# BRAC Neg Wave 2- ARS Lab

## Substantial T

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#### A. Interpretation – a Substantial increase in investment is 3.7 billion

Oldershaw, 08 [Mark Oldershaw, 2008,“NATIONAL’S INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN: BUILDING FOR A BRIGHTER FUTURE”, <http://www.national.org.nz/files/2008/infrastructure_policy.pdf>]

National’s fiscal policy includes a substantial increase in infrastructure investment over the next six years, totalling $3.7 billion. This takes the form of an increase in the capital allowance in each of the next six Budgets, adding to the capital allowances that Labour has already planned.

#### B. Violation—Plan at most costs $530 million.

SDDC 2010 (Surface Deployment and Distribution Command-Transportation Engineering Agency, “Defense Access Road Program Criteria Study,” July 29, http://www.tea.army.mil/pubs/nr/dod/briefings/Defense%20Access%20Road%20Program%20Criteria%20Study.pdf)

The recommended project will, at a minimum, restore the level of service or delay time to levels which existed prior to the military action. For all DAR projects, SDDC conducts an analysis to determine the fair-share that should be funded by DoD. This analysis considers the military impact to traffic on the subject roadway segment and mitigation required to address the impact. The appropriate military funding share is then determined based on the installations proportion of the total traffic which utilizes the subject roadway segment. For large, complex projects involving military and non-military impacts, other factors (such as overall project scope, total project cost, and funding available from other sources) are taken into consideration. A similar fair-share analysis shall be conducted for projects found eligible for DAR funding using the criteria recommended in this study. Based on a review of growth installations, it appears that the potential DoD order-of-magnitude contribution cost could be $530 million or more for the improvement of off-installation roadways. This is based on a very rough extrapolation of four case studies documented in this paper. The cost analysis did not involve a detailed examination of each of the installations specific site conditions.

#### C. Standards

#### 1. Limits- allowing tiny affs that just add a small amount of money massively explode the number of affs on the topic

#### 2. Ground- the best negative generic arguments deal with how the plan spends money- small affs dodge the core policy questions on the topic

#### 3. Predictability- we cant predict affs that deal with single pieces of infrastructure- they force us to read generics instead of topic specific strategies which is bad for education

#### D. Voter for fairness and education

### XT- DAR not substantial

#### The entire DAR program only had $23 million in projects for the entire last five years- this is nothing compared to other federal transportation spending.

Transportation Research Board of the National Academies 11 (Joseph M. Sussman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chair, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases: Special Report 302”, Feb, http://alexandriava.gov/uploadedFiles/tes/BRAC/Federal%20Funding%20of%20Transportation%20Improvements%20in%20BRAC%20cases.pdf)

As federal transportation programs go, the DAR program is quite modest. From 2001 to 2010, it certified as eligible 19 projects, 15 of which have been funded. Since 2005, the program has provided about $22.5 million annually for transportation improvements, including projects that are not BRAC related. By way of comparison, federal aid for highway transportation funded through USDOT exceeded $10 billion annually from 2006 to 2010.

## Military Readiness

#### **Overstretch and too many foreign bases undermines security- BRAC doesn’t solve this.**

Vance 10 (Laurence M. Vance, Laurence M. Vance is an author, a publisher, a lecturer, a freelance writer, the editor of the Classic Reprints series, and the director of the Francis Wayland Institute. He holds degrees in history, theology, accounting, and economics. The author of nineteen books, he has contributed over 450 articles and book reviews to both secular and religious periodicals. Vance's writings have appeared in a diverse group of publications including the Ancient Baptist Journal, Bible Editions & Versions, Campaign for Liberty, LewRockwell.com, the Independent Review, the Free Market, Liberty, Chronicles, the Journal of Libertarian Studies, the Journal of the Grace Evangelical Society, the Review of Biblical Literature, Freedom Daily, and the New American. His writing interests include economics, taxation, politics, government spending and corruption, theology, English Bible history, Greek grammar, and the folly of war. He is a regular columnist and blogger for LewRockwell.com, and writes a weekly column for the Future of Freedom Foundation. Vance is a member of the Society of Biblical Literature, the Grace Evangelical Society, and the International Society of Bible Collectors, and is a policy advisor of the Future of Freedom Foundation and an adjunct scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute.; LewRockwell.com, An anti-state/pro-market site on the net run by the president of the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Updated 6 days a week.; The Problem with BRAC, http://www.lewrockwell.com/vance/vance55.html)

The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission has just given President Bush its military base realignment and closure recommendations. On the surface, closing obsolete military bases in the United States sounds like a good thing. The Bush administration has even estimated that 20 to 25 percent of military bases are surplus, and that their closure could result in savings of over $3 billion a year. So, given that saving the taxpayers money is the goal, what possible problem could there be with the BRAC Commission?¶ There is one major problem with the BRAC Commission — a fatal flaw that calls the whole process into question. It is not that the military is being downsized. It is not that the United States might be rendered more vulnerable to a terrorist attack. It is not that no cost savings will ultimately be realized since the Defense Department budget will still increase no matter how many bases are closed. It is not that communities will suffer economically when a local base is shut down. It is not that local dignitaries have to shamelessly grovel before the BRAC Commission to keep their bases off the closure list. It is not that members of Congress have to suddenly come up with reasons why the base in their district is so strategically important.¶ The problem, in a word, is empire: the U.S. empire of troops and bases that encircles the globe. The only concern of the BRAC Commission is bases in the United States and its territories. The fact that the United States now has troops in 150 countries or territories is of no concern to the Pentagon, the president, the Congress, or the BRAC Commission.¶ Base closings in the United States began in the early 1960s. Back then the Department of Defense (DOD) was able to close obsolete bases without the involvement of Congress or any other government agency. Congress attempted to involve itself in the process in 1965, but President Johnson vetoed a bill that would have required the Pentagon to report any base closure programs to Congress.¶ In 1977, Congress passed, and President Carter signed, a law (PL 95-82) that required the Defense Department to notify Congress of any proposed base closings or reductions. The 1983 Grace Commission recommended the creation of an independent commission to study the need for base realignments and closures. These two events laid the groundwork for the modern BRAC Commission.¶ In 1988, the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure was created to recommend to Congress and the DOD military bases for realignment or closure. This first round of BRAC (as it is called) resulted in the closure, partial closure, or realignment of 145 military installations.¶ The next three BRAC rounds, which took place in 1991, 1993, and 1995, were carried out differently, as well as the round currently in progress. Under the new guideless adopted in 1990, it is the job of the Defense Department to draw up an initial list of bases to be closed or realigned and submit it to the BRAC Commission. Although the original BRAC Commission had twelve members, the Commission currently consists of nine members, all appointed by the president and congressional leaders and confirmed by the Senate. Working from that list, but also with the authority to add additional bases not recommended by the DOD, the Commission then recommends to the president which bases should be closed or realigned. The president reviews the BRAC recommendations, but can only accept or reject the recommendations in their entirety. If its recommendations are rejected, the BRAC Commission can resubmit a revised list. Congress, however, can still block the implementation of the package of BRAC recommendations, even if approved by the president.¶ There is no question that most of the bases recommended for closure by the BRAC Commission should be closed. If the Pentagon, the BRAC Commission, and the commander in chief all agree on the need for a particular base to be closed, and Congress acquiesces, it is hard to justify keeping it open. But before any bases in the United States are closed, a hard look needs to be made at the hundreds of U.S. military installations on foreign soil. If the purpose of the military is to defend the country, then why is the United States closing bases at home and expanding them abroad? Foreign military bases are for offense, empire, imperialism, intervention — not for defense. The conclusion is inescapable: the U.S. military does very little to actually defend the country. If it did then it would patrol our coasts and guard our borders instead of patrolling the Persian Gulf and guarding the borders of Iraq.¶ According to the latest DOD "Base Structure Report" for fiscal year 2005, the U.S. military has 770 military installations in thirty-nine countries. Is there some rational explanation why we should close military bases in America and maintain 106 military sites in South Korea? Is there any reason why the United States needs 302 military sites in Germany and 111 sites in Japan sixty years after World War II has ended?¶ There is no doubt that many bases in the United States are obsolete or unnecessary. And there is no doubt that closing or realigning these bases would result in significant cost savings. But the foreign bases should be closed first, the troops brought home to stay, and then, and only then, should the BRAC process proceed.¶

#### Alt cause – lack of readiness is caused by complex systems and equipment issues. AND, funding trade-off.

GAO ’05 [GAO, “Military Readiness”, October 2005, GAO, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/248244.pdf> AD]

While the fleet-wide condition of the 30 equipment items GAO selected for review varied, GAO’s analysis showed that reported readiness rates declined between fiscal years 1999 and 2004 for most of these items. The decline in readiness, which occurred more markedly in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, generally resulted from (1) the continued high use of equipment to support current operations and (2) maintenance issues caused by the advancing ages and complexity of the systems. Key equipment items—such as Army and Marine Corps trucks, combat vehicles, and rotary wing aircraft—have been used well beyond normal peacetime use during deployments in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD is currently performing its Quadrennial Defense Review, which will examine defense programs and policies for meeting future requirements. Until the department completes this review and ensures that condition issues for key equipment are addressed, DOD risks a continued decline in readiness trends, which could threaten its ability to continue meeting mission requirements. The military services have not fully identified near- and long-term program strategies and funding plans to ensure that all of the 30 selected equipment items can meet defense requirements. GAO found that, in some cases, the services’ near-term program strategies have gaps in that they do not address capability shortfalls, funding is not included in DOD’s 2006 budget request, or there are supply and maintenance issues that may affect near-term readiness. Additionally, the long-term program strategies and funding plans are incomplete for some of the equipment items GAO reviewed in that future requirements are not identified, studies are not completed, funding for maintenance and upgrades was limited, or replacement systems were delayed or not yet identified. Title 10 U.S.C. § 2437 requires the military services to develop sustainment plans for equipment items when their replacement programs begin development, unless they will reach initial operating capability before October 2008. However, most of the systems that GAO assessed as red had issues severe enough to warrant immediate attention because of long-term strategy and funding issues, and were not covered by this law. As a result, DOD is not required to report sustainment plans for these critical items. For the next several years, funding to sustain or modernize aging equipment will have to compete with other DOD priorities, such as current operations, force structure changes, and replacement system acquisitions. Without developing complete sustainment and modernization plans and identifying funding needs for all priority equipment items, DOD may be unable to meet future requirements for defense capabilities. Furthermore, until DOD develops these plans, Congress will be unable to ensure that DOD’s budget decisions address deficiencies related to key military equipment. GAO’s red, yellow, and green assessments of the condition, program strategies, and funding plans for the 30 selected military equipment items are shown on the following page.

#### BRAC does not relieve traffic congestion

Jim Moran campaign, no date (Jim Moran’s campaign website; BRAC and Traffic in Northern Virginia, http://moran.house.gov/issue/brac-and-traffic-northern-virginia)

In 2008, after recognizing that relocating so many personnel to Ft. Belvoir would create a three to four hour backup on major roadways near the base as well as a 2 hour delay on I-95 every morning, the DoD decided to seek an alternate location for 6,400 employees. Former Congressman Tom Davis (R-VA) and Congressman Moran advocated strenuously for the location to be at the current GSA warehouse in Springfield (which sits next to the Springfield Metro Station). The lawmakers even succeeded in passing authorizing language allowing GSA to transfer ownership of the property to the DoD.¶ Regrettably, in the final outcome, the Army made their decision on cost consideration alone, selecting the Mark Center. The Mark Center site, while lacking public transit and sufficient transportation infrastructure to handle this new workforce, was the low bidder, also beating out the Victory Center on Eisenhower Ave. Rep. Moran immediately criticized the decision.¶ By September 2012, all 6,400 personnel will have moved to the Mark Center facility located off I-395 and Seminary Road in Alexandria. According to the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT), the complete relocation will cause traffic congestion at surrounding intersections to a point designated as “failure”, adding significant delays to the daily commutes of hundreds of thousands of Northern Virginia residents.¶ Working with members of the Alexandria community, the Department of Defense, and colleagues in the House and Senate, Congressman Moran has made repeated efforts to mitigate the effect of this impending gridlock

#### Traffic congestion is key to security

FMSO 03 (Foreign Military Studies Office, military review; September 2003; “Control Architecture—A challenge for the Urban Warrior”; 7/25/12)

Once inside the building, the assault force can control access to important areas by limiting access routes, pass keys, surveillance cameras, and guards. These structures use many of the same features and devices that are part of U.S. Government buildings built after the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City and the1998 bombings of embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Generally, government and military buildings have ample buffer space around them. Civilian or commercial buildings lack keep-out distances because the owners wish to attract the public to keep the property profitable and because they usually cannot afford the real estate necessary to secure their sites. Reconnaissance and intelligence are essential to developing a complete picture of external defenses and movement— canalizing structures, the layout of the building, guard posts, high-value areas, and critical sites within the building. When an assault force must retake a protected building, the force also must control the surrounding neighborhood to deter enemy reinforcement, warning, and intelligence. Security forces seeking to retake an occupied building can use roadblocks, traffic control points, patrols, snipers, and helicopters to contain the target building. If the assault force is trying to take the building by surprise, the force should not disrupt normal neighborhood traffic flow until the last minute. Pedestrian traffic and the targeted building’s CCTV will make it difficult to gain control of the neighborhood without disclosing the security force’s presence.

#### **People live farther away from work after BRAC, hurts military retention and readiness**

Scully 5 (Megan Scully; Government Executive, GovernmentExecutive.com is government's business news daily and the premier website for federal managers and executives.¶ ¶ Government Executive in its print incarnation is a monthly business magazine serving senior executives and managers in the federal government's departments and agencies. Our subscribers are high-ranking civilian and military officials who are responsible for defending the nation and carrying out the many laws that define the government's role in our economy and society.¶ ¶ Government Executive's essential editorial mission is to cover the business of the federal government and its huge departments and agencies - dozens of which dwarf the largest institutions in the private sector. We aspire to serve the people who manage these huge agencies and programs in much the way that Fortune, Forbes, and Business Week serve private-sector managers.; BRAC commissioners worry about retention in guard, reserves, http://www.govexec.com/defense/2005/05/brac-commissioners-worry-about-retention-in-guard-reserves/19236/)

Members of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission questioned Pentagon leaders Monday about their recommendation to consolidate National Guard and Reserve bases around the country, stating that such a move might exacerbate the force's recruitment and retention problems.¶ The decision, made as part of the 2005 base closure and realignment round, could strain some troops' ability to report for weekend drill duties, commission members told Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers during a hearing on Capitol Hill.¶ "I really think you're going to have a serious problem," said former Rep. James Bilbray, D-Nev., one of nine BRAC commissioners.¶ Commission chairman Anthony Principi expressed similar concerns, but not all of the commissioners opposed the recommendations for the Reserve component. Retired Army Gen. James Hill called it a "monumental step forward."¶ After more than two years of analysis, the Pentagon announced Friday it wants to shutter around 400 National Guard and Reserve installations, including 211 Army National Guard bases and 176 Army Reserve facilities. Plans call for the military to consolidate those into 125 new Armed Forces Centers scattered around the country.¶ The Pentagon also wants to move aircraft out of 22 Air National Guard units, leaving highly trained pilots and aircraft technicians with other missions. The aircraft would be moved to other Guard units.¶ During testimony, Pentagon officials said the decisions were made after consulting adjutant generals around the country, who largely backed the consolidation plan.¶ On Friday, National Guard Bureau Chief Lt. Gen. Steven Blum said he supported the recommendations, and believed it could help boost new recruits if the centers are located in recruitment-rich communities.¶ "We ought not think of population as static," Rumsfeld said Monday.¶ The goal, department officials said, is to lengthen troops' commutes to Guard and Reserve bases by no more than 50 miles.¶ Myers conceded, however, that the support of Blum and other high-ranking reserve-component officers "does not mean it's going to sit well with everyone."¶ The Reserve Officers Association has said it is concerned about the Pentagon's recommendations, and fears that the impact on travel time to drilling stations could be much more dramatic than expected.¶ the association said in a statement. "Many of these servicemen and women ... may choose to leave the military. The result could be a loss of skills and experience the military desperately needs."¶ Officials at the National Guard Association of the United States still are analyzing the BRAC list and discussing the recommendations with adjutant generals around the country, according to a source. The decision regarding the Air National Guard is particularly tricky for the organization, with one state gaining from another's loss.¶ The closure of National Guard bases could add fuel to talk of lawsuits in Illinois and other states, based on a provision of federal law that requires a governor's permission to close a Guard facility.¶ The Pentagon "will try to satisfy folks who feel they have a legal case," but similar attempts at blocking closures in the past have not held up, said Michael Wynne, the department's undersecretary for acquisition, logistics and technology.¶ Meanwhile, commissioners said they are still awaiting 10 volumes of information from the Pentagon, which were not delivered as expected on Friday because of concerns over classified information. Pentagon officials will send those volumes to the commission by the end of the week, officials said.¶ The commission will review the Pentagon's decision throughout the summer, then submit its own list to the White House by Sept. 8.

## Naval Readiness

#### Our naval power isn’t projected by domestic bases: it’s due to bases in hot zones like East Asia.

Mccain ’11 [John Mccain, Senator, U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, “HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM”, March 8, 2011, US SENATE, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2011/03%20March/11-10%20-%203-8-11.pdf> AD]

I thank the witnesses for being here today and I thank them for their service to the country. They join us in interesting times. There’s a lot of issues that are now before us and the President and the Joint Chiefs and our military leadership to handle various situations that are unfolding in the world, some of it on a day to day basis. So I’m very interested in hearing General Amos’s and Admiral Roughead’s assessment of some of these situations. I remain concerned—by the way, in case—I know that our witnesses didn’t miss it, but the Chinese announced a 12 percent or 12.5 percent increase in their defense budget. We all know that that is not a true reflection of their defense spending, and a lot of their recent behavior in my view has emphasized the need for a naval presence in that part of the world, a very significant one, which may in future years turn our attention again to our overall maritime strategy. The Joint Strike Fighter we have been over and over and over again both in hearings and with the witnesses. General Amos, I would really appreciate it if you would keep us informed almost on a monthly basis. Secretary Gates has said, as we all know, that the Marine Corps version of the F–35 is on ‘‘probation.’’ This has really been a—I hate to keep throwing around the word ‘‘disgraceful,’’ but the cost overruns and delays have been unfortunately characteristic of a lot of our acquisition problems and challenges over the past several years. I know, General Amos, you will keep us informed. But we don’t want to be surprised. We don’t want to be surprised about anything that happens with the F–35. We do have, in these tough fiscal times, an obligation to our citizens to make sure that—we always have had that responsibility, but now in these tough times that responsibility has even been increased.

#### Forward deployment is the linchpin of US Naval power – not domestic bases.

England et al ’11 [Mr. England is a former secretary of the Navy. Mr. Jones is a former commandant of the Marine Corps. Mr. Clark is a former chief of naval operations, Wall Street Journal, “The Necessity of US Naval Power”, WSJ, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303339904576406163019350934.html> AD]

What we do believe is that uniquely responsive Navy-Marine Corps capabilities provide the basis on which our most vital overseas interests are safeguarded. Forward presence and engagement is what allows the U.S. to maintain awareness, to deter aggression, and to quickly respond to threats as they arise. Though we clearly must be prepared for the high-end threats, such preparation should be made in balance with the means necessary to avoid escalation to the high end in the first place. The versatility of maritime forces provides a truly unmatched advantage. The sea remains a vast space that provides nearly unlimited freedom of maneuver. Command of the sea allows for the presence of our naval forces, supported from a network of shore facilities, to be adjusted and scaled with little external restraint. It permits reliance on proven capabilities such as prepositioned ships. Maritime capabilities encourage and enable cooperation with other nations to solve common sea-based problems such as piracy, illegal trafficking, proliferation of W.M.D., and a host of other ills, which if unchecked can harm our friends and interests abroad, and our own citizenry at home. The flexibility and responsiveness of naval forces provide our country with a general strategic deterrent in a potentially violent and unstable world. Most importantly, our naval forces project and sustain power at sea and ashore at the time, place, duration, and intensity of our choosing. Given these enduring qualities, tough choices must clearly be made, especially in light of expected tight defense budgets. The administration and the Congress need to balance the resources allocated to missions such as strategic deterrence, ballistic missile defense, and cyber warfare with the more traditional ones of sea control and power projection. The maritime capability and capacity vital to the flexible projection of U.S. power and influence around the globe must surely be preserved, especially in light of available technology. Capabilities such as the Joint Strike Fighter will provide strategic deterrence, in addition to tactical long-range strike, especially when operating from forward-deployed naval vessels. Postured to respond quickly, the Navy-Marine Corps team integrates sea, air, and land power into adaptive force packages spanning the entire spectrum of operations, from everyday cooperative security activities to unwelcome—but not impossible—wars between major powers. This is exactly what we will need to meet the challenges of the future.

#### Overseas bases and deployment is much more important to Naval power than any domestic bases.

Department of the Navy ’94 [Navy, “Forward…From the Sea”, November 9, 1994, DTIC, <http://www.dtic.mil/jv2010/navy/b014.pdf> AD]

Although naval presence includes a wide range of forward-deployed Navy and Marine Corps units afloat and ashore in friendly nations, our basic presence “building blocks” remain Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups — with versatile, multipurpose, naval tactical aviation wings — and Amphibious Ready Groups — with special operations-capable Marine Expeditionary Units. These highly flexible naval formations are valued by the theater commanders precisely because they provide the necessary capabilities forward. They are ready and positioned to respond to the wide range of contingencies and are available to participate in allied exercises, which are the bedrock of interoperability. We have also turned our attention to examining the naval capabilities that could contribute to extending conventional deterrence. In this regard, forward-deployed surface warships—cruisers and destroyers—with theater ballistic missile defense capabilities will play an increasingly important role in discouraging the proliferation of ballistic missiles by extending credible defenses to friendly and allied countries. By maintaining the means to enhance their security and safety, we may reduce the likelihood that some of these nations will develop their own offensive capabilities. Our efforts will thereby slow weapons proliferation and enhance regional stability. In addition, even as we have shifted our emphasis to forward presence and power projection from sea to land, the Navy continues to provide a robust strategic nuclear deterrent by maintaining strategic ballistic missile submarines at sea. As long as it is U.S. policy to ensure an adequate and ready strategic nuclear deterrent, our highly survivable strategic ballistic missile submarines will remain critical to national security. U.S. naval forces are designed to fight and win wars, as are all elements of our military arsenal. To successfully deter aggressors, we must be capable of responding quickly and successfully in support of U.S. theater commanders. Forces deployed for routine exercises and activities undergirding forward presence are also the forces most likely to be called upon to respond rapidly to an emerging crisis. The potential for escalation dictates that presence forces must be shaped for missions they may encounter. This provides theater commanders with credible crisis-response capabilities in the event normal conditions or outcomes do not turn out as we expect. Building on normally deployed forces, we can mass, if the situation requires, multiple Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups into Carrier Battle Forces, Amphibious Ready Groups with embarked Marine Expeditionary Units, and as needed project our naval expeditionary forces ashore using the afloat Maritime Prepositioning Force. Such a massing of naval units can be complemented by the deployment of Army and Air Force units to provide a joint force capable of the full range of combat operations that may be required. A U.S. warship is sovereign U.S. territory, whether in a port of a friendly country or transiting international straits and the high seas. U.S. naval forces, operating from highly mobile “sea bases” in forward areas, are therefore free of the political encumbrances that may inhibit and otherwise limit the scope of land-based operations in forward theaters. The latter consideration is a unique characteristic and advantage of forward-deployed naval forces. In many critical situations, U.S. naval forces alone provide theater commanders with a variety of flexible options—including precise measures to control escalation—respond quickly and appropriately to fast-breaking developments at the operational and tactical levels.

#### BRAC not necessary for the Navy

Department of the Navy (Department of the Navy, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY ¶ ANALYSES ¶ AND ¶ RECOMMENDATIONS ¶ (Volume IV), http://www.defense.gov/brac/pdf/VolIV\_Navy-o.pdf)

For operational bases, our recommendations maintain sufficient flexibility to meet ¶ future military commitments while effectively utilizing existing capacity. While our ¶ recommendations result in retention of capacity to house more ships and aircraft ¶ squadrons than will exist in our future force structure, this is necessary in order to ¶ retain the capability to adjust to operational tempo changes and to achieve the ¶ desired strategic laydown and presence. Our analysis also led to the determination ¶ that there is no significant excess capacity in Department of the Navy ground force ¶ bases, particularly given the planned increase in Marine Corps force structure. The ¶ recommendations enable us to maintain Fleet dispersal and viable antiterrorism/force protection capability while simultaneously supporting optimal power ¶ projection, rapid force deployment and expeditionary force reach-back. ¶ For training activities, our recommendations retain capacity and flexibility to ¶ meet current and future force structure and surge requirements. Prior rounds of ¶ BRAC concentrated on the consolidation of Navy recruit training. BRAC 2005 ¶ sought to extend that consolidation effort to Navy officer accession training. ¶ Department of the Navy unique professional military education activities were ¶ determined to be properly sized and sited to support their target populations. ¶ Retention of two Marine recruit training depots is considered necessary to ¶ maintain flexibility sufficient to accommodate surge and increased operational ¶ tempo. ¶ For reserve activities, the overriding objective was to maintain a demographically ¶ sound Reserve establishment while providing balanced recruiting opportunities. ¶ Working closely with representatives from the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve ¶ components, we sought to consolidate units to active-duty installations or joint ¶ reserve centers where they could more effectively support the Fleet without ¶ impacting recruiting demographics. Our recommendations facilitate the downsizing ¶ of the Department of the Navy Reserve infrastructure by consolidating Navy and ¶ Marine Corps Reserve Centers while maintaining a geographically appropriate ¶ structure. ¶ Our recommendations eliminate a significant portion of the excess capacity within ¶ the Recruiting Management function. Because of on-going organizational

## Military-Civilian Planning

#### Military-Civilian planning won’t work – there’s too much of a gap between our military and our civilians.

Desaulniers 9 (Major Linn K. Desaulniers; Marine Corps University; The Gap that Will Not Close: Civil-Military Relations and the All-Volunteer Force, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc>?

Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA513806)

It could be argued that with the rise of the professional military in the United States there was also a distinct gap that developed, over time, between the professional soldier and the citizen who for generations had been called upon to fill the role of soldier. This gap, according to Morris Janowitz, should become smaller as the military becomes a more civilianized organization. This paper will argue that this diminishing gap is not occurring in the way Janowitz predicted mostly due to the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) and the turmoil it causes in the civilian-military relationship. While the connection between civilian society and the military has not been severed completely - i.e. conscription being used much in recent history - it has continued to grow apart even while Janowitz argued that it should be growing closer. It is this paper's intent to look at this gap in civil-military relations and to discuss its· growth in the past 50 years and how the AVF has shifted the paradigm. This paper will frame this problem by addressing the AVF, attitudes toward the military, and the declining propensity to serve showing how this affects the civilian elites who govern. It will also attempt to explore some of the root causes of the attitudes and feelings toward the military including the effect of the media and the lack of civilian knowledge of the military. It is also important to address whether the right questions are being asked in order to determine the existence of a gap or how large it may be. In order to place this situation in context and frame the issue, this paper will refer as much as possible to the situation during the decade post World War II and the beginning of the Cold War as to what may be considered the best example of an "ideal" relationship between the military and the people.

## **Fort Belvoir Internal link**

#### DAR is already working now on Fort Belvoir – the same base that they isolated.

Gonzales ’09 [Oscar R. Gonzales, Analyst in Economic Development Policy. Congressional Research Service, “Economic Development Assistance for Communities Affected by Employment Changes Due to Military Base Closures (BRAC)”, June 16, 2009, CRS, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34709.pdf> AD]

The Defense Access Road Program (DAR) allows DOD to pay for public highway improvements required as a result of sudden or unusual defense-generated traffic impacts such as BRAC-related activities. Although DOD does not fund highways outside military bases, access roads to military installations may be funded under this program and some communities have already benefitted. For example, $36 million from DAR will fund the design and construction of installation entrances in Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Projects are eligible for funding if they are related to military activities such as BRAC actions, if a defense action will result in a doubling of traffic, or if a new road is needed to accommodate special military vehicles. Given the projected decline in state and local government coffers due to decreased economic activity at the national level, federal assistance for road construction could become an increasingly important component of economic development.

#### Representative Moran’s actions in Virginia have already caused a decrease in traffic – this is the same Rep. Moran that they cite in the 1AC.

ARLnow ’12 [ARLnow is a news organization based in Arlington, Virginia, “BRAC Traffic Issues Improve in Barcroft Neighborhood”, February 1, 2012, ARLnow, <http://www.arlnow.com/2012/02/01/brac-traffic-issues-improve-in-barcroft-neighborhood/> AD]

Efforts by residents to reduce traffic headaches in the Barcroft neighborhood appear to have paid off. Residents report that the increase in shuttle buses for government workers affected by BRAC has diminished the number of cars clogging the neighborhood. In July, we reported about resident concerns over an additional 1,200 workers flooding the Barcroft neighborhood due to the Base Realignment and Closure Act. People living in the area were concerned about workers parking on the streets and dangerous traffic congestion on George Mason Drive. They appealed to Rep. Jim Moran for help. Moran asked that the plan for shuttle buses between Arlington Hall and the Pentagon Center be expedited to ease the traffic burden, and shuttles started running on September 6. Now, residents report this action has helped improve traffic conditions and safety over the past few months. “I believe the diligent work by Congressman Moran’s office and the determination of our neighbors to make clear boundaries really paid off,” said Barcroft School and Civic League President Pat Williamson. Williamson says although there’s still some congestion along George Mason during the morning rush, the situation is much improved and she hasn’t received any new complaints from neighbors. “The new Arlington Hall shuttle bus service is a testament to the impact of an engaged, active community,” Moran said. “I look forward to continuing to work with the Barcroft residents, Arlington Hall employees and the Defense Department to smooth out any wrinkles caused by BRAC.” Also being credited is the increase in Metrobus service along the route. WMATA had previously promised to increase the frequency of 22A buses, and as of this week, added additional stops to the route.

##### BRAC is ineffective, especially near Fort Belvoir

Thomson 11 (Robert Thomson, Robert Thomson is The Washington Post’s “Dr. Gridlock.” He answers travelers’ questions, listens to their complaints and shares their pain on the roads, trains and buses in the Washington region. In addition to his twice-weekly newspaper column, he writes for a daily blog on The Post’s Web site, engages readers in online chats and presents features about transportation issues on The Post’s Sunday commuter page.¶ Thomson has been a reporter and editor for 30 years in New York and Washington. He joined The Post in 1988 and worked on the D.C., Maryland and Virginia desks. In 1999, he became The Post’s transportation editor. When Ron Shaffer, founder of “Dr. Gridlock,” retired from The Post in 2006, Thomson took over the column. He enjoys getting out of the office, even to drive at rush hour.;Washington Post; Bethesda faces BRAC traffic surge this fall, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/bethesda-faces-brac-traffic-surge-this-fall/2011/04/12/AFCnzeqD\_story.html)

On a map, Bethesda might seem like an ideal spot for one of the U.S. military’s base consolidations. The National Naval Medical Center, where the consolidation will be completed this fall, fronts on six-lane Rockville Pike, just off the eight-lane Capital Beltway. Across the pike is the Medical Center Metrorail station and bus hub.¶ But the view from ground level at rush hour is very different. At least one loop of the Beltway is jammed. Traffic crawls along Rockville Pike as drivers enter and exit the medical center and the National Institutes of Health just across the road. Riders on the Red Line, Metro’s busiest, search for a rail car they can squeeze aboard.¶ Pentagon used faulty data to defend move of 6,400 defense workers, report says¶ Bethesda faces traffic surge from BRAC¶ Budget compromise includes money for traffic improvements for Fort Belvoir, Bethesda¶ Study: Pentagon should pay for transportation improvements necessitated by BRAC¶ View all Items in this Story¶ Now add several thousand workers moving over from Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the many thousands of patients and visitors who will come along with them. The consolidation into what will be the Walter Reed Military Medical Center in Bethesda is scheduled to be done by Sept. 15, under the national Base Realignment and Closing plan.¶ What won’t be done are most of the improvements needed for the transportation network.¶ “People are going to have to understand that when BRAC kicks in, it’s going to be tough out there,” said Phil Alperson, Montgomery County’s coordinator for the transportation impacts of the consolidation.¶ He noted one attention-getting example: Today, there are 3,000 daily pedestrian crossings between the Metro station and the medical center on the other side of Rockville Pike. In September, the number is likely to be about 7,000.

## Military Retention

#### **People live farther away from work after BRAC, hurts military retention and readiness**

Scully 5 (Megan Scully; Government Executive, GovernmentExecutive.com is government's business news daily and the premier website for federal managers and executives.¶ ¶ Government Executive in its print incarnation is a monthly business magazine serving senior executives and managers in the federal government's departments and agencies. Our subscribers are high-ranking civilian and military officials who are responsible for defending the nation and carrying out the many laws that define the government's role in our economy and society.¶ ¶ Government Executive's essential editorial mission is to cover the business of the federal government and its huge departments and agencies - dozens of which dwarf the largest institutions in the private sector. We aspire to serve the people who manage these huge agencies and programs in much the way that Fortune, Forbes, and Business Week serve private-sector managers.; BRAC commissioners worry about retention in guard, reserves, http://www.govexec.com/defense/2005/05/brac-commissioners-worry-about-retention-in-guard-reserves/19236/)

Members of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission questioned Pentagon leaders Monday about their recommendation to consolidate National Guard and Reserve bases around the country, stating that such a move might exacerbate the force's recruitment and retention problems.¶ The decision, made as part of the 2005 base closure and realignment round, could strain some troops' ability to report for weekend drill duties, commission members told Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers during a hearing on Capitol Hill.¶ "I really think you're going to have a serious problem," said former Rep. James Bilbray, D-Nev., one of nine BRAC commissioners.¶ Commission chairman Anthony Principi expressed similar concerns, but not all of the commissioners opposed the recommendations for the Reserve component. Retired Army Gen. James Hill called it a "monumental step forward."¶ After more than two years of analysis, the Pentagon announced Friday it wants to shutter around 400 National Guard and Reserve installations, including 211 Army National Guard bases and 176 Army Reserve facilities. Plans call for the military to consolidate those into 125 new Armed Forces Centers scattered around the country.¶ The Pentagon also wants to move aircraft out of 22 Air National Guard units, leaving highly trained pilots and aircraft technicians with other missions. The aircraft would be moved to other Guard units.¶ During testimony, Pentagon officials said the decisions were made after consulting adjutant generals around the country, who largely backed the consolidation plan.¶ On Friday, National Guard Bureau Chief Lt. Gen. Steven Blum said he supported the recommendations, and believed it could help boost new recruits if the centers are located in recruitment-rich communities.¶ "We ought not think of population as static," Rumsfeld said Monday.¶ The goal, department officials said, is to lengthen troops' commutes to Guard and Reserve bases by no more than 50 miles.¶ Myers conceded, however, that the support of Blum and other high-ranking reserve-component officers "does not mean it's going to sit well with everyone."¶ The Reserve Officers Association has said it is concerned about the Pentagon's recommendations, and fears that the impact on travel time to drilling stations could be much more dramatic than expected.¶ the association said in a statement. "Many of these servicemen and women ... may choose to leave the military. The result could be a loss of skills and experience the military desperately needs."¶ Officials at the National Guard Association of the United States still are analyzing the BRAC list and discussing the recommendations with adjutant generals around the country, according to a source. The decision regarding the Air National Guard is particularly tricky for the organization, with one state gaining from another's loss.¶ The closure of National Guard bases could add fuel to talk of lawsuits in Illinois and other states, based on a provision of federal law that requires a governor's permission to close a Guard facility.¶ The Pentagon "will try to satisfy folks who feel they have a legal case," but similar attempts at blocking closures in the past have not held up, said Michael Wynne, the department's undersecretary for acquisition, logistics and technology.¶ Meanwhile, commissioners said they are still awaiting 10 volumes of information from the Pentagon, which were not delivered as expected on Friday because of concerns over classified information. Pentagon officials will send those volumes to the commission by the end of the week, officials said.¶ The commission will review the Pentagon's decision throughout the summer, then submit its own list to the White House by Sept. 8.

## Medical Readiness

**It takes forever to organize medical records- their Mitchell card says records are the biggest deterrence**

**Peterson 7/28** (Karen Peterson, Executive editor of the News Tribune; News Tribune, Breaking news, weather, sports and entertainment news for Tacoma-Seattle, University Place, Lakewood, Puyallup and the South Puget Sound; Integrated VA-DOD health record at least 5 years away, http://www.thenewstribune.com/2012/07/28/2230915/integrated-va-dod-health-record.html)¶

House committees on armed services and veterans affairs held a joint hearing Wednesday to review details of President Barack Obama’s plan to improve the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) for separating and retiring military members, with a kind of five-to-seven-day “reverse boot camp” available by late 2013 to smooth transition to civilian life and employment.¶ But lawmakers were more interested in asking their witnesses – the secretaries of defense and of veteran affairs – for progress on some older initiatives that so far have fallen short of helping veterans.¶ **One such initiative is the integration of separate VA and Department of Defense electronic health record systems, a key component to achieving Obama’s promise of a Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record (VLER) that would capture full health care histories on individuals, including private-sector care**.¶ **Committee members said they were disappointed to learn that full integration of the VA and Department of Defense health record systems won’t occur until 2017**. And Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and VA Secretary Eric Shinseki didn’t sound confident about meeting that deadline.¶ “This is not easy,” Panetta said. “So the way we’re approaching it is to try to see if we can complete this process at two places, San Antonio and Hampton Roads (Va.). And then try to expand it to every other (VA and DoD) hospital. **It’s tough**. But if we can achieve this, it would be a very significant achievement that I think could be a model not only for hospitals that we run but for hospitals in the private sector as well.”¶ Shinseki acknowledged the two departments for 10 years have been discussing and taking interim steps toward an integrated Electronic Health Record (iEHR) system. He described as “ground-breaking” the fact that he and Panetta agree now on what the system will be and are moving toward it.¶ “**The way forward for us is a single, joint, common, integrated electronic health record” that will have “an open architecture, not proprietary in design. That is a significant change from previous discussions**” focused on possible arrangements with a “proprietary contractor.”¶ But Rep. Bill Johnson, R-Ohio, chairman of the VA subcommittee on oversight and investigations, told Shinseki and Panetta not to be satisfied with a 2017 deadline to give health care providers access to all VA and military electronic medical records. Johnson said he had a 30-year career in information technology, including at one point as staff director to the chief information officer on U.S. Special Operations Command.¶ “I know what it takes to get this stuff done and five years, gentlemen, is totally unacceptable,” Johnson said. He blamed VA, telling Shinseki his department lacked “an overall information technology architecture. You and I have talked about this before, and it still doesn’t exist.”¶ “I understand that you can’t account for the last 10 years, Mr. Secretary,” Johnson said. “And I understand that you’ve got two bureaucracies that don’t necessarily like to be told what to do and (don’t) get along all the time. But I will submit to you that another five years is unacceptable (and) ought to be unacceptable to you.”¶ “I’ll work with you,” Shinseki promised Johnson. “We believe we have a good mark on an architecture. Obviously we haven’t satisfied you. We will come back and work it again.”¶ Rep. Jeff Miller, R-Fla., chairman of the House Veterans Affairs Committee, contrasted progress integrating VA and DoD health records with the far more challenging effort in the ’60s to land a man on the moon. “Why is it taking so long?” he asked.¶ Shinseki described two large departments with “maybe the two best electronic health records in the country and trying to bring that culture together to say ‘We are going to have one and it’s entirely possible.’”¶ “And I agree with you,” Shinseki said, “it’s not technology. It’s leadership.”¶ He and Panetta met four times in the past year to discuss this and other collaborative efforts. He held earlier meetings with Robert Gates, Panetta’s predecessor. **It took a total of 17 months to reach an agreement.**¶ In April 2011, the departments announced that a preliminary version of the iEHR would be deployed by 2014 to medical facilities in San Antonio and Hampton Roads. Last November they re-chartered an Interagency Program Office (IPO) to serves as the single point of accountability for integrating health IT capabilities. But it wasn’t until February this year that they hired Barclay P. Butler as IPO director.¶ In an interview last month, Butler, an information technologist with 31 years’ experience supporting delivery of health services, including as chief information officer for the Army Medical Department, said VA and DoD continue to test “portability of information” across their separate systems at the James A. Lovell Federal Health Care Center in North Chicago as staff there treat veterans, military members and even military families.¶ “We are taking lessons learned (at Lovell) and applying them to the single integrated electronic medical records we are building in the IPO,” Butler said. **The big effort, he said, is building an infrastructure** “runway on which we will land our clinical capabilities” as they readied to run as an integrated system in San Antonio and Hampton Roads areas where at least two services have hospitals and the VA runs polytrauma centers.¶ “There is so much more we can do to provide the clinician more complete information, more longitudinal data or more population health data so they can better care for their patients. It’s all about improving quality of care at a reduced cost,” Butler said.¶ The ultimate goal is a continuous health record that builds from the day a member enters service to “final honors” as a veteran. And regardless of where the service member is assigned, or the veteran lives, Butler said, the clinician would have “visibility into a complete and lifetime record.”¶ Like his bosses, Butler mentioned the 2017 deadline to achieve full operational capability but he didn’t bang that drum very hard.¶ “It certainly is a complex undertaking. I don’t want to minimize that,” Butler said. But the effort is “leading the nation in developing an electronic medical record that follows the patient throughout their lifetime.”¶

**Medical records won’t be ready until 2017, too long for their impact**

**Vogel 7/26** (Steve Vogel, ; Washington Post; Panetta says DoD and VA need to cut red tape, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/post/panetta-says-dod-and-va-need-to-cut-red-tape/2012/07/25/gJQA5cZp9W\_blog.html)

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Secretary of Veterans Affairs Eric K. Shinseki acknowledged Wednesday that **they have been frustrated by departmental bureaucracy in their attempts to streamline military health care for severely wounded service members**.¶ At a rare joint appearance before the House Armed Services and House Veterans Affairs committees, the secretaries pointed to what they called unprecedented cooperation between their two departments in battling some of their most pressing problems, including the high rate of military suicide and the huge backlog of disability claims.¶ But they have been unable to consolidate separate VA and DoD programs to coordinate the long-term recovery of seriously wounded service members, despite warnings from the Government Accountability Office that the proliferation of programs may increase red tape.¶ “Secretary Shinseki and I share the same frustration,” Panetta said in response to questioning from Rep. Ann Marie Buerkle, (R-N.Y.) “**We’ve been working on this, and frankly we’ve been pushing, to try to say why can’t we get faster results, why can’t we get this done on a faster track.¶** “Bottom line is, frankly, we’re just going to have to kick ass and try to make it happen, and that’s what we’re going to do.”¶ Shinseki said the separate **VA and DoD programs “don’t quite harmonize” and that the issue remains under study,** as it was last year. He said the departments hope to report back to Congress in several months on their efforts to eliminate duplication.¶ The Washington Post reported in November that despite the recommendations of the Dole-Shalala commission in 2007 to create a single point of contact to cut red tape for the most severely wounded service members, DoD and VA had instead created at least a dozen programs to coordinate the care.¶ Panetta said that DoD and VA are building an integrated military and veteran support system, “something that should have been done a long time ago.”¶ Lawmakers praised the level of cooperation between the secretaries but complained about the pace of many of the reforms. **The effort to create integrated electronic medical records, which began in 2009, will not be completed until 2017**, noted Rep. Jeff Miller (R-Fla.), the chairman of the House Veterans Affairs Committee.¶ “American know-how put a man on the moon in less than a decade, but 50 years later we can’t produce single electronic medical database for our military and veterans in the same span of time,” Miller said.¶ Panetta said that with more troops returning to civilian life after service in Iraq and Afghanistan, many problems may worsen before improving.¶ **“The system is going to be overwhelmed,” said Panetta. “Let’s not kid ourselves. It’s already overwhelmed.”¶** Shinseki said the VA might face some cuts from sequestration, despite earlier assurances from the White House that the department would be exempt. “VA is exempt from sequestration, except for administrative costs,” Shinseki said, adding that he did not have information on what those costs might be.¶ Miller called on the White House to release more information about the possible cuts.

## Solvency

### 1NC Solvency Frontline

#### DAR Fails:

#### DAR only deals roads which isn’t enough to solve congestion problems.

TRB 11 [Transportation Research Board – division of the National Research Council alongside the Department of Transportation, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases”, February 2011, http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302Summary.pdf]

DoD sees its responsibilities for off-base transportation facilities as limited. The only DoD program available to assist in funding transportation infrastructure off the base—the DAR program—is inadequate for base expansion in built-up areas. Eligibility is determined by a number of criteria, but ¶ the most important in metropolitan areas ¶ is the criterion of a doubling of traffic, which is impossible on facilities that are ¶ already congested. Aside from DAR, under DoD policy local and state authorities are responsible for off-base transportation facilities even if DoD decisions increase congestion; this policy is unrealistic for congested metropolitan transportation networks. In addition, off-base projects compete poorly in the military construction budget, which also funds the higher priorities of base commanders for on-base facilities. Finally, DAR is limited to road projects, whereas transit is often necessary to serve some travel demand in congested metropolitan areas.

#### The DAR program is ineffective – lack of knowledge and outdated regulations limit its usefulness.

Government Accountability Office ’11 [GAO, “DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE”, January 2011, GAO, http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/315273.pdf AD]

The Defense Access Roads program is providing some assistance in mitigating transportation needs in communities surrounding growth installations, but program usage has been limited, in part, by a lack of knowledge of the program, outdated regulations, and unclear guidance on how to navigate the program’s complex process. DOD has certified 20 transportation projects at 11 of the 26 military installation locations since 2004. Of the 20 certified projects, 11 have been funded at about $125 million. Considering funding delays and construction time frames, most of the approved projects to date are unlikely to provide relief in the near term. The procedures of the Defense Access Roads program are complex, involving multiple federal, state, and local stakeholders. The guidance describing the program’s procedures and, specifically, the application of the criteria, is difficult to follow and some regulations and guidance are outdated. Despite program outreach efforts and positive experiences with program administrators, military officials from 11 installations said that more information would be helpful to clarify the program’s procedures. Without program guidance that clearly details the program’s procedures and is effectively communicated to all stakeholders, the program may not be used to its fullest extent.

#### Base commanders will prioritize other construction needs

GAO 11 Government Accountability Office (audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of Congress that examines the use of public funds and evaluates federal programs); January 2011; “High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program”; United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees; http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11165.pdf

The second area of the current DAR program design identified by installation officials limiting the usefulness of DAR is the program’s funding process, which calls for potential DAR projects to compete for military construction funding with on-installation infrastructure projects, such as barracks and administrative buildings. The installation officials who cited funding as an issue told us that installation commanders are reluctant to prioritize off-installation roads over on-installation needs for military construction funding and that roads were unlikely to receive military construction funding given the other demands on this funding source. According to a senior Army official, there are currently at least $62 billion in unfunded military construction projects awaiting funding in the Army alone.35 In addition, as we reported in September 2009, communities surrounding installations affected by growth resulting from the BRAC process alone have identified an estimated $2 billion in unmet transportation needs.36

#### D. Long wait and project competition

GAO 11 Government Accountability Office (audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of Congress that examines the use of public funds and evaluates federal programs); January 2011; “High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program”; United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees; http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11165.pdf

The share of the total project cost that DOD will contribute is negotiated between DOD, the Department of Transportation, and appropriate state and local authorities. Based on the eligibility criteria determination and funding negotiations, the Commander of the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command may then certify the project as important to the national defense, as required by the DAR statute.23 The DAR program does not have a separate source of funds; instead, for DOD’s share of the funding, DAR projects must compete against other construction projects— such as child care centers, maintenance buildings, and mission facilities such as piers, hangars, and barracks—across installations and commands.24 In addition, securing funds for a DAR project may take years as many planned projects are already awaiting funds, due in part to DOD’s numerous ongoing growth initiatives. For example, a senior Army official emphasized the competing needs for military construction funds, by noting that as of April 2010, there were 2,500 projects worth $62 billion in the service’s database, of which only about $2 billion could be expected to be funded each year.

### Other Solvency Args

#### **The DAR funding process is too complex and trades off with other military infrastructure.**

Government Accountability Office ’11 [GAO, “DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE”, January 2011, GAO, http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/315273.pdf AD]

The process for certifying and funding a DAR project is complex due to the need to coordinate with numerous DOD, Department of Transportation, state, and local stakeholders. The process begins with the installation commander. According to the DOD service regulation governing the DAR program, when the commander of a DOD installation determines that improvements to a public road are needed, it is the responsibility of that commander to bring deficiencies to the attention of the appropriate state or local authority. In cases where the state or local transportation authority cannot or will not correct the deficiency, the installation commander has the option to initiate the process of requesting assistance for improvements under the DAR program by preparing a needs report. After reviews through military service command channels, DOD’s Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command then determines potential project eligibility and requests that the Federal Highway Administration conduct an evaluation of the transportation need and potential solutions in coordination with the relevant state department of transportation and other officials. Using the results of that study, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command determines whether the transportation project meets one of the DAR program eligibility criteria: 22 • A new access road to an installation is needed to accommodate a defense action. • A defense action causes traffic to double. • Urgent improvements are needed to accommodate a temporary surge in traffic to or from an installation because of a defense action. • A new or improved access road is needed to accommodate special military vehicles, such as heavy equipment transport vehicles. • A replacement road or connector is required for one closed because of military necessity. The share of the total project cost that DOD will contribute is negotiated between DOD, the Department of Transportation, and appropriate state and local authorities. Based on the eligibility criteria determination and funding negotiations, the Commander of the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command may then certify the project as important to the national defense, as required by the DAR statute. The DAR program does not have a separate source of funds; instead, for DOD’s share of the funding, DAR projects must compete against other construction projects— such as child care centers, maintenance buildings, and mission facilities such as piers, hangars, and barracks—across installations and commands. 24 23 In addition, securing funds for a DAR project may take years as many planned projects are already awaiting funds, due in part to DOD’s numerous ongoing growth initiatives. For example, a senior Army official emphasized the competing needs for military construction funds, by noting that as of April 2010, there were 2,500 projects worth $62 billion in the service’s database, of which only about $2 billion could be expected to be funded each year. After Congress appropriates funds designated for a DAR project, DOD transfers those funds to the Department of Transportation, which, in turn, disburses those funds to the appropriate state or federal entity to accomplish the necessary work to complete the project. Following the transfer of funds, the Department of Transportation’s Federal Lands Highway Office and the appropriate state division office of the Federal Highway Administration oversee project execution. According to a senior program official, DOD is also involved in project oversight through the review of project documents and the authorization of the expenditure of DAR funds by the Department of Transportation for appropriate phases of the work, thus ensuring DAR projects meet the agreed-upon defense requirements. (Appendix III provides additional detail in an overall schematic of the DAR process.)

#### The DAR is probably the worst organization for the job – they can’t even communicate within the military.

Government Accountability Office ’11 [GAO, “DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE”, January 2011, GAO, http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/315273.pdf AD]

We found that some military officials were unfamiliar with the DAR program and how it works, despite DOD’s outreach efforts to inform growth installations about the program. Representatives of the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command contacted officials at installations gaining over 1,000 personnel in population as a result of BRAC 2005 to discuss the DAR program. In addition, representatives of the command presented information on the DAR program at three conferences led by DOD in Atlanta, Georgia in May 2006; St. Louis, Missouri in December 2007; and Orlando, Florida in November 2009. Nonetheless, officials from 4 of the 26 growth installations stated that they had no knowledge of the program or who administers it. Of the remaining 22 installations, officials from 11 installations commented positively on the efforts of DAR program administrators, stating that they were helpful or transparent.25 When officials from these 22 installations were asked what could be improved with the program, 11 of the 22 said that more information on how to certify and fund DAR projects would be helpful. 26 One official characterized the process as a complicated puzzle because so many steps and players had to come together in just the right way to be successful. Navy officials at the Naval Support Activity Bethesda in Maryland noted that they relied extensively on the installation’s full-time transportation planner, who was able to work with the many stakeholders involved in the DAR process and stated that this was a potential “lesson learned” for other growth installations. Officials from 5 of the 26 installations we interviewed expressed confusion about the DOD chain of command in the DAR process, particularly inside the Army. For example, Army officials from four installations misunderstood DOD data requests funneled through the Army Installation Management Command as DAR project data calls and therefore did not take appropriate action to begin the DAR certification process at the installation level. We also found the roles of various state and federal agencies can differ and can be a source of confusion for DAR stakeholders. For example, senior transportation officials stated that a Federal Lands Highway division office is directing the construction of DAR projects at three installations whereas the states’ departments of transportation are directing the construction of the other DAR projects. In addition, officials from one of the Federal Highway Administration’s Federal-aid Division Offices were unclear as to when their own office becomes involved with the DAR program.

#### **DAR has too many outdated regulations to be effective.**

Government Accountability Office ’11 [GAO, “DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE”, January 2011, GAO, http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/315273.pdf AD]

We also found that the DAR process is not readily explained in available DAR regulations and guidance, which are outdated in certain ways. DAR program regulations and guidance are promulgated by both DOD and the Department of Transportation. A senior Department of Transportation official told us that some of the DAR regulations and guidance have not been updated in nearly 20 years even though the program has changed. For example, under current Department of Transportation eligibility criteria, the doubling of traffic criterion is limited to secondary roads, rather than highways, which would limit DAR projects to smaller, more rural roads. Although the DOD organization—the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command—that currently administers the program no longer makes such a distinction when considering projects for certification, the expanded eligibility of urban highway projects is not apparent in the program regulations and guidance. In addition, the command responsible for administering the DAR program changed its name in 2004, but this change is not reflected in DOD or Department of DAR Regulations and Guidance Are Outdated and Do Not Clarify Process Page 19 Transportation regulations and guidance.27 Furthermore, the DOD service regulation refers to the Federal Highway Administration’s Federal-Aid Policy Guide, which has been replaced.28 Moreover, in addition to certain outdated aspects of current regulations and guidance, there is a lack of working-level guidance29 available to help clarify the application of the eligibility criteria for potential DAR program users in complex situations. For instance, users often conclude that meeting the doubling of traffic criterion is potentially impossible on an already congested urban highway, without recognizing that, if the transportation need was limited in scope, it could potentially meet the criteria. For example, if the scope is limited to an exit ramp at a particularly busy time of day, the doubling of traffic criterion could possibly be met to make a case for DAR eligibility for the ramp itself but not necessarily the highway. One installation official stated that his office had determined that a potential DAR project did not meet the doubling of traffic criterion and consequently did not apply. Having clear and current regulations and guidance helps to foster improved understanding of a program and reduces confusion among key stakeholders. According to the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,30 a good internal control environment requires that the agency’s organizational structure clearly defines key areas of authority and responsibility and that lines of communication exist both within the agency to ensure compliance with laws and regulations and externally with stakeholders to obtain information that may have significant impact on the agency’s ability to achieve its goals. As a result of outdated regulations and a lack of working-level guidance clearly communicated to better inform potential DAR program users, those users may be overly dependent on DOD and Department of Transportation program officials for advice and instruction throughout the process for each DAR project. Although current DOD and Department of Transportation program administrators have been able to implement the DAR program despite these challenges, any change in key personnel at either agency could significantly impact the program’s implementation because DAR users are currently dependent on their assistance to navigate the DAR process. In addition, without up-to-date regulations and working-level guidance clearly communicated to better inform potential users about the DAR program process, the likelihood exists that the program as designed is not being used to its fullest extent.

#### **DAR isn’t key**

Government Accountability Office ’11 [GAO, “DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE”, January 2011, GAO, http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/315273.pdf AD]

A number of federal transportation programs, other than DAR, provide funding for state and local governments to use to help address defense-related transportation needs. However, communities most affected by DOD growth continue to face unmet transportation needs and federal agencies lack a coordinated strategy to address those needs. Installation officials identified many unmet transportation needs and two issues limiting their ability to use the DAR program to address these needs. Transportation projects in defense-affected communities can be funded through several federal or state resources. A number of existing federal transportation programs provide funding that state and local governments can use to help address defense-related transportation needs. These programs provided approximately $42.4 billion for highway improvements in states and the District of Columbia in fiscal year 2009.31 In addition, since February 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the Recovery Act) has provided additional funding for highway infrastructure projects—approximately $25.6 billion to state and local governments for over 12,300 highway projects—selected by the state and local governments. Recovery Act funds may be used for defense-related projects, but the projects need to have been ready to begin construction in 2009 or 2010. The Recovery Act required that the Department of Transportation obligate 100 percent of these funds to the states, by March 1, 2010.32 Defense-related projects in some communities may not have been eligible for Recovery Act funds if the projects were in the design or planning phase and were not ready to begin construction. Furthermore, in order to receive any federal transportation funding, all projects must go through the relevant state and local transportation planning processes, which, according to a Department of Transportation official, require a comprehensive approach to highway planning, including consideration of alternatives and environmental and safety planning. The time requirements to complete federally required state planning processes may prevent some transportation products from being completed by the September 15, 2011, BRAC implementation deadline, as these processes can require significant time to complete. Nevertheless, some states were able to use Recovery Act funds to begin construction on projects in certain defense-affected communities. During our interviews with installation officials, 11 of the 26 installations we spoke with identified Recovery Act funds as a source of funding for some of transportation needs. For example, the state of Florida is using $46 million in Recovery Act funds for an intersection grade separation project near Eglin Air Force Base, and Virginia is using about $60 million in Recovery Act funds to complete the Fairfax County Parkway project, which is expected to alleviate traffic congestion near Fort Belvoir.

#### **Doing the plan does nothing**

GAO 11 (United States Government Accountability Office; DEFENSE ¶ INFRASTRUCTURE ¶ High-Level Federal ¶ Interagency ¶ Coordination Is ¶ Warranted to Address ¶ Transportation Needs ¶ beyond the Scope of ¶ the Defense Access ¶ Roads Program, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11165.pdf)

From calendar year 2001 to 2010, Congress has appropriated about $225 ¶ million for DAR projects—ranging from no funds in several years to $89.9 ¶ million in 2008—for an average of about $22.5 million per year. Our ¶ analysis of DOD data shows that about $125 million of that amount was ¶ designated for projects at military growth installation locations.¶ 20¶ As ¶ shown in table 2, as of December 2010, DOD had certified 20 ¶ transportation projects as DAR-eligible for DOD funding at 11 of the 26 growth installation locations since calendar year 2004. Of the 20 projects ¶ certified eligible for DAR, over half of those projects (11 of 20) had been ¶ funded. A senior DOD official stated that funding for the remaining ¶ projects was pending, and that any funds provided would occur in fiscal ¶ year 2011 and beyond.¶ 21¶ Moreover, none of the funded projects were ¶ completed at the time of our review and the earliest expected completions ¶ were for 3 projects in 2011 at the former Engineering Proving Ground ¶ location at Fort Belvoir. Because most of the population growth at the ¶ 26 installations will likely occur by September 15, 2011—the mandated completion of the 2005 BRAC round—and considering the 10-year time frame necessary to proceed from design to construction for some major transportation projects, as estimated by the Maryland Department of Transportation’s State Highway Administration, most of the certified DAR projects to date will not immediately mitigate the transportation needs in the near term but should provide some relief in later years if and when the projects are funded and completed

## Politics Links

#### BRAC is expensive – and they couldn’t start solving for years.

Transportation Research Board of the National Academies Press ’11 [Joseph M. Sussman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chair; Thera Black, Thurston Regional Planning Council, Olympia, Washington; Thomas B. Deen, Transportation Consultant, Stevensville, Maryland; James R. Gosnell, West Coast Corridor Coalition, Los Angeles, California; Max I. Inman, Mercator Advisors, Fairfax, Virginia; Ashby Johnson, Houston–Galveston Area Council, Houston, Texas; Fred Meurer, City of Monterey, California; Kevin Neels, Brattle Group, Washington, D.C.; George E. Schoener, I-95 Corridor Coalition, Celebration, Florida; Randall Yim, Independent Consultant, Scottsville, Virginia. Staff: Edward Weiner, Consultant; Stephen R. Godwin, Transportation Research Board, Transportation Research Board of the National Academies Press, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases: Special Report 302”, NAP, February 2011, http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302Summary.pdf AD]

Resolving metropolitan area transportation congestion problems is complex and expensive. The additional travel demand on congested routes serving bases caused by BRAC 2005 cannot be accommodated in a matter of a few months or years. Over time, delays can be eased, but greater DoD funding, realigned metropolitan area priorities, and better communication between base commanders and civilian authorities will be required. Adoption of the committee’s recommendations to improve base–community communication and planning will help avoid future problems caused by rapid growth in personnel at military bases.

#### BRAC funding would be politically unpopular because it would require raising taxes.

Transportation Research Board of the National Academies Press ’11 [Joseph M. Sussman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chair; Thera Black, Thurston Regional Planning Council, Olympia, Washington; Thomas B. Deen, Transportation Consultant, Stevensville, Maryland; James R. Gosnell, West Coast Corridor Coalition, Los Angeles, California; Max I. Inman, Mercator Advisors, Fairfax, Virginia; Ashby Johnson, Houston–Galveston Area Council, Houston, Texas; Fred Meurer, City of Monterey, California; Kevin Neels, Brattle Group, Washington, D.C.; George E. Schoener, I-95 Corridor Coalition, Celebration, Florida; Randall Yim, Independent Consultant, Scottsville, Virginia. Staff: Edward Weiner, Consultant; Stephen R. Godwin, Transportation Research Board, Transportation Research Board of the National Academies Press, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases: Special Report 302”, NAP, February 2011, <http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13104&page=55> AD]

Federal Funding of transportation improvements in BRAC Cases state infrastructure Banks: Many of the states with BRAC actions have state infrastructure banks that could be a source of upfront capital to improve transportation facilities at low or no interest if a revenue source could be found to repay the loan. In the case of Fort Bliss, the state is dedicating a share of future federal surface transportation revenues to pay a developer who financed the project. Another possibility is for a local jurisdiction or state to dedicate some portion of existing tax revenues, or raise taxes, to repay a loan from a state infrastructure bank. Some complexities with this approach are obvious. Most of the facilities adversely affected by base expansion are state highways, and local property or business taxes would not apply. The state could dedicate a share of future highway user taxes to repay the loan, but, as indicated above, most state transportation trust funds are inadequate to meet current needs. Given the current status of state and local finances, the concept of diverting existing tax revenues to a new purpose, or raising taxes, would be politically unpopular, but such an approach might be possible in the future for some projects. impact fees The situation of a sharp increase in base personnel being transferred to new or expanded facilities is analogous to an unanticipated new, large private development occurring within a metropolitan region. Typically, regional leaders would negotiate with the developer and require that certain conditions be met to ameliorate the negative impacts of the development, and they often impose fees to offset capital improvement needs as a result of the development. If developers in such instances are unwilling to pay the impact fees, local governments can refuse to allow the development. Exactions, the on-site construction of public facilities or dedication of land, have been used for decades.3 Impact fees, a form of exaction, were instituted in the 1920s as a local financing tool. Where no appropriate land was available for a traditional exaction, off-site land or a fee- in-lieu could be substituted for a dedication. Over time, these fees came to include capital costs for on- and off-site improvements brought about by new development. Rooted in the idea that new development should pay its own way, impact fees increasingly have been used to pay for improvements traditionally paid for by property taxes. According to the California State Controller’s Office, fees and service charges account for See Appendix A, from which this chapter is derived, for a more extended discussion of impact fees. 3 72

#### And, Americans hate paying taxes.

Bryner ’12 [Jeanna Bryner, LiveScience Managing Editor, LiveScience, “Why Americans Hate Paying Taxes, May 23, 2012, <http://www.livescience.com/20518-paying-taxes-moral-principles.html> AD]

The debate over taxes has long been an issue in American politics, and now researchers have found some of the moral underpinnings that may explain why many hate paying taxes. The study was small, with just 24 small businesspeople taking part in relatively open-ended interviews. Even so, Jeff Kidder of Northern Illinois University and Isaac Martin from the University of California-San Diego, found some trends. In essence, middle-class Americans, the results suggest, see taxes as a means of robbing hardworking citizens of their dignity. The participants "portray taxation as a threat to the moral order because they believe taxes deprive deserving hardworking middle class people of dignity, while rewarding others who are undeserving (both rich and poor)," the researchers write this week in the journal Symbolic Interaction. [Infographic: Death and Taxes] Kidder and Martin chose this group of participants from the South, because such entrepreneurs are typically strongly anti-tax, while southern states also hold plenty of supporters of the Tea Party (whose name stands for Taxed Enough Already). In fact, a recent survey by payroll service provider Paychex found that tax codes, along with employment regulations and retirement security are the top three election issues for small business owners. The interviews in the new study revealed participants associated income taxes as violating the moral principle that hard work should be rewarded, the researchers noted. So rather than being associated with a free-market ideology or a person's own economic interests, at least for these taxpayers, tax hostility was more linked with moral principles. "When Americans lash out at 'takeovers,' 'massive taxes' and 'bailouts,' they are looking at these issues from the perspective of a hardworking middle class besieged on all sides," Kidder said in a statement. "Tax talk is about dollars, but it is also about a moral sense of what is right."

#### And, raising taxes to pay for BRAC roads is unpopular in the context of the Great Recession – also, there is no possibility of cost underruns.

Transportation Research Board of the National Academies Press ’11 [Joseph M. Sussman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chair; Thera Black, Thurston Regional Planning Council, Olympia, Washington; Thomas B. Deen, Transportation Consultant, Stevensville, Maryland; James R. Gosnell, West Coast Corridor Coalition, Los Angeles, California; Max I. Inman, Mercator Advisors, Fairfax, Virginia; Ashby Johnson, Houston–Galveston Area Council, Houston, Texas; Fred Meurer, City of Monterey, California; Kevin Neels, Brattle Group, Washington, D.C.; George E. Schoener, I-95 Corridor Coalition, Celebration, Florida; Randall Yim, Independent Consultant, Scottsville, Virginia. Staff: Edward Weiner, Consultant; Stephen R. Godwin, Transportation Research Board, Transportation Research Board of the National Academies Press, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases: Special Report 302”, Alexandria.gov, February 2011, http://alexandriava.gov/uploadedFiles/tes/BRAC/Federal%20Funding%20of%20Transportation%20Improvements%20in%20BRAC%20cases.pdf AD]

The fundamental question posed in the committee’s statement of task concerns the responsibility of the Department of Defense (DoD) to pay for off-base transportation impacts. The first section of this chapter reviews existing DoD programs for assisting communities whose transportation facilities are affected by military base growth. The second section reviews traditional non-DoD government programs to fund surface transportation infrastructure. These programs include those administered by the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT), for which national defense is an eligibility criterion. State and local government transportation sources are also reviewed in this section, including how local governments normally work with private developers who propose major projects that will affect the localities’ transportation networks. Alternatives to construction funding for capital improvement to increase infrastructure capacity, such as operations and maintenance (O&M) funding for ongoing congestion management, are also discussed. The committee is also charged with assessing current federal programs that could be of assistance in BRAC cases. The committee’s treatment of traditional federal, state, and local programs for funding transportation is influenced by the current fiscal context. In the aftermath of the “great recession,” governments are under the most demanding fiscal pressure experienced in recent decades and face a public unsympathetic to tax increases to fund transportation. Even as the military budget has grown dramatically to wage wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, governments have seen their revenues decline because of the recent recession, particularly tax revenues they typically rely on for transportation. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS The official policy of DoD is that, with limited exceptions, the impact of bases on local government infrastructure is the responsibility of those governments (DoD 2008) (see also Box 1). The principal argument is that DoD employees pay taxes into the state and local coffers that fund infrastructure, and those sources should be tapped for making improvements to meet the demands placed on the infrastructure by soldiers and DoD civilian employees. DoD policy, however, also allows for special circumstances in which DoD provides funds for transportation improvements. Defense Access Roads Program Under the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program, administered by the military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), DoD may pay for public highway improvements to address the impact on traffic of sudden or unusual defense-related actions (see Box 2). DAR enables DoD to help pay indirectly for improvements to highways DoD designates as important to the national defense. Under DAR, DoD can use funds provided in military construction (MILCON) appropriations to pay for all or part of the cost of constructing and maintaining roads designated as “defense access roads.” The DAR program began decades ago when many bases were located, or being located, in relatively undeveloped regions. The program appears to have been designed to pay for access roads used principally by the military or to improve roads that would be harmed by heavy military equipment. The program has funded road projects that access missile installations and other military facilities that were off the federal-aid primary highway system. These facilities were generally in isolated areas and not served by access roads. Funds appropriated for DAR projects are transferred from DoD to FHWA to administer. The provisions of U.S. Federal Code, Title 23, which includes requirements of federal laws applying to federal-aid highways, apply to all DAR projects. Allocations are project specific; therefore, underruns cannot be used on other projects and unused DAR funds may be reallocated by the Washington Headquarters office of FHWA or returned to the military. Funds must be obligated within 5 years of approval. Unobligated balances lapse after the period of availability. Unexpended funds are canceled 10 years after the last year of obligation. As federal transportation programs go, the DAR program is quite modest. From 2001 to 2010, it certified as eligible 19 projects, 15 of which have been funded. Since 2005, the program has provided about $22.5 million annually for transportation improvements, including projects that are not BRAC related. By way of comparison, federal aid for highway transportation funded through USDOT exceeded $30 billion annually from 2006 to 2010.

#### BRAC is expensive and unpopular

Brannen and Weisgerber, defense reporter, Jan 25 (“Pentagon to request 2 new rounds of BRAC,” Army Times, 2012, <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/01/dn-pentagon-to-request-2-new-rounds-of-brac-012512/>)

To close or consolidate military bases in the United States requires legislation from Congress to create a bipartisan Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC), which then studies the problem and makes recommendations to the president and the defense secretary.¶ The last round of BRAC took place in 2005 and the changes it implemented were only completed in this past fall.¶ The new requests would seek authorization for the first BRAC in 2013, to be followed by another in 2015, one source said. The two new rounds of closures could reap savings in five to eight years, sources predict, but would cost money up front.¶ Closing bases is hugely expensive in the short-run, one former Pentagon official said. There are the costs of relocating people and equipment, plus the costs of shutdown and the associated environmental impacts. Proposed base closings often are contentious, too, as legislators fight to keep jobs and spending in their districts.¶ “It’s going to be a tough sell,” a defense source said.

## States CP Solvency

#### The states solve better than DAR – they’ve already taken actions in some cases.

Government Accountability Office ’11 [GAO, “DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE”, January 2011, GAO, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/315273.pdf> AD]

GAO identified an additional step that may be necessary to meet the large pool of the transportation needs that are not being met by the Defense Access program—greater high-level federal interagency coordination. Aside from the Defense Access Roads program, other sources of funding exist that can be used to help mitigate unmet needs in the defense-affected communities. Local and state agencies generally have the responsibility for constructing and maintaining highways and are the recipients of billions of dollars from federal sources, such as grants from the Department of Transportation or through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. GAO found that some of the transportation projects at several of the military growth locations have been funded by the states in which they are located and others are recipients of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds. Because this assistance is coming from diverse sources and is largely uncoordinated among the stakeholders involved, it is unclear to what extent priority consideration is being given to the defense-affected communities as prescribed by Executive Order 12788. This presidential order provided for a federal committee—the Economic Adjustment Committee—bringing together 22 agencies, under the leadership of the Secretary of Defense or his designee to, among other things, support various programs designed to assist communities most affected by defense activities. As chair of the committee, DOD has the opportunity to convene full committee meetings and exercise high-level leadership needed to ensure that federal agencies are affording priority consideration to defense-affected communities. However, the committee has only rarely convened and has at no time discussed transportation needs affecting all 26 growth locations. Without this leadership, it is unlikely that the federal agencies can provide the effective interagency and intergovernmental coordination and potential funds needed to help address the unmet transportation needs of defense-affected communities.