## 1AC

### Inherency

#### Congress has ceased additional procurement of C-17 strategic airlift forces now

Gertler, Military Aviation Specialist at CRS, ’10 (Jeremiah, April 6, “Air Force C-17 Aircraft Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress” http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/19040.pdf)

Procurement of C-17 airlift aircraft began in FY1988, and a total of 223 have been procured through FY2010. The Administration’s proposed FY2011 defense budget proposed to end C-17 procurement and did not request any funding for the procurement of additional C-17s. Further, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in testimony to the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, stated, “Should Congress add funds to continue this program, I will strongly recommend a presidential veto.” The Administration argues that enough C-17s have now been procured to meet future operational needs. Supporters of procuring additional C-17s in FY2011 believe additional C-17s will be needed to meet future operational needs. The issue of how much airlift capability will be needed in the future is currently being examined in a congressionally mandated study being done by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) and in a separate Department of Defense (DOD) study called the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), which was due to be completed by the end of 2009. The primary issue for Congress in FY2011 is whether to procure additional C-17s. An additional issue is whether to pass legislation relating to the airlift aircraft force structure. Congress’s decisions on these issues could affect DOD capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. military aircraft industrial base.

### Plan

#### The United States federal government should procure additional strategic airlift capabilities.

### Hegemony Advantage

#### Strategic airlift like the C-17 is key to hegemony –

#### First, it enables effective power projection

Knight and Bolkcom, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division at CRS, ‘8 (William an Christopher, April 15, “Strategic Airlift Modernization: Analysis of C-5: Modernization and C-17 Acquisition Issues”http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34264.pdf)

A central tenet of U.S. national military strategy is that strategic airlift is an essential capability enabling the military power projection anywhere around the world. Strategic airlift has proven critical in the success of global combat and humanitarian relief operations. An alternative transportation mode, sealift, is capable of deploying larger quantities of troops and cargo when compared with airlift, but it is slower and sometimes constrained by a lack of seaports near potential contingency operations. The capability that strategic airlift provides is the ability to deliver forces, equipment, and supplies with the greatest speed to virtually any place on the globe. Despite its importance, DOD’s strategic airlift system is under stress, having supported continuous contingency operations over the last 17 years. At the same time, the United States has reduced its Cold War infrastructure by closing two-thirds of its forward bases. Thus, U.S. forces are now required to deploy more frequently and over greater distances. For example, even before the 9/11 terrorist attacks and resulting conflicts, the Air Force estimated that it was deploying four times more frequently than when it enjoyed the larger Cold War infrastructure. 6 The ongoing war against terrorism has placed further demands on the strategic airlift system. Combat Operations The massive military buildup prior to the 1991 Gulf War highlighted the value of strategic airlift when U.S. aircraft moved over 500,000 troops and 543,548 tons of cargo into the Persian Gulf region. 7 After Desert Storm, strategic airlift provided 12 years of continuous support to coalition forces enforcing the northern and southern no-fly zones over Iraq. Since 1995, strategic airlift has also supported U.S. and NATO operations in the Balkans. Strategic airlift plays a key role in combat operations in the Middle East. On a typical day, C-5s bring cargo and troops from the United States to staging bases in Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East, while C-17s fly directly to forward operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since September 2001, over 260,000 airlift missions have delivered over 3.3 million passengers and 1.7 billion short tons of cargo to Iraq and Afghanistan. 8 Few nations possess the organic airlift capability necessary to project power around the world. Consequently, DOD’s strategic airlift capability is often requisite to enabling coalition partners to join us in operations. As part of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, nearly 170 C-5 and C17 cargo planes were initially dispatched to create an “air bridge” to this distant, landlocked nation. 9 Although distance was clearly a challenge, securing permission for overflight and sourcing infrastructure appears to have been even more burdensome. Most Afghan airfields from which C-17s operated were short (~3,500 feet) and strewn with debris and potholes. Some airfields were nothing more than packed dirt, and C-5s cannot operate from these types of primitive airfields. 10 Two events from the Global War on Terrorism — the 2003 brigade airdrop and medical evacuation missions — reflect the evolving capabilities of strategic airlift. Brigade Airdrop. Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. commanders expressed a desire to open a northern front during the invasion of Iraq. After the Turkish government denied the United States rights to stage the land invasion from Turkey, Air Force C-17s executed a much publicized airdrop of the 173 rd Airborne Brigade into northern Iraq on March 26, 2003. 11 Medical Evacuation. DOD retired its dedicated aeromedical evacuation fleet in 2003, switching to a concept where nearly every air mobility aircraft is capable of performing this time-critical mission. Strategic airlift platforms are now routinely tasked “in system” to perform patient movements. As a result, the time required to return a wounded service member from the battlefield is now approximately 72 hours — less than half that required for Desert Storm. This is contributing to survival rates for casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq now exceeding 90%, compared with 75% during Desert Storm. 12

#### Second, it creates interoperability and flexible allied response

Vasilescu, Senior Lecturer Defense Resources at Brasov, ’11 (Cesar, “Strategic Airlift Capability: From Theory to Practice” Journal of Defense Resource Management, http://journal.dresmara.ro/issues/volume2\_issue2/07\_vasilescu.pdf)

Over the time, national armed forces need to remain interoperable with main partners and allies. It will also need to be deployable, sufﬁciently self-reliant, versatile, and adaptable. Their international interests require that nations must retain the ability to contribute with combat capabilities when required. The general result should be a projected force structure that retains and enhances its current mix of capabilities, enabling it to operate in places similar or different to where it is today. In this respect, strategic airlift remains a critical supporting capability that should be achieved, maintained and improved. This capability ensures the ability to deploy and sustain military forces across possible distant battleﬁelds. The combat effectiveness, protection, sustainability, and mobility of military forces are highly important objectives, and that’s why the enabling capabilities of longrange air transport are so critical. Generally speaking, the term capability is used to describe the personnel, equipment, platforms and/or other material that affect the capacity to undertake military operations. More speciﬁ cally, capability is: “The power to achieve a desired operational effect in a nominated environment, within a speciﬁ ed time, and to sustain that effect for a designated period. Capability is generated by some fundamental inputs such as organization, personnel, collective training, major systems, supplies, facilities, support, command and management”. [1] Airlift capability represents “the total capacity expressed in terms of number of passengers and/or weight/ cubic displacement of cargo that can be carried at any one time to a given destination by available airlift” [2]

#### Third, airlift comparatively allows for the fastest response

CBO, ‘5 (Congressional Budget Office, September, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf)

The amount of time needed to move military units a given distance after a deployment order and the amount of cargo that a transportation system can move are the primary measures that CBO used to assess the effectiveness of the options to expand mobility forces. As illustrated in Chapter 3, each option would have its own characteristic delivery profile, and differences between those profiles result in different improvements in cargo deliveries (relative to those of the base-case force) at any particular point in the scenario. Only the airlift and prepositioning options would improve deliveries in the first week of a notional deployment to the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean region, and the prepositioning options would deliver significantly more cargo than the airlift options during that time. By the end of the second week, the more distant prepositioned brigades would have arrived, and the high-speed sealift ships in Option 2B would begin to arrive as well. By the end of week 3, the HSS force would have completed its first deliveries, and the contributions of airlift would continue to grow. The new large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships in Option 2A would not arrive until the fourth week, but when they did, their enormous capacity would dwarf the deliveries of the other options.

#### US decline is not inevitable – it is built on a strong foundation of military power projection

Beitelman, PhD Candidate at Dalhousie U, ’11 (David, September, “U.S. Remains the Only Superpower” http://www.policymic.com/article/show?id=1739)

Superpower. We’ve all heard the term yet few seem to remember what it means. In a piece several months ago, fellow PolicyMic pundit Georgi Ivanov used the term to describe Russia, India, Japan, and Iran. If you pick up a paper or international affairs weekly, it is not uncommon to see the term applied to China. While it makes for colorful copy, using the term to describe any current state other than the United States represents a watering down of the term to a point that makes it a useless descriptor. To prove the point, we need only look at what it means to be a superpower and why by every measure, no country other than the U.S. fits the bill. A useful definition of a superpower comes from Andrei Gromyko who defined a superpower as “a country that has a say in every corner of the globe and without whose say nothing truly substantial can be achieved in any such corner.” No nation other than the United States fits such a description. In all measures of power (political, military, economic, cultural/soft power), the United States remains in a class of its own. Yes, China’s economy is surging, though anyone paying attention can see that its rise seems increasingly tenuous. Fitch Ratings has been warning of a possible ratings downgrade for China following concerns of its domestic borrowing. Regardless, two things remain fact — China’s growth and stability are unproven, whereas America has maintained an approximate 20% share of global GDP since the end of World War II, and America’s economy remains almost double that of China’s (approx. 20% v. 12%) in terms of global GDP. For India or China or anyone else to be considered a superpower, even on economic grounds (which still represents a bastardization of the term), they would have to have an economy equal to or greater than of the U.S. — and not just in terms of overall size, but in terms of per capita GDP. And, when it comes down to the nuts and bolts of international relations, it is impossible to overlook the enormous power disparity between the U.S. and everyone else when it comes to military power — conventional and nuclear. For all the talk of China’s military modernization, the country still remains decades behind the U.S. There is something to be said for the changing nature of power in the 21st century — technology and ideas may very well prove to be great equalizers or the true measure of a state’s power. But for the time being, economics and military strength remain essential power indicators and help us understand where everyone stands in the international pecking order. It is impossible to dismiss that countries like China, India, and Brazil are indeed becoming more powerful and important players on the world stage. There is a shift in power away from the traditional centers to the peripheries. But does this mean we’re moving towards a multipolar world? Applying "superpower" status to China or any other country implicitly makes the suggestion. Again, we need to clarify the term. Polarity in international relations represent power centers. Multipolarity suggests just that — multiple centers of power. In a world with one superpower, as it is today, the world is unipolar, with the U.S. as the power center. In Europe’s hay-day, where Britain, Germany, and France were of roughly equal power capability and jostled for control and dominance of the continent and sea lanes, the world was said to be multipolar. But that’s the ticker — approximate power equality. China, Brazil, Russia, India — they may be on par with one another, but with the U.S.? Not quite. And this doesn’t even take into account institutional influence or the fact that the dollar remains the world’s reserve currency. We may be moving towards a multipolar world, but it won’t actually arrive anytime soon — definitely not as soon as some of my fellow pundits would have you believe. It is important to look passed sensationalism and rhetoric when having frank and meaningful debates about international relations and the direction the world system seems to be moving. I have no doubt many of you will disagree with much of what I have said here — and I hope you do — but if we’re going to throw words around, it’s important that we remember what they mean.

#### Hegemony stops great power wars and creates global stability

Kagan, Senior Fellow at Brookings, 3-14-’12 (Robert, “America has made the world freer, safer and wealthier” CNN, http://us.cnn.com/2012/03/14/opinion/kagan-world-america-made/index.html?hpt=hp\_c1)

We take a lot for granted about the way the world looks today -- the widespread freedom, the unprecedented global prosperity (even despite the current economic crisis), and the absence of war among great powers. In 1941 there were only a dozen democracies in the world. Today there are more than 100. For four centuries prior to 1950, global GDP rose by less than 1 percent a year. Since 1950 it has risen by an average of 4 percent a year, and billions of people have been lifted out of poverty. The first half of the 20th century saw the two most destructive wars in the history of mankind, and in prior centuries war among great powers was almost constant. But for the past 60 years no great powers have gone to war. This is the world America made when it assumed global leadership after World War II. Would this world order survive if America declined as a great power? Some American intellectuals insist that a "Post-American" world need not look very different from the American world and that all we need to do is "manage" American decline. But that is wishful thinking. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other powers, the world order will inevitably change to suit their interests and preferences. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great power autocracies. Both China and Russia already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. What about the free market, free trade economic order? People assume China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. But China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal being preservation of the ruling party. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power it brings. They might kill the goose because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Many people imagine that American predominance will be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been neither stable nor peaceful. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated, however, by major wars among great powers and culminating in World War I, the most destructive and deadly war mankind had known up to that point. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand. Many people view the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior, and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government -- forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. But there was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others -- in America's case, the domination of liberal free market principles of economics, democratic principles of politics, and a peaceful international system that supports these, over other visions that other nations and peoples may have. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms American power has supported will decline, too. Or they may collapse altogether as we transition into another kind of world order, or into disorder. We may discover then that the United States was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe -- which was what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

### COIN Advantage

#### Intervention to rebuild failed states is inevitable

Choksy & Choksy, Former Director Middle East Studies at Indiana, ’11

[Carol E. B. Choksy, Adjunct lecturer in Strategic Intelligence and Information Management at Indiana University, CEO of IRAD Strategic Consulting, Inc, PhD from U Chicago, Jamsheed K. Choksy, Professor of Central Eurasian, International, Iranian, and Islamic Studies and Former Director of The Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University, Council on the Humanities at the US National Endowment for the Humanities, PhD from Harvard University, “American Intervention in Failing Countries is Necessary,” May 12th 2011]

Intervention to stabilize and reconstruct failed, failing, fragile, and even re-orient hostile countries may not be avoidable for the U.S. and also for its E.U. partners. But for intervention to be successful it must be undertaken cautiously, preemptively when possible, and swiftly, with coalitions of willing partners and should focus on rebuilding the institutions and economies that sustain civil society. Moreover, successful reconstruction after intervention takes time, resources, and planning in addition to going hand in hand with stabilization. Each endeavor must address the needs and values of the nation undergoing intervention, stabilization, and reconstruction as well, so that citizens become willing partners in the process and valuable resources are not squandered. This article focuses largely on U.S. parameters for intervention and how success may be achievable for all parties involved. Need for Interventions: To ensure regional wellbeing approximately 2500 years before American, British, Australian, and Polish soldiers entered Iraq in 2003, the Persian leader Cyrus the Great of biblical renown sent his troops to oust its tyrannical leader and prevent a country from disintegrating through civil war. That endeavor proved successful, for Cyrus’ forces were able to quickly “reestablish the seat of government,” prevent “anyone from terrorizing the people,” “restore homes” and “end the troubles there.”[1] Given the current tensions with Iran, an ancient Persian intervention may not rank high as a model for western politicians and generals to emulate. But much can be learned from Cyrus’ actions especially as he even gained praise from the Israelites set free there as a wise and just leader. As Cyrus seems to have known, destabilizing conditions can lead to the breakdown of entire societies, and so should be prevented, preferably before they get out of control yet must not be undertaken without as prior planning that is full as possible. Mission creep is not a workable and successful strategy for engaging in and escalating U.S. and E.U. roles in foreign interventions. As the West is drawn slowly but surely into greater military confrontation with Mu’ammar Qadhafi’s intransigent and brutal regime in Tripoli, it is both reasonable and necessary to assess the purposes, strategies, and goals of intervention, especially by the U.S. which often but not always takes the lead role in those endeavors.[2] Many of the world’s weakest countries are now in similar plight to that of ancient Babylonia for they “are falling apart.”[3] Even more troubling, such failed and failing nations are falling into the hands of militias, despots, religious fanatics, and terrorists.[4] Despite the backlash from incursions into Afghanistan and Iraq initiated by the administration of American President George W. Bush, current governments in the U.S. and E.U. are finding international interventions, and the inevitable stability and reconstruction (S&R) that follows, to be unavoidable.[5] So, intervention is on the upsurge in places like Yemen and Pakistan, as recent WikiLeaks reveal, and now on the urging of France and Britain in Libya.[6] Writing about the interconnectedness of people during the political, economic, and social chaos brought on by the Mongols and their violent partners in Asia and the Middle East during the 13th century another Persian, the poet Sa’di, commented: “The children of Adam are limbs to each other, having been created of one essence. When calamitous times afflict one limb, the other limbs cannot remain inactive. You who are not responsive to the tribulations of others, it is not fitting for you to be called human.”[7] Indeed, destabilizing conditions whether in Somalia from al-Shabaab Islamists, in Yemen due to al-Qaeda terrorism even prior to the Arab Spring protests against its incumbent president, in Iraq owing to Baathists and other militias, or in Afghanistan because of its Taliban insurgency undermine lawful governance and hinder economic development while generating health, education, and welfare crises. Equally dangerous is the tendency for problems and violence to be spread first regionally, as from Afghanistan to Pakistan and from Somalia to Uganda, and then globally by ideologues and terrorists.**[**8] Like it or not, conflicts and calamities that appear to usually occur far away and seemingly only to others in Third World countries do impact everyone and require attention and resolution.[9]

#### Current post-intervention reconstruction will fail to successfully utilize COIN

Luján, Special Forces Major, ’12

[Fernando Luján, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations based at the Center for a New American Security, Major in the U.S. Special Forces, Served in the Pentagon's AfPak Hands program, “Beyond Groundhog Day,” Foreign Affairs; Jan/Feb 2012, Vol. 91 Issue 1, pg. 180-183]

The real danger as the United States withdraws from Afghanistan and Iraq is that U.S. military commanders and civilian policymakers will purge the whole experience of counterinsurgency from institutional memory, as occurred in the aftermath of Vietnam, resetting the U.S. armed forces to fight large-scale wars against conventional enemies. This would only hurt the United States. Young, sharp military and civilian leaders who thrived in counterinsurgency operations over multiple deployments will be redirected toward preparing for tank battles, artillery duels, and traditional diplomacy. Hard-earned lessons will be unlearned; the competitive adaptation of tactics, procedures, and operational techniques, discarded. Yet no matter how much the various institutions of the U.S. military may prefer wars in which the enemy wears uniforms and fights in large formations, the United States is certain to face insurgencies again. The U.S. defense establishment must be prepared to deal with them effectively, with very limited resources, or face irrelevance. Rather than demonizing a false, straw-man version of counterinsurgency that calls for tens of thousands of troops and a commitment to nation building, West and other defense leaders and theorists should focus on how to institutionalize the adaptations of the past decade and increase the military's capability for smaller-scale, but equally complex, counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts. To do any less is to embark on a "Groundhog Day" of the military's own making, denying the nature of today's security environment and condemning U.S. soldiers to repeat the mistakes of the past.

#### Airlift key to effective COIN operations – boosts morale, supply routes, and weeds out insurgency basing

Owen and Mueller, RAND Corp, ‘7 (Robert and Karl, “Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operation” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND\_MG565.pdf)

U.S. armed forces are engaged in ongoing counterinsurgency (COIN) operations ranging from the highly visible, large-scale, high-intensity COIN campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan to much smaller missions that rarely make headlines, helping friendly governments around the world combat internal enemies. The likelihood that counterinsurgency will continue to be a major focus of U.S. national security policy for the foreseeable future has revitalized debate about whether or not this type of warfare demands airlift forces with unique organization, training, equipment, and doctrines of employment in light of the operational contrasts between counterinsurgencies and more conventional conﬂicts. This monograph recommends that the United States rely largely on its general airlift forces—headquarters, units, core aircraft types, etc.—to perform the counterinsurgency mission. With adjustments in employment doctrines and training, these forces can accomplish the majority of COIN missions eﬀectively. Indeed, for most missions, the tactical elements of airlift missions in conventional and unconventional conﬂicts are much the same. However, some COIN airlift operations will present planners with distinctive balances of operational details, such as the need to support a higher proportion of small, dispersed units and the locations and intensities of threats. Consequently, these diﬀerences in operational detail likely will require the United States to expand some parts of its general airlift forces and to acquire some COIN-specialized airlift capabilities for its own use and for that of governments under the FID program. hese additional capabilities may come in the form of new aircraft, such as small, ﬁxed-wing transports designed for short, rough-ﬁeld operations; unmanned aerial vehicles; satellite-guided precision airdrop systems; or other new systems able to enhance the airlift arm’s ability to support numerous dispersed units and patrols operating clandestinely. Strategic Effects of Airlift in Counterinsurgency After more than eight decades of experience, the logistical value of airlift in counterinsurgency is obvious and springs from the dependence insurgents have for sanctuary. Almost by deﬁnition, serious insurgencies tend to break out and mature in regions that are geographically or militarily remote from centers of governmental power. In the past, most insurgencies operated in geographically remote regions where their governmental enemies could not project power easily, if at all. Over the last several decades, some insurgent forces have fought within major cities, like Grozny and Baghdad, where their presence was a direct consequence of the eﬀective remoteness of competent governmental power. Airlift’s strategic value in such circumstances is that it can accelerate the process of deploying government forces into sanctuary areas and then provide support for them. Airlift movements permit rapid concentrations of force and reduce the vulnerability of maneuvering ground units to logistical isolation and piecemeal destruction. This added security is particularly important to small, widely dispersed units that can rely on aerial resupply to sustain them in the ﬁeld, to bring reinforcements, to evacuate their sick and wounded, and to withdraw them when they complete their missions. Thus, strong airlift forces permit COIN commanders to conduct operations ﬂexibly and in depth without having to secure and defend extended ground lines of communication. (See pp. 17–19.) The positive inﬂuence of airlift on counterinsurgent morale and conﬁdence is also well documented and strategically important. Wherever they have beneﬁted from it, counterinsurgent military personnel have commented that airlift support reduced their sense of isolation, even when they were widely deployed during security-phase operations, and increased their conﬁdence that they would be reinforced, supplied, and evacuated when needed. Airlift also reduces troop fatigue and wastage by improving diet and reducing the time and casualties incurred in moving into and out of battle areas. Rested and conﬁdent soldiers are not only more eﬀective militarily, they are also likely to be more astute and restrained in their use of force and thus less likely to commit the mistakes in their use of the force that can undo counterinsurgencies as eﬀectively as military defeats. (See pp. 19–21.)

#### Purchasing more C-17As solves – it’s the best means of rapid transport

CBO, ‘5 (Congressional Budget Office, September, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf)

Option 1A: Purchase More C-17s The first approach in CBO’s analysis would speed up strategic deployments by increasing the throughput capacity of the conventional airlift force, the most prompt form of transportation in today’s strategic mobility forces. This option would expand the currently planned fleet of C-17s by 21 aircraft, or 12 percent. That approach has the advantage of relying on a proven airlifter rather than on more-advanced and not yet proven concepts that might be developed. However, it has the disadvantage of adding to the already substantial demand for support infrastructure of the current airlift force. In an infrastructure-constrained theater, more aircraft might offer little or no improvement in capability (see Chapter 4). 3 CBO selected the C-17 for its conventional-airlift option for several reasons. First, that aircraft is the only military strategic airlifter now in domestic production. The Administration’s current plans call for purchasing 15 C-17s in 2006 and a final 12 in 2007, bringing the total throughout the program to 180 aircraft. Second, other existing options for increasing the throughput capacity of airlift lack the C-17’s performance. For example, the C-130J (which is also in production) is a tactical transport plane with a much shorter range, a much smaller payload, and an inability to carry outsize cargo. Another possible alternative might be to get more private-sector aircraft into the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, but CRAF aircraft have limited ability to carry the vehicle cargos that dominate unit deployments. Third, the C-17 is the most efficient airlifter in terms of cargo delivered per amount of support infrastructure needed—a potentially important advantage in locations with constrained infrastructure. Buying 21 additional C-17s would cost $4.4 billion, CBO estimates, assuming a purchase price of about $210 million per aircraft. Operating the new aircraft would cost another $6.9 billion over 30 years. That figure is based on the Air Force’s estimate of annual operating costs for the C-17 of about $12 million per aircraft. The estimate may be optimistic for a 30-year period, however, because it is based on the current operations of a relatively young C-17 fleet (the first production C-17s were delivered in the mid-1990s). Maintenance costs tend to rise as aircraft get older and are especially sensitive to the number of hours flown, the number of takeoffs and landings, and even the characteristics of individual missions. 4 (For more details of how CBO estimated the costs of the various options in this study, see the appendix.) Because some fraction of the airlift fleet is usually assumed to be unavailable for reasons such as depot maintenance, CBO assumed that 19 of the 21 additional C-17s would be available to contribute to this analysis’s representative deployment. In the absence of infrastructure constraints, those aircraft would provide increased deliveries to the theater in just one to two days. By day 6 (when the first prepositioned ship would arrive), this option could deliver about 1,400 more tons of cargo than the current force—a 7 percent increase in total deliveries to that point (see Figure ). After day 6, the percentage improvement offered by Option 1A would drop because prepositioned ships would have begun unloading large amounts of cargo. Nevertheless, Option 1A would continue to increase deliveries to the theater by about 350 tons per day during surge operations.

#### Only COIN can win future wars – the alternative is coercive tactics which ensure escalation

Kahl, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for The Middle East, ’07

[Colin Kahl, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “COIN of the Realm,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63035/colin-h-kahl/coin-of-the-realm?page=show>]

HEARTS AND MINDS Counterinsurgency refers to military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by governments or occupying forces to quell a rebellion. It is fundamentally a contest between insurgents and the government for control and the support of the population (with intervening outside powers sometimes attempting to tip the scales one way or the other). The COIN FM is not an academic document, but it is deeply informed by classical counterinsurgency theory, which emerged in response to the wave of wars of "national liberation" that followed World War II. Within that tradition, there are two competing schools of thought about the appropriate way to conduct counterinsurgency warfare: "hearts and minds" and "coercion." The COIN FM sides definitively with the former. The manual embraces a model commonly referred to as "clear, hold, and build." It directs the military to support the "host nation" government in combating insurgents by "clearing" areas and then to transition to a law enforcement model to "hold" them. This, in turn, enables the implementation of political, social, and economic programs designed to reduce the appeal of the insurgency and "build" the government's legitimacy. The COIN FM argues that most active, passive, and potential supporters of an insurgency -- whether they are ideological, ethnic, or religious in character -- can be won over through the provision of security, since "citizens seek to ally with groups that can guarantee their safety." Providing basic services and enacting policies aimed at "address[ing] the legitimate grievances insurgents use to generate popular support" also help flip support from the guerrillas to the government. The population, rather than the insurgent movement, is the "center of gravity," and the military's "primary function in COIN is protecting that populace." To be sure, some insurgents have to be killed and captured. But as the manual contends, "killing every insurgent is normally impossible." Force must be used with incredible restraint and discrimination and in strict compliance with the laws of war, or it "risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge." Protecting and developing relationships with the population also allows counterinsurgents to derive "actionable" intelligence that is vital to efficiently targeting the rebellion. This requires that they live side by side with the people they are protecting, instead of hunkering down on outlying bases. Strategic success in the long term requires accepting more risk in the short term. Such military action is only the first step. "While security is essential to setting the stage for overall progress," the manual states, "lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation, and restored hope." Here, it echoes the French counterinsurgency theorist David Galula's famous tenet that "military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population." This means that the military must be prepared to support the efforts of U.S. civilian agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the host-nation government to rebuild critical infrastructure, provide essential services, promote economic development, and empower local and national political institutions. It also means, however, that when civilian entities are slow to arrive, lack sufficient resources, or are incapable of conducting these activities in dangerous environments, the military must be ready to pick up the slack. The military, in other words, is not only the primary protector of the population but also the nation builder of last resort. Although the guidelines presented in the COIN FM are derived from research on dozens of twentieth-century counterinsurgency campaigns, it is difficult to know whether its template can work in all cases. Every insurgency has unique properties, and no counterinsurgency campaign has ever been conducted in exactly the way the manual describes. The purest example of the clear, hold, build model is the effective British effort during the Malayan Emergency (1948-60). The United States experimented with elements of this approach during the later stages of Vietnam, with some success, but too late to turn the tide. Still, overall, the COIN FM probably represents the single best distillation of current knowledge about irregular warfare. GLOVES ON The most powerful critique of the COIN FM's approach comes from the "coercion" school of thought on counterinsurgency, which sees legitimacy as an unattainable -- and wholly unnecessary -- goal. In the 1960s, the RAND analysts Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf argued that counterinsurgents should worry less about winning popular allegiance and more about raising the costs of supporting the insurgency. As Edward Luttwak put it in a recent essay, "The easy and reliable way of defeating all insurgencies everywhere" is to "out-terrorize the insurgents, so that fear of reprisals outweighs the desire to help the insurgents." In contrast to the COIN FM, the coercion school sees no need for conventional armies to remake themselves into kinder, gentler nation builders; instead, they can win by doing what they do best: employing overwhelming firepower to destroy the adversary and using armed coercion -- including harsh collective punishment -- to convince the population to shun the insurgents. "The teething-ring nonsense that insurgencies don't have military solutions defies history," the widely read military analyst Ralph Peters has written. "Historically, the common denominator of successful counterinsurgency operations is that only an uncompromising military approach works -- not winning hearts and minds nor a negotiated compromise." Ultimately, the thinking goes, military sticks are much more important than civilian carrots. This position is alive and well in the debate over Iraq. Hawkish commentators contend that the United States' problems in Iraq are the result of overly restrictive rules of engagement and a hesitancy to "take the gloves off." Some have even derided the COIN FM as "malpractice" for allegedly applying the lessons of Vietnam under the guise of learning from Iraq. In particular, they object to its application of political models of nationalist and ideological struggle to contemporary insurgencies that are, they contend, essentially religious. Bing West, assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, argues, for example, that the approach endorsed by the COIN FM "does not apply to the root cause of the insurgency [in Iraq and elsewhere] -- a radical religion whose adherents are not susceptible to having their hearts and minds won over." The proponents of the coercion school generate extraordinary heat but little light. Certainly, there are historical cases in which coercion has proved brutally effective. During the nineteenth century, for example, the U.S. Army used collective punishment on a genocidal scale to destroy the Native American "insurgents," and the United States combined similar techniques with what we would now call "civic-action programs" to defeat the Filipino insurrection after the Spanish-American War. But as William Polk describes in his new book, Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla War, From the American Revolution to Iraq, coercion has more often than not been ineffective -- or counterproductive. Even extraordinary levels of brutality have sometimes proved inadequate to crush determined insurgencies, as Polk's case study of the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia during World War II powerfully demonstrates. In other instances, namely, those of the British in Kenya and the French in Algeria, massacres of guerrilla supporters, the widespread use of concentration camps, and the frequent torture and execution of prisoners produced the appearance of victory only to give way to strategic defeat as opposition to colonial occupation grew at home and abroad. And for those who believe that harsher measures are required in campaigns against religiously driven fanatical insurgents, Polk notes that overwhelming and indiscriminate Soviet firepower in Afghanistan proved insufficient to defeat the Islamist rebels and instead generated global sympathy for their plight and attracted scores of foreign fighters to engage in jihad. Russian brutality in Chechnya and Serbian atrocities against Bosnian Muslims during the 1990s -- two conflicts not covered by Polk's study -- had similar effects. The bare-knuckle approach seems singularly unsuited to twenty-first-century counterinsurgencies conducted by Western democracies. The immoral and illegal use of indiscriminate violence would require abandoning the very values Western militaries claim to protect, and it would be strategically disastrous. This is especially true of counterinsurgency campaigns, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, embedded within the so-called war on terror -- a global clash of ideas in which "victory" hinges on the United States' discrediting the tactics used by violent extremists and in which 24-7 satellite media and the Internet allow insurgents and terrorists to exploit incidents of "collateral damage" to create widespread sympathy for their cause. In this context, the COIN FM strikes exactly the right balance. It admits that some religious zealots "are unlikely to be reconciled" and "will most likely have to be killed or captured" but directs commanders to determine how to "eliminate extremists without alienating the populace."

#### North Korea collapse is inevitable

Kim, ’11

[Hyung-Jin Kim, Writer for the Associated Press, “SKorea: Nuclear push could bring North's collapse,” January 17th 2011, <http://www.kansascity.com/2011/01/17/2588331/skorea-nuclear-push-could-bring.html>]

Impoverished North Korea could bring its own collapse if it keeps pouring scarce national resources into its nuclear weapons program and military, a senior South Korean official warned in an interview to be broadcast Monday. South Korean officials have used tough language against North Korea after two deadly attacks last year killed dozens of people. But it's still rare for a top Seoul official to speak publicly on a potential North Korean collapse and shows the South's growing impatience with its communist neighbor. "I think they will come to the point where they can no longer sustain the burden of military expenditures," Chun Yung-woo told "PBS NewsHour," according to part of the interview posted on the U.S. public broadcaster's website. Chun is South Korea's chief presidential adviser on national security and foreign affairs and once was the South's top negotiator on now-stalled six-nation talks on the North's nuclear weapons program. "They are already suffering from misery ... I think they will be worse off," Chun said. "I think their obsession with their military capabilities, especially weapons of mass destruction like nuclear weapons, chemical weapons ... that would be a short-cut to their demise." He said "the energy for changing" North Korea is growing but declined to predict when that change might happen. North Korea's state-controlled economy was devastated by natural disasters and mismanagement in the 1990s, and a botched 2009 currency reform and massive flooding last year are feared to have worsened it. However, experts say the North still devotes much of its scarce resources to its 1.2 million-member military under its "army-first" policy. In November, the North unveiled a uranium enrichment facility that could give it a second way to make atomic bombs in addition to its known plutonium-based program. North Korea has deployed new types of tanks near the border with South Korea and boosted its special operations forces in recent years, according to an official South Korean defense document released late last month. Tension on the peninsula spiked after North Korea unleashed artillery shells on a front-line South Korean island near their disputed sea border, killing four people. The shelling came eight months after a deadly warship sinking that South Korea and the U.S. have blamed on Pyongyang. The North has denied its responsibility for the sinking that killed 46 sailors, and it says the South provoked the island attack with nearby military drills. Chun said the attacks indicate how desperate North Korea is due to its economic crisis. "I think North Korea's behavior enabled us to see North Korea as it is, not as we want to see it," Chun said. "I am inclined to see it as an indication of their desperation."

#### Irregular warfare capabilities key to prevent the collapse from escalating

Maxwell, Special Forces Commander, ’10

[Colonel David S. Maxwell, US Army Special Forces Officer, Commander of Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines, Faculty at the National War College, “Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula,” November 30th 2010, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-23/ch\_14.asp]

The fundamental assumption for this paper is that the threats that may emerge following collapse or conflict on the peninsula will be characterized by being irregular and these irregular threats will pose a dangerous and complex situation that if not properly planned and prepared for could destabilize the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asian region for years to come. These threats will be a source of human suffering in the region, as well as cause significant security threats and economic turmoil, perhaps on a global scale. It is imperative that these potential irregular threats be identified and understood and that countermeasures be developed. The second fundamental assumption is that the North Korean people will not welcome the Republic of Korea and its allies with open arms. They may be welcomed by some, perhaps many, but certainly not by all and therein is a significant threat. It should be recalled that an assumption regarding liberation of Iraq was made in 2003 that postulated the Iraqi people would welcome the US as liberators and this incorrect assumption led to years of insurgency that was only countered after belated recognition of the conditions of insurgency and then undertaking a significant shift in strategy. The third assumption is that while Irregular Warfare is the current 21st Century term of art for the conflicts that the US is likely to face, planners and policy makers do not appear to view the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) (Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats 2.0 dated 17 May 2010) as applying to the problems that can be expected to be posed by a post-Kim Family regime in North Korea. While the IW JOC appears to be pre-disposed to countering the violent extremism of non-state actors as well as asymmetric threats from state actors, a post Kim Family Regime North Korea will at once have many characteristics of violent extremism (though based on a different ideology: the religious-like Juche ideology) and at the same time use many of the already existing asymmetric capabilities developed by the North Korean state. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly the assumption is made that remnants of the North Korean military, Communist Party and population will oppose the introduction of non-North Korean forces and conduct a uniquely North Korean insurgency to accomplish the classic insurgent goal of ridding a land of an occupying power. Additionally, it should be noted that the term irregular warfare in Korean is the same as unconventional warfare and this breeds confusion within the alliance.

#### Escalation goes global

Bennett & Lind, Government Prof @ Dartmouth, ’11

[Bruce W. Bennett, Senior Defense Analyst at The RAND Corporation, Jennifer Lind, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” International Security, Volume 36, Number 2, Fall 2011]

A government collapse in North Korea could unleash a series of catastrophes on the peninsula with potentially far-reaching regional and global effects. Collapse would likely trigger a humanitarian crisis. Many of North Korea’s 24 million inhabitants are already severely malnourished; if government-provided food and health services were to cease, the population would rapidly face the prospect of starvation. Food shortages and the possibility of civil war [End Page 84] would trigger a massive outflow of refugees, as desperate North Koreans searched for food and safety across international borders. North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could find their way out of the country and onto the global black market. If other countries wanted to intervene to mitigate such instability, they would need to perform complex military operations. The provision of humanitarian relief could not be delegated to international relief organizations. Because North Korea has some 1.2 million active-duty military personnel and 7.7 million reservists,5 outside military intervention would likely be necessary to provide security for such operations. The consequences of a poorly planned response to a government collapse in North Korea are potentially calamitous. Rapid cooperation would be essential because many response missions are time-sensitive—for example, the longer it takes to organize humanitarian efforts, the higher the number of North Koreans who might perish or decide to leave their homes; in addition, the longer North Korean WMD are left unsecured, the larger the risk that they will disappear across international borders. Perhaps the greatest danger is that countries will send their militaries in without coordination to stabilize the area or to secure the WMD. The specter of Chinese forces racing south while U.S. and South Korean troops race north is terrifying given the experience of the Korean War, a climate of suspicion among the three countries,6 and the risk of escalation to the nuclear level.7

## Inherency/Uniqueness

### No C-17 Procurement Now

#### Not enough strategic airlift capability now

GAO, ‘9 (November 12, “Strategic Airlift Gap Has Been Addressed, but Tactical Airlift Plans Are Evolving as Key Issues Have Not Been Resolved” http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-67)

Department of Defense (DOD) used nearly 700 aircraft, as well as commercial and leased aircraft, to carry about 3 million troops and 800,000 tons of cargo in support of wartime, peacetime, and humanitarian efforts in 2008. C-5s and C-17s move troops and cargo internationally (strategic airlift) and C-130s are the primary aircraft that moves them within a theater of operation (tactical airlift). Over the next 4 years, DOD plans to spend about $12 billion to modernize and procure airlifters and is currently studying how many it needs. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to (1) identify the status of DOD's modernization and acquisition efforts and (2) determine how well DOD is addressing any capability gaps and redundancies. In conducting this work, GAO identified the cost, schedule, and performance of airlift programs, as well as DOD's plan for addressing gaps and redundancies. GAO also discussed mobility study efforts with DOD, Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), and RAND Coporation officials. DOD has recently revamped airlift investments due to modernization cost increases and requirement changes. For strategic airlift, the number of C-5s that will be fully modernized were cut in half because of substantial reengining cost increases and C-17 quantities were increased from 180 to 213 aircraft. These twin changes resulted in a net cost increase of about$3 billion. Additional costs and force structure changes are possible pending decisions on C-5 retirements, other modifications, the potential need for more C-17s to meet tactical airlift needs, and the planned shutdown of C-17 production. For tactical airlift, substantial cost increases for modernizing C-130 avionics tripled unit costs, delayed its schedule, and resulted in almost 60 percent fewer aircraft being modernized. There have been large increases in the C-130J quantity to replace older C-130s, but modest increases in unit costs. The joint Army-Air Force C-27J program was recently transferred to the Air Force and quantities were cut from 78 to 38 aircraft, with an uncertain effect on the Army's airlift missions. The Army and Air Force must also resolve fundamental differences in operating requirements and employment strategy for the Joint Future Theater Lift (JFTL). DOD appears to have addressed its strategic airlift gap, but there is a potential future tactical airlift gap for moving medium weight equipment. Also, questions regarding how the Air Force will meet the Army's direct support mission have not been resolved. DOD is using $5.5 billion appropriated by Congress to procure 23 additional C-17s, which DOD officials believe more than offsets the strategic airlift gap associated with the restructured C-5 modernization program. However, there is a potential gap in the tactical airlift of medium weight loads beyond the capability of the C-130s. The C-17 is the only aircraft capable of moving this type of Army equipment within a theater of operation, although not to austere, short, or unimproved landing areas. The JFTL is envisioned to provide this capability, but will not be available for 15 years or more under the current acquisition strategy. While the various mobility studies acknowledge the C-17's significant dual role, they did not comprehensively evaluate the expanded use of the C-17 to transport medium weight equipment in theater and how this could impact the force structure, the C-17's service life, and decisions related to when to shut down the production line. In addition, questions remain about the number of C-130s and C-27Js needed to fulfill Army direct support missions. Two studies reached somewhat different conclusions about the cost effectiveness of using C-130Js and C-27Js for this mission. The Air Force and Army have not completed a plan for meeting Army direct support requirements, which could affect future decisions on both the C-27J and the C-130J. DOD's recently established portfolio management structure is supposed to provide a useful forum to address the broad range of airlift investment decisions. However, efforts so far have primarily focused on new programs rather than addressing gaps and making other airlift decisions such as when and how many C-5s to retire or the appropriate mix of C-130s and C-27Js needed to perform Army missions.

#### More investment in C-17s needed now – demand growing

Thompson, Chief Operating Officer Lexington Institute, ‘6 (Loren- Former Deputy Director Security Studies Program at Georgetown and PhD from Georgetown University, September 13, “The Dumbest Weapons Decision of the Decade” http://lexington.server278.com/987.shtml)

The C-17 Globemaster III is by all accounts the best long-range military transport ever built. It can fly very big loads into very small places, it has a 90% mission-capable rate, it is cheap to operate, and it costs no more than a commercial airliner. The plane is so popular with military users that it is being used at a rate 40% higher than expected. Basically, every C-17 that's available is in use everyday, delivering supplies to troops in Afghanistan, providing humanitarian relief to refugees, evacuating wounded soldiers from Iraq (which is one reason why the time it takes to get wounded from the war zone to stateside hospitals has declined from ten days in the first Gulf War to three days today). So of course, policymakers have decided to stop building the plane. They say they have enough C-17's to meet strategic airlift needs for the foreseeable future. Even though their stated requirement for how much airlift is needed hasn't changed since a "Mobility Requirements Study" was conducted in 2000. Perhaps you remember what it was like back then. No global war on terror. No shift to expeditionary warfare. No plans to return troops in Europe to the U.S. No big hurricane evacuations. The good old days. So how is it possible that a projection of future airlift needs calculated before 9-11 could still be valid? Simple -- you just make up the assumptions to assure they give you the results you wanted. And just to be on the safe side, you keep almost everybody from the Air Force's mobility community out of the room. That's how the Pentagon did its update of the 2000 study last year, producing a mobility analysis that concluded the war on terror and the Katrina disaster added nothing to the discussion about future airlift needs. Is it any wonder that many Americans believe in conspiracy theories? Someday in the not-so-distant future, American soldiers are going to die because the joint force couldn't get essential supplies into some remote airstrip fast enough. When that day comes, critics will recall the optimistic assumptions that justified killing the nation's only modern jet airlifter and say, "How could anybody think that 180 C-17's would be enough to cover the world when the only other long-range airlifter in the fleet was designed in the 1960's, couldn't use small airstrips, and had chronic reliability problems? It must be some sort of a conspiracy!"

#### No plans to build more C-17As

CBO, ‘5 (Congressional Budget Office, September, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf)

Air Force Aircraft. The Air Force’s current strategic airlift force consists mainly of 126 C-5A/B Galaxy and 138 C-17A Globemaster III jet transports. 5 The C-5A was developed in the 1960s and is one of the world’s largest operational aircraft, with a length of 248 feet and a wingspan stretching 223 feet (see Table 1-1). The last C-5A was delivered in 1973, and 50 C-5B models, which incorporated some improvements in reliability, were purchased during the 1980s. To help address problems with the aging and reliability of the C-5 fleet, the Air Force plans to upgrade 109 of its C-5s with modern engines, digital avionics, and other improvements. That effort is scheduled to be completed around 2018 and is expected to cost about $10 billion. C-17A aircraft were produced starting in the mid-1990s, and a total of 180 are planned for delivery through 2010. Although the commander of the Air Mobility Command has expressed a need for at least 42 more C-17As, no current plans exist to continue production beyond 180 aircraft.

### Transportation Infrastructure Now

#### US already upgrading military transportation infrastructure

CBO, ‘5 (Congressional Budget Office, September, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf)

With the end of the Cold War, having the flexibility to move forces to regional conflicts as the need arose became more important than having large forward-deployed forces arrayed against specific threats, such as the Soviet Union. Consequently, the importance of the transportation services provided by USTRANSCOM increased as well. As forward-deployed forces have been reduced by nearly half since the Berlin Wall came down (and additional reductions have been proposed), strategic transportation capabilities have been steadily enhanced. USTRANSCOM’s first experience with trying to rapidly deploy large forces to a major theater war came in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. Although the military was able to move 3.7 million tons of dry cargo, 6.1 million tons of petroleum products, and more than 500,000 personnel to the Persian Gulf in about seven months, lessons learned from that operation indicated a need for improved transportation systems as well as better planning, coordination, and execution of such missions. In response to that experience and to the results of mobility studies conducted in the early 1990s, DoD has upgraded its strategic transportation forces. Improvements have included buying 180 C-17 airlift aircraft (the last of which is scheduled for delivery around 2010) and 19 large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs). Although the C-17s are nominally being purchased to replace earlier C-141 transport planes, they offer a considerable improvement in capability. In particular, C-17s can carry larger pieces of cargo than C-141s can, making them more effective at transporting the equipment of Army units, and they can operate from smaller runways, potentially increasing the number of locations to which cargo can be delivered. The LMSRs have added to already-significant improvements in sealift that the Navy made during the 1980s. 3 Eight of the 19 LMSRs are loaded with Army equipment and prepositioned at forward locations. Additionally, improvements in planning and execution processes have helped eliminate many of the problems experienced during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

### No Transportation Infrastructure Now

#### Current strategic mobility forces inadequate

CBO, ‘5 (Congressional Budget Office, September, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf)

Perceived Shortfalls of Current Forces Two often-cited shortcomings of today’s strategic mobility forces are inadequate cargo delivery early in deployment and overreliance on support infrastructure in the theater of operations. Those concerns are reflected in two common proposals by DoD officials for improving mobility: purchasing additional C-17s, thus increasing deliveries (possibly to small airfields) early in a deployment, and developing shallow-draft high-speed sealift ships, with the greater speed improving promptness and the shallow draft reducing the need for deepwater ports. Mobility studies by DoD over the past decade have emphasized shortfalls in the ability to deliver forces in the early days of a conflict. Ideally, a commander wants all forces in place immediately, because the time needed to amass forces represents a period of vulnerability that an adversary might be able to exploit. In addition, the Army’s transformation efforts have focused largely on getting more forces to a conflict in less time, placing an even greater premium on promptness than in the past. Except in cases in which forces are forward deployed at the right place and time, however, requirements for mobility must be tempered by the feasibility of transportation. A mobility system with adequate throughput capacity over a longer time scale can fall short at earlier times if initial units cannot be moved promptly. In keeping with that focus on promptness, CBO’s analysis emphasized factors that affect unit delivery times and examined options that would shorten those times. (Ex panding mobility systems to improve promptness would also increase total throughput capacity, unless slower systems were retired as faster systems were introduced.) CBO did not choose options to meet a specific requirement for mobility, because new requirements are currently being defined. When this report was being prepared, DoD was completing a new Mobility Capabilities Study to update its requirements, and results of that effort were not available.

## Hegemony Advantage

### Hegemony I/L – Flexibility

#### C-17 key – most flexible transport

Aviation Zone, ’11 (“Boeing C-17 Globemaster III” http://www.theaviationzone.com/factsheets/c17.asp)

The C-17 is possibly the most flexible airlift aircraft to enter the Air Force inventory since the C-130 Hercules. The ultimate measure of airlift effectiveness is the ability to rapidly project and sustain an effective combat force close to a potential battle area. Threats to U.S. interests have changed in recent years, and the size and weight of U.S. mechanized firepower and equipment have grown in response to the improved capabilities of potential adversaries. This trend has significantly increased air mobility requirements, particularly in the area of large or heavy outsized cargo. As a result, additional airlift is needed to meet potential armed contingencies, peacekeeping or humanitarian missions worldwide. Since 1995, the fleet has amassed more than 250,000 flying hours. The C-17 has been involved in numerous contingency operations, including flying troops and equipment to Operation Joint Endeavor to support peacekeeping in Bosnia and Allied Force Operation in Kosovo. In 1998, eight C-17s completed the longest airdrop mission in history, flying more than 8,000 nautical miles from the United States to Central Asia, dropping troops and equipment after more than 19 hours in the air, a feat repeated in 2000.

### Transportation Infrastructure Key

#### Transportation infrastructure key to US military transformation – solves shift from forward deployment

CBO, ‘5 (Congressional Budget Office, September, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf)

Following the Cold War, emphasis has shifted away from forward basing and toward increasing the mobility of forces based in the United States. In the past 15 years, the U.S. military has cut the number of forward-based troops by about half and has improved its strategic transportation capability by fielding such systems as C-17 airlift aircraft and large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs) for sealift. In addition, the Army is largely focusing its current “transformation” efforts on changing equipment and organization to create units that can be deployed more quickly and easily. Nevertheless, officials in the Department of Defense (DoD) seek to increase the speed of military deployments to an even greater degree, because the ability to deliver forces to a distant theater in the first few days or weeks of a crisis is seen as critical to ensuring a favorable outcome. Several general approaches exist for speeding up the U.S. military’s response to crises, such as: B Better matching the locations of forward bases to locations where conflicts are likely to arise, B Redesigning ground combat and support units and their equipment to make them easier to transport, and B Improving strategic transportation forces. Previous studies by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have analyzed the first two approaches and concluded that they would reduce the deployment times of large forces to only a limited extent. 1 This study looks at the third approach; it analyzes how potential changes in strategic mobility forces could speed the deployment of ground troops and equipment to a distant theater early in an operation. Today’s strategic transportation forces have three main components: airlift aircraft, surge sealift ships, and afloat prepositioned equipment (see Summary Table 1). The latter consists of equipment for Marine Corps or Army units that is kept on ships stationed at forward locations—such as ports on the Mediterranean Sea, the island of Guam in the western Pacific Ocean, and the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean—which are closer than U.S.-based ships to many regions where military forces might be needed.

### MCS Study Indict

#### MCS study flawed

Knight and Bolkcom, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division at CRS, ‘8 (William an Christopher, April 15, “Strategic Airlift Modernization: Analysis of C-5: Modernization and C-17 Acquisition Issues”http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34264.pdf)

The MCS findings surprised observers. Many expected the study to project a growth in airlift needs — perhaps a requirement closer to 60 MTM/D — from the previous estimate. The mobility study immediately prior to the MCS, the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 (MRS-05), completed in 2000, set airlift requirements at 54.5 MTM/D. 52 Others speculated the MCS would not increase the 54.5 MTM/D requirement because planners knew that DOD could not afford to purchase enough aircraft to provide additional airlift. 53 They imply the MCS was not an unbiased study of requirements, but a compromise between what is needed and what can likely be afforded within current budget constraints.

Analysts also criticized the MCS for its methodology and focus. In September 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) documented a number of shortcomings in methodology for the ongoing MCS. 54 A more detailed GAO criticism followed in September 2006 after the final MCS was released. 55 Others criticized the study for not adequately addressing DOD intra-theater airlift needs and for focusing on “near-term” capabilities rather than taking a longer view. 56 Criticism of the MCS with regard to intra-theater airlift requirements is particularly germane because the C-17 can be used in both the strategic and intra-theater roles. As a result, some believe DOD requires more C-17s to meet tactical requirements, even if strategic airlift requirements can be met with DOD’s current programs of record.

In light of the criticism, some have called for DOD or an independent agency to conduct another mobility study to rectify the MCS’s perceived shortcomings. In September 2006, it was reported that the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command was again studying DOD airlift needs. Some may interpret the Air Force’s initiation of another airlift study so soon after the completion of the MCS as tacit acknowledgment of flaws in the MCS and an attempt to ameliorate them. 57

## COIN Advantage

### Airlift Key to COIN – Short-field Capabilities

#### Short-field capabilities and survivability key to effective COIN airlifts

Owen and Mueller, RAND Corp, ‘7 (Robert and Karl, “Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operation” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND\_MG565.pdf)

If analysis does indicate the need to acquire specialized assault airlifters to meet COIN requirements, experience suggests two general program goals that DoD should emphasize. First, the aircraft designs chosen should emphasize capability for short takeoﬀs and landings from rough ﬁelds or vertical takeoﬀs and landings and high survivability over other design goals, such as cargo capacity and economy of operation. Short-ﬁeld capabilities are the very reason for an assault airlifter to exist. Survivability is also essential, since assault airlifters operate very near the front or over unfriendly territory as a matter of course. Second, the purchase of specialized systems should be minimized. Ideally, an existing aircraft design, suitably modiﬁed, would be able to provide these capabilities, since funding an entirely new aircraft would be an extremely diﬃcult proposition in the current budget environment. (See pp. 47–50.)

### Airlift Key to COIN – Sanctuaries

#### Airlift key to COIN – solves sanctuary and hideouts

Owen and Mueller, RAND Corp, ‘7 (Robert and Karl, “Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operation” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND\_MG565.pdf)

Airlift’s logistical and operational value in counterinsurgency largely springs from the dependence insurgents have on sanctuary. 19 Almost by deﬁnition, serious insurgencies tend to break out in places that are beyond the reach of governmental power. In the past, most insurgencies operated in geographically remote regions where their governmental enemies could not project power easily, if at all. However, over the last several decades, some insurgent forces have fought within major cities, like Grozny and Baghdad, when government power was unable to penetrate into the urban jungles of their own capitals. Once even modestly eﬀective counterinsurgent forces reestablished themselves, the insurgents abandoned open resistance and either ﬂed or devolved operationally into small guerilla bands attacking weakly defended targets and people for terrorist eﬀect. These small bands could survive only because they could ﬁnd sanctuary in the friendly neighborhoods, hideouts, and anonymity that remained available to them in the stronger security environment. Simply put, to succeed, insurgents must have sanctuaries proportional to their numbers and the scale of their operations. For this reason, they focus much of their military and clandestine operations on establishing, defending, and exploiting their sanctuaries, which may range from whole regions of the hinterlands to a single safe house on a quiet street in the capital. Airlift can accelerate the process of deploying and supporting government forces moving against insurgent forces and their sanctuaries wherever they are located. In the face of insurgent guerilla operations, airlifting personnel and materiel usually makes them much less vulnerable to attack and destruction than surface transport. Airlift movements permit maneuvering ground forces to concentrate rapidly and with surprise, to maintain reliable communications with their secure areas, and to avoid entrapment and piecemeal destruction by insurgent forces. This added security is particularly important to small units widely dispersed for counterguerilla and security-phase operations or in hot pursuit of guerilla bands. hey depend on aerial resupply to sustain them in the ﬁeld, to bring reinforcements, to evacuate their sick and wounded, and to withdraw them when they complete their missions. In sum, airlift allows counterinsurgent commanders to exploit the military principles of mass, surprise, economy of force, and security. With airlift, they can get more out of their forces with greater eﬀectiveness and safety. Consequently, most post–World War I accounts of counterinsurgency warfare conﬁrm the importance of airlift, either directly or indirectly through discussions of the maneuvers and successes of airlift-supported ground forces. Typically less prominent in counterinsurgency histories and doctrinal manuals, but no less important than logistics, are other strategic eﬀects of airlift. Indeed, the integration of airlift with other elements of airpower and modern land forces has altered the character and conduct of counterinsurgency warfare fundamentally. By combining these military elements, democratic states in particular have been able to pursue counterinsurgency operations more aggressively, yet with greater restraint in their overall use of force, than in the past. Airlift also has given them greater control over the timing of their interventions on behalf of weaker states engaged in counterinsurgencies and has enabled them to initiate security-phase operations well before insurgent military forces are fully contained. While airlift’s capacity for ﬂexible operations in depth has not guaranteed counterinsurgent victories, it has made the military, psychological, and political demands of such conﬂicts more bearable. It has, in other words, fundamentally altered the strategic balance of power between insurgents and counterinsurgents.

### Airlift Key to COIN – Morale

#### Airlift key to COIN – solves morale\*\*

Owen and Mueller, RAND Corp, ‘7 (Robert and Karl, “Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operation” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND\_MG565.pdf)

Morale Effects The positive inﬂuence of airlift on counterinsurgent morale and conﬁdence is also well documented and strategically important. Wherever they have beneﬁted from it, counterinsurgent military personnel have commented that airlift support reduced their sense of isolation, even when widely deployed during security-phase operations, and gave them the conﬁdence that they would be reinforced, supplied, and evacuated when needed. Airlift also reduces troop fatigue and wastage by improving diet and reducing the time and casualties incurred in moving into and out of battle areas. In Vietnam, for example, ground units often deployed in minutes from established base areas—clean, reasonably rested, and fully equipped—into combat. Following some period of patrolling and/or combat, helicopters would whisk them just as quickly back to the cots, mess hall meals, and relative security of their base areas. It was not luxury, but it was much better than the experiences of counterinsurgent armies in the past. Rested and conﬁdent soldiers are desirable for a number of reasons. First, they are more eﬀective militarily—an observation that hardly needs expansion in the history of all wars. Second, such soldiers are usually more astute and restrained in their use of force. This is valuable in any war, but in the military-political brew of counterinsurgency, energetic, imaginative, and well-controlled soldiers are of premium worth. The nature of their tasks, particularly during the security phase, requires constant interaction with the civilians whose support the government hopes to win and retain. If the soldiers are well led, mentally connected to their chain of command and the higher purposes of the war, and well supported, they are less likely to commit the mistakes in their use of force that can undo counterinsurgencies as eﬀectively as military defeats. Finally, well-led and well-supported soldiers are more likely to remember and adhere to the government’s rules of engagement. Again, the immediate beneﬁt of their discipline will be restraint in their use of force, bringing greater credibility and legitimacy to the government. Of course, good soldiers are the product of many things, including leadership, training, cultural values, and a sense that they are achieving success. But regardless of the quality of their discipline and initial training, soldiers who are left to feel isolated, undersupported, and at excessive risk over a prolonged period will eventually take their frustrations out on themselves, captured enemies, or even civilians they perceive as unfriendly or recalcitrant. Commanders of forces dispersed for security-phase operations can counter these trends with leadership, threats, and promises. But often it will be airlift that gives their words substance, by providing the connectivity, supplies, sense of support and relief needed to sustain troops at high levels of discipline and eﬀectiveness under diﬃcult conditions. In summary of their overall strategic eﬀects, airlift forces contribute greatly to the ability of civil and military leaders to control the pace, direction, and ultimate eﬀectiveness of counterinsurgencies. Eﬀective airlift, in concert with combat air and land forces, will allow them to pursue insurgent ﬁeld forces where they are most vulnerable. It facilitates the early start-up or resumption of security-phase operations and may help prevent or deter the insurgents from switching to conventional operations altogether, with likely reductions in human suﬀering and economic dislocation as a result. Airlift helps good troops be better at prosecuting their military and political duties. Certainly, there never will be easy counterinsurgencies. But there can be successful counterinsurgencies, and these are most likely when supported by powerful airlift forces operating in unison with high-quality combat air and land power and by sound political leadership.

### Infrastructure Investment Key

#### Current infrastructure solves – new investment is key

Owen and Mueller, RAND Corp, ‘7 (Robert and Karl, “Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operation” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND\_MG565.pdf)

The good news is that the current U.S. airlift ﬂeet, organizations, and doctrines are suitable for performing the great majority of missions incumbent in counterinsurgency operations. Most airlift missions in support of counterinsurgencies are simple logistics missions moving people and things between established bases, often with appropriately developed airﬁelds nearby. The other important class of missions is what this study calls battleﬁeld airlift, the movement of personnel, combat units, and materiel over relatively short distances, often into landing zones and/or short and rough runways. Some or all of these missions will be performed in the presence of threats or under direct ﬁre from air defense systems varying widely in sophistication and capabilities. Airlift crews also may face threats on the ground, in the form of sapper attacks, guerilla killer-teams, and so on. However, none of these missions, operating environments, or threats is unique in basic character to counterinsurgency warfare. Airlifters facing insurgents may land more often at primitive ﬁelds and may face a more widely dispersed and unpredictable threat array than they would in a conﬂict against a conventional enemy. These are not new challenges but rather a diﬀerent constellation of challenges that are more or less familiar from other types of operations. Thus, the large and complex U.S. airlift system has the capability of delivering the goods in a counterinsurgent environment. The bad news is that the United States cannot go on handling the counterinsurgency airlift mission much longer as it is currently without substantial reinvestment and realignment of its airlift program. In a world destabilized by globalization, Islamic radicalism and other forms of atavism, and worsening social and economic inequities in many countries, insurgency is likely to intensify and expand as a military challenge to the United States. This expansion will put the existing national airlift system under great pressure. The C-130 ﬂeet will be stressed in particular, given the unending demands for its services in the theaters, the assignment of most C-130s to the reserve components, and the generally advanced structural age of most aircraft in the ﬂeet. The Army’s medium helicopter ﬂeet of CH-47Ds will experience similar pressures. While portions of both ﬂeets are presently undergoing service-life extension programs, the day is not far oﬀ when they will require total recapitalization. Given the current straits of the defense budget, the prospect of adding replacement of the theater and battleﬁeld airlift ﬂeets to the mix of competing programs is daunting indeed. But that prospect also should spark creative studies and thinking about the issue of airlift in general, including quantitative analyses of future counterinsurgency airlift requirements in particular.

### COIN Good – Conflict

#### Military can create legitimacy – solves effective COIN operations

Nagl & Burton, ’09

[John A. Nagl, Former President of the Center for a New American Security, Professor of National Security Studies at West Point, Former Military Assistant to The Deputy Secretary of Defense, D. Phil from Oxford, Rhodes Scholar, Retired Lieutenant Colonel, Served in Iraq, Brian M. Burton, Bacevich Fellow at CNAS, MA in Security Studies from Georgetown, “Dirty Windows and Burning Houses: Setting the Record Straight on Irregular Warfare,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32, Issue 2, pg. 91-101, April 2009]

There is much truth in the contention that the challenges presented by insurgencies and failed states are not particularly amenable to externally imposed military solutions. Leading theorists and practitioners from David Galula and Sir Robert Thompson to Gen. David Petraeus and Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli have noted the limitations of military power and the primacy of politics over force in counterinsurgency.7 Unless the counterinsurgent is willing to employ the so-called Roman method of unrestrained violence to suppress rebellion, the only way to defeat an insurgency is to gain the loyalty of the population, thereby depriving insurgents of the support base they require to destabilize a government. Gaining the loyalty of the population requires the difficult process of nation building, which consists of improving the ability of a government to secure its citizens and developing its capacity to provide essential services, including security, to the population. In developed countries, civilian police and utility workers perform these functions. As Mazarr aptly points out, an armed force trained for major interstate war is not an ideal tool to carry out such missions. Indeed, without proper doctrine, strategy, and training for counterinsurgency and nation building, military forces can be counterproductive in those situations. In fact, the U.S. military’s poor understanding of the nature of irregular warfare contributed to the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and the rise of the insurgency in Iraq.8 Mazarr correctly asserts that ‘‘an expanded and deepened set of nonmilitary tools,’’ specifically ‘‘economic aid, foreign service efforts, and public diplomacy, and cultural outreach,’’ should be the United States’ weapons of choice to deal with civil conflicts and failed states in an ‘‘anticipatory and collaborative manner.’’9 Unfortunately, the necessary civilian tools to deal with failed and failing states do not currently exist in sufficient supply and are unlikely to be developed in the foreseeable future due to inadequate resourcing of the nonmilitary instruments of power. The U.S.Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual notes that integrated operations with civilian assets in irregular warfare are ‘‘always preferred,’’ but civilian agencies are generally incapable of deploying the required numbers of personnel to do the job and have difficulty operating in less-than-permissive environments without armed protection. Thus, ‘‘by default . . . military forces often possess the only readily available capability’’ to do the necessary counterinsurgency and nation building jobs that would be better left to civilians.10

### North Korea Collapse Inevitable

#### North Korean collapse inevitable – inside sources agree

AP, ’12

[The Associated Press, “Doubts on North Korea From Dead Leader’s Son,” January 18th 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/world/asia/kim-jong-nam-says-north-korea-may-collapse-book-claims.html]

A new book claims that the estranged eldest son of North Korea’s late leader, Kim Jong-il, believes that the impoverished government is in danger of collapse and that his young half brother, hailed as the new leader, is merely a figurehead. The author, Yoji Gomi, a journalist for Tokyo Shimbun, said that over a number of years, he exchanged 150 e-mails with the older son, Kim Jong-nam, and spent a total of seven hours interviewing him. The book, “My Father, Kim Jong-il, and Me,” which went on sale on Wednesday, drew immediate attention as a rare view into the family that has led the secretive country for decades, even though Kim Jong-nam is thought to be estranged from his family and the workings of government. The book quotes Kim Jong-nam as countering the state media campaign that portrayed his half brother, Kim Jong-un, as the unquestioned new leader after their father’s death on Dec. 17. “Jong-un will just be a figurehead,” the book quotes him as saying. It also claims that he has called the collapse of North Korea’s economy likely unless the government initiates reforms, which could also bring it down. “Without reforms and liberalization, the collapse of the economy is within sight,” Mr. Kim is quoted as saying. “But reforms and opening up could also invite dangers for the regime.”

#### North Korean collapse is inevitable – multiple factors prove

Lee, ’12

[Sunny Lee, Reporter for the Asian Times, “North Korea's end is nigh - or is it?,” January 13th 2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MA13Dg01.html]

A raft of reports support Lee's view. According to an increasingly popular view, South Korea will take the lead in a swift reunification following a collapse or implosion of North Korea through a power struggle, military coup or economic meltdown. All Seoul and Washington have to do is to remain "strategically patient", waiting for the doomsday to transpire. On December 31, South Korean media outlets rushed to report that there had been a deployment of a tank unit in Yanggangdo province, purportedly to counter a military coup. On January 1, the South's media said North Korean soldiers had left their barracks en masse looking for food. On Christmas Eve, South Korean daily Chosun Ilbo said many new defectors believed North Korea would collapse in April 2012, the month marking the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung, the founder of the country. The newspaper also reported on December 27 that the government would designate the New Year as "the first year of unification". Kim Jong-il is currently suffering from an assortment of illnesses, including a brain disorder, rheumatism, neuralgia and eye disease, Seoul's E-Daily said, citing a "high-level North Korean source" whose name was withheld. On Sunday, another major South Korean daily, Donga Ilbo, ran a cover story of the possible "sudden" deaths of both Kim Jong-il and his son and heir Kim Jong-eun this year. "There will be big unrest in North Korea this year. The father and the son of the Kim clan can die in this turmoil," the report cited a well-known fortuneteller named Oh Jae-hak as saying. Perhaps sensing his days are numbered, even the Dear Leader hid inside an underground bunker for nine days during the recent South Korea-US joint military drills, for fear of bombing by F-22 Raptors of the US Air Force, the Joongang Sunday magazine said on January 2. All these reports were sparked by revelations on WikiLeaks that painted a picture of the North's closet ideological ally, China, relenting to the idea of North Korea's demise. According to WikiLeaks, Chun Yung-woo, now national security adviser to President Lee, confided to US ambassador to South Korea Kathleen Stephens in February that China "would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the US in a 'benign alliance' as long as Korea was not hostile towards China".

## Humanitarian Relief Add-on

### Airlift Key to Humanitarian Relief

#### Strategic airlift key to humanitarian relief operations

Knight and Bolkcom, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division at CRS, ‘8 (William an Christopher, April 15, “Strategic Airlift Modernization: Analysis of C-5: Modernization and C-17 Acquisition Issues”http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34264.pdf)

Humanitarian Relief Operations Strategic airlift has proven its value many times since World War II by delivering humanitarian relief. During a 15-month stretch in 1948 and 1949, American and British airmen executed some 277,000 airlift sorties, keeping Berlin from being cut off from the West. 13 During the 1990s, more than 85% of some 160,000 metric tons of food, medicine, and relief supplies reached besieged Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, via airlift. 14 More recently, strategic airlift delivered disaster relief after earthquakes in Iran (2003) and Pakistan (2005), the southeast Asia tsunami (2004), and Hurricane Katrina (2005), demonstrating the importance of strategic airlift in mitigating consequences after natural disasters. 15

#### <insert humanitarian relief impact>

## Offcase Ans

### Obama Good

#### Huge lobby for the plan

Scully, ‘7 (Megan, March 8, “Lawmakers divided over cargo plane options” http://www.govexec.com/defense/2007/03/lawmakers-divided-over-cargo-plane-options/23903/)

On Monday, Air Force leaders met behind closed doors with Senate staff and argued that they could buy more C-17s if Congress would lift restrictions on C-5 retirements. The Air Force would like to retire roughly 30 older C-5s, which are twice the size of the C-17, but far older. And service leaders, including Air Force Chief of Staff Michael Moseley, have not been shy about declaring that the C-17 is a far more valuable asset than the C-5. Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., acknowledged there is a "lot of work that needs to be done" in the budget to add more C-17s because it "conflicts with the C-5." Feinstein represents Boeing's Long Beach facility, where much of the C-17 work is done. Lockheed built its last C-5 in 1989, but is replacing the fleet's engines and avionics -- a move that supporters say will keep the planes flying for at least another 25 years. But those efforts are experiencing cost overruns and delays. The issue puts several members who have an interest in both aircraft in a tough spot. Sen. Saxby Chambliss, R-Ga., represents both the Lockheed facility and a C-17 plant in Macon. Meanwhile, Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Calif., has both C-17s and C-5s at Travis Air Force Base in her district. "I don't want to be the mother in 'Sophie's Choice,'" Tauscher said. Tauscher argued that the military needs more strategic lift -- and should proceed with both programs, given worldwide commitments and 92,000 new soldiers and Marines expected in the force over the next several years. When asked if Congress could make room in the budget for both the C-5 modernization and buying more C-17s, Chambliss said: "I don't know. That's what we're going to be talking to the Air Force about." Should it come down to a choice between the two programs, the C-17, which has legendary support on Capitol Hill, could ultimately win out. Congress last year approved 10 additional C-17s, to the tune of $2.1 billion.

#### Republicans will shield the plan

Simon, ‘9 (Richard, October 1, “In bipartisan vote, Senate protects funding for Boeing C-17 cargo planes” LA Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/01/nation/na-cargo-planes1)

The Senate on Wednesday shot down an effort to kill funding for Boeing C-17 military cargo planes that President Obama says are not needed, underscoring the turbulence the White House faces in trying to cut money for politically popular projects. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), a leading critic of pork-barrel spending, sided with his Democratic opponent in last year's presidential election in pushing to end the production of additional planes "that we don't need, the Pentagon doesn't want, and that we can't afford." But a bipartisan group of senators, in a 64-34 vote, thwarted the effort to strike $2.5-billion for 10 additional C-17s from the annual defense spending bill. McCain vowed to continue to try to strip the funding from the measure. "Some of my colleagues have attacked the C-17 as a special-interest item," said Sen. Christopher S. Bond (R-Mo.). "I agree. Investing in the C-17 is in the special interest of our war fighters. It is critical to our national security interests." The measure must be reconciled with the House bill, which includes $674 million for three more C-17s. Whatever the final figure, the bill sent to the president is certain to include money for the planes, which are assembled in Long Beach. That would be on top of the $2.2 billion for eight C-17s included in a war-spending bill approved this year. The vote was a victory for Chicago-based Boeing, which has gained broad political support on Capitol Hill through the purchase of the C-17's parts from 650 suppliers in 44 states. "You can't walk through these hallways without bumping into a lobbyist from Boeing," McCain complained, challenging Obama to veto a bill that includes additional C-17s. "And, of course, there are subcontractors all over America." Boeing has spent more than $4.9 million on lobbying for the first six months of this year, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, a watchdog group. The vote was a reminder that Congress intends to fiercely guard its prerogatives -- especially the power of the purse. The $636-billion Senate defense bill includes more than 700 earmarks, items sought by senators for their home states, at a cost of about $2.7 billion. Included are $25 million to expand the National World War II Museum in New Orleans and $20 million for the Edward M. Kennedy Institute for the United States Senate in Massachusetts. The watchdog groups Taxpayers for Common Sense and the Project on Government Oversight, in a letter to lawmakers, called the C-17 "the earmark that will not die." Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, joined McCain in opposing the additional funding. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said in a letter to lawmakers that the department has enough cargo planes in the fleet or on order and that buying any more would come "at the expense of other priorities." California Sens. Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer, both Democrats, supported the additional planes.

#### Air Force insulated from defense cut debates

Brannen, Defense News, 4-17-’12 (Kate, “U.S. Lawmakers Mount Case Against Air Force Cuts” http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120417/DEFREG02/304170006/U-S-Lawmakers-Mount-Case-Against-Air-Force-Cuts)

U.S. lawmakers are continuing to push back against budget cuts made by the Air Force that many say fall too heavily on the Air National Guard. The Air Force budget plan proposes to cut 3,900 active-duty, 5,100 Guard and 900 reserve airmen. The Air Force maintains that it crafted its budget request with the full input of the Air National Guard. House members voiced their opposition to the Air Force moves April 17, when the Armed Services Committee provided noncommittee members with the opportunity to propose legislation for the panel to consider when it marks up the 2013 defense authorization bill later this month. The Republican lawmakers who argued against the cuts all stand to lose aircraft or force structure in their districts. Rep. Tim Murphy, R-Pa., criticized the Air Force’s decision to close the 911th Airlift Wing and downsize the 171st Air Refueling Wing, both of which are located at Pittsburgh International Airport. He said he had yet to receive the Air Force’s cost-benefit analysis that justifies the moves. Rep. Tom Latham, R-Iowa, also expressed frustration over what he called inadequate justification from the Air Force for its decisions and urged the committee to continue to push the service for answers. He said the Air Force’s budget cuts fall too hard on the Air National Guard. He’s especially concerned about the proposed cuts to 132nd Fighter Wing, which would eliminate all F-16 fighter aircraft stationed in Des Moines. Although the city is not in Latham’s current district, it is part of the new district in which Latham is running for election in November. When he asked Air Force officials why the 132nd Fighter Wing had been cut, he was told it was a “judgment call,” Latham said. Like Murphy, he said he has yet to see the strategic or cost-assessment reasons why this unit is being cut. Rep. Randy Neugebauer, R-Texas, did not address the cuts to the Air National Guard but urged the committee to continue to support the Air Force’s B-1 bomber fleet, over half of which is located at Dyess Air Force Base in Neugebauer’s district. The Texas lawmaker helped spearhead an effort in last year’s authorization bill that limits the Air Force’s ability to retire B-1 aircraft over the next five years. Rep. Buck McKeon, chairman of the committee, was receptive to the lawmakers’ concerns and promised to consider them during markup. In addition to Air Force budget cuts, a handful of lawmakers used the hearing to offer their support for small businesses competing for Pentagon contracts. Military hazing was also addressed, with Rep. Judy Chu, D-Calif., proposing new language for the defense authorization bill that would create a national database for military hazing incidents. Chu’s nephew, Marine Lance Cpl. Harry Lew, killed himself in Afghanistan after allegedly being hazed.

#### Critics of C17 spending getting shot down

Hebert, ‘9 (Adam, December, “Why the C-17 Has Lived On” Airforce Magazine, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/December%202009/1209issbf.aspx)

For critics, however, the only real issue is cost. “The C-17’s excellence is one of those facts that is indisputably true but irrelevant to the issue at hand,” opines Los Angeles Times business columnist Michael Hiltzik. What is relevant, however, is that new requirements are due and no one knows whether they can be met without more C-17s. Indeed, said Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.), the US “cannot take the chance that we ‘may’ have enough aircraft.” She points out the obvious fact that it would be irrational to kill production before Congress has a chance to review the forthcoming study. The Congressional support is a mixed blessing; the Air Force desperately needs the right to manage its airlift inventories. Air Mobility Command would like to retire old C-5As on a one-for-one basis as additional C-17s are purchased, but Congress prohibits AMC from doing so. “Too much aluminum is almost as bad as not enough,” noted Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, USAF Chief of Staff. Meanwhile, both chambers of Congress have passed funding bills including C-17 purchases. In the Senate’s consideration of the 2010 defense appropriations bill, McCain proposed an amendment to strip out all $2.5 billion in C-17 funding. He got torched, with his amendment going down to defeat by a 68-to-30 margin. The House appropriations bill also included C-17 money. There is no conference report yet, however, and no Presidential signature. Meanwhile, December is looking to be a big month for the C-17—either up or down. The MCS is due for delivery. So is an independent assessment by the Institute for Defense Analyses. It now seems that lawmakers will decide this month how many C-17s to buy (up to 10) in 2010. So it won’t be a case of “ready, fire, aim” after all.

### Spending

#### Plan would cost $11 billion

CBO, ‘5 (Congressional Budget Office, September, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf)

In developing the options for this analysis, CBO focused on alternative ways to spend the same amount of money: roughly $11 billion (in 2006 dollars) beyond the amount needed to maintain current strategic mobility capabilities. That additional expenditure includes costs for research and development (if necessary), procurement, and operations and support for 30 years after the first new system is delivered. By comparison, the Department of Defense has spent an average of about $12 billion per year on strategic transportation, including investment and operations, over the past 20 years, CBO estimates.

### A2: LMSR Sea-lift Ship CP

#### Higher speed sealift ships fail – requires more frequent refueling

CBO, ‘5 (Congressional Budget Office, September, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf)

As with aircraft, increasing the speed of ships requires making design compromises that affect the hull form, range, payload, overall size, and cost. Such compromises can reduce the advantage offered by greater speed. For example, a very high speed ship might have a short range, requiring many time-consuming stops for refueling. A good choice of speed for a future sealift ship should balance those factors against the benefit of shorter transit times and the technical risk inherent in pursuing a design significantly more advanced than those of contemporary ships. That balancing act is especially important given the declining marginal benefit of adding each knot of speed as overall speed increases (an effect illustrated by the fact that the lines in Figure 3-5 are closer together at higher speeds). Various designs have been proposed for high-speed sealift ships (see Table 3-2). They show how greater speed comes at the cost of much larger power requirements and smaller payloads (over a given range) for ships with external dimensions similar to those of current sealift ships. 8 Improvements in technology over time have the potential to reduce the impact of those performance compromises; for example, advanced lightweight structural materials and propulsion plants might enable the 55-knot trimaran proposed by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) to achieve similar ranges and payloads as a 37-knot ship with today’s technology. But such advanced technologies can be difficult to realize and are likely to be more expensive than current technologies. For its illustrative high-speed sealift (HSS) option, CBO selected a monohull design with a speed midway between those of the NAVSEA Rapid Strategic Lift Ship concept and the advanced-technology NAVSEA trimaran (see Table 3-2). Despite being slower than the conceptual trimaran, CBO’s notional high-speed ship still represents a very advanced design that would push the current state of the art in hull-form design, materials technology (for lightweight hulls that can withstand the pounding of high-speed movement through water), and propulsion technology. The characteristics of that notional HSS ship are an amalgamation of several specific designs that CBO reviewed. The ship’s size would allow it to transit the Panama and Suez Canals, if necessary, and give it at least the same port accessibility as today’s LMSRs. With a cruising speed of 45 knots, the HSS ship could travel 10,000 nm in eight fewer days than a current LMSR and just one to two more days than the 55-knot trimaran. That slightly longer delivery time would be balanced against having a design that was less reliant on undeveloped technology than the trimaran’s. A drawback of CBO’s notional ship is that, barring great technological leaps, it would not have a long enough range to travel anywhere in the world (carrying its full payload of 10,000 tons) without refueling. Consequently, it would require a ship for refueling that could be dispatched ahead or prepositioned in likely locations for that task. Alternatively, the HSS ship could carry extra fuel to extend its range, but at the expense of cargo space. This option would purchase two oilers to provide underway refueling for the HSS ships; one for transAtlantic missions and one for trans-Pacific missions. 9

#### Aircraft loaders comparatively faster

CBO, ‘5 (Congressional Budget Office, September, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf)

Loading times for ships vary widely, from as little as two days for a fast sealift ship to more than five days for some large container ships (see Table 2-2). Those times are influenced by a ship’s ease of loading and by the total cargo to be loaded. For example, a roll-on/roll-off ship with two vehicle ramps to the pier can theoretically be loaded twice as fast as a RO/RO with only one ramp. The number of items to be loaded can be a more important factor than their cumulative size or weight because each item (such as a truck or a container of supplies) must be individually moved into the ship’s hold and secured in place. 4 Part of the Army’s move toward shipping supplies in commercial containers has been motivated by the benefits of having fewer items to handle: a single container can consolidate many items that would need to be handled individually on a break-bulk type of cargo ship. (Containers also have the advantage of rapid tie down because they are designed to be easily secured to the ship.) Loading times for aircraft are subject to similar considerations, although they are measured in hours rather than days (see Table 2-2). Those times depend on the amount of cargo, the type of cargo, and the type of aircraft. C-17 and C-5 military airlifters are designed specifically for vehicular cargo and for operations with less support infrastructure than is typically needed with commercial aircraft (or derivatives of commercial aircraft, such as the KC-10A). Both the C-17 and C-5 have cargo floors that are low to the ground (only about 64 inches high for the C-17) and integral ramps that allow vehicles to be driven directly aboard. As a result, special materiel-handling equipment, such as the Air Force’s 60K loaders, are not always necessary to lift cargo up to the aircraft’s cargodeck level. Moreover, the C-17’s and C-5’s cargo doors and ramps are coaxial with the aircraft fuselage, so vehicles do not have to be maneuvered through an often tricky and time-consuming 90-degree turn, as can be the case when loading them through a side cargo door. For nonvehicular equipment and bulk supplies, rollers built into the cargo floor of the C-17 and C-5 allow items to be slid aboard directly from trucks or other cargo carriers.

#### Shallow-draft sealift ships difficult to develop

CBO, ‘5 (Congressional Budget Office, September, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf)

In the future, the Department of Defense would like to develop shallow-draft sealift ships (preferably with high speed as well) that could deliver cargo to smaller ports. Although such ships could increase a theater’s total port capacity, (much as the C-17’s ability to use small airfields can increase a theater’s MOG), it is unlikely that even the best over-the-shore systems operating from smaller ports could match the unloading rates achieved in a large established port. Moreover, such shallow-draft sealift ships would be challenging to develop. When loaded, a ship with a large payload and a transoceanic range will be very heavy and thus will have to displace a great deal of water, making shallow draft a difficult objective. CBO did not include such an option in this analysis because of the uncertainty about when or even whether those ships could be developed.

## Neg

### 1NC Hegemony Advantage

#### No need for more C-17s

Aerospace Daily and Defense Report, ‘9 (May, “New C-17s Not Needed, DOD Analysis Shows” http://beta.globalspec.com/reference/54995/121073/new-c-17s-not-needed-dod-analysis-shows)

Early indications from the Pentagon’s Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study suggest no need for additional strategic airlift beyond the funded procurements of re-engined C-5s and 205 C-17s already planned, says U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz. The 2005 Mobility Capabilities Study had suggested a requirement of roughly 300 strategic airlifters, and Schwartz says he sees “no major shift in the demand signal.” The 2005 study, however, was discredited in much of Washington as a budget-driven formality under former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and a new study has been eagerly awaited. The new study is now under way, although official results are not expected until the fall. Unlike previous reviews, this study will take into account the requirements associated with increases in Army and Marine Corps end-strength, as well as the new U.S. Africa Command. Even if more strategic airlift is ultimately needed, Air Force Secretary Michael Donley says an independent study presents several options before considering a buy of additional C-17s, the only aircraft made at Boeing’s Long Beach, Calif., plant. These include leasing additional Civil Reserve Air Fleet capacity, as well as re-engining all 111 C-5s. Now, the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP) calls for modifying only 49 C-5Bs, two C-5Cs and one A model for test purposes.

#### Not key to heg – US able to maintain single theater capabilities

Bolkcom, National Defense Analyst at CRS, ‘5 (Christopher, “Strategic Airlift Modernization: Background, Issues and Options” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS20915.pdf)

The final option that may be considered is to operate within the current and projected airlift capabilities. There appear to be at least three arguments for this approach. First, there is some debate over the realism of MRS-05’s plan for supporting two nearly simultaneous MTWs. General Ryan, for instance, was quoted saying “We will never have enough for two MTWs. I don’t think we can afford it. We have a one-major theater war airlift force.” 13 General Walter Kross, former commander of the Transportation Command also said “the airlift force available for the next decade will be one that can handle a single major regional contingency.” 14 Furthermore, the actual U.S. airlift capabilities have been short of the stated MTM/D requirement for 11 of the last 13 years. 15 During this time, the United States has successfully conducted operations in South West Asia, Bosnia and Kosovo. It can thus be argued that the airlift requirement set by MRS-05 and other studies is greater than required. A counter argument is that airlift requirements are designed to satisfy a worst case scenario. Adherents to this perspective say the 54.5 MTM/D requirement is justified, and the United States has been fortunate over the last 13 years not to have faced the worst case scenario, in which case its airlift shortfall would have been detrimental. Second, it is argued that the MTM/D requirement can be lowered because strategic airlift capacity is not the limiting deployment factor. Instead, the ability to move forces may be limited by too few airfields and inadequate airfield infrastructure. Therefore, acquiring more strategic airlifters might not only fail to satisfy airlift shortcomings but employing them could actually exacerbate deployment problems. In Operation Allied Force, for instance, “there were not enough air bases in the area immediately around Kosovo to support all the aircraft...” 16 This finding is significant because this theater contains numerous airbases relative to other regions. Also, a study by the Army’s Military Traffic Management Command found that the biggest roadblock to achieving the service’s deployment goals is the limited infrastructure at forward airfields. 17 Examples of infrastructure shortfalls include limited ramp space and loading/unloading equipment.

#### There’s no correlation between hegemony and stability

Fettweis, ’10 [Christopher J. Fettweis, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, 52:2, 59-82, March 25th 2010, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396331003764603>]

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible ‘peace dividend’ endangered both national and global security. ‘No serious analyst of American military capabilities’, argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, ‘doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace’.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilising presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

#### Heg will inevitably decline – only our ev assumes coming budget fights

Michael Mandelbaum – Prof, Foreign Policy, SAIS - August 9, 2011, America's Coming Retrenchment, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68024/michael-mandelbaum/americas-coming-retrenchment?page=show

The acrimonious negotiation that produced legislation to raise the American debt ceiling while cutting the federal budget deficit, which President Barack Obama signed on August 2, was an early skirmish in the battle to bring deficits under control. That battle is bound to be protracted, difficult, and contentious, and one of its casualties will be spending on foreign and security policy, which will decline in the years ahead. That will impose new limits on the projection of American power around the world. What a difference a year makes. Only last year, in the May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, I published a review (“Overpowered?”) of three books whose common theme was that the United States was doing far too much beyond its borders. For its own sake and the sake of other countries, the three authors recommended, the country should pursue a more modest foreign policy. Now, as I forecast at the end of that essay, the fiscal condition of the United States will compel the fulfillment of that recommendation -- for better (the general sentiment of the books’ authors) or for worse (my own view). The August 2 legislation calls for $1 trillion in spending cuts over a ten-year period, about $350 billion of which is likely to come from the defense budget. The legislation also mandates a further $1.5 trillion reduction in expenditures in the next decade. If a special Congressional panel cannot agree on the targets of those reductions, an automatic trigger will impose across-the-board budget savings that will lower the Defense Department’s budget by an estimated $600 billion. Even if the triggering mechanism is avoided, spending on defense and on other aspects of U.S. foreign policy will decline over the next decade. The scale of deficit reduction required to put the country on solid fiscal footing is so large that it must involve both limits on Social Security and Medicare, despite the Democrats’ determination to preserve these programs intact, and increases in taxes in some form, despite the Republicans’ determination to prevent this. When Americans are paying more to their government and getting less from it, they will not be as generous in supporting the United States’ global role as they have been in recent decades. Defense budgets will contract for two other reasons. First, the sense of external threat that the country felt throughout the Cold War and after 9/11 has ebbed. Americans’ support for defense spending depends on how threatened they feel. For the moment, at least, the world does not seem particularly threatening. Second, the politics of the federal budget do not favor the Department of Defense, which cannot count on either political party to protect its share of federal spending. No major part of the Democratic coalition makes foreign and security policy a high priority. The Republican coalition does include national security hawks, who are committed to a large military and a robust foreign policy. But there are two other parts of the Republican coalition. Social conservatives are indifferent in these matters, and proponents of small government and low taxes -- now the most influential members of the coalition because they express the views of the Tea Party movement -- are willing to sacrifice defense spending for the sake of their principal goals.

### 1NC COIN Advantage

#### No good airlift for COIN – impossible to predict mission needs

Owen and Mueller, RAND Corp, ‘7 (Robert and Karl, “Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operation” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND\_MG565.pdf)

Unpredictable Requirements The challenge, of course, is that airlift requirements are impossible to forecast with precision. No matter how carefully airlift planners map out the likely requirements for future conﬂicts, they know that they will guess incorrectly in the end and that the mix of aircraft in the ﬂeet resulting from their plans will not perfectly match the conﬂicts that the United States actually ﬁghts. The C-17 Globemaster III program, for example, began in the face of concerns over general shortfalls in the U.S. ability to reinforce Western Europe and, more immediately, a possible need to lift whole armored divisions to block a Soviet advance into Iran. U.S. airlift planners accordingly sought an aircraft that could deliver tanks and other armored vehicles into undeveloped desert airﬁelds. 1 Ultimately, the aircraft was used in the deserts of the Middle East, but to deliver U.S. expeditionary forces into Kuwait and Iraq rather than to stop Soviet tank divisions in the Iranian mountains. Moreover, the vast majority of C-17 missions ﬂown today are transoceanic logistics missions, missions for which the aircraft is not particularly eﬃcient. 2 This inability to predict precisely the types, numbers, and mix of airlift aircraft needed in the wars the country actually will ﬁght, as opposed to the ones visualized and precisely deﬁned in the planning documents the Joint Staﬀ or the Air Force generate to set budgeting guidelines, is unavoidable. The lag between initially identifying requirements for new aircraft and bringing them into the operational ﬂeet is so long—typically on the order of decades rather than years—that the structure of the airlift ﬂeet is likely always to diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the force that would be ideal to support actual operations. Therefore, it is important for architects of future forces to make plans and set requirements that will remain as relevant as possible if the conditions that drive them change or fail to materialize.

#### Counterinsurgency doctrine hollows conventional military dominance – can’t prepare for broad range of potential security conflicts

Mazarr 8 (Michael J. Mazarr is a professor of national security strategy at the U.S. National War College. © 2008 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Washington Quarterly • 31:3 pp. 33–53. <http://www.twq.com/08summer/docs/08summer_mazarr.pdf>)

If counterinsurgency and nation building are mostly political, social, economic, and psychological tasks and are only military in character to a small degree, it does not make much sense to spend billions developing skills, units, doctrines, and equipment that ultimately will not be decisive in most asymmetric challenges, all the while continuing largely to ignore, in relative budgetary and bureaucratic terms, the nonmilitary tools (economic aid, foreign service efforts, public diplomacy, and cultural outreach) that will be decisive in such conflicts. Meanwhile, there are opportunity costs to be borne. Gradually but inevitably, a focus on and continual engagement in asymmetric wars will force the United States to devalue systems and force structures appropriate for interstate war**.** The risk of such trade-offs—the danger of underfunding the research, development, and procurement of systems for major war because the United States is building and deploying forces for asymmetric war—is already evident in the 2009 fiscal year defense budget request. The Defense Department added almost $9 billion to pay for additional numbers of ground troops for the new missions. Given the high tempo imposed by Iraq and Afghanistan, operations and readiness categories of the budget will grow 42 percent, an increase of almost $15 billion, while strategic modernization accounts rise only 23 percent, just more than an $8 billion increase.17 Yet, specific program lines in particular fiscal year defense budgets measure these trade-offs in only the narrowest of terms. After all, many defense budget experts would quickly object that the numbers just cited mislead, that longterm U.S. defense commitments remain heavily weighted toward big-ticket weapons systems. Yet, the wider, long-term costs of the larger strategy of embroiling the United States in such conflicts are immense. In fiscal year 2008, for example, supplemental costs of $189 billion for the “global war on terror,” largely Iraq and Afghanistan funding, were stacked on top of a straightforward defense budget of $479.5 billion. That amount does not begin to count the accumulating health, pension, operations, maintenance, and other related costs built into the defense budget itself. Repeated deployments into stability operations create enormous ongoing costs in these areas as well as in lost equipment that must be replaced, bonuses to boost recruitment for unpopular wars, and other associated obligations. Over the long term, these costs tend to drive out new investments, and an asymmetric war strategy that has U.S. forces hopping from one stability operation to another will substantially magnify this problem. Beyond that, there are skills and training trade-offs; every month an Army captain spends in Arabic language training is a month not spent mastering large-scale warfare tactics. The strategic opportunity costs may be even more profound. While the U.S. national security apparatus obsesses about asymmetric conflict, the nonmilitary tools necessary to deal successfully with such challenges languish. Meanwhile, other potentially more important security threats, such as the challenge of rising powers, such as Russia and China, receive less attention than they should. In an era in which the potential for war between major powers, although unlikely, remains alive, this kind of a trade-off seems strategically unwise, especially because of the undeniable fact that such large-scale wars, were they to occur, would engage U.S. interests that dwarfed anything at stake in contingencies such as Somalia or even Afghanistan. Russia is headed increasingly for a sort of autocratic, anti-Western nationalism, and China’s determination to transform its economic strength into geopolitical and military might has long been obvious. Although neither of these states will inevitably become a threat to peace, either one could. Along with continuing risks such as North Korea and Iran, these realities render naive the assumption that the world has been rendered immune from the requirement for deterrence of major conventional war. Unlike in the case of asymmetric challenges, where a broad range of national and international states and organizations can play important roles in dealing with the economic, social, and political challenges involved, only the Defense Department offers the sorts of tools—long-range strike, global logistics, space-based capabilities, missile defense, and the like—required to engage in major conventional operations. If the United States allows these capabilities and skills to depreciate, no one else is capable of picking up the slack.

#### No offense – COIN is an ideal that can’t be effectively applied

Hazelton 11 (Jacqueline L. Hazelton. Research Fellow, International Security Program. She is writing her dissertation on compellence and accommodation in counterinsurgency warfare. It asks under what conditions states defeat guerrilla insurgencies. She is ABD in the Politics Department at Brandeis University. Spring 2011. Belfer Center Programs or Projects: International Security Interview with Jacqueline (Jill) Hazelton: Does Counterinsurgency as state-building work? <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20860/interview_with_jacqueline_jill_hazelton.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F2085%2Fjacqueline_l_hazelton>)

Q: Your PHD dissertation, which you’re working on currently, focuses on counterinsurgency warfare and the conditions under which governments defeat guerrilla insurgencies. In the cases that you’ve studied, what are some of the constants that you’ve found that enable governments to defeat guerillas? A: We have a conventional wisdom on counterinsurgency right now, which is counterinsurgency as state-building ­­­­­­- the development of healthy, participatory, well-governed states will defeat insurgency. But this process is very long term and it has actually never been done. It’s an ideal. The ideal involves building the civil arm of the state to serve popular interest, to gain the broad allegiance of the populace, including instituting broad reforms that affect the lives of the people the state in fundamental ways. And it involves limiting the use of military force in order to prevent the alienation of civilians by causing unintentional causalities. And all of those things are powerfully appealing to us. They make sense normatively as what we want and what we like and what we think states should do for their citizens. But, as I said, this model has never actually been put into effect. And that’s important because the United States is shaping a great deal of its foreign policy around this type of counterinsurgency - in Afghanistan particularly right now, but also in some other weaker states, where jihadi violence or support for jihadi violence has been a problem- Yemen and Somalia., for example. We have this model of what should work to end the threat to the U.S. homeland and to its interests abroad and to its allies, but it doesn’t bear any resemblance to what has succeeded in counterinsurgency in the past. We as a polity and policy makers can make a choice, and military planners can make a choice, to attempt to conduct this type of effort in a particular case because it’s important, it’s valuable, it’s normatively the way we want the world to work. But we need to realize that that’s not what actually succeeds in counterinsurgency. Empirically what has succeeded in counterinsurgency is a lot of fighting, not necessarily a lot of killing, but a lot of fighting, and a little bit of political accommodation of political entrepreneurs. Whether they’re community leaders or tribal leaders or war lords, the limited, targeted accommodation of these individuals …will advance the state’s goal of defeating the insurgency because it gains the state the intelligence necessary for targeting insurgents and for further political accommodation attempts. So, if you compare the two models -- the hearts and minds or population centric model that is the conventional wisdom which guides American policy now is about building the civilian institutions of the state. What actually works in building the military. The conventional wisdom is about winning the broad allegiance of the populace. What works is gaining the cooperation of a few political entrepreneurs. The conventional wisdom says limit the use of force and in particular don’t target civilians; don’t hurt civilians, whatever you do. Think about the rules of engagement in Afghanistan. In fact what has succeeded has included not only the use of the full spectrum of force but unfortunately also the targeting of civilians. So we have two very different models. One is visionary, and ambitious, and optimistic and one is not at all pretty- it’s very, very ugly.

#### CFC solves impacts to North Korea regime collapse

Bolton, AEI, ‘8 (John, October 2, “The World Shouldn't Fear The Collapse of North Korea” Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122291070711596789.html)

As panicky U.S. negotiators raced this week to save the endangered Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program, they faced a major new issue: Who would be calling the shots in Pyongyang when the breathless American diplomats arrived? Kim Jong Il's absence from the North's recent 60th-birthday celebration unleashed a world-wide torrent of speculation and rumors about his failing health. In both Washington and Pyongyang, voices have been raised essentially arguing that a regime crisis is the last thing we should want. But is the stability of an internationally criminal, cruelly dictatorial, nuclear-weapons-equipped North Korea really something we should value above all conceivable alternatives? Nightmare predictions of loose nukes, an out-of-control North Korean military, a tsunami of refugees and the prospect that the South might have to absorb over 20 million impoverished new citizens are keeping some awake at night. Unquestionably, a Pyongyang regime crisis carries huge risks and challenges. But let's keep our eyes on the prize. There may be a precious opportunity in the midst of potential disaster to reunite the Korean Peninsula under democratic rule, or at least bring this objective closer. A regime crisis in Pyongyang poses two main challenges: (1) the military and nuclear threat on the Peninsula and more broadly; and (2) the humanitarian and economic consequences of the North's collapse, both the immediate risk of massive refugee flows and the long-term economic impact of reunification. These two challenges actually pose very similar choices for U.S. and South Korean leaders today. First, there is no doubt that North Korea's nuclear arsenal must not be allowed to fall into the wrong hands, outside or inside the country, nor should the North's chemical and biological weapons be made operational. The U.S.-South Korean Combined Forces Command (CFC) has contingency plans for these circumstances, drawn with the full realization that rapid implementation in a period of high uncertainty may mean the difference between securing the North's weapons of mass destruction and seeing them used in chaotic and deadly ways. Despite contrary speculation, there is no motivation for North Korea's generals to attack South Korea. They are far more likely to engage in an internal power struggle, which is where the most destructive weapons would be used, and why we must act rapidly to secure them. If things really come unglued, the generals' main preoccupation may well be simply getting out of Dodge -- an objective we should be happy to facilitate. Critical here is that Beijing be told clearly that any military action across the DMZ is intended only to deal with the regime crisis, and is in no way aimed at China. Indeed, to the extent Beijing has information about, say, the location of the North's nuclear weapons, it would clearly be in China's interest to share that information. Not only would a decisive CFC operation minimize the chances for loose nukes or warlord-minded generals, it could also dramatically help reassure the North Korean population that they could stay in their homes, and prevent massive refugee flows into China. That, in turn, could eliminate any thoughts Beijing might have about its own intervention to keep North Koreans from flowing across the Yalu River. Second, whatever the CFC is able to do, there is little doubt we must plan for urgent humanitarian needs in the North. The scale and expense of the response required to forestall tragedy in these circumstances could be staggering -- but today such an international response is not only feasible, but potentially quite manageable. Key to this assessment is the critical geographical fact that North Korea is adjacent to South Korea, an affluent democracy. For any successful response to humanitarian travails in North Korea, of course, establishing order as rapidly as possible will be imperative. In all too many contemporary humanitarian crises, refugees have nowhere to return to. Not so here: the South Korean Constitution already established their right to citizenship in the Republic of Korea. Like Germany during the Cold War, and Israel today, South Korea guarantees a "right of return" for those in the North. Instead of facing an uncertain future in "displaced persons" camps in China, Russia or elsewhere, North Korean escapees could count on protection and legal rights in the Republic of Korea. The economic implications of absorbing the North Korean population have seemed terrifying to South Korean policy makers ever since the Berlin Wall came down. But the plain fact is that the economic chasm between North and South will continue to widen as long as the North Korean regime survives. The longer unification is postponed, the greater the immediate challenges of reunification are likely to be. There are potential economic opportunities in an economic reintegration of North and South -- not just expenses. A flexible and market-oriented Korean economy, under rule of law and open to international trade and finance, will be best placed to capitalize upon these opportunities. In the short run, the expenses of dealing with humanitarian needs from the North may be high. But in the long run, if a reunified Korea can recreate the sort of "business climate" in which the South thrived, the "costs" of reunification will take care of themselves. Kim Jong Il's demise could thus hasten North Korea's demise as well, an outcome we should welcome. A reunited, fully democratic Korea would likely be a strong U.S. ally, a geopolitical benefit too often ignored by our State Department. Let us not lose sight of that prospect as we deal with the perils and prospects of regime crisis in Pyongyang. Preparing for the worst should not keep us from trying to plan for the best as well.

### LMSR CP

#### Purchasing more LMSRs solves

CBO, ‘5 (Congressional Budget Office, September, “Options for Strategic Military Transportation Systems” http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27-strategicmobility.pdf)

Option 2A: Purchase More LMSRs This option would speed strategic deployments by adding to the number of large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships in the strategic sealift force. Although the Military Sealift Command’s fast sealift ships are faster, CBO chose LMSRs for this option because they were in production much more recently (the last one was delivered in 2003, whereas the FSSs were produced in the early 1970s) and because they were built domestically. Thus, LMSRs offer the advantage of a proven ship design with which U.S. shipyards have recent production experience. Trying to build a ship with FSS-like performance would entail greater technical and cost risks and would require extra expenditure on new design work. This option would buy 17 additional LMSRs at a total cost of $8.4 billion, CBO estimates, with production split between the two shipyards that built the current fleet of LMSRs (National Steel and Shipbuilding in California and Avondale in Mississippi). No funds would be needed for development. Operating the new LMSRs would cost about $7 million per ship per year, or about $2.9 billion over the 30 years after the first ship was delivered. Those operating costs assume that the LMSRs would be maintained in four-day reduced operating status, as current surge sealift ships are. The 17 ships purchased under Option 2A could deliver their first cargo to a Persian Gulf conflict in about 24 days, making this option the least prompt alternative in CBO’s analysis. However, the average throughput capacity of this option would be very high. Assuming no constraints on infrastructure, by day 35 the additional LMSRs could deliver about 280,000 tons of cargo (more than enough equipment for two heavy divisions) from the United States—approximately a 30 percent increase over the base case (see Figure 3-4). 7 The throughput capacity offered by this option is so large that it would probably allow the Department of Defense to retire older RO/RO ships in the Ready Reserve Force in exchange for the new LMSRs, which could arrive 10 days earlier. (That potential implication for the modernization of the basecase sealift force is discussed in Chapter 4.)

### Politics Links

#### Congress will refuse to increase C-17s over the current cap

Munoz, ’11 (Carlo, July 14, “DoD Caps Airlift at 300 C-5s, C-17s; Hill Cannot Refuse” http://defense.aol.com/2011/07/14/dod-caps-airlift-at-300-c-5s-c-17s-hill-cannot-refuse/)

So how many aircraft does it take to move the world's largest military force? Not as many as many as you would think, the Pentagon says. In what has at times seemed like a long-running bad joke, filled with terms like 'floors', 'ceilings' and 'sweet spots', the Pentagon has finally capped its strategic airlift requirement at 300 aircraft. That mix of C-17 Globemasters and modified C-5 Galaxy aircraft will be enough to move America's fighting men and women to spots all over the world, Christine Fox, director of DoD's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office, told the Senate Armed Services Seapower subcommittee. DoD's plan calls for just over 200 C-17s and roughly 50 C-5s to support combat and peacetime operations. It also requires retirements of over 30 C-5s from the fleet. That 300-plane number seemingly puts to rest the years of bickering between the department, the Air Force and the Hill on strategic airlift. It is also a number that, for the first time, Congress cannot refuse. "I do not think there is the political climate to support any more" strategic airlifters or push back against the C-5 retirements, according to a Hill aide. But it has not always been that way. During the most contentious years of the airlift requirement debate, then newly-installed Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz drafted a letter to Congress, saying that a 316-plane fleet was the "sweet spot" for the service for strategic airlift. Previous assessments placed that number as high as 320 or more. In those days, current U.S. Transportation Command chief Gen. Duncan McNabb was "the person that would tell you, behind closed doors, we would love to have more C-17s," the aide said. Simply put, the Air Force would ask and the Hill would deliver, according to the aide. But with a stagnant economy, shrinking defense dollars and a toughening fiscal mindset in Congress, the days of airlift wishlists being granted are over, the aide said. When asked if the Air Force had been roaming the halls of Congress, drumming up support for more airlift, no matter what the Defense Department says, the aide replied "there hasn't been any of that lately." But the silence coming from the Air Force's congressional liaison office does not mean airlift supporters are going away quietly, another Hill staffer said. Included in the SASC draft of the fiscal year 2012 defense spending bill, members voted against changes to current law that required the Air Force to maintain a strategic airlift fleet above 300 airplanes. Even though the measure does not ban C-5 retirements outright, the measure is a huge stumbling block to shrinking the airlift fleet, the staffer said. With similar language in the House committee bill, the Air Force can theoretically keep pushing for 316 planes "barring a conference surprise," according to the staffer. But getting the green light from defense authorizers does not mean that the Air Force is free and clear, the Hill aide noted. Even if the final defense bill says 316 is the number, the Air Force is "basically looking at a bill they are going to have to pay" from other areas in the service budget, the source said. "There is really no sympathy for them [now]," the source added.

#### Strategic airlift unpopular – Congress pushing to reduce current fleet size

Senator Ayotte, ’11 (October 13, “Bipartisan Ayotte Bill to Reduce Aircraft Floor Could Save Taxpayers More than $1 Billion” http://www.ayotte.senate.gov/?p=press\_release&id=241)

U.S. Senators Kelly Ayotte (R-NH) and Jack Reed (D-RI), both members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, today introduced legislation to reduce the Air Force's strategic airlift aircraft inventory minimum, an action that could save taxpayers as much as $1.2 billion in the next few years. Although federal law sets the Air Force's minimum number of strategic airlift aircraft at 316, Pentagon officials have indicated that only approximately 300 aircraft are needed to meet strategic airlift capacity requirements. The Defense Department and the Air Force support the removal of the 316 minimum for the strategic airlift aircraft inventory, consistent with the President's FY 2012 budget request. These planes are used to carry supplies, equipment and military personnel around the globe. The Ayotte-Reed bill, the Strategic Airlift Force Structure Reform Act of 2011, would reduce the strategic airlift aircraft floor from 316 to 301 aircraft. "Congress needs to stop forcing the Pentagon to maintain aircraft that our warfighters say they don't need. This common sense, bipartisan legislation would save taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars while ensuring that our military continues to meet strategic airlift requirements," said Senator Ayotte. "I appreciate the Pentagon's efforts to combat wasteful and unnecessary spending within its budget, which will help ensure the most efficient and cost-effective use of taxpayer dollars." "Congress has a responsibility to ensure the Air Force has the tools it needs, but we should also pay close attention when they tell us they don't need certain equipment. The Pentagon, the Air Force, and Transportation Command support this common-sense fleet reduction, which will enable the military to better allocate their resources," said Senator Reed. During a July 13 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, General Raymond Johns, Commander of U.S. Air Mobility Command, testified, "...we completely support the President's authorization request...eliminating the 316 strategic airlift aircraft restriction...the 316 strategic airlift floor requires us to keep unneeded, less capable C-5As in the inventory. Over the FYDP [Future Years Defense Plan] the un-programmed cost to the Air Force to maintain these aircraft could be as much as $1.23 billion." General Johns testified that strategic airlift aircraft in excess of 301 were "over capacity" that forces "extra workload on our airmen to keep that capability when we don't need to utilize it." In June, Senator Ayotte drafted an amendment to the Senate version of the FY 2012 Defense Authorization bill that would reduce the number of C-5 and C-17 aircraft that Congress requires the Air Force to maintain. Her efforts, as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, helped lead to the July 13 Seapower Subcommittee hearing to investigate the required force level of strategic airlift aircraft mandated by law. In the wake of these efforts, a recent Center for New American Security (CNAS) report, entitled "Hard Choices: Responsible Defense in an Age of Austerity" endorsed this initiative to reduce the strategic airlift aircraft floor.

#### Military won’t shield the plan – they support cuts

Rector, ’11 (July 14, “Pentagon wants more cuts in C-5 fleet” http://warnerrobinspatriot.com/bookmark/14701373-Pentagon-wants-more-cuts-in-C-5-fleet)

Defense officials asked Congress Wednesday to reduce the statutory minimum for the nation’s strategic airlift fleet from 316 to 301 aircraft, enabling the Air Force to retire additional C-5A Galaxies. The C-5, the largest of the airlift weapon systems, is managed and sustained by some 1,000 workers at Robins Air Force Base. If granted, the move would retain 27 C-5As along with 52 newer C-5s updated to the C-5M configuration and 222 C-17s. How the cuts might impact Robins is unclear. In his prepared remarks before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen. Duncan McNabb, commander of U.S. Transportation Command, said the C-5A retirements would “improve aircraft availability by removing maintenance intensive jets from the fleet and allow us to focus our critical maintenance, aerial port and aircrew personnel and resources on a right-sized fleet.” McNabb said the most recent Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 completed in February justifies repeal of the congressionally mandated 316 aircraft minimum. “The strategic airlift aircraft reduction will allow the Air Force to retire an additional 15 C-5As and provide a substantial savings by freeing up over $1.2 billion in taxpayer dollars across the five-year defense plan,” he told the committee. The most recent study underscored a strategic airlift requirement of 32.7 million ton-miles per day, the commander said. “And our analysis confirms (that the requirement) can be met with approximately 300 strategic airlift aircraft,” McNabb stressed. Gen. Raymond Johns, Jr., Air Mobility Command commander, told the same committee that new C-17s and updated C-5Ms allow the fleet to meet the most stringent of requirements with fewer aircraft. He said the 316 aircraft requirement forces the Air Force to keep unneeded, less capable aircraft. “Each of these unneeded aircraft comes with a cost to maintain in flyable status – a cost not programmed in the Air Force budget,” Johns underscored in his printed remarks.