# Urban Planning K

## 1NC

#### Ontology comes first—we must begin by questioning the foundations of our knowledge and understanding of reality. The criticism is a gateway to the affirmative we have to rethink our relationship with the economy and humanity if there is any chance of stopping the inevitable extinction of humanity caused by economic rationality

Murphy in 4

John W, Professor of Sociology University of Miami, Globalization with a Human Face, pg. 11-13

The process of development, now commonly referred to as globalization, has been analyzed in a variety of ways. The political, cultural, and economic aspects of globalization, for example, have been the focus of attention of many books and articles for quite some time. What is missing, however, is a deeper level of analysis that Leonardo Boff believes is necessary to correctly understand social growth and the allocation of resources.' In this chapter, this approach is referred to as an ontological Assessment.Within this context of development, the term ontological refers to the base, or conceptual foundation, of a particular rendition of growth. No matter what theory is adopted, an image of how the social world operates is conveyed. And as part of this picture, questions are presupposed about the prospects for growth, who controls this process, the range of acceptable possibilities, and the source of all change. These considerations serve as the background assumptions that gradually begin to dictate how development will proceed. These precepts, in other words, establish the parameters of the version of reality that is suggested, often quite subtly, by a particular theory of development. For this reason, these issues are referred to as ontological or foundational. This is not to say that political analysis is irrelevant when globalization. Nonetheless, in the absence of ontological questions political assessment is not often very insightful. For example, take the problem of alienation. Often capitalism is presumed to be the key culprit with regard to producing this personal and social malady. Without a doubt, workers are treated as commodities within this production system, and thus they are transformed into objects and become alienated, as Marx says, from themselves, other persons, and the social world in general. But is a change at the political level sufficient to address this condition? Subsequent to the work of the Frankfurt School, for example, the answer to this query is no. Does a shift to the collective ownership of the means of production necessarily guarantee the eradication of alienation? Many traditional Marxists believed that this linkage was essential to building a new, more humane world. Nonetheless, they were wrong, and their lack of insight into important ontological issues contributed to discrediting in many intellectual circles a theory that otherwise provided a trenchant critique of capitalism. Shifting to collective ownership, simply put, did not address the origin or grounding of production systems. As a result, workers within socialism, similar to those within capitalism, were integrated into a system of production that was understood to exist sui generis. The result of this maneuver, of course was more—although unexpected—alienation, because the workplace was assumed to be unrelated to human desires and interests. Most important at this juncture is that many persons nowadays are criticizing globalization in an equally superficial manner. Economic and political analyses are inaugurated with the aim of illustrating the inhumanity of this worldwide process. In the opinion of many critics, not much more proof is required to demonstrate the economic and cultural inequities that this trend has spawned. Many cultures have been decimated because of the so-called adjustment policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The rich seem to be getting richer, while others are falling into despair and becoming increasingly marginalized. But is this sort of critique automatically enlightening? Clearly the dismal living conditions of much of the world are revealed; the divide between the rich and poor countries has never been clearer. Yet what about the prospects for change? As Giulio Girardi describes, this sort of research has simply reinforced in the minds of many persons the idea that this situation is normal? The message is that the world is comprised of rich and poor people, and that the human condition is undoubtedly nasty in many places throughout the world. Accordingly, the rich appear to have a historical mandate to govern the world and amass wealth at the expense of the rest of humanity. Proposing change is simply folly that contradicts human nature. So what is needed to alter this scenario? Referring back to Marx, at the heart of the revolution must be philosophy. Ontological questions must be raised, in other words, so that a critique of globalization is not equated with cynicism and inaction, or merely providing alternatives, such as a welfare net, that are touted to humanize this process. What is needed**,** instead, is a new relationship between globalization and those who are affected by this activity. But, again, this shift is not necessarily a part of political analysis. The necessary change must be made initially at the level of ontology, and then political practice may be much more fruitful**.** Persons may be able to control their lives, instead of being subjected to another insensitive political system. And with respect to globalization, they will be able to do more than simply adjust to economic policies that are equated with rationality and general improvement.

#### Mass Transit policies like the aff are built upon the twin logics of efficiency and neoliberalism—while planners rhetorical goals of social justice get hijacked and redeployed—extending social control, structural violence and conflict, and disenfranchisement

Professor Grengs, 5

Dr. Joe Grengs, Associate Professor of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Michigan in 4 CITY, VOL. 9, NO. 1, APRIL 2004 The abandoned social goals of public transit in the neoliberal city of the USA, Joe Grengs, Associate Professor of Urban and Regional Planning

Hidden behind the surge of national headlines about sprawl, Smart Growth, and maddening freeway congestion lies a series of conflicts emerging in cities across the USA. These conflicts pit poor people of colour in inner cities against mostly white commuters in the suburbs over scarce public transit funds, with questions of civil rights and social equity playing central roles. These emerging conflicts reveal that the very purpose of mass transit in the sprawling metropolis is undecided. As populations continue to disperse, as poverty concentrates at the core, and as costs outpace revenues, transit planners are facing a growing dilemma: should transit serve people who have few transportation choices, or should transit offer drivers an alternative to their cars? The neoliberal city of the USA is one that must struggle to compete and remain viable in the network of globalizing cities by cutting costs, reducing social welfare, deregulating business activity, privatizing previously public spaces and activities, and engaging in new forms of social control (Marcuse and van Kempen, 2000; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Goonewardena, 2003). This essay examines how the contradictions of the neoliberal city influence mass transit policy in the USA, creating a worsening divide between disparate transit constituencies and undermining longstanding social equity goals. Mass transit is a new space of emerging social conflict over how the contradictions of neoliberalism will be resolved in cities of the USA (Rodriguez, 1999; Grengs, 2002). This new space of conflict holds special relevance for planners, because the neoliberal agenda involves central questions about public services in an increasingly privatized polity, the agenda contributes directly to changing urban spatial patterns, and the emerging spatial patterns raise new questions for planning theory about the role of social justice in cities where racial and economic segregation are worsening. Contradictions within neoliberal urbanization highlight an obscure but crucial predicament faced by transit planners. Are current transit policies hurting social equity? Should public transit serve an even higher purpose, as an instrument for advancing social justice? Transit once held promise as a means for advancing larger social goals. Congress embraced transit as a legitimate means of redistributing wealth, as an acceptable counterbalance to the damages imposed by a transportation system skewed toward the automobile (Fitch, 1964; Smerk, 1991; Weiner, 1999). Despite a commitment to social goals over several decades aimed at providing mobility for people who cannot drive, other goals have taken over in prominence. But transit policy is slowly, almost imperceptibly, shifting away from its broader social purposes. This shift away from meeting social goals toward the more narrow purpose of relieving traffic congestion, from achieving equity toward merely efficiency, is now influenced by a neoliberal political agenda that separates the social from the economic, causing planners to lose sight of the public purpose of mass transit.

#### Structural violence is the proximate cause of all war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation

\*\*Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the *scale* of violence and the *disproportionate* *relationship* between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)

(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### **Alternative: Reject the neo-liberal instrumentality of the affirmative and their use of the transportation regime of knowledge. Only through community based organizing can we develop appropriate methods to achieve social justice in government and urban planning—only bottom up approaches solve.**

Bang 10 Myung-Ji Bang, Research Associate III, Institute of Urban Studies at the University of Texas at Arlington, “Understanding Gentrification: The Role and Abilities of Community-Based Organizations in Changing Neighborhoods - A Case Study of Post-Katrina New Orleans,” Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Arlington in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of City and Regional Planning, May 2010, <https://dspace.uta.edu/bitstream/handle/10106/5110/Bang_uta_2502M_10677.pdf?sequence=1>

Researchers, however, criticize market favorable redevelopment, community activists and policy-makers under neo-liberal governance (Newman & Wyly, 2006; Slator, 2006). Newman & Wyly (2006) notes the role of community actors and policy-makers to ensure public housing and rent policy for low-come residents and they criticize policy-makers for being favorable to gentrification. They also highlight the role of CBOs in resisting gentrification. They argue that despite the hard work of CBOs to initiate affordable housing in the gentrified neighborhood, it is difficult to reach city policy-makers (p.52). Slater (2006) points to the importance of the role of Community-Based Organizations (i.e. charities, non-profits, and community development corporations) as a result of the devolution of social welfare functions. CBOs replace the role of local government and often work for them, thus, they cannot protest against those that provide needed operational funding (Newman & Lake, 2006). However he emphasizes that less conflict does not lessen the fear that low-income residents have of gentrification (p.220). Although there are criticisms CBOs sometimes weak representation of low-income residents’ needs, CBOs have been considered an important solution to help low-income residents to resist gentrification. According to Kennedy & Leonard (2001), the role of community-based organizations should also be considered in the policy making process as a bottom-up approach. The critical role of community-based organizations is to create social capacity for the existing residents that will empower them to connect with government and developers (Robinson, 1996). In the urban planning process, these community-based organizations may operate in the following capacities: connecting poor residents to urban and policy regimes, leading government representatives and developers to listen to their needs; and create social capacity for the existing residents that will empower and connect them with government representatives and developers (Robinson, 1996). Therefore, the roles of community-based organizations should be considered as a solution to creating social capacity for existing residents and to support low-income residents to deal with changes in gentrifying neighborhoods. Freeman argues that affordable housing policies alone cannot change the perspectives of private developers and renters: Even if affordable housing were made an entitlement, this alone would not necessarily solve the affordability problems raised by gentrification. For example, someone in a gentrifying neighborhood may obtain a housing voucher, but if the landlord did not accept it, that person may still be forced to move (p.190). He finds the needs for effective organizing should be accompanied with policy reactions (e.g. Tax Increment Financing targets affordable housing, affordable homeownership programs, etc.) for affordable housing as a solution (2005, p.182-186). Another perspective to the solution is organizing community politics (Betancur, 2002). Betancur argues that “the right to community is a function of a group’s economic and political power” and “community formations are as strong as their political and economic power” (p.806). Especially, market-driven redevelopment of disinvested places cannot be accomplished without government support, thus community formation may resist the frightening partnership between government and the private sector that lead gentrification (p.807).

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## Overview

#### The alternative solves all of the case—bottom up approaches to community development solve for the structural violence of gentrification. Prioritizing everyday violence is key- responding to it later causes error replication and movement burn out, only re-orienting focus away from macro-level violence produces sustainable political coalitions—This is a sequencing question

Cuomo ’96

(Chris, Prof. of Political Science @ U of Cincinnati, “War is not just an event: reflections on the significance of everyday violence”, *Hypatia*, vol. 11, no. 4 Fall (1994))

Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state.

## AT: Perm

#### It’s a forced choice

Pollack, Bluestone, Billingham 10(Stephanie Pollack, Barry Bluestone, Chase Billingham, Dukakis center for urban and regional policy at northeastern university, October 2010, maintaining diversity in america’s transit-rich neighborhoods, <http://www.dukakiscenter.org/storage/TRNEquityFull.pdf>)

More than 3,000 transit-rich neighborhoods (TRns) in U.S. metropolitan areas have fixed-guideway transit stations and hundreds more such neighborhoods could be created over the next decade if current plans for new transit systems and stations are realized. Americans are increasingly using transit and showing more interest in living in transit-rich neighborhoods. For neighborhood and equity advocates from Atlanta to Seattle and Minneapolis to Houston, however, this good news is tempered by a growing concern about gentrification and displacement. Will current neighborhood residents, many of them low income and/or people of color, benefit from planned transit stations? Or will they be displaced by wealthier and less diverse residents lured not only by transit but also by the other amenities that come with transit-induced neighborhood revitalization? Planners and policymakers would appear to face a Hobson’s choice if transit investment and expansion inevitably lead to gentrification and displacement: either make the transit investment and accept loss of neighborhood diversity as collateral damage, or avoid transit expansion projects serving diverse, lower-income neighborhoods and leave those residents with poor public transit or none at all. neighborhoods.

**The discourse of the aff sets the**

**Wilson 01** Richard Wilson, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, California State Polytechnic University, “Assessing communicative rationality as a transportation planning paradigm,” 2001, http://www.uvm.edu/~transctr/pdf/willson\_article.pdf

Transportation planners use language as if it mirrors the world. If language is a mirror, then, it is a neutral tool in the service of communicating information. In most **transportation** planners’ minds, **language describes objective conditions, explains methodologies and expresses values.** Numbers, moreover, are a precise form of language that provide unambiguous representations of reality. Are not measures of vehicle flows, level of service or cost effectiveness robust representations of reality? Gridlock is gridlock, right? For planning, however, gridlock is not gridlock until we have defined it as a problem and decided to do something to address it. Transportation plans depend on what gridlock means, and establishing meaning is an inherently social and linguistically based process. **The way that transportation planners use language – understanding certain ideas and values and excluding others, hearing some things and not hearing others, and defining roles for themselves, their organizations, decision makers and the public – shapes knowledge, public participation, problem definition, process design and negotiation, and the outcome of planning.** The perspective offered in this paper is that language profoundly shapes our view of the world. The paper critically examines the formal scientific rationality that dominates the field and uses insights from planning practice, social theory and philosophy to explore the promise of communicative rationality as a new paradigm for transportation planning – one in which language and communicative processes form the basis for rational planning. Innovative forms of transportation planning based on theories of communicative rationality hold the promise of solving some of our most difficult transportation planning problems.

#### The perm links worse to the K than the plan—the attempt to mix the social justice perspective of the alternative and the policy approach ensures that the policy apparatus hijacks the K and crushes change

Slater ‘6

<https://www.indymedia.nl/media/2007/09/47003.pdf>, “The Eviction of Critical Perspectives

from Gentrification Research” by Tom Slater, Centre for Urban Studies, University of Bristol, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 30.4, December 2006

The current era of neoliberal urban policy, together with a drive towards homeownership, privatization and the break-up of ‘concentrated poverty’ (Crump, 2002), has seen the global, state-led process of gentrification via the promotion of social or tenure ‘mixing’ (or ‘social diversity’ or ‘social balance’) in formerly disinvested neighbourhoods populated by working-class and/or low-income tenants (Hackworth and Smith, 2001; Smith, 2002; Slater, 2004b; 2005; plus many articles in Atkinson and Bridge, 2005). But social mixing may not necessarily be a neoliberal enterprise — in a striking recent study, Rose (2004: 280) acknowledges that gentrification is ‘a particularly “slippery” area of social mix discourse’ and demonstrates the impact of recent municipal policies to encourage the movement of middle-income residents into Montreal’s inner-city neighbourhoods. Much of this is facilitated by new housing construction, ‘instant gentrification’ as Rose calls it, yet there has also been a municipal drive to provide social housing in the vicinity of middle-income developments. As she points out, unlike in Toronto (Slater, 2004b), ‘the Montreal policies and programs can scarcely be cast in terms of a neoliberal agenda’ (Rose, 2004: 288); there are geographical variances in policy-led gentrification in Canada (Ley, 1996). By interviewing professionals who moved into small-scale ‘infill’ condominiums (constructed by private developers on land often purchased from the city) in Montreal between 1995 and 1998, Rose harvested the views of gentrifiers on municipally encouraged ‘social mix’. Interestingly, the majority of these 50 interviewees expressed either tolerant or egalitarian sentiments with respect to the prospect of adjacent social housing; as one interviewee remarked: At a certain point, I think you shouldn’t live in a closed circle where everybody has the same [middle-class] social standing, where everything is rose-coloured. That’s not the way it is . . . The attraction of a city in general is that it’s where things happen. And, everyone has the right to be there and to express themselves [translation] (interviewee 479 quoted in Rose, 2004: 299–300). While Rose is undoubtedly correct to divorce social mix from neoliberal ideas and sentiments in the Montreal case, unlike some other researchers (Florida, 2002; Bromley et al., 2005) she does stop short of pushing social mix as a remedy for urban disinvestment and decay, which is precisely the intention of neoliberal urban policies elsewhere. In a powerful study of Vancouver’s tortured Downtown Eastside, Nick Blomley has commented on just how ‘morally persuasive’ the concept of social mix can be in the face of addressing long-term disinvestment and poverty: Programs of renewal often seek to encourage home ownership, given its supposed effects on economic self-reliance, entrepreneurship, and community pride. Gentrification, on this account, is to be encouraged, because it will mean the replacement of a marginal anticommunity (nonproperty owning, transitory, and problematized) by an active, responsible, and improving population of homeowners (Blomley, 2004: 89). Blomley’s work helps us to think more in terms of who has to move on to make room for a social mix: The problem with ‘social mix’ however is that it promises equality in the face of hierarchy. First, as often noted, it is socially one-sided. If social mix is good, argue local activists, then why not make it possible for the poor to live in rich neighbourhoods? . . . Second, the empirical evidence suggests that it often fails to improve the social and economic conditions for renters. Interaction between owner-occupiers and renters in ‘mixed’ neighbourhoods seems to be limited. More importantly, it can lead to social segregation and isolation (ibid.: 99). As Smith (2002) has noted, creating a social mix invariably involves the movement of the middle class into working-class areas, not vice versa, working on the assumption that a socially mixed community will be a socially ‘balanced’ one, characterized by positive interaction between the classes. Such planning and policy optimism, however, rarely translates into a happy situation in gentrifying neighbourhoods, not least South Parkdale, Toronto, where a deliberate policy of social mixing initiated in 1999 exacerbated homeowner NIMBYism, led to rent increases and tenant displacement (Slater, 2004b). Gentrification disguised as ‘social mix’ serves as an excellent example of how the rhetoric and reality of gentrification has been replaced by a different discursive, theoretical and policy language that consistently deflects criticism and resistance. In the UK, social mix (particularly tenure mix) has been at the forefront of ‘neighbourhood renewal’ and ‘urban regeneration’ policies for nearly a decade now, but with one or two well-known exceptions (Smith, 2002; Lees, 2003a) there is still not much of a critical literature that sniffs around for gentrification amidst the policy discourse. If we listen to one influential analyst, we are still under a linguistic anaesthetic: Not only does ‘urban regeneration’ represent the next wave of gentrification, planned and financed on an unprecedented scale, but the victory of this language in anaesthetizing our critical understanding of gentrification in Europe represents a considerable ideological victory for neoliberal visions of the city (Smith, 2002: 446). At a time when cities ‘have become the incubators for many of the major political and ideological strategies through which the dominance of neoliberalism is being maintained’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 375–6), and at a time when so many urban researchers are charting and challenging neoliberalism, it is surprising that there are fewer critical takes on policy-led gentrification in Europe than ever before. It is difficult to isolate why this is the case, but the very nature of policy research, usually funded by policy institutions, may be a significant factor. Loic Wacquant has captured this well: In the United States, it is ‘policy research’ that plays the lead role as a cover and shield against critical thought by acting in the manner of a ‘buffer’ isolating the political field from any research that is independent and radical in its conception as in its implications for public policy. All researchers who want to address state officials are obliged to pass through this mongrel field, this ‘decontamination chamber,’ and agree to submit to severe censorship by reformulating their work according to technocratic categories that ensure that this work will have neither purchase nor any effect on reality (over the entrance gates of public policy schools is written in invisible letters: ‘thou shalt not ask thy own questions’). In point of fact, American politicians never invoke social research except when it supports the direction they want to go in anyway for reasons of political expediency; in all other cases, they trample it shamelessly (Wacquant 2004: 99).

## AT: Framework

### AT: Case Outweighs

#### You should privilege everyday violence for two reasons- A) social bias underrepresents its effects B) its effects are exponential, not linear which means even if the only causes a small amount of structural violence, its terminal impacts are huge

Nixon ‘11

(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 2-3)

Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink-politically, imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow violence." By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory. Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.

### AT: We solve the K

#### Their focus on catastrophic violence trades off with analysis of everyday slow violence and ensures error replication because it allows us to bracket on-going casualties from declared conflicts that have officially ended

Nixon ‘11

(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 12-14)

Over the past two decades, this high-speed planetary modification has been accompanied (at least for those increasing billions who have access to the Internet) by rapid modifications to the human cortex. It is difficult, but necessary, to consider simultaneously a geologically-paced plasticity, however relatively rapid, and the plasticity of brain circuits reprogrammed by a digital world that threatens to "info-whelm" us into a state of perpetual distraction. If an awareness of the Great Acceleration is (to put it mildly) unevenly distributed, the experience of accelerated connectivity (and the paradoxical disconnects that can accompany it) is increasingly widespread. In an age of degraded attention spans it becomes doubly difficult yet increasingly urgent that we focus on the toll exacted, over time, by the slow violence of ecological degradation. We live, writes Cory Doctorow, in an era when the electronic screen has become an "ecosystem of interruption technologies.''" Or as former Microsoft executive Linda Stone puts it, we now live in an age of "continuous partial attention.?" Fast is faster than it used to be, and story units have become concomitantly shorter. In this cultural milieu of digitally speeded up time, and foreshortened narrative, the intergenerational aftermath becomes a harder sell. So to render slow violence visible entails, among other things, redefining speed: we see such efforts in talk of accelerated species loss, rapid climate change, and in attempts to recast "glacial"-once a dead metaphor for "slow-as a rousing, iconic image of unacceptably fast loss. Efforts to make forms of slow violence more urgently visible suffered a setback in the United States in the aftermath of 9/11, which reinforced a spectacular, immediately sensational, and instantly hyper-visible image of what constitutes a violent threat. The fiery spectacle of the collapsing towers was burned into the national psyche as the definitive image of violence, setting back by years attempts to rally public sentiment against climate change, a threat that is incremental, exponential, and far less sensationally visible. Condoleezza Rice's strategic fantasy of a mushroom cloud looming over America if the United States failed to invade Iraq gave further visual definition to cataclysmic violence as something explosive and instantaneous, a recognizably cinematic, immediately sensational, pyrotechnic event. The representational bias against slow violence has, furthermore, a critically dangerous impact on what counts as a casualty in the first place. Casualties of slow violence-human and environmental-are the casualties most likely not to be seen, not to be counted. Casualties of slow violence become light-weight, disposable casualties, with dire consequences for the ways wars are remembered, which in turn has dire consequences for the projected casualties from future wars. We can observe this bias at work in the way wars, whose lethal repercussions spread across space and time, are tidily bookended in the historical record. Thus, for instance, a 2003 New York Times editorial on Vietnam declared that" during our dozen years there, the U.S. killed and helped kill at least 1.5 million people.'?' But that simple phrase "during our dozen years there" shrinks the toll, foreshortening the ongoing slow-motion slaughter: hundreds of thousands survived the official war years, only to slowly lose their lives later to Agent Orange. In a 2002 study, the environmental scientist Arnold Schecter recorded dioxin levels in the bloodstreams of Bien Hoa residents at '35 times the levels of Hanoi's inhabitants, who lived far north of the spraying." The afflicted include thousands of children born decades after the war's end. More than thirty years after the last spray run, Agent Orange continues to wreak havoc as, through biomagnification, dioxins build up in the fatty tissues of pivotal foods such as duck and fish and pass from the natural world into the cooking pot and from there to ensuing human generations. An Institute of Medicine committee has by now linked seventeen medical conditions to Agent Orange; indeed, as recently as 2009 it uncovered fresh evidence that exposure to the chemical increases the likelihood of developing Parkinson's disease and ischemic heart disease." Under such circumstances, wherein long-term risks continue to emerge, to bookend a war's casualties with the phrase "during our dozen years there" is misleading: that small, seemingly innocent phrase is a powerful reminder of how our rhetorical conventions for bracketing violence routinely ignore ongoing, belated casualties.

### AT: Utilitarianism

#### Framework- Neoliberal transportation policies like the affirmative rely on modes of efficiency and instrumentality The aff speaks in terms of instrumental rationality which necessarily ignores the complex social implications of transportation development

**Wilson 01** Richard Wilson, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, California State Polytechnic University, “Assessing communicative rationality as a transportation planning paradigm,” 2001, http://www.uvm.edu/~transctr/pdf/willson\_article.pdf

**The predominant method of transportation planning is instrumental rationality, a process of optimizing means (plans and programs) according to identified ends (goals).** Instrumental rationality requires that the desired ends of a unitary decision-maker can be known**.** It assumes that efficient means can be identified using algorithm-like methods**.** Instrumental rationality bases reason on logic and scientific empiricism. **It maintains that what we know is based on what we can observe in a neutral and dispassionate manner. Furthermore, it assumes that urban and transportation systems operate in mechanistic, predictable ways – that immutable laws about travel behavior can be discovered and used for prediction.** Finally, instrumental rationality assumes that the actors in a planning process are autonomous individuals who refine their knowledge against universal principles, and that planning roles can be divided into various analysis, evaluation and decision-making tasks. In this model, planning activities focus on analytic issues such as modeling and forecasting, impact analysis and economic evaluation. Although recent advances in planning theory have had little connection to transportation planning, the roots of transportation lie in classical conceptions of planning. Of the intellectual precursors to planning identified by Friedmann (1987), systems engineering, systems analysis, neo-classical economics, welfare and social choice, scientific management and policy science have shaped the field most strongly. In the US context, Wachs (1985) highlights the influence of progressive era ideas about professionalized planning, where administrative discretion is provided to planners to implement management principles in areas that are too complex for political leaders or the public. **The hope was that scientific management principles could be applied to public affairs, much as scientific approaches advanced industrial production, leading to the idea of an expert-led, analytical-based transportation planning**. These notions supported **a transportation planning process** that **follows a sequence of steps and treats ends and means separately. It is a process in which the core problem is optimizing means to achieve ends that are derived from decision-makers and society; transportation planners play a technocratic role.** This model of transportation planning is remarkably unchanged over the last 50 years. Pas (1995), for example, summarizes a step-by-step process that elaborates the classic ends-means process.2 The nine-step process includes the following: 1. Problem and issue identification; 2. formulation of goals and objectives; 3. data collection; 4. generation of alternatives; 5. analysis (including land use-activity system models, urban transportation models and impact analysis models); 6. evaluation (economic and non-economic); 7. decision making; 8. implementation and 9. system monitoring. (p. 60) Figure 1 presents instrumental rationality in a broader decision making context. The diagram shows planning as responding to **societal values, public opinion, institutions and stakeholders**. These elements **are assumed to be independent of the planning activity itself** – the planner’s challenge is simply to understand them. Planners, then, assist decision-makers in expressing desired ends. **This is often a cursory activity; sometimes it is ignored** because it is assumed that goals are self-evident (e.g., enhancing automobile mobility). The main activity of planning, therefore, is designing, analyzing and evaluating alternative means as shown in number two of the numbered boxes in Figure 1. The theory of knowledge, or epistemology, that is implied by instrumental rationality is scientific objectivism. Drawing from the natural sciences, engineering and certain of the social sciences, **this view assumes that objective facts can be known and that the analyst is able to observe a system without participating in it or effecting it. Furthermore, it is assumed that facts can be separated from subjective information and abstracted from complex social settings.** Data analysis and modeling results provide the primary information upon which alternatives are evaluated, information such as level of service, air quality conditions or cost effectiveness. Objectivist epistemology and instrumental rationality method go hand-in-hand – if one element cannot be supported it is difficult to justify the other.

**Their approach to transportation planning ignores forms of knowledge other than objective analysis which makes it impossible to account for other perspectives**

**Wilson 01** Richard Wilson, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, California State Polytechnic University, “Assessing communicative rationality as a transportation planning paradigm,” 2001, http://www.uvm.edu/~transctr/pdf/willson\_article.pdf

The problems with instrumental rationality are not unique to transportation planning – they stem from changes in the larger social context for planning. The changes, in turn, touch on the most basic questions in philosophy and social theory. Instrumental rationality and objectivism are part of traditional notions of modernism and progress, yet these foundational elements have been transformed. Starting in the 1950s, critiques of scientific social science emerged in sociology and planning (see Guhathakurta (1999) for an overview). Yet **in practice and research, transportation planning has followed a schizophrenic path – acknowledging problems in instrumental rationality but continuing to employ it** in research, practice and teaching. In the recent years, social theorists use the term postmodernism to describe changes that undermine traditional modernist notions, including instrumental rationality and objectivism. Stated simply, **postmodernism recognizes that there is no longer a single organizing narrative around which a plan can optimize** (e.g., a consensus notion of what constitutes progress). **Without such an organizing narrative, a plan cannot optimize means with respect to ends, and many assumptions of rational transportation planning come apart.**4 Milroy’s (1991) four observations about the implications of postmodernism for planning are used here to discuss the context for transportation planning. First, a postmodern perspective questions conventional beliefs and seeks to understand the power relations beneath them. The changing notions about the appropriateness of mobility as a transportation planning goal are an example of this. **Mobility (taken here to mean vehicle throughput) was once assumed to be the general aim of transportation planning, but now there are competing ideas about such goals (e.g., mobility versus accessibility, and recently, restricting travel opportunity).** Transportation planning rarely optimizes around a single goal; it usually balances multiple, often contradictory goals. In addition, more is understood about who benefits and who loses from differing goals definitions, so terms and ideas that were formerly uncontroversial become contested. **Second, a postmodernism perspective challenges the notion of universals as bases of truth. Mobility enhancement used to be associated with a general notion of progress. Just as old postcards show factories billowing smoke as a sign of economic prosperity, the freedom to live and work where one chooses was a cornerstone of American** land use and **transportation policy**. Although that freedom is still sought, **the question of progress is now contested, not consensual.** In the realm of project evaluation criteria, the cost/benefit calculus of economic evaluation is not offered as the sole decision criterion as it might have been in the past. Third, a postmodernism perspective asserts that a clear delineation between subjective and objective is not possible. There is, for example, recognition that **objective analysis leaves out forms of knowing important to understanding travel behavior and making policy choices, such as qualitative factors, aethestics and morals. For example, Talvitie** (1997) **challenges the economic theory that underlies transportation models by introducing psychoanalytic understandings of travel behavior, aspects outside the realm of traditional notions of objectivity. He calls for examination of the “dark” side of transportation behavior instead of focusing solely on utility maximization.** And finally, a postmodernism perspective is said to value plurality and difference. Recent research shows how **transportation systems function differently for women, people of color, children, the elderly, the disabled, the poor and other groups. As we begin to recognize the perspectives and claims of a more diverse society, a type of planning that is “clean, calculating and homogenizing” seems a poor fit with the likely planning and decision-making environment.**

### AT: Extinction First

#### You should privilege everyday violence for two reasons- A) social bias underrepresents its effects B) its effects are exponential, not linear which means even if the only causes a small amount of structural violence, its terminal impacts are huge

Nixon ‘11

(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 2-3)

Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink-politically, imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow violence." By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory. Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.

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# Links

## Gentrification Link

## Rail

#### Rail Transit 🡪 gentrification

Lin 02

Lin, Jeffery. Senior Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.“Gentrification and Transit in Northwest Chicago”. Journal of the Transportation Research Forum. Published in Transportation Quarterly by the Eno Transportation Foundation, Washington D.C. Fall 2002. http://www.mendeley.com/research/gentrification-transit-northwest-chicago-1/. Accessed 29 June 2012.

A fulfillment of the LeRoy and Sonstelie prediction leads to gentrification, as meas-ured by change in property values, being most evident near transit access points.' In addition, two geographic features are considered that are likely to wield a strong influence on gentrification patterns: the CBD and Lake Michigan. Specifically, it is expected that gentrification would act like a "wave," originating from both sources and spreading outwards as time progressed. Urban profes-sionals would seek to be as near as possible to the Central Business District to shorten their commute times. As inner neighborhoods fill up with previous gentrifiers, development occurs in areas farther from downtown. Similarly, the north side lakeshore has traditionally served as amagnet for the affluent. As lakefront properties reach capacity, development is expected to move westward from Lake Shore Drive over time.' This study conducts a test for transit induced changes in Chicago property value growth rates. The study region is the area bounded by North Avenue, Elston Avenue, Foster Avenue, and Lake Shore Drive during the period 1975-1991. Increases in property values by block are regressed on the type of property, distances from the CBD and Lake Michigan, and proximity to Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) elevated stations that lie along rail transit lines. If upper- and middle- class professionals are gentrifying as predicted by the above theory, then a premium should be placed on mass transit access. Thus, property value growth rates closer to transit stations should exceed growth rates farther from transit stations.

#### Lack of knowledge to meet regulations to solve negative implication of HSR, creates urban displacement

Alexandrine Press 12 (Alexandrine press, built environment, volume 38, number 1, march 2012, environment in the broadest possible sense - from urban and regional planning to architecture; from housing and the environment to social issues and sustainability.loukaitou-sideris, Anastasia, <http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/alex;jsessionid=696hfbm3t9uaa.alice>)

High speed rail (HSR) is planned for California and other US states, but there is a significant lack of knowledge regarding the urban development impacts that HSR systems have had in other parts of the world. The study identifies the important preconditions for positive development around HSR stations, the most important positive and negative effects of such development, and extracts lessons for California. From a Delphi survey of twenty-seven experts, we found that the impacts of HSR on the urban development of adjacent station areas differ depending on the context and circumstances. A number of preconditions should be in place for positive development to happen, such as careful choice of station location, an urban design vision for the station area, a transportation plan that links the station to other modes, supportive land-use policies and zoning regulations, and processes that help create broad interest coalitions and elicit community support.

#### Increasing heavy rail and transportation magnifies neighborhood change. Housing stock rises which forces out lower socioeconomic classes that need infrastructure most.

Pollack, Bluestone, Billingham 10(Stephanie Pollack, Barry Bluestone, Chase Billingham, Dukakis center for urban and regional policy at northeastern university, October 2010, maintaining diversity in america’s transit-rich neighborhoods, <http://www.dukakiscenter.org/storage/TRNEquityFull.pdf>)

To better understand patterns of neighborhood change in newly transit-rich neighborhoods, the third chapter of the report analyzes socioeconomic changes in 42 neighborhoods in 12 metropolitan areas first served by rail transit between 1990 and 2000. Because prior research on gentrification and TRNs had looked at only a few characteristics, we explore a broad range of population, housing and transportation characteristics. For each of the 42 neighborhoods analyzed, we studied changes between 1990 and 2000 in population, racial and ethnic composition, and in-migration; the number of housing units, tenure, housing value and rent; household income; and the use of public transit for commuting purposes and automobile ownership. We then compared the neighborhood level changes to those in each neighborhood’s corresponding metropolitan area to see if patterns of neighborhood change in the TRNs differed from corresponding changes in the region. As in prior studies, we found that patterns of neighborhood change varied across the transit-rich neighborhoods we investigated. Many of the TRNs changed in ways that were roughly similar to the underlying pattern of change in their larger metro areas. We focused, however, on those TRNs where changes were more pronounced than those in the surrounding metropolitan area. In these neighborhoods, a predominant pattern of neighborhood change could be discerned: with the addition of transit, housing stock became more expensive, neighborhood residents wealthier and vehicle ownership more common. We found evidence of gentrification in the majority of newly transit-served neighborhoods, if gentrification is defined as a pattern of neighborhood change marked by rising housing costs and incomes. Our research also provides support for the conclusion that neighborhoods with a large number of renters are more susceptible to gentrification. Indeed, when we specifically looked at the neighborhoods where the new stations were light rail —neighborhoods which, in our study, were more likely to be dominated pre-transit by low-income, renter households than those in the heavy rail and commuter rail neighborhoods— almost every aspect of neighborhood change was magnified: rents rose faster and owner-occupied units became more prevalent.

## Mass Transit

#### **Property values prove transit causes gentrification**

Lin 02

Lin, Jeffery. Senior Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. “Gentrification and Transit in Northwest Chicago”. Journal of the Transportation Research Forum. Published in Transportation Quarterly by the Eno Transportation Foundation, Washington D.C. Fall 2002. http://www.mendeley.com/research/gentrification-transit-northwest-chicago-1/. Accessed 29 June 2012.

This study hypothesized that transit access was a spur to gentrification in northwest Chicago between 1975-1991. En conclusion, the data supports this hypothesis. It seems clear that in the periods 1975-1980 and especially 1985-1991, properties closest to transit experienced significant gains in property value change versus properties located farther from transit. In 1980-1985, the trend seems to have been interrupted. However, the coefficient on transit access during this period was not statistically significant. Certainly, this result warrants further analysis of this period.The data also present strong evidence of a wave theory, i.e., that gentrification spread like a wave emanating from Lake Michigan and downtown. The peak changes in property values moved roughly westward from Lake Michigan in the periods of analysis. In addition, a flattening property value curve suggests that properties farther from the cen-tral business district were catching up with the growth rates in value experienced by properties near the central business district. The extent of both this phenomenon and the relationship between gentrification and transit should be explored further by extending the analysis into the 1990s, when further growth took place (especially in areas such as Wicker Park and Uptown). However, the uncertain future of Olcott's Land Values Blue Book, the unique data source that made this study possible, makes further exploration difficult. The explosive growth experienced by northwest Chicago in the period 1985-1991 seems likely to have been continued—if not continually observed.

#### Transit causes gentrification

Lin 02

Lin, Jeffery. Senior Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. “Gentrification and Transit in Northwest Chicago”. Journal of the Transportation Research Forum. Published in Transportation Quarterly by the Eno Transportation Foundation, Washington D.C. Fall 2002. http://www.mendeley.com/research/gentrification-transit-northwest-chicago-1/. Accessed 29 June 2012.

LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983) propose that the presence of transit, in combination with declining automobile costs, leads to the gentrification of inner-city, transit-sewed neighborhoods. This paper attempts to empirically demonstrate whether the existence of transit resulted in phenomena consistent with gentrification, utilizing data from northwest Chicago between 1975 and 1991. Using changes in residential property values as an indicator of gentrification, evidence is found that properties closest to transit stations increased in value much more than those farther away, especially in the period 1985-1991. Properties adjacent to transit stations had a 20% higher increase in value compared with those located a half-mile away, supporting the hypothesis that transit access was a spur to gentrification.

#### Empirically proven - new transit services spark gentrification

Lin 02

Lin, Jeffery. Senior Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. “Gentrification and Transit in Northwest Chicago”. Journal of the Transportation Research Forum. Published in Transportation Quarterly by the Eno Transportation Foundation, Washington D.C. Fall 2002. http://www.mendeley.com/research/gentrification-transit-northwest-chicago-1/. Accessed 29 June 2012.

The 1980s saw a small but significant trend reversal in American cities. Cer-tain upper- and middle-class persons, instead of choosing to move to the suburbs, resettled near the central business district (CBD) in formerly run-down areas. This middle-class resettlement of the inner city is known as gentrification. In Chicago, gentrification began in earnest in Lincoln Park and has since surfaced around the city, including such diverse neighborhoods as Bucktown, Wicker Park, Ukrainian Village, and Pilsen. This study examines the role of transit in the gentrification of neighborhoods of the north and northwest sides of Chicago over the period 1975-1991. It was during this period that portions of these areas were particularly sensitive to gentrification pressures. The percentage change in land values is examined as evidence of gentrification. Then, the paper investigates whether the availability of rapid transit service spurred gentrification by testing whether properties close to mass-transit stations experienced a larger increase in value than those properties located farther away.

#### Transit stations catalyze neighborhood change, forces gentrification through increased stock in the area.

Pollack, Bluestone, Billingham 10(Stephanie Pollack, Barry Bluestone, Chase Billingham, Dukakis center for urban and regional policy at northeastern university, October 2010, maintaining diversity in america’s transit-rich neighborhoods, <http://www.dukakiscenter.org/storage/TRNEquityFull.pdf>)

The addition of a new transit station—and perhaps even the continuing attraction of an older transit station—can catalyze a process of neighborhood change that produces gentrification and, potentially, displacement of prior residents by higher-income and potentially more racially homogeneous residents with the ability to pay higher rents and buy more expensive homes. Such gentrification and displacement does occur in some TRNs. But it is equally clear that transit does not inevitably lead to gentrification and displacement: some neighborhoods see little change, while others actually experience increased poverty.

#### Heavy rail, commuter rail, and light rail force increased gentrification and displacement shifts

Pollack, Bluestone, Billingham 10(Stephanie Pollack, Barry Bluestone, Chase Billingham, Dukakis center for urban and regional policy at northeastern university, October 2010, maintaining diversity in america’s transit-rich neighborhoods, <http://www.dukakiscenter.org/storage/TRNEquityFull.pdf>)

The first two rounds of analysis were designed to evaluate whether the construction of new transit stations of any type could cause changes in neighborhood demographics including gentrification and displacement. But it is possible that certain types of transit lead to a much higher potential for both gentrification and displacement. By separately studying heavy rail, commuter rail, and light rail transit stations, we were able to dig deeper into the gentrification and displacement phenomenon. Hence, a third and final round of analysis, in which we sorted the 42 TRNs by their types of stations, helps explain where gentrification is most likely to occur. The results of this transit type analysis demonstrate that neighborhoods surrounding new light rail stations experience considerably more substantial demographic shifts than those surrounding new heavy rail and commuter rail stations.

#### **Professionals in cities push others out of areas near convenient transit**

Lin 02

Lin, Jeffery. Senior Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. “Gentrification and Transit in Northwest Chicago”. Journal of the Transportation Research Forum. Published in Transportation Quarterly by the Eno Transportation Foundation, Washington D.C. Fall 2002. http://www.mendeley.com/research/gentrification-transit-northwest-chicago-1/. Accessed 29 June 2012.

It allows modeling of the process of residential location by different income groups within the Alonso-Mills-Muth framework. A choice is introduced between the older, slower transit system and the newer, faster, and more expensive automobile. Given this choice, then the model predicts that the affluent will suburbanize if the auto is affordable to them and not to others. This is because only the affluent will place a high enough value on their time to make adoption of the new transportation technology worthwhile. If the auto is either unaffordable to all or affordable to all, then all individuals will use the same mode, and the affluent (or at least those whose income elasticity of demand for housing is less than their income elasticity of marginal cost of commuting by both modes) will live in the central city. For the dynamic implications of this model, consider an example of four periods, based on the experiences of many US cities. Prior to 1950, autos were not commonly available and both affluent and less-affluent used transit, with the affluent choosing higher-priced properties closer to downtown. After 1950, as the affluent were better able to afford autos, they moved out to the suburbs. In more recent years, auto ownership has become more universal, allowing the less affluent to also migrate outwards. This shift creates competition for land and increased commuting times as the roads become more congested. In the final period, some of the affluent move downtown and commute by transit. Thus, the LeRoy and Sonstelie model predicts gentrification of the central city and die suburbanization of the less affluent as a result of declining automobile costs and increased auto ownership. As a result, this paper deduces that transit serves as a magnet for gentrification, as reduced commute time benefits for the urban professional decline as distance increases from transit access.

## Congestion

#### The rhetoric of reducing congestion is a critical nexus point for the neoliberal rationality which undergirds transportation policies which destroy community, ensure inequality, and perpetuates the (im)mobility of the cities poorest

Dr. Joe Grengs, Associate Professor of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Michigan in 5

CITY, VOL. 9, NO. 1, APRIL 2005 *The abandoned social goals of public transit in the neoliberal city of the USA*, Joe Grengs, Associate Professor of Urban and Regional Planning

In an emerging world order where capitalism spreads American-style to all corners of the globe, three major problems are widely recognized by critics from left to right: a continuous threat of war; persistent economic inequality that threatens to disrupt the social order; and a loss of political community that undermines our ability to address day-to-day problems and decisions (Goonewardena, 2003). By way of analysing transportation policy, I will set aside the question of war even though we grow ever more dependent on oil to feed our bigger and faster cars. The recent headlines about surging gasoline prices and the ongoing wars in the Middle East add up to a compelling case that our highway-dependent lifestyles have as much to do with the threat of war as perhaps any other explanation. But here I focus on the two problems of social inequality and the loss of political community because they both bear on future outcomes of mass transit policy. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, government support for mass transit has long carried with it explicit social goals. The US federal government took decisive steps starting in the 1960s to advance mass transit. These congressional actions strengthened transit as a counterbalance to previous federal programmes that had overwhelmingly supported highway construction as the principal thrust of transport policy, and had inadvertently contributed to urban spatial patterns that put some people without access to a car at a serious disadvantage. Second, the social purpose of public transit is becoming supplanted by the economic imperative of efficiency and competitiveness. Gains in shifting commuters from cars to transit may actually undermine the goal of providing transit for those without cars, so that the social goal of providing mobility becomes displaced by the economic goal of reducing congestion. The third part of the argument explains how recent changes in transportation policy are influenced by a neoliberal political agenda, heightening the conflict between transit’s competing goals in ways that are not readily evident. To the casual observer, support for transit is growing. But national policy has at the same time encouraged a shift in emphasis within the transit programme, a shift that is likely to harm those who depend most on good transit.

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Besides contributing to an imbalanced transportation system, federal transportation policy also places transportation users in competition with one another. Transit advocates struggle against highway interests in competition for scarce transportation dollars. Even among transit advocates, one constituency has long been in conflict with another. Jones (1985) argues that from the very beginning federal programmes for public transit were biased in favour of the suburban commuter. Federal policy in the early 1960s was “constructed in terms of the world view of the suburbs-to-central city commuter … built for and around the racehorses, not the workhorses, of the transit industry” (Jones, 1985, p. 121). The workhorses here are the local buses in the urban core where most transit dependent riders live, including the carless, the poor, students, elderly and recent immigrants.

## Policy making

#### Our current system of politics places profit before all else, allowing for practices like gentrification

Aka ‘10

<http://www.nssa.us/journals/2010-35-1/pdf/35-1%2001%20Aka.pdf>, Ebenezer O. Aka, Jr. Morehouse College, National Social Science Journal, “Gentrification and Socioeconomic Impacts of Neighborhood Integration and Diversification in Atlanta, Georgia”, 2010

The economic factors of gentrification appear to be inherently linked to politics. In studying how economic forces have contributed to gentrification, there is a strong emphasis placed on intentional neglect of inner-city neighborhoods by powerful land-based interest groups. “This implication is that powerful interest groups follow a policy of neglect of inner-city neighborhoods until such time as they become aware that policy change could yield tremendous profits. Then policies change accordingly, with little regard for the powerless inner-city residences who will be displaced from their homes” (London and Palen, 1984). Stakeholders in the local real estate market have massive earning potential in distressed areas. Neil Smith’s rent gap theory substantiates this ideology. The rent gap is the difference in property values in depressed areas before renovations and after renovations. When the rent gap is large enough, investment money is pumped into dilapidated areas. According to Smith, the government amplifies this effect through various zoning, financing, and fiscal practices” (Kennedy and Leonard, 2001).

# Impacts

## Racism MODs

### Racism MOD

#### Gentrification amplifies racism

Aka ‘10

<http://www.nssa.us/journals/2010-35-1/pdf/35-1%2001%20Aka.pdf>, Ebenezer O. Aka, Jr.

Morehouse College, National Social Science Journal, “Gentrification and Socioeconomic Impacts of Neighborhood Integration and Diversification in Atlanta, Georgia”, 2010

Analyzing each variable independently makes the presence of gentrification evident. When all of the variables are analyzed together, there is a greater understanding of how the neighborhood is being restructured. Each neighborhood is seeing an influx of white residents, while loosing segments of the black and senior citizen populations. There are a greater number of more educated individuals inhabiting the neighborhoods – bringing with them higher incomes. Just as the income of neighborhood residents has increased, so has the cost of housing and rental prices. This economic and social restructuring which is occurring in each of the neighborhoods brings with it lower crime rates, higher tax revenues, ascetics, poverty de-concentration, social motivation, and overall civic improvement. Unfortunately, the problem in neighborhood restructuring boils down to a matter of displacement and racial discord. We can account for the higher-educated individuals, with higher salaries that are moving into these five neighborhoods, but what is happening to the elderly, and those with little education and small yearly incomes. The only trace of these people is in a negative percent change. Racial discord can be seen as a spillover from the white flight era. Some black residents blame the state of inner-city urban America on the past actions of whites. They see the influx of middle-income whites back into the central city, not as a source of good, but as a “take over.”

#### And, Racism makes war and genocide possible—biopolitics won’t become genocidal without it

Mendieta, 02 – SUNY at Stony Brook, (Eduardo, ‘To make live and to let die’ –Foucault on Racism, Meeting of the Foucault Circle, APA Central Division Meeting –Chicago, April 25th , 2002 http://www.sunysb.edu/philosophy/faculty/emendieta/articles/foucault.pdf)

This is where racism intervenes, not from without, exogenously, but from within, constitutively. For the emergence of biopower as the form of a new form of political rationality, entails the inscription within the very logic of the modern state the logic of racism. For racism grants, and here I am quoting: “the conditions for the acceptability of putting to death in a society of normalization. Where there is a society of normalization, where there is a power that is, in all of its surface and in first instance, and first line, a bio-power, racism is indispensable as a condition to be able to put to death someone, in order to be able to put to death others. The homicidal [meurtrière] function of the state, to the degree that the state functions on the modality of bio-power, can only be assured by racism “(Foucault 1997, 227) To use the formulations from his 1982 lecture “The Political Technology of Individuals” –which incidentally, echo his 1979 Tanner Lectures –the power of the state after the 18 th century, a power which is enacted through the police, and is enacted over the population, is a power over living beings, and as such it is a biopolitics. And, to quote more directly, “since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it, if necessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics.” (Foucault 2000, 416). Racism, is the thanatopolitics of the biopolitics of the total state. They are two sides of one same political technology, one same political rationality: the management of life, the life of a population, the tending to the continuum of life of a people. And with the inscription of racism within the state of biopower, the long history of war that Foucault has been telling in these dazzling lectures has made a new turn: the war of peoples, a war against invaders, imperials colonizers, which turned into a war of races, to then turn into a war of classes, has now turned into the war of a race, a biological unit, against its polluters and threats. Racism is the means by which bourgeois political power, biopower, re-kindles the fires of war within civil society. Racism normalizes and medicalizes war. Racism makes war the permanent condition of society, while at the same time masking its weapons of death and torture. As I wrote somewhere else, racism banalizes genocide by making quotidian the lynching of suspect threats to the health of the social body. Racism makes the killing of the other, of others, an everyday occurrence by internalizing and normalizing the war of society against its enemies. To protect society entails we be ready to kill its threats, its foes, and if we understand society as a unity of life, as a continuum of the living, then these threat and foes are biological in nature.

### Segregation MOD

#### Gentrification results in segregation and deepening of socio-economic divides

Alex B. Hill (a Community Health Worker in Detroit, holds a BA in International Relations and African Studies from Michigan State University with specializations in International Development and Social Movements.)2010/08/09 “YOUNG, WHITE, AND IN DETROIT: GENTRIFICATION IMPLICATIONS”

<http://alexbhill.org/2010/08/09/young-white-and-in-detroit-gentrification-implications/>

Consequent to gentrification, the average income increases and average family size decreases in the community, which may result[s] in the informal economic eviction of the lower-income residents, because of increased rents, house prices, and property taxes. This type of population change reduces industrial land use when it is redeveloped for commerce and housing. In addition, new businesses, catering to a more affluent base of consumers, tend to move into formerly blighted areas, further increasing the appeal to more affluent migrants and decreasing the accessibility to less wealthy natives. I live in the University District, which like most of Detroit is now a majority black community, but that wasn’t always the case. The District has a long history from farmland to annexation with the city, to development as a model community where, “homes could never be sold to or used by persons other than ‘of white or Caucasian race.’” Following the riots of 1967 and full blown white flight to suburban areas, black families began moving into the neighborhood. I live in a home who’s family has a long history of living in the area, contributing to the community, and working with the labor movement. Being a gentrifier in Detroit has a serious implication when tied to the city’s past. That implication is born of the history of racial segregation and violence in the city of Detroit and the Detroit metro area. Public policy and popular perception of black people systematically marginalized and segregated populations based on race. The extended outcome of those causes can be seen with Michigan’s “blackest” city: Detroit residing a stone’s throw away from its “whitest” city: Livonia. Because of this historical disenfranchisement of the black community in Detroit, gentrification is all that much more a hard topic in a city facing difficult economic development.

#### Segregation perpetuates genocidal actions which destroys individuals and the world

LUCY D. SUDDRETH (chief of support operations for the Library of Congress) February 22, 1993 “How Racism Affects Everyone” <http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/93/9304/racism.html>

One of the most critical issues facing the world today is racism and its equivalents," Alvin Poussaint told a standing room only crowd in the Mumford Room on Feb. 2. The keynote address kicked off the Library's African American History Month celebration. Dr. Poussaint, a well-known author, psychiatrist and educator represented the national theme for the month "Afro-American Scholars: Leaders, Activists and Writers," commemorating the legacy of Mary McLeod Bethune, James Weldon Johnson, W.E.B. DuBois and others. In opening remarks, Denise Banks, director of Affirmative Action and Special Programs, expressed her appreciation of the "Library's commitment to educating and raising the awareness of the myriad of contributions made by individuals of diverse backgrounds." Before he introduced the keynote speaker, Dr. Billington said he felt the occasion was appropriate for announcing a major new undertaking. The Library is planning a major exhibit that will celebrate cultural and intellectual achievements of African- Americans. It will bring attention to LC's extraordinary, highly varied and unique collections such as those of Daniel A.P. Murray, who founded Black History Week, Thurgood Marshall, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and Tuskegee Institute to highlight creative expressions and social, institutional and legal history. Dr. Billington announced that once formalized, "the exhibit will encompass all three buildings of the Library. Through American Memory and possibly traveling exhibits, the city and country will have an outreach capacity to the items." In his introduction, Dr. Billington described Dr. Poussaint, "as an individual who has done much to inspire human dignity and change the quality of life." To the amusement of the audience, Dr. Poussaint began by revealing that "PrimeTime Live" news commentator Renee Poussaint "is not his estranged wife but his niece." Speaking of the recently played SuperBowl, Dr. Poussaint said, "One of the moving aspects of that day was not the game nor superstar Michael Jackson, but the ethnic appeal from the children to 'Heal the World.' "Racism can destroy us as individuals and ultimately destroy the world," he continued. "One of the reasons why it has historically been so lethal and devastating is that when played out unharnessed, the bottom line, is genocide. Once you know that racism leads to genocide, and frequently that is one of its missions, then you can spread out and kind of tabulate the other manifestations on a different level of the genocidal doctrine. Racism plays itself out institutionally in the way we deal with people." Dr. Poussaint reminded the audience of how racism was played out in America through segregation. For example, blacks that visited health care facilities were not given the same quality of care as whites. Some black patients were allowed to die, children were neglected, and women often had their babies in trucks on the side of the road. The institutions reflected the different value base placed on an individual's life. Even today, Dr. Poussaint said, "You can easily form a hierarchy of whose lives in America, according to race, are worth more than another. "The primary focus of the civil rights struggle," he continued, "has been to make a black life count as much as a white life -- still a difficult point to move toward in this country. When a relative value is placed on a life, it sends a message to persons doing the oppressing, as well as to the persons being victimized. In turn, the victim learns to devalue their own life. This can often work itself out in a lot of destructive kinds of ways." These devaluations have been inflicted upon others through cultural expressions. Dr. Poussaint gave the example, "The only good Indian is a dead Indian," to describe what he meant by "genocidal doctrine." "I still get nervous when I hear kids saying "eeny meeny, miney mo ...," he said. "We need to be sensitive to this type of language. Definitions of race can also have an insidious message. "The definition of a black person meant an individual with any known black ancestry. One drop would do it to you -- denoting the potency of black blood. It isn't based on anything biological. There is a psycho-political message there. It is a way of promoting white purity and stigmatizing blackness as something bad, inferior and polluted that should be relegated, be oppressed, suppressed and enslaved." Dr. Poussaint told the audience to be mindful of the psychological effects of racism. To be black in America is "to be suspect," he said. "Being a minority has a whole psychological impact. There becomes a burden of proof on blacks to show that they are OK; a burden of proof to show that they are competent." Dr. Poussaint concluded by acknowledging that "none of us are pure and free of everything. We all have the capability of being racist. "The benefit of being sensitive to multiculturalism is an ability to put yourself in another person's shoes. When an effort is made to understand other cultures, then we can better understand ourselves."

### Link XTs

#### Residential segregation causes disproportionate negative health effects

Bell et al. ‘2

http://www.calendow.org/uploadedFiles/reducing\_health\_disparities.pdf “Reducing Health Disparities Through a Focus on Communities: A PolicyLink Report”, PolicyLink Health Disparities Team Janet Dewart, Bell Judith Bell, Raymond Colmenar, Rebecca Flournoy, Marshall McGehee, Victor Rubin, Mildred Thompson, Jennifer Thompson, Victoria Breckwich Vasquez, November 2002

Race and ethnicity are also major determinants of socioeconomic position.12 After adjusting for SES, racial differences persist in the quality of education, the family wealth associated with a given level of income, the purchasing power of income, the stability of employment, and the health risks associated with occupational status.13 With respect to health status, data suggest that, for most causes of death and disability, African Americans, Latinos, and American Indians suffer poorer health outcomes relative to whites with statistically equivalent levels of socioeconomic position.14 To improve medical treatment and prevention and reduce health disparities, efforts have focused on diversifying the healthcare work force to better reflect the diversity of patients and to improve cultural sensitivity and competence. Racial discrimination, evidenced partly through residential segregation, affects health through numerous pathways, including access to resources and opportunities, environmental conditions, and psychosocial factors. For example, residential segregation by race and income can limit residents’ access to health-promoting resources such as fullservice grocery stores and safe, walkable neighborhoods, since such resources are less frequently found in low-income areas. Consistent with these findings, many researchers and practitioners interviewed for this report asserted that race and ethnicity play a critical role in health disparities, citing a range of societal patterns, including low-quality education systems and subsequent poor student performance, that are shaped in large part by race relations.

## Poverty MOD

#### Gentrification forces those who stay behind in poverty, often transportation not placed to help those people

Pollack, Bluestone, Billingham 10(Stephanie Pollack, Barry Bluestone, Chase Billingham, Dukakis center for urban and regional policy at northeastern university, October 2010, maintaining diversity in america’s transit-rich neighborhoods, <http://www.dukakiscenter.org/storage/TRNEquityFull.pdf>)

Displacement is not, however, the only problem associated with gentrification. Another negative consequence of gentrification involves not those neighborhood residents who leave but those who remain behind. We found larger increases in both rents and home values in the newly transit-served neighborhoods than in the corresponding metropolitan areas in roughly three-quarters of the TRNs studied. For existing homeowners in these TRNs, this was a boon. For existing renters, however, this likely caused many to pay a higher proportion of their income for shelter and could eventually force them to seek housing elsewhere. Our findings therefore raise the concern that new transit is associated with higher housing cost burdens for renters who remain in the neighborhood. Another troubling finding from the first round of analysis was that the placement of a new transit station did not consistently increase the number of neighborhood residents reporting that they used public transit for their commute. Indeed, in over half of the TRNs we studied, public transit use for commuting by neighborhood residents actually declined relative to the change in transit use in the metro area after the new station opened. This was perhaps not surprising since automobile ownership increased more than in the corresponding metro area in nearly three-quarters of these newly transit-served neighborhoods, with ownership of two or more autos increasing in nearly three in five. Another adverse consequence of the gentrification observed in newly transit-served neighborhoods is that the higher income households living

#### Poverty outweighs nuclear war and it’s the root cause of your impacts

Gilligan 96 (James Gilligan, M.D., Former Director of the Center for the Study of Violence and the Institute of Law and Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and Its Causes, 1996, pgs. 195-196)

The 14 to 18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those caused by genocide- or about eight million per year, 1939-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000 deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (232 million), it was clear that even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year. In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. Structural violence is also the main cause of behavioral violence on socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from homicide and suicide to war and genocide). The question as to which of the two forms of violence- structural or behavioral- is more important, dangerous or lethal is moot, for they are inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect.

### XT

Gentrification makes poverty invisible by destroying the authentic identity of urban communities

Newcombe ‘10

<http://www.governing.com/columns/urban-notebook/The-Gentrification-Effect.html>, The Gentrification Effect: Does the return of a neighborhood mean its culture and the poor have to leave? BY: Tod Newcombe, GOVERNING's editor. He has more than 20 years experience covering state and local government, June 2010

But sometimes the city neighborhoods aren't so much returning to life as changing a way of life. Working-class neighborhoods in top-tier cities are feeling the pressures of gentrification as the demand for loft apartments, well built row houses and heavily trafficked commercial areas outstrips the supply, pushing up rents, forcing the poor out and letting the middle class in. To some people, these changes are robbing cities of their authenticity, no matter how gritty or unsafe the neighborhoods may have been. Single-room occupancy (SRO) hotels, bodegas and 99-cent stores are authentic. Starbucks, designer loft condos and wine shops are not. San Francisco's Tenderloin district has stayed authentic thanks to the support of nonprofits that have bought up the numerous SROs in the neighborhood, providing the poor with cheap housing that no one else wants. But rampant crime and vice have become a growing problem (see Street Fight, Governing, May 2010), forcing the city to finally try to rein in the Tenderloin's less romantic lifestyle. Yet the efforts to crack down on crime have raised heated debates on whether the Tenderloin can be cleaned up without changing it. The latest battle over urban authenticity has erupted in New York City, where the poor, middle class and rich have rubbed shoulders for centuries, thanks to the Big Apple's dense urban grid. Sharon Zukin, a sociology professor and author of Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places, points out that key New York neighborhoods are in danger of losing their authenticity to gentrification, none more so than Harlem. Today the ghetto around 125th Street is being transformed as urban professionals move into renovated brownstones and apartment buildings. Zukin and other anti-gentrifiers call for more government involvement to control rents and set zoning laws that limit the development of high-rise towers in small-scale neighborhoods. They want to slow down what they see as the rapid and wholesale transformation of gritty neighborhoods into glitzy oases that cater only to the urban affluent. At first glance, her argument seems elitist in some ways, a type of nostalgia that relies on government regulation that may not produce the desired results. But the poor and working class are part of the urban fabric too. They work at unsung jobs, and they rely on a city's supply of affordable apartments, transit and inexpensive retail stores to meet their modest needs. Unlike other income groups, the poor have far fewer options when it comes to living outside the city. Perhaps it's time to change the argument about urban authenticity. It shouldn't be about gentrification or nostalgia, but about giving all sectors of society the authentic opportunity to live the city life.

#### Gentrification affects the most impoverished people in urban communities, usually minorities

Kennedy and Leonard ‘1

<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2001/4/metropolitanpolicy/gentrification.pdf>, Muareen Kennedy and Paul Leonard, Maureen Kennedy is a California-based policy consultant focused on housing and economic development issues, and high-leverage social change strategies. She served in the Clinton Administration, first in the White House, then as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy at the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and finally as Administrator of the Rural Housing Service. Paul Leonard is a policy consultant specializing in issues of housing, community development and welfare reform, based in Berkeley, CA. He served as acting Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Research and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Development at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Comments on this paper can be sent directly to the authors at MaureenKennedy@aol.com and [paleonard@home.com](mailto:paleonard@home.com), “DEALING WITH NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: A PRIMER ON GENTRIFICATION AND POLICY CHOICES A Discussion Paper Prepared for The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy www.brookings.edu/urban and PolicyLink [www.policylink.org](http://www.policylink.org), April 2001

Renters are clearly most vulnerable to displacement, especially when renters lack legal immigration status or do not speak English, as is often the case in San Francisco’s Mission District. Lower income renters are ill equipped to afford price increases from owners who want to upgrade, charge market-based rents, or convert their buildings to condominiums. In a dwindling number of cities (including Washington and San Francisco), rent controls shield renters from dramatic rent increases, but frequently do not effectively target benefits to low income households who need affordability protection most. Gentrification pressures often provide existing property owners with better choices. While gentrification can increase property values, and thus property tax burdens, many cities have protections in place to assist owners who cannot afford such increases, including deferment of property tax increases (sometimes limited to elderly residents). Moreover, existing owners usually enjoy appreciation in their property values as gentrification occurs. This allows owners to choose whether to sell their homes or commercial buildings with substantial profit, to stay and borrow against their new equity to improve their property or for other purposes, or to maintain the status quo. The benefits of appreciation are likely to flow to some of the most vulnerable portions of the low-income population. National data suggest that nearly 30 percent of low-income homeowners have a single elderly head of household, over 50 percent of all low-income homeowners are female heads of household, and 25 percent include a minority household head. Whether property owners stay or sell can be a divisive issue in many gentrifying communities. In both the West Oakland and Kirkwood, Atlanta neighborhoods, low-level conflict has erupted among original homeowners, some of whom want to stay in place, and others who want to take their newfound equity and leave. A former Pittsburgh community development corporation director argues that individual residents should make decisions that are right for them, and none should be deterred from cashing out. He compared this choice for minority residents today to the same choice that white homeowners faced after riots in the late 1960s. “No one told white city residents they should stay in place during the period of white flight; why should anyone argue that black homeowners should stay in place when they see their best prospects elsewhere?”33 The San Francisco case study outlines the process of business displacement in the Mission District, where business operators saw large increases in rents and in building sales between 1997 and 1999. Displacement in the South of Market area is blamed for a loss of nearly 400 manufacturing jobs. Some community development corporation staffers in the case study cities concede that some original businesses may be marginally operated or may be losing global competition battles, or their owners may be close to retirement—that is, jobs may be lost due to factors other than gentrification-induced displacement. While gentrification may push out some businesses whose markets have changed or whose lease has run out, a business able to shift with changing markets can do better when residents in the area have more disposable income. Our case studies reinforced the basic point: Involuntary displacement is most likely to affect the poorest, most ill-equipped residents of a community. Because in many communities these residents include significant numbers of minorities, displacement tends to hit minorities disproportionately hard. With vacancy rates at record low levels in some cities, it is likely that most of those displaced were forced to move out to other surrounding communities with somewhat more affordable housing opportunities. For these households, both the economic and social costs of displacement can be extremely high. Finally, when a household leaves a neighborhood through displacement, it misses out on the opportunity to share in the social and economic improvements the neighborhood might enjoy in future generations. Moreover, those future generations in the neighborhood miss out on the history and grounding those residents might have provided.

## Partioning reality MOD

#### The global war for talent partitions reality into skilled and unskilled categories of workers- depoliticizes structural violence and renders huge sections of the population invisible

Gunder & Hillier ‘9

(Michael, Senior planning lecturer in the School of [Architecture](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Architecture) and [Planning](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planning) at the [University of Auckland](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Auckland), Jean, Professor of Town and Country Planning at School of Architecture, Newcastle University, Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning, pgs. 109-111)

Slavoj Zizek claims that, 'a nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be materialised in a set of social practices and submitted through national myths that structure these practices' (Zizek 1993,202). Whilst winning cycling or swimming Olympic medals might bring a nation state and its enjoyment into existence, Zizek argues that the barely challenged international narrative of global capitalisation and the fantasies it now induces also structure the enjoyment of nation states and their many city-regions (Stavrakakis 2003, 63; Zizek 2004b, 61). These are attainments of enjoyment without goal or direction, apart from simply pride and attainment of material pleasure as measured by national GDP.7 As Zizek (1997c, 45) observes, the 'true horror does not reside in the particular content hidden beneath the universality of global Capital, but rather the fact that Capital is effectively an anonymous global machine blindly running its course'. As we noted in the previous chapter, the invisible hand of the market fails in provision of a 'public good' if, at a global scale the effects of capital are sufficient to damage the world, if not ultimately to destroy it. Even the ruling British Labour govemment," in contrast to its more socialist origins, has placed 'economic globalisation' as 'the most significant factor in shaping Labour Party thinking since the early 19905' (Allmendinger 2003, 326). In New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the UK and, no doubt, the US, key national, as well as local, economic development policies and supporting spatial planning policies seek to ensure that 'our' diverse city-regions are globally competitive (Gunder 2006). As McGowan (2004, 193) observes: we trust fully in the staying power of global capitalism ... The universe of global capitalism is, or so we think, here to stay, and we best not do anything to risk our status within it. Hence, we pledge our allegiance to it, and we put our trust in it. This is the fundamental mode of contemporary obedience to authority ... Global capitalism seems an unsurpassable horizon ... because we don't want to lose it - and the imaginary satisfaction that it provides. Unfortunately, illusion hides behind this global fantasy of capital where 'the basic feature of' this dominant cultural imperative 'no longer operates on the level of ideals and identifications, but directly on the level of *regulating jouissance'* (Zizek 2004b, 113). This is a global capitalism, indeed, where surplus-value is synonymous with surplus-enjoyment, supporting the injunction: 'you must enjoy!' In this light, the role of public policies, including those of economic development and spatial planning, is to facilitate jouissance by providing the 'correct' space - healthy, vibrant, competitive, fit and attractive - where enjoyment, especially for talented, foot-loose, knowledge workers, can be effectively materialised and maximised under the imperative of global capitalism. The 'need' to attract and retain play-full bohemian and talented knowledge workers is central to this imperative of enjoyment. It is mandatory to plan spatially for this key crucial community of creative talent, regardless of other cost, if one wants one's city-region to become and to remain globally competitive! Consequently, local public governance and the policies of economic development and spatial planning which facilitate this necessary environment of vibrancy and 'fun' are 'nothing more than an ideology that claims to be either "art" or "technology" or "science," depending on the context' (Lefebvre 2003, 159). This ideology gives the illusion of rational scientific practice in the public interest. It does so by drawing on the 'truths' of the academic masters of success \_ the gurus who know - the Porter(s) and Florida(s) and their related ilk." However, this is an ideology that obscures, by selectively deploying only selected 'facts' and also by leaving things unsaid. Above all, it gives the appearance of promoting societal efficiency predicated on the concept of satisfaction and enjoyment. However, such 'efficiency' is effectively a satisfaction of vested interests, the wealthy and the talented - those who can inwardly invest financial or human capital (i.e., themselves) - whose needs must be understandably catered for and accommodated, through spatial planning policies such as 'new urbanism' and 'Smart Growth' regardless of the cost to everyone else and to the environment. Those talented in other ways - at performing more manual 'blue-collar' tasks in primary, secondary, or personal service sectors - are thus regarded as the 'less talented', more 'knowledge-challenged' even though they are likely to constitute the majority of any workforce in a city-region. Their needs, compared to those of 'talented' knowledge workers, are rendered less important. This disenfranchised majority, moreover, are also the workers who are likely to be less mobile and less able to move geographically for jobs than the foot-loose talented knowledge workers who the economic development-led planning policies sought to attract in the first place (Bunce 2004; Gunder 2006; Gunder and Searle 2007; McGuirk 2004,2007 Raco 2005b). In the economic development axis of spatial planning, social reality is indeed divided! Just as Beauregard (1993) suggested over fifteen years ago, economic development-derived policy continues to partition reality. The only interests continually served by economic development are those capable of the provision of inward capital investment: originally financial capital, but now also human capital. In response to the dominant 'logic' of global competitiveness, academic technocratic experts and their bureaucratic disciples, including economic development and spatial planning practitioners (perhaps with some public-private governance 'input' or 'leadership') shape, contextualise and implement public policy mainly in the interests of this dominant hegemonic bloc. This occurs in places like Austin, Texas; Sydney, Australia; Toronto, Canada; South East England: in fact, almost anywhere. Further, this is constructed under the logics and knowledges of Lacan's Discourse of the University Bureaucracy, with an objective to remove existing or potential economic and spatial blight, 'dis-ease' and disfunction detracting from local enjoyment - at least for the talented - and from global competitiveness (Gunder 200Sc; McCann 2007; McGuirk 2004; Raco 200Sb) - for who can argue against such crucial need!

#### Partioning of reality through skill distinctions ensures extinction- invisibility of populations creates general conditions of violence and ecological destruction, only challenging this background condition of warfare can solve flashpoint violence

Szentes ‘8

Tamás Szentes, a Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 <http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf>

It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

## Economic Collapse Impact

#### The aff enframes urban environments – mediation of cities through neoliberal logic re-codes all social space in terms of economic value, understood as proximity to bus stops or rail stations – the impact is massive social inequality through marginalization of alternative communities

Cook ‘10

(Mitchell, freelance research consultant specializing in issues of urban planning, local governance and international development, he has consulted for the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, visiting scholar studying urban development strategy and local governance at the National Research Center for the Economy of the Upper Reaches of the Yangtze in Chongqing, China “Toward a Sustainable Urbanism: Globalization, Urban Planning and the New Urban Reality”. *GPIA Student Working Paper Series 2010-2*. New York: Graduate Program in International Affairs, The New School, www.gpia.info/files/u900/\_Mitchell\_Cook\_GPIA\_Student\_WPS\_Updated\_5-19.pdf)

It is crucial to note that all activity within and through the city has a spatial correlation. Zukin (1992) distinguishes space through two categories: the vernacular, the local neighborhood spaces of everyday life; and landscape, the spaces of power created and managed by commercial and state institutions. This juxtaposition within urban form can be observed in cities throughout much of the world. From global and gateway cities to provincial cities in interior regions, commercial and financial centers that are spatially contiguous but functionally disjointed from the spaces of everyday living are now common. This all reflects a particular pattern of debt- financed urbanization that has come to dominate urban development since the 1970s (Harvey 2005). The system reached its apex with the explosion of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and over the counter (OTC) derivative contracts that allowed the very largest global financial institutions to extract the monetary value of urban real estate and repackage it into complex financial instruments that corporations, institutional investors and hedge funds could use to hedge risk or seek speculative profits. Constructed on the false premise of perfect markets and a logic of perpetual growth, global financial capitalism found within the contemporary city a spatial and regulatory configuration that has perpetuated its most destructive forces. Harvey (2008) explores the relationship between the urbanization process and global capitalism and shows how urban restructuring processes have been critical stabilizers to regional crashes and crises since the 1970s. While financial expansion and contraction were general corollaries to the urbanization process from the 1970s to the present, there were other more acute forces intervening in the city during this period. Reagan and Thatcher’s neoliberal revolution was exported around the globe: strategic domestic price controls were abandoned, currencies were devalued to promote exports, and public expenditures were drastically cut across the board as structural adjustment became the governing doctrine of both national and urban economies. This led not only to volatile swings in municipal finances but also distortions in the inter-urban distribution of public expenditures through increased competition for scarce public resources. In Buenos Aires in 1991, for example, it was found that 11.5% of the population received 68% of public investment in infrastructure and 26.1% in education (Cohen and Debowicz 2001). Returning to Luke (2003), a necessary but not mutually exclusive distinction must be made between the planning processes within the few Global Cities a la Saskia Sassen (1992) and the numerous globalizing cities throughout the world. The employment of scale theory (Brenner 2001) is useful in moving past the hierarchical conceptualizations of global integration, in which power and change flow along a straight line of cause and effect, to dynamic spatial models of global economic interaction. The historical need for global financial centers with centralized control functions over the global economy has always existed (Arrighi 1994) and the interaction between the global economy and these cities is well-documented in the urban literature (Friedmann and Wolff 1982; Friedmann 1986; Fainstein 2001). However, a cursory appraisal of cities throughout the developing world, with minimal fiscal resources to meet rapidly increasing demand for essential services, much less public education and transportation, would show that most do not fit the Global City typology. Yet it is in these very cities that the dominant logic of global capitalism frequently informs a very peculiar planning dogma, illustrated by the rampant zoning of commercial and business districts to attract highly mobile capital flows, that shows little or no concern for the long-term socio-economic consequences of urban restructuring. Logically, urban scholars and policy makers assert that context matters. However, typologies derived from hierarchy often obscure as much as they explain. As the current global economic crisis persists, we are beginning to observe new ways in which the impacts of economic globalization get woven between and spread diffusely among cities that are not financial centers. In short, how global integration is shaping the new urban reality. It is now apparent that the linkages global urbanization has created and through which the processes of globalization have flowed over the past forty years have become channels through which risk could be distributed beyond traditional geographic boundaries.4 The scale and intensity of penetration by contemporary globalization into all cities, particularly aspects of financial globalization though not exclusively, have created a distinct landscape of inequality within the city.5 Capitalism’s tendency to produce periodic crises has been manifested regularly throughout its history as an economic system yet we are just beginning to see the cumulative effect of these crises’ impacts on the city and the residents that inhabit them. Indeed, as the frequency of crises over the past forty years has increased, high income countries and developing countries with open economies alike are increasingly exposed to this phenomenon. Empirical evidence shows that economic crises tend to increase inequality as wealthy individuals own multiple classes of assets to mobilize during recessionary periods while the poor have little to none (CEPAL 1997). Miller (2005) found that during crises in both Mexico and Indonesia in the 1990s, urban wage workers suffered disproportionately negative impacts on income, pushing many of them into the informal sector where they lost job security and faced increased competition, driving down wages and welfare.

#### The process of gentrification destroys community

Nyden et al. ‘6

<http://www.luc.edu/curl/pdfs/HRC_Report.pdf>, “THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF GENTRIFICATION ON COMMUNITIES IN CHICAGO” by Philip Nyden, Emily Edlynn, and Julie Davis Center for Urban Research and Learning Loyola University Chicago, January 2006

Part of the tension between existing residents and gentrifiers is related to control over community identity or fears by existing residents of “loss of community.” The issue of identity is a thread throughout our interviews. In addition, stereotypes about the new development and new people moving into the neighborhood punctuate these concerns. It is not uncommon to hear criticisms about the appearance of the new construction, even though some might see it as an improvement in residential quality. In some cases, the physical appearance of new development is seen as being insensitive to the visual character of the existing community. New houses are described as “cookie-cutter” houses that threaten the distinctiveness of the community. One West Town/Humboldt Park community leader asserts that “There’s a sense of history, a sense of connection that [developers] are basically killing off.” He sees an irony in this destruction of his community, observing that developers and real estate agents work to create “new trends” and “create a sense of community and sell that. Why? …In these areas that they’ve gentrified there is no sense of community. You get a bunch of people that don’t know each other.”

# Alternative

**Habermas Alt-By creating community discourse, the alt utilizes communicative rationality which is the only way we can solve the problems inherent in transportation planning**

**Wilson 01** Richard Wilson, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, California State Polytechnic University, “Assessing communicative rationality as a transportation planning paradigm,” 2001, http://www.uvm.edu/~transctr/pdf/willson\_article.pdf

Jürgen Habermas is the major figure in the development of communicative rationality. **Habermas proposed communicative rationality as a form of rationality that transcends scientific rationality while avoiding pure subjectivity.** His work seeks to describe a form of reason that encompasses both means (instrumental rationality) and ends (teleological rationality). He responds to the decline of logical positivism by attempting to create **standards of truth and goodness** that do not rely on ontological or transcendental bases, but **are grounded in a science of everyday communication**. He integrates an interpretive (hermeneutic) approach with a causal, empirical/analytical approach rather than arguing for one to the exclusion of the other. His theories attempt to bridge and integrate science and ethics in an open, process-oriented model that supports a democratic social order. Just as economic theory offers a criterion such as marginal cost pricing, or design theories might offer universal prescriptions about spatial arrangements, Habermas offers normative criteria for rational discourse (see Outhwaite (1998) for an overview of Habermas’s work). **His notion of “ideal speech” would create a collective self-consciousness about the claims to validity offered in public discourse. For him, democracy prospers and is rational as we seek to approach ideal speech.** Habermas (1979, 1984) uses four criteria to understand the rationality of communication and ideal speech. They are 1) the comprehensibility of statements, 2) the accuracy of statements (their relationship to the objective world), 3) the legitimacy of the speaker (in relationship to the social world) and 4) the sincerity of the speaker (in relationship to the speaker’s subjective world). These elements exist in the background of all policy discourse; considering them explicitly means making more transparent the process by which communicative action occurs. **The implication of this model is that planners should work to reduce distortions of communication and support conditions for discourse** that recognize the four elements mentioned above (Forester 1989). Distortions can range from inevitable distortions related to patterns of speech (affecting comprehensibility), to deliberate distortions designed to conceal or make false claims. Obviously, such distortions can be sustained by power imbalances among those engaged in discussion. **Better conditions for discourse emerge from carefully designed planning and participatory processes that critically examine legitimacy, encourage sincerity, and enhance accuracy and comprehensibility.** From this base, Habermas considers how society might achieve the form of rationality he espouses. His concept of communicative action provides many ideas for planning. **Communicative action is a circumstance in which the social actors participate in dialogue/action with active and critical consideration of the bases for validity of the claims that they and others make.** Through this process, participants can arrive at more fully reasoned conclusions than they can if they follow a narrower model of ends-means rationality. Habermas’s concerns are directly relevant to planning. Forester (1989, 1993, 1999) shows how **planners can shape communicative practices to support communicative action and counteract distortions to communication.** An example of a distortion would be a transportation planner making what is essentially a moral claim on the basis of technical expertise. Further elaborating, Healey (1993) argues that **communicative rationality is an interactive and interpretive process that involves various “discourse communities.” It is “. . . a process of mutual learning through mutually trying to understand** . . .” (Healey 1993, p. 243). **Communicative planning creates not only programs of action but arenas in which programs are formulated**, including multiple dimensions of knowing, expressing and judging. They constitute a communicative process that includes a critical perspective on how communicative action (a line of thinking or plan) occurs. Finally, Innes (1998) focuses on information in communicative processes. She argues that **information “. . . becomes gradually embedded in the understandings of actors in the community, through processes in which participants, including planners, collectively create meanings. The participants, moreover, rely on many types of ’information’, and not primarily on formal analytic reports or quantitative measures**.” (p. 53). **In short, communicative rationality offers a framework that can help address some of the key dilemmas of transportation planning, such as the relationships of facts and values.** The greatest misconception about communicative rationality is that it is simply “more participation.” **Communicative rationality places language as the core planning activity, and therefore is inclusive of community participation**, modeling, policy exploration and politics. Communicative rationality is the working out of claims, the interpretation of knowledge and values, and the sharing of facts and stories, while maintaining a critical self awareness of the ground rules for communication.

#### Criticism of neoliberalism is key to challenge the policies that make gentrification possible

Slater ‘6 <https://www.indymedia.nl/media/2007/09/47003.pdf>, “The Eviction of Critical Perspectives from Gentrification Research” by Tom Slater, Centre for Urban Studies, University of Bristol, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 30.4, December 2006

And finally, the task for academics interested in resisting gentrification and reinstating a largely critical perspective is best described as follows: Critical thought must, with zeal and rigor, take apart the false commonplaces, reveal the subterfuges, unmask the lies, and point out the logical and practical contradictions of the discourse of King Market and triumphant capitalism, which is spreading everywhere by the force of its own self-evidence, in the wake of the brutal collapse of the bipolar structure of the world since 1989 and the suffocation of the socialist project (and its adulteration by supposedly leftwing governments de facto converted to neoliberal ideology). Critical thought must tirelessly pose the question of the social costs and benefits of the policies of economic deregulation and social dismantling which are now presented as the assured road to eternal prosperity and supreme happiness under the aegis of ‘individual responsibility’ — which is another name for collective irresponsibility and mercantile egoism . . . [T]he primary historical mission of critical thought . . . [is] to perpetually question the obviousness and the very frames of civic debate so as to give ourselves a chance to think the world, rather than being thought by it, to take apart and understand its mechanisms, and thus to reappropriate it intellectually and materially (Wacquant, 2004: 101).

#### Normative descriptions of city planning is key to avoid catastrophic collapse of globalization and generate social equality

Cook ‘10

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A fundamental distinction must be made between globalization and the city. Jepson discusses the scientific basis for sustainability through the literature on system dynamics and shows “the built-in tendency for systems to become ever larger and more complex (i.e., too many connections, too many agents) until lag times and systemic interdependencies leave them virtually unmanageable and prone to catastrophic collapse” (2001, 501). This systemic tendency for cause and effect to become blurred was recently experienced with the global economic crisis, beginning with the collapse of the housing market in the United States and spreading throughout the global financial sector and real economy as a result of overleveraging of sovereign and institutional balance sheets. The city, as the spatial correlation to globalization, has the potential to manage these lag times and interdependencies and build an urban system that contains globalization instead of facilitating its most pernicious impacts. While popular notions of sustainability have tended to center on the environment, I would argue that sustainability as it relates to the city cannot be fully addressed without extending the discussion to the distribution of equity within the city, which can only come from a more normative planning theory rooted in social justice, based on increased equity in the city through the production of public wealth. Sanyal argues that as a result of their professional responsibilities, urban planners tend to locate themselves somewhat in the middle of the ideological spectrum which, at one end, is occupied by pro-globalization cheerleaders and at the other by anti-globalization skeptics. He states that these two groups “rely on neatly interconnected sets of theoretical propositions which have very little room for ambiguity, surprises and moral hesitation” (2002, 118). For Sanyal, this ideological middle ground that planners occupy should be recognized as a strength, forged in the spirit of compromise and the only “fair and rational way of reaching an agreement between different points of view” (Ibid., 118). However, there are a set of unintended consequences that have arisen from the trend toward an ideological middle ground and a lack of normative planning theory that are evident in the most common form of interaction between planners and the city – incrementalism. In answering the question of whether or not planners should intervene in the city to improve performance in transportation, environment and employment sectors for the poor, Bertaud writes, “a planner disposes of three tools to influence city shape: land use regulations, infrastructure investments and taxation. However, to be able to use these tools coherently, clearly established objectives must have been formulated by elected officials” (2004, 2). Because the use of “objectives” is never value-neutral, by extension, urban planning practice and theory can never be value-neutral. What then are to be the central values that guide planning theory and practice as it negotiates the conflict within and between cities and regions that has been created by globalization? The simple delineation of the planner’s toolkit – land use regulations, infrastructure investments and taxation – says nothing of how the planner is to utilize these tools to produce sustainable cities. The deficiency in urban planning theory and practice is that the debate has remained for too long in the descriptive realm, within the contours of negotiation and moderation, and has shied away from normative prescriptions of what the city is to look like and how it should operate. While there may be no optimum spatial form, there must be an optimum distribution of opportunity throughout the city. This critical importance of equity must be considered if sustainability is to be operationalized as a solution to the negative urban impacts of globalization. “Opportunity” in the context of the city is defined as “the right to change ourselves by changing the city” (Harvey 2008, 23). Harvey’s invocation of a right to the city is based upon collective power reshaping the whole horizon of opportunities in the city. However, it must be noted that collective action, in relationship to rapidly evolving urban form and function, has been at times muted by acquiescence to an unsustainable status quo. For example, the collective inaction by urban residents around the planet on issues of environmental sustainability, in the context of carbon dioxide emissions from private vehicle ownership, has been a major contributing factor to climate change and insecurity. Americans, coerced by a seemingly unceasing extension of consumer credit, were more than happy to accelerate the suburban transformation of their cities to dependency on cheap oil, fueling for decades the global production of automobiles which continues to undermine public or zero-emission modes of transportation. Consequently, this same suburbanization of the city seems to be gaining traction in many of the world’s most rapidly urbanizing regions, including in India and China.6 I hold no illusions regarding the allure of private rather than communal forms of consumption and private rather than communal urban shapes and places. Therefore, I argue that urban planners are presented with an opportunity to reassert themselves in the management of space and place to temper the advances of individualism and the logic of global capitalism in the city and become more active in the production of local public wealth. If, according to the 2009 World Development Report, “place is the most important correlate of a person’s welfare” (World Bank 2009, 1) and urban planners are fundamentally concerned with the allocation and optimization of space, then a substantial opportunity exists to contribute to the remaking of sustainable cities.

#### Community-based organizations provide a voice for residents. This voice is critical to empowerment and positive development

Maurrasse and Bliss 06 David J. Maurrasse, President, CEO, and Founder of Marga Incorporated, a global consulting firm, Associate Research Scholar at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, founder of the Center for Innovation in Social Responsibility, and Jaclyn B Bliss, ”Comprehensive Approaches to Urban Development: Gentrification, Community, and Business in Harlem, New York,” Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy, Volume 1, Issue 1 Summer, Article 6, Summer 2006, <http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=njlsp&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fhl%3Den%26q%3Dcommunity%2Bgentrification%2Bsolution%26btnG%3D%26as_sdt%3D1%252C5%26as_sdtp%3D#search=%22community%20gentrification%20solution%22>

Resident involvement in setting policy can place community interests and government decisions in greater accord. Although it is important to solicit resident opinions beforehand, this input only goes so far, and can be easily ignored once policy is set. Not only should residents be extensively involved in advising; they also should have some role in making the actual decisions that affect their neighborhood.25 Although the creation of formal avenues to resident participation in policy making can enhance the likelihood that development will lead to empowerment, no democratic structure will work without informed, involved, and organized residents. In fact, it is probably not likely that effective equitable development will come to fruition without resident involvement. On the one hand, policy makers, businesses, developers, and others should consult residents; on the other, residents should actively seek out information and take advantage of opportunities that will enable them to benefit from their neighborhood’s assets. An organized community is better positioned to advocate on its own behalf.26 Strong community-based organizations are central to continuous effective community participation, and very well can be the portal through which resident concerns can be voiced and acted on.27 Resident concerns are more likely to be understood and heeded when effective partnerships between community residents and various major institutions, such as corporations, universities, banks, and others, are in place.

#### The affirmative ignores community involvement, which is the only way to create universally positive consequences from policy actions

Maurrasse and Bliss 06 David J. Maurrasse, President, CEO, and Founder of Marga Incorporated, a global consulting firm, Associate Research Scholar at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, founder of the Center for Innovation in Social Responsibility, and Jaclyn B Bliss, ”Comprehensive Approaches to Urban Development: Gentrification, Community, and Business in Harlem, New York,” Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy, Volume 1, Issue 1 Summer, Article 6, Summer 2006, <http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=njlsp&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fhl%3Den%26q%3Dcommunity%2Bgentrification%2Bsolution%26btnG%3D%26as_sdt%3D1%252C5%26as_sdtp%3D#search=%22community%20gentrification%20solution%22>

In many ways, community building is a means of creating new vehicles through which residents can impact policy. Too often, the perspectives of those impacted by policy are not addressed when decisions are made. The philosophy behind this thinking has logic—if the recipients of policy do not have a say, they will not own the results. The philosophy behind comprehensive approaches also makes sense in that the issues confronting communities are deeply intertwined, to the point where it is difficult to separate job access from the state of schooling from the relative affordability of housing. Although, with limited resources, it is practical to focus on one issue, the broader context must be kept in mind at all times.35 Keeping the big picture in constant view makes it easier to anticipate the ripple effects of particular development decisions. For example, if an employment development strategy is pursued, how does it impact small businesses, real estate, the environment, and other issues? Ripple effects occur with any decision, but how can potentially negative ripple effects be transformed to create positive ones? How can development lead to widespread empowerment? In thinking about development, we recommend what we call ripple effects management. What we mean by this is a development strategy that is thoughtful enough on the front end to anticipate how particular decisions can affect other areas, especially concerning low-income communities, and increase the chances of this development yielding positive ripple effects. The intent is to turn potentially negative consequences for low-income communities into positive ones. A ripple effects management strategy cannot be successfully conducted without including the participation of those who will be affected.36 Importance of Resident Input No matter how many ideas around comprehensive development might be discussed, policy makers, corporations, and developers may not have the best interest of communities, particularly low-income ones, automatically in mind. Yet with a deeper understanding of residents’ point of view, it is more likely that various influential figures will become better positioned to collaboratively craft mutually beneficial strategies, and institutions will have a greater understanding of their point of view. The other continuous challenge to the pursuit of such broad, contextual development approaches is decision making. Involving community residents is not new, but opening up genuine avenues to shared governance between communities, institutions, and government is a more elusive proposition.3The limited formal avenues through which inner-city residents and community organizations can influence those who ultimately make the decisions decreases the likelihood that urban development will take a holistic direction, because the resident voices and experiences recognize, understand, and reflect the need for comprehensive approaches. Anyone would be hard-pressed to find a completely unified community voice. In most communities, some own homes while others rent, for example. Self-interest and experience foster differing opinions. And in some cases, people simply don’t agree. However, in general, the voices of disadvantaged communities often do not become incorporated into high-level discussions about the market impacts on poor neighborhoods. This missing piece is part of the reason why urban development initiatives have not succeeded in substantially improving the lives of low income communities.

## No Solvency:

#### **Policy approaches fail – they ignore the role of those displaced by their policies**

Slater ‘6

<https://www.indymedia.nl/media/2007/09/47003.pdf>, “The Eviction of Critical Perspectives from Gentrification Research” by Tom Slater, Centre for Urban Studies, University of Bristol, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 30.4, December 2006

My purpose here is not to criticize research (or researchers) that seeks to understand the urban experiences of more advantaged social groups, and certainly not to demonize gentrifiers, whose identities are multiple and whose ambivalent politics often contradict assumptions of a group intent on booting out extant low-income groups from their neighbourhoods (Ley, 2004), but rather to point out that there is next to nothing published on the experiences of non-gentrifying groups living in the neighbourhoods into which the much-researched cosmopolitan middle classes are arriving en masse. A dozen years ago now Jan van Weesep argued that we need to focus on the effects — not the causes — of gentrification, and that one way to do this is through the lens of urban policy, or in his words, ‘to put the gentrification debate into policy perspective’ (van Weesep, 1994: 74). His call drew numerous responses, and it could be argued that he changed the course of the gentrification debate, as exemplified by the emphasis on the role of policy in so much recent and current research. One wonders what might have been the outcome if van Weesep had said that we need ‘to put the gentrification debate into working-class perspective’. Instead, academic inquiry into gentrification has looked at either the role of urban policy in harnessing the aspirations of middle-class professionals, or provided a closer view of the issues that they are confronting when choosing where to live. It is as if the middle classes are the only characters occupying the stage of the gentrification, with the working-class backstage, both perennial understudies and perennially understudied. This is particularly disappointing, for middle-class gentrifiers are, of course, only one part of a much larger story (Slater et al ., 2004).

# Epistemology/Ontology

#### Be suspect of their arguments—because their method is flawed --Neoliberal policies like the plan deliberately ignore those displaced by gentrification – alternative approaches are necessary for a critical perspective

Slater ‘6

<https://www.indymedia.nl/media/2007/09/47003.pdf>, “The Eviction of Critical Perspectives

from Gentrification Research” by Tom Slater, Centre for Urban Studies, University of Bristol, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 30.4, December 2006

The reason why displacement itself got displaced from the gentrification literature was methodological. In 2001, I remember being told by a community organizer in Park Slope, Brooklyn, that the best way I could help with local efforts to resist gentrification was to ‘come up with some numbers to show us how many people have been and are being displaced’. He was not impressed when I explained what a massive undertaking this is, if indeed it was possible at all. Atkinson (2000) has called measuring displacement ‘measuring the invisible’, whereas Newman and Wyly sum up the quantification problem as follows: In short, it is difficult to find people who have been displaced, particularly if those people are poor . . . By definition, displaced residents have disappeared from the very places where researchers and census-takers go to look for them (Newman and Wyly, 2006: 27). In the 1990s especially, these considerable barriers to a research agenda did not steer researchers in the way of a qualitative agenda to address displacement, but rather steered them away from displacement altogether. In the neoliberal context of public policy being constructed on a ‘reliable’ (i.e. quantitative) evidence base, no numbers on displacement meant no policy to address it. It was almost as if displacement didn’t exist. This is in fact the conclusion of Chris Hamnett (2003: 2454) in his paper on London’s rampant gentrification from 1961 to 2001; in the absence of data on the displaced, he reasserts his thesis that London’s labour force has ‘professionalized’: The transformation which has taken place in the occupational class structure of London has been associated with the gradual replacement of one class by another, rather than large-scale direct displacement. Yet isn’t it precisely a sign of the astonishing scale of gentrification and displacement in London that there isn’t much of a working class left in the occupational class structure of that city? Labour force data support an interesting story Hamnett has been telling for over a decade now, but in the absence of any numbers on displacement it appears that he is blanking out the working class in the same manner as Butler’s interviewees in Barnsbury. The lack of attention to displacement has recently changed — dramatically — with the work of Lance Freeman and Frank Braconi (2002; 2004), who are increasingly seen by the media and, worryingly, policymakers, as putting forward the ‘definitive verdict’ on gentrification and displacement (see Newman and Wyly, 2006: 29) — the verdict being that displacement is negligible and gentrification therefore isn’t so bad after all. Their work has been summarized at length elsewhere (Newman and Wyly, 2005; 2006), but briefly, Freeman and Braconi examined the triennial New York City housing and vacancy survey (which contains questions pertaining to demographic characteristics, employment, housing conditions and mobility), and found that between 1996 and 1999, lower-income and lesser-educated households were 19% less likely to move in the seven gentrifying neighbourhoods studied than those elsewhere, and concluded that displacement was therefore limited. They suggested that such households stay put because they appreciate the public service improvements taking place in these neighbourhoods and thus find ways to remain in their homes even in the face of higher rent burdens. This was the main reason that the USA Today, on 20 April 2005, decided to feature their work with the spurious headline: ‘Gentrification: a boost for everyone’. The media coverage completely ignored the fact that Freeman and Braconi (2002: 4) cautioned that ‘only indirectly, by gradually shrinking the pool of low-rent housing, does the reurbanization of the middle class appear to harm the interests of the poor’, and that Freeman more recently wrote this: The chief drawback [of gentrification] has been the inflation of housing prices on gentrifying neighbourhoods . . . Households that would have formerly been able to find housing in gentrifying neighbourhoods must now search elsewhere . . . Moreover, although displacement may be relatively rare in gentrifying neighbourhoods, it is perhaps such a traumatic experience to nonetheless engender widespread concern (Freeman, 2005: 488). On the point of shrinking the pool of low-rent housing, it is important to return to Peter Marcuse’s identification of ‘exclusionary displacement’ under gentrification, referring to households unable to access property because it has been gentrified: When one household vacates a unit voluntarily and that unit is then gentrified . . . so that another similar household is prevented from moving in, the number of units available to the second household in that housing market is reduced. The second household, therefore, is excluded from living where it would otherwise have lived (Marcuse, 1985b: 206). As Marcuse (2005) has recently pointed out, the Freeman/Braconi work only touches on this crucial question: are people not moving not because they like the gentrification around them, but rather because there are no feasible alternatives available to them in a tight/tightening housing market (i.e. that so much of the city has gentrified that people are trapped)? This is the carefully considered conclusion of an excellent recent paper on the gentrification of Brussels by Mathieu van Criekingen: Evidence highlighted in Brussels strongly suggests that poorly-resourced households are less likely to move away from marginal gentrifying districts because they are ‘trapped’ in the lowest segment of the private rental housing market, with very few alternatives outside deprived neighbourhoods, even in those areas experiencing marginal gentrification (van Criekingen, 2006: 30). On the point of traumatic experiences of displacement, these have been documented recently in New York City by Curran (2004), Slater (2004a) and particularly Newman and Wyly (2006), who as well as conducting interviews with displaced tenants, used the same data set as Freeman and Braconi to demonstrate that displacement is not ‘relatively rare’ but occurs at a significantly higher rate than they implied. This points to the absolute necessity of mixing methods in the study of displacement: The difficulties of directly quantifying the amount of displacement and replacement and other ‘noise’ in the data are hard to overcome. It may be that further research at a finer spatial scale using a more qualitative approach could usefully supplement this work (Atkinson, 2000: 163). In a huge literature on gentrification, there are almost no qualitative accounts of displacement. Doing something about this is vital if critical perspectives are to be reinstated.

#### Gentrification results from an economic thought which emphasizes production based decisions over natural ones

Hackworth and Rekers 05

Hackworth, Jason R., and Josephine Rekers. (Jason, Professor of Geography and Urban Planning at the University of Toronto; Josephine, Phd Student in geography at the University of Toronto) "Ethnic Identity, Place Marketing, and Gentrification in Toronto." *Neighbourhoodchange.ca*. Center for Urban and Community Studies, Apr. 2005. Web. 29 June 2012.

The “economics school,” conversely, focuses on the production side of gentrification. It suggests that the necessary condition for gentrification to occur is the availability of inexpensive real estate. The key explanatory model of this school of thought is the rent gap theory of Smith (1979a and 1996; Badcock, 1989 and 1995; Clark, 1995). Many neighborhoods in the advanced capitalist world experienced massive disinvestment in inner-city real estate markets during the mid-twentieth century. One result of this disinvestment was the decline in potential rent that could be garnered for a given plot of land in the inner city. Potential rent is a complicated concept that is in part a function of distance to the central business district; it is casually explained as the value of land at its “highest and best use.” According to this school of thought, the primary explanation for the gentrification of certain cities lies in the concentration of available properties in areas where the actual rent is far below potential rent. That is, the supply and concentration of undervalued inner-city properties is the necessary (though not sufficient) condition for gentrification to occur. Though led in some cities by individual owner-occupiers in search of inexpensive housing, much of the expansion of gentrification has been facilitated by housing producer primarily developers, but also the state (Smith, 1979b; Hackworth and Smith, 2001). According to this line of thought, gentrification is less an organic shift in preferences than a produced one. The roots of this school lie primarily in Marxian economics (Smith, 1982).

#### Gentrification benefits are not stable, increases auto dependence

Kushto 08 (Emily R. Kushto, PH.D. Candidate, department of civil and environmental engineering, northwestern university, 10/1/08, Travel and Transportation Impacts of Urban Gentrification: Chicago, Illinois Case Study)

The aggregate results show that geography of gentrification changed over the twenty years from 1980 to 2000: the gentrified census tracts between 1990 and 2000 were closer to the center of the city compared to non-gentrified census tracts, while gentrified and nongentrified tracts were about the same distance from the center between 1980 and 1990. The gentrified group used public transit to work more even though they had about the same number of cars as the non-gentrified group. Households showing signs of gentrification that have lived at their current location between 1 and 2 years have lower vehicle miles of travel (VMT) than the non-gentrified households that have been at their current location for the same amount of time, while gentrifying households that have been in their current location more than 2 years consume about the same VMT as the non-gentrified households. This analysis suggests that the gentrification process, and its participants, have changed over the last twenty years. There is at least a modest trend toward less auto dependence for more recent gentrifiers, and so the opportunity to reduce auto dependence may have become a more important force in this process. However, longer tenure at central locations seems to be associated with increasing auto dependence. This may suggest that transportation benefits of gentrification are not stable over time as a consequence of many other factors occurring in and outside of the household.

#### The drive for efficiency in urban area leads to a disregard for social consequences

Lichfield 88

Lichfield, Nathaniel. (Professor of Urban Planning at University College London) *Economics in Urban Conservation*. Cambridge [England: Cambridge UP in Association with Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1988. Print. Pg. 153-154

Both economic planners and town planners share the common starting point in their work: intervention into an ongoing system with a view to improving upon the outcome that would otherwise prevail. Both recognise that, as just indicated (9.1), the market carries out 'non-planned planning' and so produces order in the ongoing system. But both recognise that this order could be improved upon because of its well known features, such as the following: the market is primarily concerned with efficiency and not equity; the efficiency is judged in the main by private and not social costs and benefits; the absence of equity is due in some measure to economic and social inequality; there is the difficulty of accommodating the public sector, alongside public sector activities. For economists this field is generally known as 'market failure'12; to planners it is the imperfections of the land and development market which are even more marked than with other mar-kets.13 In both instances the intervention is carried out ,by government. From this it follows that there are necessarily great variations in the nature of the intervention, be it in the economy in general (compare East and West Europe); or in urban and regional planning (compare the different systems in north-west Europe). But there is a common thread. In simple terms, in all countries there are twin drives for both efficiency and equity, with too much emphasis on efficiency resulting in a sacrifice of equity (Britain in the 1980s or a drive for equity resulting in a loss of efficiency (Eastern Europe).14 The problem therefore is to find the right balance in intervention against 'market failure'. It is in achievement of this right balance around which the discussions revolve, in the theory and practice of intervention in all countries, and there have been many essays on the topic in regard to urban and regional planning in Britain.15

#### Economic logic ignores all social and environmental consequences

Lichfield 88

Lichfield, Nathaniel. (Professor of Urban Planning at University College London) *Economics in Urban Conservation*. Cambridge [England: Cambridge UP in Association with Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1988. Print. Pg. 249-250

We introduced above (Introductory, 13.3 and 14.2) the term 'social' to effect that financial and economic analysis was concerned in each case with epercussions on sectors other than those who were promoting the project mder consideration. But even under this connotation the range of the ectors brought in is only partial. For example in social financial analysis hey exclude off-site costs not borne by the promoters; and while social cost Knefit analysis is capable of handling the sectors which are indirectly iffected,1 it typically does not set out to do so. But there are decision situations in which consideration of the impact on the whole community is essential, as in urban and regional planning, where fie 'public interest' requires that decisions take into account the impact on ill relevant sectors of the relevant community. Thus a full analysis is required which will encompass all the off-site linkages and effects which ivere introduced in Table IV. 1, thus including all relevant externalities and spillovers. Thus a fully social form of analysis is required. This is provided by community impact analysis. But even if social cost benefit analysis were to attempt to cover the whole range of sectors and externalities involved, it typically has the following Limitations. Being founded in economic analysis it tends to have regard primarily to economic impacts and thus ignores others which are relevant, such as social and environmental, which come outside the 'measuring rod of money' and are not in the economic content of national income accounts. Being concerned with the economy, cost benefit analysis concen­trates on the net change in economic output from the project and thereby rightly eliminates 'double counting'. It is not concerned with the distri bution of the costs and benefits between the sectors. That this wider approach is entirely relevant for conservation was seer above in considering who benefits and who pays for conservation (12.3V

#### A shift to policymaking based on equity preceding efficiency is possible

Lichfield 88

Lichfield, Nathaniel. (Professor of Urban Planning at University College London) *Economics in Urban Conservation*. Cambridge [England: Cambridge UP in Association with Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1988. Print.

Having reached conclusions on efficiency and equity it is then necessary to le off between the two in reaching the final conclusion on choice: which ion would give the best mix of efficiency and equity? But since the eria for equity are unsure, the trade off becomes unsure. This is icularly so in CIE, where the efficiency conclusion can only be cative, because of lack of measurement and valuation. What guidelines be offered? 1 the simplest case, the preference for efficiency and equity could be metrical, and so enable a choice to be made which would have good ires for both. In practice, however, this is unlikely. Accordingly there id need to be some trade off as between the two. The simplest approach le trade off would be to adopt provisionally the option proved best on efficiency and then consider the implications on equity. This would then lead to judgments as to whether a less efficient more equitable option it be chosen instead, bearing in mind the opportunity cost in resources equity. But it is possible to work from equity towards efficiency. Here choice would be made on equity, and then consideration be given to the opportunity costs in dropping from the preferred option to one of the others. many instances, with so little certainty in the conclusion on either r efficiency, no recommended choice can be seen. But the CIE ay would enable the decision makers to consider the implications of choice and so reach a judgement on their preferred option.

# ATs

## AT Pinker

#### Pinker’s analysis is useless- entirely ignores role of population growth, which accounts for all of the change he cites

Flynn 12/7

Julian Flynn, Financial Times, “Angel thesis hangs on overpopulation,” December 7, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/30bf527c-1cfb-11e1-a134-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1h1lHx8gS

Sir, Gideon Rachman’s article “[The long shadow of the 1930s](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/79656ee4-19b3-11e1-ba5d-00144feabdc0.html)” (Comment, November 29) refers to Steven Pinker’s new book, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, which makes the case that, statistically, humans have become less violent over the course of history. Mr Pinker deals with percentages of the global population. For example, his book states that the second world war ranks as only the ninth worst atrocity in history. Because he deals with percentages of the global population, his thesis absolutely depends on the exponential overpopulation of our species. The total of 50m-plus second world war dead only seems “smaller” because of the exponential growth of the human population. Mr Pinker’s “let’s be grateful for what’s gone right” message depends entirely on another issue (rampant overpopulation) which is an extremely serious sword of Damocles hanging over our planet.

## AT World Getting Better - Link

#### This is a new link – neoliberalism has cloaked social injustice to undercut action based on shared responsibility

Giroux 3-20

Professor @ McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department

Henry, “Gated Intellectuals and Ignorance in Political Life: Toward a Borderless Pedagogy in the Occupy Movement,” http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/8009-gated-intellectuals-and-ignorance-in-political-life-toward-a-borderless-pedagogy-in-the-occupy-movement

Neoliberalism or market fundamentalism as it is called in some quarters and its army of supporters **cloak their interests** in an appeal to "common sense," while doing everything possible to deny climate change, massive inequalities, a political system hijacked by big money and corporations, the militarization of everyday life and the corruption of civic culture by a consumerist and celebrity-driven advertising machine. The financial elite, the 1 percent and the hedge fund sharks have become the highest-paid **social magicians** in America. They perform social magic by making the structures and power relations of racism, inequality, homelessness, poverty and environmental degradation **disappear**. And in doing so, they employ deception by seizing upon a stripped-down language of choice, freedom, enterprise and self-reliance - all of which works to personalize responsibility, collapse social problems into private troubles and reconfigure the claims for social and economic justice on the part of workers, poor minorities of color, women and young people as a species of individual complaint. But this deceptive strategy does more. It also substitutes shared responsibilities for a culture of diminishment, punishment and cruelty. The social is now a site of combat, infused with a live-for-oneself mentality and a space where a responsibility toward others is now gleefully replaced by an ardent, narrow and inflexible responsibility only for oneself. When the effects of structural injustice become obscured by a discourse of individual failure, human misery and misfortune, they are no longer the objects of compassion, but of scorn and derision. In recent weeks, we have witnessed Rush Limbaugh call Georgetown law student Sandra Fluke a "slut" and "prostitute"; US Marines captured on video urinating on the dead bodies of Afghanistan soldiers; and the public revelation by Greg Smith, a Goldman Sachs trader, that the company was so obsessed with making money that it cheated and verbally insulted its own clients, often referring to them as "muppets."(2) There is also the mass misogyny of right-wing extremists directed against women's reproductive rights, which Maureen Dowd rightly calls an attempt by "Republican men to wrestle American women back into chastity belts."(3) These are not unconnected blemishes on the body of neoliberal capitalism. They are symptomatic of an infected political and economic system that has lost touch with any vestige of decency, justice and ethics.

## AT Inequality Low Now

#### Inequality high

Weinger 12-5

Politico Reporter Mackenzie, “Wealth gap widening in U.S., globally, report says,” http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211/69803.html#ixzz1qTqJ62Q6

The gap between the rich and the poor isn’t just widening in the United States - it has hit its highest level in more than 30 years in the world’s wealthiest countries.

According to an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development report released Monday, income inequality is on the rise in the United States and most other developed countries. The average income of the richest 10 percent across developed countries is about nine times more than that of the poorest 10 percent of the population in those countries, the report found. The U.S. — where the Occupy Wall Street movement exploded to protest the disparity between the richest 1 percent and the remaining 99 percent — ranks in with the fourth-highest inequality level, coming after Chile, Mexico and Turkey. Overall, the report stated, inequality among U.S. workers has risen by 25 percent since 1980. Around the world, income inequality grew in 17 of the 22 OECD countries, the report stated. It rose by more than four percentage points in Finland, Germany, Israel, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Sweden and the U.S., while falling in Greece and Turkey. The gap remained stable in France, Hungary and Belgium. The OECD report recommended that governments combat the issue of income inequality by reviewing their tax systems, creating more jobs and investing in human capital. “The social contract is starting to unravel in many countries,” OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría said, according to a press release. “This study **dispels the assumptions** that the benefits of economic growth will automatically trickle down to the disadvantaged and that greater inequality fosters greater social mobility. Without a comprehensive strategy for inclusive growth, inequality will continue to rise.” And it’s a good time to be part of the U.S.’s one percent: The top earners have more than doubled their share of the national income between 1980 and 2008, moving from 8 percent to 18 percent. And those in the U.S. that make it into the richest one percent typically stay there — only 25 percent drop back into the 99 percent, according to the report. But for anyone in the bottom 10 percent of full-time workers in the U.S., things continue to get worse: The gap between them and the wealthiest jumped by almost one-third, more than in most other developed countries, the OECD found.

#### Neoliberalism hides inequality by throwing all of the Black males in jail

Koehler 12

PhD Candidate in Criminology @ Cambridge

Johann, “Inequality and Criminal Justice II: Neoliberal Penality,” http://www.thephronetics.com/2012/01/inequality-and-criminal-justice-ii.html

Here’s a possible answer. In a fabulous book critiquing the genesis and development of neoliberal thought, the University of Chicago’s Bernard Harcourt has tried to reconcile what seems like an unusual divergence of principle: he asks how America’s professedly neoliberal government, which espouses minimalist intervention in the lives of its citizens (recall Bill Clinton’s famous claim that “the era of big government is over”) manages simultaneously to justify enormous government intervention in the penal sphere. America maintains the largest prison system in the developed world, and it does so without sensing any contradiction. This is due in large part to the Enlightenment belief in “natural order” proposed by a coterie of French thinkers who styled themselves as the “Physiocrats”. This idea was then refined by the Chicago School in the 1960s in order to arrive at the system of governmental dualism that we have today: one standard of governing is appropriate for economic matters, and a different standard applies when dealing with penal matters. Forgive the lengthy quotation, but the summary is apt: It’s the messianic belief in natural order in economics—in spontaneous order, as Friedrich von Hayek called it—or today in the efficiency of free markets, conjoined with a faith in strong government to deal with those who are outside the natural order—who are out-of-order, or disorderly. It’s the combination of those two paradoxical tenets—of government incompetence when it comes to regulating the economy and government competence when it comes to policing and punishing—that links these thinkers… For both the Physiocrats and the Chicago School, there is an orderly inside but also an outside—and for those outside, there is the iron fist of the state. The Physiocrats called for “legal despotism.” “The only object of man-made, positive law is to punish severely men whose passions are out-of-order,” Quesnay wrote in 1767. These two paradoxical tenets were joined together for the Physiocrats, and you can hear it well, again, in Quesnay: “All that is required for the prosperity of a nation is to allow men to freely cultivate the earth to the greatest possible success, and to preserve society from thieves and rogues [“des voleurs et des méchants”]. The first task is governed by self-interest; the second is ensured by civil government.” Looking back at Quesnay’s writings offers us a kind of recul—a French term for stepping back to see better—on how the idea of natural order would evolve into the invisible hand and laissez-faire, later into spontaneous order, and ultimately into a theory of free markets. By the same token, it lets us see better how the idea of legal despotism evolved into a theory of the state as “night watchman,” into Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon prison, and finally into Richard Posner’s argument that the “major function of criminal law in a capitalist society” is to prevent “market-bypassing.” This neoliberal ‘double standard of government’ advocating state intervention in the penal sphere while eschewing intervention in market activity is central in my mind to understanding not just Harcourt’s thesis about where governmental intrusion is appropriate, but also why social inequality in the penal system is acceptable to adherents of neoliberalism. As Harcourt notes, some of the early liberal conceptions of appropriate state intervention were a distortion of its authors’ beliefs in significant ways: Cesare Beccaria, for example, who is credited with originating many of the cameralist arguments in favour of a strong police state, was also an impassioned proponent of state intervention in economic matters, too. However, his views on economics were conveniently overlooked in the early formation of classical liberalism. Similarly, some of the key arguments proposed by Rousseau about social inequality were either neglected or dismissed by the Physiocrats in their dogged pursuit of “legal despotism” and the belief in natural order. While Rousseau contended that all social inequalities were a product of man’s laws and therefore could (and indeed should) be rectified by legal intervention, Mercier (who was the intendant of Martinique) believed entirely to the contrary. Mercier adamantly refused to concede that social inequalities were the result of anything but the inherent rank ordering of man’s initial condition – in this respect, Mercier represented the triumph of Aristotelian principles of natural inequality. Ultimately, Mercier and the Physiocrats prevailed, and Rousseau’s belief in the state’s obligation to eradicate systemic inequality (especially in the penal sphere where state intervention was condoned) dissipated. Fast forward to today, and we have a pastiche of different sets of beliefs concerning neoliberalism that have evolved over the intervening years since the Physiocrats. This pastiche borrows certain elements from some parts of liberal traditions, but foregoes other elements in order to arrive at a systemic worldview that happily elides what would otherwise be a source of acute cognitive dissonance. We accept the notion of state incompetence in matters economic, and laissez-faire free market policies have triumphed as a result. At the same time, we have been persuaded into subscribing to the iron fist of governmental penalism in dealing with all those who fall outside of, or disrupt, the operation of the rules of the market. If man’s natural condition predisposes certain categories or types of people to that form of state supervision, then so be it. This brings us back to the 2012 election, and the question of why social inequality in the criminal justice system isn’t more salient a concern than we might suppose. In reality the neoliberal agenda, including a commitment to ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’, entails **no commitment** whatsoever to ensuring social equality. The Physiocratic belief in man’s natural social inequality disposed of Rousseau’s belief in the government’s responsibility to assuage that inequality on the simple basis that doing so would necessitate eradicating civil society in its entirety. We have been left with a political philosophy that successfully reconciles two ideas that are, rather than being contradictory, in fact entirely compatible with one another: the belief in every man’s “freedom to pursue life’s goals” on the one hand, and the repeated, systemic targeting of one slice of the population for criminal justice institutionalization on the other. So why aren’t the presidential candidates suffering from an acute cognitive dissonance? The answer is simple: sadly, the overrepresentation of uneducated black males in the prison system is a feature of neoliberal penality, and not a bug.

## AT War Declining Now

#### Wars increasing

Hadley 11

Editor of History Today Kathryn, “Alarming increase in wars,” July, http://www.historytoday.com/blog/2011/07/alarming-increase-wars

New research by Professors Mark Harrison from the University of Warwick and Nikolaus Wolf from Humboldt University has revealed that between 1870 and 2001, the frequency of wars between states increased steadily by 2% a year on average. Between 1870 and 1913, the frequency of ‘pairwise’ conflicts (the numbers of pairs of countries involved in conflicts) increased on average by 6% per year. The frequency of wars increased by 17% per year in the period of the First and Second World Wars, and by 31% per year during the Cold War. In the 1990s, the frequency of wars between states rose by 36% per year. Professor Mark Harrison explained how: ‘The number of conflicts has been rising on a stable trend. Because of two world wars, the pattern is obviously disturbed between 1914 and 1945 but remarkably, after 1945 the frequency of wars resumed its upward course on pretty much the same path as before 1913.’ The graph below illustrates this increase in pairwise conflicts. It only includes wars between states and does not include civil wars. Conflicts range from full-scale shooting wars and uses of military force to displays of force (sending warships and closing borders, for example). Although Harrison and Wolf’s study does not measure the intensity of violence, it reflects the readiness of governments to settle disputes by force.

#### Neoliberalism creates a shift to internal warfare – their data ignores hunger as a modality of warfare and is excessively macropolitical

Hristov ‘5,

(Jasmin, M.A. candidate in Sociology at York University, Toronto, Freedom and Democracy or Hunger and Terror: Neoliberalism and Militarization in Latin America, Social Justice, Vol. 32, 2005, questia)

IN LATIN AMERICA, THE PROCESS OF CONCENTRATING WEALTH WITH WEALTH AND poverty with poverty began 500 years ago, but it has dramatically accelerated in the last 25 years under neoliberal policies. Latin American countries that followed the free-market prescription and inserted themselves fully into the global economy in the expectation that freedom and democracy would ensue found such promises to be chimera fabricated by the preachers of market liberalization. Real freedom under neoliberalism is enjoyed only by capital. Large sectors of society are denied basic human rights and dignity, while local elites allied with transnational companies have grown stronger, as has the determination to eliminate all remaining barriers to capital's search for resources, cheap labor, and markets. As millions are born, live, and die in the wreckage left by neoliberalism's plunder, the elite version of democracy counsels the hungry to patiently wait for wealth to trickle-down to them. Such democracy offers citizens the freedom to choose whether to spend their income on clean water, medicine, or food, to sell their dignity, or to become an "internal enemy." The promise of democracy by those seeking to maintain their unchallenged privileges translates into increased repression and violence against those who stand up for social justice and the protection of life. The neoliberal model is based on the assertion that poverty is best alleviated by opening societies to market-based competition, since an unregulated free market promotes economic growth and a democratic and just development process. Most Latin American countries have adopted this model and have experienced it for over two decades. Much evidence now suggests that this economic system produces poverty, aggravates existing poverty and inequality, impedes social development by turning human rights into commodities, and destroys sustainable livelihoods by granting corporations unprecedented rights and freedoms (Hristov, 2004). Fantu Cheru, an independent expert on the effects of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) on human rights, concluded that SAPs--a primary component of the neoliberal agenda--represent a political project of social transformation at the global level that aims to make the world safe for multinational corporations (MNCs). These policies reduce the role of the state in national development, erode the social welfare of the poor, and deny their economic, social, and cultural rights (Singh, 1999). Since it is unresponsive to the needs of the majority, the continued existence of neoliberalism requires a political counterpart capable of suppressing opposition to it. "The modern army of financial capital and corrupt governments advances in the only way it is capable of: destroying" (EZLN, 1998a: 12). This explains the emergence of war not between countries, but within them, waged by states against the poor (the majority of their populations). The weapons in such wars go beyond hunger to include military dimensions.

# \*\*\*Aff Answers\*\*\*

# Perm

#### Perm – transportation planning must incorporate different mindsets

**Wilson 01** Richard Wilson, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, California State Polytechnic University, “Assessing communicative rationality as a transportation planning paradigm,” 2001, http://www.uvm.edu/~transctr/pdf/willson\_article.pdf

**One of the realities of practice is that transportation planners are frequently not able to achieve a consensus concerning the ends of planning. The multiple stakeholders to transportation planning often have different goals and objectives;** in recent decades the range of goals for transportation have widened significantly. **Instead of acting as advisors to a rational actor decision-maker who is functioning in a closed system, transportation planners find competing interest groups in an organizationally defined and differentially empowered setting**. Instead of well-defined problems, they find multiple, perhaps ideologically defined problems. Instead of perfect information and analytic certainty, they find contested, ideological information and models that are stretched to represent complex behavioral realities. **The transportation planner’s challenge is to reconcile the espoused theory with these conditions to find practical wisdom and a process that will lead to decision-making and plan adoption.** The conventional model is not helpful in this regard. Furthermore, transportation scholarship has abandoned the issue except for offering postmortem on failed processes.

# Alt fail

#### Alt fails—unfair costs and benefits is inevitable

Lichfield 88

Lichfield, Nathaniel. (Professor of Urban Planning at University College London) *Economics in Urban Conservation*. Cambridge [England: Cambridge UP in Association with Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1988. Print.

"The conventional criterion for economic efficiency (net benefit or benefits minus costs) assumes that any decision unit would choose between options on its sectoral objective of maximising net benefit. This concept is applied in community impact evaluation by posing for each of the community sectors its sectoral objective, and judging which of the options they would prefer on that basis. That option is the most 'efficient' for them. It follows that if all the community sectors preferred the same option then, on the judgements made, that particular option would be the most efficient, even though the excess of benefit over cost had not been . But where sectors differ in their preference for a particular as they usually ck\ the conclusion is not clear, if we were able to measure all the impacts we could compare the actual amount of benefit less cost for all the sectors, and therefore derive aggregate efficiency for the total community. But, it is only for a limited array of costs and benefits that comparative indices in money terms can typically be kjned. For others, but not all, measurement without money valuation, illy ordinal statements, can be made. This clearly inhibits reaching elusions on efficiency. But it does permit of comparative and perhaps inal rankings on efficiency, by comparing marginal outputs with ■ginal inputs, even though not valued or even fully measured. Equity in distribution of costs and benefits whatever the project, its choice and implementation will result in an allocation of resources and, inevitably, as in all economic activity, a distribution to the various sectors of the costs and benefits arising from this ration. This will have certain 'social justice' or 'equity' implications ich representative bodies must consider alongside 'efficiency'. In doing it is useful to recognise that in urban and regional planning generally the ure of the distribution is three-fold. We illustrate by reference to asport. -irst comes the 'geographic' or 'horizontal'. Because the activities of the town are spread over an area, it is not possible for them to be evenly accommodated in the level of service offered. For example, some residents 1 have long walks to bus stops and infrequent services and others will :. Thus in choosing where to live the household will trade off the various ributes of different locations, of which accessibility by transport is one hers being proximity to countryside; availability of schools, shops, etc.; al environmental amenities). And in the trade offs, each may value ferently the individual attributes of the package and its totality. And the al will be traded off against price. In this trade off comes the second aspect of distribution, 'income' or rtical'. In the evaluation of the package, the town's residents cannot npete evenly, because of varying income and wealth levels, access to crmation and professional help, etc. Accordingly low income families are disadvantaged in the competition. This leads to the third aspect where 'needs' for public transport vary, some groups (young, elderly or infirm) are disadvantaged in that they are incapable of driving a car. Even if they could afford a car, this reduces their mobility and accessibility compared with a car-owning neighbour. Faced with these inevitable inequalities in distribution of costs and benefits, the authority must have regard to the issues of 'social justice' or 'equity' which arise, and the degree to which they wish to trade off conflicting efficiency and equity considerations, when making their deci­sions. In essence they must consider not simply value for money, but 'whose value' and 'whose money'. In seeking the help of analysis for this purpose an authority will however find that the methods of evaluating 'equity' are inadequate compared with those of efficiency. And there is comparatively little movement in them in the literature.7 But whether the method be there or not, decision makers must neces­sarily reach conclusions on these aspects in their decisions; to ignore distribution and equity is also reaching a decision on them. For this, there is no general agreement on what constitutes social justice or equity, nor any method of advising confidently on the topic (as there is in efficiency); there is no universal weighting system. Some would argue that needs must be brought into the balance, some would argue for merit and some for deserts.8 Thus decision makers must use their judgement, in accord with their own concepts of social justice. These are matters of ethics, which will vary between localities and political parties, and over time even with given parties. For the decision makers to do this, they need to know the incidence of the costs and benefits amongst various sectors of the community. On this, CIA can assist by displaying the costs and benefits on the array of sectors that are pertinent. Faced with such a display the decision makers can consider the costs and benefits by sector, and the question of whether and how they wish to trade off the option with the greatest efficiency against less efficient options which will provide a more equitable distribution, in accordance with their concepts of social justice. As indicated they cannot do so by any accepted weights, even in SCBA where the costs and benefits are all measured in money terms (14.3). It is more difficult where there are non-measurables, as in CIA. But at least they will be able to readily recognise the existence of inequality (which is inevitable) and make adjustments towards less inequality, in accordance with their individual criteria on equity?/

# AT: Gentrification

#### Your studies are wrong, there is no causal link between gentrification and displacement--

Sternberg, 9

Intelligencer, What’s Wrong With Gentrification?, The displacement myth., Adam Sternbergh, Dec 11, 2009, http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/62675/#

Displacement is understood, of course, to be gentrification’s primary evil consequence. Housing prices balloon; boutiques and bistros blossom; and before you know it, some bearded dudes in vests have bought the local bodega and opened a saloon festooned with taxidermied animals. Thank God that’s all over, right? Back in 2003, Lance Freeman, an associate professor of urban planning at Columbia, wanted to find out just how much displacement had occurred in two predominantly black, rapidly gentrifying neighborhoods: Clinton Hill and Harlem (Freeman’s home). But “much to my surprise,” he wrote in his book There Goes the ’Hood, he didn’t find any causal relationship between gentrification and displacement. More surprising, he found that “poor residents and those without a college education were actually less likely to move if they resided in gentrifying neighborhoods.” How does that square with our beliefs about Ikea-hoods?

#### The discourse of gentrification misinforms—because it refuses to acknowledge the positive effects of gentrification

Sternberg, 9

Intelligencer, What’s Wrong With Gentrification?, The displacement myth., Adam Sternbergh, Dec 11, 2009, http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/62675/#

Often lost amid our caricatures of benighted hipsters invading a blighted neighborhood is the fact that without gentrification, you’ve simply got a blighted neighborhood. “The discourse on gentrification,” Freeman writes, “has tended to overlook the possibility that some of the neighborhood changes associated with gentrification might be appreciated by the prior residents.” Freeman contrasts the late-century decline of Harlem with the conditions of the Lower East Side (or Harlem) decades earlier. Early urban slums were bustling and overcrowded, and thus could sustain a wide range of services. By contrast, Harlem lost 30 percent of its population in the seventies alone. Such neighborhoods became penal colonies of poverty, drained of population, services, and hope. Which explains, in part, the lack of displacement when gentrification improbably arrived. Once these neighborhoods improved, people opted to stay if they possibly could.

#### The residents of these blighted neighborhoods want gentrification

Sternberg, 9

Intelligencer, What’s Wrong With Gentrification?, The displacement myth., Adam Sternbergh, Dec 11, 2009, http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/62675/#

Not everyone, of course, could stay. As neighborhoods gentrify, buildings are sold, landlords raise rents, and some people are forced out. In an ideal world, you wouldn’t have to wait for the dual bugaboos to arrive before you get a decent grocery store or adequate police patrols. It’s ironic, though, that after the white-flight disasters that climaxed in the seventies, most people agreed that our cities’ only hope was reintegration, both racial and economic. In parts of gentrified Brooklyn in the last decade, this actually started to happen. For a neighborhood, or a city, abandonment is a death sentence. Gentrification—especially when coupled with intelligent urban policy—can serve as a reprieve, even if it arrives in the form of guilt-wracked hipsters and yoga studios. And it’s why cities from Buffalo to Braddock, Pennsylvania, are trying to spark similar renewals by luring artists and creative small businesses. These efforts are easy to dismiss or caricature as well; no doubt someone in Braddock has already opened a saloon with antlers over the bar. Yet the ailing cities that save themselves in the 21st century will do so by following Brooklyn’s blueprint. They’ll gentrify as fast as they can.

#### All your conclusions are wrong; gentrification is good and displacement doesn’t happen

Kiviat. 8

Barbara Kiviat, Gentrification: Not Ousting the Poor?, Sunday, Jun. 29, 2008

<http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1818255,00.html>,

A new study by researchers at the University of Colorado at Boulder, University of Pittsburgh and Duke University, examined Census data from more than 15,000 neighborhoods across the U.S. in 1990 and 2000, and found that low-income non-white households did not disproportionately leave gentrifying areas. In fact, researchers found that at least one group of residents, high school–educated blacks, were actually more likely to remain in gentrifying neighborhoods than in similar neighborhoods that didn't gentrify — even increasing as a fraction of the neighborhood population, and seeing larger-than-expected gains in income. Those findings may seem counterintuitive, given that the term "gentrification," particularly in cities like New York and San Francisco, has become synonymous with soaring rents, wealthier neighbors and the dislocation of low-income residents. But overall, the new study suggests, the popular notion of the yuppie invasion is exaggerated. "We're not saying there aren't communities where displacement isn't happening," says Randall Walsh, an associate professor of economics at the University of Pittsburgh and one of the study's authors. "But in general, across all neighborhoods in the urbanized parts of the U.S., it looks like gentrification is a pretty good thing."

#### Gentrification decreases poverty

Kiviat. 8

Barbara Kiviat, Gentrification: Not Ousting the Poor?, Sunday, Jun. 29, 2008

<http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1818255,00.html>,

The researchers found, for example, that income gains in gentrifying neighborhoods — usually defined as low-income urban areas that undergo rises in income and housing prices — were more widely dispersed than one might expect. Though college-educated whites accounted for 20% of the total income gain in gentrifying neighborhoods, black householders with high school degrees contributed even more: 33% of the neighborhood's total rise. In other words, a broad demographic of people in the neighborhood benefited financially. According to the study's findings, only one group — black residents who never finished high school — saw their income grow at a slower rate than predicted. But the study also suggests that these residents weren't moving out of their neighborhoods at a disproportionately higher rate than from similar neighborhoods that didn't gentrify.

#### Question their conclusions the most detailed studies ever conducted argue that drawing conclusions are reckless

Kiviat. 8

Barbara Kiviat, Gentrification: Not Ousting the Poor?, Sunday, Jun. 29, 2008

<http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1818255,00.html>,

The study is under review for publication, but is being circulated early by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The findings, while unexpected, are notable for the depth of data on which they're based. Walsh and his colleagues, Terra McKinnish, an associate professor of economics at the University of Colorado at Boulder, and Kirk White, an economist at Duke University's Triangle Census Research Data Center, compared confidential Census figures from 1990 and 2000 from 15,040 neighborhoods, with an average of about 4,000 residents each, in 64 metropolitan areas, such as Phoenix, Boston, Ft. Lauderdale, Columbus, New York, Atlanta and San Diego. The researchers identified gentrifying neighborhoods as those in which the average family earned less than $30,079 in 1990 — the poorest one-fifth of the country — and at least $10,000 more 10 years later. Taken all together, the study paints a more nuanced picture of gentrification than exists in the popular imagination. But the authors acknowledge that it leaves plenty of unanswered questions, such as why certain demographic groups are more likely to stay in — or move to — gentrifying neighborhoods, and why certain groups, such as blacks without high school degrees, don't see the same income gains as others. Then there is that most fundamental of questions: does gentrification lead to greater wealth for people in a neighborhood, or are the people who choose to live in such a place otherwise predisposed to make more money? "This study shows us a lot more about gentrification," says Walsh, "but there's still a lot we don't know."

# Poverty decreasing

#### Poverty is decreasing

Brookings 12

5/22/12, Sustainable Development for Fighting Poverty http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/05/sustainable-development-mcarthur?rssid=LatestFromBrookings&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+BrookingsRSS%2Ftopfeeds%2FLatestFromBrookings+%28Latest+From+Brookings%29

Over the past generation, the world has achieved remarkable success in reducing the number of people living on less than US $1.25 per day. According to recent World Bank estimates, the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) for halving extreme poverty was reached globally by 2010. In 1990, 43% of the developing world lived in extreme poverty. Today, the figure has dropped to roughly 21%.

#### More ev—greatest poverty reduction in history

**Tupy 12—policy analyst at CATO**

Marian, Capitalism Will Eliminate Poverty in Africa, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/capitalism-will-eliminate-poverty-africa

Yet, the last decade was great for Africa. The real gross domestic product rose at an average annual rate of 4.9 percent between 2000 and 2008 — twice as fast as that in the 1990s. It is true that as a result of the financial crisis, African growth had slowed to 2 percent in 2009. But, it has since returned to an average annual rate of 5 percent. Developed economies, which contracted by 3.5 percent in 2009, have also returned to growth. What was the impact of that growth on the lives of ordinary Africans? According to the most recent World Bank estimate, "For the first time since 1981, less than half of ... [sub-Saharan Africa's] population (47 percent) lived below $1.25 a day. The rate [of poverty] was 51 percent in 1981. The $1.25-a-day poverty rate in SSA has fallen 10 percentage points since 1999. Nine million fewer people [were] living below $1.25 a day in 2008 than 2005." That reduction in poverty is especially encouraging considering that the population of SSA more than doubled between 1981 and 2008, rising from 398 million to 813 million. What is true for Africa is also true for the rest of the world. In 1981, 70 percent of people in the developing world lived on less than $2 a day and 42 percent on less than $1 a day. In 2012, 43 percent lived on less than $2 a day and 14 percent lived on less than $1 a day. According to Laurence Chandy and Geoffrey Gert of the respected Brookings Institution, "Poverty reduction of this magnitude is unparalleled in history: Never before have so many people been lifted out of poverty over such a brief period of time."

# Quality of life improving

#### Quality of life is improving globally

Diamondis and Kotler 12

Peter H., founder and CEO of the X Prize Foundation and cofounder and chairman of Singularity University, degrees in molecular biology and aerospace engineering from MIT, and an M.D. from Harvard Medical School, and journalist Steven Kotler, The World Is Getting Better, Argues New Book, ‘Abundance’, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/02/21/the-world-is-getting-better-argues-new-book-abundance.html

At a global level, the gap between wealthy nations and poorer nations continues to close. Across the board, we are living longer, wealthier, healthier lives. Certainly, there are still millions of people living in dire, back-breaking poverty, but using almost every quality-of-life metric available—access to goods and services, access to transportation, access to information, access to education, access to lifesaving medicines and procedures, means of communication, value of human rights, importance of democratic institutions, durable shelter, available calories, available employment, affordable energy, even affordable beer—our day-to-day experience has improved massively over the past two centuries.

# Violence Decreasing

#### Statistical evidence suggests violence is declining worldwide

Goldstein 11

Josh, professor emeritus of international relations at American University and author of Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide, Think Again: War, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think\_again\_war

So far they haven't even been close. In fact, the last decade has seen fewer war deaths than any decade in the past 100 years, based on data compiled by researchers Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch of the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Worldwide, deaths caused directly by war-related violence in the new century have averaged about 55,000 per year, just over half of what they were in the 1990s (100,000 a year), a third of what they were during the Cold War (180,000 a year from 1950 to 1989), and a hundredth of what they were in World War II. If you factor in the growing global population, which has nearly quadrupled in the last century, the decrease is even sharper. Far from being an age of killer anarchy, the 20 years since the Cold War ended have been an era of rapid progress toward peace. Armed conflict has declined in large part because armed conflict has fundamentally changed. Wars between big national armies all but disappeared along with the Cold War, taking with them the most horrific kinds of mass destruction. Today's asymmetrical guerrilla wars may be intractable and nasty, but they will never produce anything like the siege of Leningrad. The last conflict between two great powers, the Korean War, effectively ended nearly 60 years ago. The last sustained territorial war between two regular armies, Ethiopia and Eritrea, ended a decade ago. Even civil wars, though a persistent evil, are less common than in the past; there were about a quarter fewer in 2007 than in 1990. If the world feels like a more violent place than it actually is, that's because there's more information about wars -- not more wars themselves. Once-remote battles and war crimes now regularly make it onto our TV and computer screens, and in more or less real time. Cell-phone cameras have turned citizens into reporters in many war zones. Societal norms about what to make of this information have also changed. As Harvard University psychologist Steven Pinker has noted, "The decline of violent behavior has been paralleled by a decline in attitudes that tolerate or glorify violence," so that we see today's atrocities -- though mild by historical standards -- as "signs of how low our behavior can sink, not of how high our standards have risen."

# Wars Decreasing

#### We control uniqueness – global calamities on the decline now

Fettweis 11—political science professor @ Tulane

Christopher, Professor of Political Science @ Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 85-86

The evidence supports the latter. Major wars tend to be rather memorable, so there is little need to demonstrate that there has been no such conflict since the end of the Cold War. But the data seem to support the 'trickle-down" theory of stability as well. Empirical analyses of warfare have consistently shown that the number of all types of wars-interstate, civil, ethnic, revolutionary, and so forth-declined throughout the 1990s and into the new century, after a brief surge of postcolonial conflicts in the first few years of that decade.' Overall levels of conflict tell only part of the story, however. Many other aspects of international behavior, including some that might he considered secondary effects of warfare, are on the decline as well. Some of the more important, if perhaps underreported, aggregate global trends include the following: • Ethnic conflict. Ethnonational wars for independence have declined to their lowest level since 1960, the first year for which we have data.' • Repression and poh twa! discrimination against ethnic minorities. The Minorities at Risk project at the University of Maryland has tracked a decline in the number of minority groups around the world that experience discrimination at the hands of states, from seventy-five in 1991 to forty-one in 2003.1 • War termination versus outbreak. War termination settlements have proven to be more stable over time, and the number of new conflicts is lower than ever before.' • Magnitude of conflict/battle deaths. The average number of battle deaths per conflict per year has been steadily declining."' The risk for the average person of dying in battle has been plummeting since World War IT-and rather drastically so since the end of the Cold War.' • Genocide. Since war is usually a necessary condition for genocide,-9 perhaps it should be unsurprising that the incidence of genocide and other mass slaughters declined by 90 percent between 1989 and 2005, memorable tragedies notwithstanding.' • Coups. Armed overthrow of government is becoming increasingly rare, even as the number of national governments is expanding along with the number of states-"' Would-he coup plotters no longer garner the kind of automatic outside support that they could have expected during the Cold Ware or at virtually any time of great power tension. Third party intervention. Those conflicts that do persist have less support from outside actors, just as the constructivists expected. When the great powers have intervened in local conflicts, it has usually been in the attempt to bring a conflict to an end or, in the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, to punish aggression." • Human rights abuses, Though not completely gone, the number of large-scale abuses of human rights is also declining. Overall, there has been a clear, if uneven, decrease in what the Human Security Centre calls "one-sided violence against civilians" since 1989.1 • Global military spending. World military spending declined by one third in the first decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall.` Today that spending is less than 2.5 percent of global CliP; which is about twothirds of what it was during the Cold War. • Terrorist attacks. In perhaps the most counterintuitive trend, the number of worldwide terrorist incidents is far smaller than it was during the Cold War. if Iraq and South Asia were to he removed from the data, a clear, steady downward trend would become apparent. There were 300 terrorist incidents worldwide in 1991, for instance, and 58 in 2005:' International conflict and crises have steadily declined in number and intensity since the end of the Cold Var. By virtually all measures, the world is a far more peaceful place than it has been at any time in recorded history. Taken together, these trends seem to suggest that the rules by which international politics are run may indeed he changing.

#### Great power war on the decline now

-this card also answers resource wars and security-based impacts to population growth

Fettweis 11—political science professor @ Tulane

Christopher, Professor of Political Science @ Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 219-220

Scholars are not alone in their curious under appreciation of the many positive trends of the current era. The message that major war has grown obsolete does not seemed to have penetrated those societies that can be expected to experience, for the first time in history, sustained peace. This puzzled Singer and \Vildavsky more than a decade ago. "Why," they wondered, is there "no joy that for the first time there is no prospect of war among the leading powers of the world?"" We live in an era in which, by almost all measurable indicators, life is improving in every corner of the globe, yet as sociologist Barry Glassner has pointed out, "the more things improve, the more pessimistic we become."" Has the long era of near-invulnerability made Americans in particular nearly incapable of rendering coherent judgment about their security?" Perhaps something in human nature prevents optimism. Perhaps on some deep level individuals and societies feel better when they have an enemy against whom to struggle or a cause that keeps them motivated; perhaps conflict and struggle help us in our life-long search for meaning.` "Give us a happy ending," wrote Glassner, and we write anew disaster story." Whatever the reason, sometimes people just do not seem to be hardwired to remain happy for tong. The current global pessimism might he tempered by a hit of historical perspective: Today a far greater percentage of the world population lives in societies at peace than any time before in history. That the number and intensity of all types of warfare have dropped steadily since the early 1990s is especially significant given the rapid increase in the number of both states and people over the last fifty years. The number of independent countries roughly tripled in the twentieth century. When World War Two began, the total world population was around 2.3 billion people, the majority of whom were touched in some way by the war, Over four billion souls have been added to the world since, including almost a billion in the 1990s alone. This unprecedented, exponential systemic growth has not resulted in Malthusian clashes for resources in most areas of the world, as many predicted. Despite the minor wars and terrorist attacks that have occurred since September 11, it seems as if more citizens of the twenty-first century both in raw numbers and as a percentage of the overall global population-will lead mundane, peaceful lives than in any that came before, bothered perhaps by quiet desperation but not by the violence of war.

#### Prevalence of wars continues to decline globally

Fettweis 9—political science professor @ Tulane

(Christopher, assistant professor of political science @ Tulane, “A Brief History of the Future of International Politics”, February 6, pg. http://convention2.allacademic.com/one/isa/isa09/index.php?click\_key=1&limit=50&cmd=Multi+Search+Search+Full+Text&iterate=true&offset=50&search=true&PHPSESSID=e530b7d2bde515cfd72b7620ab1ab91c)

The incidence of new wars is at an all-time low.36 Only one international war occurred since the publication of the original study, and it can be counted only if the definition of “war” is stretched a bit. Despite the sound and fury that accompanied the 2008 Russo-Georgian clash, especially during the U.S. presidential campaign, the combined the casualty figures appears to be under 1000 battle deaths, which means it would not qualify as a war using the most commonly used definitions.37 Overall, a greater percentage of the world’s people live in societies at peace than at any time before in human history.The evidence is apparent on every continent. At the close of 2008, the only conflict raging in the entire Western Hemisphere was the ongoing civil war Colombia, but even that was far less severe than a decade ago. Europe, which historically has been the most war-prone of continents, is entirely calm, without even the threat of interstate conflict. More than one scholar has noted that no war planning now goes on among the European powers, which is a rather remarkable departure from all previous eras.38 The situations in Bosnia and Kosovo are not settled, but are at least calm for the moment. And in contrast to 1914, the great powers have shown no eagerness to fill Balkan power vacuums – to the contrary, throughout the 1990s they had to be shamed into intervention, and were on the same side when they did. The Pacific Rim is currently experiencing no armed conflict. Even in the Middle East, where Iraq continues to burn, a tenuous peace was holding between Arabs and Israelis, terrorism notwithstanding, and no other wars seemed imminent. Even in Africa, where despite a variety of on-going serious challenges, levels of conflict were the lowest they have ever been in the centuries of written history we have about the continent. Darfur and the Congo were the only real extended tragedies still underway; the intensity of the internal conflicts simmering in Algeria, Somalia, Senegal and a couple of other places were all lower than a decade ago. This can all change quite rapidly – Ethiopia and Eritrea might at any moment decide to renew their pointless fighting over uninhabitable land, for instance – but as of now, the continent has never been more stable. West Africa is quiet, at least for the time being, as is all of southern Africa, despite the criminally negligent governance of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Territorial disputes, which were the most common cause of warfare in the past,39 have dropped to record low levels, especially among the great powers. International borders have all but hardened.40 Today state survival, the key factor driving behavior according to defensive realists, is today all but assured for even the smallest of states.41 Throughout most of human history, the obliteration of political entities was a distinct possibility. Polities as diverse as Central Asian empires, Greek poleis and German princely states were all at risk of conquest or absorption by powerful neighbors. That this no longer occurs is an underappreciated break from the past. Since World War II, precisely zero UN members have been forcibly removed from the map. The only country to disappear against its will – South Vietnam – was hardly a country at all, and held only observer status in the UN. As Martin Van Creveld has pointed out, the world reacted in a uniform, collective manner to Saddam Hussein’s attempt to absorb Kuwait, perhaps demonstrating the power of the norm against territorial conquest.42 Today political entities are safe from complete annihilation or absorption by their neighbors. Conquest is dead.43