# 1AC Plan Text

**The United States federal government should substantially increase funding for transportation infrastructure for the Defense Transportation System in and around its military ocean terminals.**

# 1AC Solvency

**Military Ocean Terminal usage is ramping up now – uncertain funding will hamstring ammunition transports**

**Keating and Sommerhauser 12** (Edward G. Keating, professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, senior economist specializing in defense economics issues, PhD, economic analysis, Stanford University, Daniel Sommerhauser, Statistical Project Associate in the Statistical Research and Consulting Group, RAND, MA, statistics, University of Missouri, “Funding Ammunition Ports,” RAND, Technical Report, Arroyo Center, 2012, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical\_reports/2012/RAND\_TR1204.pdf

Ammunition port workload is calibrated using both Net Explosive Weight (NEW) and “measurement tons.” NEW is a stock concept—how much ammunition can be safely located at a port at a point in time. Measurement tons is a flow concept—how much ammunition a port handles over a period of time, such as one year. Interestingly, an ammunition measurement ton is not a measure of weight. Instead, it is a measure of volume equal to 40 cubic feet. The NEW of a measurement ton would vary based on how compactly the ammunition is packed and whether the ammunition is heavily encased in metal or is largely explosive material. MOTSU’s current maximum allowable NEW is 44.2 million pounds and MOTCO’s is 18.8 million pounds. This difference is caused by a greater distance at MOTSU between wharves where ammunition-laden ships dock and inhabited areas. As one might expect, given the ports’ mission, personnel at both ports are extremely cognizant of ammunition-handling safety issues and risks. A port can occasionally approach or hit its NEW while, in general, being highly underutilized. Both ports have low overall utilization rates, hosting at most two or three ships per month. But, of course, if a ship carries a sizable amount of ammunition, the port’s NEW may be a binding constraint during the period of the ship’s visit to the port. Figure 2.1 shows total measurement tons of ammunition handled by the two ports annually between fiscal year 2003 (FY03) and FY10. MOTSU has consistently handled more workload than MOTCO has, but MOTCO’s trend is up in recent years. The ratio of MOTSU measurement tons to MOTCO measurement tons has varied widely between 2.3 in FY05 and 22.7 in FY06. The ratio of MOTSU workload to MOTCO workload was 4.7 in FY10. MOTSU’s closer proximity to recent military operations in the Middle East is one reason for the cross-port workload differentials. Along with handling more workload than MOTCO, MOTSU is in considerably better physical condition. With a legacy of years of neglect by the Navy, MOTCO would require hundreds of millions of dollars in maintenance, upgrades, and repairs to approach the current conditions of MOTSU’s cranes, equipment, facilities, railroad track, roads, and wharves. MOTCO leadership has plans for many such upgrades, but future funding levels are, of course, uncertain.

**Current funding structure guarantees rampant price volatility - Creating a stable funding structure for ammunition port infrastructure can prevent it – ONLY the military can solve**

Keating and Sommerhauser 12 (Edward G. Keating, professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, senior economist specializing in defense economics issues, PhD, economic analysis, Stanford University, Daniel Sommerhauser, Statistical Project Associate in the Statistical Research and Consulting Group, RAND, MA, statistics, University of Missouri, “Funding Ammunition Ports,” RAND, Technical Report, Arroyo Center, 2012, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical\_reports/2012/RAND\_TR1204.pdf,

Here we set forth criteria to evaluate prospective port funding arrangements (appropriation,

working capital fund, some hybridization thereof).

One criterion we espouse is non-distortion, i.e., the chosen funding mechanism should encourage efficient use of the ports. In this context, efficiency means that ports are used if and only if the benefit to the DoD of using the ports exceeds the marginal costs of doing so. We would not want a prospective customer to avoid using a port (e.g., switch to a different port) on the grounds of price if that price is set in excess of the port’s marginal cost of handling the customer’s workload. Non-distortion implies that customers pay the marginal costs of putting workload through a port but no more than those marginal costs. Most obviously, marginal costs include the costs of contracted stevedores, since no stevedores would be hired if there were no workload shipped through the ports. Customers currently, and quite correctly in our view, pay for stevedores at both ports through working capital fund prices. But there are other categories of costs that also figure to increase when ports are used more, including costs of supplies, some types of maintenance, and personnel overtime. Customers should face all of these incremental costs, but no fixed costs, in their prices of using ammunition ports. Either insufficient or excessive working capital fund prices can be problematic. If prices for goods and services are too low, as with free issue of spare parts, customers do not have the appropriate incentive to conserve resources. It may be easier for the customer—but more costly to the DoD—to throw away a broken part than to have it repaired. This phenomenon could occur in an appropriation-only environment where there is no incremental cost to a new part seen by a customer. In the current DoD working capital fund environment, excessive pricing is probably the more common problem. In particular, average cost pricing in which fixed, not just marginal, costs are included in prices can be deleterious. Brauner et al. (2000), for instance, discusses the situation in the mid-late 1990s where the Army’s depot maintenance system was highly underused but customers such as Forces Command nevertheless had strong incentive to minimize the amount of workload they provided to the depots. The appendix provides more discussion of defense working capital fund pricing issues. A second criterion we espouse is funding stability. In particular, if the DoD has a longrun need for the capability to load and unload ships carrying ammunition, it is not helpful to sharply vary funding for such ports. As noted at the end of Chapter Two, MOTSU has been adroit at making good use of episodic influxes of funding. But it is challenging for port managers to accommodate funding variability while capability requirements are unchanged. Any governmental organization faces variance in the level of funding availability over time. But funding variability can be amplified in a working capital fund environment. The total costs of operating MOTCO, for instance, would not be three times as large if nine ships used the port in a year rather than three. However, working capital fund–generated revenue would be three times as large absent a change in prices. Indeed, working capital fund prices are adjusted inversely to expected workload levels for this reason. But to help customers formulate their budgets, prices are generally set two to three years in advance based on forecasts of workload. Unanticipated workload therefore generates unexpected revenue, whereas unexpected loss of workload implies loss of anticipated revenue. Of course, funding stability cannot offset funding inadequacy. MOTCO’s funding has been relatively stable but arguably at an inadequate level. Ultimately, the fixed costs of ammunition port capabilities and capacities1 need to be borne by someone. They can be borne by port customers through prices that vary inversely with workload provided to the ports. Or they can more directly be funded through appropriation. We favor the latter approach because reliance on price-generated revenue introduces additional volatility. Further, paying for such costs through appropriation makes clear the DoD’s fundamental decision on the level of ammunition port capability and capacity it wishes to fund. Reliance on price-generated revenue obfuscates the fundamental decision with the related, but different, decision of how much workload to put through a given port in a year. Since ammunition ports most centrally exist for infrequent, high-intensity deployments, the level of annual workload may be poorly correlated with the underlying requirement. Another criterion espoused by experts we interviewed is simplicity, i.e., the chosen funding mechanism should use existing (or easily obtained) financial data to the maximum extent possible to minimize recurring and one-time accounting and other management costs. Consolidating the ports on a single funding approach would intrinsically increase simplicity. Also, the algorithm to determine what is included in customer prices should be (reasonably) easily explained and justified. In the illustration we present below, we ran into ambiguous cases, e.g., what fraction of ports’ personnel overtime costs are caused by additional workload from ships in port?2 It may not be worth collecting additional data to more accurately tie overtime to specific ships’ visits, though it could be done. The costs of developing more precise pricing may exceed the benefits of doing so. We found that ambiguous cases constitute only a small minority of expenditures. As mentioned above, MOTSU’s TWCF data proved to be more useful to us for analysis purposes. Data that are more informative may be worth paying a cost in reduced simplicity. An additional criterion one could consider is fairness. We were told that roughly 80 percent of the ports’ workload in recent years has been provided by Army customers. The Navy has its own (smaller) ammunition ports so it largely does not use MOTSU or MOTCO. But the Air Force and the Marine Corps provide workload to MOTSU and MOTCO. To the extent that Army appropriations provide more of the ports’ funding and working capital fund– generated revenue provides less, the Air Force and the Marines Corps benefit at the expense of the Army. From a DoD or taxpayer perspective, it is not a valid argument against an otherwise desirable funding approach that it favors one military service over another. There may also be possible bureaucratic compromises, e.g., keep ports’ working capital fund prices low enough to cover only marginal costs but ask the Air Force and the Marine Corps to provide some part of the ports’ appropriated funding. This approach would be analogous to Metzger’s (1994) proposal for internal service funds to have price equal to the variable cost of the service applied to actual use plus a measure of fixed costs based on long-run average utilization. Fairness concerns may be of greater importance in other DoD contexts. It could be argued that it is not fair to private sector competitors if governmental providers (such as MOTCO and MOTSU) charged only marginal costs for services whereas private firms must have pricing arrangements that fully cover their costs. But because of the risk of explosion, no nonmilitary ports can handle large amounts of ammunition. The same would not be true of, for instance, many types of maintenance activities where private sector maintenance is possible. But public policy decisions imply that at least a portion of such work must be done by government operated depots.3

**Transportation infrastructure to Military Ocean Terminals is necessary to ensure efficient response times and prevent logistical nightmares**

**HDR 04** (HDR Engineering, global firm providing architecture, engineering, consulting, construction and related services, “Economic Feasibility Study for the Restoration of the Wallace to Castle Hayne Rail Corridor and Associated Port/Rail Improvements,” North Carolina Department of Transportation Rail Division, February 2004, http://www.bytrain.org/quicklinks/reports/WtoWEconomicStudy.pdf, Sawyer)

5.5.5 Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU) One of the primary stakeholders in the rail service system for greater Wilmington is MOTSU. MOTSU is a key DOD seaport facility dedicated to movement of munitions and other explosive cargoes to/from overseas sites. It is the only such facility located on the Eastern seaboard of the U.S. MOTSU is a DOD facility administered by the U.S. Army and is served by the USA Railroad as described in Chapter 2. It is both isolated and dedicated to these types of cargoes because of strict explosion-safety clearances from population centers. This military port is located approximately 18 miles downstream from the Port of Wilmington on the Cape Fear River. It is a relatively heavy user of rail for movement of munitions to/from inland points using expansive rail handling facilities within the complex. All MOTSU/DOD rail movements are via the CSXT rail system into and out of the greater Wilmington area using the identical circuitous rail routing as the Port of Wilmington for destinations north and northwest. Switching to/from the MOTSU facility is accomplished by the DOD owned and operated USA Railroad using an interchange from CSXT at Leland. Leland is accessed by CSXT trackage exiting Davis Yard, the primary staging yard west of the Cape Fear River for all Wilmington area rail destinations. The USA Railroad also provides switching from/to CSXT for three private industries (COGENTRICS, ADM and a chemical firm) located along the government-owned rail system. Current practice is to stage MOTSU and private industry cars in the CSXT Davis Yard rather than passing through-trains at Leland. **This** practice **adds handling time to all MOTSU traffic** as it does for most Wilmington area rail traffic. The inefficient rail connection at Leland hampers a direct through move from CSXT to the USA Railroad. Private rail freight handled by the USA railroad, totaling 3,926 carloads in 2002, consists mostly of coal, cornstarch and citric acid. These commodities and carloads are included in existing and forecasted growth tallies obtained by waybill sample and therefore considered in the economic benefits analysis along with other private shipping to/from the greater Wilmington area. Munitions and other explosive shipments to/from MOTSU vary by DOD volume-demand tied to military operations rather than commercial-factors. Rail car volumes experienced for fiscal years 2001 – 2003 is shown on the following page: Year Export Carloads Import Carloads Total Carloads 2001 569 736 1305 2002 658 699 1357 2003 1160 137\* 1297\* \*Imports for July, August, and September 2003 not included. Peak numbers of total carloads by month have also been experienced including 358 in 2001, 305 in 2002 and 402 in 2003. Although the above numbers of carloads are not in themselves large enough to constitute commercially significant impacts from less efficient rail service, the freight handled is clearly a strategic national defense issue as well as virtually all carloads being hazardous and requiring some special-handling. To relate MOTSU’s needs to a possible reopening of the Wallace to Castle Hayne line segment, brief interviews were held with logistics professionals at the military facility. DOD rail operations serving private industry were easily segregated from the more critical movement of munitions and accounted for in other Study analyses concerning possible benefits. For munitions and other explosive rail freight, it was determined that the primary origin/destination sites included: Anniston, AL Letterkenny, PA Blue Grass, KY McAlester, OK Toole, UT Red River, TX Hawthorne, NV Iowa, IO Crane, IN With the exception of locations in Alabama and perhaps Kentucky, through-rail service for CSXT and its western connecting railroads would normally approach the greater Wilmington area from the north using the primary CSXT north-south mainlines. As such the rail operations advantages provided by a reopening i.e., **shortened distance, decreased running times, decreased crew-changes and bypassing of Davis Yard could all be available to MOTSU rail traffic.** Average operating savings of $206 per carload are included in the total $2.6 million annual savings for greater Wilmington area. That saving for DOD freight alone would equate to about $280,000 annually if passed through by the railroad. Similar to commercial rail traffic, a clear basis for technical feasibility exists for MOTSU. Use of the new route through Wallace and Castle Hayne only represents increased efficiency that would be fully compatible with all operations of both CSXT and the USA Railroad systems. On the same basis the use of a reopened Wallace to Castle Hayne route by MOTSU would be economically feasible. Additional marginal economic benefits created by MOTSU’s use of a reopening are not easily quantifiable as specific dollar values for use in a cost-benefit analysis. However, MOTSU has identified positive consequences of a reopening, many of which involve security, reliability and safety factors for their special type of freight:

• Reduces transit time

• Reduces hazardous cargo exposure to public

• Potential to reduce the number of switches in Wilmington area

• Provides enroute rail redundancy (second route to the area)

• Provides more predictable delivery of hazardous cargo for better synchronized hand-off from CSXT with security

• Potential reduced rates for DOD private customers and DOD

Positive values of a reopening to MOTSU should be considered as strongly supporting the project even though a specific dollar value cannot be easily identified for use as a valid benefit in the analysis.

# 1AC Strategic Mobility Advantage - Stem

**Global crises are inevitable – There will inevitably be international contingencies that will require rapid military responses**

Ward **Wilson** (former Fellow at the Robert Kennedy Memorial Foundation) **2006** “Rationale for a study of City Annihilations,” http://wardhayeswilson.squarespace.com/city\_annihilation/

One of the characteristics of international crises is that they come seemingly out of the blue. The Kennedy Administration, in the fall of 1962, was focused on the coming midterm elections, not the almost inconceivable possibility that the Soviets would try to sneak nuclear missiles into Cuba. President Truman was vacationing in Independence, Missouri on June 24, 1950 when North Korean soldiers stormed across the 38th parallel. The words “Pearl Harbor” are synonymous in the US with being caught unawares. And so on. Crises are made more unpredictable by the fact that they are not distributed regularly over time. Some decades are filled with them. Sometimes years go by without one. We have lived in a fortunate time. For fifty years no nation that possesses nuclear weapons has fought a war in which its national interests were seriously at risk. The wars fought in that time that have involved nuclear powers – Korea, Vietnam, the Chinese-Vietnam border war of 1979, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Falkland Islands, the Gulf War, the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq – have all been secondary or peripheral for the nuclear power involved. Some crises have had the potential to put national interests at stake (Berlin, Cuba) but fortunately the moment when potential became reality never arrived. It would be foolish, however, to rely on luck in international affairs. If we wish to plan responsibly, we must assume that sometime in the future – perhaps sooner, perhaps later – there will be a crisis that puts a nuclear nation's vital interests at stake. When that moment comes, when the grim-faced men and women sit face-to-face around the table and consider their “options,” what arguments will be used to either promote or discourage the use of nuclear weapons? The arguments in favor will have to do with winning and intimidation. (They may also have to do with getting revenge, although likely that word won't be used.) The arguments against using nuclear weapons will probably be moral arguments and arguments about risk and rationality

**Infrastructure limitations can add almost 2 weeks to critical ammunition shipments – ensuring broadened transport capability is key to avoid strategic bottlenecks**

Paul **Murphy** (Major, United States Airforce, MA in Mobility Studies) **1999** “THE AVAILABILITY OF CONTAINER SHIPPING NEEDED TO MEET WARTIME AMMUNITION SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA372314

V. Ammunition Port Restrictions

What throughput limitations exist at the three DoD strategic ammunition port facilities as a result of the rise of containerships? Ammunition shipped out of the United States, both in peacetime and in war, must pass through one of only three seaports. The three "dedicated" ammunition SPODs are Weapons Support Facility (WSF) Seal Beach, Detachment Port Hadlock, WA, and WSF Seal Beach, Detachment Concord, CA, both on the West Coast. The third is Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU), NC on the East Coast. The MTMC Command (IOC). Figure 2 shows the location ofthese specialized ports and depots. Ammunition, in planned wartime required amounts, is not stored at the ports. Rather it is transported from the perspective depots by truck and rail according to the MTMC Surface Distribution Plan (SDP). The SDP is a carefully choreographed sequence ofmovements based on capabilities, NEW, and asset availability. The dangerous nature of ammunition limits its trans-loading to these three ports. Unlike civilian cargo that can be marshaled and stockpiled at the dock in large quantities, ammunition has inherent limitations that, by accident or hostile intent, can literally blow up a whole port and its surrounding support complex. This lesson was learned in July 1944 at the port of Concord, CA (called Port Chicago at the time). A handling accident caused an explosion that blew apart two brand new liberty ships. Hundreds ofNavy stevedores were killed. The force of the blast sent pieces ofthe 7,500-ton E.A. Bryon and the 10,000-ton Quinart Victory eight thousand feet into the air. It leveled buildings three miles inland (9:Sec A, 1). This lesson is the main reason that ammunition is restricted to just the three ports that are relatively remote from large populated areas. It is, therefore, more than likely that these last three ports will be the only dedicated ammunition ports for the next century. With good commercial ports at a premium on both coasts, no community welcomes a facility that handles massive quantities of high explosives. Furthermore, with the size of commercial container ships only growing larger, the specific port limitations of these three sites will only become more critical. Losing port capability on either coast would add a critical extra 12 days by forcing an inter-ocean passage through the Panama Canal. Ammunition ports are restricted for the most part by the cumulative NEW allowable. This determines the maximum amount of explosive cargo that may be handled within the port at any one time. The NEW limit of a port determines the maximum number of ships that may be trans-loaded at any given time or it may limit the maximum amount of ammunition that may be loaded onto a single ship. The length of piers and the water depth alongside and through the approaches to a port determine maximum limits for vessel size and factor into maximum cargo capacity. The number of piers, storage and staging areas, rail and road access, and the quality and quantity of cargo handling equipment determine throughput capacity. These limitations affect the size and type of ships that are usable (32:13). The IOC is the agency responsible for coordinating ammunition shipment. IOC coordinates its loads with MTMC and identifies every type of ammunition by hazard class, NEW, and the weight included in each container. The command designs its loads with ship loading and port restrictions in mind (37). For example, ammunition is not stored in containers at the depot. It must be stuffed at the time of contingency. Therefore careful planning must be done to prevent bottlenecks. Dockside bottlenecks must be avoided also due to NEW limitations of the holding pads. It can be a time consuming process coordinating dissimilar loads, compatible loads, bulkhead clearances, ballast and trim considerations etc. All these factors can stack up and cause potential delays (13). The rise of the large containership poses multiple physical limitations. The larger the ship, the more difficult it is to access these unique locations. Air and water drafts are most critical. This is the main reason MSC considers ships that are less than 1,500 TEU as "handy size." Ships larger than this size tend to be either too tall to make it under the bridges, or will reach their water draft limit prior to being fully loaded. WSF Concord for example, is impaired mainly by air and water draft limitations. Figure 3 shows its location well inland of the San Francisco Bay (8). Ofnote are the last two ofthe four permanent bridges that large vessels must fit under in order to get into a berth.

**These bottlenecks crush our military’s surge deployment capability – link magnitude is massive – effective MoTs are pre-requisites to over 90 percent of our sealift capability**

**VanHoosen 97** [Paul VanHoosen, Lieutenant Commander, February 7, 1997, “MILITARY OCEAN TERMINALS WHO NEEDS THEM?”, Naval War College, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA325154>,

With these actions, the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommended, and the President subsequently approved, the closure of the last two CONUS, non-ammunition Military Ocean Terminals (MOTs). Are MOTs unnecessary, as the commission concluded? No, MOTs are not operationally obsolete but operationally indispensable. Without them the mission of successfully deploying U.S. combat forces is in jeopardy. The Commission's rationale focused on the monetary issues, citing an expected saving of over $10 million annually. This focus was hardly surprising given both the BRAC Commission's charter and an admittedly bloated water port bureaucracy.2 However, the commission's justification was predicated on the ability of the commercial sector to absorb the workload left behind by the MOTs. In the commission's words, "There are sufficient commercial port facilities on the East and Gulf Coasts [and West] to support power projection requirements with a minimal loss to operational capability. Bayonne [and Oakland] provide the Army with few military capabilities that cannot be accomplished at commercial ports."3 In routine operations, this is most likely true. However, Military Ocean Terminals were not established for routine operations. Their true value lies in their capacity to accommodate a large volume of military cargo on a short-notice basis, in essence, a surge deployment. Certainly the BRAC Commission is correct in concluding that water ports are costly to operate, but whether the commercial sector has the ability, or willingness, to absorb the military mission of surge deployment is less certain than the Commission declared. Commercial port availabilities and capabilities are not guaranteed. As the ultimate customers ofthe Defense Transportation System (DTS) services, the CINCs should view this potential lack of support with concern. They have every expectation that the DTS will fully deliver combat power to its place of employment within the planned time window. Anything less would delay the CINCs' mission accomplishment and increase their "window of vulnerability". This was a matter of great concern to U.S. commanders during Desert Shield. To ensure mission success and customer satisfaction, the DTS must ensure that it has access to sufficient and capable water port facilities. CONUS Military Ocean Terminals provide that guarantee, with deployment capacity and surge reaction time that commercial terminals can not or will not duplicate. Present plans to downsize CONUS water port infrastructure by closing Military Ocean Terminals jeopardize the ability ofU.S. forces to deploy quickly, completely, and in line with CINC expectations. In a major deployment, MOTs are operationally indispensable. TRANSCOM'S MISSION The requirement for a large, quick surge deployment of U.S. forces has not diminished since the Desert Shield experience. In his testimony before a House Committee, Mr. Norman Rabkin, Associate Director, Military Operations and Capabilities Issues, Government Accounting Office, stated that, "DoD has identified extensive mobility requirements for its sealift and airlift forces. During major regional conflicts, the requirement calls for moving as much cargo in 8 weeks as was moved during the first 6 months of the Persian Gulf War."4 This echoes especially true when considering the reduced forward presence ofU.S. forces. In a Major Regional Conflict scenario, an increasing percentage of U.S. forces will deploy from CONUS, and of those deploying forces, ninety to ninety-five percent will deploy their equipment by sealift through a water terminal. In charge of satisfying this deployment requirement is the United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). As DoD's single manager for transportation, TRANSCOM is tasked with "providing common-user airlift, sealift, surface transport, *terminal services* and commercial air, land, and sea transport, as needed to support the deployment, employment, and sustainment for U.S. forces on a global basis ..."(emphasis added).5 TRANSCOM's policy is to rely on DoD organic transportation assets for initial surge deployment requirements, approximately C-day through C+15.6 The JCS Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review Update (MRS-BURU) validated this policy citing, "The immediate surge shipping mission requires organic shipping to ensure the immediate reinforcing units can be deployed expeditiously."7 Lift self-sufficiency for the initial stages of surge deployment is TRANSCOM's goal Desert Shield demonstrated that TRANSCOM did not have the wherewithal to comply with this policy. TRANSCOM has aggressively attacked the DTS shortfalls over the past several years to correct this situation, spending billions in acquisition and mobility enhancement funding to procure aircraft, build new or convert existing vessels into Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off ships, purchase additional DoD rail cars, improve DoD installation transportation infrastructure (forts, camps, and bases), and develop documentation and intransit visibility data systems, which in many cases duplicate the commercial sector's capabilities. TRANSCOM has directed all ofthis effort toward building a self-sufficient DTS. However, little attention was paid to non-ammunition water ports. The long term effect is a potentially significant bottle neck at the ports as DoD requirements grow, organic lift becomes more readily available, but DoD port capabilities decrease. To address this potential bottleneck, TRANSCOM has turned towards the commercial sector. A heavy dependence on commercial ports for expanded port capability, although contrary to its policy of self-sufficiency, provides TRANSCOM with an immediately available solution. TRANSCOM is aware of the potential dangers. Gen. Rutherford, USAF, USCINCTRANS, commented that, "..we will become more dependent on commercial ports. But I think we will continue to get the priority to go in and use what we need."8 His Deputy, LTG. Wykle, USA, echoed a similar sentiment saying, "Yes. The commercial sector is part of our force structure and so we take it for granted that it's there. But we have no institutionalized way of assessing the readiness of those commercial carrier's assets and they would certainly resist our doing so. We have to pretty much accept that they will be able to provide us with what we are asking for."9 Neither statement projects confidence that the commercial sector will positively respond to TRANSCOM's requirements when needed. The prerequisite for a successful DTS water terminal deployment operation is the guarantee that ports of sufficient capability are available when required. Until recently, the commercial ports have repeated assurances to TRANSCOM that they are ready and willing to handle DoD port business, convincing TRANSCOM that its water port policy is prudent. However, TRANSCOM's reliance on the commercial sector is not a safe solution. It risks disappointing a demanding, high profile CINC customer.

**Err on the side of caution – overinvestment is better than underinvestment – otherwise we develop a false sense of security – hollows out our entire military capability**

**Fogleman 94**- MA in military history and pol sci, former chief of staff of the Air Force (Ronald R., “Reengineering Defense Transportation,” DTIC, Winter, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA528899)//mat>

The ability of Assyria in the 7th century B.C. to field 50,000-strong armies in deserts and mountains is attributed to smoothly operating staffs and logistics. Over the centuries the innovative commander has mastered the art of foraging with two effects: limiting the avenue of attack to those places where sustainment is found, and muting popular support by the local inhabitants when their crops are confiscated or burnt, cities pillaged, and families separated. General Erwin Rommel said that the first condition for armies to endure the strain of battle is to have ample stocks of weapons, ammunition, and fuel. He added that battles are decided by quartermasters, for even brave soldiers can do nothing without weapons. And weapons can accomplish nothing without ammunition, and weapons and ammunition are useless in mobile warfare unless vehicles have the fuel to haul them. Admiral Ernest King echoed a similar point when in frustration he said: “I don’t know what the hell this logistics is that [General George] Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it.” Such historical vignettes should remind joint planners and commanders when preparing for war or a contingency to train to get where they are going and to be sustained when they get there. Dangerous Assumptions Having participated in a variety of wargames, exercises, and contingencies, it is clear to me that we frequently assume difficulties of deployment and sustainment, but bank on infrastructure—at home, en route, and in theater—to meet our requirements. We assume that we will know the location of every critical piece of equipment at all times and that the transportation assets needed to rapidly mobilize and sustain a force will be there in adequate numbers, ready for battle. Such assumptions lead to complacency and sometimes to disaster. Many assumed that the C–141 aircraft designed in the 50s, built in the 60s, stretched in the 80s, and flown hard ever since would be there as our core airlifter. They overlooked that the size of equipment and the amount of supplies to be lifted have grown since the 50s, that we are not just postured for operations to large airfields in Western Europe, and that the majority of our forces will now be predominantly based in America. Some assumed that the U.S.-flag merchant marine fleet would still be there in sufficient numbers with the appropriate types of vessels to provide bulk sustainment for the Armed Forces. They assumed there would always be a pool of trained U.S. merchant mariners to man Fast Sealift Ships and Ready Reserve Force vessels. Others assumed that railheads, roads, cranes, and ports would always be ready to support surges accompanying major contingencies. Assumptions lull us into thinking that we will always be able to fly and sail to facilities that are well maintained, sized to handle the load, and immune from enemy attack. I want to hang out a banner for everyone to read: check your assumptions. Don’t conduct wargames with invalid Timed Phase Force Deployment Data and assume that all your forces will be there when needed. Accounts of employing forces that don’t consider deploying and sustaining them are probably suspect. Discussions about long arm movements over maps without mention of railheads, roads, airports and airlift, seaports and sealift, the health of the civil transport sector, and access to key, capable international transportation facilities should be carefully scrutinized. The System Today When the President, through the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, asks if ports and airfields are secure, air superiority has been achieved, a ground offensive is ready to begin, or victory has been achieved, he is actually asking about deployment and sustainment or, in other words, about strategic mobility. In the recent past a significant portion of the C–141 core airlifter fleet is grounded, a larger portion restricted from air refueling operations, and each aircraft limited to carrying only 74 percent of its designed load capacity. Both U.S.-flagged merchant marine fleet vessels and the Americans aboard them are declining in number with no improvement in sight. Commercial air carriers, under pressure to achieve profitability, have declined to participate in the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF) program to such an extent that we are not able to meet all CRAF stage II and III requirements. Today, the United States is withdrawing from overseas facilities which were once ready and available for global deployment and sustainment operations. It is fortunate that the President, Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs, and CINCs, as well as many in the Congress, support strategic mobility programs like the C–17, sealift ship conversion and construction, and Ready Reserve Force expansion and maintenance. But there are some who suggest we can’t afford the mix of assets recommended by the congressionally mandated Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) which did not meet the warfighting requirements of the CINCs. Deploying forces with a low risk to lives was too expensive. Thus a compromise was struck: delay the closure of necessary forces by giving the enemy more time to lay land mines, seize key terrain, move tanks and equipment forward, sow harbors with mines, and attack U.S. and allied forces that may be present, and thereby reduce the cost of transportation. Let me illustrate the importance of reevaluating planning. MRS assumed that in FY99 there would be a certain number of fully mission-capable C–141s (which is now highly unlikely), that there would be a fully supported CRAF program (which is now in doubt), that there would be a certain number of converted or constructed sealift ships (which is now delayed), and that a badly needed new C–17 core airlift program would be supported (which is now under attack). The study also pointed out that even after an expected 120 C–17s were built, a shortfall would exist (which is as yet unaddressed). Today MRS is undergoing further review. The Case for Change One learns from a constant stream of articles and speeches that change is required, coming, or even here already. I couldn’t agree more. But the distance between the United States and other regions of the world hasn’t changed. The speed at which surface, sea, and airlift assets will travel isn’t likely to change any time soon. And the need to rapidly respond, almost simultaneously, in many parts of the globe hasn’t changed. What is changing—really happening—is that America is returning to its origins as a militia nation. America has not historically maintained large standing forces, instead encouraging reliance on the Guard and Reserve, and avoiding international entanglements. After major wars, including the Cold War, administrations have sought to radically downsize the military by shifting resources to domestic priorities on the assumption that the remaining force structure is trained, deployable, sustainable, and capable of winning future wars—however winning is defined. The U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) was established in 1987 with the idea that unity of effort in mobility is essential to ensuring joint combat effectiveness on the battlefield. It was not until Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm that TRANSCOM really came into its own. While successful, the experience proved what coaches have known for decades: you must practice the way you are going to play. That realization led to a 1993 DOD Directive which designates TRANSCOM as the single manager for defense transportation in both war and peace by placing the Military Sealift, Military Traffic Management, and Air Mobility Commands under one combatant command and assigning strategic mobility (or common user) forces to an operational command. TRANSCOM is taking its newly assigned responsibilities very seriously. The warfighting CINCs determine requirements for their respective theaters of operations. We, in turn, determine within the constraints of the existing defense transportation system whether these requirements can be met. If not, we work with the CINC’s staff to minimize shortfalls and maximize opportunities for victory. In concert with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, military services, Department of Transportation, and commercial transportation sector, we will strongly advocate the need for and promote the acquisition of mobility assets to support our national military strategy. With the current administration’s call for reduced defense budgets while still maintaining the capability to achieve victory when the Armed Forces are committed, we got a clear, unambiguous message: we can’t continue to conduct business as usual, we can’t afford it financially nor do the men and women who are asked to go in harm’s way deserve a transportation system that reduces their chance of victory—even of survival. In sum, a smaller force structure based predominantly in the United States which is not deployable or sustainable in a manner that allows us to win with what are considered acceptable losses is a hollow force. Reengineering the System To ensure military forces are successful despite declining defense budgets, TRANSCOM is hard at work charting a course for the defense transportation system into the next century. Change means more than total quality management or improving existing processes. It is investing the time and resources to reengineer the defense transportation system. The first task of a recently formed TRANSCOM initiatives team is to develop an ought to be defense transportation system as well as to provide a framework to get there. The team will work with the Joint Transportation Corporate Information Management Center—which was recently chartered by DOD—to further refine plans to include detailed procedural, organizational, and technological reforms. In retrospect one can see how in part the defense transportation system developed in both service and functional stovepipes. This has affected the ways in which requirements are identified, tasked, contracted, monitored, and billed to customers, and involves various automation systems used to run these processes—many of which originated centuries ago (if measured in technological years) and most of which don’t talk with one another, even within a single headquarters. Some ask why TRANSCOM is unable to provide services like the private sector. Why is it that in the marketplace there are local travel agents who, upon request, can book a flight to Florida, a ship for a cruise, a bus tour en route at intermediate stops, and a train trip to complete the journey—one agent for air, sea, road, and rail, and with only one bill? After sending parcels via a delivery service a toll free number is available to check on where the shipments are, anytime of day or night. If that can be done by private enterprise, why can’t critical spare parts destined for a CINC’s area of responsibility be located and arrival times determined in the DOD pipeline? Reengineering the defense transportation system will give customers—the Armed Forces—the type of quality service offered by the private sector, or perhaps better. Soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and coastguardsmen—active and Reserve—as well as members of the civil service and the commercial transport industries, have ensured a strong and robust defense transportation system throughout our Nation’s history. For those who today go in harm’s way, TRANSCOM pledges to develop a new system that lives up to Winston Churchill’s dictum: “Victory is the beautiful bright coloured flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.”

**This is particularly true NOW – investment in our strategic mobility infrastructure is key to efficiency – acts as a force multiplier in the face of budgetary cuts elsewhere**

**McNabb 11**- retired Air Force general (Duncan J., “We Measure Success Through the Eyes of the War Fighter,” Air and Space Power Journal, Winter, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a555500.pdf>)//mat

Strategic Context Demands More with Less Against a backdrop of rising national debt and an uncertain future security environment, USTRANSCOM can do its part to secure our nation’s interests by improving the access and efficiency of our strategic mobility system—a national asymmetric advantage. The ongoing threats of global extremism, the rise of China, a nuclear North Korea, the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, and the war in cyberspace are but a few of the difficulties we can see on the horizon. Even as we prepare for these kinds of problems, we know we will face disaster-related humanitarian crises like those that have occurred in Indonesia, Haiti, Japan, Pakistan, New Zealand, the United States, and elsewhere. Covering this crisis spectrum demands a wide range of capability, one in which our logistical forces must be equally capable of meeting warfighter needs in uncontested, semicontested, and contested domains; favorable and unfavorable terrain; all types of weather; and places with limited or no infrastructure. In short our mobility enterprise must have assured access to the entire globe, able to reach even the remotest areas and project power where our national interests dictate we must—a tall, expensive order. Our nation’s debt of $14.5 trillion (and growing) will shape future military capability more than any other factor. The enormity of this indebtedness led Adm Mike Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to declare it “the most significant threat to our national security” 3 —one that we simply cannot address without considering defense. Our spending on national security—$881 billion in fiscal year 2012—consumes more than any other category of the federal budget. 4 As the debate rages in Washington over how to handle our debt issues, it seems only prudent that the Department of Defense (DOD) find ways of operating in a shrinking budget environment. To do so, we must become more efficient at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. Balancing the opposing challenges of increasing access while using fewer resources will likely produce an ever-growing demand for mobility. The DOD probably will not be able to recapitalize its aging inventory of ships, planes, and vehicles on a one-for-one basis. A RAND study of 2008 concluded that the annual cost growth of all types of military aircraft has far outpaced inflation because of many factors, the lion’s share coming from technological complexity of design—a trend not unique to aircraft. 5 Analyses of the US Navy’s ship fleet and the US Army’s / Marine Corps’s tactical vehicle fleets show similar trends in cost growth. Across the board, Services are forecasting declining platform numbers because of such growth and budgetary constraints. 6 All the while, the world security environment is becoming more complex and multipolar. Quite simply, the American military will have to do more with fewer things and in more places than it ever has before. As the more-with-less trend accelerates, strategic mobility will increasingly assert itself as a multiplying force for good—a prospect that will necessitate a global network of interconnected ports in suitable positions to enable global reach.

**The aff is the linchpin of all rapid response and power projection globally**

Paul **Murphy** (Major, United States Airforce, MA in Mobility Studies) **1999** “THE AVAILABILITY OF CONTAINER SHIPPING NEEDED TO MEET WARTIME AMMUNITION SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA372314

The United States military is increasingly reliant on rapid global mobility to project power. Therefore, the capability to rapidly move wartime stocks to forward locations has become a linchpin of that capability. With its overseas drawdown, the Army in particular relies heavily on follow-up ammunition sustainment capability that can only be efficiently transported by sealift. Historically, virtually all of the U.S. warfighter's sustainment ammunition has been transported by break bulk cargo ships. In 1999 these ships are being phased out of the commercial inventory in favor of larger container vessels. As the U.S. military increases its intermodal capability, a potential sealift shortfall exists due to the unavailability of suitably sized and configured containerships combined with the growth in individual ship size of the containerized merchant fleet. This research paper addresses current and short-term capabilities versus stated requirements in an attempt to identity any potential shortfalls. The topic is worthy of study due to our current defense drawdown coupled with the requirement to fight two near-simultaneous theater wars.

This is key to overall deterrence and conflict de-escalation – we control ceiling on all war impacts

Hickins 09 (COLONEL KENNETH, United States Army, March 30, 2009, “STRATEGIC MOBILITY: FORGOTTEN CRITICAL REQUIREMENT OF THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA494718///TS)

As I stated at the beginning of the paper, Strategic Mobility has not been fixed and is the weakest link in the strategic chain of getting the right forces, to the proper place in space and time in order to allow the Combatant Commander to either deter, deescalate, or decisively defeat an adversary. I believe I have shown that the 2006 QDR which stated, “Extensive investments in cargo transportability, strategic lift, and prepositioned stocks over the past decade have yielded military forces capable of responding to a broad spectrum of security challenges worldwide”,41 is at best misleading and at worst wishful thinking of the highest order. Eighty percent of all countries border on the coast, 80 percent of the world’s capitals lie within 350 miles of the coast, and 95 percent of all the world’s population lives within 500 miles of the coast.42 Currently, the United States cannot move significant ground forces to a crisis area in a timely manner. The recent National Security Strategy states that either Host Nation or an Allied Nation APODs and SPODs will be used to quickly move forces into the crisis area. An examination of past and potential crisis areas reveal most border the world’s oceans and are in remote, unimproved areas of the world: Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Yemen, Myanmar, Pakistan, India, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, China, Korea, Taiwan, Georgia, Sudan, East Timor, Venezuela, and Cuba. Half of these countries sit astride strategic waterways that would impact the United States and our Allies. If the United States would have to engage any of these countries militarily, the Combatant Commander would need all the assets that the Mobility Triad has in order to respond to any and all contingencies. If the United States wants to continue to provide the world with political, economic, informational, and military leadership it will need to have the ability to flow military forces into the numerous trouble spots throughout the world. The United States cannot afford to rely on possible Host Nation or Allied Nation support. Nor can it rely on limited air transport and slow sealift to get our forces quickly to the crisis area. The United States must quit paying lip service to the shortfalls in our Strategic Mobility Triad and leverage the available technology and create a truly interdependent and complimentary Mobility Triad that is a critical requirement for any operational and strategic success

# 1AC Strategic Mobility Advantage – PACOM Module

**Credible maritime support is key to USPACOMs effectiveness – otherwise the US will be overwhelmed in the theatre with regional contingencies**

**Keating 09** [Timothy J. Keating, *retired United States Navy admiral of PACOM*, March 19, 2009, “ STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL TIMOTHY J. KEATING, U.S. NAVY COMMANDER U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE”, PACOM, <http://www.pacom.mil/web/pacom_resources/pdf/19MAR09%20PACOM%20SASC%20Posture%20Statement.pdf>, DMintz]

Advocacy of programs critical to USPACOM. USPACOM remains a theater of opportunities and challenges requiring the United States to maintain a credible warfighting capability. The trend toward new regional powers and presence of unpredictable actors necessitates that USPACOM maintain preeminence in military capability and understand the emerging threats to deter or defeat any aggression. To this end we must continue to advance our capabilities to better gauge intentions, enhance our ability to operate in an advanced electronic warfare environment, and continue to develop a ballistic missile defense system capability that will protect our high value assets and our territories. As a theater dominated by the maritime environment we must maintain maritime superiority in a time of conflict. Undersea warfare capabilities of regional players in our theater are continuing to improve, and we must retain the competitive edge we now enjoy. The vast 25 distances encountered in USPACOM have the potential to stress critical air and sealift capabilities; we continue to look for ways to improve our ability to operate throughout the USPACOM AOR.

By increasing the capabilities of our partners in the theater, we will ensure that the relationships exist and the capability is present to facilitate current and future coalition support and multi-nation operations.

**Military Ocean Terminal infrastructure upgrades are critical to USPACOM effectiveness**

**Fraser 12** [William Fraser, February 28, 2012, “Statement of General William Fraser, USAF Commander, United States Transportation Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee On the State of the Command”, United States Transportation Command, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/02%20February/Fraser%2002-28-12.pdf>, DMintz]

Infrastructure improvement projects at the U.S. Army Military Ocean Terminal Concord (MOTCO), in Concord, CA, are essential to USTRANSCOM’s support of USPACOM’s operational plans and DOD’s military capability in the Pacific theater. Due to the nature and size of this military mission, no suitable alternatives to MOTCO exist on the West Coast. We continue to work within DOD to find necessary resources to alleviate any ammunition throughput issues in the Pacific Theater.

**Otherwise we will be completely absent in the region – lift capabilities are key**

**Gulledge and Keating 10** [Jay Gulledge,  *Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, served on the faculties of Tulane University and the University of Louisville,* Timothy J. Keating, *retired United States Navy admiral of PACOM,* 2010 “Future Naval Operations in Asia and the Pacific” in “Climate and Energy Proceedings 2010”, Johns Hopkins University, page 344-345, <http://www.jhuapl.edu/ClimateAndEnergy/Book/Chapter/Chapter7.pdf>, DMintz]

\*\*\*All text is from Timoth y J. Keating

The instrument of foreign policy that works best in that part of the world is the U.S. Navy. The junior officers at the command coined a phrase, “virtual presence equals actual absence.” That is the one point I would emphasize to you when you talk about climate and energy. There is no substitute, in both my personal and my professional opinion, for American forces being present. And as the Navy works through the challenges, and the Air Force works through the challenges, and, to a lesser extent, our Army and Marine Corps, because those forces that are generally in garrison are of less utility to the commander of USPACOM, **unless we have the lift capability to move those forces** out of garrison and be present for exercises and training in the countries of the AOR.

If we do not have a Navy of sufficient numbers and an Air Force of sufficient numbers and lift capability, we are not present. We are absent. You can do all of the video teleconferencing you want. You can have as many meetings as you want. But you have to be out there and train with, and develop the trust and confidence of, and build relationships with, the younger men and women in the armed forces of the AOR so that they can grow up knowing that we are not going to leave them high and dry.

A great way of manifesting that faith, trust, and confidence that they should have in us is through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations like those after Katrina. I cannot recount for you the number of times that a hurricane, a typhoon, a cyclone, or an earthquake has hit, or a cold snap has affected hundreds of thousands of people in the USPACOM AOR, and because we are there, because we are present, or we have sufficient reach and lift, we can provide assistance immediately. Such operations have dramatic impact.

Several years ago, a devastating tsunami hit the western tip of Indonesia. Although the first forces to get on scene came by air, the second forces and the most sustainable forces came by sea. When Myanmar was hit by a tropical cyclone, I flew out there to offer the use of some of our medium- and heavy-lift helicopters and C-130s. We and our allies had deployed four ships off the coast. But the Myanmar government said, “No thanks, we don’t need the help.” Thousands of lives were lost as a result; it was one of the significant regrets I have in my tour there.

When an earthquake and a bout of extremely cold weather occurred in China, the first American expression of support came in the form of two C-17s loaded with relief supplies. We had to get permission to let them land, but that is the authority that we enjoyed at USPACOM. So it is presence. It is readiness. It is partnership. These three essential elements of USPACOM strategy, I am convinced, provide the basis for success in the region.

**Two Impact Scenarios**

**First is South China Sea**

**US maritime deployment credibility and strength is key to prevent war in the South China Sea – key to force peaceful cooperation**

**Cronin and Kaplan 12** [Patrick M. Cronin, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and Robert D. Kaplan, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, January 2012, “Cooperation from Strength The United States, China and the South China Sea”, Center for New American Security, <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_CooperationFromStrength_Cronin_1.pdf>, DMintz]

There is an ineluctable geostrategic contest at work in the South China Sea, and that contest can be boiled down to this question: Will the United States maintain a credible sea control capacity of the South China SLOCs or will China’s anti-access and area-denial capabilities fundamentally neutralize that threat and thereby alter the strategic assumptions throughout the Indo-Pacific region?

Whereas the other countries of the region maintain specific territorial claims based on their coastlines, China claims the vast middle of the Sea itself. In the not-too-distant future, China’s reemergence and its concomitant ability not only to press these claims but back them with military capabilities may call into question the credibility of American military might and decades of U.S. regional predominance: predominance that has kept regional disputes from escalating into warfare.

In this way, the South China Sea represents the wider global commons in microcosm – not only in its maritime and air dimensions but also in the crucial domains of cyberspace and outer space. In the South China Sea, all of these domains are potentially threatened by China’s attempt, through military purchases and deployments, to deny American naval access. This is one reason why 16 of 18 countries at the East Asia Summit in November 2011 underscored the importance of maritime security, with most backing the need for multilateral mechanisms for resolving differing claims in the South China Sea. 8

In the decades ahead, the challenge for the United States will be how to preserve historic norms – freedom of navigation above all else – while adapting to the growing power and activity of regional actors. Maintaining global public goods tied to the freedom of navigation will require continuing U.S. preeminence, especially naval primacy. At the same time, adaptation and increasing cooperation will be necessary. Thus, the United States must cooperate, but from a position of strength.

Although it may seem oxymoronic, cooperation from a position of strength is a way to foster regional diplomatic and economic integration while collectively preserving the balance of power as China rises. This approach is not contrary to China’s interests: In fact, no Asian country has benefitted from this U.S.-led system as much as China. However, because the status quo is not sustainable indefinitely, the aim of cooperative primacy is to build a wider multilateral framework for stable change that preserves the rules of the road for good order at sea. The economic and military rise of China threatens to unleash a storm of change in the South China Sea region. It is therefore crucial to maintain the key elements of the status quo: free trade, safe and secure SLOCs, and full-bodied independence – free of intimidation – for all the littoral countries within a rules-based international order.

As used here, primacy does not have to mean dominance: It means that the United States retains its role as a regional power in order to shepherd its allies and partners into doing more on their own behalf. In this way, the balance of power can be maintained, even as the burden on the United States decreases. The important thing, as President Obama stressed during a visit to the region in November 2011, is that all countries play by the same set of rules.

**The impact is multiple nuclear conflicts**

**Straits Times 2k**  (Ching Cheong, Straits times, July 25 2000, lexis nexis)

The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation.

**Scenario Two is Korea**

**North Korean conflict is inevitable – having the capability to project forces is key to prevent conflict**

**Chi-dong 12** [Lee Chi-dong, June 8, 2012, “NK proliferation threatens both U.S. and China: Panetta”, Yonhap, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/06/08/52/0301000000AEN20120608000400315F.HTML>, DMintz]

The United States and China share responsibility for resolving the issue of North Korea's proliferation activities, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said. On a trip to Asia, Panetta singled out North Korea as a continuing threat, along with the terrorism, not only in Pakistan but in Yemen and Somalia and North Africa. "We continue to face the instability of North Korea and the potential for some kind of conflict with that country. We face the same thing with Iran," he said during a visit to the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, India, according to a transcript released Thursday by his department. He expressed concern about proliferation by North Korea, which has conducted two nuclear tests and possesses a host of missiles. “We also face the threat of, frankly, nuclear proliferation from an unstable North Korea -- that's something that is as much a threat to China as it is to others in this region -- and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction," he said. The secretary was apparently pressing Beijing to join efforts to deal with various challenges from North Korea and others, including terrorism, piracy, humanitarian and disaster needs as well as the ability to use sea lanes and protect maritime rights. The two superpowers, dubbed G-2, have been often engaged in subtle diplomatic stand-offs over ways to deal with North Korea, China's key communist ally. "They're threats to all of the countries in this region," Panetta stressed. "And it's for that reason that we all have to work together in developing a cooperative relationship and developing the capabilities of these countries so that we can all confront these issues." He reiterated the importance of having capabilities to handle more than one enemy at a time. "For example, if we have a war in Korea and we face a threat in the Straits of Hormuz, we have to have the ability to address both of those and to win. And we think we have projected a sufficient force to do that," he said.

**Korean war goes nuclear**

**De Luce 10**  [Dan de Luce, November 25, 2010, “War with North Korea Poses Nightmare Scenarios” AFP, <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/11/25/10/war-north-korea-poses-nightmare-scenarios>]

A full-blown war on the Korean peninsula offers up a nightmare scenario that would cause appalling casualties and potentially trigger a nuclear exchange, experts and former officials say. The crisis provoked by North Korea's artillery attack on a South Korean island this week makes the prospect of an all-out conflict look less remote, and US officials -- mindful of the high-stakes -- have carefully avoided talk of military action. With an array of artillery trained on Seoul, North Korea could easily blast the glass towers of the South's booming capital for days and kill huge numbers of civilians before US and South Korean forces prevailed, experts said. "Official Pentagon models assume it would take months to win the war at a cost approaching one million casualties or more, all told, including dead and wounded," Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, told AFP. "And that's without nuclear weapons being used," said O'Hanlon, who wrote a book looking at the effects of a potential war. US and allied military planners have long believed that the North would be overwhelmed in a conventional war, but they worry how Seoul would use its arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, as well as its small cache of atomic bombs, said Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the Rand Corporation. "The key question is whether or not they can use their WMD (weapons of mass destruction) effectively," Bennett said. "That's the part which we don't really know." Bennett and some other analysts say North Korea likely will have the ability to fit a nuclear warhead onto one of its missiles within months, and may already have succeeded. In the first hours and days of a conflict, US warplanes would be focused on taking out nuclear sites, missiles and chemical weapons before the North Koreans had a chance to use them. Under one war game played out in 2005 by The Atlantic magazine, former military officers and officials concluded that US fighter aircraft would have to carry out up to 4,000 sorties a day to prevent a WMD catastrophe for Seoul and the region. South Korea has said it believes the North has about 100 nuclear facilities, but in the event of a war, Pyongyang would likely move weapons and atomic material to other locations, including a vast network of underground sites, Bennett said. "We may not have surveillance that's adequate over all of North Korea in time to monitor where things get moved to," he said. If the North chose to fire chemical shells into Seoul or strike at air fields with special forces armed with biological weapons, it would run the risk of a massive retaliation from the US military -- raising the danger of the world's first nuclear war.

# 1AC Strategic Mobility Advantage – AFRICOM Module

Credible strategic mobility capabilities are key to AFRICOMs military credibility – failure would devastate their ability to respond to crises

Hilberg 10 (Erik, MAJ United States Army, 2010, “Does the United States’ Strategic Mobility Program Support the Needs of Operational Commanders?”, <http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536555>///TS)

Imagine a scenario where the United States desires to enter a failed state or a state in need of support during a humanitarian crisis, and the nation is not able to project its forces due to having acquired the wrong mix of force projection platforms. For the world’s lone superpower, this is an embarrassing scenario to encounter especially when considering past investments in power projection. Then imagine compounding that with an increase in projection requirements based on the stateside repositioning of forces after the conduct of two Base Realignment and Closure Commissions.1The goal of this monograph is to examine how capable the Department of Defense is at meeting these new requirements while illustrating how previous decisions may affect future operational commanders. Does the Department of Defense’s strategic mobility program meet the needs of operational commanders? More importantly, what challenges do operational commanders face because of the inability to project certain capabilities? The hypothesis for this monograph is that the Department of Defense’s shortfalls in strategic sealift will limit a ground commander’s operational reach, tempo, simultaneity, depth, phasing, transitions, and synergy, while increasing risk and the possibility of early culmination. The Department of Defense’s transportation system underwent numerous innovations upon reviewing the results of the deployment and redeployment from the Gulf War of 1990-1. The most significant of those reviews was the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update of 1995. The review identified three key elements to generating an effective transportation system. They were the strategic mobility triad consisting of airlift, sealift, and prepositioning. The Department of Defense quickly went to work on procuring and incorporating the majority of the study’s recommendations. The study recommended a fleet of twenty large cargo vessels, thirty-six medium cargo vessels, and an airframe to replace the United States Air Force’s C-141 fleet. However, one key recommendation regarding sealift only underwent a partial fix. The Department of Defense’s procurement of several existing medium-sized roll on roll off vessels for placement into the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Fleet, under a reduced operating status, was only a partial solution. The procurement effort focused on achieving the strategic goal of available square footage requirements. However, the majority of the ships were medium when considering their overall size, yet their maximum drafts are equivalent to much larger vessels. The procurement achieved a strategic goal with regard to square footage, while leaving a potential operational level problem for future commanders. Recently, much of the United States Army has undergone a transformation into modular type units in conjunction with the re-stationing of numerous forces to the continental United States. The brigade headquarters that has traditionally commanded and controlled Army watercraft transformed into a multifunctional sustainment brigade headquarters in 2006. How this change affects power projection is also worthy of further examination. The Department of Defense focused their effort on procuring twenty very large cargo vessels, called large medium-speed roll-on roll-offs (LMSR), in order to meet the square footage recommendations from the study. The focus was getting the maximum square footage for money spent.Inherent to the plan of getting the most square-footage for the funds available is the acceptance of the risk that the United States fleet of large cargo vessels may not be able to access many world ports. This scenario or tension is part of a tradeoff that occurs between strategic objectives and operational realities. At the strategic level, the desire is to possess the quantitative or maximum square footage possible. At the operational level, the desire is qualitative which involves having vessels that can access the ports where operational level commanders desire to conduct their reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. The case studies in this monograph depict how simply procuring square footage requirements does not always equate to one’s desired results. This is especially the case when vessels are too large to berth at shallow draft terminals. Recent history proves the occurrence of this phenomenon, which is why this monograph examines the capabilities of the large and medium cargo vessel fleets during operations over the past twenty years. The United States’ deployments to Somalia and Haiti were relatively small in scale. Yet, the deployments to both of these locations created force projection challenges. The missions to Haiti and Somalia involved less than 30,000 United States troops.3Neither of these deployments involved a major projection of combat power, especially in comparison to the over one-half million troops that deployed to Saudi Arabia in order to liberate Kuwait from their Iraqi captors in 1990. The missions to Haiti and Somalia may provide information on how well the United States’ strategic mobility program performed as a system within the infrastructure of those nations. Studying how well that system interacts with the limited infrastructure of those nations may provide valuable insights towards future operations in similar scenarios. The two historical case studies this monograph utilizes involve host nations that possess limited or damaged port infrastructure. The results of the effort may identify potential risks associated with the strategic mobility program. The intent of the 1995 and subsequent reviews was to examine requirements for America’s emerging force posture. The continental United States was becoming the home base for the majority of that force. When Russia was no longer a near peer to the United States, the doctrine of containing communism in Europe was no longer necessary. With the prospect of relative peace in Europe during the early 1990s, the United States decision was to redeploy the bulk of its European forces back to the continental United States. Since that decision, the United States has projected power from home to The intent of the 1995 and subsequent reviews was to examine requirements for America’s emerging force posture. The continental United States was becoming the home base for the majority of that force. When Russia was no longer a near peer to the United States, the doctrine of containing communism in Europe was no longer necessary. With the prospect of relative peace in Europe during the early 1990s, the United States decision was to redeploy the bulk of its European forces back to the continental United States. Since that decision, the United States has projected power from home to support numerous contingencies that include Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and most recently a second mission to Haiti. Today a similar restructuring is in progress with the “Grow the Army Campaign.” Despite new growth in end strength, the stationing of those forces occurs stateside. The increase in stateside force posture resulting from the 2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission and the Grow the Army Campaign creates an even greater dependence on power projection or strategic mobility.4 Roll-on roll-off vessels (ROROs) are ships with configurations designed to support rolling stock. The design of these vessels allows for the rapid loading and unloading of vehicles. The vessels typically have high steel sides that contain and safeguard their cargo from the elements. Another key feature of the vessels is their weather deck where containers, boats, and other outsized cargos are often stowed. The civilian equivalent to the United States Navy’s roll-on roll-off fleet is the commercial car carrier vessel. The difference between the two is that the Navy’s ships have stronger decks that can hold more weight, higher deck heights that are often adjustable, and the tie-down points on the Navy’s vessels are much stronger. The heavy deck loads and tie-down points support the military’s heavy vehicles and tanks. Most of the United States Navy’s roll-on roll-off ships have self-sustaining capabilities such as cranes. In the commercial world, most ships have designs that perform one specific purpose in order to achieve any economy of scale. Naval cargo vessels require adaptability in order to transport a variety of cargos for an unknown variety of contingencies. A key difference between roll-on roll-off vessels and general cargo or break-bulk vessels is that the entire inner portion of the roll-on roll-off vessel is open or accessible without the removal of hatches, walls, or barriers. The ability to drive a vehicle from one end of the vessel to the other or from one deck to another allows rapid and efficient stowage. The large medium-speed roll-on roll-off vessel is an imposing power projection capability. The potential usable square footage of the vessel is 380,000 square feet of cargo or eight football fields of space. The amount of square footage on the vessel equates to just under a heavy brigade combat team’s worth of supplies and equipment. Typically, a vessel sails with close to sixty-five percent of its square footage capacity fulfilled. The thirty-five percent of open space consists of space between the front, back, and sides of vehicles plus the space between the cargo and the walls of the vessel. The needs of the operational commander may require a rapid discharge of certain capabilities at the port. This can reduce the percentage of potential stowage while increasing the effectiveness of the operational force. The stowage factor of a vessel often represents a tension between the strategic and operational levels. The intent of this study is to examine how well the United States’ fleet of large cargo vessels supports operational commanders in achieving their campaign objectives. The study examines the elements of operational design during past and potential conflicts to achieve this intent. A critical item to examine is how many of the world’s ports can accept a large medium-speed roll-on roll-off vessel. The 5 An Army Stryker Brigade Combat Team represents over 210,000 square feet of cargo with over 1,400 vehicles.6 All of the brigade’s equipment easily fits into the large medium-speed roll-on roll-off vessel. The vessel imposes many challenges on the ports where it lands. The maximum draft of the large medium-speed roll-on roll-off vessel is just under thirty-seven feet of water.7 Therefore, the port and harbor must be capable of servicing vessels of such depth. Since the large medium-speed roll-on roll-off vessel stores over 380,000 square feet of cargo, its ports of call require at least four to five times that amount of square feet of open storage for efficient marshalling of the cargo loaded inside the large medium-speed roll-on roll-off vessel. Another key concern is whether the harbor and its approach can support the depth, length, width, and turning radius of such a large vessel. Lastly, the berthing space at the port must be able to physically fit and tie-down a vessel that is over 950 feet in length. Department of Defense’s alternative when a vessel cannot be loaded pier-side in order to support military operations is a process known as joint logistics over-the-shore. Joint logistics over-the-shore involves building an elevated causeway, a floating causeway, or the improved navy lighterage system (INLS) that connects into a vessels existing ramp system to allow the discharge of cargo while out at sea in deep water.8Joint logistics over-the-shore is another imposing power projection capability that few nations can imagine affording or conducting. The conduct of a joint logistics over-the-shore requires extensive logistics support and preparations by all of the parties involved. At a minimum, those parties include command and control personnel, lighterage vessels, tugboats, harbormasters, barge derrick cranes, beach preparation crews, cargo handlers, and cargo documenters. 9 The point being that the operation is complex and time consuming. The resources to conduct the mission involve slow moving boats with slow transit times and a significant assembly period that spans 7-14 days.10 Many works have studied the feasibility of the large medium-speed roll-on roll-off vessel, the C-17, and prepositioned afloat cargo. Examples of such works are the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review of 1995, the Quadrennial Defense Reviews of 2001 and 2006, and the Army Materiel Command’s review of the Operation Iraqi Freedom deployment.11 There are also several studies highlighting the shortcomings of the large medium-speed roll-on roll-off fleet. Many of the studies identify the need for some type of vessel that can bridge the gap between them and the limitations of shallow draft ports. Kenneth Hickins’ study titled, “The United States Military’s Weakest Link,” identifies the overall shortcomings and successes of the strategic mobility program in a very articulate and detailed manner. Another excellent work studies the capabilities of the Theater Support Vessel. The focus of the study is how the Theater Support Vessel can augment the execution of joint logistics over-the-shore. However, the intent of the work was to examine the exact number of Theater Support Vessels the Department of Defense should procure. 13 The study examined the Theater Support Vessel as a potential fix for the Department of Defense’s medium sized roll-on roll-off fleet and concluded that the Theater Support Vessel best works to provide intra-theater lift in a rapid manner. Due to its limited carrying capacity, the vessel best serves commanders once in a theater of operations. The Theater Support Vessels currently serving in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf perform missions of this nature. These vessels deliver or lighter cargos to ports in the Persian Gulf region. However, the focus of that work was the entire spectrum of the system; whereas this study focuses specifically on sealift in terms related to operational art and design. 12 Lightering refers to the process of taking goods or cargos from a larger ship to a smaller ship that can access shallow waters or a bare beach The Department of Defense’s Mobility Requirements Study for 2005 and the Congressional Research Service’s analysis of that study are two other works that analyzed the shortcomings of the medium sized vessel fleet. Both studies identify the faults of the cargo vessel fleet while examining potential replacements that the Department of Defense may procure to eliminate deficiencies. However, neither study articulates the current problem in terms that show the shortcomings operational commander’s face because of those challenges. The Congressional Research Service study highlights the failure to procure a shallow draft medium sized high speed roll-on roll-off platform as an “issue of regret” representing a significant lost opportunity. One trend amongst strategic mobility studies is that authors typically identify the main issue of overall size and draft among the fleet. However, none of the studies to date articulates the issue in a manner that analyzes the problem at the operational level using the elements of operational art and design. The lack of analysis at the operational level may be why the issue has not generated much interest. Until an analysis displays the problem in those terms, it may not garner the support or attention it truly deserves. The intent of this work is to go into depth with regard to the need for the right mix of large and medium sized roll-on roll-off vessels. In addition, the intent of this study is to tie all of the shortcomings discussed so far in terms that relate to how an operational commander prosecutes his overall fight. In order to achieve this goal the quantitative research associated with this study goes through a qualitative analysis. The research results of this study then undergo an examination using the elements of operational design such as operational reach, tempo, simultaneity, risk, and culmination.17 The aim of this study is to identify those effects historically using the most recent mission to Haiti, Operation Unified Response, and the mission to Somalia from 1992 to 1994, Operation Restore 16These concepts are the method this study uses to compare quantitative and qualitative data. 9 Hope, as examples. A comparison of the historical case studies and two notional case studies occurs next, with Nigeria and Kenya as the notional case studies for this monograph. They are potential examples of nations or regions where the United States may face future challenges. The decision to use nations and ports in Africa is due to the current nature of conflict, the potential for relief missions in the region, and the untested capabilities of the United States’ newest combatant command, Africa Command (AFRICOM).

**AFRICOM failure crushes critical access to Africa – key to overall stability**

William C. **Whitsitt** (Lieutenant Commander in the Navy, MA US Naval War College) May **2007** “U.S. Africa Command: An Opportunity for Effective Interagency Cooperation” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA470807%5D&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

The success or failure of AFRICOM will have strategic, operational and tactical impacts. Strategically, though axiomatic when considering the United States’ recent and ongoing involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and subsequent loss of international support for these efforts, failure to achieve greater stability in Africa will further deplete the United States’ international legitimacy in the eyes of allies and enemies alike. Continued instability in Africa would hamper U.S. efforts to reduce its dependency on Middle Eastern oil, as well as prevent African nations from exploiting their own resources in overcoming their economic crises: both affecting the global economy. Finally, continued instability in Africa prolongs the United States’ efforts in fighting the formerly known Long War. Conversely, stability in Africa addresses narcotics trafficking, illegal immigration, and terrorism issues facing Europe, the United States and Africa. Operationally, an ineffective GCC would erode U.S. legitimacy within Africa and effectively close U.S. Government access to this strategically important continent. Our inability to promote theater security cooperation would negatively impact United Nations, European Union, African Union (AU), and Economic Community of Western Africa States (ECOWAS) efforts in Africa. At the tactical level, whether conducting humanitarian assistance, crisis response, peacekeeping or direct action, Africa would ultimately be more dangerous to troops and civilians in the performance of their missions.

\*GCC = Geographic Combatant Command

**Africa is a geopolitical open range – plan is key to lock in political alliances that prevent great power involvement**

Dr. Jeffrey Deutsch (Founder, Rabid Tiger Project) November 2002 “the rabid tiger project's major prediction for 2025” http://users.rcn.com/jeff-deutsch/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html

Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

**Otherwise wars escalate globally**

Glick, 12/12/2007 Caroline – senior Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy, Condi’s African holiday,http://www.carolineglick.com/e/2007/12/condis-african-holiday.php?pf=yes

The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers. Located in and around the Horn of Africa are the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year civil war, is a major source of regional conflict. Eritrea has a nagging border dispute with Ethiopia which could easily ignite. The two countries fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000 over control of the town of Badme. Although a UN mandated body determined in 2002 that the disputed town belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia has rejected the finding and so the conflict festers. Eritrea also fights a proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia and in Ethiopia's rebellious Ogaden region. In Somalia, Eritrea is the primary sponsor of the al-Qaida-linked Islamic Courts Union which took control of Somalia in June, 2006. In November 2006, the ICU government declared jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. Backed by the US, Ethiopia invaded Somalia last December to restore the recognized Transitional Federal Government to power which the ICU had deposed. Although the Ethiopian army successfully ousted the ICU from power in less than a week, backed by massive military and financial assistance from Eritrea, as well as Egypt and Libya, the ICU has waged a brutal insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military for the past year. THE SENIOR ICU leadership, including Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed have received safe haven in Eritrea. In September, the exiled ICU leadership held a nine-day conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia headed by Ahmed. Eritrean President-for-life Isaias Afwerki declared his country's support for the insurgents stating, "The Eritrean people's support to the Somali people is consistent and historical, as well as a legal and moral obligation." Although touted in the West as a moderate, Ahmed has openly supported jihad and terrorism against Ethiopia, Kenya and the West. Aweys, for his part, is wanted by the FBI in connection with his role in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Then there is Eritrea's support for the Ogaden separatists in Ethiopia. The Ogaden rebels are Somali ethnics who live in the region bordering Somalia and Kenya. The rebellion is run by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which uses terror and sabotage as its preferred methods of warfare. It targets not only Ethiopian forces and military installations, but locals who wish to maintain their allegiance to Ethiopia or reach a negotiated resolution of the conflict. In their most sensationalist attack to date, in April ONLF terror forces attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in April killing nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopians. Ethiopia, for its part has fought a brutal counter-insurgency to restore its control over the region. Human rights organizations have accused Ethiopia of massive human rights abuses of civilians in Ogaden. THEN THERE is Sudan. As Eric Reeves wrote in the Boston Globe on Saturday, "The brutal regime in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, has orchestrated genocidal counter-insurgency war in Darfur for five years, and is now poised for victory in its ghastly assault on the region's African populations." The Islamist government of Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir is refusing to accept non-African states as members of the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur that is due to replace the undermanned and demoralized African Union peacekeeping force whose mandate ends on December 31. Without its UN component of non-African states, the UN Security Council mandated force will be unable to operate effectively. Khartoum's veto led Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping to warn last month that the entire peacekeeping mission may have to be aborted. And the Darfur region is not the only one at risk. Due to Khartoum's refusal to carry out the terms of its 2005 peace treaty with the Southern Sudanese that ended Khartoum's 20-year war and genocide against the region's Christian and animist population, the unsteady peace may be undone. Given Khartoum's apparent sprint to victory over the international community regarding Darfur, there is little reason to doubt that once victory is secured, it will renew its attacks in the south. THE CONFLICTS in the Horn of Africa have regional and global dimensions. Regionally, Egypt has played a central role in sponsoring and fomenting conflicts. Egypt's meddling advances its interest of preventing the African nations from mounting a unified challenge to Egypt's colonial legacy of extraordinary rights to the waters of the Nile River which flows through all countries of the region.

# \*\*\*Topicality\*\*\*

# DTS

**Counterinterp – DTS programs are transportation infrastructure**

**Fairbanks 96** (D. Fairbanks, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, “DoD Transportation Engineering,” April 1996, DoD Directive 4510.11, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA306890, Sawyer)

2. Defense Transportation System. That portion of the Nation's **transportation infrastructure** that supports DoD common-user transportation needs across the range of military operations. It consists of those common-user military and commercial assets, services, and systems organic to, contracted for, or controlled by the Department of Defense. Also called DTS.

# Investment (Funding Mech)

**Funding goes directly to and only to port transportation infrastructure**

**Keating and Sommerhauser 12** (Edward G. Keating, professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, senior economist specializing in defense economics issues, PhD, economic analysis, Stanford University, Daniel Sommerhauser, Statistical Project Associate in the Statistical Research and Consulting Group, RAND, MA, statistics, University of Missouri, “Funding Ammunition Ports,” RAND, Technical Report, Arroyo Center, 2012, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical\_reports/2012/RAND\_TR1204.pdf, Sawyer)

The United States Army’s Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) asked the RAND Corporation to assess the mechanisms by which SDDC funds its two ammunition ports, Military Ocean Terminal Concord (MOTCO), northeast of Oakland, California; and Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU), southwest of Wilmington, North Carolina. With a legacy of different histories (e.g., before October 1, 2008, what is now MOTCO was the Navy’s Naval Weapon Station Concord, NWSC), the ports are currently funded in different manners. In that the ports are now both overseen by SDDC and have essentially the same missions albeit on different coasts, it seems eminently reasonable to transition the ports onto the same financial structure. The central question of this research inquiry is what the most appropriate financial structure would be. In the broadest sense, there are two alternatives (as well as additional alternatives generated by hybridization of the two basic approaches). The first alternative we term appropriation. Under this approach, the standard Department of Defense (DoD) and Army budgetary process would appropriate funds to pay to operate, maintain, and, if desired, upgrade the ports. The ports would then provide ammunition handling services to Army and other DoD customers as needed without charging those customers for the services provided.

**That’s one of four topical aff lit bases – our interp solves limits better**

**Commander et al. 10** (NO DATE CITED, 2010 is the copyright date) \*Charles Commander, Sector Leader (Global & Americas) \*\*Jamie Page, Sector Leader (EMEA) \*\*\*Stafford Bagot, Sector Leader (APAC) “Engineering, Construction & Infrastructure” http://www.heidrick.com/ExecutiveSearch/Industry/Industrial/Pages/ECI.aspx)

While the term infrastructure is widely used to cover a range of asset classes, traditionally it has been used to describe three specific categories of physical assets: Transportation - infrastructure such as airports, ports, roads and rail etc. Energy - infrastructure such as power stations and gas distribution pipelines

# Equipment

**Counterinterpretation – transport investment is construction of infrastructure and new equipment – excludes repair and maintenance – solves limits better**

**Collenette 99** – Hon. David M. Collenette, P.C., M.P. Minister of Transportation of Canada Transportation in Canada 1999 annual reporthttp://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/T1-10-1999E.pdf BK

Whether made by business or government, “transport investment” can be defined as both new infrastructure construction and purchases of new machinery and equipment. Investment excludes repair and maintenance expenditure, which are expenditures on existing infrastructure, machinery and equipment.

# MOTs In the United States

**MOT’s are part of the United States**

**VanHoosen 97** [Paul VanHoosen, Lieutenant Commander, February 7, 1997, “MILITARY OCEAN TERMINALS WHO NEEDS THEM?”, Naval War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA325154, DMintz]

1- Official Military Ocean Terminals are owned by the Army.

Bayonne, Oakland, and Sunny Point, NC (MOTSU) are the only true MOTs in CONUS. MOTSU is currently an ammunition only port.

2- Unofficial MOTs (not normally called MOTs) are owned by DoD (non-Army elements) The Ports of Charleston, Norfolk and NWS Concord (as the west coast ammunition only port) are in this category.

# \*\*\*Solvency Mechanisms\*\*\*

# 1AC Funding

**The plan transitions MOT’s away from price-generated revenue – this prevents revenue volatility and is key to adequate funding**

**Keating and Sommerhauser 12** (Edward G. Keating, professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, senior economist specializing in defense economics issues, PhD, economic analysis, Stanford University, Daniel Sommerhauser, Statistical Project Associate in the Statistical Research and Consulting Group, RAND, MA, statistics, University of Missouri, “Funding Ammunition Ports,” RAND, Technical Report, Arroyo Center, 2012, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical\_reports/2012/RAND\_TR1204.pdf, Sawyer)

A second criterion we espouse is funding stability. In particular, if the DoD has a longrun need for the capability to load and unload ships carrying ammunition, it is not helpful to sharply vary funding for such ports. As noted at the end of Chapter Two, MOTSU has been adroit at making good use of episodic influxes of funding. But it is challenging for port managers to accommodate funding variability while capability requirements are unchanged. Any governmental organization faces variance in the level of funding availability over time. But funding variability can be amplified in a working capital fund environment. The total costs of operating MOTCO, for instance, would not be three times as large if nine ships used the port in a year rather than three. However, working capital fund–generated revenue would be three times as large absent a change in prices. Indeed, working capital fund prices are adjusted inversely to expected workload levels for this reason. But to help customers formulate their budgets, prices are generally set two to three years in advance based on forecasts of workload. Unanticipated workload therefore generates unexpected revenue, whereas unexpected loss of workload implies loss of anticipated revenue. Of course, funding stability cannot offset funding inadequacy. **MOTCO’s funding has been** relatively stable but arguably **at an inadequate level.** Ultimately, **the fixed costs of ammunition port capabilities and capacities need to be borne by someone.** They can be borne by port customers through prices that vary inversely with workload provided to the ports. Or they can more directly be funded through appropriation. We favor the latter approach because reliance on price-generated revenue introduces additional volatility. Further, paying for such costs through appropriation makes clear the DoD’s fundamental decision on the level of ammunition port capability and capacity it wishes to fund. Reliance on price-generated revenue obfuscates the fundamental decision with the related, but different, decision of how much workload to put through a given port in a year. Since ammunition ports most centrally exist for infrequent, high-intensity deployments, the level of annual workload may be poorly correlated with the underlying requirement.

**Ammunition port funding stability is key to prevent price volatility – key to meet force demands**

**Keating and Sommerhauser 12** (Edward G. Keating, professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, senior economist specializing in defense economics issues, PhD, economic analysis, Stanford University, Daniel Sommerhauser, Statistical Project Associate in the Statistical Research and Consulting Group, RAND, MA, statistics, University of Missouri, “Funding Ammunition Ports,” RAND, Technical Report, Arroyo Center, 2012, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical\_reports/2012/RAND\_TR1204.pdf

We think that expenditures used to maintain a port’s existing capabilities and capacities should be funded by appropriation. The majority of these expenditures are fixed costs, i.e., they do not vary with the port’s annual output level. It would be desirable for the budgetary process to explicitly acknowledge the fixed, output-invariant costs associated with having ammunition port capabilities available. Paying for such costs through appropriation makes clear the DoD’s fundamental decision on the level of ammunition port capability and capacity it wishes to fund. Reliance on price-generated revenue obscures the fundamental decision with the related, but different, decision of how much workload to put through a given port in a year. Since ammunition ports most centrally exist for infrequent, high-intensity deployments, the level of annual workload may be poorly correlated with the underlying requirement. As opposed to fixed costs, variable costs are those that vary with a port’s annual workload level. We think that variable costs should be funded by customers through revenue from TWCF prices. We further recommend that capacity and capability improvements be funded by whoever demands the improvement, e.g., the TWCF, operating commands. Although the precise division of fixed costs, variable costs, and capacity/capability improvements has some grey areas, we show that most ammunition port costs in MOTSU’s accounting data can be logically inserted into one of these categories. Our two funding policy variations differ in that the variation on the left of Figure S.1 has appropriations directly pay for fixed costs, whereas in the variation on the right of Figure S.1, appropriations would 100 percent reimburse the TWCF that would actually make the fixed cost expenditures. Under the latter variation, the port’s management would have more discretion and flexibility but less chain-of-command oversight. A strength of either proposed variation is that customers, through TWCF prices, would face marginal costs when deciding how much workload to put through a port. Efficiency is enhanced when customers make decisions based on marginal, not average, costs. Funding would be more stable than under arrangements with higher TWCF prices. Current MOTSU financial data can be used to implement either variation. Increased reliance on appropriations could benefit other military services, but at the expense of the Army. The ports’ current funding arrangements do not perform badly against our stated criteria. In that the TWCF pays for more fixed costs at MOTSU than at MOTCO, there is more behavior distortion from excessive prices at MOTSU. However, there is little evidence at observed price levels that ammunition-shipping customers respond to prices, i.e., ports’ locations and capabilities are more important than their prices in customer decisionmaking. We were told that military services choose which port to use on the basis of geography, ship and port availability, and port capability, with TWCF prices being of little importance. Of course, at some price level, customers’ ammunition port decisions would be altered. The current funding arrangements rate less well against the funding stability criterion. When workload changes, revenue from customers likely changes more than costs. A fairness concern with the current funding arrangements is that MOTCO’s greater reliance on appropriations benefits other services more than MOTSU’s current arrangement.

# 1AC Railway

**Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its investment in transportation infrastructure by reopening the Wallace to Castle Hayne rail segment**

**Here’s our solvency advocate – this is key to MOT access**

**HDR 04** (HDR Engineering, global firm providing architecture, engineering, consulting, construction and related services, “Economic Feasibility Study for the Restoration of the Wallace to Castle Hayne Rail Corridor and Associated Port/Rail Improvements,” North Carolina Department of Transportation Rail Division, February 2004, http://www.bytrain.org/quicklinks/reports/WtoWEconomicStudy.pdf, Sawyer)

The overall objective of this Study is to provide and test a “Proof of Concept” that will examine the feasibility of reopening the Wallace to Castle Hayne rail segment. Previous Chapters of this Report addressed various railroad operational and infrastructure issues to include capital cost estimates. This Chapter will build on information already presented and will summarize the analysis of the economic feasibility of reintroducing rail service between Wallace and Castle Hayne. Improved rail operations due to the rehabilitation of the Wallace to Castle Hayne line segment would not only increase efficiency and reduce costs of existing operations, but also provide opportunities for expansion of rail service and enhancement of regional business opportunities. These potential savings and enhancements were divided into five areas for evaluation:

1. Reduced operating costs for existing and forecasted growth of current rail service.

2. Incremental increases in existing rail traffic.

3. New rail and Port opportunities through expanded cargo handling or expansion of new industries.

4. Location of new industries on the reopened line segment.

5. Improved access to the Military Ocean Terminal at Sunny Point (MOTSU), a Department of Defense (DOD) Facility operated by the U.S. Army.

# 1AC Equipment

**The plan’s investment in new infrastructure for ammunition ports solves**

**Martin 99** (Bruce A. Martin, Lieutenant, United States Navy B.S., Oregon State University, “Analysis and Evaluation of the Department of Defense’s Shift from Motor Carrier to Rail Movements of Ammunition Within the Continental United States,” Naval Postgraduate School, March 1999, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA361430, Sawyer)

\*\*\*note – CHE = Container Handling Equipment

TURBOCADS exercises identify potential shortfalls in the transportation system that could prevent the routine continuous use of containerized muntions. TURBOCADS exercises test on-hand container handling equipment throughput at depots and ports and identify container-handling shortages. They also test container throughput at ammunition ports. They found a shortage of CHE at depots and ports and that borrowing or leasing equipment is standard practice at installations with shortages. **This presented an obstacle in the smooth operation of containerized ammunition transfer.** Another major finding was the low container throughput at the West Coast ammunition ports. Dedicated container cranes did not exist at these ports and throughput suffered as a result. Each year, a subsequent TURBOCADS exercise is designed to improve lessons learned from the previous exercise and test a different area of the containerized ammunition pipeline. [Ref. 7:p. 77]

**Funding port equipment upgrades solves**

**Hancock and Lee 98** (Sam R. and Peter J., “The Ammuniton Supply Chain and Intermodalism: From Depot to Foxhole,” March, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA343623)//mat

The purpose of TURBO CADS 95 was to use the lessons learned from TURBO CADS 94 and improve on them. Many of the objectives were similar, but also included: • Place more emphasis on partnership with the commercial transportation industry and civilian ports. • Employ newer CHE technologies and doctrine. Provide and utilize a standing door-to-door contract with the carrier. • Emphasize Army and Marine Corps operations more. • Emphasize Korea, both in and out. • Evaluate alternative dunnage. • Evaluate Intransit Visibility (ITV). [Ref. 38:p.2] Among the ports to be utilized and shipped to in TURBO CADS 95 were Valdez Alaska, Hawaii, Port Hadlock, NWS Concord, Okinawa, Misawa, Sasebo, Hiro, and Chinhae. The articles to be transported were: • USAF - Standard operational munitions. • Army - Training munitions. • USMC - Training munitions. This would use no more than 2000 containers in all. There was a combination of two plans under consideration in the initial exercise design phase. Together Plans A and B would provide for the total ammunition lift requirement. The principal objective of Plan A was to utilize commercial door-to-door service, including the use of commercial ports. Two hundred and thirty-six TEUs were to be shipped from CONUS to Korea. There was particular interest in the capabilities of commercial West coast ports to ship containers to Pusan. 7 Plan B was to supplement Plan A by utilizing commercial door-to-door service, but routed through military instead of commercial ports. This would cover the remaining 1536 TEU lift requirement. Shipments were to go from NWS Concord to ports in Hawaii, Okinawa, Japan and Korea. These shipments were available to all US flagged carriers through open competition. Plan A was not successful. Korea disapproved use of Pusan, so Plan A's container assignment was merged with Plan B. The movements were accomplished with MSC Charters and Commercial Carriers. A total of 30,780 short tons were moved for $596/short ton or a total of $18.3 Million. There were several major lessons learned from this exercise. Commercial door-to-door service was not possible without conducting risk assessments and obtaining waivers for ports and intermodal transfer facilities. Limits and/or restrictions on Net Explosive Weight (NEW) must be worked out prior to port planning. Commercial waivers are very difficult to obtain but the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) has waiver authority for DoD facilities. The west coast DoD munitions ports, Port Hadlock and NWS Concord, were not as effective as in the previous TURBO CADS exercise. Recommendations were made to continue full funding of the NWS Concord container port upgrade, to upgrade Port Hadlock's container gantry crane, and to continue working munitions movements through commercial ports. Commercial transportation industry response was fairly poor. Ocean carriers' proposals would not meet deadlines, and the lack of backloads from west coast ports caused slow truck support until increased funding was paid for deadhead mileage. Ocean, rail and truck carriers need to be included in exercise planning meetings to relieve these conflicts. It was discovered that ITV through Automatic Identification Technologies (AIT) required host nation approval for radio frequency (RF) spectrum usage. This also needs to be incorporated into the planning phase. Oceangoing tug-barges provided a viable strategic capability for sustainment and resupply. A 680 TEU tugbarge unit with a 120 ton crane and container handling equipment was self sustaining and reliable. They could make the trip from NWS Concord to Chinhae, Korea at 8-10 knots in 21-26 days, only 5-6 days longer than container ships. These vessels also provided an excellent platform for Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) operations if port facilities were not available. [Ref. 38:p.l6] Overall, integrating CADS with existing commercial intermodal service proved to be very challenging. Hence, this was to be the focus of the CENTCOM (Central Command) TURBO CADS 96 exercise. The 96 exercise was canceled however due to various reasons including difficulties in contracting services, obtaining port waivers and permits, and overall funding.

# 1AC Personnel

**The plan invests in adequate security forces for MOTs – this protects and sustains vital base operations**

**Schwartz 06** (General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF Commander, United States Transportation Command, “Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Seapower Subcommittee On the State of the Command,” April 4, 2006, www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/TestSchwartz060404.doc, Sawyer)

USTRANSCOM ability to accomplish its global mission rests on our ability to protect our personnel and assets. We are improving force protection through intelligence information sharing, physical countermeasures, and employee screening, partnering with COCOMs, our components, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and commercial industry. To better share information, SDDC is sponsoring surface secure classified communication efforts to integrate the Association of American Railroads (AAR) by late CY06. In addition, SDDC has explored similar capability discussions with the American Trucking Associations (ATA) to facilitate ATA gaining secure connectivity with SDDC. As an interim solution, SDDC provides classified intelligence exchanges via Transportation Security Operations Center secure systems accessible by ATA and AAR representatives, and hosts weekly intelligence sharing sessions and secure telephone connectivity with maritime commercial partners. Protecting our military and commercial seaports will continue to be a serious challenge. USTRANSCOM and SDDC have continued to secure funding to further improve infrastructure security at the Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU), North Carolina and the Military Ocean Terminal Concord (MOTCO), California. In 2005, waterside protective barriers at MOTSU were completed and $789,000 was invested for two new physical security improvements. As we upgrade and better fortify these installations from terrorism or natural disaster, **the difficulty ahead lies in providing an adequate level of security force manning with sustained funding to support base operations and protect our vital national AA&E transshipment ports.** In 2005, SDDC mobilized a small compliment of the remaining Army Reserve military police (MP) elements to augment SDDC civilian ports security. However, their departure and lack of backfill requires USTRANSCOM to seek alternatives such as contracting security personnel drawn from local sheriff/police departments during surge periods. However, availability of these security forces will be at risk during a local crisis, which makes this solution less than optimal. During a localized state crisis involving a strategic DOD seaport of embarkation, DOD may need to depend on augmentation under state control until military augmentation would be available.

# \*\*\*Transportation Good-Generic\*\*\*

# Improved Logistics Needed

**Force reduction and increased tempo of operations necessitates improved logistics**

**Honea et al. 2k** - PhD (Robert B., Sarah E. Brown, Henry M. Bennett, “U.S. Military Transportation,” Committee on Military Transportation, <http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/millennium/00137.pdf>)//mat

Recent closure or loss of overseas bases and assets now requires a greater dependence on deploying forces from the continental United States (CONUS), thus requiring efficient deployment planning. At the same time, widely scattered and increasingly numerous lowscale operations result in a greater pace of military deployments than ever before. Deploying from home station directly into theaters together with resupply and sustainment presents a highly complicated problem in military logistics that demands the application of appropriate technologies. In the civilian world, technology and advanced logistics concepts have greatly increased transportation efficiency and capacity. The Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) theater commanders in chief (CINCs) have recognized the emergence of the new technologies and now routinely demand constant updates and estimates on when the “forces will close.” Furthermore, the Wal-Mart approach to resupply and sustainment is becoming the norm. In most military operations, early deployment cargo moves on military assets. Although these early movements may account for only a small portion of the total, they are often the most critical. Still, most military cargo, personnel, and war-fighting assets now move on commercial assets. For example, more than 95 percent of the equipment and cargo shipped in Desert Shield and Desert Storm moved on commercial carriers. Because of this, DoD instituted agreements with commercial carriers to ensure asset availability when needed. However, in an era of increasing need for military augmentation, competitive pressures have reduced civilian excess capacity and increased the need for closer coordination between the military and civilian carriers. Civilian-sector efficiency improvements result from the rapidly increasing use of technology to identify, track, and quickly locate cargo and shipments. For example, global positioning systems are now commonplace in the commercial trucking industry. The military sector needs to adopt these commercial successes more rapidly. Many disciplines are available to improve the planning and execution of military deployments, such as information technology and computers; communications; network flow models; operations research and logistics science; design of lift assets; demand reduction; and vehicle scheduling, routing, and monitoring. Many military transportation problems are being addressed by commercial companies or are the subject of research in universities and national laboratories. Because of the military’s conservative nature, the research community has the lead in developing and using advanced technology. We need a mechanism to bring these groups—military, business, and research centers—together to ensure that the latest developments in transportation are made available to solve military transportation problems. We believe that the Transportation Research Board’s Committee on Military Transportation is that mechanism.

# Transportation Improvement Needed Now

**The geopolitical climate makes transportation improvement uniquely important**

**McNabb 11**- retired Air Force general (Duncan J., “We Measure Success Through the Eyes of the War Fighter,” Air and Space Power Journal, Winter, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a555500.pdf>)//mat

United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provides strategic mobility to our nation. No other government, commercial, or private agency can move as much to as many places as quickly. The spirit and flexibility of the people who make up the Total Force USTRANSCOM team put the command on the world’s stage. The past two years have been among the most challenging in USTRANSCOM’s history. The simultaneous drawdown of 80,000 troops in Iraq, the surge of forces into Afghanistan, Haitian earthquake-relief operations, and the Pakistani flood-relief effort confronted us in 2010. 1 The year 2011 has proved no less dramatic. The “Arab Spring” began in Tunisia and quickly spread to Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen. USTRANSCOM supported each situation, evacuating innocents, moving security forces, and delivering humanitarian-relief supplies. In Libya the command moved forces and offered around-the-clock air-refueling tanker capability for North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces while also supporting the president’s travels in Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador. Then, the fourth most powerful earthquake since 1900 struck off the east coast of Japan, lasting over six minutes, literally knocking the earth off its axis, and shortening the length of a day. 2 Worse, the tsunami that followed devastated Japanese coastal areas, caused a nuclear meltdown, and even damaged property in California. USTRANSCOM’s emergency airlift and airrefueling support not only evacuated over 7,500 people and 400 pets but also made available crucial transport of nuclear expertise and material to help control the reactors at Fukushima. We did all of this in addition to supporting combat operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. In March 2011, for the first time in USTRANSCOM history, the command supported simultaneous priority-one movements in all six geographic combatant commands—truly March madness! In the face of two unbelievably difficult years, I’m proud to say that USTRANSCOM, together with our components and commercial partners, never failed to fulfill our promises to the war fighter, the president, and our nation. Yet, even as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq wind down, future challenges demand continued advances.

# Rail Capacity Decreasing

**Railway capacity is decreasing- DoD track purchase solves**

**Honea et al. 2k** - PhD (Robert B., Sarah E. Brown, Henry M. Bennett, “U.S. Military Transportation,” Committee on Military Transportation, <http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/millennium/00137.pdf>)//mat

Current DoD policy is to transport personnel, equipment, and sustainment using commercial assets when practical and prudent. Even in contingency situations, commercial railroads, truck lines, ocean carriers, barge-towing industry, airlines, and bus companies play a critical role in projecting U.S. forces from CONUS and outside CONUS locations to the theater of operations. A major issue facing the commercial transportation industry and Military Transportation 3 DoD is the declining excess capacity of the system. Other issues include a shortage of seafarers and longshoremen in the ocean carrier industry. DoD responded to the airline industry problem by implementing the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Program and to the commercial ocean-shipping problem with the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) program. A readily available fleet of militarily useful merchant vessels and motor and rail carriers is a critical element of the Defense Transportation System (DTS). VISA and CRAF provide DoD with staged access to and payment procedures for commercial shipping and intermodal assets in the event of war or national emergency. The Ready Reserve Force and the Military Sealift Command (MSC) Surge Sealift Fleet provide DoD with an organic ability to move most of its unit equipment that is too large to fit in commercial containers. Motor Carriers Although sufficient motor carrier resources appear to be available to support surface transport, the availability of drivers and an appropriate mix of specialized transport is a potential problem for DoD. Trucking competition and deregulation have forced motor carriers to become more efficient, thereby removing the excess capacity on which DoD has relied for surge requirements. DoD may be able to recapture some of the lost capability by purchasing organic specialized fleets. However, a better answer appears to be in partnering with commercial carriers and offering incentives to ensure needed capacity. Rail Carriers Railroads are a primary means of transportation during deployment because of security, flexibility, and high capacity. Since 1976, U.S. railway accessibility and capability have steadily declined. As a last resort to combat the capacity erosion, DoD can purchase and maintain critical track sections when commercial ownership is not viable. Shortline railroads, formed as the larger railroads centralized, are now critical to maintaining a feeder network to and from the main rail lines. Today, only a limited surplus of rolling stock is available to serve during defense emergencies. As a result, DoD has purchased a fleet of more than 2,000 railcars. Inland Waterway Carriers In recent years, various entities have examined the U.S. inland waterway system as a resource to transport military cargo. Continued application of technology to barge operations and integration of the inland waterway system into the nation’s intermodal system makes this an area ripe for additional development.

# Transportation Infrastructure key to Crisis Response

# DTS Infrastructure key to Power Projection

**DTS infrastructure sustains DoD capabilities that are essential to power projection**

**USTC 11** [United States Transportation Command, August 18, 2011 (original: August 2007), “Defense Transportation Regulation Part VII”, <http://www.transcom.mil/dtr/part-vii/dtr_part_vii_toc.pdf>, DMintz]

The Defense Transportation System is that portion of the worldwide transportation infrastructure that supports Department of Defense (DOD) transportation needs in peace and war. The Defense Transportation System consists of two major elements: military (organic) and commercial resources. These resources include aircraft, assets, services, and systems organic to, contracted for, or controlled by the Department of Defense. The Defense Transportation System infrastructure, including ports, airlift, sealift, railway, highway, intransit visibility, information management systems, customs, and traffic management that the Department of Defense maintains and exercises in peacetime, is a vital element of the Department of Defense capability to project power worldwide. It provides for responsive force projection and a seamless transition between peacetime and wartime operations.

# \*\*\*Military Ocean Terminals\*\*\*

# MOTs Indispensable

**Fully capable and operable MOT’s are needed**

**VanHoosen 97** [Paul VanHoosen, Lieutenant Commander, February 7, 1997, “MILITARY OCEAN TERMINALS WHO NEEDS THEM?”, Naval War College, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA325154>, DMintz]

As the single manager of the Defense Transportation System, TRANSCOM's mission is to provide DoD with transportation services as the honest broker between supporting and supported CINCs. TRANSCOM must ensure it can deliver the service its customers expect in the amount planned and in the time frame allotted. The CINCs' warfighting capabilities depend on TRANSCOM minimizing the CINCs' "window of vulnerability" while force capability arrives at its place of employment. It is in TRANSCOM's interest that they do not inhibit mission accomplishment.

TRANSCOM has prescribed that DoD organic self-sufficiency is essential to initial surge deployments. TRANSCOM has not fully extended this policy to their water ports and is heavily dependent on commercial ports for mission success. With the closing of Military Ocean Terminals Bayonne and Oakland, that dependency is increased. Should the commercial sector fail, or be unable, to support TRANSCOM for whatever reasons, mission failure is probable and the trust in jeopardy.

Alternatives are available. Retain sufficient DoD organic port capability to ensure a Major Regional Conflict deployment is accommodated with Defense Transportation System assets. Utilizing ammunition ports, expanding capabilities at active Military Ocean Terminals, and establishing a Military Ocean Terminal within existing DoD infrastructure offer opportunities to improve Defense Transportation System self-sufficiency. Military Ocean Terminals are the guarantee TRANSCOM needs for guaranteed mission accomplishment. **Fully capable and always available, Military Ocean Terminals are not obsolete**. **They are indispensable**.

**Military Ocean Terminals are indispensable—solve mission failure**

**VanHoosen 97** [Paul VanHoosen, Lieutenant Commander, February 7, 1997, “MILITARY OCEAN TERMINALS WHO NEEDS THEM?”, Naval War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA325154, DMintz]

CONCLUSION

TRANSCOM's DoD mission places it as the intermediary between the supporting and supported CINC. As the honest broker oftransportation services, TRANSCOM must ensure that it can deliver the service in the amount required and in the time frame allotted. The CINCs must trust TRANSCOM to minimize the "window of vulnerability" as force capability arrives in theater and builds up at its place of employment. It is in TRANSCOM's interest to ensure that nothing betrays this trust. TRANSCOM has decreed that DoD organic self-sufficiency is essential to preserving this trust, but they have not fully extended this logic to their water ports.

TRANSCOM is heavily dependent on commercial ports for mission success. The closing of Military Ocean Terminals Bayonne and Oakland increases that dependency. Should the commercial sector fail to support or not be able to support TRANSCOM for whatever reason, mission failure is probable and the trust in jeopardy. The solution is straight forward. Retain enough organic port capability to ensure that deployment operations for a Major Regional Conflict is accommodated with Defense Transportation System assets. **This capability is found in the Military Ocean Terminal.** Guaranteed available and fully ready to support a TRANSCOM directed deployment, **Military Ocean Terminals are not obsolete. They are indispensable**.

# AT: Commercial Ports Solve

**MOTs are critical for deployment to occur as planned**

**VanHoosen 97** [Paul VanHoosen, Lieutenant Commander, February 7, 1997, “MILITARY OCEAN TERMINALS WHO NEEDS THEM?”, Naval War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA325154, DMintz]

The decisive factor is control of the port. It is analogous to renting vice owning one's house. Renting presents significant problems if modifications or expansion to the house are necessary. Alterations can only commence when parameters are negotiated, responsibilities assigned, and agreements reached. Owning the house allows for greater assurance that it will be modified and ready to accommodate a surge deployment. When needed, **MOTs can provide that guarantee of availability and readiness that TRANSCOM needs to assure its customers that combat power will deploy as planned and as advertised**.

# MOTs key to TRANSCOM Readiness

**MOTs key to readiness**

**VanHoosen 97** [Paul VanHoosen, Lieutenant Commander, February 7, 1997, “MILITARY OCEAN TERMINALS WHO NEEDS THEM?”, Naval War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA325154, DMintz]

Military Ocean Terminals and L/T Leased ports are not constricted by the same limitations as commercial terminals. Vessel berths are controlled by MTMC and available when required. Sufficient staging area exists to prestage several vessels worth of surge unit equipment on a no-notice basis. Other capabilities include:

-available covered and secured storage areas.

-comprehensive physical security resources, with preplanned contingency responses to quickly modify security as required.

-resident heavy lift capability and helo receiving facilities.

-trained and experienced laborers, assigned by the unions and dedicated to military ocean terminal requirements.

-willingness to handle ammunition and manage its explosive arc issues. All MOTs handle small arms ammunition routinely and have standing exemptions ready for short-notice activation for higher classes of explosives.31 There is less sensitivity to ammunition movements provided the ammunition, and its arc, are confined within a DoD installation.

-rapid reaction and quick establishment of deployment operations. MOTs and MTMC L/T Leased facilities employ full time terminal employees engaged in routine terminal operations. As the MRS-BURU observed, "A great deal of benefit can be realized by keeping an active presence at strategic seaports."32 MOTs also bring unique advantages to the table that assist in deployment operations.

-Safe Haven areas for enroute classified, sensitive or high value shipments which are experiencing difficulties.

-layberthing for Military Sealift Command operated vessels. MOT layberth charges are five times less than commercial layberth rates.33

-improved command, control, communication, and documentation capabilities as system nodes are located at the ports.

-customized facilities, designed to receive, stage, and load military cargo.

-waiver and permit availability, with quick reaction time to prepare transportation documentation for unprepared units.

-24 hour port access. Surprisingly, this is not a given at commercial ports.

-billeting and messing for terminal personnel and reservists.

-training facilities for active duty, reserve, and civilian members in water port operations.

The decisive factor is control of the port. It is analogous to renting vice owning one's house. Renting presents significant problems if modifications or expansion to the house are necessary. Alterations can only commence when parameters are negotiated, responsibilities assigned, and agreements reached. Owning the house allows for greater assurance that it will be modified and ready to accommodate a surge deployment. When needed, **MOTs can provide that guarantee of availability and readiness** that TRANSCOM needs to assure its customers that combat power will deploy as planned and as advertised.

# MOTs key to Equipment Deployment

**Terminals key to equipment deployment during conflict—commercial sector doesn’t solve**

**VanHoosen 97** [Paul VanHoosen, Lieutenant Commander, February 7, 1997, “MILITARY OCEAN TERMINALS WHO NEEDS THEM?”, Naval War College, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA325154>, DMintz]

TRANSCOM'S MISSION

The requirement for a large, quick surge deployment of U.S. forces has not diminished since the Desert Shield experience. In his testimony before a House Committee, Mr. Norman Rabkin, Associate Director, Military Operations and Capabilities Issues, Government Accounting Office, stated that, "DoD has identified extensive mobility requirements for its sealift and airlift forces. During major regional conflicts, the requirement calls for moving as much cargo in 8 weeks as was moved during the first 6 months of the Persian Gulf War."4 This echoes especially true when considering the reduced forward presence of U.S. forces. In a Major Regional Conflict scenario, an increasing percentage of U.S. forces will deploy from CONUS, and of those deploying forces, **ninety to ninety-five percent will deploy their equipment by sealift through a water terminal.**

In charge of satisfying this deployment requirement is the United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). As DoD's single manager for transportation, TRANSCOM is tasked with "providing common-user airlift, sealift, surface transport, terminal services and commercial air, land, and sea transport, as needed to support the deployment, employment, and sustainment for U.S. forces on a global basis ..."(emphasis added).5 TRANSCOM's policy is to rely on DoD organic transportation assets for initial surge deployment requirements, approximately C-day through C+15.6 The JCS Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review Update (MRS-BURU) validated this policy citing, "The immediate surge shipping mission requires organic shipping to ensure the immediate reinforcing units can be deployed expeditiously."7 Lift self-sufficiency for the initial stages of surge deployment is TRANSCOM's goal.

Desert Shield demonstrated that TRANSCOM did not have the wherewithal to comply with this policy. TRANSCOM has aggressively attacked the DTS shortfalls over the past several years to correct this situation, spending billions in acquisition and mobility enhancement funding to procure aircraft, build new or convert existing vessels into Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off ships, purchase additional DoD rail cars, improve DoD installation transportation infrastructure (forts, camps, and bases), and develop documentation and intransit visibility data systems, which in many cases duplicate the commercial sector's capabilities. TRANSCOM has directed all of this effort toward building a self-sufficient DTS. However, little attention was paid to non-ammunition water ports. The long term effect is a potentially significant bottle neck at the ports as DoD requirements grow, organic lift becomes more readily available, but DoD port capabilities decrease.

To address this potential bottleneck, TRANSCOM has turned towards the commercial sector. A heavy dependence on commercial ports for expanded port capability, although contrary to its policy of self-sufficiency, provides TRANSCOM with an immediately available solution. TRANSCOM is aware of the potential dangers. Gen. Rutherford, USAF, USCINCTRANS, commented that, "..we will become more dependent on commercial ports. But I think we will continue to get the priority to go in and use what we need."8 His Deputy, LTG. Wykle, USA, echoed a similar sentiment saying, "Yes. The commercial sector is part of our force structure and so we take it for granted that it's there. But we have no institutionalized way of assessing the readiness ofthose commercial carrier's assets and they would certainly resist our doing so. We have to pretty much accept that they will be able to provide us with what we are asking for."9 Neither statement projects confidence that the commercial sector will positively respond to TRANSCOM's requirements when needed. The prerequisite for a successful DTS water terminal deployment operation is the guarantee that ports of sufficient capability are available when required. Until recently, the commercial ports have repeated assurances to TRANSCOM that they are ready and willing to handle DoD port business, convincing TRANSCOM that its water port policy is prudent. However, TRANSCOM's reliance on the commercial sector is not a safe solution. It risks disappointing a demanding, high profile CINC customer.

# West Coast MOT key to Readiness

**A West Coast MOT is key to readiness**

**VanHoosen 97** (Paul, “Military Ocean Terminals: Who Needs Them?” Naval War College, 2/7, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA325154>)//mat

Alternative #3 - Reestablish a West Coast MOT: With the closing of MOT Oakland, no DoD owned port facility will exist on the west coast except Pt Hueneme. Expanding NWS Concord is a possibility, but the ammunition mission will force unit equipment deployment elsewhere once ammunition arrives at the port. Some west coast MOT capability is required, possibly at a DoD owned location such as San Diego, CA or Bremerton/Everett, WA. The development of a permanent presence integrated into an existing supporting structure such as a Naval Base might reduce costs sufficiently to reexamine the readiness expense of maintaining MOT capability. A terminal operation may find it less expensive to rely on support functions resident in a Naval Base organization, such as billeting, messing, routine security, fire and safety, administration, and facility maintenance, than to perform these support functions as a stand alone command. One west coast MOT, capable of loading two ships simultaneously, would significantly ease DTS dependence on east coast ports to compensate for west coast shortfalls. The effects of implementing these three alternatives are summarized in Table 4 and detailed in Appendix D. PORT CATEGORIES MRC-EAST MRC-WEST MOTs, L/T LEASE, AND ALTERNATIVES 100% 78% Table 4 The West Coast still depends upon commercial ports or MTMC east coast ports for support, but its self-sufficiency numbers are greatly improved. This was accomplished using minimal new construction and existing or excess infrastructure within DoD to create additional port capacity. By implementing some or all of these alternatives, the DTS can improve its chances of mission success and the CINC's probabilities of receiving support on time and as planned.

**West Coast MOTs are key to rapid Asian response**

**Hancock and Lee 98** (Sam R. and Peter J., “The Ammuniton Supply Chain and Intermodalism: From Depot to Foxhole,” March, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA343623)//mat

Once a container of ammunition leaves the depot, it is almost exclusively moved intermodally until it reaches the theater of operations. Within CONUS, containers will move to a Port of Embarkation (POE) by rail or truck. The commercial industry, which is efficient in intermodal transportation, is normally used for these movements. During peacetime and wartime, the majority of ammunition, whether containerized or not, would move through one of the three military ammunition ports. Currently, MOTSU is the only containerized ammunition port with a capability of moving 600 Twenty-foot equivalents (TEUs) per day. MOTSU is the designated East Coast ammunition port to support a Major Regional Contingency (MRC) West scenario. NWS Concord and Port Hadlock make up the West Coast ammunition port mainly to support a (MRC-East) scenario. Without a West Coast port, ammunition would take 31 days to move from MOTSU through the Panama Canal and to Korea versus 16 days from the West coast. There are ongoing improvements to NWS Concord and Port Hadlock that will increase there throughput capacity from a combined total of just over 250 to over 600 TEUs per day. [Ref. 2] The needed improvements listed in Table 4 were identified in the MRS and as a result of TURBO CADS exercises.

# Increasing Infrastructure in Concord and Hadlock

**Increasing infrastructure for Concord and Hadlock solve chokepoints**

**Hancock and Lee 98** (Sam R. and Peter J., “The Ammuniton Supply Chain and Intermodalism: From Depot to Foxhole,” March, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA343623)//mat

Incorporating the development of new equipment and concepts to make the ammunition supply chain more flexible and responsive is a step in the right direction toward supporting CINC's. The ability of the Defense Transportation System to transport ammunition is adequate, but there are areas that require improvements to increase the utility of the ammunition supply chain. These areas include the upgrades of West coast ports, intermodal equipment developments, and organizational coordination between DoD, regulatory agencies and commercial industry. 1. Port Upgrades The infrastructure upgrades of NWS Concord and Port Hadlock to achieve a throughput of 600 TEUs per day are positive steps toward increasing the throughput of containerized ammunition. Currently, these ports are choke 101points in the flow of containerized ammunition from the West coast.

# Four Ports key to Ammunition Shipping

**Four ports are key to overseas ammunition shipping**

**Jankowski 3** (William M., “Maritime Shipping Container Security and the Defense Transportation System: Problems and Policy in the 21st Century,” June, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA417484)//mat>

Within the continental United States, there are established strategic seaports, i.e., ports that have been designated as fit to satisfy the needs and demands of DoD requirements. Strategic seaports are U.S. ports designated to support major deployments under the National Port Readiness Network. These ports are chosen based on an evaluation of port capabilities compared to the military’s deployment requirements. A team comprised of Maritime Administration (MARAD) and MTMC staff selects the ports and establishes the number of vessel berths, staging areas, and other assets required. [Privratsky, July 2002] There are currently 18 designated strategic seaports, four of which are DoD facilities primarily used for movement of arms, ammunition, and explosives. The four DoD strategic seaports are the Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point, NC; the Military Ocean Terminal Concord, CA; the Indian Island Naval Magazine, WA; and the Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme, CA. It is through these strategic seaports that DoD shipments, in ISO maritime shipping containers, are controlled, monitored, and tracked.

# Port Capacity Declining

**Ports capacity is declining- commercial shift**

**Honea et al. 2k** - PhD (Robert B., Sarah E. Brown, Henry M. Bennett, “U.S. Military Transportation,” Committee on Military Transportation, <http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/millennium/00137.pdf>)//mat

INFRASTRUCTURE Port Readiness More than 95 percent of DoD cargo moves by sea. To ensure the readiness of military and commercial seaports to support deployment of military personnel and cargoes in national defense contingencies, nine governmental agencies formed a Port Readiness Network for enhanced coordination and cooperation. Members of the network are MARAD, the U.S. Atlantic Command, the U.S. Forces Command, USTRANSCOM, MSC, the Military Traffic Management Command, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Maritime Defense Zone. Port Readiness Network representatives work directly with commercial port authorities in coordinating and informing them of defense needs.Transportation in the New Millennium 4 Currently, DoD designates 13 U.S. commercial ports as strategically important. Many of these ports, because of their location and physical characteristics, need more of their overall capability to serve commercial interests. Despite an overall patriotic attitude, some ports are telling DoD that they cannot make their facilities available in emergencies as soon as DoD would like. Although DoD can shift some operations to other ports, this generally results in a slower deployment. To ensure that future commercial port planning includes military needs, DoD should consider involving metropolitan planning organizations in the early stages of planning for contingency port operations. Theater Infrastructure Limitations Once in theater, units still face the challenge of moving tactically into the fight. Ships carrying military cargo must compete with normal commercial cargo for discharge capability. Further, channel depth and quality of Third World nation port facilities are serious potential problems. Techniques such as JLOTS that enable units to bypass choke points at the port give the operational CINC a tremendous advantage in denying the enemy a chance to dig in for the fight. Rapidly deployable causeway ferries allowing for JLOTS operations are in both the Navy and Army inventories, and DoD is evaluating systems for off-loading in higher seastates. The U.S. Marines are now considering using future ships as assembly areas and lines of departure rather than grounded infrastructure. Offshore bases are being evaluated for technical feasibility.

2

# \*\*\*Sealift\*\*\*

# Sealift key to Power Projection

**Sealift is the only sustainable method of power projection – encourages smaller footprints**

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It is important to start by making a clear distinction between traditional amphibious warfare, and the new concept of sealift for strategic force projection roles. In today's world, the nations that would have the required assets to launch a large-scale forcible entry amphibious operation, involving at least a brigade-size assault from the sea against well-organised defence forces, can be counted on the fingers of one hand with some fingers to spare. And even for these selected forces such as the US Marine Corps or the UK Royal Marines, various political constraints - starting most notably with the likelihood of high own losses - could hamper the operation. Rather, what is needed now even by medium-size navies is the capability to deliver to shore (either in port or over unprepared beaches) personnel, vehicles, equipment and supplies during operations with limited armed opposition, as well as the ability to conduct swift, small-size amphibious operations involving e.g. non-combatant evacuations, SOF raids, surges, security frame to logistic landing, and the like. The clear perception of this need has led to a flare of recent activities. NATO, in the framework of the 1999 Defence Capabilities Initiative, identified sealift as a severe shortfall in the Alliance. During the November 2002 Prague Summit, a decision was taken to overcome this critical weakness, especially in view of the establishing of the NATO Response Force (NRF). In December 2003 as many as nine NATO countries (Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the UK) signed an agreement for establishing a common sealift capacity, with other countries committed to join the group in the near future (France, Greece, Turkey, Czech Republic). This capability will be based on 12-14 merchant vessels, including Ro-Ro, container and multipurpose ships, involving a mix of vessels under permanent charter and other with multinational assured access contract. The new NATO Sealift Coordination Centre based at Eindhoven is tasked to manage the Alliance strategic sealift capabilities. The initial (2004) package of five Ro-Ro ships will be gradually increased until reaching the established goal. Nearly at the same time the European Union decided the implementation by 2005 of the EU Strategic Lift Joint Coordination, with a view to achieving by 2010 the necessary capacity in strategic lift in support of anticipated operations (so-called Helsinki Force Goal). This include the complete development by 2007 of rapidly deployable battle groups, including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and debarkation assets, as decided by the EU Defence Ministers at the Noordwijk meeting in September 2004. Prepositioning and J-LOTS The US created a large structure of prepositioned vessels loaded with vehicles, equipments and supplies, ready to support the deployment of heavy forces in the hottest spots of the world. Operation "Iraqi Freedom", thanks to the permissive environment and the availability of large port infrastructures, represented the largest amphibious-prepositioning effort ever. Two 7-ships Amphibious Task Forces, three 3-ships Amphibious Ready Groups, and 21 Prepo ships, allowed and supported the deployment of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. The US Military Sealift Command's Afloat Prepositioning Force currently consists of: three MPS Squadrons, each capable of supporting a Marine Expeditionary Brigade; ten ships of the Afloat Prepositioning Squadron (APS) loaded with the equipments for two Army's heavy brigade; and nine Logistic Prepositioning Ships, carrying fuel and ammunition for the Navy and the Air Force and with intermediate maintenance facilities for the Marine Corps' aircraft. Sealift is also provided by the Strategic Sealift Force, the Ready Reserve Force, and other vessels under contract as needed. The Strategic Sealift Force includes eleven Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR), eight Fast Sealift Ships (30 knots) and five tankers. All the sealift ships have specific features for the military roles they are intended for, such as reinforced decks, heavy side and stern extendable ramps, and two-to-four 55-tons pedestal cranes. Those ships, as well as other more conventional transport vessels, require either a port facility or a discharge capability at sea (in calm waters). A skin-to-skin transfer mode is being evaluated, with crane-ships providing the required lift from one platform to another. Joint Logistic Over The Shore (J-LOTS) is a joint Army and Navy programme providing initial sustainment for early entry forces through discharge operations either in open sea (transferring the cargo into lighters and subsequently to unprepared beaches), or into minor ports with shallow waters and/or limited facilities, or operating in normal or damaged ports with an increased discharge rate (through lighters, floating cranes, etc). The US Army is planning to increase its prepositioning forces up to three flotillas, each capable to deploy and sustain a two-battalion brigade combat team. Each Army Regional Flotilla will include five ships: one Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ship loaded with one armoured battalion, one mechanised infantry battalion and related support elements; a second LSMR loaded with support materials, including port and airfield opening packages; one Ro-Ro ship with humanitarian-disaster relief equipment (power generators, water purification, engineering vehicles, etc); one ship loaded with supplies allowing 30 days operations for up to 2.5 divisions; and a fifth ship carrying ammunition. The Army Flotillas contribute to the Navy's concept of "Sea Basing" (see below). [Photograph] The US Army TSV-1X and the US Navy HSV-X1 experimental fast catamarans. The TSV and HSV programmes have since been merged under the new designation of HSC (High Speed Connectors). [Photograph] A STRYKER 8x8 wheeled AFV being unloaded by USNS SISLER (T-AKR 311, WATSON class of Large Medium-Speed Roll-on Sealift Ships) at the Port of Kuwait in November 2003. Although the STRYKER family of vehicles was procured by the US Army specifically in view of the (highly perplexing) notions of entire light armoured units being moved by airlift, the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) was actually deployed to Iraq by ship - a very poignant reminder, if such was needed, of the continuing pivotal significance of sealift. The two present Army Port Opening Packages are prepositioned loaded into two heavy-lift ships. They include an array of watercraft and equipments such as tugs, landing craft, barges, heavy cranes, repair shops, diver support, etc. A Port Opening Package can be deployed and provides access to damaged port facilities. Where facilities are not available or not practical, helicopters, landing craft, lighters, or larger self-deploying vessels can unload ships at anchor. A number of innovative deployable facilities, such as Elevated Causeways (ELCAS), Ro-Ro Discharge Facility (RRDF), Causeway Ferries (CF), Floating Causeways (FC), Nearshore Breakwater Systems (NBS), Rapidly Installed Breakwater System (RIBS), make possible discharging operations with small displacement vessels and craft. The Sea Basing Concept Peace Support Operations and, generally speaking, other MOOTW and contingencies require a lesser logistic footprint for a number of self-evident political and operational reasons. It is therefore advisable to keep most of the support capability afloat, instead of downloading everything ashore creating large and complex logistic centres. This, in turn, requires a number of other innovative means, such as the availability of a number of vessel able to discharge their load in a selective way, even without harbour facilities available. This requirement is creating different projects, which supplement the current fleet of Maritime Prepositioning Ships. The three MPF(E), where E stays for Enhanced, were the last addition to the MPS fleet and carry an expeditionary airfield, a fleet hospital package and construction equipment, therefore greatly increasing the capabilities of the three existing MPS Squadrons. The next MPF(F), for Future, will play a pivotal role in making the US Marine Corps' Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) possible from 2010 onwards. Logistic support will come from the sea, rather than from a large land-based supply point, while the Sea-Base area will be resupplied by other traditional ships from the national or allied ports. For the MPF(F) concept various solutions are being evaluated. The idea is to complement the current amphibious task groups, providing additional capabilities, with an organic deployable interface to surface movers (LCAC, LCU, lighters) and supporting both vertical lift and close air support. Among the different variants considered, there is also one, named MPF(A) for Aviation, roughly resembling the WW2 Merchant Carrier concept, i.e. a converted large container ship with a flight deck capable to operate and support heavy-lift rotorcrafl as well as the F-35C STOVL variant of the Joint Strike Fighter. [Photograph] The two new Royal Navy LPDs. HMS ALBION (L14) and HMS BULWARK sailing in formation. [Photograph] The JERVIS BAY fast catamaran during deployment by the Royal Australian Navy for the peace support operation in East Timor. The adaptability of the MPF(F) and MPF(A) designs will allow to install intermediate aviation maintenance facilities, and/or a large expeditionary hospital, or a deployable joint command and control centre, besides the more traditional transport of helicopters, vehicles, troops, containers, etc. These new MPFs will support the deployment and operation of Marine Expeditionary Unit/Brigade when part of a larger task group and would be able to operate stand-alone for non-combatant contingency operations with a lesser MEU(SOC) detachment embarked. A first MPF(F) is expected to be available by 2007, with two additional MPF(F) and one MPF(A) by 2009. Unit cost is currently projected at $2.2 billion. Sea Basing requirements include, besides MPF(F) and MPF(A), also other innovative capabilities and assets, i.e. Rapid Strategic Lift Ship (RSLS) for inter-theatre transport, and high-speed Theatre Support Vessels (TSV). These needs are being addressed under different programmes at various stages of definition. The various types of proposed RSLSs would have an objective speed of 36 knots, a range of 12,000nm and the capability of transporting either 1,000-3,000 personnel, 3,000t of cargo, or 5,000 lane meters of vehicles. The availability of such vessels would strongly reduce the need of C-17 airlifters.

Sealift is key to overall power projection- national defense objectives

Evenson 09 (James, Lieutenant Colonel United States Marine Corps Reserve, May 27, 2009, “INTERMODAL WAR: ASSESSING CONTAINERIZED POWER PROJECTION”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA508289///TS)

Examining each of these principles relative to the ability of the U.S. to project power from CONUS, one finds a common focus on the support for the overseas war fighter through disciplined logistics. As a whole, these principles seek to “to optimize use of strategic lift, focusing primarily on sealift, to improve force closure time for unit equipment and sustainment supplies and meet national defense objectives.”47 Each principle clearly has roots in the past when wartime conditions stymied the movement of material, precluded timely information on the location of stores, or denied support for operations due to lack of supplies. Take these principles and project them onto possible military actions in the future and the enormity of the logistics effort required soon emerges.

# Sealift Upgrades key to Hegemony

**Increasing port infrastructure for Sealift capabilities is the only way of sustaining global hegemony. A stagnant Navy has caused the collapse of all previous hegemons.**

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According to the eminent military historian Jeremy Black, "The rise of European states to a position of power across the oceans and around much of the globe was the military/ political change that most deserves the description of a military revolution." Starting at the end of the 15th century, when the Portuguese sailed around Africa into the Indian Ocean, maritime mobility allowed a number of states to create empires, commercial networks and spheres of influence that dominated world politics. This capability has been further refined by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. The drafting of a new Quadrennial Defense Review often pits the armed services against each other competing for limited resources despite the stated emphasis on joint operations. The projection of American power overseas, however, should also be the basis for an alliance between the Army and the Navy as the pillars of jointness, with airpower in a strong but supporting role. The key to understanding this combination is not the American naval strategist A. T. Mahan, who, like many prophets of airpower, overemphasized the decisive potential of a single arm, but the British maritime thinker Sir Julian Corbett. For Corbett, the principal value of seapower was the ability to either move your own army across water barriers or prevent the enemy from moving his, "Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided-except in the rarest cases-either by what your army can do against your enemy's territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do." Science fiction writers have long been fascinated by the movement of vast armies through the air, which would expand on Black's definition of a military revolution. As part of today's transformation effort, few question the need to up-gun light units with air-transportable armored systems that can get American troops into action quickly with improved firepower, but how far can this go? Converting nearly one-third of the proposed active force, 15 of 48 brigades, to the Future Combat System (PCS) would cost more than $100 billion. Additional airlift would be needed to move units in worthwhile numbers. In congressional testimony, Air Force Gen. John Handy, head of the U.S. Transportation Command, said that the Air Force needs 225 C-17 air transports. It currently has 120, with 60 more on order. Adding another 45 would cost $7.4 billion. A single Army Stryker brigade at Fort Lewis, Wash., whose 19-ton vehicles are a proxy for the FCS, would require 270-300 C-17 missions to deploy to Macedonia, according to a Rand Corporation study, and deployment would still take a week because of congestion at the Skopje airport. Air landing facilities in other potential trouble spots, especially in the developing world, are always going to be problematic. It should be noted that when the first Stryker brigade was deployed to Iraq, its 1,000 vehicles were sent by ship from Tacoma, Wash., rather than by air. So how many FCS brigades could ever be actually deployed by available airlift? Throughout the Iraqi campaign, heavy units have proven their worth, whereas more lightly equipped forces have run into trouble. The Marines had taken the lead in training for urban warfare, but were grateful for the support of 70-ton Army Ml tanks in Karbala, Najaf, Fallujah and elsewhere. Experience has shown the need to provide better armor for vehicles and more firepower for support units. FCS weight limits are being prudently relaxed to improve survivability. If fuel, ammunition, armor kits and other supplies have to be flown in separate from the FCS vehicles, it would significantly increase the number of sorties required. In a Defense News interview on September 27, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker said that the actual fielding of the FCS brigades has been pushed back to 2030 because it will take time to develop technology that will provide "superior protection and firepower" for a vehicle limited to 20 tons. "We have to find a way to increase the mobility, lethality and survivability of whatever it is that replaces the Ml," said Schoomaker. Is this realistic, and is the 20-ton weight constraint mandated for air transport worth the effort? While this debate will continue, it is clear that between now and 2030, if America wants to get its ground forces into action, it will have to continue to depend on sea transport. The 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) was sent to Iraq in five large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs), with a cruising speed of 24 knots. These 62,000 ton ships had an average construction cost of less than $250 million. During the January to June 2004 redeployment of some 240,000 troops and their equipment in and out of Iraq, sealift provided 84 percent of the mobility needs. It only took 210 ships to move 1.8 million short-tons of cargo. Airlift primarily moved people. There is no practical alternative to the U.S. Transportation Command strategy of selecting sealift first. The Army wants a "campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities." History and current events show that expeditionary forces must be capable of sustained operations. This will particularly be the case when regime change is the objective. America needs some light forces that can conduct rapid operations, especially in this era of global terrorism. Major wars against regional powers that could threaten vital U.S. interests, however, will require substantial boots on the ground, armed with heavy weapons. Only maritime capabilities can deliver this kind of powerful expeditionary force to where it is needed. If recent experience is any guide, seaborne troops can still move faster than diplomats when responding to a crisis. If the United States is to maintain its revolutionary capability of sending powerful armies overseas to wage decisive warfare, it must concentrate its mobility efforts on sealift. Modernizing and expanding the large-deck amphibians, dry cargo ships, LMSRs and tankers available, while sustaining a robust shipbuilding industrial base, are vital. **Embarkation ports in the United States need to be improved and more equipment prepositioned in forward areas, as Army units are pulled back from Europe to a central reserve in the United States.** The Navy is developing a "sea base" concept aimed at putting 30,000 marines on an enemy coast within a two-week time frame. This will require expanded joint planning, including the Army's new modular brigades, if sufficient mass is to be deployed to rapidly defeat an enemy once engaged. The Navy will also have to control global sealanes and provide security and support for ground forces as they land and move inland. Thus the steady decline in the size of the fleet cannot be viewed with indifference by the Army. The distinguished scholar of international politics John J. Mearsheimer has argued that "the presence of oceans on much of the earth's surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. Not even the world's most powerful state can conquer distant regions that can be reached only by ship." The United States, of course, does not seek hegemony, but it has often projected substantial land power to distant regions of the globe. Its first entry into the European theater of World War II was to land two armored and four infantry divisions in North Africa, most of the troops sailing directly from the United States. By the end of the war, America had moved 15 armored, 43 infantry and three airborne divisions, with a vast array of support units, to Europe by sea, liberating half the continent in concert with allies. No other nation in the history of the world has managed such a feat. While such a massive effort is not again on the horizon, Iraq is not likely to be the last time American ground combat forces will be deployed far from home. Daniel Gouré, vice president of the Lexington Institute, has even suggested that in a future possible confrontation with Beijing, military planners should consider "putting U.S. troops on Chinese soil in ways that are persuasive." While a new land war in Asia would be a daunting prospect, only in America can such an idea even be raised-which may be why the United States is the only truly global power.

# Sealift key to Readiness

**Sealift is key to Military readiness – only way we can control multiple points at all times without becoming overwhelmed like Airlift.**

**Wilson 10** a full-time freelance writer, focusing primarily on aerospace, defense and high technology, since 1992, when he finished a four-year assignment as North American Group Editor for the UK-based Jane’s Information Group. A 1971 graduate of the University of Missouri School of Journalism, he spent eight years with United Press International before joining McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co. as head of public relations for the space sector. A similar post with defense simulation contractor Cubic Corp. was followed by a brief stint as president and CEO of a small manufacturing firm in San Diego. (J.R., “The State of U.S. Sealift”, Defense Media Network, July 6, 2010, http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/the-state-of-u-s-sealift/) RaPa

“In the initial entry phase, if you look at Haiti or any scenario where one airfield can quickly become overwhelmed, along with devastation in the port area, the ability to bring in ships that can offload off-port shows the unique capability sealift can bring to bear, not only in delivering goods but also opening up a port,” Thayer said, noting both Haiti and the war in Southwest Asia also have demonstrated the value of military-civilian cooperation at sea. “In the past decade, the value of the maritime security program in assuring we have a reasonably robust U.S.-flagged fleet of ships to support military requirements has proven its value as a complement to the ships the Navy and the Maritime Administration maintain in reduced operating status to support military requirements. That program is good for commerce and the military and supports a base of U.S. mariners we need to crew those ships we activate from reduced operating status.” Thayer estimates the ratio of mariners to seagoing jobs in the private sector is roughly 2-to-2.5 to 1, an overage needed to meet labor agreements saying mariners will work for three or four months at sea, followed by three or four months off. “For every billet on the ship, there are two or three ashore available to augment any contingency requirements,” he said. “So it is a strong base, not only for ocean-going ships, but also inland waterways.” MSC’s prepositioning ships also have added significantly to the U.S. military’s ability to respond quickly to almost any point on the globe, providing supplies needed by all the services only a few days’ sail away rather than far longer times it might take supplies to reach theater from the United States. “From the first Gulf war through today, we have had large quantities afloat on ships prepositioned in key spots around the world to respond rapidly with the right mix of heavy combat forces or civil assistance,” Thayer said. “That has become a hallmark of the triad of strategic sealift, along with surged sealift from reduced operating status and sustainment from the ocean transportation providers.

**Sealift is key to overall military readiness – airlift can’t move large forces fast enough.**

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For well more than a century, U.S. defense policy has been based-initially as an accident of geography, but in more recent years as a carefully calculated national strategy-on the concept of forward deployment. In practice, that strategy has meant that, in any international conflict involving the use of U.S. forces, virtually all of the fighting has taken place on foreign soil rather than in the U.S. homeland. The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, although not really an exception to the rule, brought home to the American people, and to U.S. contingency planners, the wisdom of the forward-deployment policy. In World War II, though, the United States had time to rebuild and rearm. In today's era of fast-paced conflict, made exponentially more lethal by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the luxury of time is no longer available. As in the Gulf War, the almost immediate airlift of troops to overseas areas of potential crisis is still possible, but the simultaneous airlift of the supplies needed by those troops-hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies, in most if not all scenarios-is not possible. The solution to this problem that has been developed by U.S. planners is to: (1) preposition huge caches of military supplies and equipment-particularly oversized equipment that could not be carried by transport aircraft-overseas, either in secure land sites or aboard ship; (2) airlift troops to overseas areas of potential conflict as soon as possible after the start of an international crisis endangering U.S. political, economic, and/or military interests; (3) join the troops with their equipment as close as possible to the area of crisis; and (4) sustain the troops thereafter with additional equipment and consumables of all types transported from the United States in U.S.-flag merchant ships and/or the Defense Department's in-house sealift ships-which are owned, operated, and managed by the Military Sealift Command (MSC). The article on the following pages discusses some of the principal components of, and concepts governing, the prepositioned sealift force. Maritime Prepositioning Force In 1979, the secretary of Defense approved plans to initiate what became known as the Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) program to forward-deploy U.S. Marine Corps vehicles, equipment, supplies, and ammunition in ships throughout the world in support of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) assigned to contingency operations. In the mid-19$Os, 13 self-sustaining rollon/roll-off (RO/RO) container ships were chartered by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) to conduct this mission. Ships of three separate classes (MV Corporal Louis V Hague Jr., SS Sergeant Matej Kocak, and MV Second Lieutenant John P Bobo) are currently on-station, attached to MPS squadrons (MPSRONs) in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Western Pacific. Each MPSRON can support up to 17,300 MAGTF personnel for up to 30 days during initial operations. This concept of force deployment, coupled with strategic airlift, to "marry" forces with equipment, greatly reduces force closure time in response to critical events overseas. [Photograph] The USNS Pomeroy, a new-construction Watson-class LMSR (large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ship), slides down the way at her launching ceremony earlier this year at the National Steel and Shipbuilding (NASSCO) yard in San Diego. The need for additional MPF ships, with even more advanced capabilities, has been validated by the new long-range defense strategy outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report made public on 30 September 2001. Maritime Prepositioning Force (Enhanced) The experience gained from MPS operations during Operation Desert Storm, and from various peacetime evolutions, pointed out the need to add specific new MPSRON cargo, such as the supplies and equipment needed to build and sustain an expeditionary airfield and/or a naval expeditionary medical support system, and to support a Navy Mobile Construction Battalion. A corollary need was to restore the cargo stowage area lost due to increases in equipment size and quantities. To address these needs, Congress authorized the acquisition and conversion of one Maritime Prepositioning Force (Enhanced) (MPF(E)) ship for each MPSRON to significantly augment the warfighting capabilities available to support the unified commanders in chief (CINCs). All three MPF(E) ships authorized-- USNS First Lieutenant Harry L. Martin (T-AK 3015), USNS Lance Corporal Roy M. Wheat (T-AK 3016), and USNS Gunnery Sergeant Fred W. Stockham (TAK 3017)-have been or will be delivered to MSC in the near future. These new assets are combination RO/RO-container ships capable of long-term stowage of Marine Corps equipment in environmentally controlled spaces. They can offload their cargo either pierside or at anchor in seas up to state 3, and launch amphibious vehicles via a submerged stem ramp. Each ship is capable of carrying the lighterage needed to support cargo operations. Vital statistics for the MPF(E) ships are listed in the box on this page. Among the specific new capabilities introduced to each MAGTF with the deployment of the MPF(E) ships are the following: Expeditionary Airfield (EAF). An EAF provides the flexibility needed to allow the force commander to order a variety of airfield configurations to suit the tactical situation. The modular runway can be up to 3,800 feet in length with parking spaces for 75 aircraft and enough fueling stations to service all of them. Runway lights, to permit night operations, and arresting gear also are provided. Naval Expeditionary Medical Support System (NEMSS). Staffed by 940 Sailors, the NEMSS can be fully operational in 10 days. This expeditionary hospital consists of six operating tables as well as 80 intensive-care and 420 acute-care beds. The NEMSS provides in-situ state-of-theart medical care for personnel engaged in remote areas. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB). The NMCB, which is capable of carrying out numerous vertical and horizontal construction missions, will be able to build troop billeting facilities and both refueling and ammunition supply points, to clear main supply routes, and to provide other construction support as needed. National Strategic Asset: Blount Island, Fla. Blount Island, located on the St. John's River near Jacksonville, Fla., is the home port for MPF ships when they return to the continental United States. MPF vessels offload MAGTF equipment at Blount Island for maintenance and reorganization for future deployment as dictated by circumstances, then proceed to whatever shipyard is available for maintenance and upkeep operations, following which they return to Blount Island for cargo loadout and redeployment. The Blount Island facility provides a centralized and secure location for the conduct of these critical MPF support evolutions. [Photograph] Above: The USNS Gunnery Sergeant Fred W. Stockham underway following her conversion to the MPF(E) configuration. Below: one of the MPSRON Two ships on-station at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MFP(F)) For today's MPF to successfully operate, a secure area must first be established to permit the arrival and offloading of ships and aircraft. The strategy envisioned by the Marine Corps' OMFTS concept requires a more robust capability than is now available with the ships currently deployed. MPF(F), the nextgeneration MPS, will contribute to the forward-presence and power-projection capabilities needed to support the four pillars of future MPF/OMFTS operations. The MPF(F) ships will have the following capabilities: Force closure: MPF(F) ships will provide for the enroute arrival and assembly of the prepositioning force. Marines will deploy via a combination of surface craft and strategic, theater, and tactical airlift aircraft to rendezvous with the prepositioning platforms while enroute to the operating area. To facilitate this process, the MPF(F) ships will incorporate air and surface interface points, as well as personnel billeting and support facilities. Easy access to equipment for inspection, maintenance, and selection of tactical loads to support arrival and assembly in the objective area in a combat-ready configuration will be among the other key features of the MPF(F) ships. Amphibious Task Force (ATF) Interoperability: MPF(F) ships will enhance OMFTS effectiveness by using selective offload capabilities to reinforce the assault echelon of an ATF. Within the overall power-projection mission, MPF(F) ships will be able to interface with the ATF and should also be able to interoperate with, and potentially provide maintenance support for, ATF aircraft, assault craft, and advanced amphibious assault vehicles. MPF(F) ships will possess versatility through a combination of their lighterage capabilities, cargo-handling systems (including selective offload equipment and supplies), and the C41 interfaces needed to reinforce the striking power of the ATE Sustainment: MPF(F) ships will contribute to sustainment by serving as a sea-base for logistics support. These ships are expected to employ an automated inventory-management system that can receive, store, maintain, manage, and deploy the equipment and supplies required for the sustained logistics support of naval operations. This will be accomplished independently or as a larger sea-based logistics effort. The ships' onboard cargo-handling and delivery systems will provide selective offload of supplies, be compatible with naval and commercial delivery systems, and incorporate the means to deliver this support ashore. Reconstitution and redeployment: MPF(F) ships will conduct in-theater, at-sea reconstitution and redeployment without the requirement for extensive material maintenance or replenishment at a strategic sustainment base. The ability to rapidly reconstitute the MPF MAGTF will permit immediate employment in follow-on missions. In addition to these requirements, MPF(F) ships must be able to: (a) perform their offload mission in up to sea state 3; (b) perform essential ship functions in up to sea state 5; and (c) survive in up to sea state 8. They also must be able to operate in U.S., foreign, and international waters in full compliance with existing U.S. and international laws, and to safely navigate and access a wide range of ports worldwide. They also must be able to conduct RO/RO and Lift-on/Lift-off operations in the majority of worldwide commercial marine cargo terminals as well as at anchor. A significant second step in the MPF(F) program timeline occurred on 25 May 2001 when Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark signed the Navy's MPF(F) Mission Needs Statement. That signing initiated the next phase of the acquisition process that will lead to design development and ship/systems acquisition. Navy officials are confident that the long-term outcome of this process will be the building of a much improved Maritime Prepositioned Force able not only to meet all U.S. forward-- deployment requirements but also possessing the flexibility needed to support all facets of amphibious operations well into the 21 st century.

**Sealift capabilities aren’t adequate – can’t handle multiple points of engagement**

**Baumgardner 02** Senior Military Analyst at Dynamis from Georgetown University (Neil, “Army Wargame Participants See Need For More Lift Capabilities”, Defense Daily. Potomac: Apr 26, 2002. Vol. 214, Iss. 20; pg. 1, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?did=116124581&Fmt=3&clientId=17822&RQT=309&VName=PQD) RaPa

CARLISLE BARRACKS, Pa.--Fast sealift and airlift are critical needs for the U.S. military to transport the Army's future Objective Forces, according to officials taking part in the Army Transformation Wargame here. "If we've got a future requirement it's that, long-range transport and fast sealift," Maj. Gen. William Boykin, the commander of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Ft. Bragg, N.C., told reporters here on Wednesday. "We've got to have that to be able to get to the battle." Boykin is the head of a "Blue" U.S. and allied special operations task force for the "Sumesia" scenario of the wargame, which involves Blue forces initially sending peacekeeping forces to the island region and then moving into combat operations against insurgent forces. The wargame played here is set in 2020 and features a strategic look at the ability of Army Objective Forces to respond to multiple contingencies around the world. With a global-strategic group that looks at the overall picture, and operational teams for the individual scenarios, the wargame gives particular emphasis to the need for lift and the mobilization of forces and capabilities (Defense Daily, April 10). Previous wargames, which focused on responding to a single crisis in the Middle East, have highlighted the capabilities of a Joint Tactical Rotorcraft (JTR) that could transport the Future Combat Systems (FCS) that are to make up the Objective Force (Defense Daily, April 30). The Army currently has no funds for such a transport aircraft, but recently recrafted its Future Transport Rotorcraft program as the Air Maneuver Transport (AMT) (Defense Daily, Nov. 16). Boykin said that for the Sumesia scenario, the use of fast sealift, which during the wargame includes high-speed vessels similar to the Army's current Joint Venture catamaran and high- speed shallow-draft vessels, was a particular advantage. "For example, coming out of Hawaii, to get to this Sumesia theater, we looked at a total of seven days," he said. The Army, in cooperation with the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, is leasing the 313-foot catamaran high-speed vessel Joint Venture (HSV-X1) built by Australia's Incat for testing high-speed catamaran capabilities, potential operational impact and technologies. The Army is sending the Joint Venture to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and also wants to charter a second catamaran high-speed vessel to support the movement of forces as part of OEF (Defense Daily, March 28). "Unquestionably, the Navy and the Air Force have got to have the assets, the resources to move the Army," Boykin said. In addition to such fast sealift assets, this wargame still features a JTR-like transport, albeit in the guise of AMT, as well as Air Force Advanced Theater Transports. However, this year's wargame has a much more realistic assessment of airlift capabilities, according to Bill Rittenhouse, wargame director for the Army's Training and Doctrine Command. "I would tell you that those assumptions are much more realistic this year than they have been in past years," he told reporters. "In the past years, we just came out with an outlandish amount of lift capabilities but to try an understand what those capabilities translate on the ground, your ability to move a force. We're much more conservative this year." Retired Marine Col. Darrell Combs, a consultant for defense services company MPRI and deputy commander of the Red forces for the Caspian region scenario of the wargame, also said that lift was an important requirement for the Army's Objective Forces. "They are very rapidly deployable but the joint community is going to have to weigh in and build adequate lift to get them to the fight and make them fully effective," he told reporters. "That's one of the things that's being highlighted from our viewpoint as Red. If there's a vulnerability, strategic lift has to come along to make this fully effective. I think that's a key issue." Combs said that if the Army had enough lift for its forces, it would be a significant force multiplier. "The Army is kind of leading the joint community I believe, so that everybody transforms at the same time and maybe we can get at that strategic lift issue," he said. "If they do, it's going to be a very, very sad day for red forces everywhere."

# Sealift key to Military Capabilities

Sealift is critical to our overall military capabilities

Dominic 09 (Keith, Naval War College, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, April 5, 2009, “Foreign Flag Shipping: A Weakness in the Sealift Trident”**,** http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA503079///TS)

Milan Vego stated in his Joint Operational Warfare book, “Logistical support and sustainment are perhaps two of the most critical factors for the success of a campaign or major operation. Failure to establish sound logistical organization in the theater, a lack of readily available supplies of all kinds, and inability to provide protection to both the elements of logistical organization and the lines of communication will lead to major setbacks and often defeats.”59 While TRANSCOM has and will continue to use foreign flag shipping the use of these vessels must be integrated into today‟s polices and doctrine in order to avoid critical vulnerabilities in our logistical operation. If these critical vulnerabilities are not addressed they leave a vital exposed weakness in our ability to surge and sustain our military forces globally. Furthermore, most States and all non-state actors will not be capable of having a typical Clauswitzian type battle and will follow the Sun Tzu way of battle by indirectly attacking the United States‟ center of gravity. Without a new policy and doctrine that incorporates foreign flag shipping, these vessels will become a logical and appealing target for an indirect attack by the United States next adversary. In conclusion, JP 4-01.2 states “Successful response to regional contingencies depends upon sufficient strategic mobility assets in order to deploy combat forces rapidly and then sustain them in an operational area as long as necessary to meet United States military objectives.”60 The current reliance upon foreign commercial assets to achieve mission success has and will continue to introduce an inherent risk into United States military operations that could interrupt the flow of personnel and materials into a theater. This could impact the ability to conduct sustained operations while constraining the strategic, operational, and tactical options that operational commanders can employ, ultimately influencing the outcome of the operation being conducted. This requires a complete integration of foreign flag shipping in our doctrine in order for the United States to maintain total dominance over the seas throughout the range of military operations and to guarantee the capability to unilaterally project power around the globe. Without these actions the United States will remain vulnerable and it will only be a matter of time before an adversary exposes and take advantage of this weakness. As General Dwight D. Eisenhower stated, when he was the Supreme Commander of Allied forces in Europe, “maximum safety of these lines of communication is a „must‟ in our military effort; no matter what else we attempt to do…Shipping…will remain the bottleneck of our effective effort.”61

**Sealift is key to capabilities**

**Levin 12** [Carl Levin, *Senator,* February 28, 2012, “LEVIN OPENING STATEMEMENT AT PACOM-TRANSCOM HEARING”, MENAFM, [https://www.menafn.com/menafn/qn\_news\_story.aspx?storyid={b3a59c89-6aa2-4643-869f-3e2ffde3d10d}](https://www.menafn.com/menafn/qn_news_story.aspx?storyid=%7bb3a59c89-6aa2-4643-869f-3e2ffde3d10d%7d), DMintz]

TRANSCOM is also facing other, less well-known modernization challenges. The Ready Reserve Force (RRF), a group of cargo ships held in readiness by the Maritime Administration, is aging and will need to be modernized with newer ships at some point in the not too distant future. Sealift may not be quite as glamorous as airlift operations, but sealift support is critical to our Nation's capabilities. We have relied on sealift to deliver more than 90 percent of the cargo to Iraq and Afghanistan, similar to previous contingencies.

# Sealift key to Fighting Capability

**Minimized assets cause decreased seabasing abilities- that hamstrings our ability to fight on foreign soil**

**JNI 12** Intelligence, consultancy and advertising firm for the defense, national security and transport sectors (“Making connections: US marines return to the high seas”, Jane’s Navy International, April 1, 2012, 117. 3, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/947094520) RaPa

Although the expression 'seabasing' was not officially codified as a verb in US doctrine until 2006, the genesis of the Department of the Navy's plan to equip, deploy and sustain a land force from a network of prepositioned ships in fact began as a US Army trial as early as 1964 in Okinawa, Japan. Known as Exercise 'Quick Release', it was "the first ever arrival and assembly exercise for afloat prepositioned equipment", said Jim Strock, director of the US Marine Corps' (USMC's) Seabasing Integration Division. "It was conducted by the army as part of their forward floating depot concept, which they envisaged to support operations in southeast Asia. "They planned this exercise in 1963, well before Vietnam became a household word," Strock added. "It's remarkable that some of these basing ideas were crafted nearly 50 years ago. Seabasing is by no means new." Now the eyes of the US naval service are turning again to Asia, given its increased prominence in the new national security strategy published by the Obama administration in January 2012. This document is intended to set out the framework for bolstering US presence in its Pacific Command (PACOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM): a policy that is likely to further increase demand for amphibious assets. Landing helicopter dock ships (LHDs) and other amphibious platforms are already in heavy demand from operational commanders in the Pacific and Middle Eastern regions. Between 2007 and 2010 the number of requests for three-ship amphibious ready groups (ARGs) and their accompanying marine expeditionary units (MEUs) rose by 86 per cent, while requests for individual amphibious warships increased by 53 per cent, according to Fleet Forces Command. The increased focus on PACOM and CENTCOM will require an ability to deploy men and materiel from the sea, Strock told IHS Jane's on 20 January. "Last time I checked there's a whole lot of water out there," he said. The new national security strategy and the recently released Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13) budget mark an inflection point for the USMC in particular. The service has long voiced a desire to return to its maritime roots after a decade of land warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, the budget provides a new backdrop of austerity to the corps' seabasing plans. In the 1990s the US Navy (USN) and USMC developed an ambitious future vision based on the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) - MPF(F) - concept, which was designed to take prepositioned sealift and transform it into prepositioned amphibious lift by exploiting purpose-built shipping and advanced at-sea vehicle and cargo transfer systems. By 2007, the MPF(F) was envisaged as a single prepositioned squadron consisting of 14 vessels - two purpose-built 'flattop' assault ships and a legacy LHD, three dry cargo/ammunition replenishment ships (T-AKEs), three Large, Medium Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships (T-AKRs), two container ships (T-AKs) and three Mobile Landing Platforms (MLPs) - intended to provide a marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) with rapid reinforcement and sustainment from over the horizon. The proposed seabased force has now been significantly reduced in scale and re-orientated, losing the LHD and the purpose-built landing helicopter assault (LHA) ships. Each maritime prepositioning ships squadron (MPSRON) will consist of about seven vessels: a single Lewis and Clark-class T-AKE, one or two Bob Hope- or Watson-class LMSRs, a number of legacy T-AKs and a single MLP. The FY13 budget cut an additional MPSRON from the force structure and designated the third planned MLP as a future Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) to support mine countermeasures (MCM) helicopters and special operations forces, primarily in CENTCOM. Presented with less than ideal building blocks for their seabasing concept, the USN and USMC nonetheless have cobbled together a plan to maximise existing assets to provide logistics support to forces ashore without the benefit of the uncontested ports and airfields that drove the entry into Iraq and Afghanistan. "The challenge that we have in seabasing - a major challenge that we're working through - is all of these piece parts were developed as independent programmes," Strock said. Modular, mobile and scalable Development of the seabasing concept began at the conclusion of the Cold War. The utility of forward-deployed US land forces diminished after the departure of the Soviet threat and the incentive was to push towards a modular, mobile and scalable force to exploit fully the sea control that the US had already established, according to a 2009 White Paper entitled 'Seabasing for the Range of Military Operations', written by the USMC's Combat Development Command. That shift was foreseen by naval historian Samuel P Huntington in 1954, according to the White Paper. "The base of the USN should be conceived of as including all those land areas under [US] control and the seas of the world right within a few miles of the enemy's shores," he wrote. "The objective should be to perform as far as practical the functions now performed on land at sea bases closer to the scene of the operation." While the rationale for this strategy is often popularised as the need to conduct forcible entry operations from the sea against a determined enemy ashore, both the USN and the USMC stress that seabasing capabilities are required in peacetime too. "Seabasing spans the full range of military operations from most likely to most dangerous. You certainly assemble MEBs to go fight the most dangerous places in the world, but what's most likely is the day to day things that we're doing with the new style of MPF ships," Strock said. "It's not some monolithic thing. It's tailored. It's task organised." The capability is something the marine corps in particular clings to. "This inherent flexibility and utility isn't widely understood or isn't appreciated, as evident by the frequent and erroneous assumption that forcible entry requirements alone define the capability of amphibious ships," the USMC's commandant, General James Amos, told the Surface Navy Association's annual symposium in January 2011. Amphibious lift certainly has wide utility in operations other than war: from peacekeeping and peace-enforcement to the provision of personnel and equipment for crisis management tasks, humanitarian aid/disaster relief (HADR) and military training to other nations. Recent examples of major US amphibious operations include the HADR responses to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti and the March 2011 earthquake/tsunami in Japan. Minimising US military presence on the ground is part of the appeal of the sea base. During Exercise 'Bold Alligator 2012' (BA12) in January-February - which was billed as the largest US amphibious exercise in 10 years - logistics and C2 capabilities for a force of almost 4,000 marines were maintained by a group of ships off the US eastern seaboard as a proof of concept. "The idea is to avoid the perception of a long-term presence ashore. We like to keep our footprint as small as possible, not large enough to appear to the public that we're going to stay there for a long time," said exercise planner Lieutenant Commander George Pastoor of the Royal Netherlands Navy, speaking to IHS Jane's onboard the assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1) on 3 February. The cost of procuring vessels for the original MPF(F) concept - intended to support an MEB from the sea - was originally estimated at USD15 billion.

# Sealift key to Security Assistance Ops

Sealifting is key to security assistance operations

McDermott 11 (CAPT Charles U.S. Navy, 2011, “Joint Interagency Multinational Sea-based Logistics Platforms: Utilizing Strategic Sealift to Enhance Geographic Combatant Commanders’ Theater Engagement Capabilities”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA545854\///TS)

Sealift also successfully supported security assistance operations. The MPF ship USNS 1st Lt Jack Lummus was among the first ships to arrive with USS Tripoli (LPH 10) Amphibious Task Force (ATF) at Mogadishu, Somalia in December 1992 where security issues hampered a United Nations mission to end years of starvation. After discharging her Marine Corps combat cargo, Lummus remained on station in Mogadishu to serve as a logistics base providing critical shelter, food and fresh water to deployed Marines and a local population in crisis.35 An accidental shooting in the first days of the operation resulted in the death of two Somalis and wounding of seven others. No U.S. Army or coalition field hospitals had yet arrived and Tripoli had the best medical facilities and surgical teams within the ATF. The wounded were treated onboard Tripoli and all recovered. This incident demonstrated the value of sea-based medical facilities and the criticality of having them available at the start of an operation.

# Sealift key to Ready Response

Sealift is critical to military ready response

Dominic 09 (Keith, Naval War College, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, April 5, 2009, “Foreign Flag Shipping: A Weakness in the Sealift Trident”**,** http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA503079///TS)

Operational logistics provides the foundation for every surge and sustainment capabilities for all military operations. The sealift portion of logistics is the most cost effective and most utilized means to transport our military cargo to an operational area. Therefore, our military’s responsiveness and sustainment is imperative on having a strong and reliant sealift capability. With the steady decline of the United States flagged Merchant Marine and the need to maintain a strong and reliant sealift capability, the United States military has been required to rely on foreign flag shipping to fully meet their sealift requirements. This reliance on foreign flag shipping introduces multiple inherent risks that could interrupt the flow of personnel and materials into a theater of operations. This has the potential to significantly impact the ability to surge and sustain forces, which could result in the constraint of strategic, operational, and tactical options available to the operational commander. This paper discusses these inherent risks to the geographic combatant commanders and TRANSCOM, the functional combatant commander, while also demonstrating the need to address these risks. Finally, the paper will draw a conclusion concerning these inherent risks and recommend updating doctrines and plans so that they incorporate today’s reliance on foreign flag shipping allowing the United States military to continue having the freedom of action necessary for an operational commander to respond to any conflict worldwide that threatens United States national security.

# Intermodal Containerization?

Intermodal Containerization is necessary to revitalize the US transportation sector

Evenson 09 (James, Lieutenant Colonel United States Marine Corps Reserve, May 27, 2009, “INTERMODAL WAR: ASSESSING CONTAINERIZED POWER PROJECTION”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA508289///TS)

If the military of tomorrow seeks to avoid the clogged ports and the congested rail yards of the past, a keen understanding of intermodal containerization as a strategic mobility enabler is in order. The present-day factory-to-foxhole path of military logistics is a series of interconnected capabilities employing common hardware standards and practices. Each of these capabilities, in turn, relies on various equipment and information technologies, civil and military organizations, and doctrine and policies for the conduct of operations. These technologies include transportation-related entities such as standardized containers, container handlers, container ships, specialized railcars and trucks, and all of the supporting infrastructure and information technology to provide the overall management of the end-to-end process. Organizations supporting intermodal container operations include specialized military logistics units, civilian workers, railroads, shipping lines, trucking companies, and all of the supporting activities required to make these groups function. Each of these organizations also bring with them business strategies and operating practices that make the supply chain work as a whole. To understand the strategic implications of each of these elements, a summary of their contribution to the overall concept of military power projection using intermodal containerization is required.

# Sealift key to Natural Disasters Rapid Response

Sealifting is key to natural disasters rapid response

McDermott 11 (CAPT Charles U.S. Navy, 2011, “Joint Interagency Multinational Sea-based Logistics Platforms: Utilizing Strategic Sealift to Enhance Geographic Combatant Commanders’ Theater Engagement Capabilities”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA545854\///TS)

On December 26, 2004, a 9.0 magnitude undersea earthquake centered off the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia triggered a series of devastating tsunami waves that struck most landmasses bordering the Indian Ocean resulting in the death of at least 283,100 people in fourteen countries. 38 As discussed previously, sea-based logistics from Navy and Coast Guard ships participating in Operation Unified Assistance provided the support necessary to affect a massive international response while virtually eliminating the need for basing ashore. These ships provided personnel and extensive airlift support. However, they did not carry much in the way of relief supplies for the scope of the disaster or the heavy machinery, construction, and engineering capacity needed to repair tremendous infrastructure damage. The significant amount of useful equipment onboard the Marine Corps MPF ships responding was not available because accessing it would have required extensive offload of combat equipment and compromised unit integrity. However, those combat-loaded sealift ships proved useful in disasters response by supplying tremendous amounts of fuel and potable water. However, even empty strategic sealift ships have provided significant capability in domestic disasters. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the U.S. Gulf Coast with devastating effect in August and September 2005. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) ultimately utilized nine ships from the U.S. Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) in relief operations in Louisiana and Texas. The ships served as temporary headquarters for the Port of New Orleans, greatly expediting the resumption of port operations to restore the local economy. They provided food, water, shower facilities, laundry services, and even air-conditioned cargo holds as temporary shelter for U.S. Army, National Guard, FEMA workers, local police, doctors, nurses, and other relief workers. These nine ships provided an estimated 270,000 meals and 83,000 accommodations. The ships also provided fuel to restore or maintain power at nearby pumping stations, water treatment plants, hospitals, emergency shelters, responder command centers, and emergency vehicles.39 These ships proved to be a tremendous asset to the U.S. government response to these domestic disasters. However, 18 when Hurricane Ike struck just three years later, FEMA called in the Navy’s Tarawa-class amphibious assault ship USS Nassau (LHA 4).

# Sealift key to Transportation Capabilities

Sealift is crucial to our transportation capabilities

Levin 11 (Senator Levin, April 7, 2011, HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, “AFRICOM's Ham Testifies Before the Senate Armed Services Committee”, http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=6405&lang=0///TS)

A number of ongoing critical issues confront TRANSCOM. One is modernizing the forces. One acquisition program supporting TRANSCOM has received a lot of visibility and has been resolved and that's the strategic tanker modernization program. TRANSCOM has received Congressional additions to the budget to buy C-17 aircraft in excess of what DOD and TRANSCOM said were needed to support wartime requirements. Now as the Air Force is taking delivery of those extra C-17s, the Air Force is seeking authorization to retire C-5A aircraft because it believes that they do not need the extra aircraft, and cannot afford to operate them. TRANSCOM is also facing other less well known modernization challenges. The ready reserve force, the RRF, a group of cargo ships held in readiness by the maritime administration is aging and will need to be modernized with newer ships over the next 10 years. While perhaps not as glamorous as airlift operations, sealift support is critical to our capabilities. We have relied on sealift to deliver more than 90 percent of the cargo to Iraq and Afghanistan similar to previous contingencies. This committee has sought to ensure that our combatant commanders have what they need to succeed in all of these missions, conflicts and challenges. This committee will continue to support the needs of our warfighters in these conflicts.

# Sealift Prerequisite to Airlift

Sealift investment is a prerequisite to airlift

Hickins 09 (COLONEL KENNETH, United States Army, March 30, 2009, “STRATEGIC MOBILITY: FORGOTTEN CRITICAL REQUIREMENT OF THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA494718///TS)

As with airlift, the United States needs to continue to pursue the acquisition and development of future sealift platforms such as shallow Draft High Speed Sealift (SDHSS), Fast Sealift Monohull, Navy Vision Trimaran High Speed Sealift (NVTHSS), and Navy Vision Surface Effect Ship high Speed Sealift (NVSESHSS). Just as our planning model has moved away from a threat based to a capabilities based model, the same must be applied here. Addressing the needs of sealift and the positioning of the pre-positioned equipment will not only fix their shortcomings but will also mitigate the airlift requirements thereby strengthening the airlift leg of the Triad. The fix for sealift is to modernize the fleet and the fix for pre-positioned equipment is better placement.

# Sealift is Most Efficient

Sealift is the most efficient mode of transportation

McDermott 11 (CAPT Charles U.S. Navy, 2011, “Joint Interagency Multinational Sea-based Logistics Platforms: Utilizing Strategic Sealift to Enhance Geographic Combatant Commanders’ Theater Engagement Capabilities”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA545854\///TS)

Sealift and sea basing are efficient and effective means of moving equipment and supplies, sustaining forces in theater, and providing a base of operations for both military and civilian organizations. Movement by sealift is far less expensive than airlift. Ships are slower than airplanes but, when moving large volumes of cargo, sealift can be more time effective as well. Time is lost however when a ship must be activated from a cold start. Therefore, a best scenario would be to have the ships loaded and standing by in the vicinity of where they will likely be required. Unfortunately, under current fiscal constraints, the nation cannot afford the additional cost of operating ships that are just standing by, waiting for a disaster. The ships must be available to support other DOD activities.

**Sealift is more efficient**

**Baldwin 09** [Mathew A Baldwin, *Major,* 2009, “CHINA'S EVOLUTION TOWARD BECOMING A MORE RESPONSIBLE GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA510339, DMintz]

A key component for any military operation is logistics. Sealift is far more efficient than Airlift in term of mere tonnage though restraints on accessibility make Airlift a necessary capability. Military operations in general, especially Disaster Relief operations where access via roads has been affected makes Airlift mobility a key capability. Degradation to infrastructure or sheer remoteness can limit the amount of supplies, equipment and personnel that can be employed to an area of operation. Transport aircraft and helicopters have been given a low priority by the PLAAF in relation to the expenditures on advanced fighter aircraft. The PLAAF has a small dedicated aerial transport fleet that is limited in numbers and capability.

# Sealift Falling Behind—Plan key

**The Sealift budget is falling apart – only a reinvigoration of the program will maintain it**

**Bonney 6-26** Senior Editor of the Journal of Commerce and expert on Transportation Finance and Economics for 30 years (Joseph, “Military Sealift ‘Holding Breath’ on Budget Cuts”, Journal of Commerce, 6-26-2012, http://www.joc.com/washington/military-sealift-%E2%80%98holding-breath%E2%80%99-budget-cuts) RaPa

The Military Sealift Command is worried about its inability to plan for a threatened federal budget sequestration that would require 10 percent cuts at the start of 2013, said John S. Thackrah, the command’s executive director. “We are all just holding our breath,” Thackrah said in a speech at the annual meeting of the United Seamen’s Service. The sequestration threat arose when a bipartisan congressional “supercommittee” last year failed to agree on additional deficit reduction as part of a deal to raise the budget ceiling. As a result, 10 percent line-item budget cuts are scheduled to kick in on Jan. 2. Half of the cuts will come from the Defense Department. Thackrah said Defense agencies have been directed by Office of Management and Budget “to do no preparations whatsoever” for the threatened sequestration. “I’ve never seen anything like it,” he said. “When we in the Department of Defense got a directive from the Office of Management and Budget, ‘Do not exert resources, Do not spend appropriated money to do planning around sequestration,’ that’s what we did…You would think there would be squads of people walking the halls of the Pentagon working on planning this.” The sealift command has the responsibility of resupplying, refueling and prepositioning navy ships. Since his appointment in 2010, Thackrah has overseen a reorganization that created separate units for the government-operated and contract-operated ships. Thackrah said a 10 percent, across-the-board sequestration, coupled with likely budget cuts next year, would require reprogramming of major contracts with sealift command contractors. “You can’t drop those kinds of cuts on industry and expect action overnight,” Thackrah said. He noted that, depending on the state, companies must provide employees with 60- or 90-day notice of layoffs. Thackrah said he hopes lawmakers and the administration can agree on budget issues in time to head off problems. “It’s the lack of action right now that’s causing all the drama,” he said. “As we go through this summer, this is going to get really, really tough.”

**Enhanced infrastructure capabilities are key to readiness – Sealift facilities require upgrades**

**AUSA 11** Association of the United States Army, AUSA is a private, non-profit educational organization that supports America's Army - Active, National Guard, Reserve, Civilians, Retirees, Government Civilians, Wounded Warriors, Veterans, and family members. AUSA provides numerous Professional Development Opportunities at a variety of events both local and national. (“Readiness: Resolutions for 2011”, 11-11 Power Projection, http://www.ausa.org/legislation/agenda/resolutions2011/Documents/11-11%20%20Power%20Projection%20-%20murder%20board%20draft%201.pdf) RaPa

Most national security experts predict persistent conflict for the next several decades. Local and regional frictions, fueled by globalization and other emerging trends, will be exploited by extremists to support their efforts to destroy our way of life. Given these circumstances, the Army must be strategically responsive and able to provide properly sized early entry forces fully prepared to operate in a joint expeditionary environment to engage and defeat our enemies. To meet these national security challenges, the Army must be able to dominate across the full spectrum of joint and expeditionary operations by providing the agility and versatility required to transition rapidly from one event and location to another with the least loss of momentum. The purpose of the Army Power Projection Program (AP3) is to institutionalize our Expeditionary Army Capability - the ability to rapidly deploy, employ, and sustain combined arms forces worldwide in any operational environment and operate effectively upon arrival – to achieve Army deployment goals (as defined in the Army Campaign Plan) and enable Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). Improving the manner and speed with which the Army responds is underscored by Joint interdependence, our National Military Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), OSD Transformation Planning Guidance, and The Army Plan. Timely global projection of Army combat power against dynamic adversaries and into austere environments will most often begin from CONUS-based power projection installations and requires synchronized, complementary joint and 1service force projection programs. Significant investment in facilities infrastructure, network infrastructure, reliable strategic airlift, and improved sustainment initiatives is crucial to achieving this objective. Army Campaign Plan Deployment Goals can only be achieved with an appropriate mix of joint capabilities, including deployment infrastructure upgrades; enhanced inter-theater and intra-theater airlift and sealift capabilities; reconstituted and improved Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) unit sets and Army Regional Flotilla (ARF); optimum levels of War Reserve Sustainment (WRS) stocks; and better deployment processes and information technology tools. The Army contribution to DoD force projection and distribution objectives is achieved by supporting and funding AP3 related Management Decision Packages (MDEPS) and Installation Information Infrastructure Modernization Program (I3MP) initiatives. The I3MP provides expanded fiber optic networks and switching facilities. Infrastructure enhancements are critical to the installations capability to support growth due to Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), Army Modular Force (AMF), and Global Defense Posturing Review (GDPR) construction programs. Modernization of information technology has not kept pace with requirements to upgrade Power Projection capabilities. The Installation Information Infrastructure Modernization Program upgrades the Information Technology infrastructure that supports LandWarNET both at home station and when forward deployed. Only 34 of 95 CONUS installations are currently funded for upgrade/refresh. I3MP is not funded for upgrade/refresh of 61 other installations. 2Rapid and assured provisioning of forces world-wide includes the Distribution Management and Transformation initiative, configured loads, Containerization/Field Pack Up (Storage and Shipping) System, Future Tactical Truck System (FTTS) and Integrated Logistics Aerial Resupply initiative, consisting of a suite of capabilities and enablers (e.g. precision airdrop, advanced platform, and modular packaging technologies) integrated to provide an enhanced aerial resupply capability synchronized with surface distribution. WE THEREFORE RESOLVE to urge the Administration and Congress to: • Fully fund infrastructure improvements of Power Projection Platforms to include the Installation Information Infrastructure Modernization Program (I3MP) as requested in the President’s Budget

**Japan, Germany, and China have better sealifting capabilities than the US**

**McDermott 11** [Charles D. McDermott, *Captain US Navy*, November 5, 2011, “Joint Interagency Multinational Sea-based Logistics Platforms: Utilizing Strategic Sealift to Enhance Geographic Combatant Commanders’ Theater Engagement Capabilities”, School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, <http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA545854>, DMintz]

Today’s U.S. ocean-going merchant fleet totals only about 348 ships. These are ships owned by U.S. companies and registered in the U.S. An additional 732 ships are U.S.-owned but registered in other countries. Compare this to the top three shipping nations of Japan with 3,757 ships, Germany with 3,380, and China with 3,247.52 In an effort to alleviate concern over the decline in U.S. commercial shipping, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Maritime Administration manage several programs designed to ensure U.S. military access to mobility sealift capacity.

At its height in 1950, the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) consisted of 2,277 government-owned merchant cargo ships held in varying conditions of readiness to support the nation’s strategic sealift requirements.53 As of December 31, 2010, the NDRF consisted of 158 ships including forty-nine ships in the highest state of readiness in the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). The RRF are home-ported in commercial maritime ports along each of the three U.S. coasts. RRF ships are generally maintained in reduced operating status (ROS) with the expectation of being fully crewed, provisioned, and underway in as little as four days. When underway in full operating status (FOS), these ships are crewed by as many as thirty-five merchant marine officers and crew. In ROS however, RRF ships may carry up to ten personnel, primarily engineering staff. The annual cost of maintaining the RRF fleet is $275.5 million, or approximately $5.62 million per ship.54 Over the course of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the consistent availability of commercial shipping has largely relegated the RRF to sitting empty and idle.

# \*\*\*MSC\*\*\*

# Investment key to MSC

**MSC is successful now but risks future budget cuts – only investment ensures longevity**

**Buzby 11** Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy Commander, Military Sealift Command (Mark H., “Military Sealift Command: Who we are. Where we're going. How we're getting there.”, Defense Transportation Journal. Washington: Sep 2011., http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?did=2466799541&Fmt=3&clientId=17822&RQT=309&VName=PQD) RaPa

After almost two years at the helm of Military SeaJift Command (MSC), IVe gained a unique perspective on who we are as a command and what we do for the Navy, the Department of Defense, and the nation. We are a worldwide organization of professional civilian mariners and Navy sailors afloat and equally qualified maritime transportation and other support specialists and sailors ashore. There are about 10,000 of us, and more than 80 percent serve afloat daily on MSC's average of 1 1 0 active ships. If you're in the surface Navy, you see the black, gray, blue, and gold stack stripes of our Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force ships every time a fast combat support ship, fleet replenishment oiler, or dry cargo/ammunition ship pulls alongside to deliver your fuel, spare parts, mail, and food, especially ice cream! But combat logistics support for the Navy fleets isn't the only part of our mission. Most folks don't see our white-hulled Special Mission ships because they're always in far-off corners of the world, charting ocean bottoms, gathering undersea intelligence, and supporting submarine and special warfare requirements and a host of other tasks for organizations and agencies throughout the federal government. Meanwhile, our prepositloning ships stage the combat equipment, ammunition, fuel, and basic supplies for all the US armed forces at sea, near the world's "hot spots," ready for delivery to combat forces when the balloon goes up. MSC also delivers the day-to-day combat equipment, supplies, and fuel to US warfighters around the world in response to tasking from USTRANSCOM. Another area that always involves MSC ships is providing sea-going platforms for civic assistance and humanitarian relief. When you see the hospital ships USNS Comfort or USNS Mercy traveling to our neighbors and friends along the Pacific Rim or in Central and South America and the Caribbean Sea, that's part of our worldwide mission. We're also a growing operation, adding new ships and missions as we demonstrate our capabilities and expertise to a growing customer base. We recently added the NaVy1S two submarine tenders to MSC operations using hybrid crews of civil service mariners for basic ship operations and Navy sailors for the mission crews tasked with submarine maintenance. At the same time, five more Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo/ammunition ships have joined the MSC fleet for improved combat force logistics at sea, and we've placed two newly built, double-hulled tankers under long-term charter to meet the fuel transport needs of die Department of Defense. The new ships and missions coming to MSC are indicative of the high level of trust in which we are held by the Navy and all of DOD. We've developed a reputation For getting the job done efficiendy and effectively. STRATEGIC PRIORITIES As many of you no doubt are also aware, the Secretary of Defense has issued very strong marching orders concerning the future budget. My concern is that if we don't take a good look at our own operations and how we spend tax payers' money, then someone else will do it for us, and we'll just have to abide by the results instead of having any control over them. To that end, I've developed a set of four strategic initiatives for MSC that will help us focus our organization, gain even more efficiencies, and help shape our own future. PROVIDE SHIPS READY FOR TASKING We're looking at our operations and maintenance processes to make sure we're able to meet the Navy's operational requirement of availability 270 days of the year with ships that are crewed with the right number of highly trained personnel. We're also constantly looking at maintenance contracts to get the best repair value for our ships. This means our ships spend less time in maintenance facilities and more time at sea, meeting our customers' needs. Military SealiftFleet Support Command, our subordinate command in Norfolk, VA1 conducted a complete review and scrub of our standard shipyard contracts. For the past year, MSFSC has been using innovative dual-ship contracts to reduce costs and reduce source selection workload while still achieving excellent performance. MSFSC has also developed principal port engineer training programs and created electronic tracking tools for the port engineers' change requests and standard work items. We're fine tuning our ship maintenance plans with an eye toward ensuring we get every bit of service life from our ships. DEVELOP. ENHANCE, AND ENABLE OUR WORKFORCE Tell a steam engineer to fix a high-voltage control panel problem armed only with a maul and a slugging wrench, and he'll probably figure out a way to do it - but you're not likely to get a very elegant solution to the problem. A much smarter and more efficient approach is to give the right person - with the right training, experience, and tools - the right amount of time and maximum encouragement. They'll not only solve the problem, but also complete the mission better, faster, and more economically than it's ever been done before. MSC people are the well-spring of our past accomplishments and our fumre triumphs. Competition for bright, young talent is fierce in today's job market, and leveraging the knowledge and capabilities of our current employees is critical, too. That's especially true when you consider that a large percentage of MSC s workforce will be eligible for optional retirement within 10 years. Their knowledge and skills must be passed on; we can't afford to lose them. One recent initiative instituted formal leadership training for more than 1500 mid- and senior-level afloat leaders. The emphasis in this training is skills such as conflict resolution and employee empowerment. It's been extremely well received - our mariners want more! We're also looking at significant overhaul to our personnel management system of detailing, training, granting time off, and making promotions. We absolutely must do this to attract and retain a talented workforce. FOCUS ON THE CUSTOMER While we're doing these internal checks and developments, we will remain totally aware of our need to focus die results of our efforts on the customer. Since I wear multiple hats, we've got a lot of customers. The Navy combatant fleet needs our combat logistics capabilities at sea. TRANSCOM requires our cargocarrying expertise for DOD cargo delivered to customers worldwide. All armed services rely on us to preposition combat gear, fuel, and ordnance at sea. Then there are our Special Mission platforms that provide undersea intelligence, océanographie survey, submarine, and special warfare support and a host of other services in the far-Hung corners of the world. No, we do not lack for customers; so we rightly need to focus all our improvement efforts with our customers' mission requirements in mind. MANAGE ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND GROWTH By most measures, we are executing our mission well today, but that doesn't automatically mean we'll be doing a great job tomorrow. In the near-term years ahead, there is no doubt that MSC is going to have more responsibility, but with smaller budgets. I believe that MSC has two options: react to whatever comes and be changed by someone else, or be proactive and pursue effective change that we can help control. Option two gives us more time to make reasonable accommodations to the changes that are coming and allows us to make MSC an even more effective and efficient organization. Much of "big Navy" has adopted an organizational structure called Competency Alignment. The commands (and outside organizations) that have done this have proven to be very agile and flexible and now have superior capabilities. They are able to execute their missions strongly, yet maintain highly motivated people who have broad depth and background in multiple areas of expertise. At MSC, we are in the process of realigning ourselves in chis way. Competency alignment should be transparent for MSC's mariners and sailors afloat. The basic premise is to structure our shoreside functions, roles, and responsibilities into "communities" that can provide the best services to meet mission needs. Our communities are our N-codes (Nl Personnel, N7 Engineering, etc.) where our people have the knowledge, skills, and abilities to deliver the services needed by our program managers to support our ships at sea, delivering products and services to our customers in the Navy and throughout DOD. Our N-code leaders will have full responsibility to provide the best-trained workforce and missionready equipment co our program leaders. Today, MSC has small groups of people from many of the N-codes placed throughout the command. That's because the right people should be in the right place at the right time to make everything happen. But tying all these professionals to communities so each group of professionals has standards, practices, and processes that are common across MSC will inevitably lead to greater efficiency. It's not a major reorganization; it's just lining up everyone to perform the mission better. Make no mistake - MSC delivers today. We are one of the most cost-effective and capable elements of today's Navy. But, if we look closely, we can find new ways to make ourselves even more effective and mission capable. This will help us offset the fiscal realities that are coming our way.

# MSC key to Naval Power

**MSC is the enabling force for Naval Power**

**Buzby 12** Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy Commander, Military Sealift Command (Mark H., “S•E•A•L•I•F•T: The U. S. Navy’ s Military Sealift Command”, March 2012, http://www.sealiftcommand.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Sealift-2012-03.pdf) RaPa

While DOD is looking at significant budget cuts in the next several years, the 2012 strategic guidance recently released by the Secretary of Defense has a definite maritime focus. It reaffirms the benefits and strengths of sea power and operating forward, focusing on the Pacific area of responsibility, but keeping a firm eye fixed on the Middle East and Southwest Asia at the same time. As more and more U.S. ground forces come home, air and sea power will become the predominant strengths behind U.S. diplomacy. The added maritime focus means MSC will be the enabling force for U.S. power projection, goodwill and humanitarian assistance. Led by the strategic guidance, the Navy’s budget for fiscal years 2013-2017 produces a Navy-Marine Corps team built for war that is capable of operating forward to preserve the peace, responding to crises and protecting United States and allied interests. The force will be lean, agile, flexible, ready and technologically advanced. So what does that really mean for MSC? It means that the many MSC missions around the world every day – be they in our government-operated fleet or our contractor-operated fleet – will become increasingly important to the execution of the new defense strategy. It also means new equipment and missions are headed our way

# MSC key to Asian Power Projection

**MSC is key to Asian Power Projection**

**Laird 12** International defense consultant and co-founder of Second Line of Defense, a website which focuses on logistics, sustainment and concepts of operations (Robbin, “Military Sealift Command: A Flexible Key to The Asia Strategy”, 6-7-2012, AOL Defense, http://defense.aol.com/2012/06/07/military-sealift-command-a-key-to-the-asia-strategy/) RaPa

The U.S. can afford to build a 21st century power projection force able to provide a lynchpin for Asian security. But it won't be able to if we don't take advantage of new concepts of operation, new technologies and new approaches. A key element for deploying a forward presence force is sustainability. There is probably no subject less discussed in the strategic debates than logistics and sustainment. As a version of the old adage goes: "Amateurs discuss strategy; professionals think logistics." This could not be truer when it comes to the Military Sealift Command. The Military Sealift Command is not the most visible element of the Navy-Marine Corps team, unless you are at sea and need them. Whether that support comes from underway replenishment, from ships at sea or air assets, the more than 100 MSC ships are the lifeblood of our fleet. In an era of tight budgets and challenges to ship numbers, the ships of MSC are part of the solution for enhanced fleet performance. Indeed, the recent landing of a V-22 Osprey on a T-AKE MSC ship during Bold Alligator 2012 was an eye opener of how the roles of these ships can change. All this is indicative of a shift from well-organized carrier battle groups to a more dispersed presence force. The dispersed fleet is occurring through LCS deployments, the evolution of the Amphibious Ready Group-Marine Expeditionary Group or Expeditionary Strike Group. Indeed, the demand upon the fleet has gone up significantly over time. In a recent interview, Admiral Buzby, the Commander of the MSC underscored that from its humble origins in 1949 (as the Military Sea Transportation Service) the demand has gone up significantly over time. There are a number of notable aspects of MSC as the U.S. builds its fleet out into the future for the long distances of the Pacific. First, the crews of the MSC are civilians. Indeed, they are among the hardest working civilians in the U.S. government or in the private sector, for that matter. They are at sea an average of nine months of each year. The personnel costs of these civilian mariners are substantially less than if they wore uniforms. Second, the command has a very flexible contracting system, which allows it to achieve cost effective results and breathtaking acquisition outcomes in short periods of time. A very impressive example illustrates this. When the Secretary of Defense decided he needed to develop and deploy a sea base to support countermine operations in the Gulf and focused on putting the USS Ponce back to sea, the Navy turned to MSC to get the job done. They did it in about 90 days. The RFP was published in mid-January 2012 and by mid-April 2012 the ship was being readied for deployment. That's 90 days. An ongoing example is the new supply ship – the T-AKE. These can be built in 12 months or less at a cost of $450 million. The last ones are being built, but to this analyst buying more of these ships to build a more diverse, forward-deployed fleet make a great deal of sense. T-AKEs carry fuel, ammunition, and supplies and can support a contingent of military forces afloat. As the U.S. shapes its con-ops for forward deployment, there are real opportunities to pair this ship with other combat or security vessels to create appropriate deployment packages. For example, Adm. Buzby discussed a potential pairing of a USCG National Security Cutter with a T-AKE ship. "The [Coast Guard's] National Security Cutters have an embarked helicopter, some firepower and some good command-and-control. Pair them up with a T-AKE, and you can have presence and staying power for a regional security mission....." In other words, the MSC is an integral part of what the Navy-Marine Corps team can do, especially in the difficult and vast domain of the Pacific. Three potential lessons, which could be learned moving forward, thinking about the future, can come from considering MSC and its role. First, the MSC has very useful flight decks that can work with Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard flight elements. These decks function as lily pads for the fleet and provide a significant part of the sustainable presence punch essential to maritime forces, whether for military or security missions. Second, the Secretary of the Navy is a keen proponent of environmental security. His commitment could be demonstrated by getting the MSC fleet out of single hull tankers and into more environmentally secure -- and safer -- double hull tankers as quickly as possible. In today's commercial environment, operating a single hull tanker would be difficult since insurance companies often will not cover them. But, is as too often the case, we ask our forces to operate in ways that we would not accept in our personal or commercial lives. There is a plan to do this over time. But I think the time is now. Third, the MSC and the logistics infrastructure it embodies reminds one that low cost is in the eye of the beholder. We are told that we should acquire the LCS in large part because of its initial operational capability (IOC) cost. But LCS represents the classic approach of focusing on a platform without looking profoundly at the context of operational and sustainment approaches. The LCS ships are so small that they possess VERY limited organic support. This means that the already challenged Military Sealift Command will have to be able to support the "surging" LCS fleet and if the fleet is disaggregated this will put significant stress on an already challenged fleet. In short, the MSC provides a key element for sustained forward deployment. And folding this into the discussion about what is needed for the Asian pivot is part of what professionals need to do

# \*\*\*Naval Power\*\*\*

# Naval Power Projection key to Light Footprint

**Naval Power projection is key to a cost-effective military strategy – maintains allied assurance with a light footprint.**

**McKeon 12** House Armed Services Committee Chairman (Howard P. "Buck", “FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND”, 3-7-2012, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON THE ARMED SERVICES ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, pdf) RaPa

With the withdrawal of our last troop units from Iraq, excluding our men and women in the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, and as we continue to draw down in Afghanistan and 6 transition operational lead to the Afghanistan National Security Forces, our ground-based troop presence across the region is decreasing. However, as the President has stated, “our strong presence in the Middle East endures… and the United States will never waver in defense of our allies, our partners, or our interests.” The question then becomes, how do we maintain our presence with a light footprint? To accomplish this, the USCENTCOM AOR will assume an increasingly maritime character with special operations forces (SOF) and strong air enablers. Naval forces – with embarked troops – provide presence and a cost efficient means of rapidly projecting power in a crisis to execute contingency operations. Sustained naval presence and response forces provide a lighter “footprint” on the ground, and are vital for reassuring our partners, deterring those with malign intent and tempering destructive actors from fermenting trouble in our region. The maritime environment also permits freedom of action unfettered by international boundaries and agreements. However, the stacked Iranian threats in our AOR of ballistic missiles, long range rockets, mines, small boats, cruise missiles and submarines demand stronger naval presence and capability to protect vital sea lines of communication. I view with concern efforts to decrease our naval presence and capability when our volatile AOR and the threats of the future are increasingly maritime. Demands on our naval forces will only grow in the future; I anticipate that we will need more maritime missile defense, anti-fast attack craft capabilities, amphibious ships and mine-countermeasure capability, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Maintaining a credible naval force covered by sufficient aviation combat power is essential for demonstrating our enduring commitment to regional partners, building trust and 7 relationships and rapid projection of power in a crisis. We are working to address our near-term capabilities and I am grateful for the Committee’s strong support.

# Naval Power Projection = Trade

**Naval Power Projection is net beneficial for the economy – it’s an investment in trade**

**England 12** President of E6 Partners LLC, which advises on defense business strategies, consults with U.S. and international businesses, and assists with mergers and acquisitions. He served as Deputy Secretary of Defense, as Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and for two terms as Secretary of the Navy. (Gordon R., “Naval Forces Underpin Economic Success”, United States Naval Institute. Proceedings. Annapolis: Jan 2012. Vol. 138, Iss. 1; pg. 18, 2 pgs, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?did=2583771281&Fmt=3&clientId=17822&RQT=309&VName=PQD) RaPa

This year, as we begin our observance and celebration of the Bicentennial of the War of 1812, it is useful to bear in mind that the Royal Navy's supremacy at sea at Trafalgar would soon come into doubt with the spectacular victories of ships of the young U.S. Navy such as the Constitution, United States, Hornet, and Wasp. Those victories were quite astonishing. It is remarkable that the most powerful navy in the world in 1805, having handily vanquished the number-two French and number-three Spanish, was then losing to an unranked opponent less than ten years later. What we can take from this is that no navy or nation, however powerful, can rest on its laurels. The Nelson band of brothers, after that remarkable victory at Trafalgar, did not drive ahead in strengthening and modernizing their fleet. Less than a decade later, the Royal Navy was not a match for the newer, better ships of the upstart U.S. Navy. The message is the same now as then: Continue to progress, or fall behind, and lose. 'Two Sides of the Same Coin' For the United States today, two long and costly land wars with high sacrifices by our men and women in uniform are coming to a close. This is a time when President Barack Obama is calling for the rebuilding of America and when political leadership and our citizens are rightfully looking to reduce national expenditures. Hundreds of billions in defense-spending cuts are being planned with more expected. The question is being asked, "Why do we need to maintain such large forces - and at such a high fiscal cost?" In response, I would comment that security and economic development are two sides of the same coin. Security, and the stability it brings, is necessary for economic development. Capital quickly leaves countries or regions that are not safe, secure, and stable. In turn, economic development longer-term is necessary to afford security. Since the end of World War II, deployed U.S. military forces around the globe, backed by a strong military at home, along with committed political leadership and advanced technology, provided the security blanket for Europe and Asia to thrive economically. Many European nations are now squandering that wealth, and the United States, unfortunately, is on the same path and not far behind. In this fiscal environment, the Department of Defense can certainly be more effective and efficient. Defense budgets should be reduced. But if U.S. forces shrink too much, or pull back too far to U.S. shores, the nation and the world could find themselves without security or economic development. Security, and the stability it brings, is essential if the world is to recover economically. Here, we must sound a caution. The President and the Congress, as they look to reduce deficits and hopefully one day again balance the budget, must be mindful that our economy and the world economy are inextricably intertwined with security and the stability that security brings. A strong military, and especially strong naval forces, are crucial for the nation to thrive economically. Beyond Politics Over the 40 long years of the Cold War, work on these issues by America's leadership transcended politics, and Congresses, and administrations. It was not a question of being a Republican or a Democrat, or a conservative or a liberal. Everyone came together and put national security first. After World War II, President Harry S. Truman and his Republican Congress rarely saw eye to eye. But they created strong, flexible, new national-security institutions, to include the Department of Defense. They forged a consensus on national defense to defeat the Soviet threat. That same consensus is needed now. During the Cold War, Soviet shipyards on the White Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Pacific Ocean were building new generations of submarine and surface combatants. Throughout the 1950s, '60s, '70s, and '80s, the nation knew the U.S. Navy was needed. The nuclear superpower rivalry framed the debate and shaped decisions on the size of the Fleet and funding. With the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the economic and security forces of the world entered a process of change that continues and is accelerating. The nation entered a new, long, asymmetric war against extremists that is today only a part of the security challenge. We are faced with state-based nuclear and conventional threats, and the threat that nonstate actors may acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. The future courses of major powers such as China and Russia are not clear, and they continue their sophisticated military modernization. The nation's responsibility is to be prepared for the future. The global role of the Navy is essential to this preparation. President Theodore Roosevelt's words from more than a century ago ring truer than ever: ? good Navy is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guaranty of peace." In today's world, naval forces are ever more vital. The U.S. Navy is forward-deployed globally with embedded Marines. Naval forces and the Coast Guard are contributing to the nation's homeland defense. The Navy's Aegis cruisers and destroyers conduct ballistic-missile defense operations. Naval forces operate freely on the world's oceans, exercising sea control, collaborating with allies and foreign partners, deterring strategic and conventional aggression, **providing sealift,** and projecting power ashore when and where needed, all day, every day. Humanity and Technology The strength of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard starts with their men and women in uniform. Those serving are without peer. To see them in action is to witness talent, training, capability, and commitment. The Navy's strength - surface, subsurface, and air - builds from its technological prowess. Since the launch of the USS Nautilus (SSN-571) in 1954, the Navy's use and advances in nuclear propulsion in submarines and surface ships of the Fleet is an unmatched, incredible achievement, embracing science, research and development, shipbuilding, seamanship, strategy, tactics, and vision. That Fleet today includes ballistic-missile submarines providing strategic deterrence, guided-missile submarines with missile-power projection and specialforces-power projection ashore, and carrier strike groups, forward deployed and acting on some of the nation's highest security priorities. A sampling of the work of these carrier strike groups, sea-based, largely self-sustaining, operating in places with no need for bases across the world's oceans, is instructive. In late 2010, President Obama ordered the USS George Washington (CVN-73) carrier strike group to the waters off the Korean Peninsula to commence operations with our South Korean allies following the North Korean shelling of the island of Yeonpueong. Thousands of miles away in the Arabian Sea, the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) strike group was conducting air operations against insurgents in Afghanistan. Within hours of the March 2011 catastrophic earthquake/ tsunami/nuclear power-plant disaster in Japan, the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) strike group was operating in waters off the stricken nation bringing relief supplies and searching for survivors. During Nelson's time, there was a clear connection between the Royal Navy's control of the seas and British commercial success. Today, the connection for the United States is not as evident but just as strong, as our nation relies on the freedom of the seas for much of our international commerce and wealth. Maritime Security is Crucial Multinational corporations are responsible for an ever-increasing percentage of world trade. Some 90 percent of that trade is moving by sea. Upward of 200 million containers on board cargo ships are on the move each year. Trade to and from the United States around the world is carried almost entirely by ships. The U.S. Navy, U.S. sea power - on-scene and from afar, strategic and tactical, surface, air, cyber, and space - provides a stabilizing presence for the world's global economy. The safeguarding of seaborne commerce is an enduring part of the Navy's global mission. Bear in mind, security and economic development are intertwined. A strong national defense is essential for economic strength. Strong naval forces are central to that defense. The Navy and Marine Corps exercise a strategic concept of global operations that contributes uniquely and indispensably to the defense, security, and economic well-being of the United States. Control of the sea, deterrence of aggression, projection of power from the sea, and stabilizing global presence are functions of first-order importance to the nation. They underscore the wisdom of our Founding Fathers who gave Congress explicit power to provide and maintain a Navy in Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United States. That guidance has withstood the test of time as our nation has grown in wealth and influence. It is especially relevant today.

# \*\*\*AFRICOM\*\*\*

# Sealift key to AFRICOM

Sealifting is key to AFRICOM stability

Martinez 08 (Miguel, LT USN, April 23, 2008, “LESSONS FROM SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS APPLIED TO AFRICOM”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA484403///TS)

The next lesson from the case studies is that a critical capability for U.S. forces in disaster relief operations is the ability to provide logistical support to relief agencies and the effected population. Recent disaster relief operations show the most effective elements of the Joint Task Force were not traditional combat forces. Instead, logistic units and assets were the most beneficial parts of the U.S. force. Examples include the importance of aviation units accessing remote terrain in Operations Lifeline and Support Hope.75 In Operation Unified Assistance, the forward deployed nature of the Military Sealift Command meant that large amounts of supplies could be provided quickly via shortened sea lines of communication.76 – Another lesson related to logistics is that effective coordination with OGAs, IOs, and NGOs is required to efficiently provide logistical support. Operation Support Hope showed how lack of coordination with OGAs, IOs, and NGOs can hinder logistical support. In Operation Lifeline, the JTF took advantage of preexisting relationships in the U.S. Embassy and with the host nation to better provide support. Even when an attempt is made at synchronization, friction can be introduced to disaster relief operations when a JTF attempts to synchronize with OGAs, IOs, and NGOs. Case studies in Rwanda and Indonesia showed how lack of synchronization can result from a number of different factors including different communication technology between military and civilian agencies. Joint doctrine does address the need to synchronize efforts with civilian organizations through the formation of civil military operations centers (CMOC) and humanitarian operations centers (HOC).77, 78 However, due to the advisory nature of the operation centers and the fact that IOs and NGOs are not bound by U.S. military doctrine, effective coordination is not always achieved. AFRICOM should establish a high threshold with objective criteria defining when U.S. military forces will be utilized for disaster relief operations. Less complex and common disaster relief situations should be left to the traditional providers of relief such as USAID as well as IOs and NGOs. The United Nations (U.N.) addresses this issue by pointing out the need to establish a clear distinction between civil and military humanitarian action.79 The U.N. goes further and suggests military forces should only be used as a last resort when a “humanitarian gap” exists because civilian relief agencies are unable to provide assistance.80 It has also been proposed by experts in humanitarian assistance that military assets should only be used when they hold a “comparative advantage” over other relief agencies.81 The threshold for U.S. military forces should include widespread destruction of infrastructure and evidence of an inability of OGAs, IOs, and NGOs to provide disaster relief due to lack of logistical capability. The U.S. civilian agency component of the command structure of AFRICOM should make it possible for OGAs to monitor and provide input to the geographic combatant commander if the threshold has been met to provide military support to disaster relief operations. Developing a high threshold for military participation in disaster relief operations should alleviate some of the concerns on the part of host nations and traditional providers of disaster relief. OGAs, IOs, and NGOs would not feel as if they were in competition with the U.S. military for humanitarian resources. The fear that the U.S. military uses humanitarian disaster to gather operational intelligence or gain a military advantage would also be alleviated. The next recommendation is AFRICOM should utilize the sea basing concept whenever possible in disaster relief scenarios. The case studies showed host nations can be wary of U.S. military disaster relief operations and sea-basing would reduce the size of the military footprint in the effected nation. Sea basing would also be more effective for force protection. Many of the regions USAID is providing relief for in Africa are accessible by the sea.82 If these regions degenerated into a complex crisis and experienced large scale destruction of infrastructure they would be ideal for sea basing.

Sealift is crucial to AFRICOM’s ability to meet threats

Ward 10 (General William, March 9, 2010, “AFRICOM Posture Statement: General Ward reports annual testimony to Congress”, http://www.usaraf.army.mil/NEWS/NEWS\_100310\_WARD\_AFRICOM\_REMARKS\_CONGRESS.html///TS)

The level of funding for programs under the authority of DOS that are available to Africa has increased since the creation of U.S. Africa Command, and we request continued funding to allow us to fully pursue the defense aspects of the President's stated priorities. The countries in our AOR are among the poorest in the world. Many of their militaries are inappropriately trained, equipped, and prepared for their primary missions-the defense of their state or participation in peacekeeping operations. Movement of U.S. and African military personnel and equipment to meet emergent threats, conduct capacity building activities, and respond to crises, is heavily dependent on U.S. military air and sealift. Fully funding DOS-led programs is necessary to assist our partners in maintaining stability that fosters development, while helping them transform their security sectors. The greatest needs include the following:

# Sealift key to African Stability

Sealift crucial to African stability

Sohn 09 (Kathi, is a civilian employee of the Department of Defense with a current assignment to the Pentagon in direct support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. She graduated with highest distinction from the Naval War College in June 2008 and was awarded the McGinnis Family Award for Outstanding Performance in Distance Education. Sohn also has a master’s degree in conflict analysis and resolution from George Mason University 2009, “THE GLOBAL FLEET STATION

A Powerful Tool for Preventing Conflict”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA519324///TS)

In March 2008, the prepositioning ships of the Military Sealift Command’s West Africa Training Cruise joined the Africa Partnership Station for a sea-basing and humanitarian-assistance-distribution exercise off Monrovia, Liberia. The March 2008 edition of Rhumb Lines, a weekly Navy Office of Information e-mail circular for senior Navy leadership, reported the impact of such additional sea-base platforms as the Improved Navy Lighterage System, a redesigned floating-dock system originally used during WorldWar II, in its first operational deployment. Rhumb Lines reported, “The ability to create a mobile plat format sea enables future execution of the Maritime Strategy, complements APS initiatives and has the potential to enhance future support in the African region.” 18 One report on an early February 2008 visit by APS to Cameroon to assist with the relief of refugees escaping to the northern part of that country from civil conflict in Chad illustrates the multifaceted relationship-building nature of the APS mission: “In addition to providing relief assistance during the visit, Sailors from Swift will conduct a community relations project, meet with local officials, play soccer with the Cameroon Navy, and support a diplomatic reception aboard the ship.”

AFRICOM stability is crucial for African stability- conflict reduction, security, terrorism, crisis response

Wood 08 (Colonel Patricia, United States Army, March 14, 2008, “FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION: THE STRATEGIC CHALLENGES OF PROTECTING THE “TOTAL FORCE” IN U.S. AFRICA COMMAND (AFRICOM)”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada493835///TS)

The main focus for AFRICOM is to provide conflict reduction efforts, improve the security environment, defeat terrorist activity, and provide support in crisis response. The primary goal of AFRICOM is to develop a stable environment in Africa, promote civil society and improve the quality of life for those who live on the continent. The missions will include non-traditional military operations, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, training of African militaries and to conduct training, and medical missions. AFRICOM will be responsible for other presidential-directed military operations as required. 4 At the writing of this paper, AFRICOMs immediate focus is not necessarily on establishing a military presence or responding to a military operation in Africa, but rather refining the mission, formulating staffing requirements, and determining a headquarters location. A force health protection strategy in AFRICOM must be a critical priority prior to deployments in Africa because the nature of stability operations planned, such as multi-component jointly staffed, smaller contingencies, and/or in remote areas. Environmental health threats are the predominant threat to military personnel because of the many viruses, bacteria and parasites unique to Africa. Now is the optimum time to formulate a strategy for force health protection in Africa, identify critical force protection issues, and identify recommendations of strategic options to minimize the infectious disease threat to the operational force, and ensure a comprehensive and mobile medical care system to care for the sick and injured.

# Sealift key to African CT

Sealifting is crucial to CT in Africa

Ward 08 (GENERAL WILLIAM, USA COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND, March 13, 2008, “FACT SHEET: AFRICOM POSTURE STATEMENT: Ward Updates Congress on U.S. Africa Command”, http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1799&lang=1///TS)

Our ability to conduct TSC and other activities on the African continent is directly tied to mobility. Vast distances, combined with very limited civilian rail, road, and air transportation infrastructure, constrain the full range of AFRICOM engagement and contingency activities. There is limited intra-theater commercial airlift, and EUCOM's current fleet of C-130s does not possess the range or capacity to support rapid movements throughout AFRICOM's AOR. While African airlines account for only four percent of world travel, they experience 25 percent of the world's air disasters. The expanse of the African continent, coupled with limited commercial airlift availability, requires military airlift to ensure mission success. In cooperation with other DoD organizations, AFRICOM is conducting an analysis to identify the requirements for military aircraft. In the long-term, the U.S. must encourage the improvement of civilian transportation infrastructure and its security across the African continent, but the near term requires an increase in the quantity and capacity of military air and rapid sealift platforms made available to AFRICOM.

# A2 AFRICOM = Neoimperialism

**AFRICOM is not neoimperialist – security focus is good**

Jason **Warner** (MA in African Studies from Yale University, where he formerly served as the Editor-in-Chief of the Yale Journal of International Affairs. He currently works as a researcher on issues of African security, international relations, and politics) Winter **2011** “Neo-Imperialism and the Anti-Security Blanket in Africa: The Need for Nuance on the Debate about AFRICOM” <http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/116116warner.pdf>

More distressing to opponents than neocolonialism is the claim that the introduction of AFRICOM risks “securitizing” U.S. policy on the continent. States, even powerful ones, are concerned about their security, and the United States engages its closest allies—namely, NATO members—primarily via a framework of security. Preferable for the United States then, are allies that can help it protect its security, rather than ones who are content to absorb handouts in the form of development assistance. By engaging Africa as more than just a basket case, the United States is expressing its faith in the capacities of African states. Others fret that AFRICOM will facilitate interjections from the United States into the affairs of African states, meddling in continental conflicts whenever possible. To the contrary, AFRICOM is not an intervention-minded operation, but rather a training force to build the capacity of admittedly lacking African armies and navies. Rather than playing continental policeman, the United States is attempting to help Africa patrol itself; far from serving as an excuse for the United States to enter African conflicts, AFRICOM is an attempt to obviate such a need. Still others claim that the United States has “constructed” threats on the continent to justify entry. Were the July 2010 bombings in Uganda a farce? Did the Lord’s Resistance Army not actually rape some hundreds of women in the Democratic Republic of the Congo? Has the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia finally succeeded in controlling more than four blocks of Mogadishu? Oddly, opponents characterize AFRICOM’s “securitizing [of] U.S. policy towards Africa” in a disparaging way, as if attempts at engendering security on a chronically insecure continent are something to be rued. But perhaps most confusing is just why opponents view the securitization of U.S. engagements with the continent as less constructive than continued engagement by development. To be sure, what the continent needs are roads and schools, not more arms. But the reality is that development cannot happen in the absence of security; a reliable electric grid, for instance, means little when the specter of attack from rebel groups is a real one. More to the point, over the past fifty years, bilateral development efforts by the United States have admittedly done some amount of good on the continent, though few would argue that on the whole, the endeavor could be considered a resounding success. Poverty still reigns. Democracy remains elusive. Humans are still trafficked, drugs still flow, and preventable diseases still take lives needlessly. Near exclusive engagement via the lens of development has not worked, yet some of the continent’s most ardent supporters lobby passionately to stay the very course that has proven to produce little fruit. In the face of brighter (or at least, new) alternatives, they cling tight to the well-worn threads of a shabby, gray anti-security blanket. AFRICOM cannot and will not solve the breadth of the continent’s problems. It remains to be seen whether it will even do more harm than good, and its critics on and off the continent should most certainly continue to voice their concerns about it as candidly as possible. But taking jabs at the low-hanging fruits of assumed neo-imperialism and the antithetical critiques of anti-securitization is un-nuanced, overly simplified, and most importantly, counteractive. As AFRICOM is very much a project in formulation, the continent’s friends need not continuously rehash the same tired critiques, but rather work to ensure that what does end up on the ground is as effective as possible. Dissenters: criticize away—but next time, leave your easy blanket statements at home

# \*\*\*PACOM\*\*\*

# Sealift key to PACOM

**USPACOM needs more and better sealift capabilities**

**Gulledge and Keating 10** [Jay Gulledge,  *Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, served on the faculties of Tulane University and the University of Louisville,* Timothy J. Keating, *retired United States Navy admiral of PACOM,* 2010 “Future Naval Operations in Asia and the Pacific” in “Climate and Energy Proceedings 2010”, Johns Hopkins University, page 347, <http://www.jhuapl.edu/ClimateAndEnergy/Book/Chapter/Chapter7.pdf>, DMintz]

\*\*\*All text is from Timoth y J. Keating

Admiral Timoth y J. Keating: I will try. One can easily get into some controversial discussions here. While still on active duty, I made some comments that, although appreciated inside of the Pentagon, were not universally endorsed. At the time, the Navy had plans to build some very high-end, very sophisticated combatants. Out in USPACOM, we like the Arleigh Burke class DDG destroyers. On the aviation side, the department is committed to the F-35, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Out in USPACOM, we like F-16s, F-15s, and F-18s because we have them in sufficient numbers to execute the plans that are on the shelf, but certainly in greater numbers than we could have 10, 20 years from now. That goes for ships as well, not to mention tankers and heavy airlift capacity and sealift capacity. Those of us who have spent a lot of time in the Pacific tend to agree with Napoleon that quantity has a quality all its own. As a result, I tend to prefer highly capable, albeit not the most advanced fifth-plus generation, military air capability and very capable surface capability in numbers that we can use to sustain or even enhance presence and crisis response. I like the DDG-51 and the F-18EF over the alternatives. So, I have provided a long answer to a short question. We do not have as much as we would like. Who does? If current budgets are executed, if the current program is executed as is designed, I think we will be in more trouble than we know 5–25 years from now because we will just be out of certain elements that are essential to USPACOM.

# PACOM key to Power Projection

PACOM is crucial for power projection

Matlock 09 (COLONEL PATRICIA, United States Army, March 30, 2009, “ACQUISITION CROSSSERVICING AND MUTUAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT IN THE PACIFIC”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA494797///TS)

This paper articulates the criticality of ACSAs and MLSAs in the Pacific region and provides a strategic view of their need in the future. In an attempt to understand the variations and manifestations of these support agreements, a review of the definition, doctrine, practice and polices were highlighted. The inclusion of support agreements during the execution of the Theater Security Cooperation Plan, allows the combatant commander to build, during peace, what is critical during war. It also builds interoperability and cooperation skills and relationships which will facilitate flexible and timely logistics support when time is of a criticality. Employment of support and services under an ACSA or MLSA benefits both nations involved in the agreement by decreasing the need for large, standing inventories and support and service providers. Increased material availability and decreased wait times continue to prove these support agreements provide the combatant commander and his force the needed supplies and services. The benefits for the Pacific far outweigh any negatives; for partner and allied nations, the gains in interoperability and good will are immense. Added benefits for the United States Pacific Command are the employment of cooperative agreements while supporting the Theater Security Cooperation Plan and the security strategy. In order for the United States military, and the land, sea, and air forces of the United States Pacific Command, to be as agile and responsive as possible, the methods and systems by which we acquire logistics and supply our Airmen, Marines, Sailors and Soldiers must be equally responsive. The systems and methods of supply and sustainment, when integrated and supplemented by ACSAs and MLSAs, decrease wait time and increase sustainment capabilities. By overcoming the traditional time consuming, bureaucratic, and costly methods of singular nation support, nations in the Pacific, especially the United States, can be as flexible and responsive as required and dictated by our strategic needs. Through a reduction of duplicated and redundant services and supplies resident in the military services and across the capabilities of our friends and allies, logistic planners can maximize support to the commander. These agreements and similar arrangements provide an easily activated program for acquiring goods and/or services from other countries and organizations on a reciprocal basis. Couple this logistics support framework with AGATRS, and the visibility it gives the combatant commands and service components, collectively will lessen capability gaps and logistics shortfalls. At the strategic level, these agreements for cooperative support provide for timely, flexible, and efficient logistics. Being cooperative in nature, they strengthen the ties between countries, and further the goals of the U.S. National Security Strategy.

# Concord key to PACOM Rapid Response

**Upgrading Concord solves rapid response in PACOM**

**Hancock and Lee 98** (Sam R. and Peter J., “The Ammuniton Supply Chain and Intermodalism: From Depot to Foxhole,” March, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA343623)//mat

In the Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress tasked the DoD with conducting a study of the military's future mobility requirements. (This tasking was actually initiated in 1990, before Desert Shield.) The study was headed by the Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (J-8) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In January 1992 they issued their expectations and recommendations as the Mobility Requirement Study (MRS). The primary focus of this study was strategic mobility, the ability to transport sufficient quantities of men and material in support of military contingency abroad. In the area of containerization there were three main recommendations: • Integration of containerization as the primary mode of ammunition transportation. • Acquisition of a fleet of 20 foot containers and container handling equipment. • Upgrade of existing facilities to appropriate output levels and establishment of a west coast container facility. [Ref. 14:p. VII-7] These recommendations would make ammunition distribution more efficient, and would ensure that adequate amounts of ammunition would arrive in theater in time during a contingency. Establishment of the Concord, CA, Naval Weapons Station as an ammunition container facility would ensure adequate rapid container throughput to the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. The attention given to ammunition by the Mobility Requirement Study prompted USTRANSCOM to develop a series of exercises to test and develop the intermodal transportation of ammunition. These are the TURBO CADS exercises.

# Sealift & Prepositoning key to Solve Korean Conflict

**Sealift and pre-positioning are necessary to contain a Korean conflict**

**Di Genio 2000** [John Di Genio, operations research systems analyst with Headquarters, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U. S. Forces Korea, Assistant Chief of Staff, “Sustaining Combat in Korea”, <http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb00/MS503.htm>, DMintz]

During the Gulf War, the military required a means of projecting and sustaining a force capable of delivering a decisive victory, but the logistics arteries became clogged. Renewed conflict in Korea will create similar problems. General John G. Coburn, now Commander of the Army Materiel Command, observed in 1997—

Today's Army is a mostly continental U.S.- based power projection force that must be capable of rapidly deploying and sustaining its forces. The Army's strategic mobility program depends on a critical triad of pre-positioned unit equipment, strategic sealift, and strategic airlift.

Should fighting break out in Korea, power projection and reception platforms could prove to be inadequate to support the massive influx of manpower and materiel needed to deter one of the largest standing armies in the world. Offloading supplies and military personnel during actual combat poses another concern since the United States has not attempted such an operation in the last half century. Once in theater, large trucks and railcars will find it difficult to navigate Korea's narrow, winding roadways and railroads—potentially clogged with refugees—which will hinder timely delivery of essential personnel and materiel.

As the Army embraces the velocity management concept—substituting speed of supply delivery for forward-deployed stockpiles of materiel—sealift, airlift, and pre-positioned supplies should become the "force enabler triad" that will play a key role in the successful defense of the Korean theater.

# PACOM key to Solve Laundry List of Issues

**Multiple issues PACOM is key to solving**

(North Korea, South China Sea, Prolif of WMD, Humanitarian Aid)

**Levin 12** [Carl Levin, *Senator,* February 28, 2012, “LEVIN OPENING STATEMEMENT AT PACOM-TRANSCOM HEARING”, MENAFM, [https://www.menafn.com/menafn/qn\_news\_story.aspx?storyid={b3a59c89-6aa2-4643-869f-3e2ffde3d10d}](https://www.menafn.com/menafn/qn_news_story.aspx?storyid=%7bb3a59c89-6aa2-4643-869f-3e2ffde3d10d%7d), DMintz]

Today we receive testimony on the posture of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific and the status of the United States military's strategic global distribution and deployment capabilities. On behalf of the Committee, I'd like to welcome Admiral Bob Willard, Commander of United States Pacific Command, and General William Fraser, Commander of United States Transportation Command.

The Committee appreciates your years of faithful service and the many sacrifices you and your families make for our Nation. Likewise, we greatly appreciate the service of the men and women, military and civilian, who serve with you in your commands. Please convey to them our admiration and appreciation for their selfless dedication.

Admiral Willard, this will be, in all likelihood, your last hearing before this Committee after a full and productive tour as Commander of our forces in the Pacific. On behalf of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I would like to thank you for your service and leadership in this important assignment. Before and beyond that, your decades of selfless and devoted service to our nation included assignments as Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Commander of U.S. Seventh Fleet and Commanding Officer of the aircraft carrier USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN. I note that your wife Donna is here this morning, as she has been with past hearings. I'd also like to especially thank her for her many contributions and sacrifices. We know very well the importance of our military families to the success of our armed forces and we wish you both, and the entire Willard family, the very best in the future.

This is General Fraser's first hearing as Commander of Transportation Command. As we heard from the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff earlier this month, the President's recently unveiled Defense Strategic Guidance includes a re-emphasis on the Asia-Pacific, a region that is impacted by what has been called "the tyranny of distance", which puts a premium on the capabilities provided by Transportation Command, capabilities that have been stressed and honed over more than ten years of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. So, we also look forward to General Fraser's testimony on the status of Transportation Command and its important global mission.

With regard to the Asia-Pacific, the United States has been and will continue to be present and active in the region because of our commitments to our allies and partners and also because of the clear U.S. national interests there.

The leadership change in North Korea, occasioned by the recent death of long-time dictator Kim Jong-il, opens new questions about possible future threats from an oppressive regime that has shown little interest in cooperating with the international community and little concern for the well-being of its people. We are mindful that the security situation on the Korean Peninsula remains tense and, as of yet, there are no indications that the situation will improve under the new regime. North Korea continues to pursue its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and with its history of deadly, unprovoked military attacks on South Korea, there's little reason for optimism for a prompt resolution of the tensions on the Peninsula. In fact, over the weekend, North Korea issued its usual threats in response to the military training exercises conducted by the U.S. and South Korea every year at this time.

China's rising regional and global influence and rapid military growth, coupled with the overbreadth of its claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea and its increasing propensity for challenging conflicting claims of its regional neighbors unsettles the region and raises concerns about the prospects for miscalculation. There also are growing concerns about China's exploitation of cyberspace for military and for non-military purposes such as use of the internet by Chinese entities to conduct corporate espionage. In the current National Defense Authorization Act, we acted against counterfeit electronic parts in defense systems, most of which came from China. Nonetheless, it is important that we continue efforts to engage with the People's Liberation Army and to attempt to find common ground and to address common concerns.

There are many other challenges facing PACOM, such as preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; countering violent extremism; providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and protecting critical sea lanes of communication.

# PACOM key to Solving Asia Conflict/Prepositioning Key

**PACOM key to prevent conflict and maintain US interests in Asia—prepositioning and readiness is key**

**Willard 11** [Robert F. Willard, *US navy commander, USPACOM,* April 12, 2011, “STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT F. WILLARD, U.S. NAVY COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/04%20April/Willard%2004-12-11.pdf>, DMintz]

The USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) is vital to U.S. national interests. It spans half the earth and is home to more than three billion people living in three dozen nations—five of which are allied with the U.S. and many more of which are important economic and security partners. The region contains the world’s three largest economies, and almost one-third (over $1 trillion) of U.S. two-way trade in goods and services is with nations in the region. Moreover, much of the world’s trade and energy that fuels the world economy moves on Asia’s sea and air lines of communication.

The vastness of the region makes permanent and rotational U.S. force presence essential to enabling security and strategic deterrence throughout the region while protecting and defending the homeland. Military construction provides necessary facilities for new weapon systems, supports the Services’ evolution to become more efficient and effective, offers warfighters and their families quality-of-life facilities while at home, and renovates existing facilities that are beyond their useful lives. Thus the MILCON projects in this testimony enhance the capabilities of USPACOM forces that underpin security in this increasingly important and dynamic region.

While the region remains relatively secure and stable, the strategic environment also includes traditional and asymmetric challenges that drive the need for forward presence and the subsequent MILCON recommendations in this testimony. Sustaining the conditions that have underpinned unprecedented prosperity for over six decades remains challenging for a variety of reasons, including the following:

 The threat to the United States and its allies posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies, and its potential for instability

 Transnational violent extremist organizations (VEOs) undermine stability and threaten traditional Allies and emerging partners

 China’s significant military modernization associated with its unclear intent

 Territorial disputes, and increasingly assertive actions to resolve them, present the potential for conflict and instability

 Increasingly persistent and sophisticated cyber threats that challenge unencumbered operations.

 Transnational criminal activity—to include piracy and trafficking in narcotics and persons—that rejects the rule of law and challenges international order

 Humanitarian crises such as pandemics and famines, as well as natural disasters such as tsunamis, earthquakes, and volcanoes

 Environmental degradation caused by poor resource management, the pillaging of natural resources, and disputes over resource sovereignty

Despite these many challenges, the region remains one of immense opportunity for peaceful growth, cooperation, and prosperity. Realizing such opportunity relies upon continued U.S. ability and willingness to underwrite security, extend deterrence, and protect the global commons upon which the region’s livelihood depends. U.S. military strength, presence, and engagement provide the means to ensure security and peace and avoid confrontation and conflict. Secretary of Defense Gates emphasized this point in Singapore in June 2010: ―The strength of the U.S. commitment and deterrent power will be expressed through the continued forward presence of substantial U.S. forces in the region.‖

USPACOM thus embraces a theater strategy that leverages an evolving force posture. In concert with other government agencies, this posture is designed to simultaneously hedge against traditional and asymmetric challenges as well as advance alliance and partner-nation relationships. Extensive analyses clearly indicate a need to build an integrated posture framework that prioritizes adjustments by maximizing strength, balancing and biasing disposition, and sustaining readiness in all sub-regions (Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania).

Regional Force Posture Assessment. Broadly, the U.S. military in the Asia-Pacific enjoys freedom of action, numerous dependable Allies and partners, and ready access to theater forces (e.g., Hawaii, Guam, and Japan) as well as to global and continental (especially West coast and Alaska garrisoned) forces. Other existing posture strengths include the collocation of command elements in Hawaii, pre-positioned stocks, maintenance support, and several distributed, forward sub-commands.

Current force posture throughout the Asia-Pacific remains heavily influenced by post-World War II- and Cold War-era basing and infrastructure. While maintaining access and capabilities in Northeast Asia remains essential, attaining better access to and support from Allied and partner nations in South and Southeast Asia is increasingly important. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen stated in the 2011 National Military Strategy, ―our presence and alliance commitments remain the key to preserving stability in Northeast Asia, [and] we must also invest new attention and resources in Southeast and South Asia.‖

USPACOM strives to continuously optimize its force posture to meet emerging 21st-century conventional and asymmetric threats. Nevertheless, forward forces remain potentially vulnerable to cyber attack on networks and logistics systems. Also, growing anti-access and area-denial challenges make joint capabilities and cooperation imperative; further development of the Air-Sea Battle concept will establish a better institutionalized method to address this threat.

# High Speed Sealift key to PACOM

**High-speed sealift key to solve PACOM timelag which facilitates intratheater missions**

**Defense Science Board 05** [Defense Science Board, *federal advisory committee established to provide independent*

*advice to the secretary of defense,* September 2005, “Defense Science Board Task Force on Mobility”, <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA316992.pdf>, DMintz]

Some have promoted the concept of high-speed (40 knots or better), transoceanic sealift as a major part of the solution to the timelag problem of reinforcing land forces. CONUS-based high-speed sealift with the capability to access austere ports could provide a valuable addition to pre-positioned forces. Estimates suggest that each flight of four or five vessels could transport a medium or heavy brigade combat team to an operational area in United States Central Command (CENTCOM) or United States Pacific Command (PACOM) from CONUS in less than 15 days5 and disembark it ready for employment. The vessels could then take on intratheater missions or cycle to deliver follow-on forces or sustainment. The vessels would also provide a method for staging interventions in locations too far from pre-positioned forces or where it was impractical to use them.

# Prepositioning key to Rapid Response

**Pre-positioning key to rapid response**

**Mitchell et al 11** [Gregory P. Mitchell,  *Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy,* Bruce M. Reilly,  *Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy*, andJeffrey J. Cisek, *Captain, United States Marine Corps,* June 2011, “SUPPLY POSITIONING IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS”, Naval Post Graduate School, <http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA547813>, DMintz]

The U.S. military possesses many capabilities that are used throughout the range of military operations (ROMO) in order to carry out planned and contingency response missions. These capabilities can bring destruction to an adversary or can provide critical aid in a humanitarian assistance or disaster response (HA/DR) operation. In many situations, prepositioning supplies and equipment is essential to the Department of Defense (DoD) in a rapid response that is efficient and effective. Such readiness translates to the pre-establishment of adequate inventory capacities and resources that enable efficient relief operations. In this study, we identify current prepositioned DoD inventory locations and establish a framework for DoD decision-makers to use in developing the most appropriate logistics strategy for different natural disasters that may occur around the globe.

**Prepositioning facilitates fast response in times of crisis**

**Mitchell et al 11** [Gregory P. Mitchell,  *Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy,* Bruce M. Reilly,  *Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy*, andJeffrey J. Cisek, *Captain, United States Marine Corps,* June 2011, “SUPPLY POSITIONING IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS”, Naval Post Graduate School, <http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA547813>, DMintz]

Prepositioning enables an organization to be ready for catastrophic events (Apte, 2009; Van Wassenhove, 2006) and may be considered a form of capacity expansion (Salmeron & Apte, 2010). A pro-active rather than re-active approach to disaster preparation is the best means of mitigating damage from natural disasters or other forms of destruction. However, despite systematic planning efforts, when emergencies do occur—whether they are on a small scale or catastrophic—they can be overwhelming (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, 2011). Prepositioned supplies need to be placed and organized to logistically support the response strategy. A shortage of a particular type and quantity of item could cause the emergency response to be ineffective and result in increased human suffering and decreased security levels. Prepositioning allows for a faster response, better procurement planning, and improvement in distribution costs (Ergun, Karakus, Keskinocak, Swann, & Villarreal, 2011).

# China War

# ---Uniqueness

**The South China Sea has potential for conflict now—US position of strength is key to check back.**

**Cronin and Kaplan 12** [Patrick M. Cronin, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and Robert D. Kaplan, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, January 2012, “Cooperation from Strength The United States, China and the South China Sea”, Center for New American Security, <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_CooperationFromStrength_Cronin_1.pdf>, DMintz]

American interests are increasingly at risk in the South China Sea due to the economic and military rise of China and concerns about its willingness to uphold existing legal norms. The United States and countries throughout the region have a deep and abiding interest in sea lines of communication that remain open to all, both for commerce and for peaceful military activity such as humanitarian interventions and coastal defense. China, however, continues to challenge that openness, both by questioning historical maritime norms and by developing military capabilities that allow it to threaten access to this maritime region.

The geostrategic significance of the South China Sea is difficult to overstate. The South China Sea functions as the throat of the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans – a mass of connective economic tissue where global sea routes coalesce, accounting for $1.2 trillion in U.S. trade annually. It is the demographic hub of the 21st-century global economy, where 1.5 billion Chinese, nearly 600 million Southeast Asians and 1.3 billion inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent move vital resources and exchange goods across the region and around the globe. It is an area where more than a half-dozen countries have overlapping territorial claims over a seabed with proven oil reserves of seven billion barrels as well as an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.

Defending U.S. interests and promoting the status quo need not – and should not – lead to conflict with China. Both the United States and China will continue to benefit from cooperation and, indeed, no Asian country has benefitted more from the U.S.-led system of international order than China. Nevertheless, managing tensions and advancing cooperation in the South China Sea will require persistent, painstaking attention in Washington.

In the decades ahead, the challenge for the United States will be how to preserve historic norms regarding the freedom of navigation while adapting to the growing power and activity of regional actors, including China. The aim is cooperation, **but cooperation can best be advanced from a position of strength.** This will require maintaining U.S. strength and wider regional cooperation, a concept that might be called “cooperative primacy.”

To protect U.S. and allied interests in the South China Sea and preserve longstanding legal norms, U.S. policymakers should take five general steps:

\*First, the United States should strengthen its naval presence over the long term by building toward a 346-ship fleet rather than retreating to the 250-ship mark that the United States faces due to budget cuts and the decommissioning of aging warships in the next decade. Diplomatic and economic engagement with China and others will work better when backed by a credible military posture. However, growing the Navy must be contingent on healthy economic growth in the future – a strategic priority for the United States.

Second, the United States should foster a new web of security partnerships. The “hub and spoke” model of alliances between the United States and its East Asian partners is being eclipsed by a broader, more complicated and more diffuse web of relationships in which Asian countries are the primary drivers. Building a distributed network of stronger partners and allies in Southeast Asia should be an important, long-term objective of the United States.

Third, the United States needs to ensure that peace and security in the South China Sea remain at the top of its diplomatic and security agenda. Freedom of navigation is a universal concern, and maritime cooperation and mechanisms for peacefully resolving disputes should continue to be tackled in regional forums. The United States also needs to build multilateral institutions over the long run while recognizing that it may need to focus on bilateral or minilateral approaches in practice to avoid provoking China.

Fourth, the United States should promote further economic integration within the region, as well as between the United States and the region, with a particular focus on trade. Trade is the currency of the realm in Asia and can help link America’s strategic investments to the most dynamic region in the world.

Fifth and finally, the United States will need to get its China policy right. This will require active diplomatic and economic engagement backed by a strong U.S. military and a growing economy. A realistic policy begins by shoring up American power and then actively supports rules-based cooperation; it avoids military conflict but not diplomatic confrontation.

**The South China Sea is a hotspot for conflict now—multiple scenarios make US-China conflict inevitable now**

**Glaser 12** [Bonnie S. Glaser, senior fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies and a senior associate with the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2012, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea”, Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883>, DMintz]

The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region's possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China's two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping—and being shaped by—rising apprehensions about the growth of China's military power and its regional intentions. China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific.

Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily.

The Contingencies

Of the many conceivable contingencies involving an armed clash in the South China Sea, three especially threaten U.S. interests and could potentially prompt the United States to use force.

The most likely and dangerous contingency is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's EEZ that provokes an armed Chinese response. The United States holds that nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also increased the danger of an incident, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S. destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts. A miscalculation or misunderstanding could then result in a deadly exchange of fire, leading to further military escalation and precipitating a major political crisis. Rising U.S.-China mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult.

A second contingency involves conflict between China and the Philippines over natural gas deposits, especially in the disputed area of Reed Bank, located eighty nautical miles from Palawan. Oil survey ships operating in Reed Bank under contract have increasingly been harassed by Chinese vessels. Reportedly, the United Kingdom-based Forum Energy plans to start drilling for gas in Reed Bank this year, which could provoke an aggressive Chinese response. Forum Energy is only one of fifteen exploration contracts that Manila intends to offer over the next few years for offshore exploration near Palawan Island. Reed Bank is a red line for the Philippines, so this contingency could quickly escalate to violence if China intervened to halt the drilling.

The United States could be drawn into a China-Philippines conflict because of its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines. The treaty states, "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes." American officials insist that Washington does not take sides in the territorial dispute in the South China Sea and refuse to comment on how the United States might respond to Chinese aggression in contested waters. Nevertheless, an apparent gap exists between American views of U.S. obligations and Manila's expectations. In mid-June 2011, a Filipino presidential spokesperson stated that in the event of armed conflict with China, Manila expected the United States would come to its aid. Statements by senior U.S. officials may have inadvertently led Manila to conclude that the United States would provide military assistance if China attacked Filipino forces in the disputed Spratly Islands.

With improving political and military ties between Manila and Washington, including a pending agreement to expand U.S. access to Filipino ports and airfields to refuel and service its warships and planes, the United States would have a great deal at stake in a China-Philippines contingency. Failure to respond would not only set back U.S. relations with the Philippines but would also potentially undermine U.S. credibility in the region with its allies and partners more broadly. A U.S. decision to dispatch naval ships to the area, however, would risk a U.S.-China naval confrontation.

Disputes between China and Vietnam over seismic surveys or drilling for oil and gas could also trigger an armed clash for a third contingency. China has harassed PetroVietnam oil survey ships in the past that were searching for oil and gas deposits in Vietnam's EEZ. In 2011, Hanoi accused China of deliberately severing the cables of an oil and gas survey vessel in two separate instances. Although the Vietnamese did not respond with force, they did not back down and Hanoi pledged to continue its efforts to exploit new fields despite warnings from Beijing. Budding U.S.-Vietnam relations could embolden Hanoi to be more confrontational with China on the South China Sea issue.

The United States could be drawn into a conflict between China and Vietnam, though that is less likely than a clash between China and the Philippines. In a scenario of Chinese provocation, the United States might opt to dispatch naval vessels to the area to signal its interest in regional peace and stability. Vietnam, and possibly other nations, could also request U.S. assistance in such circumstances. Should the United States become involved, subsequent actions by China or a miscalculation among the forces present could result in exchange of fire. In another possible scenario, an attack by China on vessels or rigs operated by an American company exploring or drilling for hydrocarbons could quickly involve the United States, especially if American lives were endangered or lost. ExxonMobil has plans to conduct exploratory drilling off Vietnam, making this an existential danger. In the short term, however, the likelihood of this third contingency occurring is relatively low given the recent thaw in Sino-Vietnamese relations. In October 2011, China and Vietnam signed an agreement outlining principles for resolving maritime issues. The effectiveness of this agreement remains to be seen, but for now tensions appear to be defused.

# ---Terminal Impact

**US-Chinese conflict kills the US economy and causes nuclear war**

**Johnson, 01** – President of the Japan Policy Research Institute and Professor Emeritus at the University of California-San Diego, Contributor to the Third World Traveler and Writer for the Nation Magazine (Chalmers, "Time to Bring the Troops Home", The Nation Magazine, May 14th 2001, May 5th 2010, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Imperialism\_Neocolonialism/Bring\_Troops\_Home.html, KONTOPOULOS)

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China's minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no one wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world's most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China's sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on China's borders have- virtually no deterrent effect.

China war goes nuclear

**Hunkovic 2k9** (Lee J, American Military University “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf //da: 7/24)

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

# Korea

# ---War Terminal Impact

**Nuclear war**

**Straits Times 09** ["North Korea Set to Undermine Asia's Peace and Stability", The Straits Times, June 1, 2009, Lexis Nexis]

HAVING tested a nuclear device, the next strategic and logical move for North Korea is to acquire nuclear weapons. This new military status will inevitably undermine peace and stability in the Korean peninsula in particular and Asia in general. A nuclear North Korea is bad news for the world. The possession of nuclear weapons by an impoverished country, with an unpredictable regime that ignores all United Nations resolutions, is a nightmare waiting to happen. Just one wrong miscalculation and Asia will bear the brunt of this new catastrophe for years to come. Imagine - Hiroshima and Nagasaki happened 64 years ago, but the fear, memories and tribulations continue to linger on till this day. Using nuclear capability to annihilate another country is not the answer to world domination. So this prompts the next question: Why would a poor country want to possess such destructive power and which countries are the likely targets? Answer: South Korea, Japan and the United States. If North Korea has nuclear weapons, the South would want them to retaliate, and Japan would need them as a deterrent. And we know for sure that the US will wipe North Korea out if any US territory is attacked. This is the apocalypse of nuclear war Asia faces.

**Korean war causes extinction**

**Africa News, 99** [10-25, Lexis]

If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably reduce earth to a huge smoldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military tension between the hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war. She still regards the US as an occupation force in South Korea and wholly to blame for the non-reunification of the country. North Korean media constantly churns out a tirade of attacks on "imperialist" America and its "running dog" South Korea. The DPRK is one of the most secretive countries in the world where a visitor is given the impression that the people's hatred for the US is absolute while the love for their government is total. Whether this is really so, it is extremely difficult to conclude. In the DPRK, a visitor is never given a chance to speak to ordinary Koreans about the politics of their country. No visitor moves around alone without government escort. The American government argues that its presence in South Korea was because of the constant danger of an invasion from the north. America has vast economic interests in South Korea. She points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the demilitarised zone as part of the invasion plans. She also accuses the north of violating South Korean territorial waters. Early this year, a small North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters after getting entangled in fishing nets. Both the Americans and South Koreans claim the submarine was on a military spying mission. However, the intension of the alleged intrusion will probably never be known because the craft's crew were all found with fatal gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been described as suicide pact to hide the truth of the mission. The US mistrust of the north's intentions is so deep that it is no secret that today Washington has the largest concentration of soldiers and weaponry of all descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World, apart from America itself. Some of the armada that was deployed in the recent bombing of Iraq and in Operation Desert Storm against the same country following its invasion of Kuwait was from the fleet permanently stationed on the Korean Peninsula. It is true too that at the moment the North/South Korean border is the most fortified in the world. The border line is littered with anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and is constantly patrolled by warplanes from both sides. It is common knowledge that America also keeps an eye on any military movement or build-up in the north through spy satellites. The DPRK is said to have an estimated one million soldiers and a huge arsenal of various weapons. Although the DPRK regards herself as a developing country, she can however be classified as a super-power in terms of military might. The DPRK is capable of producing medium and long-range missiles. Last year, for example, she test-fired a medium range missile over Japan, an action that greatly shook and alarmed the US, Japan and South Korea. The DPRK says the projectile was a satellite. There have also been fears that she was planning to test another ballistic missile capable of reaching North America. Naturally, the world is anxious that military tension on the Korean Peninsula must be defused to avoid an apocalypse on earth. It is therefore significant that the American government announced a few days ago that it was moving towards normalizing relations with North Korea.

# ---Prolif Uniqueness

**North Korea proliferating now—construction on Experimental Light Water Reactor**

**Chance 12** [David Chance, Reuters, May 16, 2012, “North Korea resumes work on nuclear reactor: report”, WSAU, http://wsau.com/news/articles/2012/may/17/north-korea-resumes-work-on-nuclear-reactor-report/ , DMintz]

North Korea has resumed construction work on an experimental light water reactor (ELWR) in a move that could extend its capacity to produce more material for nuclear weapons, website 38North reported on Thursday.

Based on April 30 satellite images, work halted in December at the reactor had now re-started, said the website (http://38north.org), run by the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University and former U.S. State Department official Joel Wit.

The construction activity comes as Pyongyang has stepped up progress towards conducting a third nuclear test, perhaps using highly enriched uranium for the first time, despite warnings from the United States and China.

"Pyongyang's construction of an ELWR — which the North Koreans have indicated is the prototype for additional reactors — as well as a uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon, is an important indication of the North's intention to move forward with the expansion of its nuclear weapons stockpile in the future," 38North said.

It said the reactor could be operational in 1-2 years and that North Korea had almost completed the reactor containment building, based on the satellite images.

North Korea says it needs nuclear power to provide electricity, but has also boasted of its nuclear deterrence capacity and has traded nuclear technology with Syria, Libya and likely Myanmar and Pakistan.

It became the first country to withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and has denied international inspectors access to its nuclear facilities, reneging on a February 29 deal to do so after it announced plans to launch a long range rocket, in defiance of U.K. Security Council resolutions.

# ---Prolif Terminal Impact

**That causes extinction**

Utgoff 2 (Victor A., Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Survival Vol 44 No 2 Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions, p. 87-90)

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but **every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.**

**North Korean prolif fuels terrorist nuclear capability.**

**Bandow and Carpenter 2004** – \*JD from Stanford, senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant to Reagan, writes for Fortune, National Interest, WSJ, Washington Times, \*\*PhD in diplomatic history from Texas, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, contributing editor to the National Interest, editorial board of the Journal of Strategic Studies (Ted Galen and Doug, “The Korean conundrum”, Google Books, pages 96-97)

Although the prospect of North Korea possessing a nuclear arsenal is unsettling, the other component of the North Korean nuclear problem is the most troubling. The United States and North Korea’s neighbors probably can learn to live with Pyongyang’s possession of a nuclear arsenal. What the United States cannot tolerate is North Korea’s becoming the global Wal-Mart of nuclear technology.118 An especially acute danger is that Pyongyang might provide either a nuclear weapon or fissile material to al Qaeda or other anti-American terrorist organizations. The DPRK’s record on missile proliferation does not offer much encouragement that it will be restrained when it comes to commerce in nuclear materials. North Korea earned $560 million in 2001 alone in missile sales—including sales to some of the most virulently anti-American regimes.119 Perhaps most troubling of all, Pyongyang has shown a willingness to sell anything that will raise revenue for the financially hard-pressed regime. In the spring of 2003, for example, evidence emerged of extensive North Korean involvement in the heroin trade.120 It is hardly unwarranted speculation to worry that the DPRK might be a willing seller of nuclear weapons or materials to terrorist groups flush with cash. William Potter, director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, observes: “Certainly, groups such as al Qaeda must be attracted by the prospect of unsafeguarded nuclear material controlled by an impoverished and isolated regime which already has broken many of its international nonproliferation commitments.”121 Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage rightly argues that “the arms race in North Korea pales next to the possibility . . . that she would pass on fissile material and other nuclear technology to either transnational actors or to rogue states.”122

# ---Instability Terminal Impact

**North Korean instability goes nuclear**

Bennett and Lind 11(Bruce is Senior Defense Analyst at the RAND Corporation, Jennifer is Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Fall 2011, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements”, http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=BW&aulast=Bennett&atitle=The+Collapse+of+North+Korea:+Military+Missions+and+Requirements&id=doi:10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00057&title=International+security&volume=36&issue=2&date=2011&spage=84&issn=0162-2889///TS)

Many signs suggest that Kim Jong-il’s regime in North Korea is entering a difficult stage in which its future may be in doubt. Although the historical record shows, and many scholars have noted, that authoritarian regimes can repress their populations and retain power for decades,1 the Kim regime is embarking on the most difficult challenge that such regimes face: succession.2 The last time power changed hands in Pyongyang, Kim Il-sung spent ªfifteen years preparing for the transfer, carefully consolidating support for his son Kim Jong-il. By contrast, Kim Jong-il, who suffered a stroke in 2008, has only recently anointed his inexperienced, twenty-seven-year-old third son, Kim Jong-un, as his heir.3 Kim Jong-il’s sudden death or incapacitation could trigger a power struggle and government collapse in North Korea.4 As previous revolutions in the Middle East and Eastern Europe demonstrate, the transition from apparent stability to collapse can be swift. A government collapse in North Korea could unleash a series of catastrophes on the peninsula with potentially far-reaching regional and global effects. Collapse would likely trigger a humanitarian crisis. Many of North Korea’s 24 million inhabitants are already severely malnourished; if government provided food and health services were to cease, the population would rapidly face the prospect of starvation. Food shortages and the possibility of civil war would trigger a massive outºow of refugees, as desperate North Koreans searched for food and safety across international borders. North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could find their way out of the country and onto the global black market. If other countries wanted to intervene to mitigate such instability, they would need to perform complex military operations. The provision of humanitarian relief could not be delegated to international relief organizations. Because North Korea has some 1.2 million active-duty military personnel and 7.7 million reservists,5 outside military intervention would likely be necessary to provide security for such operations. The consequences of a poorly planned response to a government collapse in North Korea are potentially calamitous. Rapid cooperation would be essential because many response missions are time-sensitive—for example, the longer it takes to organize humanitarian efforts, the higher the number of North Koreans who might perish or decide to leave their homes; in addition, the longer North Korean WMD are left unsecured, the larger the risk that they will disappear across international borders. Perhaps the greatest danger is that countries will send their militaries in without coordination to stabilize the area or to secure the WMD. The specter of Chinese forces racing south while U.S. and South Korean troops race north is terrifying given the experience of the Korean War, a climate of suspicion among the three countries,6 and the risk of escalation to the nuclear level.7 Some countries have begun planning for North Korea’s collapse. The United States and South Korea have negotiated an operational plan for joint military responses to this and other emergencies that could arise in North Korea.8 South Korea’s president, Lee Myung-bak, has proposed a taxation plan to prepare for the monumental ªfinancial burden of Korean unication.9 China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reportedly has developed contingency plans for humanitarian, peacekeeping, and counter-WMD-related missions in North Korea.10 Thus far, however, multilateral planning that involves China has been stymied. Long aligned with North Korea, China has been reluctant to provoke the Kim regime by coordinating plans for its demise with its enemies. In addition, the Chinese worry that open discussion of a North Korean collapse could increase the probability that it occurs.11 A failure to engage in combined planning, however, could be catastrophic because of the risks of misperception and crisis escalation. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, we seek to bring into the public debate a discussion of the scale of the problems that the collapse of North Korea’s government could create, and the potential for dire consequences, both humanitarian and strategic, if stability efforts were delayed or failed altogether. We describe the military missions that might be necessary to stabilize North Korea and estimate the force requirements for those missions.12 In these estimates, we put aside the question of whether South Korean, U.S., or other troops would conduct the operations. Throughout the analysis, however, we discuss the interests and potential involvement of various countries. Second and more broadly, this analysis sheds light on international intervention in collapsing states. Each case is of course unique, but this article provides a framework for thinking about this kind of problem—a problem that foreign policy planners envision as increasingly salient in perhaps Colombia, Iran, Pakistan, and even Mexico. Based on optimistic assumptions about how a collapse might occur, we estimate that 260,000–400,000 ground force personnel would be required to stabilize North Korea. This means that even in the relatively benign scenario that we describe, the requirements for stabilizing a collapsed North Korea would outpace the combined U.S. troop commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan.13 Managing a more demanding Korean collapse scenario would push these requirements higher or lengthen the duration of the operation, or possibly both.

# \*\*\*High Speed Sealift\*\*\*

# HSS key to Power Projection & Conflict Resolution

**High-speed sealift capabilities are critical for power projection and quick conflict resolution**

**Meier 01** [John G. Meier III, Business Library, June 2001, “High-Speed Sealift: Enabling Rapid and Flexible response”, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb076/is\_3\_57/ai\_n28858434/ , DMintz]

For most of the latter half of the 20th Century, our Nation's National Military Strategy has been dominated by the assumptions, expectations, and suspicions of the Cold War, however, during the past decade, the international security environment has undergone drastic change. As we enter the 21st Century, we are faced with a world that is characterized by complexity, instability, and uncertainty. It is a world increasingly characterized by regional tensions, numerous simultaneous crises and contingency situations, and one in which threats to U.S. global interests are widespread and often unpredictable. Within such an environment, the ability to rapidly project force is, and will continue to be, vital to our Nation's ability to promptly, effectively, and successfully support the deployment of forces as directed by the National Command Authorities.

As a potential force projection enabler, it is suggested that emerging high-speed sealift technologies, working in concert with agile ports, could accelerate the movement of high priority cargo (e.g., personnel, equipment, and sustainment) to crisis and conflict locations. As envisioned, high-speed sealift vessels could provide for the rapid movement into, and within, a theater of operations in support of missions requiring the projection, employment, and sustainment of forces across the entire spectrum of military operations -- deterrence, operations other than war, or war. Such a capability would enhance force projection, increase the operational and logistical flexibility of U.S. forces, and hopefully, enable quicker conflict resolution on terms favorable to U.S. interests.

# HSS key to Effective Military

**High Speed Sealift necessary for an effective military**

**Meier 01** [John G. Meier III, Business Library, June 2001, “High-Speed Sealift: Enabling Rapid and Flexible response”, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb076/is\_3\_57/ai\_n28858434/ , DMintz]

Introduction

**If we do not build a transportation system that can meet our needs tomorrow, then it doesn't matter much what kind of force we have because we won't be able to get it there.**

General John M. Shalikashvili

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [(1993-1997).sup.i]

As U.S. force structure continues to become increasingly reliant on rapid and responsive strategic mobility, the Defense Transportation System (DTS) is forced to respond with ever more sophisticated and complex solutions to address the challenges with which it will be faced in the 21st Century. Capabilities will continue to be required to support force projection and the deployment of forces into, and within, theaters of operations for missions requiring the projection, employment, and sustainment of forces across the entire spectrum of military operations -- deterrence, operations other than war, or war.

As operational concepts continue to evolve, the idea of preempting an adversary's aggressive actions, as opposed to reacting after an opponent has had an opportunity to position significant combat power and establish forces at a position of relative advantage, i.e., to "set", continues to be examined. Emerging operational concepts address the desirability of interdicting an adversary's ability to set and look towards focusing on injecting forces quickly enough to force an adversary to either terminate hostilities or, at a minimum, relinquish the initiative. Such an interdiction ability hinges on the capability to rapidly deliver decisive force at the right time and place.

With the increasing recognition of the importance of rapid force projection capabilities, the purpose of this discussion is not to solve the challenges that will potentially confront the DTS in the 21st Century. Rather, the intent is to introduce an emerging facet of sealift technology -- high-speed sealift (HSS) -- and to impart an awareness of the associated potential that may be presented for enhancing Department of Defense (DOD) force projection operations. As a potential force projection enabler, HSS could provide the responsiveness to deny an adversary critical objectives, while reducing operational risk to U.S. forces and/or interests.

21st Century Security Environment

The security environment in which we live is dynamic and uncertain, replete with numerous challenges. Ethnic conflict and outlaw states threaten stability in many regions of the [world..sup.ii]

For most of the latter half of the 20th Century, our Nation's National Military Strategy has been dominated by the assumptions, expectations, and suspicions of the Cold War. This mindset presumed that the primary threat to the security of the United States would essentially originate from the Soviet Union. U.S. military forces, strategy, and doctrine were postured to respond to a confrontation of alliances led by the United States and the Soviet Union, presumably occurring in Western Europe.

During the past decade, the international security environment has undergone drastic change. With the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, and the subsequent emergence of new threats and uncertainties, we have witnessed a transformation from the bipolar "Old World Order", characterized by the dominance of the U.S. and USSR as world super-powers, to a multipolar, some would argue uni-polar, environment in which the U.S. has emerged as the sole remaining super-power, and finds itself no longer confronted by a "peer-competitor."

The threats to our national security are changing and, as Figure 1 [depicts.sup.iii], we are faced with a world that is characterized by complexity, instability, and uncertainty. It is a world where, although the probability of a major regional or global conflict with a peer, or near peer, competitor (i.e., as was the primary threat during the Cold War) has been significantly reduced, it is one increasingly characterized by a multitude of regional and localized tensions, and one in which threats to U.S. global interests, and thus having the potential for the involvement of U.S. military forces, are widespread and often unpredictable.

Not only are the origins and locations of the threats, to which we may respond, becoming more and more unpredictable, but these changes in the potential threats to our national interests are emerging during a period where we have also witnessed a significant reduction in the number of U.S. forces permanently stationed overseas. As the number of U.S. forces permanently stationed overseas decreases, an enhanced capability to deploy forces abroad is becoming increasingly [important..sup.iv] Credible force [projection.sup.v] is essential in accomplishing the tasks specified by the National Command Authorities, and the ability to rapidly project force is, and will continue to be, vital to our Nation's ability to promptly and effectively response to crises.

The Desire for Speed

We must remember that no force, no weapons system is of any value if it can not be delivered to the battlefield on time.

Lieutenant General James D. Starling Deputy CINC, USTRANSCOM [(l99l-l993).sup.vi]

In response to the dynamic security environment with which we are faced, rapid, flexible, and responsive force projection continues to increase in importance to planners and decision-makers. In response, innovative operational concepts increasingly suggest that high-speed sealift [(HSS).sup.vii] vessels could perform critical maneuver tasks allowing U.S. forces to increase their operational and logistical flexibility. HSS, operating in conjunction with "agile port" [(AP).sup.viii] technologies, could accelerate the movement of high priority cargo (e.g., personnel, unit equipment, and/or sustainment) to crisis and conflict locations, enhancing DOD force projection capabilities and provide for the rapid entry into, and within, a theater of operations in support of missions requiring the projection, employment, and sustainment of forces across the entire spectrum of military operations.

Although the DOD is still very early in the development of any potential future military-specific HSS "requirement" (e.g., a Mission Needs Statement and/or Operational Requirements Document), emerging force projection concepts appear to acknowledge the opportunities associated with, and the desirability of, rapid force projection capabilities. As reflected in Joint Vision 2020, the concepts of strategic preclusion and strategic maneuver, as well as the U.S. Army's recent Vision Statement, the presumed aspirations for such capabilities would enable U.S. forces to rapidly deploy to regions of conflict and/or crisis to immediately conduct operations as directed by the National Command Authorities.

# \*\*\*Hegemony Impact Work\*\*\*

# Navy Key to Hegemony

**Navy key to hegemony**

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This strategy reaffirms the use of seapower to influence actions and activities at sea and ashore. The expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces provide the U.S. the asymmetric advantage of enlarging or contracting its military footprint in areas where access is denied or limited. Permanent or prolonged basing of our military forces overseas often has unintended economic, social or political repercussions. The sea is a vast maneuver space, where the presence of maritime forces can be adjusted as conditions dictate to enable flexible approaches to escalation, de-escalation and deterrence of conflicts. The speed, flexibility, agility and scalability of maritime forces provide 6755 joint or combined force commanders a range of options for responding to crises. Additionally, integrated maritime operations, either within formal alliance structures (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or more informal arrangements (such as the Global Maritime Partnership initiative), send powerful messages to would-be aggressors that we will act with others to ensure collective security and prosperity. United States seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world. As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance. We will employ the global reach, persistent presence, and operational flexibility inherent in U.S. seapower to accomplish six key tasks, or strategic imperatives. Where tensions are high or where we wish to demonstrate to our friends and allies our commitment to security and stability, U.S. maritime forces will be characterized by regionally concentrated, forward-deployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional conflict, deter major power war, and should deterrence fail, win our Nation’s wars as part of a joint or combined campaign. In addition, persistent, mission-tailored maritime forces will be globally distributed in order to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of international partners, and prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises. Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors. This combat power can be selectively and rapidly repositioned to meet contingencies that may arise elsewhere. These forces will be sized and postured to fulfill the following strategic imperatives: Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power. Today regional conflict has ramifications far beyond the area of conflict. Humanitarian crises, violence spreading across borders, pandemics, and the interruption of vital resources are all possible when regional crises erupt. While this strategy advocates a wide dispersal of networked maritime forces, we cannot be everywhere, and we cannot act to mitigate all regional conflict. Where conflict threatens the global system and our national interests, maritime forces will be ready to respond alongside other elements of national and multi-national power, to give political leaders a range of options for deterrence, escalation and de-escalation. Maritime forces that are persistently present and combat-ready provide the Nation’s primary forcible entry option in an era of declining access, even as they provide the means for this Nation to respond quickly to other crises. Whether over the horizon or powerfully arrayed in plain sight, maritime forces can deter the ambitions of regional aggressors, assure friends and allies, gain and maintain access, and protect our citizens while working to sustain the global order. Critical to this notion is the maintenance of a powerful fleet—ships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-based fleet activities—capable of selectively controlling the seas, projecting power ashore, and protecting friendly forces and civilian populations from attack.Deter major power war. No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power war. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces.

# Hegemony Good

**Threats are real and inevitable—only primacy solves great power war**

**Thayer 06** [Bradley Thayer,  *Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Study at Missouri State University, Former Research Fellow at International Security Program at Harvard Belfer Center of Science and International Affairs* November/December 2006, “In Defense of Primacy”, The National Interest]

A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power‑the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, ei­ther because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of pri­macy and called for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its in­terests. But retrenchment, in any of its guis­es, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capa­bilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capa­bilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American pri­macy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action­ but they fall to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensur­ing American primacy takes as its starting point the protec­tion of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on re­trenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no mat­ter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington can­not call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terror­ists, rogue states or rising powers, his­tory shows that threats must be confront­ed. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvinc­ing half‑pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weak­ness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of interna­tional politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confront­ed, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from .American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a phys­ical, on‑the‑ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global com­mon"‑‑the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space‑allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent ca­pabilities is increased.' This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics today‑-in a world where Ameri­can primacy is clearly and unambiguous­ly on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes, ­their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America‑-their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements‑and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this coun­try, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy‑-and the bandwagon­ing effect‑has also given us extensive in­fluence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to cre­ate coalitions of like‑minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Pro­liferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the where it can be stymied by opponents. American‑led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effec­tiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand coun­tries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezeula. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and ac­tions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, re­sort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communica­tion and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases‑‑Venezuela, Iran, Cuba‑it is an anti‑U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrin­sically anti‑American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power‑‑Rome, Britain or the United States today. Schol­ars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we con­sider the current international order ‑ free trade, a robust monetary regime, increas­ing respect for human rights, growing de­mocratization‑‑is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages fol­lowed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. With­out U.S. power, the liberal order cre­ated by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Rai Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washing­ton and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated rela­tionships aligned‑-between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread de­mocracy and other elements of its ideol­ogy of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing inter­ests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. lead­ership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Admin­istration for attempting to spread democ­racy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's crit­ics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or sta­bilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Per­haps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Af­ghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threat­ened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Wash­ington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western‑style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Ku­wait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the glob­al economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network character­ized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mo­bility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a glob­al public good from which all states ben­efit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well‑being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin‑offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his ca­reer confident in the socialist ideology of post‑independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recog­nizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globaliza­tion, which are facilitated through Amer­ican primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides.

**Intervention is inevitable – it’s only a question of effectiveness**

**Kagan 11** [Robert Kagan,  *a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution.* “The Price of Power”. The Weekly Standard, Jan 24, 2011, Vol. 16, No. 18. http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?page=3]

Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations. At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly “stabilize” the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula would increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japan’s case would mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal. Layne and other offshore balancing enthusiasts, like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States allowed the great European powers to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open for debate—most would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself. Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States wound up intervening with millions of troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously, in the two most dreadful wars in human history. It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the safest course was to build “situations of strength” (Acheson’s phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a “preponderance of power,” and to create an international system with American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to strategically important parts of the world. They did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply rejected the offshore balancing strategy, and they did so because they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in the past and would likely do so again. They believed their new global strategy was more likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and less expensive in the long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all agreed on this core strategic approach. From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Truman’s containment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy warned of “imperial overstretch,” arguing that American decline was inevitable “if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.]” were allowed to continue at the same time as “massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe.” Today, we are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global strategy. Of course it is precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided, including the financial benefits, somehow never appear on the ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order that the United States has sustained since Word War II—the prevention of major war, the support of an open trading system, and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free government. How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another type of order? Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen a greater increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American economy, though suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely from this international order. One price of this success has been maintaining a sufficient military capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been worth it? In the first half of the 20th century, the United States found itself engaged in two world wars. In the second half, this global American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the great-power struggle of the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace. Looked at coldly, simply in terms of dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs. The danger, as always, is that we don’t even realize the benefits our strategic choices have provided. Many assume that the world has simply become more peaceful, that great-power conflict has become impossible, that nations have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what counts. This belief in progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of international order is always alluring to Americans and Europeans and other children of the Enlightenment. It was the prevalent belief in the decade before World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those heady days after the Cold War when people spoke of the “end of history.” It is always tempting to believe that the international order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist in the absence of that power, or at least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change in American strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role will keep pouring in. This is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under a table and the table will not fall over. Much of the present debate, it should be acknowledged, is not about the defense budget or the fiscal crisis at all. It is only the latest round in a long-running debate over the nature and purposes of American foreign policy. At the tactical level, some use the fiscal crisis as a justification for a different approach to, say, Afghanistan. Richard Haass, for instance, who has long favored a change of strategy from “counterinsurgency” to “counterterrorism,” now uses the budget crisis to bolster his case—although he leaves unclear how much money would be saved by such a shift in strategy. At the broader level of grand strategy, the current debate, though revived by the budget crisis, can be traced back a century or more, but its most recent expression came with the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, some critics, often calling themselves “realists,” expressed their unhappiness with a foreign policy—first under George H.W. Bush and then under Bill Clinton—that cast the United States as leader of a “new world order,” the “indispensable nation.” As early as 1992, Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson assailed President Bush for launching the first Persian Gulf war in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. They charged him with pursuing “a new world role .  .  . required neither by security need nor by traditional conceptions of the nation’s purpose,” a role that gave “military force” an “excessive and disproportionate .  .  . position in our statecraft.” Tucker and Hendrickson were frank enough to acknowledge that, pace Paul Kennedy, the “peril” was not actually “to the nation’s purse” or even to “our interests” but to the nation’s “soul.” This has always been the core critique of expansive American foreign policy doctrines, from the time of the Founders to the present—not that a policy of extensive global involvement is necessarily impractical but that it is immoral and contrary to the nation’s true ideals. Today this alleged profligacy in the use of force is variously attributed to the influence of “neoconservatives” or to those Mearsheimer calls the “liberal imperialists” of the Clinton administration, who have presumably now taken hold of the Obama administration as well. But the critics share a common premise: that if only the United States would return to a more “normal” approach to the world, intervening abroad far less frequently and eschewing efforts at “nation-building,” then this would allow the United States to cut back on the resources it expends on foreign policy. Thanks to Haass’s clever formulation, there has been a great deal of talk lately about “wars of choice” as opposed to “wars of necessity.” Haass labels both the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan “wars of choice.” Today, many ask whether the United States can simply avoid such allegedly optional interventions in the future, as well as the occupations and exercises in “nation-building” that often seem to follow. Although the idea of eliminating “wars of choice” appears sensible, the historical record suggests it will not be as simple as many think. The problem is, almost every war or intervention the United States has engaged in throughout its history has been optional—and not just the Bosnias, Haitis, Somalias, or Vietnams, but the Korean War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and even World War II (at least the war in Europe), not to mention the many armed interventions throughout Latin America and the Caribbean over the course of the past century, from Cuba in 1898 to Panama in 1989. A case can be made, and has been made by serious historians, that every one of these wars and interventions was avoidable and unnecessary. To note that our most recent wars have also been wars of choice, therefore, is not as useful as it seems. In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898: Cuba, 1898 The Philippines, 1898-1902 China, 1900 Cuba, 1906 Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912 Mexico, 1914 Haiti, 1915 Dominican Republic, 1916 Mexico, 1917 World War I, 1917-1918 Nicaragua, 1927 World War II, 1941-1945 Korea, 1950-1953 Lebanon, 1958 Vietnam, 1963-1973 Dominican Republic, 1965 Grenada, 1983 Panama, 1989 First Persian Gulf war, 1991 Somalia, 1992 Haiti, 1994 Bosnia, 1995 Kosovo, 1999 Afghanistan, 2001-present Iraq, 2003-present That is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years, or roughly 47 percent of the time. Since the end of the Cold War, it is true, the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit. Many don’t want to admit it, and the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions. The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued. To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. But whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains. It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially a so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country. There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression. Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war. On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it. Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid. The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners? Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia, should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help? Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate? The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But history has provided some lessons, and for the United States the lesson has been fairly clear: The world is better off, and the United States is better off, in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.

**American intervention solves poverty, violence, and extinction**

**Barnett 11** [Thomas Barnett,  *Chief analyst at Wikistrat, former visiting scholar at the University of Tennessee’s Howard Baker Center for Public Policy and a visiting strategist at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies,* March 7, 2011, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts US, and the Globalization, at Crossroads”, World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads]

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job.  It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II.  Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation.  But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.

Transition goes nuclear

Posen and Ross 97 [Barry Posen, *Professor of Political Science in the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program at MIT,* Andrew Ross, *Professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College*, International Security, Winter 1997]

The United States can, more easily than most, go it alone. Yet we do not find the arguments of the neo-isolationists compelling. Their strategy serves U.S. interests only if they are narrowly construed. First, though the neo-isolationists have a strong case in their argument that the United States is currently quite secure, disengagement is unlikely to make the United States more secure, and would probably make it less secure. The disappearance of the United States from the world stage would likely precipitate a good deal of competition abroad for security. Without a U.S. presence, aspiring regional hegemons would see more opportunities. States formerly defended by the United States would have to look to their own military power; local arms competitions are to be expected. Proliferation of nuclear weapons would intensify if the U.S. nuclear guarantee were withdrawn. Some states would seek weapons of mass destruction because they were simply unable to compete conventionally with their neighbors. This new flurry of competitive behavior would probably energize many hypothesized immediate causes of war, including preemptive motives, preventive motives, economic motives, and the propensity for miscalculation**. There would** like **be more war. W**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction **might be used in** some of **the wars**, with unpleasant effects even for those not directly involved.

# \*\*\*Politics Link Turns\*\*\*

**Sealift has the influence of major ship lobbies**

**Sapolsky 2** Professor of Public Policy and Organization, Emeritus, and recently retired from teaching political science and directing the MIT Security Studies Program (Harvey M., “Cargo Cults”, Fall 2002, http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/34933/17-460Fall-2002/NR/rdonlyres/Political-Science/17-460Fall-2002/3CBFEC6E-2E59-4B14-BD6E-F717EEF4ADED/0/17460cargo\_cults.pdf) RaPa

Merchant Marine a failing industry - commercially deeply divided Jones Act trade restricted to US companies on US built bottoms Operating Differential Subsidy since 1930s/ Unions heavy contributors/ Now Maritime Security Program Shipbuilding subsidies Most of commercial trade on flags of convenience US lines rely on government cargo---50% of aid; 100% of military Interests include shippers, maritime unions, ship owners, ship lines, shipbuilders, & ports. WWI, WWII massive building, surplus carried US through Vietnam Start of government fleet in 1970s, 1980s ---SL-7s, RRF Shipbuilders get 600-ship Navy rather than bigger loan subsidy program Gulf War - MSC did fine, big chunk on foreign instead of ODS Post Gulf US bought up most of big RO/ROs; shipyards get LMSR program MSP instead of OD What are Allies for - 5000 container ships (200 or less US flag) Prepo the answer, but what is problem

Military Sealift Command (MSC) has long been assigned responsibility for providing maritime support to all components of the Department of Defense and to other government agencies in both peacetime and war.

**Sealift has the protection of Congress – it has empirically been upgraded**

**Sea Power 03** Almanac for all things Sea (“Miltary sealift command”, Sea Power46. 1 (Jan 2003): 117. http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/235931964) RaPa

Inadequacies in available U.S. strategic sealift capability, particularly for supporting U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean, gained national attention in the late 1970s, around the time of upheaval in Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Modem port facilities for handling cargo were either minimal or, in some cases, nonexistent. The already dismal state of overall U.S. sealift capability was worsened by both the decline of the U.S. Merchant Marine and the high percentage of modern merchant ships that, though available for emergency sealift requirements, were poorly configured to handle military cargo effectively. In the 1980s, recognition of those deficiencies led to a number of actions that bolstered MSC's ability to transport military cargo. Iraq's 1990 invasion of neighboring Kuwait quickly made it clear that the ships in the strategic sealift reserve were insufficient to move large numbers of troops and their equipment to faraway battlefields in a timely manner. The 79 MSC ships that were usable required support from ships chartered from both domestic and foreign sources. Congress, recognizing the vital need for fully modern ships properly configured to carry high-priority military equipment, appropriated $5.4 billion from fiscal years 1990 through 1999 to construct and convert additional strategic-sealift platforms. Nineteen large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ships were funded to meet the goals of the 1992 Mobility Requirements Study, which called for an additional five million square feet of sealift capacity-two million square feet for propositioning requirements and three million for surge capability.

**Powerful Fishing and Defense lobbies advocate sealift – Clinton proves**

**Ryan 93** Stationed in Singapore where he covers the Asean region for a Washington-based risk-analysis firm. (Stephen L., “Playing politics with the US defence budget”, 2-27-1993, Business Times (Singapore) Weekend Edition, http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=3S89-11X0-0002-M05K&csi=11432&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true) RaPa

A case in point: the Clinton Administration is cutting the defence budget -US$ 8.5 billion according to recent newspaper reports -but has promised to increase funding for sealift to assure that American troops can be re-deployed overseas should the need arise. Here in Asia, the news of renewed interest in sealift sweetens an otherwise unhappy picture -American troops may go, but more American sealift ships would assure us that these troops could return in an emergency. The facts, however, may not be so simple. Added funding for sealift is a perennial issue in the US Congress, one which the lawmakers pushed on George Bush through all his four years in office. But the demand for sealift funding came not so much from the armed services committees of the House and Senate, the organisations presumably most concerned with strategic issues, but from the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. The latter body deals less with the issue of national security than with the issue of levelling (or some say tilting) the playing field between foundering American maritime industries and their foreign competition. The American merchant marine has lingered in the doldrums for years. But the seafaring and dock-worker community is unionised and carries political clout. Members of this committee have argued, rightfully, that the need to get troops overseas requires government intervention to prevent further erosion of this industry. Clinton's support of sealift certainly represents some commitment to America's world obligations. But it also represents some commitment to a powerful domestic voting bloc and its spokesmen in Congress.