# Military Transportation Neg 2.0

[\*\*\*C17 Case Materials 3](#_Toc328948977)

[C17 Fails – 1NC 4](#_Toc328948978)

[Ext. Squo Solves 5](#_Toc328948979)

[Ext. C17s Fail 6](#_Toc328948980)

[AT//Squo Solves 8](#_Toc328948981)

[\*\*\*Counterplan 9](#_Toc328948982)

[CP 1NC 10](#_Toc328948983)

[2NC AT//Permutation “Do Both” 13](#_Toc328948984)

[\*\*\*MPF Plank 14](#_Toc328948985)

[Solves: Military Flexibility 15](#_Toc328948986)

[Solves: Warfighting 16](#_Toc328948987)

[Solves: Failed States / Crisis Response 17](#_Toc328948988)

[Solves: Power Projection / Deterrence 18](#_Toc328948989)

[AT//Military Transportation Key 19](#_Toc328948990)

[AT//Seabasing Fails 20](#_Toc328948991)

[\*\*\*Containment Strategy Plank 21](#_Toc328948992)

[Solves: State Failure 22](#_Toc328948993)

[Solves: Anti-Americanism 23](#_Toc328948994)

[AT//Containment Fails 24](#_Toc328948995)

[\*\*\*Information Plank 26](#_Toc328948996)

[Solves: Anti-Americanism 27](#_Toc328948997)

[\*\*\*AFF – Counterplan 28](#_Toc328948998)

[Answers to the MPF Plank 29](#_Toc328948999)

[Answers to the Containment Plank 30](#_Toc328949000)

[Answers to the Information Plank 32](#_Toc328949001)

[\*\*\*Military Humanitarianism DA 33](#_Toc328949002)

[Military Humanitarianism 1NC 34](#_Toc328949003)

[Ext. Solves Military Humanitarianism 38](#_Toc328949004)

[Ext. Military Humanitarianism Fails 39](#_Toc328949005)

[Ext. Destabilizes Iran 43](#_Toc328949006)

[Ext. Iran Conflict Impact 44](#_Toc328949007)

[Ext. China Impact 45](#_Toc328949008)

[Ext. COIN Fails 46](#_Toc328949009)

[\*\*\*AFF – Military Humanitarianism 47](#_Toc328949010)

[COIN Solves 48](#_Toc328949011)

[No China Impact 50](#_Toc328949012)

[No Iran Impact 52](#_Toc328949013)

[\*\*\*Military Humanitarianism Advantage 54](#_Toc328949014)

[M/H 1AC 55](#_Toc328949015)

[Ext. Solves Deterrence 61](#_Toc328949016)

[Ext. Japan 63](#_Toc328949017)

[Ext. Solves – General 64](#_Toc328949018)

[Ext. Airlift Key 65](#_Toc328949019)

# \*\*\*C17 Case Materials

### C17 Fails – 1NC

#### ( ) Squo solves – current C17 levels are *sufficient*

Walsh, 10 - Government Affairs and Public Policy Reporter In Washington Bureau (March 18, 2010, Joel, “Gates to Congress: Kill the C-17,” <http://totalbuzz.ocregister.com/2010/02/03/gates-to-congress-kill-the-c-17/29481/>)

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in no uncertain terms today that if Congress attempts to put back money for the C-17, the military cargo plane built in Boeing’s Long Beach plant, he will recommend to his boss, President Barack Obama, that he vetoes the whole defense spending bill. The Defense Department tried to kill the plane, which supports some 5,000 jobs in southern California — including about 1,000 Orange County workers, in 2007. That year it decided the 180 planes it had on order with Boeing were enough. Yet in every budget cycle since, Congress has provided funding for the aircraft. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Gates, who was flanked by the president’s top military adviser, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, said the department currently has 194 C-17s. By Oct. 1 it will have 223. “The department has concluded that the current C-17 is more than sufficient to meet the military airlift needs,” Gates said in a prepared statement. “Should Congress add funds to continue this program, I will strongly recommend a presidential veto.” Scrapping the C-17 would save the federal government an estimated $2.5 billion. That’s out of a more than $700 billion department-wide budget request. If the plane is killed Boeing says it would have to close down the C-17 line in September, 2012. Even though it’s built in Long Beach, the effects of discontinuing production on the C-17 are widespread. Suppliers and manufacturers in Texas and Minnesota have made large investments in capital and personnel related to the aircraft. Gates’ statement and the president’s recommendation will lead to an inevitable showdown between lawmakers who have backed funding for the C-17 in years past and an administration that is fighting to control what it sees as extraneous costs. Sen. Barbara Boxer, D-Calif., has already said she disagrees with Obama’s decision to halt production. Rep. Ken Calvert, R-Corona, said that keeping larger C-5 aircraft, instead of C-17, may be unwise, because they cannot go into some places the military needs to fly, such as some of the rough terrain in Afghanistan. Gates acknowledged these concerns. But he noted that, of the 200,000 landings made by C-17s since 1997, “less than 4 percent were in places that were not accessible to the C-5.” A final decision on the fate of the government’s use of the plane is not likely until much later this year.

#### ( ) That’s offense – adding more aircraft to the fleet *drives up costs* and *tubes effectiveness*

**Gertler, 9**

- Specialist in Military Aviation for the Congressional Research Service (12/22/2009 , “Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22763.pdf, pg. 21-22)

A September 29, 2009 letter from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committee states: I am writing as a follow up to our discussion last week regarding the retirement of strategic airlift aircraft. The Department [of Defense] fully supports the language in Section 311 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-32) which requires a minimum of 292 strategic airlift aircraft as reflected in the Department’s 2005 Mobility Capability Study. Since the release of MCS-05, Congress has funded an additional 33 C-17s the Department did not request. The addition of these C-17 aircraft influenced our decision to upgrade only 52 of 111 C-5s with the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP). Congress is now considering adding another 10 C-17s in the FY2010 budget. The Department’s current fleet of 324 aircraft (213 C-17/111 C-5) is in excess of strategic airlift needs, driving increased operating costs at the expense of other priorities. Each C-5A costs over $13 million in annual operating expenses. Since we are over our current requirement by eight aircraft, as determined by the analysis conducted during the C-5 RERP Nunn-McCurdy recertification, it costs the Department over $100 million a year in excess expenditures. These costs will only grow if we receive additional C-17s and/or delay the ability for the Department to retire excess aircraft. Initial indications from Mobility Capability Requirements Study 2016 show the strategic balance will not fundamentally change. This leads me to believe: 1) the Department does not need additional C-17s to meet strategic needs; 2) the Department needs to begin shedding excess strategic airlift inventory by retiring a portion of the C-5A fleet now. The Department requests your support and authority to allow the proper management of the strategic airlift fleet to meet the Nation’s requirements. Thank you for your strong interest and continued support of the Department.

###  Ext. Squo Solves

#### ( ) The C17’s not key – *other forms of air transport* can fill the void

**Gertler, 9**

- Specialist in Military Aviation for the Congressional Research Service (12/22/2009 , “Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22763.pdf, pg. 21-22)

GAO reported in November 2009 that: Additional funds provided by Congress for C-17 procurement more than offset the strategic airlift gaps associated with reduced C-5 modernization plans. However, there is a potential future gap in tactical airlift capabilities for transporting medium weight Army equipment that cannot fit on C-130 aircraft. The C-17 fleet, in its dual role of providing both strategic and tactical airlift, currently provides this capability and is anticipated to continue to do so for many years. The JFTL [Joint Future Theater Lift aircraft] is envisioned to eventually replace the C-130H and perform this and other roles, but will not be available for 15 years or more under the current acquisition strategy. While the various mobility studies acknowledge the C-17s’ significant dual role, they did not comprehensively evaluate an expanded future use of the C-17 for the transport of medium weight equipment and how this could affect the force structure, the C-17s’ service life, and when to shut down the C-17 production line. For example, the studies do not quantify current and anticipated future use of the C-17 for tactical airlift. This is because DOD officials do not consider the C-17 to be a suitable substitute for the JFTL.... A potential future capability gap exists in the deployment and redeployment of Army medium weight weapon systems within a theater of combat. The C-17 is the only aircraft currently capable of transporting heavier equipment, such as combat configured armored Strykers and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, within a theater of operations as these are too large and bulky for C-130s to carry. However, the C-17 cannot transport this equipment into austere, short, or unimproved landing areas. DOD’s long-term plan is to use the JFTL, the planned C-130H replacement, to transport these vehicles in theater, including to such access-challenged locations. However, it will not be available for at least 15 years as currently planned. While the various mobility studies acknowledge the C-17 can perform both strategic and tactical airlift missions, none of the three recently completed or ongoing studies comprehensively considered the C-17 in the tactical force structure, even though about 20 percent of the tactical sorties flown by the C-17 fleet in fiscal year 2007 were for missions where loads were too large for C-130s. As such, DOD has not evaluated the impact the increasing tactical heavy lift mission will have on future tactical airlift requirements, the C-17’s service life, its availability to perform strategic airlift and other tactical airlift missions, and the impact it could have on C-17 production shutdown plans. DOD officials do not believe that the C-17 is a suitable substitute for the JFTL mission. A DOD official stated that preliminary results of the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 show that in the worst case planning scenario there would be enough C-17s to perform its primary role as a strategic airlifter, as well as some tactical missions through 2016. This is because the study analysis shows the peak demand for the C-17 and the C-130 occurs at different times and the C-17 is aging as planned. However, officials indicated that none of the current mobility studies analyzed the need for the C-17 to perform additional tactical heavy lift missions for the 8-year period between 2016 and 2024, when the JFTL is expected to be fielded. Furthermore, because we were not granted access to the preliminary study information, we could not ascertain the extent to which the C-17’s heavy lift mission had been considered in DOD’s analysis through 2016. C-17 production is scheduled to end in March 2011. As we previously reported a well-reasoned, near-term decision on the final C-17 fleet size could help DOD avoid substantial future costs from ending production prematurely and later restarting production. For example, the Air Force has estimated that restoring the production line could cost $2 billion. Costs and challenges associated with such a course include hiring and training a workforce of nearly 3,100 people, reinstalling and restoring production tooling, and identifying suppliers and qualifying their parts and processes.

###  Ext. C17s Fail

#### ( ) C17’s fail – too many counterfeit parts

Maloof, 12- former senior security policy analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (6/3/2012, F. Michael, “U.S. MISSILES INFECTED WITH CHINESE FAKES,” http://www.wnd.com/2012/06/u-s-missiles-infected-with-chinese-fakes/)

Fake electronic components from China have been discovered in thermal weapons sights delivered to the U.S. Army on mission computers for the Missile Defense Agency’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, missiles and on military aircraft, including several models of helicopters and the P-8A-Poseidon, according to federal investigators. The new evidence comes reports that the problem with faked Chinese electronic components being installed in U.S. military systems is far more widespread that originally thought. The G2Bulletin recently reported a U.S. Senate investigation revealed counterfeit electronics are being found in U.S. defense systems. The parts don’t just come directly from China anymore; they also are coming from suppliers in Britain and Canada who redirect Chinese products. The Senate panel tracked some 1,800 cases of suspected counterfeit parts through the supply chain. It found that U.S. defense contractors had purchased many of the critical components from U.S. companies who in turn obtained them from Chinese firms but never subjected them to testing before handing them over to the U.S. military as part of their contract. The Senate unit, whose investigators were denied access to Chinese firms by Chinese authorities, said that the evidence “consistently point(s) to China as the epicenter of the global trade in counterfeits.” To put the growing problem into perspective, Gen. Patrick O’Reilly, director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, said, “We do not want a $12 million missile defense interceptor’s reliability compromised by a $2 counterfeit part.” Find out just what the U.S. government is doing about China’s antics, in “Bowing to Beijing.” The military aircraft that have been affected include the SH-60B, AH-64 and CH-46 helicopters; and the C-17, C-130J, C-27J and P-8A Poseidon airplanes Investigators said if the component in the FLIR’s Electromagnetic Interference Filter, or EIF, had failed, then the FLIR itself would fail and the SH-60B could not conduct surface warfare missions, which included firing its hellfire missiles. A FLIR failure also would compromise the pilot’s ability to avoid hazards and identify targets at night, thereby limiting the SH-60B’s night mission capability. A defense subcontractor in Texas had sold the components to Raytheon. The components prior to that sale traveled through four states and three countries, originating with a company called Huajie Electronics Ltd in Shenzhen, China. Suspect parts also were found in the C-130J and C-27J, two military cargo planes equipped with display units that provide the pilot information on aircraft performance, engine status, fuel use, location and warning messages, according to documentation from Senate investigators. The display units were manufactured by L-3 Display Systems, a division of L-3 Communications. L-3 Display Systems manufactures the display units for Lockheed Martin, which is the prime contractor for the C-130J. For the C-27J, L-3 Display Systems manufactures the display units for Alenia Aeronautica, a subcontractor to L-3 Integrated Systems. Display Systems, however, learned that a memory chip used in the display units was a suspect counterfeit. By the time it was noticed, however, the company had installed counterfeit components in more than 500 display units, including in units for the C-27J, the C-130J and C-17 aircraft, and the CH-46 helicopter used by the Marine Corps. “Failure of the memory chip could cause a display unit to show a degraded image, lose data, or even go blank,” the Senate report said. While L-3 Display Systems told Alenia after discovering the problem, neither L-3 nor Alenia told the U.S. Air Force for nearly a year after it was discovered that the C-27Js were affected by the suspect parts. According to the Senate report, L-3 Display Systems had bought the suspect memory chips from an electronics distributor in California. That distributor had bought the chips from Hong Dark Electronic Trade, a company in Shenzhen, China. In fact, the Senate investigators had uncovered the fact that L-3 had purchased tens of thousands of Hong Dark electronic components that had entered the U.S. defense supply chain. According to Senate investigators, the U.S. Air Force had reported that more than 84,000 counterfeit electronic parts purchased from Hong Dark “entered the DOD supply chain and many of these parts have been installed on DOD aircraft.” Senate investigators said that these counterfeit parts are driving up defense costs, in addition to compromising safety and national security. For example, the Middle Defense Agency had learned that mission computers for THAAD missiles contained suspect counterfeit memory devices. If the devices had failed, MDA said the THAAD missile itself would have failed. In this case, the memory devices were purchased by Honeywell from an independent distributor. Honeywell had installed them on mission computers which it sold to Lockheed Martin which in turn supplied them to MDA. Honeywell and Lockheed Martin informed MDA when they determined the parts were suspect and fixed the problem. However, the cost to fix the problem, which MDA reimbursed to the two companies, was nearly $2.78 million. “Counterfeit electronic parts pose long-term reliability problems, and reliability is a major driver in the overall cost of a weapon system,” the Senate report said. The problem of coping with potentially counterfeit parts stems from a policy decision that was made years ago during the Clinton administration to give priority to off-the-shelf components as a way to reduce cost. But they also were supposed to be tested and current investigations indicate that such testing isn’t always occurring. In the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, there are a number of provisions to address weaknesses in the defense supply chain, such as those identified by Senate investigators. The NDAA has provisions to strengthen the inspection regime for imported electronic parts. The NDAA also has provisions to eliminate purchases from unknown and frequently suspect suppliers, given that counterfeit parts often change hands many times before being purchased by defense contractors. The Senate report said that aggressive inspection and testing practices are necessary to catch counterfeit parts that make it into the supply chain. “When suspect counterfeit parts are identified, they must be reported,” the report said. “Failing to do so allows suspect suppliers to operate with impunity and puts everyone at risk.” The earlier article said the issue appears to be connected to “unvetted independent distributors who supply electronic parts for critical military applications.” The problem of faked or counterfeit products from China, as well as contaminated products, are issues on which WND has reported for years. WND columnist Phyllis Schlafly wrote last year about fake computer chips that were being purchased by the U.S. military for use in U.S. warplanes, ships and communications networks. She wrote that malfunctions traced to the chips were being reported as early as 2005. Targeted were computers aboard U.S. F-15 fighter jets at Robins Air Force Base in Georgia. Even at that point, officials said at least 15 percent of the spare and replacement chips the Pentagon was buying were counterfeit. Officials in the National Intelligence Agency and the FBI expressed concern then that the fakes could let the Chinese gain access to secure systems inside the United States. Schlafly wrote at the time: “The U.S. bought 59,000 counterfeit microchips from China for use in our warships, planes, missile and antimissile systems but fortunately were discovered they are fake in time. How many didn’t we catch?” One Senate investigator even discovered that electronic components had been harvested from “e-waste” and sometimes were sold on public sidewalks and in public markets in China. There also are whole factories in China with up to 15,000 people employed for the purpose of counterfeiting products. WND has not been alone in its reporting. DefenseTech also reported on the danger: “You don’t have to be a genius to see the safety nightmare presented by fake parts on incredibly complex systems like submarines, fighter jets and tiltrotors.”

###  AT//Squo Solves

#### ( ) More C17’s are key – prefer the most recent and qualified evidence

US Air Force, 11 (12/29/2011 “C-17 GLOBEMASTER III” <http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=86>”) DG

**The C-17 Globemaster III is the newest, most flexible cargo aircraft to enter the airlift force**. **The C-17 is capable of rapid strategic delivery of troops and all types of cargo to main operating bases or directly to forward bases in the deployment area. The aircraft can perform tactical airlift and airdrop missions and can transport litters and ambulatory patients during aeromedical evacuations when required.** **The inherent flexibility and performance of the C-17 force improve the ability of the total airlift system to fulfill the worldwide air mobility requirements of the United States. The ultimate measure of airlift effectiveness is the ability to rapidly project and sustain an effective combat force close to a potential battle area. Threats to U.S. interests have changed in recent years, and the size and weight of U.S.-mechanized firepower and equipment have grown in response to improved capabilities of potential adversaries.** This trend has significantly increased air mobility requirements, particularly in the area of large or heavy outsize cargo. **As a result,** newer and more flexible airlift aircraft are needed **to meet potential armed contingencies, peacekeeping or humanitarian missions worldwide. The C-17 is capable of meeting today's demanding airlift missions.**

# \*\*\*Counterplan

### CP 1NC

#### Text: The United States federal government should develop necessary technical capabilities for and fully fund the Maritime Pre-Positioning Force. The United States federal government should transition to a containment strategy in the face of state failure and restrict its state building and reconstruction efforts. The United States federal government should establish an image-sensitive global information campaign including the selective dissemination of effective information about the United States via internet, social media, and satellite television to counter misinformation. We’ll clarify.

#### ( ) The MPF is the vital internal link to hegemony – the counterplan prompts *wide-spread* marine sea-basing and *improves military capabilities* – this solves the 1AC’s internal link arguments about operational capacity, power projection and quick response by enhancing our forward basing while preventing the initiation of diplomatic or humanitarian missions.

**Hanlon ‘4**

[Edward. Lt General and Deputy Commandant of Combat Development of the US Marine Corps. “Statement before the Committee on Armed Services – Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities” “Regarding Transformation” Feb 2004, http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/transformation/02-26-2004-hanlon.htm//Cal-JV]

Seabasing is not a single thing, unit, or platform. It is the flexible integration of a wide range of capabilities that provides freedom of movement by using the sea as maneuver space; freedom of action in anti-access environments; reduced vulnerability to attack; and increased operational agility and speed. A series of Navy - Marine Corps capabilities to operationalize Seabasing are being developed through four interdependent and synergistic Naval Capability Pillars (NCPs): - Sea Shield describes the precise and persistent naval defensive capabilities that extend not only throughout large maritime areas, but also deep overland to protect joint forces and allies ashore in anti-access environments. Sea Shield Mission Capability Areas include Personnel Protection, Critical Asset Protection, Air and Missile Defense, and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. We are pursuing such programs as the Complementary Low Altitude Weapon System and the Multi-Role Radar System. Another key element of Sea Shield is Force Protection, and the Marine Corps, as the lead agent for Joint Non-Lethal Weapons, is actively seeking new and innovative ways to expand the ground commanders force protection capabilities. We must capitalize on Seabasing as a means of protecting joint forces across the range of military operations (ROMO). This can be viewed as a protection "network" addressing the Force Protection functions of detect, assess, warn, prevent/deter, defend, and recover. - Sea Strike describes the naval capabilities to project dominant and decisive offensive power from the sea in support of joint objectives. These capabilities include and integrate long-range, precise aircraft and missile fires; large-volume covert strike capability; high-tempo decisive maneuver by Marine Air Ground Task Forces; Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS); maritime special operations; and information operations to capitalize on the strategic agility, operational maneuverability, precise weapons employment, battlespace influence capabilities and persistent sustainment of naval forces. Transformational Sea Strike capabilities are Deliberate and Time Sensitive Strike, and Marine Air Ground Task Force Ship-To-Objective Maneuver. The Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing Joint Strike Fighter, as well as the afore-mentioned EFV, MV-22, and CH-53X, all play a significant role in achieving these capabilities. Our triad of fire support systems - the Expeditionary Fire Support System, the Lightweight 155, and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) - also are key to our Sea Strike success. - Sea Base describes the capabilities that allow naval forces to exploit the maneuver space provided by U.S. control of the sea. It includes those capabilities that provide unimpeded mobility and persistent sustainment. Incorporating the complementary characteristics of amphibious, maritime prepositioning, and critical connecting platforms, Sea Base capabilities provide movement without the need for permission or infrastructure, and logistics without fixed and vulnerable stockpiles ashore. The Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) platform ranks highest in our requirements for achieving these capabilities. Along with the LPD-17 and LHA(R) amphibious assault ships, advanced fast sealift ships such as the T-AKE Auxiliary Cargo and Ammunition ships, and high speed connectors, the MPF(F) provides the needed basis for our future Sea Base capabilities. - FORCEnet, as the integral naval component of the DoD-wide Internet Protocol-based advanced network, will provide the open architecture and building blocks that integrate sensors, networks, decision aids, weapons, warriors, and supporting systems into a highly adaptive, human-centric, comprehensive system that operates from seabed to space and from sea to land. FORCEnet is the enabler for functional capabilities across each of the other three pillars. Our future command and control systems, such as the Common Aviation Command and Control System and the Unit Operations Center, along with advanced communications systems such as the Joint Tactical Radio System, will move us toward a truly integrated C2 architecture.

#### ( ) Information campaigns successfully assuage anti-American sentiments *without boots on the ground*

**Shanks ‘6**

[Wayne. Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army. “Strategy to Increase US Credibility” USAWC Strategy Research Project, 2006. DTIC http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA449854//Cal-JV]

The current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and many of the objectives outlined in the  NSS are negatively impacted by the USG’s lack of credibility within many portions of the world  but especially within the Greater Middle East. Effective communication alone will not solve this  credibility gap. There must be a perceived congruence between the USG’s actions and words.  The 2004 DSB report suggests that the USG intervention in the Middle East has subsequently  diminished support for the USG “to single digits in some Arab societies.” When USG diplomats  speak about furthering democracy in the region it is only seen as “self-serving hypocrisy.” The  US military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan also fuel the perception of diverging actions and  words and has led to “only more chaos and suffering.”2 A recent Pew Research Center report describes the level of mistrust of the USG’s efforts: Simply put, the rest of the world both fears and resents the unrivaled power that  the United States has amassed since the Cold War ended. In the eyes of others,  the U.S. is a worrisome colossus: It is too quick to act unilaterally, it doesn’t do a  good job of addressing the world’s problems, and it widens the global gulf  between rich and poor. On matters of international security, the rest of the world  has become deeply suspicious of U.S. motives and openly skeptical of its word.  People abroad are more likely to believe that the U.S.-led war on terror has been  about controlling Mideast oil and dominating the world than they are to take at  face value America’s stated objectives of self-defense and global  democratization.3 The lack of an ability to effectively communicate within such a vital area as the Greater  Middle East will hamper the effectiveness of the other elements of national power. A  communication strategy should be designed to gain the support of the USG policies from all  audiences, local, national and global, while also reducing the support for our adversaries, the  most prominent one being al-Qaeda.4 The Internet and satellite television have dramatically  increased people’s access to independent sources of information. However, the credibility and  accuracy of this information may be questionable. Therefore, it is imperative for the United  States to develop information campaigns and capabilities to counter misinformation very rapidly.  Additionally, public diplomacy can aid in developing long-term perceptions of the USG which  should influence foreign audiences. The Department of State’s fiscal years 2004 – 2009  Strategic Plan outlines the areas of public diplomacy which should support USG policies.

#### ( ) A containment strategy effectively deals with state failure – COIN only makes it worse

**Chipman ‘10**

[John. Director of the Intl Institute for Strategic Studies. “A Strategy for Afghanistan” The International Herald Tribune, 9/10/10 ln//Cal-JV]

Containing the international threat from the Afghan/Pakistan border and deterring the reconstitution of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan would have political, diplomatic, economic and military elements. It would require political deals in Afghanistan and among key regional powers, including India, Pakistan, Iran and the Central Asian states. It would entail promises of economic and development support to those who embrace it, as well as the threat of military strikes against any re-concentration of international terrorist elements. Unlike the present counterinsurgency strategy, this new approach would not be so dependent on orchestrating near-ideal internal political and developmental outcomes in Afghanistan. Nor would it require the degradation of Taliban capacities to the point of near-surrender, a prospect that is by no means immediate. It would not depend on winning an ever-lengthening succession of local battles against an enemy that is motivated by the presence of foreign forces. Rather than signaling victory for the enemy, it would represent a policy that could meet the principal security goal over a longer period than the current approach, given the low support for the campaign among Western electorates. Indeed, it would underline the fact that the original goal of the combat has already been achieved. As a first step, foreign forces should be restructured to deter and prevent the reconstitution of a terrorist threat. This would mean redeployment to the north of Afghanistan and the arrangement of a status-of-forces agreement that would allow intervention in the south against any reconstitution of jihadist capacities. This could involve targeted operations, but not attacks on Taliban forces that posed no extra-provincial threat. Second, outside powers should seek to orchestrate a more federal Afghanistan, where the provinces accept that formal rule and external authority resides in the capital, and the capital cedes practical sovereignty on most issues to the provinces. However paradoxical it may sound, a balance of weakness between the capital and the provinces may be more conducive to stability. International cooperation would continue, but not to the extent of investing more power in a central government that cannot deliver. Third, the new strategy should accept that the Afghan National Army will need to have a federal character, co-opting local forces with local roots. Coalition military leaders have already discussed with President Hamid Karzai the creation of uniformed local security forces: Afghan Army badging could follow. Fourth, the United States and others will have to further deepen the engagement with Pakistan, persuading Islamabad that contact with a wide variety of actors in Afghanistan is necessary, and engage more fully with other regional actors, including India.

### 2NC AT//Permutation “Do Both”

#### ( ) Still links to all of our “state building bad” arguments – Chipman says COIN is a counterproductive approach to state failure that breeds resentment, motivates resistance, and overstretches resources. Shifting to a strategy of containment solves – America’s only role would be to isolate and manage the instability – state building would be left to individual governments.

#### ( ) The *counterplan disproves the thesis of the 1AC*, not the other way around – airlift capabilities are worthless without a Maritime Pre-Positioning Force – this is a sequencing DA to the permutation

**Cook ‘4**

[Henry. Major in the US Army National Guard. “Sea-Basing and the Maritime Pre-Positioning Force” Military Review, 2004. Ebsco//Cal-JV]

MPF(F) enables sea-based RSOI. (25) MPF(F) ships will be able to conduct at-sea arrival, assembly of units, and selective offloading of equipment needed for the objective operation. (26) Joint forces arriving by high-speed airlift or sealift from the U.S. or advanced bases will meet the MPF(F) platforms while en route to the objective area. (27) The MPF(F) combines the capacity and endurance of sealift with the speed of airlift to rapidly deploy MAGTFs to objective areas with the capability for indefinite sea-based sustainment. (28) Accelerated deployment and employment times will permit the projection of ground combat power within days rather than weeks or months. (29) Efficient mating of marines with their equipment will permit elements of the MPF(F) and MAGTF to arrive in the objective area integrated and prepared for operations. The joint force can implement STOM deep inland in the enemy's rear, which is a significant advantage over traditionally phased amphibious operations. (30)

## \*\*\*MPF Plank

### Solves: Military Flexibility

#### ( ) The counterplan is the only way to ensure durable military flex – it allows us to effectively counter emergent threats at every stage of the fight. This is comparatively more effective than resupplying stationary forces

**Hanlon ‘4**

[Edward. Lt General and Deputy Commandant of Combat Development of the US Marine Corps. “Statement before the Committee on Armed Services – Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities” “Regarding Transformation” Feb 2004, http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/transformation/02-26-2004-hanlon.htm//Cal-JV]

The inherent mobility, security, and flexibility of naval forces provide an effective counter to emerging military and political limitations to overseas access. Seabasing provides the dynamic access, speed of response, flexibility, and persistent sustainment capabilities necessary to execute combat operations ashore, allowing us to initiate maneuver in the seaspace to enable and conduct joint operations ashore at a time and place of our choosing. Seabasing is not new to the Navy - Marine Corps Team; we have projected power from the sea for many decades. However, the new transformational capabilities that we seek in Sea basing will allow us to conduct the initial Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration of our combat forces at sea, rather than in a permissive shore location. Critical to our Seabasing concept is the Maritime Prepositioning Force of the Future which will provide the capabilities of At Sea Arrival and Assembly, Selective Offload, and Reconstitution at Sea. But, we must also continue to retain the advantage in joint forcible entry operations provided by our amphibious assault ships, such as will be provided by the LPD-17 and LHA(R). As we face an uncertain future characterized by unreliable access to host nation or allied support and increasingly sophisticated anti-access and area denial technologies, we believe that Seabasing will exist not only as another operational capability, but as the preferred means of deploying, employing, and sustaining joint forces in distant anti-access environments throughout the globe.

### Solves: Warfighting

#### ( ) The counterplan solves any combat-based internal link – it coordinates and improves *every aspect* of battlefield superiority

**Hanlon ‘4**

[Edward. Lt General and Deputy Commandant of Combat Development of the US Marine Corps. “Statement before the Committee on Armed Services – Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities” “Regarding Transformation” Feb 2004, http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/transformation/02-26-2004-hanlon.htm//Cal-JV]

The Marine Corps` transformation is inherently linked with that of our sister Service, the United States Navy. Indeed, the integration of Navy and Marine Corps concepts, organizations, and technologies is a prime example of our continuing transformation, and serves as a model for future joint force development. The Navy - Marine Corps Team`s transformation encompasses and integrates powerful extensions to current joint capabilities, as well as a range of innovative new capabilities. Operational Concepts Seabasing, Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS), and Ship-To- Objective-Maneuver (STOM) are the central concepts in our transformational efforts. Seabasing is the overarching expression of our Navy-Marine Corps vision, incorporating the initiatives that will allow the joint force to fully exploit one of this nation`s asymmetric advantages - maritime dominance of the sea. Seabasing, a national capability, is our overarching transformational operating concept for projecting and sustaining naval power and joint forces which assures joint access by leveraging the operational maneuver of sovereign, distributed, and networked forces operating globally from the sea. Seabasing unites our capabilities for projecting offensive power, defensive power, command and control, mobility and sustainment around the world. It will enable commanders to generate high tempo operational maneuver by making use of the sea as maneuver space in order to gain advantage over our adversaries.

### Solves: Failed States / Crisis Response

#### ( ) Marine seabasing solves crisis response – they can respond anywhere – Iraq proves

**Hanlon ‘4**

[Edward. Lt General and Deputy Commandant of Combat Development of the US Marine Corps. “Statement before the Committee on Armed Services – Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities” “Regarding Transformation” Feb 2004, http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/transformation/02-26-2004-hanlon.htm//Cal-JV]

Marines are both expeditionary and innovative by nature, with a centuries-old tradition of anticipating, adapting, and preparing for new circumstances. We are transformational by design. Our heritage of doctrinal and system development in close air support, amphibious warfare, vertical envelopment, and maritime prepositioning has contributed much to joint warfighting over the past century. The overall mission of the Marine Corps has similarly evolved throughout the years, from a naval constabulary to an amphibious force, to today`s expeditionary force-in- readiness. Sea-based, combat-ready Marine and Navy combined arms forces have played a vital role in shaping global and regional security environments, assuring access to overseas regions, and facilitating timely crisis response - anytime, anywhere, from the sea. Our successes over the past few years has both reaffirmed our tradition of flexibility and innovation and provided valuable lessons for our future force development. In Operation Enduring Freedom, sea-based Marines projected power hundreds of miles inland to establish a stronghold deep in enemy territory. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, more than 66,000 Marines (including Reservists), their equipment, and supplies deployed to the Iraqi theater using a combination of expeditionary amphibious warships comprising two Amphibious Task Forces, two Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS), and strategic military and chartered commercial airlift. Once combat commenced, a Marine Corps combined-arms team advanced more than 450 miles from the sea to Baghdad and beyond. Your Marine Corps went farther, faster than in any time in its history, and achieved successes in every battle. The lessons from those continuing endeavors are still being collected, analyzed, and incorporated into our future concepts and capabilities. As one example, we are bringing our Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies (ANGLICO) back to the active Marine Corps from the Reserve component in order to further integrate with joint fires capabilities.

### Solves: Power Projection / Deterrence

#### ( ) Marine seabasing solves power projection

**Mullen ‘6**

[Mike. Chief of US Naval Operations. “What I Believe: 8 Tenets that Guide my Vision for the 21st Century Navy” Proceedings, Jan 2006. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/proceedingsjan06.html//Cal-JV]

I worked hard under my predecessor, Admiral Vern Clark, as one of Sea Power 21's principal architects. I believe in it and intend to use it. Our Sea Strike capability will continue to be centered on carrier and expeditionary strike groups, with sufficient lift, sustainability, and tactical aviation assets to meet irregular and conventional joint warfighting requirements. Sea Basing will be facilitated by expeditionary warfare ships and connectors, heavy lift and transport aircraft, maritime prepositioning forces, and by the combat logistics force. Sea Shield capabilities, which are designed to extend naval defensive firepower far beyond the task force, will be enabled by advanced antisubmarine warfare and theater ballistic-missile defense technologies, and by a submarine fleet with a technological edge over all adversaries in warfighting, intelligence-gathering, detectability, and survivability. Further, the Fleet Response Plan and basing options will provide an adjustable rheostat to meet foreseeable forward-presence requirements. The Navy cannot meet the threats of tomorrow by simply maintaining today's readiness and requirements. Our adversaries will not rest, our global neighbors will not wait. Neither will we. Building on Sea Power 21, we must continue to transform, recapitalize, and modernize for the future without jeopardizing our current readiness and the strides we have made—-and continue to make—in personnel and manpower management. With our partners in industry, the acquisition community, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, other governmental and non-governmental agencies, and with the continuing support of the Congress, the Navy will build a force that is properly sized, balanced, and priced for tomorrow. As Admiral John B. Nathman makes clear in the article that follows, Shaping the Future, American sea power in the 21st century is the projection of power—and more. It extends beyond the sea. It is joint and interagency. It requires awareness and understanding. It enables access and cooperation. It provides for presence and interaction. It is driven by compassion and collective security. And it is decisive and lethal. It is and must be wielded by American sailors as a force both for war and for peace. I think Admiral Raymond Spruance had it just about right when he defined sea power as "pushing our front lines as far forward as possible." A naval force floating off the continental shelf with no impact on shore is not decisive. We must go forward to the very reaches of the sea, operating effectively in every part of the littoral and beyond. That is the debate I am eager to have, and that is the level to which I want the discussion raised.

###  AT//Military Transportation Key

#### ( ) The counterplan resolves this internal link, too – the logistical expert system increases efficiency and anticipates necessary resources.

**Cook ‘4**

[Henry. Major in the US Army National Guard. “Sea-Basing and the Maritime Pre-Positioning Force” Military Review, 2004. Ebsco//Cal-JV]

Another major benefit derived from using the expert system is the ability to run extensive logistical models in support of a landing force to obtain possible logistical courses of action. A sea-based logistical expert system will greatly increase the efficiency in time and the manpower needed to support a forward-deployed unit, which will directly correlate into more combat power with greater ability and agility. The highly automated nature of an "anticipated pull" expert logistics system will allow a "management by exception" approach. The enhanced knowledge of in-transit inventories and total asset visibility will refine the allocation of transportation resources, improve item availability, and increase the velocity of materiel movement through the entire supply chain. (45)

###  AT//Seabasing Fails

#### ( ) Your solvency deficits assume the squo – the new tech and investment generated by the counterplan *resolve these concerns*

**Cook ‘4**

[Henry. Major in the US Army National Guard. “Sea-Basing and the Maritime Pre-Positioning Force” Military Review, 2004. Ebsco//Cal-JV]

Research and development will be required to integrate new technologies to support the MPF(F)'s requirements. The areas that will require further vision and innovation are selective onload/offload of cargo and internal ships systems (such as automated warehousing; item, pallet, container operations; RO/ RO systems; and cargo flow patterns). An additional effort must be given to external ship systems (such as ramps, lighterage, and other craft interfaces), modular systems or subsystem concepts (such as joint command and control modules and additional berthing modules) as well as aircraft interfaces for vertical replenishment and reception of deployed forces. (38) An automated inventory-management system that can receive, store, maintain, manage, and deploy equipment and supplies for sustained logistics support is a necessity. (39) The MPF(F) will allow the logistics base to maneuver in an open sea and will reduce double handling of materiel by cutting out the intermediate step of establishing shore-based logistics activities. (40) The logistical support required to sustain the force ashore will be reduced and the operational pause associated with that effort would be eliminated. The selective offload of equipment and materiel will be the centerpiece of MPF(F)'s sea-based support. (41)

#### ( ) Joint Marine-Navy seabasing solves

**Hanlon ‘4**

[Edward. Lt General and Deputy Commandant of Combat Development of the US Marine Corps. “Statement before the Committee on Armed Services – Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities” “Regarding Transformation” Feb 2004, http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/transformation/02-26-2004-hanlon.htm//Cal-JV]

And, recent operations including Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom reaffirmed the scalability and tailorability of our Marine Air Ground Task Forces. The ability to rapidly combine Marine forces from around the world under a single commander provides joint warfighters with a powerful operational advantage, one that enables the potential of other joint capabilities. As the Navy - Marine Corps Team pursues innovative methods such as Seabasing to support the Joint Operating Concepts, we are also working to speed the seamless blending of Marine Corps units from around the globe as crises demand. The ability to more rapidly fuse MAGTFs from in and out of theater, along with integrated naval tactical aviation and other elements of the flow-in echelon to support our single battle concept, will require careful consideration of our MAGTF training and readiness cycles. Along with the Navy`s transformation in the operational availability of our Expeditionary Strike Groups and Carrier Strike Groups, streamlined scalability of our MAGTFs will provide Joint Force Commanders with superior strategic agility by more rapidly and effectively integrating forward-deployed, prepositioned, and surge forces.

## \*\*\*Containment Strategy Plank

### Solves: State Failure

#### ( ) A containment strategy solves best – it prevents the resurgence of instability and generates goodwill toward America. This evidence describes the precise mechanism of the counterplan.

**Kay ‘9**

[Prof of Politics at Ohio Wesleyan. Fellow of Foreign Policy at the Eisenhower Institute. “From COIN to Containment” 9/1/9 afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/01/from\_coin\_to\_containment //Cal-JV]

"Plan A" for Afghanistan would have been to resource the war, and win it. Eight years on, it appears regrettably too late. The time for "Plan B" is now. Five key elements, basic to national security, should guide a new strategy: 1. Be clear on vital interests. The Taliban are horrible, and are tangled together with al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But al Qaeda are the global threat. Conflation of the two has drawn America into an Afghan civil war and a never-ending nation-building project, while efforts to separate the Taliban and al Qaeda have not been successfully engaged to date. Over-investing against the Taliban diverts resources from essential areas of national security. Nation-building in Afghanistan is a moral cause, and America should support the United Nations and NGOs. However, nation-building in Afghanistan is not a vital American interest. 2. Define attainable success and timelines. Success currently means defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda, training and equipping the Afghan military and police, and rebuilding Afghanistan. Defeating the Taliban has proven militarily difficult, if not impossible. Training and equipping of sustainable Afghan forces is complicated and substantially under-resourced -- but it is attainable. Army and police training should be the primary American military objective. The goal would be to enhance security for the Afghan population via local forces in the lead -- allowing space for political and economic development where possible. Training and equipping of credible and self-sustaining Afghan forces is the exit strategy and requires clear timelines. 3. Shift from COIN to containment: Rather than a heavier presence, the United States should limit its military operations in southern Afghanistan and consolidate existing gains. Where possible, U.S. officials can negotiate with Taliban in the south if they will turn against global jihadists. Many Afghans supporting the Taliban can be bought out -- requiring financial incentives to persuade and empower populations to reject extremism. While several years ago major troop increases could have worked in southern Afghanistan, more troops now may be dangerously counterproductive. Increased presence in the south risks pushing Taliban over the mountains and into nuclear armed Pakistan. Meanwhile, previously secure areas of northern Afghanistan are falling under Taliban and al Qaeda influence -- encircling Kabul and threatening NATO supply lines. 4. Align strategy and tactics: Containment will not be easy against an unconventional threat. A softer footprint that emphasizes army and police training, economic progress in key cities, and supporting non-corrupt local leaders is the best route. Redeploying forces to consolidate gains in stable areas is a more effective use of troops than sustained combat operations. The promised civilian surge must be resourced, recruited, trained, exercised, and deployed. Continued pressure from Pakistan against the Taliban remains crucial. Counterterrorism efforts should be redoubled -- mainly as an intelligence operation with military support. Pentagon and other planners need to develop clear operational concepts for an effective containment regime for southern Afghanistan -- and, once established, implement plans for a steady decrease in overall troop numbers. 5. Re-engage the American people: If an alternative strategy is not adopted, then a hard discussion must be had with the American public laying out the duration and costs of the war in Afghanistan. If a new strategy is adopted the American people must also be engaged in a frank assessment of national interest, mission, and exit strategy. Public support for war in Afghanistan can no longer be assumed.

### Solves: Anti-Americanism

#### ( ) Containment resolves the resentment that fuels conflict escalation

**Aggour ‘8**

[Lora. Research Analyst for Strategic Insights – a bi-monthly journal produced by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School. “The Strategy of Containment in Fighting Terrorism” September 2008, <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2008/Sep/aggourSep08.pdf>//Cal-JV]

Application of Containment The policy of containment has been increasingly brought to the forefront because of its success in the past and the fact that it offers hope for a better alternative to current policy. Gaddis argues that containment is worth considering, though not all aspects of Cold War containment are relevant to a post-9/11 world and instead argues for selective transferability. This is because the circumstances that gave rise to Cold War containment, sustained it and eventually made it successful are different from today’s environment. One of the arguments against containment is that it is a state-based strategy. The question then becomes, how can you deter a stateless entity? However, as stated by Gaddis, Al-Qaeda was not “an entirely stateless enemy.”[23] The United States knew Al-Qaeda predominantly resided in Afghanistan and still resides on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan today. Kennan believed that exploiting contradictions between the Soviet Union and world communism was an important tenet of the containment strategy, as it would help lead to the Soviets defeating themselves. This same reasoning could also be applied post-9/11. States seek to survive with a functioning economic program and this is something fundamentalist terrorists do not currently aspire to. With sufficient economic incentives states that wish to thrive can often be pressured to reduce or eliminate their support of terrorists. Furthermore, the moderate majority of the Islamic world should be engaged to help counter the incorrect and radical ideology to which the fundamentalist terrorists adhere. This should be done first and foremost by changing the perception that the war on terror is a war against Islam as is currently perceived by many in the Muslim world. Containment also stresses the importance of allies. The Cold War brought forth NATO and the Warsaw Pact along with the drive to attain more allies than the other side. After the end of the Cold War, the United States has been increasingly quick to utilize military force with the success of the Gulf War and incursions into Bosnia and Kosovo. As a result, there is the fear that “in the effort to resist an authoritarian adversary, the United States itself might become authoritarian whether through the imposition of a command economy or through the abridgment of democratic procedures.”[24] Challenges to Containment The question has been raised: can containment be applied to the terrorism threat? What are the similarities and differences between the Soviet threat and the terrorist threat and is containment relevant to the present circumstances? Answering these questions will provide us with an understanding of the challenges containment faces as well as establishing what is applicable. Both the Soviet Union during the Cold War and today’s terrorist organizations have not proven to be amenable to persuasion or reasoning, as both the Soviet outlook and the current state of mind of terrorist organizations are antithetical to the principles of the United States. The Soviet and terrorist organizations had/have both regional and global ambitions as both wanted/want their ideology spread, and were/are anti-democracy and/or capitalism. How can containment deal with the threat of terrorism, which is quite different than the threat posed by the Soviet Union (a nation-state), in that, is it applicable considering the transnational nature of the threat? The notion of containment asserts that “the adversary to be contained share one’s own sense of risk.”[25] The reality is that terrorist organizations do not exist in a vacuum and they rely on enabling states and local populations to accomplish their goals. These enabling states provide sanctuary for training and a safe haven to conduct their business unimpeded. Without territory a terrorist group cannot pose a serious threat. As such, “Terrorist groups might not themselves always be feasible targets of containment, but enabling regimes certainly can be.”[26] For example, the containment of Libya, especially through UN sanctions, helped end its state-sponsorship of terrorism.

###  AT//Containment Fails

#### ( ) Containment is comparatively more effective than COIN

**Lobe ‘10**

[Jim. Washington Bureau Chief for the InterPress Service. “Calls for Change of Afghan Strategy Grow Louder” 9/9/10 <http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/09/us-afghanistan-calls-for-change-of-strategy-grow-louder/> //Cal-JV]

"(A)s the military surge reaches its peak and begins to wind down, it is necessary and advisable for outside powers to move to a containment and deterrence policy to deal with the international terrorist threat from the Afghan/Pakistan border regions," said IISS’s director-general, John Chipman, in introducing this year’s report. "At present the COIN strategy is too ambitious, too removed from the core security goals that need to be met, and too sapping of diplomatic and military energies needed both in the region and elsewhere," he noted. "(F)or Western states to be pinned down militarily and psychologically in Afghanistan will not be in the service of their wider political and security interests." The two reports come amid growing public skepticism both in the United States and its European and NATO partners – two of which, Canada and the Netherlands, have just withdrawn all of their troops — about the course of the war, which will soon mark its ninth anniversary. Currently costing U.S. taxpayers 100 billion dollars a year, the Afghan war became the longest in U.S. history earlier this summer, when it exceeded the Vietnam conflict. Despite the appointment in June of Gen. David Petraeus, the author of the U.S. COIN strategy in Iraq, to head U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, two out of three respondents in a recent CNN poll said they believed Washington was "not winning" the war. Half said the war could not be won. 68 percent of respondents in a Wall Street Journal/NBC poll taken last month said they were "less confident" that the war will be brought to a "successful conclusion" – a striking increase from the 58 percent who took that view last December. Only 23 percent said they were "more confident." The increasingly sour mood is no doubt due in part to the preoccupation with the economy and growing political support in both parties for cutting the yawning government deficit, of which the 100 billion dollars spent on Afghanistan is not an insignificant part. But the persistent high casualty rates — this year’s total U.S. military death toll, 331, already exceeds 2009′s record high of 317 — has also contributed to the growing popular conviction that the war is simply not worth the cost. Meanwhile, the virtually daily reports of high-level corruption in the government of President Hamid Karzai – this past week, major stories have featured the run on the politically well-connected Bank of Kabul – have persuaded a growing number of people, including members of the foreign policy elite and even a number of normally hawkish Republicans, that Washington simply lacks the kind of local partner that any true COIN campaign requires in order to prevail. Released as Congress returns to Washington after the long August recess, the Afghanistan Study Group’s report, entitled "A New Way Forward: Rethinking U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan," appears designed to provoke debate about U.S. policy during the mid-term election campaign and in the run-up to a formal review in December by the Obama administration itself of how its COIN strategy is faring. On the advice of Petraeus and the Pentagon, Obama has increased the number of U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan from some 35,000 when he took office to around 100,000 today. He has vowed to begin withdrawing troops in July 2011, although the pace at which they will be withdrawn has not yet been determined and remains a source of considerable contention within the administration. The administration has indeed been split for some time. The so-called COINdinistas have argued for a major "nation-building" effort combined with a military campaign directed against the Taliban which they depict as inseparable from al-Qaeda. Others within the administration, reportedly led by Vice President Joseph Biden, have argued for a less ambitious counterterrorism campaign (CT) aimed more narrowly against al-Qaeda on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. In that respect, the Study Group, whose membership spanned the political spectrum from the Democratic left to the libertarian right but was weighted most heavily towards "realists" who, until George W. Bush generally dominated the post-World War II foreign policy elite, is aligned more closely with the CT advocates. Quoting arch-realist Henry Kissinger, the report noted that "Afghanistan has never been pacified by foreign forces," and that "(w)aging a lengthy counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan may well do more to aid Taliban recruiting than to dismantle the group, help spread conflict further into Pakistan, unify radical groups that might otherwise be quarrelling amongst themselves, threaten the long-term health of the U.S. economy, and prevent the U.S. government from turning its full attention to other pressing problems." "We’ve been creating enemies faster than friends," noted Paul Pillar, who served as the CIA’s National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005, at the report’s release at the New America Foundation (NAF). Complaining of a "disconnect" between the conduct of the war and U.S. aim of destroying and disabling al-Qaeda, he described the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan as "a nine-year-long mission creep." The report called instead for a five-pronged strategy that would "fast-track a peace process designed to decentralize power within Afghanistan and encourage a power-sharing balance among the principal parties"; intensify diplomatic efforts with Afghanistan’s neighbors and others "to guarantee Afghan neutrality and foster regional stability"; and lead an international effort to develop the country’s economy. Obama, it said, should "firmly stick to his pledge to begin withdrawing U.S. forces in the summer of 2011 – and earlier if possible. U.S. force levels should decline to the minimum level needed to help train Afghan security forces, prevent massive human rights atrocities, resist an expansion of Taliban control beyond the Pashtun south, and engage in robust counter-terrorism operations as needed." In particular, U.S. forces should maintain their capabilities "to seek out known al-Qaeda cells in the region and be ready to go after them should they attempt to relocate elsewhere or build new training facilities," the report said. "Al-Qaeda is no longer a significant presence in Afghanistan, and there are only some 400 hard-core al-Qaeda members remaining in the entire Af/Pak theater, most of them hiding in Pakistan’s northwest provinces." Besides Pillar, other signers of the report included Gordon Adams, a top White House budget official for national security under the Clinton administration who is currently with the Stimson Center; Steve Clemons, the head of NAF’s American Security program; Patrick Cronin, a senior advisor at the Center for a New American Security; W. Patrick Lang, who served as the top Middle East/South Asia officer in the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency during the 1990s; Selig Harrison, an Afghan specialist at the Center for International Policy; and Stephen Walt, a Harvard University scholar considered a leader of the "realist" school of international relations. (Inter Press Service)

## \*\*\*Information Plank

### Solves: Anti-Americanism

#### **( ) The counterplan repairs America’s image abroad – it *gives military leaders* the credibility they need**

**Shanks ‘6**

[Wayne. Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army. “Strategy to Increase US Credibility” USAWC Strategy Research Project, 2006. DTIC http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA449854//Cal-JV]

Leaders want a tool which they can use to further their policy objectives in the public  arena. In order to gain support for these objectives, they need the ability to effectively inform  domestic and global publics.9 The ability to leave lasting perceptions of the merits of a policy  requires the acceptance, or at least the understanding, of those policies. The goal of any  communication strategy should be to maintain support among those who agree with your  position, neutralize those who disagree and increase support in groups who are undecided.  The communication of relevant, timely information in a manner which audiences can easily  understand and relate to is essential to accomplishing any national security objective.10 While  the information element of national power has been defined as the “ability to employ information  capabilities to influence the attitudes and behaviors of foreign elites and publics,”11 it also  includes all aspects of information including public diplomacy, public affairs and information  operations. Strategic communication has become a catch-all phrase for information or influence  operations. Everyone wants it, but very few actually know how to use it. In essence, when  most people think of the information element of national power, they are thinking of strategic  communication. Strategic communication, however, is not perception management. Perceptionmanagement can include any actions used to either convey or deny information to foreign  audiences to influence their emotions, motives, or objective reasoning.12

## \*\*\*AFF – Counterplan

### Answers to the MPF Plank

#### ( ) Permutation do both – better airlift capabilities are the only way to make MPF functional

**Cook ‘4**

[Henry. Major in the US Army National Guard. “Sea-Basing and the Maritime Pre-Positioning Force” Military Review, 2004. Ebsco//Cal-JV]

The MPF(F) faces several challenges before it can become a reality. One challenge is to ensure the MPF(F) can function along with current transportation systems (such as cargo helicopters, amphibious assault vehicles, utility landing craft, and air cushion landing craft) as well as future transportation systems (such as motor vessels, advanced amphibious assault vehicles, replacement utility landing craft, and heavy-lift air cushion landing craft). The bottom line is, the efficient use and implementation of the MPF(F) will depend on "high-speed, reliable and survivable surface craft and aircraft able to deliver logistics support where and when needed." (44) The current reality is, the legacy systems will be used as long as possible, but a smooth transition to future systems must be planned.

#### ( ) Politics / spending aren’t net benefits – and the plan solves faster

**Tiron ‘5**

[R. Staffer for the National Defense Industrial Assc. “Ships’ Cost could Sink Plans for Floating Military Bases” The National Defense Magazine, Jan 2005. ln//Cal-JV]

As far as the MPF-F design is concerned, options could range from a ship comparable to the current Bob Hope class of sealift vessels, to a much larger ship, or a family of dissimilar ships, explained Navy sources. “We can’t [tell] you exactly what MPF-F is going to look like,” said Adm. Vernon Clark, the chief of naval operations and one of the staunchest supporters of sea basing. As a temporary stopgap, the Navy may consider leasing or purchasing modified commercial S-Class container ships made by Maersk Line Ltd. The vessel could be reconfigured for military use by adding a flight deck and accommodations for 1,000 troops at a cost of approximately $300 million per ship, said industry sources. By comparison, a new MPF-F ship class could run in the billion-dollar range. CBO estimated that the Navy’s plan would require spending an average of $2.4 billion a year on ship construction between 2005 and 2035, more than twice the Navy’s average annual spending to build amphibious and maritime pre-positioning ships between 1980 and 2004.

### Answers to the Containment Plank

#### ( ) COIN’s good – the alternative is every conceivable scenario for conflict in the region – these culminate in extinction

**Barno and Exum ‘10**

[David – Senior Fellow at the Center for New American Security. And Andrew – Fellow at the Same. “Responsible Transition: Securing US Interests in Afghanistan beyond 2011” 12/7/10, <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_ResponsibleTransition_BarnoExum_2.pdf>//Cal-JV]

The drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, scheduled to begin in July 2011, will mark nearly 10 years of war against al Qaeda and the Taliban. As the United States enters its second decade of military engagement, it is important to identify U.S. interests in the region and focus future strategies around the pursuit of those interests. Clarity in what the United States seeks to accomplish is a prerequisite to accomplishing those goals, avoiding the misuse of resources and ensuring that the strategy is coherent and appropriate. The twin threats of al Qaeda-inspired terrorism and nuclear proliferation into terrorist hands are considered vital interests because they threaten the United States and its citizenry directly; they represent threats so serious that the United States would go to war to defend against them. Important interests, such as promoting regional stability, countering the narcotics trade and protecting human rights benefit the United States, but they do not rise to the level of directly threatening the security of the United States. Vital U.S. Interests The United States has many interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the rest of Central and South Asia, but only two can be considered vital and thus worth the continued expenditure of U.S. blood and treasure. The first vital interest concerns al Qaeda and associated movements. The United States has a vital interest in preventing AQAM, groups committed to violent and even catastrophic attacks on American citizens and soil, from returning to safe havens in Afghanistan akin to those they enjoyed prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The United States also has a vital interest in continuing to degrade and disrupt AQAM and eliminate safe havens in Pakistan in order to prevent future attacks against the United States and its allies. Despite al Qaeda’s metastasizing to places such as Yemen and the Horn of Africa, the core of its leadership and the geographic heartland for its international struggle remains firmly in the AfghanPakistan border region.⁷ The second vital interest concerns the stability of Pakistan. The United States cannot allow Pakistan’s nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of violent extremist organizations or any other enemy of the United States.⁸ Accordingly, the United States supports a strong Pakistani state capable of maintaining control of both its nuclear arsenal and its territory, particularly from internal threats. The outcome of events in neighboring Afghanistan will play a key role in the ultimate stability of the Pakistani state. A return to Afghan civil war could embolden Pakistan’s own internal insurgency, potentially undermining Pakistan’s fragile stability.⁹ Important U.S. Interests The United States has many other interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the surrounding region. The most important of these interests is regional stability: A war between India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed nations, or the spread of destabilizing Islamist insurgencies to the states of Central Asia would be disastrous. Further, state failure in Pakistan – owing to financial crisis, popular unrest or insurgent disruption – could upend the region’s fragile balance of power in potentially catastrophic ways. A Taliban return to control in Afghanistan would energize the global jihadist movement, motivate insurgent groups in Pakistan and across the region, endanger democracy and human rights in Afghanistan and deal a blow to widely held standards of freedom and justice in the region and around the world. An Afghan civil war fought by proxies of regional neighbors could also prove a destabilizing and bloody outcome of a precipitate U.S. departure. While U.S. support for human rights in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is an important interest, it is not a vital one. The United States has been a powerful advocate for human rights across the globe, but it has rarely intervened militarily to protect them. The same can be said for countering the spread of illicit narcotics. This strategy clearly recognizes risks to these important but not vital interests. The way in which the United States deals with Afghanistan – its first conflict of the 21st century – will be studied across the globe for any portent of a decline in U.S. power. Will the United States abandon its friends when things get tough? Can the powerful U.S. military be defeated by insurgent extremists fighting a prolonged or irregular war? Is the United States going to play a major role in the resource-rich economies of Central and South Asia, or will it cede the region to other powers and return to a post-Cold War idyll that ignores the region entirely? These questions will be asked by rivals of the United States such as Iran and China as well as by U.S. allies in the region. While perceptions of U.S. power today may prove ephemeral tomorrow, an Internet-savvy, ideologically based jihadist network with global reach and aspirations might leverage a wholesale U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan to fuel a compelling narrative of revolution that would serve as a useful recruiting tool. The second-order effects of the next U.S. choices in Afghanistan should not be underestimated.

### Answers to the Information Plank

#### ( ) Information campaigns fail – especially for failed states

**Rodriguez 6-29**

[Alex. Intl Desk for the LA Times. “Despite Humanitarian Efforts, Pakistan Views US as a Foe, Poll Finds” The LA Times, 6/29/12 ln//Cal-JV]

In the last couple of years, Washington has earmarked a bigger chunk of its aid to Pakistan for civilian projects, hoping to engender goodwill with the country's intensely anti-American populace. The latest polling suggests that strategy hasn't worked. About 75 percent of Pakistanis surveyed regard the U.S. as an enemy, according to a poll released this week by the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. That's actually up more than 10 percent since three years ago, when 64 percent said they viewed America as an enemy. A key reason for the ongoing ill will appears to be America's use of drone strike as a tactic against Islamist militants based in Pakistan. According to the Pew survey, only 17 percent of Pakistanis surveyed said they support the strikes. Pakistanis even appear less willing to back the use of their own military against Islamist extremists. In the new survey, 32 percent supported the use of Pakistani security forces, a sizable drop from 53 percent three years ago. A growing number of Pakistanis also feel that improving relations with Washington isn't a major priority, the poll found. Last year, 60 percent of Pakistanis surveyed said strengthening ties with the U.S. was important; this year only 45 percent said they feel that way. The U.S. channels hundreds of millions of dollars in military and economic aid to Pakistan every year. Much of that aid is aimed at targeting such civilian needs as limiting Pakistan's crippling power crisis and improving its weak education system. Yet about 40 percent of Pakistanis surveyed said they think that U.S. economic and military assistance actually has a negative effect on their country. Only 12 percent said they believe that economic assistance from Washington helps solve Pakistan's problems.

# \*\*\*Military Humanitarianism DA

### Military Humanitarianism 1NC

#### ( ) The plan bolsters military humanitarianism

**Knight and Bolkcom ‘8**

[Knight and Bolkcom, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division at CRS, ‘8 (William an Christopher, April 15, “Strategic Airlift Modernization: Analysis of C-5: Modernization and C-17 Acquisition Issues”http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34264.pdf]

Humanitarian Relief Operations Strategic airlift has proven its value many times since World War II by delivering humanitarian relief. During a 15-month stretch in 1948 and 1949, American and British airmen executed some 277,000 airlift sorties, keeping Berlin from being cut off from the West. 13 During the 1990s, more than 85% of some 160,000 metric tons of food, medicine, and relief supplies reached besieged Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, via airlift. 14 More recently, strategic airlift delivered disaster relief after earthquakes in Iran (2003) and Pakistan (2005), the southeast Asia tsunami (2004), and Hurricane Katrina (2005), demonstrating the importance of strategic airlift in mitigating consequences after natural disasters. 15

#### ( ) That bankrupts military effectiveness and incites Chinese aggression and Iranian belligerence

**Cropsey ‘11**

[Seth. Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. “Disaster Relief in a Dangerous World” [www.cfr.org/united-states/disaster-relief-dangerous-world/p224463](http://www.cfr.org/united-states/disaster-relief-dangerous-world/p224463) March 2011]

American military aid to Japan following the March 11 earthquake and tsunami, known as Operation Tomodachi (WSJ) (or "friend"), is the most recent instance of the humanitarian mission that U.S. armed services fulfill around the globe, including similar disaster relief efforts in Haiti and Pakistan in 2010. Hudson Institute defense expert Seth Cropsey says one reason humanitarian operations gained greater prominence in the recent U.S. maritime strategy (PDF) was that the "Soviet Union was gone" and there is "a notion that there were no other large naval threats on the horizon." But Cropsey points out that growing economic constraints and a changing global threat environment raise questions about how long the United States can sustain missions non-critical to national security. Still, he argues that if a strategic ally like Japan "is in trouble, you help them." In 2007, the U.S. Navy, in concert with the Marines and Coast Guard, developed a "Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-First Century Seapower." This combined maritime strategy for the U.S. sea services replaced a version dating back to 1986, which had a Cold War context. What motivated this update? Admiral Mike Mullen, who was then chief of Naval Operations [now chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], thought that a strategy was important and that being able to articulate it was essential. He had spoken as early as 2004 or 2005 about a Global Maritime Partnership (PDF)--an informal arrangement that would bring together allied maritime forces from different nations, port operators, and government organizations. They would all work together to make the international commons, as the seas are now being called, safer and more secure. In theory, this would add to global security in a measurable way. The concept of Global Maritime Partnerships was both a precursor and now makes up a large component of the 2007 cooperative strategy. The 2007 cooperative strategy upgraded the status of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the mission of U.S. sea services, and the Navy in particular, is that correct? Yes. The idea began with the core principle that global security had become an important mission. It sprang from the notion that there were no other large naval threats on the horizon: The Soviet Union was gone, and the Navy needed to adapt to the changed political circumstances. With this understanding, the sort of classic problem of protecting shipping at sea became more important. From that concept came a series of other ideas, not least of which was that more globalization meant more trade, more commerce, and more mutual interdependence. Without great bipolar competition, there was a growing system of international commerce based on the safe transit of raw materials and manufactured goods. The Navy has had crisis response, humanitarian relief, and disaster assistance as part of its key mission since World War II. That was taking place on a large scale before the new 2007 cooperative strategy was announced, but it gained more prominence in 2007. The turning point was really the idea that if countries could work together for the greater good in providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief on a large scale, they could also work together to make the oceans a more secure environment. The operations in December 2004 following the Indonesia tsunami were certainly important in that, but the understanding that cooperative efforts between navies could produce useful results preceded that. It all contributed to something that was already there. What is the U.S. military providing to Japan? At my last count, there are something like fourteen U.S. Navy ships, including an aircraft carrier and its complement of planes, involved in the disaster relief effort. There are something like seventeen thousand sailors and Marines at work in this relief operation. This is all the U.S. Seventh Fleet? Yes. They are providing a wealth of services including water purification and delivery, which is in short supply. As of a couple of days ago, they had delivered some 4,200 pounds of food and 129,000 gallons of water. The heavy-lift helicopters and U.S. amphibious ships were helping the Japanese troops with vehicles and equipment that could be used for delivery. This also includes medical assistance, hospital beds, electricity generators, and the like. Do these humanitarian missions distract from the ability of the United States to fulfill its other duties globally? And given the recession and stagnant defense budget, will the United States have to curtail some of these operations and activities that aren't directly related to national security? That's a very serious question. How long can you sustain something like this? At what cost--and not just in immediate operational dollars? You have to start thinking about the funds you had allotted for other things. What effect does all of this have? This question really goes to the root of the issue, which is the assumption that underlies this new cooperative maritime strategy. Primarily, this is the assumption that enemies have disappeared and that the threats we face in the world are illegal drug trafficking, piracy, the possible movement of nuclear materials, illegal immigration, and so on. Whether those are the real issues that we are going to face in the future, that question hasn't been answered. There are several reasons for this. Iran is developing nuclear weapons, as you know. They have rockets that can travel long distances, and they are aiming to build them so they can go even further. The Navy has an important part to play in defending against those missiles. That's not disaster relief; that's trying to prevent a disaster. The Russians announced a $650 billion defense budget the other day. They plan to spend money on upgrading and expanding their military. And then there is China. The question you are really asking there, and it's the same one I have, is: Is this assumption correct--that these international cooperative efforts represent the future of the Navy and that competition on the seas is something of the past? I don't think we've gotten beyond that. How long can you sustain something [these humanitarian missions]? At what cost, and not just in immediate operational dollars--you have to start thinking about the funds you had allotted for other things. What effect does all of this have? How are humanitarian missions going to evolve with the rising military might of China and the aspirations of countries like Iran and North Korea, and even a resurgent Russia? Will humanitarian missions take on a diminished role in a more dangerous world? That's a political decision. In the short term, it's up to the president. And in the longer term, it's up to the judgment of the American voter to assess the president's decision-making. If the president acknowledges that China's intentions are unclear and that Chinese military capacity is increasing, and the voters start to feel nervous about this, then there will be political consequences. If nobody cares, and China's military capabilities keep increasing, then there will be political and military consequences. It's a big unknown, and one of the factors that make it difficult for the Navy to make this question public is that China is not even mentioned in the new maritime strategy. So, you are not likely to see people from the Defense Department or the Navy going to Capitol Hill to speak on how the Navy's budget is important in order to maintain combat ships that will allow the Seventh Fleet to maintain its presence in the area. You won't see them speak on the potential threat posed by China denying access to the Seventh Fleet, and how that is something we may have to deal with in the coming years.

#### ( ) Chinese military aggression over Taiwan causes extinction

**Glaser ‘11**

[Charles. Prof PoliSci @ George Washington. “Will China’s Rise lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011. Ebsco]

ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN? THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

#### ( ) Iran also causes extinction

**Kurtz ‘6**

[Stan. Senior Fellow @ Ethics and Public Policy Centre. “Our Fallout Shelter Future” The National Review, 28 Aug 2006. Lexis//Cal-JV]

Proliferation optimists, on the other hand, see reasons for hope in the record of nuclear peace during the Cold War. While granting the risks, proliferation optimists point out that the very horror of the nuclear option tends, in practice, to keep the peace. Without choosing between hawkish proliferation pessimists and dovish proliferation optimists, Rosen simply asks how we ought to act in a post-proliferation world. Rosen assumes (rightly I believe) that proliferation is unlikely to stop with Iran. Once Iran gets the bomb, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are likely to develop their own nuclear weapons, for self-protection, and so as not to allow Iran to take de facto cultural-political control of the Muslim world. (I think you’ve got to at least add Egypt to this list.) With three, four, or more nuclear states in the Muslim Middle East, what becomes of deterrence? A key to deterrence during the Cold War was our ability to know who had hit whom. With a small number of geographically separated nuclear states, and with the big opponents training satellites and specialized advance-guard radar emplacements on each other, it was relatively easy to know where a missile had come from. But what if a nuclear missile is launched at the United States from somewhere in a fully nuclearized Middle East, in the middle of a war in which, say, Saudi Arabia and Iran are already lobbing conventional missiles at one another? Would we know who had attacked us? Could we actually drop a retaliatory nuclear bomb on someone without being absolutely certain? And as Rosen asks, What if the nuclear blow was delivered against us by an airplane or a cruise missile? It might be almost impossible to trace the attack back to its source with certainty, especially in the midst of an ongoing conventional conflict. We’re familiar with the horror scenario of a Muslim state passing a nuclear bomb to terrorists for use against an American city. But imagine the same scenario in a multi-polar Muslim nuclear world. With several Muslim countries in possession of the bomb, it would be extremely difficult to trace the state source of a nuclear terror strike. In fact, this very difficulty would encourage states (or ill-controlled elements within nuclear states — like Pakistan’s intelligence services or Iran’s Revolutionary Guards) to pass nukes to terrorists. The tougher it is to trace the source of a weapon, the easier it is to give the weapon away. In short, nuclear proliferation to multiple Muslim states greatly increases the chances of a nuclear terror strike. Right now, the Indians and Pakistanis “enjoy” an apparently stable nuclear stand-off. Both countries have established basic deterrence, channels of communication, and have also eschewed a potentially destabilizing nuclear arms race. Attacks by Kashmiri militants in 2001 may have pushed India and Pakistan close to the nuclear brink. Yet since then, precisely because of the danger, the two countries seem to have established a clear, deterrence-based understanding. The 2001 crisis gives fuel to proliferation pessimists, while the current stability encourages proliferation optimists. Rosen points out, however, that a multi-polar nuclear Middle East is unlikely to follow the South Asian model. Deep mutual suspicion between an expansionist, apocalyptic, Shiite Iran, secular Turkey, and the Sunni Saudis and Egyptians (not to mention Israel) is likely to fuel a dangerous multi-pronged nuclear arms race. Larger arsenals mean more chance of a weapon being slipped to terrorists. The collapse of the world’s non-proliferation regime also raises the chances that nuclearization will spread to Asian powers like Taiwan and Japan. And of course, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to embolden Iran, especially in the transitional period before the Saudis develop weapons of their own. Like Saddam, Iran may be tempted to take control of Kuwait’s oil wealth, on the assumption that the United States will not dare risk a nuclear confrontation by escalating the conflict. If the proliferation optimists are right, then once the Saudis get nukes, Iran would be far less likely to make a move on nearby Kuwait. On the other hand, to the extent that we do see conventional war in a nuclearized Middle East, the losers will be sorely tempted to cancel out their defeat with a nuclear strike. There may have been nuclear peace during the Cold War, but there were also many “hot” proxy wars. If conventional wars break out in a nuclearized Middle East, it may be very difficult to stop them from escalating into nuclear confrontations.

###  Ext. Solves Military Humanitarianism

#### ( ) C17’s are key to disaster response

ENP Newswire, 6/25 (6/25/2012, ENP Newswire, “Boeing Delivers UAE Air Force and Air Defence's 6th C-17” http://www.avionics-intelligence.com/news/2012/06/25/boeing-delivers-uae-air-force-and-air-defence-s-6th-c-17.html)

Release date- 21062012 - LONG BEACH, Calif. - Boeing [NYSE: BA] delivered the sixth United Arab Emirates C-17 Globemaster III to the UAE Air Force and Air Defence earlier this month at the company's final assembly facility in Long Beach. The delivery completes an agreement announced on Jan. 6, 2010, for six advanced airlifters to modernize the UAE's transport capabilities. Boeing delivered four C-17s to the UAE in 2011 and a fifth aircraft in May. 'After every delivery, UAE C-17s fly into action, conducting humanitarian airlift and disaster-response missions and life-saving aeromedical evacuation,' said Bob Ciesla, Boeing vice president, Airlift, and C-17 program manager. 'We're proud to deliver another C-17 that strengthens the UAE Air Force and Air Defence's range and ability to perform critical airlift missions around the globe.' The C-17 is the global airlifter of choice, delivering cargo in every worldwide operation for more than a decade. The C-17's ability to fly long distances and land in remote airfields in rough, land-locked regions make it a premier transporter for military, humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. With a full payload of 164,900 pounds, a C-17 can fly 2,400 nautical miles and land in 3,000 feet or less on a small unpaved or paved airfield, day or night. As part of the C-17 Globemaster III Integrated Sustainment Program (GISP) Performance-Based Logistics agreement with the U.S. Air Force, Boeing provides after-delivery support to the UAE C-17 fleet. The GISP provides all C-17 customers an affordable sustainment solution that includes the C-17 'virtual fleet' arrangement where all participants benefit from the economies of scale found in purchasing materials for the entire worldwide fleet. 'Through innovative Performance-Based Logistics contracting and partnering with customers, we have provided tailored support solutions, maintaining the highest level of aircraft readiness while continuously reducing the cost of ownership,' said Gus Urzua, vice president, C-17 GISP. Boeing has delivered 244 C-17s worldwide, including 216 to the U.S. Air Force active duty, Guard and Reserve units. A total of 28 C-17s have been delivered to Australia, Canada, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the 12-member Strategic Airlift Capability initiative of NATO and Partnership for Peace nations. India has 10 C-17s on order for delivery in 2013 and 2014. A unit of The Boeing Company, Boeing Defense, Space & Security is one of the world's largest defense, space and security businesses specializing in innovative and capabilities-driven customer solutions, and the world's largest and most versatile manufacturer of military aircraft. Headquartered in St. Louis, Boeing Defense, Space & Security is a $ 32 billion business with 61,000 employees worldwide.

###  Ext. Military Humanitarianism Fails

#### ( ) Military humanitarianism fails and incites conflict against the US – a laundry list of conflicts prove

**Cook 6-26**

[Jonathan. Winner of the Martha Gellhorn Special Prize in Journalism. “The Evils of Humanitarian Wars” 6/26/12 http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/06/26/the-evils-of-humanitarian-wars///Cal-JV]

Since 9/11, the United States and its allies in Europe have persuaded us that they are waging a series of “white hat” wars against “black hat” regimes in the Middle East. Each has been sold to us misleadingly as a “humanitarian intervention”. The cycle of such wars is still far from complete. But over the course of the past decade, the presentation of these wars has necessarily changed. As Hollywood well understands, audiences quickly tire of the same contrived plot. Invention, creativity and ever greater complexity are needed to sustain our emotional engagement. Declarations by Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu aside, there are only so many times we can be convinced that there is a new Hitler in the Middle East, and that the moment is rapidly approaching when this evil mastermind will succeed in developing a doomsday weapon designed to wipe out Israel, the US, or maybe the planet. In 1950s Hollywood, the solution for audience ennui was simple: High Noon put the noble sheriff, Gary Cooper, in a black hat, and the evil gunslinger in a white one. It offered a veneer of complexity, but in reality the same good guy-bad guy formula played out along familiar lines. If Washington required a new storyline after the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, it did not have to work hard to write one. It was assisted by the rapid changes taking place in the political environment of the Middle East: the so-called Arab Spring. Washington could hardly have overlooked the emotionally satisfying twists and turns presented by the awakening of popular forces against the deadening hand of autocratic regimes, many of them installed decades ago by the West. The reality, of course, is that the US and its allies are pursuing the same agenda as before the Arab Spring: that is, they are looking to preserve their own geo-political interests. In that regard, they are trying to contain and reverse dangerous manifestations of the awakening, especially in Egypt, the most populous and influential of the Arab states, and in the Gulf, our pipeline to the world’s most abundant oil reserves. But for Washington, the Arab Spring presented opportunities as well as threats, and these are being keenly exploited. Both Afghanistan and Iraq followed a model of “intervention” that is now widely discredited and probably no longer viable for a West struggling with economic decline. It is not an easy sell to Western publics that our armies should single-handedly invade, occupy and “fix” Middle Eastern states, especially given how ungrateful the recipients of our largesse have proven to be. Humanitarian wars might have run into the sand at this point had the Arab Spring not opened up new possibilities for “intervening”. The Arab awakening created a fresh set of dynamics in the Middle East that countered the dominance of the traditional military and political elites: democratic and Islamist forces were buoyed with new confidence; business elites spied domestic economic opportunities through collaboration with the West; and oppressed ethnic, religious and tribal groups saw a chance to settle old scores. Not surprisingly, Washington has shown more interest in cultivating the latter two groups than the first. In Libya, the US and its allies in Nato took off the white hat and handed it to the so-called rebels, comprising mostly tribes out of favour with Gadaffi. The West took a visible role, especially in its bombing sorties, but one that made sure the local actors were presented as in the driving seat. The West was only too happy to appear as if relegated to a minor role: enabling the good guys. After Libya’s outlaw, Muammar Gadaffi, was beaten to death by the rebels last year, the credits rolled. The movie was over for Western audiences. But for Libyans a new film began, in a language foreign to our ears and with no subtitles. What little information has seeped out since suggests that Libya is now mired in lawlessness, no better than the political waste lands we ourselves created in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hundreds of regional militias run the country, extorting, torturing and slaughtering those who oppose them. Few can doubt that Syria is next on the West’s hit list. And this time, the script-writers in Washington seem to believe that the task of turning a functioning, if highly repressive, state into a basket case can be achieved without the West’s hand being visible at all. This time the white hat has been assigned to our allies, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, who, according to the latest reports, are stoking an incipient civil war not only by arming some among the rebels but also by preparing to pay them salaries too, in petro-dollars. The importance to Western governments of developing more “complex” narratives about intervention has been driven by the need to weaken domestic opposition to continuing Middle East wars. The impression that these wars are being inspired and directed exclusively from “inside”, even if by a heterogeneous opposition whose composition remains murky to outsiders, adds a degree of extra legitimacy; and additionally, it suggests to Western publics that that the cost in treasure and casualties will not be born by us. Whereas there was a wide consensus in favour of attacking Afghanistan, Western opinion split, especially in Europe, over the question of invading Iraq in the same manner. In the post 9/11 world, the villain in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden, seemed a more credible threat to Western interests than Saddam Hussein. The critics of Operation Shock and Awe were proven resoundingly right. The Arab awakenings, however, provided a different storyline for subsequent Western intervention — one that Washington had tried weakly to advance in Iraq too, after Saddam’s WMD could not be located. It was no longer about finding a doomsday person or weapon, but about a civilising mission to bring democracy to oppressed peoples. In the era before the Arab Spring, this risked looking like just another ploy to promote Western interests. But afterwards, it seemed far more plausible. It mattered little whether the local actors were democratic elements seeking a new kind of politics or feuding ethnic groups seeking control of the old politics for their own, vengeful ends. The goal of the West was to co-opt them, willingly or not, to the new narrative. This move effectively eroded popular opposition to the next humanitarian war, in Libya, and looks like it is already achieving the same end in Syria. Certainly, it has fatally undermined effective dissent from the left, which has squabbled and splintered over each of these humanitarian wars. A number of leading leftwing intellectuals lined up behind the project to overthrow Gadaffi, and more of them are already applauding the same fate for Syria’s Bashar Assad. There is now only a rump of critical leftwing opinion steadfast in its opposition to yet another attempt by the West to engineer an Arab state’s implosion. If this were simply a cowboy movie, none of this would be of more than incidental interest. Gadaffi was, and Assad is, an outlaw. But international politics is far more complex than a Hollywood script, as should be obvious if we paused for a moment to reflect on what kind of sheriffs we have elected and re-elected in the West. George Bush, Tony Blair and Barack Obama probably have more blood on their hands than any Arab autocrat. Many on the left are struggling to analyse the new Middle East with anything approaching the sophistication of Washington’s military planners. This failure derives in large part from a willingness to allow the war-merchants to blur the meaningful issues — on the regimes, the opposition groups and the media coverage — related to each “humanitarian intervention”. Yes, the regimes selected for destruction are uniformly brutal and ugly towards their own people. Yes, the nature of their rule should be denounced. Yes, the world would be better off without them. But this is no reason for the West to wage wars against them, at least not so long as the world continues to be configured the way it is into competing and self-interested nation states. Nearly all states in the Middle East have appalling human rights records, some of them with even fewer redeeming features than Gadaffi’s Libya or Assad’s Syria. But then those states, such as Saudi Arabia, are close allies of the West. Only the terminally naïve or dishonest argue that the states targeted by the West have been selected for the benefit of their long-suffering citizens. Rather, they have been chosen because they are seen as implacably opposed to American and Israeli interests in the region. Even in the case of Libya, where Gadaffi’s threat to the West was far from clear to many observers, Western geo-political interests were, in fact, dominant. Dan Glazebrook, a journalist specialising in Western foreign policy, has noted that shortly before the West turned its sights on Libya Gadaffi had begun galvanising African opposition to Africom, the Africa command established by the US military in 2008. Africom’s role is to organise and direct African troops to fight to ensure, in the words of a US Vice-Admiral, “the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market”. In overthrowing Gadaffi, Africom both removed the main challenger to its plan and put into effect its mission statement: not a single US or European soldier died in the operation to unseat Gadaffi. Highlighting the hypocrisy at the heart of the interventionist agenda should not be dismissed as simple whataboutery. The West’s mendacity fatally undermines the rationale for intervention, stripping it of any semblance of legitimacy. It also ensures that those who are our allies in these military adventures, such as Saudi Arabia, are the ones who will ultimately get to shape the regimes that emerge out of the rubble. And yes too, the peoples of the Arab world have the right to live in freedom and dignity. Yes, they are entitled to rise up against their dictators. Yes, they have the right to our moral sympathy, to our advice and to our best efforts at diplomacy in their cause. But they have no right to expect us to go to war on their behalf, or to arm them, or to bring their governments down for them. This principle should hold because, as the world is currently configured, humanitarian intervention guarantees not a new moral order but rather the law of the jungle. Even if the West could be trusted to wage just wars, rather than ones to promote the interests of its elites, how could we ever divine what action was needed to achieve a just outcome – all the more so in the still deeply divided societies of the Middle East? Is the average Libyan safer because we pulverised his or her country with bombs, because we crushed its institutions, good and bad alike, because we left it politically and socially adrift, and because we then handed arms and power to tribal groups so that they could wreak revenge on their predecessors? It is doubtful. But even if the answer is unclear, in the absence of certainty we are obliged to follow the medical maxim: “First, do no harm”. It is the height of arrogance – no, more a God complex – to be as sure as some of our politicians and pundits that we deserve the gratitude of Iraqis for overthrowing Saddam Hussein at the likely cost of more than a million Iraqi lives and millions more forced into exile. Societies cannot have democracy imposed from without, as though it were an item to be ordered from a lunch menu. The West’s democracies, imperfect as they are, were fought for by their peoples over centuries at great cost, including horrific wars. Each state developed its own checks and balances to cope with the unique political, social and economic conditions that prevailed there. Those hard-won freedoms are under constant threat, not least from the very same political and economic elites that so vociferously campaign for humanitarian interventions abroad. The reality is that greater freedoms are not awarded by outside benefactors; they are struggled for and won by the people themselves. No modern society achieved democracy except through a gradual, painful struggle, where lessons were learnt, often through error, where reverses and setbacks were plentiful, and where lasting success came with the realisation by all sides that legitimacy could not be secured through violence. If we owe other societies struggling for freedom anything, it is our solidarity, not access to our government’s arsenals. In fact, the West’s duty is not to intervene more but to intervene far less. We already massively arm tyrannies such as those in the Gulf so that they can protect the oil that we consider our birthright; we offer military, financial and diplomatic cover for Israel’s continuing oppression of millions of Palestinians, a major cause of political instability in the Middle East; and we quietly support the Egyptian military, which is currently trying to reverse last year’s revolutionary gains. Popular support for humanitarian wars could not be maintained without the spread of propaganda masquerading as news by our corporate-owned media. Over the past decade they have faithfully marketed the Middle East agendas of our war-making governments. As the fanciful pretext for each war is exposed, the armchair generals assure us that the lessons have been learnt for next time. But when the script is given a makeover – and the white hat passed to a new lawman – the same discredited media pundits justify war yet again from the safety of their studios. This is another reason to tread cautiously. In the case of Syria, the source of the certainty expressed by our newsrooms is often no more than a one-man outfit in the British town of Coventry known as the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. If Rami Abdulrahman did not exist, our interventionist governments and their courtiers in the media would have had to invent him. The Observatory produces the anti-regime news needed to justify another war. This is not to argue that Assad’s regime has not committed war crimes. Rather, it is that, even were “humanitarian interventions” a legitimate undertaking, we have no comsistently reliable information to make an assessment of how best we can intervene, based on the “news” placed in our media by partisan groups to the conflict. All that is clear is that we are once again being manipulated, and to a known end. These are grounds enough to oppose another humanitarian war. But there is an additional reason why it is foolhardy in the extreme for those on the left to play along with West’s current agenda in Syria, even if they genuinely believe that ordinary Syrians will be the beneficiaries. If the West succeeds in its slow-motion, proxy intervention in Syria and disables yet another Arab state for refusing to toe its line, the stage will be set for the next war against the next target: Iran. That is not an argument condoning Assad’s continuing rule. Syrians should be left to make that decision. But it is an admonition to those who justify endless meddling in the Middle East in the service of a Western agenda. It is a caution against waging wars whose destructive power is directed chiefly at civilians. It is a warning that none of these humanitarian wars is a solution to a problem; they are only a prelude to yet more war. And it is a reminder that we have no right to play God.

#### ( ) COIN proves that military humanitarianism inevitably fails

**Stewart ‘10**

[Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (Rory, “Afghanistan: What Could Work”, New York Review of Books, 1/14, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jan/14/afghanistan-what-could-work/?page=3//Cal-JV]

The counterinsurgency strategy and surge in Iraq led to a drop in violence (against predictions), but the same will not happen in Afghanistan. The Iraq insurgency was the movement of a minority sectarian group, the Sunnis, whose supporters have been driven from most of the neighborhoods in the capital city and whose leaders were tribal figures with a long-standing relationship to the central government. The Shia-dominated Baghdad government was a powerful, credible force, from the majority ethnic and sectarian group, and was supported by mass political parties, with their own militias. The challenge for Petraeus and his predecessors in Iraq was to grasp this political opportunity; provide support, money, and status to the losing Sunni groups to separate them from al- Qaeda; and convince Nouri al-Maliki to disengage from some of the Shia militias and endorse the settlement. In Afghanistan, neither the Karzai government nor the Taliban have the history, the structure, or the incentives to foster such a deal. Afghanistan contains a diffuse rural insurgency spread among a population of 30 million people, 80 percent of whom are scattered among 20,000 remote, often mountainous villages. It is different from Iraq, where the insurgency was largely centered around the flat urban areas surrounding Baghdad. Nor is it like the much smaller Malaya of the 1950s, where the British in their antiguerrilla operations were able to move villagers to walled and guarded camps. At least half of Afghanistan (a country almost the size of Texas) is now threatened by insurgency, and the COIN doctrine requires sufficient troops to secure and protect the population areas. This is why the architects of the COIN doctrine are calling for a ratio of one “trained counterinsurgent” (a category that includes Afghans, if they have been given the necessary skills) for every fifty members of the population or a combined total that would amount in Afghanistan to 600,000 troops, if they intended to cover the country (though most theorists believe it is only necessary to cover half). The effective, legitimate Afghan government, on which the entire counterinsurgency strategy depends, shows little sign of emerging, in part because the international community lacks the skills, the knowledge, the legitimacy, or the patience to build a new nation. In short, COIN won’t work on its own terms because of the lack of numbers and a credible Afghan partner and in absolute terms because of the difficulties of the country and its political structures.

###  Ext. Destabilizes Iran

#### ( ) COIN destabilizes Iran

**Garfinkle ‘9**

[Adam. Former Prof Middle East Politics @ Pennsylvania. “The Real Linkage: Afghanistan and Iran”<http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/11/the-real-linkage-afghanistan-and-iran/>, 11/4/9 //Cal-JV]

As President Obama decides how to proceed in the Afghan war, he needs to add one more variable that is rarely mentioned: Iranian determination to acquire nuclear weapons. An ongoing Afghanistan campaign means that resort to force against Iran would be tantamount to starting a second war. The politics being what they are, that will knock the military option against Iran off the table, with negative implications for an empowered diplomacy toward Iran. Consider the timelines of the Afghan and Iranian policy portfolios, as President Obama must. Whether or not Iran parts with some of its fissile material in coming months in accord with the recent Geneva deal, it will still have enough nuclear “stuff” for one at least bomb within 18 months. (It may have more than that if, as looks increasingly likely, the recent Qom revelation displayed the tail end of a significant and protracted effort.) It will probably have overcome its weaponization and delivery-system challenges within 36-48 months. In 36-48 months U.S. and NATO forces will probably still be fighting in Afghanistan, whether Obama decides on a minimalist, counterterrorism-plus approach or General Stanley McChrystal’s counterinsurgency-minus one. The logic and overlapping timetables of the Afghan-Iran linkage suggest a need to choose. How should we think about that choice? Both problems are consequential, but an Iranian nuclear breakout poses more serious long-term security dangers to the region and to the United States than any likely fallout from the Afghan war. Losing in Afghanistan could boost the morale of Islamist extremists worldwide, harm NATO and possibly exacerbate the situation in Pakistan. But acquiescing to an Iranian nuclear capability would spell the collapse of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and likely set off a proliferation race in and around the region that could catalyze a regional nuclear war. Unlike the Cold War deterrence relationship many of us remember, which involved just two sides with mostly secure weapons and command-and-control systems, a multifaceted nuclear Middle East without stable second-strike arsenals would be extremely crisis unstable and accident-prone, and could “leak” dangerous materiel to terrorists, as well. It is facile to assert that a deterrence relationship which worked in one context will also work in others; that assumption with respect to Iran is a textbook example of the “lesser-included case” fallacy. If American interests require the prevention of an Iranian bomb, then major combat operations in Afghanistan must end before the moment to decide on Iran is at hand. That’s not the track we’re now on. General McChrystal’s plan is a stop-loss effort that cannot achieve a level playing field upon which to drive a new Afghan diplomacy, let alone achieve anything remotely resembling victory in three years or less. There are only two alternatives to preserve a credible military option, and hence a credible diplomacy, with regard to Iran: accept defeat in Afghanistan, whatever we may call it, and leave; or surge militarily to reverse the perception of Taliban ascendancy, and then drive a new political arrangement there to end the war within the next 18-24 months. Either option is preferable to a protracted and inconclusive bloodletting, but the latter option—depending more on air power and avoiding the massive (and counterproductive) garrisoning of the country with foreign forces—is preferable. It would avoid the optic of defeat. A new Afghan coalition government, blessed by a Loya Jirga within and supported by high-level contact-group diplomacy from without, would have at least a chance of creating a stable environment over the longer run—something that cannot reliably be said about the current regime in Kabul. A success in Afghanistan also would lift the admittedly modest prospects that diplomacy can persuade the Iranians to step back from the nuclear precipice, just as failure to turn the tide would likely tempt them forward. And if the Iranians do not step back, a success in Afghanistan will better undergird the diplomacy that must accompany any military operation directed toward them. Clearly, however, no McChrystal-plus option is on the table. This suggests that, barring some major out-of-the-blue event, like the collapse of the Iranian regime, the administration will be unable to consider using force against Iran when the time comes to decide, even if it might wish to do so. And Tehran’s knowledge that all U.S. military options are off the table is not liable to be helpful.

###  Ext. Iran Conflict Impact

#### ( ) Iran conflict is the most likely scenario for great power conflict

**Crytzer ‘7**

[Kurt. Lt Colonel in the Army. “Mahdi and the Iranian Nuclear Threat” 30 March 2007. Stinet//Cal-JV]

The potential worst case scenario is that Iran continues to develop nuclear capabilities with little oversight or regard for the judgments passed by the United Nations and develops a robust nuclear weapons program. Once weapons are developed, Iranians will increase their political influence and also export technologies to allied countries such as Syria in the Middle East, Sudan in Africa, proxies such as Hezbollah and possibly other non-aligned nations who are not on good terms with the United States. As quantities of enriched uranium and plutonium increase, the Iranians could also supply materials necessary for nuclear weapons production to terrorist organizations, with the goal of striking Israel, the United States or other western countries. Authors Peter Zimmerman and Jeffery Lewis have written an article entitled “The Bomb in the Backyard”, which describes how feasible it would be for a well funded terrorist organization and a few devout experts to construct and detonate a nuclear device within the United States. The authors put together step by step procedures, which while difficult, are surely not impossible. 84 This nightmare scenario continues with ultra-conservative Iranian leadership believing in the ability to influence the timing of the long awaited Hidden Imam. The desire for the return of Mahdi could then outweigh the risks of mutually assured destruction (MAD) through retaliatory nuclear strikes, and lead to reckless actions in order to realize the dream of worldwide Islamic domination. The Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons might also lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons by threatened Arab countries in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, further escalating a dangerous nuclear arms race and leading to the increasing destabilization of the region. With the spread of nuclear weapons, the prospect of catastrophic nuclear events in multiple U.S., European, or Israeli cities increases. Given such an event, the western nations would retaliate with nuclear weapons and the world would become embroiled in the Third World War.

###  Ext. China Impact

#### ( ) Chinese military aggression manifests itself in a conflict over Taiwan – that causes extinction

Hunkovic ‘9

[Hunkovic, American Military University, 09 [Lee J, 2009, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, <http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf>]

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

###  Ext. COIN Fails

#### ( ) COIN fails – history’s on our side

**Kramer ’10** [Franklin D. , “Irregular Conflict and the Wicked Problem Dilemma Strategies of Imperfection” pg. 75]A.S.

<http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism2-3/Prism_75-100_Kramer.pdf>

The problems of doctrine discussed above would not be particularly consequential if the counterinsurgency campaigns (or other irregular conflict responses) were more effective. But the practice of counterinsurgency is not filled with obvious success. One recent study, reviewing 30 counterinsurgency efforts during the years 1978 to 2006, found 22 failures and only 8 successes by the counterinsurgents. There are many reasons for this, and a look at recent U.S. activities, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, some of the significant difficulties. Here are some important considerations.

## \*\*\*AFF – Military Humanitarianism

### COIN Solves

#### ( ) The benefits of COIN outweight the costs

#### Wong 2011 (Oct. 9, 2011, Kristina, news journalist for ABC News' Washington, D.C. bureau, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: Is It Working?” <http://abcnews.go.com/US/counterinsurgency-afghanistan-working/story?id=14694736#.T_Ctr7VfF2A>)

"That has come at the balance of: We are not capable of doing as many or as dense, you know, enemy-centric focused patrols to eliminate the IEDs, cells, and the facilitators, and the financiers and all of that," he said. "So that's the cost. I think when you look at the end result, though, the benefit still outweighs the cost from a mission accomplishment perspective."Paganini acknowledged the costs in resources and human treasure. "It takes awhile, and the cost is extremely high," he said. "But there is that capability, this long term tremendous benefit, specifically for Afghanistan, but for a greater area. I mean, the region can look at that and say, 'I would have bet everything against that, but look at it, it's working.' And, I think, that has an impact." Paganini was aware American public patience and willingness to fund the war was wearing thin, but he remained confident that the war would be won.New General Takes on War in Afghanistan Watch Video "We've got to work within the resources that we're capable of," he said. "I don't know that we necessarily need to sustain that amount of money, but what we need to sustain is that thought process of whatever resources we commit -- American treasure in soldiers or money or whatever it is -- it's got to be geared towards a specific effect, and how long-lasting do we want that effect to be, and how do we sustain the benefits of that effect. That's the critical thought that's got to go into it.. And we know as we talk about sustainment of that effect that the resources are not unlimited. "So you do have to plan for: OK, at some point, how are we going to turn this over or scale down this and let the Afghans take more control of this," he said. "And it's not just in the south." Paganini wears a black metal bracelet bearing all the names of the soldiers that didn't come home during his last tour in Afghanistan. He wears it every day, so as never to forget them, he said. "I am really proud of the guys that are over there fighting it right now because it's tough," he said. "And they are doing tremendous work. It's really hard to look a kid in the eye and go, "Today, you are not going out there on a hunt, [even though] that's what you went into your recruiter's office to do. Today you're going out there to talk to an elder and find out why they didn't participate in a shura yesterday, and that's going to get us closer to winning than anything you're doing to do on the hunt.' "And when soldiers accept that and internalize that and go out and execute that, that nests, that end state, all the way out to the ISAF level -- it's hugely important and tremendously difficult and they're doing it with absolute precision every day," he said.

#### ( ) COIN is necessary to fight terrorism

Metz 12 (Jan 24, 2012, Steven, writer for World Politics Review, “Counterinsurgency and American Strategy, Past and Future,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11248/counterinsurgency-and-american-strategy-past-and-future>)

Americans often assume that insurgency is a modern phenomenon, invented by Mao Zedong and refined by his emulators. The notion permeates official thinking, including Department of Defense definitions and doctrines. In reality, insurgency has existed ever since states and empires began attempting to impose their will on people too weak to resist with conventional military means. Indeed, counterinsurgency is a common function for most states and an inevitable one for empires. That said, the strategic significance of insurgency has ebbed and flowed over time. When the chance of direct conflict between great powers was high, insurgency became background noise in the security system. But when direct conflict between the great powers was unlikely, insurgency assumed greater strategic significance. Since it was the only game in town, it often drew the attention of great powers as well as the weak or flawed states directly challenged by an insurgency-based opponent. It is easy to see this pattern in the past 50 years of American history. Insurgency took on strategic significance at the beginning of the Cold War as nuclear weapons, U.S. military power and the creation of NATO lowered the probability of direct conflict with the Soviet Union, leading Moscow to sponsor insurgencies as an indirect means of weakening the West. Insurgency's strategic significance briefly ebbed following the American disengagement from Vietnam, but re-emerged as Soviet-backed insurgencies in Africa and the Americas seized state power or appeared ready to do so. With the demise of the Soviet Union and China's withdrawal from the business of sponsoring insurgencies, their strategic significance to the United States declined, only to explode again following the Sept. 11 attacks. In the post-Sept. 11 era, however, counterinsurgency became a component of counterterrorism. The idea was that al-Qaida and similar Islamic extremist movements were using insurgency to overthrow regimes hostile to them, in the hopes of substituting sympathetic governments that would offer sanctuary to plan and train for transnational terrorism. Because of this, counterinsurgency shifted from an abandoned concept in U.S. military strategy to the forefront. Now another page has turned. With the United States largely disengaged from Iraq and heading toward a diminished role in Afghanistan, interest in insurgency and counterinsurgency is once again fading. Its place in official strategy documents, strategic war games and the professional military educational system continues to shrink. While the U.S. military and intelligence communities along with the wider network of security experts and organizations may not totally wash their hands of counterinsurgency as in the mid-1970s and most of the 1990s, it is no longer the centerpiece of U.S. national security and military strategy. This is a natural development but, at the same time, it is vital that counterinsurgency be put it in its proper place -- neither overemphasized nor totally abandoned. As the security and intelligence communities attempt to do this, they are grappling with two important questions: What did the United States learn about counterinsurgency over the past decade? And what is its appropriate role in future U.S. strategy?

### No China Impact

#### ( ) Democratic intensions prevent China escalation

**MacDonald ‘11**

[Bruce. US Institute of Peace. “Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commissions on the Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs” FDCH, 2011 ln//Cal-JV]

In the face of this growing Chinese military space challenge, it is easy to assume the worst about Chinese intentions. China seeks to be able to prevail militarily at some point in the future should conflict come, but they see the United States as militarily superior to them and thus would be unlikely to consciously provoke any military conflict. While we should guard against a worst case, we should not treat it as a given. I do not believe China or the PLA is spoiling for a fight with the United States – China has come too far to want to place their substantial economic achievements at risk unless they faced an extraordinary threat to their national security. In addition, China faces serious demographic realities over the next couple of decades, where their ratio of workers to retirees will shrink substantially (the result of their one- child policy), which further underscores China’s need for stability and continued economic growth for years to come. China also has additional needs, and vulnerabilities: • Growing environmental problems and water shortages with no obvious solutions that are growing irritants to the public; • A relentless search for new sources of manufacturing inputs; • An increasingly restive working class that is making new demands for higher wages and political freedoms; • A non-democratic one-party system that leaves its senior leadership constantly looking over its shoulder at possible challenges to its authority, especially in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring”; • Growing citizen anger against corruption and cronyism that seems impossible for the CCP to root out; and many more. These factors are reasons why China is probably not looking for war with the United States, though they also could inadvertently become factors in China’s stumbling into a conflict they would ordinarily not want, through miscalculation or distraction.

#### ( ) Diplomacy also thumps the impact

**Zhang ‘11**

[B. Assc Prof of Poli Sci at Lingnan Univ (Hong Kong” “The Security Dilemma in the US-China Military Space Relationship” April 2011//Cal-JV]

As Kevin Narizny points out in his study of grand strategy, political turnover in the executive office often leads to dramatic shifts in state behavior. In particular, changes in control of government from one party to another can lead states to redefine their strategic goals and the means of promoting them. 40 The profound and ongoing strategic adjustment by the Obama administration has indeed borne out this argument. The much-maligned grand strategy of primacy and unilateralism has given way to a new stance that emphasizes strategic restraint and multilateral diplomacy. Smart power, rather than military preponderance, is now seen by many as the best way to pursue U.S. interests in the world. The current strategic adjustment by the U.S. has significantly lowered China’s traditional concern about the threat posed by a hegemonic America. China’s foreign policy analysts have reached a consensus that the U.S. has suffered a significant relative decline and is in the process of strategic retreat. 41 As a result, the old hegemonic system is believed to have disintegrated. This new perception of the U.S. position in the world has also led the PLA to reassess the likelihood of war between the two countries. Some Chinese military strategists now believe that the relative decline of the U.S. has critically affected the ability and will of the American military to engage in major foreign wars. Lei Sihai, a strategist with a PLA background, claims that “the military capability of the U.S. has declined significantly and it is no longer capable of launching major wars.” 42 Major General Jin Yinan, a strategist at the PLA National Defense University, has suggested that the rise of China and the relative decline of the U.S. have made a war scenario between them very unlikely. 43 Thus, the strategic landscape between China and the U.S., as seen by Chinese experts from both civilian and military backgrounds, has shifted because of changes in American grand strategy and military strategy. This change in perception has relaxed Chinese concerns about national security. It marks a significant turnaround from China’s view of the American threat from the mid-1990s to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the American pursuit of hegemony was seen as the greatest threat in China’s strategic environment. After U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced major changes in the Pentagon’s 2010 budget, including cancelling the procurement of F-22 fighters and key missile defense programs, one PLA strategist characterized these adjustments as “a comprehensive rethinking about U.S. geopolitical strategies.” As the analysis emphasizes, “Gates’s and Obama’s thinking no longer shows aggressiveness. Instead, they seek a new security framework through accommodation. These significant adjustments in U.S. military strategies, especially the decisions to cut missile defense and stop procurement of F-22 fighters, which are directed mainly against China and Russia, should be welcomed. They are conducive for relaxing relations among great powers and reducing their strategic misunderstanding.” 44 Moreover, Chinese experts have taken keen notice of the new space policy of the Obama administration, which opposes deployment of weapons in space and is willing to explore international agreements on the issue. As observed by a recent PLA analysis, “Obama’s willingness to reach an international treaty banning space-based weapons and to establish a global cooperative mechanism will have positive impacts on the world’s efforts for space arms control and prevention of an arms race.” 45

#### ( ) Chinese NFU prevents escalation

**Zhenqiang ‘5**

[Pan. Professor of International Relations at the Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defence University of the People’s Liberation Army of China , retired Major General of the People’s Liberation Army, “China Insistence on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons”, China Security World Security Institute China Program, 2005 <http://www.irchina.org/en/news/view.asp?id=403>//Cal-JV]

In my view, No-First Use (NFU) has been a theoretical pillar of China’s nuclear policy. This rationale of NFU of nuclear weapons serves Beijing’s foremost security interests. It also contributes to the maintenance of world strategic stability. There are at least five reasons to explain why China has consistently stuck to that principle, and will continue to do so in the future. Underlying Principles First, NFU highlights China’s philosophical belief that nuclear weapons can only be used to serve one purpose, that of retaliation against a nuclear attack, pending complete nuclear disarmament. Indeed, their extremely large destructive capabilities render nuclear weapons the only truly inhumane weapon of mass destruction and are of little other use to China. Faced with U.S. nuclear blackmail in the 1950s, China had no alternative to developing its own nuclear capability so as to address the real danger of being a target of a nuclear strike. But even so, Beijing vowed that having a nuclear capability would only serve this single purpose. From the very beginning of acquiring a nuclear capability, Beijing announced that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons under any conditions; it also pledged unconditionally not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon states. This claim is not merely rhetoric that cannot be verified, as some Western pundits accused. On the contrary, China’s nuclear rationale has determined the defensive nature of its nuclear force, its posture, size and operational doctrine, which have been highly visible and have stood the test of time. It is in this sense that China is NOT a nuclear weapon state in the Western sense. Unlike all the other nuclear weapon states, for example, China has never intended to use its nuclear capability to make up for the in efficiency of conventional capabilities vis-à-vis other world powers nor has China an interest in joining a nuclear arms race with other nuclear states. And thanks to the insistence of this policy based on NFU, China succeeds in reducing the nuclear element to the minimum in its relations with other nuclear nations, avoiding a possible nuclear arms race, and contributing to the global strategic stability at large. If this policy serves well its core security interests, why should Beijing change it?

### No Iran Impact

#### ( ) The drive to proliferate is inevitable

**Kahlili ‘11**

[Reza. An ex-CIA spy who uses pseudonym for safety reasons, former double agent in Iran's Revolutionary Guard. "Six-Power Nuclear Talks With Iran End -- When Will the West Wake Up", Fox News (op ed) 1/22/11 ln//Cal-JV]

Six-power talks with Iran ended abruptly on Saturday in Istanbul. According to the Associated Press, the talks were "meant to nudge Iran toward meeting U.N. Security Council demands to stop uranium enrichment...with Tehran shrugging off calls by six world powers to cease the activity that could be harnessed to make nuclear weapons." (To continue reading about the collapse of six-power talks, [click here](http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/01/22/iran-talks-turkey-focus-confidence-building/#ixzz1BmzBQkYL).) The Iranian hostage crisis ended 30 years ago this week. Yet even after all this time -- and four separate sets of U.N. sanctions -- Iran is still concealing its nuclear program and adamantly refuses to address the issue. I cannot put it more simply: The West needs to wake up or all is lost. It is time we realize that the Iranian leaders are only looking to buy time until when they are nuclear armed. For literally three decades, the West has failed to understand the political structure of Iran and the mindset behind the radicals ruling Iran. That failure has cost hundreds of thousands of lives of innocent Iranians aspiring for freedom and too many lives of American heroes fighting for democracy and freedom in [Iraq](http://www.foxnews.com/topics/politics/supplemental-spending.htm#r_src=ramp) and [Afghanistan](http://www.foxnews.com/topics/politics/afghanistan.htm#r_src=ramp). Every U.S. administration since the onset of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 in Iran tried in vain to negotiate with the Iranian rulers; every one has failed. In the last 30 years Iran’s leaders have pursued their aggressive policies against the West with a focus on increasing their military capability. The Revolutionary Guards have expanded their missile program with the collaboration of [North Korea](http://www.foxnews.com/topics/politics/north-korea.htm#r_src=ramp) and China. They now have the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the [Middle East](http://www.foxnews.com/topics/politics/middle-east.htm#r_src=ramp), which are capable of targeting all of [Israel](http://www.foxnews.com/topics/politics/israel.htm#r_src=ramp), every U.S. base in the Middle East and every capital in Western Europe. The Guards are also working on intercontinental ballistic missiles with the help of North Korea under the guise of their space project. Most alarming is the Iranian nuclear program, which started in the mid-80s with **only one goal** — to obtain the nuclear bomb. Today Iran is ever closer in achieving that goal. It is just a matter of time before they have the capability to weaponize warheads on their ballistic missiles. Iran has enough enriched uranium for three nuclear bombs. They are involved in joint research and development on weaponization with North Korea. The leaders of Iran continue their terrorist activities around the world and their ongoing support of terrorist groups including Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, [Al Qaeda](http://www.foxnews.com/topics/politics/iraq/al-qaeda.htm#r_src=ramp) and others in [Saudi Arabia](http://www.foxnews.com/topics/politics/saudi-arabia.htm#r_src=ramp), [Yemen](http://www.foxnews.com/topics/yemen-al-qaeda.htm#r_src=ramp) and Africa. If Iran acquires the nuclear bomb, proliferation will become a nightmare and every terrorist organization in the world could be armed with such weapons of mass destruction. **The idea of changing the behavior of the Iranian leaders is as much a fantasy as believing that watered down sanctions will force them to negotiate.** The failure of our approach is reflected in our misunderstanding the ideology of the radicals ruling Iran. They literally take everything from the Koran, **which demands the annihilation of the infidels** and Islam’s conquest of the world, with martyrdom celebrated as the greatest achievement under the rule of Allah. We have to understand that when Iranian leaders call for the destruction of Israel, America and the West, **they really mean what they say.** Prophecies call for Islam to conquer the world and those prophecies drive the actions of the Iranian leaders. They believe that Allah has empowered them and America will not be able to do anything about it. We cannot allow history to repeat itself. Today we are facing an evil much worse than we did in 1938. Appeasement and vacillation do not work. World peace, global stability and millions of lives are on the line. America must stop this menace. It needs leaders who value the very principles that make our enemies despise us.

#### ( ) Deterrence checks the impact

**Hendrickson & Tucker ‘6**

[David – Distinguished Service Professor at Colorado College. And Robert – professor Emeritus of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University, “A Test of Power” The National Interest, Fall 2006 ln//Cal-JV]

The consensus view that Iran could not be deterred if it did acquire nuclear weapons is also dubious in the extreme. These alarms were a regular feature of the Cold War, and it was confidently predicted that neither the Soviet Union nor China would be susceptible to deterrence once they acquired atomic devices. Events showed otherwise. It is said today that President Ahmadinejad is different, that he welcomes the coming of the twelfth imam that a nuclear holocaust would entail, and that a crazed religious fanatic in control of a nuclear-armed state would represent an intolerable danger to Israel, the Gulf sheikhdoms, the United States and the rest of the world. Against these considerations, however, it may be asserted that the Iranian public did not elect their new president on the basis of the expectation that they would soon be burnt to a crisp, but rather that he would improve their standard of living in the here and now; that Ahmadinejad's reputed common touch is utterly incompatible with the careless disregard for the lives of his countrymen that such an act would entail; that any decision for war by Iran could not, from all we know of Iranian decision-making, be undertaken simply on the president's say so but would also require the consent of the religious establishment; and that it is inconceivable that Iran's rulers would display such a complete disregard of Iran's true interests as to invite the retaliation against it that would surely follow. The restraints governing the use of nuclear weapons rest on far more than the strong likelihood of retaliation. Any regime that used nuclear weapons in a first strike "bolt from the blue" would almost certainly be signing its death warrant. The infamy that would attach to any such action, both at home and abroad; the license it would give to others to retaliate or otherwise attempt to bring the regime down; the international isolation and withering contempt it would draw upon itself; the reputation for brigandage it would entail--all this constitutes an insurance policy against the dangers of an Iranian bomb. As a practical matter, it makes extremely unlikely--nay, virtually inconceivable--what is now taken by consensus opinion in America as a sort of moral certainty.

# \*\*\*Military Humanitarianism Advantage

### M/H 1AC

#### ( ) Humanitarian aid capability gap now – the DOD will be unable to fill the void in the *near term*

**GAO ‘9**

(The Govt Accountability Office. November 12, “Strategic Airlift Gap Has Been Addressed, but Tactical Airlift Plans Are Evolving as Key Issues Have Not Been Resolved” http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-67)

Department of Defense (DOD) used nearly 700 aircraft, as well as commercial and leased aircraft, to carry about 3 million troops and 800,000 tons of cargo in support of wartime, peacetime, and humanitarian efforts in 2008. C-5s and C-17s move troops and cargo internationally (strategic airlift) and C-130s are the primary aircraft that moves them within a theater of operation (tactical airlift). Over the next 4 years, DOD plans to spend about $12 billion to modernize and procure airlifters and is currently studying how many it needs. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to (1) identify the status of DOD's modernization and acquisition efforts and (2) determine how well DOD is addressing any capability gaps and redundancies. In conducting this work, GAO identified the cost, schedule, and performance of airlift programs, as well as DOD's plan for addressing gaps and redundancies. GAO also discussed mobility study efforts with DOD, Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), and RAND Coporation officials. DOD has recently revamped airlift investments due to modernization cost increases and requirement changes. For strategic airlift, the number of C-5s that will be fully modernized were cut in half because of substantial reengining cost increases and C-17 quantities were increased from 180 to 213 aircraft. These twin changes resulted in a net cost increase of about$3 billion. Additional costs and force structure changes are possible pending decisions on C-5 retirements, other modifications, the potential need for more C-17s to meet tactical airlift needs, and the planned shutdown of C-17 production. For tactical airlift, substantial cost increases for modernizing C-130 avionics tripled unit costs, delayed its schedule, and resulted in almost 60 percent fewer aircraft being modernized. There have been large increases in the C-130J quantity to replace older C-130s, but modest increases in unit costs. The joint Army-Air Force C-27J program was recently transferred to the Air Force and quantities were cut from 78 to 38 aircraft, with an uncertain effect on the Army's airlift missions. The Army and Air Force must also resolve fundamental differences in operating requirements and employment strategy for the Joint Future Theater Lift (JFTL). DOD appears to have addressed its strategic airlift gap, but there is a potential future tactical airlift gap for moving medium weight equipment. Also, questions regarding how the Air Force will meet the Army's direct support mission have not been resolved. DOD is using $5.5 billion appropriated by Congress to procure 23 additional C-17s, which DOD officials believe more than offsets the strategic airlift gap associated with the restructured C-5 modernization program. However, there is a potential gap in the tactical airlift of medium weight loads beyond the capability of the C-130s. The C-17 is the only aircraft capable of moving this type of Army equipment within a theater of operation, although not to austere, short, or unimproved landing areas. The JFTL is envisioned to provide this capability, but will not be available for 15 years or more under the current acquisition strategy. While the various mobility studies acknowledge the C-17's significant dual role, they did not comprehensively evaluate the expanded use of the C-17 to transport medium weight equipment in theater and how this could impact the force structure, the C-17's service life, and decisions related to when to shut down the production line. In addition, questions remain about the number of C-130s and C-27Js needed to fulfill Army direct support missions. Two studies reached somewhat different conclusions about the cost effectiveness of using C-130Js and C-27Js for this mission. The Air Force and Army have not completed a plan for meeting Army direct support requirements, which could affect future decisions on both the C-27J and the C-130J. DOD's recently established portfolio management structure is supposed to provide a useful forum to address the broad range of airlift investment decisions. However, efforts so far have primarily focused on new programs rather than addressing gaps and making other airlift decisions such as when and how many C-5s to retire or the appropriate mix of C-130s and C-27Js needed to perform Army missions.

#### Several impacts –

#### ( ) Military humanitarianism’s key to sustainable ground forces and credible deterrence – alliances are key

**Stalder ‘10**

[Lieutenant General Keith J. Stalder Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific Tokyo American Center, “Marine General Stalder Speaks at Tokyo American Center” Feb 17, http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20100217-71.html//Cal-JV]

One more thing about ground forces. Their mission is not just about conflicts. Look at Haiti today. Think of the response when Mount Pinatubo blew up in the Philippines, or the efforts after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Recall responses to cyclones in Bangladesh and Burma. Central to all these humanitarian relief efforts was the Marine Corps. May I interject here how proud the Marine Corps is to be operating with the Japan Self Defense Force in Haiti at this very moment. That your government was willing to send your forces half way around the world to help people in urgent need sends a powerful message about the values of the people of Japan. Every time the Third Marine Expeditionary Force deploys on a humanitarian assistance mission, we are assisted by the citizens of Okinawa. Our bases in Okinawa make these life-saving missions possible, and have resulted in perhaps hundreds of thousands of lives being saved in the last fifty years. Geography matters. Okinawa is in the center of an earthquake and cyclone region. There is probably nowhere better in the world from which to dispatch Marines to natural disasters. Hours matter during such tragedies. Timed saved means lives spared in the aftermath of these terrible events. Humanitarian assistance is also a key means of supporting stability. Disaster relief missions often involve assisting poorer governments lacking the capacity or capability to manage a crisis. By helping those governments meet needs and rebuild lives, we contribute to political stability that sustains economic growth throughout the wider region. Looking to the next 50 years of our Alliance, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief is an area where the U.S. and Japan have great potential to unite our capabilities and make a difference in the lives of millions of people, as we strengthen peace and stability. Humanitarian assistance is important because it enhances political stability, reinforces to the world our fundamental values, and provides an answer to our enemies who lie about our intentions. But it also reinforces deterrence. When the impressive power and capability of a United States Marine Air Ground Task Force can land at the site of a disaster within hours or days, our competitors notice.

#### ( ) Alternative’s pre-emptive and unpredictable nuclear strikes against American assets – extinction

**Schneider ‘8**

[Mark. National Institute for Public Policy. “The Future of the US Nuclear Deterrent” Comparative Strategy, Vol 27 No 2. JSTOR//Cal-JV]

According to the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review, the United States must maintain a “robust nuclear deterrent, which remains a keystone of U.S. national power.”98 The reason should be self evident—without a nuclear deterrent the United States could be destroyed as an industrial civilization and our conventional forces could be defeated by a state with grossly inferior conventional capability but powerful WMD. We cannot afford to ignore existing and growing threats to the very existence of the United States as a national entity. Missile defenses and conventional strike capabilities, while critically important elements of deterrence and national power, simply can’t substitute for nuclear deterrence. In light of the emerging “strategic partnership” between Russia and China and their emphasis on nuclear weapons it would be foolish indeed to size U.S. strategic nuclear forces as if the only threat we face is that of rogue states and discard the requirement that the U.S. nuclear deterrent be “second to none.” Ignoring the PRC nuclear threat because of Chinese “no first use” propaganda is just as irresponsible. Absent a nuclear deterrent to their WMD use, rogue states could defeat our forces by the combination of few nuclear EMP weapons and large chemical and biological attacks. The situation would be much worse if they build a more extensive nuclear strike capability as has been reported. Freezing U.S. nuclear forces at the technical level of the Reagan administration will assure that, within two decades, Russia, China, India, and probably others will be technically superior and U.S. deterrence ability against CBW attack will be reduced. United States nuclear forces must be modernized and tailored to enhance deterrence and damage limitation against the rogue WMD threat. WMD capabilities have given otherwise inconsequential states the ability to kill millions of people. The right combination of missile defense and conventional and nuclear strike capabilities provide the best deterrent and damage limiting capability against the rogue state threat. We must not ignore the requirement to provide extended deterrence to our allies. British and French nuclear forces are not large enough, and these nations are not perceived as tough enough, to provide a deterrent for NATO Europe against Russia. In the Far East, there is literally no nuclear deterrent capability against China other than that provided by the United States. Failure to provide a credible deterrent will result in a wave of nuclear proliferation with serious national security implications. When dealing with the rogue states, the issue is not the size of the U.S. nuclear deterrent but the credibility of its use in response to chemical or biological weapons use and its ability to conduct low collateral damage nuclear attacks against WMD capabilities and delivery systems including very hard underground facilities for purposes of damage limitation. We must also have the capability to respond promptly. The United States nuclear guarantee is a major deterrent to proliferation. If we do not honor that guarantee, or devalue it, many more nations will obtain nuclear weapons. If arms control really becomes a substitute for nuclear deterrence and defense, it may very well precipitate the most destructive war in history. Effective verification is essentially impossible, and verification is not a substitute for compliance. Today, arms control has become part of the problem rather than a solution to the problem. The abolition of the in-kind deterrent to CBW use—which deterred CBW use in World War II—is making the world more unsafe almost on a daily basis. The START and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaties prevent or inhibit the development of conventional strike capabilities with enhanced ability to counter WMD. The demise of the ABM Treaty, while very useful, does not completely address the problem of legacy arms control and its constraints upon U.S. conventional capabilities.

#### ( ) Second impact’s Japan – humanitarian airlift’s vital to post-Fukushima reconstruction

**DY ‘11**

[The Daily Yomiuri. “Japan, US Take Steps Toward Boosting Alliance” 4/11/11 ln//Cal-JV]

U.S. forces, in tandem with the Self-Defense Forces, have been providing aid on an unprecedented scale to victims of the Great East Japan Earthquake. We have nothing but the highest praise for the assistance provided by U.S. personnel, which also will be an important contribution toward strengthening the bilateral alliance. The United States' "Operation Tomodachi" (friend) mobilized up to 20,000 troops to restore airports, harbors and schools, transport relief goods and do other essential work. From April 1 to 3, U.S. personnel joined SDF members and rescue teams in a massive search for people missing since the March 11 earthquake and tsunami. They combed the Pacific coast of three prefectures in the Tohoku region, recovering 79 bodies. U.S. forces are stationed across Japan, one of its major allies. However, the bilateral security treaty does not obligate the United States to carry out rescue activities when disaster strikes Japan. The massive relief efforts by the United States reflect the mutual trust both countries have forged over many years. Japan should maintain close coordination with the United States to weather the multiple disasters that have been simultaneously pounding this country. Practice pays off The United States has provided help after detailed discussions and coordination with high-ranking SDF officers conducted daily at the Defense Ministry; the command of U.S. forces in Japan; and the Ground Self-Defense Force's Northeastern Army Headquarters in Sendai. Experience built up during numerous joint exercises and activities overseas by the SDF and U.S. forces has helped relief operations proceed smoothly in disaster areas. To deal with the ongoing crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant, Japan and the United States have set up several work teams tasked with blocking radioactive substances, nuclear fuel disposal and other operations. Washington also dispatched to Japan an expert squad of marines in charge of radiation detection and decontaminating people exposed to radiation. During the early stages of the joint relief activities, the United States expressed dissatisfaction with Japan's failure to provide sufficient information on some key matters. However, the decision to use freshwater rather than seawater to cool reactors at the Fukushima plant was made at the suggestion of Washington, and the United States provided Japan with a pair of huge barges for shipping the water. These steps have deepened bilateral collaboration. Ordeal signals deeper ties The United States has been pressing hard to have the nuclear crisis resolved, not only to support a key ally, but also because doing so is **essential** for maintaining the U.S. policy of promoting nuclear power generation. Japan and the United States should do their utmost to make the best possible use of their knowledge, equipment and technological capabilities to cope with the situation as effectively as possible. Japan has never experienced an ordeal like the Great East Japan Earthquake before. Some people say the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks transformed the world view of the United States. But the impact and ramifications touched off by Japan's March 11 disaster could be even more profound than those of the Sept. 11 attacks. The hardships facing Japan, however, could be a significant opportunity for Tokyo and Washington to consolidate the bilateral alliance. After the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Japan enacted a law to deploy SDF vessels in the Indian Ocean, a step that beefed up the alliance. It is unclear whether a meeting of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, known as the "2-plus-2 conference," will go ahead during the holiday-studded period in late April and early May. We hope both countries will do everything they can to hold the meeting as scheduled. We hope the meeting participants will discuss how the shared experience of handling the quake and tsunami disaster can boost bilateral cooperation. These discussions will take the alliance to a new level.

#### ( ) It’s on the brink

**CIM 7-2**

[The Chosun Ilbo Media Company. “Japan Resumes Work on Nuclear Processing Plant” 7/2/12 ln//Cal-JV]

The Japanese government on Tuesday authorized the construction of additional facilities to reprocess spent nuclear fuel. The product is known as mixed oxide fuel, which contains plutonium blended with natural uranium, reprocessed uranium, or depleted uranium. Construction of the MOX processing plant was halted following the nuclear accident in Fukushima last year. Some critics worry that the authorization was rushed through to give Japan a plutonium production facility that can be transformed for military use. Last week, the Japanese Diet revised the Atomic Energy Basic Act to include a controversial clause that nudges open the door to defensive use of nuclear arms. Japan's Asahi Shimbun reported Wednesday that the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency gave the green light to continue construction of the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture. The approval apparently means that Tokyo intends to maintain the troubled Monju prototype fast-breeder reactor in Fukui Prefecture, according to experts, despite growing public doubts over nuclear energy. The Monju reactor has been plagued with safety problems amid soaring costs and is not expected to become operational until 2050. The Mainichi Shimbun reported that the revision of the act provided the legal basis to continue constructing the plutonium reprocessing facility in Rokkasho, which could be used for military purposes.

#### ( ) Solves warming

**Moore ‘6**

[Pat. Chief Scientist of Greenspirit Strategies. “Hearing of the Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee; Subject: Nuclear Energy Oversight” The FDCH, 9/13/6 ln//Cal-JV]

MR. MOORE: But the way I would kind of sum it up is that I find it both terribly ironic and unfortunate that we find ourselves at a juncture where it is the environmental movement itself that is one of the main impediments to the realistic and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emission, because they are opposed to all of the realistic solutions, which include nuclear energy and hydroelectric energy as the only two other base load cost-effective sources of electricity. Most environmental groups are not only opposed to fossil fuels, but also to nuclear, and are proposing to tear hydro dams down rather than build new ones, and almost stopped the Three Gorges Dam in China, which amounts to the equivalent of 36 huge brown coal fired power plants. And so I think the -- I agree with Steward Brand and others that the environmental movement has to re-think its policy on nuclear because its policy on nuclear is completely logically inconsistent with its policy on climate change and greenhouse gas emissions. Like, what is it? Do you want to reduce fossil fuel consumption, which amounts to 86 percent of world supply? And between them, fossil fuel, nuclear and hydro are 99.2 percent of the world's energy. All of the renewables and wind and solar is less than 1 percent of the world's energy supply at the present time. And while I thoroughly favor expanding those renewable energy resources where cost-effective, in particular hydroelectric, geothermal -- by which I mean both the hot rocks kind that California has, and ground source heat pumps, which could take fossil fuels out of every building in the world and provide heating, cooling and hot water with renewable solar energy -- and then wind energy is also very important. Those three I think are the most important, along with biomass. I shouldn't have left that out. Biomass will be very important in the future too. So, there are a number of renewable energy sources that can be considerably expanded, but with the amount of energy that is used in this country and this world, they cannot make a significant dint in fossil fuels, seeing as though energy consumption as a whole is also rising. Nuclear energy, as I said, my main -- I think my main thesis is that nuclear energy is the only non-greenhouse gas emitting power source that can effectively replace some of the fossil fuels we use now, while at the same time supplying the demand for energy in the world. I think that is a true statement.

#### **( ) Climate change causes extinction**

**Sify ‘10**

 [Sydney newspaper citing Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, professor at University of Queensland and Director of the Global Change Institute, and John Bruno, associate professor of Marine Science at UNC (Sify News, “Could unbridled climate changes lead to human extinction?”, <http://www.sify.com/news/could-unbridled-climate-changes-lead-to-human-extinction-news-international-kgtrOhdaahc.html>]

The findings of the comprehensive report: 'The impact of climate change on the world's marine ecosystems' emerged from a synthesis of recent research on the world's oceans, carried out by two of the world's leading marine scientists. One of the authors of the report is Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, professor at The University of Queensland and the director of its Global Change Institute (GCI). 'We may see sudden, unexpected changes that have serious ramifications for the overall well-being of humans, including the capacity of the planet to support people. This is further evidence that we are well on the way to the next great extinction event,' says Hoegh-Guldberg. 'The findings have enormous implications for mankind, particularly if the trend continues. The earth's ocean, which produces half of the oxygen we breathe and absorbs 30 per cent of human-generated carbon dioxide, is equivalent to its heart and lungs. This study shows worrying signs of ill-health. It's as if the earth has been smoking two packs of cigarettes a day!,' he added. 'We are entering a period in which the ocean services upon which humanity depends are undergoing massive change and in some cases beginning to fail', he added. The 'fundamental and comprehensive' changes to marine life identified in the report include rapidly warming and acidifying oceans, changes in water circulation and expansion of dead zones within the ocean depths. These are driving major changes in marine ecosystems: less abundant coral reefs, sea grasses and mangroves (important fish nurseries); fewer, smaller fish; a breakdown in food chains; changes in the distribution of marine life; and more frequent diseases and pests among marine organisms. Study co-author John F Bruno, associate professor in marine science at The University of North Carolina, says greenhouse gas emissions are modifying many physical and geochemical aspects of the planet's oceans, in ways 'unprecedented in nearly a million years'. 'This is causing fundamental and comprehensive changes to the way marine ecosystems function,' Bruno warned, according to a GCI release. These findings were published in Science

#### ( ) Disaster response independently solves extinction from unpredictable threats

**Sid-Ahmed ‘5**

(Mohamed, Al-Ahram Online, Jan 6-12, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/724/op3.htm)

The human species has never been exposed to a natural upheaval of this magnitude within living memory. What happened in South Asia is the ecological equivalent of 9/11. Ecological problems like global warming and climatic disturbances in general threaten to make our natural habitat unfit for human life. The extinction of the species has become a very real possibility, whether by our own hand or as a result of natural disasters of a much greater magnitude than the Indian Ocean earthquake and the killer waves it spawned. Human civilisation has developed in the hope that Man will be able to reach welfare and prosperity on earth for everybody. But now things seem to be moving in the opposite direction, exposing planet Earth to the end of its role as a nurturing place for human life. Today, human conflicts have become less of a threat than the confrontation between [Humanity] Man and Nature. At least they are less likely to bring about the end of the human species. The reactions of Nature as a result of its exposure to the onslaughts of human societies have become more important in determining the fate of the human species than any harm it can inflict on itself. Until recently, the threat Nature represented was perceived as likely to arise only in the long run, related for instance to how global warming would affect life on our planet. Such a threat could take decades, even centuries, to reach a critical level. This perception has changed following the devastating earthquake and tsunamis that hit the coastal regions of South Asia and, less violently, of East Africa, on 26 December. This cataclysmic event has underscored the vulnerability of our world before the wrath of Nature and shaken the sanguine belief that the end of the world is a long way away. Gone are the days when we could comfort ourselves with the notion that the extinction of the human race will not occur before a long-term future that will only materialise after millions of years and not affect us directly in any way. We are now forced to live with the possibility of an imminent demise of humankind.

#### ( ) Humanitarian crises should filter your impact calculus – state failure makes every impact worse

**Perrin ‘98**

(Pierre, medical doctor for the ICRC before becoming the organization’s Chief Medical Officer. He gives courses at the universities of Aix-en-Provence, in France, and Louvain, in Belgium, and at John Hopkins University in the United States, “The impact of humanitarian aid on conflict development”) <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jpcj.htm> MissT

The consequences of conflict from a humanitarian point of view Malnutrition, illness, wounds, torture, harassment of specific groups within the population, disappearances, extra-judicial executions and the forcible displacement of people are all found in many armed conflicts. Aside from their direct effec ts on the individuals concerned, the consequences of these tragedies for local systems must also be considered: the destruction of crops and places of cultural importance, the breakdown of economic infrastructure and of health-care facilities such as hospitals, etc., etc. The direct impact of armed conflict on people and on the systems essential to their survival is highly visible but it should not be forgotten that the priority for the warring parties is their military operations, not the smooth operation of economic and social structures. The result is a gradual deterioration of these structures, even in situations where they are not directly targeted by the combatants. The impact of armed conflict on people and systems vital to their survival can take different forms, as the following examples illustrate: — When Rwandan refugees fled into former Zaire, the mortality rate rose sharply, to as much as 10 times what is regarded as the threshold of extreme emergency. [1 ] — Large-scale displacement invariably causes a dramatic increase in malnutrition rates. In children under the age of five, this can reach 20% (Rwandan refugees in Zaire, 1994) or even 50% (Somalia, 1992). — During the five years of conflict in Sierra Leone, almost 40% of the country’s population were forced to flee their homes. Hundreds of thousands of people left for Guinea and Liberia, but most sought refuge in camps within Sierra Leone itself, and by the end of 1995 over one million people were living in camps in Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Segbwema and Daru. [2 ] — Somalia 1991: “The economic and social structure has ceased to exist. There is no electricity, communications have broken down and schools are closed. Everything that was vital to the country has been destroyed. Insecurity, conflicts between clans and even within factions — there are a variety of causes for this disastrous situation.” [3 ] — The destruction of the water supply system in the city of Sarajevo had disastrous consequences for the population. Part of the city had no running water for a year and a half. There were a few places where the inhabitants had to go and get the water they needed, at the risk of being ambushed by snipers. [4 ] — The number of Mozambicans killed during the conflict in that country is estimated at 100,000. Over five million people were displaced and 1.7 million people had to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. Two million people no longer had any access to health care. In some areas, half the health-care facilities were destroyed. Three million farmers, finally, were prevented by the conflict from farming.

#### **( ) Only the plan solves – more C17’s are key**

**Knight and Bolkcom ‘8**

[Knight and Bolkcom, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division at CRS, ‘8 (William an Christopher, April 15, “Strategic Airlift Modernization: Analysis of C-5: Modernization and C-17 Acquisition Issues”http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34264.pdf]

Humanitarian Relief Operations Strategic airlift has proven its value many times since World War II by delivering humanitarian relief. During a 15-month stretch in 1948 and 1949, American and British airmen executed some 277,000 airlift sorties, keeping Berlin from being cut off from the West. 13 During the 1990s, more than 85% of some 160,000 metric tons of food, medicine, and relief supplies reached besieged Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, via airlift. 14 More recently, strategic airlift delivered disaster relief after earthquakes in Iran (2003) and Pakistan (2005), the southeast Asia tsunami (2004), and Hurricane Katrina (2005), demonstrating the importance of strategic airlift in mitigating consequences after natural disasters. 15

### **Ext. Solves Deterrence**

#### ( ) Military humanitarianism’s key to deterrence – credibility

**Ameriforce ‘11**

(“Official Notes Readiness Challenges in Pacific,” <http://www.ameriforce.net/news/?tag=japan-tsunami>, 3/16/11)

The U.S. military response following the March 11 earthquake and tsunami in Japan highlights the importance of a forward troop presence in the region, a senior defense official told Congress today. Michael Schiffer, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, testified today before the House Armed Services Committee’s readiness subcommittee on long-term challenges in the Pacific region. “Our forward presence in Japan and throughout the Asia-Pacific region has allowed us to respond to Japan’s urgent needs quickly,” Schiffer said. The U.S. military is contributing humanitarian assistance and helicopter search-and-rescue operations in Japan, Schiffer said, while U.S. Navy ships are providing water purification, medical teams and hospital beds. The military services will continue to provide “whatever assistance our Japanese friends require,” he added. U.S. service members in the Pacific region are ready to meet any challenges they may face in the near, medium or long term, Schiffer said. The Asia-Pacific region represents $1 trillion annually in U.S. trade and holds more than half of the world’s population, 15 of the world’s major ports and six of its largest armies, Schiffer said: “China, India, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan and, of course, our own.” Schiffer discussed U.S. military readiness in the context of the rise of China, North Korean provocation and the evolving U.S. regional posture. China offers cooperation and partnership on certain regional challenges, he said, but also poses regional challenges. “Areas such as its military modernization efforts, its opaquely defined long-term strategic intentions, and questions about the development of its anti-access and area-denial capabilities [cause] concern,” Schiffer said. Long-term readiness requires the United States to work with its allies and with China to “positively shape China’s rise both within the Asia-Pacific region and globally,” he said. U.S. strategy must be flexible enough to capitalize on the potential of the nation’s relationship with China, while managing the risk inherent in China’s rise, he added. As China’s military capabilities continue to increase, both nations benefit from a healthy military-to-military relationship, Schiffer said. The United States will continue to strengthen its posture, presence and capabilities in the region and to build its alliances there, he said. North Korean provocations represent a complicated security threat, Schiffer said. “The United States and our ally, the Republic of Korea, are enhancing our deterrent capabilities and so ensuring that we are fully prepared to meet any threat from North Korea,” he said. The U.S. must maintain a forward-deployed military presence on the Korean peninsula, he said. “The Department of Defense is evaluating U.S. global posture on an ongoing basis, to better position us and our forces to meet the demands of the myriad emerging threats and provocations in the region,” Schiffer said. The U.S. defense posture in Asia is shifting to one that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable, he told the panel. Schiffer said the United States and Japan are working closely to relocate Marine Corps Air Station Futenma from its present location to a less-populated area on the Japanese island of Okinawa. “Indeed, events in the region have conspired to remind us all of the importance and the necessity of Marine forces on Okinawa, and the vital role [U.S. forces play] in both deterring potential conflict and responding to crisis in Japan,” he said. America has deep roots and enduring interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and DOD remains focused on “protecting American interests and allies against the range of threats and challenges we will face together in the 21st century,” Schiffer said.

#### **( ) The ability to resolve failed states is *especially important***

**DoD ‘95**

(1995 Annual Defense Report, ROLES OF MILITARY POWER IN U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY, http://www.dod.gov/execsec/adr95/roles.html)

U.S. military forces and assets are frequently called upon to provide assistance to victims of floods, storms, droughts, and other disasters. Both at home and abroad, U.S. forces provide emergency food, shelter, medical care, security, and demining assistance to those in need. During FY 1994, 60 countries benefited from DoD humanitarian assistance, which included four major humanitarian operations. These operations included: Rwanda. Humanitarian operations in support of Rwandan refugees included logistics, airfield management, and water purification. By the end of FY 1994, 1,250 airlift sorties moving over 15,500 tons of humanitarian assistance supplies had been completed. Former Yugoslavia. The United States completed over 1,800 sorties that landed nearly 29,500 tons of food and humanitarian assistance supplies in the former Yugoslavia. In addition, over 1,200 U.S. sorties airdropped nearly 11,500 tons of relief supplies in Bosnia and Croatia. Cuban and Haitian Migrants. Operations undertaken by the U.S. armed forces facilitated refugee and migrant processing, refugee camp construction, and camp management in response to the Haitian and Cuban migration emergencies. Northern Iraq Relief. DoD funds and oversees a relief program for the Kurds and other minorities of northern Iraq. For FY 1994, this program included the provision of more than 40,000 tons of food as well as heating fuel, medical supplies, and basic construction and agricultural materials.\

###  Ext. Japan

#### ( ) Humanitarian assistance’s key to Japanese recovery – they can’t do it alone

**USFN ‘11**

[The US Fed News. “Japan Minister of Defense Highlights Bilateral Capabilities at Yokota” 4/26/11 ln//Cal-JV]

Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa visited here April 23 to observe the capabilities of the Japanese Central Readiness Force and the U.S. military's chemical biological incident response force. This was the first visit to Yokota Air Base by a Japan Defense Minister since the Ministry of Defense was established in 2007. The American CBIRF team arrived last month due to concerns about the Fukushima nuclear plant and remained on standby in the event Japanese officials requested their assistance. "The advanced skill sets demonstrated by both the American and Japanese teams was very impressive and encouraging," Mr.Kitazawa said. "I'd like to express my deepest appreciation for (our) friendship with the United States, which dispatched its treasured elite team to aid Japan." Mr. Kitazawa also expressed his appreciation for the overall assistance the Joint Support Force has provided following the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan March 11. "Thanks to the United States' great contributions, the situation at the Fukushima nuclear plant is static. I am fully convinced that your posture continues to give Japanese people a great sense of security as we start the reconstruction process," Mr. Kitazawa said. More than 20,000 U.S. service members have been working jointly with Japan Self-Defense Forces, at the request of the Japanese government, in support of Operation Tomodachi. Lt. Gen. Burton Field, the commander of Joint Support Force and U.S. Forces Japan, also praised the CRF and CBIRF units for their hard work. "The Soldiers of the CRF and the Marines and Sailors of the CBIRF have put on a remarkable display of lifesaving capability while demonstrating the unique abilities they possess," General Field said. "More importantly, thank you for all the hard work, coordination and planning you've done together over the last several weeks." General Field said that he was honored to have the Japanese defense minister here to witness the bilateral demonstration of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidence response. "Your presence is a testament to the level of importance this training and capability holds for the continued safety of the people of Japan," the general said.

###  Ext. Solves – General

#### ( ) Humanitarian aid solves state failure

**Perrin 1998**

(Pierre, medical doctor for the ICRC before becoming the organization’s Chief Medical Officer. He gives courses at the universities of Aix-en-Provence, in France, and Louvain, in Belgium, and at John Hopkins University in the United States, “The impact of humanitarian aid on conflict development”) <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jpcj.htm> MissT

[5 ]The aim of humanitarian aid is to assist the victims of armed conflict, without discrimination, in coping with these problems. The role of humanitarian aid Aid for victims of conflict remains the primary responsibility of the warring parties. The need for outside help arises when the parties to a conflict are unable or unwilling to shoulder that responsibility. Any successful aid strategy will have different goals. For example, aid is primarily intended to prevent the disastrous consequences mentioned above by stepping in before the health of the victims of conflict deteriorates. This requires prompt action either to assist the affected population groups directly or to prevent the deterioration of health care, agricultural or other local systems. This enables those systems to cope with the situation and thereby to prevent people’s health from deteriorating. But aid should also be designed to prevent the growth of dependence on outside assistance. For example, food distribution remains a valid option when the situation calls for it, but it often goes hand in hand with action to help the beneficiaries regain their self-sufficiency quickly. This strategy can have various forms. Steps may be taken to increase food production and develop distribution channels, while protection work can help restore access to food. In some cases specific action is needed to assist individuals suffering from acute malnutrition. The overall strategy is usually a combination of various measures taken at different stages in the food-production and distribution process. Humanitarian aid frequently also takes other forms as well. — In Afghanistan, the ICRC assists five hospitals, the aim being to improve the quality of surgical treatment for war casualties and to provide regular supplies of medicines and medical/surgical items. [6 ] — To prevent water contamination in Albania — which is more likely in the summer months and poses a threat to public health — the ICRC gave 52 tonnes of chlorine last year to the authorities responsible for water quality. [7 ] — “The United Nations maintained the embargo on Iraq, which had been in force since 1990. (...) Iraqi water installations continued to deteriorate for lack of spare parts, equipment and qualified personnel. Throughout Iraq, including the three northern governorates, the ICRC kept up its efforts to lessen the effects of this deterioration on public health by rehabilitating water supply and treatment facilities which had been identified, in cooperation with the Iraqi water authorities, as priority sites.” [8 ] — In Brazzaville, ICRC delegates worked on both sides of the front lines to supply drinking water to displaced people, support medical facilities and evacuate to Kinshasa any wounded people who could not be treated on the spot. — “Regular contact was maintained at all levels with the relevant Rwandan authorities in order to remind them that they themselves bore the main responsibility for ensuring that the conditions of detention were acceptable. At the same time, the ICRC continued the large-scale assistance programme launched in 1994 to enable the detainees in those prisons to survive. The programme undoubtedly had an effect: by late 1995, the prison mortality rate had dropped to approximately that of the rest of the population (...).” [9 ] — In Somalia in 1992, several different kinds of assistance were provided by the ICRC, including food relief (120,000 tonnes), a veterinary programme, an agricultural programme and one in support of medical facilities. Humanitarian action can thus take very different forms: — a limited, one-time operation; — complex, long-term rehabilitation programmes; — relief operations for people whose lives are directly threatened; — operations combining immediate relief work and medium-term rehabilitation; — operations for the purpose of preventing violations of humanitarian and human rights law. Over the last five years, there has been a marked trend in humanitarian aid towards preventing or, at the very least, alleviating the worst effects of armed conflict. Direct and massive relief operations naturally remain necessary in certain situations, but there has also been a stepping-up of work to support local services essential to people’s survival. The inclusion of humanitarian aid in more long-term projects thus makes it possible to restore self-sufficiency.

###  Ext. Airlift Key

#### ( ) C17’s *vital* to military humanitarian missions

ENP Newswire, 6/25

(6/25/2012, ENP Newswire, “Boeing Delivers UAE Air Force and Air Defence's 6th C-17” http://www.avionics-intelligence.com/news/2012/06/25/boeing-delivers-uae-air-force-and-air-defence-s-6th-c-17.html)

Release date- 21062012 - LONG BEACH, Calif. - Boeing [NYSE: BA] delivered the sixth United Arab Emirates C-17 Globemaster III to the UAE Air Force and Air Defence earlier this month at the company's final assembly facility in Long Beach. The delivery completes an agreement announced on Jan. 6, 2010, for six advanced airlifters to modernize the UAE's transport capabilities. Boeing delivered four C-17s to the UAE in 2011 and a fifth aircraft in May. 'After every delivery, UAE C-17s fly into action, conducting humanitarian airlift and disaster-response missions and life-saving aeromedical evacuation,' said Bob Ciesla, Boeing vice president, Airlift, and C-17 program manager. 'We're proud to deliver another C-17 that strengthens the UAE Air Force and Air Defence's range and ability to perform critical airlift missions around the globe.' The C-17 is the global airlifter of choice, delivering cargo in every worldwide operation for more than a decade. The C-17's ability to fly long distances and land in remote airfields in rough, land-locked regions make it a premier transporter for military, humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. With a full payload of 164,900 pounds, a C-17 can fly 2,400 nautical miles and land in 3,000 feet or less on a small unpaved or paved airfield, day or night. As part of the C-17 Globemaster III Integrated Sustainment Program (GISP) Performance-Based Logistics agreement with the U.S. Air Force, Boeing provides after-delivery support to the UAE C-17 fleet. The GISP provides all C-17 customers an affordable sustainment solution that includes the C-17 'virtual fleet' arrangement where all participants benefit from the economies of scale found in purchasing materials for the entire worldwide fleet. 'Through innovative Performance-Based Logistics contracting and partnering with customers, we have provided tailored support solutions, maintaining the highest level of aircraft readiness while continuously reducing the cost of ownership,' said Gus Urzua, vice president, C-17 GISP. Boeing has delivered 244 C-17s worldwide, including 216 to the U.S. Air Force active duty, Guard and Reserve units. A total of 28 C-17s have been delivered to Australia, Canada, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the 12-member Strategic Airlift Capability initiative of NATO and Partnership for Peace nations. India has 10 C-17s on order for delivery in 2013 and 2014. A unit of The Boeing Company, Boeing Defense, Space & Security is one of the world's largest defense, space and security businesses specializing in innovative and capabilities-driven customer solutions, and the world's largest and most versatile manufacturer of military aircraft. Headquartered in St. Louis, Boeing Defense, Space & Security is a $ 32 billion business with 61,000 employees worldwide.

#### ( ) Only airlift solves – supply restoration’s key to make efforts on the ground effective

Martin, 5/3

Maj. Gen., AMC Director of Operations (5/3/2012, Rick, “AMC: Maintaining a Global Lifeline”, http://www.89aw.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123300564)

More than a decade after the start of American involvement in Afghanistan, pilots and aircraft belonging to a global mobility enterprise headquartered amidst the cornfields of Illinois here continue to provide a lifeline for thousands of Americans overseas. Each day, Air Force C-17 and C-130 aircrews provide critical resupply to U.S. troops deployed to isolated outposts, part of a counterinsurgency strategy that places them among the Afghan people. Lt. Col. David Preston, commander of the 801st Brigade Support Battalion and 1st. Sgt. Brian Gemmill, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, recently described their experience to a group of Air Mobility leaders. Serving in an austere existence at combat outposts in Afghanistan's Paktika province, nearly 80 percent of the locations lacked running water and many had no sewage, a single hot meal a day was a luxury, and frequent showering was a logistical impossibility. In this environment, fuel and water were among the most important commodities and because of the terrain nearly three quarters of the outposts could only be resupplied via air, they added. Most of the time, that resupply is part of a carefully orchestrated 96-hour air tasking order planning process that is based on forecasted, "regular" requirements. However, flexibility has and remains a key characteristic of the process. In practice, this means that high-priority or emergent requirements can be completed within a matter of hours through the dynamic re-tasking of regularly scheduled missions. This delicate ballet occurs every day in the Combined Air Operations Center in the Central Command Area of Responsibility where talented, professional Airmen ensure the warfighters requirements are met with allocated resources. The benefits of that flexibility are clear. In one recent example, an Air Force C-130 delivered life-sustaining fuel to an isolated outpost in the mountains of Afghanistan within five hours of the initial notification of a shortage. In another example, soldiers at an isolated FOB had already identified wooden barracks that would be used as firewood - a course of action that did not have to be pursued thanks to responsive air drop. However, beyond that immediate impact, there's another compelling benefit. Airborne direct support aerial delivery saves lives by reducing the requirement for ground-based resupply convoys, denying the enemy the use of their weapon of choice: the improvised explosive device. That point was powerfully articulated by the soldiers at Rally who noted that every air drop of fuel keeps two fuel trucks and four gun trucks off of the road and that "soldiers on the ground know they can always count on effective and timely Air Force support". Based on all of this, it is far from surprising that there is a near-insatiable desire for air drop: on average, 6.7 million pounds of cargo were dropped each month in 2011, peaking a historic trend that saw a doubling in demand every year since 2005. While there's little doubt that the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan will have an impact on that demand, in the near term, air drop remains the essential, sole means of resupply for thousands of Americans: approximately 27,000 Americans at 43 hard to reach FOBs in 2012. Because of that incredible demand, maintaining a robust tactical resupply capability remains a top priority for the Air Force - even in the midst of an operating environment characterized by increasingly constrained resources. Recently, after conducting a rigorous analysis, the Air Force came to the conclusion that the C-130 fleet was able to meet the demanding direct ground support requirements for our joint and coalition partners. Operating the dynamic and proven C-130 Hercules, the Air Force will continue to support time-sensitive direct airlift support to our warfighters. With the C-130H able to drop up to 16 Container Delivery System bundles of cargo, and the C-17 able to carry up to 40 CDS bundles, along with accuracy enhanced through technologies like the Joint Precision Airdrop System, the nation's mobility forces are well-positioned to continue meeting the needs of our most valued customers - our warfighters. The bottom line is that AMC and our mobility partners have been and will remain committed to providing food, water, ammunition and supplies to our troops wherever and whenever needed. They continue to deliver hope, fuel the fight, and save lives every day.