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# war won’t escalate

**Middle East war won’t escalate**

**KELLEY 2002** (Jack, national security writer for the Post-Gazette and The Blade of Toledo Pittsburgh Post Gazette, April 7)

During the Cold War, there was reason to suppose an Arab-Israeli war could spark a third world war. In those days, Israel was a client of the United States. The radical Arab states were clients of the Soviet Union. If the proxies got into a tiff, the conflict could spread to the principals. The closest we came to this was during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when Egyptians, in a surprise attack, dealt a severe blow to Israeli defense forces. Only an airlift of M-60 tanks from U.S. bases in Germany kept Israel from being overrun. Once its initial battle losses had been replaced, Israel quickly regained the initiative, routing Egyptian and Syrian forces. Israeli troops were poised to take Cairo and Damascus. The Soviets were willing to permit the United States to restore the status quo ante. But they threatened to intervene to prevent a decisive Israeli victory. So we prevailed upon the Israelis to stop short of humiliating their enemies. The Yom Kippur War was a near thing for the world. Only three times in history have U.S. forces gone to DEFCON 1, the highest war footing. The Yom Kippur War was one of those times. Now the Cold War is over. Russia is a shadow of what we thought the Soviet Union was, and is more or less an ally in the war on terror. Radical Arabs have lost their sponsor. And Egypt has, after a fashion, switched sides. There is no longer good reason to suppose a conflict between Israelis and Palestinians would spread. Another consequence of the Yom Kippur war was the Arab oil embargo. But the oil "weapon" has lost much of its bang. We are more dependent upon foreign oil now than we were then, but less dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf, since new sources elsewhere have been developed. And Arab governments have become so dependent upon oil revenues that the loss of them would harm Arabs more than the loss of their oil would harm us.

**War In The Middle East Won’t Go Nuclear Or Draw In Outside Powers**

**FERGUSON 2006** (Niall, Professor of History at Harvard University, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, LA Times, July 24)

Could today's quarrel between Israelis and Hezbollah over Lebanon produce World War III? That's what Republican Newt Gingrich, the former speaker of the House, called it last week, echoing earlier fighting talk by Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. Such language can — for now, at least — safely be dismissed as hyperbole. This crisis is not going to trigger another world war. Indeed, I do not expect it to produce even another Middle East war worthy of comparison with those of June 1967 or October 1973. In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbors — Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard to imagine today. Nor does it seem likely that Syria and Iran will escalate their involvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a position to risk a full-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this might precipitate an American military reaction. Crucially, Washington's consistent support for Israel is not matched by any great power support for Israel's neighbors. During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle East war could spill over into a superpower conflict. Henry Kissinger, secretary of State in the twilight of the Nixon presidency, first heard the news of an Arab-Israeli war at 6:15 a.m. on Oct. 6, 1973. Half an hour later, he was on the phone to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later, Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. The stakes were high indeed. At one point during the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the White House issued DEFCON 3, putting American strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anything like that today. In any case, this war may soon be over. Most wars Israel has fought have been short, lasting a matter of days or weeks (six days in '67, three weeks in '73). Some Israeli sources say this one could be finished in a matter of days. That, at any rate, is clearly the assumption being made in Washington.

**No escalation**

Steven A. **Cook** (fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations) Ray **Takeyh** (fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations) **and** Suzanne **Maloney** (senior fellow at Saban Center) June 28 **2007** “Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune

Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

**War won’t escalate—casualties are low and it’s empirically false**

**LUTTWAK 2007** (Edward, senior adviser at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Prospect, May http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article\_details.php?id=9302)

Why are middle east experts so unfailingly wrong? The lesson of history is that men never learn from history, but middle east experts, like the rest of us, should at least learn from their past mistakes. Instead, they just keep repeating them. The first mistake is "five minutes to midnight" catastrophism. The late King Hussein of Jordan was the undisputed master of this genre. Wearing his gravest aspect, he would warn us that with patience finally exhausted the Arab-Israeli conflict was about to explode, that all past conflicts would be dwarfed by what was about to happen unless, unless… And then came the remedy—usually something rather tame when compared with the immense catastrophe predicted, such as resuming this or that stalled negotiation, or getting an American envoy to the scene to make the usual promises to the Palestinians and apply the usual pressures on Israel. We read versions of the standard King Hussein speech in countless newspaper columns, hear identical invocations in the grindingly repetitive radio and television appearances of the usual middle east experts, and are now faced with Hussein's son Abdullah periodically repeating his father's speech almost verbatim. What actually happens at each of these "moments of truth"—and we may be approaching another one—is nothing much; only the same old cyclical conflict which always restarts when peace is about to break out, and always dampens down when the violence becomes intense enough. The ease of filming and reporting out of safe and comfortable Israeli hotels inflates the media coverage of every minor affray. But humanitarians should note that the dead from Jewish-Palestinian fighting since 1921 amount to fewer than 100,000—about as many as are killed in a season of conflict in Darfur.

**Middle East war won’t escalate**

**Dyer 2002 (**Dr. Gwynne, lecturer on international affairs, December 22 “The coming war”, Queen's Quarterly)

All of this indicates an extremely dangerous situation, with many variables that are impossible to assess fully. But there is one comforting reality here: this will not become World War III. Not long ago, wars in the Middle East always went to the brink very quickly, with the Americans and Soviets deeply involved on opposite sides, bristling their nuclear weapons at one another. And for quite some time we lived on the brink of oblivion. But that is over. World War III has been cancelled, and I don't think we could pump it up again no matter how hard we tried. The connections that once tied Middle Eastern confrontations to a global confrontation involving tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have all been undone. The East-West Cold War is finished. The truly dangerous powers in the world today are the industrialized countries in general. We are the ones with the resources and the technology to churn out weapons of mass destruction like sausages. But the good news is: we are out of the business. And this is one of the great developments in human history. The democratization of the planet has seen us go from a situation fifteen years ago where only one third of the world's population lived under democratic government to our new reality, where two thirds of the people in the world have democratic systems. Through a series of non-violent revolutions, a chain reaction of events began in Southeast Asia in the 1980s with the Philippines, Thailand, and Bangladesh, before moving through South Korea and beyond. The Chinese tried in 1989 and, alas, failed. Their example was picked up by the citizens of the eastern European communist countries only months later. Then came the collapse of the Soviet empire, the end of apartheid, and the fall of the dictatorship in Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country. It has been an astounding fifteen years of transformation, and while many of these new democracies are both shaky and shabby, they are a great improvement over what went before. And we are seeing two enormous benefits from this newly democratized planet. One is that the United Nations is empowered by a democratic majority to act in defence of human rights in ways that would have been unimaginable before the 1990s. We did not intervene to stop the genocide in Cambodia - it was simply unthinkable during the 1970s. But by the 1990s the international community was able to act to stop the genocide in Bosnia. Of course there was also the failure of the international community to act quickly in Rwanda - but the scope of the subsequent tragedy there worked to stiffen the resolve of that same community during the later crisis in Kosovo. THE other great bonus of our new international community is that democratic countries do not fight wars with each other. For two hundred years, history has shown us this. That is why the Cold War is over, and that is why World War III has been cancelled. For the Middle East, 2003 is shaping up as a dreadful year. But I do not believe that it is going to be a dreadful decade or a dreadful century. At least we can be thankful for that.

**No escalation—Israeli military supremacy deters**

**Sappenfeld,** Christian Science Monitor, **06** [Mark, “Wider war in Middle East? Not likely.”, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0718/p01s01-wome.html]

Of the dangers presented by the conflict between Israel and Hizbullah in southern Lebanon, the possibility of a broader Middle East war is among the less likely. In the 1967 Arab-Israeli war – and repeatedly since – Israel has shown its clear military supremacy. So dominant has been Israel's advantage in both technology and tactics that former foes such as Jordan and Egypt sued for peace in those wars, while Tel Aviv's avowed enemies – Syria and Iran – have turned to backing terrorists. At this moment, the calculus doesn't appear to have changed. There is no coalition of Arab governments willing to unite militarily against Israel. Syria's military prowess has crumbled since the fall of the Soviet Union – its greatest benefactor – while Iran remains too geographically remote to strike effectively. The result is a new paroxysm of the proxy war that has existed in the region for a generation – ebbing and flowing as Hizbullah, armed and financed by Iran and Syria, harass Israel without provoking a major Middle East war, military analysts say. "**No state is willing to deal with Israel conventionally,**" says Seth Jones, a terrorism expert at the RAND Corp. The shape of the conflict so far – sparked by Hizbullah's raid into northern Israel and capture of two Israeli soldiers – reveals both the capabilities and limitations of each side. Historically, Hizbullah has been able to do little more than nip at Israel's northern border with incursions and sporadic rocket attacks. By and large, its arsenal is primitive, comprising various short-range rockets that can destroy buildings only with a direct hit, yet are difficult to aim with any precision. It has continually fired rockets into northern Israel. Hizbullah's longer-range rockets Yet there are signs of increasing sophistication, perhaps due to help from Iran, experts say. On Friday, Hizbullah launched a more advanced missile, which struck an Israeli warship. Hizbullah rockets are also penetrating deeper into Israel than ever before, with several striking Haifa, Israel's third-largest city, on Sunday. Israel claims that four of the missiles were the Iranian-made Fajr-3, with a 28-mile range. For its part, Israel has so far relied mostly on air strikes as its military response. Monday, Israel acknowledged that its forces had invaded Lebanon, though they returned shortly after. Israel invaded southern Lebanon in 1982. Its army occupied the territory for three years, then withdrew because of the strain of the occupation and broad international condemnation. History also offers a note of caution to Israel's foes. In 1967, Israel responded to Egyptian aggression by taking the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Years later, when Syria and Israel fought over control of Lebanon in 1982, Israeli jet fighters reportedly shot down 80 Syrian planes without losing any of its own. Israel's military superiority is built on American support and a skill honed by decades of fighting for the very existence of the nation. Israel receives the best equipment that the United States can offer its allies. "They have some of the most highly advanced weapons systems in the world," says Dr. Jones. Israel's air force, in particular, has no rival in the region, which makes air strikes the most effective – and most probable – means of Israeli retaliation and aggression. Yet Israel has so far focused most of its attacks on Lebanon, despite Hizbullah's links to Syria and Iran. Indeed, both sides have long used Lebanon as a way to harass the other, since Lebanon's military is almost irrelevant, analysts say. Even though Israel accuses Syria and Iran of backing Hizbullah's attacks, it hesitates to attack them directly. The reason is simple: Though Syria's aging military is no match for Israel's, it has missiles that could strike any part of Israel, as well as stocks of chemical weapons. Moreover, the 60 miles from the Israeli bordewr to the Syrian capital of Damascus is one of the most heavily fortified zones in the world. "Syria doesn't have the capacity to win [a war against Israel], but it can cause lots of suffering," says Nadav Morag, former senior director for domestic policy in the Israel National Security Council. Iran more formidable than Syria By contrast, Iran presents a far more formidable challenge – but one that is so remote from Israel geographically as to make hostilities difficult. As with Syria, Iran's greatest threat lies in its missiles. Yet the prospect of firing missiles at America's greatest ally – at a time when it is surrounded by American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan – is decidedly risky. Likewise, the notion of an Israeli air strike against Iran presents enormous logistical hurdles. Although Iran does not possess a credible air force and has only mid-grade Russian air-defense systems to contend with Israeli jets, Israel would surely be denied overfly rights by the Arab countries that surround them, meaning it would have to take a circuitous and difficult oversea route to Iran. It would probably be a measure taken only as a last resort., Mr. Morag says.

**Middle East war claims are false - no one in the region will risk war.**

Li **SHAOXIAN**. Professor expert in the Middle East and a senior researcher in the Institute of Contemporary International Relations, 8-17-**2001**, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Aug/17671.htm

Although the situation in the Middle East is alarming, it will not start a war. The main reasons are: First, both the international community and international environment will not allow another Middle East war to break out. Peace and development is still the theme of today’s world. No big power wants to see a new war between Arab and Israel in this area so crucial to oil production. Second, war is not in line with the interests of several countries in the Middle East. None of the Israelis (including Sharon himself) wants war, because war would again put the very existence of the country in danger; Yasser Afrafat, as well, does not want war, because war would turn his 10 years peace efforts into nothing; Egypt and Syria, the other two big powers in Middle East, do not want war either. The president of Egypt Hosni Mubarak firmly rejected the possibility of war in an interview with Israeli TV. Bashar al-Assad, the new president of Syria, has put most his attention on domestic affairs. Third, the countries and extremists who do want to see war have neither the capablities or means for war.

# israel-palestine war good

**Israel-Palestine conflict must escalate to solve violence in the long run**

**LUTTWAK 12-22-2000** (Edward, Senior Fellow at CSIS, LA Times)

But if peace cannot be achieved by diplomacy, it may yet be achieved by war--that being admittedly only a lesser peace of separation, rather than a full peace of reconciliation. War destroys itself by consuming the resources, willpower and hopes needed to keep fighting. Unless one side annihilates the other--a very rare event in history--leaders and nations eventually accept the compromises necessary for peace. War can therefore bring about peace, by exhaustion--with or without negotiations--agreements or treaties. War is 1,000 killed here today, 2,000 killed there tomorrow, cities wrecked and villages obliterated, as in the Balkans most recently. With all passions spent, Croats, Serbs and Muslims now coexist without killing each other, even if they cannot yet cooperate. No such war process has been underway between Israelis and Palestinians. In spite of all the dramatic television imagery and wildly exaggerated language--the prime minister of Morocco accused the Israelis of "exterminating" the Palestinians--90 killed in 12 days, 200 killed in a month, 300 killed in three months and a few dozen buildings destroyed is not war. Israeli casualties remain trivial. Therefore no peace by exhaustion is forthcoming. Today's sporadic violence could continue indefinitely. Progress toward a peace of separation would require substantially more violence--enough of it to induce the Palestinians to avoid armed confrontations with Israeli troops and to induce the Israelis to dismantle the most exposed settlements in the West Bank and all settlements in the Gaza Strip. War can be its own remedy, if fought in earnest.

**The United States should not encourage negotiations with the Palestinians—this only prevents Israel from destroying terrorists who would attack the U.S.**

**BERNSTEIN 2003** (Andrew, Ph.D. in Philosophy and Senior Writer for ARI, “The U.S. Must Stop Undermining Israel’s War on Terrorism,” Sept 23, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?JServSessionIdr004=96t8wqbf54.app7a&page=NewsArticle&id=7873&news\_iv\_ctrl=1021)

For several compelling reasons the United States must desist from restraining Israel. The death of Arafat and the destruction of murderous groups like Hamas and Hizbollah will eliminate terrorists who hate the United States. It will strengthen Israel, our sole ally in the area, who will no longer have to live with constant suicide attacks. And the demise of Palestinian terrorism will prevent the creation of a Palestinian state, which given the hostility to the West of Palestinian leaders, would only add another independent nation to those already supporting terrorism.

# israel security turn

**Middle East war reduces risk of attack on Israel**

**CETRON AND DAVIES SEPTEMBER 1 2007** (Marvin, president of Forecasting International Ltd.; Owen, former senior editor at Omni magazine and freelance writer, The Futurist)

There are implications here for Israel as well. If Fatah, Hamas, and Hezbollah are invigorated by the chaos of regional war, they will also be divided by it. Some of their partisans may remain focused on Israel, but many will be drawn away by the larger conflict. There aredangers here for Israel, such as that Muslim radicals will gain still more influence in the region, but on balance the problems of a Middle Eastern war seem unlikely to be much greater than the ones Israel faces today.

**Impact is nuke war**

**BERES 1997** (Louis Rene, Prof of International Law at Purdue, Armed Forces and Society, Summer)

Should Israel absorb a massive conventional attack by enemy states, a nuclear retaliation could not be ruled out, especially if the aggressor were perceived to hold nuclear or other unconventional weapons in reserve, or Israel's leaders were to believe that nonnuclear retaliations could not prevent destruction of the Third Commonwealth.

# war good—terrorism

**Middle East war key to prevent terrorist aggression against the US**

**Cetron and Davies 7 – \*president of Forecasting International Ltd. and \*\*reader in Social History at the University of Hertfordshire** (Marvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies, “Worst-case scenario: the Middle East: current trends indicate that Middle Eastern war might last for decades. Here is an overview of the most critical potential impacts,” The Futurist, 9/1/07, http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices/5523341-1.html)

For example, the Iraq war has inspired, recruited, trained, and battle-hardened a new generation of future terrorists who, when freed from Iraq, are likely to turn their attention to the United States and its allies, especially in the U.K. and France. Having a Middle Eastern war to keep them occupied may be the West's only protection against a jihad that could make terrorism to date seem relatively tame.

**Middle East war distracts and moderates terrorists- prevents current and future terrorism**

**Cetron and Davies 7 – \*president of Forecasting International Ltd. and \*\*reader in Social History at the University of Hertfordshire** (Marvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies, “Worst-case scenario: the Middle East: current trends indicate that Middle Eastern war might last for decades. Here is an overview of the most critical potential impacts,” The Futurist, 9/1/07, http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices/5523341-1.html)

Terrorism, quelling the threat. Terrorism is fundamentally a separate issue from the U.S. relationship with Israel. Al-Qaeda and its allies object to any U.S. presence in the Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia, the location of Mecca. For al-Qaeda, supporting the Palestinian cause is little more than an opportunity to curry favor among moderate Muslims. As things stand, a sustained and convincing display of even-handedness toward the Palestinians by the United States could weaken moderates' support for al-Qaeda, and this can only be beneficial for the West. However, a Middle Eastern war changes that equation. In any credible future, we can expect to see much the same level of terrorism we already are accustomed to. Hotels owned or patronized by Americans will be bombed all too often. The United States and its allies will lose the occasional embassy. There may even be another attack on the scale of the World Trade Center every decade. But will a regional war bring more terrorism against the West or less? We see two possibilities. An all-out war between the Sunni and Shi'ite lands could reduce the amount of anti-Western terrorism. In. this scenario, extremists throughout the Muslim world would rush toward the Middle East to fight for whichever side of the conflict holds their allegiance. Most are likely to be Sunnis, as they form a large majority in most of the Muslim world. These extremists will be too busy killing their fellow Muslims to bother much with the United States and its allies. Eventually, they could turn the training and experience won in the Middle East against the West. But it is at least possible that a long internal conflict might finally slake the extremists' appetite for slaughter. And two or three decades is long enough for the West to demonstrate good will toward Islam and reduce the appeal of jihad.

**Millions of deaths are inevitable from terrorism but Middle East war is key to divide the Muslim world- leads to moderate Islam**

**Cetron and Davies 7 – \*president of Forecasting International Ltd. and \*\*reader in Social History at the University of Hertfordshire** (Marvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies, “Worst-case scenario: the Middle East: current trends indicate that Middle Eastern war might last for decades. Here is an overview of the most critical potential impacts,” The Futurist, 9/1/07, http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices/5523341-1.html)

In a paper delivered to the 15th Annual Defense Worldwide Combating Terrorism Conference in 2005, Forecasting International examined the possible outcome of Islamist terrorism if it continues on its present course. That scenario, too, involved millions of deaths in the Muslim world, but in that case they would occur at the hands of the United States, and perhaps its allies. From the U.S. viewpoint, it would be far better for such a catastrophe to originate within the Muslim lands. Indonesia and the other remote Muslim countries outside the "stans" might reasonably distance themselves from the mess that would be a regional war across the Middle East. This would split the Muslim world between those who saw a war between Sunni and Shi'a as being worth fighting and those who did not. This possibility could only be improved, however slightly, by memories of a U.S-led attempt to make peace between Israel and the Palestinians that had failed primarily because of Palestinian intransigence. In the long run, a divided Muslim world conceivably could be the beginning of broader change. In the end, we might finally see the birth of an Islam comparable to modern Christianity and Judaism--one that is able to coexist with other religions and with secular authority and one with which the West would find it much easier to coexist in turn.

# iraq war good—terrorism

**Chaos in Iraq is good—solves Iranian prolif, diverts resources from terrorism, and contains radical Islam**

**SALHANI 2006** (Claude, UPI international editor, UPI, Nov 29)

The second school of thought -- albeit a rather Machiavellian one -- sees a unique "opportunity" to entangle the Muslim world in a fratricidal war that would keep Islamic forces occupied for years, if not decades, to come. Should in fact the U.S. choose to remove its troops from Iraq and in the process leave that country's Sunni community in harm's way, there is no doubt Saudi Arabia will intervene, as it said it would, by sending its military in great force to protect their co-religionists. What could ensue is a protracted Shiite-Sunni war. While this could turn out to be the worst case scenario -- the worst nightmare -- for Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region, for some policymakers it could provide the answer to what they perceive as a rising threat that three years of continued all out war by the world's best armed, best trained, best equipped and most motivated army in the world could not resolve. Under this scenario Saudi troops, along with billions of Saudi petro-dollars, would be tied up for years to come fighting Iranian-backed insurgents in Iraq. Chances are that the fighting may very well spill over into neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia itself, Jordan, Iran and possibly beyond. In fact chances of this happening would be very high. The thinking among groups supporting that theory is that this would tie down fundamentalist forces on both sides for years to come. Saudi Arabia would find itself funneling large sums of money to sustain Iraq's Sunnis and their troops in that country. That would be money diverted from other Saudi projects, such as financing Islamic schools and mosques in Europe and North America. Intra-Muslim fighting would also weaken the Shiites in Iraq as well as in neighboring Iran. As a result, a weakened Iran would be less inclined -- and certainly less financially inclined -- to pursue its nuclear program or to foment revolts beyond its borders. Or even be to preoccupied by what is going on its own front yard to continue its active support for Lebanon's Hezbollah party.

**Civil war in Iraq is good—it enhances the Sunni-Shi’ite split and solves terrorist attacks against the U.S.**

**KURTH 2005** (James, Claude Smith Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College, The American Conservative, Sept 26)

Iraq represents a test case and potential crucible for the Sunni-Shi’ite split. It is easy to imagine the current sectarian suspicion and violence in Iraq descending into an actual civil war between the Sunni and the Shi’ite communities—more accurately, between the Sunni Arabs and the Shi’ite Arabs, since the Sunni Kurds are trying to separate themselves from both Arab groups. What would the global Islamist movement look like then? It would have a rather different meaning and attraction than it does today. An Islamist identity might still appeal to some Muslims, but it might well become less salient than the warring Sunni and Shi’ite identities. This would be even more likely to be the case if the Sunni-Shi’ite conflict in Iraq spread to its neighbors. Indeed, if the Sunni-Shi’ite conflict became not only intense and widespread but also prolonged, perhaps as much so as the Sino-Soviet conflict during the last three decades of the Cold War, the global Islamist movement might have almost no meaning or attraction at all. In the Muslim world there might be Sunni Islamists and Shi’ite Islamists, but each might consider their greatest enemy to be not the United States, but each other.

# iraq withdrawal good—war

Civil war in Iraq is good if U.S. forces withdraw—Sunnis, Kurds, and Shi’ites will all fight each other, which will end global terrorism by distracting militants

KURTH 2005 (James, Claude Smith Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College, The American Conservative, Sept 26)

It might seem obvious that an Iraqi civil war, or a war between separating Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurdish states, would be bad for U.S. interests. At the very least, it would put the United States in a very difficult and embarrassing position. If, however, American military forces were no longer in Iraq, the major enemies of each Iraqi ethnic community or state would be each other. The United States would remain an enemy in the memory of many of the people living in Iraq, certainly the Sunnis, probably the Shi’ites, and potentially the Kurds (because the U.S. might have abandoned them once again), but for each ethnic community, the immediate and operational enemy would be the other communities now engaged in killing them. The current insurgency against U.S. military forces in Iraq is doing much to increase the appeal and strength of Islamism and indeed of transnational networks of Islamic terrorists. In contrast, a war between the states in Iraq might do much to render Islamism irrelevant, at least in Iraq if not other countries of the Middle East. What meaning will Islamism have if Sunni Arab Muslims are killing Shi’ite Arab Muslims (along with Sunni Kurdish Muslims), and vice versa?

Withdrawal from Iraq turns radical Muslim groups against each other and prevents terrorism against the U.S.

KURTH 2005 (James, Claude Smith Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College, The American Conservative, Sept 26)

When the United States got out of Vietnam, it had to abandon its project of maintaining noncommunist regimes in Indochina. Within a half decade, however, communist Vietnam, a Soviet ally, invaded communist Cambodia, a Chinese ally, and then communist China invaded communist Vietnam. With the United States out of the picture, the communist states naturally fell into fighting among themselves. The United States, under the Reagan administration, was able to take advantage of these and other conflicts within the communist world. Similarly, if the United States gets out of Iraq, it will have to abandon its delusional project of establishing democratic regimes in the Middle East. Within a short time, however, the central conflict within the Muslim world will be that between Sunnis and Shi’ites. It will be the fate of the Sunnis of Iraq, and in the longer run perhaps the fate of the Sunnis of Pakistan, that will wonderfully concentrate the Sunni mind. In that context, the current focus of Sunni Islamists upon the United States will appear misplaced and indeed mindless. The United States should never have invaded Iraq in its vain effort to impose an external and alien development upon the Muslim world. The best course it can now take is to get out of Iraq and to allow the internal and natural contradictions within the Muslim world to take their course. The wise strategy of any truly great power in extending its influence to other countries is not to try to erect utterly new and bizarre constructions that have no foundation in the local realities. It is rather to try to turn to its own advantage those local realities and the inherent tensions within and between them.

# israeli nuclear strike good

**Israeli pre-emption is good—the sooner they attack the lower the impact of nuclear war in the Middle East could be**

**BERES 1997** (Louis Rene, Prof of International Law at Purdue, Armed Forces and Society, Summer)

Both Israeli nuclear and nonnuclear preemptions of enemy unconventional attacks could lead to nuclear exchanges. This would depend, in part, on the effectiveness and breadth of Israeli targeting, the surviving number of enemy nuclear weapons, and the willingness of enemy leaders to risk Israeli nuclear counterretaliations. In any event, the likelihood of nuclear exchanges would appear to be greatest where pertinent enemy states (primarily Iran) are allowed to deploy ever greater numbers of increasingly destructive unconventional weapons without some form of timely Israeli preemptive interference. Should such deployment take place, Israel could effectively forfeit the nonnuclear preemption option, and be forced to choose between a no longer timely nuclear preemption and waiting to be struck first. It follows that the risks of Israeli nuclear preemption, of nuclear exchanges with an enemy state, and of enemy nuclear first-strikes, could all be reduced by timely Israeli nonnuclear preemptions-directed at critical hard targets and/or at regimes. This would contradict the conventional wisdom that associates any prospective Israeli preemptive strike with aggression and with expanded harms. There is one last point here. Israel should not be unduly deterred from lifesaving forms of preemption for fear of eliciting condemnation from the United States. This country already has an announced policy of rejecting the right of certain countries to have nuclear weapons5 and even an associated policy of forcible nonproliferation. In an unclassified briefing, Maj. Gen. Robert Linhard, director of plans and policy at the Strategic Command, identified "rollback of proliferation where it has occurred" as one of DoD's "counterproliferation objectives."Si General Linhard's elaboration of U.S. preemption rationales likely drew in part upon the statement made by Secretary of State Warren Christopher in January 1993: " . . . we must work assiduously with other nations to discourage proliferation through improved intelligence, export-control incentives, sanctions and even force when necessary (emphasis added)."

# a2: israeli involvement

**Sunni-Shiite Conflict Means War Against Israel Won’t Escalate**

**FERGUSON 2006** (Niall, Professor of History at Harvard University, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, LA Times, July 24)

Yet the biggest ethnic conflict in the Middle East today is not between Jews and Arabs. It is between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. With every passing day, the character of violence in Iraq shifts from that of an anti-American insurgency to that of a sectarian civil war. More than 100 civilians a day were killed in Iraq last month, according to the United Nations, bringing the civilian death toll this year to a staggering 14,000-plus. A rising proportion of those being killed are victims of sectarian violence. For Israel, spiraling Sunni-Shiite conflict is a dark cloud with a silver lining. The worse it gets, the harder it will be for Israel's enemies to make common cause. (Fact: Syria is 74% Sunni; Iran is 89% Shiite.) But for the United States, such conflict, emanating from a country supposedly liberated by American arms, must surely be a cause for concern.

**Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Won’t Escalate**

**HALEVI 2002** (Yossi, New Republic Online 2-14, http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20020225&s=halevi022502)

The incidents have scarcely been noticed by an Israeli public riveted to more immediate threats, like the Palestinian rocket attack into southern Israel this week. By contrast, the Galilee would seem to be the most peaceful region in Israel: White almond blossoms fill the rocky hills, snow covers Mount Hermon, and the roads are empty of the security roadblocks that segment the center of the country. But, however horrifying, Palestinian-Israeli violence is unlikely to escalate into regional conflict, simply because no Arab country has ever gone to war for the Palestinians and, even now, the Arab world offers them little more than lip service. On the northern border, though, an escalating confrontation with Hezbollah would almost certainly expand to include its Syrian protector and possibly its Iranian arms supplier as well.

**Middle East war won’t escalate even if Israel used nuclear weapons**

**HENNIGAN 2006** (Jim, Lawyer, The Beat, July 25 http://www.metrobeat.net/gbase/Expedite/Content?oid=oid%3A3946)

Israel may have gone “nuclear” over Hezbollah’s cross-border incursion to kidnap two Israeli soldiers (certainly if one takes the position that Hezbollah’s action must be viewed in isolation and not as the last straw), but it’s only figuratively speaking. Even if Israel were to use nuclear weapons (I’m not betting on it), it’s unlikely to escalate into a worldwide war. The war in Lebanon bears none of the indicia of earlier incidents – from the good old days – where the world was truly on the brink of a third world war. Events like the Yom Kippur War (or Arab-Israeli War of 1973) when a beleaguered Nixon facing down a constitutional crisis with Watergate delegated authority to his flag officer in the Sixth Fleet to use tactical nuclear weapons, if needed, to halt the Soviet-trained and –armed Egyptian and Syrian offensive. Or the Cuban Missile Crisis in which Nikita Khrushchev was only slightly less aggressive than Fidel Castro about whether to fire the nukes at America before they had to withdraw them. Now those are a couple of bona fide World War-inspiring developments. To think that the world is teetering on the brink of a world war now seriously diminishes the gravity of the near-cataclysms the world has walked away from in the past. The events in Lebanon don’t hold a Polaris missile to a string of volatile situations over the past half century. Even though Hezbollah is Syria’s surrogate in yet another attempt by Syria to wage war against Israel, the nations of the world are not inextricably linked to supporting one side or the other in this regional conflict. In fact, there’s dissension among Arab nations as to whether Hezbollah is worth defending. Even Egypt is noncommittal. And the parties most directly involved – Syria and Israel – are seemingly content to let Lebanon provide the battleground. How the world could get dragged into this conflict requires a conspiracy of events that Oliver Stone would envy.

# a2: iran

**No impact to war with Iran—Iranian terrorism is all hype and they can’t shut down oil**

**LUTTWAK 2007** (Edward, senior adviser at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Prospect, May http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article\_details.php?id=9302)

Then there is the new light cavalry of Iranian terrorism that is invoked to frighten us if all else fails. The usual middle east experts now explain that if we annoy the ayatollahs, they will unleash terrorists who will devastate our lives, even though 30 years of "death to America" invocations and vast sums spent on maintaining a special international terrorism department have produced only one major bombing in Saudi Arabia, in 1996, and two in the most permissive environment of Buenos Aires, in 1992 and 1994, along with some assassinations of exiles in Europe. It is true enough that if Iran's nuclear installations are bombed in some overnight raid, there is likely to be some retaliation, but we live in fortunate times in which we have only the irritant of terrorism instead of world wars to worry about—and Iran's added contribution is not likely to leave much of an impression. There may be good reasons for not attacking Iran's nuclear sites—including the very slow and uncertain progress of its uranium enrichment effort—but its ability to strike back is not one of them. Even the seemingly fragile tanker traffic down the Gulf and through the straits of Hormuz is not as vulnerable as it seems—Iran and Iraq have both tried to attack it many times without much success, and this time the US navy stands ready to destroy any airstrip or jetty from which attacks are launched.

# a2: oil prices (conflicts with alt energy)

**War in the Middle East has no effect on oil prices**

**LUTTWAK 2007** (Edward, senior adviser at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Prospect, May http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article\_details.php?id=9302)

Strategically, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been almost irrelevant since the end of the cold war. And as for the impact of the conflict on oil prices, it was powerful in 1973 when the Saudis declared embargoes and cut production, but that was the first and last time that the "oil weapon" was wielded. For decades now, the largest Arab oil producers have publicly foresworn any linkage between politics and pricing, and an embargo would be a disaster for their oil-revenue dependent economies. In any case, the relationship between turmoil in the middle east and oil prices is far from straightforward. As Philip Auerswald recently noted in the American Interest, between 1981 and 1999—a period when a fundamentalist regime consolidated power in Iran, Iran and Iraq fought an eight-year war within view of oil and gas installations, the Gulf war came and went and the first Palestinian intifada raged—oil prices, adjusted for inflation, actually fell. And global dependence on middle eastern oil is declining: today the region produces under 30 per cent of the world's crude oil, compared to almost 40 per cent in 1974-75. In 2005 17 per cent of American oil imports came from the Gulf, compared to 28 per cent in 1975, and President Bush used his 2006 state of the union address to announce his intention of cutting US oil imports from the middle east by three quarters by 2025.

# a2: we solve the Root

**Conflict in the Middle East can’t be solved peacefully**

**PINE 1997** (Maj. Shawn, former US military strategic intelligence officer and is currently a research student in international relations at The Hebrew University, “Israel’s Security and the Peace Process,” Sept, http://www.freeman.org/m\_online/sep97/pine1.htm)

While the proliferation and threat of Islamic extremism is the greatest danger challenging the regional status quo, there is no evidence to support contentions that resolution of the Israeli - Palestinian conflict will ameliorate the strategic threat this phenomena poses to Israel.3 This is primarily due to the fact that Islamic extremism is a manifestation of deeply imbued religious, cultural, and historical norms which transcends the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. Islamic Extremists reject modernity (Westernization), as the negation of God's sovereignty. They blame modernity and nationalism for having cast the Islamic world into its present state of jahiliyya (barbarity). This jahiliyya, an extreme Hobbesian view of a state of nature, is believed to be similar to the time before Mohammed. For Islamic extremists, the panacea from this state of barbarity is the immediate overthrow of corrupt regimes and a return to the Sharia.4 Extremists believe that the modern state and Islam are incompatible and cannot coexist and tend to view their struggles in existential terms. Consequently, while this existential struggle may be temporarily suspended by treaties, it can only be ended with the ultimate conversion or subjugation of unbelievers.5 While economic hardships heighten the appeal of Islamic extremism, it is by no means the sole reason for the proliferation of Islamic extremism throughout the region. Despite its economic prosperity, Islamic extremists won 40 percent of the Kuwaiti parliamentary elections in 1992. Additionally, Islamic extremism has increased in many countries that have prospered economically such as Turkey, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco, while having met with limited success in the poverty stricken nations of Bangladesh, Niger, and Yemen.6 This anomaly suggests that it is the quest for power rather than economic prosperity that makes Islamic extremism appealing to many of its followers.

\*\*\*ALTERNATIVE ENERGY AND OIL

# oil prices link

**Regional War in the Middle East is key to long-term oil prices**

**Wallace,** staff writer for Time International, **2002** (Charles P., *The Old Empty Feeling: Terror attacks and war in Iraq could make resorts look like ghost towns, oil prices rise, and the world economy tremble.,* Academic OneFile)

The terrorists are hitting "soft targets"--holiday resorts in Bali and Mombasa--and they tried to take out an airliner with surface-to-air missiles. And Washington's preparations for a war against Iraq continue. What impact will terrorism and the looming conflict in the Middle East have on oil prices and the economic climate in 2003? The global economy has displayed remarkable resilience in the face of terrorist attacks. Resort bombings have devastated local tourist economies but not world tourism. That won't change unless the bombings become far more frequent. Similarly, the effect of war in Iraq depends on whether the military action is brief and decisive or prolonged and inconclusive--and on whether the conflict spreads to Iraq's oil-producing neighbors. Recently, the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. convened a conference of military, political and economic experts who formulated four scenarios and tried to assign probabilities to each. In most of the projections, the economic fallout was modest, but in the worst-case scenario--which is given a 5-10% probability--an invasion meets strong resistance, with chemical and biological weapons used; the conflict spreads to nearby countries and Iraq's oil fields are seriously damaged. Oil prices shoot to $80 a barrel--up from about $25 today--and remain at an average of $40 a barrel for two years. Iraq produces 1.8 million barrels of oil a day, so a war will leave a large global shortfall. Saudi Arabia could bridge the gap, but not if the region erupts. "If oil prices go to $60 next year, there will be effects in every region and every country," says former Federal Reserve governor Laurence Meyer. "Nobody will be spared."

**Middle East War causes oil prices to soar**

**Cetron and Davies, 2007** (Marvin J and Owen, U.S Navy Intelligence Expert, and Worst Case Scenario: The Middle East, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\_0286-32674184\_ITM)

Security risks continue with oil dependence. That leaves the matter of oil. The Middle East produces nearly 31% of the world's oil and consumes only one-fifth of its own output. About two-thirds of the petroleum used in the United States is imported. Perhaps one-fourth of that--around one-sixth of total consumption--comes from the Middle East. Japan imports all of its oil, most of it from the Middle East. Europe, India, and China all depend, to greater or lesser degrees, on Middle Eastern oil as well. If something disrupts the flow of almost one-third of the world's oil as a major war in the Middle East inevitably would, the cost of energy throughout the world will soar. This is a recipe for prolonged recession, and perhaps even depression, in the United States and most of its trading partners. In a recent New York Times op-ed (May 12, 2007), Thomas Friedman points out, "You can't be in favor of setting a date to withdraw from Iraq without also being in favor of a serious energy policy to radically reduce our dependence on oil--now." In the short run, healing the U.S. economy from the wounds inflicted by a sudden petroleum shortfall would mean accepting measures that many Americans would prefer to avoid. The United States could wind up competing with China for oil in totalitarian states that Washington currently shuns. It also might use its intelligence agencies to promote more favorable policies in Venezuela.

# warming 1nc

**Middle East war causes coal gasification and renewables—solves greenhouse gases**

**CETRON AND DAVIES SEPTEMBER 1 2007** (Marvin, president of Forecasting International Ltd.; Owen, former senior editor at Omni magazine and freelance writer, The Futurist)

Coal gasification. In an effort to wean the United States off foreign oil, the Department of Energy has mounted a substantial R&D program for coal gasification. A gasification pilot plant is expected toenter operation in 2010, and the zero-emissions FutureGen power plant, based on an advanced gasifier, is scheduled to begin producing electricity and hydrogen a few years later. Nothing can make coal miningenvironmentally friendly, but these technologies at least reduce thegreenhouse and respiratory impact of burning coal for power. The gasification program will be one of the first alternative energy programs to be accelerated in time of Middle Eastern war. Coupled with consumer trends toward plug-in hybrid cars, real opportunities for energy efficiency exist through coal power. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] \* Renewables. We can expect a much stronger push for renewable energy as well. Given the proper incentives--and a world oil shortage seems likely to qualify--solar, wind, and other renewable power technologies already have proven useful.

**Extinction**

**Tickell 8** [Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Guardian, 8-11, “On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange]

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

# alt energy link

**Middle East war increases investment in alternative energy**

**Cetron and Davies 7** – \*president of Forecasting International Ltd. and \*\*reader in Social History at the University of Hertfordshire (Marvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies, “Worst-case scenario: the Middle East: current trends indicate that Middle Eastern war might last for decades. Here is an overview of the most critical potential impacts,” The Futurist, 9/1/07, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:9GDlR6inIhIJ:www.docstoc.com/docs/37338044/The-Worst-Case Scenario-AnAlternativeView+22There+is+another+possibility+as+well,+and+from+the+viewpoint+of+the+United+States+it+is+extremely+interesting%22&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)

That leaves the matter of oil. The Middle East produces nearly 31 percent of the world’s oil and consumes only one-fifth of its own output. About two-thirds of the petroleum used in the United States is imported. Perhaps one-fourth of that—around one-sixth of total consumption—comes from the Middle East. Japan imports all its oil, most of from the Middle East. Europe, India, and China all depend, to greater or lesser degrees, on Middle Eastern oil. If something disrupts the flow of almost one-third of the world’s oil, as a major war in the Middle East inevitably would, the cost of energy in the throughout the world will soar. This is a recipe for prolonged recession, and perhaps even depression, in the United States and most of its trading partners. In the short run, healing the American economy would mean accepting measures that many Americans would prefer to avoid. The United States could wind up competing with China for oil in totalitarian states that Washington currently shuns. It also might use its intelligence agencies to promote more favorable policies in Venezuela. Tapping the oil reserves beneath the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve becomes a given in this scenario. To prevent needless environmental damage, drilling would be limited to the winter, when the ground is rock-hard. In addition, the oil would be transported through double-walled pipelines to prevent spills. The pristine Alaskan environment still would suffer, but this concern would no longer prevent drilling. The West Coast also would be opened to drilling, though at distances beyond 20 miles from the beaches, not 10, as the law currently requires. The risk of environmental damage here too would be considered an acceptable price for economic survival. Less controversially, the U.S. surely would buy still more oil from Canada, where a significant new field has recently been discovered, and would develop the deep-water deposits under the Gulf of Mexico much faster than anyone now plans. Crude oil, of course, is useless without sufficient refining capacity, and the United States already needs more than it possesses. No new refineries have been built there in more than 20 years, thanks to a combination of environmental concerns and the unwillingness of potential neighbors to have a refinery in their back yards. To meet America’s current need for gasoline and heating oil, at least four new refineries are required. The only obvious solution is for the federal government to build them around the country, either on government-owned land or on property obtained through eminent domain. These might be sold or leased to oil producers or operated by the government itself. At the same time, it should use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve much more actively to mitigate temporary supply shortages. The United States also needs at least seven new atomic power plants to meet its current and future demand for electricity. An energy crisis finally would break the country’s de facto ban on new reactors, allowing the construction of at least those seven. These first generating stations would use safe hot-water reactors. Even safer technologies lie further in the future, and they are likely to be adopted once they become available. Expanding the use of atomic energy of course means finding somewhere to put still more nuclear waste. This is not a technological problem, so much as a political one. The ideal hiding place for atomic waste was recognized almost as soon as anyone considered the problem. The salt domes of Louisiana have been geologically stable and free of water for hundreds of millions of years; if they had not been, water would long since have washed the salt away. Nuclear waste could safely be stored in one of them until it decayed to the level of background radiation. However, thanks to Louisiana’s political power decades ago, the law forbids consideration of any depository other than the Yucca Mountain site now being developed by the Atomic Energy Agency. In an energy emergency, that law is likely to be rescinded and the country will finally do the obvious. Nuclear waste will be buried in salt domes and forgotten. We can expect a much stronger push for alternative energy as well. Given the proper incentives—and a world oil shortage seems likely to qualify—solar, wind, and other renewable power technologies already have proved useful. Germany, where cloudy days are common, is home to 15 of the world’s largest photovoltaic power plants. The American Southwest would be a much more cost-efficient place to collect solar power. Add in expanded use of wind power where it is most available, perhaps some wave energy on the coasts, and a much stronger effort to develop biofuels such as cellulosic ethanol, and alternative energy stands a good chance of helping out if Middle Eastern oil suddenly becomes unavailable. Yet it will not be available immediately, and it will replace all the energy now coming from the Middle East.

# renewables solve warming

**Renewables solve warming**

**Sovacool and Cooper 7 – \*Senior Research Fellow for the Network for New Energy Choices in New York and Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University in Blacksburg, VA and \*\* Executive Director of the Network for New Energy Choices** (Benjamin K. Sovacool, also a Research Fellow at the Centre for Asia and Globalization at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and Christopher Cooper, Renewing America: The Case for Federal Leadership on a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), Network for New Energy Choices • Report No. 01-07, June, 2007, http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/RPS%20Report\_Cooper\_Sovacool\_FINAL\_HILL.pdf)

Carbon Dioxide (CO2) and Other Greenhouse Gases (GHG) In its most recent report released on April, 2007, theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—a forum made up of thousands of the world’s top climate scientists—concluded that continued emissions of greenhouse gases will contribute directly to global: • Changes in the distribution, availability, and precipitation of water, resulting in severe water shortages for millions of people. • Destruction of ecosystems, especially the bleaching of coral reefs and widespread deaths of migratory species. • Complex, crop productivity and fishing impacts. • Damage from floods and severe storms, especially among coastal areas. • Deaths arising from changes in disease vectors and an increase in the number of heat waves, floods, and droughts.298 Policymakers should not underestimate the impacts of global warming for the United States. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change estimates that, in the Southeast and southern Great Plains, the financial costs of climate change could reach as high as $138 billion by 2100. Indeed, Pew researchers warn that “waiting until the future” to address global climate change might bankrupt the U.S. economy.299 Yet carbon-intensive fuels continue to dominate electricity generation in the **U**nited **S**tates. By 2005, almost 90 percent of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions were energy-related, with the electric utility industry outpacing all other sectors (including transportation)with 38 percent of national carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Fossil-fueled power plants in the U.S. emitted 2.25 billion metric tons of C02 in 2003, **more than 10 times** the amount of C02 compared to the next-largest emitter, iron and steel production.301 Put simply, of all U.S. industries, electricity generation is—by substantial margins—the **single largest contributor** of the pollutants responsible for global warming. In 2004, almost every state in country was home to at least one power plant with significant C02 emissions. Nuclear energy is not much of an improvement, despite recent claims by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) that nuclear power is “the Clean Air Energy.” Reprocessing and enriching uranium requires a substantial amount of electricity, often generated from fossil fuel-fired power plants. Data collected from one uranium enrichment company alone revealed that it takes a 100- megawatt power plant running for 550 hours to produce the amount of enriched uranium needed to fuel a 1,000 megawatt reactor (of the most efficient design currently available) for one year.302 According to the Washington Post, two of the nation’s most polluting coal plants (in Ohio and Indiana) produce electricity exclusively for the enrichment of uranium.303 Because uranium enrichment consumes so much electricity derived from fossil fuels, many nuclear power plants contributeindirectly, but substantially, to global climate change and do virtually nothing to end U.S. dependence on foreign oil. The International Atomic Energy Agency estimates that when direct and indirect carbon emissions are included,coal plants are around 10 times more carbon intensive than solar and more than 40 times more carbon intensive than wind. Natural gas fares little better, at three times as carbon intense as solar and 20 times as carbon intensive as wind.304 The Common Purpose Institute estimates that renewable energy technologies could offset as much as 0.49 tons of carbon dioxide emissions per every MWh of generation. According to data compiled by the Union of Concerned Scientists, a 20 percent RPS would reduce carbon dioxide emissions by **434 million metric tons** by 2020—a reduction of 15 percent below “business as usual” levels, or the equivalent to taking nearly 71 million automobiles off the road.305 These estimates are not simply theoretical. Between 1991 and 1997 renewable energy technologies in the Netherlands reduced that country’s annual emissions of CO2 by between 4.4 million and 6.7 million tons.Renewable technologies were so successful at displacing greenhouse gas emissions that Europe now views renewable energy as “the major tool of distribution utilities in meeting industry CO2 reduction targets.”

# oil shale 2nc

**The resulting disruption would lead to the marketing of oil shale --- that solves the entitlement crisis**

**Cetron and Davies 7** – \*president of Forecasting International Ltd. and \*\*reader in Social History at the University of Hertfordshire(Marvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies, “Worst-case scenario: the Middle East: current trends indicate that Middle Eastern war might last for decades. Here is an overview of the most critical potential impacts,” The Futurist, 9/1/07, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:9GDlR6inIhIJ:www.docstoc.com/docs/37338044/The-Worst-Case-Scenario-An-Alternative-View+%22There+is+another+possibility+as+well,+and+from+the+viewpoint+of+the+United+States+it+is+extremely+interesting%22&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us]

There is another possibility as well, and from the viewpoint of the United States it is extremely interesting. American shale deposits contain upwards of 1 trillion barrels of oil, with around 560 million barrels recoverable. This is equal to roughly half the world’s proved reserves of conventional petroleum. If the U.S. were to market even half of this shale oil, its 300-year supply would shrink to only 150 years-worth, but the United States suddenly would become the world’s most important supplier of oil. Europe would gain a source of energy that carried fewer political liabilities than reliance on Russia. China would lose still more of its influence in global affairs. The Middle East could never again dominate the world’s energy markets. And the United States would grow rich and powerful to a degree that it cannot even dream about today. This wealth could be used for a number of critical purposes. The portion that flows to Washington as license fees and income tax, both corporate and individual, might well pay off the nation’s budget deficit. It could eliminate any concern about the viability of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. It might be used to strengthen the country’s educational system, to provide a college degree or career training to anyone capable of benefiting from it. Or it might fund a foreign-aid program that could eliminate much of the disease and poverty that afflicts the developing world. Whatever use then seemed the highest priority, oil wealth would give the United States an economic and fiscal flexibility it cannot hope to gain from any other source.

**Entitlement crisis kills hegemony and the economy**

**Carafano,** Ph.D., Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation, 07 [James, Baker, and Mackenzie, “Four Percent for Freedom: Maintaining Robust National Security Spending”, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/em1023.cfm>]

Although defense spending has been relatively restrained, expen­ditures on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid have been exploding. Meeting the resource needs for winning the war on terrorism includes maintain­ing overall defense budgets at 4 percent of GDP while simultaneously recognizing that projected growth in entitlement expenditures will jeopardize the nation's ability to wage war over the long term. This harsh fact makes entitlement reform a national security issue. Avoiding a "Hollow Force**."** The term "hollow force" was coined in the post-Vietnam War era to describe a military force that lacks the resources to field trained and ready forces, to support ongoing operations, and to modernize. In the past, when America's military has begun to become hollow, the strain has showed first in the National Guard. The same warning signs are evident today, including an austere lack of equipment, heavy reliance on cross-leveling to fill out units preparing to deploy, and a reduction in the levels of unit readiness. However, this problem is not exclusive to the National Guard. The Army and Air Force are already showing signs of funding shortfalls for equipment modern­ization. Although today's military is not yet hollow, it could become so in less than a decade if funding for military modernization is not adequate over a sustained period of time. Moreover, underfunding defense will actually cost the U.S. more in the long run, including reduc­ing the defense industrial base to a dangerously low level. This leads to an undercapitalized base that is not competitive, driving up costs for the U.S. gov­ernment and taxpayer. Not spending enough on defense also **creates the reality and perception of American** weakness, which will increase risk, hinder economic growth, and lower stability in the world. Indeed, robust defense spending saves money. President Ronald Reagan's defense buildup and steady defense funding throughout the 1980s helped to win the Cold War and enabled the U.S. to quickly defeat Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. Regrettably, the Administration's defense budget request and emergency supplemental spending bill come at a time when political pressure to reduce defense expenditures is growing. The perception is that the battle in Iraq constitutes the entirety of the war effort and that as this operation winds down, the American people are entitled to a new peace div­idend. This notion, coupled with the imminent retirement of 78 million baby boomers, means that the danger of a hollow force is very real. Mandatory spending in the U.S. budget is projected to increase significantly in the coming years. The Congressional Budget Office projects that the share of the U.S. economy devoted to defense spending will actually decrease as a result. Entitlement Reform as National Security Issue. The U.S. government is running a large bud­get deficit, and the principal reason is the growth in entitlement costs, not increased defense funding since 9/11. Since 1970, the historical ratio between defense spending and entitlement spending on Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security has flipped. In 1970, military spending totaled 7.8 percent of GDP-almost twice the 4.1 percent of GDP spent on the big three entitlement programs. Today, defense spending has fallen to 3.9 percent of GDP while enti­tlement spending has more than doubled to 8.8 per­cent of GDP. By 2030, the big three entitlements will absorb roughly 84 percent of all federal revenues, crowding out defense and homeland security and threatening the historically low-tax, high-growth U.S. economy. Congress needs to find a solution to the entitlement spending problem quickly. Consequently, defense is not the problem with the budget, and cutting defense is not the solution. As a nation at war, the U.S. is spending remarkably little on defense. Devoting 4 percent of GDP to defense imposes a reasonable burden on the U.S. economy and is significantly below the mean of roughly 7.5 percent of GDP that the U.S. spent on defense during the Cold War. Spending 4 percent of GDP will not risk losing the war because of economic collapse brought on by excessive defense spending. Further, Congress needs to keep in mind the economic costs of mili­tary failure. Military power trumps economic power in the short term. Even a single successful attack on U.S. territory using an electromagnetic pulse gener­ated by a nuclear weapon would have devastating economic consequences. What the U.S. Should Do. Over the long term, federal spending should be reformed to provide ade­quate funds for current defense needs, and the shape of the U.S. military should continue to transform to reflect future threats. Rather than decrease defense spending, Congress needs to make a strong commit­ment to fund the nation's war requirements well into the future; indeed, the next President and future Congresses must also commit to providing for the nation's defense through increased defense budgets. Both Congress and the President should also begin the difficult task of changing public opinion, not fol­lowing it, by reminding the American people that the ongoing war is not over, regardless of what hap­pens in Iraq, and that the stakes in this war extend to their lives, liberty, and future prosperity. Conclusion**.** Spending 4 percent of GDP on national defense will allow the U.S. to keep the nation and its service members properly trained, equipped, and ready. In the long term, continuing to underfund defense and then allowing wild fluctuations in defense budgets during times of war will only cost the country more and compromise national security. Congress and the Administration should commit now to spending at least 4 percent of GDP on national security, and they should move swiftly to reform the major entitlement programs that threaten both the budget and the economy over the long term.

**Great power nuclear conflict**

**Gray, 05** – Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies, and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, at the University of Reading (Spring 2005, Colin S., Parameters, “How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?” http://www.carlisle.army. mil/usawc/parameters/05spring/gray.htm)

6. Interstate War, Down but Far from Out

Logically, the reverse side of the coin which proclaims a trend favoring political violence internal to states is the claim that interstate warfare is becoming, or has become, a historical curiosity. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen assure us that “most armed conflicts in coming decades are likely to be internal ones.”21 That is probably a safe prediction, though one might choose to be troubled by their prudent hedging with the qualifier “most.” Their plausible claim would look a little different in hindsight were it to prove true except for a **mere one or two interstate nuclear conflicts,** say between India and Pakistan, or North Korea and the United States and its allies. The same authors also offer the comforting judgment that “decisive war between major states is rapidly moving toward history’s dustbin.”22 It is an attractive claim; it is a shame that it is wrong. War, let alone “decisive war,” between major states currently is enjoying an off-season for one main reason: So extreme is the imbalance of military power in favor of the United States that potential rivals rule out policies that might lead to hostilities with the superpower. It is fashionable to argue that major interstate war is yesterday’s problem—recall that the yesterday in question is barely 15 years in the past—because now there is nothing to fight about and nothing to be gained by armed conflict. Would that those points were true; unfortunately they are not. The menace of major, if not necessarily decisive, **interstate war will return to frighten us when great-power rivals feel able to challenge American hegemony.** If you read Thucydides, or Donald Kagan, you will be reminded of the deadly and eternal influence of the triad of motives for war: “fear, honor, and interest.”23

# oil sands—canada impact

**High oil prices key to make oil sands competitive—this is key to Canada’s economy.**

**Brower**, PhD in Russian Literature and MA in East European Studies, **2008**. (Derek, “Alberta’s Oil Rush,” Prospect Magazine, Lexis. 1/31/2008)
But one effect of the $100 barrel is to make alternative sources of energy-and of oil-more economically viable. The discovery of the giant Tupi oil field off the Brazilian coast last November is a perfect example. Drilling in deep water to look for oil in the "pre-salt," a geological formation that has scarcely before been tapped, was only undertaken because the current high price of oil makes such expensive operations attractive to companies. Tupi could be the tip of a very large offshore field. But the biggest beneficiary of the high oil price has been Canada and its oil sands. As an unconventional source, the oil sands were until recently simply too costly to bother with. As recently as the mid-1990s, extracting a barrel of oil from the tar cost around $35. When oil prices were hovering around $10 a barrel at the end of the last century, the few companies involved in the oil sands were making a loss. That forced the developers to cut their expenses and become more efficient. This wasn't easy, because extracting the bitumen from beneath the muskeg and turning it into something that fuels an engine or makes a plastic is an expensive and energy-intensive process. For now, most of the tar extraction takes place near the surface, which allows it to be mined. Huge cutters tear up the topsoil, using enough electricity to power a city of 40,000. The tar beneath is dumped into 400-tonne trucks that haul their load to nearby plants where the oil sand is mixed with hot water to create a slurry, which is then separated into sand, water and bitumen. Refineries can't handle the heavy bitumen, so first it goes to upgrading plants where its molecules are reorganised and some of the impurities-like the sulphur that gets left to rot under the open sky-are removed to leave synthetic crude. It is this "syncrude" that is then exported and refined into oil products like fuels and plastics. The oil companies have whittled this process down to one that costs them $15-20 a barrel. And with long-term oil price futures trading at over $80 a barrel, the oil sands are now very profitable. Every major oil company is under pressure to replace its reserves. Outside of Canada, that has become tough. Operating in other big oil-producing countries has in recent years become far riskier politically, as the balance of power has shifted away from "big oil" to energy-rich governments. So now the companies are flocking to Alberta. BP, the only large western oil company that seemed wary of the oil sands, recently joined the rush. Shell has bought control of its local subsidiary. The companies that operate in the oil sands say they will spend some $100Cbn (roughly £50bn) there in the next decade. That should increase output to 4m barrels a day in 2020, compared with 1.3m barrels a day now. The charge to the oil sands has turned Fort McMurray, once a trading post but now the centre of the boom, into the kind of frontier town northern Canada last saw during the days of the Klondike gold rush. The population of "Fort McMoney," as some call it, could grow to more than 120,000 in the next few years from around 40,000 in the early 1990s. For a town where the temperatures range from -40 degrees Celsius on a winter's day to +40 in the summer, that is some achievement. The climate isn't the only thing that is extreme about "Murray." "It gets wild," one local told me when I was there. "Guys spend hundreds of dollars a night on booze and drugs. And they fight." Casinos and prostitutes have followed the money to the city. Property prices are among the highest on the North American continent-if somewhere to live can be found at all. Drive for long enough on the clogged roads around the oil sands and you'll see tent camps and barracks housing thousands of "roughnecks" who have doubled their money by coming to Fort McMurray. Alberta is quickly turning into a petro-state. The energy sector directly or indirectly employs one in six workers. Farmers in the breadbasket of the country have dropped dairy and ranching to work in construction. And yet there are still skill shortages. Some oil companies have taken to flying workers in from as far away as Newfoundland, 4,000 km from Fort McMurray. The men stay for a two-week shift before flying home again in the company's charter. The companies have cut runways into the muskeg to land their planes. Alberta is pressing the federal government to relax rules on immigration to feed the talent pool. "We need welders," one executive told me. "Why don't you become a welder?" The consequences of this boom seem scarcely to bother politicians in Alberta. It has always been a boom and bust sort of place, with a more American, laissez-faire culture than most of the rest of Canada. "We're not dirigiste," one minister told me, "but we might have managed this boom differently." The political and business capitals of Alberta-Edmonton and Calgary-are undergoing their own booms. Calgary, once a prairie town whose chief attraction was its proximity to the ski slopes of the Rockies, is now Canada's most dynamic city. Ironically, given its role as the corporate centre of the oil sands, it is also the world's cleanest city, according to the consultant Mercer. Buildings go up with Dubai-like speed. EnCana, one of the giant companies of the sector, has commissioned Norman Foster to design "The Bow," a new 236m-high skyscraper that will be a suitable testament to Calgary's self-confidence. Torontonians still scoff at western Canadians for their backwardness. But the money, power and new immigrants are heading for Alberta, not Ontario. Yet all this brings problems. Calgary is unlikely to stay the cleanest city on the planet for much longer. A grey pall of smog already hangs over Canada's SUV capital. And Calgary's sprawl is spreading across the prairie that lies to its east, north and south; if the city could bulldoze through the First Nations reserve that borders its west, it would. And while small government in Alberta might be good for the oil sands, it isn't getting much infrastructure built. With a $6.8bn budget surplus from oil revenues in 2005, Alberta's then premier, the Falstaffian controversialist Ralph Klein, gave each citizen of the province a $400C "rebate," at a total cost of $1C.4bn. Critics said the money could have paid for a high-speed rail link. Or it could have been invested in the province's rainy-day fund, which stands at around $12bn, compared with Norway's $200bn. There are big issues for Canada itself. As the engine of the country's economy, the oil sands are powering its growth, even if, as the constitution allows, Alberta retains the bulk of the revenues from the sands. The cumulative value to Canada from the oil sands will be $790Cbn by 2020, according to Alberta Energy. Alberta will retain $630Cbn of that.

# venezuela impact

**Decreasing oil prices causes Chavez to invade Colombia to distract the public—draws in the US.**

Justice **Litle**, 3/4/**2008**. Editor of Outstanding Investments (number one by Hulbert's Financial Digest for total return performance). “South America and the Petrocrat Problem,” Taipan Publishing Team, http://www.taipanpublishinggroup.com/TPG/archives/Daily\_030408a.html.

For obvious reasons, tied to political ideology and the war on drugs, the United States considers FARC to be terrorists. But, just as the Contras were freedom fighters in the eyes of Uncle Sam, the FARC guerrillas are freedom fighters in the eyes of Venezuela. Relations between Venezuela and Colombia were already on a downward spiral. They blew apart completely a few days ago when, with the help of U.S. intelligence, Colombia targeted and killed a top FARC leader in Ecuador. In response to the cross-border assassination -- deemed an infringement on Ecuador’s sovereignty -- Venezuela and Ecuador amassed thousands of troops, tanks and fighter jets on the Colombian border. Hugo Chavez, Venezuela’s president, then threatened to join forces with the FARC rebels in overthrowing the Colombian government. In an ironic twist, Venezuela’s Chavez is accused of secretly funding FARC to the tune of $300 million -- just as the Reagan administration once secretly funded the Contras. (As the old saying goes, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.) A High-Stakes Bluff Alvaro Uribe, Colombia’s president, is considered a friend to the United States. The war on drugs is another factor. If Venezuela actually invades Colombia, the United States will likely get involved. The obvious question is, get involved with what? American military might is already stretched thin. Chavez knows this, of course. He is probably running a high-stakes bluff, betting that America’s hands are tied by Iraq. (Ecuador’s leftist leader, Rafael Correa, is merely following Chavez’ lead.) That is the logical assessment… but it’s hard to know for sure. The home-front stakes are high for Chavez right now. In spite of all the oil money, cracks in the Venezuelan economy are widening. Corruption, incompetence and the shortage-inducing effect of price controls are taking a toll. With paradise crumbling, Chavez’ bold bid to become president for life was rejected. His populist sway is fading. Straight From the Playbook If dictators were handed a playbook along with the keys to the new regime, the top “Hail Mary” play would be this one: “When there’s trouble at home, make trouble abroad.” Dictators always need a cause to rail against or an enemy to fight. This gives them an excuse to keep the country in lock-down mode. Meanwhile, stirring up nationalist sentiment is a kind of sleight-of-hand; it gives the people something to focus on other than their own troubles. For a dictator on the ropes, making trouble abroad hits all the right strategy points. When the people are angry and ready to rise up, redirect their ire towards an outside target. If normal political functions can be suspended in a time of military emergency, so much the better. This is why the possibility of an actual Colombian invasion can’t be ruled out. The more Venezuela’s economic situation deteriorates, the less Chavez has to lose in executing an insane gamble abroad. The Petrocrat Problem Whether South America erupts into war or not -- which could still happen as of this writing -- Venezuela nicely illustrates the “Petrocrat Problem.” (While democracy means “rule by the people,” a petrocracy is basically “rule by oil interests.”) In short, the Petrocrat Problem is this: A number of regimes around the world -- from **Venezuela** to Iran to Russia to various members of OPEC -- **are** **dependent on the high price of oil for their continued stability**. These regimes have become addicted to their oil money inflows. They have been spending like mad and making big promises to maintain stability. If those oil inflows were to stop (or significantly decline), economic chaos could ensue. Populist sentiment could erupt. Entrenched leaders could fall. This presents a nasty Catch-22 because, if the price of oil falls enough to threaten one (or all) of the various petrocrat regimes, the incentive to “stir things up” becomes greatly magnified. Or think of it like this: If the price of oil were to go into real decline, Hugo Chavez would have a big problem. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would have a big problem. Vladimir Putin would have a big problem. The House of Saud would have a big problem… and so on. The end result of an oil-price decline could thus be one (or more than one) of these players doing something drastic. (Like touching off a small-scale hot war, for example.)

**That causes global war.**

James Francis **Rochlin**, **1994**. Professor of Political Science at Okanagan University College. “Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America,” p. 130-131.

While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

# venezuela link ext

**High prices key to prevent Venezuela collapse**

**McCarthy, 2008**. (Shawn, Senior analyst and program manager at IDC Government Insights. “Chavez's fire fails to ignite markets; Doubt the fiery Venezuelan leader can afford to go without revenue from crude exports to the U.S.,” The Globe and Mail, lexis.

Still, analysts are shrugging off the latest salvo from Mr. Chavez, saying he is far too dependent on oil revenue to reduce exports. "He is like a crack addict - he spends his money as fast as he gets it," said Stephen Schork, a Philadelphia-based analyst who produces a popular industry newsletter. In 2002 and 2003, employees at Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA), the country's national oil company, went on strike to protest against Mr. Chavez's political interference in the company's affairs. The strike ended oil exports and crippled the Venezuelan economy. U.S. consumers saw a small increase in prices but the pinch was temporary as refiners found other sources. Now the Venezuelan economy - and Mr. Chavez's political fortunes - are even more heavily dependent on oil revenue because the President relies on the national oil company to finance popular food and fuel subsidies for the poor. Roger Tissot, an independent consultant who follows Latin American oil markets, also believes Mr. Chavez's weekend bluster was an "empty threat. "He is using his big rhetorical, nationalistic view and saying, this is Exxon and we are going to respond to the imperialist," Mr. Tissot said. "But I don't think the regime could survive more than a matter of days without these exports." The analyst noted that Mr. Chavez is facing growing unrest among the urban poor, who are experiencing rising food prices despite controls on basic commodities. On the weekend, the President also threatened to nationalize the Venezuelan assets of Italy's Parmalat SpA and Switzerland's Nestlé SA, accusing them of conspiring to undermine the country's dairy industry, which is experiencing shortages of milk. The Exxon dispute "is a welcome opportunity to distract people's attention from the real problems," Mr. Tissot said. While Venezuela can't afford to cut back its sales, it's unlikely to find new major markets for its oil. And to the extent it did, said James Williams of WRTG Economics in Arkansas, it would merely displace supplies from another producer, which would become available on world markets. At the same time, the country produces a particularly heavy grade of crude oil that U.S. refineries are uniquely configured to handle. It would be easier for the Gulf Coast refiners to find additional product than it would be for PDVSA to find new markets for its product, Mr. Tissot said.

**High oil prices key to Venezuelan economy**

**Bowman,** staff writer for Arabian Business, **2008** (Joel, 3/10/2008. “Oil-rich nations dependent on record prices,” http://www.arabianbusiness.com/513314-oil-producers-addicted-to-record-prices.)

PFC Energy said many Opec members cannot afford to sustain their current level of economic activity if prices drop to what they were just a few years ago. “The economies of most producer countries now require massive [revenue] flows, which are only possible with higher prices,” said Robin West, chairman of PFC Energy, quoted the UK's Financial Times. “This is one of the factors leading to long-term higher prices.” Of the Gulf states outlined in the report, PFC Energy said Saudi Arabia and Iran would be the most exposed if the price of crude fell, with the two countries needing oil to stay at $55 just to “break even". Crude was last seen trading at this level around two years ago. Increased government spending in net oil-exporting countries and a ramp up in domestic consumption has lead to an over-reliance on high prices, according to PFC Energy, leaving oil-exporting countries severely exposed if prices recede. Other Gulf states bound to oil’s record rally include the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar, all of which require oil to average $50 to meet the extensive financial commitments made by their governments. The report found that Venezuela is the most dependent on oil maintaining its record streak, requiring prices to average $94 this year and $97 in 2009 just to service its external accounts.

# canada impact

**Lower oil prices devastate the Canadian economy.**

Kathy **Lien**, 8/8/**2007**. Chief strategist at the world's largest retail forex market maker, Forex Capital Markets in New York. “Think Oil Prices are Headed Back to $50? Trade USD/CAD,” About Currency, http://www.aboutcurrency.com/content/view/365/577/.

If oil crashes, there will be ripple effects across many economies. In the Middle East, a lot of wealth and home valuations are tied to oil, making it even more important for those traders to look for hedging opportunities. The same is true here in North America. Canada’s booming economy has been fueled by the climb in oil which has benefited domestic corporate profitability. It has also sent the Canadian dollar to 30 year highs against the US dollar by boosting the international purchasing power of Canadians. As the world’s second largest holder of oil reserves, Canada has been one of the primary beneficiaries, which means that **if oil crashes**, **it will also be the country and currency that suffers the most**.

**Quebec secession would result**

Donald E. **Nuechterlein**, September **1999**. Rockefeller Research Scholar at the University of California, Berkeley. “CANADA DEBATES A VARIETY OF DOMESTIC ISSUES,” http://donaldnuechterlein.com/1999/canada.html.

Current opinion polls in Quebec show that pro-independence forces are somewhat below the 50 percent margin that would trigger formal negotiations with the rest of Canada on the terms of separation. The current premier, Lucien Bouchard, is a crafty nationalist who will not put the question to another referendum unless he is convinced it will obtain a majority vote. My guess is that if Bouchard has doubts about reaching at least 50 percent in favor of independence, he will first call a provincial election and hope to increase the majority of his Parti Quebecois. That would give him more confidence about winning a referendum. **An important factor influencing many Quebeckers will be their degree of satisfaction with the Canadian economy**. At present, prosperity reigns in most parts of the country and many Quebec voters may worry that their province will suffer economically if it separates.

**This sets a global model for separatism.**

Stephane **Dion**, 11/21/**1997**. Canadian Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs. “Canada is Going to Make it After All,” http://www.pcobcp.gc.ca/aia/default.asp?Language=E&Page=PressRoom&Sub=Speeches&Doc=19971121\_e.htm.

In a recent article in the Boston Globe, Lester C. Thurow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology wrote that in the new global economy, smaller states are becoming more viable than they once were, so "everyone feels much freer to opt out of big countries and create more homogenous small countries", including Quebec, which "doesn't need the rest of Canada economically." Actually, John McCallum of Canada's Royal Bank estimates that trade between two Canadian provinces is, on average, 14 times greater than trade between a Canadian province and an American state after adjustments are made for the size of the market and the distance involved. Moreover, provinces within Canada benefit from the stabilization provided by equalization and other transfer payments. Borders matter. And clearly there is much more involved in a secession than economics. Secession would be economically bad for Quebec, but it would also be morally wrong and, from a practical point of view, it would be a mess. Secession is an extreme solution, one of the most divisive acts possible in a society. The secession of Quebec would not only break up Canada. It would pit Quebecers against Quebecers, and breed intolerance in what is a very tolerant and open society. In a country as democratic, as rich, as successful and as respectful of diversity as Canada, there is nothing to justify secession. And it would send the wrong signal to the world. Canada **has been a model to the world in terms of its ability to accommodate -- and celebrate -- diversity**. But **secession would set an unfortunate precedent**. According to Daniel Elazar of Temple University in Philadelphia, there are currently some 3,000 human groups who are conscious of a collective identity. And yet there are only 185 states recognized by the UN. The belief that every society with its own distinctive character should become a state could **clearly wreak havoc on this planet**. You, as Americans, with your burden of responsibilities in the world, especially want Canada to stay united. Quebec is not a failure, Canada is not a failure -- but secession would be. In the next century, when the main challenge of many states will be how to have different populations living together, **Canada will be needed more than ever as a model of tolerance and openness**. If we fail to preserve our unity, we will send a very sad signal to the rest of the world -- the message that even a country as blessed by fortune as Canada cannot successfully bring together populations with different languages and backgrounds.

**Nuke war**

Kamal **Shehadi**, December **1993**. Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Ethnic Self Determination And the Break Up of States, p. 81.

This paper has argued that self-determination conflicts have direct adverse consequences on international security. As they begin to tear nuclear states apart, the likelihood of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of individuals or groups willing to use them, or to trade them to others, will reach frightening levels. This likelihood increases if a conflict over self-determination escalates into a war between two nuclear states. The Russian Federation and Ukraine may fight over the Crimea and the Donbass area; and India and Pakistan may fight over Kashmir. Ethnic conflicts may also spread both within a state and from one state to the next. This can happen in countries where more than one ethnic self-determination conflict is brewing: Russia, India and Ethio¬pia, for example. The conflict may also spread by contagion from one country to another if the state is weak politically and militarily and cannot contain the conflict on its doorstep. Lastly, there is a real danger that regional conflicts will erupt over national minorities and borders.

# venezuela impact ext

**Colombian escalation will disrupt the Panama Canal.**

Richard **Millett**, October **2002**. Senior fellow at North-South Center, emeritus prof of history at Southern Illinois Univ, and foreign policy expert. "Colombia´s Conflicts: The Spillover Effects of a Wider War," Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB14.pdf.

In the view of those in the United States, concerned about issues of Panama Canal security in the wake of the U.S. military withdrawal, the spillover of Colombia’s conflicts into Panama represents a particularly serious threat. Panamanians have tended to downplay this, noting that the border with Colombia is remote from any installations related to the Canal and pointing out that it was clearly in the guerrillas interest to abstain from any actions which might provide an excuse for direct U.S. military actions against them. Rand analysts Rabasa and Chalk largely concur, pointing out that “the constraints against a guerrilla move against Panama or the Canal are largely political,” but adding that if the Colombian government “succeeded in putting real pressure on the guerrillas,” this might change their calculations. 58 Of all the bordering nations, Panama is the most vulnerable, having neither regular armed forces nor direct land connections with the border region, a long history of the usage of Panamanian territory by Colombian narcotraffickers, and a lack of any real capacity to control its land, sea, or air frontiers. Panama’s problems have three distinct, but interrelated aspects. The first are the actions of armed Colombians, insurgents, and/or paramilitaries in its national territory. The second encompasses the wide range of criminal activities, notably, but by no means exclusively, narcotics trafficking, linked to Colombian organized crime. Finally, problems are caused by refugees moving into the Darien, representing a threat both to local inhabitants and to the region’s fragile ecological balance. All of this not only undermines Panama’s control over its remote Darien Province, it also contains the potential seriously to disrupt relations with the United States.

**That collapses the global economy**

**Wheeling Jesuit University**, **2002**. Center for Educational Technologies, "Central America: Panama Canal: Economic Importance," copyright 1999-2002, http://www.cotf.edu/earthinfo/camerica/panama/PCtopic4.html.

Not only is the Panama Canal important to Panama for income and jobs, but it is also considered to be vitally important to the United States economy. Many U.S. exports and imports travel through the Canal daily (over 10% of all U.S. shipping goes through the Canal). Exports represent jobs for U.S. citizens because the products were made by U.S. workers. Imports enable U.S. consumers to receive needed products. Since the United States is the only superpower in the world, the United States is interested in keeping the global economy running smoothly. If world trade is disrupted, it can lead to worldwide economic problems. Therefore, any disruption in the flow of goods through the Panama Canal could directly hurt the U.S. and global economies. For instance, if England were selling products to Peru, England's economy would suffer if the Canal were not operating. Without access to the Canal, the cost of exports from England to Peru would significantly increase because England would have to regain the added expenses involved in sailing around South America. Because of increased prices, Peru could not afford to purchase as many products from England, which in turn would decrease England's revenues gained from exports. Decreased revenues means that England would have less money available to purchase products from the United States and other countries. A "domino effect" would be set in motion as the United States and other countries experienced similar problems with their exports and imports. This example illustrates the economic importance the Panama Canal has to the U.S. and global economies.

# mexico impact

**Drop in oil revenue causes more immigration to the US.**

**World Press**, 4/25/**2006**. “Mexico: Oil Depletion and Illegal U.S. Immigration,” http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/2326.cfm.

The decline in oil production hasn't seriously hurt the Mexican economy yet. In fact, the country is experiencing economic growth, as reported in London's Reuters (March 24): "Mexico's economy expanded 5.7 percent in January compared with a year ago, government data showed on Friday in the latest sign that growth in the country is picking up after a slump last year." Mexico's El Universal Online (April 7) concurred, noting that: "The Finance Secretariat said it expects the government to end 2006 with a small budget surplus, thanks largely to higher-than-estimated oil income. The secretariat said it expects federal revenue to be 82.7 billion pesos (US$7.56 billion) higher than initially estimated, with 74.3 billion pesos (US$6.8 billion) coming from oil. **Oil and related taxes account for more than one-third of federal revenue**. The document submitted this week estimates 2007 economic growth of 3.6 percent." Underscoring the importance of the proceeds garnered from the sale of oil, China's Xinhua (March 13) reported: "Mexico's oil sector produces 8 percent of the country's gross domestic product, and pays nearly 37 percent of the nation's taxes." Given the country's obvious dependence on oil revenues, a projected sizeable drop in production is worrisome. Whether or not the new oil discoveries will ultimately offset the current decline remains to be seen. Any significant shortfall in oil revenues, which leaves the government with less money to deal with domestic issues, **will likely prompt more Mexicans to contemplate migrating north to the U.S**.

**Immigration distracts law enforcement agencies from preventing terrorism.**

David **Price**, 6/23/**2008**. Congressman (D-NC). “PRICE DELIVERS MAJOR SPEECH ON HOMELAND SECURITY,” http://price.house.gov/apps/list/press/nc04\_price/062308.shtml.

“As comprehensive reform has floundered, our Subcommittee has used the power of the purse to take on the Administration’s skewed priorities in immigration enforcement. In 2007, the number of individuals ICE deported because they crossed the border illegally or overstayed their visas was 91 percent higher than in 2003, while the number of criminal aliens identified for deportation by the agency rose by only 16 percent. In other words, while we have been using scarce resources to detain and deport laborers at meatpacking plants, we have allowed tens of thousands of dangerous criminal aliens to be released back into our communities after serving their sentences, with no awareness on our part of their immigration status. “At our Committee’s direction, ICE has now developed a plan for identifying all those criminal aliens now serving time in our Federal, state, and local prisons and jails, and for deporting them upon the completion of their sentences. This plan will require dogged dedication and significant additional resources to fully implement. We have provided such resources in the FY 2009 bill. No matter what one’s opinion about the broader illegal immigration problem and how to address it, we should all be able to agree that ICE’s highest priority should be to identify and deport unlawfully present aliens who have already shown themselves to be a danger to our communities and have been convicted of serious crimes. “Our Subcommittee has also taken on the challenge of border security – through what will be a one third increase in the number of Border Patrol officers from the beginning of FY 2008 to the end of FY 2009; by compelling attention to the vast Northern border (which is more significant as a potential entry point for terrorists than the Southern border); and by requiring some accountability as DHS spends hundreds of millions of dollars to build fencing along the Southwest border. We are insisting that cost-benefit estimates be provided and that alternative means of border protection be seriously compared before funds are spent on expensive fence construction. “The illegal immigration problem cannot be solved by border security and law enforcement actions alone – I have yet to meet an experienced Border Patrol agent who believes that it can. We are fooling ourselves if we believe that fences and worksite raids will do the trick. Our illegal immigration is more about demand than about supply, so as long as our immigration policies are not responsive to the realities of our labor market, **illegal immigration will drain our resources and distract attention from the apprehension of** criminal and **terrorist aliens crossing our borders** and living among us.

**US retaliation to a terrorist attack causes global nuclear war.**

Jerome **Corsi**, **2005**. PhD in political science from Harvard. excerpt from Atomic Iran, http://911review.org/Wget/worldnetdaily.com/NYC\_hit\_by\_terrorist\_nuke.html.

The combination of horror and outrage that will surge upon the nation will demand that the president retaliate for the incomprehensible damage done by the attack. The problem will be that the president will not immediately know how to respond or against whom. The perpetrators will have been incinerated by the explosion that destroyed New York City. Unlike 9-11, there will have been no interval during the attack when those hijacked could make phone calls to loved ones telling them before they died that the hijackers were radical Islamic extremists. There will be no such phone calls when the attack will not have been anticipated until the instant the terrorists detonate their improvised nuclear device inside the truck parked on a curb at the Empire State Building. Nor will there be any possibility of finding any clues, which either were vaporized instantly or are now lying physically inaccessible under tons of radioactive rubble. Still, the president, members of Congress, the military, and the public at large will suspect another attack by our known enemy – Islamic terrorists. The first impulse will be to launch a nuclear strike on Mecca, to destroy the whole religion of Islam. Medina could possibly be added to the target list just to make the point with crystal clarity. Yet what would we gain? The moment Mecca and Medina were wiped off the map, the Islamic world – more than 1 billion human beings in countless different nations – would feel attacked. Nothing would emerge intact after a war between the United States and Islam. The apocalypse would be upon us. Then, too, we would face an immediate threat from our long-term enemy, the former Soviet Union. Many in the Kremlin would see this as an opportunity to grasp the victory that had been snatched from them by Ronald Reagan when the Berlin Wall came down. A missile strike by the Russians on a score of American cities could possibly be pre-emptive. Would the U.S. strategic defense system be so in shock that immediate retaliation would not be possible? Hardliners in Moscow might argue that there was never a better opportunity to destroy America. In China, our newer Communist enemies might not care if we could retaliate. With a population already over 1.3 billion people and with their population not concentrated in a few major cities, the Chinese might calculate to initiate a nuclear blow on the United States. What if the United States retaliated with a nuclear counterattack upon China? The Chinese might be able to absorb the blow and recover. The North Koreans might calculate even more recklessly. Why not launch upon America the few missiles they have that could reach our soil? More confusion and chaos might only advance their position. If Russia, China, and the United States could be drawn into attacking one another, North Korea might emerge stronger just because it was overlooked while the great nations focus on attacking one another.

# mexico econ uniqueness

**Mexico’s economy is high and grew 4.3% in 2010**

**AP Financial Wire 10** (“Mexico’s economy grows 4.3 pct in 1st quarter,” 5/20/10, Lexis)

Mexico's economy is surging out of the global economic crisis, recording growth of 4.3 percent in the first quarter of the year compared to the same period last year, the National Statistics Institute reported Thursday. It was the first year-on-year growth in more than a year. Mexico's gross domestic product had fallen 6.5 percent for 2009 as a whole the worst figure for any country in Latin America. Mexico can anticipate similar growth for the entire year, said Moody's Latin America analyst Alfredo Coutino. But he warned political leaders should still exercise political moderation.

**The Mexican economy is rebounding and predicted to grow this year**

**San Antonio Express-News 10** (David Hendricks, “Violence is hiding news of recovery,” 4/29/10, Lexis)

The chaos is masking the news that Mexico's economy is recovering, its rebound bolstered by foreign investments, a strong peso-dollar exchange rate, higher oil prices and rising family remittances from U.S. workers. Trinity University economics professor Jorge Gonzalez said Wednesday that Mexico's economy will grow by 4 percent this year. The economic bounce is remarkable, he said, given that as recently as the second quarter of 2009, Mexico's economy shrank at an annual rate of 10 percent, mostly because of falling exports to U.S. factories, such as auto plants. Fiscally, Mexico's government is sound, Gonzalez said, having a federal budget deficit of only 2.2 percent of the national economy in 2009, compared with 10 percent in the United States last year. "Mexico is coming out of the recession with strong fundamentals. It started the crisis with strong fundamentals. The United States would be lucky to have those fundamentals," Gonzalez told about 50 people attending a San Antonio Business & Economics Society luncheon. "Violence is not the story of Mexico. The story of Mexico is the productivity of the people," he said. "Investors are seeing beyond what they are reading in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal." Gonzalez's positive message about Mexico differed significantly from the grim picture delivered last month by Mexican newspaper publisher Alejandro Junco de la Vega in a speech to the World Affairs Council of San Antonio. Junco, CEO of Grupo Reforma, described Mexico as a nation suffering systematic societal breakdowns and lacking hope for progress, factors that feed the drug and criminal activities. Gonzalez stressed that Mexico's manufacturing export sector is driving the country's rebound, just as a fall of exports led to the economic contraction last year. When Mexico's March exports are announced soon, they will be at record levels, he said. Mexico also is on track to surpass soon the volume of exports from Canada to the United States. The strong peso-vs.-weak dollar exchange rate will continue for the foreseeable future, giving Mexican shoppers in South Texas favorable purchasing power, he said. Gonzalez acknowledged that more than 10,000 Mexicans have died because of drug cartel and organized crime violence the last three years. "But 99.9 percent of the people all are going to work every day. Violence is not what most Mexicans think about," he said.

# mexico link ext

**Mexico collapse imminent without more oil revenue- drug cartels and mid east competition are bringing it down**

**Kelly, 2009** (Brian, resident and Founder of Kanundrum Capital and a CNBC contributor. Brian has over 15 years investment experience trading US & international equities, *Mexican Economy: Does what Happens in Mexico, Stay in Mexico?*, http://seekingalpha.com/article/115114-mexican-economy-does-what-happens-in-mexico-stay-in-mexico)

One precursor to political collapse is financial collapse. Let’s examine what could lead to economic distress in Mexico. Clearly, the weakness in the U.S. economy is the number one suspect, and more specifically, the falling demand for Mexican oil in the U.S. In a piece titled, I Can Tango, Can You?, I discussed how the contango in the oil market was causing a huge build in inventories in Cushing, OK. The impact of this build is fewer oil imports, - this, is the Mexican connection. The Mexican economy is highly dependent on crude oil exports; according to the EIA, Saudi Arabia, Canada and Mexico are the top three importers of oil to the U.S. In July and August, Mexico made one of the greatest trades of all time and bought put options on their own oil production locking in prices of $70. So how can the country be unstable? Glad you asked. Approximately 40% of the Mexican government budget is financed by oil exports and 32% of those exports come from the Cantrell field. In December, Pemex, the state owned oil company announced that production from the Cantarell field fell 33%, twice the official estimate. As a result, the government is devoting more money to fighting drug cartels and the main source of financing is disappearing more rapidly than expected. Furthermore, the contango in the oil market has resulted in a huge build in inventories of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude in Cushing, OK. WTI is a light, sweet crude, meaning it has low sulfur and is easier and cheaper to refine. In contrast, Mexican crude is sour, oil-speak for more sulphur and more costly to refine. The inventory build means there is more, desirable oil for the refiners to buy before they think of purchasing Mexican crude. Luckily, for Mexico, and the U.S., the put options on Mexican production have bought some time. So there you have it - a country fighting a war with criminals, running out of money and losing its main source of income. While I believe that any financial instability in Mexico is likely, a story for the second half of 2009, without either a significant decrease in violence or a dramatic rise in oil prices, Mexico is a candidate for rapid collapse.

High prices force companies to move their manufacturing closer to the US—this increases foreign investment in Mexico and drives economic growth.

Jonas, staff writer for Reuters, 2008 (Iliana, 6/24/2008. “Mexico may benefit from higher fuel prices,” REUTERS, http://uk.reuters.com/article/electionsNews/idUKN2437840720080624?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0.

Soaring fuel prices may force some companies to move manufacturing and warehousing closer to the United States, a trend likely to benefit Mexico **and U.S. urban centers, the head of AMB Property Corp (AMB.N: Quote, Profile, Research) Properties said on Tuesday. Skyrocketing fuel costs are forcing manufacturers to rethink their locations.** With oil topping more than $135 a gallon, manufacturers are weighing the costs of labor against the price of shipping**, AMB Property Chairman and Chief Executive Hamid Moghadam told the Reuters Real Estate Summit. "I think** Mexico stands to benefit the most," he said. Higher fuel costs may affect not only where goods are manufactured but how they are transported and warehoused. **Although the upshot is not likely to be a complete overhaul,** incremental changes are likely as the cost of fuel trumps labor and rent expenses, **he said. "It's not going to be any total change of the supply chain," he said. Still, while** high U.S. labor costs and a lack of manufacturing infrastructure will likely hinder a U.S. rebound in manufacturing prowess, Mexico may benefit as manufacturers seek to cut shipping costs. "They have the combination of cheap labor and close proximity to the U.S. market as opposed to China, which has the cheap labor but obviously is farther away**," Moghadam said. Mexico already manufactures items from drugs and food to flat panel television screens and auto parts, he said.** Warehousing and distribution also may shift from sites that are out of the way but offer cheap rents to locations closer to where consumers shop. **The new urban or suburban warehouse and distribution centers are likely to be taller instead of the one-story big boxes located in sparsely populated locations. "Today, with fuel at $135 a barrel, that math argues for shorter runs," Moghadam said.** "You're more likely to be closer in to population centers. You'll pay higher rent, but you'll more than make up for it in higher energy savings." **Trade routes also may be inclined to change. Instead of goods shipped from China to Los Angeles and then trucked or shipped by rail to the East Coast, shi**ppers may use the Panama Canal more often and sail straight to the East Coast ports, even though it takes longer. **"With increasing fuel costs, that trade-off is more and more in the favor of going directly to the East Coast ports," he said.** AMB Property has a large presence in Mexico and has invested in developing warehouses in more populated locations.

# mexico impact ext

**Mexican economic collapse destroys the global economy.**

**Dallas Morning News**, 11/28/**1995**. Dallas Morning News, Lexis.

With the exception of 1982 - when Mexico defaulted on its foreign debt and a handful of giant New York banks worried they would lose billions of dollars in loans - few people abroad ever cared about a weak peso. But now it's different, experts say. This time, the world is keeping a close eye on Mexico's unfolding financial crisis for one simple reason: Mexico is a major international player. If its economy were to collapse, it would drag down a few other countries and thousands of foreign investors. If recovery is prolonged, the world economy will feel the slowdown. "It took a peso devaluation so that other countries could notice the key role that Mexico plays in today's global economy," said economist Victor Lpez Villafane of the Monterrey Institute of Technology. "I hate to say it, but if Mexico were to default on its debts, that would trigger an international financial collapse" not seen since the Great Depression, said Dr. Lpez, who has conducted comparative studies of the Mexican economy and the economies of some Asian and Latin American countries.

**Mexican Econ Collapse causes drug cartel expansion, civil wars, and massive immigration**

**Stilson, 2009** (Tom, staff writer for the Stanford Review, *A Brewing Storm: Mexican Drug Cartels and the Growing Violence on our Borders*, http://stanfordreview.org/article/brewing-storm-mexican-drug-cartels-and-growing-vio)

While some Americans may have little concern for the proximity of the violence to the U.S. border, the war is being waged much closer than some may expect. Nearly 70 Americans are estimated to have been kidnapped by cartels on both American and Mexican soil. Phoenix, Arizona has the second highest reported kidnapping rate in the world, averaging nearly one kidnapping every day. Mexico City is currently number one with the nation of Mexico averaging 30 to 50 kidnappings per day. The number of kidnappings in Phoenix has risen 40% since last year. Kidnappings vary from random ransom abductions to those of family members related to cartel associates. With the recent collapse in gas prices, the Mexican government could face a budget shortfall of $1.5 billion and possible economic collapse. This scenario has officials such as Texas State Senator Dan Patrick (R) wondering what options the US and border-states have if the Mexican government collapses and how such an event will occur. As he said on the Glenn Beck show: There are two scenarios… one is a slow collapse of Mexico in which hundreds of thousands would come here over a period of time. The second is what I call the “Colombian” collapse of Mexico, an assassination of the [Mexican] president, the drug cartels taking over the country, civil war breaking out on the streets, people fleeing for their lives, not for a job. We have to be prepared in the United States for both. The presence of this threat spilling over onto US soil is very real. The month of January yielded, on the border alone, 20 beheadings with 1000 bodies found last year in total. The new Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, has promised to crack down on illegal gun smuggling to the cartels. President Obama has promised aid to President Calderón Over 28,000 weapons seized in Mexico last year originated, albeit illegally, from the United States. Despite these acts, a plausible action to combat the growing problem on America’s border with Mexico was plainly summarized by Senator Patrick, “It will be done if we have leadership… We all have to do everything we can—whether you’re a sheriff on the border or a senator in Austin.”

**Ending the Power of the drug cartel is key to preventing biological and nuclear terrorism**

**Webster, 2008** (Michael, Invesigative Reporter for EDU Mexico, *Mexican Drug Cartels Threaten the United States*, http://edumexico.org/mexican-drug-cartels-threaten-the-united-states/401/)

As America wages its war on drugs and terror with costs to the tax payer in the billions organized criminal gangs here in the U.S. have merged with the Mexican drug cartels, the threat to U.S. interests from an emerging international crime cartel grows more serious every day. Groups like the Sinaloa, Juarez, Tijuana, gulf Cartels, has virtually taken over law enforcement and high ranking Mexican government officials in their host country and are dangerous and significant players on the international stage, carrying out their criminal activities across borders and threatening the stability and interests of the United States. In other words they are a big security threat to this nation. Fresh evidence of this growing threat comes from the powerful Mexican cartels which is already responsible for up to 80 percent of the cocaine that reaches the United States, and are increasingly able to operate above the law, buying off or even killing the government officials who are supposed to work with U.S. law- enforcement agencies to crack down on crime. What’s worse, the cartels have now forged alliances with American street gangs, giving these drug cartels a deep reach into American life and through that alliance with our gangs that gives them control over most of the $300 to $500 billion American drug trade, the largest in the world. These cartels have become a global crime corporation with an international reach of illegal franchises spanning the world. The ability of these Mexican drug cartels to operate with complete disregard for the law on both sides of the border – trafficking in drugs, weapons, humans, terrorists, prostitution, and money laundering is now threatening to destabilize the American economy and our way of life, especially in poor areas and in our projects and barrios. By corrupting our government officials and buying and undermining legitimate American business enterprises, these criminal aliments threaten to set back what little progress we as a nation have made in regards to American poor minorities and their offspring gang members, and already in the case of Mexico, could forestall reform there indefinitely. Federal authorities point to the Mexican drug cartels that are ultimately responsible for border violence by having cemented ties to street and prison gangs like El Paso’s Barrio Azteca on the U.S. side of the border. Azteca like many other U.S. gangs retail drugs that they get from Mexican cartels and their gangs. One Of The Most Dangerous. Mexican gangs also run their own distribution networks in the United States, and they produce most of the methamphetamine used north of the border. They have even bypassed the Colombians several times to buy cocaine directly from producers in Bolivia, Peru and even Afghanistan. These same gangs often work as cartel surrogates or enforcers on the U.S. side of the border. Intelligence suggests Los Zetas They’re known as “Los Zetas have hired members of various gangs at different times including, El Paso gang Barrio Azteca, Mexican Mafia, Texas Syndicate, MS-13, and Hermanos Pistoleros Latinos to further their criminal endeavors. Dangerous Mexican Cartel Gangs The list of crimes the new international criminal organizations are involved in is long. They traffic in drugs, people, and chemical, biological and nuclear material. They perpetrate billions of dollars worth of fraud against banks, businesses and governments. They destroy lives, undermine economies, and diminish confidence in political and economic reform, and spread corruption and violence. In short, they have become an international security threat. Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, chairman of the Senate Anti-Narcotics Caucus, in a speech at The Heritage Foundation, a Washington think tank said “Clearly, we need to devise a new foreign policy to deal with these criminal groups — to put them out of business and in jail.” But what we really need is a homeland defense policy that which will stem the flow of illegal commerce crossing unabated into our country. In a speech to the United Nations, President Clinton acknowledged the growing threat posed by international criminal groups such as the Mexican drug cartels, and called for stronger efforts to fight these organizations. So we have known about this problem for a long time. A ranking House Republican has demanded a hearing based on recent reports that Islamic terrorists embedded in the United States are teaming with Mexican drug cartels to fund terrorism networks overseas. Rep. Ed Royce, ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs terrorism and nonproliferation subcommittee, said the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) document — first reported by The Washington Times — highlights how vulnerable the nation is when fighting the war on drugs and terrorism. Sen. Grassley further stated “Such efforts must achieve several goals: dismantle the major criminal groups, stiffen the penalties for engaging in international crime, and foster international cooperation to counter the actions of criminal elements.” U.S. policy-makers must take concrete steps to meet today’s massive challenges in regards to these Mexican drug cartels. We as Americans must protect our borders and keep these dangerous elements out of this country. We must beef up intelligence capabilities against key groups and their leaders.

**Powerful Drug Cartels are the most likely avenue for a WMD terrorist attack on the US**

**National Terror Alert, 2008** (America’s Leading Source for Homeland Security News and Information, *U.S officials worry Terrorists Could Align with Drug Cartels*, http://www.nationalterroralert.com/updates/2008/10/09/us-officials-worry-terrorists-could-align-with-drug-cartels/)

There is real danger that Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah could form alliances with wealthy and powerful Latin American drug lords to launch new terrorist attacks, U.S. officials said Wednesday. Extremist group operatives have already been identified in several Latin American countries, mostly involved in fundraising and finding logistical support. But Charles Allen, chief of intelligence analysis at the Homeland Security Department, said they could use well-established smuggling routes and drug profits to bring people or even weapons of mass destruction to the U.S. “The presence of these people in the region leaves open the possibility that they will attempt to attack the United States,” said Allen, a veteran CIA analyst. “The threats in this hemisphere are real. We cannot ignore them.” [...] Much as the Taliban tapped Afghanistan’s heroin for money, U.S. officials say the vast profits available from Latin American cocaine could provide al-Qaida and others with a ready source of income. The rebel group known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, has long used drug money to pay for weapons, supplies and operations — and is also designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. “We’ve got a hybrid that has developed right before our eyes,” Braun said. Latin America’s drug kingpins already have well-established methods of smuggling, laundering money, obtaining false documents, providing safe havens and obtaining illicit weapons, all of which would be attractive to terrorists who are facing new pressures in the Middle East and elsewhere.

**The Alliance is the strongest its ever been- an influx in immigrants would bring terrorists streaming into the U.S**

**Hedgecock, 2010** (Robert, nationally syndicated radio talk-show host, *Iran threatens U.S with Proxy Terrorists on the Border*, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=37975)

Illegal immigration is not just about poor workers seeking a better life. It's now also about Iran-backed Hezbollah and Hamas terrorists organizing in Latin America to penetrate the U.S.-Mexico border and generate drug profits to finance and carry out terrorist attacks against the U.S. This week, Mexico announced it had arrested Jameel Nasr, the reputed Hezbollah leader in Latin America, at his home in Tijuana, a stone's throw from the border separating that Mexican city and San Diego, Calif. It looks like the much maligned Rep. Sue Myrick (R.-N.C.) was right. In a letter criticised by the left, Myrick warned Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano in June of the collusion between Hezbollah and the Mexican drug cartels, urging her to establish an inter-agency task force to "clamp down" on this "national security" threat. Myrick warned that Iranian agents and Hezbollah members were showing up in Hugo Chavez's Venezuela to learn Spanish and better fit in with the waves of illegals crossing the border. Jameel Nasr recently spent a month in Venezuela. In her letter, Myrick cited Hamas and Hezbollah's expertise in tunnel building in Lebanon and Gaza as a further threat to the U.S.-Mexico border. In recent years, more than a dozen tunnels, some built with mining-grade technology and equipped with electric lights, air conditioning, and railroad tracks have been discovered under the otherwise effective triple fence along the Tijuana-San Diego border. A 2008 report from the House Homeland Security Committee documented that Hezbollah agents had already been caught trying to illegally enter the U.S. from Mexico. The report specifically noted the case of Mahmoud Toussef Kourani, the brother of a Hezbollah chief, who pled guilty in a U.S. court in 2005 to providing material support to Hezbollah after he was smuggled into the U.S. and settled in Dearborn, Mich. With gang members showing up in U.S. prisons with tattoos in Farsi (the national language of Iran), with Mexican law enforcement telling American counterparts that Hezbollah agents are teaching the Mexican drug cartels the art of the car bomb, and with the OTM (Other Than Mexican) illegal alien population being caught by the Border Patrol on the rise, how many clues do the Obama Sherlocks need ? With these (nearly) unreported facts as background, what to make of Obama's statement to Sen. Jon Kyl (R.-Ariz.) that if the border were secure, the Republicans would not support "Comprehensive Immigration Reform.” It seems to me that the national security of the U.S. is being held hostage to the President's objective to pass an amnesty bill. Ugly events are likely to overshadow both the debate over the Obama lawsuit against the Arizona immigration law, as well as the politics of an Obama push for amnesty. Pinal County, Ariz., Sheriff Paul Babeu stated last week that he had "lost control" over wide swaths of his county—areas now under the effective control of the paramilitary troops of the drug cartels. This week, Babeu admitted to a reporter's question that he had received a death threat from a Mexican cartel. Assassinations of Mexican law enforcement officers by the cartels are commonplace in Mexico. That violence now threatens U.S. officers. The cartels are emboldened by their continued success against the Mexican Army and, maybe, by the increasing influence and support from worldwide terrorist organizations. Our open border with Mexico is not just a source of cheap labor and not just millions of "Undocumented Democrats" waiting for amnesty. The border is now a conduit for Iran to strike at the heart of America.

**Mexican economic collapse causes military takeover, civil wars, and American draw in**

**DAVID 99** (Steven, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb)

Mexico today faces a future more uncertain than at any other point in its modern history. Pervasive corruption financed by drug traffickers, the end of one-party rule, armed revolt, and economic disaster have all surfaced over the past few years. In response, the Mexican army has begun to question its decades-old record of non-interference in politics. Should Mexico collapse into chaos, even for a short period of time, vital American interests will be endangered. This, in turn, raises the specter of U.S. intervention. The growing influence of drug money is the greatest single source of Mexican instability. The narcotics industry has worked its way into the fabric of Mexican society, to the extent that it is now Mexico's largest hard currency source (estimated at $30 billion per year) and is probably the country's largest employer. As in Colombia, drug dealers threaten to take control of the state. More worrying, senior Mexican officials--including those in charge of the antidrug effort--are routinely found to be working for drug cartels. Major drug traffickers have assembled their own private armies and operate without fear of prosecution. Crime, much of it drug financed, runs rampant throughout the country, particularly in Mexico City. In x995, then--CIA director John Deutch signaled his concern for the impact of drugs on Mexico by making that country a strategic intelligence priority for the first time. It may, however, already be too late for help from Washington. The control of Mexico by drug traffickers will be hard to reverse, especially since, given the central role the drug lords play in Mexican life, doing so might further destabilize the country. The Mexican economy provides a second source of civil conflict. The country still has not recovered from its 1994 economic crisis, when the devaluation of the peso sparked fear of total financial collapse. Disaster was averted by the extraordinary intervention of the United States and the International Monetary Fund, which provided a $50 billion bailout. Despite this assistance, inflation climbed to 52 percent (up from 7 percent the year before), real earnings dropped by as much as 12 percent, the GDP shrank 6 percent, and over 25 percent of Mexicans fell seriously behind in debt repayment. Though conditions have improved slightly in the years since, the basic problems that caused the devaluation in the first place remain--such as reliance on foreign investment to finance growth. These problems, combined with crushing Mexican poverty (85 percent of Mexicans are either unemployed or not earning a living wage), falling oil prices, and the widening gap between the prosperous north and the impoverished south, together form the basis for future unrest. Ironically, the advent of true democracy has further threatened Mexican stability. For 70 years, the Institutional Revolutionary Party ruled the nominally democratic country as a private fiefdom. The PRI made all key decisions and chose all important officials (including the president) while suppressing meaningful dissent. The monopoly ended in 1997, however, when the PRI lost its majority in the lower house of parliament to two competing political parties. The Conservative Party (PAN) now threatens the PRI in the more prosperous north while the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) has gained support among poor southerners, students, and intellectuals, and has won the key post of mayor of Mexico City. The fall of the PRI may enhance stability in the long term, as oppressed groups see their demands addressed for the first time. But the transition itself will be dangerous; states in the process of democratizing are far more vulnerable to civil conflict than are mature democracies or authoritarian regimes. As opposition parties declare their intent to expose the PRI's corrupt and criminal history, the order which Mexico has enjoyed for 70 years will be the first casualty of the new freedom. As if to illustrate the potential for disorder, major armed uprisings have once again erupted. Mexico has suffered a long tradition of regional warfare, dating back to its earliest days of independence. After decades of peace, this threat reemerged in the mid-1990s, and now endangers the stability of the state. In January 1994, some 4,000 "Zapatista" rebels, fearful of losing their land, seized seven towns in the southern state of Chiapas. Though they were poorly armed, the support they received throughout Mexico and the army's inability to quell their revolt starkly demonstrated the weakness of the Mexican government. That weakness grew even more pronounced when it was revealed that the government had turned to paramilitary groups to suppress the rebels. One such group massacred 45 civilians in December 1997, sparking widespread protest and investigations of government complicity. Meanwhile, the less well known but potentially more dangerous People's Revolutionary Army (EPR) launched a rebellion in 1996 by attacking military and economic targets in six southern states. Unlike the Zapatistas, the EPR openly seeks to overthrow the current regime. While its prospects of doing so may be remote, the EPR's very existence drives a thorn into the government's side. Amidst these struggles, the Mexican military may abandon its long tradition of noninvolvement in politics. Since the 1980s, the government has called on the military to suppress drug-related violence within the country. This use of the military for domestic purposes drew it directly into political disputes it had shied from in the past, and risked spreading corruption within the ranks. Meanwhile, the end of the PRI'S monopoly on power may further destabilize the armed forces. For the first time in their history, the troops face an institutionally divided leadership. The military might split into rival political factions, especially if opposition parties are prevented from exercising power. Conflict in Mexico threatens a wide range of core American interests. A civil war would endanger the 350,000 Americans who live south of the border. Direct American investments of at least $50 billion would be threatened, as would $156 billion in bilateral trade and a major source of petroleum exports. Illegal immigrants would swarm across the 2,000-mile frontier, fleeing civil conflict. And armed incursions might follow; during the Mexican Revolution of 1910, fighting spilled over the border often enough that the United States had to deploy roughly half its armed forces to contain the conflict. In a future war, the millions of Americans with family in Mexico might take sides in the fighting, sparking violence within the United States.

# norway impact

**Norway’s economy will remain stable unless oil prices fall dramatically**

**DAGENS NÆRINGSLIV 10-15-2008** (lexis)

DnB Nor's chief economist in Norway, Øystein Dørum, says that although the financial crisis is far from over, it has hit a turning point and he thinks Norway will do best out of all the western economies, in particular if the oil price stays above US$ 60 (EUR 44.49)-70 per barrel. Nevertheless the labour market and property market will be weakened in the near-future.

**Strong Norwegian economy makes all efforts to solve conflict more successful—this is key to peacemaking and conflict mediation in the Middle East and worldwide which keeps their impact from escalating**

**WHITFIELD 2008 (**Teresa Whitfield, Director, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, Social Science Research Council, 2008Armed conflict and the Role of Norway, http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/kampanjer/refleks/innspill/engasjement/whitfield.html?id=493364)

From the mid-1990s on there has been a sharp decline in the numbers of wars, genocides, and international crises after a steady rise for more than four decades and a notable growth in the number of conflicts that ended, and ended in negotiated peace agreements rather than in victory, as has been amply documented by the Human Security Report and others.[1] Much of this decline can be attributed to the explosion of international attention – through the United Nations, by regional organizations, individual states such as Norway, states acting together in “Friends” or “contact groups”, and non-governmental actors – to peacemaking and conflict management. But there is no room for complacency. Experience has shown that those who underestimate how difficult it is to stop wars on a self-sustaining basis do so at their peril. Sub-Saharan Africa was the only region in the world to see a decline in armed conflict between 2002 and 2005; as of mid-2007 there remain some 56 active conflicts (defined by 25 or more battle-related deaths in a given year), while the list of conflicts or situations in which conflict or crisis might threaten maintained by the International Crisis Group in its “Crisis Watch” numbers over seventy. The most likely prognosis for the future is that violent conflict, crisis and instability will be constant - if constantly unpredictable - and driven by some combination of the following factors: \* the persistence of intractable conflicts within states, as well as entrenched regional conflict systems; \* the recurrence of some conflicts as a consequence of the failure or reversal of a significant number of peace agreements; \* new or transformed conflicts, mostly within states and involving one or more groups of non-state armed actors, arising from a combination of elements including:\* large numbers of “weak” states with a limited capacity to fulfill the basic institutional and other functions (security, justice, public administration) required by the citizenry;\* the uneven pace of economic and social development, whose inequities may be accentuated by contravening forces of globalization; \* crises in relations between militant Islamists, more moderate elements of the Arab world, and western societies; \* growing transnational networks exploited by criminal and terrorist organizations; \* environmental degradation and consequent competition over natural resources. Areas of particular instability, violence and intractability - all involving some combination of the above - are likely to include the Middle East and Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Sudan and the Horn of Africa, in addition to eastern DRC and Central Africa, and South and South east Asia. This list is daunting, and accentuates the urgency for those in a position to do so, such as Norway, to prepare themselves to meet the challenges that lie ahead. Peacemaking and international actors Peacemaking since the end of the Cold War has been in constant evolution. The achievements of international third-party mediators and facilitators have been significant, but who these third parties are, and how they engage, both with conflict parties and with each other, has changed dramatically. The primacy of great power, or United Nations-led, peacemaking, pulling on the strings left behind by Cold War support of proxy actors, has given way to a much more confused environment in which issues of leverage are less clear cut and the characteristics and motivations of conflict actors more diffuse. Meanwhile third parties are rarely disinterested actors, and their own ambitions, capacities, and institutional cultures frequently collide. Indeed the challenges of coordination amongst many would-be peacemakers and/or builders can often appear to rival the complexity of the conflicts themselves. Some of challenges facing international peacemakers include: \* The evolution of the United Nations: the UN has been the preeminent actor in conflict management in the post-Cold War period, and is in the midst of a period of significant institutional reform, but the jury is still out on whether it will enter the second decade of the 21st century as a stronger or weaker actor with respect to international peacemaking. A number of different factors are involved: \* the organization suffers from its identification with a western, and specifically U.S. agenda; \* consensus among the five permanent members of the Security Council may prove harder to reach in the context of continuing hegemonic tendencies by the United States, the rising influence of China as a global actor, and the likely assertion by Russia of its role in conflicts in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus; \* the ability of the current Secretary-General to rise to the enormous challenges of his office is not yet assured; \* the value of institutional innovations, such as the Peacebuilding Commission and the Mediation Support Unit as well as the current reform of the peacekeeping machinery, will take longer to prove itself than some of their backers had hoped;\* there is a dearth of experienced UN mediators. \* The capacity and coherence of regional and sub-regional organizations: although regional organizations may in many instances – and particularly in Africa - be the peacemakers of choice, they can be hindered by substantive differences over conflicts within their own neighborhoods (viz the limitations of IGAD in the Horn of Africa) and suffer from poorly resourced peacemaking capacities. \* Problems of competition and coordination: competition among rival, if well-intentioned, peacemakers is a relatively recent but complicated phenomenon. Under some circumstances a mechanism such as a group of Friends has helped ensure that would-be peacemakers work together, ideally in support of a recognized lead. Benefits include leverage, information, and practical support for the mediator; influence and an identified (and therefore legitimate) role for the states in the groups; technical and other assistance to parties to the conflict; and attention, resources, and strategic coordination to the peace process as a whole. Different arrangements have sought to coordinate post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction, with a mixed record of success. \* Identifying their role: primary responsibility for resolving conflicts lies with the belligerent parties and those affected by the conflict. External actors, it follows, play an essentially auxiliary role in peacemaking. They need to be careful not to exert such pressure (as on Darfur in 2006) as to encourage compromises unsustainable in the medium or long term. \* Engaging with non-state armed actors: engaging with non-state armed actors has become more complex since the attacks of September 2001 and launch by the United States of its “war on terrorism”, but it remains an obvious pre-requisite for effective peacemaking. \* Issues of peace and justice: external actors join national actors and conflict parties in struggling to work with changing normative concerns, in particular tensions between peace and justice, and the growing role of the International Criminal Court. These issues can be more, not less, complex for actors such as Norway strongly identified by their commitment to human rights and humanitarian principles. \* Complexity: external actors still struggle to understand the complexity of each individual peace process; sufficient humility to accept that this is the case is often lacking. Norway’s Comparative Advantages and Limitations Norway is in many respects uniquely well-placed to address these and other challenges. Its emergence as a peacemaker and security exporting state has been a significant element within the landscape of conflict management in recent years and has contributed to decisions by other states to redirect their foreign policy priorities in a similar direction. Norway’s comparative advantages are many. Resources: Norway is not just a rich and generous donor, but, importantly, not afraid to invest significantly and over the long term in efforts to promote peace and reconciliation, whether on its own behalf, through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, or in support of regional and non-governmental organizations. Perceived lack of interest: Norway’s wealth, distance from conflict arenas and lack of a colonial past insulate it from suspicion that it is acting on the basis of strategic or economic interests. (That it nevertheless has an interest in successful participation in conflict management is a separate matter).Track record: Norway’s track record as lead peacemaker (in the Middle East, the Philippines and Sri Lanka), or supporting member of a Friends or other such mechanism (in Colombia, Guatemala and Sudan or the new International Contact Group it helped to form on Somalia) have won it a reputation as a “helpful fixer” and “honest broker”, even when the outcome of the processes with which it has been involved have not been successful. Consensus builder: Norway’s strategic position and good standing with the United States – in some respects a consequence of its active membership of NATO and the transatlantic policy its pursued during the Cold War – places it in a good position to help build consensus on issues that have the potential to divide key members of the international community, as its role on Somalia, for example, demonstrates. Lack of EU membership: Not being member of the European Union brings with its significant advantages, most obviously the discretion to engage with armed actors who may be proscribed by the EU as terrorists. Not to be overlooked, however, are the time and resources liberated by not having to fulfill the responsibilities of EU membership. Flexibility: Norway has displayed admirable flexibility in its ability to draw on the expertise of actors outside the foreign ministry (Fafo in the Middle East, the Lutheran World Federation in Guatemala, Norwegian Church Aid in Sudan, well-connected individuals in Sri Lanka) to develop official engagement; in its readiness to partner with non-governmental peacemakers such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; and its ability to respond quickly and effectively to well-founded requests for support from the United Nations (for example in the help it provided in launching of the UN Mission in Nepal) and other actors. Targeting of diplomatic resources: Norway has also garnered benefits from its decision to assign good people to hard places, and open up embassies (in Guatemala, Colombia and the Middle East for example) in function of its involvement in a peace effort. Commitment to gender equality: Norway’s role in promoting the participation and representation of women in peace processes, including through the adoption of an Action Plan for the implementation of SCR 1325, has been commendable - although there is a long way to go. Patience: Norway’s ability to commit to the long haul in circumstances that do not appear auspicious has had demonstrable benefits. This is true even in circumstances other than a recognizable peace process. A quiet but consistent involvement in Haiti, for example – even as other donors pulled out – is a notable example of this approach and one which has placed Norway in a prime position to make a useful contribution as the country’s dynamics appear to be moving in a more positive direction But Norway is not without its limitations and challenges. Norway is a small country and consequently has a relatively small pool of individual peacemakers and diplomats to draw upon. It cannot expect to intervene in all conflict situations, or support those that it does choose to engage with to an equal degree. When the going gets tough – as Sri Lanka has demonstrated - many of the positive aspects of Norway’s identity render it vulnerable to criticism that it is a remote, Northern, do-gooder, with little understanding of the dynamics of the conflicts of others. In some contexts (for example at the UN) Norway can be vulnerable to jealousies that its ample resources buy it a disproportionate influence in some of the bodies, organizations or processes that it contributes to. Priorities in moving forward Clearly there is much about Norway’s engagement in activities that support peace and reconciliation in recent years that is to be commended. But as it moves ahead with the current review of globalization and national interests, a few core priorities can be suggested. Norway will face tough strategic decisions with respect to the prioritization of its resources and efforts. Important contributions would be to champion attention to conflicts whose resolution may help “unlock” wider regional conflict formations (Ethiopia and Eritrea for example) and prioritize early engagement with countries in processes of transition (such as Cuba) that others may have greater difficulties engaging with. This will involve a hard assessment at some of its areas of long-standing engagement, where adverse developments on the ground may have damaged the comparative advantages with which Norway entered the conflict arena. Norway’s successful experiences of working with others place it in a good position to help international actors face tough questions about their own involvements. Whether and how the international community is able organize itself in support of a given peace process has never been more critical. In considering future relationships, a particular priority should be to identify and develop partnerships in the global South and from the Islamic world. Norway’s extraordinary contribution to the United Nations should be continued. Assisting the Mediation Support Unit – and encouraging others to do so as well – not least in the MSU’s effort to engage with and support peacemakers outside the UN system is an obvious priority. Norway’s experience, including the role it plays in hosting the Oslo Forum and Mediators’ Retreats, well equip it to continue to help professionalize the practice of peacemaking. Thought should be given to how to provide capacity to a new generation of peacemakers, with priority attention to women and peacemakers from the South (fellowships, secondment to mediation teams etc).

# norway oil uniqueness

**Norwegian oil revenue is high now --- investment returns**

**Bloomberg, 10** [March 5th, “Norway Oil Fund Rose 26% Last Year as Markets Rallied (Update1)”, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-05/norway-oil-fund-rose-26-last-year-as-markets-rallied-update1-.html>]

March 5 (Bloomberg) -- Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, the world’s second largest, said the value of its investments rose **a record 26 percent** last year as markets rebounded. The Government Pension Fund - Global climbed by 613 billion kroner ($104 billion) in 2009, as measured by a basket of foreign currencies, the central bank said in a statement today. The fund, worth 2.6 trillion kroner at the end of 2009, gained 34.3 percent on its stock holdings and 12.5 percent on bonds. “The values have come back much sooner than expected,” Yngve Slyngstad, head of Norges Bank Investment Management, the central bank’s asset management arm, said in the statement. “The parts of the fixed income markets that stopped working during the financial crisis gradually returned to more normal conditions.” The fund rose after the MSCI World Index jumped 27 percent last year and the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Index of European companies rallied 28 percent. In 2008, the fund lost a record 633 billion kroner after the global financial crisis wiped out gains since the fund began investing oil revenue 12 years earlier. “The fund’s results for 2009 show that considerable values have been recovered and faster than we dared hope a year ago,” Norges Bank Governor Svein Gjedrem said in the report. Investment Breakdown Last year, the Nordic country put 169 billion kroner into the fund, which was set up to manage the country’s petroleum riches after the discovery of oil in the North Sea in 1969. This was the lowest capital inflow since 2004 and less than half the inflow of 2008, the bank said. Norway is the world’s sixth- largest oil exporter and the second-largest gas exporter. The nation of 4.8 million people generates money for the fund from taxes on oil and gas, ownership of petroleum fields and dividends from its 67 percent stake in Statoil ASA, the country’s largest energy company. The return generated by the fund, which invests abroad to avoid stoking domestic inflation, was 4.1 percentage points higher than the benchmark set by the Finance Ministry. Norway’s central bank runs the fund, while the ministry sets guidelines.

# norway link ext

**Drop in oil prices destroys Norwegian economy**

**E24.NO 9-30-2008** (lexis)

Bankers in Norway state that although the mortgage rates will rise strongly in a short-term perspective, due to a continued rise in the money market rates, an economic recession will lead to lower interest rates in the next few years. Norway may however be relatively protected from the international crisis if the oil price remains high. If this drops as well, to levels below US$ 60 (EUR 41.66)-70 per barrel, Norway will face a serious economic downturn, says Erlend Lødemel in DnB Nor Markets.

**Decline in oil prices will force Norway to lower interest rates—this collapses the economy**

**NORWEGIAN BUSINESS DIGEST 9-30-2008**

Mortgage interest rates will increase strongly in the short term as money market interest rates rise further, Jullum said. But the global economy is facing a downturn, which will press the key interest rate downwards.

"I agree that the key interest rate in Norway can fall to 2-3% in the course of two to three years if we get the global setback we now maybe see the contours of. We risk that it could be the worst setback in more than 20 years," stock analyst at DnB NOR Markets, Erlend Lodemel, said. The interest rate on mortgage loans can fall to 3% due to the crisis, he estimates. "We are a rich country which can spend money to keep the activity going. In addition, the oil price will probably hold at a relatively high level, due to which the offshore sector will not be hit so badly by the crisis. But if the oil price falls to under USD 60-70 per barrel and the oil sector is affected, then the crisis will really hit Norway," Lodemel argued.

# norway impact ext

**Norway is a key model for sovereign wealth funds—this is key to the global economy and solves all other oil turns**

**VELCULESCU 2008** (Delia, IMF European Department, IMF Survey Magazine, July 9, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/POL070908A.htm)

The Norwegian Oil Fund—recently renamed "the Government Pension Fund-Global"—is often cited as an exemplary sovereign wealth fund (SWF). This uniquely positions the fund as a model for and potentially important contributor to the new set of voluntary principles being developed for SWFs. SWFs have been receiving increased scrutiny due to their growing presence in global financial markets. Their total assets are currently estimated at about $3 trillion (see table). Experts are expecting that their assets will increase rapidly to over $10 trillion in the next 5-10 years. The growing importance and active investment strategies of SWFs are expected to affect the structure of international financial markets and asset pricing. On the one hand, their long horizons, lack of leverage, and absence of claims for imminent withdrawal of funds could help stabilize international financial markets by enhancing market liquidity and dampening asset price volatility. On the other hand, their sheer size, rapid growth, and potential to abruptly change investment strategies, coupled with—in some cases—a lack of transparency and uncertainty surrounding the purpose of their investments, could exacerbate market uncertainty and thus increase volatility. Voluntary code of conduct In light of the concerns about SWFs, the IMF has been given a new mandate to facilitate the development of a set of voluntary principles for these funds. These principles would cover issues of public governance, transparency, and accountability. To this end, an International Working Group of SWFs (IWG) was formed at end-April 2008 and began work on the set of principles. The new set of principles should help countries where SWFs are located to both strengthen their domestic policy frameworks and institutions and facilitate their macroeconomic and financial interests. The principles will also help ease concerns in countries receiving SWF investments and promote an open global monetary and financial system. Lessons from Norway's experience Norway's Government Pension Fund-Global (GPF) has a number of exemplary features that could serve as a model for other SWFs. The GPF is one of the largest and fastest-growing SWFs in the world, with total assets amounting to $373 billion at end-2007, or close to 100 percent of Norway's GDP. But size aside, the Norwegian GPF is mostly known for its features, which in many ways are considered best practices by international standards: • The GPF's stated aim is to support government saving and promote an intergenerational transfer of resources. The fund facilitates the long-term management of the government's petroleum revenues. Given the expected population aging in Norway, it serves to pre-fund public pension expenditures. • The GPF functions as a fiscal policy tool, which, together with the fiscal guideline, serves to limit government spending. The fund's capital consists of revenues from petroleum activities. The fund's expenditure is a transfer to the fiscal budget to finance the non-oil budget deficit. The fiscal guideline, introduced in 2001, calls for a limit on the non-oil structural central government deficit of around 4 percent of the assets of the GPF. Since 4 percent is the estimated long-run real rate of return, this rule amounts to saving the real capital of the fund and spending only its return (akin to an endowment fund). • The fund is fully integrated into the budget (see Chart 1). The net allocation to the fund forms part of an integrated budgetary process. This process makes transparent the actual surplus of the fiscal budget and the state's use of petroleum revenues. • It pursues a highly transparent investment strategy (see Chart 2). The Ministry of Finance—the fund's owner—reports regularly on the governance framework, the fund's goals, investment strategy and results, and ethical guidelines. The Central Bank—the fund's operational manager—publishes quarterly and annual reports on the management of the fund, including its performance and an annual listing of all investments. Detailed information on the fund's voting in shareholders' meetings is also published.• Its assets are invested exclusively abroad. This strategy ensures risk diversification and good financial returns. Moreover, it helps to shield the non-oil economy from shocks in the oil sector, which can put pressure on the exchange rate (so-called "Dutch disease" effects). The GPF has small ownership shares in over 7,000 individual companies worldwide (the average ownership stake at end-2007 was 0.6 percent, against a maximum allowed of 5 percent).• Its high-return, moderate-risk investment strategy has been hitting the mark. Currently, the fund is adjusting its portfolio to its new strategic benchmark of 60 percent of assets in equities and 40 percent in fixed income. There are plans to move gradually into real estate, to improve the risk-return tradeoff. The investment strategy has produced a healthy 4.3 percent average annual real return during the past decade.• Its asset management is governed by a set of ethical guidelines. These guidelines, established by the Ministry of Finance, are based on internationally accepted principles developed by the United Nations and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Two policy instruments are used to promote the fund's ethical commitments. First, the fund exercises ownership rights in companies in which it invests with a view to promoting good and responsible conduct and respecting human rights and the environment when this is consistent with the fund's financial interests. Second, the Ministry of Finance can decide to avoid fund investments in specific companies whose practices constitute an unacceptable risk that the fund could become complicit in grossly unethical activities. A role for Norway The Norwegian GPF brings to the table several elements that could help design a set of successful voluntary principles for SWFs. The fund's role as a fiscal policy tool could guide other countries with nonrenewable resources in managing their policies in a sustainable way over the long run. The GPF's highly transparent, yet competitive and successful asset management strategy—buying in markets whose values are falling to rebalance its portfolios—can serve as an example that open strategies not only produce financial results, but also enhance market liquidity and financial resource allocation and act as a stabilizing influence. Its experience with ethical guidelines provides further proof that commitment to the common good is not necessarily antagonistic to high returns.

\*\*\*CHECHNYA

# chechnya 1nc—afghanistan

**Chechen conflict is on the brink of escalation—foreign militants are making it a hub of international terrorism and threatening Russian collapse**

**McLean,** research intern at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C., **05** [Robert, “Chechen Jihad”, http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=6420]

The connection between international terrorism and the “movement for independence” in Chechnya is substantial and explicit, but all too often ignored in the West. The popular assumption is that Chechnya is a distant problem that need not be addressed by anyone outside Russia. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests otherwise. Islamic extremists and their terror-tactics have been a central factor in the Caucasus more than a decade ago. From Iraq to Afghanistan, London to Moscow, Islamic terrorists have firmly imbedded Chechnya into the global web of terror networks. A sparsely reported but highly significant development in the war against Islamic extremism in the Caucasus occurred on October 13 in the Russian republic of Astemirov-Balkaria. There, approximately 100 terrorists led by Wahhabi adherent Anzor Astemirov killed at least twenty-four police officers and civilians, though the Russian daily *Kommersant* reported the actual casualty count was higher than the official count. Chechens and a significant group of Arabs took part in the assault, and news reports suggested that radical Chechen leader Shamil Basayev may have been directly involved in the operation. Leon Aron, thedirector of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute, believes that foreign Islamic militants have fueled much of the violence in the Caucasus and “hijacked Chechnya’s struggle for independence.” There is much to support this claim as many Islamic fundamentalists who have a history of international terrorism have become involved in the Chechen conflict. Osama bin Laden’s chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, attempted to establish a base for Islamic terrorists in Chechnya in 1996. By 1999, it was estimated that at least 100 Al Qaeda members joined up with Chechens in the Caucasus. In addition, Shamil Basayev is believed to have trained in Afghanistan in 1994. Basayev has claimed responsibility for – among other horrendous acts of terror – the Beslan school hostage situation that claimed the lives of 330, including women and young children. This process of Chechen “Islamization” began in the mid 1990s as significant numbers of Arab fighters joined the fight of Muslims in Chechnya seeking to gain independence from the Russian Federation. At that time, moderate Sufi Islam, long dominant in Chechnya, began to give way to Wahhabism. Money coming from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan was paid to those who converted to Wahhabism and those who recruited others to join the militant sect. As one Chechen convert explained: “I liked it that Arabs want to go on making war until they liberate the whole world of the [infidels]” and holy war should continue “until all the Christians are converted to Islam.” The influx of Arabs and Islamic fundamentalists soon changed the face of the conflict in Chechnya. The *Middle East Quarterly* accurately noted last summer that “A close examination of the evolution of the Chechen movement indicates that Islamists and followers of Al-Qaeda have increasingly sought to co-opt the Chechen movement as their own.” American and Russian intelligence services have found evidence suggesting that many of the same groups and individuals that financed al-Qaeda also provided support for Chechen leaders, such as the Saudi-born Ibn al-Khattab. Iran and Saudi Arabia are also believed to have provided funding for Basayev and his followers. The explanation for this generosity is unambiguous: this diverse group of fanatics is united under the common goal of establishing an Islamic state in the Caucasus. The events on the ground continue to suggest that the forces attempting to establish an Islamic state from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea are relatively weak. However, as the United States and our Iraqi allies crush the hopes of the Islamists in Iraq who seek to create a new caliphate, their efforts will soon focus elsewhere - as is already evident with recent terror attacks in Jordan, Indonesia, and Bangladesh. An extremely likely target will be Chechnya and its neighboring republics. Alexei Malashenko, an expert on Chechnya at the Carnegie Center in Moscow, stated recently that “**The Chechen conflict is spilling into neighboring republics, escalating the process of destabilization**” in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This poses an enormous threat to both the **territorial integrity of Russia** and the long-term interests of the United States in the region. The process has already started and is likely to pick up increasing steam as Islamists begin to lose hope in Iraq and Afghanistan. The second Chechen war began in 1999 with the invasion of Chechnya’s neighboring republic of Dagestan. This was an attempt to spread the conflict in hope of generating a larger Islamic rising. Although Russian forces quickly drove the aggressors back to Chechnya, the Islamists have far from given up hope. The Russian republic of Ingushetia has similarly experienced terror at the hands of the Chechens and their Islamist supporters. Repeated attempts to assassinate the pro-Moscow president of Ingushetia, Murat Zyazikov, have so far been unsuccessful. However, the employed tactic of suicide car bombings illustrates not only the same desired ends of the Chechens and their Islamist allies, but also the matching callous means. While the Islamists have failed to topple the Ingush leadership thus far, they did succeed in briefly taking the republic’s capitol of Nazran in 2004. This operation was carried out by militant followers of Shamil Basayev and concluded only after nearly 100 government officials and police officers had been killed. The influx of radical Islam and the expansionist nature of the aspirations of its followers have made it evident that Chechnya has transformed from a republic seeking independence to one of the global centers of Islamic jihad. Vladimir Putin described the danger of a widening conflict in a December 2003 television appearance: “they have completely different goals – not the independence of Chechnya, but the territorial separation of all territories of compact Muslim residence. It follows that we should resist that, if we don't want the collapse of our state. And if that happens, it will be worse here than in Yugoslavia.” Unfortunately, Putin was not exaggerating. London’s *Sunday Express* reported that British intelligence sources revealed that Chechen fighters were some of the last holdouts in the battle at Tora Bora in Afghanistan. Chechens have also gone to Iraq to fight Americans and our allies. The same British intelligence source told the *Sunday Express*: “These are not just people dreaming of a homeland, they are key global terrorist figures.” The source added: “British forces in the Gulf during the initial phase of the fighting were finding Chechen bodies among the fanatics fighting along Saddam Hussein’s troops. A number of the foreign fighters confronting our troops in Basra have turned out to be Chechens.” Thus, Chechens are clearly gaining experience in guerrilla warfare and terrorist operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and those that survive will bring their skills back to Chechnya.

**Afghan instability draws foreign jihadists away from Chechnya**

**CBS News, 08** [“Foreign Jihadis Flock To Afghanistan”, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/18/world/main4270681.shtml]

(CBS/AP)Afghanistan has been **drawing a fresh influx of jihadi fighters from** Turkey, Central Asia, **Chechnya** and the Middle East, one more sign that al Qaeda is regrouping on what is fast becoming the most active front of the war on terror groups. More foreigners are infiltrating Afghanistan because of a recruitment drive by al Qaeda as well as a burgeoning insurgency that has made movement easier across the border from Pakistan, U.S. officials, militants and experts say. For the past two months, Afghanistan has overtaken Iraq in deaths of U.S. and allied troops, and nine American soldiers were killed at a remote base in Kunar province Sunday in the deadliest attack in years. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned during a visit to Kabul this month about an increase in foreign fighters crossing into Afghanistan from Pakistan, where a new government is trying to negotiate with militants. A former high-ranking member of the pre-2001-invasion Taliban government, who spoke to CBS News' Sami Yousafzai on condition of anonymity on Monday, said the Taliban was benefiting hugely from a massive influx of foreign fighters. The former minister, who presently lives in Pakistan, told Yousafzai that the attack on the U.S. troops in Kunar province was made possible by the new techniques and skills brought to the country by outsiders, and he admitted that Afghan Taliban were not previously capable of carrying out such daring attacks. He called it a "well planed attack, and the start of a new resistance in direct combat with the invaders." The former Taliban official told CBS News the number of foreigners - who he described as primarily Arab or Pakistani - coming to wage jihad in Afghanistan had increased three-fold since 2007. "As much as the so called war on terror in Afghanistan expands, numbers of the foreigner volunteers get more and more." Two U.S. officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the information, told The Associated Press that the U.S. is closely monitoring the flow of foreign fighters into both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Jihadist Web sites from Chechnya to Turkey to the Arab world featured recruitment ads as early as 2007 calling on the "Lions of Islam" to fight in Afghanistan, said Brian Glyn Williams, associate professor of Islamic history at the University of Massachusetts. Williams has tracked the movement of jihadis for the U.S. military's Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

**Impact is nuclear war, terrorism, environmental destruction, and prolif**

**DAVID 99** (Steven, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb)

Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

# middle east war link

**Middle East war ensures stability in Chechnya**

**Cetron, et al, 07** [Marvin, president of Forecasting International Ltd. in Virginia, “Worst-case scenario: the Middle East: current trends indicate that a Middle Eastern war might last for decades. Here is an overview of the most critical potential impacts”, http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices/5523341-1.html]

Russia clearly benefits from a Middle Eastern war. In any such scenario, Europe must become even more dependent on Russian oil than it is today, and Russia grows rich. This does not represent a significant change, of course; the trends are going in that direction already. In addition, by drawing Muslim extremists to the Middle East, a war between the Sunni and Shi'ite lands is likely to bring relative **stability to Chechnya** and the "stans" for so long as it draws terrorist attention away from local goals. Russia can only welcome this development.

# influence links

**Perception that US policies are causing instability allows Russia to expand influence in the Middle East**

**STRATFOR 2-13-2007** (http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read\_article.php?id=284283)

In his speech at the Munich conference, Putin said the United States is responsible for growing instability and insecurity in the international system. By lashing out at the United States, Russia hoped to appeal to a latent perception among the United States' Arab allies that Washington is playing with fire in their region. Moscow hopes to exploit these concerns to infiltrate the region, which has been firmly in the U.S. sphere of influence. The Russians hope to counter U.S. moves in its own neighborhood and contain U.S. power overall; the Kremlin has already started this process with Iran. But the Kremlin knows it must position itself among the Arabs to really use the Middle East as a lever in its struggle with the United States. This explains Putin's recent visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan, all major U.S. allies. Russia has correctly realized the potential for an opening in the Middle East. The Russians know that the Arabs, despite their continued close relations with Washington, are unhappy with U.S. policies in the region and are looking for leverage in dealing with the United States.

# influence link—iraq

**US military presence in Iraq expands Russian influence in the Middle East**

**DEFENSE NEWS 2-12-07** (Lexis)

The two developments are the latest in a series of initiatives that signal Russia's growing interest, and possibly growing influence, in the Middle East. As the United States struggles with the war in Iraq, belligerence from Iran and recalcitrance in Palestine and Lebanon, Russia appears to be gleefully making the most of the situation, said Steven Stalinsky, executive director of the Middle East Media Research Institute in Washington. "The Russians are happy that the United States seems to be in a quagmire in Iraq. The deeper the U.S. gets into it," the more Russia stands to benefit, he said. So it shouldn't have been surprising last fall that the Russians balked when the United States pushed for tougher U.N. sanctions aimed at stopping Iran's nuclear development program. Since 2000, Russia's stated aim in the Middle East has been to restore and strengthen its position, particularly its economic position. Russia hopes to recapture the influence and prestige it enjoyed in the region at the height of the Cold War in the 1970s, Stalinsky said. And U.S. bumbling in Iraq is unwittingly aiding the Russians. After two invasions of Iraq and a decade of substantial U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, many of the states in the Middle East have grown uneasy with the United States as the world's sole superpower, Stalinsky said. They would prefer to have a counterbalance. And Russia is angling for the job.

# influence internals—key to chechnya

## Russian influence contains conflict in Chechnya

**COHEN 2003** (Ariel, esearch Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Davis Institute of The Heritage Foundation, WebMemo #336, Sept 12, http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm336.cfm)

Most importantly, though, Moscow believes that Saudis and other rich Gulf states keep the keys to the 9-year-old war in Chechnya. One audacious Islamist commander in Chechnya, now dead, Hattab, was a Saudi. Another top commander, Shamil Basaev, on the U.S. Department of State terrorism list, receives financial support and a flow of jihadi recruits from the Gulf. Saudi foundations and rich individuals have out poured over $100 million to support Chechen separatism between 1997-1999 alone, according to a State Department official who requested anonymity. Radical Chechen leaders, such as Movladi Udugov and Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, found asylum in Saudi Arabia. However, Al Qaeda’s May 12 terrorist attacks in Riyadh, in which over 35 people died, seemed to change the tone. The Putin Administration is now hoping to stem the financing, and decrease hostilities in and around Chechnya.

**Russian influence in the Middle East is critical to pacify Chechnya**

**FREEDMAN 2007** (Robert, Professor of Political Science at Baltimore Hebrew University and is a Visiting Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, August)

As Putin was moving to bolster the Russian position in the Middle East, he also tried to prevent the Arab and Moslem worlds from aiding the rebellion in Chechnya. Thus he sought, and obtained, for Russia observer status in the Islamic Conference (OIC), and took the opportunity to side with the Moslem world by denouncing the Danish cartoons which were seen as insulting to Islam. For the same reason, he pursued an improved relationship with Saudi Arabia, an effort that bore some fruit as the Saudi government, distancing itself from the Chechen rebels, promised to help in the reconstruction of Chechnya.

**Russian Middle East influence contains Chechnya**

**KATZ 2007** (Mark, professor of government and politics at George Mason University, “Policy Watch: Russia's Middle East strategy,” June 11, http://wpherald.com/articles/5126/2/Policy-Watch-Russias-Middle-East-strategy/Chechen-worries.html)

For while Moscow has by now succeeded in persuading or cajoling all those Middle Eastern governments that were not already completely opposed to the Chechen rebels to stop giving them even minimal support, Moscow knows that there are forces in the Middle East that are willing to support them. In June 2006 the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq kidnapped several Russian diplomats in Baghdad, demanded that Moscow pull its troops out of Chechnya within 48 hours if it wanted them released and executed them when Moscow did not comply. What was especially remarkable about this incident is that the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq (a Sunni umbrella group that includes al-Qaida in Iraq) presumably already had its hands full fighting U.S. forces, Iraqi Shiites and other Sunnis it doesn't like. Despite this, however, the Mujahideen Shura Council found time to think of Russia.

**Russian influence contains Chechnya**

**KHRESTIN 2007** (Igor, research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute. John Elliott, research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, Middle East Quarterly, Winter http://www.meforum.org/article/1632)

Any Middle Eastern government which seeks Moscow's support understands it must either side with the Russian struggle against Chechen separatists or, at a minimum, agree not to meddle. With the end of the Cold War, the Israeli government has sought to better its relations with Moscow. Since 1999, Israeli intelligence has shared information with their Russian counterparts and has assisted Russian forces in training and border security. Israeli officials have likened the Chechen separatists to Palestinian terrorists.[25] Damascus, too, has assisted Russia diplomatically. In September 2005, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad welcomed the pro-Moscow president of Chechnya, Alu Alkhanov, to Damascus, granting the embattled Chechen leader some international legitimacy.[26]

# foreign support key

**Foreign support is key to the Chechen resistance**

**BBC NEWS 2002** (Jan 10, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1751251.stm)

The Chechen rebels have built up an extensive international network supplying money, weaponry and propaganda support. Extradition hurdles Russia will face serious difficulties in persuading foreign governments to help, but the hunt for Mr Udugov is one of the priorities in Moscow's campaign to crush what remains of the Chechen insurgency. He stands accused since March 2000 of one of the most serious crimes in Russia's criminal code - "armed rebellion". What makes him a particularly important target for Moscow is his role in sporadically contacting the international media with reports contradicting Moscow's official line. And his ability to elude capture and justice humiliates Russia's military and security chiefs. Foreign support The Chechen rebel leaders have extended their presence and influence in a number of countries. This lies at the heart of Moscow's argument that the rebellion is about international terrorism, not a neo-colonial war to retain territory historically incorporated into the Russian state by conquest. There is a network of sorts. Its efficiency is questionable, but support for the rebellion does rely on a number of international factors. There is convincing evidence that money and arms have been supplied in ample amounts by a number of Islamic states.

**Foreign support is the key factor for Chechen resistance—Russian soldiers would crush them otherwise**

**WILLIAMS 2006** (Brian, Associate Professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, “Operation Enduring Freedom 2001-2005: Waging Counter-Jihad in Post-Taliban Central Eurasia,” October 5, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71031\_index.html)

Russia responded to this rogue jihadi incursion led by Egyptian, Dagestani, Chechen, Saudi, and Jordanian mujahideen by launching a full scale invasion of Chechen Republic in October 1999. In many ways this played into Khattab’s hands for this drove the Chechen moderate leadership, which had tried to have Khattab and his terrorist camps located in the inaccessible mountains of south eastern Chechnya removed, into a strategic alliance with the jihadis. As a result of the Russians’ brutal campaign the role of the previously-unpopular foreign jihadi militants increased dramatically for the Chechen nationalist resistance needed all the support it could get. As the Chechen army switched from frontal combat to asymmetric guerilla tactics following the fall of their capital of Grozny in February 2000 it began to work closely with Khattab’s Islamic jihadis . The Chechen insurgency has subsequently devolved into a guerilla campaign and the approximately 1,200 full time Chechen insurgents and 100 to 200 foreign volunteers are trying to make the Russian occupation of Chechnya as costly as possible. As the Russians have increasingly responded to this guerilla campaign with brutal attacks on Chechen civilians, extra-judicial executions of suspected guerilla sympathizers, torture on a scale that far surpasses the US excesses in Abu Ghraib (Iraq) and indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets, the Kremlin had driven many Chechens into the arms of the extremists from abroad. This is partly due to the fact that Khattab’s International Islamic Battalion has access to the funds from the Arab world and can offer unemployed and embittered Chechens ‘blood money’ for fighting the hated Russians.

## Foreign support heightens brutality and terrorism in Chechnya

**WILLIAMS 2006** (Brian, Associate Professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, “Operation Enduring Freedom 2001-2005: Waging Counter-Jihad in Post-Taliban Central Eurasia,” October 5, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71031\_index.html)

While few in number, the foreign jihadis have thus profoundly influenced the nature of the Chechen resistance. These foreign extremists been, to an extent, been successful in hijacking the secularist movement for Chechen independence and transforming it into a clash between Islam and the infidel (as they tried in Bosnia and Kosovo and succeeded in Kashmir, Uzbekistan, and the Philippines). Bin Laden has praised the Chechens on numerous occasions and the jihadi Wahhabi cemaats (platoons) have been successful in spreading their influence into the neighboring republics of Ingushetia, Karachai-Balkaria, and Dagestan. As the expanding conflict continues to take its toll on the Muslim populations of all these republics, more and more local Muslims are being driven into the hands of the extremists. Jihad has thus planted roots in the north Caucasus and a new generations of ex-Soviet Muslims is growing up in an a battle zone between Islam and Christianity that encourages holy war as and end unto itself. This can certainly be seen as a victory for the jihad brotherhood. But the radicalization of many components of the Chechen resistance has also given Russia a propaganda victory. Despite the moderate Chechen leadership’s efforts to distance itself from the Arab extremists in the Chechens’ midst, Putin has been has been very successful in having his Chechen adversaries defined as “Al Qaeda” in the West. And in truth, Khattab’s success in grafting the notion of jihad to the Chechens’ struggle lends some truth to Putin’s accusations. In a self-fulfilling prophecy, the Kremlin’s brutal actions have in fact transformed tiny Chechnya into a base for Arab extremists who have worked with local Chechens to sow terrorism in the heartlands of Russia. And in so doing they have fulfilled a dream of the first generation of Afghan-Arabs who had visions of striking directly at Moscow itself as early as the 1980s but hurt the Chechens’ cause abroad. While one must not make the mistake of conflating Russia’s cruel war on the Chechens with the West’s war on Al Qaeda, it is a sad fact that the role of foreign jihadis in the current round of conflict is of tremendous importance and many Arab and Turkish fighters who have fought in this zone of jihad have subsequently drifted into Al Qaeda terrorism. Russia’s brutal actions in Chechnya have thus turned this region into a jihadi training ground which offers ‘hands on’ training for a new generation of front line jihadi holy warriors, some of whom become Al Qaeda terrorists. It can be said that jihadism has a base in Europe in the North Caucasus flank centered on Chechnya.

# iraq withdrawal link

**Iraqi withdrawal ensures terrorists flock to Chechnya and set up a safe haven**

**Katz, prof**essor of government and politics at **George Mason** University, **07** [Mark, , “Policy Watch: Russia's Middle East strategy,” June 11, p. lexis]

Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has pursued three main goals in the Middle East: first, to prevent the United States from becoming the predominant power there; second, to prevent the Middle East (and broader Muslim world) from sympathizing with and supporting Chechen rebels and other Islamic opposition movements in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union; and third, to make money for Russian enterprises through expanding their investments in and exports to the Middle East. Recently, Russia has been attempting to pursue all three of these goals through establishing and maintaining friendly relations with all Middle Eastern governments simultaneously, including those that are anti-American, pro-American, and/or opposed to one another. Thus, while Russia maintains good relations with anti-American regimes in Iran and Syria, it has also established friendly relations with pro-American ones in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Egypt and elsewhere. Moscow is even trying to maintain good relations with Israel, Fatah and Hamas all at the same time. What Moscow -- and many other governments -- feared at the time the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq began in 2003 is that the United States would quickly succeed in establishing a democratic government there, would then proceed to intervene in Iran and/or Syria, and that a democratic Middle East would emerge. While this vision was highly discomforting to all the region's authoritarian regimes (both pro- as well as anti-American), it ewas also uncomfortable for Moscow. The Putin administration assumed that a democratic Middle East would be a pro-U.S. Middle East where Russia would have little influence. Further, the Americans would use their influence to exclude Russian firms from the region. Most importantly, though, the spread of democracy in the Middle East would increase the likelihood of democratic revolution toppling additional authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet Union -- perhaps even in Russia itself. By now, however, neither Moscow nor the Middle East's authoritarian regimes worry about the United States being successful in Iraq. Quite the contrary: Moscow and several other governments have reason to worry about what will happen if the United States fails in Iraq and leaves. For while Moscow has by now succeeded in persuading or cajoling all those Middle Eastern governments that were not already completely opposed to the Chechen rebels to stop giving them even minimal support, Moscow knows that there are forces in the Middle East that are willing to support them. In June 2006 the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq kidnapped several Russian diplomats in Baghdad, demanded that Moscow pull its troops out of Chechnya within 48 hours if it wanted them released and executed them when Moscow did not comply. What was especially remarkable about this incident is that the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq (a Sunni umbrella group that includes al-Qaida in Iraq) presumably already had its hands full fighting U.S. forces, Iraqi Shiites and other Sunnis it doesn't like. Despite this, however, the Mujahideen Shura Council found time to think of Russia. How much more time and effort might they devote to the Chechen cause if U.S. forces left Iraq? The Russians themselves are asking this question. In an article published March 13, 2007, in Izvestia (one of Russia's leading newspapers), Maksim Yusin wrote, "Better the current puppet government in Baghdad than al-Qaida, which would almost certainly gain control over several Iraqi provinces once the Americans were to 'distance themselves.' Then die-hard 'jihadists' would pour into Iraq from other regions, including the North Caucasus ... and the jihadists would start dashing back and forth like shuttle merchants -- off to Russia to blow something up, then back to Iraq for R&R. ... So it would be better if the Americans would just stay put." This statement reveals that some in Moscow are worried about the implications for Russia of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. It also indicates something about what Moscow's interests in the Middle East actually are. While Moscow does not want the United States to be predominant there, it does not want the United States to withdraw, either. For the American presence serves to contain -- and distract -- those jihadists who could well be expected to help the Chechens and other Muslim opposition forces in Russia if they had the time and leisure to do so (they already have the will). And to the extent that the American presence does enhance the security of Middle Eastern countries other than Iraq, this provides the stability that Russian enterprises -- especially oil and gas firms -- need in order to operate there. For Moscow is well aware that if the United States -- with all its resources -- cannot pacify Iraq or keep order in the Middle East more generally, Russia certainly could not hope to do so either. The problem for Moscow is that while a strong American presence in the Middle East limits Russian influence there, a weak American presence there may limit Russian influence there even more.

# chechnya impact—nuke war

**Conflict in Chechnya goes nuclear**

**Blank**, Professor of Research, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, **01** [MacArthur, Winter, online: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_qa3996/is\_200101/ai\_n8951462/print Russian military officials… advocated limited nuclear war.66 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_qa3996/is\_200101/ai\_n8951462/print]

These political threat assessments invoke NATO and the United States as authors of growing threats and define the international situation in terms of the threat U.S. unipolarity poses to Russia's cherished multipolar world. The various doctrinal documents also expand parameters for first-strike use of nuclear weapons and urge vastly increased defense spending; the draft doctrine calculates that spending, as in Soviet times, on the basis of what the military claims to need rather than what Russia can afford.61 Russian military officials and analysts also told me in June 1999 that NATO's Kosovo campaign led doctrine writers to include provisions for deploying tactical nuclear weapons in unspecified conventional threat scenarios.62 In December 1999, Moscow confirmed this when the commander in chief of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, General Vladimir Yakovlev, admitted that Moscow had to lower the threshold of conflict wherein it might **launch a first-strike nuclear attack** because it could not otherwise defend against local wars and conflicts, **a category that could be stretched to include Chechnya**.63 The security concept reiterated his statements, overtly expressing Russia's strategy of deterrence and nuclear warfighting for limited and unlimited nuclear war.64 Other authoritative statements by Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Mikhailov confirm the trend toward nuclear warfighting for limited and unlimited nuclear war scenarios and announce Moscow's belief that it can control such situations despite forty years of Soviet argument that no such control was feasible.65 Indeed, the national security concept openly advocated **limited nuclear war**.66

# chechnya impact—moscow strike

## Chechens will use nuclear terrorism against Moscow

**DOWLE 2005** (Mark, Teaches at the Graduate School of Journalism at Berkeley, California Monthly, September, http://www.alumni.berkeley.edu/Alumni/Cal\_Monthly/September\_2005/COVER\_STORY-\_Berkeleys\_Big\_Bang\_Project\_.asp)

One thing was stressed. Moscow is a feasible target for a terrorist nuclear attack. It is the capital of a fractious nation with a ruthless interior enemy, the Chechens, who have more than once proven their willingness to kill large numbers of Russian civilians. The country has had difficulty containing its own fissionable material. And a domestic terrorist in possession of a nuclear device would not have to cross an international border to reach Moscow. Moreover, Chechen rebels are mostly Muslim and aligned with al-Qaeda, which has expressed interest in obtaining a nuclear device.

## Nuclear terrorism against Russia would cause Russian nuclear retaliation against the U.S. and a series of global wars

**DOWLE 2005** (Mark, Teaches at the Graduate School of Journalism at Berkeley, California Monthly, September, http://www.alumni.berkeley.edu/Alumni/Cal\_Monthly/September\_2005/COVER\_STORY-\_Berkeleys\_Big\_Bang\_Project\_.asp)

In the scenario presented by the BBP team, Vladimir Putin survives the attack. He is traveling in southern Russia when it happens and returns to find his entire military high command and most of his key ministries annihilated. He immediately institutes martial law, although most of the officers prepared to administer it are gone. In public briefings, Putin struggles to persuade his country and the world that there remains a chain of command, although that’s unlikely to be the case. He is by all indications a confident, thoughtful, and level-headed leader, unlikely to lash out. But many officers in the Russian military, and more than a few powerful civilians, harbor deep, residual post-Cold War distrust of America. More than a few surviving Russian military leaders still believe that the August 2000 sinking of the Kursk nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea somehow involved the United States Navy. Such people could be persuaded with relative ease that America was complicit in a nuclear attack, which almost certainly will surface as a conspiracy theory in Russia and elsewhere in the world. If we didn’t set it off, we knew it was coming and could have stopped it. Adding fuel to the scenario of a possible Russian reprisal against the United States has been the recent decline of relations between the two nations as the Bush administration has castigated Putin for human rights violations. Russia, in turn, has leaned more heavily toward China in trade and the two nations have been conducting joint military operations. Putin will be pressed to subdue suspicious military leaders, many of them in distant reaches of the country and in virtual possession of loaded nukes. If Putin were killed by the Big Bang, a question one member of the BBP posits, the post-attack likelihood of political instability and nuclear retaliation becomes even greater. One goal of the BBP team was to search for ways to quickly convince surviving Russian leaders that they would have no grounds for retaliating against the West. With that danger in mind, Harold Smith made a strategic decision. He brought two well-known Russians into the project’s deliberations—Nobel Laureate Zhores Alferov and Alexei Arbatov, a popular member of the Duma and, according to Smith, “the smartest man in Russia.” Their presence was meant to counteract a Russian general from waving the Big Bang report as “proof’’ that the U.S. Department of Defense had foreknowledge of just such an attack. If they are not too near ground zero when the Big Bang occurs, one or both of them could assure their fellow citizens that the BBP report is what it is—the product of an essential, collaborative exercise in theoretical, long-range, post-terrorist planning, in which they participated. The Berkeley team also stressed concerns about profiteering from collapsed markets, exploiting “holes of ungoverned spaces’’ by terrorist organizations seeking sanctuary, starting other wars between longtime adversaries, or taking advantage of Russia’s weakened international position.

[“the scenario” described here comes from a UC Berkeley study into the aftermath of a Chechen nuclear attack on Russia ---Calum]

# chechnya impact—terrorism

**Chechnya is a breeding ground for terrorism --- it provides a safe haven and ensures increasing radicalization**

**Brownfield**, editor American enterprise institute**, 03** [Peter, editor and writer at the American Enterprise Institute, “The Afghanization of Chechnya,” March 26, <http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=2798>]

Afghanistan threatened America because it was a lawless country where terrorists could organize and train. For this reason America destroyed the al-Qaeda-sponsoring Taliban. Because the lawless parts of the Philippines and Georgia have given haven to terrorists, the U.S. military is training the local forces and fighting those threats. A worse problem than Georgia or the Philippines and a region ripe for Afghanization has been largely ignored since the war on terror began. That region is Chechnya, which offers one of the most serious international security threats. Over the last nine years, and particularly in the last four, the Russian military has [brutalized the Chechen people](http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGEUR460072001), thus radicalizing that conflict and **creating an environment where international terrorism could thrive**. What had been a secular and democratic independence movement could now be changing as extreme Islam and terrorism are becoming attractive to some Chechens and al Qaeda’s leadership and operatives appear to be seeking a greater involvement in that conflict. In a twist of irony, Russia’s cooperation in the War on Terrorism has caused Washington to ignore the growing terror threat in Chechnya. The almost unbelievable level of suffering the Chechens have endured is radicalizing them and making terrorism more likely. When one considers what they have gone through, it is natural that desperation and extremism would find fertile ground. Chechnya has been at war with Russia twice, from 1994 to 1996 and from 1999 to the present. It is now a nation of warlords and anarchy. In the last nine years, between 180,000 and 250,000 people have been killed. Approximately 350,000 Chechens have been displaced by the fighting. These numbers are from a population of just 1.1 million. Roughly half of the population has been killed or displaced by the wars. As a means of comparison, while about 16 percent (using the conservative estimate) of Chechens have been killed, during the conflict in Kosovo 0.6 percent of Kosovars were killed. According to the International Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, “The numbers of disappeared Chechens in recent months indicate a continuing assault against the Chechen people that borders on genocide.” Chechnya, which is the size of Connecticut and has the population of Vermont, has approximately 80,000 Russian troops in it, troops that regularly commit atrocities with no accountability. Almost every village and town in Chechnya has repeatedly endured so-called “mopping up” operations, during which Russian troops loot, beat, rape, extort, and illegally execute and detain Chechen civilians. One more frightening statistic: Russian authorities have designated approximately 73 percent of Chechen territory environmentally contaminated. If such a hellish environment continues, young Chechens will not reject terrorism. Carrying their fight abroad and allying with a bin Laden will seem acceptable. Despite the diaspora of 100,000 Chechens in Russia, Chechens rarely carry the war outside their borders. The fear of more attacks like the one at the Moscow theater last fall should cause concern in the Kremlin. Of greater concern for the West is that Chechnya could serve as a base and recruiting ground for al Qaeda or other terror networks. Last week, Chechen foreign minister Ilyas Akhmadov, speaking at a New Atlantic Initiative meeting in Washington, said that while events like the hostage standoff in the Moscow theater are now rare, the tenor of the conflict could make them more likely. Akhmadov is a part of the last elected Chechen government, which came to power in 1997. The Russian brutality will continue to evoke a sharp response from the brutalized. Because Chechens have “no right except to die,” the “path to radicalization is open,” Akhmadov said. “Russian policies toward Chechnya have been a factory for creating terrorism.” Every year that passes it gets worse. More terrorists are created. Akhmadov warned that young Chechens have no other training but in war. This generation has grown up with family members being killed and tortured and with much of their schooling done with Kalashnikovs. In a foreign ministry document, Akhmadov wrote, “Four years of indiscriminate warfare, ethnic cleansing operations, and international indifference to Russian atrocities has created an atmosphere of hopelessness and desperation.” In this era of worldwide terrorist networks and alliances among disaffected groups, such as Colombian rebels and the Irish Republican Army, it should be clear how this bitter and terrorized people could align with terrorists. The warning signs are already there. Recent incidents show that Chechnya should be within the spectrum of America’s anti-terrorism efforts. In December 1996 al Qaeda’s second in command, the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, investigated transferring the terrorist network’s headquarters to Chechnya. In the fall of 1999, three of the September 11 attackers were intending to fight the Russians in Chechnya before being told there were enough fighters there. In November 2002, bin Laden himself invoked Chechnya. In a message broadcast on al Jazeera, bin Laden said, “As you look at your dead in Moscow, also recall ours in Chechnya.” While Chechnya has attracted the interests of Muslim terrorists, radical Islam, which had never before been popular in Chechnya, has likewise gained a foothold there. Long beards are appearing on men, while some women are wearing the Arab-style *hijab*, a head-to-toe black dress that leaves only the eyes uncovered. Pleading for international attention and action, Foreign Minister Akhmadov wrote in a peace proposal published on March 18, “Moscow’s policy of collective terror against the Chechen people is turning some elements of Chechen society toward irrational and undifferentiated vengeance. While the government of Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov has and will continue to condemn any terrorist acts, regardless of who may perpetrate them, *a just peace is ultimately the only way to prevent this deeply alarming trend*” [emphasis in the original]. A Chechen ministry of foreign affairs document similarly drew a grave picture of the potential for terrorism in that country. “Russia’s policy of collective terror and total lack of accountability is turning Chechnya into a fertile ground for terrorism. The Moscow hostage taking clearly demonstrates Chechnya’s extreme desperation and fast-growing radicalization. Undoubtedly, continuation of the war will turn at least a part of Chechnya’s armed resistance to irrational . . . violence of vengeance independent of the political agenda, which neither President Maskhadov nor anyone else would be able to control. Ending the war and solving the conflict are surely the only way to prevent this.” This week Chechens voted on a constitution that would declare the republic an inseparable part of Russia. The reported voter turnout of about 80 percent and the overwhelming support for the proposal would appear to offer some hope for a political solution. However, this referendum was taken at the point of a gun, with 80,000 Russian troops in the country. Human rights activists have said they suspect large-scale fraud. Additionally, because of the climate of intimidation and fear, they say a fair poll could not be taken. Leading Russian human rights organizations, such as Memorial, have also criticized the poll. One suspect detail is the fact that between 27,000 and 36,000 Russian servicemen stationed in Chechnya were among the voters. The likelihood of this referendum leading to a final settlement seems small, because the elected Chechen leadership and the guerillas do not support it. Chechnya’s political leaders consider the relationship with Russia to be poisoned because of the brutality of the two wars. The Chechen guerillas have also rejected the Russian proposal and actively campaigned against it. With the continuing tough resistance, the opposition of the Chechen political leadership, and the poll being taken in a country occupied by a brutal army, it is hard to see the ingredients for peace through this referendum. The Chechen government offered a different formula for peace. Akhmadov was in Washington to promote the government’s peace proposal, which recognizes the security threat Chechnya poses to Russia, and the haven Chechnya could be for terrorists. Because of these concerns, the proposal is for a conditional independence with a period of several years of international administration that would include both United Nations peacekeeping troops and civilian administrators. Chechnya is not an issue that can be ignored. Should the radicalization and Islamization of that conflict continue, Western security interests will be in danger.The irony of Washington’s hesitancy to criticize Moscow for its record in Chechnya is that this policy has worsened the international security climate. Past experience in Afghanistan should spur Washington to address Chechnya’s plight before it becomes a terrorist haven.

**Failure to address stability in Chechnya causes terrorism**

**Vidino,** deputy director at the Investigative Project, a Washington D.C.-based counterterrorism research institute**, 05** [Lorenzo, Middle East Quarterly, summer, <http://www.meforum.org/article/744>)

BBC NEWS 2002

(Jan 10, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1751251.stm>)

With the loss of their Afghan safe haven, Al-Qaeda operatives scattered. With the help of Islamist charities, many traveled to the Pankisi Gorge,[[52]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn52) a mountainous area in northern Georgia. In December 2003, for example, an Azeri military court convicted the leaders of Revival of Islamic Heritage, a Kuwaiti humanitarian organization, for sending Azeri recruits to the Pankisi Gorge on their way to fight in Chechnya.[[53]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn53) According to Georgian officials, in early 2002, some sixty Arab computer, communications, and financial specialists, military trainers, chemists, and bomb-makers settled in the gorge. The group used sophisticated satellite and encrypted communications to support both Ibn al-Khattab's operations in Chechnya and terrorists planning attacks against Western targets. The "Pankisi Arabs" later tried to buy explosives for what Georgian security officials believe was to have been a major attack on U.S. or other Western installations in Russia.[[54]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn54) A 2003 plot involving ricin, a virulent and deadly toxin, demonstrated the Islamist co-option of the Chechen nationalist conflict **and its transformation into a global jihadist training ground.** According to U.S. intelligence sources cited in the Italian indictment, Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian terrorist alleged to mastermind much of the Iraqi insurgency, dispatched Adnan Muhammad Sadiq (Abu Atiya), a former Al-Qaeda instructor at a Herat, Afghanistan training camp, to Pankisi. In the gorge, Abu Atiya, a Palestinian who had lost a leg during the Chechen war, trained terrorists in the use of toxic gases.[[55]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn55) He also was behind a 2002 scheme to stage biological and chemical attacks against Russian or American interests in Turkey.[[56]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn56) Undeterred by his compromised Turkey plot, in autumn 2002, he tasked a number of Islamist cells from North Africa to travel to Europe to conduct poison and explosive attacks.[[57]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn57) In December 2002, French authorities arrested four terrorists planning to blow up the Russian embassy in Paris. According to the French Interior Ministry, three of the individuals arrested—Merouane Benahmed, Menad Benchellali, and Noureddine Merabet—had fought alongside Chechen mujahideen and had received training in toxic substances from "high-ranking Al-Qaeda operatives" in the Pankisi camps. The terrorists said they wanted to attack the Russian embassy to avenge Ibn al-Khattab's death.[[58]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn58) Information extracted from the detainees in France led investigators to another cell in north London, which possessed a stock of ricin.[[59]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn59) The ensuing investigation led to raids on London's Finsbury Park mosque,[[60]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn60) a raid in Manchester during which an Algerian terrorist fatally stabbed a British police officer,[[61]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn61) and arrests in Spain.[[62]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn62) The global reach of Al-Qaeda's Chechen cells was demonstrated by the fact that the ricin's manufacture was consistent with descriptions in Al-Qaeda manuals and in a notebook found by Russian Special Forces during a raid of a Chechen rebel base.[[63]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn63) According to the Kremlin's spokesman for Chechen issues, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the ricin investigation showed that Chechnya had become part of a "network of international terrorist organizations."[[64]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn64) In April 2002, the U.S. Defense Department created the "Georgia Train and Equip Program" as part of which U.S. Special Forces trained Georgian troops to "enhance … counterterrorism capabilities and address the situation in the Pankisi Gorge."[[65]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn65) The program officially ended in April 2004 with its success unclear. While there have been important arrests of Arab jihadists,[[66]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn66) the February 2003 declaration of the Georgian State Security Ministry that Al-Qaeda had fled the Pankisi Gorge,[[67]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn67) was premature. In May 2003, Russian deputy prosecutor general Sergei Fridinsky said that about 700 terrorists still operated in the Pankisi Gorge.[[68]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn68) In December 2004, despite sustained operations carried out by Georgian Special Forces, Russian authorities claimed that about 200 Chechen and foreign fighters remained in the Pankisi Gorge and even threatened a preemptive strike inside Georgian territory.[[69]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn69) The Russian claims, which the Georgian government described as "strange and irresponsible,"[[70]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn70) appear to be motivated by both genuine concern about the presence of guerrilla fighters on Georgian territory and by Moscow's desire to assert authority over Georgia. While small groups of fighters cross between Chechnya and Georgia, it appears that the Georgian government has been sincere in its efforts to end a massive and constant presence of armed guerrillas on its territory. The Georgians claim that Moscow is using the Pankisi Gorge to threaten them.[[71]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn71) Such a perception is reinforced by the Russian government's refusal to extend the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's renewal of the Georgia Border Monitoring Operation,[[72]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn72) which, since December 1999, had stationed neutral observers along the porous border.[[73]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn73) Unfortunately, Moscow's tendency to conflate corollary geopolitical concerns with its war on terrorism has allowed its detractors to ignore legitimate grievances with regard to Islamist infiltration of Chechen fighters. Conclusions Terrorist groups have not limited their actions to Chechnya and Georgia. According to the State Department, Ibn al-Khattab, with Al-Qaeda's financial support, also mobilized mujahideen from Azerbaijan and the Russian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Ossetia.[[74]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn74) Moscow is correct in asserting that the Chechen question cannot be contained to the borders of Chechyna. With external financing and subsidized mosques and Islamic schools spreading extremism in areas bordering Chechnya, **the spread of Islamism is a real threat**.[[75]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn75) Ibn al-Khattab stated that his goal was "the removal of all Russian presence from the land of Caucasus,"[[76]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn76) implying that he saw Chechnya as **a launching pad for a much wider war**. The FSB sees the Chechen fighters "not [as] nationalists or independence-seekers, [but rather as] disciplined international terrorists, united by a single aim: to seize power and bring in a new world order based on Shari'a (Islamic) law."[[77]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn77) The March 2005 death of Aslan Maskhadov, the circumstances of which are still murky, will probably exacerbate the conflict. With Maskhadov's nationalism out of the way, it will be easier for Baseyev and his followers to put a Wahhabi-influenced Islamist stamp on the conflict. U.S. and European officials are slowly realizing the repercussions of hundreds of battle-hardened jihadis just three hours by plane from Western Europe. In the era of global jihad, terrorists operating in the remote mountains of the Caucasus pose the same threat as a cell operating in the heart of any Western European city. Jean Louis Bruguière, the French magistrate that conducted the investigation on the Chechnya-trained cell that planned to bomb the Russian embassy in Paris, said after the perpetrators' arrests, "We have some information that the Caucasus at the present time will play a very major role and could be a new Afghanistan."[[78]](http://www.meforum.org/744/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn78) Western authorities should heed Bruguière's warning. Chechnya may appear a diplomatic and military quagmire as once did Afghanistan. But the cost of leaving the problem unaddressed can be high. Chechnya may seem half a world away, but **distance is no longer a guarantee of immunity from terror.**

# chechnya impact—nuke reliance

**War in Chechnya weakens Russian conventional power—that causes nuclear reliance**

**Blank, 01** [Steven, MacArthur Professor of Research, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Demokratizatsiya, Winter)

The fiscal costs of maintaining the regular army in Chechnya already preclude either conventional force modernization or the development of a professional army that can deal with high-tech weapons and modern war beyond the guerrilla level. Prolongation of the war can only aggravate the situation further. As it is, Putin had only 90,000 troops available to go into Chechnya out of an estimated 1.2 million men in the army. Further fighting means that neither training nor reequipping the men is possible, nor is the development of other reliable cadres. Other possible economic-political solutions will be foreclosed for reasons of cost and inappropriateness to a wartime contingency.

**Impact is nuclear war**

**Lambert and Miller, 97** [Stephen and David, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, “Russia’s Crumbling Tactical Nuclear Weapons Complex: An Opportunity for Arms Control” April, <http://fas.org/irp/threat/ocp12.htm>]

**N**uclear Dependency in the Face of Conventional Contingencies. Concerns regarding Russia's nuclear policies have been deepened by Russia's increasing reliance on its nuclear forces in the face of dramatically reduced conventional force quality and readiness. Igor Khripunov, a former Soviet diplomat and expert on security affairs, recently noted that some Russian military analysts "make a strong case for maintaining and improving nuclear weapons, *air-based weapons in particular*, without which Russia cannot adequately protect its security in the current geostrategic situation." It seems to be clear that "the demise of the Red Army that formerly protected Russia shifted the burden of security onto nuclear forces. Russia's new military doctrine abandons its former pledge of no-first-useof nuclear arms, and widens the conditions under which it might use them. By increasing its reliance on these weapons, Russia also magnifies the significance of its nuclear strategy." In order to operationalize this new reliance on nuclear weapons, Russian officials have chosen to emphasize the value and role of tactical nuclear weapons. They understand that posturing with strategic nuclear systems is practically useless, since they perceive there is a very basic state of strategic equilibrium between the United States, Russia, and China. Therefore, the solution to making the nuclear threat more credible is to articulate a greater role for tactical nuclear weapons since these weapons are viewed as "war fighting weapons." In fact, there has been evidence that some Russian officials have not ruled out redeploying tactical nuclear weapons in forward locations (such as land-based systems in Belarus and Kaliningrad and sea-based systems on the ships of the Baltic fleet). Sergei Kortunov, a member of the Russian security council and the deputy director of the Analytic Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation, recently warned that in the face of a mounting unfavorable balance in the correlation of forces, Russia might resolve to re-evaluate the 1991 unilateral tactical nuclear weapons initiatives. Other Russian officials have also alluded to potential initiatives regarding tactical nuclear systems. Major General Belous has stated that "there is no doubt that in the present geopolitical situation a number of Russian TNW [theater nuclear weapons], particularly air-based ones, should be retained...." Belous regards tactical nuclear weapons as "the equalizer which would deprive NATO of its new-found military superiority." He mentions the possibility that Russia may choose to "carry out a 'demonstration' TNW detonation to prove to an aggressor our resolve to use nuclear weapons," and concludes that, "faced with an economic crisis and a rather modest ability to equip its army and navy, for the foreseeable future Russia will be forced to rely on nuclear weapons to ensure its security

# chechnya impact—oil/econ

**Conflict in Chechnya outweighs the Middle East—it goes global and disrupts oil supplies and the Russian economy—this evidence is comparative**

**Beeman, 03** [Phillip, teaches anthropology at Brown University, dir. of Middle East Studies, Pacific News Service, Jan 8, <http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=5330>]

The Republic of Chechnya is poised to explode, and the reverberations are likely to send shock waves throughout the world. Washington has chosen to do nothing about this, to the detriment of the United States and the globe. The level of violence in Chechnya arguably exceeds that of any other conflict on earth today, including the Israel-Palestine conflict. The danger of continued violence in the Northern Caucasus also threatens Western interests more than any other strategic situation on the planet. Why, then, is the Bush administration doing nothing? The short answer is that it does not want to lose potential Russian support in the United Nations for its upcoming war on Iraq, and the ongoing "war on terrorism." Nor does it want to threaten the oil resources of the Northern Caucasus region, which are themselves key to accessing the vast trans-Caspian oil fields of Central Asia. Three actions toward the end of the year show the gathering storm clouds, in addition to the terrible theater hostage tragedy in Moscow on October 23. During the Christmas holidays, a number of violent attacks occurred, including a suicide truck bombing of the Chechen government headquarters on Dec. 27, which killed 83 people. Following this was the astonishing acquittal of Russian Colonel Vladimir Budanov for the murder of a Chechen civilian woman on New Year's Eve. Finally, a key organization that was making progress on peace in Chechnya was dissolved. The mandate for the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) in Europe's monitoring group in Chechnya expired on New Year's Day -- and President Putin will not renew it. Of the three events, the last is the most ominous. The OSCE has been the principal source of stability and reconciliation in Chechnya since 1995, brokering cease-fires at least twice and working to curb human rights abuses despite criticisms from both Chechens and Russians. The United States claims that it has worked to maintain the OSCE in Chechnya, but it has exerted little or no pressure on President Putin to renew the mandate. This essentially takes the lid off of potential violence by Chechen rebels, and removes any effective monitoring of excesses by Russian troops -- a deadly combination. President Putin prefers a "referendum" that, if passed, would change the Chechen constitution, binding it inextricably to Moscow. Few Chechens believe that this Moscow-sponsored poll will be fairly conducted. Violent protest in reaction to Kremlin-engineered vote manipulation is almost guaranteed. Washington has pussy-footed around dealing with the Chechnya problem for several reasons. First, President Putin was an early supporter of Washington's mandate for the global war on terrorism. A kind of bargain was struck after the Sept. 11 tragedy: The United States would be allowed to operate unchallenged to pursue terrorists throughout the world, as long as it left Chechnya and other rebel enclaves in Russia under Moscow's purview. The United States further needed Russia's vote in the United Nations to support its potential military intervention in Iraq. Thus far, both Washington and Moscow have kept their devil's bargain. Second, the United States realizes that stability in Chechnya at whatever price is the key to oil transport through the Caucasus. Besides having considerable oil reserves of its own, Chechnya sits astride a critical pipeline that links the oil-rich republics of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (on the landlocked Caspian Sea) with the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. The oil market is a global market. The United States is as concerned about Russian oil supplies as those of the Gulf region. Moreover, since oil is one of the few economic resources helping Russia to stay afloat, Washington sees protection of those economic interests as crucial to maintaining stability in the region-even at the price of human rights and civilian repression by the Russian Army. According to Washington and Moscow, "stability" is not about stopping a brutal war, but rather assuring Russian sovereignty in the region. Chechnya would probably do far better on its own. Since it was invaded by Russia in the mid-19th Century, it has never been successfully incorporated into the Russian Federation. It was briefly independent in 1918, but later re-annexed by the Soviet Union. Rebellion was so common under Stalin that he ordered the entire population deported to Siberia. They were only allowed to return in 1957 under Khruschev's regime. Many of its intellectuals and political leaders still live in exile in Turkey or Europe. Chechnya's economic resources would easily sustain it as a nation. It enjoys good relations with its immediate non-Russian neighbor, Georgia. The problem from Moscow's perspective is a possible domino effect created by Chechen independence. Other Islamic Republics in the region might also want to break away. Of particular concern is Dagestan, which borders on the Caspian Sea and is crucial for oil transport. Washington's failure to engage with President Putin on this issue is astonishingly short-sighted. **A full-scale civil war in Chechnya could endanger the region, and eventually the world,** and this is certainly going to happen if America sits on its hands.

# chechnya impact—state collapse

**War in Chechnya distorts the Russian state—this causes prolif, terrorism, and disease spread**

**Shlapentokh, prof**essor of history **at Indiana** University, **03** [Dmitry, , Society, “Trends in Putin’s Russia” November]

The attempt to create a strong state could fail and the state could become even weaker. Yet this weakness, the inability to mobilize resources for a confrontation with the West or solve other problems, could well foster the irrational mentality that could lead to the employment of various types of terrorism. This sort of mindset could also encourage asocial and extremist actions among the general population. Asocial processes could also have medical implications and foster the rise of disease, which could also have implications for the global community. State-Sponsored Terrorism The external changes in the present regime could lead to the creation of a nation that would sponsor state terrorism. In this case Russia could follow the road of Iran, Libya, and other rogue states. The Chechen war could have a role in this sort of development. In the last several years there has been a considerable rise of tension between Russia and the United States. These tensions have continued even after 9/11 when Putin proclaimed the USA to be Russia's ally. Russia has often implied that a new "Cold War" could be launched. In the West this "Cold War" has implicitly been seen as following the model of the old Cold War. This model is essentially wrong. The old Cold War involved an arms race and the support of proxies all over the world. This arrangement required considerable resources that presentday Russia does not have. The only way to harm the United States is to transform Russia into a "rogue" state that would support terrorism and support other rogue states. The recent terrorist attack in the United States provided the Russian elite with convincing arguments that in certain situations terrorist actions could be a powerful "asymmetrical response," which makes weak nations or small groups equal to a superpower, The support of terrorism and rogue states is not a new arrangement. It was widely used during the Cold War, although it had a comparatively minor role in the overall geopolitical arrangement of the time. Yet the sponsoring of terrorism and "'rogue" states could be a major way of fighting and/or blackmailing the West. It could include, among other activities, the transfer of nuclear technology to rogue states and terrorist groups. The Chechen war demonstrated clearly that there are forces in the present Russian elite ready for these reckless actions. It is widely believed, for example, that the apartment building in Moscow where three hundred residents perished was blown up by members of the Russian elite. The terrorist attack was attributed to the Chechens and created an excuse for the new war that was essential for Putin's victory.

**Extinction**

**ZIMMERMAN AND ZIMMERMAN 95** (Barry and David, both have M.S. degrees from Long Island University, Killer Germs p 132)

Today some five thousand vials of exotic viruses sit, freeze-dried, at Yale University—imports from the rain forests. They await the outbreak of diseases that can be ascribed to them. Many are carried by insects and are termed *arboviruses* (*ar*thropod *bo*rne). Others, of even greater concern, are airborne and can simply be breathed in. Some, no doubt, could threaten humanity’s very existence. Joshua Lederberg, 1958 winner of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine and foremost authority on emerging viruses, warned in a December 1990 article in *Discover* magazine: “It is still not comprehended widely that AIDS is a natural, almost predictable phenomenon. It is not going to be a unique event. Pandemics are not acts of God, but are built into the ecological relations between viruses, animal species and human species…There will be more surprises, because our fertile imagination does not begin to match all the tricks that nature can play…” According to Lederberg, “The survival of humanity is not preordained…The single biggest threat to man’s continued dominance on the planet is the virus” (*A Dancing Matrix*, by Robin Marantz Hening).

\*\*\*ARMS SALES

# Russia arms sales 1nc

**Middle East conflict won’t escalate to all-out war but tensions sustain demand for arms imports**

**Neumann 1995** (Robert, Journal of International Affairs, Summer)

More important for Middle East security are political considerations. The reality of U.S. domestic politics dictates the continuation of the very high level of U.S. assistance to Israel. Even though the new Republican majority in Congress may try to reduce the overall level of U.S. foreign assistance, the quantity and sophistication of U.S. arms exports to Israel are not likely to suffer greatly in the foreseeable future. The Israeli military doctrine requires that Israel remain qualitatively superior not only to its individual Arab neighbors, but to any combination of Arab states, and this is unlikely to change. In view of these considerations, a war between some or all Arab states and Israel has now become a practical and rational improbability. Even irrational attacks, in light of such odds, are most unlikely, unless suicidal policies are to be assumed.(18) Of course wars are not always started to be won. Anwar al-Sadat began his war against Israel in 1973 without any expectation of victory in the usually accepted form. He hoped for tactical, if not strategic, surprise--which he achieved--and he aimed at shaking up both the Israeli and the U.S. establishments. The eventual result was the Camp David Agreement. Today such a situation is unlikely.(19) Yet the arms race in conventional weapons is bound to continue for other reasons.

**That’s key to the Russian economy**

**Rivlin 5 – Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University** (Dr. Paul, “The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East,” The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies)

In the years 1994-98, Russian arms exports to the Middle East exceeded $2 billion and those of the US totaled $17.6 billion.2 Russia’s arms exports to the Middle East increased rapidly in the second half of the 1990s, at a much faster rate than those of other suppliers, and in 2003 alone they totaled almost $1.5 billion. Since 2000, the Middle East has accounted for 18 percent of Russian arms exports and Russia sees the region as an important market for arms and nuclear equipment, one that it is determined to retain. Yet these exports, and especially sales of nuclear materials to Iran, are highly controversial on the international scene and therefore have exacted a political price for Russia in the West and in Israel. This study examines why Russia persists in these sales nonetheless, and why it is likely to do so in the future. Three principal explanations can be posited to account for the controversial export policy. The first is economic necessity: Russia has little to sell abroad except oil and arms, and the latter provides a vital source of employment for Russian scientists, technicians, and engineers who might otherwise emigrate in search of better professional opportunities. The second explanation is political: Russia has important political interests in the Middle East that are advanced by selling arms and nuclear materials. The third is what might be called “chaos theory”: the Russian government lost control and the result was that different public and private sector bodies followed their own interests rather than those of the state.3 This study contends that the first two explanations are the key to understanding Russia’s Middle East arms export policy. The state of the Russian economy is a function of its Soviet past, and the structure that the Soviets built was a response to their geo-political position, strongly influenced by Marxist thinking (appendix1). This pattern of development isolated the Soviet Union from world markets and resulted in Soviet goods being uncompetitive on international markets. The Soviet economy developed on the basis of exploiting raw materials, together with heavy industry and large-scale production. The communist system, dominated by an archaic central planning mechanism, was unable to respond to changes in demand, and the economy did not diversify sufficiently. As a result its exports were mainly confined to raw materials and arms. When Russia became an independent state in 1991, it had little to sell abroad except oil, gas, and arms, and it was forced to rely heavily on fluctuating income from oil and gas sales.

**Impact is Russia-China war**

**TRENIN 2002** (Dmitri, Deputy Director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Former Russian Officer, After Eurasia, pp 308-309)

Usually, there is no shortage of dire predictions concerning Russia’s ultimate fate. In a characteristic exchange of views on the eve of the year 2000, a prominent Russian intellectual predicted Russia’s disintegration within 10 to 15 years. His European counterpart’s vision of Russia was that of Muscovy west of the Urals, with Siberia under Chinese control. The American scholar limited himself to the vision of a Sino-Russian war. If a doomsday scenario were to become a reality, this would be the result of a major economic catastrophe. If Russia became a loose confederation, its borderlands would gravitate in different directions, and governing Russia would require the art of managing these very different orientations. In other words, Russia would still join the world, but it would do so in less than one piece.

**Extinction**

**SHARAVIN 2001** (Alexander, Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, What the Papers Say, Oct 3)

Now, a few words about the third type of war. A real military threat to Russia from China has not merely been ignored; it has been denied by Russia's leaders and nearly all of the political forces. Let's see some statistic figures at first. The territory of Siberia and the Russian Far East comprises 12,765,900 square kilometers (75% of Russia's entire area), with a population of 40,553,900 people (28% of Russia's population). The territory of China is 9,597,000 square kilometers and its population is 1.265 billion (which is 29 times greater than the population of Siberia and the Russian Far East). China's economy is among the fastest-growing economies in the world. It remains socialistic in many aspects, i.e. extensive and highly expensive, demanding more and more natural resources. China's natural resources are rather limited, whereas the depths of Siberia and the Russian Far East are almost inexhaustible. Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

# Russian econ uniqueness

**Russian economy high now**

**Russia & CIS Banking & Finance Weekly 10** (“Russian GDP up estimated 2.9% in Q1 – Rosstat,” 5/14/10, Lexis)

Russian GDP grew around 2.9% year-on-year in Q1 2010, the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) said in its preliminary estimate for the period. Economic Development Minister Elvira Nabiullina also said on May 14 that GDP rose something like 2.9% in the quarter. The Russian Economic Development Ministry said at the end of April, though, that GDP might have grown 4.5% year-on-year in Q1. The Rosstat said it estimates GDP shrank 7.9% in 2009. The Econ Ministry forecasts at least 4% growth in 2010.

**Russian economy stable now**

**Bloomberg, 6/30**/10 [“Russia Leaves Rates Unchanged as Economy Gathers Pace”, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-30/russia-leaves-rates-unchanged-as-economy-gathers-pace.html>]

June 30 (Bloomberg) -- Russia’s central bank left its main interest rates unchanged today, ending a 14-month easing cycle as the economic recovery gathers speed and inflation slows. Bank Rossii kept the refinancing rate at a record low 7.75 percent, it said on its website today, as forecast by all 15 economists in a Bloomberg survey. It also left the repurchase rate charged on one- and seven-day loans unchanged at 6.75 percent. The regulator last trimmed rates on May 31. “The main trends in economic activity, monetary and credit spheres remain the same,” the bank said in a statement. “Industrial activity, employment and domestic demand” are recovering. “The continued gradual recovery of bank lending, which began in March, and decreasing interest rates on loans to the real sector are positive factors.” The economy may expand 7 percent this year, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. Chief Global Economist Jim O’Neill said on June 19, compared with the government’s 4 percent forecast. Higher commodity prices and domestic demand are helping the world’s biggest energy exporter recover from last year’s 7.9 percent slump, the biggest on record. Inflation this year will slow to between 5.5 percent and 6.5 percent, the government estimates. Inflation risks are “at an acceptable level” and the regulator will “likely keep interest rates unchanged in the coming months,” according to the statement. The inflation rate remained at 6 percent in May, the lowest level in 12 years. No Rush “Given the benign inflation dynamics, we expect the central bank not to rush to tighten policy, although the bank would likely continue to withdraw anti-crisis support measure to the banking sector,” Anna Zadornova, a London-based economist at Goldman Sachs, said by e-mail today. Russian stocks erased gains after the decision and the ruble remained little changed. The Micex Index slipped than 0.5 percent to 1,316.29 as of 2:40 p.m. in Moscow, after rising as much as 0.4 percent. The ruble traded at 31.1900 per dollar, from 31.2675 yesterday. “All the necessary conditions for a swifter economic recovery are emerging,” Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said at a Cabinet meeting on June 2. The 14 rate cuts in as many months helped boost lending, he said. Lending Growth Corporate lending grew at the fastest pace this year in May as the economic recovery gained momentum, central bank data show. Corporate loans rose 1.9 percent, compared with 0.9 percent in the previous month, Bank Rossii said in a report on its website today. Retail loans advanced 1.2 percent in May, compared with 1 percent the month before, it said. Retail deposits increased 1.7 percent, according to the report. “The refinancing rate won’t have a significant influence because it is lowered to increase liquidity on the market,” Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said on June 19. “There is currently a lot of liquidity. The key, fundamental factors for lending are industry risks, the potential for growth.” There is enough liquidity in the system as banks have 2 trillion rubles ($64 billion) of liquid assets, half of which is held in central bank bonds, Bank Rossii’s First Deputy Chairman Alexei Ulyukayev said yesterday. Capital Flows Russian lending rates are “too low” and “do not reflect the real risks” in the economy, German Gref, chief executive officer of OAO Sberbank, the country’s biggest bank, said on June 1. Still, Sberbank doesn’t have immediate plans to raise the interest rates it offers on loans, according to Gref. “Rates at the current level don’t create significant preconditions for capital inflow,” the central bank said in a statement last month. Net capital inflow reached $10 billion in March through May and probably continued in June, Ulyukayev said. There will be no net capital inflow for the year as a whole, after a $52.4 billion outflow last year, according to government estimates. Bank Rossii’s “commitment” to a flexible exchange rate and free capital movement means inflows will make the ruble’s appreciation “inevitable,” ING Groep NV analyst Stanislav Ponomarenko said last month. The central bank has reduced the extent to which it steers the ruble to lessen the effects of currency moves on producers. Ruble Policy While the bank will continue to intervene on currency markets to “smooth out the volatility” of the ruble, “we will not set a target for the ruble’s nominal or real exchange rate,” Ulyukayev said yesterday. The ruble may strengthen to 28 versus the dollar by the end of 2012 and maintain a “trend toward appreciation” in the next three years, according to a government report this month. The ruble may gain 20 percent in the next three years against the currencies of Russia’s major trading partners with the effects of inflation stripped out, the report said.

# instability links

**Instability in the Middle East drives arms exports**

**Neumann 1995** (Robert, Journal of International Affairs, Summer)

It is commonly accepted that the Middle East is awash in conventional arms, with pressure for the delivery of ever more exotic, lethal equipment. It is also commonly asserted that such supplies are basically destabilizing and hence that some means or mechanism must be found to control, or at least to reduce, these massive arms sales. While these facts are true, I find the conclusions less than compelling. The overall arms-import problem in the Middle East, now and for the foreseeable future, is a consequence of relations among Israel, the Arab states and Iran, with Turkey as an uneasy but politically marginal player. The export of conventional weapons is, and will remain, dependent on supply and demand rather than on arms-control agreements.

**Instability in the Middle East creates a vibrant arms market**

**Neumann 1995** (Robert, Journal of International Affairs, Summer)

The demand for arms in Middle Eastern markets, requiring more and increasingly sophisticated supplies, is a consequence of important regional dynamics. First, there are the security problems arising from the Arab-Israeli tension. Second, there are the "rogue states," especially Iran and Iraq, but also Sudan, which are viewed as threats throughout the area. Third, there is now an increasingly "robust," or more nationalistic, Russian policy, as most recently demonstrated in break-away Chechnya, a region mostly inhabited by Muslims (whatever the depth of their faith). Finally, there is the quite different threat of Islamic radicalism, misnamed fundamentalism, which might be considered the most imminent threat to regional stability in the Middle East.(14) Islamic radicalism constitutes a special category, because it is both internal and supranational, and arms proliferation plays only a limited role. Such radicalism also feeds on popular frustrations caused by fiscal constraints, which tend to force governments to reduce arms purchases but which also result in cuts in social, health and educational expenditures. All of the areas of potential regional conflict argue for more, not less, conventional arms sales and make the already dim prospects for arms control even dimmer. Many such conflicts remain while further sources of instability are increasing all around the former Soviet Union.

**Instability in Iraq and throughout the region is key to Russian arms exports**

**BROOKES 2007** (Peter Brookes is a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense who also served in the Navy, with the CIA and on Capitol Hill, Arms Forces Journal, November, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/11/3081301/)

Instability in Iraq, sectarian violence, Islamic extremism, ethnic rivalries, the rise of Iran and questions about America’s long-term commitment to the region are making for a Middle East more unsettled than at any time in recent memory. So it shouldn’t come as a shock that a Middle East arms race — both conventional and nuclear — may be in the offing as states hustle to get weapons that ensure their security bets are well hedged against current and future threats. Taking a look at the political-military landscape around the Middle East, from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, there’s no shortage of well-founded reasons for strategic insomnia in regional capitals. Topping the list of problems is the cocky, ascendant Islamic Republic of Iran. In the eyes of many, Tehran’s regional policies are more troubling than at any time since the 1979 Iranian revolution and the fall of the Shah. Although none of the region’s Muslim states like the fact that Israel has long had an undeclared nuclear weapons program, the likelihood that Iran’s ayatollahs will become atomic seems all but inevitable. Iran is also supporting elements of the insurgencies in Iraq (Shiite militias) and Afghanistan (the Taliban). As if that weren’t enough, Tehran is propping up fundamentalist Hezbollah in Lebanon and radical Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Navy is conducting aggressive maneuvers in the Persian Gulf amid threats by Tehran to attack oil facilities — and close the strategic Strait of Hormuz to tanker traffic. Syria is giving its neighbors heartburn, as well. Its close ties with predominantly Persian Iran make none of the region’s Arab states very happy; nor does Damascus’ blind eye to the hordes of jihadists, who transit Syria to destabilize Iraq. The Israeli raid into Syria in September against a “military target” has everyone chattering — and jittery. The possibility of Syrian-North Korean cooperation on anything beyond ballistic missiles, such as a nuclear program, is utterly unnerving. Moreover, last summer saw no shortage of rumors of an impending Syrian-Israeli war, or even another Israeli-Hezbollah conflict. The militant Lebanese Shiite group spent the past year re-arming, courtesy of Iranian and Syrian sponsors. No one in the Middle East, with the possible exception of Iran and Syria, takes comfort in the sectarian and ethnic violence in Iraq, either — or at the idea that Iraq will spin apart into its Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish components. The rise of militant Islam is another cause of dyspepsia in the region’s capitals. Lebanon fought for several months this year against an al-Qaida-inspired (possibly al-Qaida-associated) group, Fatah al Islam, that was holed up in a Palestinian refugee camp. In a summer stunner, Hamas forcefully expelled its political rival, secular Fatah, from the Gaza Strip, creating concern not only for the Middle East peace process, but also that Gaza might become an operating base for even more regional militancy. It goes without saying that no state is sanguine about the possibility of a yet-to-be identified Taliban-like resistance movement or homegrown al-Qaida-style wannabes popping up in their midst. ARMS BUYERS AND SELLERS Not surprisingly, as the winds of war swirl across the region, Middle Eastern states are taking steps to shore up their security. As a result, there’s no shortage of arms buyers and sellers. Last summer, the U.S. announced $20 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia and neighboring Persian Gulf states: Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Although the sales are still controversial on Capitol Hill — surprisingly, in some cases, more so than in Israel — the deal reportedly includes Joint Direct Attack Munitions, electronic warfare gear, UAVs, fighter upgrades, missile defense systems and new naval vessels. Another $13 billion in weapons was proposed for Egypt over 10 years. And Israel, ever mindful of maintaining its qualitative military edge, could get as much as $30 billion worth of new U.S. arms and equipment over the same period. Russia, no shrinking violet when it comes to arms sales, is also increasingly active in the Middle East. Russia is now the world’s second biggest arms seller to the developing world — including supplying the lion’s share of Iran’s conventional arms. In fact, Russia agreed to sell Iran $700 million worth of surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems (likely the TOR M-1) last year, which would come in handy in defending Iran’s nuclear-related sites against air attack. Moscow also plans to upgrade Tehran’s Su-24 and MiG-29 aircraft (some famously flown to Iran during the 1991 Persian Gulf War by fleeing Iraqi pilots), and T-72 main battle tanks. Iran is rumored to be interested in S-300 SAMs, Su-30 fighters and Il-78 airborne tankers, too. Russia has also forgiven most — maybe all — of Syria’s Cold War arms debt, allowing Syrian generals to shop till they drop. Although information is murky, Damascus may be into Moscow for $1 billion in air defense systems, possibly the Pantsyr-S1E.

# middle east key

**Middle East war is key to US, Russian, and Chinese arms sales**

**Brookes 7 – senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation and former deputy assistant Secretary of Defense, served in the Navy, with the CIA and on Capitol Hill** (Peter, “Flashpoint: Arms racing,” Armed Forces Journal, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/11/3081301/>)

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Moscow is playing in Washington’s sandbox, too, reaching an agreement with the UAE in September for air defense systems and armored personnel carriers, as well as the launching of the DubaiSat-1 satellite. The British are in the arms games, as well. Notwithstanding allegations of corruption in an earlier Tornado jet deal, Saudi Arabia (now the developing world’s third-largest arms buyer) has agreed to buy 72 Eurofighter Typhoon jets, worth almost $9 billion. Asians are also increasingly involved in the Middle East arms bazaar. China will have a world-class defense industry in the next 10 to 15 years, and is increasingly interested in getting its foot in the arms market door. Beijing already provides Tehran with a number of systems, including the highly-capable C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles. (Hezbollah, or the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, used this missile against an Israeli destroyer during the 2006 war.) In addition, in the late 1980s, China secretly sold Saudi Arabia the nuclear-capable, medium-range DF-3 (CSS-2) ballistic missile. Some analysts believe Beijing is involved in upgrading these 20-year-old missiles for deterring Iran. North Korea hawks its favorite export, ballistic missiles, in the Middle East, too. Pyongyang has sold its medium-range No Dong technology to the Iranians for their Shahab missile, as well as short-range Scud missiles to the Syrians. PEDDLING ARMS OR INFLUENCE? Some insist the avalanche of prospective weapons deals is part of a Bush administration plan to contain Iran — plus emphasize America’s long-term commitment to regional security, especially with rough sledding in — and calls for withdrawal from — Iraq. According to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the arms sales aim to “bolster forces of moderation and support a broader strategy to counter the negative influences of al-Qaida, Hezbollah, Syria and Iran.” The Bush administration may also be trying to encourage Middle Eastern states such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt to assist Iraq, which many Sunni Arab nations see as dominated by the Shiites, symbolized by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Indeed, the Saudis have snubbed Maliki since he took office, refusing to meet him. Riyadh apparently sees him as a pawn of Tehran — and as not having done enough to protect Iraq’s Sunni population. Saudi Arabia still doesn’t have an embassy in Baghdad. Washington may also be trying to ply the likes of Riyadh and Cairo with arms sales to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, rein in Hamas, loosen Damascus’ embrace of Tehran and ensure continued access to regional energy supplies. Some gulf nations are eager to have a powerful backer in the face of Iran’s growing strength; those that host U.S. forces or bases (40,000 ashore; 20,000 afloat) want the capability to protect themselves from retribution should the Iran matter go “hot.” Russia wants to increase its clout in the Middle East, through arms sales — or otherwise. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had a significant amount of clout in the region based on its anti-Israel and anti-American stance. Today, Russian nostalgia for the good old days, as well as its desire to develop markets for its competitive but declining arms industries, guide Kremlin policy — not to mention developing sway with Gulf states for the formation of a natural gas OPEC. Moscow is also interested in balancing U.S. power (Russian President Putin visited the UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia this year) and discouraging anyone (e.g., Saudi Arabia or Iran) from causing mischief among Russia’s restive Muslim population.

**Arms sales revitalize the Russian economy- key to defense innovation and employment**

**Rivlin 5 – Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University** (Dr. Paul, “The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East,” The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies)

Russia’s military exports played a vital role in its economic turnaround. A critical part of the Soviet legacy was a large arms industry, a function of the Soviet Union's political isolation and its experiences in the Second World War and the Cold War. Soviet policy meant that arms transfers were made primarily for political reasons and the economy paid the price through large government subsidies. When the Cold War ended and Russia emerged as an independent state, local demand for its defense products collapsed. Russia could no longer afford to give away arms as the Soviet Union had done, and its ability to buy influence decreased. The need to export arms for economic reasons increased at the same time as the ideological imperative declined. For Russia, selling arms thus became a vital source of foreign economic exchange and a way of financing defense industries threatened with closure. As such, the industry, part of which is relatively technologically advanced, preserves employment at home, especially of key personnel, and helps to maintain markets and influence abroad. Overall, Russian foreign policy in the 1990s was increasingly driven by economic factors. International trade and debt, currency stability, balance of payments, and integration in the world trade system became priorities. Economic issues played a major role in Russian policy choices, arms being sold rather than given. Economic opportunities drove Russia to seek markets that were shunned by the West. In the Far East this meant China; in the Middle East this meant Iran.5

**Arms sales to the Middle East are key to the Russian economy- empirically proven**

**Rivlin 5 – Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University** (Dr. Paul, “The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East,” The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies)

The creation of an independent Russian Federation after the collapse of the USSR was accompanied by a change in Middle East arms supplies policy. Russia’s financial needs became a much more important factor in decisions to sell military equipment. At the same time, the arms industry emerged as a semi-independent lobby in promoting such sales.2 The Middle East market included states that had large debts to Russia, such as Iraq and Syria, others with whom it had important economic relations, such as Turkey and Iran, and significant trading partners, such as Egypt.

**Russian arms exports to the Middle East are critical to sustain the Russian defense industry**

**Antonenko 1 – Research Fellow and Programme Director (Russia and Eurasia) at the International Institute for Strategic Studies** (Oksana, “Russia’s Military Involvement in the Middle East,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, March 2001, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue1/jv5n1a3.html#Author>)

On the other hand, Russia was no longer prepared to exercise self-restraint in its arms sales to the region as long as **financial arrangements were beneficial for the Russian defense industry, which over the past decade had grown to depend on arms exports for its survival.** All arms sales were seen as purely commercial projects, often driven by individual Russian arms-producing or arms-exporting companies. This was clearly demonstrated in Russia's military cooperation program with Iran, which was continued despite active U.S. pressure including sanctions. A similar lack of restraint is demonstrated in Russia's proposals to Syria and Libya, as well as declared plans to restore active military cooperation with Iraq once sanctions are lifted. As a result of these two changes, Russia's military cooperation with Middle East states, while reduced in scale, may potentially have a much greater impact on regional security if including such weapons as missiles. Moreover, Russia's desperate attempts to penetrate the world's largest arms market in the Middle East now faces competition from other suppliers -- such as Ukraine, Belorus, Eastern European states, China and North Korea--all offering used and older models of equipment and modernization of ex-Soviet equipment for lower prices. This places the sale of advanced weapons systems at the top of Russia's arms marketing strategy for the Middle East.

# california 2nc

**Arms exports are key to the economies of California and Russia**

**Neumann 1995** (Robert, Journal of International Affairs, Summer)

Budget constraints in all purchaser countries, including the United States since the end of the Cold War, and the disappearance of the single most dangerous potential enemy of the U.S., the Soviet Union, have resulted in military budget cuts in the U.S. and other nations and a consequent reduction in funds at the disposal of arms industries in each country. Nevertheless, the production and export of such weapons remain highly significant to both the U.S. and Russian economies. Although deliberate efforts have been made, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, to disperse production over as wide an area as possible for demographic and economic reasons, the arms industry in the U.S. remains highly concentrated. In states like California, the economic and political effects of declining arms production are felt strongly. This is true to an even greater extent in Russia, where employment in the St. Petersburg area is highly dependent on weapons-industry exports. Sophisticated weapons systems often require many years for design and development. Production lines for airplanes and tanks, once closed down, are neither quickly nor easily reopened. When private enterprise carries the brunt of such production shifts, the reopening of such lines (once threat perceptions change) cannot be undertaken without enormous government subsidies. Hence all producer countries, especially Russia and the U.S., but increasingly China and other growing secondary producers such as Brazil and India, have a strong political interest in keeping the arms market going. Although waves of moral indignation against weapons exports rise quite high in the U.S. at certain times, the consequences of unilateral control efforts can be very drastic--and negative. In 1985, Congressional opposition to the sale of F-15 planes to Saudi Arabia was demonstrated largely by supporters of Israel who professed to see a danger to the Jewish state. The Saudis, always irritated by the often rude Congressional debate, decided to buy British Tornado planes instead.(6) The result was the loss of a considerable number of jobs in the U.S., while security for Israel became even more tenuous. While the Saudis would have accepted some, though not all, downgrading of the F-15s, the Tornados were delivered by Britain without any downgrading or restrictions on their use.(7)

**That’s key to the US economy.**

**Newsweek, 2003** [“State of Siege: Total Recall: As goes California, so goes the nation. If true, we're all in trouble. An economy on the ropes, and a political culture on the verge of collapse,” <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-23888657_ITM>]

Beyond the numbers is something more profound: a sense that California has lost the ability to govern itself and is in need of cataclysmic political renovation. The state's sulfurous civic life makes the last days of Rome look serene. Voter participation is at record lows, disdain for elected leaders at record highs. Californians haven't been this angry, experts say, since the early 20th century, when corrupt and imperious railroad magnates ruled the state from their enormous mansions on Nob Hill in San Francisco. Their excesses produced sweeping reforms. Gov. Hiram Johnson, a legendary progressive, sought to banish "special interests" from politics, and championed the very recall procedures Costa now embraces. Is another such era in the offing? Or is the recall Costa launched just a cruel historical joke, the final proof that California is democracy run riot? "It's an epic story," says California-based pollster Pat Caddell. "Everything here is an epic, but this is the real thing."  And epics in California matter to the rest of America. The Golden State is the biggest by far, with an economy larger than all but four nations. If it goes belly up, so do we all. (The enormous state deficit is mirrored by the growing federal version, now expected to be $450 billion this fiscal year.) But more than bookkeeping is involved. California is our own El Dorado--America's America--home of start-ups and starting over, of new social trends and of trends from elsewhere writ large.

# california impact ext

**Californian economic decline kills the global economy**

**Navarro**, professor at the Merage School of Business, UC Irvine, **08** [Peter, “California nightmare for the global economy?”, <http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-08-15/opinion/17121318_1_california-s-budget-budget-deficit-spending-cuts>]

Will the California budget crisis tip the United States into recession? The California economy is certainly large enough to inflict such damage. It's the seventh-largest economy in the world and home to close to 38 million Americans. California's budget deficit is by any reasonable measure enormous. This budget deficit is estimated at $17.2 billion and represents more than 17 percent of the state's general fund expenditures (about $101 billion). In contrast, New York, which faces the second-worst budget gap in the nation for fiscal year 2009, has a gap of about $5 billion, which represents less than 10 percent of its budget. In closing its past budgetary gaps, California has acted more like the federal government rather than merely one of 50 states. Indeed, unlike the federal government (or sovereign nations), each state is required to balance its budget each year; and no state, at least in principle, has the authority to engage in the kind of discretionary deficit spending both the federal government and nations around the world routinely use to stimulate their economies. In the past, a profligate California has gotten around this balanced-budget requirement by using a technique that effectively allows the Golden State to administer its own fiscal stimulus. In particular, California - under both Democratic and Republican governors - has simply issued new bonds every time that it has spent far beyond its means. California's problem this time, however, is that its deficit is so big, its balance sheet is so bad, and world credit markets are so tight that issuing new bonds alone is no longer a viable option. Instead, California's politicians are inexorably being forced toward a solution that will prominently feature both a large tax increase and significant spending cuts. Indeed, this is not a partisan matter of choosing one's poison. The budget deficit is so large that it cannot be eliminated without raising taxes, anathema to the state's Republicans, and spending cuts, equally unpalatable to California Democrats. Of course, the faster the state Legislature accepts this harsh reality, the faster the deadlock can be broken. Viewed from a macroeconomic perspective, there is an even harsher reality. Increased taxes and reduced spending will send a very nasty contractionary shock through a California economy that is already reeling from a housing market meltdown and punishing gas prices. Should Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's budgetary medicine - including firing many state employees - trigger a recession, this may well serve as a tipping point for a national recession and, in the worst case scenario, even a global recession. In considering these dangers, it is worth noting that California provides close to 13 percent of America's real GDP growth. In contrast, the second-largest contributor to U.S. gross domestic product is Texas, and it provides only half that stimulus. It also worth noting that California is an important destination for both U.S. manufactured goods and world imports, particularly from Asia. Already, California's unemployment rate is more than 6.8 percent and well above the national average of 5.7 percent. At least some economists believe California may already be experiencing negative growth. The economy is likely to get a lot worse before its gets better. If there is any one civics lesson to be learned from this fine mess, it is that the state's politicians must learn to resist overspending in good times so that the state won't face bankruptcy when bad times hit. It should be equally clear that any damn fool can issue bonds to balance a budget. However, it takes real political courage and economic foresight to put a state budget on an even keel through fiscally conservative tax-and-spend policies. At this juncture, California is nowhere close to that - and the rest of the country, and perhaps the world, may soon pay the Golden State's piper.

**California’s Economy is key to the U.S Economic Survival**

**Herbst, 2009** (Moira, staff writer for business week, California’s Economy, Too Big to Fail?, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jun2009/db20090616\_615065.htm)

Golden State residents are all too aware of the cuts in essential services that may result, or that some businesses or taxpayers may have to accept IOUs as payment from the state. But will the rest of the U.S. have to share California's pain? In May, State Treasurer Bill Lockyer sent a letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner urging him to consider helping cash-strapped municipalities. The pitch by Lockyer and other California Democrats is a play on the "too big to fail" argument made on behalf of bank bailouts: If you don't save this bank (or in this case, state), the financial markets and the national economy will be thrown into turmoil. "This matters for the U.S., not just for California," Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.), who chairs the state's Democratic congressional delegation, told The Washington Post. "I can't speak for the President, but when you've got the eighth biggest economy in the world sitting as one of your 50 states, it's hard to see how the country recovers if that state does not." The Obama Administration is now seeking to answer that question. So far the Administration has declined to bail out California. At a June 16 press briefing, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs underscored that stance, saying California's budgetary problem "unfortunately is one that [the state is] going to have to solve." GOVERNOR ISN'T ASKING FOR HELP Later, in the evening, Republican Governor Schwarzenegger issued a statement denying he was seeking any such help. "We are in complete agreement with the White House that California should be solving its budgetary problems on its own without a bailout from the federal government," said the statement issued by Communications Director Matt David. But there remains concern that the deeper California's woes get, the more it will delay the potential U.S. recovery. A report released by the University of California at Los Angeles on Tuesday projects the $24 billion annual state budget deficit will translate into 60,000 job losses by the middle of 2010. At the same time, the state could institute massive cuts in public services such as its welfare program, which serves 1.3 million people. The worry is that these efforts to balance California's state budget would work in a direct cross-purpose with the $787 billion U.S. stimulus package Obama signed in February. Though few experts think California will default on its debt—following the example New York City set in 1975 and Cleveland in 1978—the mere possibility is troubling for the credit markets. "If California truly defaults, I am sure it will shake the faith of bondholders and noteholders in the overall municipal finance system," says Don Boyd, senior fellow at the Rockefeller Institute of Government. "That would undoubtedly lead to higher issuance costs to additional state and local government loans."

# russia arms impact—red army

**Arms exports are key to Russian conventional power**

**WEITZ 2007** (Richard, Senior Fellow and Director, Project Management at Hudson Institute, “Russia’s military-industrial complex” June 4, http://cffss.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication\_details&id=4947)

The primary purpose of this increased spending is to push new weapons systems from the research and development stage to actual procurement for Russia’s armed forces. Over the course of 2007-2015, Russia’s army and navy will replace almost half (45 percent) of their military equipment. In the past, poor government and industry practices frustrated similar plans to supply large numbers of advanced conventional weapons to Russia’s armed forces. The country’s military-industrial sector suffers from limited domestic orders and extensive overcapacity. Purchases for the Russian army and navy have been increasing, but still only sustain about one-fourth of Russia’s existing military production capacity. The Russian government now spends more on new Russian-made conventional weapons than do foreign purchasers. Yet, persistent inefficiencies in the Russian defence procurement system result in foreign buyers receiving more new systems than the Russian military. As a result, Russia’s leading defence firms remain heavily dependent on foreign sales. Although Russia’s arms exports have decreased considerably since the Soviet period, its revenue per transaction is now greater because Russian firms have yielded much of the lower-end market to less expensive suppliers like China, India, and other former Soviet bloc allies. Moreover, where the USSR transferred much weaponry under easy commercial terms or without charge (e.g., under long-term loans not expected to be repaid), Russia now discounts arms only for its closest allies. On March 27, 2007, the Defence Ministry announced that Russia’s annual arms exports increased by 50 percent, from $4 billion to $6.5 billion, from 2001 to 2006. In an effort to both maximise foreign revenue and strengthen Russia’s own military potential, former Russian defence minister Sergei Ivanov, who now oversees Russia’s military-industrial complex and is one of the two leading candidates to succeed Putin as president, stressed the need for “the national defence industry to find a balance between a commitment to arm the Russian military and an opportunity to export arms to countries not subject to UN sanctions”. Besides helping to sustain the health of Russia’s military industrial complex, many Russian officials think that arms sales will promote Russia’s diplomatic interests by strengthening ties with recipient states.

**Russian conventional weakness increases reliance on nuclear weapons—this increases the chance of accidental or deliberate nuclear war**

**LAMBERT AND MILLER 1997** (Stephen and David, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, “Russia’s Crumbling Tactical Nuclear Weapons Complex: An Opportunity for Arms Control” April www.usafa.af.mil/inss/OCP/ocp12.pdf)

To compensate for Russia’s current conventional weakness, Russian strategists have explicitly sought to “extend the threshold for escalation downward,”28 thereby increasing the likelihood of tactical nuclear release in the face of hostilities. Thus there are two distinct concepts at work: (1) the procedure of pre-delegating the launch codes; and (2) the operational doctrine of lowering the nuclear threshold. These trends are corroborated by interviews with Russian officials familiar with nuclear weapons strategies. Dr. Nikolai Sokov, an expert on the Soviet delegation to START I as well as other US-Soviet summit meetings, affirms that with such a doctrine in place, one “cannot rule out that a local commander could individually take the authority to launch a weapon.”29 The assumption that the Russian weapons control system is more stable during peace-time is also suspect. Due to the lack of technical safeguards, especially on air-delivered weapons (cruise missiles and gravity bombs), individual attempts to acquire these weapons even during times of peace are possible. Moreover, the lack of adequate locking mechanisms on these weapons would then make them deliverable, with a full nuclear yield, even without launch authorization. Media attention has been overwhelmingly dedicated to the apex of the control system; this focus seems to be at least partially misplaced. While it is largely true that the absence of a stable political system and the reliance on a control system with the potential for sudden shifts in allegiances could cause a breakdown of control, the most important dangers of misuse of Russia’s nuclear weapons are not to be found at the apex, but at the lower echelons of the command system. The Russian practice of pre-delegation carries with it the dangers of a premature weapons release or the employment of a nuclear weapon because of the judgment of a local military commander.

# arms sales key to russian economy

**Competitive arms exports are key to the Russian economy and defense**

**RIVLIN 2005** (Dr. Paul, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern & African Studies, The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East, November, www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo79.pdf)

Russia’s military exports played a vital role in its economic turnaround. Acritical part of the Soviet legacy was a large arms industry, a function of the Soviet Union's political isolation and its experiences in the Second World War and the Cold War. Soviet policy meant that arms transfers were made primarily for political reasons and the economy paid the price through large government subsidies. When the Cold War ended and Russia emerged as an independent state, local demand for its defense products collapsed. Russia could no longer afford to give away arms as the Soviet Union had done, and its ability to buy influence decreased. The need to export arms for economic reasons increased at the same time as the ideological imperative declined. For Russia, selling arms thus became a vital source of foreign economic exchange and a way of financing defense industries threatened with closure. As such, the industry, part of which is relatively technologically advanced, preserves employment at home, especially of key personnel, and helps to maintain markets and influence abroad.

**Russian defense exports are key to the economy**

**RIVLIN 2005** (Dr. Paul, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern & African Studies, The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East, November, www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo79.pdf)

With the exception of arms, Russia has never been a major exporter of manufactured goods. Traditionally, the USSR exported raw materials and this trend has been reinforced in Russia in recent years because of the increase in oil prices.1 The sale of arms, therefore, represents one of the few areas where Russia’s manufacturing industry has a competitive international position. It also provides employment for skilled workers and scientists otherwise unemployed by the economy. Arms production and exports is a means of keeping this vital manpower in the country and funding research and development.

# russian econ impacts

**Russian economic decline causes accidental nuclear war**

**FORDEN 2001** (Geoffrey, senior research fellow at the Security Studies Program at MIT, Policy Analysis, May 3)

Because of that need, Russia’s continuing economic difficulties pose a clear and increasing danger to itself, the world at large, and the United States in particular. Russia no longer has the working fleet of early-warning satellites that reassured its leaders that they were not under attack during the most recent false alert—in 1995 when a scientific research rocket launched from Norway was, for a short time, mistaken for a U.S. nuclear launch. With decaying satellites, the possibility exists that, if a false alert occurs again, Russia might launch its nuclear-tipped missiles.

**Kills billions**

**FORROW ET AL 1998** (Lachlan Forrow, Bruce G Blair, Ira Helfand, George Lewis, et al, Author Affiliation: From the Division of Gencral Medicine and Primary Care, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Harvard Medical School, (L.F.); the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. (B.G.B.); Physicians for Social Responsibility, (I.H.); Massachusetts Institute of Technology, (G.L., TP); the Department of Epidemiology and Social Medicine, Montefiore Medical Center and Albert Einstein College of Medicine, (VS.); Barry S. Levy Associates and Tufts University School of Medicine, (B.S.L.); the Department of Radiology and the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, (H.A.); and Mount Sinai School of Medicine; New England Journal of Medicine, April 30)

A missile launch activated by false warning is thus possible in both U.S. and Russian arsenals. For the reasons noted above, an accidental Russian launch is currently considered the greater risk. Several specific scenarios have been considered by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization of the Department of Defense.31 We have chosen to analyze a scenario that falls in the middle range of the danger posed by an accidental attack: the launch against the United States of the weapons on board a single Russian Delta-IV ballistic-missile submarine, for two reasons. First, the safeguards against the unauthorized launch of Russian submarine-based missiles are weaker than those against either silo-based or mobile land-based rockets, because the Russian general staff cannot continuously monitor the status of the crew and missiles or use electronic links to override unauthorized launches by the crews. Second, the Delta-IV is and will remain the mainstay of the Russian strategic submarine fleet.27,32,33 Delta-IV submarines carry 16 missiles. Each missile is armed with four 100-kt warheads and has a range of 8300 km, which is sufficient to reach almost any part of the continental United States from typical launch stations in the Barents Sea.34,ss These missiles are believed to be aimed at "soft" targets, usually in or near American cities, whereas the more accurate silo-based missiles would attack U.S. military installations.36 Although a number of targeting strategies are possible for any particular Delta-IV, it is plausible that two of its missiles are assigned to attack war-supporting targets in each of eight U.S. urban areas. If 4 of the 16 missiles failed to reach their destinations because of malfunctions before or after the launch, then 12 missiles carrying a total of 48 warheads would reach their targets. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT We assume that eight U.S. urban areas are hit: four with four warheads and four with eight warheads. We also assume that the targets have been selected according to standard military priorities: industrial, financial, and transportation sites and other components of the infrastructure that are essential for supporting or recovering from war. Since lowaltitude bursts are required to ensure the destruction of structures such as docks, concrete runways, steel-reinforced buildings, and underground facilities, most if not all detonations will cause substantial early fallout. Physical Effects Under our model, the numbers of immediate deaths are determined primarily by the area of the "superfires" that would result from a thermonuclear explosion over a city. Fires would ignite across the exposed area to roughly 10 or more calories of radiant heat per square centimeter, coalescing into a giant firestorm with hurricane-force winds and average air temperatures above the boiling point of water. Within this area, the combined effects of superheated wind, toxic smoke, and combustion gases would result in a death rate approaching 100 percent.3' For each 100-kt warhead, the radius of the circle of nearly 100 percent short-term lethality would be 4.3 km (2.7 miles), the range within which 10 cal per square centimeter is delivered to the earth's surface from the hot fireball under weather conditions in which the visibility is 8 km (5 miles), which is low for almost all weather conditions. We used Census CD to calculate the residential population within these areas according to 1990 U.S. Census data, adjusting for areas where circles from different warheads overlapped.38 In many urban areas, the daytime population, and therefore the casualties, would be much higher. Fallout The cloud of radioactive dust produced by lowaltitude bursts would be deposited as fallout downwind of the target area. The exact areas of fallout would not be predictable, because they would depend on wind direction and speed, but there would be large zones of potentially lethal radiation exposure. With average wind speeds of 24 to 48 km per hour (15 to 30 miles per hour), a 100-kt low-altitude detonation would result in a radiation zone 30 to 60 km (20 to 40 miles) long and 3 to 5 km (2 to 3 miles) wide in which exposed and unprotected persons would receive a lethal total dose of 600 rad within six hours.39 With radioactive contamination of food and water supplies, the breakdown of refrigeration and sanitation systems, radiation-induced immune suppression, and crowding in relief facilities, epidemics of infectious diseases would be likely.40 Deaths Table 1 shows the estimates of early deaths for each cluster of targets in or near the eight major urban areas, with a total of 6,838,000 initial deaths. Given the many indeterminate variables (e.g., the altitude of each warhead's detonation, the direction of the wind, the population density in the fallout zone, the effectiveness of evacuation procedures, and the availability of shelter and relief supplies), a reliable estimate of the total number of subsequent deaths from fallout and other sequelae of the attack is not possible. With 48 explosions probably resulting in thousands of square miles of lethal fallout around urban areas where there are thousands of persons per square mile, it is plausible that these secondary deaths would outnumber the immediate deaths caused by the firestorms. Medical Care in the Aftermath Earlier assessments have documented in detail the problems of caring for the injured survivors of a nuclear attack: the need for care would completely overwhelm the available health care resources.1-5,41 Most of the major medical centers in each urban area lie within the zone of total destruction. The number of patients with severe burns and other critical injuries would far exceed the available resources of all critical care facilities nationwide, including the country's 1708 beds in burn-care units (most of which are already occupied).42 The danger of intense radiation exposure would make it very difficult for emergency personnel even to enter the affected areas. The nearly complete destruction of local and regional transportation, communications, and energy networks would make it almost impossible to transport the severely injured to medical facilities outside the affected area. After the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, Japan, which resulted in a much lower number of casualties (6500 people died and 34,900 were injured) and which had few of the complicating factors that would accompany a nuclear attack, there were long delays before outside medical assistance arrived.41 FROM DANGER TO PREVENTION Public health professionals now recognize that many, if not most, injuries and deaths from violence and accidents result from a predictable series of events that are, at least in principle, preventable.44,45 The direct toll that would result from an accidental nuclear attack of the type described above would dwarf all prior accidents in history. Furthermore, such an attack, even if accidental, might prompt a retaliatory response resulting in an all-out nuclear exchange. The World Health Organization has estimated that this would result in billions of direct and indirect casualties worldwide.4

**Russian economic collapse causes nuclear war**

**BLAIR AND GADDY 1999**

(Bruce Blair is a senior fellow and Clifford Gaddy a fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program, Brookings Review, Summer)

Western policymakers appear not to recognize that the fate of Russia’s economy is neither exclusively Russia’s problem nor exclusively an economic problem. Although Russia, with its nearly $200 billion of foreign debt, still has the ability to shake global financial markets—and likely will do so—the unquestionably bigger threat posed by its weak economy concerns national security. Russia’s economic woes increase the nuclear threat to the United States.

**Russian economic collapse causes nuclear war**

**RUDDY 99** (Christopher, newsmax Russia expert, march 12, http://www.newsmax.com/articles/?a=1999/3/12/53227)

The collapse of Russia's economy greatly increased the chances of war with the West. With 29 times Finland's population, Russia's budget barely matches theirs. According to news reports, millions of ordinary Russians are now struggling just to stay alive, selling family heirlooms and chopping up their furniture for kindling. Russia's political leaders and economic czars, of course, will never admit that they and their failed totalitarian system are responsible for this widespread misery, and increasingly the West is being blamed. This is particularly dangerous, because despite economic desperation, Russia continues is still a nuclear superpower. Victor Olove, director of Moscow's Center for Policy Studies, told the Los Angeles Times, "People who have nuclear warheads in their hands have not gotten their salaries for three or four months and are literally hungry."

# russian economy key to world

**Russian economic downturn will disrupt the world economy**

**COOPER 2008** (William, Congressional Research Service Specialist in International Trade and Finance Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “Russia’s Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States,” May 30, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34512.pdf)

The greater importance of Russia’s economic policies and prospects to the United States lie in their indirect effect on the overall economic and political environment in which the United States and Russia operate. From this perspective, Russia’s continuing economic stability and growth can be considered positive for the United States. Because financial markets are interrelated, chaos in even some of the smaller economies can cause uncertainty throughout the rest of the world. Such was the case during Russia’s financial meltdown in 1998. Promotion of economic stability in Russia has been a basis for U.S. support for Russia’s membership in international economic organizations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a major oil producer and exporter, Russia influences world oil prices that affect U.S. consumers.

**Russian economic collaspe would destroy the world economy**

**AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW 1-8-2000**

As a big debtor nation, Russia’s ability to meet its financial obligations also matters to world markets – as the Russian rouble’s collapse and accompanying loan default in August 1998 starkly revealed. The crisis raised fears of a domino effect across emerging markets that could ultimately push the global economy into recession. That, in the end, didn’t occur. But an economist specialising in Russia at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Ivan Szegvari, says the confidence of international investors in emerging markets, and in transitional economies as a whole, is affected by what happens in Russia. In addition, Russia remains one of the most important clients of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. “These organisations are the major players in the whole institutional set-up of the world economy – and they are strongly preoccupied with what happens in Russia,” says Szegvari. “What happens in Russia has, and will have, a large impact on the credibility of these institutions… “So I see many, not directly economic, issues which makes me say that Russia’s importance for the rest of the world is incomparably more than the current size of its GDP should suggest.”

# a2: economy resilient

**Russian economy is not resilient—incomplete privatization makes it vulnerable to shocks**

**BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING 10-10-2008** (Text of report by popular Russian newspaper Moskovskiy Komsomolets on 6 October)

Over the almost two decades that have passed since the collapse of the USSR, our economy, it would seem, has changed unrecognizably. But the scourge of the Soviet planned economy -monopoly-operation -is still alive, as if no one had ever fought it. "Our economy has turned into a giant state corporation where officially private structures are playing the role of mere cogs," a former important official in the government apparatus told me. "And not just a state corporation but a retro-style state corporation. Moreover, the monopoly that exists at a federal level is reproduced in each region and in each specific settlement. Look, for example, at the extent to which small and medium-sized businesses are hemmed in, despite all the solemn statements from the very top! Such a system kills competition and in the long term is not competitive under crisis conditions."

# ukraine arms sales 1nc

**Middle East conflict won’t escalate to all-out war but tensions sustain demand for arms imports**

**Neumann 1995** (Robert, Journal of International Affairs, Summer)

More important for Middle East security are political considerations. The reality of U.S. domestic politics dictates the continuation of the very high level of U.S. assistance to Israel. Even though the new Republican majority in Congress may try to reduce the overall level of U.S. foreign assistance, the quantity and sophistication of U.S. arms exports to Israel are not likely to suffer greatly in the foreseeable future. The Israeli military doctrine requires that Israel remain qualitatively superior not only to its individual Arab neighbors, but to any combination of Arab states, and this is unlikely to change. In view of these considerations, a war between some or all Arab states and Israel has now become a practical and rational improbability. Even irrational attacks, in light of such odds, are most unlikely, unless suicidal policies are to be assumed.(18) Of course wars are not always started to be won. Anwar al-Sadat began his war against Israel in 1973 without any expectation of victory in the usually accepted form. He hoped for tactical, if not strategic, surprise--which he achieved--and he aimed at shaking up both the Israeli and the U.S. establishments. The eventual result was the Camp David Agreement. Today such a situation is unlikely.(19) Yet the arms race in conventional weapons is bound to continue for other reasons.

**Ukrainian arms exports are critical to economic recovery**

**STACK 3-17-2010** (Business New Europe, “Ukraine’s defence sector apprehensive over pro-Russian foreign policy,” http://grahamstack.wordpress.com/2010/03/17/ukraines-defence-sector-apprehensive-over-pro-russian-foreign-policy/)

Ukraine’s annus horibilis of 2009 did not extend to its defence sector. In fact, being almost entirely dependent on exports, with state procurement playing a negligible role, the 60% devaluation of the hryvnia proved a major competitiveness booster – and output accordingly grew by 58%, probably making Ukraine the world’s sixth biggest arms exporter. The success of 2009 was down to a string of big-ticket export contracts: to modernize Antonov An-32 military cargo planes for India worth $400m; to deliver 100 Antonov AI-20 5 engines to India worth $110m; to deliver Zubr air-cushion landing ships to China, worth $315m; and to supply to Iraq six Antonov An-32 worth $100m and to supply 420 BTR-4 armoured personnel carriers for $400m. The largest output growth was reported by aircraft builders (77%), shipbuilders (71%) and armaments (16%). With Ukraine desperately needing to diversify its economy away from commodities, like Russia it is turning to the defence industry as the most likely candidate. The sector has been whittled down to a core of competitive companies – down from nearly 2,000 Soviet Ukrainian defence companies to 300 today, of which only 60 have a real mid-term strategy, according to Valentin Badrak of the Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmament. According to former top Defence Ministry official Oleksiy Melnyk, it is not yet clear whether the new Ukrainian defence minister, Mykhailo Yezhel, will be able to source greater budget funds for defence spending and shift defence expenditure from personnel to weapons systems, which would stimulate the defence sector and the overall economy. This is the policy that Russia has pursued, and one that Melnyk advocates for Ukraine. With fiscally conservative Mykolai Azarov installed as prime minister, however, Melnyk thinks it unlikely it will be implemented, leaving Ukraine’s defence sector reliant on exports for the foreseeable future.

**Ukrainian economic strength prevents nationalism and civil war—impact is US-Russian nuclear war**

**ROMANENKO 12-1-2008** (Yuriy, Ukranian political scientist, “Ukraine is heading for a civil war,” December 1, http://www.warandpeace.ru/en/article/view/30081/)

Economic crisis will cause that new forces with leftist and nationalist orientation enter the scene. The crisis will lead to position radicalisation and therefore the time for leftist and rightist radicals is coming up. Their time is yet to come. Big parties and blocs formed yet during Kuchma's era will take centre stage in the course of next one and a half year. However, their time is nearing the end. Their inability to react flexibly to challenges, which have become up-to-date at disastrous speed, have directed Ukraine towards the edge of an abyss. It reminds of Spain in 1936 – 1939 to some extent and unfortunately, Ukrainian politicians have forgotten about the Spanish lesson. We are very likely to experience the battle of authoritarian projects that will include ideological components in their programs. That's why leftist parties are sure to enter the scene. These won't be classic leftist parties without real prospects, but such ones with nationalist tone. It's evident that at present, when the country's destiny has been decided on with such urgency like never before, it's necessary to react to the national question. External frameworks marked by global economic crisis and the escalation of geopolitical battle lead to self-determination. It's an either-or situation - we will decide on self-determination, we will decide on who we are and why we live in this territory and what our mission is or Ukraine will lose its subjectivity and stronger players will divide it among them. Is it possible to divide Ukraine into western and south-eastern part? Can the recognition of the Russian language as the second state language prevent this? It's possible and it depends on external factors to a large degree. If Ukraine isn't able to stabilise innerpolitical situation, sooner or later stronger neighbours, i.e. Russia and the EU, will make decision on state division. Germany and Russia have often proved that they can find a compromise as for the question of the sphere of influence division in Eastern Europe. One has also to take into account US efforts to prevent the origin of continental alliance between Germany and Russia. Therefore Washington considers it a priority that Eastern Europe remains a buffer zone between the EU and Russia. That's why the US will try to play their game in Ukraine whose task within the "divided Europe” project remains pivotal. This will spark countermeasures of Russian side, which perceives Ukrainian change into American ally to be fatal danger. If Russia and the US don't reach agreement, the war for Ukraine will be under way in the hardest and most radical shape. It means that both sides will pursue the radicalisation of the situation in Ukraine via their players. Therefore the question of Ukrainian division is connected with Ukrainian elite's capabilities of consolidating own ranks and taking responsibility for the country and creating an efficient state, also with authoritarian features in current stage if necessary, as well as with the necessity for an agreement between global players, i.e. the US and Russia. This agreement is a must because the battle for Ukraine may lead the world to a nuclear war. I'm not dramatising the situation because one has to grasp that for the US and Russia, the moment of truth has come. The US has to keep on advancing into Eurasia in order to preserve hegemony, whereas Russia mustn't allow the Americans into this room in order to survive. This has nothing in common with ideology, this is rank geopolicy. The question of language has an operational character in this situation particularly when we consider the conditions of a great economic crisis where millions of people have been losing their jobs. It is state government problems which take first place and not official language problems. The language issue is to be solved if the Ukrainian language preserves the status of a state language and the Russian one isn't limited, which the Yushchenko administration attempts. Many people are aware that language disputes and similar questions serve solely for provoking conflicts which are supposed to conceal stealing, corruption and inefficient government. The crisis discloses the whole of these problems. In 2009, Ukraine will have to pay 60 billion dollars. Furthermore, metallurgical production has been suspended and construction industry as well as the entire country faces financial and technological collapse. What language do we want to talk about now when Ukrainian existence itself is at stake? How will the current political crisis in Ukraine end up according to you? There will be a civil war in the course of next three or four years. The war will stand for a reaction to the elite's incapability of surmounting system difficulties sharpened in the aftermath of global depression. Tymoshenko is most likely to win presidential elections and sweep aside useless figures like Yushchenko and Yanukovych. However, she isn't a builder but a destroyer. Therefore the problems will grow more severe in the context of the disputes between the US and Russia. Subsequently, non-systemic radical political forces will rise to the surface escalating the situation in the country. The probability of a civil war will reach 80 per cent in the medium term. Have you got any notion how to avoid the pending civil war? By the arrival of new players in Ukrainian policy, ideally one player. In other words, we are sure to buckle under the conditions of new world division if there's double rule in Ukraine. Strong capital failed to optimise the rule over the country. On the contrary, oligarchs, who weren't able to come to an agreement, have led the country to an eternal spiral of self-destructing fight. The existence of a single power centre, which would restore quickly the work of the effective vertical and stabilise the country, is needed. Ideally, such a force should be a political party since other institutions, which would be capable of fulfilling the task of a stabiliser, like the army in Turkey, don't exist. In other words, Ukraine is in need of its Franco, Kemal or Salazar at the moment in order to stop the process of state decay. In fact, it's about the establishment of a new state – the third republic, which will be rid of the deficiencies and traumas of contemporary Ukrainian state. This party must gain popularity quickly and after it obtains 51 per cent, it has to conduct a restart of the state. Present constitution must be abolished and a new one constituted via the Crisis Act. This would transform Ukraine into a presidential republic in which the head of state bears all responsibility for executive power. He or she should constitute the government, answer for foreign policy etc. The president is supposed to act as a sovereign who harmonises relations among diverse social groups, or rather, financial and industrial groups. The Parliament is to transform into a two chamber one and also regions will be enlarged. Thus the influence of regional barons will be enfeebled and the governability of the country improved. Following the adoption of new constitution, any amendments to it will be banned for ten or fifteen years. Concurrently, the reform of administrative and criminal law will be conducted and also punishments will be made considerably stricter. Since corruption is a key problem, by establishing a special census, the death penalty is to be imposed for this crime when committed in large extent. Aside from this, flexible punishments in the form of community service would be imposed. This would enable to include thieves and public order transgressors in infrastructure reconstruction. It's necessary to apply neo-Keynesian reforms in economic area. The objective is to establish a strong home market that would facilitate the restart of economy. Therefore it's needed to carry out new demanding projects, for example, the construction of a new capital town, the reconstruction and development of the whole infrastructure and the re-armament of the army, which would fit in with the active neutrality concept. There are sources for these projects mainly due to the fact that Ukraine has been losing external markets under the conditions of the crisis. That's why oligarchs show interest in upholding such a regime. In your opinion, how should the country's foreign policy look like under the conditions of global rivalry which Ukraine is the subject of? NATO integration is to be rejected in terms of foreign policy. Ukraine shouldn't be a hostage of the conflict between Russia and the US. Since NATO represents the most thorny issue for Russia, it's to be stamped out and Russia must be enabled to solve the dispute with the Americans in other places in Eurasia, for instance in Caucasus and Central Asia. May them fight in territories where they're successful, but not in our territory. This variant is fully acceptable for Russia because it facilitates cost optimisation for the increase of defensiveness as Russian sources are more than limited at present. Europe approves of similar variant too since the question of Russian conflict won't be topical any longer, but the US will hold similar scenario back because it's interested in tension growth on Russian borders. The focal role of Ukrainian foreign policy under the circumstances is to avert its involvement in a big war. Ukraine should take part in this war only if it is necessary and not prior to its second stage, like Romania in 1916. The massive re-armament is supposed to deflect the threat of any attack. Ukraine is able to produce missiles and not only those. We're capable of producing nuclear weapons as well if such a political decision is made. Anyway, Ukraine can pose a forbidding threat, which can be ignored neither by Russia nor by the EU, also without nuclear weapons. Gas pipelines, nuclear power plants and other strategic objects lie in its territory. Should the threat of an attack arise, Ukraine may blackmail Russia as well as Europe.

# ukraine econ uniqueness

**Ukrainian economy is high – 6.1% growth, land reform, and mining revenue**

**Stack 6/24** (Graham, Kyiv Post staff writer, “Hot prospects still seen in Ukrainian economy,” <http://www.kyivpost.com/news/business/bus_focus/detail/70949/>)

After the financial collapse of 2008-2009, Ukraine’s economy is finally reviving again, with 6.1 percent growth from January to May of this year. Long-term prospects may be bright. With assets prices still low, analysts say now is a good time to buy Ukrainian assets or securities. The nation could look even better if several factors go Ukraine’s way: the government lives up to its ambitious new program to deepen free-market reforms; China’s economy keeps growing, stimulating demand for key Ukrainian exports such as steel; the ongoing rapprochement with Russia bears fruit; and partnerships with Europe flower. Plowing ahead Liberalization that would allow the buying and selling of land could be one of the most compelling investment spurs. President Viktor Yanukovych called for the “creation of a transparent” agricultural land market in his June 3 address to the nation as part of his government’s plan. “Now the government is determined to push land reform through as soon as possible,” according to Phoenix Capital’s Andriy Yastreb. Land market liberalization – removing the current moratorium on land sales to creating a fully-fledged market in land – will trigger a sharp spike in the price of land. This in turn will trigger a surge in the value of agriculture companies, who currently have exclusive purchase rights on land they lease. “Appreciation may be steep,” Yastreb said. “Ukrainian land, although widely known for its high quality, is currently cheap.” Just how steep is illustrated by the Russian experience: Following the introduction of a private land market in Russia in 2001-2002, the price of land increased from $300 to $2,000-3,000 per hectar of black earth land equivalent to Ukraine’s. In contrast to Russia, foreigners will most likely remain banned from owning land in Ukraine, at least at first. “But foreign investors who wish to invest in land will be able to do so through buying shares of Ukrainian agricultural companies,” Yastreb said. Ukraine’s agriculture sector has a large and increasing number of publicly listed companies both in Ukraine, but especially on foreign exchanges. Considering that private land ownership is the foundation of efficient agriculture, and that Ukraine enjoys a competitive advantage thanks to its ultra-fertile black earth soil and favorable climate, combining the two could be a match made in heaven. Only when large companies own their land will they both have incentives for long-term development of the land, and the collateral to secure the bank loans needed. With the government enjoying a decent majority and having declared its intentions, legislation lifting the land sale moratorium could be the start of something big. A diamond in the rough Ukraine’s mining and steel sector is not as picturesque as agriculture, but it is potentially just as profitable for investors. Here the investment story is not domestic reform, but China’s resource-hungry industrial powerhouse. With Chinese growth topping 11 percent in the first quarter of 2010, the country is acting as an enormous vacuum cleaner, sucking up the world’s raw materials. China has massively ramped up its domestic steel production. In doing so, it has driven up demand for the iron ore, coke and coal – all raw materials used in steel-making – that Ukraine has to offer. Chinese demand for iron ore consequently soared by 41 percent in 2009, and this is good news for Ukraine, sitting pretty on one of the world’s largest deposits. “Ukraine’s location and developed infrastructure is its competitive advantage,” said Dragon Capital’s Sergei Gaida. “Low production costs and [strong logistics] enable local iron ore producers to report high margins,” he added. Ukraine’s coke plants are equally well positioned to take advantage of a growing global deficit in coke capacities, said Phoenix Capital’s Oleksandr Makarov: “For investors looking to play the rebound on the steel market and reap rewards from developing countries’ gluttony for steel, the Ukrainian coke sector offers good opportunities and upsides of more than 100 percent.” Ukraine is currently one of few countries in the world with idle coke capacities, and analysts believe the country could hike exports threefold over the medium-term. Past bottlenecks in securing high quality coal needed could soon be resolved by construction of deep-water ports. Major coke plants benefited from cheap credit to acquire state-of-the-art coke batteries in recent years, improving competitiveness. The main risk in the sector, apart from a downturn in China, is poor corporate governance and transfer pricing, say analysts. Coal miners will also benefit from Chinese growth and government reform of the sector, said Gaida. “Expected coal sector privatization will enable an increase in investment, and a boost in coal production while decreasing import of coking coal.” Ukraine boasts the seventh-largest proven coal deposits in the world, but output is still trailing at around half of Soviet-era levels, leaving plenty of room for improvement. However, pending privatization – Ukraine still has a Ministry for Coal running most of the country’s mines – there are few chances to get exposure to the sector.

**Ukraine’s economy is recovering but on the brink- a decline in exports would collapse the economy**

**Global Insight 10** (Ralf Wiegert, “Ukraine’s Economy Shows Modest Growth Q1, Recent Output Results Herald No Major Recovery Yet,” 5/19/10, Lexis)

Ukraine's GDP showed growth for the first time after the recession, but the outcome fell clearly short of what could be regarded as the start of a sustained recovery. Ukraine's economy grew by 4.8% in the first quarter 2010, according to the State Statistics Committee, which published a provisional estimate on real GDP's year-on-year (y/y) change without further details. The estimate confirms that the economy eventually got back into growth mode in annual comparison, but remained burdened by the impact of the political and financial gridlock in the country. Stalemate prevailed until the presidential election in January/February this year, after which the new President Viktor Yanukovych managed to install a workable majority and a government of his liking. Moreover, harsh weather conditions in the first quarter have additionally dampened the outcome, so that even a modest relapse in seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter (q/q) comparison is likely. Ukraine's GDP posted a modest rebound in the first quarter, being supported by the low base level and mainly driven by exports, while harsh weather conditions have likely dampened the result. The economic situation in Ukraine is stabilising further, but a broad-based recovery is not around the corner yet. The latest output data for April basically confirmed that. Ukraine's lopsided recovery pattern will hardly change in the near term, but domestic demand could join in 2011 as a driving force. If Ukraine's recovery rests on exports alone, risks of a relapse are relatively high, given Europe's current weaknesses. Indeed, the result for the first quarter is hardly impressive when recalling that GDP had sagged by 20.3% in the first quarter of 2009, marking the trough of the recession. Some growth in q/q terms was already observed in the second quarter, but that was mostly a rebound effect from an extremely low level of economic activity. The recovery hardly had any traction during the second half of the year and has remained largely stuck in the first quarter of 2010 as well. There has been grounds for hope that, with the political stalemate being broken and the worst of Ukraine's financial crisis being overcome with the adoption of the budget for 2010, the economy would embark on a sustained recovery path. First sketchy evidence for that could have come from April output and sales data, yet the results for industry, construction and retail sales have yielded hardly a convincing result. It is at least safe to say that the macroeconomic stabilisation has been fostered further, paving the ground for an accelerating recovery during the second half of the year and further out. The industry output index rose by 17.4% y/y, the highest annual increase in a month since six years. However, one should mind that, even after the y/y bounce in April, output still remains more than 20% below the pre-crisis level, which clearly shows that a very large output gap still exists and the recovery actually has not yet begun in earnest. Metallurgy and machinery and equipment are leading the pack in terms of y/y output expansion (33.4% and 33.9% respectively), affirming their importance for Ukraine's recovery and highlighting the fact that **exports are currently the single driving force for growth in Ukraine.**

# ukraine econ impacts

**Ukranian economic strength is critical to European integration and resisting Russian pressure**

**LONDON TELEGRAPH 10-25-2008** (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/recession/3260054/Ukraine-suffers-from-the-economic-crisis-along-with-the-rest-of-Eastern-Europe.html)

With a range of continuing disputes with the Kremlin during an intractable domestic political dispute, economic collapse has rendered Ukraine vulnerable to a resurgence of Russian influence. Last week a Russian consortium was seen as a leading contender to take over the failed Ukrainian bank, Prominvest. Ukraine's pro-Moscow opposition has spent months warning that the government had steered disastrously away from Russia, a path that jeopardised its economy. Last week Serhyi Taruta, the country's leading steel magnate, compounded its crisis by warning of mass lay-offs in the vital industry. "Elections are coming, and the steel industry employs 500,000 people," said leading analyst, Peter Vanhecke, head of investment banking for Renaissance Capital in Ukraine. "If no supportive measures are taken by the government, the steel industry will most likely have to reduce its headcount substantially. Output has gone down due to the global economic slowdown." The fallout from the crisis goes beyond the realms of the economic. Ukraine's efforts to join Nato and set up a close alliance with the EU is in Moscow's cross-hairs. The Kremlin last week formally renewed its requestion for an extension of the lease on the Crimean port of Sevastopol, home its Black Sea fleet. "There's broad consensus that the aspiration for Ukraine to join Nato in the near future is now highly unlikely," said Mr Vanhecke. "The last thing you want to do is to start haggling with your energy suppliers at a time of economic downturn. My sense is that Ukraine will move closer to a more neutral, non-provocative position towards Russia."

**Integration is key to peace in Europe**

**HORBULIN 1998** (Volodymyr Horbulin, Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, NATO Review, Autumn, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9803-03.htm)

Ukraine's course towards full-scale integration into European and transatlantic structures of cooperation is an integral part of our efforts to contribute to a united and stable Europe. Nevertheless, we recognise the reality of differing speeds of integration and fully support the early accession into Euro-Atlantic structures of those of our Central European partners who are further along in the process. At the same time, we are convinced that more effort should be made to reduce the differences in the levels of economic development and hence in the tempos of integration of individual countries. Narrowing these differences would help to reduce the risk of the enlargement process having a negative impact on the efficiency of these institutions. More generally, we believe it is the only way to ensure a secure and stable Europe, where nations cooperate within transparent structures, share common values and are measured by the same criteria. We fully share and subscribe to the spirit of solidarity and common values of the Council of Europe, OSCE and the European Union. Ukraine is already a member of the Council of Europe and OSCE and is working actively to join the EU as well. With the entry into force of Ukraine's Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU earlier this year, we are working to further develop political, economic, financial, social and cultural ties with the European Union. We are also seeking closer relations with the Western European Union, which we view as an important component of European security. In June 1997, Ukraine and WEU concluded an agreement providing for the use of Ukrainian long-range airlift capabilities. This agreement, the first of its kind concluded by the WEU, is a practical example of the type of cooperation we are engaged in to strengthen European stability and security. On this basis, we hope to be in a position to establish a more formalised relationship with the WEU in future.

**Nulcear war**

**GLASER 1993** (Charles, Professor at the University of Chicago, International Security, Summer)

However, although the lack of an imminent Soviet threat eliminates the most obvious danger, U.S. security has not been entirely separated from the future of Western Europe. The ending of the Cold War has brought many benefits, but has not eliminated the possibility of major power war, especially since such a war could grow out of a smaller conflict in the East. And, although nuclear weapons have greatly reduced the threat that a European hegemon would pose to U.S. security, a sound case nevertheless remains that a major European war could threaten U.S. security. The United States could be drawn into such a war, even if strict security considerations suggested it should stay out. A major power war could escalate to a nuclear war that, especially if the United States joins, could include attacks against the American homeland. Thus, the United States should not be unconcerned about Europe’s future.

# russia-ukraine war impact

**Russia-Ukraine war causes immediate nuclear attack on the U.S.**

**PRY 1999** (Peter Vincent, Former US Intelligence Operative, War Scare: U.S.-Russia on the Nuclear Brink, netlibrary)

Russo-Ukrainian tensions are dangerous for the United States, because they contribute to an overall sense of growing international crisis among an already suspicious and fearful Russian military. Perhaps more importantly, U.S. efforts to help resolve the Russo-Ukrainian crisis have created the impression that Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons in exchange for substantial security guarantees from the United States. In fact, under the Trilateral Statement of January 14, 1994, the U.S. security guarantees to Ukraine were largely symbolic and probably would not legally bind the United States to side with Ukraine militarily in a war against Russia. But it is not clear that Moscow or Kiev understands the ethereal nature of the U.S. commitment to Ukrainian defense. The potentially deadly illusion that the United States is committed by treaty to defend Ukraine could convince the Russian military that a future Russo-Ukrainian conflict, or Russian war of imperial reconquest, will inevitably involve war with the United States. This misapprehension might well lead the Russian General Staff to plan, out of mistaken military necessity, for a knockout nuclear blow against the United States at the very beginning of a war in which the United States, in reality, has no vital interest or real intention of participating.

\*\*\*NON-MIDDLE EAST/GENERAL WAR GOOD

# africa war won’t escalate

**War In Africa Does Not Escalate**

**ALEXANDER 1995** (Bevin, Professor and Director of the Inter-University Institution for Terrorism Studies, The Future of Warfare)

The United States also will be reluctant to enter into conflicts in Africa, unless a major outside power tries to gain control of a region, as was the case with Soviet incursions during the Cold War, or unless one power attempts to corral the supply of vital minerals such as cobalt, chromium, or manganese. Without such incursions, African conflicts constitute little international danger because the continent does not possess enough inherent military or economic power to threaten the world. That is why the United States has ignored, militarily at least, the civil wars or ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Liberia, Chad, Mozambique, Sudan, and elsewhere. It intervened in Somalia primarily to halt starvation.

# liberia war good

**U.S. civil war proves war in Liberia should be allowed to continue—intervention only fosters bad regimes**

**PINKERTON 2003** (James, Writer for Newsday, The Times Union, August 2)

Will Americans on the ground there be peacekeepers, or targets? And for that matter, do Liberians need us to keep the peace -- such as it might be -- or do they need us to help the better side win the civil war? As the United States proved way back in 1865, sometimes it's better to settle things through final victory, not temporary compromise. To be sure, President Bush is over a barrel. As he shifts the rationale for the Iraq war away from weapons of mass destruction and toward humanitarian relief, it looks hypocritical for him not to apply that same humanitarian-relief argument to Liberia, where thousands have died in recent months. Fearing violence against Americans, Bush has said he doesn't want U.S. peacekeepers to go in until Liberian President Charles Taylor goes. But Taylor hasn't left yet, and in the meantime the death toll -- and the pressure on the United States to "do something" -- continues to mount. So it's possible that Bush will be pushed into committing peacekeepers to walk the mean streets of Monrovia, the capital, even before Taylor departs. But no matter what the sequence of events, there's still the huge question of what the Marines would do when they got there; most likely, they'd be confronting angry men brandishing Kalashnikovs and rocket-propelled grenades. Moreover, the politico-military situation is complicated. There are, in fact, two rebel movements seeking to gain control of the country. The rebels in Monrovia now call themselves Liberians United for Reconstruction and Democracy. They are backed by Guinea, which borders Liberia to the north. The other group, which the Associated Press describes as "better armed and better disciplined," is called Movement for Democracy in Liberia. It is backed by Ivory Coast, which borders Liberia to the east. So here's a question: If the United States wants Taylor to leave immediately, why fool around with peacekeeping? Why not, as in the case of the American civil conflict 140 years ago, give war a chance? One can speculate what would have happened if the same logic of peacekeeping had been applied to the United States during the Civil War. Around about 1863, neither the North nor the South had delivered a knockout blow. Foreigners could hardly have been blamed for judging the war-torn United States, where hundreds of thousands had died, to be a "failed state." What if the French or the Prussians, for example, had intervened as peacekeepers? Would they have attempted to stand between Blues and Grays to prevent further fighting at, say, Gettysburg? What if the Great Powers had insisted on negotiations between Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis? Would that have been a good idea? No. It was far better for the North and the South to fight it out, and for the North to win, thus preserving the Union and abolishing slavery. Yet if hypothetical European do-gooders had decided to advance the cause of human freedom, they would have intervened on behalf of the Yankees. Moreover, it could be argued that Americans won their revolution in the 18th century only because so many idealistic Europeans flocked to fight for the Stars and Stripes. One shudders to think what would have happened if Lafayette, Kosciuszko, Von Steuben & Co. had come to America not as warriors for George Washington, but instead as "peacekeepers" eager to mediate between Rebels and Redcoats. The outcome would have been far different -- and much worse. If it would have been a bad idea to impose "peacekeeping" in America's early wars, why are we so sure it's a good idea to impose peacekeeping on Liberia's civil war? Instead, maybe the United States should decide to help one or both of the rebel groups, insisting, in return, that the groups pledge to form a good government after they win.

# peacekeeping bad

**U.N. peacekeeping prolongs war by forcing artificial settlements—conflicts should be allowed to burn themselves out**

**LUTTWAK 99** ( Edward N. Luttwak is Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. , Foreign Affairs, July/August, http://isuisse.ifrance.com/emmaf/base/give\_war\_a\_chance.html)

Today cease-fires and armistices are imposed on lesser powers by multilateral agreement -- not to avoid great-power competition but for essentially disinterested and indeed frivolous motives, such as television audiences' revulsion at harrowing scenes of war. But this, perversely, can systematically prevent the transformation of war into peace. The Dayton accords are typical of the genre: they have condemned Bosnia to remain divided into three rival armed camps, with combat suspended momentarily but a state of hostility prolonged indefinitely. Since no side is threatened by defeat and loss, none has a sufficient incentive to negotiate a lasting settlement; because no path to peace is even visible, the dominant priority is to prepare for future war rather than to reconstruct devastated economies and ravaged societies. Uninterrupted war would certainly have caused further suffering and led to an unjust outcome from one perspective or another, but it would also have led to a more stable situation that would have let the postwar era truly begin. Peace takes hold only when war is truly over. A variety of multilateral organizations now make it their business to intervene in other peoples' wars. The defining characteristic of these entities is that they insert themselves in war situations while refusing to engage in combat. In the long run this only adds to the damage. If the United Nations helped the strong defeat the weak faster and more decisively, it would actually enhance the peacemaking potential of war. But the first priority of U.N. peacekeeping contingents is to avoid casualties among their own personnel. Unit commanders therefore habitually appease the locally stronger force, accepting its dictates and tolerating its abuses. This appeasement is not strategically purposeful, as siding with the stronger power overall would be; rather, it merely reflects the determination of each U.N. unit to avoid confrontation. The final result is to prevent the emergence of a coherent outcome, which requires an imbalance of strength sufficient to end the fighting.

**Peacekeeping encourages war by forcing artificial interruptions in conflict**

**LUTTWAK 1997** (Edward, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Boston Review, Oct/Nov, http://www.bostonreview.net/BR22.5/luttwak.html)

1. To "work for peace" in her sense causes war, more so when working "energetically," whereas it is the destructions of war (or the expenses and moral fatigue of war-preparation in cold wars) that brings about peace, by exhausting the resources and will to persist in war (or war-preparation). To say that Reagan's SDI ended the Cold War is at least exaggeration, but had Forsberg and those of like minds succeeded in cutting US defense spending when it was still useful (not for self-defense, admittedly), the USSR--in its later, military aggrandizement phase (prompted by the loss of all hope in ideological victory)--would have lasted longer, and the peoples of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States might still be imprisoned in it. And before then, the arms race that Forsberg & Co. systematically opposed greatly helped to keep the peace, by venting acute insecurities into harmless "overkill" weapon programs in lieu of far more dangerous attempts to conquer strategic depth, the standard prenuclear remedy. 2. More generally, war-preparation by those actually willing to fight (not just ritualistic preparations, as is mostly the case in advanced countries nowadays) may avert war by dissuading others' hopes of easy victories--even Bosnia might have done it, had it raised a good army before declaring independence--whereas wishing for peace, marching for peace, etc., is as relevant as wishing and marching for good weather--except if it interferes with concrete war-preparations, when it may be counterproductive. 3. "Peacekeeping institutions" commonly perpetuate war, by freezing the processes that would exhaust it (consider the effect of imposed cease-fires in Arab-Israeli wars). The various UN peacekeeping forces everywhere are symbolically and frictionally useful only when other factors (exhaustion, great-power pressure) are dissuading war. In all other cases they are either ineffectual or, much more often, counter-productive (as in ex-Yugoslavia).

# a2: it’s immoral

**Our argument is moral—lack of intervention is done out of concern for human welfare**

**LUTTWAK 99** ( Edward N. Luttwak is Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. , Foreign Affairs, July/August, http://isuisse.ifrance.com/emmaf/base/give\_war\_a\_chance.html)

Too many wars nowadays become endemic conflicts that never end because the transformative effects of both decisive victory and exhaustion are blocked by outside intervention. Unlike the ancient problem of war, however, the compounding of its evils by disinterested interventions is a new malpractice that could be curtailed. Policy elites should actively resist the emotional impulse to intervene in other peoples' wars -- not because they are indifferent to human suffering but precisely because they care about it and want to facilitate the advent of peace. The United States should dissuade multilateral interventions instead of leading them. New rules should be established for U.N. refugee relief activities to ensure that immediate succor is swiftly followed by repatriation, local absorption, or emigration, ruling out the establishment of permanent refugee camps. And although it may not be possible to constrain interventionist NGOs, they should at least be neither officially encouraged nor funded. Underlying these seemingly perverse measures would be a true appreciation of war's paradoxical logic and a commitment to let it serve its sole useful function: to bring peace.

**War is peace—allowing conflicts to burn themselves out is key to long-term stability and these conflicts don’t escalate**

**LUTTWAK 99** ( Edward N. Luttwak is Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. , Foreign Affairs, July/August, http://isuisse.ifrance.com/emmaf/base/give\_war\_a\_chance.html)

An unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. This can happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively. Either way the key is that the fighting must continue until a resolution is reached. War brings peace only after passing a culminating phase of violence. Hopes of military success must fade for accommodation to become more attractive than further combat. Since the establishment of the United Nations and the enshrinement of great-power politics in its Security Council, however, wars among lesser powers have rarely been allowed to run their natural course. Instead, they have typically been interrupted early on, before they could burn themselves out and establish the preconditions for a lasting settlement. Cease-fires and armistices have frequently been imposed under the aegis of the Security Council in order to halt fighting. NATO's intervention in the Kosovo crisis follows this pattern. But a cease-fire tends to arrest war-induced exhaustion and lets belligerents reconstitute and rearm their forces. It intensifies and prolongs the struggle once the cease-fire ends -- and it does usually end. This was true of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, which might have come to closure in a matter of weeks if two cease-fires ordained by the Security Council had not let the combatants recuperate. It has recently been true in the Balkans. Imposed cease-fires frequently interrupted the fighting between Serbs and Croats in Krajina, between the forces of the rump Yugoslav federation and the Croat army, and between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia. Each time, the opponents used the pause to recruit, train, and equip additional forces for further combat, prolonging the war and widening the scope of its killing and destruction. Imposed armistices, meanwhile -- again, unless followed by negotiated peace accords -- artificially freeze conflict and perpetuate a state of war indefinitely by shielding the weaker side from the consequences of refusing to make concessions for peace. The Cold War provided compelling justification for such behavior by the two superpowers, which sometimes collaborated in coercing less-powerful belligerents to avoid being drawn into their conflicts and clashing directly. Although imposed cease-fires ultimately did increase the total quantity of warfare among the lesser powers, and armistices did perpetuate states of war, both outcomes were clearly lesser evils (from a global point of view) than the possibility of nuclear war. But today, neither Americans nor Russians are inclined to intervene competitively in the wars of lesser powers, so the unfortunate consequences of interrupting war persist while no greater danger is averted. It might be best for all parties to let minor wars burn themselves out.

# a2: de mello

**De Mello is wrong—negotiated solutions come only after military victory**

**LUTTWAK 2000** (Edward, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Foreign Affairs, March/April)

Vieira de Mello states that I neglected to mention the wars in Namibia, El Salvador, and Mozambique, all of which ended through negotiations, rather than through conclusive wars. Really? True, there were negotiations in which the U.N. played a large role alongside others, such as Rome's Community of San Egidio and less-dubious NGOS. But as I noted, South Africa's war with the South West Africa People's Organisation was finally stopped by U.S. pressure, against the background of the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola. As for El Salvador, its guerrilla war did end through negotiation -- but only after the insurgents were denied any chance of winning by the increasingly strong army and the Defensa Civil militia, conjoined with the diminishing hope of Sandinista-Cuban-Soviet assistance. Only then did the insurgents want to try the ballot box instead of the gun, but they were defeated electorally as well. As for Mozambique, the government's rival -- the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) -- was born as a Rhodesian covert operation and lived on as a South African proxy. Once the MNR's creator had disappeared and its replacement patron cut off further support, the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) won the war. Only then did undoubtedly useful mediation play its small role; so that too was a war ended by victory. The rest of Vieira de Mello's contentions can be answered by my response to Crocker, especially in the case of Sierra Leone, whose own war was inconclusive because, amid many atrocities against civilians, it was hardly fought by the supposed combatants. Outside multilateral intervention was notably ineffectual. Vieira de Mello notes that "U.N. officials in such places as eastern Angola, northern Sierra Leone, and the eastern areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo face the fact that rebels fight not for victory but because fighting itself offers power and wealth." U.N. officials may "face the fact" but can do nothing about it, other than to legitimize grotesque entities that call themselves states because a U.N. seat has their name on it. Those officials are not earning their keep, because they neither kill rebels nor help them win on the sound calculation that war itself is more savage than the most savage of belligerents.

# a2: crocker

**Crocker is wrong—civil wars will burn out if they are allowed to escalate**

**LUTTWAK 2000** (Edward, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Foreign Affairs, March/April)

Chester Crocker's thoughtful critique of my article, "Give War a Chance," warrants broader consideration, but here I can only try to respond to his main objection ("A Poor Case for Quitting," January/February 2000). While describing the paradoxical logic of the strategy presented in my article as "compelling," Crocker notes major exceptions to the proposition that wars themselves establish the preconditions for peace, if uninterrupted by outsiders -- including the cases of Chechnya, Sudan, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, and Angola. He is, of course, correct. In all those areas, warfare has persisted for decades, yet there is no peace in sight. But war can become its own remedy only by consuming and destroying the material and moral resources needed to keep fighting. It follows that the speed with which war destroys itself depends on its intensity and scale. In civil wars, the intensity of the fighting is usually low and the scale very limited, except for short (often seasonal) explosions of violence that, in most cases, are very localized. That leaves unaffected the wider environment, whose undestroyed resources can fuel war endlessly. As Crocker notes, Chechen resistance to the Russians began in the 1830s. But during the last 170 years there have been only a few months of truly intense large-scale fighting. Otherwise, the Russians would long ago have achieved an imperial peace through genocide or forced dispersal. Acting Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to achieve peace through all-out victory. But he is unlikely to do so because his war is not destroying the essential war-making resource of the Chechens -- their warrior youth. With Russia's democracy sufficiently established to make genocide or mass deportation impossible, Putin's choices are restricted to an endless war inside Chechnya or the republic's isolation behind a well-guarded perimeter. In Sudan, the fighting has been limited to some areas of the far south, and even there it has been mostly seasonal. Neither a war restricted by outside interference nor a war so limited in scope can create the preconditions for peace. Kashmir exhibits both the Chechen phenomenon of an imperial power unwilling to destroy or accommodate a rebellious nationality and the interrupted-war syndrome. None of the Indo-Pakistan wars persisted long enough to bring peace to Kashmir (in 1971, Pakistan was spared total defeat by American intervention). Now a nuclear stalemate has inaugurated a protracted cold war. In Sri Lanka, ethnic war has continued for decades in the northeast, while foreign tourists continue to frequent tranquil beaches in the south-west. Had the intensity of the fighting in the Jaffna peninsula been replicated throughout the island, the war would have ended long ago. Angola has seen periods of intense fighting, mainly when the Luanda government had allies or mercenaries fighting its battles, but the war with the rebels has been mostly localized and desultory. The logic of strategy is no more than a theoretical formulation of an almost physical process. Had World War II been fought in fits and starts and in secondary theaters far from Germany and Japan, it would still continue. That the paradoxical logic of strategy cannot exceed its limits is no excuse for the current practice of systematically sabotaging war's peace-making potential by outside interventions that are disinterested and therefore both arbitrary and usually inconclusive. Nor is it an excuse for the U.N. and nongovernmental organizations (NGOS) to provide refugee assistance by permanent encampment, instead of providing immediate humanitarian relief followed by a natural dispersion when quick repatriation is impossible. Such an intervention guarantees the perpetuation of refugee polities, the only possible ideology of which is revanchist. This, in turn, guarantees perpetual war -- as in Rwanda's recent case. Again, had the U.N. and today's plague of irresponsible, self-seeking NGOS existed in Europe's past, the continent would contain no stable states but only vast camps of unreconciled refugees, still battling their ancient enemies.

# war good—biodiversity

**War preserves biodiversity—peace destroys it**

**McNEELY 2002** (Jeffrey, Chief Scientist at IUCN, Conserving the Peace, www.iisd.org/pdf/2002/envsec\_conserving\_overview.pdf)

So while war is bad for biodiversity, peace can be even worse: in the 1960s, when Indonesia and Malaysia were fighting over border claims on the island of Borneo, they did relatively little damage to its vast wilderness, but in the 1990s they peacefully competed to cut down and sell its forests; in Indonesia, the 1997–1998 forest fires that caused US$4.4 billion in damage were set primarily by businesses and military to clear forests in order to plant various cash crops. Ironically, the prices of these commodities that were to be grown have fallen considerably in recent years, making them even less profitable. Vietnam’s forests are under greater pressure now that peace has arrived than they ever were during the country’s wars; Nicaragua’s forests are now under renewed development pressures; and Laos is paying at least part of its war debts to China and Vietnam with timber concessions; I was told in Laos that the Chinese and Vietnamese timber merchants and logging companies are able to operate with impunity in Laos, irrespective of logging regulations, protected area boundaries, or any other considerations. This is perhaps not surprising given the dependence of the Pathet Lao on the support of Vietnam and China during the IndoChina wars. The motivations may be more noble in times of peace, but the impacts of inappropriate development on biodiversity following the end of hostilities often are even worse than the impacts of war. Market forces may be more destructive than military forces

**War prevents environmental destruction—peace accelerates it**

**McNEELY 2002** (Jeffrey, Chief Scientist at IUCN, Conserving the Peace, www.iisd.org/pdf/2002/envsec\_conserving\_overview.pdf)

The impact of war on biodiversity is often decidedly mixed, with a complex combination of damages and benefits. Nicaragua provides an outstanding example. Engaged in civil war for over 20 years, nearly half of the country’s population was relocated in one way or another, and nearly 100,000 casualties resulted. The human tragedy was immense, but biodiversity was able to recover from a long history of exploitation, as trade in timber, fish, minerals, and wildlife was sharply reduced. The domestic cattle population, which was roughly equivalent to the human population when the war started, was reduced by two-thirds, freeing pastures for recolonization by forests, enabling the recovery of animal populations such as white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus), peccaries (Tayassu angulatus), four species of monkeys (Cebidae), crocodiles (Caiman Crocodilus), iguanas (Iguana iguana), large birds and various mammalian predators. Fishing boats were destroyed and fishermen fled, leading to drastic declines in the catches of fish, shrimp and lobsters, which in turn revitalized these fisheries. On the other hand, some hunting by soldiers had at least local negative impacts on wildlife, and new military bases and roads were established in formerly-remote areas, opening them up to exploitation. Further, the country’s once outstanding system of protected areas fell into neglect, and new areas planned were not established; the collapsing economy forced villagers into environmentally destructive activities, including clearing forest for firewood and harvesting wildlife for food. Nietschmann (1990b) concludes that a significant portion of this conflict was over resources and territory, not ideology. Biodiversity rejuvenated by the war came under renewed threat by people whom the war had impoverished; the post-war period saw a great acceleration of such impacts and now that peace has broken out, biodiversity is under renewed pressure.

**War is on balance good for biodiversity**

**McNEELY 2002** (Jeffrey, Chief Scientist at IUCN, Conserving the Peace, www.iisd.org/pdf/2002/envsec\_conserving\_overview.pdf)

As one of the world’s last remaining strongholds of unexploited resources, tropical forests often serve as a point of contention as they become the focus of social, ecological, political and economic changes. Poor management of forest resources and the absence of an established set of equitable sharing principles among contending parties lead to shifts in resource access and control. Resulting tensions and grievances can lead to armed conflict and even war. Many governments have contributed to conflict by nationalizing their forests, so that traditional forest inhabitants have been disenfranchised while national governments sell trees to concessionaires to earn foreign exchange. Biodiversity-rich tropical forests in Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Indochina, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Central Africa, the Amazon, Colombia, Central America and New Caledonia have all been the sites of armed conflict, sometimes involving international forces. While these conflicts have frequently, even invariably, caused negative impacts on biodiversity, peace is often even worse, as it enables forest exploitation to operate with impunity. Because many of the remaining tropical forests are along international borders, international cooperation is required for their conservation; as a response, the concept of international “peace parks” is being promoted in many parts of the world as a way of linking biodiversity conservation with national security. The Convention on Biological Diversity, which entered into force at the end of 1993 and now has nearly 180 State Parties, offers a useful framework for such cooperation.

**War is good for biodiversity—prevents civillian exploitation of the environment**

**McNEELY 2002** (Jeffrey, Chief Scientist at IUCN, Conserving the Peace, www.iisd.org/pdf/2002/envsec\_conserving\_overview.pdf)

But war, or the threat of war, can also be good for biodiversity, at least under certain conditions. As Myers (1979: 24) put it, “In some respects, indeed, wildlife benefits from warfare: combatant armies effectively designate war zones as ‘off limits’ to casual wanderers, thus quarantining large areas of Africa from hunters and poachers.” Of course, any benefits of war to biodiversity are incidental, inadvertent and accidental rather than a planned side-effect of conflict. But even so, it is useful to review some cases where war, or preparations for war, has benefited biodiversity, perhaps supporting the views of some anthropologists that war helps societies adapt to their environmental constraints. For example, the border between Thailand and Peninsular Malaysia was a hotbed of insurgency during the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. On the Malaysian side of the border, the military closed off all public access and potential logging activity in the Belum Forest Reserve. As a result, this extensive area of some 160,000 ha has remained untouched by modern logging pressures and therefore is rich in wildlife resources. Malaysia is now converting this into a national park that will form a transboundaryprotected area with matching protected areas in southern Thailand. While the second Vietnam War was an ecological disaster, it also led to some important biological research, such as the extensive, long-term review of migratory birds in eastern Asia carried out by the Migratory Animals Pathological Survey (McClure, 1974). The excuse for this research was its relevance to the war effort, but it has yielded data that are useful for numerous civilian conservation applications. And the watersheds through which ran the Ho Chi Minh trail, some of the most heavilybombed parts of Indo-China during the second Vietnam War, have more recently been remarkably productive in discoveries of previously unknown species. The discoveries of new large mammals include two species of muntjak or barking deer (Megamuntiacus vuquangensis and Muntiacus truongsonensis), a unique variety of forest antelope (Pseudoryx nghetinhensis), and a bovid ultimately related to wild cattle (Pseudonovibos spiralis) (Dillon and Wikramanyake, 1997) as well as the rediscovery of a species of pig that formerly was known only by a few fragmentary specimens. That such species could survive in such a heavily-bombed area is testimony to the recuperative power of nature and the ability of wildlife to withstand even the most extreme kinds of human pressure during warfare. Interestingly, these species now are even more severely threatened by the peacetime activities of development than they were by the Indochina wars. Some other species are likely to have benefited from the war in Vietnam. Orians and Pfeiffer (1970: 553) say that tigers “have learned to associate the sounds of gunfire with the presence of dead and wounded humanbeings in the vicinity. As a result, tigers rapidly move toward gunfire and apparently consume large numbers of battle casualties. Although there are no accurate statistics on the tiger populations past or present, it is likely that the tiger population has increased much as the wolf population in Poland increased during World War II.” Fairhead and Leach (1995) report that parts of the Ziama region of Guinea, which includes an extensive biosphere reserve, became forested following a series of wars that affected the area from 1870 to 1910. The resident Toma people first fought with Mandinka groups from the north and subsequently with the French colonial armies, causing major depopulation and economic devastation that in turn allowed the forest to reclaim agricultural land. The human disaster of war enabled nature to recover.

# biodiversity impact

**Biodiversity checks extinction**

**WATSON 2006** (Captain Paul, Founder and President of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, dude on Whale Wars, Last Mod 9-17, http://www.eco-action.org/dt/beerswil.html)

The facts are clear. More plant and animal species will go through extinction within our generation than have been lost thorough natural causes over the past two hundred million years. Our single human generation, that is, all people born between 1930 and 2010 will witness the complete obliteration of one third to one half of all the Earth's life forms, each and every one of them the product of more than two billion years of evolution. This is biological meltdown, and what this really means is the end to vertebrate evolution on planet Earth. Nature is under siege on a global scale. Biotopes, i.e., environmentally distinct regions, from tropical and temperate rainforests to coral reefs and coastal estuaries, are disintegrating in the wake of human onslaught. The destruction of forests and the proliferation of human activity will remove more than 20 percent of all terrestrial plant species over the next fifty years. Because plants form the foundation for entire biotic communities, their demise will carry with it the extinction of an exponentially greater number of animal species -- perhaps ten times as many faunal species for each type of plant eliminated. Sixty-five million years ago, a natural cataclysmic event resulted in extinction of the dinosaurs. Even with a plant foundation intact, it took more than 100,000 years for faunal biological diversity to re-establish itself. More importantly, the resurrection of biological diversity assumes an intact zone of tropical forests to provide for new speciation after extinction. Today, the tropical rain forests are disappearing more rapidly than any other bio-region, ensuring that after the age of humans, the Earth will remain a biological, if not a literal desert for eons to come. The present course of civilization points to ecocide -- the death of nature. Like a run-a-way train, civilization is speeding along tracks of our own manufacture towards the stone wall of extinction. The human passengers sitting comfortably in their seats, laughing, partying, and choosing to not look out the window. Environmentalists are those perceptive few who have their faces pressed against the glass, watching the hurling bodies of plants and animals go screaming by. Environmental activists are those even fewer people who are trying desperately to break into the fortified engine of greed that propels this destructive specicidal juggernaut. Others are desperately throwing out anchors in an attempt to slow the monster down while all the while, the authorities, blind to their own impending destruction, are clubbing, shooting and jailing those who would save us all. SHORT MEMORIES Civilized humans have for ten thousand years been marching across the face of the Earth leaving deserts in their footprints. Because we have such short memories, we forgot the wonder and splendor of a virgin nature. We revise history and make it fit into our present perceptions. For instance, are you aware that only two thousand years ago, the coast of North Africa was a mighty forest? The Phoenicians and the Carthaginians built powerful ships from the strong timbers of the region. Rome was a major exporter of timber to Europe. The temple of Jerusalem was built with titanic cedar logs, one image of which adorns the flag of Lebanon today. Jesus Christ did not live in a desert, he was a man of the forest. The Sumerians were renowned for clearing the forests of Mesopotamia for agriculture. But the destruction of the coastal swath of the North African forest stopped the rain from advancing into the interior. Without the rain, the trees died and thus was born the mighty Sahara, sired by man and continued to grow southward at a rate of ten miles per year, advancing down the length of the continent of Africa. And so will go Brazil. The precipitation off the Atlantic strikes the coastal rain forest and is absorbed and sent skyward again by the trees, falling further into the interior. Twelve times the moisture falls and twelve times it is returned to the sky -- all the way to the Andes mountains. Destroy the coastal swath and desertify Amazonia -- it is as simple as that. Create a swath anywhere between the coast and the mountains and the rains will be stopped. We did it before while relatively primitive. We learned nothing. We forgot. So too, have we forgotten that walrus once mated and bred along the coast of Nova Scotia, that sixty million bison once roamed the North American plains. One hundred years ago, the white bear once roamed the forests of New England and the Canadian Maritime provinces. Now it is called the polar bear because that is where it now makes its last stand. EXTINCTION IS DIFFICULT TO APPRECIATE Gone forever are the European elephant, lion and tiger. The Labrador duck, gint auk, Carolina parakeet will never again grace this planet of ours. Lost for all time are the Atlantic grey whales, the Biscayan right whales and the Stellar sea cow. Our children will never look upon the California condor in the wild or watch the Palos Verde blue butterfly dart from flower to flower. Extinction is a difficult concept to fully appreciate. What has been is no more and never shall be again. It would take another creation and billions of years to recreate the passenger pigeon. It is the loss of billions of years of evolutionary programming. It is the destruction of beauty, the obliteration of truth, the removal of uniqueness, the scarring of the sacred web of life To be responsible for an extinction is to commit blasphemy against the divine. It is the greatest of all possible crimes, more evil than murder, more appalling than genocide, more monstrous than even the apparent unlimited perversities of the human mind. To be responsible for the complete and utter destruction of a unique and sacred life form is arrogance that seethes with evil, for the very opposite of evil is live. It is no accident that these two words spell out each other in reverse. And yet, a reporter in California recently told me that "all the redwoods in California are not worth the life on one human being." What incredible arrogance. The rights a species, any species, must take precedence over the life of an individual or another species. This is a basic ecological law. It is not to be tampered with by primates who have molded themselves into divine legends in their own mind. For each and every one of the thirty million plus species that grace this beautiful planet are essential for the continued well-being of which we are all a part, the planet Earth -- the divine entity which brought us forth from the fertility of her sacred womb. As a sea-captain I like to compare the structural integrity of the biosphere to that of a ship's hull. Each species is a rivet that keeps the hull intact. If I were to go into my engine room and find my engineers busily popping rivets from the hull, I would be upset and naturally I would ask them what they were doing. If they told me that they discovered that they could make a dollar each from the rivets, I could do one of three things. I could ignore them. I could ask them to cut me in for a share of the profits, or I could kick their asses out of the engine room and off my ship. If I was a responsible captain, I would do the latter. If I did not, I would soon find the ocean pouring through the holes left by the stolen rivets and very shortly after, my ship, my crew and myself would disappear beneath the waves. And that is the state of the world today. The political leaders, i.e., the captains at the helms of their nation states, are ignoring the rivet poppers or they are cutting themselves in for the profits. There are very few asses being kicked out of the engine room of spaceship Earth. With the rivet poppers in command, it will not be long until the biospheric integrity of the Earth collapses under the weight of ecological strain and tides of death come pouring in. And that will be the price of progress -- ecological collapse, the death of nature, and with it the horrendous and mind numbing specter of massive human destruction.

# war good—aids

**Ending small wars increases the spread of AIDS**

**POST-GAZETTE.COM 2005** (July 19, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05200/540074.stm)

Her report asserts that the AIDS pandemic began with armies using mass rape as a weapon. But Garrett's research found that "it is the peace following a long period of war that poses the greatest risk."

"It is in the euphoria of peace, with the demobilization of thousands of combatants, return of refugees, opening of borders and sudden influx of trade, that HIV is spread," Garrett wrote in the report.

# aids impacts

**AIDS causes deforestation and destroys the environment**

**OGLETHORPE AND GELMAN 2006** (Judy, World Wildlife Fund; Nancy, Africa Biodiversity Collaborative Group, Frontiers in Ecology and Environment, April 2006)

Behind these broad population figures, the impacts of AIDS on demographic structure are seriously worsening the imbalances between population and natural resource consumption/land use in sub-Saharan Africa. The most economically active age group (15–49 years old) is most impacted by AIDS (UNAIDS 2004). When individuals in this age group succumb to the disease, wages and agricultural labor are lost. Rural households are forced to change their livelihood strategies in an ever-deepening spiral of poverty. They often cultivate less labor-intensive but also less nutritious crops (Barnett and Whiteside 2002) and increase natural resource consumption. Activities such as hunting, fishing, wild food-plant collection, and fuel-wood extraction increase as families struggle to maintain diets and generate alternative income (Barany et al. 2001; Africa Biodiversity Collaborative Group 2002). The subsequent increase in resource use is often unsustainable. Indigenous knowledge of agriculture and resource management is often lost when parents die before passing it on to their children. For example, using fire for agricultural clearing can increase as indigenous knowledge of agricultural production disappears and less labor is available for farming. Uncontrolled fires destroy natural resources such as forest foods and building materials (M Jurvelius pers comm) and can accelerate erosion. As AIDS orphans grow up, they often have little indigenous knowledge and a weak attachment to land and resources. This could result in unsustainable mining of natural resources and future insecurity, both locally and nationally. Compounding this, law enforcement capacity is being weakened by the epidemic, as is the ability of governments and non-governmental organizations to provide technical support for rural development and resource management. At a local level, AIDS can result in shifts in land and resource control, as traditional governance structures break down and power relations change. Inefficient and unsustainable use can increase, particularly if knowledge of sustainable practices is lost or there is less commitment to sound use. In addition, in some societies, widows and orphans cannot inherit land when the male head of a household dies, because of patriarchal laws and traditions. Even if there is a legal basis for inheritance, land-grabbing may occur (International Center for Research on Women 2004).

**AIDS causes pandemic mutations**

**NEWSDAY 5-31-2001** (http://www.aegis.com/news/NEWSDAY/2001/ND010505.html)

Today, with the AIDS epidemic 20 years old, about 37 million people are suffering from various stages of HIV-induced immune system problems. Twenty years into the future, according to some forecasts, the pool of human beings living with AIDS-weakened immune systems could well exceed 200 million. And that has some biologists worried about the insidious next pathogen that may surface, taking advantage of such an enormous pool of people with compromised immune systems. "I can envisage other horror scenarios," says Dr. Robin Weiss of the Wohl Virion Centre at University College in London. "Where 10 percent or more of the population is immunocompromised due to HIV infection, just imagine how previously rare opportunistic infections could rapidly evolve to become novel human-to-human pathogens." Weiss recently authored a forecast for the British science journal Nature in which he suggested: "Microbes that are poorly adapted for human infection could become well adjusted, first to the immunodeficient host and eventually to immunocompetent humans, provided they learn the tricks of human-to-human transmission. This could include free-living microbes from the environment ... as well as microbes and parasites from other animal sources." Bacteria could become increasingly drug resistant. Floating pieces of "harmless" genetic material, which are common now, could take on lethal forms. And, Weiss predicts, even if HIV comes under control by immunization, "new diseases may roam former HIV land." Such speculation may seem apocryphal, except for two points: First, the explosion of HIV is occurring at the same time as societies of the wealthy world are aging. With age, most people's immune systems deteriorate, rendering them fatally vulnerable to infections such as the flu. And such events already have occurred with HIV. Several diseases have taken advantage of the immune-compromised AIDS populations, causing not only unusual ailments in HIV-positive individuals but also communitywide outbreaks. These include cryptosporidiosis (an intestinal disease passed in contaminated water), multidrug- resistant tuberculosis, HHV-8 (a cancer-causing virus), Herpes simplex virus, vaccine-associated viruses and bacteria, Mycobactrium avium (a bird form of tuberculosis), toxoplasmosis, bird viruses and farm animal parasites. "The one I worry about is what it's going to do to TB on a large scale," says Dr. David Ho, director of the Aaron Diamond AIDS Research Center in Manhattan. "When I went to rural areas in China, you could just go and track the HIV epidemic by TB. And that could really take off in Asia as the epidemic blossoms. Of the ones we know about, that's the one that's so frightening." And what about the ones we don't know about? Scientists recently completed a rough sequence of the entire human genome. And among the surprises was discovery that 8 percent of all the genes in human beings are HERVs-Human Endogenous Retroviruses. Like HIV, there are dozens of retroviruses that have infected human beings, or our ancestor species, says virologist John Coffin of Tufts University in Boston. The HERVs got into human DNA thousands, even millions, of years ago, and have passed from one generation to the next. In some cases they have come to perform useful functions in human biology. Weiss has asked whether such viruses, or viral fragments, could emerge again, popping out of our DNA to cause disease.

# india-pakistan war good

**India-Pakistan war is good—key to prevent future conflict and resolve underlying disputes**

**SRINIVASAN 2004** (Rajeev, “Give War a Chance,” January 4, http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/jan/30rajeev.htm)

American military historian John Keegan says in Intelligence in War: 'Decision in war is always the result of a fight, and in combat, willpower always counts for more than foreknowledge… It is force, not fraud or foresight, that counts… Knowledge of what the enemy can do and of what he intends to do is never enough to ensure security, unless there are also the power and the will to resist and preferably to forestall him.' In other words, carry a big stick, and be prepared to use it, and make people believe you will use it, too. The fact of the matter is that Pakistan cannot win any war with India, conventional or nuclear. Yet, we let this pathetic little failed state nag us to death. This shows an absence of will to take the necessary pain of war. In the words of strategic affairs expert Brahma Chellaney, 'Global history testifies to the fact that peace is the outcome of war. But for peace to prevail for a significant period, the war has to be decisive. The enemy has to be humbled and disarmed. The peace the West is enjoying for almost 60 years is the outcome of World War II. Unfortunately, India does not fight or even plan decisive wars. That is the reason why Pakistan keeps coming back at India.' The will and capacity to take the hits is something India displayed after Pokhran II. Then the usual suspects moaned that American sanctions would ruin India, so we should rollback our nuclear program. India stood firm, however. And surprise, surprise, this week the Americans entered into a comprehensive engagement with India in space, nuclear technology, and so forth, in effect putting India on par with NATO! Similarly, calling Pakistan's bluff will reduce this pit bull to a poodle in no time.

# india-pak won’t go nuclear

**India-Pakistan War Would Not Go Nuclear–Pakistan Knows It Would Lose And Deterrence Checks**

**ATAL 2002** (Subodh, Independent Foreign Policy Analyst, Ph. D. from the University of Maryland, April 6, http://www.subodhatal.org/articles/war.html)

 The knee-jerk reaction to any talk about an Indo-Pak war is that of raising the spectre of a nuclear catastrophe. This is based on Pakistan's oft-repeated threat of using its nuclear arsenal. But one needs to weigh the potential and dangers of such a conflagration against the interminable jehad being waged by Pakistan. The exact size of each country's nuclear arsenal is unclear. But it is commonly accepted that India has 50-100 warheads, while Pakistan may have 20-30. According to seismological evidence of the 1998 tests, India's nuclear weapon yields were 20-40 kilotons, while Pakistani bombs ranged from 2-10 kilotons. An important aspect is the delivery systems, where Pakistan was considered to have an edge until recently. Its medium range Ghauri and Shaheen missiles, which would reach Indian targets in a matter of minutes, are based on solid fuel technology, while India's short-range Prithvis are based on liquid fuel technology. Thus the Prithvis need to be positioned close to the border, and require several hours of fueling as opposed to the Pakistani missiles. India has remedied this asymmetry recently, with the testing and induction of the modified Agni missile. The medium range Agni-II is solid-fuel based and can be based deeper in India as an effective second-strike option. Most analysts fear that Pakistan would pull the nuclear trigger first, particularly if Indian forces make major gains, such as threatening to cut off Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Such an attack, if it did happen, would be missile-based. However, Pakistan must realize that if it did strike first, it would face massive retaliation from India. Such massive nuclear retaliation, possibly with a combination of Prithvis and Agni-IIs by India would undoubtedly end Pakistan's existence as a nation. Thus it is difficult to believe that a Pakistani first strike would happen. It is more likely that Pakistan will use ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads against Indian targets. The Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s set a precedent for such an exchange. The missiles fired by each country were more of a nuisance, with few cases of mass casualties. In the case of South Asia, one can argue that use of ballistic missiles against population centres could be more deadly, however, the international community is likely to take a dim view of such attacks. It is roughly estimated that about 100,000-150,000 deaths may occur in a single nuclear attack on a large city in South Asia. With non-nuclear missiles, particularly Pakistani missiles of Chinese and North Korean origin that have suspect accuracy, the toll is likely to be several magnitudes lower, but may be more effective as a weapon of terror. India's Prithvi and Agni are considered to be more accurate. If a nuclear or ballistic missile exchange does occur, it is likely to be aimed at advancing armies to avoid international consequences. In this context, the Indian military has done recent exercises to train for a nuclear war. Thus the Indian military is likely to survive such an exchange more effectively than Pakistan's smaller and less-prepared forces. Any preparation for a nuclear exchange would have to include protection of the central government and political officials. In this case, Pakistan, where the political system is already decimated and disrupted, may be at a rare advantage. A sudden attack on the Indian Parliament building when it is in session could potentially remove the entire democratic leadership of the country. India would have to take appropriate preventive steps to ensure that its political system can continue to function in a war with potential for nuclear exchanges. Conventional Warfare The above discussion indicates that a nuclear war is unlikely, and thus conventional forces would decide the outcome of a war. Below is a discussion of the conventional strengths of the two nations.

# no outside intervention

**Threat Of Escalation Is Exactly Why It Would Not Happen–China Won’t Intervene**

**ATAL 2002** (Subodh, Independent Foreign Policy Analyst, Ph. D. from the University of Maryland, April 6, http://www.subodhatal.org/articles/war.html)

China is Pakistan's most faithful ally and benefactor. It has supplied over two dozen F-7s to Pakistan since January. However, during a conflict, it is unlikely to take sides, particularly in light of recently improving relations with India. The biggest Chinese threat is the opening up of a second front for India. If India concentrates its forces on the western borders, the eastern sector would be vulnerable. However, China is unlikely to defy UN resolutions or take on India overtly, unless the existence of Pakistan was threatened, by which time it would be too late for outside intervention. China's direct involvement would be deterred by the possibilities of a world war breaking out, with Russian and US involvement.

**Middle Eastern Nations Would Not Intervene**

**ATAL 2002** (Subodh, Independent Foreign Policy Analyst, Ph. D. from the University of Maryland, April 6, http://www.subodhatal.org/articles/war.html)

Saudi Arabia and perhaps the United Arab Emirates may be tempted to help out Pakistan with military aid, including advanced AWACS planes and even MiG 25s. However, in all likelihood the UN Security Council would pass resolutions banning military aid to India and Pakistan at the outset of the conflict. Arab countries would be unlikely to defy such a ban. Futhermore, once India has established superiority in the air and in the Arabian Sea, supply links to such aid would be non-existent.

# no impact to india-pak nuke war

**India-Pakistan War Would Not Cause Extinction–Damage Would Be Confined To South Asia**

**COPLEY NEWS SERVICE 6-10-2002** (http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020610-indopak1.htm)

The horror of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan could decimate South Asia's largest cities, killing up to 12 million people and bringing misery to countless others. But a war, if limited to those two nations and the nuclear arsenals they are thought to possess, poses little danger of radioactive fallout reaching North America, physicists and atmospheric scientists say. There are fundamental reasons. First, India and Pakistan are believed armed with less potent weapons, probably no larger than the equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT, about the same size as the bombs the United States dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. In contrast, the typical nuclear weapon in the U.S. stockpile today is 10 to 20 times more powerful than the weapons held by India and Pakistan, according to GlobalSecurity.org. Second, the two countries are thought to have no more than 200 warheads between them - not enough, scientists believe, to endanger populations far beyond South Asia. More than 31,000 nuclear weapons, by contrast, are maintained by eight known nuclear powers, and 95 percent are in the United States and Russia, according to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, which monitors nuclear proliferation. Third, the approaching summer in the Northern Hemisphere will mean an absence of fast-moving winter storms that could carry nuclear fallout quickly across the globe. Further, South Asia's monsoon season, which begins this month and extends into October, could wash nuclear fallout back to Earth, confining the worst environmental damage to that part of the world. "Of course, there will be some radiation reaching globally, but the amounts will be small compared to the levels that would produce health effects," said Charles Shapiro, a physicist at San Francisco State University, who co-authored a 1985 study on the environmental effects of nuclear war.

**India-Pakistan Nuclear War Would Have No Global Impact**

**KNIGHT RIDDER, JUNE 4 2002** (http://www.boulderclassifieds.com/news/worldnation/04anucl.html)

A nuclear war between Pakistan and India could dwarf any catastrophe in world history, killing up to 12 million people in South Asia, but the radioactive fallout likely would not harm Americans half a world away. In fact, because of the combined effects of distance, dispersion and dilution, the increased amount of radiation in U.S. air would be barely measurable, health experts say. • Kashmir: An interactive look "As concerned as we need to be for the Indian and Pakistani populations, the concern for ourselves here is not proportionate to the (tiny) risk," said Cham Dallas, a University of Georgia toxicologist. He is helping the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention coordinate medical response to possible nuclear attacks on the United States. "The effects here in the United States will be minimal." Other experts say there would be no real U.S. risk. "In terms of health effects, I think the risks are vanishingly small," said former National Cancer Institute director Arthur Upton, a leading authority on the health effects of radiation. "I don't think one can say it's a public health threat." That's because by the time the radiation travels across the globe, it would spread out in the air so much that it would register only a minuscule increase over normal background radiation, Upton said. Ordinary "background radiation" — which emanates from space, seeps up from Earth's core and is ingested in food — exposes the average American to about 100 millirems of exposure per year, he said. (A millirem is a unit of absorbed radiation; one millirem is the amount absorbed by the average TV viewer over one year.) A nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India would add less than one millirem a year to the average American's exposure, Upton predicted.

# cbw’s cause u.s. nuclear strike

**CBW use would result in US nuclear retaliation**

**SCHNEIDER 1997** (Barry, Director of the USAF Counterproliferation Center at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and an Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Future Conflict Studies at the U.S. Air War College., Future War and Counterproliferation, 72-73

As a result, today, in the minds of many, the only legitimate use of U.S. nuclear weapons would be in response to a direct nuclear attack on the United States, its forces, its allies, or its vital interests.13 A U.S. nuclear response to much less severe attacks likely would be seen as severely disproportionate to the provocation, even if chemical or biological attacks were launched. However, if enemy CBW attacks were directed against important target~ in the American homeland, or if they caused horrific numbers of U.S. and allied casualties in the field, it might well be that U.S. public opinion then woul.d sanction a U.S. nuclear retaliatory response. In that case, an aroused American public might demand harsh nuclear retribution.

# U.S. Nuclear Strikes Good

**A US nuclear strike is key to deter use of chemical and biological weapons**

**Schneider 99 – director of the US Air Force Counterproliferation Center and Professor of International Relations at the Air War College** (Dr. Barry R., Future War and Counterproliferation: U.S. Military Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats, 73)

**\*\*Note: NASTI = NBC-Arming Sponsor of Terrorism and Intervention**

However, if enemy CBW attacks were directed against important targets in the American homeland, or if they caused horrific numbers of U.S. and allied casualties in the field, it might well be that U.S. public opinion then would sanction a U.S. nuclear retaliatory response. In that case, an aroused American public might demand harsh nuclear retribution. Nuclear weapons have been used just twice in history and that was over half a century ago. There is likely to be a gradual erosion in the ability of the United States to deter military action by others with their threatened use as nuclear weapons become progressively delegitimized. Some analysts argue that at present the "non-use ethos has become so persuasive that nuclear deterrence is no longer credible."14 Some believe that while any nuclear explosion anywhere would be a local disaster, there would be at least one global silver lining. Nuclear deterrence would be more credible and might then better scare off the enemy's use of chemical and biological weapons. For this reason, one analyst has provocatively suggested that "the sooner a nuclear weapon is used in the world the better, on the grounds that only then will the United States and other nuclear powers be able to develop a credible strategy against weapons of mass destruction.”15 Some Rand Corporation analysts suggest that the United States make a nuclear declaratory policy statement that it will use such atomic arms in response to any NBC attacks. This announced policy would go beyond the “belligerent reprisal” doctrine that merely argues that it is legal to do so. Such a policy would say the United States would consider itself free to use nuclear arms against such WMD aggressors. This, it is argued, would help to dispel thinking by rogue state leaders that the United States may not be willing to escalate to the nuclear option. However, for those states that sign, ratify and simultaneously adhere to the NPT, CWC, and BWC pacts, these same analysts argue that the United States should make a “no first use” pledge regarding its nuclear forces. 16 Against a NASTI, U.S. nuclear threats and, if necessary, nuclear weapons employment might have a number of advantages over U.S. biological and chemical weapons responses in kind. 17 The compellence advantage of making a nuclear threat is that employment of such weapons could indeed inflict "unacceptable levels of damage" on almost any adversary. This is especially true in some areas of the world where one or two targets are of supreme cultural, economic, or political value to that society or state and where even a small nuclear strike could inflict ruinous damage on those targets. In the Middle East, for example, one analyst talks about most states being "one bomb states,"18 countries that would be ruined if their capital or major city were destroyed. It is highly unlikely that the United States today would elect to bomb a populated area where many civilians live in order to retaliate, but the Hiroshima and Nagasaki precedent *does* exist, and this precedent might make a NASTI think twice before starting the first use of weapons of mass destruction.

**Conventional weapons aren’t a big enough threat- a nuclear strike is key to deter CB attacks**

**Schneider 99 – director of the US Air Force Counterproliferation Center and Professor of International Relations at the Air War College** (Dr. Barry R., Future War and Counterproliferation: U.S. Military Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats, 70)

First, the threat of conventional force counterattacks may not be great enough to deter an enemy already subject to the full force of such attacks anyway in a conflict. An enemy may not see conventional forces as being able to deliver "unacceptable damage" upon them, and therefore they may take the risk of an allied conventional retaliation. It is also conceivable that an adversary may calculate that the U.S. leadership would not pay the political price of going nuclear in response to a CB attack, and that it was already doing its worst to them conventionally. Thus, it might be reasoned, why not enjoy the military advantages of using chemical and biological weapons?

\*\*\*MIDDLE EAST WAR BAD

# middle east war escalates

**Middle East conflict triggers nuclear warfare—end of the Cold War increased the risk of escalation**

**Primakov, 09** [September, Yevgeny, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation; Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; member of the Editorial Board of *Russia in Global Affairs*. This article is based on the scientific report for which the author was awarded the Lomonosov Gold Medal of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2008, “The Middle East Problem

in the Context of International Relations”]

The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of **its potential for spreading globally**. During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS *Liberty* was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in **the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality**. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens **a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision** in the region, which would have **catastrophic consequences for the whole world.** The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched *Yevgeny Primakov* 1 3 2 RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS VOL. 7 • No. 3 • JULY – SEPTEMBER• 2009 by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility.

**Conflict in the Middle East escalates to a nuclear holocaust**

**London, prof**essor emeritus of **New York University**, **6/23**/10 [Herbert, “*The Coming Crisis in the Middle East”, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication\_details&id=7101&pubType=HI\_Opeds]*

The gathering storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum. War clouds are on the horizon and like conditions prior to World War I all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey’s provocative flotilla - often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission - has set in motion a flurry of diplomatic activity, but if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, it could present a casus belli. It is also instructive that Syria is playing a dangerous game with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public accounts Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long, medium and short range missiles and Syrian territory has served as a conduit for military material from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, **a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained.** In the backdrop is an Iran with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course. Iran is poised to be the hegemon in the Middle East. It is increasingly considered the “strong horse” as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia regional strategic vision is a combination of deal making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counter weight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state. Should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni “tent” must stand on two legs, if one, falls, the tent collapses. Should that tent collapse and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling its oats and no longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario with nuclear weapons in tow, war against Israel is a distinct possibility. However, implausible it may seem at the moment, the possible annihilation of Israel and **the prospect of a second holocaust could lead to a nuclear exchange.**

**War won’t remain limited --- conflict ensures great power draw in**

**Kober,** a research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute**, 10** [Stanley, Ma 12th, “Guns of August in the Middle East?”, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11805]

Indeed, preparations for war on both sides seem well under way. The Iranians recently completed major naval exercises in the Persian Gulf, and the Israelis have revealed new capabilities for striking targets at long range. The conflict does not have to begin with an attack on Iran. The border between Israel and Lebanon, which was the site of a war four summers ago, is once again looking dangerous. Reports that Hezbollah now possesses Scud missiles, whether true or not, add to heightening tensions. The challenge here is not only for the United States, but for Israel. It is, first of all, a conceptual challenge. In Israel there is a growing sentiment that its conflict with the Palestinians is not ripe for resolution, but that it can be successfully managed. The sense of urgency evident in King Abdullah's warning does not seem to exist. This is a huge and potentially dangerous disconnect, as **it may lead to miscalculation**. In 1914, Austria miscalculated. The government in Vienna did not imagine when it delivered its ultimatum to Serbia that it had set in motion a chain of events that would culminate in its own destruction. Which brings us to the question we confront now. If there is another war in the Middle East, will it remain limited like previous ones, or will it draw in other participants who feel they can no longer stand aside? Will governments be able to restrain the emotions of people who feel they will be dishonored if they don't support their brethren? So far, the 21st century has been characterized by war.

**Centron and Davies concede that war could escalate**

**Cetron and Davies 7 – \*president of Forecasting International Ltd. and \*\*reader in Social History at the University of Hertfordshire** (Marvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies, “Worst-case scenario: the Middle East: current trends indicate that Middle Eastern war might last for decades. Here is an overview of the most critical potential impacts,” The Futurist, 9/1/07, http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices/5523341-1.html)

There is more to come. After all, this is the most volatile region in the world. Sunnis and Shi'ites have carried on an intermittent religious and ethnic power struggle there for some 1,400 years. Worse, after World War I the victors deliberately broke the Middle East into artificial states that could never be stable, and thus could not easily be united under the banner of Pan Arabism. As Sesh Velamoor of the Foundation For the Future points out, if the West is unhappy with conditions in the Middle East, it has itself largely to blame. But the important point is that mere instability soon could break down into general chaos. Here is one possible course of events: Hezbollah's current protests in Lebanon and the government's reactive crackdown may result in a larger war. Saudi Arabia could intervene here, too, as it has been actively supporting the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. At the same time, Hezbollah and Hamas, in the Occupied Territories, will be encouraged to expand their struggle against Israel. In Egypt, the banned but still powerful Muslim Brotherhood would be encouraged to resume the battle for a fundamentalist Islamic state, endangering Western access to the Suez Canal. Extremists from distant reaches of the Muslim world will flood into the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, a land of Sunni Arabs, and Iran, the home of Persian Shi'ites, already on opposite sides in Iraq, might expand their conflict to do battle across the Persian Gulf, with fallout in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. One way or another, it all spins out of control. Everyone in the Middle East fights everyone else for decades.

# russian intervention

**Middle East war draws in Russia --- commitment to Syria and Lebanon and forward deployed military presence**

**Simonov, et al,06** [ Pavel, Staff Writer Axis Globe “Russia Might Get Involved in the Middle East Conflict” , http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ncSUN8fwGRoJ:www.axisglobe.com/article.asp%3Farticle%3D995+%22middle+east%22+and+war+and+escalation+and+%22great+power%22&cd=30&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us]

Not so long ago, the Russian soldiers and officers had fought alongside the Syrians against the Israelis on the Lebanese soil. More than one year back, Damascus withdrew its army from the neighbouring country. But today again, because of Lebanon, a threat of involving Syria in the conflict with Israel has sprung up. Moscow is expressing its growing concern on this score, as in that case it again would appear **to be among the participants of this military confrontation...** Asad is pushed to fight On July 15, speaking at a briefing on the occasion of opening the G-8 summit, Russian Vice-Premier and Minister of Defence Sergey Ivanov declared that Moscow «is worried by a real threat of involving the other countries in the Middle East conflict». Two days earlier Yevgeny Primakov, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister, told which particular country in the region Russia considers the most probable candidate for participation in the military confrontation. In the interview to the *NTV* television, he emphasized that «Syria might be affected by the Israeli actions». In the beginning Damascus showed its hightened wariness in the connection with the escalation on the Lebanon-Israeli direction that started on July 12. In the first days no representative of the Syrian leadership expressed his support to the main participant of confrontation from the Lebanese side, the radical Shia organization, Hezbullah. Moreover, on July 14, Syrian ambassador in London, Dr Sami Khiyami, told the *BBC* TV that his country was even trying to talk to the Hezbullah with an aim to put an end to the rocket bombardments of Israel. He pointed out that «today it is the most important to discuss an exchange of the prisoners of war and to safeguard peace in the Middle East». Apprehension of Moscow amplified even more later on, when, on July 18, the leaders of the US, Britain and Israel accused Damascus of supporting the Hezbullah, putting it reponsible for the military actions in Lebanon. *Messages of Tel Aviv* In parallel, in every possible way Israel let the president of Syria Bashar al-Assad know that it is not going to expand the military actions to the territory of his country. Although, from the beginning of the aggravation of the situation in the zone of the Middle East conflict on June 25, Tel Aviv repeatedly accused Damascus of supporting HAMAS and Hezbullah, but the Israeli leadership has been constantly denying the rumours about the presence of any military plans concerning Syria. The next day after the capture of two Israeli reservists by the Shia insurgents, Dan Halutz, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff, declared that he «does not see any reason» for involving the Syrians in military actions. On July 15, his subordinate, the IDF Operations Branch Head Major General Gadi Eisenkot informed that Hezbullah had been trying to involve Syria in the operations against Israel. He told that for this purpose the Katyusha missiles had been fired against the settlement of Merom Golan, along the Israeli-Syrian border. At the same time, Eisenkot noted that «Syria does not take part in the warfare and has no interest of doing so». The next day «a high-ranking military source» told the Israeli daily *Ha’aretz* that an offensive plan against Syria has not at all been considered. He emphasized that «since 1974 calmness is kept on the Golan Heights, and it has an important strategic significance for Israel». According to the same source, «Syria has not been directly involved in the present escalation in the region ». On July 16, Udi Adam, the chief of Israel's northern command, has added that «there are no intentions to involve Syria in the armed opposition». On July 17 and 18 the similar statements were made by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff Moshe Kaplinski and the already mentioned Gadi Eisenkot. *Forcing of tension* At the same time, attempts of forcing tension on the Tel Aviv-Damascus line have really become frequent. The first to speak about a possibility of collision between Israel and Syria was the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. On July 13, he declared that if «the regime which has seized Jerusalem, would dare to attack Syria» it will receive «a worthy repulse». Further the Hezbullah subjected to rocket bombardment the Israeli territory adjoining to the Syrian border. *Al-Mustakbal*, the 15th Lebanese TV channel, distributed false information on the airstrike allegedly targeted by the Israeli Air Forces at the military objects in Syria. This information was immideately denied by Damascus. Simultaneously, referring to an anonimous source in the Pentagon, the London-based Arab newspaper *Al-Haiyat* informed, that if al-Assad wold not render pressure on the Hezbullah, this “might push Israel to strike from air at the Syrian strategic objects". According to the article, the same source neither confirmed nor denied the rumours coming from Washington that Tel Aviv in the categorical form gave Damascus 72 hours to fulfil the specified requirements. However, later many world mass-media began to distribute reports, at times not at all mentioning the article by the *Al-Haiyat*, about the Israeli ultimatum to Syria. And frequently, there was no question about any «rumours that appeared in Washington», and the was presented as if the given ultimatum, almost officially, was voiced by the Israeli leadership. In addition, on July 16, the Hezbullah struck across Haifa - the “northern capital”of Israel, intentionally having used a missile of the Syrian production. *Guarantees of Moscow* Against **the background of the growing escalation in the Middle East,** Moscow has from the very beginning expressed its political support to Damascus. Still on June 29, the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs condemned Israel in connection with the «unacceptable violation of the Syrian air space». On July 11, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Syria Feysal Mikdad. At the meeting the situation in Gaza Strip was discussed, first of all, but at the same time Lavrov assured the interlocutor of the full Russian support of Damascus in light of **escalation** in the region. Two days later, in connection to the beginning of the Lebanese-Israeli confrontation, the Head of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spoke also about the military component of Russia’s relations with Syria. Answering the journalists’ question on a ossibility of Damascus' involvement in the conflict, he emphasized that Moscow is not going to reconsider its previous plans of arms deliveries to the Middle East. Thus, it has became clear that despite of the situation change in the region, the Kremlin will continue to closely cooperate with the Syrian regime in military and political spheres. For Bashar al-Assad it has a special value as Russia, the same as Iran, is one of its major strategic allies, and actually - the only one outside the Muslim world. Moreover, Syria is the only country outside the post-Soviet space, where Moscow keeps its military presence, and this is considered as an important factor in maintenance of the Russian interests in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean. Lavrov’s statement served as a guarantee that the bilateral agreements reached last years, in particular during the negotiations of the Syrian President al-Assad in Moscow in January 2005, and during the visit of the Chief of the General Staff of Russia Yury Baluevsky to Damascus a year later, despite of all the circumstances, would be observed. Having only get convinced of this, the Syrian President decided to take a hard line on the situation in Lebanon. Strangely enough, Syria appeared to be almost the last Arab country to officially state its attitude towards the Lebanese-Israeli confrontation.

# israel strikes impact

**Israel strikes cause global nuclear holocaust**

**RIA Novosti, 10** [“Israeli Attack on Iran Might Lead to Nuclear Conflict – Medvedev”, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=18632>]

MOSCOW -- Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has warned Israel against a military attack on Iran, saying it **might lead to nuclear war and global disaster.** The United States and Israel have refused to rule out military action against Iran if diplomacy fails to resolve the dispute over Tehran's nuclear program. In an interview with the ABC News, the Russian leader said an attack on Iran would be "the worst possible scenario" in the Middle East, because **"everyone is so close over there that nobody would be unaffected."** "And if conflict of that kind happens, and a strike is performed, then you can expect anything, including use of nuclear weapons. And nuclear strikes in the Middle East, this means a global catastrophe. Many deaths," Medvedev said. He added that he was uncertain on whether Israel would decide to carry out an airstrike against Iran.

# oil/econ impact

**Middle Eastern instability collapses the oil industry before alternatives come online—the impact is world economic collapse**

**Primakov, 09**[ September, Yevgeny, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation; Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; member of the Editorial Board of *Russia in Global Affairs*. This article is based on the scientific report for which the author was awarded the Lomonosov Gold Medal of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2008, “The Middle East Problem

in the Context of International Relations”]

The Arab-Israeli conflict has one more important dimension, as it has a destabilizing effect on the entire Middle East region, which has 68 percent of world oil reserves (not including Arab North Africa, which has also been affected by the Middle East conflict). One will hardly see a recurrence of the events of 1973 when Arab states stopped oil supplies to the West. Yet the U.S. military operation against Iraq, which accounts for almost 10 percent of the world’s oil resources, has already placed this country outside the list of major oil exporters for years. Despite the development of alternative energy sources, oil and gas will continue to be primary energy resources for the next few decades. Therefore, **stability in the Middle East is and will be of paramount importance**, especially at a time when the main consumers of Middle East oil start overcoming the present recession. The jocular saying “The energy crisis has made the light at the end of the tunnel go off” is in fact not that jocular. I would also like to emphasize that the Middle East region, which has been least hit by the global economic crisis, will be of special value in the post-crisis period as an object of foreign investment. Huge financial resources accumulated in the Gulf area provide good prerequisites for that.

**Middle East war increases energy costs, collapses the economy**

**Cetron and Davies 7 – \*president of Forecasting International Ltd. and \*\*reader in Social History at the University of Hertfordshire** (Marvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies, “Worst-case scenario: the Middle East: current trends indicate that Middle Eastern war might last for decades. Here is an overview of the most critical potential impacts,” The Futurist, 9/1/07, http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices/5523341-1.html)

Security risks continue with oil dependence. That leaves the matter of oil. The Middle East produces nearly 31% of the world's oil and consumes only one-fifth of its own output. About two-thirds of the petroleum used in the United States is imported. Perhaps one-fourth of that--around one-sixth of total consumption--comes from the Middle East. Japan imports all of its oil, most of it from the Middle East. Europe, India, and China all depend, to greater or lesser degrees, on Middle Eastern oil as well. If something disrupts the flow of almost one-third of the world's oil as a major war in the Middle East inevitably would, the cost of energy throughout the world will soar. This is a recipe for prolonged recession, and perhaps even depression, in the United States and most of its trading partners. In a recent New York Times op-ed (May 12, 2007), Thomas Friedman points out, "You can't be in favor of setting a date to withdraw from Iraq without also being in favor of a serious energy policy to radically reduce our dependence on oil--now."

# terrorism/democracy/economy

**Middle East war emboldens terrorist recruits, halts the spread of democracy, and destroys the global economy**

**Forest 7 – director of terrorism studies at the U.S. Military Academy and the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point** (James, “War is a No-Win Scenario,” September 2007, <http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices/5523341-1.html>)

A regional war in the Middle East would bring a variety of negative consequences for the United States. First, and most obvious, the global security environment would shift in a most unfavorable direction. The death and destruction would transcend geopolitical boundaries and possibly spill over into neighboring regions. The humanitarian crisis would overwhelm the unprepared regimes throughout the Middle East. Calls for intervention and relief could result in allies of the United States becoming involved. Meanwhile, the asymmetric nature of much of the fighting will offer new opportunities for many young, motivated men and women to acquire the skills of guerrilla warfare, making them attractive recruits for al-Qaeda and affiliate terrorist organizations. Wars bring an enabling environment for arms trafficking and other sorts of criminal activity, as well as human rights abuses--in some cases, even atrocities like genocide. It is also highly doubtful that, should such a war take place, the victors of the bloodshed will be inclined to establish the sort of liberal, open democratic societies that were fostered and nurtured in Europe and Asia following World War II. The impact of a regional war on the world's increasingly interdependent economy would go beyond the price we pay to heat our homes and fuel our cars, which will increase dramatically. (Of course, this could force more serious private and personal investment in alternative energy sources, which is not a bad thing.) Key shipping lanes, like the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Suez, will become hazardous for all types of commercial vessels. We have already witnessed how instability in the Middle East--punctuated by brief skirmishes like the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in 2006--negatively affects global commodity prices, foreign exchange rates, and other facets of the global economy. A full-blown regional war would naturally exacerbate this. Some observers have suggested that a regional war might actually benefit the United States in some way. For example, it has been suggested that a regional war would compel America to get serious about energy independence, thus helping us cut oil imports and reduce the trade deficit. Others have suggested that a regional war would give the United States an excuse to abandon our commitments in the entire region. And there are the conspiracy advocates who claim that America's defense industrial sector--the world's leading arms exporter--would benefit from a regional war. On a personal level, as someone who over the past several years has watched some of his recent students return from Iraq and Afghanistan in body bags, I find these perspectives incredibly difficult to comprehend or digest. On a more pragmatic level, the unstoppable power of globalization means that the fortunes of nations and people in the Middle East are, and will remain, inextricably intertwined with America's own. Overall, to suggest that war benefits the citizens or institutions of a civilized nation-state raises a variety of moral, ethical, philosophical and pragmatic issues for academic or political debate. However, at the end of the day there is little evidence to indicate that U.S. security, economic growth, or position of leadership in the world could benefit from a regional war in the Middle East.

# u.s. nuclear strike bad

**Nuclear strikes cause prolif, undermine rule of law and erode Presidential power**

**Schneider 99 – director of the US Air Force Counterproliferation Center and Professor of International Relations at the Air War College** (Dr. Barry R., Future War and Counterproliferation: U.S. Military Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats, 74-75)

On the other hand, nuclear threats may have a major downside, particularly if followed by nuclear first use. At the end of any such regional conflict, it would be very much harder for U.S. leaders to resurrect the nuclear weapons taboo that the United States had worked for decades to establish. Further, after unleashing a nuclear attack, the United States might be seen by large segments of the world community as a pariah state that used illegal and horrific means rather than following the rule of law. Moreover, other states may decide that the only way of deterring similar NBC attacks on their own forces or soil is to have a nuclear deterrent of their own and to be willing to use such nuclear forces in future conflicts. Nuclear first use may set a dangerous precedent that was unkind to U.S. and allied interests. Also, clearly a president who authorized the first use of nuclear weapons might catalyze an U.S. domestic political crisis. Some domestic critics would charge the President with using disproportionate means of responding to lesser attacks. A nuclear first use decision might be political suicide for the President and his party unless the American public was so aroused by U.S. and allied casualties caused by enemy CBW attacks that they would support such U.S. nuclear action. Indeed, this is a two-edged sword. A president might be pressured to take such an escalatory step after an aroused public learned of tens of thousands of U.S. deaths due to an enemy use of NBC weapons against American troops or cities. Public acceptance of such U.S. nuclear weapons use, therefore, would be highly scenario dependent. The U.S. nuclear arsenal at present is not very well designed to allow the United States to initiate proportional attacks in retaliation for CB strikes. 19 Most U.S. nuclear weapons have significant yields that place them in the Nagasaki or Hiroshima range or far higher, and are not the kind of mininukes that would he better designed for regional battlefield conflicts. Some believe this is all to the good, since mininukes would make it easier to initiate nuclear warfare and leads down a terribly dangerous path. Others have pointed out that it would be a powerful deterrent to future chemical and biological weapons use if U.S. or UN forces would bash the next CB initiator so as not to set a "soft precedent." Kathleen Bailey, a nonproliferation analyst at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, concludes, In summary the U.S. nuclear deterrent is not now effective vis-à-vis BW threats. U.S. declaratory policy clearly excludes a nuclear response; there is limited public support for a nuclear role in such deterrence (based in large part on the misperception that nuclear weapons are necessarily high-yield and extremely damaging) and the U.S. is not optimally configured to provide a range of proportional responses.20

**Nuclear strikes aren’t key to deter radical states**

**Schneider 99 – director of the US Air Force Counterproliferation Center and Professor of International Relations at the Air War College** (Dr. Barry R., Future War and Counterproliferation: U.S. Military Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats, 164)

In some cases, it may be possible to preserve security, prevent proliferation, and deal with dangerous radical regimes short of military action. Logically, if the personal political power, regional security needs, economic goals, and political goals of such leaders could be achieved by less radical and risky means, it might be possible that they might slow or abandon the quest for their own weapons of mass destruction. Or, if radical regimes are not deterred from acquisition of such weapons, they may be deterred from use of them by countervailing military power, and, in time, the leadership of such regimes will change and relations may improve as a result. Long-term enemies have from time to time decided to make peace after many wars and much bloodshed. Note the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty engineered by Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin in 1980, and the more recent accord reached between Yassir Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel in 1993. Even more dramatic has been the end of the Cold War and subsequent warmer relations that exist between the republics of the former Soviet Union and the United States.

**Use of nuclear weapons doesn’t deter irrational states**

**Cropsey 94 – former Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and former Director of the Heritage Foundation’s Asia Studies Center** (Seth, “The Only Credible Deterrent,” *Foreign Affairs*, March 1994)

The weapons of America's still formidable nuclear arsenal are a poor deterrent against the often dictatorial regimes of lesser nations for three reasons. First is the unwillingness to use them. The utter destruction of, for example, Iraqi or North Korean civilian population centers as a response to a one or two weapon attack on their most likely American targets—military bases or personnel stationed on foreign soil—would be extremely unjust. Neither Iraqi nor North Korean civilians have any effective control over their governments. Nor did Soviet citizens. But even America's Cold War strategy of mutually assured destruction threatened first the Soviet Union's ability to launch a nuclear attack against the United States and, only subsequently, Soviet industrial and population centers. A policy of unilaterally assured destruction is not only unworthy of the United States but also falls beyond the pale what America’s public conscience can safely guarantee. It would wreak such disproportionate vengeance on both the intended target and its neighbors downwind that the strategy is barely a credible deterrent. Second, the dictators of many smaller nations have not always worried about sacrificing the lives of their citizens, especially when the regional advantages of frustrating or humiliating the United States seem within grasp. Thus even a U.S. doctrine of proportionate response to a nuclear attack – while its power to sober an enemy cannot be denied – would provide an extremely slender defense. An “irrational” despot might well calculate the costs of a nuclear exchange differently from strategists in the West – not so much in terms of lives or absolute devastation but rather in terms of what affects or furthers his own grip on power. A greater deterrent would threaten those targets he values most – the sources of his power, such as military infrastructure, bases and troops. Such a deterrent strategy could be carried out far more economically and humanely without employing nuclear weapons.

**Nuclear strikes are net worse- they cause proliferation that makes attacks against the US more likely**

**Cropsey 94 – former Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and former Director of the Heritage Foundation’s Asia Studies Center** (Seth, “The Only Credible Deterrent,” *Foreign Affairs*, March 1994)

The actual use of a nuclear device would greatly increase pressure on many countries to start or complete their own nuclear weapons programs. Even the possibility that North Korea may possess a nuclear weapon has produced a legitimate and widening discussion in Japan of what, until 12 months ago, was unthinkable: a Japanese nuclear arsenal. Tokyo’s effort to achieve nuclear status would generate similar programs throughout the region. An atomic burst – of whatever size – fired in anger anywhere on earth would turn the world’s most economically dynamic and populous quarter into a pressure cooker heated by ancient enmities and the most powerful instruments of modern destruction. The possibility of a direct attack on the United States will grow as more nations are able to field the most effective means of delivering unconventional weapons: rockets and submarines. Thanks to exporters such as China and North Korea, membership in the intermediate-range ballistic missile club is less and less exclusive. India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan can now launch IRBMS, or are on the threshold of being able to do so. The new ballistic missile Pyongyang tested in 1993 brings Osaka, Japan within range of North Korean fire. Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey has told the House Select Intelligence Committee that 20 states will possess IRBM capability by the end of this decade. Putting IRBMS aboard submarines is not an easy technical feat. But building or buying submarines, especially cheap and quiet diesel or electric subs, is not difficult. Besides the United States, 15 other nations manufacture submarines, either under licensing agreements or of their own design. Moreover, unclassified data from the recently completed global positioning satellite system gives any vessel extremely reliable information on its location, removing a significant obstacle to launching an accurate missile attack from the sea. Such a depressed-trajectory missile launched from a quiet submarine off the U.S. coast is a defense planner’s nightmare. The missile would be difficult to detect and allow very little time to shoot it down – even if the United States were protected by a ballistic missile defense. In a world that had left behind the prohibition against using nuclear weapons, this nightmare turns real. Any breach of the stricture on using nuclear weapons could slide the world toward greater and more general chaos. The effect can be likened to current concerns over Bosnia. The West’s recognition of Bosnia and subsequent failure to help defend it erodes the international stricture against seizing a sovereign nation by force. It signals to ambitious, would-be rulers such as Russia’s Vladimir Zhirinovsky that the revanchist path is open, that the sovereignty of Ukraine, Georgia and even Poland is important but not critical to the free nations. Greece’s deputy foreign minister, George Papandreou, has seen fit to remark, “The whole concept of a multiethnic Europe has been undermined. We’re tearing apart what we’ve built over the last 50 years in Europe.” Even a single detonation could subvert the international stricture against using nuclear weapons. Yet that possibility is only increasing. One tactical nuclear burst, for example, could be very useful in gaining the advantage before or during an armored engagement, such as a North Korean invasion across the demilitarized zone or a Russian attack on Ukraine. U.S. deterrence policy must seek not only to prevent a nuclear blast but, if deterrence fails, it should reassert the primacy of a valuable international norm to help stem any movement toward wider nuclear use. The world is clearly better off if the unwritten proscription against the use of nuclear weapons remains intact.