declare, "After launching the war, we should try our best to fight against the enemy as far away as possible, to lead the war to enemy's operational base, even to his source of war, and to actively strike all the effective strength forming the enemy's war system."35 In their view, operational systems that manage command and control and logistics (satellites, bases, etc.), are the primary targets; they relegate tactical platforms that deliver firepower (warships, fighters, etc.) to a secondary status. To illustrate the effects of striking the source of the enemy's fighting power, Peng and Yao further argue: To shake the stability of enemy's war system so as to paralyze his war capabilities has already become the core of the contest between the two sides in the modern hightech local war. So, more attention should be paid to striking crushing blows against the enemy's structure of the operational system . . . especially those vulnerable points which are not easy to be replaced or revived, so as to make the enemy's operational system seriously unbalanced and lose initiative in uncontrollable disorder.36 The authors are remarkably candid about what constitutes the enemy's operational system. Particularly relevant to this study is their assertion that the supply system emerges as a primary target: The future operational center of gravity should not be placed on the direct confrontation with the enemy's assault systems. We should persist in taking the information system and support system as the targets of first choice throughout. . . . In regard to the supply system, we should try our best to strike the enemy on the ground, cut the material flow of his efficacy sources so as to achieve the effect of taking away the firewood from the caldron.37 Destruction of the supply system in effect asphyxiates the adversary. In order to choke off the enemy's capacity to wage war, Peng and Yao contend, a "large part of the supply systems must be destroyed."38 Their prescriptions for winning local high-tech wars suggest that the horizontal escalation of a conflict to U.S. regional bases in Asia is entirely thinkable. Even more troubling, some Chinese appear to envision the application of substantial firepower to pummel the U.S. forward presence. While The Science of Military Strategy should not be treated as official strategic guidance to the PLA, its conceptions of future conflict with a technologically superior adversary provide a useful framework for thinking about what a Chinese missile campaign against regional bases might entail.

There is substantial evidence in Chinese doctrinal writings that PLA defense planners anticipate the possibility of a sizable geographic expansion of the target set, to include U.S. forward presence in East Asia. Although the documents do not explicitly refer to naval bases in Japan, they depict scenarios strongly suggesting that Yokosuka is a primary target. In the hypothetical contingencies posited in these writings, U.S. intervention is a critical premise, if not a given. In particular, Chinese planners expect Washington to order the deployment of carrier strike groups near China's coast, a prospect that deeply vexes Beijing. It is in this context of a highly stressful (though by no means inconceivable) scenario that U.S. military bases come into play in Chinese operational thinking. For PLA planners, the primary aims are to deter, disrupt, or disable the employment of carriers at the point of origin, namely, the bases from which carriers would sortie. Given the limited capability, range, and survivability of China's air and sea power, most studies foresee the extensive use of long-range conventional ballistic missiles to achieve key operational objectives against U.S. forward presence. In Intimidation Warfare, Zhao Xijun proposes several novel missile tactics that could be employed to deter the use of naval bases in times of crisis or war.39 Zhao proposes demonstration shots into sea areas near the enemy state to compel the opponent to back down. Zhao explains, "Close-in (near border) intimidation strikes involve firing ballistic missiles near enemy vessels or enemy states (or in areas and sea areas of enemy-occupied islands). It is a method designed to induce the enemy to feel that it would suffer an unbearable setback if it stubbornly pursues an objective, and thus abandons certain actions."40 One tactic that Zhao calls a "pincer, close-in intimidation strike" is particularly relevant to missile options against U.S. military bases. Zhao elaborates: "Pincer close-in intimidation strikes entail the firing of ballistic missiles into the sea areas (or land areas) near at least two important targets on enemy-occupied islands (or in enemy states). This enveloping attack, striking the enemy's head and tail such that the enemy's attention is pulled in both directions, would generate tremendous psychological shock."41 Zhao also proposes an "island over-flight attack" as a variation of the pincer strike. He states: For high-intensity intimidation against an entrenched enemy on an island, an island over-flight attack employs conventional ballistic missiles with longer range and superior penetration capabilities to pass over the enemy's important cities and other strategic targets to induce the enemy to sense psychologically that a calamity will descend from the sky. This method could produce unexpected effects.42 While these missile tactics are primarily aimed at coercing Taiwan, they could also, in theory, be applied to any island nation. Reminiscent of the 1996 crossstrait crisis, the PLA could splash single or multiple ballistic missiles into waters near Yokosuka (shot across Honshu Island, over major metropolitan cities) in the hopes that an intimidated leadership in Tokyo would stay out of a contingency over Taiwan, deny American access to military facilities, or restrict U.S. use of naval bases in Japan. Should deterrence through intimidation fail, the Chinese may seek to complicate U.S. naval operations originating from bases located in the Japanese home islands. The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, the most authoritative work on the PLA's strategic rocket forces, furnishes astonishingly vivid details on the conditions under which China might seek to conduct conventional missile operations against outside intervention.43 Notably, the document explores "firepower harassment" as a potentially effective tactic to resist external interference. Given its explicit references to the U.S. use of military bases on foreign soil, a passage on harassment strikes is worth quoting in its entirety: When the powerful enemy uses allied military bases in our periphery and aircraft carriers as aircraft launch platforms to implement various forms of military intervention; and when the powerful enemy's allied military bases around our periphery are beyond our air arm's firing range, and when the carrier battle groups are far away from our shores, thus making it difficult to carry out the overall operational advantages associated with firepower coordination among the armed services and service arms, conventional missiles can be used to implement harassment strikes against the military bases of the enemy's allies around our periphery as well as the carrier battle groups.44 In other words, PLA planners intend to assign long-range strike missions to the ballistic missile force if warships, bombers, and submarines prove unable to reach enemy bases. Since U.S. bases in South Korea are well within reach of China's short-range ballistic missiles, shore-based aircraft, surface combatants, and undersea fleet, the "allied military bases" to which the study refers can only be those located in Japan. For the authors, harassment strikes might involve periodic missile launches into "no go" zones erected near the naval bases, in order to "block the points of entry and exit to important enemy ports," or they might entail direct attacks against "key targets within the enemy ports, such as fueling and fuel loading facilities, and logistical supply facilities."45 Such operations would be intended to disrupt seriously the resupply and movement of U.S. naval forces. Beyond selective attacks, some Chinese analysts advocate highly destructive operations against U.S. military bases. In a study on the PLA's blockade operations against Taiwan, Chinese defense planners entertain the possibility of significant vertical and horizontal escalation to defeat U.S. intervention. The authors call for "opportune counterattacks" to defeat a carrier strike group engaged in combat operations against Chinese targets at sea, in the air, or on the mainland coast. In such a scenario, the PLA would do everything it could to successively weaken, isolate, and ultimately sink the carrier. In addition to lethal strikes against aircraft carriers, the authors envision concerted efforts to inflict massive damage on the military bases supporting carrier operations. According to Zhu Aihua and Sun Longhai, "To punish the external enemy and to accommodate world opinion, it is not enough to sink the external enemy's aircraft carrier. . . . It is necessary to destroy the springboard of combat operations, to pulverize the operational bases, to cut off the enemy's retreat . . . in order to render obsolete hegemonism and power politics."46 It is clear, then, that Chinese strategists have systematically examined the strategies, doctrines, and operational concepts for dissuading, disrupting, and denying the use of U.S. military bases along China's periphery. These studies suggest that the PLA is prepared to calibrate the scale and magnitude of its military exertions against American forward bases across a spectrum that includes deterrence, compellance, and high-intensity conflict. It is equally evident that an extension of missile operations to the Japanese homeland is well within the bounds of Chinese planning. Should circumstances warrant, the PLA may not hesitate to escalate a crisis or conflict radically with missile salvos directed at Japan, to demonstrate political resolve, preclude Japanese involvement, or unhinge U.S. intervention.

# Seabasing CP

### Sea Basing updates

#### Turns credibility ----- will spill over to other elements

KLEIN AND MORALES ‘4 (United States Naval Institute, Lt. Com John and Col. Rich, both of USN

http://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=7854563)

Sea Basing will affect other elements of U.S. national power, especially diplomacy. U.S. military power appears to have eclipsed other forms of power; the Defense Department's current budget is approximately 20 times larger than that of the State Department.7 Despite the fiscal inequalities, both departments are equally important to U.S. effectiveness on the world stage. Each element of national power-diplomatic, informational, military, and economic-is significant, and all are interdependent, as changes in one can send shock waves **through the others**.8 In the past, the basing of forces at sea has supported and enhanced diplomatic effectiveness. Indeed, a large seabased force off a nation's coast can be a powerful means of coercion, and demonstrates U.S. commitment in a region. In addition, having combat forces based in a maritime environment mitigates many cultural sensitivities that are exacerbated when ground forces are placed in unwelcome locales.9 Keeping U.S. forces near a potential crisis area though Sea Basing reduces the observable U.S. public presence to local inhabitants. Moreover, sea-based forces would be more difficult targets for terrorists to attack using traditional methods. Fewer terrorist or guerrilla attacks against U.S. forces on foreign soil would obviate the blaming that typically follows such attacks. Consequently, Sea Basing, once fully deployed and developed, could help solidify stable relations between the United States and its allies.

#### Turns deterrence ----- capabilities like never before!

ENGLAND 4 - Secretary of the Navy (Gordon England, “Naval Transformation Roadmap,” http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/transformation/naval-transformation.pdf)

Sea Basing will provide sustainable global projection of American power from the high seas at the operational level of war. Sea Basing transformational capabilities include the Accelerated Deployment and Employment Times of naval power projection capabilities and the Enhanced Sea-borne Positioning of Joint Assets. Sea Basing offers the potential for secure, sovereign, and mobile assembly areas and sanctuaries for key elements of the joint force, allowing the United States and its allies to most effectively utilize the international domain of the sea as maneuver space. Sea Basing will allow positioning networked joint forces for immediate employability. It will enhance maneuver ashore by reducing the need to move in major command and control elements, heavy fire support systems, or logistical stockpiles. By locating these critical functions at sea to the greatest extent possible, Sea Basing will strengthen international stability by reducing force protection requirements and demands on allied and coalition partners’ infrastructure, will enhance deterrence, and will provide the nation with unmatched operational freedom of action.

### A2: Sea Basing = Carriers

#### Not so fast! We’re using carriers right now – sea basing’s more sophisticated than that, duh…

NDM ‘8 (National Defense Magazine, “Marine Corps Makes Strong Pitch for ‘Sea Bases’”, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2008/February/Pages/MarineCo2350.aspx)

Senior Marine Corps officials are asking Navy leaders to commit to a plan to deploy floating military bases within the next decade.

Since 2002, the Navy and Marine Corps have debated “sea basing” options as alternative means to bring troops close to shore when land bases are not accessible. Advocates point to Turkey denying U.S. forces rights to its ports and airfield before the invasion of Iraq as an example of why the United States needs to be able to launch operations from the sea.

So far, however, there is little consensus on what exactly constitutes a sea base. Some officials have argued that the Navy already deploys sea bases — in the form of aircraft carriers, large-deck amphibious ships and cargo vessels. Others, particularly in the Marine Corps, contend that future sea bases require more sophisticated equipment that the Navy currently does not have.

“Sea basing would allow the military to exploit maneuver of the seas 365 days a year,” said Lt. Gen. James Amos, head of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, at an NDIA conference.

Troops could be as far as 150 miles off shore and still have the ability to operate from the sea base doing a range of missions, from humanitarian assistance to major combat operations, he said.

Beyond attaining access for major combat operations, the need for sea bases has been demonstrated in recent natural disaster relief and humanitarian aid missions around the globe, officials said.

Shortly after his installation as chief of naval operations, Adm. Gary Roughead formed a “sea basing and forcible entry task force” — an advisory group consisting of leaders in academia and industry. The task force will pay particular attention to relationships and cooperation among the maritime services and international and interagency partners, said Cmdr. Pamela Kunze, spokeswoman for the chief of naval operations.

“Effective sea basing is critical for maintaining the expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces … in areas where access may be denied or limited,” she said.

The commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. James T. Conway, recently endorsed the sea basing doctrine.

“One of the important cornerstones in my mind is this concept of sea basing,” he said. “To be able to put something at sea that serves as a port and an airfield, to flow things through to shore” in an anti-access environment is crucial, he said.

In the future, Marines want to be able to pre-position forces at sea rather than rely upon airfields, said Maj. Gen. Thomas Benes, director of the Navy’s expeditionary warfare division.

Achieving that goal will require more than just large ships, officials said. A sea base also must have sophisticated cargo loading equipment that can move supplies from one ship to another, as well as transport vessels that ferry troops and equipment from the ships to the shore and back.

“We think it’s going to work, but we’re not sure yet,” said Conway.

The Navy has a fleet of landing craft air cushion vessels that it plans to replace with a next-generation vehicle. “That’s the main connector for the sea base. The sea base is not a reality without that connector,” said Benes. Capable of operating from the well decks of amphibious ships, the LCAC rides a cushion of air and delivers forces and equipment onto beaches. Research into a replacement began in 2006 and the first craft is projected to begin service in 2014.

To transport forces quickly into austere ports, the Navy joined efforts with the Army to procure 12 high speed vessels. These shallow draft ships will accommodate company-sized units with their equipment and will have flight decks for helicopters and off-loading ramps for vehicles.

“It’s essentially a truck,” said Benes.

The Marines require at least six such ships for operations in the Pacific, he added. Rear Adm. Charles Goddard, program executive officer for ships, said the decision of which vessel to buy will be made in August or September. The Navy plans to buy five ships and the Army is procuring seven. Delivery of the first ship is expected in 2011.

The cornerstone of the sea base is a fleet of ships collectively known as the maritime pre-positioning force future. It would have a mixture of amphibious assault and cargo ships, including two Landing Helicopter Assault Replacement ships (LHAR), one Landing Helicopter Dock ship (LHD), three Large Medium Speed Roll On/Roll Off ships (LMSR), three dry cargo/ammunition carriers (T-AKE), three mobile landing platforms (MLP) and two maritime pre-positioning ships (T-AK).

The LHAR and LHD amphibious ships resemble small aircraft carriers that can host vertical take-off and rotary wing aircraft operations. They have well decks that can accommodate sea base connectors, such as the LCAC boats. The LMSR and T-AK ships can carry ammunition, food, water, fuel, vehicles and other equipment and supplies to sustain up to 20,000 soldiers for up to 15 days, and 17,000 Marines for up to 30 days, respectively. The T-AKE dry cargo/ammunition ships will provide at-sea replenishment of supplies. Finally the mobile landing platform ships will enable at-sea cargo transfers.

### A2: Sea-Basing Fails

#### We’ve got the tech

NDM ‘8 (National Defense Magazine, “Marine Corps Makes Strong Pitch for ‘Sea Bases’”, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2008/February/Pages/MarineCo2350.aspx)

Together these vessels would provide assembly areas for forces to prepare for operations. They will transfer the necessary troops and equipment from ship to ship and then support those units as they operate ashore.

Navy and Marine Corps officials have initiated a study to examine the mix of ships for the sea base.

“I think this is a really good time to ask these questions. The debate over the proper mix of MPF(F)s and amphibs is intertwined in this. We still have a ways to go,” said Robert Work, senior naval analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

“The vehicle transfer system is critical. The technology must be fully developed,” said James Strock, director of the sea basing integration division at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

One such system is found on the mobile landing platform, a partially submersible platform that will link the LMSR ships with connectors, such as the LCAC. It will have a dynamic lifting capability and a high tech ramp to facilitate the transfer of equipment and vehicles from the cargo ship and onto transports that will move troops ashore.

The LMSR ship must be outfitted with anti-roll tanks in order to maintain its position even in rough seas — so that a lance corporal in a truck or tank can get across those ramps, said Strock. The Office of Naval Research has determined that the ramp technology is still not ready for deployment. “There’s a reasonable sense of confidence that these technologies will be mature in time when these ships come on line,” Strock said. Such technologies must be developed in order for sea basing to become a reality, he added.