## \*\*\*MOBILITY K\*\*\*

### 1NC

#### The affirmatives focus on mobility is beholden to an ideology of speed that informs every other part of life – existential threats cannot be separated from the pursuit of acceleration – the affirmative ethos of speed will be used to justify violent pursuit of those who do not accelerate at an adequate pace

Derrida renowned deconstructionist and philosopher 1984 Jacques Diacritics 14.2 jstor

Let me say a word first about speed. At the beginning there will have been speed.

We are speaking of stakes that are apparently limitless for what is still now and then called humanity. People find it easy to say that in nuclear war "humanity" runs the risk of its self-destruction, with nothing left over, no remainder. There is a lot that could be said about that rumor. But whatever credence we give it, we have to recognize that these stakes appear in the experience of a race, or more precisely of a competition, a rivalry between two rates of speed. It's what we call in French a course de vitesse, a speed race. Whether it is the arms race or orders given to start a war that is itself dominated by that economy of speed throughout all the zones of its technology, a gap of a few seconds may decide, irreversibly, the fate of what is still now and then called humanity- plus the fate of a few other species. As no doubt we all know, no single instant, no atom of our life (of our relation to the world and to being) is not marked today, directly or indirectly, by that speed race. And by the whole strategic debate about "no use," "no first use," or "first use" of nuclear weaponry. Is this new? Is it the first time "in history"? Is it an invention, and can we still say "in history" in order to speak about it? The most classical wars were also speed races, in their preparation and in the actual pursuit of the hostilities. Are we having, today, another, a different experience of speed? Is our relation to time and to motion qualitatively different? Or must we speak prudently of an extraordinary- although qualitatively homogeneous- acceleration of the same experience? And what temporality do we have in mind when we put the question that way? Can we take the question seriously without re-elaborating all the problematics of time and motion, from Aristotle to Heidegger by way of Augustine, Kant, Husserl, Einstein, Bergson, and so on? So my first formulation of the question of speed was simplistic. It opposed quantity and quality as if a quantitative transformation-the crossing of certain thresholds of acceleration within the general machinery of a culture, with all its techniques for handling, recording, and storing information-could not induce qualitative mutations, as if every invention were not the invention of a process of acceleration or, at the very least, a new experience of speed. Or as if the concept of speed, linked to some quantification of objective velocity, remained within a homogeneous relation to every experience of time- for the human subject or for a mode of temporalization that the human subject-as such-would have himself covered up.

#### This obsession with mobility within transportation infrastructure is uniquely entrenched in ableism 🡺 social exclusion

Imrie Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London 2000 Rob Disability and discourses of mobility and movement Environment and Planning volume 32 http://www.environmentandplanning.com/epa/fulltext/a32/a331.pdf

Barnes et al (1999, page 121), for instance, note that UK households with a disabled person are half as likely as those without to own a car (also, see OPCS, 1993). In addition, most cars are designed for standardised bodies and few mobility-impaired or ambulant impaired disabled people are able to get into one. Specially adapted cars are expensive, and insurers regard disabled people as a risk and charge high motor insurance pre miums. These experiences are connected to the domination of medical discourses which are infused with conceptions of the incapacitated and immobile body, or the body which is malfunctioning due to a loss of functional capacity. Disabled people are portrayed as less than whole and as a population requiring particular forms of regulation, discipline, and control by state programmes and policies. Indeed, Levi-Strauss (1955) refers to modern societies as anthropoemic or, as Young (1999, page 56) defines it, societies that ``vomit out deviants, keeping them outside of society or enclosing them in special institutions''.

Such discourses see disability as a social burden which is a private, not public, responsibility. The impairment is the focus of concern, and biological intervention and care are seen as the appropriate responses. The problem of immobility is seen as personal and specific to the impairment; that it is this that needs to be eradicated, rather than transformations in sociocultural attitudes and practices, if mobility is to be restored. In particular, political and policy assumptions about mobility and movement are premised on a universal, disembodied subject which is conceived of as neutered, that is without sex, gender, or any other attributed social or biological characteristic (see Hall, 1996; Imrie, 1994; Law, 1999; Whitelegg, 1997). The hegemony of what one might term the mobile body is decontextualised from the messy world of multiple and everchanging embodiments; where there is little or no recognition of bodily differences or capabilities. The mobile body, then, is conceived of in terms of independence of movement and bodily functions; a body without physical and mental impairments.

The hegemony of the mobile body is also reinforced by professional discourses which seek to measure, characterise, and understand disability through the movement and mobility of disabled people's body parts. Such conceptions see disabled people as neither sick nor well but in a liminal state which is characterised by a (potential) movement from one bodily state to another (also, see Ellis, 2000; Leder, 1990; Paterson and Hughes, 1999). The underlying objective is the disciplining of the deviant or impaired body through the restoration of movement in body parts to facilitate independence of mobility (and the restoration of the `whole person'). For Ellis (2000), such (welfare) discourses emphasise the importance of individuals attaining an `independent body', or a body which revolves around self management, personal responsibility, and the projection of desirable bodily characteristics. As Ellis (2000, page 17) suggests, it is a carnality which propagates the aestheticisation of the body while seeking to exclude those (impaired) bodies which are, so some claim, a source of anxiety in contemporary culture (see, for instance, Lupton, 1994)

Indeed, as Paterson and Hughes (1999, page 604) argue, ``the information that animates the world is dominated by non disabled bodies, by a specific hegemonic form of carnality which excludes as it constructs''. These send out specific signals or codes which favour the corporeal status of nonimpaired people, or at least do little to facilitate the independent ease of movement of people with physical and mental impairments. (5) This, for Paterson and Hughes (1999, page 606), is indicative of ``a subtle interplay of micro and macro relations of power'', where specific design features, for example, prioritise forms of movement based on the bodily needs of the neutered body (which is devoid of physical and mental impairments). In this sense, intercorporeal encounters between the hegemonic world of the mobile body and disabled people tend to reinforce the former's sense of presence and the latter's sense of absence, in other words a recognition of disabled people being there but being unable to interact with the social or physical structures which surround them. It is, in Leder's (1990) terms, a projection of the absent body or bodies which ``dys-appear'' when confronted with the embodied norms of everyday life [see Paterson and Hughes (1999) for an amplification of these points].

The dys-appearance of disabled people's bodies is not unconnected to the work of transportation planners and operators who, as Whitelegg (1997, page 14) notes, make ``decisions about what kinds of travel are important and which journey purposes and destinations are to be favoured''. In particular, the impaired body is largely invisible in transportation planning and policy or, as Law (1999, page 566) notes, ``bodies appear in conventional transportation models as discrete entities with independent trajectories''. As Whitelegg (1997) suggests, this leads to the provision of transportation infrastructure which tends to prioritise the movement and mobility of ``productive bodies'' between a limited range of destinations (also, see Marshall, 1999). Thus, mobility policies largely revolve around the provision of commuter networks between home and the workplace, seeking to facilitate movement which is limited to specific social, geographical, and temporal ranges. (6) The effect is, as Huxley (1997, page 2) observes, one of reducing mobility to ``predictable, purposeful trips, origins and destinations'' rather than seeking to conceive of mobility as ``a messy, unpredictable, diverse and changeable reality''.

#### Transportation infrastructure planning should be rejected – its reliance on universal understandings of acceptance causes violence

Imrie Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London 2000 Rob Disability and discourses of mobility and movement Environment and Planning volume 32 http://www.environmentandplanning.com/epa/fulltext/a32/a331.pdf

Disabled people's mobility and movement are highly circumscribed by sociocultural attitudes, practices, and the related design of the built environment. From the micro architecture of urban streetscapes, to the discontinuous nature of transportation infrastructure and networks, one can agree with Paterson and Hughes (1999, page 605) who suggest that it is ``hegemonic bodies that are culturally formative of the codes and idioms'' which condition the norms of movement and mobility (also, see Corker, 1998; 1999; Hughes, 1999). Such norms revolve around conceptions of the bodily incompetence of people with physical and mental impairments, while propagating welfare policies and procedures which seek to discipline disabled people into a state (and status) of nonimpaired carnality. For disabled people, then, their immobility is their own fault or the consequences of a deviant corporeality which requires medical care and rehabilitation or, failing that, the application of charitable works. Law (1999, page 583) suggests that an excavation of the ``practices and meanings related to mobility should not detract us from the politics of mobility''. For disabled people, a politics of mobility is, however, not divisible from broader challenges to, and reformulations of, the hegemonic values and practices of a society which, as Paterson and Hughes (1999, page 609) note, serves to maintain a hierarchy of identities. Such hierarchies essentialise conceptions of disability (as impairment of a particular type), with the effect that the complexities of disabled people's corporeality and experiences (of mobility and movement) are rarely described, acknowledged, nor understood (see, for example, Corker, 1998; 1999; Gleeson, 1999; Hine, 1999; Hine and Mitchell, 2001; Imrie, 1996; 2000b). Not surprisingly, as some respondents intimated, the shifting, indeterminate, and incoherent corporealities of disability are often at odds with the static categories and practices of, for example, producers and providers of transportation services.

Such services treat disabled people as `different' and `special' or even as `burden some'. As Corker (1998, page 82) suggests, the ascription of ``difference'' to disabled people is often used to distinguish them ``as persons who can justifiably be treated unequally''. For Corker (1998, page 82), the unequal treatment of (disabled) people, in relation to ``the distribution of benefits and burdens, and in the absence of any justification, is a paradigm of injustice''. Arguably, these injustices require a politics of mobility in which liberal conceptions of mobility and freedom are reassessed to destabilise the efficacy of `the mobile body'. Given liberalism's abstract universality and individualism, and its preoccupation with the sameness of treatment of subjects, alternative frameworks are required, so some argue, which seek to develop ``a recognition of difference and responsiveness to individuated needs, as well as the protection of the rights of difference'' (Gould, 1996, page 180). A politics of movement and mobility, then, ought to enable us to think about, and respond to ``the diversity of mobility, networks and access required by diverse groups in their daily lives'' (Huxley, 1997, page 2).

These ideas are core to a politics of disability which is premised on the eradication of ascribed needs, or processes whereby policy experts and professionals assess disabled people's needs and ascribe the relevant policy prescriptions (for example, the provision of special transport or equipment to facilitate mobility). For Oliver (1990), ascribed needs reinforce the power of professional experts, such as transportation planners, to determine the quality of disabled people's lives. This, according to Oliver, maintains disabled people's dependence on others and does little to create the conditions for disabled people's self-determination. In contrast, Oliver (1996) notes that a politics of disability ought to work from a position of self-defined needs as a basis for rights claims (also, see Handley, 2000). As Oliver (1996, page 74) suggests, ``it is rights to appropriate their own self defined needs that disabled people are demanding, not to have their needs defined and met by others''.

### Link – Neg Block

#### FIRST - SPEED – extend Derrida evidence – the focus on mobility is a replication of the modern obsession with speed – all politics become about efficiency and pace which causes violence against those who cannot access the rate of speed the affirmative lives at – this ideology is the justification for war and violence and guarantees technological accidents – turns the case

Kellner, 99 (Douglas, Ph.D., Philosophy, Columbia University , “Virilio, War, and Technology: Some Critical Reflections”, Illuminations, http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell29.htm)

In addition, for Virilio, the acceleration of events, technological development, and speed in the current era designates "a double movement of implosion and explosion," so that "the new war machine combines a double disappearance: the disappearance of matter in nuclear disintegration and the disappearance of places in vehicular extermination" (Virilio 1986: 134). The increased speed of destruction in military technology is moving toward the speed of light with laser weapons and computer-controlled weapons systems constituting a novelty in warfare in which there are no longer geo-strategic strongpoints since from any given spot we can now reach any other, producing what Virilio calls "a strategy of Brownian movement through geostrategic homogenization of the globe" (Virilio 1986: 135). Thus, "strategic spatial miniaturization is now the order of the day," with microtechnologies transforming production and communication, shrinking the planet, and preparing the way for what Virilio calls "pure war," a situation in which military technologies and an accompanying technocratic system come to control every aspect of life.

In Virilio's view, the war machine is the demiurge of technological development and an ultimate threat to humanity, producing "a state of emergency" in which nuclear holocaust threatens the very survival of the human species. This involves a shift from a "geo-politics" to a "chrono-politics," from a politics of space to a politics of time, in which whoever controls the means of instant information, communication, and destruction is a dominant socio-political force. For Virilio, every technological system contains its specific for of accident and a nuclear accident would, of course, be catastrophic. Hence, in the contemporary nuclear era, in which weapons of mass destruction could create an instant world holocaust, we are thrust into a permanent state of emergency that enables the nuclear state to impose its imperatives on ever more domains of political and social life.

Politics too succumbs to the logic of speed and potential holocaust as increased speed in military violence, instantaneous information and communication, and the flow of events diminishes the time and space of deliberation, discussion, and the building of consensus that is the work of politics. Speed and war thus undermine politics, with technology replacing democratic participation and the complexity and rapidity of historical events rendering human understanding and control ever more problematical. Ubiquitous and instantaneous media communication in turn makes spin-control and media manipulation difficult, but essential, to political governance. Moreover, the need for fast spin control and effective media politics further diminishes the space and role of democratic political participation and interaction.

#### SECOND - TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE - the planning necessary for the affirmative is entrenched in ableism – extend the Imire evidence – multiple arguments:

#### HEGEMONIC BODIES – transportation infrastructure planning is based on a hegemonic understanding of mobility – the implementation of the plan will be based on a dichotomy which places abled bodied people in the normalized role of transportation – this ableist understanding of the world leads to social exclusion

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Mobility and movement are core to people's identities, life experiences, and opportunities. This is particularly so for those whose mobility and movement patterns are constrained by wider social or situational circumstances over which they have little or no control. For instance, research by the Royal National Institute for the Blind (1995, pages 17 ^ 18) shows that many people with vision impairments are isolated and trapped in their homes, ``with many dependent on sighted assistance for such tasks as shopping''. Likewise, wheelchair users are prevented from entering into and using most buildings and transport; for example, 80% of London's underground stations are inaccessible to wheelchairs. Physical obstacles and barriers are compounded by social barriers too, with many disabled people often experiencing combinations of violence, verbal abuse, and hostile or negative reactions in public places (Barnes et al, 1999; Butler and Bowlby, 1997). Such expressions of societal aversion to the public presence of disabled people are commonplace and do little to encourage disabled people to move around. For most disabled people, then, daily reality is of restricted mobility, no mobility, or forms of mobility and movement which serve to highlight their impairment and difference. (1)

The inequities of mobility and movement are connected to sociocultural values and practices which prioritise mobile bodies or those characterised by societally defined norms of health, fitness, and independence of bodily movements. Such bodies are, as Ellis (2000, page 5) notes, ``naturalised as a biological given'' and projected as ``the legitimate basis of order in a humanist world''. Illustrative of this are the plethora of metaphors of mobility and movement which are infused with conceptions of bodily completeness and independence, of the (normal) body far removed from those with physical and mental impairments. Such representations counterpoise the mobile body to the immobile, the capacitated to the incapacitated, the abled to the disabled, and the normal to the abnormal. These binary divides reinforce what Oliver (1990) refers to as a ``legacy of negativism'', or values which mark out disabled people as ``problems because they are seen to deviate from the dominant culture's view of what is desirable, normal, socially acceptable, and safe'' (Corker, 1999, page 20; in addition, see Abberley, 1987; Paterson and Hughes, 1999).

In this paper, I argue that assumptions of unrestricted movement and mobility in contemporary Western societies are hegemonic in prioritising specific bodies and modes of mobility and movement. (2) In particular, mobility and movement are defined through discourses which serve to alienate impaired bodies and to prioritise the movement of what one might term `the mobile body'. In exploring such ideas, the paper is divided into three parts. The first part is a discussion of the hegemonic discourses of the body in relation to mobility and movement. This is followed by an empirical exploration, through self-testimonies, of disabled people's experiences of movement and mobility. I conclude by exploring some of the practical and political possibilities for challenging the hegemonic discourses of the body, mobility, and movement.

#### LIBERAL HUMANISM – in so much as the disabled body is configured into infrastructure planning it is always already based on the liberal notion of universal impairment – this excludes the infinite differences of the disabled body and leads to social exclusion

Hughes Head of Division of Sociology Glasgow Caledonian University 2007 Bill Being disabled: towards a critical social ontology for disability studies Disability & Society 22.7 Taylor & Francis

In summary, the universalistic approach to ontology in disability studies that I have sketched above is inadequate on at least three counts. Firstly, in treating the body as a limit it fails to recognize that disabled bodies embody potential and possibility and thus leaves unchallenged the profoundly invalidating vision of disability that haunts the non‐disabled imaginary. Secondly, it fails to treat the body as a body subject. As a consequence of the loss of the ‘lived body’, the materialist ontology proposed by our main protagonists as they labour to map out an anthropology of frailty ends up mechanistic and mired in reductionism. Thirdly, in appealing to a universal human subject the approach taken by Turner and Shakespeare and Watson annihilates disability as an identity and conceals the discrimination and exclusion that is the ubiquitous experience of people who embrace disability as a subject position. The argument is Rousseauesque. We are all the same. There is no room for difference and diversity. In reflecting on this argument, however, perhaps we need to listen to Baudrillard’s (1993, p. 125) claim that ‘it is our undifferentiated concept of man that gives rise to discrimination’. In my view disability studies is best served, at least in the present conjuncture, by a critical social ontology that focuses in the first instance on the ‘pathologies of non‐disablement’ (Hughes, 1999, p. 164) that regularly misrepresent and sometimes destroy disabled peoples lives.

#### CONTROLING BODIES – the incorporation of provisions to accommodate disabled bodies 🡺 regulation and control by the state apparatus – this biopolitical control over otherized bodies replicates an ideology of violence

Elden, Lecturer in politics at the University of Warwick, England, 2002 Stuart, boundary 2 - Volume 29, Number 1, page project muse

It is worth thinking this through in a little more detail. As Foucault notes, "Never have wars been so bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations" (VS, 179; WK, 135–36). He suggests that the modern formidable power of death is the counterpart of a power that administers life through precise controls and comprehensive regulations (FDS, 215; VS, 179–80; WK, 136). What happens is that politics becomes increasingly scientific: medical and mathematical. There is a discipline of the individual body—an anatomo-politics—and a regulation of the social body—a bio-politics of the population or human species (FDS, 216; VS, 183; WK, 139). Bio-power involves the builing up of profiles, statistical measures, and so on, increasing knowledge through monitoring and surveillance, extremely meticulous orderings of space, and control through discipline. Birth and death rates and measures of longevity become important; fertility, illness, diet, and habitation become measured; statistics and demographics come together with economics and politics (FDS, 215–16; see also VS, 36; WK, 25). This use of figures is pronounced in medical campaigns at the time (FDS, 217). This notion of calculation is both a particular case and the foundation of the more general science of ordering. As Foucault notes, "The body is a bio-political reality; medicine is a bio-political strategy" (DE, 3:210).

### Link – Speed

#### The impact to the 1ac is constructed under an epistemology of speed – the dissociation created by their claims of survival offers a site to think through the essence of techne – our position as non-experts is a reason to embrace the negative – our role as critics of text greets us with the responsibility of criticism

Derrida renowned deconstructionist and philosopher 1984 Jacques Diacritics 14.2 jstor

Indeed: nowhere has the dissociation between the place where competence is exercised and the place where the stakes are located ever seemed more rigorous, more dangerous, more catastrophic. Seemed, I said. Is it not apparently the first time that that dissociation, more unbridgeable than ever for ordinary mortals, has put in the balance the fate of what is still now and then called humanity as a whole, or even of the earth as a whole, at the very moment when your president is even thinking about waging war beyond the earth? Doesn't that dissociation (which is dissociation itself, the division and the dislocation of the socius, of sociality itself) allow us to think the essence of knowledge and techne itself, as socialization and de-socialization, as the constitution and the deconstruction of the socius?

Must we then take that dissociation seriously? And what is seriousness, in this instance? is the first question, and thus the first reason why it is not totally irrelevant, inconsistent, to hold a colloquium on the nuclear in a space, our own, which is essentially occupied by non-experts, by questioners who doubtless don't know very well who they are, who don't very well know what justifies them or what legitimates their community but who know at least that they are not military professionals, are not professionals of strategy, diplomacy, or nuclear techno-science.

Second reason. So we are not experts in strategy, in diplomacy, or in the techno-science known as nuclear science, we are oriented rather toward what is called not humanity but the humanities, history, literature, languages, philology, the social sciences, in short all that which in the Kantian university was situated in the inferior class of the philosophy school, foreign to any exercise of power. We are specialists in discourse and in texts, all sorts of texts.

Now I shall venture to say that in spite of all appearances this specialty is what entitles us, and doubly so, to concern ourselves seriously with the nuclear issue. And by the same token, if we have not done so before, this entitlement, this responsibility that we would thus have been neglecting until now, directs us to concern ourselves with the nuclear issue- first, inasmuch as we are representatives of humanity and of the incompetent humanities which have to think through as rigorously as possible the problem of competence, given that the stakes of the nuclear question are those of humanity, of the humanities. How, in the face of the nuclear issue, are we to get speech to circulate not only among the self-styled competent parties and those who are alleged to be incompetent, but among the competent parties themselves. For we are more than just suspicious; we are certain that, in this area in particular, there is a multiplicity of dissociated, heterogeneous competencies. Such knowledge is neither coherent nor totalizable. Moreover, between those whose competence is techno-scientific (those who invent in the sense of unveiling or of "constative" discovery as well as in the sense of production of new technical or "performing" mechanisms) and those whose competence is politico-military, those who are empowered to make decisions, the deputies of performance or of the performative, the frontier is more undecidable than ever, as it is between the good and evil of all nuclear technology. If on the one hand it is apparently the first time that these competencies are so dangerously and effectively dissociated, on the other hand and from another point of view, they have never been so terribly accumulated, concentrated, entrusted as in a dice game to so few hands: the military men are also scientists, and they find themselves inevitably in the position of participating in the final decision, whatever precautions may be taken in this area. All of them, that is, very few, are in the position of inventing, inaugurating, improvising procedures and giving orders where no model - we shall talk about this later on - can help them at all. Among the acts of observing, revealing, knowing, promising, acting, simulating, giving orders, and so on, the limits have never been so precarious, so undecidable. Today it is on the basis of that situation- the limit case in which the limit itself is suspended, in which therefore the krinein, crisis, decision itself, and choice are being subtracted from us, are abandoning us like the remainder of that subtraction- it is on the basis of that situation that we have to re-think the relations between knowing and acting, between constative speech acts and performative speech acts, between the invention that finds what was already there and the one that produces new mechanisms or new spaces. In the undecidable and at the moment of a decision that has no common ground with any other, we have to reinvent invention or conceive of another "pragmatics.

### Link – Infrastructure

#### The plans focus on new and improved infrastructure prefers new technologies and ignores “risky bodies” 🡺 politics of exclusion

Imrie 01 (Barriered and Bounded Places and the Spatialities of Disability. By: Imrie, Rob, Urban Studies (Routledge), D/A 7/10/12 BS)

These ideas about identity and place underpin the emergence of a variant of urban studies concerned with the spatialities of disability. Such studies are documenting the diverse ways in which disabled people's lives are constituted by, and are constitutive of, the intersections between their impaired bodies and particular places (Butler and Parr, 1999; Dorn, 1999; Gleeson, 1999a; Golledge, 1993; Imrie, 2000a, 2000b). For disabled people, the physical construction of urban space often (re)produces distinctive spatialities of demarcation and exclusion, from the lack of access to public transport systems to the absence of visual clues or guides in towns to enable vision-impaired people to move with ease. Indeed, the socio-spatial patterns of ableist values are etched across the city in numerous ways, forming a type of architectural apartheid. Thus, the absence of lifts into underground stations makes them into `no-go' areas for many mobility-impaired people. Likewise, the use of moving stairways in public buildings inhibits usage by many vision-impaired and frail and elderly people with diminished capacities to judge distance and speed (see Imrie and Hall, 2001).

However, the (re)production of barriered and bounded spaces is as likely to be affected by the symbolic and cultural encoding of the city, particularly in seeking to reinforce the efficacy of `civilised' and normal `bodies'. As Ellis (2000,p. 21) notes, modern society is averse to "risky bodies", and anxieties about the corporeality of the body revolve around concerns to preserve independent bodies, of "health, fitness, and youth". For instance, Hawkesworth, in this issue, refers to the bounded and barriered spatialities of people with facial disfigurements, or those individuals who fail to measure up to, or present, an acceptable aesthetic appearance. As Hawkesworth notes, such individuals are often regarded as `dirty' and `disordered' or `abject things', objects of disdain and a danger to be distanced from society. These attitudes are not unconnected with a broader literature about strangers in the city, or the potentially disruptive nature of the `uncivilised' body in the midst of what Connelly (1991,p. 64) terms "the good, coherent, complete or rational" (also, see Bauman, 1990; Robins, 1995).

For a range of authors, such as Dyck (1999), Moss (1999) and Parr (1999), amongst others, the spatialities of disability are inscribed by biomedical discourses of the body. Such discourses seek to propagate a conception of disability as abnormal, deviant and reducible to the physical and mental impairment or the functional limitations of the body. Sibley, in this issue, refers to the `lure of binarism', or the shifting and sorting of people into simplified categories as the basis for the shaping of social space. For disabled people, the binary categories of biomedicine, such as the normal and the abnormal, the diseased and the healthy, the abled and the disabled, etc., underpin broader societal attitudes and responses. These categories have become more or less naturalised and are inscribed in a range of socio-spatial practices, or what Dom (1999,p. 47) refers to as forms "of politico-moral territorialisation" (also, see Gleeson, 1999a; Sibley, 1995). Such territorialisation is often subtle, including signs and symbols or socio-cultural codes which are, potentially, powerful demarcaters of difference.

### Link – Cost/Effective Calc

#### Their economic decision making process is necessarily abelist. It maximizes service to the “productive elites” while ignoring those that would drive the cost of the plan up.

Imrie 01 (Barriered and Bounded Places and the Spatialities of Disability. By: Imrie, Rob, Urban Studies (Routledge), D/A 7/10/12 BS)

Part of the boundedness of places also relates to the institutionalisation of spatial practices and the operations of key actors and agents in influencing the (re)production of space. Spatialities of disability are not unconnected, as some of the contributors in the issue suggest, to the material and purposive actions of architects, developers, planners and others, with a stake in the land market. For Hill, in this issue, agents, such as architects, often fail to understand users of urban space because, as Harvey (2000) suggests, they immediately encounter the limitations of their own sensory world. The two dominant, yet bodily reductive, traditions in Western architecture, theomorphism and anthropomorphism, are centre-stage in architectural education and training, and provide the staple ways in which architects learn about the interrelationships between bodies, design and space. Such learning conceives of the body as reducible to a type, revolving around specific standards and dimensions; that is, a fit and able masculine body, the body as a machine, mechanical, fixed, taut, upright and pre-given to interaction.

However, for Imrie and Hall, also in this issue, the sensory world of architectural production is tied, albeit in complex ways, to the social relations, material practices, representations and institutions of property development. As they comment, land markets respond to profit signals and opportunities, and are less attentive to the supply of property, and related infrastructure, sensitised to non-profit uses or activities. For most developers, the provision of access facilities and features in buildings falls into this latter category. Likewise, Gleeson, in this issue, argues that the modem city is underpinned by institutional practices which serve to secure what he terms the `productive elites'. Following Beck (1998), Gleeson suggests that the spatial professions are important in securing "the needs of productive bodies, leaving the rest exposed to social and environmental risk". As Gleeson concludes, the `open' city can only be realised by democratising "the ensemble of ideologies and structured practices that shape city development".

### Link - Highway Infrastructure

#### Highway infrastructure 🡺 mobility disability and entrenches the norms of power

Langan Associate Prof of English UC-Berkeley 2001 Celeste Mobility Disability Public Culture 13(3) project muse

To think about mobility disability is to think about norms of speed and ranges of motion; perhaps also of desired ends. Rousseau long ago declared in The Social Contract that the cripple who wants to run and the able-bodied man who doesn't will both remain where they are. But by focusing on internal resources and intentions, Rousseau forgot to mention all those whose mobility is affected by external constraints. To consider those constraints is to notice how the built environment--social practices and material infrastructures--can create mobility disabilities that diminish the difference between the "cripple" and the ambulatory person who may well wish to move.

Two examples, one from the United States, one from Turkey. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act appeared to sweep away legal obstacles to the mobility of African Americans. But in "The Legacy of Jim Crow in Macon, Georgia," David Oedel (1997: 98) describes how the contemporary transportation infrastructure still has discriminatory effects:

A steady stream of seemingly innocuous funding and operational decisions . . . have, since 1964, quietly but effectively restricted the mobility [End Page 459] of poor African-Americans and other disfavored minorities who do not own cars. Meanwhile, these same officials and citizens have simultaneously lavished public funds on transportation accommodations favored by the car-owning majority, who have used the new and improved roads, streets, and highways in effect to live free from close contact with poor African-Americans and others similarly situated.

The power of "funding and operational decisions" to create mobility disabilities becomes even clearer upon consideration of the Turkish case, where discrimination takes place under the sign not of race but of modernization: the homogenization and amplification of speed. Responding to (but also stimulating) the massive urbanization and mobilization of its population, Turkey has built new multilane highways with lowered gradients that allow traffic to move with greater efficiency. All sorts of traffic one encounters on other roads, however, are absent on the new freeways. Pedestrians, horse-drawn carts, and tractors are all prohibited; highway signs proclaim which forms of mobility are no longer "up to speed." Those disqualified from travel on the new highways may soon discover that schools, stores, and other public facilities are more spread out and harder to reach, for such amplified norms of mobility alter the spatial dimensions of people's lives.

### Link - Automobility

#### Automobility 🡺 liberal individualism

Langan Associate Prof of English UC-Berkeley 2001 Celeste Mobility Disability Public Culture 13(3) project muse

In the rest of this essay, I explore the implications of this metamorphosis--the ideology of freedom as automobility recoded as the freedom of the automobile--for disability studies. I suggest that the object of restoring automobility to individual bodies reinforces the model of liberal individualism, which is grounded in the false premise of bodily equality as the basis of democratic justice. I propose here to dispense with that false premise by recognizing in the artificial form of the citizen a prosthetic subject, whose capacities for liberty depend on the built [End Page 464] environment of the public sphere. I therefore wish to undertake a deconstruction of mobility disability--not to deny the difference between people with bodily impairments and those whose mobility is limited in other ways, but to develop a new account of what is required for just transportation. I propose that the reduction of mobility disparities depends on an omnibus model of rights--a model that may require abandoning the (always problematic) category of the "physically disabled" in favor of an alliance--a strategic nonessentialism, so to speak--among the (social) mobility-impaired. 5

#### Automobility is an extension of the individualistic logic of capitalism and American identity

Hensley PhD candidate NYU Dep’t of Media, Culture, and Communication 2010 Kari One Nation Behind the Wheel American Quarterly 62(1) project muse

Automobility is a theme increasingly found in a rich array of scholarly texts, as attested by Robert Buerglener's December 2008 American Quarterly review of five books on the theme of transportation.2 There Buerglener asks, "Just what accounts for a societal obsession with cars and transportation, anyway?"3 Although those five texts were published too late to be referenced in Republic of Drivers, Seiler continues the dialogue on transportation and offers some new and compelling responses to Buerglener's question. In his review, Buerglener discusses the many ways in which the six authors use the lens of automobility (or transportation more broadly) to explore issues as varied as "individual identity, public policy, labor and business history, even the connections [End Page 173] between humans and the nonhuman world."4 Even more than these other books, Republic of Drivers shows that the ubiquity of the automobile in the United States has to do with more than mere transportation.

Touching on many of the same themes, such as the role of social power, corporate influence, technology, national identity, and consumerism in the United States, Seiler contributes a valuable and distinct addition to this growing subfield of study. Like David Blanke, who writes that "by 1940, driving was an inescapable ingredient of modern citizenship," he is attuned to the symbolic role of driving in the United States.5 But Seiler not only dates this codification a decade earlier; he develops these ideas further, taking the subjectivity of the driver-citizen as the main focus and offering an in-depth investigation into how the driver came to represent the dominant ideals of American citizenship. The book spans the years from 1895 to 1961, a period of ascendancy for the United States as a world power and a time when, according to Seiler, "automobility emerged as a shaper of public policy and the landscape, a prescriptive metaphor for social and economic relations, and a forge of citizens" (3). In approaching these issues, he problematizes many cultural assumptions about the American attachment to the automobile.

While Buerglener applauded David Blanke and Tom McCarthy on many points, he critiqued both authors for attributing the American love affair with the automobile to consumers' irrational drives (seen to stand outside intellectual analysis). Seiler's book, a deep and nuanced account of this complex relationship between drivers and autos, offers an elaboration of and a counterpoint to these earlier conversations. For him, the popularity of the automobile during this period arose as a response to the exigencies of the modern era—especially those related to labor, consumption, race, gender, and what it meant to be an "authentic" individual. In a sense, his text amounts to a genealogy of the notion of individualism in U.S. discourse. As Seiler charts the concept of individualism in its many iterations, he shows how such ideologies were mobilized to ultimately shore up a consumer-citizen who supported mass production through individual acts of self-expression, one who valued freedom of movement but tolerated policing and surveillance, privileged self-fulfillment over collective action, and conformed in isolation—in short, a citizen who was destined to drive.

#### The naturalization of the automobile is our link – the banality justifies its violence

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Seiler seeks to historicize the rise of the automobile, a commodity that, in the words of scholar Kristin Ross, is so "completely integrated into the banality of the everyday" that it appears as one of those "goods whose habitual use effectively removed them from the discursive realm" (quoted on 36). The car is so mundane and integral to daily existence that most assume utility to be its raison d'être. Of course, other viable options for transportation were available, but they were not developed as thoroughly as the automobile. One of Seiler's strengths is his sensitivity to the many alternatives available to this history, such as mass transit. Just as the language of driving has become an unavoidable and naturalized metaphor for history (for instance, "Karl Marx argued that class struggle is the driving force of history"), the ubiquity of automobility appears as a necessity for life in the United States. [End Page 175]

In a democracy, Seiler argues, freedom, specifically freedom of individual movement, is imperative to the definition of the citizen. He writes, "The legitimacy of modern liberal societies depends to a large degree on their capacity not merely to tolerate but to enable performances of self-determination in all those individuals identified as citizens" (130). Thus automobility, seen as a fusion of self-directed mobility and consumerist self-expression, becomes a synecdoche for normative citizenship in the United States.

#### Automobility justifies systems of capitalism – it’s a natural response to the alienation of capitalism

Hensley PhD candidate NYU Dep’t of Media, Culture, and Communication 2010 Kari One Nation Behind the Wheel American Quarterly 62(1) project muse

Drawing heavily on the work of Foucault, Seiler charts the rise of automobility at the turn of the twentieth century as a technology of the self, as a disciplinary technology, and as a form of capital deeply inscribed by state and commercial systems of surveillance and control. He explores "how mobility itself informs and structures modern liberal subjectivity, the contested 'prize' that its disparate groups seek to realize through the practices of automobility" (11). Seiler understands driving as an "apparatus" similar to the way that Foucault understood sexuality, simultaneously liberating as it disciplines: Like sex, driving is imbued with emancipatory pleasures and destructive potential "called for the construction of an apparatus, consisting of legal, technical, medical, cultural, economic, political, ethical, and architectural/spatial elements, that would simultaneously enable and constrain, cultivate and regulate, govern and license it" (62–63).

In the early days of the automobile, shifts in the capitalist mode of production, coupled with the emergence of discourses exhibiting anxieties over modernization and a perceived loss of subjectivity, created a crisis to which automobility was able to respond. The implementation of Taylorist forms of scientifically managed manufacturing were key, as alienation in the workplace created a space to generate a new "expressive" ideal of individualism, à la Herbert Hoover. Workers were not only likened to a mass by figures such as Frederick Taylor, but these laborers, typically white men, were subjected to a mode of surveillance previously associated with women and people of color.

This alienation and perceived emasculation in the workplace created a desire not only for self-expression but also for mobility and individual freedom of choice. The new brand of individualism was meant to restore agency (often read as masculinity) to the individual. As commodities became the primary mode of self-expression, the automobile was positioned as the quintessential product to meet these ends. Seiler argues that ultimately the automobile was championed as "both the instrument for the performative recuperation of the 'sovereign self' of the republican past and the facilitator of the blithely masterful new subjectivity of the consumer-citizen" (13). Driving came to be seen as a performance of freedom, and thus analogous to citizenship. [End Page 176]

#### Automobility 🡺 social inequality and exclusion

Hensley PhD candidate NYU Dep’t of Media, Culture, and Communication 2010 Kari One Nation Behind the Wheel American Quarterly 62(1) project muse

These acts of automotive freedom, however, are of an uneven and precarious nature. Here Seiler furthers the discussion of Kevin Borg, who reminds his readers that automotive breakdowns strip a driver of such freedoms, and that their restoration lay in the hands of a class of the highly skilled, yet hardly esteemed, mechanics. On a more political note, Seiler highlights the undemocratic nature of such freedoms, and shows that automobility, like U.S. citizenship, has not been made equally available to all in this country. Interested in the normative power of "American character," Seiler explores the question "Who is served by automobility?" He writes that "assigning the honorific 'American' … has been bound up with legitimating particular regimes of accumulation and policies of exclusion, assimilation, and conquest throughout the nation's history" (7). This ideology of freedom is defined by a periphery of unfreedom and restriction, as the notion of the authentic American renders some as "inauthentic."

### Impact – Neg Block

#### SPEED – extend Derrida – the ideology of speed leads to exclusion and the build up for war – makes all their impact inevitable

#### ABLEISM – extend Imrie – the planning for transportation infrastructure presumes a neutered universal body – this entrenches the view of the immobile or disabled body as abject which leads to social exclusion and violence - the entire process should be rejected

Hughes Head of Division of Sociology Glasgow Caledonian University 2007 Bill Being disabled: towards a critical social ontology for disability studies Disability & Society 22.7 Taylor & Francis

Readers may have noticed in this very preliminary and adumbrated account of what a critical social ontology for disability studies might look like a measure of intellectual affinity with one of the key building blocks of the critique of the individual and medical model’s of disability (and ergo of the social model of disability), namely ‘personal tragedy theory’ (Oliver, 1990). This concept need not be reduced to issues of compensation, entitlement or therapeutic interventions (Oliver, 1996, p. 131; Kumari Campbell, 2005) but is closely articulated with the negative and invalidating way in which non‐disabled people relate to disabled people and the threat that this poses to the ‘psycho‐emotional well‐being’ of disabled people (Thomas, 1999). Fiona Kumari Campbell (2005, p. 109) argued that, almost without fail in modern discourse, disability ‘is assumed to be ontologically intolerable, that is, inherently negative’ and ‘always present … in the ableist talk of normalcy, normalization and humanness’. The assumption that a disabled life is ubiquitously, even invariably, blighted and aberrant is spliced into the emotion of pity that underpins disability charity (Smith, 2005), into the ‘practices and effects of the law’ (Kumari Campbell, 2005), into conceptions and practices of care (Hughes et al., 2005), into the humiliations and violations of institutional life (Malacrida, 2005), into the order of things, into everyday subjectivity. One could go one better, extending the (recently researched) list of realms in which the authenticity of disability is implicitly or explicitly questioned, the blight of oppression felt and ontological recognition denied. It is the task of a critical social ontology for disability studies to claim authenticity for disability whenever it is denied, be it in the cold logic of Peter Singer’s (1995) ‘preference utilitarianism’ that revokes personhood from those who are unable to engage reflexively with their own temporality or in the most mundane everyday words or deeds that exclude or invalidate.

### Impact – Projection

#### Ableism 🡺 projection of fear onto the disabled body – denies the value of non-normalized existence

Hughes Head of Division of Sociology Glasgow Caledonian University 2007 Bill Being disabled: towards a critical social ontology for disability studies Disability & Society 22.7 Taylor & Francis

Indeed, the invulnerable self is a fantasy and form of self‐deception associated with carnal ‘normalcy’. It is widely used by non‐disabled people to create and sustain social distance between disabled and non‐disabled people. One can use Tom Shakespeare’s work from the mid 1990s to develop this argument. Shakespeare (1994, p. 298) argued that non-disabled people‘project their fear of death, their unease at their physicality and mortality onto disabled people, who represent all these difficult aspects of human existence’. There are two important elements involved in this psycho‐emotional and social process that results in the ‘disavowal of disability’ and its invalidation as a worthwhile existential status. One is psychological and the other ontological. The first is fear of physical frailty, bodily difference and social vulnerability that is projected onto the disabled other and the second is the process by which the social distancing associated with projected fear is frozen into a binary of being that embodies a hierarchy of existence. Ironically, the ontological insecurity of non‐disabled identity is the original sin that pushes disabled people to the margins of the human community. Disability is not an outcome of the infraction of social norms about ‘normalcy’ but a product of the failure of carnal normalcy to take proper account of itself, to indulge in ‘bad faith’ and delude itself into thinking that it is exempt from the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. The problem rests with the normative body that does not want to be reminded of its own vulnerability or to admit that abjection and death is its fate. In this context the disabled body is troublesome because it ‘exposes the illusion of autonomy, self‐government and self‐determination that underpins the fantasy of absolute able bodiedness’ (Thomson, 1997, p. 45).

### Impact – Ablenationalism

#### Ableism justifies a politics of international violence

Snyder and Mitchell 10 (Sharon Snyder is the founder of Brace Yourselves Productions which has now published more than twenty titles for the University of Michigan Press, David Mitchell Is Associate Professor in the Curriculum, Instruction, and Technology in Education Department in the College of Education at Temple University, Ablenationalism and the Geo-Politics of Disability, Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, D/A 7/12/11 BS)

A key conflation of nation and able-ism has been emerging since at least the late eighteenth century in countries enduring processes of industrialization and post-industrialization. With a nod to Jasbir Puar's influential formulation of homonationalism,1 we call this convergence "ablenationalism"—the degree to which treating people with disabilities as an exception valorizes able-bodied norms of inclusion as the naturalized qualification of citizenship. Disability Studies critiques are based on an analysis of the repetition of human predicaments—or, more precisely, a parsing through of the ever multiplying modes of non-normalcy—as people with disabilities encounter the inflexibilities of key social institutions such as healthcare, religious gatherings, communities, work places, schools, families, etc. These sites of interaction exclude some populations inequitably based on differences that cannot be adequately accommodated.

Yet, while disability has been recognized as a social, material, and manufactured terrain, its basis in bodies as well as ideologies also provides opportunities for unique combinations of social becoming. Attention to the lived intricacies of embodiment offer alternatives to normalization efforts aimed at homogenizing social outsiders. As such, the interactions of disability cultures, as Anne Finger emphasizes in the film Vital Signs: Crip Culture Talks Back (1995), will always be self-consciously generated around the politics of exclusion and the alternatives that such exclusions precipitate.

The historical development of ablenationalism results in the modern formation of disability as a discrete, sociological minority. In order to locate people with disabilities under market capitalism one must often look beyond the margins of surplus labor to those classified as "deserving poor" by national regimes. In emphasizing severity of incapacity as primary to a devalued identity, discourses of policy, economics, health, rehabilitation, and citizenship support [End Page 113] practices of charity as voluntary instances of conspicuous contributions to sustain them and the bureaucratic provision of supports and services. Whether nation-state or market-supplied, ablenationalism's calculated provision (and non-provision) of services based on principles of detecting and qualifying bodies as "too impaired" for meaningful labor underscores the degree to which the category of "deserving poor" is a highly guarded space of ostracization. The best result, from the perspective of the modern state, may be to have hordes of individuals not fully recognized as part of the "deserving poor" while simultaneously existing on the social scales of impoverishment.

Disability Studies maps the coordinates of these populations in order to deepen an understanding of the degree to which disabled people find themselves "locked in or locked out" of meaningful cultural interactions with others. This mapping imperative involves the advent of alternative outlines of human existence not formally recognized within systems of ablenationalism. One result of this effort is the ability to begin undertaking necessary comparisons and contrasts between people with disabilities around the globe. This is not in order to draw up universalizing conclusions about duplicative states of social rejection (the forms of social rejection experienced by people with disabilities are often quite unique), but rather to gain an understanding of the nuances of ablenationalism's tactics on a global scale.

Geo-politics, then, draws upon identifications of shared predicaments of exclusion and isolation while also allowing ways of revaluing the demographics of disability as counterinsurgent opportunities to resist the dictates of ablenationalism. In part, these resistance strategies manifest themselves as necessitated survival strategies in response to violence and orchestrated campaigns of neglect. The contributors in this special issue of JLCDS seek to parse through the particularities of exclusions (both within and without the borders of post-industrialization) in order to lay the groundwork for alternative responses to transecting forces of globalization.

### Impact – Universal Bad

#### Universal ontology of impairment 🡺 biological reductionism

Hughes Head of Division of Sociology Glasgow Caledonian University 2009 Bill Wounded/monstrous/abject: a critique of the disabled body in the sociological imaginary Disability & Society 24.4 Taylor & Francis

The position taken by Turner (2001) and Shakespeare and Watson (2002), in which vulnerability is universal and frailty the fate of all, suggests, in Timpanaro’s (1975, 20) words, ‘a common morality, based on the solidarity of all men [sic] in the struggle against nature’. The common morality derived from the essential ontological identity of all, egalitarian though it is, seems to me to be unable to escape from the problem of biological reductionism, a charge that is regularly levelled at the medical model of disability. Not only does the category of disability disappear into the universal siblinghood of our wounded lives – lives inevitably tarnished by physical and mental limitation – but also the issues of exclusion, discrimination and oppression that are associated with a disabled identity become superfluous. They can no longer be constituted as experiences of specific political import to disabled people. If we are all fragile/wounded, ergo disabled, then either all or none of us are oppressed, and if it is the former, then perhaps we can be content with our poor but equal treatment. It may be ‘good for the soul’ to admit to ourselves that we are, or one day might become, the other that we (once) despised, but such moral clarity is unlikely to improve disabled people’s standard of living or bring down the barriers that exclude them from participation in social and economic life. Furthermore, the appeal to vulnerability as an essence of being human should be rejected on the grounds that it is an attempt ‘to normalise disability at an anthropological level by invoking the empirical universality of impairment’, where impairment finds itself thrust into a ‘sociological limbo dominated by a pre‐social notion of life as limit’ (Hughes 2007, 679). One can appreciate that the emphasis placed on the natural limits of the body is an attempt to ward off the crass relativism of strong forms of social constructionism, but even if one is sympathetic to the backlash against postmodernism, there is a mistake inherent in the argument that makes disabled people of us all. It assumes that because the body declines and calls time on everyone, it is the perfect example of that which is beyond discourse and represents the final moment when human matter reveals itself unambiguously as nothing but nature. However, it is important to argue that, despite its vulnerability, the body’s materiality is indeterminate and its limits negotiable (James and Hockey 2007). Furthermore, the body is not just a limit. It also embodies a set of possibilities. It is clear that the disabled body is ubiquitously represented in negative ontological terms and its limitation and deficits dominate the literature. It is difficult to escape the representation of the disabled life as doomed and tragic or to avoid the melancholia that surrounds non‐disabled people’s accounts of disabled people’s lives. To make disabled people of us all adds pessimism to essentialist naturalism. Would it not be better – as recent proponents of the ‘rhizomatic’ potential of people with learning disabilities have done (Goodley 2007; Braidotti 2002) – to admit that all of us, disabled or not, are bursting with possibilities and capabilities? In the universalist discourse ‘lack’ haunts us all. For those who embrace the tropes of monstrosity and abjection ‘lack’ is a status reserved for disability.

Liberal universalism bad 🡺 social exclusion

Hughes Head of Division of Sociology Glasgow Caledonian University 2007 Bill Being disabled: towards a critical social ontology for disability studies Disability & Society 22.7 Taylor & Francis

If we collapse the particularities of disabled lives into the abstract concept of humanity we end up claiming that disability does not matter. It is inconsequential, superfluous in comparison to ones generic, species status. Shylock’s experience, however, tells us something very different. No matter how much he protests his humanity, he is deviant and unworthy of recognition. He is not Christian and, in practice, his religion excludes him. In a disablist society, it does not matter how one defines disability because the qualities ascribed to the status will always appear negative in comparison with those associated with ‘able‐bodied being’. Normal/abnormal or valid/invalid! It does not matter which particular binary one invokes, the latter term will be the negative to its partner’s positive. No matter how much we go on about a common humanity, in everyday life the negative ontology of disability and the particularities of prejudice and oppression tend to reassert themselves. Moreover, this sociological claim reaffirms the hegemony of the ontological view that human worth is closely associated with ability.

I do not have a quarrel—on empirical grounds—with the view that impairment is ‘the normal condition of humanity’ (Sutherland, quoted in Shakespeare & Watson, 2001, p. 26), but because we are all impaired or will all become impaired does not mean that we are all treated in the same way. Because we are all impaired does not mean to say that disablement is or even will be the destiny of each and every one of us. The embodied ontology offered by Shakespeare and Watson and Turner lapses into a position in which biological being ends up as a universal reference point at the expense of what existentialists call being-in-the-world. In this latter view being, including physical being, is always marked by the social and the body (impairment) is a particular context that invokes a negative form of recognition (misrecognition) that informs its character and projects. Further, impairment is the vantage point from which disabled people see the world and how the world responds. Their inter‐subjective and inter‐corporeal experience is marked, ubiquitously, by ‘felt’ processes of socio‐ontological invalidation. The attempt by Shakespeare and Watson and Turner to normalize disability at an anthropological level by invoking the empirical universality of impairment ends in a sociological limbo dominated by a pre‐social notion of life as limit.

#### Universality fails

Hughes Head of Division of Sociology Glasgow Caledonian University 2007 Bill Being disabled: towards a critical social ontology for disability studies Disability & Society 22.7 Taylor & Francis

For Turner and Shakespeare and Watson it is the ‘species’ and the authenticity of impairment in relation to it that is the focus of the argument. However, ‘in truth a society is not a species for it is in society that the species attains the status of existence’ (De Beauvoir, 1972, p. 68). From this perspective an argument that rests on the universality of the frailty of the species is specious. It is not that Turner and Shakespeare and Watson failed to recognize the importance of cultural context and social factors in the formation of disabled lives. As social scientists they could not do otherwise and as theoreticians who appeal to the dialectic of impairment and disability they are keen to play down the importance of biology and to avoid the constuctionist pitfall of discursive determinism, but this argument makes concessions to the immutability of human frailty to the extent that species data is taken to have a meaning that is pre‐social and forms a imperturbable fact of being or an ontological verity that is beyond transcendence. It is fair enough to claim that we will all die and that our bodies will break down and to suggest that mortality and impairment will have meanings that vary with social context, but when the first part of the argument is used to posit a biological infrastructure (impairment) upon which arises a sociological superstructure (disability) then a residual biological reductionism is evident and impairment becomes the master category upon which the claim to disability rights and social justice for disabled people must be built. In their effort to reject the ‘strong’ social model distinction between impairment and disability (manifest, for example, in Oliver, 1990; Barnes & Mercer, 2003) Shakespeare and Watson were forced to confer ontological privilege upon impairment and to transform it into the dominant category in the field of disability studies. Theoretically, Turner and Shakespeare and Watson have taken the ontological negativity out of the categories of impairment and disability, but that has not negated the negativity of the lived experience of disability. The perspective of non‐impairment continues unabated. ‘This world … that encourages people to perceive disability as thoroughly encapsulated by negation’ (Titchkosky, 2005, p. 662) remains undisturbed. The non‐disabled body cannot be nor cannot become vulnerable or frail because it is not an empirical body. It is a normative construction, a ‘body schema’, a myth that is used to constitute the flawed other and provide a place of emotional safety from the fear felt by those ‘clean and proper bodies’ (Shildrick, 2002) that have deluded themselves into thinking that existence is secure, stable and autonomous.

### Alternative – Neg Block

#### Rejection of transportation infrastructure planning is necessary to solve our obsession with mobility – extend Imrie and Derrida – expertism plagues the implementation of the plan – individuals refusal to partake in ableist planning mechanism is necessary to open a space for the criticism of fast paced mobility

Burke School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, 2002 Anthony, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27.1 page InfoTrac OneFile

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available--and where they are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired--which creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing. (60) This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse what we are. (61 ) Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, it is at these levels that we can intervene. We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web.

This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of rebellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." We must, he says, "observe how an individual may be able to escape the discursive order and influence its shifting boundaries.... By doing so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible." (62)

Pushing beyond security requires tactics that can work at many levels--that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cultural, and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection, and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society, and the international that security seeks to imagine and police.

The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity that security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Conolly, and Moira Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship that thinks difference not on the basis of the same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for a "debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics"--an encounter that involves a transformation of the self rather than the other. (63) Thus while the sweep and power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be **refused**: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order, and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on "ourselves"--a **political refusal** of the One, the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. It would be to ask if there is a world after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be.

### Alt – Anti-Universal Solves

#### The rejection of universal notions of disability is key to immanent value

Petra Kuppers, 2009 (PhD University of Plymouth, Associate Professor of English University of Michigan,Director of the Olimpias Performance Research Projects and Associate Professor University of Michigan, the Artistic Director of The Olimpias Performance Research Series, “Toward a Rhizomatic Model of Disability: Poetry, Performance, and Touch”)

I propose a rhizomatic model of disability, already a model, slanted, quotationed, rather than a mode of experience. This is a model in which the extrinsic and intrinsic mix and merge, as they do in my own physical and psychical being when I am in pain, and cannot walk up the stairs, and wish for a painkiller, and take pride in my difference (what other choice do I have?), and feel unable to speak of the nature of my discomfort, cannot find the words, but find comfort in the company of others whose pain might be different, but who somehow feel sympatico. The rhizomes in A Thousand Plateaus connect at any point of their surface, assemble into new life forms, run along the surface of the earth, and just beneath it, mixing below and above, refusing fixed differentiation (and of course, the schizoanalytic rhizome is not the biological rhizome, but neither is it ‘not it’: the two, concrete and abstract, are in productive tension). To me, in my life reality, thinking about my disability as a rhizomatic formation is useful and productive. And of course Deleuzoguattarian politics are specific, momentary, individual, and not-reproduceable. And yet I feel that there is currency in this rhizomatic model for more than just me and my personal imaginary. Without knowing what specific assemblages will emerge for any one reader-operator, a rhizomatic model allows the co-existence of “not only different regimes of signs but also states of things of differing status” (Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, 7)— and that last part of the quote, things of differing status, resonates with my lived experience of disability as one that lives in a simultaneity of codes, devalued and valued at the same time. The rhizomatic model of disability produces an abundance of meanings that do not juxtapose pain and pleasure or pride and shame, but allow for an immanent transformation, a coming into being of a state of life in this world, one that is constantly shifting and productive of new subject/individual positions. But, like all Deleuzoguattarian concepts, this rhizomatic model of disability is only useful when used. It cannot have truth status, for it is empty of specific meaning. It is a movement rather than a definition.

## \*\*\*AT\*\*\*

### AT: Ontology Bad

#### Questions of disability are always already ontological

Hughes Head of Division of Sociology Glasgow Caledonian University 2007 Bill Being disabled: towards a critical social ontology for disability studies Disability & Society 22.7 Taylor & Francis

In debates about disability questions of ontology are, it could be argued, never far from the surface. Formal, bureaucratic quality of life measures, almost by definition, assume disability to be ontologically problematic and many disabled people feel that many of the people with whom they interact in everyday situations treat them as if they are invisible, repulsive or ‘not all there’. Debates about selective abortion, pre‐natal screening, euthanasia and physician‐assisted death cannot be disentangled from sentiments that question disabled people’s right to life (see, for example, Priestly, 2003, pp. 35–60 & 166–188). Medical literature on disability embodies an ontological subtext in which the distinction between the normal and the pathological suggests a hierarchical ontological dichotomy in which impairment/disability is associated with ‘deficit’ or a ‘flawed’ existence. There is a significant North American literature from a humanities/literary criticism perspective that focuses on corporealities and critiques the negative representation of disabled people in print and the visual media. This literature claims that the disabled figure is ubiquitously portrayed as a metaphor for embodied disruption and invariably represents the dependencies that a society based on the myth of the autonomous subject can only interpret as ‘tragedy’ (see, for example, Thomson, 1997; Deutsch & Nussbaum, 2000; Mitchell & Snyder, 2000). Furthermore, ontological arguments are implicit and sometimes explicit in the literature that describes the ‘othering’ of disabled people during the modern period (Shakespeare, 1994; Hughes, 1999, 2000) and the ways in which these processes invalidate disabled lives.

### AT: Link Turn / Permutation

#### Welfare for the disabled 🡺 Otherization

Hughes Head of Division of Sociology Glasgow Caledonian University 2009 Bill Wounded/monstrous/abject: a critique of the disabled body in the sociological imaginary Disability & Society 24.4 Taylor & Francis

The vulnerable, like many negative or paternalistic appellations for disabled people, acquires its metaphorical power from the tribunal of anatomical perfection against which it is measured. The strong, well‐formed, non‐disabled, masculine body is the benchmark and against this benchmark a woman is found wanting and a disabled person – man or woman – is weak and vulnerable. Whenever a corporeal universal is used as a benchmark for ontological categorisation the roll call of those who are invalidated is a significant proportion of humanity. This might be described as the roll call of the ‘wounded’, of those who become a burden to the healthy legions, keen to march ahead and get on with the business at hand. Bryan Turner (2003, 277) pointed out that the word ‘vulnerability’ has its roots in the term vulnus, meaning wounded. Modern systems of welfare are built on the premise that something must be done for the ‘wounded’, for those whose days of belonging and contributing fully have come to an end. The wounded are ‘deserving’. They cannot be left behind to die. They have lost control of their bodies and require the paternalistic support of a moralised system of social welfare (Dean 1999). In a world dominated by possessive individualism, the vulnerable do not possess themselves and, therefore, must be reinvented as dependent relative to those who are whole and healthy. Bacchi and Beasley (2002, 326) claimed that subjects who are regarded as having control over their bodies are regarded as citizens, whereas ‘those reduced to their bodies are constituted as lesser citizens’. Frailty offends, reminding the ‘clean and proper body’ of the ghosts of the ageing, suffering and affliction that represent its most profound fears. The vulnerable, disabled body ‘exposes the illusion of autonomy, self‐government and self‐determination that underpins the fantasy of absolute able‐bodiedness’ (Thomson 1997, 45).

#### Policy making focus 🡺 essentialism and managerialism

Imrie Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London 2000 Rob Disability and discourses of mobility and movement Environment and Planning volume 32 http://www.environmentandplanning.com/epa/fulltext/a32/a331.pdf

Such observations are apt in relation to the ways in which disabled people's mobility needs are conceived of by policymakers, where there is a tendency to categorise disabled people's corporeality in essentialist terms. As previous research suggests, it is common place for disabled people to be defined as having walking difficulties or an impairment that confines them to a wheelchair (Imrie, 1996). These definitions are problematical because they fail to recognise the diversity of physical and mental impairments and the often conflicting and different mobility needs of different categories of (disabled) people (Imrie, 1996). They also have the potential to reduce the provision of modes of mobility to particular types which might, as a consequence, be inattentive to the corporeal diversity of disabled people. Thus, although it is common for public buildings to provide ramps to facilitate wheelchair access, it is less so to see signage, texture, or colour coding of a type which provides ease of sight, direction, and communication to vision-impaired people and those with learning difficulties (see Imrie, 1996; Royal National Institute for the Blind, 1995).

These deficiencies are reinforced by welfare policies which seek to facilitate the mobility of disabled people, largely through the context of special welfare measures or programmes. Such measures reduce disabled people's mobility to the terrain of the managerial state where mobility is a matter of the management of resources to facilitate the broader objectives of ``budgetary disciplines and performance measures'' (Ellis, 2000, page 20). Increasingly, many disabled people's mobility is related to, and often dependent on, the state's measurements of bodily capacities and capabilities. Mobility, then, becomes a function of the state's benevolence and the possible provision of fixtures, fittings, and welfare payments to facilitate some form of mobility and move ment. It represents, as Priestly (1999, page 23) argues, the propagation of ``charity over the pursuit of civil rights, individual care over collective needs, and segregation over inclusion''. Arguably, disabled people's corporeality, in the context of their mobility needs, is an object of a punitive culture which draws attention to their impairments while reinforcing the view that they ought to be grateful for what is provided.

### AT: Framework

#### The epistemology of mobility structures policy

Cresswell 06 (Tim Cresswell¶ Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London,¶ Egham, Surrey, UK; The Right to Mobility: The Production of Mobility in the Courtroom, Antipode volume 38 issue 4 D/A 7/10/12 BS)

It is this status of a necessary social production, I argue, that makes knowledge surrounding mobility (like that surrounding other fundamental geographical concepts such as space and place) so important and so deeply implicated in the politics of the modern world. Stasis and mobility, fixity and flow are the subjects of deep knowledges that inform any number of ways of seeing the world. For this reason an understanding of¶ the ways in which ideas about fixity and flow provide a profound undercurrent to thinking which is closer to the surface of cultural life—such¶ as law—enacts a critical geosophy. It enables us to examine the role of¶ geographical knowledges in the always political and always differentiated production of social life.

## \*\*\*AFF\*\*\*

### Politics of Mobility Good

#### The aff is a prerequisite to the alternative – there is no alternative to a politics of mobility

Imrie Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London 2000 Rob Disability and discourses of mobility and movement Environment and Planning volume 32 http://www.environmentandplanning.com/epa/fulltext/a32/a331.pdf

There are no easy answers nor programmatic or prescriptive resolutions to these questions and it is only through the development of a `politics of mobility' that such questions can come to the fore as the basis for developing new perspectives and political programmes in relation to disabled people's movement and mobility. This, though, is a long way from realisation. Disabled people lack rudimentary levels of participation and involvement in civil society and a precondition for transforming their mobility and movement is, I would argue, increases in opportunities for participation in what Gould terms ``the discourse and associations of the public sphere'' (1996, page 181). This ought to be more than just the installation of deliberative democratic fora or procedural enactments that potentially do little to transform the social and institutional fixities of disablist attitudes and practices. In particular, discourses of movement and mobility ought to move beyond just public-sector participative networks towards the development and propagation of private-sector or corporate-sector responsibilities.

Ultimately, the configuration of political debates and movements around mobility and movement will depend on particular combinations of contextual factors, including the social, political, and institutional structures of local (geographical) environments (see Imrie, 2000a). However, such environments ought to be enabling or, as Gleeson (1999, page 149) suggests, aiming ``to establish social independence for all inhabitants'' by empowering people ``to meet their own needs within a network of mutual obligations rather than within a hierarchy of dependency relationships (e.g. care giver/care receiver)''. Indeed, disabled people's mobility and movement are entrenched in, and defined by, hierarchical relationships which are also implicated in defining (place specific) hierarchies of where disabled people can and cannot go to. There is, then, no alternative to the development of a politics of mobility because to be with little or no movement or mobility is ``to be a non person for whom power, choice and participation are meaningless'' (Corker, 1998, page 75).

### AT: Speed Link

#### Speed is good – it increases the potential for dissent and subversion

Bleiker IR Prof at U of Queensland 2000 Roland The Changing Space and Speed of Dissident Politics Social Alternatives 19.1 EBSOHost

What Virilio identifies as speed is in some ways a more precise conceptualisation of what others call globalisation, that is, the "coalescence of varied transnational processes and domestic structures, allowing the economy, politics, culture, and ideology of one country to penetrate another" (Mittelman 1996: 3). Contrary to widely held opinions, this essay seeks to demonstrate that globalisation does not necessarily, or at least not only, lead to a centralisation of power and a corresponding loss of democratic participation and political accountability. Interweaving theoretical insights and practical examples, the essay reveals how the advent of speed has also increased the potential to engage in acts of dissent that can subvert processes of control and homogenisation. In doing so, the essay counters images of a hyperreal world, of an increasingly shallow and media dominated globe in which nothing can penetrate beneath the surface. Political dissent, according to this doomsday scenario, becomes all but impossible, for there is nothing left to dissent against. There is only a twenty-for-hour-a-day-blur of information and entertainment We hear of a nation state that is no longer able to uphold its sovereignty and the spheres of justice and civility that the corresponding boundaries were supposed to protect. We hear of a cruel global market, whose random dynamics have increased the gap between rich and poor to grotesque proportions. A recent report by the United Nations Development Program, for instance, informs us that the assets of the world's three richest people amount to more than the combined GNP of all least developed countries on the planet (Shalom 1999:1; Human Development Report 1999). Nor surprisingly, we hear of a neoliberal world order that is increasingly run by a few powerful multinational corporations — monstrous unaccountable structures whose strategic leitmotifs and decision making principles reflect the imperatives of short-term material objectives, rather than the more widely sketched humane principles that may well be necessary for the survival of a global ecosystem that is becoming more and more stretched.

While these phenomena are undoubtedly occurring — and pose increasingly difficult ethical and Dolitical challenges to the world community — they are not the only aspects of globalisation. A focus on speed allows us to recognise the contradictory forces of globalisation, the manner in which its whirlwinds push and pull politics, form the local to the global, in a variety of directions. Look at the erosion of national sovereignty and how, fatal as this phenomena may appear in some ways, also opens up possibilities for a politics of post-national solidarity. Recent humanitarian interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, controversial and politically debatable as they may be, testify for the emergence of a new kind of global politics — one in which rights and responsibilities are no longer limited by the boundaries of the national state. Some even think ahead towards a time in which we can speak of unconditional universal hospitality — a situation in which rights and responsibilities would no longer be circumscribed by the spatial and political logic of national sovereignty (Derrida 1999:69-71).

The same type of dynamic holds true for political activism. While circumscribed in some ways by the encroaching dimensions of globalisation, dissident practices have also gained new momentum with the advent of speed. An act of resistance, such as a protest march, is no longer limited to its immediate spatial environment. If the dissident event is picked up by global media networks it has the potential to quire an almost immediate transnational dimension. The patterns of power and transformation inherent to this evolution will be outlined in more detail below. May it suffice, at least at this stage, to emphasise that the process of doing so consists of posing a number of key questions — not necessarily in order to look for precise responses, but to locate the more broadly perceived domains of inquiry in which possible answers could be worked out in a dialogical way. Adequate solutions to many problems of today may well be reached by recognising that new potential for dissent and political activism emerges out of the very messiness created by processes of globalisation. "Is not everything in flux now?" Zarathurstra would ask, with all its good and bad connotations. "Have not all railings and bridges fallen into the water?" (Nietzsche 1954:313).

#### The embrace of speed is key to dissent

Bleiker IR Prof at U of Queensland 2000 Roland The Changing Space and Speed of Dissident Politics Social Alternatives 19.1 EBSOHost

The phenomenon of speed has not annihilated dissent. Quite to the contrary. Speed may well have erased space to the benefit of some kind of globalised instantaneity. Yet, hyperreal images racing daily over our television screens nevertheless take part in a struggle over 'real time.' Independently of how instantaneous, distorted and simulated they are, these images influence our perceptions of the world and thus also our responses to important issues of our time. To accept the logic of speed, then, is not to render Veal time' obsolete, but to acknowledge multiple and overlapping spatial and temporal spheres within which political practices are constantly.

Speed has increased the potential to interfere with the gradual transformation of societal values over 'real time. But where exactly is this potential for political action in a world of blurring boundaries, images and realities? One must acknowledge that with the advent of speed, the terrain of political struggle has changed fundamentally. Manifestations of dissent, such as street demonstrations or acts of civil disobedience, used to take place in a mostly local context They engaged the spatial dynamics that were operative in the interactive relationship between ruler and ruler. The contraction of space, however, has altered the very foundations of these socio-political dynamics.

Domination and resistance now interact in a much wider and more complex array of power relations. The boundaries of discursive struggles have widened — and so have, consequently, the possible terrains of dissent where human agency can be exerted. Images of a protest march, for instance, may flicker over television screens world-wide only hours after people have taken to the street. As a result, a local act of resistance can acquire almost immediately a much larger, cross-territorial dimension. It may generate a variety of outside pressures on the authorities against which the protest was directed. Any protest action that draws sufficient media attention thus has the potential to engender a political process that transcends its immediate spatial environment Political activism then no longer takes place solely in the streets of Dilli and Belfast, at the gates of factories or around the Aboriginal Tent Embassy in front of Canberra's Old Parliament House. Political activism, wherever it occurs and whatever form it takes, has become intrinsically linked with the non-spatial logic of speed. Knowledge about this transformed logic of global politics can provide us with the potential for activist engagements and the resulting means to search for a more just world in the new millennium.

#### The criticism of speed falsely universalizes Western culture – we can understand reality even under an epistemology of speed

Bleiker IR Prof at U of Queensland 2000 Roland The Changing Space and Speed of Dissident Politics Social Alternatives 19.1 EBSOHost

Virilio's and Baudrillard's observations are as problematic as they are insightful. They draw attention to an array of important contemporary phenomena, but do so in ways that may, at second thought, not be as compelling as their innovative appearance suggests. For instance, Virilio's and Baudrillard's analyses deal primarily with aspects of Western culture. Although this culture has spread throughout the globe, an undifferentiated universal assessment of its dynamics suppresses important local differences. It fails to appreciate the fragmentations and contradictions that arise precisely as a reaction against processes of homogenisation (see, for instance, Agnew and Corbridge 1995:217; Castoriadis 1997:xiv-xv; Bourdieu 1998:29-59; Harvey 1990:306). Problematic as well is the claim, especially pronounced in Baudrillard, that current cultural trends have robbed us of the ability to appreciate reality. Many authors have criticised this position as a form of metaphysical idealism, a naive desire to return to some pre-mass media authenticity (Hutcheon 1989:33-4; Docker 1994:104-8). There cannot be unmediated access to reality, authentic awareness of our existence. Representations of the Veal,' even before the advent of mass media, were inevitably intertwined with social images embedded in language. The advent of speed has not fundamentally changed, but only intensified this aspect of social dynamics.

### AT: Speed Link - Permutation solves

#### You can embrace an ideology of speed and the alternative – it remedies the link argument

Bleiker IR Prof at U of Queensland 2000 Roland The Changing Space and Speed of Dissident Politics Social Alternatives 19.1 EBSOHost

But things do not necessarily have to look this grim. One can accept the rapidly changing nature of the late modern world and, at the same time, explore new forms of activism that emerge. The most potent of these terrains of dissent are perhaps located in the types of struggles that lead to a slow transformation of societal values. Reading Virilio (1995:31) may help us recognise the contours of such a position:

The question no longer is one that opposes the global in relation to the local, or the transitional in relation to the national. It is, above all, the question of this sudden temporal commutation which blurs not only the inside and the outside, the boundaries of the political territory, but also the before and after of its duration, its history.

One can acknowledge the phenomena that Virilio and Baudrillard describe without necessarily accepting the overall conclusion that they have reached from their analyses. Yes, the blurring of distinctions between local and global, national and transnational, reality and virtuality, has altered the interaction between domination and resistance today. If 'real space' has become absorbed into the domains of speed and simulation, as Virilio and Baudrillard claim, then dynamics of dissent do not primarily, or at least not only, take place in their immediate spatial environment. Dissent operates as least as much in the virtuality of speed, the instantaneity of globalised communication.

### AT: Biopower

#### Their impact proves correlation not causation – genocidal violence is not the outcome of biopolitics

Ojakangas 5 (Mika, U of Helsinki, May, Foucault Studies, No. 2, http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf)

Admittedly, in the era of biopolitics, as Foucault writes,  even “massacres  have  become  vital.” This is  not the case, however, because violence is hidden  in  the foundation of biopolitics, as Agamben  believes. Although the twentieth century thanatopolitics is  the “reverse  of  biopolitics”, it should not be understood, according to Foucault, as “the effect, the result, or the logical consequence” of biopolitical rationality. Rather, it should be understood, as he suggests, as an outcome of the “demonic combination” of the sovereign power and biopower, of “the city-citizen game and the shepherd-flock game” or as I would like to put it, of *patria potestas* (father’s unconditional power of life and death over his son) and *cura maternal* (mother’s  unconditional  duty  to  take  care  of  her  children). Although massacres can be carried out in the name of care, they do not follow from the logic of biopower for which death is the “object of taboo”. They follow from the  logic  of  sovereign  power,  which  legitimates  killing by whatever arguments it chooses, be it God, Nature, *or* life.

#### Democracy checks the impact to biopower

Dickinson 4 (UC Berkeley – History, Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

In the current literature, it seems that biopolitics is almost always acting on (or attempting to act on) people; it is almost never something they do. This kind of model is not very realistic. This is not how societies work. The example of the attempt to create a eugenic counseling system in Prussia should be instructive in this respect. Here public health and eugenics experts— technocrats— tried to impart their sense of eugenic crisis and their optimism about the possibility of creating a better “race” to the public; and they successfully mobilized the resources of the state in support of their vision. And yet, what emerged quite quickly from this effort was in fact a system of public contraceptive advice — or family planning. It is not so easy to impose technocratic ambitions on the public, particularly in a democratic state; and “on the ground,” at the level of interactions with actual persons and social groups, public policy often takes on a life of its own, at least partially independent of the fantasies of technocrats. This is of course a point that Foucault makes with particular clarity. The power of discourse is not the power of manipulative elites, which control it and impose it from above. Manipulative elites always face resistance, often effective, resistance. More important, the power of discourse lies precisely in its ability to set the terms for such struggles, to define what they are about, as much as what their outcomes are. As Foucault put it, power— including the power to manage life —“comes from everywhere.”105 Biomedical knowledge was not the property only of technocrats, and it could be used to achieve ends that had little to do with their social-engineering schemes.106 Modern biopolitics is a multifaceted world of discourse and practice elaborated and put into practice at multiple levels throughout modern societies.

### AT: Reject Impact

#### Political responsibility requires a consideration of consequences – moral absolutism should be rejected

Jeffrey Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, Spring 2002, Dissent, vol. 49, no. 2

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness. WHAT WOULD IT mean for the American left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politics? First, it would mean taking seriously the specific means employed by the September 11 attackers--terrorism. There is a tendency in some quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruction of September 11 to more ordinary (and still deplorable) injustices of the world system--the starvation of children in Africa, or the repression of peasants in Mexico, or the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by ignoring the specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico, Palestine, and elsewhere, too many innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government has ever hijacked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. Al-Qaeda did precisely this. That does not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the September 11 hijackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary injustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluousness of human life. This premise is inconsistent with civilized living anywhere. It threatens people of every race and class, every ethnicity and religion. Because it threatens everyone, and threatens values central to any decent conception of a good society, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence. Ordinary injustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left--that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can become a rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies. Most striking about the campus left's response to September 11 was its refusal to ask these questions. Its appeals to "international law" were naive. It exaggerated the likely negative consequences of a military response, but failed to consider the consequences of failing to act decisively against terrorism. In the best of all imaginable worlds, it might be possible to defeat al-Qaeda without using force and without dealing with corrupt regimes and political forces like the Northern Alliance. But in this world it is not possible. And this, alas, is the only world that exists. To be politically responsible is to engage this world and to consider the choices that it presents. To refuse to do this is to evade responsibility. Such a stance may indicate a sincere refusal of unsavory choices. But it should never be mistaken for a serious political commitment.

### Universal Disability Model Good

#### Universal impairment model is key to political strategies that combat ableism

Bickenbacha et al WHO, Division of Mental Health and Prevention of Substance Abuse, Assessment and Classification Unit 1999 Jerome Models of disablement, universalism and the international classification of impairments, disabilities and handicaps Social Science & Medicine 48.9 Science Direct

Zola argued in this paper that “an exclusively special needs approach to disability is inevitably a short-run approach”. What is needed instead, for the long haul, “are more universal policies that recognize that the entire population is ‘at risk’ for the concomitants of chronic illness and disability”. We need a political strategy which, as Zola put it, “demystifies the specialness of disability”, because “[b]y seeing people with a disability as ‘different’ with ‘special’ needs, wants and rights in this currently perceived world of finite resources, they are pitted against the needs, wants and rights of the rest of the population”. Though a great deal had been achieved by the civil rights strategy and the minority group model, eventually we must rely on the more durable strategy of universalization:

Only when we acknowledge the near universality of disability and that all its dimensions (including the biomedical) are part of the social process by which the meanings of disability are negotiated will it be possible fully to appreciate how general public policy can affect this issue. (Zola, 1989, p. 406)

#### Viewing disability through the lens of difference 🡺 medical model of disability – turns their biopolitics argument

Bickenbacha et al WHO, Division of Mental Health and Prevention of Substance Abuse, Assessment and Classification Unit 1999 Jerome Models of disablement, universalism and the international classification of impairments, disabilities and handicaps Social Science & Medicine 48.9 Science Direct

Zola noticed that, quite unintentionally, the minority group approach tended to reinforce salient aspects of the medical conception of disability (see as well Barnartt and Seelman, 1988). Because of the medical understanding of impairments and the statistical requirement that measured phenomena be stable, disability, he argued, tends to be viewed as dichotomous and fixed: one either has (and so can be counted as having) a disability or not, and if one has a disability, one is limited by it to a fixed and determined degree in standardized contexts. While these may be features of impairments — given their biomedical grounding — they are not features that make sense when disabilities are fully contextualized in people’s lives.

As it happens, the developing sciences of rehabilitative and occupational therapy have moved away from this conception of disability and are sensitive to the spread of disability and its discontinuous nature. However, and here the irony is thickest, the minority group approach finds itself requiring a fixed and dichotomous sense of disability precisely in order to define the minority group of people with disabilities. One cannot engage in identity politics without establishing clear eligibility requirements for membership in the group. And this is precisely what Zola doubted could be done in any nonarbitrary manner.

#### Universal disability model 🡺 better policy solves their impact

Bickenbacha et al WHO, Division of Mental Health and Prevention of Substance Abuse, Assessment and Classification Unit 1999 Jerome Models of disablement, universalism and the international classification of impairments, disabilities and handicaps Social Science & Medicine 48.9 Science Direct

Universal disability policy, in other words, merely expands the range of human normality to more realistically include empirically-grounded human variation. In particular, our standards and codes should reflect a policy commitment to universal design, not merely for public buildings and transportation, but across the board for housing, workplaces and other human environments. Universal design is a blueprint for the creation of human environments and tools that can be successfully used by human beings given human variations. It means that, instead of catering to people who happen to fit within a relatively narrow range of the normal, we ensure that environments and tools are suitable to as many as possible.

#### Universal Impairment is necessary to legal protection and social models of disability

Barry 2010 Kevin assistant professor of law at Quinnipiac School of Law "Toward Universalism: What The ADA Amendments Act Of 2008 Can And Can't Do For Disability Rights." Berkeley Journal Of Employment & Labor Law 31.2 (2010): 203-283. Business Source Complete. Web. 13 July 2012

The universal approach, on the other hand, holds that since everyone has an impairment of one sort or another, everyone is at risk of being "disabled" by society's treatment of that impairment.''" Rather than locating disability in a discrete group of people with stigmatized impairments, this approach "treats 'disability' as inhering in each discrete decision to deny an opportunity to a person because of an . . . impairment."^' According to this approach, disability rights laws ought to protect everyone who experiences discrimination based on an impairment much like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects everyone who experiences discrimination based on race, religion, gender, or ethnicity.^\* Importantly, the universal approach draws some lines. Because the social model recognizes disability as the interaction between an impairment—i.e., a physiological disorder—and society, the universal approach does not protect people treated adversely based on mere characteristics." Height, eye color, or lack of athletic prowess (absent some underlying impairment), for example, does not make one "disabled" under the social model, and thus does not trigger protection under the universal approach.''\* Aside from this constraint, however, the universal approach is far-reaching in scope, extending protection to anyone with an impairment regardless of whether and how that impairment limits a person's bodily functions. An extensive discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the universal approach is beyond the scope of this article, but a few notes are in order. The universal approach's biggest strength is its consistency with an "orthodox account of how civil rights laws work."™ That is, when civil rights laws prohibit consideration of a characteristic, they prohibit it completely, even if that means extending protection against discrimination to a large number of people who might never need it.\*° As Professor Chai Feldblum points out: [M]ost white people, . . . most men, [and] most heterosexuals [do not] experience discrimination on the basis of their race, gender, or sexual orientation. Nevertheless as a society, we have not passed laws that prohibit discrimination solely against those individuals whose race, or gender, or sexual orientation have historically been the object of stigma and discrimination. Rather, our civil rights laws prohibit the use of a characteristic that the legislature has decided should ordinarily be irrelevant in decision-making. Once that characteristic has been identified, no decision may be made on that basis (unless otherwise justified by the law) regardless of who possesses that characteristic.\*' In this way, the universal approach to disability rights coverage is no different than other civil rights laws, which take coverage as a given and focus on adverse action.\*^ As Professor Bagenstos notes, A Title VII plaintiff... might need to prove she that she suffered adverse action on the basis of her race or sex, but she does not have to prove that she has a race or sex (a trivial requirement if ever there was one), nor does she have to prove that she has a particular race or sex. Title VII protects everyone against discrimination on the basis of their race or sex, whatever their race or sex may be.\*^ By removing the focus on bodily limitations, moreover, the universal approach represents the fullest working out of the social model of disability.\*'' Alternative approaches (the minority group approach, or the "truly disabled" approach) put at least part of the focus on the limitation, thereby undermining a central tenet of the social model: it is society's response to impairments—^not the objective reality of how much or how little an impairment impacts a person's bodily functions—^that creates "disability."\*