# Military Ocean Terminals Aff – Part 2

# ---Crises Inevitable---

# Crises inevitable

**Many potential world crises**

**Conway, Roughead, and Allen** **07** - General US Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral of the US Coast Guard, Commandant of the Coast Guard (James T., Gary, Thad W, "A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower", navy.mil, October 2007, <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf>)//KL

The security, prosperity, and vital interests of the United States are increasingly coupled to those of other nations. Our Nation’s interests are best served by fostering a peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance. We prosper because of this system of exchange among nations, yet recognize it is vulnerable to a range of disruptions that can produce cascading and harmful effects far from their sources. Major power war, regional conflict, terrorism, lawlessness and natural disasters—all have the potential to threaten U.S. national security and world prosperity. The oceans connect the nations of the world, even those countries that are landlocked. Because the maritime domain—the world’s oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, littorals, and the airspace above them—supports 90% of the world’s trade, it carries the lifeblood of a global system that links every country on earth.

**Global crises are inevitable -- climate and resources**

**Conway, Roughead, and Allen** **07** - General US Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral of the US Coast Guard, Commandant of the Coast Guard (James T., Gary, Thad W, "A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower", navy.mil, October 2007, <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf>)//KL

Expansion of the global system has increased the prosperity of many nations. Yet their continued growth may create increasing competition for resources and capital with other economic powers, transnational corporations and international organizations. Heightened popular expectations and increased competition for resources, coupled with scarcity, may encourage nations to exert wider claims of sovereignty over greater expanses of ocean, waterways, and natural resources—potentially resulting in conflict. Technology is rapidly expanding marine activities such as energy development, resource extraction, and other commercial activity in and under the oceans. Climate change is gradually opening up the waters of the Arctic, not only to new resource development, but also to new shipping routes that may reshape the global transport system. While these developments offer opportunities for growth, they are potential sources of competition and conflict for access and natural resources. G

**Irregular tactics**

**Conway, Roughead, and Allen** **07** - General US Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral of the US Coast Guard, Commandant of the Coast Guard (James T., Gary, Thad W, "A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower", navy.mil, October 2007, <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf>)//KL

Globalization is also shaping human migration patterns, health, education, culture, and the conduct of conflict. Conflicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways. Weak or corrupt governments, growing dissatisfaction among the disenfranchised, religious extremism, ethnic nationalism, and changing demographics—often spurred on by the uneven and sometimes unwelcome advances of globalization—exacerbate tensions and are contributors to conflict. Concurrently, a rising number of transnational actors and rogue states, emboldened and enabled with unprecedented access to the global stage, can cause systemic disruptions in an effort to increase their power and influence. Their actions, often designed to purposely incite conflict between other parties, will complicate attempts to defuse and allay regional conflict. Proliferation of weapons technology and information has increased the capacity of nation-states and transnational actors to challenge United States seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world. a cooporative strategy for a 21st century seapower 5 maritime access, evade accountability for attacks, and manipulate public perception.

**Asymmetric warfare**

**Conway, Roughead, and Allen** **07** - General US Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral of the US Coast Guard, Commandant of the Coast Guard (James T., Gary, Thad W, "A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower", navy.mil, October 2007, <http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf>)//KL

Asymmetric use of technology will pose a range of threats to the United States and its partners. Even more worrisome, the appetite for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is growing among nations and non-state antagonists. At the same time, attacks on legal, financial, and cyber systems can be equally, if not more, disruptive than kinetic weapons. The vast majority of the world’s population lives within a few hundred miles of the oceans. Social instability in increasingly crowded cities, many of which exist in already unstable parts of the world, has the potential to create significant disruptions. The effects of climate change may also amplify human suffering through catastrophic storms, loss of arable lands, and coastal flooding, could lead to loss of life, involuntary migration, social instability, and regional crises. Mass communications will highlight the drama of human suffering, and disadvantaged populations will be ever more painfully aware and less tolerant of their conditions. Extremist ideologies will become increasingly attractive to those in despair and bereft of opportunity. Criminal elements will also exploit this social instability.

# ---Solvency---

# \*\*\*DAR Mechanism\*\*\*

# DAR Descriptions

(DAR = Defense Access Roads, or simply funding programs to improve the roads around a military ocean terminal. They are used by both civilians and the military)

**DAR can help fund DoD transportation**

**National Academy of Science 11** [National Academy of Science (Transportation Research Board),  *expertise in transportation budgeting and policy, military budgeting and policy, infrastructure planning, state and local infrastructure management, economics, and military facility planning,* 2011, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases: Special Report 302”, <http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13104>, DMintz]

DoD recognizes that situations occur where defense traffic places an unexpected burden on state and local highway programs. These situations may include a dynamic increase in mission-related activities that result in a significant and sudden increase in defense traffic. The DAR program may then be able to be used to help fund highway improvements necessary to accommodate the sudden and unusual defense impacts.

Defense Access Roads Program

 Under the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program, administered by the military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), DoD may pay for public highway improvements to address the impact on traffic of sudden or unusual defense-related actions (see Box 2). DAR enables DoD to help pay indirectly for improvements to highways DoD designates as important to the national defense. Under DAR, DoD can use funds provided in military construction (MILCON) appropriations to pay for all or part of the cost of constructing and maintaining roads designated as “defense access roads.

**Five criterions for DAR funding**

**National Academy of Science 11** [National Academy of Science (Transportation Research Board),  *expertise in transportation budgeting and policy, military budgeting and policy, infrastructure planning, state and local infrastructure management, economics, and military facility planning,* 2011, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases: Special Report 302”, <http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13104>, DMintz]

Projects are eligible for DAR funding if they meet one of the following criteria (GAO 2009):

1. The installation needs a new access road to accommodate a defense action.

2. A defense action causes traffic to double.

3. The installation needs a new or improved access road to accommodate a temporary surge in traffic to or from the installation due to a defense action.

4. The installation needs a new or improved access road to accommodate special military vehicles such as heavy equipment transport vehicles.

5. The installation needs a road to replace one closed because of military necessity.

**DAR is defense spending, but is administered by TRANSCOM and the Federal Highway Administration**

**Else 08** [Daniel H. Else, *Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade*, *Masters in Political Science from Penn State and GW,* January 11, 2008, “The Defense Access Road Program” Congressional Research Service, <http://www6.montgomerycountymd.gov/content/exec/brac/pdf/dar-crs_rept-dar_program-011108.pdf>, DMintz]

The Transportation Engineering Agency of the Army’s Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC, known before January 1, 2004, as the Military Traffic Management Command, or MTMC), a component of the Department of Defense’s Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), jointly administers the Defense Access Road Program with the Federal Highway Administration, an agency within the Department of Transportation.1 The Federal Highway Administration acts as the link between the Department of Defense and the state and local authorities who are responsible for local highway maintenance and who execute the road projects funded under the DAR.

**DAR is the only funding mechanism but is insufficient now**

**112th Congress, 12** [112th Congress, May 22, 2012, “MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATION BILL, 2013”,

 Defense Access Roads.--With the consolidation of military facilities through BRAC 2005 realignments and transformation initiatives, traffic congestion around growth installations has become a major issue, particularly in densely populated urban areas. The Defense Access Road [DAR] program is DOD's only funding mechanism for building or improving access roads outside of military installations. However, the program is currently constrained by strict eligibility requirements, such as the doubling of existing traffic congestion, which makes it extremely difficult for congested urban areas to qualify for DAR certification.

**Funding process**

**FHWA 10** [FHWA, July 16, 2010, “Defense Access Roads”, <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/federalaid/guide/guide_current.cfm#c13>, DMintz]

 Funds appropriated for defense access roads (DAR) are transferred to the FHWA from the Department of Defense for military access and replacement roads, access and replacement roads for Atomic Energy Commission plants, NASA installations, defense industries, maneuver area roads, and missile installations and facilities. Hence, Federal participation is variable depending primarily on the degree to which usage will be out of the ordinary due to the military installation or activity.

Funds are centrally allotted to the Program Manager, Federal Lands Highway (FLH). Funds and the authority to obligate are allocated to the FLH Divisions or to a State through the FLH Program Development Office. Allocations are project specific; therefore, underruns cannot be used on other projects and unused DAR funds may be reallocated by the Washington Headquarters office or returned to the military. Unobligated balances remaining after the period of availability lapse. Overruns can be covered only by specific requests for additional allocations. Unexpended funds are canceled after 5 years after the last year of obligation.

Title 23 requirements apply to all DAR projects. However, the FHWA will be involved in approval of plans, specifications and estimates, concurrence in award, and appropriate construction monitoring on all projects involving DAR funding. Project numbers are assigned by the Washington Headquarters.

# DOD/Congress Fence DAR Funds

**Funding DAR key to success—Congress or the DoD can do it**

**National Academy of Science 11** [National Academy of Science (Transportation Research Board),  *expertise in transportation budgeting and policy, military budgeting and policy, infrastructure planning, state and local infrastructure management, economics, and military facility planning,* 2011, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases: Special Report 302”, <http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13104>, DMintz]

Recommendation 9

DAR funds should be fenced within MILCON so that once funds have been committed for a transportation project they cannot be pulled back to serve some other purpose, short of an emergency. In addition, the 5-year constraint on obligation of funds should be extended parallel to USDOT funding. The required “fencing” of funds can be done by DoD as policy or it can be specified by Congress. Funds for base access requirements should be increased and segregated in a separate fund so that they do not have to compete with other MILCON projects. The current 5-year limit on expenditures should also be eased to allow states and regions to develop plans, complete environmental reviews, allow for citizen participation, and commit other funds for the projects.

# DOT-DOD Coordination Key

**Leadership and coordination between the DOD and DOT is key to guarantee funding.**

**GAO 2011** (Brian J. Lepore, Director Defense Capabilities and Management, Report to the Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives “ DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program” January 2011, http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/315273.pdf )//ALo

As we have noted in our prior work on DOD-growth communities, highlevel leadership is essential to leverage scarce federal resources to help address vital infrastructure issues. 37 DOD Directive 5410.12 states that it is the Department of Defense policy to take the leadership role in assisting communities substantially and seriously affected by DOD relocation activities. 38 Executive Order 12788 directs federal agencies to give priority consideration to requests from defense-affected communities for federal assistance. 39 In 2008, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)— who oversees assistance to defense-affected communities and serves as the Chair of the 22-agency Economic Adjustment Committee—to implement Executive Order 12788 by holding regular meetings of the full executive-level Economic Adjustment Committee and by serving as a clearinghouse for identifying expected community impacts and problems as well as identifying existing resources for providing economic assistance to communities affected by DOD activities. Despite concurring with our recommendation, DOD has yet to convene the full committee except to address concerns stemming from the military buildup in Guam and, to a limited extent, at Fort Bragg. We continue to believe that it is necessary and appropriate for DOD to implement our prior recommendation to use the committee as a coordinated body for marshalling resources at the federal level that can help address potential infrastructure gaps at the affected communities. Specifically concerning unmet transportation needs, until DOD takes a larger leadership role and better coordinates with the Department of Transportation, at a minimum, to address unmet transportation needs surrounding DOD growth installations, it is likely that a large number of transportation needs will not be met and quality of life for both military and civilian residents could be degraded.

**Interagency cooperation is key to leverage funding.**

**GAO 2011** (Brian J. Lepore, Director Defense Capabilities and Management, Report to the Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives “ DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program” January 2011, http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/315273.pdf )//ALo

Despite its traditionally limited utility, more attention has been focused on the DAR program as a potential solution to traffic congestion and other unmet transportation needs. The long list of unaddressed transportation needs has recently been intensified by the combination of a nationwide economic downturn coupled with unprecedented military growth activities. While the DAR program has begun to help mitigate some of these needs, the potential exists that it could provide more assistance under the current program design if it was better understood by all installation commanders. Without a concerted effort by DOD and the Department of Transportation to update DAR regulations and guidance, provide additional working-level guidance to potential DAR program users, and effectively communicate that guidance to stakeholders, opportunities may be missed to make effective use of the existing DAR program under the current procedures. Further, given the project-specific process of determining eligibility under current criteria and the challenge of obtaining funding for those projects certified as eligible, recent successes may be driven more by the dedicated work of the individuals involved rather than the program’s design. While we acknowledge that simply updating and clarifying the regulations and providing and communicating better working level guidance concerning the DAR program would not put it in a position to address all the transportation needs surrounding growing military installations, such actions could increase the accessibility and usefulness of the program to its stakeholders.

High-level interagency coordination regarding policy and funding decisions by DOD and the Department of Transportation could affect the potential of the DAR program to meet the needs of communities most severely affected by DOD growth. Furthermore, unless high-level interagency leadership takes additional steps to improve the utilization of DAR—in conjunction with other federal programs that provide funding for transportation projects nationwide—both installations and communities affected by DOD growth will continue to struggle to address their transportation needs. Moreover, without a strategy for providing priority assistance and leveraging funding for transportation projects surrounding its DOD-growth installations, infrastructure needs both on and off the installation will continue to be subject to funding uncertainties, and both military readiness and the communities’ ability to plan to meet the needs of their citizens could suffer. Specifically, Executive Order 12788 provides DOD a tool—the 22-agency Economic Adjustment Committee—to help ensure that the federal government effectively and efficiently leverages scarce resources to assist impacted communities. By convening the committee specifically to address transportation issues surrounding military growth installations, DOD may be able to reach agreement with other federal agencies to meet more of those unmet needs by more fully leveraging federal resources to their best advantage.

**DAR is currently limited because of outdates regulations and unclear guidance – interagency cooperation solves.**

**ADC 11** [Association of Defense Communities, March 3, 2011, “Use of Defense Roads Program Limited, GAO Finds”, [http://www.defensecommunities.org/headlines/use-of-defense-roads-program-limited-gao-finds/#](http://www.defensecommunities.org/headlines/use-of-defense-roads-program-limited-gao-finds/), DMintz]

Since 2004, Congress has allocated almost $125 million for 11 projects under the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program at domestic growth installation sites, according to a new study from the Government Accountability Office (GAO). A total of 20 projects have been certified by the Defense Department as eligible for DAR funding, but given expected funding delays and the extended time frame necessary to complete major traffic construction, most of the approved projects are unlikely to mitigate transportation needs arising from the 2005 BRAC round in the near term.

Usage of the program has been limited by a lack of knowledge of the program, outdated regulations and unclear guidance on how to navigate the program’s complex process, concluded the congressional watchdog agency.

Greater high-level federal interagency coordination may be necessary to meet the estimated $2 billion in transportation improvements needed by BRAC growth communities. In failing to convene the 22-agency Economic Adjustment Committee, the Pentagon so far has not provided the leadership critical to achieving effective interagency collaboration, GAO found. As of last November, DOD had never assembled the entire Economic Adjustment Committee to address transportation issues facing the defense communities surrounding 26 growth installations.

The department’s Office of Economic Adjustment has provided technical assistance and grants for growth planning; however, that agency cannot guide interagency cooperation at a high enough level to identify potential funds needed to fill the unmet transportation needs, the report said.

# Fed Key

**Federal leadership and funding needed for DAR – DOD is key.**

**GAO 2011** (Report to the Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives “ DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program” January 2011, http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/315273.pdf )//ALo

The Defense Access Roads program is providing some assistance in mitigating transportation needs in communities surrounding growth installations, but program usage has been limited, in part, by a lack of knowledge of the program, outdated regulations, and unclear guidance on how to navigate the program’s complex process. DOD has certified 20 transportation projects at 11 of the 26 military installation locations since 2004. Of the 20 certified projects, 11 have been funded at about $125 million. Considering funding delays and construction time frames, most of the approved projects to date are unlikely to provide relief in the near term. The procedures of the Defense Access Roads program are complex, involving multiple federal, state, and local stakeholders. The guidance describing the program’s procedures and, specifically, the application of the criteria, is difficult to follow and some regulations and guidance are outdated. Despite program outreach efforts and positive experiences with program administrators, military officials from 11 installations said that more information would be helpful to clarify the program’s procedures. Without program guidance that clearly details the program’s procedures and is effectively communicated to all stakeholders, the program may not be used to its fullest extent. GAO identified an additional step that may be necessary to meet the large pool of the transportation needs that are not being met by the Defense Access program—greater high-level federal interagency coordination. Aside from the Defense Access Roads program, other sources of funding exist that can be used to help mitigate unmet needs in the defense-affected communities. Local and state agencies generally have the responsibility for constructing and maintaining highways and are the recipients of billions of dollars from federal sources, such as grants from the Department of Transportation or through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. GAO found that some of the transportation projects at several of the military growth locations have been funded by the states in which they are located and others are recipients of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds. Because this assistance is coming from diverse sources and is largely uncoordinated among the stakeholders involved, it is unclear to what extent priority consideration is being given to the defense-affected communities as prescribed by Executive Order 12788. This presidential order provided for a federal committee—the Economic Adjustment Committee—bringing together 22 agencies, under the leadership of the Secretary of Defense or his designee to, among other things, support various programs designed to assist communities most affected by defense activities. As chair of the committee, DOD has the opportunity to convene full committee meetings and exercise high-level leadership needed to ensure that federal agencies are affording priority consideration to defense affected communities. However, the committee has only rarely convened and has at no time discussed transportation needs affecting all 26 growth locations. Without this leadership, it is unlikely that the federal agencies can provide the effective interagency and intergovernmental coordination and potential funds needed to help address the unmet transportation needs of defense-affected communities.

# Squo Fails

**Senate agrees—DAR funding now is insufficient and needs adjustments.**

**ADC 11** [Association of Defense Communities, *the nation’s premier membership organization supporting communities and states with active, closed and closing defense installations,* June 30, 2011, “Pentagon Needs to Improve Defense Roads Program, Senate Appropriators Say”, [http://www.defensecommunities.org/headlines/pentagon-needs-to-improve-defense-roads-program-senate-appropriators-say/#](http://www.defensecommunities.org/headlines/pentagon-needs-to-improve-defense-roads-program-senate-appropriators-say/), DMintz]

The Defense Department should improve the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program, focusing on adjusting the eligibility criteria, the Senate Appropriations Committee said in its report accompanying the fiscal 2012 military construction and veterans affairs spending bill.

The lawmakers direct DOD to address the recommendations included in recent reviews of the DAR program by the Government Accountability Office and the National Academy of Sciences Transportation Research Board. **The program is the only federal mechanism for the military to fund improvements to roads outside of an installation**.

# ---A2 Eligibility Solvency Deficit

**Eligibility already expanded, only funding is needed.**

**Lanham 1/5/12** ( Congressional Documents and Publications “Release: Four Connolly Bills & Amendments Signed Into Law on Last Day of Year; Rep. Gerald E. "Gerry" Connolly (D-VA) News Release” Proquest)//ALo

Four pieces of legislation sponsored by Congressman Gerry Connolly were signed into law by President Obama on New Year's Eve. The four Connolly legislative initiatives were rolled into a larger defense authorization measure that passed the Congress this month. Two of the Connolly initiatives concern the federal workforce and programs to enhance the training of federal employees who conduct oversight of federal contracts and improve the federal internship program. A third provision would change Department of Defense regulations to provide more money for off-base road improvements at military facilities that grow due to BRAC. The fourth piece of Connolly legislation in the new law would require the use of more energy-efficient tents for service members in war zones to reduce the number of fuel convoys exposed to IEDs on roadways. ENHANCING FEDERAL ACQUSITION INSTITUTE - One of Connolly's bipartisan bills would increase training for federal acquisition personnel who oversee federal contracts. Connolly, who is Ranking Member on the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee that handles contracting and procurement issues, said, "If we are concerned about saving taxpayer money, looking for efficiencies and avoiding waste, fraud and abuse, it starts with professional training." The legislation would give the Federal Acquisition Institute the tools it needs to enhance training, improve oversight, and develop and update government-wide training standards and certification requirements. "Given the complexity of many of today's federal contracts, it benefits the taxpayers to have federal contracting officers who are well-versed in the issues at hand," Connolly said. Pennsylvania Republican Todd Platts cosponsored the Connolly amendment. Maine Republican Senator Susan Collins authored the companion bill in the Senate and Connolly worked closely with her on the language and strategy. The Professional Services Council and other contracting advocates supported the Connolly/Collins language. IMPROVING FEDERAL INTERNSHIP PROGRAM - A second Connolly bill would beef up the federal internship program and add some standardization to how agencies conduct their internships. "Not always do bright and promising interns get the opportunity to understand the agency they are interning for," Connolly said. "This bill would put structure in place across the federal government, make internships a better educational experience for participants, and most importantly, give federal agencies a good opportunity to identify top-notch candidates for federal jobs to replace the brain drain that will result as more Baby Boomers - more than 45 percent of the workforce - retire from the federal government over the next decade." California Republican Brian Bilbray cosponsored the internship amendment. The Federal Managers Association and the Senior Executives Association supported the Connolly legislation. BRAC - A provision developed by Connolly and Congressmen Jim Moran (D-VA) and Rob Wittman (R-VA) changes Department of Defense regulations on how DoD can use funds to make improvements to roads around military installations and facilities that will grow in size due to BRAC. Current DoD rules required that traffic double on roads off-base before any DAR (defense access roads) money could be used. That mandate would be eliminated. In addition, DoD is required to find other money in its budget to help fund traffic-related road improvements off-base, and, in the future, it must take traffic mitigation into account when it plans a BRAC move. REDUCING DEATHS AND INJURIES IN BATTLEFIELD CONVOYS - Another Connolly amendment will help reduce fuel convoy deaths and injuries among troops on the battlefield. The amendment mandates the use of more fuel-efficient tents for our forward and frontline troops to reduce the need for as many fuel convoys to travel through dangerous territory to the front lines. "Many of our service members are killed and injured by IEDs targeting fuel convoys on roads in the war zones," Connolly said. "This legislation will help to reduce their exposure to IEDs."

# \*\*\*Must Solve Congestion\*\*\*

# Funding Now Fails

**New funding is crucial**

**National Academy of Science 11** [National Academy of Science (Transportation Research Board),  *expertise in transportation budgeting and policy, military budgeting and policy, infrastructure planning, state and local infrastructure management, economics, and military facility planning,* 2011, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases: Special Report 302”, <http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13104>, DMintz]

 Funding

A variety of existing and new funding sources will need to be tapped to better serve military transportation access needs in the future and to avoid imposing large costs on surrounding communities. Immediate needs will require extraordinary responses.

# Funding Uncertainties

**BRAC 2005 is causing transportation problems—more funds are critical but uncertain now**

**National Academy of Science 11** [National Academy of Science (Transportation Research Board),  *expertise in transportation budgeting and policy, military budgeting and policy, infrastructure planning, state and local infrastructure management, economics, and military facility planning,* 2011, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases: Special Report 302”, <http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13104>, DMintz]

These BRAC movements are occurring at a difficult time. The nation is fighting two wars during the severest economic downturn since the Great Depression. Traditional sources of funding for transportation are under severe strain because of the economic downturn; the federal-aid transportation program has not been reauthorized, in part because of inadequate revenue to fund needed improvements. The forces driving growth at military bases and the surrounding communities are more complex than they would be if they were the result of BRAC decisions alone. During fiscal years 2006 through 2012, the populations of the communities in the vicinity of the 18 BRAC bases are expected to increase by an estimated 181,800 military and civilian personnel plus an estimated 173,200 dependents, for a total increase of about 355,000 persons (Table 1).1 The total military and civilian workers at these locations in 2005 was about 422,000 (DoD 2009), indicating an increase of 84%.

About 28% of the total population increase, roughly 98,000 people, will occur at bases in metropolitan areas, several of which have transportation facilities serving the bases that are barely able to serve current demand during peak periods. Except in the case of congestion caused by a doubling of traffic, however, DoD views the responsibility for addressing increasing traffic attributable to military expansion to be that of state and local authorities (DoD 2008). The problems for state and local jurisdictions in BRAC cases are attributable to the rapid pace of traffic growth on heavily used facilities, particularly those in urbanized areas that have limited options for expansion; the lengthy process for projects to be evaluated for environmental impact and included in state and regional transportation plans; the intense competition among state and local projects for available federal and state aid for capacity enhancements; and the general shortage of available state and local funds. Moreover, the normal process for developing highway and transit projects, from required planning and environmental processes all the way through construction is, at best, 9 years and usually takes 15 to 20 years (GAO 2003).

Addressing congestion problems around bases in metropolitan areas will require major improvements in the transportation system, including both increased capacity and improved operations**. At issue is where the additional funds will come from and who will be responsible for carrying out the improvement**s.

# Now Key

**Acting now is key—unmanageable congestion coming**

**National Academy of Science 11** [National Academy of Science (Transportation Research Board),  *expertise in transportation budgeting and policy, military budgeting and policy, infrastructure planning, state and local infrastructure management, economics, and military facility planning,* 2011, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases: Special Report 302”, <http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13104>, DMintz]

There is substantial evidence that in an unusually short period an extraordinary amount of new traffic will be added to already congested facilities serving some military bases around the country. These problems cannot be addressed with current funding and processes, nor would they be addressed by the recommendations made above. Some corridors, such as the section of I-395 serving the Mark Center, cannot be expanded with new lanes, but problems can be eased with expanded transit, improved exit and egress lanes, and travel demand measures. I-5 serves Joint Base Lewis–McChord as well as being the main freight artery for the state of Washington. Its capacity constraints are significant and expansion would be extremely expensive. Similarly, I-395 and I-95 in Northern Virginia are already heavily congested in peak periods and will be overwhelmed by the additional traffic from personnel increases at Fort Belvoir and the Mark Center. Waiting for projects to address these problems to be funded through the normal transportation cycle, given continued delays in reauthorizing federal surface transportation programs and the much diminished size of state transportation budgets, means that severe congestion problems around growing military bases could go unaddressed for years. The committee cannot estimate the amount of financial assistance needed in affected areas and recognizes that virtually no amount of money will result in free-flow traffic conditions; however, some improvements are possible. The committee examined only a few case studies and did not have the resources to conduct detailed analyses of options in the cases it examined. It is convinced, however, of the potential exceptional severity of the impacts in these locations and presumes the same could be true in other locations.

# Reverse Causal

**And it’s reverse causal**

**National Academy of Science 11** [National Academy of Science (Transportation Research Board),  *expertise in transportation budgeting and policy, military budgeting and policy, infrastructure planning, state and local infrastructure management, economics, and military facility planning,* 2011, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases: Special Report 302”, <http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13104>, DMintz]

Transportation programs to reduce congestion that may appear to be small can have large benefits. The disproportionate, nonlinear impact of increased traffic in congested networks also works in reverse. Programs and policies that adjust the travel behavior of a small percentage of travelers in congested settings have a disproportionate benefit for traffic flow, which means that travel demand management programs that allow workers to shift the time of travel, shift mode, change route, or work from home can have important effects on regional congestion and delay levels.

# \*\*\*MILCON\*\*\*

**Bases’ transportation needs are sent to MILCON to compete for funding in the MILCON budget**

**National Academy of Science 11** [National Academy of Science (Transportation Research Board),  *expertise in transportation budgeting and policy, military budgeting and policy, infrastructure planning, state and local infrastructure management, economics, and military facility planning,* 2011, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases: Special Report 302”, <http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13104>, DMintz]

During planning, an installation’s facility requirements are derived from the installation’s mission. The need to acquire additional facilities is determined by an assessment of how existing facilities meet the installation’s facility requirements. If additional facilities are needed, construction projects may be undertaken to build new facilities or to upgrade existing, substandard facilities to accommodate new missions, accept technological changes, and improve operational efficiency. This planning process focuses primarily on the capital facility requirements at the base and not on the expectations the bases have of the infrastructure and of the surrounding communities. And, as a result, most planning is directed at identifying military construction (MILCON) and operations and maintenance budgets for physical infrastructure, rather than other funding sources to mitigate ongoing traffic congestion impacts through measures such as mass transit subsidies and flextime policies.

Each base submits annual construction requirements, which are a summary for correcting facility deficiencies, to headquarters as part of the military construction budgeting process (DoD 1996). This summary provides a 6-year construction program for the base. The facility requirements are reflected in an installation master plan. This document is the installation’s long-range strategy for development. It prescribes overall facility quality standards and architectural themes and addresses areas such as land use, utility systems, roads, and parking. It also identifies unprogrammed requirements that can be reasonably deferred. The bases’ main requirements are given a priority ranking and placed in competition with other projects for available resources within the MILCON budget. The project definition effort begins at the installation level and moves through the chain of command until the project ultimately is included in the budget submittal.

To the extent that this planning and budgeting process is carried out at each facility, it is apparently done with little coordination and cooperation from surrounding communities (GAO 2007). (The Fort Bliss example cited in the case study chapter stands out as a counterexample.) Communities are generally left in the dark about the military base actions that affect them. They receive little information and, to the extent that they do receive information, it is generally too little or too late to allow adequate planning and programming on their part. They are often left with addressing problems after they occur. This lack of coordination between military bases and surrounding communities has been a long-term problem and continues to this day (GAO 2007). To the extent the base public works directors are not engaged in the MPO process, presumably they are not fully aware of the carrying capacity of regional transportation infrastructure and its potential (or lack thereof) for expansion.

**DAR programs have to compete for MILCON funds—off-base infrastructure is low priority**

**National Academy of Science 11** [National Academy of Science (Transportation Research Board),  *expertise in transportation budgeting and policy, military budgeting and policy, infrastructure planning, state and local infrastructure management, economics, and military facility planning,* 2011, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases: Special Report 302”, <http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13104>, DMintz]

 Competition for MILCON Funds

The DAR program funds projects relatively infrequently (15 projects over the last 10 years) in part because of the strict criteria used to approve projects and in part because of competition for funds with other MILCON projects. If a project is approved, funding is not guaranteed; projects must compete through the normal DoD MILCON appropriations process. In that context, the DAR project must compete with every other MILCON project being considered by DoD.

Even before entering the competition, a DAR project must be supported by the garrison commander. Bases preparing for a large influx of personnel have myriad needs for MILCON funds for essential items such as barracks, training facilities, and on-base infrastructure. The individual responsible for public works at Joint Base Lewis–McChord explained to the committee that improving off-base access was a low priority for the base commander compared with these more immediate needs (see Chapter 2).

# ---New Advantages---

# \*\*\*Arctic\*\*\*

# Conflict Inev

**Arctic military intervention is inevitable – demand for resources amid receding ice leads to global energy race.**

**Joyner 2009** – managing editor of the Atlantic Council (James, “Arctic Thaw Brings NATO Security Risks” January 29, 2009 http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/arctic-thaw-brings-nato-security-risks)

NATO leaders said yesterday that an Arctic thaw will create new security concerns for the Alliance — and they don't mean "security" in a postmodern sense in which any concern is labeled one of security to help argue for increased funding. David Stringer reports for AP: An Arctic thaw will open up sea routes and competition for lucrative energy reserves in a multinational scramble sure to pose new security threats, NATO's chief said Thursday. NATO commanders and lawmakers meeting in Iceland's capital said a military presence in the region will eventually be needed as standoffs between powerful nations unfold. "I would be the last one to expect military conflict — but there will be a military presence," NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told delegates. "It should be a military presence that is not overdone, and there is a need for political cooperation and economic cooperation." The NATO chief said negotiations involving Russia, NATO and other nations are the key to preventing a future conflict. De Hoop Scheffer is expected to meet Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov next week to discuss such issues. The opening up of Arctic sea routes once only navigable by icebreakers threatens to complicate delicate relations between countries with competing claims to Arctic territory — particularly as once inaccessible areas become ripe for exploration for oil and natural gas. The United States, Russia and Canada are among the countries attempting to claim jurisdiction over Arctic territory alongside Nordic nations. Analysts say China is also likely to join a rush to capture oil and gas trapped under the region's ice. "Several Arctic rim countries are strengthening their capabilities, and military activity in the High North region has been steadily increasing," de Hoop Scheffer said. Strategists expect territorial disputes to become increasingly aggressive as the world's energy demands increase. "Climate change is not a fanciful idea, it is already a reality, a reality that brings with it certain new challenges, including for NATO," said de Hoop Scheffer, acknowledging that an upsurge of energy exploration would likely require a larger NATO presence in the Arctic. Some scientists predict that Arctic waters could be ice-free in summers by 2013, decades earlier than previously thought. De Hoop Scheffer said trans-Arctic routes are likely to become an alternative to passage through the Suez or Panama canals for commercial shipping. "The end of the Cold War resulted in a marked reduction in military activity in the High North — Iceland would like it to stay that way," Iceland's outgoing Prime Minister Geir Haarde told the conference. Haarde tendered his resignation Monday amid the country's economic crisis and said the one-day conference was among his final duties before he steps down on Saturday. Lee Willett, head of the maritime studies program at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based military think tank, said that as routes open up, warships from nations seeking to defend claims to possible energy resources are will follow. "Having lots of warships, from lots of nations who have lots of competing claims on territory — that may lend itself to a rather tense situation," Willett said. "We may see that flash points come to pass there more readily than elsewhere in the world." Russia and Canada have already traded verbal shots over each other's intentions in the Arctic. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper said he'll firm up control of the disputed Northwest Passage, while Russian President Dmitry Medvedev seeks to lay claim to Arctic territory equivalent to the size of France. This is not an issue that has gotten much attention, especially in national security circles, where most of us focus on more traditional military concerns. It's something we'll be keeping a close eye on at the Atlantic Council.

# Mil Key

**Military readiness key to prevent arctic resource conflict – alliances don’t check.**

**Goldenberg 2011** – US environment correspondent (Suzanne, “Prepare for Arctic struggle as climate changes, US navy warned: Climate change could upset the delicate security balance in the Arctic, warns National Academy of Sciences report” Thursday 10 March 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/mar/10/arctic-struggle-climate-change>)

America urgently needs to build up its military readiness in the Arctic where melting summer sea ice is setting up a global struggle for resources, a study prepared for the US navy has warned. The report by the National Academy of Sciences warned that climate change could upset the delicate security balance in the Arctic – even among close allies – and that America is unprepared for the challenges ahead. "The US military as a whole has lost most of its competence in cold-weather operations for Arctic weather," the report, National Security Implications of Climate Change for US Naval Forces, warned. "In the immediate term, the navy should begin Arctic training and the marine corps should also establish a cold weather training programme." The report warned that America was currently unprepared to defend its interests in the Arctic. Current submarine sytems would be challenged to operate in the Arctic, the report warned. In addition, the coastguard has just three ice breakers, and these are old and obsolete. It went on to call on the navy to develop an Arctic observer and research service, with remote sensing equipment such as satellites and drones. "Even the most moderate predicted trends in climate change will present new national security challenges for the US navy, marine corps, and coastguard," said Frank Bowman, a retired US navy admiral and co-chair of the committee that produced the report. "Naval forces need to monitor more closely and start preparing now for projected challenges climate change will present in the future," Bowman said. The report said that it expected large stretches of the Arctic to be ice-free in the summer by 2030, if current rates of ice loss continued. Competition for oil and gas in the region was bound to increase, the report said. Last year, Scottish oil producer Cairn Energy confirmed it had found oil off the coast of Greenland and one of Nato's senior commanders warned the race for resources could lead to conflict. "The geopolitical situation in the Arctic region has become complex and nuanced, despite the area being essentially ignored since the end of the Cold War," the report warns. Between them, the countries sharing the Arctic, which include the US, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, Iceland, Sweden and Finland, have a number of unresolved disputes – over boundaries as well as resources, the report warned. Although the report acknowledged the potential for conflict in the Arctic was low, it warned: "Co-operation in the Arctic should not be considered a given even among close allies." The report, four years in the making, reflects growing concern in US military and strategic circles about the security implications of climate change.

# Russia Scenario

# ---High Probability

**Arctic conflict is likely – trade ties don’t check and Russia’s nationalist interests outweigh their defense.**

**Zellen 2011** (Barry S. “Cold Front on a Warming Arctic” United States Naval Institute. Proceedings 137. 5 (May 2011): 45-49, ProQuest)//ALo

In its sector of the Arctic, Russia focuses on its vast, resource-rich, uniquely shallow continental shelf - which it wants the world to recognize as Russian territorial waters. The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) will likely agree. The 2007 diplomatic stunt placing a Russian flag beneath the North Pole was less a grab for the polar seabed than it was an assertion that there is a Russian side of the Arctic. Moscow would probably welcome the selection of the North Pole as the boundary point, as it was in the Cold War. UNCLOS and the International Seabed Authority may, after all the claims have been filed and adjudicated, find that Canadian territorial waters extend past the pole into what Moscow views as its side - or that Russian waters extend to what many in the West perceive to be our side. It all depends partly on what Canada, Russia, and the United States can prove to be their respective continental-shelf extensions. With its extensive and increasingly accessible Arctic continental shelf chock-full of petroleum in exploitable quantities, Russia has much to gain from a thaw and is rehabilitating its all-but-abandoned Northern Sea Route to bring the treasure to market. The strategic importance of this wealth to the country's economic resurgence also provides ample motivation for Moscow to ensure an adequate defense of its northern domain. It can no longer count on nature for a great wall of ice. This could increase security tensions along the old East-West fault line. In April 2010, Russia and its Cold War rival Norway resolved long-simmering disagreements over their offshore boundary line, easing the way to the joint development of bountiful offshore petroleum resources. But economic collaboration can, and throughout history has, yielded to nationalist rivalries and even war between trading partners. In the end, the old East- West rivalry could resurface. This possibility reinforces the notion that the Arctic as a region, and a potential theater of conflict, fits logically into EUCOM's area of operations and its continuing mission of securing Europe from external threat. Just as Canadians have a powerful emotional attachment to their northern frontier, Russians view the Arctic as an extension of their heartland. It has been and remains their key to their survival, militarily and economically. The intensity of this attachment, and the strategic importance of the heartland, which saved the nation from Napoleon Bonaparte's armies as it did Adolf Hitler's, combine to define a vital national interest for Moscow. More than the other littoral Arctic states, Russia is inclined to make full use of its Arctic assets, even though the post-Soviet economic collapse led to a decade-long abandonment of many mega-projects in the vast and now rusting Russian Arctic, and of the maritime infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route. But in recent years, with higher commodity prices changing the calculus, Moscow has reversed course. There is a growing commitment to Arctic resources along with an awareness that Russia's destiny is tied to the North. Already Arctic naval, land, and air exercises have shown the world that Moscow is serious about its ambitions there. Along Russian borders, where regional military deployments could appear to be more menacing, such activities could lead to a reemergence of historic tensions with neighbors, especially after the 2008 assault on Georgia. There can be little doubt that Russia would aggressively defend its Arctic interests if Moscow felt they were threatened. Still raw is Russia's loss of empire, first with the sale of Alaska to the United States, which many in Russia still feel was nothing short of wholesale theft. The history of that transaction remains clouded by distrust. Moscow transferred sovereignty over Alaska to the United States in 1867, and the commercial interests of the Russian American Company were sold to Hutchinson, Kohl & Co. of San Francisco, which was renamed the Alaska Commercial Company - after decades of sacrifice and investment by explorers who risked much to colonize the high North Pacific. Many Russians were perplexed by the abandonment of Alaska, and some nationalists still include Alaska on their maps, even though this is largely symbolic and not necessarily a reflection of military ambition. With the Soviet collapse, Russia became even smaller and more vulnerable when it lost its Central European, Central Asian, and Baltic empire. The remaining Arctic lands and seas are thus highly valued as a sacred part of Mother Russia, a key to its future, and one of its last sources of pride and hope. Having agreed to purchase new French warships and with more heavy icebreakers than all its neighbors combined, Russia may well emerge a predominant regional power in the high North. While Russia was at the table at the Arctic Ocean Conference held in Ilulissat, Greenland, on 27-29 May 2008 and pledged to support international law and the UNCLOS mechanism, one wonders what Moscow would do if the world community sided with Canada or Denmark in terms of continental-shelf extensions, at Russia's expense. The resolution of the border dispute with Norway is a welcome sign of a more collaborative Russia, but political winds can change. On the other hand, much like what Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev proposed in his prescient Murmansk speech on 1 October 1987, the Arctic could become a testing ground for a new relationship between Russia and the West, and perhaps even a path toward eventual NATO membership. But if competition trumps cooperation in the end, the Arctic may become one of the first regions where a newly assertive Russia confronts the West. This is one more reason for which EUCOM will be drawn into the increasingly salient and challenging mission of securing the Arctic.

# ---Russia Nuke War Internal

**Escalates to nuclear conflict with Russia.
Wallace & Staples 2010 \***Professor Emeritus of the University of British Columbia \*\*President of the Rideau Institute (Michael and Steven, “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: a task long overdue,” Canadian Pugwash Group, Rideau Institute, March 2010, <http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf>)

The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.”55 Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years.56 In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic.57 The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with shipbased helicopters able to drop troops anywhere.58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs.59 The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved.60 Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the United States and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world – converge on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons.”61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low – for now, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, “[the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.” 62

# ---Russia Nuke War Impact

**US-Russian nuclear war causes extinction – outweighs on timeframe and magnitude.**

**Helfand and Pastore 2009** (Ira Helfand, M.D., and John O. Pastore, M.D., are past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility, March 31, 2009, “U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat”, http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT\_pastoreline\_03-31-09\_EODSCAO\_v15.bbdf23.html)

President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species**,** including perhaps ourown, would become extinct. It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war.The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today.

# \*\*\*International Disaster Reponse\*\*\*

# Disaster Inev – Capabilities Key

**There is going to be an increase is disaster response operations because of climate change—capabilities are a prerequisite to the US’s ability to respond**

**Gulledge and Keating 10** [Jay Gulledge,  *Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, served on the faculties of Tulane University and the University of Louisville,* Timothy J. Keating, *retired United States Navy admiral of PACOM,* 2010 “Future Naval Operations in Asia and the Pacific” in “Climate and Energy Proceedings 2010”, Johns Hopkins University, page 376-379, <http://www.jhuapl.edu/ClimateAndEnergy/Book/Chapter/Chapter7.pdf>, DMintz]

\*\*\*All text is from Timoth y J. Keating

Let’s begin by talking about mission capabilities and capacities in the context of what I have just said. The mission of our naval forces is going to change in two ways. I will go from the relatively low end of the mission spectrum, if you will, to something a little bit higher. On the low end, because of the effects of climate change, many of which were covered very well by Commander Cole and in Roundtable 1, **we are going to see more humanitarian assistance and disaster relief scenarios**. In addition to increasing in frequency, we can expect that an increase in scale will be needed to accommodate the greater intensity of the underlying weather events. This will mean that the United States and U.S. naval forces are going to be forced into a higher operations tempo trying to deal with these humanitarian assistance and disaster relief scenarios, or else we as a nation will choose not participate to because we are capability limited or capacity limited. I think that, given our history, our tendency is going to be to continue to try to meet the need. Admiral Keating talked about some of the wonderful responses—those that were actually executed and those that were offered but turned down for whatever reason. He talked about the aftermath of Katrina. He talked about the aftermath of the terrible tsunami and various other weather events on the mainland of Asia. Such events give us a sense of the large scale with which we can be confronted. Right now we have foremost in our mind the terrible aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti. Although this catastrophe was not caused by climate change, it gives us a sense of the scale for future humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. We have heard Bangladesh mentioned several times. So imagine, if you will, that this country, which over centuries has been battered by typhoon after typhoon in the Bay of Bengal, is confronting more frequent and more intense typhoons. Let’s put aside the issue of sea-level rise for the present and focus on the temperature of the ocean. Rear Admiral Titley, the Oceanographer of the Navy and the Head of Task Force Climate Change, can tell us that the intensity of typhoons and hurricanes is directly related to the amount of energy in the water. Assuming that there is no sea-level rise but assuming a much greater intensity of cyclonic activity, tidal surge, and wind damage, we are looking at a scenario in which literally millions of people who subsist on coastal irrigation-fed farms and rice paddies, or who subsist on fisheries that require that they have fishing boats and nets and structures available to catch fish, are wiped out not for weeks or months, as has been the case in the past several hundred years in Bangladesh, but literally for years. So then you have literally millions of environmental refugees who need the basics of life. Where are they going to go? Having them tramp off toward India will ratchet up tension in the region and put a tremendous burden on India as well as the people displaced from Bangladesh. It is interesting, too, that although I used Bangladesh for my example, I could have just as well chosen the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Taiwan, mainland China, or all of the islands of Micronesia. So let’s talk about some things that really get nations fighting mad. Such as, where is my oil going to come from? We have a very energy-intense global economy. We learned from Admiral Keating that a large percentage of the oil used by Asian nations passes through the Malacca Strait. Well, let’s fast-forward 10, 20, 30 years, and imagine what the supply-and-demand curves for this essential lifeblood of the global economy are. I will tell you this: It will not be more supply and less demand. No, it will be just the opposite. The supply-and-demand curves for petroleum are diverging. How does the market respond when demand exceeds supply? Prices go up. Eventually, you are going to get to a point at which the issue is not one of price but rather one of availability. Can we get the oil we need? And then you start getting into some really nasty nation-on-nation or region-on-region scenarios in which we are literally, as the effects of climate change go on in the background, focused not on competition, but on conflict over energy resources. And then you really get back into the kinetic mode of strategic planning in which we feel so comfortable. So what are the capacities that we have now that are relevant to the kinds of scenarios that I just mentioned, or the kind of mission changes that we should anticipate? As Admiral Keating made clear, our response, our presence, and our being there are extremely important. Thanks to our tremendous lift capability—both air and sea—and our tremendous medical capability, our ability to support such operations is first rate. But those capabilities are not perfectly suited for the kinds of scenarios in the numbers (in terms of people) that may be affected by future climate change-induced catastrophes. So we need to think carefully about what kind of lift we have, what kind of supplies we have, and what kind of afloat prepositioning capabilities we have to deal with more intense, more frequent, and more widespread humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. We also need to think about what the likely scenarios are if in fact my prediction of intense competition over oil comes true. What is that going to do? What do we need to be doing in terms of working with allied nations? What kinds of kinetic capabilities do we need to develop?

# Now Key

**Plan is key now—climate change will destroy current capabilities**

**Youngblut 09** [Christine Youngblut,  *Adjunct Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a Federally-Funded R&D Center (FFRDC) that supports the Secretary of Defense. In her nearly thirty-year career, she has worked on defense-related issues ranging from military uses of virtual environments to cognitive readiness for irregular warfare. Most recently, Dr. Youngblut served as a member of the Defense Science Board study team examining the Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security. She holds a doctorate in Information Technology from George Mason University,* July 2009, “Climate Change Effects: Issues for International and US National Security”, Institute for Defense Analysis, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA527880>, DMintz]

The anticipated increase in international humanitarian emergencies could significantly tax U.S. military transportation and support force structures, resulting in a strained readiness posture and decreased strategic depth for combat operations (Army War College 2008; Fingar 2008). At the same time, increased stress on U.S. borders and domestic missions will lower the availability of Guard and Reserve forces that are already stretched by current military operations (CNA 2007). There is also the concern that U.S. forces may have to operate where the environment is the greatest challenge—or even the weapon of the enemy’s choice (AEPI 2007; Sigler 2008; Woolsey 2007). Higher intensity storms and increased frequency in temperature and precipitation extremes will stress personnel and equipment. Severe northern Atlantic storms, for example, increase transit times, contribute to equipment fatigue, and hamper flight operations (CNA 2007). In other regions, increases in dust storms, atmospheric interference, and heavy precipitation events may compromise both human and system performance. These types of concerns must be included in contingency plans, as well as in future system acquisitions (AEPI 2007). Some U.S. national security interests are in countries that are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts. These interests range from military bases and embassies to sites of major transportation corridors and military ports. A number of active coastal military installations in the continental U.S. are at a significant and increasing risk of damage from worsened storm surges in the near-term (Busby 2007; CNA 2007; Fingar 2008; USJFCOM 2007). As key installations are degraded, so is the readiness of U.S. forces. A global basing posture review is needed to identify the risks and guide the development of contingency plans that ensure continued operational capability (CNA 2007). The Pentagon recently initiated an effort to Assess the Impact of Sea Level Rise on Military Infrastructure. This study will develop the analysis methods needed to assess the impacts of local mean sea level rise ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 meters on DoD installations worldwide.39 The impacts to be considered include loss or damage to mission essential infrastructure as well as loss to transportation means, facilities, and/or corridors.40

# Diplomacy Scenario

# ---DoD Key

**Only the DoD can have rapid humanitarian assistance—sealift support is key**

**DoD 11** [Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, February 2011, “Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Estimates Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance, and Civic Aid”, <http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PARTS/O_M_VOL_1_BASE_PARTS/0819_OHDACA_OP-5_FY_2012.pdf>, DMintz]

 The DoD plays a key role by providing effective response when asked by the DOS and USAID. The U.S. military offers exceptional operational reach and can immediately deploy personnel as a stopgap measure to limit the extent of emergencies. The DoD’s ability to respond rapidly assists in the containment of crises and limit threats to regional stability by donating and/or transporting relief aid within hours or a few days of a disaster. The DoD is unmatched regarding command and control, logistics, transportation, and communications, and the amount of cargo transported by available air or sealift support. These capabilities would be extremely expensive to develop and maintain in any other government agency.

**DoD will have to respond and the ability to isn’t ensured now**

**Youngblut 09** [Christine Youngblut,  *Adjunct Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a Federally-Funded R&D Center (FFRDC) that supports the Secretary of Defense. In her nearly thirty-year career, she has worked on defense-related issues ranging from military uses of virtual environments to cognitive readiness for irregular warfare. Most recently, Dr. Youngblut served as a member of the Defense Science Board study team examining the Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security. She holds a doctorate in Information Technology from George Mason University,* July 2009, “Climate Change Effects: Issues for International and US National Security”, Institute for Defense Analysis, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA527880>, DMintz]

As your paper highlights, water is likely to be the cause of many future disasters, either because there is too much (flooding) or too little (draught). In either case, when civilian authorities call upon DoD resources to assist in these contingencies (the Federal Emergency Management Agency for domestic and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance for foreign), the force must be prepared to deliver the needed response. We have examined DoD’s response to exercises53 and actual contingencies54 and found them needing improvement. Recent discussions with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations confirm that these concerns still exist.

# ---DoD Does Humanitarian Assistance

**Humanitarian assistance is a DoD role**

**Serafino 08** [Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, December 9, 2008, “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress”, FAS, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34639.pdf>, DMintz]

DOD Roles and Responsibility Disaster relief and humanitarian assistance have long been considered traditional, albeit secondary, DOD roles. DOD is one of the three principal U.S. government departments that provides disaster and other humanitarian assistance overseas.102 DOD humanitarian relief in disasters and other emergency and recovery situations is often carried out in coordination with or under the direction of U.S. government civilian agencies. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) takes the lead in disaster assistance; the State Department takes the lead in assisting refugees. DOD humanitarian assistance also takes place in the context of military operations, some of which are conducted solely for humanitarian purposes and others in which humanitarian activities are carried out as a strategic supplement to combat operations or military training exercises. In many situations, DOD also cooperates and coordinates with international organizations, such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and a wide variety of non-governmental organizations.

**DoD does humanitarian aid**

**Serafino 08** [Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, December 9, 2008, “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress”, FAS, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34639.pdf>, DMintz]

Responding to humanitarian and basic needs. Since at least the 19th century, U.S. military forces have provided urgent assistance to foreign populations in time of disasters, such as earthquakes and floods. More recently, U.S. military forces have also provided aid in humanitarian crises such as famines and forced population movements. DOD aids foreign populations under authorities to conduct humanitarian assistance in a variety of other circumstances, including as an adjunct to military training and exercises with and as part of military operations.

# ---Humanitarianism K2 Diplomacy

**Quick humanitarian aid is critical to diplomacy**

**Serafino 08** [Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, December 9, 2008, “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress”, FAS, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34639.pdf>, DMintz]

DOD is involved in a broad range of foreign assistance activities. U.S. military personnel deploy as first responders to foreign disasters and provide humanitarian relief and basic needs assistance in other urgent situations. U.S. military personnel also provide medical and veterinary assistance and civic support (such as the construction or repair of small educational and medical facilities) as a routine part of their training and as part of military operations. U.S. troops routinely train foreign military forces and are authorized to train police forces for counternarcotics missions. Recently, in the context of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and elsewhere, they have provided humanitarian assistance and taken on state-building tasks related to political and economic development. For the past several years, DOD has worked to enhance its own capabilities to carry out state-building and to draw on civilian advice. It has also urged Congress to enhance the capabilities of civilian agencies to form partnerships with DOD in those activities.

DOD stresses a national security imperative for its activities in the foreign assistance area. Critics, however, most often judge DOD involvement in foreign assistance activities in terms of its effect on foreign relations and foreign policy goals. The following sections recapitulate the perceived benefits and liabilities of that involvement. Summary of Benefits The United States and the U.S. military benefit from DOD foreign assistance activities in several ways. U.S. diplomacy benefits from the U.S. military’s capacity to project itself rapidly into extreme situations, such as disasters and other humanitarian emergencies, promoting the image of the United States as an humanitarian actor.61 Especially in conflict situations, military forces can provide needed security, intelligence and aerial reconnaissance, command and control and communications capabilities, and maritime support.62 Humanitarian assistance also provides a means to cultivate good relations with foreign populations, militaries, and governments. For U.S. diplomacy, military training and other security assistance can be a potent tool to cultivate or cement relations with foreign governments.

**Humanitarian aid has been empirically beneficial for diplomacy—inability to further provide it is detrimental**

**Katzenstein and Legro 09** [Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cornell University, APSA President (2008-09)*, and Jeffrey W. Legro, *University of Virginia, Chair,* September 2009, “US Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future”, American Political Science Association, DMintz]

U.S. efforts in recent years that have provided public goods in humanitarian aid and global health have seen positive returns for the United States. For example, humanitarian aid in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami significantly improved favorable attitudes Task Force on U.S. Standing in World Affairs 15 towards the United States in Indonesia.34 And U.S. spending on AIDS and two other diseases, tuberculosis and malaria, primarily in Africa helps to explain that region’s distinctive positive attitude towards the United States. If the United States becomes unwilling or unable to provide these goods in the future, it is a safe bet that its standing and influence will both decline.

**Further investment in humanitarian aid is key to overall diplomacy**

**Katzenstein and Legro 09** [Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cornell University, APSA President (2008-09)*, and Jeffrey W. Legro, *University of Virginia, Chair,* September 2009, “US Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future”, American Political Science Association, DMintz]

To be sure, more resources must go to a broader definition of public diplomacy. As seen above, public goods are a particularly important category. There has, however, been an imbalance in the types of public goods the U.S. provides. The United States will spend more than 600 billion dollars for defense in 2010-11, ten times the amount for diplomacy and foreign assistance—and this even after the Obama administration had sharply reversed the budgetary priorities of the U.S. government. There is no doubt that the U.S. military is one of the key providers of the United States’ most important international role—i.e., the guarantor of general stability and freedom of the seas, commerce, and travel. That role enhances U.S. credibility and perhaps esteem as well. Greater funding for other types of diplomacy, however—e.g., humanitarian aid, social services in fractured nations—would, if effective (a major caveat), enhance credibility and esteem as well, and perhaps at better value. Moreover, many argue, greater investments in these areas might reduce the likelihood of instability and conflict that require U.S. military intervention.

**Humanitarian assistance relief key to prevent escalation of conflict and has favorable responses**

**Serafino 08** [Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, December 9, 2008, “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress”, FAS, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34639.pdf>, DMintz]

Perspectives On Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance

U.S. officials state that DOD has instructed military commanders to look more broadly than in the past at humanitarian assistance, employing it as a component of U.S. security cooperation with foreign nations.23 Guidance to U.S. combatant commanders has stated that DOD regards humanitarian assistance as “foremost a tool for achieving U.S. security objectives,” which can also serve several “complementary security goals.”24 The “complementary” goals cited are “improving DOD visibility, access, influence, interoperability, and coalition-building with military and civilian host nation counterparts; building/reinforcing security and stability in a host nation or region; generating positive public relations and goodwill for DOD that will enhance our ability to shape the regional security environment; bolstering host nation capacity to respond to disasters ... and promoting specific operational readiness skills of US military personnel.”25 The 2006 QDR places humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations under the rubric of “humanitarian and early preventive measures” and claims that the use of such measures can “prevent disorder from spiraling into wider conflict or crisis.”26

State Department officials welcome the U.S. military’s ability to deliver disaster and humanitarian relief assistance in a timely fashion. They also tend to favor routine humanitarian assistance and civic action projects, albeit as a matter of necessity, because such projects allow the U.S. government to provide supplies and medical services to needy populations, and to construct schools and clinics in underserved areas, where funds are not otherwise available. These projects can create goodwill and personal contact for the United States, often in areas where U.S. diplomats would otherwise not venture.

DOD and U.S. military personnel attitudes toward disaster response and humanitarian relief vary. Attitudes tend to be favorable for immediate disaster response and for training exercises, particularly for National Guard and Reserve troops. Attitudes become ambivalent when U.S. military personnel are used for prolonged periods for humanitarian assistance in conventional operations.

# ---PACOM Does Humanitarian Aid

**Humanitarian assistance is key to trust and confidence—capabilities are necessary to be present**

**Gulledge and Keating 10** [Jay Gulledge,  *Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, served on the faculties of Tulane University and the University of Louisville,* Timothy J. Keating, *retired United States Navy admiral of PACOM,* 2010 “Future Naval Operations in Asia and the Pacific” in “Climate and Energy Proceedings 2010”, Johns Hopkins University, page 344-345, <http://www.jhuapl.edu/ClimateAndEnergy/Book/Chapter/Chapter7.pdf>, DMintz]

\*\*\*All text is from Timoth y J. Keating

The instrument of foreign policy that works best in that part of the world is the U.S. Navy. The junior officers at the command coined a phrase, “virtual presence equals actual absence.” That is the one point I would emphasize to you when you talk about climate and energy. There is no substitute, in both my personal and my professional opinion, for American forces being present. And as the Navy works through the challenges, and the Air Force works through the challenges, and, to a lesser extent, our Army and Marine Corps, because those forces that are generally in garrison are of less utility to the commander of USPACOM, unless we have the lift capability to move those forces out of garrison and be present for exercises and training in the countries of the AOR.

If we do not have a Navy of sufficient numbers and an Air Force of sufficient numbers and lift capability, we are not present. We are absent. You can do all of the video teleconferencing you want. You can have as many meetings as you want. But you have to be out there and train with, and develop the trust and confidence of, and build relationships with, the younger men and women in the armed forces of the AOR so that they can grow up knowing that we are not going to leave them high and dry. **A great way of manifesting that faith, trust, and confidence that they should have in us is through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations** like those after Katrina. I cannot recount for you the number of times that a hurricane, a typhoon, a cyclone, or an earthquake has hit, or a cold snap has affected hundreds of thousands of people in the USPACOM AOR, and because we are there, because we are present, or we have sufficient reach and lift, we can provide assistance immediately. Such operations have dramatic impact.

**PACOM does humanitarian aid—just a question of whether they have the capacity to do it—plan is key**

**Gulledge and Keating 10** [Jay Gulledge,  *Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, served on the faculties of Tulane University and the University of Louisville,* Timothy J. Keating, *retired United States Navy admiral of PACOM,* 2010 “Future Naval Operations in Asia and the Pacific” in “Climate and Energy Proceedings 2010”, Johns Hopkins University, page 354, <http://www.jhuapl.edu/ClimateAndEnergy/Book/Chapter/Chapter7.pdf>, DMintz]

\*\*\*All text is from Timoth y J. Keating

 Let me just say that I think Admiral Keating covered a lot of that already. He certainly emphasized the importance of capacity, made the point that we have the capability to do lots of things, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the kinds of operations that can be precipitated by adverse weather or by the environmental effects arising from climate change. The issue for the future is not so much that we do not have the capabilities, because the U.S. military routinely demonstrates that we have the capabilities to respond to all sorts of natural disasters; the key question in the future will be, if weather changes the periodicity of these sorts of events, will we have the capacity to respond? Admiral Keating also mentioned the reaction of countries around the region to the effects of climate change, and he used the example of the chief of defense of Tonga, who was worried about inundation as sea level rises. As we have heard, the AORs for U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) cover a large expanse of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and those two bodies of water include many, many island nations. There are also immense archipelagic states in Indonesia and the Philippines that have thousands of islands, many of which are low lying. The prospect of sea-level rise is a serious issue for these countries. Based on my own participation in some of the events that Admiral Keating mentioned, I would like to reemphasize that this is not simply an abstract problem for many of these countries. This is a no-kidding, serious thing that they talk about a lot.

# ---Response K2 Diplomacy

**Rapid response to disasters and humanitarian emergencies are key to diplomacy**

**Serafino 08** [Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, December 9, 2008, “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress”, FAS, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34639.pdf>, DMintz]

The Department of Defense (DOD) has long played a role in U.S. efforts to assist foreign populations, militaries, and governments. The use of DOD to provide foreign assistance stems in general from the perception that DOD can contribute unique or vital capabilities and resources because it possesses the manpower, materiel, and organizational assets to respond to international needs. Over the years, Congress has helped shape the DOD role by providing DOD with its mandate for such activities through a wide variety of authorities. The historical DOD role in foreign assistance can be regarded as serving three purposes: responding to humanitarian and basic needs, building foreign military capacity and capabilities, and strengthening foreign governments’ ability to deal with internal and international threats through state-building measures. The United States and the U.S. military benefit from DOD foreign assistance activities in several ways. **U.S. diplomacy benefits from the U.S. military’s capacity to project itself rapidly into extreme situations, such as disasters and other humanitarian emergencies, enhancing the U.S. image as a humanitarian actor**. Humanitarian assistance, military training, and other forms of assistance also provide opportunities to cultivate good relations with foreign populations, militaries, and governments. U.S. military personnel have long viewed such activities as opportunities to interact with foreign militaries as part of their professional development. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, DOD training of military forces and provision of security assistance have been an important means to enable foreign militaries to conduct peacekeeping operations and to support coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD’s perception of the appropriate non-combat role for the U.S. military has evolved over time. Within the past few years, the perceptions of DOD officials, military officers, and defense analysts have coalesced around a post-9/11 strategy that calls for the use of the U.S. military in preventive, deterrent, and preemptive activities. This strategy involves DOD in the creation of extensive international and interagency “partnerships,” as well as an expanded DOD role in foreign assistance activities. Critics point to a number of problems with an expanded DOD role in many activities. Indeed, a key DOD document acknowledges that state-building tasks may be “best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals.” Nevertheless, although reluctant to divert personnel from combat functions, DOD officials believe that the U.S. military must develop its own capacity to carry out such activities in the absence of appropriate civilian forces.

# ---Naval Power Solve

**Naval capabilities key to humanitarian assistance and diplomacy activities**

**Greenert 12** [Jonathan Greenert, *Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations,* March 2012, “Statement Of Admiral Jonathan Greenert Chief Of Naval Operations Before The Congress On FY 2013 Department Of Navy Posture”, <http://www.navy.mil/cno/120316_PS.pdf>, DMintz]

 Provide a Stabilizing Presence; Conduct Counterinsurgency, HA/DR and Other Operations

Although our warfighting capability will be focused on the Middle East and Asia-Pacific, other regions will retain naval presence. The nature of that presence, however, will change over the next several years. While today DDGs and amphibious ships conduct security cooperation operations with partners in Latin America and Africa, our FY2013 budget submission funds procurement of JHSV, AFSB, MLP and LCS and sustainment of PCs and T-AHs to take on these missions in the future. To support an expanding range of partnership missions, they will 22 increasingly carry tailored force packages of Marines to conduct security cooperation activities with partner armies and marines.

These same ships will support humanitarian assistance operations and rapid response by U.S. forces to crisis or disaster. They can embark a wide range of interagency and non-governmental personnel, allowing them to support the whole range of development, defense and diplomacy activities and contribute to non-military efforts to counter insurgencies and conduct stabilization operations. As naval forces, they can be backed up by the robust multi-mission capability and transportation capacity of amphibious ships and embarked Marines.

# ---Diplomacy Generic Impact

**Diplomacy prevents extinction**

Jervis 9 [Robert Jervis, *Professor of International Politics at Columbia*, 2009, “Unipolairty: A Structural Perspective”, Muse]

To say that the system is **unipolar** is not to argue that the unipole can get everything it wants or that it has no need for others. American power is very great, but it is still subject to two familiar limitations: it is harder to build than to destroy, and success usually **depends on others’** decisions. This is particularly true of the current system because of what the U.S. wants. If Hitler had won World War II, he might have been able to maintain his system for some period of time with little cooperation from others because “all” he wanted was to establish the supremacy of the Aryan race. The U.S. wants not only to prevent the rise of a peer competitor but also to stamp out terrorism, maintain an open international economic system, spread democracy throughout the world, and establish a high degree of cooperation among countries that remain juridically equal. Even in the military arena, the U.S. cannot act completely alone. **Bases and overflight** rights are always needed, and support from allies, especially Great Britain, is important to validate military action in the eyes of the American public. When one matches American forces, not against those of an adversary but against the tasks at hand, they often fall short.[54](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.jervis.html#f54) Against terrorism, force is ineffective without excellent intelligence. Given the international nature of the threat and the difficulties of gaining information about it, **international cooperation is the only route to success**. The maintenance of international prosperity also requires joint efforts, even leaving aside the danger that other countries could trigger a run on the dollar by cashing in their holdings. Despite its lack of political unity, Europe is in many respects an economic unit, and one with a greater gdp than that of the U.S. Especially because of the growing Chinese economy, economic power is spread around the world much more equally than is military power, and the open economic system [End Page 210] could easily disintegrate **despite continued unipolarity**. In parallel, on a whole host of problems such as aids, poverty, and international crime (even leaving aside climate change), the unipole can lead and exert pressure but cannot dictate. **Joint actions may be necessary** to apply sanctions to various unpleasant and recalcitrant regimes; proliferation can be stopped only if all the major states (and many minor ones) work to this end; unipolarity did not automatically enable the U.S. to maintain the coalition against Iraq after the first Gulf War; close ties within the West are needed to reduce the ability of China, Russia, and other states to play one Western country off against the others. But in comparison with the cold war era, there are fewer incentives today for allies to cooperate with the U.S. During the earlier period unity and close coordination not only permitted military efficiencies but, more importantly, gave credibility to the American nuclear umbrella that protected the allies. Serious splits were dangerous because they entailed the risk that the Soviet Union would be emboldened. This reason for avoiding squabbles disappeared along with the USSR, and the point is likely to generalize to other unipolar systems if they involve a decrease of threats that call for maintaining good relations with the superpower. This does not mean that even in this particular unipolar system the superpower is like Gulliver tied down by the Lilliputians. In some areas opposition can be self-defeating. Thus for any country to undermine American leadership of the international economy would be to put its own economy at risk, even if the U.S. did not retaliate, and for a country to sell a large proportion of its dollar holding would be to depress the value of the dollar, thereby diminishing the worth of the country’s remaining stock of this currency. Furthermore, cooperation often follows strong and essentially unilateral action. Without the war in Iraq it is not likely that we would have seen the degree of cooperation that the U.S. obtained from Europe in combating the Iranian nuclear program and from Japan and the PRC in containing North Korea. Nevertheless, many of the American goals depend on **persuading others, not coercing them**. Although incentives and even force are not irrelevant to spreading democracy and the free market, at bottom this requires people to embrace a set of institutions and values. Building the world that the U.S. seeks is a political, social, and even psychological task for which unilateral measures are likely to be unsuited and for which American military and economic strength can at best play a supporting role.

**Soft power is the only way to combat world problems—cooperation**

**Nye 08** [Joseph S. Nye Jr., *former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, currently the University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, Bachelors from Princeton, PhD. From Harvard, Rhode Scholar,* March 7, 2008, “Security and Smart Power”, American Behavioral Scientist, [http://abs.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/51/9/1351.full.pdf+html](http://abs.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/51/9/1351.full.pdf%2Bhtml), DMintz]

Etzioni is correct that a successful policy of security first will require the combination of hard and soft power. Combining the two instruments so that they reinforce rather than undercut each other is crucial to success. Power is the ability to get the outcomes one wants. In the past, it was assumed that military power dominated most issues, but in today’s world, the contexts of power differ greatly on military, economic, and transnational issues. These latter problems, including everything from climate change to pandemics to transnational terrorism, pose some of the greatest challenges we face today, and yet few are susceptible to purely military solutions. The only way to grapple with these problems is through cooperation with others, and that requires smart power—a strategy that combines the soft power of attraction with the hard power of coercion. For example, American and British intelligence agencies report that our use of hard power in Iraq without sufficient attention to soft power has increased rather than reduced the number of Islamist terrorists throughout the past 5 years. The soft power of attraction will not win over the hard core terrorists but it is essential in winning the hearts and minds of mainstream Muslims, without whose support success will be impossible in the long term. Yet all the polling evidence suggests that American soft power has declined dramatically in the Muslim world. There is no simple military solution that will produce the outcomes we want. Etzioni is clear on this and highly critical of the failure to develop a smart power strategy in Iraq. One wishes, however, that he had spent a few more pages developing one for Iran.

# ---Prolif Impact

**Soft power key to solve for proliferation**

**Cirincione 05** [Joseph Cirincione,  *teaches at the Georgetown University Graduate School of Foreign Service and is one of America’s best known weapons experts, was the Director for Non-Proliferation Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,* *worked for nine years in the U.S. House of Representatives on the professional staff of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Government Operations, B.A., Boston College; M.S., Georgetown School of Foreign Service,* June 10-11, 2005, “A New Non-Proliferation Strategy”, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/Rome\_Conference\_Paper.pdf, DMintz]

A combination of approaches may offer the best chance of success. There is the need for a new strategy that combines the best elements of the US–centric, force-based approach with the traditional multilateral, treaty-based approach. For example, the European Union has crafted a joint nonproliferation strategy that includes tying all E.U. trade agreements to the observance of nonproliferation treaties and norms. This “soft power” approach could meld with the “hard power” of the United States to replicate the success of the United States and United Kingdom with Libya. The Libyan model could emerge from and prevail over the Iraq model: Change a regime’s behavior rather than change the regime. The theory and practical applications of a new approach have been detailed in a 2005 Carnegie Endowment report, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security.3 This report analyzes how to end the threat of nuclear terrorism by implementing comprehensive efforts to secure and eliminate nuclear materials worldwide and to stop the illegal transfer of nuclear technology. The strategy would prevent new nuclear weapon states by increasing penalties for withdrawal from the NPT, enforcing compliance with strengthened treaties, and radically reforming the nuclear fuel cycle to prevent states from acquiring dual-use technologies for uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. The threat from existing arsenals would be reduced by shrinking global stockpiles, curtailing research on new nuclear weapons, and taking the weapons off hairtriggeralert status. Finally, greater efforts would be devoted to resolving the regional conflicts that fuel proliferation imperatives and to bringing the three nuclear weapon states outside the NPT into conformance with a expanded set of global nonproliferation norms. The Carnegie approach recognizes the contributions of the Bush administration initiatives that, for example, correctly draw international attention to the need for serious enforcement. For many years, too much attention had been paid to obtaining signatures on treaties and not enough to achieving compliance with them. The absence of a collective political will to stop bad actors–by force if necessary–undermined deterrence. The United States itself had routinely made proliferation concerns secondary to other strategic and economic issues in relations with key states such as Pakistan, Israel and Iraq. However, if stopping the spread of nuclear weapons requires more international resolve than previous administrations could muster, it also demands more genuine international teamwork than the Bush administration recognizes. Nuclear weapons and fissile materials are problems wherever they are, not just in a handful of “evil” states. The threat cannot be eliminated by removing whichever foreign governments the United States finds most threatening at any given time. History has repeatedly shown that today’s ally can become tomorrow’s problem state. Moreover, terrorists will seek nuclear weapons and materials wherever they can be found, irrespective of a state’s geopolitical orientation. The United States cannot defeat the nuclear threat alone, or even with small coalitions of the willing. It needs sustained cooperation from dozens of diverse nations— including the leading states that have forsworn nuclear weapons, such as Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan, South Africa, and Sweden—in order to broaden, toughen, and stringently enforce nonproliferation rules. To obtain that cooperation, the nuclear weapon states must show that tougher nonproliferation rules not only benefit the powerful, but constrain them as well. Success will depend on the United States’ ability to marshal legitimate authority that motivates others to follow. As Francis Fukuyama notes, “Other people will follow the American lead if they believe it is legitimate; if they do not, they will resist, complain, obstruct, or actively oppose what we do.”4

**Even if proliferation is normally good, lack of strong multilateral alliances makes conflict uniquely likely.**

**Ross 99** [Douglas Ross, *Professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University,* Winter 1998/1999, International Journal, Vol. 54, No. 1, “Canada’s Functional Isolationism and the Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Lexis]

Thus, an easily accessible tax base has long been available for spending much more on international security than recent governments have been willing to contemplate. Negotiating the landmines ban, discouraging trade in small arms, promoting the United Nations arms register are all worthwhile, popular activities that polish the national self-image. But they should all be supplements to, not substitutes for, a proportionately equitable commitment of resources to the management and prevention of international conflict – and thus the containment of the WMD threat. Future American governments will not ‘police the world’ alone. For almost fifty years the Soviet threat compelled disproportionate military expenditures and sacrifice by the United States. That world is gone. Only by enmeshing the capabilities of the United States and other leading powers in a co-operative security management regime where the burdens are widely shared does the world community have any plausible hope of avoiding **warfare involving nuclear or other WMD**.

# ---Terrorism

**Soft power is key to cooperation on terrorism and obtaining what the US wants**

**Nye 04** [Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, currently the University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, Bachelors from Princeton, PhD. From Harvard, Rhode Scholar,* 2004, “The Decline of America's Soft Power”, Foreign Affairs, DMintz]

 Anti-Americanism has increased in recent years, and the United States' soft power -- its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them -- is in decline as a result. According to Gallup International polls, pluralities in 29 countries say that Washington's policies have had a negative effect on their view of the United States. A Eurobarometer poll found that a majority of Europeans believes that Washington has hindered efforts to fight global poverty, protect the environment, and maintain peace. Such attitudes undercut soft power, reducing the ability of the United States to achieve its goals without resorting to coercion or payment.

Skeptics of soft power (Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld professes not even to understand the term) claim that popularity is ephemeral and should not guide foreign policy. The United States, they assert, is strong enough to do as it wishes with or without the world's approval and should simply accept that others will envy and resent it. The world's only superpower does not need permanent allies; the issues should determine the coalitions, not vice-versa, according to Rumsfeld.

But the recent decline in U.S. attractiveness should not be so lightly dismissed. It is true that the United States has recovered from unpopular policies in the past (such as those regarding the Vietnam War), but that was often during the Cold War, when other countries still feared the Soviet Union as the greater evil. It is also true that the United States' sheer size and association with disruptive modernity make some resentment unavoidable today. But wise policies can reduce the antagonisms that these realities engender. Indeed, that is what Washington achieved after World War II: it used soft-power resources to draw others into a system of alliances and institutions that has lasted for 60 years. The Cold War was won with a strategy of containment that used soft power along with hard power.

The United States cannot confront the new threat of terrorism without the cooperation of other countries. Of course, other governments will often cooperate out of self-interest. But the extent of their cooperation often depends on the attractiveness of the United States. Soft power, therefore, is not just a matter of ephemeral popularity; it is a **means of obtaining outcomes the United States wants**. When Washington discounts the importance of its attractiveness abroad, it pays a steep price. When the United States becomes so unpopular that being pro-American is a kiss of death in other countries' domestic politics, foreign political leaders are unlikely to make helpful concessions (witness the defiance of Chile, Mexico, and Turkey in March 2003). And when U.S. policies lose their legitimacy in the eyes of others, distrust grows, reducing U.S. leverage in international affairs. Some hard-line skeptics might counter that, whatever its merits, soft power has little importance in the current war against terrorism; after all, Osama bin Laden and his followers are repelled, not attracted, by American culture and values. But this claim ignores the real metric of success in the current war, articulated in Rumsfeld's now-famous memo that was leaked in February 2003: "Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?" The current struggle against Islamist terrorism is not a clash of civilizations; it is a contest closely tied to the civil war raging within Islamic civilization between moderates and extremists. The United States and its allies will win only if they adopt policies that appeal to those moderates and use public diplomacy effectively to communicate that appeal. Yet the world's only superpower, and the leader in the information revolution, spends as little on public diplomacy as does France or the United Kingdom -- and is all too often outgunned in the propaganda war by fundamentalists hiding in caves.

**Soft power is the only way to combat terrorism**

**Nye 08** [Joseph S. Nye Jr., *former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, currently the University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, Bachelors from Princeton, PhD. From Harvard, Rhode Scholar,* March 7, 2008, “Security and Smart Power”, American Behavioral Scientist, [http://abs.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/51/9/1351.full.pdf+html](http://abs.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/51/9/1351.full.pdf%2Bhtml), DMintz]

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# ---Warming

**Diplomacy is critical to a global agreement on warming—that’s the only way to solve**

**Hague 10** [William Hague, *Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Member of Parliament for Richmond, United Kingdom*, September 27, 2010, “The Diplomacy of Climate Change”]

But I particularly wanted to make the point to this audience and to circulate to a wider audience certain points about climate change this morning, which is perhaps the 21st century's biggest foreign- policy challenge, along with preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. I believe those two threats over the longer term are the biggest threats to the peace and security of the world. A world that is failing to respond to climate change is one in which the values embodied in the United Nations will not be met, and it's a world in which competition and conflict would win out over collaboration. We're at a very crucial point in the global debate on this subject. Many people are questioning, in the wake of Copenhagen, whether we should continue to seek a response to climate change through the U.N. and whether we can ever hope to deal with this enormous challenge. And I will first argue today that an effective response to climate change underpins our security and prosperity; second, that our response should be to strive for a binding global deal, whatever the setbacks; and third, I will set out why effective deployment of foreign policy assets is crucial to mobilizing the political will needed if we're going to shape an effective response. Now, Ban Ki-moon is right to have made climate change his top priority. Two weeks ago, I was talking about Britain's values in a networked world. I said then that a successful response to climate change must be a central objective of British foreign policy. And I said this not only because I believe action against climate change is in line with a values-based foreign policy, but because it underpins our prosperity and security. You can't have food, water or energy security without climate security; they are interconnected and inseparable. They form four resource pillars on which global security, prosperity and equity stand. Each depends on the other. Plentiful, affordable food requires reliable and affordable access to water and energy. Increasing dependence on coal, oil and gas threatens climate security, increasing the severity of floods and droughts, damaging food production, exacerbating the loss of biodiversity, and in countries that rely on hydropower, undermining energy security through the impact on the availability of water. As the world becomes more networked, the impact of climate change in one country or region will affect the prosperity and security of others around the world. No one can have failed to be appalled by the devastating floods in Pakistan. They overwhelmed the capacity of government to respond and opened political space for extremists. While Pakistan has borne the brunt of the human impact, China too has been hit on a vast scale by a seemingly endless sequence of droughts, floods and deadly mudslides. The Russian drought last month damaged the wheat harvest, leading to an export ban. World prices surged, hitting the poorest hardest, and sparking riots over bread prices in far away Mozambique. While no one weather event can ever be linked with certainty to climate change, the broad patterns of abnormality seen this year are consistent with climate-change models. They provide an illustration of the events we will be encountering increasingly in the future. So the clock is ticking, and the time to act is now. We must all take responsibility for this threat and take robust action. But we must also be clear-headed about the difficulties of reaching agreement and not lose heart when the going gets tough. The post-war leaders set up the United Nations in the aftermath of conflagration. They saw the pressing need for global solutions to global problems: cooperation not conflict, through frameworks and institutions embedded in the rule of law, and an international system that is fair and offers everyone a realistic prospect of security and prosperity. Failure to respond to climate change is inimical to all these values, undermining trust between nations, intensifying competition for resources, and shrinking the political space available for cooperation. It is an affront to fairness, since it puts the greatest burden on those who have done least to cause the problem and are least able to deal with its consequences. It is incompatible with the values and aspirations that the U.N. embodies. And it's incompatible with the values and aspirations of British foreign policy. For more than 20 years, we've been striving to build an effective international response to climate change. But we have lacked the collective ambition required. We need to shift investment urgently from high-carbon "business as usual" to the low-carbon economy. This means building an essentially decarbonized global economy by mid- century. At the same time, we must ensure development is climate resilient; otherwise, the changes in climate that are already unavoidable will block the path for hundreds of millions of people from poverty to prosperity. These changes also threaten to sweep away the investments in development we have made, and just as the bridges and schools in Pakistan were swept away. To drive that shift in investment from low to high carbon, we need a global climate change deal under the United Nations. Now, some have argued that we should abandon hope of doing so. They say Copenhagen proved it's all too difficult; we should focus instead on less inclusive and less demanding responses, such as coalitions of the willing. But we believe this would be a strategic error. It mistakes the nature of the task, which is to expand the realm of the possible, not to lower our ambition by accepting its current limits. And we must recognize this at Cancun. One thing Copenhagen did give us was a set of political commitments, captured in the Copenhagen Accord, on which we can build. More than 120 countries have now associated themselves with that accord, and that represents a broad and growing consensus. We now need to ensure that we live up to the commitments we made to each other in the accord, and reach out even more widely. Copenhagen, despite those accords, was a strategic setback, but it was not by any means the end of the road. We need to be clear why it failed to live up to high expectations and why it did not deliver a legally binding deal. Many people say that it failed because of process: The diplomats and the politicians had created a negotiation that was too difficult and too complex. But this misses the point. International treaties are an outcome, not an input, of political bargains. If you've made the political commitment to deliver, you can make the process work to deliver. The real reason Copenhagen did not deliver on high expectations was a lack of political will. Many in developing countries saw a gap between the words and the deeds of the industrialized economies. They questioned whether we really believed our own rhetoric. And to answer those questions, we each need to start at home. That is why the coalition government to which I belong has committed itself to being the greenest government ever in the United Kingdom, and why, with others in Europe, we are calling on the European Union to commit to a 30-percent cut in emissions by 2020 without waiting for the rest of the world to act. The UK is already the world leader in offshore wind, with more projects installed, in planning and in construction than any other country in the world. We're undertaking the most radical transformation of our electricity sector ever. We aim to provide over 30 percent of our domestic electricity from renewables by 2020. We have committed to build no new coal-fired power stations without carbon capture and storage technology, and we've announced our intention to continue the demonstration projects of that. And because it's imperative that foreign and domestic policies are mutually reinforcing, we must ensure that our approach is coherent. Now, that's one reason we have established the new British National Security Council: to ensure this happens across the full range of issues, including climate change. And that's why I work hand in glove with Chris Huhne, the British Energy and Climate Change secretary, and Andrew Mitchell, the International Development secretary, to ensure that our domestic action reflects our level of international ambition. But we won't succeed, of course, if we act alone. We must aim for a framework that is global and binding. It needs to be global because climate change affects everyone. Only a response that allows everyone a voice will generate a sense of common purpose and legitimacy. Only a response that is binding will convince investors that we intend to keep the promises we make to each other. Businesses need clear political signals, so let's show them an unequivocal green light. We are now a few weeks away from the 16th Conference of Parties on Climate Change in Cancun. And I commend the consultative and collaborative approach Mexico has taken ahead of this meeting. Thanks to their determination and foresight, we have a chance in Cancun to regain momentum and make progress on key issues such as forests, technology, finance and transparency of commitments. Cancun will -- may not get us all the way to a full agreement, but it can put us back on track to one. That said, the negotiations can't succeed inside a bubble. The negotiators in the U.N. process can't themselves build political will. They have to operate on the basis of current political realities in the countries they represent. And it's those realities that limit the ambition that we can set in the -- in such negotiations, and it's those realities that we now need to shift. There is no global consensus on what climate change puts at risk, geopolitically and for the global economy, and thus on the scale and urgency of the response we need. We must build a global consensus if we are to guarantee our citizens security and prosperity. That is a job for foreign policy. A fundamental purpose here for foreign policy is to shift the political debate, to create the political space for leaders and negotiators to reach agreement. We didn't get that right before Copenhagen, and we must get it right now. So we urgently need to mobilize foreign ministers and the diplomats they lead, as well as institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations, to put climate change at the heart of foreign- policy thinking. When I became foreign secretary in May, I said the core goals of our foreign policy were to guarantee Britain's security and prosperity. Robust global action on climate change is essential to that agenda. That is why the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, under my leadership, is a vocal advocate for climate diplomacy. All British ambassadors carry the argument for a global low-carbon transition in their breast pocket or in their handbag. Climate change is part of their daily vocabulary, alongside the traditional themes of foreign policy. And they're supported by our unique network of climate attaches throughout the world. The core assets of foreign policy are its networks and its convening power. Foreign policy can build political impulses to overcome barriers between sectors and cultures. In a networked world, diplomacy builds partnerships beyond government. And nowhere are those partnerships more vital than on climate. So we must mobilize all our networks, not just across government but between governments, using organizations such as the Commonwealth as well. We must reach out, beyond, to NGOs, faith groups and businesses. And of all these, perhaps business engagement is the key to making a difference. It's business that will lead low-carbon transition. It's business that best understands the incentives needed to help us all prosper. We must also harness scientific expertise in cutting-edge low- carbon technologies. The scientific community will develop the goods which will power the low-carbon economy and drive global ambition on climate change. And that's why the British government has a science and innovation network, which fosters collaborative research in the U.K. and other countries. Now, what can the U.K. and the European Union do to make that fundamental shift and shape a global consensus on climate change? The most serious problem at Copenhagen, and the strongest brake on political will, was and is a lack of confidence in the low-carbon economy. Too few people in too few countries are yet convinced that a rapid move to low carbon is compatible with economic recovery and growth. They see the short-term economic and domestic stability risks before the opportunities and the longer-term risks of inaction. There should be only one European response to that confidence gap. The EU, in my view, must accelerate its own progress and demonstrate that a low-carbon growth path makes us more competitive. I am convinced this is in the long-term interests of Europe's economy. We have learned painful lessons from the oil price shocks. We must modernize our infrastructure. The opportunities are out there. The global industry in low-carbon and environmental goods and services is already estimated to be worth up to 3.2 trillion pounds a year. Nearly a million British people are now employed in this sector, and that's why we are creating a green investment bank to ensure that we can properly support and develop low-carbon industry. But we need to redouble our efforts, both in the EU (itself ?) and in our engagement with partners. Each of us as member states will be better able to accelerate if we're doing so together as the world's largest single market. And by opening up this effort through partnership with others, we can make it easier for them to accelerate, too. So we'll be at the forefront of pushing for low-carbon modernization of Europe's infrastructure and energy policy. The European Union's budget until 2013 is set out in the current "financial perspective". We will argue -- we will need to agree the financial perspective for the seven years after that, the period including our 2020 climate goals. And it's -- as ever, it's right that the EU budget should reflect the prevailing economic circumstances. It's also right that we direct the budget to today's challenges, not those of yesterday. And that means one that supports the transition to a low-carbon economy. Action in Europe alone will not be enough. We need both the developed and developing world to take action. And this week Guido Westerwelle, the German foreign minister, and I have tasked our teams to come together to shape a coordinated, diplomacy-led effort on climate change, combining the strengths of our respective foreign services. I've just put the case for bringing a new urgency for low-carbon transition within the EU. But together we should carry that urgency in external dialogues, whether they are with the United States, China or India. The transition to low carbon will happen faster and maximize the benefit for all if the United States -- historically the world's largest emitter -- is at the leading edge. I recognize the political challenges that the U.S. administration faces and welcome President Obama's commitment to combat climate change. As he said in his State of the Union speech, "the nation that leads the clean-energy economy will be the nation that leads the global economy." Whatever the outcome of the upcoming midterm elections in the U.S., there is scope for political unity around an economic agenda that targets new energy opportunities and new jobs. American business understands this new market and should want to lead it. But to make these new clean-energy investments at the required pace and on a sufficient scale, they need the right incentives. **On climate, as in so many areas, the world looks to the US for leadership, because it has the economic clout and diplomatic leverage to shift the global debate.** And I look forward to working with the U.S. administration and indeed with the Council on Foreign Relations to raise global ambitions and put us back on the path to sustainable growth. A key challenge for Europe is to build an economic partnership with China that reinforces the steps China is taking towards a low- carbon economy. These steps include its recent announcement of the five provinces and eight cities that have been designated as China's low-carbon pilots. Together these pilots cover 350 million people, so an ambitious approach to these schemes, tenaciously implemented, could provide a critical boost to global confidence in the concept of low- carbon development and help put China on the path to sustainable prosperity. It could also produce huge two-way investment and partnership opportunities. Europe should place itself at the heart of these, working with China to maximize the ambition and the opportunities and to build the shared technology standards that will shape a global low- carbon market. In China's case, low-carbon opportunity is matched by urgent low- carbon need. The pace of growth in China means average Chinese per- capita emissions could soon eclipse those of Europe. So while China has taken some very welcome steps, without a commitment from China to further decisive action, the efforts of others will be in vain. The emerging economies face a dilemma. Often they are the most vulnerable to the direct effects of climate change. But they are concerned that action against climate change will adversely affect their development. The challenge to all countries is to have a high- growth, low-carbon economy. Some, like Brazil, which derives nearly half its energy from clean and renewable resources, are rising to that challenge. India is another, embodying in microcosm the challenge that climate change poses to us all. Threatened by food, water and energy insecurity, India has responded with ambitious plans to generate 20 gigawatts of solar power by 2022. South Africa, a coal-dependent economy, the success of which is so important to growth and prosperity within the continent, has made a significant offer to deviate their emissions from the business-as- usual pathway. The opportunity is for the emerging economies -- for the emerging economies is to make a direct leap to low carbon, avoiding the high- carbon lock-in that we see in the developed world: a new, sustainable pathway for prosperity and security. A global low-carbon economy is not an idealist's pipe dream but a 21st-century realist's imperative. Countries that adapt quickly to a carbon-constrained world will be better able to deliver lasting prosperity for their citizens. As a Permanent Security Council member, I'm determined that the U.K. will play its full part in that, not least by supporting climate finance for the poorest. Collectively, we share a responsibility to those most vulnerable to the impact of climate change. Bangladesh, with its densely populated coastal region, is particularly susceptible to rising sea levels. Glacial melt, sea-level rises and El Nino-type events threaten the lives of millions across South America. And the very existence of many small island states is under threat. We have a shared vision to meet the Millennium Development Goals. But in a world without action on climate change, that vision will remain a dream, and the efforts of the last 10 years would So climate change is one of the gravest threats to our security and prosperity. Unless we take robust and timely action to deal with it, no country will be immune to its effects. However difficult it might seem now, a global deal under the U.N. is the only response to this threat which will create the necessary confidence to drive a low- carbon transition. We must be undaunted by the scale of the challenge. We must continue to strive for agreement. We must not accept that because there is no consensus on a way forward now, that there never will be one. And to change the debate, we must imaginatively deploy all of the foreign policy assets in our armory until we've shaped that global consensus. A successful response to climate change will not only stabilize the climate, but open the way to a future in which we can meet our needs through cooperation, in accordance with the ideals of the United Nations. Failure to do so will enhance competitive tendencies and make the world more dangerous, so this is not actually a hard choice. We have to get this right. If we do, we can still shape our world. And if we don't, the world will determine our destiny for us.

# Environmental Refugees Scenario

**Climate change effects make mass migration inevitable**

**Fritz 10** [Caroline Fritz, *Researcher at the Migration Policy Institute*, March 4, 2010, “Climate Change and Migration: Sorting through Complex Issues Without the Hype”, Migration Policy Institute]

Most scientists agree that global warming affects ecological systems, but there is less certainty about its social effects, especially regarding human mobility. Yet this has not prevented a number of scholars, multilateral agencies, and nongovernmental organizations from making alarming predictions that climate change processes will trigger historically unprecedented waves of mass migration. The more widely cited estimates for the number of people displaced by 2050 range from 50 million (UN University's Institute for Environment and Human Security) to 200 million (International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Stern Review). If the higher estimates pan out, climate change-related migration could dwarf current numbers of refugees and internally displaced people — about 45 million and 9 million by United Nations estimates, respectively. While there are no scientifically verified estimates of the number of people that will be displaced by climate change, several studies by UN agencies, IOM, and NGOs, including an influential report published in 2009, already show evidence that environmentally induced migration is occurring. Also, despite controversy surrounding the specifics of climate change data, there is no evidence to contradict the expected trend of continued global warming for at least a few decades to come. This article will examine the complex links between climate change and migration, how and where these links influence current and future migration patterns, and some of the problems with predicting future flows. It will also outline some current policy approaches and look at where the debate is headed. The Climate Change–Migration Nexus Migration has helped humans cope with environmental changes, such as droughts and floods, for centuries. The frequency, severity, and duration of such changes affect the broad types of migration patterns — temporary, permanent, internal, or international — that take place. The prevailing tendency thus far has been toward more circular, internal movements of people from mostly rural to urban areas and within national boundaries or regions. These trends are evident, for example, in the seasonal labor migration of Central American, Mexican, and West African farmers to compensate for lower agricultural productivity in rural areas, as well as in the temporary displacement of thousands of Bangladeshis to their capital, Dhaka, in response to annual monsoon floods. However, severe environmental damage, whether natural or manmade, can leave populations with little recourse but to move permanently and en-masse. This happened in the 1930s Dust Bowl in the Great Plains of the United States. Below-average rainfall, accompanied by the Great Depression, resulted in the widespread failure of small farms and the migration of about 300,000 "Okies" to California. Currently, people are beginning to leave some small island nations in the Pacific with low elevations because the islands are suffering high rates of coastal erosion and experiencing rising sea levels. Environmental degradation is also increasingly common in those areas, such as in West Africa and Haiti, where depleted agricultural land can no longer produce crops sustainably and is abandoned. Scientific evidence shows a trend toward rising sea and air temperatures. Manmade environmental degradation, which includes everything from fuel emissions to deforestation, is accelerating this trend. Global warming is expected to affect the climate through gradual processes, such as glacial melting, as well as through an increase in extreme weather events like cyclones. Both gradual changes and extreme weather events can heighten pressures on land, food, and water resources. In turn, these pressures can contribute to existing problems, including food insecurity, malnutrition, poverty, the spread of disease, rapid urbanization, and political instability, in areas of the world that already struggle with some of these issues. Add to the mix likely population growth, which demographers expect in places like Bangladesh and sub-Saharan Africa, and the chances of new or intensified migration patterns increase.

**US needs to build up disaster response capabilities now**

**Youngblut 09** [Christine Youngblut,  *Adjunct Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a Federally-Funded R&D Center (FFRDC) that supports the Secretary of Defense. In her nearly thirty-year career, she has worked on defense-related issues ranging from military uses of virtual environments to cognitive readiness for irregular warfare. Most recently, Dr. Youngblut served as a member of the Defense Science Board study team examining the Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security. She holds a doctorate in Information Technology from George Mason University,* July 2009, “Climate Change Effects: Issues for International and US National Security”, Institute for Defense Analysis, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA527880>, DMintz]

Disaster preparedness and response – The U.S. will increasingly be sought as a global “first responder” in the immediate aftermath of a major natural disaster or humanitarian emergency. If and how to respond will be a recurring question, each time raising a difficult set of issues with important national security and foreign policy implications (CNA 2007; Lennon 2007). How much financial assistance should the U.S. pledge and how quickly? With which other countries should the U.S. seek to coordinate its response, either operationally or diplomatically? Should the U.S. military participate directly, and, if so, in what capacity and on what scale? A switch in focus from disaster response to disaster preparedness is essential. Improvements in international forecast and warning systems must include the ability to identify areas of high vulnerability where disaster prevention and capacity building can be focused (Army War College 2008).

# ---Plan key Now

**Plan is key now**

**Youngblut 09** [Christine Youngblut,  *Adjunct Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a Federally-Funded R&D Center (FFRDC) that supports the Secretary of Defense. In her nearly thirty-year career, she has worked on defense-related issues ranging from military uses of virtual environments to cognitive readiness for irregular warfare. Most recently, Dr. Youngblut served as a member of the Defense Science Board study team examining the Trends and Implications of Climate Change for National and International Security. She holds a doctorate in Information Technology from George Mason University,* July 2009, “Climate Change Effects: Issues for International and US National Security”, Institute for Defense Analysis, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA527880>, DMintz]

Special concern should be raised by the fact that previously predicted changes are occurring and are taking place on a time scale that is vastly different than the planning, programming, budgeting, or operational schedule within which DoD works. Changes are occurring at an accelerating rate. There are great uncertainties in our understanding of the implications of change. Our institutional response time is damped by uncertainty and may be taken by surprise by a whole new series of effects precipitated by these changes. It is going to be a challenge for DoD to adapt its planning cycle to this broad and unpredictable threat.

# ---Generic War Scenario

**Environmental stress will cause conflict in the future – massive migration flows are highly likely to cause war**

**Atapattu 08** [Sumudu Atapattu,  *Associate Director, Global Legal Studies Center, University of Wisconsin Law School, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka (Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy),*Fall 2008,“Global Climate Change: Can Human Rights (and Human Beings) Survive this Onslaught?”]

While environmental stress has rarely been the sole cause of conflicts in and between states, the intrinsic link between access to resources - particularly water - and conflict is increasingly recognized. Global climate change will exacerbate this problem. Faced with increased temperatures, erosion, desertification, deforestation, flooding, rising sea levels, forest fires, loss of species, and increased incidence of disease, **environmental stress may well become the main cause of conflict in the coming years**. While wars and conflicts have forced many people to abandon their homes and flee to relatively safe areas, we are now faced with a situation where people may flee their homes for environmental reasons. People who do so have been termed "environmental refugees," and it is estimated that in 1984-1985 some ten million Africans fled their homes due to reasons connected with environmental degradation. n121 Many of these refugees moved across national boundaries thereby increasing tension in the receiving countries. Most receiving countries can barely cope with their own problems and when more people seek access to quickly dwindling resources, conflicts are bound to increase. The World Commission on Environment and Development ("WCED") described the relationship between environmental degradation and conflict as follows: As unsustainable forms of development push individual countries up against environmental limits, major differences in environmental endowment among countries, or variations in stocks of usable land and raw materials, could precipitate and exacerbate international tension and conflict. And competition for use of the global commons, such as ocean fisheries and Antarctica, or for use of more localized common resources in fixed supply, such as rivers and coastal waters, could escalate to the level of international conflict and so threaten international peace and security. n122 If one also considers the inherent injustices in developing countries, prevailing extreme socioeconomic inequality, and corruption and [\*62] poverty, the situation becomes bleak indeed. The WCED recognized the link between global warming and conflict as follows: Environmental threats to security are now beginning to emerge on a global scale. The most worrisome of these stem from the possible consequences of global warming... Any such climatic change would quite probably be unequal in its effects, disrupting agricultural systems in areas that provide a large proportion of the world's cereal harvests and perhaps triggering mass population movements in areas where hunger is already endemic. Sea levels may rise during the first half of the next century enough to radically change the boundaries between coastal nations and to change the shapes and strategic importance of international waterways - effects both likely to increase international tension. The climatic and sea-level change are also likely to disrupt the breeding grounds of economically important fish species. Slowing, or adapting to, global warming is becoming an essential task to reduce the risks of conflict.

**Those wars go nuclear – cause extinction.**

**Wooldridge 9** (Frosty, free lance writer, once lectured at Cornell University, 2009 “Humanity galloping toward its greatest crisis in the 21st century” http://www.australia.to/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=10042:humanity-galloping-toward-its-greatest-crisis-in-the-21st-century&catid=125:frosty-wooldridge&Itemid=244

It is clear that most politicians and most citizens do not recognize that returning to “more of the same” is a recipe for promoting the first collapse of a global civilization. The required changes in energy technology, which would benefit not only the environment but also national security, public health, and the economy, would demand a World War II type mobilization -- and even that might not prevent a global climate disaster. Without transitioning away from use of fossil fuels, humanity will move further into an era of resource wars (remember, Africom has been added to the Pentagon’s structure -- and China has noticed), clearly with intent to protect US “interests” in petroleum reserves. The consequences of more resource wars, many likely triggered over water supplies stressed by climate disruption, are likely to include increased unrest in poor nations, a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, widening inequity within and between nations, and in the worst (and not unlikely) case, a nuclear war ending civilization.

# ---Africa Scenario

**Solves Africa instability**
**Podesta and Ogden 08** [John Podesta, president and CEO of the Center for American Progress (CAP) in Washington, D.C., was chief of staff for President Bill Clinton, Peter Ogden, senior national security analyst at CAP, Winter 2007-2008,The Washington Quarterly, "The Security Implications of Climate Change", Vol 31.3: 115-138]

The impact of climate change–induced migration will be felt throughout Africa, but its effects on Nigeria and East Africa pose particularly acute geopolitical challenges. This migration will be both internal and international. The ﬁrst domestic wave will likely be from agricultural regions to urban centers where more social services are available, and **the risk of state failure will increase** as central governments lose control over stretches of their territory and their borders. Nigeria will suffer from climate-induced drought, desertiﬁcation, and sealevel rise. Already, approximately 1,350 square miles of Nigerian land turns to desert each year, forcing both farmers and herdsmen to abandon their homes. 15 Lagos, the capital, is one of the West African coastal megacities that the IPCC identiﬁes as at risk from sea-level rise by 2015. 16 This, coupled with high population growth (Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa, and three-fourths of the population is under the age of 30), will force signiﬁcant migration and contribute to political and economic turmoil. For example, it will exacerbate the existing internal conﬂict over oil production in the Niger Delta. 17 To date, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta has carried out a successful campaign of armed attacks, sabotage, and kidnappings that has forced a shutdown of 25 percent of the country’s oil output. 18 Given that Nigeria is the world’s eighth-largest and Africa’s single-largest oil exporter, this instability is having an impact on the price of oil, and it will have global strategic implications in the coming decades. 19 In addition to the Niger Delta issue, Nigeria must also contend with a Biafran separatist movement in its southeast. The threat of regional conflagration, however, is highest in East Africa because of the concentration of weak or failing states, the numerous unresolved political disputes, and the severe impacts of climate change. Climate change will likely create large fluctuations in the amount of rainfall in East Africa during the next 30 years; a 5–20 percent increase in rainfall during the winter months will cause flooding and soil erosion, while a 5–10 percent decrease in the summer months will cause severe droughts. 20 This will jeopardize the livelihoods of millions of people and the economic capacity of the region, as agriculture constitutes some 40 percent of East Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 80 percent of the population earns a living from agriculture. 21 In Darfur, for instance, water shortages have already led to the desertification of large tracts of farmland and grassland. The fierce competition that emerged between farmers and herdsmen over the remaining arable land combined with simmering ethnic and religious tensions to help ignite the first genocide of the twenty-first century. 22

**Great power war**

Glick 07 [Caroline Glick*, senior Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy*, December 11, 2007, http://townhall.com/columnists/carolineglick/2007/12/11/condis\_african\_holiday/page/full/]

The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed **global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers**. Located in and around the Horn of Africa are the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year civil war, is a major source of regional conflict. Eritrea has a nagging border dispute with Ethiopia which could easily ignite. The two countries fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000 over control of the town of Badme. Although a UN mandated body determined in 2002 that the disputed town belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia has rejected the finding and so the conflict festers. Eritrea also fights a proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia and in Ethiopia's rebellious Ogaden region. In Somalia, Eritrea is the primary sponsor of the al-Qaida-linked Islamic Courts Union which took control of Somalia in June, 2006. In November 2006, the ICU government declared jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. Backed by the US, Ethiopia invaded Somalia last December to restore the recognized Transitional Federal Government to power which the ICU had deposed. Although the Ethiopian army successfully ousted the ICU from power in less than a week, backed by massive military and financial assistance from Eritrea, as well as Egypt and Libya, the ICU has waged a brutal insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military for the past year. The senior ICU leadership, including Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed have received safe haven in Eritrea. In September, the exiled ICU leadership held a nine-day conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia headed by Ahmed. Eritrean President-for-life Isaias Afwerki declared his country's support for the insurgents stating, "The Eritrean people's support to the Somali people is consistent and historical, as well as a legal and moral obligation." Although touted in the West as a moderate, Ahmed has openly supported jihad and terrorism against Ethiopia, Kenya and the West. Aweys, for his part, is wanted by the FBI in connection with his role in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Then there is Eritrea's support for the Ogaden separatists in Ethiopia. The Ogaden rebels are Somali ethnics who live in the region bordering Somalia and Kenya. The rebellion is run by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which uses terror and sabotage as its preferred methods of warfare. It targets not only Ethiopian forces and military installations, but locals who wish to maintain their allegiance to Ethiopia or reach a negotiated resolution of the conflict. In their most sensationalist attack to date, in April ONLF terror forces attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in April killing nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopians. Ethiopia, for its part has fought a brutal counter-insurgency to restore its control over the region. Human rights organizations have accused Ethiopia of massive human rights abuses of civilians in Ogaden. Then there is Sudan. As Eric Reeves wrote in the Boston Globe on Saturday, "The brutal regime in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, has orchestrated genocidal counter-insurgency war in Darfur for five years, and is now poised for victory in its ghastly assault on the region's African populations." The Islamist government of Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir is refusing to accept non-African states as members of the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur that is due to replace the undermanned and demoralized African Union peacekeeping force whose mandate ends on December 31. Without its UN component of non-African states, the UN Security Council mandated force will be unable to operate effectively. Khartoum's veto led Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping to warn last month that the entire peacekeeping mission may have to be aborted. And the Darfur region is not the only one at risk. Due to Khartoum's refusal to carry out the terms of its 2005 peace treaty with the Southern Sudanese that ended Khartoum's 20-year war and genocide against the region's Christian and animist population, the unsteady peace may be undone. Given Khartoum's apparent sprint to victory over the international community regarding Darfur, there is little reason to doubt that once victory is secured, it will renew its attacks in the south. The conflicts in the Horn of Africa have regional and global dimensions. Regionally, Egypt has played a central role in sponsoring and fomenting conflicts. Egypt's meddling advances its interest of preventing the African nations from mounting a unified challenge to Egypt's colonial legacy of extraordinary rights to the waters of the Nile River which flows through all countries of the region.

# \*\*\*Hormuz\*\*\*

# Iran Will Close

**Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz**

**Herb 07/16**/12 (Jeremy, “Iran restarts threats over closing Strait of Hormuz,” http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/operations/238061-iran-restarts-threats-over-closing-straight-of-hormuz)//ALo

Iranian officials are once again threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz as sanctions against the country continue to bite at Iran’s economy. Iranian news agencies have reported several statements from military and political officials that Iran could close the strait, a key oil pipeline in the Middle East. “The control of the Persian Gulf region is in Iran’s hands,” said Rear Adm. Habibollah Sayyari, according to Iran’s Mehr News Agency. "The US threats are nothing more than a hollow allegation and this reality is crystal-clear to both nations," Nader Qazipour told the semi-official Iranian Fars News Agency on Monday. "If the US had the power to make an aggression against our soil, it would have made a move already." Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi explained the logistics of Iran’s closing of the strait, saying in a Mehr News Agency report that such a closure would be implemented by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Officials in Tehran made similar threats back in December as the United States prepared to enact sanctions against Iran’s central bank. The latest aggressive rhetoric is coming just after U.S. sanctions against the central bank and a European Union ban on Iranian oil imports went into effect in recent weeks. A closure of the Strait of Hormuz, even if short lived, would disrupt the world’s oil markets, something that the United States hopes to avoid. Approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil travels through the strait. The United States and its allies suspect Iran of attempting to seek nuclear weapons, while Iran insists its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. The Obama administration has said it still seeks a diplomatic solution to the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program, while President Obama has also indicated he isn’t ruling out military action. Still, there have been reports about increased U.S. military presence in the Gulf, potentially to counteract Iranian attempts to mine the strait.

**Official statements prove they are ready and willing to close the strait – US would intervene.**

**AP 7/3**/12 (“Iran tests missiles, renews Hormuz closure threat” Jul 3, 2012, http://www.wtsp.com/news/national/article/262190/81/Iran-tests-missiles-renews-Hormuz-closure-threat-)//ALo

TEHRAN, Iran - Iran's official news agency official IRNA reports that the country's powerful Revolutionary Guards unit has launched several missiles in a military exercise. Iran holds several military maneuvers per year and the current one coincides with the beginning of a European Union oil embargo meant to pressure the country over its nuclear program. The Tuesday report says the missiles, including long-range ones capable of hitting U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf, successfully hit their targets. Iran has balked at the EU oil embargo since it was first approved by the 27-nation bloc in January, with Tehran threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz - a vital shipping channel through which a fifth of the world's oil supply passes - in retaliation. Reacting at the time, Ramin Mehmanparast, a spokesman for Iran's Foreign Ministry, called the economic sanctions "illogical and unfair". He said due to the world's long-term need for energy, "It is not possible to impose sanctions on Iran," which has huge resources of oil and gas. Iranian lawmakers appeared to renew the threat of closing Hormuz off to international tanker traffic on Tuesday, as a member of parliament told news media a "bill has been developed as an answer to the European Union's oil sanctions". According to the Reuters, MP Ibrahim Agha-Mohammadi told an Iranian news agency that the bill, "stresses the blocking of oil tanker traffic carrying oil to countries that have sanctioned Iran." When Iran started making threats to close the Strait, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told CBS "Face the Nation" that Washington would simply "not tolerate" such a move by the Iranian military. "That's another red line for us and that we will respond to them," he added. General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, added that while the Iranians have the capability to block the strait for a time, the U.S. would also be able to "defeat" them if it happened. "They've invested in capabilities that could, in fact, for a period of time block the Straits of Hormuz. We've invested in capabilities to ensure that if that happens, we can defeat that," he said. "We've described that as an intolerable act. And it's not just intolerable for us, it's intolerable to the world. But we would take action and reopen the Straits." The West suspects Iran wants to build nuclear weapons, a charge the Islamic Republic denies.

# Mil Response Key

**Perception of quick response ability is key to deter Iran from closing the Strait of Hormuz.**

**Kagan 2012** - Resident scholar and director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

(Frederick W., “Strait Talk with Iran: The U.S. should make clear to Tehran that closing shipping lanes won't be tolerated”

January 4, 2012, <http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/04/opinion/la-oe-kagan-iranian-threats-demand-a-strong-respon-20120104>)//ALo

Iran's threat to close a vital international waterway if stricter sanctions are imposed on Iranian oil exports is more than just bellicose and provocative. It is also a test of U.S. will and commitment in the Persian Gulf at a time when our role in the region is changing. The world has grown used to chest-thumping by Tehran, and there was nothing particularly noteworthy about the exercises conducted by Iranian armed forces last week to demonstrate their ability to close the Strait of Hormuz. But how the U.S. reacts to the threats is crucially important. Iran's large arsenal of mines would certainly present a challenge to shipping in the region if Tehran makes good on its threat. Iran has the ability to lay mines from many platforms: small boats, combatants, submarines, midget submarines, even merchant ships. And Western navies, including America's, have long underinvested in minesweeping technology. The U.S. Navy and its allies would be challenged, therefore, to sweep the strait clear of mines laid in large numbers. But there is no doubt that the United States can prevent Iran from closing the shipping route, through which much of the world's oil travels. The U.S. and its allies could ultimately clear traffic lanes and destroy Iranian vessels attempting to lay minefields. As long as the major stakeholders in the global economy remain confident that the U.S. and its allies will keep the strait open, the impact of any Iranian attempt to close it will probably be mitigated. It is important, therefore, for the United States to declare its commitment to using all necessary force to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. Such a declaratory policy would be explicitly defensive: If Iran violates international law by attacking shipping in transit through the strait, the U.S. will act in defense of international law to stop the illegal action and eliminate the capabilities of the violator to persist in such behavior. Tehran would portray any such declaration as an act of aggression on the part of the "global arrogance" — as it calls the United States — and an escalation in the conflict. The Iranian regime has illegally seized a series of small islands in the strait belonging to the United Arab Emirates, and it uses them to claim that the whole Strait of Hormuz is Iranian territorial water. But even if Iran rightfully owned those islands, the argument that they constitute an archipelago under the principles of maritime law sufficient to grant Iran sovereignty over the strait is tenuous if not nonsensical. International law has settled the question of who owns the strait: no one. All nations have the right of free transit for both military and civilian ships and aircraft. That is one reason it is important for the U.S. to announce its commitment now to defending international law by force if necessary. Another reason to make such a declaration now is to ensure that Iranian bombast does not rattle the shaky global economy. The threat to close the strait is a form of terrorism aimed at generating a response based on fear rather than fact. The effectiveness of the terrorist tactic can be significantly reduced if the U.S. reassures the world that it can and will do what is necessary to keep international waterways open. The last reason to make a strong declaration now is to eliminate one possible source of confusion between the U.S. and Iran during a time of rising tension. No American president would have any choice but to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and destroy Iran's ability to threaten it further. But as tension between the U.S. and Iran increases, the risk of miscalculation will also increase. This is one of those moments when stability is best served by what might seem a provocative statement. The Iranian leadership at every level must be convinced that any attempt to close the strait will both fail and lead to disaster for Iran. The more the U.S. and its partners do to drive that fact home in Tehran, the less likely Iran's leaders will be to try. Iran's leaders, finally, will look to actions behind America's words. Now is the time to concentrate additional American naval and air power in the Persian Gulf region, as well as ensuring that U.S. forces already there have all necessary means of reconnaissance and surveillance to avoid surprises. If America's ability to clear mines in the Strait of Hormuz is insufficient — as it appears to be — then we should immediately invest in that capability ostentatiously. Some, even outside Tehran, would portray such actions as an escalation of conflict. They would not be. We must respond to provocation with absolute reassurance to the world that we will keep the strait open and with a stern warning to the Iranians that any attempt to close it will inevitably and disastrously fail. Displaying any kind of hesitation at this moment would be the real and dangerous provocation.

**Even an unsuccessful closure leads to conflict – military deterrent is key.**

**Singh 2012** – Managing editor of the Washington Institute (Michael, “The Real Iranian Threat in the Gulf” January 3, 2012, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-real-iranian-threat-in-the-gulf>)

Even if Iran ignored these considerations and proceeded with an effort to close the Strait, the U.S. and others would move to keep it open, and would be unlikely to stop there. As Iran has crept closer to a nuclear weapons capability, the possibility of military action against Iran has also become more imminent. President Obama has been reluctant to threaten Iran militarily, and any U.S. president would think long and hard before engaging in another armed conflict in the Middle East. An effort by Iran to shut down the oil trade in the Gulf, however, would make such a decision straightforward. The U.S. would react with force, and once engaged in hostilities with Iran, would likely take the opportunity to target Iran's nuclear facilities and other military targets. It is difficult to envision any scenario beginning with an Iranian effort to close the Strait of Hormuz that does not end in a serious strategic setback for the Iranian regime. Recognizing that Iran is neither able nor likely to try to close the Strait, the **U.S. could simply sit back, confident in our superior firepower. This would be a mistake**. The real danger in the Gulf is lower-level activity by Iran to harass shipping and confront the U.S. Navy. Iranian commanders in the area are increasingly brazen. If not deterred, **Iran's sense of impunity** -- rather than its nuclear progress -- **may be the spark that ignites a conflict in the region.** Iran's navy -- especially the naval arm of Iran's Revolutionary Guards -- has invested in vessels and armaments that are well-suited to asymmetric warfare, rather than the sort of ship-to-ship conflict that Iran would surely lose. Thus, they have purchased, with Chinese and Russian help, increasingly sophisticated mines, midget submarines, mobile anti-ship cruise missiles, and a fleet of small, fast boats. In addition, they have reportedly sought to develop a naval special warfare, or frogman, capability. Iran has also demonstrated a growing willingness to confront U.S. and allied forces in the area. The best known of these incidents occurred in March 2007, when fifteen British marines and sailors were taken captive by an entrepreneurial Revolutionary Guard commander. But other incidents abound. On many occasions, including at least one reported case this year, Iranian small boats have conducted mock "swarming" attacks on US carriers and warships. In each case, U.S. or allied commanders have shown restraint, which is inevitably interpreted as passivity by Iranian leaders, who then proceed to push the envelope further. Rather than waiting for one of these gambits to succeed and force our hand in response, the U.S. should actively seek to discourage Iran from further testing of U.S. limits through a stronger deterrence effort. First, the U.S. should resume a more active program of military exercises and signaling activities in the Gulf, in order to demonstrate U.S. capabilities and make Iran reconsider its actions in the area. Second, the U.S. should signal our enduring commitment to the Gulf after our withdrawal from Iraq and continue to bolster the littoral, air, and missile defense capacity of our GCC allies and integrate their forces into the aforementioned exercises. Finally, the U.S. should indicate clearly to Iran that we are prepared to use selective military force in response to further provocations such as those discussed above. Such limited force -- whether against Iran's navy in the late 1980s, or against the Revolutionary Guards' Qods Force in Iraq in recent years -- has proven effective in compelling Iran to draw back. It is frequently observed that the consequences of military action are unpredictable, and rightly so; it should only ever be used with caution and deliberation. However, excessive risk aversion that results in a failure of deterrence and feeds Iran's sense of impunity may, paradoxically, be just as risky. The most prudent course is neither belligerence nor passivity, but a robust posture that makes Tehran think twice.

**US military is key to preventing Iranian conflict -- now is key**

**Tripathi 12** - Dr. Sudhanshu Tripathi is Associate Professor of Political Science at M.D.P.G. College, Pratapgarh (Dr. Sudhanshu, "Looming Gulf Crisis: Is war with Iran inevitable?", International Policy Digest, January 26, 2012, <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/01/06/looming-gulf-crisis-is-war-with-iran-inevitable/>)//KL

A number of developments makes some Iranian analysists suspect that the prospects of conflict between American and Iranian Navies in the Straits of Hormuz is a possibility, however, the reality is rather remote. The Iranian nuclear programme, its continued belligerence towards the international community and Iran’s 10-day naval exercises, the Velayat 90, have further hightened tensions in the Persian Gulf and particularly, the Strats of Hormuz. Iran successfully conducted the test of a long-range cruise missile the, Gadar, on January 2, which experts regard only as a medium range rocket, without the capacity to inflict significant damage on American allies, let alone the United States. Aside from these developments, Iran has produced its first nuclear fuel rod which has been inserted into the core of an Iranian research nuclear reactor. However, Western nuclear experts have significant doubts that the rod contains enriched uranium pellets. Iran’s defiance is being played out in its war of words with the West. Iran racheted up its threats to close the Straits of Hormuz following new economic sanctions which were signed into law by President Obama while he vacationed in Hawaii this past week. Iran’s Vice President, Mohammad Reza Rahimi, told Iran’s official news agency, IRNA, that “not a drop of oil” will reach international markets through the Straits of Hormuz. Rahimi’s sentiments were reiterated by Iran’s top naval commander, Rear Adm. Habibollah Sayyari, warning to block the ‘strait’, if the USS John C. Stennis, an American aircraft carrier returned to the region. Rahimi also spoke of a “steep cost” to be borne by the West in the event that newer and tougher economic sanctions were unilaterally imposed on Iran’s oil industry. Rahimi also warned of the dangers if the United States stepped up its pressures on global financial institutions that conduct business with Iran’s Central Bank (ICB). Importantly, sovereign nations have the right to conduct military exercises either unilaterally or in association with other nations. Oftentimes, joint military exercises assess a country’s military preparedness. However, in the context of Iran, the West, particularly the United States and Israel, have become overly cautious. The United States correctly believes that Iran has the limited capacity to cut off access to the Strats of Hormuz, but due to the realities of its military capabilities, Iran is unlikely to do so. As far back as 2004, American intelligence agencies concluded that Iran had this capacity for a limited period of time, despite the West’s military presence in the Persian Gulf. Since that initial assessment, Iran has made considerable progress in upgrading it naval capabilities. However, in sheer strength, the U.S. Navy can easily defeat Iran’s navy which relies on much smaller crafts.

**Military not key -- the economy will deter Hormuz closure**

**Tripathi 12** - Dr. Sudhanshu Tripathi is Associate Professor of Political Science at M.D.P.G. College, Pratapgarh (Dr. Sudhanshu, "Looming Gulf Crisis: Is war with Iran inevitable?", International Policy Digest, January 26, 2012, <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/01/06/looming-gulf-crisis-is-war-with-iran-inevitable/>)//KL

In its narrowist point, the Straits of Hormuz is 54 kilometers wide, on Iran’s southern shore, and it connects major oil producing countries like Baharin, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE to the Indian Ocean. Around 40 percent of the global oil-trade passes through this route and that makes it a very important trade route. If is closed by Iran, however briefly, it will directly result in a steep rise in global oil prices. Iran’s forced closure of the Straits would work both ways. While it would impact the West, especially as the United States and others emerge from their economic recessions, a closure of the Straits would severely impact Iran’s economy. Iran ranks the second largest producer in OPEC, exporting roughly 2.4 million barrels of crude oil daily, mostly through the Straits. Further, oil and natural gas sales contribute to approx. 80 percent of Iran’s export earnings. The closing of the Straits would be self-defeating. Iran is likely, after considering the pros and cons of going forward with a rather irrational threat to close the Straits of Hormuz, to decide against such a bold move. Its domestic political situation is hardly settled and this could lead to political instability, which the regime in Tehran desperately wants to avoid. Despite near historic lows in U.S./Iran relations, the recent rescue of Iranian fishermen from Somali pirates by the U.S. Navy in the Arabian Sea demonstrates that while the drama surrounding the Straits of Hormuz continues, life is very much as it is on the high seas. Commander of the USS John C. Stennis battlegroup, Rear Adm. Craig Faller commented, “It was a great outcome for some innocent Iranian fisherman, and it’s an indication of who we are as Americans.” “We’d do that for any country in the world,” Faller concluded.

**Military operations are key.**

**Talmadge 2008** – doctoral candidate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where she is a member of the Security Studies Program; fellow at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University (Caitlin, “Closing Times: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz” International Security Volume 33, Number 1, Summer 2008, Project Muse)//ALo

The United States' ultimate military superiority vis-à-vis Iran is without question, and eventually the United States would prevail in any confrontation. [End Page 115] Nevertheless, mine warfare is within Iran's capabilities, and Iran possesses the antiship cruise missiles and air defense needed to make U.S. MCM operations even more difficult and time-consuming than they normally are. It does not take much imagination to suggest that the traffic in the Strait of Hormuz could be impeded for weeks or longer, with major air and naval operations required to restore the full flow of traffic. Iran's limitations, such as the command and control and targeting challenges it would face in littoral warfare, are not often appreciated. But its strengths are often overlooked as well, such as the stocks of missiles and much more explosively powerful mines it has acquired since the tanker wars of the 1980s. Likewise, although the United States retains the world's best conventional military, its past experiences hunting mobile targets from the air and conducting MCM operations in the littorals do not inspire confidence that confrontation in the strait would end quickly. The United States' fleet defenses have never been tested in combat against an adversary with large numbers of cruise missiles, and the United States is in the midst of a major transition in its entire concept of MCM operations. Given these realities, sanguine assurances about the course and outcome of military conflict in the strait seem unjustified at best, and dangerous at worst. Most important, Iran does not have to seal the strait entirely to provoke U.S. intervention, and once that intervention begins, the potential for further military escalation is high. In particular, if the air and naval campaigns appear to be dragging on, the United States might be forced to consider holding hostage other targets in Iran or using ground forces. Either way, a significant and sustained increase in the price of oil would seem likely. This analysis has significant implications for U.S. force posture and foreign policy. First, as a general matter, the analysis shows that despite a growing bipartisan consensus on the need to expand U.S. ground forces, U.S. air and naval capabilities remain essential to the defense of Persian Gulf oil supplies. More specifically, the U.S. ability to reopen the strait hinges critically on two sets of scarce assets: dedicated MCM capabilities and air defense suppression capabilities. It is precisely because the United States has such a small (and shrinking) MCM fleet that it would have to mount such a serious offensive effort to eliminate Iranian shore-based fire. If MCM assets were greater in number and therefore more expendable, the U.S. Navy would be able to risk operating them in a less permissive environment, thereby shortening the amount of time required to reopen the strait. Likewise, air defense suppression assets continue to be "high demand, low density," constraining the number of offensive air sorties that can be conducted [End Page 116] at any one time. This scarcity places an inherent limit on how fast any aerial hunt for mobile targets can proceed, unless the United States wants to incur an increased risk of shoot-downs. The importance of U.S. air control assets will only grow if Iran has the opportunity to acquire more advanced SAMs and aerial interceptors in the years to come. Greater U.S. investment in the suppression mission would be a boon not only to U.S. prospects in the strait but also against other potential adversaries, such as China and North Korea. The United States should also encourage the use of more southern routes within the gulf, as water depths allow. The greater the area tankers are comfortable traversing, the harder it will be for Iran to threaten the flow of that traffic with a small number of mines. Additionally, the farther from the Iranian coast that tankers can travel, the smaller the area within Iran from which missiles can be targeted at traffic in the gulf. Shrinking this area would reduce the difficulty of hunting for mobile missile batteries, as well as related air defense requirements, speeding how quickly the United States could conduct MCM operations in a permissive environment. Above all, the scenario described here points to the critical importance of early detection of any Iranian mine laying in the Persian Gulf and especially the need to keep close tabs on Iranian submarine activity. Such surveillance depends not only on U.S. activities in the region but also on those of Iran's gulf neighbors. If the United States wishes to continue to act as the guarantor of free passage in the strait, it needs to make these monitoring activities a clear part of a broader effort to discourage Iranian attempts at harassment or closure. It also may wish to convey to Iran that, precisely because of the potential length and complexity of the operations outlined in this article, a campaign to clear the Persian Gulf of Iranian mines could quickly become a war to clear the Iranian harbors and coast of most remnants of the country's military.

# Econ/Oil Shock Scenario

# ---Econ/Oil Internal

**Even short term Hormuz closure causes global economic disruption and oil shocks – no other regional oil transport can check.**

**Blanche 2009** (Ed, “Flashpoint Hormuz: US and allies brace for trouble in the choke-point Strait of Hormuz, gateway to the gulf, as regional tension escalates” *The Middle East*, August-September 2009, Gale)

The strait is a 180km-long horseshoe-shaped waterway between Iran on the northern shore and Oman and the United Arab Emirates on the southern coast. It is one of the world's most strategic bodies of water. Some 40% of the world's oil supplies passes through it. On a typical day, around 15 tankers carrying up to 17m barrels of oil and oil products, along with dozens of freighters, pass through the strait--two fifths of the world's oil supply. This comprises most of the oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait--and Iran. Going the other way, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states import most of their food and consumer goods through the strait and a prolonged shutdown would cause serious economic and social disruption. According to Jane's Intelligence Review, published in London: "If this choke-point was closed for an extended period, the economies of the Middle East would suffer significantly and this would generate severe economic dislocation around the world ... [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] "Millions of guest workers in Gulf states from developing countries could also be left unemployed, leading to greater poverty in South Asia and East Asia." This would undoubtedly send oil prices soaring once again, from the current level of around $70 per barrel to the peak of nearly $150 it hit in 2007-08, or possibly even higher and more crippling levels. The US Energy Information Administration estimates that if the strait were closed, only about 3m barrels of oil per day could realistically be redirected through Saudi Arabia through a trans-Arabian pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu on the kingdom's west coast. But there would no other way to transport the 31mm tonnes a year of LNG--18% of world consumption--that Qatar and the UAE export. Even if a closure of the strait was relatively short, in the order of several weeks, the economic shock waves would still be substantial. But the current global financial crisis would magnify the economic shock waves that a closure of the Gulf, which holds 55% of the world's known oil reserves, would produce. "Extended closure of the strait would remove roughly a quarter of the world's oil from the market, causing a supply shock of the type not seen since the glory days of OPEC," Caitlin Talmadge of the Security Studies Programme at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), warned in a mid-2008 assessment of the Iranian threat. Opinion is mixed on whether the Iranians would he able, or willing, to close the Strait of Hormuz, and, if they did, how long the waterway would be blocked. The Americans' high-tech forces would in all likelihood prevail in any conflict, but there is general agreement that if Iran sought to shut down Hormuz, conflict there would be. "Iran does not have to seal the strait entirely to provoke US intervention," Talmadge observed, "and once that intervention begins, the potential for further military escalation is high." Iran depends on the waterway not only to export its own oil, but to import the refined products it is unable to produce itself. Denied those imports, its economy would soon collapse. But a July 2007 report by Republican Congressman Jim Saxton to the US Congress on the impact of a closure noted that threats to do so "imply a willingness to absorb substantial detrimental repercussions. It is therefore a matter of judgment how real the threats are, hut the market does attribute some credibility to them." Saxton calculated that "the cumulative oil supply loss from a closure could reach the total amount of oil lost during previous oil shocks in 17 to 37 days." It noted the extreme sensitivity of the oil market, which "reacts with caution to disturbances in the region that could threaten access to them". The sensitivity to events in the Gulf region is such that when Iran seized 15 British marines and sailors and took them hostage in March 2007, the world oil price rose by about $7 per barrel--8% of the level at that time--"even though the flow of oil was not affected". All six of the oil shocks that have taken place since the end of World War II--from Iran's nationalisation of BP's holdings in 1950 to the Gulf war over Kuwait in 1990-91--"were not random events, as if natural disasters or accidents had caused them", the report noted. "Each crisis was associated with deliberate action in the Middle East to constrain the flow of oil or threaten the reserves." [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Saxton observed that given the lessons learned from these events, such as the post-1973 build-up of strategic oil reserves by leading consumer states, the impact of a closure of the strait for a relatively short period of time could probably be contained without too much international economic disruption. His report made no allowance for a closure during a global recession such as the one the world is now suffering. But it concluded that "the chances of overcoming a disruption have improved", since the last major shock in 1973, "provided it does not usher in an era of deteriorating oil supply".

# ---Econ Collapse Impact

**Collapse causes global nuclear war.**

Auslin 2009 – History Professor at Yale (Michael, “The Global Economy Unravels” March 6, <http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/06/global-economy-unravels-opinions-contributors-g20.html>)

Conversely, global policymakers do not seem to have grasped the downside risks to the global economy posed by a deteriorating domestic and international political environment. If the past is any guide, the souring of the political environment must be expected to fan the corrosive protectionist tendencies and nationalistic economic policy responses that are already all too much in evidence. After spending much of 2008 cheerleading the global economy, the International Monetary Fund now concedes that output in the world's advanced economies is expected to contract by as much as 2% in 2009. This would be the first time in the post-war period that output contracted in all of the world's major economies. The IMF is also now expecting only a very gradual global economic recovery in 2010, which will keep global unemployment at a high level. Sadly, the erstwhile rapidly growing emerging-market economies will not be spared by the ravages of the global recession. Output is already declining precipitously across Eastern and Central Europe as well as in a number of key Asian economies, like South Korea and Thailand. A number of important emerging-market countries like Ukraine seem to be headed for debt default, while a highly oil-dependent Russia seems to be on the cusp of a full-blown currency crisis. Perhaps of even greater concern is the virtual grinding to a halt of economic growth in China. The IMF now expects that China's growth rate will approximately halve to 6% in 2009. Such a growth rate would fall far short of what is needed to absorb the 20 million Chinese workers who migrate each year from the countryside to the towns in search of a better life. As a barometer of the political and social tensions that this grim world economic outlook portends, one needs look no further than the recent employment forecast of the International Labor Organization. The ILO believes that the global financial crisis will wipe out 30 million jobs worldwide in 2009, while in a worst case scenario as many as 50 million jobs could be lost. What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

# ---Oil Shock Impact

**Oil shocks cause global nuclear war and accesses every impact – need for key resource makes conflict likely.**

**King 2008** – Center for New American Security (Neil, Jr. “Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns” CNAS Energy Security Visionaries Series. July 2008. http://www.aspousa.org/aspousa4/proceedings/\_CNAS\_King\_Peak\_Oil\_WorkingPaper.pdf)

Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question of whether soaring oil prices and market volatility could spark an outright oil war between major powers—possibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the United States. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School in California addressed what he called the increasing militarization of international energy security. “Energy security is now deemed so central to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter,” he told a gathering at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston’s Rice University. 6 The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access to dwindling energy resources, he wrote, “is one of the most alarming prospects facing the current world system.” 7 Mr. Russell figures among a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about the psychological readiness of the United States to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock. Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress that the financial side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order to drive up the price. A breakdown in trust for the oil markets, these analysts fear, could spur calls for government action—even military intervention. “The perceptive chasm in the United States between new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close,” Mr. Russell said. “And when it does, look out.” 8 For years, skeptics scoffed at predictions that the United States would hit its own domestic oil production peak by sometime in the late 1960s. With its oil fields pumping full out, the U.S. in 1969 was providing an astonishing 25 percent of the world’s oil supply—a role no other country has ever come close to matching. U.S. production then peaked in December 1970, and has fallen steadily ever since, a shift that has dramatically altered America’s own sense of vulnerability and reordered its military priorities. During World War II, when its allies found their own oil supplies cut off by the war, the United States stepped in and made up the difference. Today it is able to meet less than a third of its own needs. A similar peak in worldwide production would have far more sweeping consequences. It would, for one, spell the end of the world’s unparalleled economic boom over the last century. It would also dramatically reorder the wobbly balance of power between nations as energy-challenged industrialized countries turn their sights on the oil-rich nations of the Middle East and Africa. In a peak oil future, the small, flattened, globalized world that has awed recent commentators would become decidedly round and very vast again. Oceans will reemerge as a hindrance to trade, instead of the conduit they have been for so long. An energy-born jolt to the world economy would leave no corner of the globe untouched. Unable to pay their own fuel bills, the tiny Marshall Islands this summer faced the possibility of going entirely without power. That is a reality that could sweep across many of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, reversing many of the tentative gains in those regions and stirring deep social unrest. Large patches of the world rely almost entirely on diesel-powered generators for what skimpy electricity they now have. Those generators are the first to run empty as prices soar. A British parliamentary report released in June on “The Impact of Peak Oil on International Development” concluded that “the deepening energy crisis has the potential to make poverty a permanent state for a growing number of people, undoing the development efforts of a generation.” 9 We are seeing some of the consequences already in Pakistan – a country of huge strategic importance, with its own stash of nuclear weapons – that is now in the grips of a severe energy crisis. By crippling the country’s economy, battering the stock market, and spurring mass protests, Pakistan’s power shortages could end up giving the country’s Islamic parties the leverage they have long needed to take power. It’s not hard to imagine similar scenarios playing out in dozens of other developing countries. Deepening economic unrest will put an enormous strain on the United Nations and other international aid agencies. Anyone who has ever visited a major UN relief hub knows that their fleets of Land Rovers, jumbo jets and prop planes have a military size thirst for fuel. Aid agency budgets will come under unprecedented pressure just as the need for international aid skyrockets and donor countries themselves feel pressed for cash. A peaking of oil supplies could also hasten the impact of global climate change by dramatically driving up the use of coal for power generation in much of the world. A weakened world economy would also put in jeopardy the massively expensive projects, such as carbon capture and storage, that many experts look to for a reduction in industrial emissions. So on top of the strains caused by scarce fossil fuels, the world may also have to grapple with the destabilizing effects of more rapid desertification, dwindling fisheries, and strained food supplies. An oil-constricted world will also stir perilous frictions between haves and have-nots. The vast majority of all the world’s known oil reserves is now in the hands of national oil companies, largely in countries with corrupt and autocratic governments. Many of these governments—Iran and Venezuela top the list—are now seen as antagonists of the United States. Tightened oil supplies will substantially boost these countries’ political leverage, but that enhanced power will carry its own peril. Playing the oil card when nations are scrambling for every barrel will be a far more serious matter that at any time in the past. The European continent could also undergo a profound shift as its needs—and sources of energy—diverge all the more from those of the United States. A conservation-oriented Europe (oil demand is on the decline in almost every EU country) will look all the more askance at what it sees as the gluttonous habits of the United States. At the same time, Europe’s governments may have little choice but to shy from any political confrontations with its principal energy supplier, Russia. An energy-restricted future will greatly enhance Russia’s clout within settings like the UN Security Council but also in its dealings with both Europe and China. Abundant oil and gas have fueled Russia’s return to power over the last decade, giving it renewed standing within the UN and increasing sway over European capitals. The peak oil threat is already sending shivers through the big developing countries of China and India, whose propulsive growth (and own internal stability) requires massive doses of energy. For Beijing, running low on fuel spells economic chaos and internal strife, which in turn spawns images of insurrection and a breaking up of the continent sized country. Slumping oil supplies will automatically pit the two largest energy consumers—the United States and China—against one another in competition over supplies in South America, West Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. China is already taking this competition very seriously. It doesn’t require much of a leap to imagine a Cold War-style scramble between Washington and Beijing—not for like-minded allies this time but simply for reliable and tested suppliers of oil. One region that of offers promise and peril in almost equal measure is the Artic, which many in the oil industry consider the last big basin of untapped hydrocarbon riches. But the Artic remains an ungoverned ocean whose legal status couldn’t be less clear, especially so long as the United States continues to remain outside the international Law of the Sea Treaty. As the ices there recede, the risk increases that a scramble for assets in the Artic could turn nasty. No country, finally, will face more varied and far-reaching strains in an oil-constrained future than the United States. Its global military posture will have to shoulder even greater policing responsibilities, from the Gulf of Guinea to the Strait of Hormuz, just as it faces unprecedented challenges in keeping its own fuel tanks full. The United States will also see its very status as the world’s lone superpower put into question as its oil-dependent economy faces rising unemployment, falling home values, and the reality of being ever deeper in hawk to countries halfway around the world. The gloomiest prognosticators envision a future in which America’s entire postwar boom—with its massive interstates and suburban sprawl—is thrown violently into reverse. A jolt of even a quarter that magnitude could still spark a period of angry victimization, when both the public and their elected oi cials seek out those who are to blame for the country’s travails.

# Iran Heg Scenario

# ---Military Key

**Reliable US military presence prevents Iranian hegemony – causes global war.**

**London 2010** – President Emeritus of Hudson Institute (Herbert I. “The Coming Crisis in the Middle East”, June 23, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication\_details&id=7101&pubType=HI\_Opeds)//ALo

The gathering storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum. War clouds are on the horizon and like conditions prior to World War I all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey’s provocative flotilla - often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission - has set in motion a flurry of diplomatic activity, but if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, it could present a casus belli. It is also instructive that Syria is playing a dangerous game with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public accounts Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long, medium and short range missiles and Syrian territory has served as a conduit for military material from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since **neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course.** Iran is poised to be the hegemon in the Middle East. It is increasingly considered the “strong horse” as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia regional strategic vision is a combination of deal making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counter weight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state. Should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni “tent” must stand on two legs, if one, falls, the tent collapses. Should that tent collapse and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling its oats and no longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario with nuclear weapons in tow, war against Israel is a distinct possibility. However, implausible it may seem at the moment, the possible annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second holocaust could lead to a nuclear exchange. The only wild card that can change this slide into warfare is an active United States’ policy. Yet curiously, the U.S. is engaged in both an emotional and physical retreat from the region. Despite rhetoric which suggests an Iran with nuclear weapons is intolerable, it has done nothing to forestall that eventual outcome. Despite the investment in blood and treasure to allow a stable government to emerge in Iraq, the anticipated withdrawal of U.S. forces has prompted President Maliki to travel to Tehran on a regular basis. And despite historic links to Israel that gave the U.S. leverage in the region and a democratic ally, the Obama administration treats Israel as a national security albatross that must be disposed of as soon as possible. As a consequence, the U.S. is perceived in the region as the “weak horse,” the one that is dangerous to ride. In every Middle East capital the words “unreliable and United States” are linked. Those seeking a moderate course of action are now in a distinct minority. A political vacuum is emerging, one that is not sustainable and one the Iranian leadership looks to with imperial exhilaration. It is no longer a question of whether war will occur, but rather when it will occur and where it will break out. There are many triggers to ignite the explosion, but not many scenarios for containment. Could it be a regional war in which Egypt and Saudi Arabia watch from the sidelines, but secretly wish for Israeli victory? Or is this a war in which there aren’t victors, only devastation? Moreover, should war break out, what does the U.S. do? This is a description far more dire than any in the last century and, even if some believe my view is overly pessimistic, Arab and Jew, Persian and Egyptian, Muslim and Maronite tend to believe in its veracity. That is a truly bad sign.

# ---Iran Heg Impact

**Iranian hegemony causes regional nuclear war**

Ben-Meir 2007 **–** Professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University (Alon, “Realpolitik: Ending Iran's defiance”, 2/6/12, UPI, , http://www.upi.com/Business\_News/Security-Industry/2007/02/06/Realpolitik-Ending-Irans-defiance/UPI-69491170778058/

NEW YORK, Feb. 6 (UPI) -- That Iran stands today able to challenge or even defy the United States in every sphere of American influence in the Middle East attests to the dismal failure of the Bush administration's policy toward it during the last six years. Feeling emboldened and unrestrained, Tehran may, however, miscalculate the consequences of its own actions, which could precipitate a catastrophic regional war. The Bush administration has less than a year to rein in Iran's reckless behavior if it hopes to prevent such an ominous outcome and achieve, at least, a modicum of regional stability. By all assessments, Iran has reaped the greatest benefits from the Iraq war. The war's consequences and the American preoccupation with it have provided Iran with an historic opportunity to establish Shiite dominance in the region while aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapon program to deter any challenge to its strategy. Tehran is fully cognizant that the successful pursuit of its regional hegemony has now become intertwined with the clout that a nuclear program bestows. Therefore, it is most unlikely that Iran will give up its nuclear ambitions at this juncture, unless it concludes that the price will be too high to bear. That is, whereas before the Iraq war Washington could deal with Iran's nuclear program by itself, now the Bush administration must also disabuse Iran of the belief that it can achieve its regional objectives with impunity. Thus, while the administration attempts to stem the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq to prevent it from engulfing other states in the region, Washington must also take a clear stand in Lebanon. Under no circumstances should Iranian-backed Hezbollah be allowed to topple the secular Lebanese government. If this were to occur, it would trigger not only a devastating civil war in Lebanon but a wider Sunni-Shiite bloody conflict. The Arab Sunni states, especially, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, are terrified of this possible outcome. For them Lebanon may well provide the litmus test of the administration's resolve to inhibit Tehran's adventurism but they must be prepared to directly support U.S. efforts. In this regard, the Bush administration must wean Syria from Iran. This move is of paramount importance because not only could Syria end its political and logistical support for Hezbollah, but it could return Syria, which is predominantly Sunni, to the Arab-Sunni fold. President Bush must realize that Damascus' strategic interests are not compatible with Tehran's and the Assad regime knows only too well its future political stability and economic prosperity depends on peace with Israel and normal relations with the United States. President Bashar Assad may talk tough and embrace militancy as a policy tool; he is, however, the same president who called, more than once, for unconditional resumption of peace negotiation with Israel and was rebuffed. The stakes for the United States and its allies in the region are too high to preclude testing Syria's real intentions which can be ascertained only through direct talks. It is high time for the administration to reassess its policy toward Syria and begin by abandoning its schemes of regime change in Damascus. Syria simply matters; the administration must end its efforts to marginalize a country that can play such a pivotal role in changing the political dynamic for the better throughout the region. Although ideally direct negotiations between the United States and Iran should be the first resort to resolve the nuclear issue, as long as Tehran does not feel seriously threatened, it seems unlikely that the clergy will at this stage end the nuclear program. In possession of nuclear weapons Iran will intimidate the larger Sunni Arab states in the region, bully smaller states into submission, threaten Israel's very existence, use oil as a political weapon to blackmail the West and instigate regional proliferation of nuclear weapons' programs. In short, if unchecked, Iran could plunge the Middle East into a deliberate or inadvertent nuclear conflagration. If we take the administration at its word that it would not tolerate a nuclear Iran and considering these regional implications, Washington is left with no choice but to warn Iran of the severe consequences of not halting its nuclear program.

**Highest probability for conflict – lack of dialogue means miscalculation is likely.**

**Bennett** **2012 –** (John T., veteran national security correspondent “U.S., Iran Lack 'Dialogue' to Avoid a Costly Miscalculation” [http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/dotmil/2012/01/31/us-iran-lack-dialogue-to-avoid-a-costly-miscalculation)](http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/dotmil/2012/01/31/us-iran-lack-dialogue-to-avoid-a-costly-miscalculation%29//ALo)

U.S. and Iranian war ships have well-established ways of communication designed to avoid misreading their maneuvers and actions, but the two militaries still lack a mechanism commanders on each side could use to stave off a costly miscalculation. As tensions between Washington and Tehran rise over the latter's alleged nuclear weapons ambitions, the chances that one side might misinterpret something done by the other is an issue that keeps Pentagon officials awake at night. The U.S. military has not had an ongoing dialogue with Tehran's military since the late 1970s--but the stakes of that silence grow more dire each day as Iran defies American officials' insistence it abandon its nuclear arms program. U.S. Fleet Forces Command chief Adm. John Harvey told U.S. News & World Report Tuesday that the nations' navies use "standard ship-to-ship communications ... protocols that work well." The U.S. Navy puts its war ship commanding officers set to operate in Tehran's backyard through extensive training on how to interact with Iranian ships, he said. [Pictures: Iran Participates in War Games.] But when asked if a similar kind of communication framework is in place at a higher level of command to allow the rivals from making a miscalculation that could trigger a U.S.-Iranian conflict, Harvey replied: "Not much of a dialogue exists." Senior U.S. military commanders have worried about such a miscalculation for some time. During his last days on the job, then-Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Michael Mullen raised such worries. "We haven't had a connection with Iran since 1979. Even in the darkest days of the Cold War, we had links to the Soviet Union," Mullen said. "We are not talking to Iran, so we don't understand each other. If something happens, it's virtually assured that we won't get it right, that there will be miscalculation." And that scenario, Mullen warned, "would be extremely dangerous in that part of the world." This lack of communication means "Washington must play the long game, with a focus on the long-term benefits of engaging Iran and the dangers of miscommunication," Middle East expert Trita Parsi wrote in a coming book on the Obama administration's Iran policies.

# ---Advantage Updates---

# \*\*\*AFRICOM\*\*\*

# Sealift Key

**Sealift key to operations in AFRICOM**

**Ward 10** [William E. Ward, *USA Commander of PACOM,* March 9-10, 2010“2010 Posture Statement”, <http://www.africom.mil/research/USAFRICOM2010PostureStatement.pdf>, DMintz]

The level of funding for programs under the authority of DOS that are available to Africa has increased since the creation of U.S. Africa Command, and we request continued funding to allow us to fully pursue the defense aspects of the President’s stated priorities. The countries in our AOR are among the poorest in the world. Many of their militaries are inappropriately trained, equipped, and prepared for their primary missions—the defense of their state or participation in peacekeeping operations. Movement of U.S. and African military personnel and equipment to meet emergent threats, conduct capacity building activities, and respond to crises, is heavily dependent on U.S. military air and sealift.

# \*\*\*PACOM\*\*\*

# Uniqueness

**Budget challenges now means PACOM needs the plan to sustain its presence in the Pacific**

**Green 12** [Michael J. Green, *senior adviser and holds the Japan Chair at CSIS, as well as being an associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University, previously served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), been on the faculty of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and a senior adviser to the Office of Asia-Pacific Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,* April 13, 2012, Part of Global Forecast 2012, “Rethinking U.S. Military Presence in Asia and the Pacific”, CSIS, <http://csis.org/files/publication/120413_gf_green.pdf>, DMintz]

 For the past six decades the U.S. military has enjoyed preeminence in the Western Pacific, but there are increasing questions about whether this advantageous position is sustainable given a combination of budget cuts, asymmetrical military threats, and local opposition to bases. The bottom line is that the United States can and must retain a robust military presence in the region, taking advantage of new partnerships, technologies, and operational concepts—while recognizing that many of the challenges we face are not entirely new. Inertia and incrementalism will not work, however. The United States will need to develop a holistic strategy that builds on all the instruments of national power as we rebalance toward Asia.

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) faces a fundamental budget challenge: even with an administration pledge to hold U.S. capabilities steady in Asia while cutting force structure elsewhere, $487 billion in planned cuts means hollowing out other commands’ assets in ways that will ultimately force cannibalizing of PACOM assets when crises hit the Middle East or elsewhere. Moreover, upgrading, consolidating, and dispersing U.S. bases and facilities in the PACOM area of responsibility will cost money–even if the result is a smaller footprint. Any serious strategy for sustaining a presence will have to take this into consideration.

The military challenges to U.S. forward presence are also growing. China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities are increasing the risk to U.S. assets located within the so-called Second Island Chain (south from Japan through Guam). The quantity, range, and lethality of Chinese and even North Korean ballistic missiles have grown several-fold in the past decade. This threat has prompted some experts to propose pulling critical U.S. assets out of missile range so there will be a conventional retaliatory capability in the region. This proposal is both ahistorical and counterproductive, however.

 The United States actually tried such a strategy in the 1930s. Under “War Plan Orange,” a decrepit Asiatic Squadron left in the Philippines to deter attack was easily swept aside by the Imperial Japanese Navy, while the supposedly safe haven of Pearl Harbor proved far too vulnerable to air attack. Moreover, as the previous chief of naval operations has stressed, “you cannot surge trust.” Influence and engagement in the region depends on constant presence.

 Finally, it is worth remembering that the United States faced equally serious missile threats from the Soviet Union during the late Cold War. The response was not to scuttle and run, but instead to double down on air and naval assets and to integrate defense planning even more closely with Japan in order to complicate Soviet planning and enhance deterrence. That strategy worked, and the asymmetrical military challenges to our presence will require a similarly bold approach today.

The political challenges to U.S. forward presence in the Western Pacific are almost entirely local, but they matter. The most acute problem is in Okinawa, Japan, which has been forced by dint of history to host 80 percent of the U.S. military facilities in Japan. Efforts by the U.S. and Japanese governments to reduce that footprint by transferring 8,000 Marines to Guam have been hung up on local environmental permits needed to consolidate replacement facilities in Okinawa (specifically an order to close Marine Corps Air Station Futenma).

 Meanwhile, escalating costs and questions about the capacity of Guam to absorb the new forces have further complicated the budgetary and political environment. Early in 2012, the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to reduce the number of Marines going to Guam to 4,700 and to proceed with the move without waiting for the new facility to replace Futenma. That created some sense of forward movement, but it did not solve the basic problem of where to base Osprey and other aircraft the Marines need forward deployed. A solution will not come in a bilateral U.S.-Japan context alone; the Defense Department will have to find a way forward that involves new thinking about the Marines’ rotational practices in the region as a whole.

 Therein lays the opportunity for a fresh look at forward presence and engagement in the Western Pacific. China’s aggressive diplomatic and military assertion of its territorial claims in the East and South China Seas has prompted almost every neighboring state to seek closer ties to the United States and a more sustained U.S. military presence. The U.S. response cannot be uniform and must take into account the unique nature of our different bilateral relationships in the region, as well as our partners’ sensitivities vis-à-vis Beijing. However, the overall trend should be toward more jointness, integration, collaboration, and presence across the region.

**Budget cuts come as potential for conflict in the Pacific heightens**

**Fuentes 12** [Gidget Fuentes, *staff writer, reporter and writer who specializes in military issues,* March 12, 2012, “New PACOM faces expanded duties, budget cuts”, Navy Times, <http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/03/navy-new-pacific-command-leader-expanded-duties-budget-cuts-031212w/>, DMintz]

 The new head of U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Samuel Locklear, takes the helm of a 325,000-strong force that’s poised to be the focus of a new strategy aimed at countering a rising China amid budget cuts that will stretch U.S. defense capabilities thinner.

Locklear was sworn in March 9 at PACOM’s headquarters at Camp H.M. Smith in Hawaii, succeeding Adm. Robert Willard in leading the military’s largest unified combatant command. Willard, a veteran aviator and former Pacific Fleet commander, is retiring after a 39-year career.

A year ago, Locklear led the NATO operation in Libya in his post as commander of Naval Forces Europe, Naval Forces Africa and the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy.

His major challenge will be to execute a strategic “pivot” to a region that covers nearly half the globe on a budget set to shrink all four services and slow the Navy’s plans to replace its aging fleet — leading to longer deployments — while Asia’s defense spending, led by China, is poised to outstrip Europe’s for the first time.

U.S. military leaders have been concerned for years about China’s rise as a global power, but have been forced to focus their attention on conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia. Meanwhile, friction between Beijing and neighboring countries has grown over China’s claims to territory and resources in the South China Sea.

Other concerns include a nuclear-armed North Korea, whose stability is in doubt after the recent death of longtime leader Kim Jong Il, and natural disasters that frequently strike the region, along with instability from civil conflicts, terrorist attacks and piracy.

# Strategic Mobility

**Strategic mobility key to rapid response in the Pacific—solves China war and Korean conflict**

**Corleto 11** [Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. Corleto, April 1, 2011, “Future Joint Seabasing in the Asia-Pacific Region”, US Army War College, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA553114>, DMintz]

A peaceful and stable Asia-Pacific Region is vital to the security, stability and economic prosperity of the United States, its allies, and partners. The region plays an important role in the global economy and serves as an economic engine. The key to a secure, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific Region lies in assuring freedom of navigation and access throughout the Western Pacific. However, the region has had a turbulent past ranging from world wars to natural disasters. A nuclear armed North Korea and a potential emerging Chinese threat provides a basis for future turmoil. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States military has dramatically reduced its forward presence. It will be more reliant on continental United States (CONUS) based power projection and strategic mobility capabilities to rapidly respond to a wide range of military operations (ROMO). Current economic conditions and fiscal constraints will significantly affect future military capabilities and limit the amount of resources that can be deployed globally to support Geographic Combatant Commanders. Seabasing is a misunderstood concept that has been defined and described in a variety ways. This paper will distinguish the difference between seabasing (the verb) and future Joint Seabasing (the noun) in order to establish a common understanding. In the past, a variety of forms of seabasing has demonstrated utility and will have to change to compensate for future threats and a new security environment. Some of these future threats, such as China, may challenge the United States for regional influence. To deter future threats or conflicts with peer competitors, the US will require a flexible and effective military capability such as Joint Seabasing.

# ---Addons---

# WMD Terror – Military Key

**Quick military response key to solve WMD terrorism.**

**De Castro 2005** - Senior professor in the International Studies Department, De La Salle University, Manila, and the holder of the Charles Lui Keung Professorial Chair in China Studies; U.S. State Department ASEAN Research Fellow from the Philippines and was based in the Political Science Department of Arizona State University in 2009; Ph.D. from the Government and International Studies Department of the University of South Carolina as a Fulbright Scholar in 2001. (Renato Cruz, “U.S. War on Terror in East Asia: The Perils of Preemptive Defense in Waging a War of the Third Kind” Asian Affairs, an American Review. Washington: Winter 2005. Vol. 31, Iss. 4; pg. 212, 20 pgs, ProQuest)//ALo

As the war on terror progressed, however, the Bush administration pondered a tough new policy predicated on military retaliation and preemption of terrorism to replace the tedious, uncertain, and protracted method of low-intensity conflict. The new strategy considered the prospect of preemptive attacks against rogue and hostile states that have chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. This quickly triggered an intense debate among Pentagon insiders and military strategists on the wisdom and feasibility of such an approach against shadowy terrorist networks and potentially hostile states that might use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the United States. Nonetheless, the Bush administration announced that it was formulating a new national security doctrine that would move away from the cold war principle of containment and deterrence and toward a policy espousing preemptive attacks against terrorist and hostile states with WMD. In September 2002, the Bush administration released the National security Strategy of the United States of America. The new security doctrine expresses America's intention to use every tool in the country's arsenal-including military power-to create a balance of power against suspicious networks or groups that can wreak havoc on and create chaos in American society. It categorically states that the thrust of the current administration is preemptive action to counter a sufficient threat to American national security.38 In military parlance, preemption means attacking a threat before it materializes. The new security policy stipulates that the United States will identify and thwart emerging threats. In part, it reads: The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat the greater is the risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessarily, act preemptively.39 To achieve this objective, the new niitional security doctrine admonishes the U.S. government to frustrate potential threats before they are fully operational and before they reach America's borders. It also behooves the U.S. government to develop better and more effective intelligence capabilities, to transform the American military, and to strengthen coordination with American allies in assessing the most dangerous threats to their common interests. The doctrine specifically states: To support preemptive options, we will: a) build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge; b) coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.40 The release of this new security policy marks the radical militarization of the war on terror and conveys the Bush administration's intention to wage a total and disproportionate war against asymmetrical opponents-terrorist organizations and rogue states. More significantly, it announces to the world the application of a unique "American approach" in addressing international terrorism, and America's way or means of wielding its power and organizing a new global order through its unrivaled military capability.41 The prospect of another surprise terrorist attack, but using WMDs, against the United States and the capability of hostile states to develop biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons made the Bush administration assume that a preemptive strategy might be the only viable means to confront the problem of international terrorism. The new security strategy presents a counterterrorist measure founded on a policy of military predominance emphasizing preemptive strikes, offensive military intervention, and proactive proliferation moves against rogue states and terrorist networks. The strategy's emphasis on military means is based on the political assumption that terrorist networks have to be destroyed as quickly as possible before they can inflict more damage to the United States. It further assumes that terrorism is masterminded by visible, identifiable, and hostile political actors that must be demolished or neutralized to demoralize terrorist networks. Finally, it presupposes that states harboring or supporting terrorist organizations can be compelled to change their policies through military means. Considered as a grand strategy, the new security doctrine conveys Washington's intention to use hard power-coercive, physical military power-and the nation's economic resources to address the dangers posed terrorism and rogue states. As a concept in strategic studies, a national or grand strategy pertains to the doctrine guiding states in the utilization of their national economic resources and manpower to sustain their military capabilities vis-à-vis other states. It also relates the aspect of controlling and utilizing the resources of a state-or a coalition of states-including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interest shall be effectively promoted and secured against opponents, which are often state actors. The new security strategy pits a highly realist and militarized doctrine against a systemic and nonstate security challenge. In the past, the United States has demonstrated its military prowess against states with defined territories and with conventional and concentrated military forces. Terrorism, however, presents the United States without a clear, identifiable, and tangible threat. International terrorism is a product of a historical or global process, not by a purposive, hostile, and identifiable state. Addressing this type of threat is not a simple extension of war among state actors to nonstate actors because terrorist groups usually will not challenge U.S. forces if the risk entails confronting American firepower, mobility, and overall technological superiority. They probably will employ cheap counter-strategies to neutralize U.S. military superiority or create explicit or tacit threats directed against the American homeland and other soft targets.42 Lacking the ability to challenge the United States and its allies militarily, terrorist groups will concentrate their efforts on breaking the American will to continue the campaign, disrupting its alliances, and shattering the domestic political support behind the war on terror. These efforts simply may involve surviving in a way that is highly visible and disruptive to the stronger state's capabilities and prestige. These effects also will include the occasional use of violence, which can cast doubts on the success of military and political efforts, which in turn can erode popular support for the counterterror campaign.43 Despite its military prowess and technological superiority, the United States cannot fully anticipate or respond to any future plot by numerous, amorphous, and diverse terrorist cells worldwide, nor will it have the capacity to intervene in all the states that have or harbor terrorist organizations within their territories. It is doubtful whether a new national security doctrine based on a highly realist and militarized approach could provide relevant precepts of statecraft in an emerging post-Westphalian system characterized by the emergence of nonstate actors that are determined in and capable of challenging states through nonmilitary and non-conventional means. The 9/11 events, the consequent war on terror, and the formulation and release of a new national security strategy based on preemption gave Washington a fresh and potent purpose for renewed American global activism. However, because terrorist organizations cannot be deterred, the United States must be prepared and willing to intervene anywhere and anytime to preemptively destroy this threat. Furthermore, since the United States is the only state that has the force-projection capability to respond to terrorist and rogue states around the world, it will need to play a direct, unilateral, and, sometimes, unconstrained role in responding to this threat. However, this will force the U.S. military to deploy its troops and all available resources against a dangerous and lethal but amorphous opponent that never can be entirely eliminated but only can be reduced to and kept at a level that does not threaten international peace and stability.

# ---Disads---

# \*\*\*Generic\*\*\*

# DAR Inevitable

**Your links are non-unique—Congress is going to update DAR inevitability—just a question of doing it now or in February**

**ADC 12** [Association of Defense Communities, *the nation’s premier membership organization supporting communities and states with active, closed and closing defense installations,* May 23, 2012, “Senate Panel Asks for Details on Planned Changes to DOD’s Roads Program”, [http://www.defensecommunities.org/headlines/senate-panel-asks-for-details-on-planned-changes-to-dods-roads-programs/#](http://www.defensecommunities.org/headlines/senate-panel-asks-for-details-on-planned-changes-to-dods-roads-programs/), DMintz]

The Department of Defense is considering improving and expanding the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program, according to the committee report accompanying the fiscal 2013 military construction and veterans affairs spending bill approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee on Tuesday.

The changes are intended to address the strict eligibility requirements of the program, which is the only mechanism DOD has for upgrading roads outside of military installations. To be eligible for aid through the DAR program, an installation must demonstrate that traffic congestion for commuters has doubled, an extremely high hurdle for urban areas to satisfy, according to the report.

The lawmakers direct DOD to provide Congress its plan and recommendations for updating the DAR program when it submits its FY 2014 budget request next February.

“Well-planned and maintained transportation infrastructure adjacent to military facilities increases mobility, improves livability and enhances relations between the base and the local community,” the report states.

# \*\*\*Politics\*\*\*

# DAR Popular

**Plan bipartisan – House eligibility expansion proves.**

**Lanham 2011** – (Congressional Documents and Publications “House Passes Bill with BRAC Transportation Reforms; Rep. Gerald E. Connolly (D-VA) News Release” May 26, 2011., ProQuest)//ALo

The U.S. House of Representatives today passed a defense authorization bill that includes language advanced by Congressmen Jim Moran and Gerry Connolly that would make it easier for DoD to allocate funds to improve roads and expand transit outside the boundaries of military facilities including Fort Belvoir, the Engineering Proving Ground, and Quantico Marine Base in Northern Virginia. More than 20,000 new employees will be moving to the three sites as a result of BRAC. Current DoD regulations, unchanged since 1978, prohibit DoD from spending funds off base unless it can be shown that base changes will result in doubling of vehicular traffic around the facility. Densely populated areas like Northern Virginia and the entire National Capital Region with already-congested roads are unable to qualify for DoD funding due to the "doubling of traffic" requirement. The House passed the National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540) by a vote of 322-96. It now moves to the Senate for consideration. "This is an important bipartisan victory in our efforts to improve transportation infrastructure around Fort Belvoir to mitigate the impact of the thousands of new employees coming to the base due to BRAC," Connolly said. "Our language included in this House-passed bill makes a key change in DoD regulations that allows DoD to use transportation improvement funding off-base to make desperately needed road and transit improvements." Without this language DoD cannot make improvements outside the base without a determination that traffic would double due to base expansion. That's tough to do. How do you double gridlock?" "The BRAC moves in Northern Virginia have caused a six-year headache," said Moran. "Transportation issues at Ft. Belvoir and the Mark Center serve as glaring examples of the flaws in the current BRAC process. The reforms included in the NDAA will allow the DoD to learn from the costly mistakes of BRAC 2005." Last July, Connolly, Moran, and Senator Mark Warner wrote to Defense Secretary Robert Gates urging him to reevaluate the DoD regulations, noting that off-site transportation improvements at the three Northern Virginia military facilities are nowhere close to being ready due to lack of funds. About $1.4 billion in identified off-site priorities are not funded. Section 2804 of the bill improves the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program, which distributes funding for defense-related road improvements, by eliminating a requirement that traffic must double on surrounding roads before funds are delivered. It further expands the program to fund transit, pedestrian, and bicycle infrastructure in addition to roads. The provision retroactively applies the change to BRAC 2005 recommendations. Another important provision added by the two congressmen, section 2706, reforms the BRAC commission's decision-making process by mandating that future commissions consider the capacity of existing transportation surrounding receiving installations and take into account the cost of road improvements. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense will be required to consult with the Federal Highway Administration if proposed relocations will have a significant impact on existing transportation infrastructure.

**Both Houses support the plan—they’ll assist its passage in Congress**

**Office of Congressman Gerry Connolly 10** [Office of Congressman Gerry Connolly, August 2, 2010, “Release: Connolly, Moran, Warner Write Defense Secretary on BRAC Needs” , <http://connolly.house.gov/news/release-connolly-moran-warner-write-defense-secretary-on-brac-needs/>, DMintz]

 Congressman Gerry Connolly, Congressman Jim Moran, and Senator Mark Warner are urging the Defense Department to reevaluate its outdated regulations that inhibit funding for road and transit projects around Fort Belvoir, the Engineering Proving Ground, and Quantico Marine Base in Northern Virginia to help state and local governments cope with the influx of more than 27,000 new employees scheduled to be transferred to the three military facilities a year from now.

In a July 30 letter to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Connolly, Moran, and Warner said the off-site transportation improvements needed to handle the new employees due the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) plans “are nowhere near close to being ready due to lack of funds.” The three lawmakers noted that the Commonwealth of Virginia and Fairfax County have invested more than $350 million in transportation improvements around Fort Belvoir, but $1.4 billion in identified off-site priorities are not funded.

The three lawmakers warned Gates that the “BRAC relocations to Fort Belvoir and the Engineering Proving Ground simply will not work without transit service.” They pointed out that “When the 2005 BRAC movements are complete, the workforce at Fort Belvoir will rival that of the Pentagon, but, as you know, the Pentagon is served by a robust multimodal network of transportation options to ensure an orderly movement of military and civilian commuters.”

Connolly, Moran, and Warner said DoD’s “rigid” Defense Access Road (DAR) program hasn’t been changed since 1978 and contains requirements that do not reflect the needs of the military or the Northern Virginia jurisdictions that will face a dramatic increase in traffic on already congested roadways. Under the current DAR, densely populated communities with highly-congested interstates and secondary roads are unable to qualify for DoD funding due to the requirement that traffic must double in order to receive assistance. “In fact, the criteria put metropolitan areas like the National Capital Region at a distinct disadvantage,” they wrote.

The congressmen and senator said just two roads, Interstate 95 and U.S. Route 1, will provide primary access to the new regional hospital, offices, and related facilities at Belvoir. The National Capital Region suffers the third-worst congestion in the country, and, according to the Virginia Department of Transportation, the worst bottleneck in Northern Virginia is located on I-95 between Quantico and Fort Belvoir.

Connolly, Moran, and Warner also urged the Defense Secretary to give Northern Virginia jurisdictions and state government “a stronger voice in requesting projects through the DAR program. “Currently, such requests must originate with garrison commanders, who are presented with a Sophie’s choice between on- and off-site improvements that are critical to mission-ready operations. While local and state leaders may not have insight to the needs of our military posts, they have intimate knowledge of local infrastructure necessary to support them and should be part of the decision making process.”

**Connolly, Moran, and Warner told Gates they are ready to assist DoD in updating its Defense Access Roads program through administrative or legislative means.**

# Defense Spending Popular

**Enacting military programs are easy—they’ve got the political support.**

**Dayen 10** [David Dayen, “Defense Spending Cuts Face Likely Congressional Override,” Monday May 17, 2010 9:18 am,
<http://news.firedoglake.com/2010/05/17/defense-spending-cuts-face-likely-congressional-override/>, DMintz]

The lesson of Congress in the modern age is that it’s much harder to eliminate a program than it is to enact one. Every program has a champion somewhere on Capitol Hill, and it probably only needs one to be saved – but 218 and 60 to be put into motion. A case in point: our bloated military budget. The Obama Administration has generally tried to cancel out unnecessary defense programs, with meager success in the last budget year. Congress will probably assert themselves in an election year, however. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has vowed to impose fiscal austerity at the Pentagon, but his biggest challenge may be persuading Congress to go along. Lawmakers from both parties are poised to override Gates and fund the C-17 cargo plane and an alternative engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter — two weapons systems the defense secretary has been trying to cut from next year’s budget. They have also made clear they will ignore Gates’s pleas to hold the line on military pay raises and health-care costs, arguing that now is no time to skimp on pay and benefits for troops who have been fighting two drawn-out wars. The competing agendas could lead to a major clash between Congress and the Obama administration this summer. Gates has repeatedly said he will urge President Obama to veto any defense spending bills that include money for the F-35′s extra engine or the C-17, both of which he tried unsuccessfully to eliminate last year. Last year, after a similarly protracted struggle, Gates succeeded in getting Congress to end funding for the F-22, a plane which tended to malfunction in the rain. Seriously. But Congress did not move on the F-35 engine or the C-17, and they seem similarly positioned this year. Ike Skelton and Carl Levin support the F-35 engine, for example, and included it in their appropriation requests out of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, which they separately chair. I fully recognize that the off-limits discussion about military spending concerns the bases in over 100 countries and continued adventures abroad in places where “victory” means almost nothing. But it’s a symptom of the same problem – the persistent inertia that aids the military-industrial complex to keep the war machine moving. And so we get new engines to planes that don’t need new engines

**The plan is massively popular—it adds to the defense budget, and any cuts are political fiascos.**

**Yglesias 10** [Matthew Yglesias 2010. (Center for American Progress). April 8, 2010. “How Politically Feasible Are Defense Spending Cuts?”, DMintz]

<http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/archives/2010/04/how-politically-feasible-are-defense-spending-cuts.php>

The most relevant issue, when thinking about cuts, is thinking about the political fight that ensues. If a President proposed cutting the defense budget and then you had a ton of stories in the press where senior military officers fret off the record that the cuts will endanger America, and every television network trotted out a former general with undisclosed ties to defense contractors as an “independent analyst” to condemn the cuts, and if active duty soldiers sent emails to their civilian family and friends complaining about the cuts, and if think tank experts who depend on cooperation with the military to do their research either complained about the cuts or else stayed silent, then I think you’d have a giant political fiasco on your hands**.** The relevant issue here, in other words, is that the military is the most trusted institution in America and then on top of that the defense sector of the economy has a lot of money and economic reach. Consequently, it’s very political difficult for a president to do anything that provokes the ire of the defense establishment whether or not it polls well in the abstract. This seems to me to be a huge problem in American political life, but it’s not obvious to me what steps will resolve it.

**Congress views defense spending as sacred.**

**McLaughlin 11** [Seth McLaughlin, *staff writer for The Washington Times,* March 23, 2011, “Defense cuts a tough sell in bid to curb deficit”, Washington Times, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/23/defense-cuts-a-tough-sell-in-bid-to-curb-deficit/?page=all#pagebreak>, DMintz]

Congressional leaders have spent months telling voters that all spending must be on the table, but so far the rhetoric is ringing hollow on Capitol Hill, where defense cuts remain a tough sell. That was clear last week after Sen. Rand Paul presented his Republican colleagues with military cuts as part of a broader effort to balance the budget within five years. “I got several fairly vocal objections to it,” the Kentucky Republican told The Washington Times. “Most people in the caucus are for having a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution, but they don’t want to crunch the numbers necessarily. I think they know when you crunch the numbers that even if you eliminate all the non-military spending, you’re still short.” Thanks in large part to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, defense spending has ballooned since 2000, jumping from $294 billion to roughly $700 billion a year, or 20 percent of the entire federal budget. And, generally speaking over that time, lawmakers have grown accustomed to giving the Pentagon whatever it wants for fear of being called weak on defense. “At the end of the day, even when you take out the cost of the wars, military spending in the base budget has grown close to $1 trillion since 2000,” said Christopher A. Preble, director of foreign-policy studies at the libertarian-leaning Cato Institute. “So, I think there is kind of a growing realization that the cost that we have incurred on behalf of a lot of other places around the world are growing increasingly burdensome, and the military has not exactly been starved of funds.” Sen. Rand Paul, Kentucky Republican, says lawmakers are going to have to face the “inconvenient truth” that “we will have to cut military spending if we are really in favor of balancing the budget.” (Associated Press) After the November election, there appeared to be a growing sense that defense spending was going to have to be on the table to get the nation’s fiscal house in order, as voters vented anxiety over the nation’s trillion-dollar deficits and more than $14 trillion national debt. The narrative spilled over into December, when the president’s high-profile deficit-reduction commission released a well-received set of recommendations. “Defense has to be on the table; that’s obvious,” said then-Sen. Judd Gregg, a commission member. “We looked hard a defense and made a suggested top-line number, and then listed a large number of specific cuts that would accomplish the top line.” But months later, none of the key players has offered up specifics. House Republicans and Senate Democrats have approved stopgap spending bills that avoid military cuts. President Obama, meanwhile, offered up a 2012 spending plan that only cuts projected military-spending growth. He’s also specifically cited the underfunding of the military as a reason to veto House spending bills. Recent military action in Libya only complicates the situation further, as the administration hasn’t provided any estimate for the related costs, leaving some lawmakers fearful that it will grow to eat up at least some of the savings that they’ve worked to pass in recent months. While the move won’t break the bank, Mr. Preble said that U.S. involvement in the North African nation is another example of why lawmakers and military leaders need to rethink the role the U.S. military plays across the globe. “It’s not the waste. Its not the inefficiency” that’s driving up the defense spending, Mr. Preble said. “We spend too much because we use our military too much.” The sentiment is catching on with some Republicans. During a recent appearance in Iowa, Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour, a likely candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 2012, said that the GOP won’t have any credibility on spending if they are not willing to tackle the defense budget. Whatever the case, Mr. Paul said eventually lawmakers are going to have to face the “inconvenient truth” that “we will have to cut military spending if we are really in favor of balancing the budget.” “That’s something that conservatives will have to overcome, because many think that every military dollar is sacred, that every military dollar is for national defense, and really in the end we have to acknowledge that military spending has doubled in the last 10 years, and we simply can’t balance the budget by cutting non-military spending.”

**Plan is massively popular—Congress hates defense spending cuts—would even go against the Secretary of Defense’s proposals.**

**Gelb 2010** [Leslie H. Gelb, *former NYT columnist and senior government official,* March 22, 2010, “Robert Gates' Lonely Crusade”, The Daily Beast, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-05-22/defense-secretary-robert-gates-cuts-military-budget/2/>, DMintz]

The defense secretary has the best facts and the best arguments on his side. He’s also playing the politics of the occasion just right—starting small, small enough just to make the point without rousing the lions of the military-industrial complex. Alas, it only takes the bare scent of challenge to rouse them, and they’re roaring. And with just a few days to go before the Pentagon budget is reported out by the House and Senate Armed Services committees, it looks as if Mr. Gates’ noble crusade will garner little support on Capitol Hill. No matter how just the cause, Washington can’t make a tough decision. It is broke financially and broken politically. The ding-dongers or tea baggers or whatever they are, are certainly right about that—but even they don’t want to cut military outlays. Mr. Gates has been invoking the famous words and warnings of former general and President Eisenhower to enhance his crusade. That name may cause goose bumps for my generation, but probably leaves cold most members of Congress, who think Ronald Reagan commanded the Allied forces during World War II. Nonetheless, Eisenhower is the right model. Gates’ main takeaway from the former five-star general is this: “The United States…could only be as militarily strong as it was economically dynamic and fiscally sound.” He also deploys two crushing quotes from the former president. The first one regards Eisenhower’s classic warning about the military-industrial complex: “This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience… We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications.” This is a warning about ever higher and unjustified spending. The second one is Eisenhower’s punch line: “We must not destroy from within what we are trying to defend from without.” In other words, the U.S. economy must come first. The defense secretary hauls out a truckload of examples of waste and mismanagement that can be safely cut. Two decades after the end of the Cold War, we still have more than 40 generals, or their equivalents, based on the European continent, and one can find as many as 30 layers between Gates and an action officer. To no one’s surprise, Gates notes that overhead accounts for roughly 40 percent of the Defense budget. As far as weapons spending is concerned, Gates insists that the Air Force already has more than enough C-17 cargo planes, despite Congressional insistence that production lines keep belching unneeded aircrafts. He is similarly trying to prevent a Congressional mandate to develop a second, or alternative, engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter for $3 billion, when the existing one is perfectly satisfactory. These Congressional maneuverings are all about jobs in the districts and states and NOT about national security. Of course, Gates also wants to curb military health-care costs, which now total $50 billion and rising. His band aid would be to increase premiums for retired military. No one is betting on this. Mostly, Congress is trying to ignore the defense secretary’s crusade. Most of the leadership there concedes privately that the Pentagon boss is absolutely correct in what he’s trying to do. They fully understand that American military power cannot survive the United States being a huge debtor nation. They know military cuts must come, along with slashes in other areas. But when vote comes to vote, it’s always “not in my backyard.” About the most sympathetic statement Gates has received from a Congressional power broker came from Senator Carl Levin. The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee gave Gates “high grades for courage” and insisted Congress would “like to be helpful.” Meantime, the relevant committees have already voted against some of Gates' recommendations. For example, the House Armed Services Committee approved a 1.9 percent military pay increase—0.5 percent more than Gates sought, though military pay increases now exceed that of comparable civilian jobs. Two of that committee’s subcommittees also approved $485 million to continue the second engine program for the F-35. Nonetheless, this highly unlikely crusader charges on. Gates is receiving modest press attention. Pushback is beginning from the military-industrial complex and conservative intellectuals who are pumping for increases in spending, not decreases. In fact, Mr. Gates is keeping his crusade alive almost all by himself—if you don’t count New York Times editorials. The White House is notably absent from the public arena on this one, though Mr. Gates warns Congress of an Obama veto of the Pentagon bill if Gates’ recommendations are flouted. But no one in Congress has been seen trembling at this threat.

# Emergency Relief Popular

**Emergency relief humanitarian assistance is universally popular**

**Serafino 08** [Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, December 9, 2008, “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress”, FAS, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34639.pdf>, DMintz]

 DOD humanitarian assistance often draws praise when provided in emergency relief situations, such as natural and manmade disasters, as it is the most flexible operational and policy tool that can be quickly brought to bear to relieve human suffering. Controversy has arisen, however, when U.S. military troops provide humanitarian and civic assistance for the longer term (i.e., in nonemergency or conflict recovery situations). Such longer-term assistance occurs in the course of military operations and deployments, or when training exercises are conducted extensively in an area over a prolonged period of time. Then, humanitarian and civic assistance is often used for political purposes, including maintaining contact with a country, region, or local population; mitigating tensions; cultivating allies; and promoting democracy.

# ---Counterplans---

# \*\*\*Alt Mech CPs\*\*\*

# DAR Key

**DAR is the only way to fund improvements outside of MOTs**

**ADC 11** [Association of Defense Communities, *the nation’s premier membership organization supporting communities and states with active, closed and closing defense installations,* June 30, 2011, “Pentagon Needs to Improve Defense Roads Program, Senate Appropriators Say”, [http://www.defensecommunities.org/headlines/pentagon-needs-to-improve-defense-roads-program-senate-appropriators-say/#](http://www.defensecommunities.org/headlines/pentagon-needs-to-improve-defense-roads-program-senate-appropriators-say/), DMintz]

The Defense Department should improve the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program, focusing on adjusting the eligibility criteria, the Senate Appropriations Committee said in its report accompanying the fiscal 2012 military construction and veterans affairs spending bill.

The lawmakers direct DOD to address the recommendations included in recent reviews of the DAR program by the Government Accountability Office and the National Academy of Sciences Transportation Research Board. **The program is the only federal mechanism for the military to fund improvements to roads outside of an installation**.

# \*\*\*States\*\*\*

# Cant Solve

**States can’t solve – funding.**

**GAO 2011** (Brian J. Lepore, Director Defense Capabilities and Management, Report to the Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives “ DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program” January 2011, http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/315273.pdf )//ALo

The recent concurrent implementation of numerous Department of Defense (DOD) initiatives—including the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, force structure increases for the Army and the Marine Corps under the Grow the Force initiative, a major Army reorganization known as force modularity and the redeployment of U.S. forces in overseas locations back to the United States under the Global Defense Posture Realignment—has resulted in anticipated and actual growth at many domestic military installations and has produced a concomitant increase in unmet transportation needs in many surrounding communities. According to several transportation experts, while many of these needs may have existed prior to the growth, DOD growth has exacerbated those needs with, for example, increased traffic congestion. Military and civilian quality of life as well as military mission, in certain cases, can be adversely affected if off-installation transportation infrastructure becomes significantly overburdened due to growth in installation populations. State and local highway agencies are primarily responsible for developing and maintaining public highways that meet normal defense and other transportation needs. These agencies rely on federal dollars primarily from the Highway Trust Fund to help accomplish this mission. In fiscal year 2009, approximately $42.4 billion was provided to states and the District of Columbia through this fund for highway-related projects. 1 In addition, in February 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided another approximately $25.6 billion for state and local highway infrastructure investment projects. Nonetheless, a large backlog of unmet transportation needs remains, in part because state and local governments have experienced fiscal pressures that have strained their ability to help fund their share of transportation projects. 2 While it is difficult to determine the magnitude of the unmet needs, we reported in 2009 that communities surrounding 18 military installations expecting BRAC-related growth had estimated over $2 billion in defense-related transportation needs. 3 This has resulted in an increased interest in the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program to help mitigate adverse transportation impacts.

**States can’t solve – laundry list.**

**Weiner and Godwin 2011** – \*a transportation consultant in Silver Spring, Maryland, served as staff to the committee for this study \*\*Godwin is TRB Director, Studies and Special Programs. (Edward and Stephen R. “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases” New Transportation Research Board Special Report, APRIL 2011, <http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/trnews/trnews273sr302.pdf> )//ALo

In BRAC cases, state and local jurisdictions must cope with the following challenges: u The rapid pace of traffic growth on heavily used facilities, particularly in urbanized areas with limited options for expansion; u The lengthy process for evaluating the environmental impact of projects and for including them in state and regional transportation plans; u The intense competition among state and local projects for available federal and state aid for capacity enhancements; and u The general shortage of available state and local funds.

# \*\*\*NEPA\*\*\*

# Normal Means

**It’s normal means for projects to undergo NEPA environmental reviews—delay doesn’t apply to the aff.**

**National Academy of Science 11** [National Academy of Science (Transportation Research Board),  *expertise in transportation budgeting and policy, military budgeting and policy, infrastructure planning, state and local infrastructure management, economics, and military facility planning,* 2011, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases: Special Report 302”, <http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13104>, DMintz]

Environmental Streamlining

The development of transportation projects depends as much on meeting state and federal environmental requirements as it does on funding. The Safe, Accountable, Flexible Efficient, Transportation Equity Act of 2005 includes a number of provisions designed to expedite the environmental review of transportation projects mandated by NEPA.1 These provisions are designed to improve interagency communication and analysis in order to meet NEPA requirements in a more timely way than they have been met in the past. Executive Order 13274 (September 18, 2002), among other things, empowered the Secretary of Transportation to identify high-priority projects that deserve special attention by resource agencies required to conduct NEPA reviews and analyses in order to expedite their review. Streamlining does not bypass NEPA or other federal requirements; instead, it attempts to resolve complex interagency reviews and enhance communication so that determinations can be made regarding compliance with NEPA and other requirements. FHWA maintains a website with extensive information about environmental stewardship and streamlining, including case examples, guidance, and performance reports.2

# \*\*\*OEA\*\*\*

# Fails – Interagency Cooperation

**OEA fails—can’t guide interagency cooperation**

 **ADC 11** [Association of Defense Communities, *the nation’s premier membership organization supporting communities and states with active,* March 3, 2011, “Use of Defense Roads Program Limited, GAO Finds”, [http://www.defensecommunities.org/headlines/use-of-defense-roads-program-limited-gao-finds/#](http://www.defensecommunities.org/headlines/use-of-defense-roads-program-limited-gao-finds/), DMintz]

The department’s Office of Economic Adjustment has provided technical assistance and grants for growth planning; however, that agency cannot guide interagency cooperation at a high enough level to identify potential funds needed to fill the unmet transportation needs, the report said.

# ---Critiques---

# Imperialism is OK

**Military involvement is productive – countries request US assistance.**

**Kaplan 2005** – a national correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly and a visiting professor at the U.S. Naval Academy (Robert D.,“Classic Imperialism” 23 Sep 2005, Wall Street Journal, ProQuest)//ALo

I embedded for a month with a Special Forces A-team in southern Algeria, the first U.S. military opening in that erstwhile radical Arab state since the Allied invasion of North Africa in 1942. I watched as one captain, one warrant officer and nine sergeants worked and lived with an Algerian Special Forces company on an equal basis, eating each other's food, shooting each other's weapons, and trying out each other's field techniques. The Algerians won a counterinsurgency struggle in the 1990s against terrorists more vicious than those in Iraq, a war that Middle East area experts doubted could be won; they were obviously worth training with. And the A-team provided a deft hinge for the further improvement of U.S.- Algerian relations, a process spurred by the collapse of the non- aligned movement and the common experience of fighting Islamic insurgents. To Algeria's south, in such countries as Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad, the Special Forces teams weren't training with host nation troops so much as mentoring them, owing to their rudimentary state. For a relatively small outlay in men and expenditures, the U.S. military has begun developing a badly needed, pan-African intervention force. Who could possibly be against such classic imperialism, provided, of course, that the term itself is not used? Not the Democrats, certainly. After all, it was Sen. John Kerry who called for a dramatic increase in Special Forces in the last election. Anyone truly opposed to most U.S. military missions abroad will have to find a fringe candidate to support next time around. For in the overwhelming majority of cases, U.S. troops are acting upon requests from struggling democratic governments to take in hand their armed forces, so that their soldiers will defend democracy, not subvert it. This was particularly true in Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, where American troops conducted the bulk of the training missions rather than NATO per se.

# Bonus Heg Card

**Multipolarity is inevitable, but hegemony is key to the transition.**

**Kaplan 2009** – a national correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly and a visiting professor at the U.S. Naval Academy (Robert D “A gentler hegemony ... It is time for us (America) to be humble” Jan 2, 2009, News India - Times. New York, N.Y.:. Vol. 40, Iss. 1; pg. 2, 2 pgs, ProQuest)//ALo

Dedinism is in the air. The latest conventional wisdom is that the combination of the disastrous Iraq war, the military and economic rise of Asia, and the steep recession in the West has chastened America, ending its period of dominance in world affairs. It is time for us to be humble. There is a lot of truth to this, but it goes too far. For decline itself - as a concept - is overrated Britain's Royal Navy went into relative decline beginning in the 1890s, even as Great Britain remained powerful enough to help save the West in two worid wars over the next half-century. The proper analogy may be the Indian Mutiny in 1857 and 1858, after the orientalists and other pragmarists in the British power structure, who wanted ? leave traditional India as it was, lost sway to Evangelical and Utilitarian reformers who wanted to more forcefully Christianize India - to make it in a values sense more like England. The reformers were good people: They helped abolish the slave trade and tried to do the same with die hideous practice of widow-burning. But their attempts to bring the fruits ofWestern civilization, virtuous as they were, to a far-off comer of the worid played a role in a violent revolt against imperial authority. Yet the debacle did not signal the end of the British Empire, which expanded for nearly another century. Rather, it signaled a transition away from an ad hoc Imperium fired occasionally by an ill-disciplined lust ? impose its values abroad - and to a calmer, more pragmatic and soldiering empire built on trade, education and technology. That is akin to where we are now, post-Iraq: calmer, more pragmatic and with a military - especially a Navy - that, while in relative decline, is still far superior to any other on Earth. Near the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy had almost 600 ships; it is down to 280. But in aggregate tonnage that is still more than the next 17 navies combined. Our military secures the global commons to the benefit of all nations. Without the U.S. Navy, the seas would be unsafe for merchant shipping, which, in an era of globalization, accounts for 90 percent of world trade. We may not be able to control events on land in the Middle East, but our Navy and Air Force control all entry and exit points to the region. The multinational anti-piracy patrols that have taken shape in the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden have done so under the aegis of the U.S. Navy. Sure the economic crisis will aflea shipbuilding, meaning the decline in the number of our ships will continue, and there will come a point where quantity affects quality. But this will be an exceedingly gradual transition, which we will assuage by leveraging naval allies such as India and Japan. Then there are the dozens of training deployments around the worid that the U.S. military, particularly Army Special Forces, conducts in any given week We are all over Africa, Asia and latin America with these small missions that increase America's diplomatic throw-weight without running the risk of getting us bogged down. Aside from Iraq and Afghanistan, our military posture around the worid is generally light, lethal and highly mobile. We have been quietly reducing land forces in South Korea while compensating with a more effective air and naval presence. In Colombia, platoon-size numbers of Green Berets have been instrumental in fighting narco-terrorists; in Algeria, such training teams have helped improve our relationship with diat formerly radical Arab country. Such stripped-down American military deployments gamer no headlines, but they are a formula that works. The Marines, after becoming virtually desert forces since 2001, will return to their expeditionary roots aboard amphibious ships in the Greater Indian Ocean and Western Pacific American military power is not going away. But instead of being in your-face, it will lurk just over the horizon. And that will make all the difference. In sum, we may no longer be at Charles Krauthammer's "Unipolar Moment," but neither have we become Sweden. Declinism of the son being preached will go immediately out of fashion at the worid's next humanitarian catastrophe, when the very people enraged at the U.S. military because of Iraq will demand that it lead a coalition to save lives. We might have intervened in Darfur had we not been bogged down in Iraq; after Cyclone Nargis, our ships would have provided large-scale relief, had Burma's military government allowed them to proceed As worid population rises, and with vast urban areas with tottering infrastructures in the most environmentally and seismically fragile zones, the opportunities for U.S. military-led disaster relief will be legion. The American military remains a force for good, a fact that will become self-evident in the crises to come. Of course we are entering a more multipolar world. The only economic growth over the next year or two will come from developing nations, notably India and China. But there are other realities, too. We should not underestimate the diplomatic and moral leverage created by the combination of the world's most expeditionary military and a new president who will boast high approval ratings at home and around the world No power but the United States has the wherewithal to orchestrate an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, and our intervention in Iraq has not changed that fact. Everyone hates the word, but the United States is still a hegemon of sorts, able to pivotaUy influence the worid from a position of moral strength. Yet American hegemony post-Iraq will be as changed as Britain's was after the Indian Mutiny. It will be a more benign and temperate version of what transpired in recent years. Henceforth, we will shape coalitions rather than act on our own. For that, after all, is the essence of a long and elegant decline: to pass responsibility on to like-minded others as their own capacities rise.