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NATO presence is shaky due to increased tension and lack of public support in Europe – US resolve is key

**AFP 10** (Patrick Falby, AFP Newswire, June 22 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100622/ts\_afp/afghanistanunrest\_20100622060352)IM

KABUL (AFP) – Ten NATO troops were killed in militant attacks and a helicopter crash in Afghanistan as foreign forces marked another grim milestone in the war against the Taliban amid signs of cracks in the alliance. Monday's deaths, the second time this month that 10 service members have been killed in a single day, came as commanders press on with a campaign to oust the Taliban from their heartland in the southern province of Kandahar. There was further turmoil for NATO as Britain announced its special envoy to Afghanistan was taking "extended leave," amid reports he had clashed with military officials over strategy. The departure of Sherard Cowper-Coles, just a month ahead of a crucial international conference in Kabul, also came as apparent evidence of friction emerged in the US command, with General Stanley McChrystal appearing to mock Vice-President Joe Biden in a magazine profile piece. In Afghanistan, three Australian commandos and a US soldier were killed when their helicopter crashed in Kandahar -- the single worst loss of life for the Australian military in the nearly nine-year Afghan war. Another two NATO soldiers -- an American and a Canadian -- died in separate bomb explosions in the south, the powerbase of the Taliban militia that is fighting an increasingly deadly insurgency against Western troops. Three more American soldiers were killed in other attacks, a spokesman for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) said. Another ISAF soldier was killed in the south, a spokesman said, without giving further details. The deaths take to 65 the number of NATO soldiers killed this month, and to 285 for the year, according to an AFP tally. Britain on Monday marked its 300th death from the conflict when a soldier died from wounds suffered earlier this month. The mounting NATO toll is unwelcome news in Western capitals where political leaders are under mounting pressure from electorates unwilling to pay the blood price for a far away and seemingly open-ended war. Much of southern Afghanistan is blighted by the Taliban insurgency, now in its deadliest phase since the 2001 US-led invasion ousted the hardline Islamist regime and installed a Western-backed administration, led by Hamid Karzai. The US military has warned that casualties will inevitably mount as foreign forces build up their campaign to oust the militants from Kandahar, a hotbed of bombings, assassinations and lawlessness. A surge of troops ordered by US President Barack Obama will see NATO and US numbers peak at 150,000 later this year -- the bulk of them American -- before a drawdown begins next year, the resolve shown by President Obama can reinstate confidence in European citizens and NATO commanders.

Weakening US resolve in Afghanistan would collapse NATO and Western security

**NYT 9** (Roger Cohen, New York Times, Oct 19 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/20/opinion/20iht-edcohen.html)IM

The troop numbers game, in which President Obama looks wobbly, is in fact a distraction. Numbers matter less than endurance, details less than overall design. A word that needs to pass Obama’s lips soon is just that: “endurance.” Afghanistan, as he has said and must not unsay, is the “necessary war.” Before explaining what should comprise this partnership, it’s important to dispel some myths. Much is being made of how the Afghan war will soon be the longest in American history. But the United States took a major detour called Iraq. It still has almost twice as many troops in Iraq as Afghanistan. In the south of the country — the critical nexus of the Kandahar-born Taliban, narco-trafficking and corrupt governance — America’s war is only months old, having begun with the Marines’ summer arrival in Helmand. It took years in Iraq’s Anbar Province for the U.S. to work out which sheikhs were amenable — or could become so with blandishments — and so engineer the Sunni awakening. The work on a Pashtun awakening has just begun. If the United States steps back — or is seen to be stepping back (a perception fostered by each day of Obamivocation) — NATO will fold. So will Pakistan. That would be a disaster for Western security. America walked away from Afghanistan at the fall of the Soviet Empire with catastrophic results: After the expenditure of so much blood and treasure the retreat-and-return cycle has to end.

Two impacts – first, NATO presence in Afghanistan prevents Pakistani loose nukes

**Asia Society 9** (Task Force Report no. 6, April 2009, p. 6)IM

The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan are at risk from a combination of violent insurgency, loss of public confidence, and economic crisis . These trends threaten not only the loss of control by the Afghan and Pakistani governments, but also the spread of terrorist safe havens and, the loss of control over some of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons or materials . NATO forces in Afghanistan, including those from the United States, should work to defeat al-Qaida, protect the local population, and train and support the national security forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan for their counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions . The military effort will also require changes in detention policies and the legal status of international forces and contractors . On the political front, the new policy would encourage the Afghan and Pakistani governments to seek reconciliation with insurgent elements that break with al-Qaida . This distinction between insurgents with a political agenda or local grievances who may be amenable to joining the political process and those who are dedicated to a global jihad is critical to achieving regional stability and creating conditions for badly needed economic reconstruction and improved governance .

NATO Good – Afghanistan DA – 1NC

Pakistani loose nukes are equivalent to nuclear great power war

**Kagan and O’Hanlon, ‘7**. Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Michael O’Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “Pakistan’s Collapse, Our Problem,” NYT 11-18, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/opinion/18kagan.html>.

**AS** the government of **Pakistan totters, we must face a fact: the United States simply could not stand by as a nuclear-armed Pakistan descended into the abyss**. Nor would it be strategically prudent to withdraw our forces from an improving situation in Iraq to cope with a deteriorating one in Pakistan. We need to think — now — about our feasible military options in Pakistan, should it really come to that. We do not intend to be fear mongers. Pakistan’s officer corps and ruling elites remain largely moderate and more interested in building a strong, modern state than in exporting terrorism or nuclear weapons to the highest bidder. But then again, Americans felt similarly about the shah’s regime in Iran until it was too late. Moreover, **Pakistan’s intelligence services contain enough** sympathizers and supporters of the Afghan Taliban**, and enough** nationalists bent on seizing the disputed province of Kashmir from India, **that there are** grounds for real worries**. The most likely possible dangers are** these: a **complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum**; a total loss of federal control over outlying provinces, which splinter along ethnic and tribal lines; **or a struggle within the Pakistani military in which** the minority sympathetic to **the Taliban and Al Qaeda try to establish Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism**. All possible military initiatives to avoid those possibilities are daunting. With 160 million people, Pakistan is more than five times the size of Iraq. It would take a long time to move large numbers of American forces halfway across the world. And **unless we had precise information about the location of all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials, we could not rely on bombing or using Special Forces to destroy them. The task of stabilizing a collapsed Pakistan is beyond the means of the United States** and its allies. Rule-of-thumb estimates suggest that a force of more than a million troops would be required for a country of this size. Thus, if we have any hope of success, we would have to act before a complete government collapse, and we would need the cooperation of moderate Pakistani forces. One possible plan would be a Special Forces operation with the limited goal of preventing Pakistan’s nuclear materials and warheads from getting into the wrong hands. Given the degree to which Pakistani nationalists cherish these assets, it is unlikely the United States would get permission to destroy them. Somehow, American forces would have to team with Pakistanis to secure critical sites and possibly to move the material to a safer place. For the United States, the safest bet would be shipping the material to someplace like New Mexico; but even pro-American Pakistanis would be unlikely to cooperate. More likely, we would have to settle for establishing a remote redoubt within Pakistan, with the nuclear technology guarded by elite Pakistani forces backed up (and watched over) by crack international troops. It is realistic to think that such a mission might be undertaken within days of a decision to act. The price for rapid action and secrecy, however, would probably be a very small international coalition. A second, broader option would involve supporting the core of the Pakistani armed forces as they sought to hold the country together in the face of an ineffective government, seceding border regions and Al Qaeda and Taliban assassination attempts against the leadership. This would require a sizable combat force — not only from the United States, but ideally also other Western powers and moderate Muslim nations. Even if we were not so committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western powers would need months to get the troops there. Fortunately, given the longstanding effectiveness of Pakistan’s security forces, any process of state decline probably would be gradual, giving us the time to act. So, if we got a large number of troops into the country, what would they do? The most likely directive would be to help Pakistan’s military and security forces hold the country’s center — primarily the region around the capital, Islamabad, and the populous areas like Punjab Province to its south. We would also have to be wary of internecine warfare within the Pakistani security forces. Pro-American moderates could well win a fight against extremist sympathizers on their own. But they might need help if splinter forces or radical Islamists took control of parts of the country containing crucial nuclear materials. The task of retaking any such regions and reclaiming custody of any nuclear weapons would be a priority for our troops. If a holding operation in the nation’s center was successful, we would probably then seek to establish order in the parts of Pakistan where extremists operate. Beyond propping up the state, this would benefit American efforts in Afghanistan by depriving terrorists of the sanctuaries they have long enjoyed in Pakistan’s tribal and frontier regions. The great paradox of the post-cold war world is that we are both safer, day to day, and in greater peril than before. **There was a time when volatility in places like Pakistan was mostly a humanitarian worry;** today it is as much a threat to our basic security as Soviet tanks once were. **We must be militarily and diplomatically prepared to keep ourselves safe in such a world.** Pakistan may be the next big test.

NATO Good – Afghanistan DA – 1NC

Independently, NATO key to deal with political violence and prevent nuclear war

**Brzezinski ‘9,** Zbigniew Brzezinski, former U.S. National Security Adviser, Sept/Oct 2009, “An Agenda for NATO,” Foreign Affairs, 88.5, Ebsco

NATO's potential is not primarily military. Although NATO is a collective-security alliance, its actual military power comes predominantly from the United States, and that reality is not likely to change anytime soon. **NATO's** real **power derives from** the fact that it combines **the U**nited **S**tates' **military capabilities and economic power with Europe's collective political and economic weight** (and occasionally some limited European military forces). Together, **that** combination **makes NATO** globally significant. It must therefore remain sensitive to the importance of safeguarding the geopolitical bond between the United States and Europe as it addresses new tasks. The basic challenge that **NATO** now **confronts** is that there are historically unprecedented risks **to global security**. Today's world is threatened neither by the militant fanaticism of a territorially rapacious nationalist state nor by the coercive aspiration of a globally pretentious ideology embraced by an expansive imperial power. The paradox of our time is that **the world**, increasingly connected and economically interdependent for the first time in its entire history, **is experiencing** intensifying popular **unrest made** all the more **menacing by** the **growing accessibility of w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction -- not just to states but also, potentially, to extremist religious and political movements. Yet there is no effective global security mechanism for coping with the growing threat of violent political chaos stemming from humanity's recent political awakening. The three great political contests of the twentieth century (the two world wars and the Cold War) accelerated the political awakening of mankind, which was initially unleashed in Europe by the French Revolution. Within a century of that revolution, spontaneous populist political activism had spread from Europe to East Asia. On their return home after World Wars I and II, the South Asians and the North Africans who had been conscripted by the British and French imperial armies propagated a new awareness of anticolonial nationalist and religious political identity among hitherto passive and pliant populations. The spread of literacy during the twentieth century and the wide-ranging impact of radio, television, and the Internet accelerated and intensified this mass global political awakening. In its early stages, such new political awareness tends to be expressed as a fanatical embrace of the most extreme ethnic or fundamentalist religious passions, with beliefs and resentments universalized in Manichaean categories. Unfortunately, in significant parts of the developing world, bitter memories of European colonialism and of more recent U.S. intrusion have given such newly aroused passions a distinctively anti-Western cast. Today, the most acute example of this phenomenon is found in an area that stretches from Egypt to India. This area, inhabited by more than 500 million politically and religiously aroused peoples, is where NATO is becoming more deeply embroiled. Additionally complicating is the fact that the dramatic rise of China and India and the quick recovery of Japan within the last 50 years have signaled that the global center of political and economic gravity is shifting away from the North Atlantic toward Asia and the Pacific. And of the currently leading global powers -- the United States, the EU, China, Japan, Russia, and India -- at least two, or perhaps even three, are revisionist in their orientation. **Whether they are "rising peacefully"** (a self-confident China), **truculently** (an imperially nostalgic Russia) **or boastfully** (an assertive India, despite its internal multiethnic and religious vulnerabilities), **they all desire** a **change in** the **global** pecking **order**. **The future conduct** of **and relationship among these** three still relatively cautious revisionist powers **will further intensify** the strategic uncertainty. **Visible on the horizon** but not as powerful **are the emerging regional rebels, with** some of them defiantly reaching for **nuclear weapons**. **North Korea** has openly flouted the international community by producing (apparently successfully) its own nuclear weapons -- and also by profiting from their dissemination. At some point, its **unpredictability could precipitate** the first **use of nuclear weapons** in anger since 1945. **Iran**, in contrast, has proclaimed that its nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes but so far **has been unwilling to consider consensual arrangements** with the international community that would provide credible assurances regarding these intentions. **In nuclear-armed Pakistan, an extremist** anti-Western religious **movement is threatening** the country's political **stability**. These changes together reflect the waning of the post-World War II global hierarchy and the simultaneous dispersal of global power. Unfortunately, U.S. leadership in recent years unintentionally, but most unwisely, contributed to the currently threatening state of affairs. The combination of **Washington's arrogant unilateralism** in Iraq **and its demagogic Islamophobic** sloganeering **weakened** the unity of **NATO** and focused aroused Muslim resentments on the United States and the West more generally.

UQ – Cohesion Strong

**NATO currently remains committed and cohesive in Afghanistan**

**Rasmussen 10** ( Anders, July 3, Secretary General NATO, Daily Times, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\07\03\story\_3-7-2010\_pg7\_1 accessed 7/8)CM

**US President Barack Obama has set a July 2011 target date to begin withdrawing** **American troops from the country**. Rasmussen said the date was an opportunity to review the effectsof **this year’s NATO troop increase** “but it **will definitely not be a withdrawal from Afghanistan”.** “**Our mission will end when the Afghans are capable to govern and to secure their own country themselves**,” Rasmussen said, according to AP. **“Obviously, Afghanistan will remain our most important operation for quite some time,**” he added. Rasmussen said the summit of the alliance’s 28 member states would shape the future of NATO. “**We’ll take important decisions as to how NATO can adapt to the security challenges of the 21st century,”** he added.

Brink

The NATO alliance is shaky – US resolve is key to salvage it

**The Atlantic Wire 9** (John Hudson, Oct 20 2009, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/opinions/view/opinion/Heralding-the-Death-of-NATO-1345)IM

Sixty years after its founding, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is at a major crossroads. As the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan threatens to become the longest war in American history, the commitment of NATO's European members is foundering. The specter of defeat for the organization has led observers to wonder, "Could Afghanistan become NATO's graveyard?" For the following international experts, the answer is yes. Here's why: \* Slowly Vanishing Away, writes Anne Applebaum at The Washington Post: "NATO... inspires nobody. The members of NATO feel no allegiance to the alliance, or to one another. On its home continent, NATO does precious little military contingency planning, preferring to hold summits. Above all, there is no recognizable alliance leader who is willing or able to engage in the national debates of the various member countries, to argue in favor of the Afghan mission or any other... The next time NATO is needed, I doubt whether it will be there at all. \* On the Brink of Collapse, warns Roger Cohen at The New York Times: "If the United States steps back — or is seen to be stepping back (a perception fostered by each day of Obamivocation) — NATO will fold... Although the United States still holds out hope for a NATO that focuses on global threats like terrorism and nuclear proliferation, other alliance members would prefer to refocus on the traditional mission of defending Europe. Add in disagreements between the United States and its allies over how to approach the Afghan situation and NATO begins to look more like a rugby scrum than a military alliance." \* A Dead Man Walking, writes John Feffer at Mother Jones: "Even at 60, NATO hasn't quite proven that it can live on its own in a sustainable and responsible manner. Indeed, it is still struggling with a Hamlet-like identity crisis: to attack or not to attack. The Afghan war has only underscored this central paradox. If the alliance doesn't engage in military operations, everyone questions its ultimate purpose. But if it does go to war — and the war is unsuccessful — everyone questions its ultimate efficacy. Damned if it does and damned if it doesn't, NATO will limp along much as the British and Soviet empires did after their misadventures in Central Asia. These were, after all, dead empires walking. NATO may be in this category as well. It just doesn't know it yet."

Links – 2NC\*\*

**NATO will inevitably win the War in Afghanistan but troop and alliance support is pivital**

**Gearan & Lekic 10** (Anne, Slobodan, writers for the associated press Associated Press http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/asia-pacific/nato-chief-says-afghan-developments-now-favour-alliance-effort/article1600674/actions.jsp Jun. 11, 2010

**NATO leaders declared Friday that the alliance had regained the initiative in the Afghan war, promising that the gains could result in a handover of security responsibilities in some parts of the country to local authorities by year's end. U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates urged his alliance counterparts to seize the moment and to provide the resources needed to accelerate efforts to bolster Afghan security forces**. **NATO wants Afghan troops to replace its forces in the war against the Taliban, thus providing the linchpin of the alliance's exit strategy**. “**Our effort is moving in right direction (but) the road ahead will be long and hard**,” Mr. Gates said after a meeting of NATO's 28 defence ministers. “I hope that by the end of year, we will be able to demonstrate that we are making progress throughout the country.” Mr. Gates urged countries who are not committing combat troops to Afghanistan to contribute more instructors to train the expanding Afghan police and army. **More trainers would step up “the pace that we can proceed with transition**,” he said. NATO officials say they have been stymied because it is difficult to find qualified people to train foreign forces. Earlier **Friday, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told ministers that the Afghan government and international authorities would soon agree on how to start handing over responsibility for security, “province by province.**” His optimism comes despite troubles with the military campaign. The campaign to blunt Taliban influence in Kandahar, birthplace of the insurgency, is unfolding more slowly than once planned, top U.S. and NATO commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal conceded on Thursday. Even so, Gen. McChrystal said he is confident he can demonstrate in the next six months that the war plan is working. Kandahar is the keystone of Gen. McChrystal's plan to protect Afghans from the Taliban and offer the U.S.-backed government in Kabul a workable alternative. The delay in the Kandahar offensive came amid an inconclusive campaign to reassert government authority in the provincial town of Marjah. Still, Mr. Gates said t**he United States and NATO are “recapturing the initiative” in Afghanistan and beginning to turn the war around**, offering a rosier perspective than usual despite delays in the defining campaign of the new battle plan. “**No one would deny that the signs of progress are tentative at this point,”** he told reporters. Mr. Gates said the focus on difficult fighting in Kandahar and the rest of the Taliban strongholds across southern Afghanistan misses the larger point that the allies are beginning to gain the upper hand. “If you talk to people who have been there for awhile ... their view is that the situation is slowly beginning to improve and that we are recapturing the initiative,” he said. Mr. Gates also said he has not set an unreasonable task for Gen. McChrystal by saying that the American public demands progress by the end of this year. Meanwhile, **NATO announced it had opened an alternate supply route to Afghanistan** via Russia and central Asia **— a critical development that gives the alliance the ability to bypass the previous ambush-prone main routes through Pakistan**. A statement said the first trainload of supplies for the alliance's 140,000-strong force arrived in Afghanistan on June 9. Until now, only individual alliance members, such as Germany and the United States, were allowed to use the so-called northern route. Although Russia offered to open its territory to NATO as a whole, negotiations over transit rights between the alliance and Central Asian states took several months to complete. **The opening of the route is important because it signals Russian willingness to indirectly support the NATO-led mission**. **Moscow has been warmer to the mission's success in recent years, fearing that a NATO defeat in Afghanistan would cause further problems for Russia**

Links – 2NC\*\*

Withdrawal without consultation would destroy NATO, cause global terrorism, collapse Pakistan, and lead to nuclear conflict

**Fox 10** (The Right Honorable Liam, MP, Sec. of State for Defense in the UK, July 7 2010, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Afghanistan-Standing-Shoulder-to-Shoulder-with-the-United-States.html)IM

So in Afghanistan today, the operations of NATO and other Coalition allies are a direct consequence of 9/11. It was there that the Taliban rulers gave al-Qaeda sanctuary, allowed it to run terrorist training camps, and made it a base for terrorist attacks across the world. The Taliban were driven out of power by Afghan and international forces. Al-Qaeda fled to the border areas of Pakistan. Although reduced and under considerable pressure, they are still there and continue to pose a real and significant threat to us. So the first reason we cannot bring our troops home immediately is that their mission is not yet completed. Were we to leave autonomously, without degrading the insurgency, conferring with our allies and increasing the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), we would probably see the return of the destructive forces of transnational terrorism. Not only would we risk the return of civil war in Afghanistan creating a security vacuum, but we would also risk the destabilization of Pakistan with potentially unthinkable regional, and possibly nuclear, consequences. The second reason is that it would be a shot in the arm to jihadists everywhere, re-energizing violent radical and extreme Islamism. It would send the signal that we did not have the moral resolve and political fortitude to see through what we ourselves have described as a national security imperative. Unilateral withdrawal would also gravely damage the credibility of NATO, which has been the cornerstone of the defense of the West for more than half a century. To leave before the job is finished, without consulting our allies would leave us less safe and less secure. Our resolve would be called into question, our cohesion weakened, and the Alliance detrimentally undermined. It would be a betrayal of all the sacrifices made by our armed forces in life and limb.

NATO is frantic to avoid unilateral action by the US, which would marginalize the alliance

**Awwal 2** (Rabi-ul, Dawn Newspaper Writer, June 4 2002, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27c/006.html)IM

Sidelined by the US military campaign in Afghanistan, NATO is working to make itself relevant for threats and security challenges that may lie far beyond the borders of Europe that it guarded during the Cold War. Defence ministers from the 19-nation alliance will kickstart the process at a meeting in Brussels on Thursday and the package of measures will be agreed at a summit in Prague next November. They will consider plans to streamline NATO's cumbersome military command structure and start work on a shopping list of military hardware to defend against weapons of mass destruction and get boots on the ground quickly when crises erupt. "The main function of this new military concept is to define NATO's role, and in particular the military role in relation to terrorism," a senior NATO official said. It will consider what role NATO could play in attacks on non-member countries outside its traditional area of operations and how it can contribute to international coalitions. The flurry of activity comes in response to fears that, by making a habit of unilateral action, the United States - which is way ahead of Europe in military technology and defence spending - could marginalize the alliance. But instead of snubbing NATO, Washington is now leading efforts to revitalize it.

Links – 2NC\*\*

Withdraw undermines US NATO relations and could lead to a nuclear war

Kern 10 **(**Soeren, 7/2, *Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Relations ,* http://www.defensestudies.org/?p=2861Center for Defense studies accessed 7/8) CM

In a speech in Washington, Fox warned that **leaving Afghanistan before the job was finished “would send the signal that we did not have the moral resolve and political fortitude to see through what we ourselves have described as a national security imperative**.” He said a **premature withdrawal from Afghanistan would “leave us less safe and less secure. Our resolve would be called into question, our cohesion weakened and the [NATO] alliance undermined.” It would also “risk the destabilization of Pakista**n**, with potentially unthinkable regional, and possibly nuclear, consequences**” and “be a shot in the arm to jihadists everywhere, re-energizing violent radical and extreme Islamism.”

Removal of US troops from Afghanistan would signal betrayal to NATO, collapsing the alliance

**AP 9** (Lekic Slobodan, Associated Press, April 4 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/03/obama-in-france-sarkozy-p\_n\_182692.html)IM

STRASBOURG, France — On the eve of the NATO summit, President Barack Obama didn't get what he wanted most from U.S. allies: significant new commitments of combat troops for Afghanistan. Faced with stiff public opposition to war, reluctant European leaders on Friday offered only limited aid for civilians and some troops to help train Afghan police and soldiers. Afghanistan was the theme to which a frustrated Obama returned over and over throughout the day. "This is a joint problem, and it requires a joint effort," he said. Any American movement toward increased removal of troops would be read by Merkel, Sarcozy and the other NATO leaders as abandonment and betrayal. It would be detrimental to NATO’s influence. The summit's co-hosts, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, both were quick to offer support for Obama's new Afghan strategy of sending American reinforcements and bolstering Afghan forces. But they went no further. "We totally endorse and support America's new strategy in Afghanistan," Sarkozy said a joint news conference with Obama after they met. After her own talks with the president later in the afternoon, Merkel said: "We have a great responsibility here. We want to carry our share of the responsibility militarily \_ in the area of civil reconstruction and in police training." Afghanistan was a key issue at a working dinner of all NATO leaders. "This is our No. 1 operational priority," NATO spokesman James Appathurai said. As the leaders talked, protesters clashed for a second day with French police, injuring two officers. With more protests to come, the efforts to disrupt the summit signaled the unhappiness of many Europeans for the faraway war, especially at a time of global economic crisis.

NATO can’t function without the US – pulling out of Afghanistan would be devastating

**Schain 2** (Martin, Political Studies @ NYU, JMWP no. 42, May 2002, http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/jmwp42.htm)IM

In the post-Cold War period, several principles of European security seem to dominate. The United States remains at the heart of the ability of Europe to act collectively. A key test of the American role in European security took place soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the wars in Yugoslavia. The initial policy of the Clinton government was to view the conflict in Bosnia as a European problem to be dealt with through a European initiative. Europe, however, was incapable of organizing a collective response to the Serbian aggression without the lead of the United States. Although outside intervention probably could have halted the war in Bosnia as early as 1992, the failure of the EU peace mission in 1991 clearly demonstrated a lack of will that permitted the war to continue until NATO intervention under a UN umbrella in 1995. Even in the early phase of the NATO intervention, Serbian forces were not effectively challenged until NATO decided to act independently of the United Nations. Willy Claes — NATO Secretary-General at the time — argued at New York University on May 2 2002, that until NATO decided on firm action, the United Nations actively resisted a strong stand against Serbian forces in Bosnia; he noted that there had been a secret agreement to inform Milosovic of bombing targets that were initially established. The importance of American leadership was demonstrated once again in Kosovo in 1999. Indeed, the entire long, unhappy episode of the Yugoslav wars is a clear demonstration of the continuing importance of American political leadership for European security, even after the end of the Cold War. In this context, NATO is important because it remains an institutionalized means of keeping the US in Europe.

Links – 2NC\*\*

NATO would collapse without the US – tech gap

**Schain 2** (Martin, Political Studies @ NYU, JMWP no. 42, May 2002, http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/jmwp42.htm)IM

European capabilities remain more tied to the United States than ever, even with the diminished importance of the US nuclear deterrent. Essentially, Europe remains dependent on the United States for high-tech intelligence — that is clear — but also for transportation of troops. These general tendencies appear to have become a real crisis in the post-September 11 world. The United States has a real interest in military action “out of area,” and is not particularly concerned about constraints from NATO allies. This orientation of American policy has often been oversimplified as “unilateralism,” which indeed it is with regard to Europe. NATO has been nowhere to be seen in the post-September 11 world. The United States has talked a great deal about an “alliance,” but this usually means an amorphous alliance against terror or “the axis of evil,” rather than NATO. Indeed, there was no real consultation with Europe as such in the months after September 11, only with a succession of European leaders coming to Washington to express support for American action. There is almost no perception in the United States that there are European troops present in Afghanistan (nor has the European press paid a great deal of attention to this presence). For the moment, our closest ally is Pakistan. We could write this off as a short-term, temporary phenomenon, or a peculiar predilection of the Bush government. However, there are some changes that seem to indicate that there may be far more serious changes taking place in the balance of trans-Atlantic security relations. History and tradition aside, behind the trans-Atlantic relationship there has always been a presumption of mutual need and mutual benefit. Behind the cycle of tensions there has always been a strong connection. The current trends are disturbing, however, because, with the end of the Cold War, the connection has become frayed, and the balance of dependency within that connection has become increasingly one-sided.

Links – Withdrawal

Troop numbers are crucial to NATO’s effectiveness in Afghanistan

**Lindborg 9** (Chris, Foreign Policy In Focus, analyst at the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), “The NATO Summit: Openings for a New Nuclear Posture,” April 2 2009, Lexis)IM

Devising a new posture is beyond the space or scope of this commentary, but there are two points that Alliance leaders should keep in mind when they rewrite the SC: \* Consider lowering the military emphasis accorded to nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons don't benefit NATO's central operations like those in Afghanistan and the Balkans, which rely on "boots on the ground." Policymakers may decide that these types of missions are most likely to dominate NATO's activities in the future. During a time of global economic recession, the problem of more limited funds confronts all allies and could force them to make choices about cutting back on capabilities, especially ones that are seen as irrelevant to core and resource-heavy missions. Prominent former British generals recently made a similar point, noting the lack of military utility that nuclear arsenals hold in the modern strategic environment and, speaking specifically about Britain, called for abandoning any successor to Trident, which is Britain's sole nuclear weapon system. They also made this plea in part because renewing the United Kingdom's nuclear forces will take away funds from what they see as far more relevant military expenses. Keeping a prominent place for these weapons in NATO also influences the strategic decisions of countries outside of the Alliance and may further motivate them to maintain or pursue their own arsenals. NATO, as the world's preeminent military alliance, has the opportunity to start changing this dynamic.

All NATO wants to do is retain credibility – being abandoned in the US’s war would ruin that

**Foxley 9** (Tim, Researcher @ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), April 1 2009, The Shadow NATO Summit, p. 27)IM

Although it is easy to be critical, given the high expectations and standards demanded of NATO, NATO’s mission in Afghanistan seems increasingly to becoming one of extracting itself from Afghanistan with some shreds of credibility intact while maintaining the pretence that it is a viable organisation for the 21st century. The viability of NATO is seriously undermined by the largely unilateral actions on the part of the United States. There has been much criticism (and hindsight is a great asset in this respect), but perhaps it is also useful to remind ourselves of the scale of the problem – not all the problems are the fault of NATO and the problems in Afghanistan are common to all international efforts.

Links – Unilat\*\*

Deciding military direction without consulting NATO destroys the alliance

**Bensahel 3** (Nora, Public Policy Expert at RAND, “The Counterterror Coalitions,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1746/MR1746.pdf)IM

However, many Europeans were dissatisfied with the small role that the alliance played in the response to the September 11 attacks and attributed it to U.S. unilateralism and arrogance. While they under- stood the need to ensure effective command and control, they felt that they had given the United States unconditional political support through the invocation of Article 5 and that they should at least be consulted about the direction of the military campaign. In part, these frustrations resulted from the fact that the military campaign did not fit the model all had come to expect during the Cold War— that an invocation of Article 5 would lead the alliance members to join together and defeat a common enemy.40 But these frustrations also reflected a fear that the U.S. decision to pursue the war on its own after invoking Article 5 would irrevocably weaken the core alliance principle of collective defense. A NATO ambassador from a large member state expressed his concerns as follows: “I don’t blame the United States for handling the conflict in Afghanistan the way it did, given the complexity of that operation and the problems we saw when NATO managed the air war in Kosovo. I also understand that invoking Article 5 was a declaration of solidarity. But by declaring a situation of collective defense and failing to follow up, I fear that we may have undermined Article 5 forever; and therefore, I think that NATO has suffered as an alliance.”41

Unilateral action on terrorism by the US would be detrimental to NATO – consultation is key

**Schain 2** (Martin, Political Studies @ NYU, JMWP no. 42, May 2002, http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/jmwp42.htm)IM

The second constraint is the tension between global openness and the perceived need for more secure borders. The primary goal of an open-door system of trade and investment creates problems for the need for more reliable security arrangements after September 11. To the extent that the United States unilaterally pursues security in the largest sense, it creates impediments for the free movement of goods and capital. Certainly, there have been efforts to coordinate “the war against terrorism” with European security agencies [5] , but these cooperative efforts appear to be running up against conflicts over the death penalty in the United States and the imposition of military tribunals. It is now becoming clearer that, for the United States, there is a price to be paid for unilateral action on terrorism – namely the alliance with NATO. The tensions that are building between the United States and Europe have been exacerbated, on the European side, by the spurt of extreme-right successes in a number of European countries. On one hand, each of these breakthroughs has its own domestic political roots, generally linked to immigration, crime and identity. They do, however, have one common threat: anti-globalization and anti-Americanism, which has been linked to opposition to the European Union. If the post-war campaign against trans-Atlantic connection was carried by the left, the cutting edge of the current campaign is carried by the populist right. This does not mean that opposition to many aspects of American policy and culture does not resonate with voters of the left—simply that the extreme right has been more successful in mobilizing this opposition for electoral purposes.

The war is run by the US – consultation is key to preserve the alliance

**NATO Watch 10** (Think tank on NATO policymaking, July 2010, *Observatory* no. 11, p.2)IM

The real issue in Afghanistan is not the Runaway General but how to stop a Runaway War. The current phase of the war is now in its ninth year, but in truth the war started in 1980 when the United States, along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, organised and sustained Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion. McChrystal’s indiscretions have inadvertently shed a little light not only on the rotten core of the Afghanistan effort, but also on the excessive influence of the military in US politics, more of which later. Let me start with Afghanistan. Of the many dysfunctional relationships amongst those in charge of the political and military strategies in that blighted country—between President Karzai, local warlords, various little would-be viceroys and the fractured military command—one thing is abundantly clear: this is an American-led war. The sacked general was nominally the “US and NATO commander” in Afghanistan, but first and foremost he was a US general, appointed and dismissed by a US President with no prior consultation among coalition allies. Karzai’s appeal to Obama to keep McChrystal (the best commander the war has had, according to the Afghan President) and the supportive noises coming out of NATO HQ in Brussels fell on stony ground. From day one, the real strategic decision-making has taken place in the White House and Pentagon. NATO and the other ‘international protectorate’ actors in Afghanistan (UNAMA, ISAF, EU, OSCE and a host of private sector and non-governmental acronyms) are largely acting as a de facto arm of American foreign policy. Further movement toward U.S. unilateralism without consultation of NATO and European allies could easily prove detrimental to the alliance.

Links – Unilat\*\*

A unilateral US fails

**Goldgeier 10** (James, Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report no. 51, Feb. 2010, p. 17)IM

In response to the new threat environment, NATO has to prepare itself for a range of military contingencies, including responding to states and groups around the world that are planning attacks on European and North American targets. Unfortunately, Europe has little capability to transport its troops across significant distances—more than 70 percent of European land forces cannot deploy. The minimal requirements the alliance set for itself to establish a NATO response force (twenty-five thousand combined land, air, and naval forces) have gone unmet, as has the provision of important equipment such as helicopters. In addition to fulfilling the stated requirements of the response force, NATO will need to focus its attention increasingly on maritime and missile defense capabilities. Under Operation Active Endeavor, NATO ships are patrolling the Mediterranean to counter terrorism, interdict weapons of mass destruction, and mitigate threats of piracy. This Arti- cle V mission requires enhancing NATO capabilities to combat non- state threats at sea.4 On missile defense, President Obama’s decision to focus on short- and medium-range Iranian missile capabilities has centered attention on the threats to Europe emanating from the Middle East, thus changing the missile defense discussion from how to protect the American homeland toward how to defend NATO territory. The next step is to gain allied agreement that territorial missile defense is an Article V mission, requiring the alliance as a whole, not just the United States, to contribute to the project. Unilateral action from the United States will fragment the alliance.

Consultation is key

**Asia Society 9** (Task Force Report no. 6, April 2009, p. 49)IM

High-level policy changes will be required to achieve these objectives, but it is also essential to formulate and communicate the objectives in such a way as to mobilize domestic and international support for them: • In reformulating objectives and strategy, the United States should consult with the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as with the United Nations (UN), NATO allies, and other partners, rather than simply announcing unilateral decisions and risk further animosity from crucial allies . The Obama administration’s agreement to include the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan in the policy review, and its solicitation of the views of NATO allies for that review, are welcome . • In addition to announcing the new objectives and policy at the NATO summit scheduled for April 3–4, 2009, President Obama should also use his planned speech addressed to the Muslim world to announce the end of the “war on terror” and the development of policies in this region based on the new approach .

Internals – Afghanistan k2 NATO

NATO would be forced to pull out if the U.S. did – Afghanistan is the cornerstone of the alliance

**Flounders 10** (Sarah, Global Research, Mar. 8 2010, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=18004)IM

Following the Dutch announcement, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in a speech at the National Defense University told NATO officers and officials that public and political opposition to the military had grown so great in Europe that it was directly affecting operations in Afghanistan and impeding the alliance’s broader goals. “The demilitarization of Europe — where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it — has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment. ... Right now the alliance faces very serious, long-term, systemic problems.” (New York Times, Feb. 24) Gates also reminded NATO officials that, not counting U.S. forces, NATO troops in Afghanistan were scheduled to increase to 50,000 this year — from 30,000 last year. Were the U.S. troops to abandon NATO it would not be able to sustain effective presence in Afghanistan. The total 43-country International Security Assistance Force, including U.S. soldiers, is presently at 140,000 troops in Afghanistan. As journalist Rick Rozoff summed up a year ago: “The Afghan war is also the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s first armed conflict outside of Europe and its first ground war in the 60 years of its existence. It has been waged with the participation of armed units from all 26 NATO member states and 12 other European and Caucasus nations linked to NATO. ... “The 12 European NATO partners who have sent troops in varying numbers to assist Washington and the Alliance include the continent’s five former neutral nations: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland. The European NATO and partnership deployments count among their number troops from six former Soviet Republics — with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine tapped for recent reinforcements and the three Baltic states ... including airbases and troop and naval deployments in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and the Indian Ocean (where the Japanese navy has been assisting).” (rickrozoff.wordpress.com, March 25, 2009) Military units from Australia, New Zealand, Jordan, Colombia and South Korea are also stationed in Afghanistan.

Internals – Afghanistan k2 NATO

Current operations in Afghanistan are critical for deterrence

Ruhle 9 (Michael, Oct 21, ,Deputy Head, Policy Planning Unit of the NATO Secretary GeneralStrategic Insights, <online>http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Sep/ruhleSep09.html date accessed 7/6)CM

In the Declaration on Alliance Security at the April 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, the NATO Allies noted that “Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and collective defence, based on the indivisibility of Allied security, are, and will remain, the cornerstone of our Alliance. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy.” The NATO Allies—and their security partners—are interested in deterrence and defense regarding challenges in addition to the direct attacks against Alliance territory and forces encompassed by Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Declaration on Alliance Security referred to “new, increasingly global threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and cyber attacks,” as well as “challenges such as energy security” and “instability emanating from fragile and failed states.”[1] In some cases, security challenges may be state-directed or state-sanctioned, and in other cases non-state actors may be the principal decision-makers that need to be deterred. The instruments of deterrence against state adversaries may extend beyond nuclear forces to involve missile defenses and other non-nuclear military capabilities, and may in some cases include economic, police, surveillance, judicial, and political measures. Moreover, as was noted at an earlier workshop, the Alliance’s current operations are important for deterrence—above all, the Alliance’s most demanding operation at present, that in Afghanistan. NATO is shaping its reputation in combat and in its struggle to establish security in this country. It is for this reason that the Vilnius workshop included a panel on “Contingencies and Scenarios” as well as one on “Capabilities and Options.” The workshops on NATO and deterrence in 2007-2008 devoted considerable attention to the concept of “tailored deterrence,” but the potential benefits for the Alliance from analysis of this concept have not yet been fully explored.[2] The “tailored deterrence” concept may point the way to deepened understanding of the requirements of deterrence, intellectual and practical. With the accession of Albania and Croatia in April 2009, the Alliance has 28 member states. The continuing enlargement process means that an increasingly smaller proportion of the Allies bears direct nuclear risks and responsibilities. For this reason and others, the following questions are critical for future Alliance policy: How can the Alliance improve its nuclear risk- and responsibility-sharing arrangements? What additional forms of sharing and consultations in the nuclear domain would be substantive and advantageous? How and to what extent are the traditional rationales for nuclear risk- and responsibility-sharing in the Alliance evolving? Fulfilling the “assurance” function of the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence posture remains a critical and closely related challenge.[3] At the same time, if proposals are implemented as previously planned, the United States and certain European Allies (the Czech Republic, Denmark, Poland, and the United Kingdom) may bear exceptional responsibilities concerning protection for most of the Alliance against long-range missile threats.[4] At the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO heads of state and government tasked the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session “to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the United States system for review at our 2009 Summit, to inform any future political decision.”[5] At the April 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, Alliance leaders noted that “a future United States’ contribution of important architectural elements could enhance NATO elaboration of this Alliance effort.” They accordingly reaffirmed “the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity,” and tasked the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to formulate “recommendations comprising architecture alternatives . . . for consideration at our next Summit.”[6] The challenge of identifying options for the protection of the Allies in southeast Europe not covered by projected U.S. missile defenses has raised burden-sharing issues that deserve analysis and discussion within the framework of the Alliance’s overall deterrence posture. More broadly, the Allies remain interested, as they affirmed at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, in “transforming . . . forces, capabilities and structures” in order to ensure “the Alliance’s ability to conduct the full range of its missions, including collective defence and crisis response operations on and beyond Alliance territory.”

Internals – Afghanistan k2 NATO

Alliance of NATO and US action is key to NATO credibility

**Bensahel 3** (Nora, Public Policy Expert at RAND, “The Counterterror Coalitions,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1746/MR1746.pdf)IM

NATO reacted swiftly and strongly to the September 11 attacks. Within hours, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) unanimously con- demned the attacks and pledged its assistance and support.1 NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, speaking with Secretary of State Colin Powell later that evening, encouraged the United States to for- mally invoke the collective self-defense provisions included in Article 5 of the NATO Charter. Robertson later recalled that he told Powell that “invoking Article 5 would be a useful statement of political backing, that it would help the United States build an instant anti- terror coalition based in part on the moral authority behind Article 5, and that it would be a deterrent—in that whoever was responsible for the attack would know they had taken on not just the United States, but also the greatest military alliance in the world.”2 U.S. officials soon responded that they would welcome an invocation of Article 5, even though they later stressed that they had not officially asked NATO to do so.3 Robertson quickly set out to build a consensus among NATO’s 19 members. Some of the allies expressed reservations about invoking Article 5, including Germany, Belgium, and Norway, and objections from the Netherlands delayed the final decision for several hours.4 Yet Robertson strongly pushed the allies toward consensus, arguing that failing to invoke Article 5 in response to such blatant attacks would fundamentally weaken the alliance and undermine its ability to respond to future crises. At 9:30 pm on September 12, NATO in- voked Article 5 for the first time in its 52-year history. The North Atlantic Council issued a statement that read in part: The Council agreed that if it is determined that this attack was di- rected from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. Many NATO members hoped that invoking Article 5 would lead the United States to conduct any military response against al Qaeda un- der the NATO flag, or at least coordinate its actions with the inte- grated military structure and political institutions, in order to guarantee the alliance’s credibility. Yet by early October, the U.S. decisionmakers made clear that the alliance would not be involved in any military actions against Afghanistan. As one U.S. senior official noted, “I think it’s safe to say that we won’t be ask- ing SACEUR [the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] to put to- gether a battle plan for Afghanistan.”7 The United States did ask NATO to provide certain forms of support, however. On October 3, the United States asked NATO to provide assistance in eight specific areas.

Internals – Afghanistan k2 NATO

**NATO success in Afghanistan is key to sustain the alliance**

**Shea 7** (Jaime, Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of the Secretary General @ NATO, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 31(2), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/31-2pdfs/Shea.pdf)IM

Getting it right in Afghanistan is essential not only for NATO’s pres- ent but also for its future. Operations are driving NATO’s transformation by making both its strengths and its weaknesses much more visible. Five major lessons have come to light that NATO must integrate fully within its bureaucracy and working culture in the months ahead if it is to be truly fit for the purpose of becoming an expeditionary alliance. If NATO decides to issue a new Strategic Concept at its sixtieth anniversary summit in 2009, these five lessons would undoubtedly need to be the core of this document. NATO today is increasingly used by its members to organize military stabilization operations. Afghanistan and Kosovo will keep NATO coun- tries occupied for some years yet. Success in both places will also largely determine NATO’s future credibility as an instrument of choice for han- dling important security challenges. Afghanistan and Kosovo, however, will not be NATO’s last operations. When we look at the international security climate today, one thing stands out: there is an increasing demand for in- ternational stabilization missions, both to resource the ones already underway and to be able to launch new ones.

****Afghanistan is critical for NATO credibility****

Brzezinski 2009, (Zbigniew , Octm former U.S. National Security Adviser, http://www.ihavenet.com/Agenda-for-NATO-Toward-Global-Security-Web.html accessed 7/7) CM

In the course of its 60 years NATO has institutionalized three truly monumental transformations in world affairs: first, the end of the centuries-long "civil war" within the West for transoceanic and European supremacy; second, the United States' post-World War II commitment to the defense of Europe against Soviet domination (resulting from either a political upheaval or even World War III); and third, the peaceful termination of the Cold War, which ended the geopolitical division of Europe and created the preconditions for a larger democratic European Union. These successes, however, give rise to a legitimate question: What next? NATO now confronts historically unprecedented risks to global security. Today's world is threatened neither by the militant fanaticism of a territorially rapacious nationalist state nor by the coercive aspiration of a globally pretentious ideology embraced by an expansive imperial power. The paradox of our time is that the world, increasingly connected and economically interdependent for the first time in its entire history, is experiencing intensifying popular unrest. Yet there is no effective global security mechanism for coping with the growing threat of violent political chaos stemming from humanity's recent political awakening. Additionally complicating is the fact that the dramatic rise of China and India and the quick recovery of Japan within the last 50 years have signaled that the global center of political and economic gravity is shifting away from the North Atlantic toward Asia and the Pacific. This dispersal of global power and the expanding mass political unrest make for a combustible mixture. In this dangerous setting, the first order of business for NATO members is to define together, and then to pursue together, a politically acceptable outcome to its out-of region military engagement in Afghanistan. It must be pursued on a genuinely shared military and economic basis, without caveats regarding military participation or evasions regarding badly needed financial assistance for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such a resolution of NATO's first campaign based on Article 5 is necessary to sustain alliance credibility.

**Troop and alliance commitment is key to NATO resolve**

**The Star 8’** (no author, Apr 05, http://www.thestar.com/article/410401 accessed 7/8) CM

If anyone can take satisfaction from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in Bucharest that wrapped up yesterday, it is **Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Armed with a no-nonsense mandate from Parliament, Harper demanded and got the help Canada needs to keep 2,500 troops in Afghanistan for the next four years. Canada's nudge was good for NATO, too. It helped motivate French President Nicolas Sarkozy to commit 700 troops to eastern Afghanistan,** which will allow the Americans to shift 1,000 to Kandahar, where we are struggling to contain a Taliban insurgency. Harper chose to read this as a sign not only that "**Canada's voice has been taken very seriously," which is true, but also as evidence of "a rallying of NATO resolve in Afghanistan."**

Internals – US k2 NATO

**US military presence is key for NATO fosters reassurance policies and prevent breakup**

**Duffield 94**, (John , Winter, Assistant Prof. of Gov and Foreign Affairs @ the University of Virginia, Political Science Quarterly, 109(5) http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-3195%28199424%2F199524%29109%3A5%3C763%3ANFATCW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T accessed 7/9) CM

**The most important intra-alliance function is that of reassurance.** **The continued existence of NATO, including its integrated military struc­ture and the U S military presence**, **assures its members that they have nothing to fear from one another**.27 Of particular concern in this regard, of course, is newly unified Germany. As many analysts have noted, few if any concrete reasons exist for expecting a renewal of German aggression. Germany has willingly accepted sharp limits on its military capabilities. More fundamentally, the values of democracy, antimilitarism, and international cooperation are deeply entrenched in the Federal Republic.28 Nevertheless, **perceptions do matter**, and the profound change that has occurred in Germany's position within the European state system will inevitably raise questions about its future foreign policy orienta­tion. West Germany's already substantial economic power and its long­term military potential have been augmented by unification. In addi­tion, Germany now faces fewer external constraints on its behavior while enjoying greater opportunities for self-assertion, especially those afforded by the reopening of Central and Eastern Europe. Thus it would not be unnatural for countries that have been victimized by Germany in the past to be concerned that Germany might someday use its new power in ways that are inimical to their interests. Just as it took some years for its neighbors to become comfortable with the idea of a rearmed West Germany, they will need time to get used to the presence of a unified Germany in their midst.29 In the meantime, the maintenance of stability requires forestalling the emergence of acute fears of Germany, or of any other West Euro­pean country for that matter, and **NATO remains the leading institu‑ tional vehicle for performing this essential reassurance function.** As Christoph Bertram, former director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, has argued, "**NATO makes German power control­lable and thus acceptable to allies and political adversaries alike. Ger­many outside NATO would raise international concerns.**"" Indeed, during the critical 1990 negotiations over the terms of German unifica­tion, even Soviet leaders concluded that it would be best for Germany to remain firmly integrated within NATO.31 **NATO reduces the possibility of conflict among its West European members in three ways: it increases transparency; it inhibits the rena­tionalization of their security policies; and by binding the United States to the continent, it ensures the maintenance of a balance of power in the region The most important intra-alliance function is that of able to keep few secrets from each other**, **and they have fewer incentives to do so**

US troops make up three quarters of NATO troops in Afghanistan – its only there because the US is

**People’s Daily 9** (Dec 4 2009, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/6831871.html)IM

NATO allies and other nations have responded to U.S. President Barack Obama's announcement of 30,000 additional troops for Afghanistan, added to the current 65,000, by increasing their own contribution by at least 5,000 extra soldiers, the alliance's spokesman said on Thursday. "Based on what we have heard in just the last 24 hours, I think we can confidently say that we will surpass that amount, we are beyond the 5,000 figure," said spokesman James Appathurai. He spoke to journalists as NATO foreign ministers were gathering to discuss Obama's call for at least 5,000 troops to join the U.S. reinforcements headed to Afghanistan next year. The U.S. troop surge is part of a revised strategy focusing on counter-insurgency that aims to stem the rising tide of Taliban attacks and win over the Afghan population with a combination of increased security, development projects and training to build up effective and reliable Afghan security forces. NATO is expected to announce more details of allied troop increases at the ministerial meeting on Friday, but several nations have already indicated they will add to their contingents. Italy said it will add about 1,000 troops, increasing its contribution by almost one-third. Britain is sending a further 500,taking its total to almost 10,000; Poland is expected to deploy 600 more; Slovakia 25, Portugal 150, and non-NATO member Georgia 900. Others have been more cautious. French President Nicolas Sarkozy says France will not be adding to its 3,300, but it is open to sending more training teams for the Afghan police. Sarkozy has suggested he could review France's position after a UN conference on Afghanistan in London next month. Germany is debating an extension of the mandate of 4,400 but is unlikely to add to that number. The total size of the force has risen to 83,467, said Brig. Gen. Eric Tremblay, ISAF spokesman.

Internals – US k2 NATO

US presence is key to NATO commitment which is key to Afghan stability

**Rubin 6** (Barnett, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sept 21 2006, foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2006/RubinTestimony060921.pdf)IM

In the past six months, a number of events have raised the stakes in Afghanistan and further threatened the international effort there. The handover of command from the US- led coalition to NATO means that Afghanistan is now not only the first battleground of the so-called “War on Terror,” but a testing ground for the future of the Atlantic alliance. The Taliban-led insurgency based in Pakistan has shown new capabilities in the south and east, challenging both the US and NATO, while suicide bombings, unknown in Afghanistan before their successful use by the Iraqi insurgents, have sown terror in Kabul and other areas as well. 2 A particularly daring attack on a Coalition convoy killed 16 people, including two US soldiers, close to the US embassy in one of the most heavily defended areas of Kabul on September 8. On May 29th in Kabul an accidental crash of a US military vehicle that killed an Afghan sparked a riot in which 17 people were killed. Rioters, who chanted slogans against the US, President Karzai, and foreigners in general, attacked NGOs, diplomatic residences, brothels, hotels and restaurants where they thought alcohol was served, media offices, businesses, and the parliament. These riots exposed the incapacity of the police, many of whom disappeared, and the vulnerability of the government to mass violence, even in the capital. This event exacerbated ethno-factional tensions within the governing elite, as the President accused opposition leaders of exploiting acts of violence by demonstrators largely from Panjsher, home of the leading group of the Northern Alliance, charges that Panjsheri leaders denied. 3 The riots showed violent opposition to the government and the US not from the Taliban but also from members of a group that had led the resistance to the Taliban. With many trends pointing in the wrong direction, it is time to rethink strategy and significantly increase both the level of resources available and the effectiveness of their use. As the largest troop contributor and aid donor, the US has to lead this transformation and reassure its allies in the country to ensure sufficient resources. For decades US policy makers of all administrations, however, have underestimated the stakes for the US and the world in Afghanistan, and they continue to do so today.

Internals – Troops k2 Afghanistan

Removal of NATO troops would be detrimental to Afghan stability

**O’Donnell 10** (Lynne, AFP News, May 30 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iqDMZjM6MGVQygJpNsVwUl1I8XoA)IM

KABUL — Six months into a multi-billion-dollar scheme to train Afghanistan's police and army to make their country secure, fundamental problems such as addiction, desertion and illiteracy remain, officials say. Ethnic tensions, lack of leadership skills and a shortage of trainers also continue to dog efforts to create a competent security force from the ground up within the next four years. The programme, run by three-star US General Bill Caldwell, faces a wide range of "challenges," he told AFP in an interview, but said it was already close to meeting its goal of 305,000 personnel. He said the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) -- costing more than 10 billion dollars, mostly from US coffers -- aimed to recruit and train 171,000 soldiers and 134,000 police officers. "Right now we're at 115,000 in the army, 104,000 in the police," he said. Afghanistan's ability to take over responsibility for securing its borders and quelling insurgency is seen as vital to Western plans to end engagement in a war NATO and its allies have been fighting since 2001. NATO and the United States will have 150,000 troops in Afghanistan by August, up from 130,000 now, charged with routing the Taliban from their strongholds in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand. In approving the deployment of an extra 30,000 troops for an escalated counter-insurgency campaign -- aimed at eradicating the Taliban threat before the end of the year -- President Barack Obama made clear there will be no more. Britain's new defence minister has also said he wants troops out "as soon as possible" and that the limits of deployment have been reached. The country won’t be able to sustain stability without a self-dependant defence force. With the war becoming ever more unpopular with the Western public, pressure is building on President Hamid Karzai to make good on his pledge to take over security by the end of his current five-year term in 2014.

NATO control in Afghanistan is key

**Nelson 4** (Richard, Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2 2004, www.acus.org/.../0406-NATO\_Role\_Confronting\_International\_Terrorism.pdf)IM

Afghanistan provides both a useful model and a key test for NATO in meeting the challenges of terrorism and the new international security environment. If it fails here, it will fail everywhere. NATO forces were invited by the Afghan government and operate under a UN mandate, thus providing the necessary political context for members to participate. The key test is whether or not members and partners will meet the requirements for future troop rotations. In Afghanistan, a more unified command and control arrangement is needed, this must come partly from stronger leadership from the allied nations and partly from less unipolar action by the U.S. This would also involve NATO command over the full range of missions: conducting stability operations of the type now conducted by ISAF, but with expanded geographic scope to cover the entire country; managing provincial reconstruction teams so that limited assets, such as helicopters, may be more efficiently allocated; and undertaking offensive counter-terrorist operations of the type now conducted by U.S. Task Force 103.

Removal of NATO troops too soon would cause deterioration of the political and security situations

**Foxley 9** (Tim, Researcher @ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), April 1 2009, The Shadow NATO Summit, p. 29)IM

Probably more than ever before - positive intentions, much achieved and learnt. The “Comprehensive Approach”—although I have problems with the term, is—a helpful reminder of intent. However, it risks becoming meaningless cliché. Again, a problem of theory versus practise—PRTs may be a good idea, but there has been a very flawed and fragmented application on the ground. Is there an exit strategy in Afghanistan? I am not entirely sure what “exit strategy” means? Is it clever packaging to cover failure? Of course it roughly means ensuring the Afghan government can stand on its own feet, but there has been nothing specific in the Obama grand unveiling aside perhaps from a greater emphasis on building up Afghan National Security Forces. But NATO is now looking to conspire with the US to redefine success–because of the war-weariness of the international community–with individual nations drifting away. Is NATO trapped by this very naïve statement that “failure is not an option” and that instead, war-weariness, casualties and cost are dictating the pace. There is a serious risk of a very messy political and security situation being left behind if NATO pulls out too early.

DA Turns Case\*\*

US-EU military cooperation through NATO is key to global stability – the alternative is unrestrained US unilateralism, turning the case

**Sloan 3** (Stanley, Founding Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative, Defense News, Sept 15 2003, http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Soft,%20hard%20power.html)IM

Current efforts to mend fences across the Atlantic suggest that rehabilitation of trans-Atlantic relations is just as important and difficult as stabilizing Iraq. The international system simply does not work very well when the United States and Europe are at loggerheads. Now, as the atmosphere of the relationship improves, the United States and Europe would be well advised to look seriously at creating a new framework to make future cooperation more relevant to their common security interests. Mastering 21st century security challenges obviously will require the effective use of military power to deal with tyrants like Saddam Hussein and terrorists like Osama bin Laden. It is good news that U.S.-European military cooperation has quietly expanded to global levels, with NATO taking on missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. But most of the struggle against terrorism and instability will require deployment of soft power as effectively as the United States used its hard power in Iraq. This temptation, like the U.S. unilateral temptation, threatens trans-Atlantic cooperation and therefore international stability. François Heisbourg, director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique think tank, has argued persuasively that his government should avoid the divisive rhetoric of multipolarity and pursue a multilateral agenda of cooperation with the United States and others. In fact, if Europeans would move away from the multipolar temptation and the United States would rein in its unilateralist instincts, the recent U.S.-European divide could be bridged in a soft power multilateral solution. They could demonstrate their commitment to such a constructive direction by preparing a new Atlantic Community Treaty, to be signed by all NATO and EU members, creating a soft power framework of cooperation to complement NATO and the EU’s work in the hard power arena. Such a structure would be ideally suited for dealing with the complex issues raised by globalization and the post-Sept. 11 terrorist and security challenges. To advance such a soft power alliance, Europe must show a greater willingness to blend its impressive soft power capabilities with hard power to provide coherent answers to tomorrow’s challenges. And the United States must build a better balance between soft and hard power instruments in its foreign and security policy tool kit. In the long run, the effective marriage of U.S. and European soft and hard power capabilities would help prevent some problems from becoming military challenges, and enhance the ability of the world community to deal with post-conflict scenarios in ways that promote stability.

NATO is key to success in Afghanistan

**NPA 8** (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Nov 15 2008, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1671)IM

The situation in Afghanistan continues to be NATO’s top operational priority,” José Lello, President of the NATO PA, told journalists during the press conference opening the session on 14 November. But he stressed, “There is no purely military solution in Afghanistan . We need a concerted effort by the Afghan authorities and all international players in Afghanistan, including the UN, NATO, the EU and others.” Addressing the NATO PA’s Economics and Security Committee on 15 November, Lt. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry, Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and previously commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan , noted progress in voter registration for next year’s elections, building infrastructure, education, and training Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). He presented the challenges facing NATO in Afghanistan as securing next year’s elections, developing effective ANSF, dealing with militant extremism and terrorism on the Pakistani side of the Afghan-Pakistani border, delivering the Comprehensive Approach agreed during the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, and marshalling “the right operational capabilities and forces.” Eikenberry expressed optimism that these challenges could be met but called for parliamentarians’ support “in explaining this very complex and difficult mission to your constituents.”

DA Turns Case\*\*

An unstable Afghanistan leads to central Asian instability and war and terrorism

**Kalburov 9** (Ivan, Move One, Nov. 25 2009, http://www.moveoneinc.com/blog/asia/instability-may-spread-from-afghanistan-to-central-asia/)IM

Analysts forecast instability can spread from Afghanistan to other states in central Asia. The landlocked war-torn Afghanistan heavily depends on deliveries through its neighbors for all kinds of supplies. We already wrote about the difficulties in transporting goods in the country, but if the insurgents stretch beyond its borders, it will become even more difficult for logistics companies to supply Afghanistan with products and equipment. As the long-lasting post-Soviet crisis is being further fueled by the current economic one, social problems are starting to create fertile ground for radical religious movements such as the one in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s Taliban may seek to establish a foothold in ex-Soviet Central Asia to recruit supporters and disrupt supplies for U.S. troops in Afghanistan, regional security officials said Tuesday. Former Soviet republics Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan act as transit nations for U.S. Afghan supplies and all but Kazakhstan have reported armed clashes with Islamists this year. In the past year, the Taliban insurgency has spread to parts of northern Afghanistan that had long been relatively peaceful, even as violence raged in the south and east of the country. ‘The deteriorating situation in northern Afghanistan enables the Taliban to spread their influence in that region, giving international terrorists more opportunities to infiltrate the territory of Central Asian states,’ Mikhail Melikhov, a senior official at the Common Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), told a conference in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek. CSTO, dominated by Russia, is a defense bloc of ex-Soviet republics. Marat Imankulov, the head of the anti-terrorist center of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), another post-Soviet bloc that focuses on economic and political ties, said security risks were compounded by the economic downturn. ‘Frankly speaking, the economic crisis in the CIS countries is turning into a social one,’ he told the conference. ‘We cannot avoid talking about the growing risks of extremist and terrorist activities.’ Imankulov said some security analysts expected the Taliban to try destabilizing Central Asian states ‘to disrupt equipment and food supply channels for coalition forces.’

NATO is crucial to achieve victory in Afghanistan and stabilize Central Asia

**Sare 9** (Harold, Prof of Int. Politics, July 6 2009, http://www.stillwaternewspress.com/editorials/local\_story\_187102639.html)IM

United States interests are critical in the Pakistani insurgency situation. Terrorist forces cannot be permitted to take over Pakistan. Since September 2001 Pakistan and the U.S. have been in an alliance to eliminate terrorist activities and terrorist camps in Pakistan. Pakistan urges in its foreign policy that a strong, but terrorist-free state be created in Afghanistan. Neither the U.S. nor Pakistan can afford to permit active terrorist activities which could ravish the U.S., Europe, and other critical areas in the world. The Pakistani government has captured and turned over more than 600 al-Qaeda members and allies of the al-Qaeda to the U.S. The United States has provided economic assistance and debt relief for Pakistan. More than $3 billion in economic aid and military assistance was committed to Pakistan by President Bush in 2003. The U.S. has sold F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan to strengthen its military. The U.S. is vitally concerned about Pakistan’s control of its nuclear weapons. These weapons, probably located in the Punjab area, simply can not be allowed to fall into the hands of a state dominated by extremist groups. The U.S. expects India, China, and Russia to have a supporting interest in this objective. What can the United States do? First, we must not make mistakes in this region that we made in Iraq. There is great danger of getting bogged down militarily in Afghanistan and even in Pakistan. President Obama, moving more troops into the area and articulating a heavy focus on this area, must be very cautious. The U.S. should have been giving more attention to this area since 2001. It was evident prior to 2001 that Central Asia was a hot-bed of terrorist activities that threatened the U.S. as well as other critical areas of the world. Secondly, we must search out moderate political forces, work with them, and cultivate their support. In Afghanistan there are regional forces that oppose the radical Taliban; and it is known that in the Taliban there are moderate elements that are willing to work with a moderate government. We must continue to work with NATO and the U.N. in efforts to stabilize the politics, improve government, and develop the economy of Afghanistan. Moderate coalitions supporting the government and the economy must be forged. New ways of dealing with cultivation of poppies are being considered in efforts to deny the Taliban as much as $50 million annually in revenue. Economic improvement of agriculture in the rural areas is being worked on; and other industries are being developed. Hopefully, the Afghans, a furiously independent but capable people, will respond.

DA Turns Case\*\*

Afghan stability is key to prevent instability in Pakistan and nuclear conflict

**Indian Express 9** (Oct 27 2009, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/afghan-instability-increases-risk-of-conflag/533860/)IM

Asserting that the Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his deputies are in Northwest Pakistan, a top American Senator has said that instability in Afghanistan is too dangerous for nuclear-armed Pakistan as the world cannot afford turbulence there. "While stabilising Afghanistan is not going to solve all of our problems in Afghanistan, I understand that instability in Afghanistan only increases the risk of conflagration where the world can least afford it, next door in Pakistan," Senator John Kerry said in a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, a Washington-based think-tank. "That's why, regardless of what happens in Afghanistan, and especially if we want to reduce the needs for additional boots on the ground over the long-haul, it is vitally important that we support, that we intensify even, our support and improve our cooperation with Pakistan," said Kerry, who is chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Kerry, who has just returned from Afghanistan and Pakistan, said the decisions made and actions taken in the weeks and months ahead will be what really gives meaning to that moment and definition to the future of both the countries. Observing that what happens inside Afghanistan is important to US's strategic interests, Kerry said: "our goals and our mission do not end at Afghanistan's borders. No front is more important in our fight against international terrorism than nuclear-armed Pakistan, and the chaos next door in Afghanistan would have enormous repercussions there." Emphasising that bringing stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan is not the job of the United States alone, Kerry said: "The United States cannot do it alone. We want all nations to trade and invest in Afghanistan but we also want all nations to help with stabilising the country, including the cooperation of President Karzai."

Failure to check the Taliban will cause heightened insecurity, rapid recruitment, instability, halted economic development and ethnic violence

**Brookings Institute 9** (Vanda Felbab-Brown, Fellow – Foreign Policy, Oct 12 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/10120\_afghanistan\_felbabbrown.aspx)IM

In the Afghanistan strategy debate, two basic options have crystallized: a militarily beefed-up counterinsurgency or limited counterterrorism through selective strikes, many from the air and offshore. Public support seems limited for the former. Given the importance of the on-ground human intelligence, the effectiveness of the latter is questionable and, anyway, narrow counterterrorism was essentially the U.S. policy in Afghanistan until 2005 while the Taliban grew and al Qaeda regrouped. Hence strategists are proposing options that lie seductively "in the middle." But these are unlikely to reverse the deteriorating security and produce a self-sufficient Afghan government. The first middle option is the continuation of the current mission with current resources. As the remainder of the 21,000 U.S. troops approved earlier deploys to Afghanistan, a reversal of the inauspicious trends may yet emerge. But the odds are low: The current ISAF levels are simply not sufficient to provide necessary security for even large cities, such as Lashkar Gah and Kandahar. As allies start peeling off next year, the struggle to maintain even current security will intensify. Moreover, parts of Afghanistan previously thought immune from Taliban destabilization – especially the north – have seen a disturbing rise of Taliban activity. The Taliban does not have to hold there to generate enough insecurity to halt economic development and provoke ethnic violence. Unless the Taliban commits some egregious mistakes, staying at current levels means drift to more insecurity and losing the patience of the Afghan people.

DA Turns Case\*\*

Unilateral action by the US fragments NATO – cooperation is key to rebuild a stable Afghanistan

**Hamilaton 3** (Hon. Lee, pres. and director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Feb 25 2003, www.wilsoncenter.org/about/director/.../Hamilton\_germamerrel.doc)IM

The transatlantic alliance is being strained by a belligerent and reckless America that verges on imperialism, Despite these differences, Europe and the U.S. remain the only conceivable international partners for one another in pursuing common values and common security concerns. Currently, there are many issues of common interest to the U.S. and Europe, and many areas for cooperation: Combating Terrorism. While there has been disagreement about Iraq, there is widespread agreement on the need to root out the al Qaeda network, which threatens both Europe and the U.S. Cooperation on counter-terrorism must include law-enforcement, intelligence sharing, joint military operations, diplomacy, and tracking of terrorist financing. The recent German prosecution of the first man to be tried in relation to the 9/11 attacks demonstrates the results that this cooperation can yield. Rebuilding Afghanistan. The German armed forces have just taken joint control of the international peacekeeping force in Kabul. Rebuilding a secure and stable Afghanistan is a vital political, economic and moral obligation of the transatlantic alliance, and only through sustained cooperation can we succeed.

DA Turns Case – Humanitarian Aid

NATO is key to establish sustainable humanitarian aid and stability in Afghanistan

**Quillen 10** (David, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, June 27 2010, http://www.ntm-a.com/aircorps/987-a-show-of-force-and-humanitarian-aid-badakhshan-gets-a-visit?lang)IM

Over a period of two days, multiple Afghan forces coordinated a humanitarian drop into the region of southern Badakhshan. These forces included the Afghan National Army Air Force, Afghan National Police, International Security Assistance Force, Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan, and the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan. NATO’s role in training Afghan forces has been crucial to establishing some semblance of stability and sustainable humanitarian aid. Through the coordination of these commands the Afghan Air Force, with the assistance of the 438th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group, were able to airlift 4,000 kg of educational supplies to a school in Wakhan district with assistance from the Ministry of Education and 3,200 Kg. of relief supplies to almost 150 refugees from Barg-e-Matal who had moved to Koh-e-Munjon. They also moved a generator for the village in Ishkasim district and an air compressor. Additionally the mission afforded the Afghan Air Force the opportunity to show their air power by using the Afghan Air Force’s Mi-17 transport helicopters. This demonstrated to the people in the northern region of Badakhshan that the Afghan Air Force, and through it, the Afghan government, has the ability to reach and provide assistance into all regions of Afghanistan.

DA Turns Case – Link XT

NATO troops are key to Afghan stability

**Fox 10** (The Right Honorable Liam, MP, Sec. of State for Defense in the UK, July 7 2010, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Afghanistan-Standing-Shoulder-to-Shoulder-with-the-United-States.html)IM

So what will success look like? Let us remember that our mission in Afghanistan is first, foremost, and in its finality a mission of national security. Our purpose is to degrade and manage the terrorist threat emanating from the region to ensure al-Qaeda cannot once again have sanctuary in Afghanistan. So in Afghanistan, success means, first, continuing to reverse the momentum of the Taliban-led insurgency; second, to contain and reduce the threat from the insurgency to a level that allows the Afghan government to manage it themselves; and third, creating a stable and capable enough system of national security and governance so the Afghan government can provide internal security on an enduring basis. This is necessarily a comprehensive effort, requiring international cooperation. So we must remember this is not a classic war of attrition. Our aims will not, and cannot, be achieved by military means alone. There is no cliff edge towards which the Taliban are being herded. There will be no decisive Napoleonic battle. There is no group of commanders sitting patiently in a tent awaiting a delegation under a white flag offering a formal surrender. Insurgencies usually end with political settlements, so bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan will be a process and not an event. An effective government—on both the local and national levels—and an inclusive political settlement will be vital to lasting peace. Supporting and facilitating the Afghan government’s political reconciliation and reintegration initiatives such as the recent Peace Jirga must be an imperative, but we must also keep pressure on the Afghan government to make progress on the pledges made at the London Conference—to tackle corruption and to improve its efficiency. The aim of these initiatives is to provide confidence in the Afghan people for a better future: \* By showing the Afghan people that their path leads away from the Taliban. \* By supporting brave individuals and villages who stand up to intimidation. \* By encouraging local shuras to seek and support the stability and security that ISAF, the ANSF, and the Afghan government can bring. That is why the work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and the troops of the allied members of NATO are so important, with civilian experts from a wide range of government departments operating alongside the military to help local Afghans bring improved governance, services, and development. Improvements which reduce the need for ordinary Afghans to turn to the Taliban for work, money, or justice make security and lasting stability more likely.

NATO is crucial to achieve victory in Afghanistan and stabilize Central Asia

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DA Turns Case – Impact XT

Stability in Afghanistan is key to prevent conflict escalation in Central Asia

**Lal 6** (Rollie, political scientist at Rand and PhD in intl studies from Johns Hopkins, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A450305&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)IM

The Asian states neighboring Central Asia have historic links and strong interests in the region. China, Iran, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan are critical players in the security and economic issues that will determine the future of Central Asia and affect U.S. interests in the region. All of these states are of importance to the United States, whether due to the war on terrorism, economic ties, arms control, nonproliferation, or other reasons. China, Iran, and India have all aggressively sought to build trade ties to and through Central Asia, and China and India have also invigorated security cooperation. But regional states are concerned about the situation in Afghanistan, which they fear might lead to a spillover of conflict onto their soil, and they also fear the possibility of Pakistani activity and influence, which has led them to keep that state at arm’s length. China has indicated that security is a primary interest in the re- gion through its initiative in establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Taji- kistan, and Russia (pp. 6–7). Concerns regarding China’s Muslim Uighur separatists, as well as concerns of U.S. encirclement, underpin China’s efforts to promote regional security cooperation (pp. 4–6, 9–10). China has also moved aggressively to expand its economic in- terests in the region through commodity trade and agreements to im- port oil via pipeline from Kazakhstan (pp. 7–8). Iran has a similar perspective toward its Central Asian neigh- bors. Stability in Afghanistan lies at the heart of Iran’s concerns, as the Taliban has historically been anathema to Iran (p. 12). Iran main-tains that an international, United Nations–led military presence should remain in Afghanistan to prevent a deterioration of the secu- rity situation (pp. 11–12). However, U.S. presence there and in Cen- tral Asia creates concern in Iran that U.S. intentions are to surround and isolate Iran rather than enhance regional security (p. 16). To in- crease its leverage in the region, Iran is developing economic links with each country in Central Asia. Transport links are another impor- tant initiative, with routes being developed via Afghanistan, con- necting Iranian ports and landlocked Uzbekistan (pp. 13–16). India shares Iran’s concerns regarding the threat of militants based in Afghanistan. However, India welcomes U.S. presence in the region as a stabilizing influence (p. 34). Economic ties are growing, and India is developing transport and energy links to the region via Iran and Afghanistan (pp. 33–34). The Central Asian states have close relations with India dating to the years of the Soviet Union and the Afghan war, a history that negatively affects their relations with Pakistan. Pakistan’s relations with Central Asia suffer from lingering memories in the region of Pakistan’s role in supporting the Taliban and Islamic militancy in general. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan all remain suspicious of Pakistan’s regional intentions, and trade with Pakistan has been weak as a result (p. 25). The estab- lishment of the Karzai government in Kabul has been a blow to Paki- stan’s regional security strategy. Whereas the Taliban regime would have been friendly to Pakistan’s interests, the current government is more open to ties with India (p. 23). Although Pakistan is moving to overcome its regional reputation, robust cooperation will take time and effort (p. 26). Afghanistan remains critical to the future of Central Asia and its neighbors, as instability in Afghanistan has the potential to destabilize the region (pp. 19–20). A potent combination of drugs, weapons, and militants traverse Afghanistan and cross into Central Asia and beyond. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan fear that Islamic militants trained in Afghanistan may slip back across their borders (p. 20). Iran remains apprehensive that hostile, anti-Shia elements may take control of Afghanistan, putting Iranian security at risk (p. 12). And Pakistan and India both compete to ensure that the Afghan re- gime in power is friendly to their interests (pp. 26, 29). Although the countries across Asia do not agree on how to secure Afghanistan against threats, unanimous agreement exists on the fact that a stable Afghanistan is critical to their own security interests.

\_\_\_\*\*NATO – Afghanistan Aff Ans

UQ > Link

**Uniqueness overwhelms the link – the NATO operation in Afghanistan will be gone by the end of 2010**

**The Guardian 10** (Ian Traynor, Feb 22 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/21/dutch-government-falls-over-afghanistan)IM

The Dutch government collapsed at the weekend, making it the first European and Nato administration to fall because of the war in Afghanistan. The fourth fall of a government under the prime minister, Jan-Peter Balkenende, in eight years could end his career and is certain to usher in a period of political uncertainty that could bring big gains for the extreme anti-Muslim right. The end of Balkenende's centrist coalition, mainly of Christian and social democrats, means that the almost 2,000 Dutch troops in Afghanistan, based around Uruzgan, south-west of Kabul, will start pulling out in August and be withdrawn by the end of the year. "If nothing else will take its place, then [the Afghan mission] ends," Balkenende told Dutch television yesterday. "The image of the Netherlands is far from flourishing abroad. They do not understand what we are doing." The Netherlands could set a precedent, encouraging other European countries to get cold feet about their presence in Afghanistan. "The moment the Netherlands says as sole and first country we will no longer have activities at the end of 2010, it will raise questions in other countries and this really pains me," Balkenende said. While the prime minister sought to extend the Afghan mission, under strong pressure from Nato allies and Washington, his Labour party coalition partner opposed the extension and walked out of crisis talks on Saturday, spelling the end of the government two years into its term. The Dutch withdrawal is a blow to President Barack Obama and comes as the US and Nato troops mount their biggest operation in Afghanistan for years. The Americans have been pressing for more European troops in Afghanistan and voiced satisfaction with European pledges of some 9,000 extra forces in recent weeks. But the Americans are demanding that the Europeans supply 2,000 trainers for the Afghan army and police.

No Link

Overhaul from Washington checks any backsliding in US-NATO relations

**Awwal 2** (Rabi-ul, Dawn Newspaper Writer, June 4 2002, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27c/006.html)IM

The flurry of activity comes in response to fears that, by making a habit of unilateral action, the United States - which is way ahead of Europe in military technology and defence spending - could marginalize the alliance. But instead of snubbing NATO, Washington is now leading efforts to revitalize it. WASHINGTON SEEKS OVERHAUL: The senior official said that US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld would propose a review of NATO's command structure, raising the question of whether it still needs a Supreme Allied Commander based in North America (SACLANT) as well as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). And Britain's Sunday Telegraph reported this week that the Pentagon would also propose that NATO set up small, highly mobile units for risky missions. NATO officials said such a plan would be in keeping with the alliance's push for "smart" forces that can be deployed quickly and sustainably to far-flung troublespots.

NATO is initiating reforms to regain primacy – its actions will check the impacts of US withdrawal from Afghanistan

**Awwal 2** (Rabi-ul, Dawn Newspaper Writer, June 4 2002, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27c/006.html)IM

BRUSSELS, June 3: NATO is drawing up a new "military concept" to define its role in the fight against global terrorism and put an end to the identity crisis which has plagued it since September 11, officials said on Monday. Sidelined by the US military campaign in Afghanistan, NATO is working to make itself relevant for threats and security challenges that may lie far beyond the borders of Europe that it guarded during the Cold War. Defence ministers from the 19-nation alliance will kickstart the process at a meeting in Brussels on Thursday and the package of measures will be agreed at a summit in Prague next November. They will consider plans to streamline NATO's cumbersome military command structure and start work on a shopping list of military hardware to defend against weapons of mass destruction and get boots on the ground quickly when crises erupt. "The main function of this new military concept is to define NATO's role, and in particular the military role in relation to terrorism," a senior NATO official said. It will consider what role NATO could play in attacks on non-member countries outside its traditional area of operations and how it can contribute to international coalitions.

NATO is committed to remaining in Afghanistan

**Poppelwell 9** (Teresa, Forced Migration Online, FMO Research Guide: Afghanistan,, July 2009, p. 9, www.forcedmigration.org/guides/fmo006/fmo006.pdf)IM

On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed authority for the ISAF mission with the aim of creating a common command structure to enable better planning and coordination. In October 2003, the United Nations extended ISAF’s mandate to the whole of Afghanistan (UNSCR 1510) which created the legal conditions for the expansion of the mission. As of January 2007, there are currently 37 Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) with a total of approximately 32,800 troops. In addition, the American led ‘Enduring Freedom’ has approximately 8,000 troops which continue to focus on hunting down Al Queda. Around the country there are five Regional Commands (RCs). Each of the Regional Commands has a varying number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams – each led by various contributing nations, which report to them. Recent events indicate that NATO/ISAF’s engagement in Afghanistan will continue for the long term. On 6 September 2006, President Karzai and the Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer signed the ‘Declaration by NATO and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’ which is a framework for long term cooperation and partnership. This declaration, as well as the fact that the NATO presence in the region is an important element on the ‘war on terror’, indicates that NATO and the ISAF mission will have an enduring presence in Afghanistan for a number of years. ISAF will remain in Afghanistan until ‘the people of Afghanistan have developed government structures and security forces that are sustainable and capable of ensuring the security of all Afghans without outside support.’ ISAF’s primary role is to support the Government of Afghanistan in providing and maintaining a secure environment that will be conducive to establishing democratic structures, to facilitate the reconstruction of the country and to assist in expanding the influence of the central government. ISAF’s key military tasks include: assisting the Afghan government in extending its authority across the country, conducting stability and security operations in coordination with the Afghan national security forces: mentoring and supporting the Afghan national army; and supporting Afghan government programmes to disarm illegally armed groups.

No Link

Turkey would take the place of the US – strong military and second largest standing army

**Aorere 9** (Manatu, NZ Ministry of For. Affairs and Trade, June 25 2009, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Middle-East/Turkey.php)IM

There have been signs that relations were improving between Armenia and Turkey ever since President Gül attended an Armenian/Turkish World Cup qualifying football match in Armenia’s capital Yerevan in September last year (the first visit by a Turkish leader to Armenia). Since then, intense discussions have occurred at all levels between the governments of Armenia and Turkey, with the possible outcome an historic reconciliation between two traditional enemies divided by strategic differences in the Caucasus and by the Ottoman Empire’s killing of Armenians in 1915. Turkey is currently a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. It is a member of NATO and maintains one of the largest standing armies in the world, and the second largest in NATO behind the United States. As a result, its defence spending places a heavy burden on both the government budget and the balance of payments. Turkey has been engaged in Afghanistan, having led the UN-authorised International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), for six months in 2002-3 and again from February to August 2005. It established a Provincial Reconstruction Team in November 2006, in Wardak, the province next to Bamyan, where New Zealand’s PRT is based. Turkey also plays an active role in the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and the Alliance of Civilisations, an interfaith forum New Zealand also participates in.

Link Turn – Afghanistan x Readiness

NATO engagement in Afghanistan strains US military effectiveness

Ruhle 9 (Michael, Oct 21, ,Deputy Head, Policy Planning Unit of the NATO Secretary GeneralStrategic Insights, <online>http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Sep/ruhleSep09.html date accessed 7/6)CM

At NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit in April 2009, the Alliance’s Heads of State and Government agreed that work should start on the development of a new Strategic Concept. The momentum for such a decision had been building up for quite some time. Over the past few years, NATO’s growing number of operations and missions, and in particular its engagement in Afghanistan, have put strains both on the Allies’ military capabilities and their political consensus. In addition, Russia’s new assertiveness, and notably the war in Georgia in August 2008, fueled a debate on the proper balance between collective defense at home and expeditionary missions abroad. Finally, the fact that new threats, such as a cyber attack or an energy cut-off, do not affect all Allies in quite the same way, has also led to calls for a re-definition of the meaning of Alliance solidarity. In short, ten years after the publication of the current Strategic Concept, there were found to be a number of good reasons to develop a new document. Initially, nuclear issues did not really feature among these reasons. Despite the long battle of a range of NGOs against NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements and the deployment of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons on the soil of some European Allies, NATO’s nuclear “acquis” has long been considered as essentially sound. Neither doubts in expert circles about the military utility of aircraft armed with nuclear gravity bombs, nor occasional anti-nuclear sentiments in the Parliaments of some NATO countries, would trump the logic of Alliance reassurance and risk-sharing. However, several recent developments now require NATO to revisit its nuclear dimension and to carefully consider how this is reflected in the new Strategic Concept. In particular, heightened concern about nuclear proliferation has prompted a change in U.S. rhetoric and policy. Guided by the conviction that restoring an eroding non-proliferation regime requires the United States to lead by example, President Obama’s Prague speech of April 2009 espoused the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world. To be sure, the President qualified this long-term objective with the proviso that as long as other states possessed nuclear weapons, the United States would maintain a nuclear deterrent of its own, including for the protection of its friends and Allies. In doing so, he remained within the tradition of every U.S. President since Harry Truman. In the public perception, however, these qualifications received little attention. Although the U.S. President did not touch upon NATO’s nuclear policy or posture, some European politicians were quick to interpret his plea for a nuclear-weapon-free world as support for their own goal to see U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons removed from Europe. Predictably, several NGOs reacted in similar ways, interpreting the President’s speech as an invitation to unilateral gestures by the United States and NATO. As a result, while U.S. policy on NATO’s nuclear dimension may not necessarily have changed, the public debate is characterized by expectations to the contrary.

Impact Turn – NATO 🡪 Afghan Stability\*\*

NATO aid is only quick fixes, doesn’t address the underlying causes of poverty, is poorly executed and causes heightened instability

**Oxfam 10** (Oxfam International, Humanitarian think tank, Jan 27 2010, http://www.oxfam.org.uk /resources/policy/conflict\_disasters/dangers-of-militarized-aid-afghanistan.html)IM

Undoubtedly, Afghans have seen some improvements, particularly in the expansion of access to healthcare and education. While it costs approximately $1 million a year to support the deployment of one US soldier in Afghanistan, an average of just $93 in development aid has been spent per Afghan per year over the past seven years.2 Far too much aid has focused on “quick fixes” and band-aid approaches rather than on what will produce positive and lasting results for Afghans over the long term. As political pressures to “show results” in troop contributing countries intensify, more and more assistance is being channelled through military actors to “win hearts and minds” while efforts to address the underlying causes of poverty and repair the destruction wrought by three decades of conflict and disorder are being sidelined. Development projects implemented with military money or through (the) military-dominated structures aim to achieve fast results but are often poorly executed, inappropriate and do not have sufficient community involvement to make them sustainable. There is little evidence this approach is generating stability and, in some cases, military involvement in development activities is, paradoxically, putting Afghan lives further at risk as these projects quickly become targeted by anti-government elements. As eight non-governmental organizations, working in Afghanistan for up to fifty years and currently serving over 5 million Afghans across the country, we are deeply concerned about the harmful effects of this increasingly militarized aid strategy. As leaders from 70 nations gather in London to debate the future of Afghanistan, we urge them to revaluate this approach to development and reconstruction.

Impact Turns – NATO Fails

The NATO strategy in Afghanistan is too heavily based on aid to be effective

**IRIN 10** (Integrated Regional Information Networks, June 29 2010, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/3d2a779c198dea11eae7303662874d2f.htm)IM

But according to research by the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, it is corruption and the ineffectiveness of the government rather than poverty that is at the root of Afghanistan's current insecurity. "A COIN strategy premised on using aid to win the population over to such a negatively perceived government faces an uphill struggle, especially in a competitive environment where the Taliban are perceived by many to be more effective in addressing the people's highest priority needs of security and access to justice." In the report of a conference discussing the COIN strategy in March 2010, researchers argued that ill-conceived, poorly implemented aid projects with weak oversight has done more harm than good for the international coalition in Afghanistan. "There is a need for much greater awareness regarding the destabilizing effects of aid in terms of creating perceived winners and losers, promoting a destructive war/aid economy, and fuelling corruption," the report noted. "Donors should avoid setting development aid up to fail by expecting it to deliver on unrealistically ambitious stabilisation objectives for which it is not well-suited."

NATO aid puts civilians on the front lines, creates new targets, are ineffective and not long-term solutions

**Afghanaid 10** (Jan 27 2010, Ashley Jackson, Head of Policy and Advocacy, http://www.afghanaid.org.uk/news.php/12/press\_release\_27.01.10\_aid\_agencies\_sound\_alarm\_on\_the\_militarisation\_of\_aid\_in\_afghanistan\_0)IM

 As Foreign Ministers gather in London for a major conference on Afghanistan, leading aid agencies warn that the international militaries' use of aid as a “non-lethal” weapon of war that may even be putting Afghans at greater risk. A US army manual for commanders in Afghanistan and in Iraq defines aid as a non-lethal weapon designed “to win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents”. The Afghan government estimates international forces have already spent $1.7 billion on “aid” in Afghanistan. The US military alone has budgeted an additional $1 billion for the coming year – more than Afghanistan’s state budget for agriculture, health and education combined. The eight international agencies are concerned that the militarization of aid is putting ordinary people on the frontlines of the conflict. Afghans say that the military places them at greater risk when they build schools and clinics which then become targets of armed opposition groups. The agencies say that “quick impact” projects provide a quick fix rather than sustainable development. Military-led humanitarian and development activities are driven by donors’ political interests and short-term security objectives and are often ineffective, wasteful and potentially harmful to Afghans. International guidelines agreed by ISAF and the UN state that “the military is primarily responsible for providing security, and if necessary, basic infrastructure and urgent reconstruction assistance limited to gap-filling measures until civilian organisations are able to take over” The agencies say that the international forces are going way beyond their remit. Ashley Jackson, head of policy for Oxfam International in Afghanistan, says: “There are no 'quick fixes' in Afghanistan and nobody should be cutting corners - the people here deserve better. Afghan people have coped with decades of grinding poverty, conflict and disorder and need real, long-term solutions.”

Impact Turns – NATO Fails

NATO’s training efforts kill Afghan soldiers and drain public and political support for NATO troops

**Al-Jazeera 10** (July 7 2010, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2010/07/2010778313947561.html)IM

At least five Afghan soldiers have been killed by a Nato air raid in eastern Afghanistan. The bombing took place in Ghazni province, where the soldiers were carrying out a pre-dawn raid against Taliban fighters, according to a spokesman for the Afghan defence ministry. "Isaf aircraft bombed and martyred five of our soldiers," Zaher Azimi, a spokesman for the ministry, said, referring to the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force (Isaf). "We condemn this incident and regret that this is not the first time such an incident has occurred. We hope it will be the last time." Two other soldiers were injured in the air raid. Josef Blotz, a Nato spokesman, confirmed the attack. He said he regretted the incident and that Isaf would launch an investigation. "The reason for this is perhaps a co-ordination issue," Blotz said. "We were obviously not absolutely clear whether there were Afghan national security forces in the area." He extended the personal condolences of General David Petraeus, the newly arrived commander of Nato and US forces in Afghanistan, to the families of the victims. So-called "friendly fire" incidents continue to occur in Afghanistan, despite tighter new rules of engagement designed to limit the use of air raids. A Nato air strike killed four Afghan soldiers in Wardak province in January and the German army accidentally killed five Afghan soldiers in April in a "friendly fire" incident in Kunduz province. Such incidents have been repeatedly condemned by the Afghan government, which highlights the effect the negative effect that they have on attempts to get the Afghan public, and the government, to support efforts against the Taliban.

NATO hurts Afghanistan – ineffective, unsustainable, corrupt, creates dependency and ill equipped

 **Oxfam 10** (Oxfam International, Humanitarian think tank, Jan 27 2010, http://www.oxfam.org.uk /resources/policy/conflict\_disasters/dangers-of-militarized-aid-afghanistan.html)IM

Military-dominated institutions, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), often lack the capacity to manage effective development initiatives, even where civilians are inserted into these structures. They are unable to achieve the level of local trust, engagement and community ownership required to achieve positive and lasting improvements to Afghan lives. In many cases, PRTs in insecure areas rely on local contracting companies that have limited capacities, weak links to communities and are widely seen as wasteful, ineffective and corrupt.3 Part of the problem is that the militarized aid approach focuses not on alleviating poverty but on winning the loyalty of Afghans through the provision of aid. In “Commanders’ Guide to Money as a Weapons System,” a US army manual for troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, aid is defined as “a nonlethal weapon” that is utilized to “win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents.”4 In a country where some 6,000 schools are needed, it is difficult to argue that those with the resources should refrain from building them. However, this approach to assistance is more likely to create dependencies rather than increase the self-sufficiency of communities. And given that it is so often poorly implemented, it is highly unlikely to achieve even its intended security objectives. One school constructed by a PRT in Kapisa province was found to have problems with its structural integrity and serious design flaws, with latrines emptying just above a stream that the community used as a water source. Another PRT-constructed school in the same province was found to have “design and safety issues” and “presented an unsafe environment in its current state” due to the absence of a retaining wall to prevent potential rock and mudslides.5 Achieving sustainability and local ownership is also a challenge: a review of PRTs by the US Congress found that “the lack of planning led PRTs to pursue short-term ‘feel good’ projects (with success measured by money spent or satisfaction of the local governor) without consideration of larger strategic and capacity-building implications.”6 Schools, for example, require much more than just buildings to function. They must have trained male and female teachers, relevant textbooks and curricula, a safe environment to enable children (especially girls) to attend and a sense of community ownership as well as links with the Ministry of Education (MoE) to ensure sustainability. PRTs, however, are scarcely equipped to provide anything beyond basic infrastructure, particularly given that the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, which support the assistance activities of US PRTs and battalions, are explicitly prohibited from being used for project maintenance or upkeep.7 In the words of one tribal leader from Paktia, “we have a common saying, it is better to have less from a sustainable source than having a great deal just once…we really do not need somebody to distribute biscuits to us and do not need construction projects that fall down after a year.”

Impact Turns – NATO Fails

NATO presence creates heightened conflict, civilian casualties and terrorism

**Oxfam 10** (Oxfam International, Humanitarian think tank, Jan 27 2010, http://www.oxfam.org.uk /resources/policy/conflict\_disasters/dangers-of-militarized-aid-afghanistan.html)IM

There is also increasing evidence that military involvement in development activities may be putting Afghans on the frontlines of the conflict. A recent report released by CARE, the MoE and the World Bank found that schools supported or constructed by PRTs were perceived by Afghans to be at higher risk of being attacked.12 With anti-government elements increasingly targeting education, schools built by the military in insecure areas are putting teachers and students at even greater risk.13 Many fear that, by extension, the same applies to health clinics and other community facilities constructed by PRTs or other military actors. As one aid worker said, “We try to keep PRTs away from our offices and do not interact with them because it brings threats from insurgents and suspicion from our target communities.”14 A related concern is that with so much international assistance directed towards counter- insurgency and military objectives, vulnerable populations are being forgotten. Chief among these are returning refugees from Pakistan and Iran and internally displaced people have been forced to flee their homes due to natural disasters or conflict. This problem will likely be exacerbated by the potential escalation of the conflict in 2010. Another practice that is putting civilians at risk is the use of aid as an incentive to extract information. US commanders are authorized to offer rewards “paid in cash or in the form of like-kind benefits such as food, local amenities, necessities, vehicles or communal rewards” to individuals who they believe can provide valuable intelligence.15 Offering food and other aid in exchange for information in a country where a third of the population is at risk of hunger is not only unethical, it puts Afghans in potential danger of being targeted by anti- government groups. In 2009, nine Afghans, including at least one community leader, were assassinated each week – nearly double the rate of assassinations in 2008.16

Impact Turn – NATO 🡪 Dehum

NATO presence causes dehumanization and conflict in Afghanistan

**Oxfam 10** (Oxfam International, Humanitarian think tank, Jan 27 2010, http://www.oxfam.org.uk /resources/policy/conflict\_disasters/dangers-of-militarized-aid-afghanistan.html)IM

The militarized aid approach is not working for Afghans, and more of the same is unlikely to yield different results. The overemphasis on military issues at the expense of efforts to promote genuine development and good government matters not only because of the resulting dehumanizing cost, but also because poverty, unemployment and weak, corrupt government are important drivers of conflict. Ultimately, these factors must be effectively addressed if there is to be any sustainable improvement in security and a lasting peace for Afghans. In order to address the problems of militarized aid and focus on solutions that work for Afghans, we urge world leaders meeting in London to: \* Provide stronger support for successful programming like Community-Based Education. Ensure that these programs remain separate from the work of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and are not recipients of military funding. \* Establish and implement a plan to gradually phase out PRT-provided and other militarized forms of aid. At the same the time, the capacity of and funding for national and international civilian organizations should be increased. \* Increase the ability of local organizations to design and implement development projects. \* Ensure that aid is equitably delivered throughout the country based on development and humanitarian needs, and in line with national development plans. \* Improve the capacity, responsiveness and transparency of local government. Afghans overwhelmingly want a government capable of delivering basic services and the rule of law, yet these systems remain weak and largely ineffective at the local level. \* Support the UN to take on a greater role in delivering and coordinating aid, particularly in under-resourced provinces and districts. NATO must also be more forceful in coordinating aid efforts, preserving their independence and improving their effectiveness, accountability and transparency.

NATO has weakened the Afghan government’s accountability and created dehumanizing conditions

**Oxfam 10** (Oxfam International, Humanitarian think tank, Jan 27 2010, http://www.oxfam.org.uk /resources/policy/conflict\_disasters/dangers-of-militarized-aid-afghanistan.html)IM

While some PRT projects have helped address immediate needs and contributed to reconstruction efforts, they have also slowed the process of rebuilding Afghan institutions. In assuming some of the responsibilities that the Afghan government should be fulfilling, PRTs may weaken government accountability to the Afghan people. The military does have a role to play in providing assistance to save lives and alleviate suffering in situations where no civilian actor is able to do so, but it must be provided impartially and on the basis of need. The Civil Military Guidelines, agreed upon by ISAF and the UN, state that only “in exceptional circumstances and as a last resort, military assets…may be deployed for the purpose of providing humanitarian assistance.” PRT Policy Note 3 also specifically states that humanitarian assistance “must not be used for the purpose of political gain, relationship building or ‘winning hearts and minds’…and must uphold the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality,” – neither of which describe the PRT’s actions.

Impact Turn – NATO x I. Law

NATO presence undermines international law

**Kabul Press 9** (Matthew Nasuti, US State Dept official, Nov 8 2009, http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article4239)IM

NATO operates 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, with a goal to add teams to every one of its 34 provinces. The PRTs primarily consist of military personnel, with a mix of civilian aid officials and technical experts. They serve a dual function of supporting military operations and aiding civilian reconstruction and are an integral part of NATO’s counterinsurgency (COIN) war plan. C. Stuart Calison, Ph.D, a Senior Development Economist with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), recently released the October 2, 2009 memo he wrote to the Director of USAID in which he complained that Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was interfering with USAID’s COIN projects and objectives in Afghanistan’s border region. The memo reflects a growing reality, which is that all American aid seems cloaked with military goals and objectives. One of the many problems with such a transformation in policy is that it violates international law. Another is that militarizing aid places civilian aid personnel at risk as they are seen as simply a tool of the Pentagon. The Fourth Geneva Convention, Part I, Article 5, essentially provides that if a military force such as the Taliban “is satisfied” that a civilian aid worker “is definitely suspected of” hostile activity, such aid worker could lose his or her protected status and would become a legitimate target. Thus, civilians who accompany or provide services and support to the armed forces could fall outside of the definition of “civilians” as set out in the Third Geneva Convention, Article 4. Major General Michael Tucker of ISAF-Kabul was quoted by Kevin Baron in the September 15, 2009, edition of Stars and Stripes as stating that NATO uses humanitarian aid as a “key factor” in its “population-centric operations.” This prompted Stephen Cornish, the director of bilateral programs for CARE Canada, to state that: NATO had placed “a counterinsurgency umbrella” over humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, which now places aid workers at risk. He went on to tell Stars and Stripes that aid organizations are being targeted if there is any suspicion of collaboration with the American forces. Stars and Stripes then interviewed a Taliban spokesman who stated: “We only respect truly neutral and independent aid organizations that do not work at the behest of American and Western forces.”

International law is crucial to uphold human rights for all

**UDHR 9** (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Aug 27 2009, http://www.udhr.org/history/question.htm)IM

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the primary international articulation of the fundamental and inalienable rights of all members of the human family. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, the UDHR represents the first comprehensive agreement among nations as to the specific rights and freedoms of all human beings. Among others, these include civil and political rights such as the right not to be subjected to torture, to equality before the law, to a fair trial, to freedom of movement, to asylum and to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, opinion and expression. The rights outlined in the UDHR also include economic, social and cultural rights such as the right to food, clothing, housing and medical care, to social security, to work, to equal pay for equal work, to form trade unions and to education. Originally intended as a "common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations", over the past fifty years the Universal Declaration has become a cornerstone of customary international law, and all governments are now bound to apply its principles. Because the Universal Declaration of Human Rights successfully encompasses legal, moral and philosophical beliefs held true by all peoples, it has become a living document which asserts its own elevating force on the events of our world. While the record shows that most of those who adopted the UDHR did not imagine it to be a legally binding document, the legal impact of the Universal Declaration has been much greater than perhaps any of its framers had imagined. Today, direct reference to the UDHR is made in the constitutions of many nations that realized their independence after the document was adopted. Prime ministers, presidents, legislators, judges, lawyers, legal scholars, human rights activists and ordinary people throughout the world have accepted the Universal Declaration as an essential legal code. Dozens of legally binding international treaties are based on the principles set forth in the UDHR, and the document has been cited as justification for numerous United Nations actions, including acts of the Security Council. As oppressed individuals turn increasingly to the Universal Declaration for protection and relief, so governments have come to accept the document not just as a noble aspiration, but as a standard that must be realized. Because it is universal, a central and integral part of our international legal structure, the Universal Declaration is widely accepted as a primary building block of customary international law -- an indispensable tool in upholding human rights for all.

Impact Turn – NATO 🡪 Taliban

NATO military presence in Afghanistan fuels the Taliban

**Mercier 10** (Gilbert, The Post, May 6 2010,

http://newsjunkiepost.com/2010/05/06/afghanistan-us-and-nato-are-still-losing-hearts-and-minds/)IM

The military operation in Marjah, launched in February 2010, was the first deployment after the surge of 30,000 additional troops decided by the Obama administration. The planning of the operation emphasized the needs of the Afghan people, and the importance of winning “hearts and minds”. However, according to a new report just released by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), this objective was not met. The reality on the ground did not match the rhetoric, and the attack turned out to be a recruiting tool for the Taliban. The ICOS report reviews the local perception of the operation from more than 400 Afghan men from Marjah, Lashkar Gah and Kandahar interviewed by the ICOS in March 2010. The report reveals that Operation Moshtarak has contributed to “high levels of anger among local Afghans”, with 61 percent of those interviewed feeling “more negative about NATO forces than before the military offensive”. In other words, the objective of winning “hearts and minds”-one of the fundamental tenets of the new counter-insurgency strategy- was not met. The report finds a few key factors at plays, and mistakes made that have translated into more recruits for the Taliban, especially in the context of a much larger city such as Kandahar. The legitimate grievance of the people of Marjah are used by the Taliban who will seek to recruit the region’s angry young men. Of those interviewed, 95 percent believed more young Afghans have joined the Taliban in the last year. 78 percent of the respondents were “often or always angry”, and 45 percent stated they were “angry at the NATO occupation, civilian casualties and night raids”. The report says that Operation Moshtarak, and similar operations in the future, provide a perfect propaganda tool for the Taliban in their recruitment strategy. The report recommends the adoption of a new “Counter insurgency impact equation to balance any negative impact, and ensure that the positive impact is greater than the negative impact”. Another point highlighted by the report has to do with the refugee situation created by the offensive, and the shortcomings to deal with it. The report found that despite advance planning, very little aid or infrastructure was made available for refugees. 97 percent of Afghans interviewed by ICOS said that the operation had led to new flow of internally displaced people. Thousands of displaced Afghans were forced to move to non existent or overcrowded refugee camps with insufficient food, medical supplies and shelters. 59 percent of those interviewed believed the Taliban will return to Marjah after the operation. 67 percent did not support a strong NATO-ISAF presence in their province, and 71 percent stated they wanted NATO forces to leave. Afghans are also very sceptical about NATO’s chances to win against the Taliban with 67 percent of those interviewed stating they did not believe “NATO and the Afghan government would win against the Taliban”, and 14 percent saying that “NATO would never win”. “The lack of humanitarian planning has been a propaganda victory for the Taliban, who will use the grievances of local Afghans to radicalize and recruit young men,” said Jorrit Kamminga Director of Policy Research at ICOS.

Impact Turn – NATO 🡪 Terrorism

NATO presence increases violence and terrorist activity in Afghanistan

**AP 10** (Robert Reid, Associated Press, June 19 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeq M5hvWEqwq3CrRvaQCmt21MfoYhjZJQD9GEFQ980)IM

KABUL, Afghanistan — The United Nations reported Saturday that insurgent violence has risen sharply in Afghanistan over the last three months, with roadside bombings, complex suicide attacks and assassinations soaring over last year's levels. The three-month report by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to the U.N. Security Council appeared at odds with Pentagon assertions of slow but steady progress in Afghanistan — an assessment that was challenged by U.S. lawmakers during recent hearings on Capitol Hill. In the report, Ban said the overall security situation in Afghanistan has not improved since his last report in March and instead the number of violent incidents had "increased significantly compared to previous years and contrary to seasonal trends." The most "alarming trend" was a sharp rise in the number of roadside bombings, which soared 94 percent in the first four months of this year compared with the same period in 2009, Ban said. Moreover, assassinations of Afghan government officials jumped 45 percent, mostly in the ethnic Pashtun south, he said. NATO has launched a major operation to secure the biggest southern city, Kandahar, the Taliban's spiritual birthplace. At the same time, suicide attacks are occurring at the rate of about three per week, Ban said, half of them in the south. Complex attacks employing suicide bombers, rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire were running about two a month, double the number in 2009, he added. During testimony Tuesday before the Senate Armed Services Committee, senior Pentagon official Michele Flournoy said the percentage of complex attacks had fallen steadily since a peak in February and were averaging below last year's levels. She gave no figures. "The shift to more complex suicide attacks demonstrates a growing capability of the local terrorist networks linked to al-Qaida," Ban said. He attributed the rise in violence to increased NATO and Afghan military activity in the south during the first quarter of the year, including the U.S.-led attack on the Taliban stronghold of Marjah. He also cited "significant anti-government element activities" in the east and southeast of the country. "The majority of incidents continue to involve armed clashes and improvised explosive devices, each accounting for one third of the reported incidents," Ban said, referring to the military term for roadside bombs.

NATO presence creates more targets for terrorists ad causes innumerable civilian casualties

**Kabul Press 9** (Matthew Nasuti, US State Dept official, Nov 8 2009, http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article4239)IM

NATO operates 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, with a goal to add teams to every one of its 34 provinces. The PRTs primarily consist of military personnel, with a mix of civilian aid officials and technical experts. They serve a dual function of supporting military operations and aiding civilian reconstruction and are an integral part of NATO’s counterinsurgency (COIN) war plan. C. Stuart Calison, Ph.D, a Senior Development Economist with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), recently released the October 2, 2009 memo he wrote to the Director of USAID in which he complained that Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was interfering with USAID’s COIN projects and objectives in Afghanistan’s border region. The memo reflects a growing reality, which is that all American aid seems cloaked with military goals and objectives. One of the many problems with such a transformation in policy is that it violates international law. Another is that militarizing aid places civilian aid personnel at risk as they are seen as simply a tool of the Pentagon. The Fourth Geneva Convention, Part I, Article 5, essentially provides that if a military force such as the Taliban “is satisfied” that a civilian aid worker “is definitely suspected of” hostile activity, such aid worker could lose his or her protected status and would become a legitimate target. Thus, civilians who accompany or provide services and support to the armed forces could fall outside of the definition of “civilians” as set out in the Third Geneva Convention, Article 4. Major General Michael Tucker of ISAF-Kabul was quoted by Kevin Baron in the September 15, 2009, edition of Stars and Stripes as stating that NATO uses humanitarian aid as a “key factor” in its “population-centric operations.” This prompted Stephen Cornish, the director of bilateral programs for CARE Canada, to state that: NATO had placed “a counterinsurgency umbrella” over humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, which now places aid workers at risk. He went on to tell Stars and Stripes that aid organizations are being targeted if there is any suspicion of collaboration with the American forces. Stars and Stripes then interviewed a Taliban spokesman who stated: “We only respect truly neutral and independent aid organizations that do not work at the behest of American and Western forces.”

Impact Turn – NATO x I. Law – Impact XT

Promotion of international law is key to preventing nuclear and genocidal conflicts

**Shaw 1** (Martin, Int. Relt’s @ Sussex, Review of International Studies 27(3), October 2001)IM

The new politics of international relations require us, therefore, to go beyond the anti-imperialism of the intellectual left as well as of the semi-anarchist traditions of the academic discipline. We need to recognise three fundamental truths. First, in the twenty-first century people struggling for democratic liberties across the non-Western world are likely to make constant demands on our solidarity. Courageous academics, students and other intellectuals will be in the forefront of these movements. They deserve the unstinting support of intellectuals in the West. Second, the old international thinking in which democratic movements are seen as purely internal to states no longer carries conviction – despite the lingering nostalgia for it on both the American right and the anti-American left. The idea that global principles can and should be enforced worldwide is firmly established in the minds of hundreds of millions of people. This consciousness will a powerful force in the coming decades. Third, global state-formation is a fact. International institutions are being extended, and (like it or not) they have a symbiotic relation with the major centre of state power, the increasingly internationalised Western conglomerate. The success of the global-democratic revolutionary wave depends first on how well it is consolidated in each national context – but second, on how thoroughly it is embedded in international networks of power, at the centre of which, inescapably, is the West. From these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived. First, democratic movements cannot regard non-governmental organisations and civil society as ends in themselves. They must aim to civilise local states, rendering them open, accountable and pluralistic, and curtail the arbitrary and violent exercise of power. Second, democratising local states is not a separate task from integrating them into global and often Western-centred networks. Reproducing isolated local centers of power carries with it classic dangers of states as centres of war. 84 Embedding global norms and integrating new state centres with global institutional frameworks are essential to the control of violence. (To put this another way: the proliferation of purely national democracies is not a recipe for peace.) Third, while the global revolution cannot do without the West and the UN, neither can it rely on them unconditionally. We need these power networks, but we need to tame them too, to make their messy bureaucracies enormously more accountable and sensitive to the needs of society worldwide. This will involve the kind of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ argued for by David Held 85 . It will also require us to advance a global social-democratic agenda, to address the literally catastrophic scale of world social inequalities. This is not a separate problem: social and economic reform is an essential ingredient of alternatives to warlike and genocidal power; these feed off and reinforce corrupt and criminal political economies. Fourth, if we need the global-Western state, if we want to democratise it and make its institutions friendlier to global peace and justice, we cannot be indifferent to its strategic debates. It matters to develop international political interventions, legal institutions and robust peacekeeping as strategic alternatives to bombing our way through zones of crisis. It matters that international intervention supports pluralist structures, rather than ratifying Bosnia-style apartheid. 86 As political intellectuals in the West, we need to have our eyes on the ball at our feet, but we also need to raise them to the horizon. We need to grasp the historic drama that is transforming worldwide relationships between people and state, as well as between state and state. We need to think about how the turbulence of the global revolution can be consolidated in democratic, pluralist, international networks of both social relations and state authority. We cannot be simply optimistic about this prospect. Sadly, it will require repeated violent political crises to push Western and other governments towards the required restructuring of world institutions. 87 What I have outlined is a huge challenge; but the alternative is to see the global revolution splutter into partial defeat, or degenerate into new genocidal wars – and perhaps even nuclear conflicts. The practical challenge for all concerned citizens, and the theoretical and analytical challenges for students of international relations and politics, are intertwined.

Impact Turn – NATO x I. Law – Democracy !

Citing foreign law is key to democracy – it avoids external economic, political and legal pressures

**Benvenisti 8** (Eyal, Law @ Tel Aviv University, American Journal of International Law, April 2008)IM

[\*241] Not so long ago the overwhelming majority of courts in democratic countries shared a reluctance to refer to foreign and international law. Their policy was to avoid any application of foreign sources of law that would clash with the position of their domestic governments. Many jurists find recourse to foreign and international law inappropriate. n1 But even the supporters of reference to external sources of law hold this unexplored assumption that reliance on foreign and international law inevitably comes into tension with the value of national sovereignty. Hence, the scholarly debate is framed along the lines of the well-known broader debate on "the countermajoritarian difficulty." n2 This article questions this assumption of tension. It argues that for courts in most democratic countries--even if not for U.S. courts at present--referring to foreign and international law has become an effective instrument for empowering the domestic democratic processes by shielding them from external economic, political, and even legal pressures. Citing international law therefore actually bolsters domestic democratic processes and reclaims national sovereignty from the diverse forces of globalization. Stated differently, most national courts, seeking to maintain the vitality of their national political institutions and to safeguard their own domestic status vis-a-vis the political branches, cannot afford to ignore foreign and international law.

Global democracy prevents nuclear wars

**Muravchik 1** (Joshua, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, http://www.npec-web.org/Syllabus/Muravchik.pdf)IM

The fall of Communism not only ended the Cold War; it also ended the only universalist ideological challenge to democracy. Radical Islam may still offer an alternative to democracy in parts of the world, but it appeals by definition only to Moslems and has not even won the assent of a majority of these. And Iranian President Khatami's second landslide election victory in 2001 suggests that even in the cradle of radical Islam the yearning for democracy is waxing. That Freedom House could count 120 freely elected governments by early 2001 (out of a total of 192 independent states) bespeaks a vast transformation in human governance within the span of 225 years. In 1775, the number of democracies was zero. In 1776, the birth of the United States of America brought the total up to one. Since then, democracy has spread at an accelerating pace, most of the growth having occurred within the twentieth century, with greatest momentum since 1974. That this momentum has slackened somewhat since its pinnacle in 1989, destined to be remembered as one of the most revolutionary years in all history, was inevitable. So many peoples were swept up in the democratic tide that there was certain to be some backsliding. Most countries' democratic evolution has included some fits and starts rather than a smooth progression. So it must be for the world as a whole. Nonetheless, the overall trend remains powerful and clear. Despite the backsliding, the number and proportion of democracies stands higher today than ever before. This progress offers a source of hope for enduring nuclear peace. The danger of nuclear war was radically reduced almost overnight when Russia abandoned Communism and turned to democracy. For other ominous corners of the world, we may be in a kind of race between the emergence or growth of nuclear arsenals and the advent of democratization. If this is so, the greatest cause for worry may rest with the Moslem Middle East where nuclear arsenals do not yet exist but where the prospects for democracy may be still more remote.

Impact Turn – NATO x I. Law – AT: Alt Causes

Every instance of international law is key

**Eriksen 9** (Asmund, Counselor to the UN for Norway, Oct 14 2009, http://www.norway-un.org/Statements/Committe-Meetings/Rule-of-law/)IM

States protect their interests through the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements with other states. They recognise the need to establish clarity, certainty and predictability in their international relations. All states undertake treaty obligations for a reason. If international obligations are not honoured by a state, that state runs the risk of other states taking counter measures or presenting claims for compensation. A state’s lack of respect for international law may thus undermine its ability to protect its own interests and collapse the system of global cooperation. Therefore, all states, whether big or small, have a genuine self interest in fully respecting their international obligations and being perceived as a responsible actor on the international stage. In other words, it is in every state’s interest to promote the rule of law at the international level. A vital question for us in this regard is how support and respect for international law can be strengthened. We believe that a key factor is strengthening the sense of ownership of international law. Although a state must explicitly consent to being bound by treaty obligations, we see how important it is to ensure that treaties, which are essentially universal, are developed within a framework where all states have the opportunity to present their views and needs. An open and inclusive negotiating process will serve to strengthen all states’ ownership of the end product and hopefully lead to increased support and respect for the treaty in question. There are at least two concrete conclusions that can be drawn from this observation. First, there must be an arena, a level playing field, which is accessible for all states. The United Nations provides such an arena and we should all aim at strengthening its role in this respect. Second, all participants must have the opportunity and capacity to contribute meaningfully to the discussions in this arena, so that they can exert a real influence. In this regard, we commend all the parts of the UN that are involved in capacity-building to that end. It is vital that international organisations also respect the rule of law. In Norway’s view, the UN and the Security Council should set an example in this regard by scrupulously adhering to the Charter and international law. Finally, let me say a few words about the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group and the Rule of Law Unit. Norway welcomes the establishment of these bodies, with a view to improving coordination and coherence in the UN’s rule of law activities. In our view, these bodies will help to improve the effectiveness of the UN, lead to synergies and reduce duplication of work. We have taken note of the activities carried out so far, with great interest, and we look forward to further steps to implement the Joint Strategic Plan for 2009 – 2011. We also commend the transparency and openness that characterise the work of the two bodies, and encourage them to continue their practice of open consultations with Members States. It is important to ensure that the Rule of Law Unit is provided with the necessary financial and human resources to carry out its important tasks in a proper manner.

\_\_\_\*\*NATO Good – Turkey DA

NATO Good – Turkey DA – 1NC

**The US will prepare for the future removal of European TNW’s by marketing the reform to its NATO allies and reassuring them of its dedication to their security—failure to lay extensive groundwork for the shift undermines the alliance.**

**Bolfrass ‘8**

[Alex, Research Assistant for the Nuclear Weapons and International Security Program of the Henry L. Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=703]

The presidential campaign inboxes are brimming with proposals for nuclear disarmament and bold stockpile reductions from a rich variety of geographic, partisan, governmental, and ideological senders. The bulk of these recommendations focus on such questions as who moves first, how reductions could be verified, and how such agreements would be enforced. As the next administration considers implementing these proposals, **a** small but **potentially hazardous stumbling block will require** immediate attention and **delicate handling: marketing a major reform to US nuclear policy to** certain **allies under its nuclear**

**umbrella**. Despite these governments’ consistent pro-disarmament records, **they** **also believe that the ultimate guarantee of US protection is the presence of t**actical **n**uclear **w**eapon**s** **on their territory. Turkey, Japan, and Germany share common concern**s; the pitfalls, complexities, and remedies are particularly illustrative in the case of Germany. The German public has historically been in favor of nuclear disarmament, and the current government of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats set the elimination of weapons of mass destruction as a policy objective in their coalition agreement. At the same time, an estimated one to two dozen aircraft-borne tactical nuclear weapons are deployed on German soil. To launch, they require both US and the host governments’ consent. Political attention to their presence has often embarrassed both governing parties. The Christian Democrats in particular may worry about re-igniting public consciousness of their existence in anticipation of next year’s fall election. These US tactical weapons were initially deployed in Germany during the Cold War to counter the Warsaw Pact’s conventional military advantage, but have not been removed due to a mixture of four reasons. The first is inertia. **Changes in strategic and nuclear matters are always viewed with suspicious anxiety, and are difficult to accomplish in the institutional context of NATO**. **Another is symbolism, because the arms are seen** by both sides **as America’s commitment** to Germany’s security. **Third, partaking in nuclear sharing gives** Germany **greater clout within NATO.** Finally, **US tactical arms are welcomed** in Germany **in response to Russian tactical weapons.** For more than a decade and a half, the conventional military balance has been tipped in NATO’s favor. Russia’s response has been to increase reliance on its tactical nuclear weapons (whose numbers are unknown to other governments, but is estimated to be up to 3,000). This leaves Germany conflicted about its shared tactical arms. While a thorough defense analysis might indicate that the US weapons cannot fulfill either their deterrence or war-fighting mission, **the traditions of deterrence doctrine magnify their significance to a counterweight of great symbolic value**. Even by the standards of nuclear weapons, tactical bombs in Europe are unique in their poor risk/benefit ratio. If they were merely of questionable value, there would be no harm in maintaining the US and Russian tactical weapons. However, due to their size and deployment patterns, these weapons are most vulnerable to theft and unauthorized use, and are often cited as a terrorist group’s shortest path to a nuclear device. All parties have an interest in withdrawing their deployment in the long run**. If it aims to enlist** the German government’s **support in a major nuclear weapons initiative, the** incoming US **administration should be mindful that** German **nuclear views are formulated with a focus on Russia.** Fortunately, a benefit of Russia’s effort to reclaim its status and rebuild its army into a capable fighting force is that it will not need to rely on the dubious protection afforded by tactical nuclear weapons. In fact, Prime Minister Putin has already boasted that “there are some technological developments in the non-nuclear, in conventional weapons which make the nuclear weapons in certain cases obsolete. So why would we need nuclear weapons if we have other means?”[1] **The incoming administration should take advantage of the opportunity**. **Cooperation on an issue of such obvious long-term mutual interest would be the first step** in reversing the trajectory of Russian-Western relations after the August war with Georgia. Germany has been eager to improve that relationship, and would not resist discussions over tactical arms as its foundation. **A US administration advancing a nuclear weapons agenda that goes beyond traditional arms control and limitations measures will need to reassure** Germany and similarly positioned **states that such deliberations would not diminish US dedication to its security**. **Early consultations on how to transition from a nuclear extended deterrence to a conventional assurance must be a crucial part of any major new initiatives.** **It will also free allied governments to support a new administration’s plans for multilateral arsenal reductions** politically and diplomatically. **A failure to work with allies could yield a tepid public response and private resistance from governments in favor of nuclear disarmament.** **Extended deterrence** in the Atlantic security environment **lends itself to denuclearization**. There are challenges, to be sure, but if it can work anywhere, it is there. As an adaptation by North Americans, Europeans, and Russians to the realities of the post-Cold War environment, it is worth pursuing alone. Beyond that, **it would serve as a model for more thorny environments in which regional security problems are dominated by nuclear weapons and insecurities**.

NATO Good – Turkey DA – 1NC

NATO key to deal with political violence and prevent nuclear war

**Brzezinski ‘9,** Zbigniew Brzezinski, former U.S. National Security Adviser, Sept/Oct 2009, “An Agenda for NATO,” Foreign Affairs, 88.5, Ebsco

NATO's potential is not primarily military. Although NATO is a collective-security alliance, its actual military power comes predominantly from the United States, and that reality is not likely to change anytime soon. **NATO's** real **power derives from** the fact that it combines **the U**nited **S**tates' **military capabilities and economic power with Europe's collective political and economic weight** (and occasionally some limited European military forces). Together, **that** combination **makes NATO** globally significant. It must therefore remain sensitive to the importance of safeguarding the geopolitical bond between the United States and Europe as it addresses new tasks. The basic challenge that **NATO** now **confronts** is that there are historically unprecedented risks **to global security**. Today's world is threatened neither by the militant fanaticism of a territorially rapacious nationalist state nor by the coercive aspiration of a globally pretentious ideology embraced by an expansive imperial power. The paradox of our time is that **the world**, increasingly connected and economically interdependent for the first time in its entire history, **is experiencing** intensifying popular **unrest made** all the more **menacing by** the **growing accessibility of w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction -- not just to states but also, potentially, to extremist religious and political movements. Yet there is no effective global security mechanism for coping with the growing threat of violent political chaos stemming from humanity's recent political awakening. The three great political contests of the twentieth century (the two world wars and the Cold War) accelerated the political awakening of mankind, which was initially unleashed in Europe by the French Revolution. Within a century of that revolution, spontaneous populist political activism had spread from Europe to East Asia. On their return home after World Wars I and II, the South Asians and the North Africans who had been conscripted by the British and French imperial armies propagated a new awareness of anticolonial nationalist and religious political identity among hitherto passive and pliant populations. The spread of literacy during the twentieth century and the wide-ranging impact of radio, television, and the Internet accelerated and intensified this mass global political awakening. In its early stages, such new political awareness tends to be expressed as a fanatical embrace of the most extreme ethnic or fundamentalist religious passions, with beliefs and resentments universalized in Manichaean categories. Unfortunately, in significant parts of the developing world, bitter memories of European colonialism and of more recent U.S. intrusion have given such newly aroused passions a distinctively anti-Western cast. Today, the most acute example of this phenomenon is found in an area that stretches from Egypt to India. This area, inhabited by more than 500 million politically and religiously aroused peoples, is where NATO is becoming more deeply embroiled. Additionally complicating is the fact that the dramatic rise of China and India and the quick recovery of Japan within the last 50 years have signaled that the global center of political and economic gravity is shifting away from the North Atlantic toward Asia and the Pacific. And of the currently leading global powers -- the United States, the EU, China, Japan, Russia, and India -- at least two, or perhaps even three, are revisionist in their orientation. **Whether they are "rising peacefully"** (a self-confident China), **truculently** (an imperially nostalgic Russia) **or boastfully** (an assertive India, despite its internal multiethnic and religious vulnerabilities), **they all desire** a **change in** the **global** pecking **order**. **The future conduct** of **and relationship among these** three still relatively cautious revisionist powers **will further intensify** the strategic uncertainty. **Visible on the horizon** but not as powerful **are the emerging regional rebels, with** some of them defiantly reaching for **nuclear weapons**. **North Korea** has openly flouted the international community by producing (apparently successfully) its own nuclear weapons -- and also by profiting from their dissemination. At some point, its **unpredictability could precipitate** the first **use of nuclear weapons** in anger since 1945. **Iran**, in contrast, has proclaimed that its nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes but so far **has been unwilling to consider consensual arrangements** with the international community that would provide credible assurances regarding these intentions. **In nuclear-armed Pakistan, an extremist** anti-Western religious **movement is threatening** the country's political **stability**. These changes together reflect the waning of the post-World War II global hierarchy and the simultaneous dispersal of global power. Unfortunately, U.S. leadership in recent years unintentionally, but most unwisely, contributed to the currently threatening state of affairs. The combination of **Washington's arrogant unilateralism** in Iraq **and its demagogic Islamophobic** sloganeering **weakened** the unity of **NATO** and focused aroused Muslim resentments on the United States and the West more generally.

UQ – Deterrence Stable

NATO Is strong now and is the best deterrent for any possible risk of war

Yost 9 ( David,July, a Prof. @ the US naval Postgrade School, Monterey, California, and a Consultant for a Science Applications International Corporation, a senior fello @ the U.S. Institution of Pecae, (85) 4http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/122476701/abstract accessed 7/7) CM

The alliance’s 1999 Strategic Concept dropped the ‘strategic balance’ language con­cerning NATO–Russia relations found in the 1991 Strategic Concept. It nonethe­less included subtle references to the alliance’s continuing responsibility to hedge against the risk of backsliding in Moscow, given Russia’s long-term power poten­tial, particularly its nuclear forces: Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists ... The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained.12 In July 2002 Colin Powell, then the US Secretary of State, offered a rare public acknowledgement that one of the factors defining the US nuclear posture must be the continuing need for a hedge against potential adverse developments in Russia. In Powell’s words, ‘there are nuclear-armed nations out there, particularly Russia, [and] even though it is a new relationship, a new partnership—they will have nuclear weapons for many, many years to come, and one cannot predict the future with certainty. So therefore it is wise for us, in view of that ... to give us a hedge.’13 It is noteworthy that US President Barack Obama included a reaffirmation of US extended deterrence commitments in his speech on nuclear disarmament in Prague in April 2009: ‘As long as these [nuclear] weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies—including the Czech Republic.’14 The role of the alliance’s nuclear posture as a ‘hedge against Russian backsliding’ is generally not explicitly articulated in public statements by NATO or its member nations in part because of the interest in promoting cooperation with Russia in various areas, including the campaigns against terrorism and WMD prolifer ation. However, this rationale remains pertinent and meaningful to allies, despite differ­ences in threat assessments. Allies in Eastern and Central Europe are especially concerned about trends in Russia towards more authoritarian and assertive rule. Russian officials have declared that certain new allies have made themselves poten­tial targets for nuclear attack by supporting US missile defence plans.15 The NATO allies have agreed that Moscow’s use of force against Georgia in August 2008 was ‘dispro portionate and inconsistent with its peacekeeping role, as well as incom­patible with the principles of peaceful conflict resolution set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration’.16 Officials of various allied nations have expressed concerns, though they have been cautious in their public remarks. For example, in December 2008 the President of Estonia affirmed the need for NATO’s deterrent posture in the light of the August 2008 Georgia–Russia conflict without explicitly mentioning that conflict: The fact that NATO is serious about its security has proved to be a powerful deterrent. Indeed, only an actor as irrational as Al Qaeda has dared to gamble with an attack against the world’s strongest conventional, nuclear, economic, and political organization ... As this summer showed us, the reasons for NATO have not disappeared, but have in fact returned, if not with a vengeance, then certainly with a strong taste of revanche. 17 The Alliance’s forces ... contribute to the preservation of peace, to the safeguarding of common security interests of Alliance members, and to the maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. By deterring the use of NBC [nuclear, chemical, and biological] weapons, they contribute to Alliance efforts aimed at preventing the prolif­eration of these weapons and their delivery means.

UQ – TNWs 4 Life

NATO will keep TNW and maintain extended deterrence

Ruhle 9 (Michael, Oct 21, ,Deputy Head, Policy Planning Unit of the NATO Secretary GeneralStrategic Insights, <online>http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Sep/ruhleSep09.html date accessed 7/6)CM

Given this complex backdrop of new non-proliferation and old reassurance concerns, what could a new Strategic Concept conceivably say on nuclear matters? The first point to note is that the collective political, military and public diplomacy requirements of an alliance that features three nuclear weapons states and 25 non-nuclear weapons states differ significantly from those of any single nation. Compared to the rather explicit U.S., British and French pronouncements on their respective national nuclear doctrines, NATO will have to bridge a spectrum of views that arguably runs from nuclear abolitionism to fears of a resurgent Russia. Thus, the key to Alliance cohesion will be to get to political consensus rather than to demonstrate intellectual rigor. With this in mind, it appears likely that assurance will be at the heart of NATO’s deliberations, and that irrespective of its “global zero” rhetoric, the U.S. Administration will go along this path. First, NATO’s easternmost members in particular view the nuclear reassurance provided by the United States as central to their membership in NATO. Second, given the current debate about Alliance solidarity in Afghanistan, there will be a reluctance to open any Pandora’s box that could further undermine the notion of a common transatlantic security space. Third, while NATO Allies are less vocal about new nuclear threats than South Korea and Japan, it is clear that a nuclear Iran poses not only a latent proliferation challenge to NATO’s Middle Eastern neighborhood, but also to certain Allies. Finally, some of the Obama Administration’s major non-proliferation goals, such as ratification of the CTBT, require bipartisan support. It is already becoming clear that this support will only be forthcoming if the Administration can demonstrate that its commitment to non-proliferation does not weaken the U.S. bonds with its Allies. In light of all this, NATO’s new Strategic Concept may well contain nuclear policy language not very different from the rather well-crafted wording in the 1999 document. The new Strategic Concept may contain more explicit references to an emerging strategic environment characterized by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means, along the lines of the Alliance’s 2006 “Comprehensive Political Guidance.” It may also include more extensive references to the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation, including a more detailed explanation of NATO’s contribution to these aims. On the other hand, the logic of maintaining a small number of highly secure U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in several European NATO countries will probably be reaffirmed, as will be the principle of Allied risk- and responsibility-sharing. It seems certain that the Allies will also stay clear of certain “red flags,” such as employment policy. All in all, therefore, the end result may be much more conservative than the current “abolitionist” debate might suggest. Simply put, the NATO reassurance narrative is likely to trump the “global zero” narrative—and disappointment in some quarters is almost a foregone conclusion

2NC Links\*\*

**TNW’s are a symbol of alliance cohesion—removing them without thorough and deliberate consultation jeopardizes the alliance**

**Schlesinger et al ‘8** [James R., Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, December, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/PhaseIIReportFinal.pdf]

The Special Case of NATO Even though their number is modest, **U.S. nuclear capabilities in Europe remain a pillar of NATO unity**. The manner in which they are geographically deployed and politically employed provides several benefits: (1) **the weapons couple U.S. and NATO security, tangibly assuring our allies of the U**nited **S**tates’ **commitment to their security**; (2) by extension **they serve as an antiproliferation tool by obviating allies’ need to develop and field their own nuclear arsenals**; (3) **each member of the Alliance receives the benefits of increased protection and deterrence,** while the burden of surety and security responsibilities and military risks associated with nuclear weapons are shared by many; (4) spread out across a wide area, **nuclear weapons in Europe are less vulnerable than if they were concentrated at a single location**; and (5) **NATO** Dual-Capable Aircraft (**DCA) contribute directly to the nuclear deterrent mission and increase the deterrent value of the weapons. They convey the will of multiple allied countries, creating real uncertainty for any country that might contemplate seeking political or military advantage through the threat or use** of weapons of mass destruction **against the Alliance**. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Sheffer has called for a strategy review in 2009 and a revised Alliance strategic concept in 2010. Most senior U.S. officials understand **the Allies continue to rely on the U.S. deterrent as a pillar of the Alliance**; indeed, **some Allies have asked for reassurance of late.** In fact, the stabilizing effects of NATO’s nuclear capabilities extend beyond NATO’s borders. **As long as NATO members rely on U.S. nuclear weapons for deterrence, no action should be taken to remove them without a thorough and** deliberate process of consultation. The deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe is not a Service or regional command issue—it is an Alliance issue. Moreover, **actions concerning nuclear posture in NATO have an impact on the** perceptions of our allies elsewhere. **NATO’s nuclear forces continue to play a specific role in war prevention**; but their role is now more fundamentally political. They are no longer directed towards a specific threat. That is, its nuclear forces are no longer targeted against any country. Today, the only theater-based nuclear weapons available to NATO are U.S. nuclear bombs capable of being delivered by DCA of several Allies and TLAM-N. The readiness requirements for these aircraft have been dramatically reduced since 1995. Their ability to assume combat readiness posture is now measured in months rather than minutes. The Allies have judged that this relaxed force posture will meet the Alliance’s deterrence requirements for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, **future uncertainties exist. The NATO Allies face the common challenge of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent force** in Europe. This includes both the weapons (B-61) and DCA. Immediate attention is required to support life extension programs for the B-61 nuclear gravity bomb. Power supply and radar systems service life extensions require funding in FY09. Concerning the delivery capability, fourth generation DCA in the Alliance will start to reach the end of their service lives within the next decade. Drastically shrinking defense budgets in Allied countries, some already below one percent of gross domestic product, complicate recapitalization of these nuclear capable fighter aircraft. In addition, the introduction of advanced air defense systems may challenge the future penetration and delivery credibility of these nuclear forces and other supporting airborne assets in certain scenarios. **A solution must be found that will continue to link NATO countries through shared risks, costs, and deterrent benefits, while maintaining the credibility of the deterrent.** Some Allies are already pursuing an option for replacing their DCA fighter forces by investing in the development of the F-35, which has an operational requirement for delivery of nuclear weapons. Although there is program uncertainty, the Department of Defense must ensure that the dual-capable F-35 remains on schedule. Further delays would result in increasing levels of political and strategic risk and reduced strategic options for both the United States and the Alliance. **NATO’s nuclear posture provides security for all members of the Alliance; for members who feel vulnerable, it provides reassurance. The presence of U.S. nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO remains an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance**. At the same time, **participation in the Alliance by countries where nuclear weapons are not based demonstrates Alliance solidarity, the common commitment of its member countries to maintaining their security, and the widespread sharing among them of burdens and risks**. Political oversight of NATO’s nuclear posture is also shared among member nations. **NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group provides a forum in which the Defense Ministers of nuclear and nonnuclear Allies alike participate in the development of the Alliance’s nuclear policy and in decisions on NATO’s nuclear posture.** More frequent and intensive involvement is found in the Alliance’s High Level Group, in which senior defense officials from member nations meet on a near-monthly basis to develop and discuss NATO nuclear policy. The Task Force found that NATO has recently developed another innovative approach to engaging nonnuclear Allies in the NATO nuclear posture through the program known as “SNOWCAT” (Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics). This is a useful approach that should be supported by the United States. The Task Force found at NATO Headquarters in Brussels some concern among NATO Allies about the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. **The Allies believe in the U.S. nuclear deterrent as a pillar of the Alliance. Some Allies have been troubled to learn that during the last decade some senior U.S. military leaders have advocated for the unilateral removal of U.S. nuclear weapons** from Europe. **These Allies are convinced that the security of the United States is “coupled” to that of Europe**. Moreover, **these allies are aware of the greater symbolic and political value** of allied aircraft employing U.S. nuclear weapons. So long as Allies continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent, **the U**nited **S**tates **should take the lead to assure them**, both publicly and privately, **of our steadfast commitment to the security of NATO.**

2NC Links\*\*

**Removing TNW’s will fracture the alliance**

Dr. Oliver **Thränert**, Senior Fellow, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, “U.S. Nuclear Forces in Europe to Zero? Yes, But Not Yet”, Dec 10, **2008**, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22533&prog=zgp&proj=znpp

At the same time, however, **there are a number of political reasons for not entirely foregoing U.S. nuclear forces in Europe at this point in time. The function of these systems is to keep the peace and to prevent wars**. In particular, **U.S. nuclear forces in Europe and nuclear sharing with Alliance partners demonstrate a shared risk within NATO and binds America to the old continent**. At least some **NATO partners continue to value this. They remain particularly interested in a strong nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis Russia and Iran. Moreover, the U.S. nuclear presence gives those NATO members participating in nuclear sharing a greater say in nuclear decision making** or, at least, more access to information. **In order to avoid yet another split in NATO on a crucial issue, these political factors should not be neglected.** In addition, three further points need to be taken into consideration.

TNW’s are perceived as US commitment to the alliance – removing them risks NATO’s collapse

Claudine Lamond and Paul Ingram, “Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states”, BASIC Getting to Zero Papers, No. 11, 23 January 2009, http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/CLamondTNWinNATO.pdf

NATO’s member states have reached an impasse on the future of nuclear sharing in Europe, and currently appear to be operating on the assumption of business as usual through fear of change. While there would be mainstream support on both sides of the Atlantic for the practice to end, governments are reluctant to take action that may appear to challenge the relevance or the future of the NATO Alliance. Even under an Obama Administration, the United States may be reluctant to remove forward-based tactical nuclear weapons from Europe for as long as allied governments wish them to remain, in order to be seen as fulfilling commitments to NATO collective security.1 Likewise, European host states will be reluctant to suggest that the United States remove them if the removal were interpreted to be anti-American or reflect a reduced commitment to NATO.

**TNW’s key to NATO cohesion and deterrence**

Amy F. Woolf Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons”, September 9, 2008, Congressional Research Service ~ The Library of Congress, lexis

The Bush Administration also emphasized the possible use of nuclear weapons in regional contingencies in its 2001 nuclear posture review. Further, the Administration appeared to shift towards a somewhat more explicit approach when acknowledging that the United States might use nuclear weapons in response to attacks by nations armed with chemical, biological, and conventional weapons, stating that the United States would develop and deploy those nuclear capabilities that it would need to defeat the capabilities of any potential adversary whether or not it possessed nuclear weapons. This does not, by itself, indicate that the United States would plan to use nonstrategic nuclear weapons. However, many analysts concluded from these and other comments by Administration officials that the Bush Administration was planning for the tactical, first use of nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration has never confirmed this view, and, instead, has indicated that it would not use nuclear weapons in anything other than the most grave circumstances. For NATO, nonstrategic nuclear weapons have a played a reduced, but continuing, role in security policy. They have been seen not only as a deterrent to a wide range of potential aggressors, but also as an important element in NATO’s cohesion as an alliance. In the Press Communique released after their November 1995 meeting, the members of NATO’s Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group stated that “Alliance Solidarity, common commitment, and strategic unity are demonstrated through the current basing of deployable sub-strategic [nuclear] forces in Europe.”26 NATO has also reaffirmed the importance of nuclear weapons for deterrence. The “New Strategic Concept” signed in April 1999 states that “to protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable.”27 NATO had also emphasized the importance of nuclear weapons in its strategy in 1997, in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security Between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Although the NATO members assured Russia that it had “no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members,” it also stated that it had no need “to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear policy — and do not foresee any future need to do so (emphasis added).”28

Link – Consult\*\*

**Consultation over TNW’s is CRITICAL – unilateral decision-making will fracture the alliance, unity, and credibility\*\*\***

**Schlesinger et al. ’08**. James R. Schlesinger, former secretary of defense,“Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management”, December 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/PhaseIIReportFinal.pdf

The Special Case of NATO Even though their number is modest, **U.S. nuclear capabilities in Europe remain a pillar of NATO unity**. The manner in which they are geographically deployed and politically employed provides several benefits: (1) **the weapons couple U.S. and NATO security, tangibly assuring our allies of the U**nited **S**tates’ **commitment to their security**; (2) by extension **they serve as an antiproliferation tool by obviating allies’ need to develop and field their own nuclear arsenals**; (3) **each member of the Alliance receives the benefits of increased protection and deterrence,** while the burden of surety and security responsibilities and military risks associated with nuclear weapons are shared by many; (4) spread out across a wide area, **nuclear weapons in Europe are less vulnerable than if they were concentrated at a single location**; and (5) **NATO** Dual-Capable Aircraft (**DCA) contribute directly to the nuclear deterrent mission and increase the deterrent value of the weapons. They convey the will of multiple allied countries, creating real uncertainty for any country that might contemplate seeking political or military advantage through the threat or use** of weapons of mass destruction **against the Alliance**. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Sheffer has called for a strategy review in 2009 and a revised Alliance strategic concept in 2010. Most senior U.S. officials understand **the Allies continue to rely on the U.S. deterrent as a pillar of the Alliance**; indeed, **some Allies have asked for reassurance of late.** In fact, the stabilizing effects of NATO’s nuclear capabilities extend beyond NATO’s borders. **As long as NATO members rely on U.S. nuclear weapons for deterrence, no action should be taken to remove them without a thorough and** deliberate process of consultation. The deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe is not a Service or regional command issue—it is an Alliance issue. Moreover, **actions concerning nuclear posture in NATO have an impact on the** perceptions of our allies elsewhere.

Link – Perception

**TNW’s highly symbolic – key to deter war, prolif, and show US commitment to NATO**

Amy F. **Woolf** Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons”, September 9, **2008**, Congressional Research Service ~ The Library of Congress, lexis

Strategy and Doctrine. **Nonstrategic nuclear weapons have continued to play a role in U.S. and NATO policy**. For the United States, the emphasis has shifted from a strategy that emphasized the deterrence of an attack from the Soviet Union and its allies to one that has placed a growing emphasis on the role that nuclear weapons might play in deterring or responding to regional contingencies that involved nations other than Russia. For example, **former Secretary of Defense Perry stated that, “maintaining U.S. nuclear commitments with NATO, and retaining the ability to deploy nuclear capabilities to meet various regional contingencies, continues to be an important means for deterring aggression, protecting and promoting U.S. interests, reassuring allies and friends, and preventing proliferation** (emphasis added).24 Specifically, the United States maintains the option to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks with conventional, chemical, or biological weapons. For example, Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward Warner testified that “**the U.S. capability to deliver an overwhelming, rapid, and devastating military response with the full range of military capabilities will remain the cornerstone of our strategy for deterring rogue nation ballistic missile and WMD** proliferation threats. **The** very existence **of U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces, backed by highly  capable conventional forces, should certainly give pause to any rogue leader contemplating the use of WMD against the U**nited **S**tates**, its overseas deployed forces, or its allies.**”25 These statements do not indicate whether nonstrategic nuclear weapons would be used to achieve battlefield or tactical objectives, or whether they would contribute to strategic missions, but it remained evident, throughout the 1990s, that the United States continued to view these weapons as a part of its national security strategy.

**Credible support for Turkey is key to alliance cohesion**

**Guray, ‘1** [Al, First Lieutenant, Turkish Army, Turkish military Academy, Doctoral Thesis. “Turkey’s response to threats of weapons of mass destruction” Naval Post Graduate School, December, 2001, <http://theses.nps.navy.mil/Thesis_01dec_Al.pdf>]

Turkey’s growing engagement in the Middle East could lead to collective defense challenges for the Alliance. Many European allies strongly oppose broadening NATO’s area of responsibility and want the Alliance to focus on security threats to the Euro- Atlantic area. Some allies, particularly Germany, France and possibly Italy and (obviously) Greece, might balk at aiding Turkey if it became involved in a skirmish with one of its Middle Eastern neighbors, such as Iran, Iraq or Syria. 239 However, **a failure of NATO to come to Turkey’s aid** in such a case **could create a crisis in Turkey’s relations with NATO** **and could even prompt Turkey to withdraw from the Alliance. Moreover, a clash with any of Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors, in which NATO support was not provided, would jeopardize the Alliance’s cohesion and credibility.**

Link – Withdrawal

Withdrawing Troops and Nuclear weapons represents a blow to US commitment and dissolves NATO

Espinosa, 94 (Paul E, December, Navel Postgrad School, Monterey, California http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/1994/Dec/94Dec\_Espinosa.pdf accessed 7/7) CM

Throughout the cold war, the deployment of substantial numbers of U.S. troops in Europe and the maintenance of U.S. substrategic nuclear weapons on the soil of NATO allies served to reassure Western Europeans of the robust nature of the U.S. nuclear commitment. Given that the number of U.S. nuclear warheads in Europe has been reduced to roughly 10 percent of peak deployment levels while the number of U.S. troops in Europe may fall well below 100,000, uncertainty, regarding the long-term credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee seems almost unavoidable."' Should this trend be perceived as likely to result in a U.S. disengagement from security commitments in Europe, the future of NATO could become questionable. Such extreme circumstances could lead to Britain's withdrawal from NATO's nuclear structure. The result for Britain might be a national nuclear force committed solely to the defense of Britain and British interests or efforts to work out limited bilateral or multilateral cooperative arrangements in Europe.

Withdraw kills alliance cohesion threatening US security

Espinosa, 94 (Paul E, December, Navel Postgrad School, Monterey, California http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/1994/Dec/94Dec\_Espinosa.pdf accessed 7/7) CM

Militarily, the effect of a NFU declaration would be negligible in today's immediately foreseeable security environment. The primary role of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear forces has shifted from deterrence to reassurance of U.S. allies. Likewise, the level of uncertainty over whether the United States would introduce nuclear weapons in response to any weapons of mass destruction attack short of a strategic nuclear strike against U.S. territory has been greatly diminished. This negates the premise upon which the strength of contemporary deterrence is based: uncertainty. Is the United States limiting its response options to such an extent that the reemergence of a "Soviet-style" threat would leave the United States unable to defend its vital interests? Obviously, so long as nuclear weapons exist, the possibility of their use will remain.' If vital interests were at stake, the United States would defend them. A better question to address is how, politically, a U.S. NFU pledge would affect the ability of the United States to continue to reassure its allies. in today's uncertain security environment. It would undermine the credibility of U.S. security assurances and be detrimental to alliance cohesion. The nations of Western Europe have not progressed far enough in the integration of their security policies to compensate for a U.S. withdrawal. The result might be a destabilized Europe with France, Britain, Germany and others each seeking primacy.'" A NFU declaration by the United States would undermine deterrence by appearing to decouple U.S. interests from Europe. The resulting break in alliance cohesion could jeopardize the vital interests of the United States. The following chapter addresses the implications of NFU for alliance security in greater detail

Link – AT: Germany T/

**Germany is in the minority – most recent statements proves the plan kills NATO**

**GSN 10-30-**09

[“German Removal of U.S. Nukes Could Face Opposition”, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20091030\_3356.php]

The new governing coalition in **Berlin could face resistance from** other European governments as well as **NATO in seeking the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons** from German territory, the New York Times reported yesterday (see GSN, Oct. 23). **The presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO countries is an important binding force for the military alliance, one NATO diplomat said: “The weapons are the foundation of that solidarity. Take them away and what have we left?”**  The official, though, challenged assertions by other NATO diplomats that the weapons serve to deter nuclear proliferation. “The countries you mention do not give a toss about what NATO does with its weapons,” the source said, referring to nuclear programs in Pakistan, India, Iran and North Korea. The United States is believed to keep several hundred short-range tactical nuclear weapons in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. That is down from more than 7,300 in the early 1970s, according to the Times. “The bombs are there because of bureaucratic resistance to change and NATO’s inability to address the issue of the future of nuclear weapons in NATO,” said Hans Kristensen, an analyst with the Federation of American Scientists. **France and the U**nited **K**ingdom **are concerned that** the **German denuclearization** of **could increase pressure to give up their arsenals,** the Times reported. “If you remove the weapons, **the whole equation between Europe and the U.S. could change**. **That is why some** of [German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s] **Atlanticist conservatives have never wanted to touch the** **issue**. But even the conservatives are beginning to change their minds about the utility of these weapons,” said Joachim Krause, head of Christian Albrecht University's Institute for Security Policy (Judy Dempsey, New York Times, Oct. 29).

Internals – Nukes k2 Deterrence

US nuclear Weapons in Europe are necessary for deterrence – withdraw would overburden NATO Forces

Espinosa, 94 (Paul E, December, Navel Postgrad School, Monterey, California http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/1994/Dec/94Dec\_Espinosa.pdf accessed 7/7) CM

It is useful to consider separately the potential effects of NFU on the military and political role of nuclear weapons within the context of regional deterrence. A NFU declaration, by definition, would indicate that the United States is prepared to defend its shared security interests with conventional forces alone, provided that nuclear weapons use is not initiated by the aggressor. Given the vast U.S. conventional superiority in current circumstances, it is probable that for the foreseeable future the United States could successfully defend those shared security interests on a purely conventional level. This raises the question of what military purpose is served by U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, given that there is no longer a clear nuclear threat to deter in Europe. The answer, from a prudent political-military point of view, lies in the uncertainty associated with the continuing progress of political and economic reforms in Russia. According to Yost, "The emergence of a expansionist Russia under dictatorial rule could rapidly increase the potential value of Western nuclear weapons capabilities for national and allied security. i 101 This view has been reinforced by Defense Secretary Perry's remarks concerning the recently completed nuclear posture review. Perry asserted that it was necessary to maintain essential elements of the current nuclear posture as a hedge against a reversal of reforms in Russia.' Militarily, therefore, U.S. nuclear forces in Europe act as a precaution against a resurgent Russian threat. A U.S. NFU declaration could weaken the credibility of this hedging strategy. It is useful to examine, from the European perspective, the effect of a U.S. NFU declaration on the security role of nuclear weapons. In a speech given at King's College in November 1993, Britain's defense secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, expressed "deep skepticism" over the value of a NFU declaration. Rifkind stated that a NFU declaration would imply that conventional war was a "safe option."' This is no longer an immediate concern now that Russia has lost the level of conventional superiority maintained by the USSR, and will have neither the economic means nor the political will to regain that superiority in the foreseeable future. It is nonetheless an important long-term consideration for any prudent government in Western Europe. experts are also concerned that a U.S. NFU declaration could lead to the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. The burden of extended deterrence would be shifted to NATO's strategic nuclear and conventional forces.

Internals – Nukes k2 Deterrence

Nuclear weapons are key to deterrence

Karmp 9, (Korak-Heinz, , Director, Research Divison, NATO Defense College,

 http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/fp\_08.pdf accessed 7/7) CM

Deterrence, as a concept based on the threat of immense retaliation by governments if attacked, has been a dominating element in NATO's strategy over the last six decades. During the Cold War, deterrence was understood mostly in a nuclear context, but already at that time it had strong nonnuclear components. Discussions in the early 1980s about the "conventionalization of NATO strategy"1 indicate the constant struggle within the Alliance to find answers to the key questions of "how" to deter the opponent with "what". Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the need for deterrence has remained, but it has changed with regard to its requirements. The set of questions on the "how" and "what" has been enriched by the need to clarify "who" needs to be deterred. Whereas during the EastWest conflict the object of NATO's deterrence efforts was primarily the Soviet leadership, the spectrum of addressees for deterrence messages has widened significantly to include a variety of state and nonstate actors. Only a few NATO members have adapted their deterrence posture and their strategic thinking to the new realities. The United States, in particular, has discussed and at least partly adopted new deterrence concepts in order to have a broader toolbox in dealing with the security challenges ahead. "Prompt Global Strike" is one such concept, banking on the idea that - provided there is sufficient intelligence - terrorist camps or production sites for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) can be destroyed by conventional means immediately after their detection, presumably in a preemptive manner. The deterrence message conveyed to potential aggressors is that there will be no safe haven in which to hide from physical destruction. Another concept is "nuclear forensics", a term signifying the technical capability to detect the physical composition of radiological material even after a nuclear detonation. Given that radioactive substances always have a "fingerprint" that indicates their origin and how they were processed, it is possible to trace the substances back to the country or region where they came from. Again, provided there is sufficient intelligence, the country in question could be held responsible for intentionally or unintentionally passing the material to those who have made aggressive use of it. The deterrence message would be that there is no way to escape punishment. Most European NATO allies, though, have scarcely taken notice of these developments. The new challenges to the effectiveness of deterrence have not been discussed, and there has been no indepth discussion of new concepts and potential solutions. Strangely enough, the need to think more deeply about deterrence has been ignored even when it has been on the immediate political agenda. For some years now, there has been an intense debate on how to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions. A myriad of concepts, ideas and strategies has been developed to keep Teheran from developing nuclear capabilities which could lead sooner or later to the Iranian bomb. So far, these strategies have not been successful. At the same time, hardly any effort has been made to assess the deterrence implications after Iran has become a nuclear weapons state (assuming that preventive measures will not succeed). How can the mullah regime be kept from instrumentalizing its nuclear status in an aggressive manner? What are the political or military means to ensure Iranian selfrestraint? Is the government in Teheran "deterrable" at all? None of these questions has received sufficient attention. Deterrence on a more general level has received even less consideration and reasoning. This holds true for the nuclear dimension as well as for its non nuclear aspects. Hence, there is still a demand in the Atlantic Alliance for a fundamental analysis and assessment of the key questions of how to deter whom with whichmeans. However, things are now in a state of flux, as external developments have put increasing pressure on the Alliance to stop ignoring the fact that a deterrence debate is overdue. This holds particularly true for the nuclear realm, where a significant contradiction between a nuclear renaissance and an erosion of deterrence has emerged. On the one hand, there has been a renaissance of the nuclear dimension of international politics, due to at least four reasons.

Internals – Nukes k2 Deterrence

**Reducing Nuclear weapons risks nuclear prolif. NATO involvement key to prevention**

Tertrais 7 (Bruno, May, Senior Research Fellow, Foundation pour la Recherche Stragique, http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/op\_21.pdf pg 95 accessed 7/7)CM

The possibility of a renewal of nuclear proliferation in NATO’s neighborhood is real; and it is possible that the nuclear dimension of the Alliance’s war prevention strategy will gain in importance in the future. NATO may have to demonstrate that the deployment of territorial missile defenses on the European continent will not be a placement for nuclear deterrence, but rather a complement. A further reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in NATO policy, viewed by many NPT members as a desirable step , should be regarded with caution, since (as suggested above) it could lead to unwanted effects: it is an area where gains would be limited and losses would be almost certain. Nuclear-sharing procedures should also be maintained. They offer concreteness to the US nuclear umbrella and give non-nuclear allies a modicum of “nuclear culture”.

Internals – Turkey k2 NATO

 US unilateral interests undermines US-NATO relations destroying NATO Credibility -Turkey is key

Yost 9 ( David,July, a Prof. @ the US naval Postgrade School, Monterey, California, and a Consultant for a Science Applications International Corporation, a senior fello @ the U.S. Institution of Pecae, (85) 4http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/122476701/abstract accessed 7/7) CM

The non-proliferation function of NATO’s nuclear posture concerns not only the alliance’s potential adversaries but also the members of the alliance that are non-nuclear-weapon states. The United States discovered in the mid-1960s that it was imperative to reach agreements with its NATO allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, on nuclear sharing and consultation arrangements— including Germany’s permanent membership in the NATO NPG founded in 1966–7in order to be able to conclude the NPT.28 The NATO arrangements, including US nuclear forces in Europe, have served to assure Germany and other non-nuclear-weapon-state allies that they have no need to seek nuclear weapons of their own. These allies have, moreover, adhered to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, a prominent Turkish scholar, nonetheless pointed out in 1995 that ‘The Turkish commitment to non-nuclear weapons status is coupled with several strong qualifiers.’ The caveats associated with US nuclear commit­ments are perhaps the most significant: the strategic balance between the United States and NATO and the Russian Federation must not be allowed to erode, by the former’s unilateral moves to the disadvantage of NATO, until Russia gives sustained evidence that it has devalued the role of nuclear weapons in its overall foreign policy, including its policy toward the near abroad and their neighbors rather than merely in its Western policy ... In other words, the extended deter­rence of the United States must remain convincing and credible to Turks as well as to de facto and de jure nuclear weapons states and potential proliferators.29 It is noteworthy in this regard that in 2007 US congressional staff sought the views of Turkish political leaders regarding how US extended deterrence commitments might affect their country’s reaction to Tehran’s possible acquisition of nuclear arms: In a closed door meeting, staff asked a group of influential Turkish politicians how Turkey would respond to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. These politicians emphati­cally responded that Turkey would pursue nuclear weapons as well. These individuals stated, ‘Turkey would lose its importance in the region if Iran has nuclear weapons and Turkey does not.’ Another politician said it would be ‘compulsory’ for Turkey to obtain nuclear weapons in such a scenario. However, when staff subsequently asked whether a U.S. nuclear umbrella and robust security commitment would be sufficient to dissuade Turkey from pursuing nuclear weapons, all three individuals agreed that it would.30

Impact – Deterrence x Iran/Russia

**Russia and Iran are challenging old forms of deterrence NATO deterrence stability is critical**

Karmp 9, (Korak-Heinz, , Director, Research Divison, NATO Defense College,

 http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/fp\_08.pdf accessed 7/7) CM

First, there will be a further increase in the number of nuclear players in international relations. North Korea has already crossed the nuclear threshold and Iran is about to do so. This is likely to encourage other countries in the respective regions to explore national nuclear options. Second, energy scarcity will be a problem of increasing relevance, forcing more governments to bank on civil nuclear energy. The rising number of nuclear power plants will result in an increase in the amount of nuclear expertise and nuclear material. Third, should the constantly mentioned radiological threat - i.e., the detonation of a "dirty bomb" made of radioactive substances and conventional explosives - come true, the "nuclear danger" would be at the top of the international agenda, even if the impact of the action in terms of damage or casualties was limited. Fourth, certain recent developments, including the Russian military action against Georgia, are likely to reemphasize nuclear issues as well. In the meantime, questions not only on the sincerity of NATO's security assurances but also on the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence (the nuclear commitments for NATO's nonnuclear members) have made their way back to the fore. Parallel to the nuclear renaissance, there are three processes of erosion going on. First, there is a constant corrosion of the international nonproliferation regime. The guiding principle of the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) was to reward military nuclear restraint with support in the field of civil nuclear energy. As the technical requirements in both fields are largely similar, it is possible for an NPT signatory state to come close to a nuclear weapons capability without treaty violations. Furthermore, the activities of the Pakistani nuclear "dealer" A.Q. Khan have shown that nuclear proliferation happens at least partly outside interstate relations - thereby circumventing the control mechanism of the statebased NPT. Second, the idea of nuclear deterrence itself is also eroding. The new international environment of aggressive states governed by religious zeal, failed states with no government at all, nonstate actors and terrorists, wealthy and trained enough to acquire and master weapons of mass destruction, calls into question the effectiveness of deterrence. Some see the hurdles piling up against effective deterrence concepts as insurmountable and call for a complete denuclearization of international relations. Only a nuclear weapons free world, they argue, can ensure that a nuclear explosion never occurs. This simplistic but convincing logic is not new, but it has received a kind of blessing from prominent strategic thinkers, such as Henry Kissinger, who have aligned with that reasoning.2 The third erosive process is directly related to the Atlantic Alliance. For some time now, NATO has been confronted with a constant wearing down of its nuclear concepts and posture. Conceptually, NATO has not yet answered the question of how to keep up 21st century deterrence with concepts and techniques that were optimized for the bipolar confrontation decades ago. Technically, NATO is facing the problem that one key element of dual key deterrence, in which the United States provides the nuclear weapons and NATO allies take care of the means of delivery, is eroding. The Tornado and F16 aircraft serving as weapons delivery platforms in NATO member states with socalled "dual key arrangements", have finite life cycles. In the next few years, the allies concerned will have to agree on new aircraft to carry the nuclear bombs still deployed in a number of NATO countries. An agreement of this kind will be difficult as it will involve a number of tricky political, military and technical questions. The mismatch between the increasing relevance of nuclear or nonnuclear deterrence requirements and the reluctance of decision makers to take note of these developments is striking. What is missing is an extended debate, at least on the level of experts. For this purpose, NATO's Nuclear Policy Directorate in Brussels, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in Washington, D.C., and the NATO Defense College in Rome combined their efforts to bring a number of internationally renowned security experts together in Rome to discuss some of the aspects mentioned above. The Rome meeting was the third in a series of seminars dealing with deterrence questions facing the Atlantic Alliance. Professor David S. Yost, from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, functioned as the "intellectual mastermind" conceptualizing the meetings in a cohesive manner. This edited volume contains the contributions of the participants in the Rome conference and will, it is hoped, serve as a stimulus for further deliberations and discussion on a very important aspect of adapting NATO to the challenges ahead.

\_\_\_\*\*NATO – Turkey Aff Ans

Link Turn – Withdrawal S Prolif

Withdraw of nuclear weapons provides a disincentive for the pursuit of nuclear weapons

Espinosa, 94 (Paul E, December, Navel Postgrad School, Monterey, California http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/1994/Dec/94Dec\_Espinosa.pdf accessed 7/7) CM

The second issue to consider is the continued relevance of extended deterrence. There are two arguments to examine. The first is a complete rejection of extended deterrence on the basis that it is no longer necessary.' This argument assigns to French and British nuclear forces the task of deterring any rejuvenated Russian nuclear threat to Europe. Two underlying tenets of this argument are that it is in the interests of both Britain and France to provide nuclear protection for Germany and that this alternative is acceptable to the Germans. The second argument acknowledges the need for the United States to continue providing a nuclear umbrella over Western Europe. while rejecting the role of tactical nuclear weapons in achieving this objective. Instead, it is argued. reassurances backed up by capable forward-deployed conventional forces and U.S.-based strategic nuclear forces would still allow the United States to meet its security commitments while eliminating the necessity for the overseas deployment of U.S. nuclear forces?' Both arguments reject the need for the United States to uphold extended deterrence commitments in the traditional manner, thereby eliminating the need for any nuclear weapons other than those required to support central deterrence. The third issue supporting the central deterrence argument considers the consequences of assigning new roles for nuclear weapons - for example, using nuclear weapons to deter or respond to the use of chemical or biological weapons. It is argued that, if nuclear weapons were assigned such a role, it would demonstrate to states potentially threatened by chemical or biological weapons that nuclear weapons provide an acceptable response, thereby legitimizing the need to obtain and/or use nuclear weapons.' According to Wolfgang Panofsky and George Bunn, "including deterrence of chemical and biological weapon activities as a mission for nuclear weapons enhances the perceived leverage of nuclear weapons."' Thus, assigning a new role for nuclear weapons legitimizes them as a military weapon, which could prompt some countries to acquire them. Based on this analysis, the only role for nuclear weapons in the post-cold war security environment is central deterrence because it is the only credible role remaining. If necessary. it is argued, strategic nuclear weapons could be used to support existential deterrence and to reassure U.S. allies. Any other threat would be more credibly deterred, and if necessary responded to. with conventional forces If central deterrence is indeed the one credible role remaining for nuclear weapons, and it is reasonable to suggest that there is no conceivable instance in which the United States would initiate a strategic nuclear strike, NFU proponents argue, then a NFU pledge could be made without jeopardizing either U.S. interests or its ability to meet security commitments. While it is feasible to make a NFU pledge, do the potential benefits warrant such a declaration? For many the answer to this question is an unequivocal "yes." The central deterrence rationale allows tactical nuclear weapons to be withdrawn from Europe and replaced by explicit reassurances of a continued U.S. commitment to European security. The exact form these assurances take would depend on the specific ally, but they would likely entail some comprehensive mix of political, diplomatic, economic, and conventional military elements. NFU proponents contend that a NFU policy declaration, reinforced by the removal of U.S. nuclear forces deployed in Europe, would demonstrate U.S. resolve in diminishing the value of nuclear weapons. This could, NFU proponents add, reduce the incentives for other states to acquire nuclear weapons. It is essential that the NFU declaration be made in conjunction with the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear forces from Europe, NFU proponents suggest: or the declaration may be perceived as an empty gesture.' Similarly, if the declaration could be made in concert with Russia. Britain. and France and with a reaffirmation by China, it would go a long way toward creating a "global taboo."' The ultimate goal is to foster a global climate in which acquisition and/or use of nuclear weapons is beyond acceptable international behavioral norms. NFU

\_\_\_\*\*NATO Good – Top Shelf UQ/Internals/Aff Ans

UQ – Alliance Strong

**NATO alliances are strong now and the current stability is maintained by US military presence**

**Lederman 10** (Josh, April 8, M.S. Candidate, Journalism (Broadcast) Northwestern University April 08, 2010http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=162809 **accessed 7/8) CM**

**The Secretary General of NATO pushed back** Thursday against **concerns that military resolve among allies in Afghanistan is weakening and stressed that 2010 will be a year of progress**. “I do realize that **2009 was a very difficult year** and we experienced many setbacks in Afghanistan,” Anders Rasmussen acknowledged **Yet he pointed to the addition of 40 thousand troops – most of them American - and the goal to train 300 thousand Afghan soldiers and police by October 2011 as reasons to be optimistic**. **Asked how NATO will maintain continuity if partners withdraw**, Rasmussen admitted that the Netherlands and Canada are engaging in heated discussions about their role in the 8-year-old war. Yet he said that **so far all 28 NATO allies have remained fully engaged. Non-U.S. troops make up 40 percent of NATO’s military presence,** he noted. “It’s quite good I think, and a testimony of solidarity and strong commitment,” Rasmussen said. “So I’m not that worried.

UQ – Gates

**Gates reassurance of NATO allies helps produce a strong alliance**

**Schake 10 ( Kori, May 13,** is a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution and an associate professor of international security studies at the United States Military Academy, AICGS,

 http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/c/schake.aspx accessed 7/8) CM

The U.S. Joint Forces Command did not consider the Allied Command Transformation dual-hatting to be a useful way to preserve interoperability of NATO forces. It brought burdensome representational activities without military progress. Europeans should hear that as a resignation by important voices in the American military leadership about the value of working with NATO as a whole. **Bilateral programs are, however, intensive with those allies the U.S. is fighting alongside. What Secretary Gates most deserves credit for is continuing to fight to produce a strong, cohesive NATO alliance**.

UQ – Petraeus

**NATO alliance are shaky but will remain strong Petraeus will smooth relations**

**Associated Press 10** (no author, July 1, http://breakingnews.gaeatimes.com/2010/07/01/natos-new-commander-in-afghanistan-briefs-alliance-on-escalating-war-37171/accessed7/8) CM

**Petraeus will likely try to smooth ruffled feathers among European allies contributing troops to the 122,000-strong international force**. Diplomats say member governments were not consulted about the changeover in command after President Barack Obama’s sudden dismissal of Petraeus’ predecessor, Gen. Stanley McChrystal. Fogh Rasmussen found himself expressing support for McChrystal after the scornful remarks he made to Rolling Stone magazine, only to backtrack the following day and give his backing to Obama’s decision to replace him with Petraeus. **U.S. troops account for most of the 122,000-strong international force in Afghanistan, while European and other allies make up about a third of the force**. The top U.S. general is also the commander of the entire NATO force. McChrystal’s sacking came amid growing disillusionment with the war in Europe, and a spate of bad news from the battlefields. Allied deaths have doubled in the first six months of this year, with June the deadliest month on record for NATO troops in the nine-year conflict. Meanwhile, a widely touted offensive aimed at retaking control of Kandahar, the biggest city in the south, has been repeatedly delayed. And **NATO’s plans to train and gradually hand over responsibility to the growing Afghan army and police forces also has run into trouble**. The training program has been hobbled by a lack of trainers, and a recent report by the U.S. special inspector general for Afghanistan found that the U.S. has often overestimated the ability of Afghan security forces to fight on their own.

**Petraeus new position will not affect NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan**

**Rasmussen 10** ( Anders, July 3, Secretary General NATO, Daily Times, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\07\03\story\_3-7-2010\_pg7\_1 accessed 7/8)CM

Meanwhile according to **AFP, Rasmussen said the change of the top commander in Afghanistan would not bring a change in strategy of NATO-led forces fighting the Taliban insurgency**. He was speaking following the appointment of General David Petraeus as the top Afghan war commander in place of General Stanley McChrystal, fired by Obama for disparaging remarks about administration officials. “**It has been a change of command but it will not be a change of strategy,**” Rasmussen said. **“I can assure the Afghan people that we’ll stay as long as it takes to secure their country,”** he added. agencies

UQ – Brink\*\*

**NATO is a strong an efficient organization but is on the brink**

**Kashmeri 10** (Sarwar, 7/1, is Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council's International Security Program and a resident of Reading. http://www.vpr.net/episode/48933/ accessed 7/8) CM

**I believe the salvation for NATO's woes is to bridge the alliance with the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy**, or CSDP. If, like many others, you believe that Europeans have been transformed into pacifists, ponder this one: In its 10 years of existence, CSDP has already been used to deploy 27 missions, from Africa to Asia.  Two years ago the EU sent an 11,000-troop mission into the heart of Africa.  The mission was deployed to protect 400,000 refugees in Chad and the Central African Republic.  27 European countries and even Russia joined together under CSDP command to execute the operation that ranged over 100,000 square miles, an area 10 times the size of Vermont. After a 19-month campaign, including numerous fire-fights and deaths in combat, the mission was successful and turned over command to the United Nations, a far different outcome than appears likely for NATO in Afghanistan. Three main reasons account for the CSDP's growing clout: The EU is a governmental entity, so it can combine civilian, police, legal, and military resources to tailor missions that are far better suited to winning hearts and minds than NATO, which is strictly a military organization.  EU missions overcome the objections some countries have to American-led NATO forces on their territory.  Finally, CSDP is European owned and operated; it is Europeans making decisions in Europe's national interests. In contrast**, NATO has an outstanding military command and control structure that the Alliance has perfected over its 60 year life-span**.  **But it is a structurre in need of a mission** - **and an asset that CSDP will surely need as it expands its role**. **So let's bridge the two organizations.  NATO will get a new lease on life; and a bridged military alliance will at least ensure that the transatlantic allies remain connected for the times when Europe, America, and Canada wish to act together. It would be a pity to let NATO fade away, because we may then have to re-invent it someda**y.  And that will not be easy.

UQ – AT: Dutch Withdrawal

**NATO will remain strong- Dutch Withdraw wont impact the alliance**

**Spiegel 10** ( Peter, Feb. 23, s senior foreign policy correspondent, based in Washington, D.C., WSJ, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703494404575081481431687918-search.html accessed 7/8) CM

**The civilian chief of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization said he doesn't believe a Dutch decision to withdraw its nearly 2,000 troops from southern Afghanistan this year will lead other European allies to follow suit**. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the NATO secretary-general, said **that the collapse of the Dutch government on Saturday**, which will likely prevent the Netherlands from extending its troop presence beyond this summer, **was a unique situation and that the rest of the alliance remained committed to the Afghan mission. "The political situation in the Netherlands is so particular that it should be seen as an isolated political event that will not have an impact on other allies and partners,"** Mr. Rasmussen said in an interview Monday. "**I have a sense of strong solidarity within the alliance**." Other European governments gave no sign Monday they would use the Dutch developments as a pretext to pull out their troops from the country.

Internals – US k2 NATO

US support is key to NATO

**Awwal 2** (Rabi-ul, Dawn Newspaper Writer, June 4 2002, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27c/006.html)IM

European forces lack strategic airlift, precision-guided weapons and other key capabilities such as surveillance, air-to-air refuelling and tactical missile defence. The senior official said that the defence ministers will start work on a revamp of the hapless Defence Capabilities Initiative, a programme of 58 tasks which was launched in 1999 to deal with shortfalls highlighted by the conflict in Kosovo. "We will focus on a much more limited area of capabilities such as defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, deployability to theatre and sustainability in theatre and battlefield inter-operability," he said. The new initiative, unlike its grander but less prescriptive predecessor, will set specific tasks for each NATO nation.

The US strong commitment to NATO is key to achieving their collective objectives

Shea 7 (Jaime, Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of the Secretary General @ NATO, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/31-2pdfs/Shea.pdf (31) 2 accessed 7/7)

A new strategic Concept would in turn allow the Alliance to show that North America and Europe are re-committing to a NATO that has been adequately transformed to deal not reactively, but proactively, with the new range of threats both within its borders and without. If all Allies are able to recognize NATO as their primary instrument for addressing these threats, it should be possible for Canada and the United States to also acknowledge the increasing role of NATO, and Europe in general, as strategic partners. A new Strategic Concept that defines NATO’s core missions and priorities should also help generate the resources necessary to achieve the Alliances objectives. Moreover, at a time when public opinion in NATO countries is understandably baffled by the rapid evolution of the Alliance and the increasing diversity of its roles, communicating a clear rationale for NATO in a way that connects with the preoccupation of the public will certainly be helpful. Without a doubt, this is a heavy agenda. IF it were solely for the Purpose of keeping an aged and venerable institution alive for a few more years, NATO governments might be able to afford something less than full success. But the stakes are much higher. This agenda Is about the ability of Europe and North America to live in peace for the next generation.

The US is the only reason NATO is in Afghanistan, in the first place

**Torsein and Davis 1** (Christina & Ian, BASIC Publications, Nov. 19 2001, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2001wardog.htm)IM

In the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, NATO signaled one of the strongest shows of support for President Bush and the U.S. administration. On September 12, Lord Robertson stated that if the attacks on the United States came from abroad, NATO would invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Article 5 stipulates that an armed attack against one or more members of NATO shall be considered an attack against them all: and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.3

AFF – UQ – No Alliance Cohesion

**NATO alliance is not cohesive- Afghan and Iraq support proves**

**Kashmeri 10** (Sarwar, 7/1, is Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council's International Security Program and a resident of Reading. http://www.vpr.net/episode/48933/ accessed 7/8) CM

**The North Atlantic Treaty Organization** **was set up in 1949 to fight the Soviet** **Union**.  **Today it is increasingly dysfunctional**, still searching for a new role two decades after the end of the Cold War.  Left in this state, **NATO may soon become irrelevant to the security needs of the Euro-Atlantic area. Cohesion used to be NATO's hallmark, but there's little of it left.** **The Eastern and Central European members want NATO to act more aggressively against Russia, while the United States, Canada, and the Western Europeans no longer consider Russia a threat**.  Many of America's largest **NATO allies refuse to fight in Afghanistan and are even unable to find a few hundred trainers for that war.**  And you may recall, **NATO refused to support America's invasion of Iraq**.

AFF – UQ – Withdrawal

**The Dutch leaving Afghanistan is signaling a mass exodus of European forces undermining NATO cohesion**

**French & Volker 10** (Julian Lindley, Kurt, Feb 26, is Eisenhower Professor of Defense Strategy at the Netherlands Defense Academy.s the former US Ambassador to NATO, and Managing Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies,The Atlantic Council http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/dutch-afghanistan-exit-game-changer accessed 7/8) CM

There are many good reasons for this departure**. The Dutch have already extended their commitment by two years beyond the original mandate of August 2008, and the force is showing real signs of wear and tear after so many years in one of the most challenging parts of Afghanistan**. Moreover, with the 2009 departure of Jaap de Hoop Scheffer as NATO Secretary-General and given the unpopularity of the war in the Netherlands, a political threshold has been crossed for what was an increasingly weak and divided government. Still, **the implications will go far beyond the Netherlands**. **The impact on current operations in the south of Afghanistan will be marked, at least temporarily, until U.S. or other Allied combat forces replace the Dutch and get experience in the province.** Uruzghan occupies a strategic position between the war-torn south and Kabul. Over eight years the Dutch have invested in both physical and human infrastructure that has enabled them to reach into the community. **With their Australian partners in Uruzghan refusing to take a lead role, much of that effort and many contacts will be lost at what is a critical moment in the campaign as U.S. forces intensify the pressure on the Taliban.** **Alliance cohesion, fragile at the best of times, will be further undermined at a critical moment. The Dutch** **are the first** NATO ally and European **state that has unilaterally signaled its intention to leave.** **The Canadians could well follow suit** and leave Kandahar. For most other Europeans, **this could well prove to be a signal moment**. No European has wanted to be the first to quit the struggle. However, **the commitment of allies such as Germany, Spain and Italy has been lukewarm at the best of times and the Dutch departure will doubtless increase pressure on them to leave**. Tragically **for the Dutch**, all the good work they have undoubtedly done could well be forgotten as they **inadvertently trigger a sustained European exodus from Afghanistan.** This is unfair not least because **the Dutch departure has been triggered by a refusal of allies in more stable regions to send troops south.** ISAF has just created a new joint command which seeks to merge counter-terror (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. This effort is U.S.-led and rightly so because the Americans are investing such a huge effort in what President Obama sees as the critical phase of the campaign in the critical space of the AFPAK region. Had the Dutch stayed until the stated peak of the surge in July 2011 a stronger **European presence would not only have helped to underpin the legitimacy of the campaign** but also ensured that ISAF represents a merger of European and American efforts, rather than the takeover it will now appear to be. The departure of the Dutch will doubtless reinforce a belief both in the Afghan Government and key elements of the international community, such as the United Nations and leading non-governmental organizations (NGOs), that only the Americans (and to some 3extent the British) are reliable partners. This will likely affect the willingness of the Kabul government to work with Europeans **and further undermine the influence of Europeans** over the government and mission. The departure of the Dutch will take place just as the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is being inaugurated, **further undermining what is a very fragile process towards European security self-determination**. However, **the greatest impact will be on NATO and with it the wider transatlantic relationship**. The Dutch departure is scheduled for the eve of NATO’s new strategic concept, in effect NATO’s ten year plan for dealing with a dangerous and complex world in which stabilization and reconstruction missions will be front and center. Should the Americans and British be forced to fill the Uruzghan space with little or no help from allies in the north and west of Afghanistan, then to the heavily-burdened Americans and British the message will be clear: the solidarity implicit in the strategic concept will be as empty as the Helmand desert.

AFF – No Link

NATO is not involved militarily with the US, they won’t feel abandoned

**Bensahel 3** (Nora, Public Policy Expert at RAND, “The Counterterror Coalitions,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1746/MR1746.pdf)IM

The European countries were extremely supportive of the United States after September 11. They pledged to support the United States individually, in personal conversations with President Bush and se- nior U.S. policymakers, and collectively, through NATO and the European Union. NATO’s invocation of its self-defense clause led many to expect that NATO would be an integral part of the military response in Afghanistan, in that the alliance was built around the principle that an attack on one member would be considered an at- tack on all. Yet it soon became clear that the United States would conduct military operations in Afghanistan without any explicit NATO role, preferring instead to incorporate European contributions on a bilateral basis.

NATO does not play a lead role in Afghanistan – American withdrawal would not anger it

**Awwal 2** (Rabi-ul, Dawn Newspaper Writer, June 4 2002, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27c/006.html)IM

BRUSSELS, June 3: NATO is drawing up a new "military concept" to define its role in the fight against global terrorism and put an end to the identity crisis which has plagued it since September 11, officials said on Monday. Sidelined by the US military campaign in Afghanistan, NATO is working to make itself relevant for threats and security challenges that may lie far beyond the borders of Europe that it guarded during the Cold War. Defence ministers from the 19-nation alliance will kickstart the process at a meeting in Brussels on Thursday and the package of measures will be agreed at a summit in Prague next November. They will consider plans to streamline NATO's cumbersome military command structure and start work on a shopping list of military hardware to defend against weapons of mass destruction and get boots on the ground quickly when crises erupt. "The main function of this new military concept is to define NATO's role, and in particular the military role in relation to terrorism," a senior NATO official said. It will consider what role NATO could play in attacks on non-member countries outside its traditional area of operations and how it can contribute to international coalitions.

The US does not need to draw NATO into military operations, and it doesn’t – NATO won’t be affected by US withdrawal

**Bensahel 3** (Nora, Public Policy Expert at RAND, “The Counterterror Coalitions,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1746/MR1746.pdf)IM

The question of NATO’s future role in counterterrorism is more complex. Many Europeans believed that the Article 5 invocation would lead to increased transatlantic cooperation against terrorism, but the United States decided to conduct Operation Enduring Freedom on a bilateral basis without any direct NATO role. The allies spent most of 2002 wrestling with the questions of why that occurred and what role NATO should play in future counterterror efforts. The Prague Summit endorsed some of the concepts that emerged from this debate, including the adoption of a new military concept against terrorism and a new capabilities initiative that will improve the al- liance’s ability to respond to short-notice crises. Yet the fundamen- tal question about NATO’s role in counterterrorism remains unanswered. Most of the allies believe that NATO needs to expand its authority and capabilities in this important area and must address related issues such as consequence management. Yet France has vo- cally challenged this position, arguing that NATO’s role in counter- terrorism is sufficient as it is now, and that related issues such as consequence management should be addressed through the European Union rather than NATO. From a purely military perspective, September 11 showed that the United States does not need to draw on NATO to conduct military operations against suspected terrorists and their state sponsors. The United States demonstrated its ability to conduct a major offensive campaign in Afghanistan, along with smaller training operations in the Philippines, Georgia, and elsewhere, while limiting the NATO role to backfilling U.S. forces by patrolling U.S. airspace and the oceans off the Horn of Africa. To be sure, individual NATO allies did make significant military contributions, particularly in regard to special forces, but these were made on a bilateral basis and did not involve NATO’s military staff. Barring a radical increase in European military capabilities—something which would take years to achieve, even under the best of circumstances—the United States will most likely choose to avoid giving NATO more than a minimal role in fu- ture military operations against terrorists and their sponsors. The United States should therefore emphasize bilateral military relation- ships when planning and conducting counterterror military opera- tions, so that it can incorporate useful contributions from the willing without automatically involving all 19—and soon to be 26—alliance members in the decisionmaking process.

AFF – No IL/Alt Causes

Alt Cause – the US-NATO alliance is damaged by military initiatives in Turkey

**Bensahel 3** (Nora, Public Policy Expert at RAND, “The Counterterror Coalitions,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1746/MR1746.pdf)IM

These disagreements also caused real political and military problems for NATO. In January 2003 the United States officially asked NATO to contribute to the campaign against Iraq, by backfilling U.S. troops redeploying from Europe to the Gulf, by helping to defend Turkey against possible retaliatory strikes from Iraq, and by assisting with postwar reconstruction and policing. Yet France, Germany, and Belgium opposed NATO undertaking any sort of operational plan- ning, because they feared that taking such action before receiving a final report from the weapons inspectors would signal that they no longer believed in the possibility of a peaceful solution and would commit them to the operation by default. They were particularly concerned about the proposal for NATO to help defend Turkey by providing it with AWACS radar planes, Patriot antimissile batteries, and antibiological and antichemical warfare units.50 On February 6, NATO Secretary General Robertson tried to break the stalemate over Turkish assistance by invoking the silence procedure, which meant that such assistance to Turkey would be automatically approved unless one or more allies explicitly objected.51 The silence procedure had often helped the allies overcome differences in the past,52 but on February 10, France, Germany, and Belgium expressed formal opposition to the proposal to provide assistance to Turkey. That same day, Turkey invoked Article 4 of the NATO Charter, which requires the allies to consult if one of them perceives a threat to its security. This marked the first time that the Article 4 consultation mechanism had ever been invoked, and Turkey clearly hoped that the seriousness of that action would help to force action. Yet France, Germany, and Belgium turned down this direct request, reiterating their position that such action was premature and would seem to commit NATO to war before the inspectors finished their work.53 In response, the United States announced that it would join willing allies in deploying defensive equipment to Turkey, even if that action was not taken within the NATO framework.54

Alt cause – capability gap

**Awwal 2** (Rabi-ul, Dawn Newspaper Writer, June 4 2002, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27c/006.html)IM

The main concern for the defence ministers meeting this week will be the yawning gap in military capabilities between the United States and its allies. The $48-billion increase planned for the US defence budget in 2003 is larger than the total annual defence budget of its next biggest allies, Britain and France. NATO Secretary General George Robertson has warned that if the gap continues to widen there will be a division of labour, with the United States providing logistics, smart bombs and intelligence and its lower-tech allies providing soldiers - or simply wringing their hands on the sidelines. European forces lack strategic airlift, precision-guided weapons and other key capabilities such as surveillance, air-to-air refuelling and tactical missile defence. The senior official said that the defence ministers will start work on a revamp of the hapless Defence Capabilities Initiative, a programme of 58 tasks which was launched in 1999 to deal with shortfalls highlighted by the conflict in Kosovo. "We will focus on a much more limited area of capabilities such as defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, deployability to theatre and sustainability in theatre and battlefield inter-operability," he said. The new initiative, unlike its grander but less prescriptive predecessor, will set specific tasks for each NATO nation.

AFF – No IL/Alt Causes

Alt Cause – the US doesn’t use multilateral approaches to terrorism – the US-NATO relationship is damaged by Operation Enduring Freedom

**Bensahel 3** (Nora, Public Policy Expert at RAND, “The Counterterror Coalitions,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1746/MR1746.pdf)IM

NATO, and transatlantic cooperation more broadly, suffered another blow when the United States shifted its attention from Afghanistan to Iraq. The diplomatic buildup to Operation Iraqi Freedom lasted more than a year, first involving divisions between the United States and the Europeans, and ultimately resulting in divisions within Europe itself. A detailed examination of the diplomatic events during that buildup is beyond our scope here, but there were two primary areas of disagreement: whether Iraq should be categorized as a problem of terrorism, and whether the United States had the right to take action in Iraq without explicit authorization from the United Nations (UN) Security Council. First, many European states disagreed with the U.S. argument that operations against Iraq should be the next step in the counterterror campaign. Despite the Bush administration’s continuing insistence that Iraq supported international terrorism, including support of al Qaeda, most European states remained unconvinced that they faced a significant threat. Instead, they believed that Iraq posed a problem related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While this may seem like a semantic difference, these different conceptual- izations of the problem led to extremely different policy preferences. The United States argued that Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism posed an imminent threat, and that regime change was the only way to mitigate this threat. Many of the European states, by contrast, believed that Saddam Hussein did not pose an imminent threat, but that he should not be allowed to achieve his long-term goal of procuring weapons of mass destruction. That objective required re- newed UN weapons inspections but would not require regime change, at least in the short term. The Europeans were encouraged by President Bush’s speech to the United Nations on September 12, 2002,42 in which he emphasized the importance of renewed WMD inspections, and by the unanimous passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which provided a new mandate for the inspectors.43 However, they grew increasingly disillusioned in early 2003, when the United States argued that it had the right to proceed with military action because Iraq was not fully cooperating with the weapons inspectors. Many Europeans argued that the inspections should be given more time, whereas the United States contended that Iraqi obstructions demonstrated that the inspections had once again failed. Countering terrorism is an inherently challenging task requiring deep and sustained international cooperation across a wide range of issue areas. To date, the United States has chosen a strategy built primarily on bilateral relationships with the Europeans. The mini- mal role that NATO played in Operation Enduring Freedom demon- strates that even when a multilateral option exists, the United States often prefers to pursue counterterror cooperation through bilateral channels.

AFF – No Impact

The gap would be filled with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean countries

**Bensahel 3** (Nora, Public Policy Expert at RAND, “The Counterterror Coalitions,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1746/MR1746.pdf)IM

One of NATO’s great strengths is that it promotes cooperation not only among its members but with partner states as well. NATO’s out- reach programs provide a good opportunity to strengthen coopera- tion against terrorism among the partner states, particularly because the institutional mechanisms for cooperation already exist.25 The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is the oldest of these mechanisms, estab- lished in 1994 to foster cooperation with the states of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. However, the character and purpose of the PfP may change significantly in the coming years. Seven current PfP members were invited to join the alliance during the Prague Summit, and the remaining PfP members are not likely to join NATO in either the near or medium term.26 Thus, the PfP will have to re- orient its activities so that they focus less on preparing for NATO membership. One possible direction for future cooperation is to ad- dress common threats such as terrorism. NATO also maintains spe- cial partnerships with Russia and Ukraine, which could also be used to address issues related to terrorism. The Mediterranean Dialogue may become the most important of these regional partnerships for the long-term struggle against terror- ism—its seven non-NATO members are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Terrorism has not traditionally been an area of cooperation within the Mediterranean Dialogue, and its 2002 Work Program states only that “NATO is considering pos- sibilities for consultation on terrorism with interested Mediterranean Dialogue countries.”27 Nevertheless, over the long term, the Mediterranean Dialogue could develop programs of cooperation in this important area that supplement what the United States and the other NATO members are able to achieve on a bilateral basis.

\_\_\_\*\*NATO Good – Impact Debate

NATO Good – Top Shelf\*\*

NATO prevents a major superpower nuclear war- consultation for reassurance is key

Yost 9 ( David,July, a Prof. @ the US naval Postgrade School, Monterey, California, and a Consultant for a Science Applications International Corporation, a senior fello @ the U.S. Institution of Pecae, (85) 4http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/122476701/abstract accessed 7/7) CM

 In other words, the ability to assure was defined as a function of the perceived ability to deter. It is generally agreed that the ability to deter derives from one or both of two forms of deterrence: a threat of punishment and/or a threat of denial. Denial means being able to deny the enemy the achievement of his operational objectives—as**,** for example**,** effective missile defences might intercept and foil a missile attack. In practice, making national and alliance policy has long been more complex than such a simple summary of these QDR principles suggests. Nuclear weapons in particular illustrate the complexity of defining the requirements of assurance. Denis Healey, Britain’s defence minister in the late 1 960s, formulated what he called ‘The Healey Theorem’ in order to underscore the difficulty of the assurance aspect of extended deterrence—that is, ‘it takes only five per cent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five per cent credibility to reassure the Europeans’ .4 The QDR framework of analysis, including its definition of ‘assurance’, has focused attention on longstanding policy challenges associated with nuclear the NATO allies. First, the topmost priority in NATO nuclear arrangements has historically been war prevention or, that failing, crisis management and a prompt restoration of the security and integrity of the NATO area. The QDR ‘dissuasion’ and ‘defeat’ goals have received little attention in the nuclear domain in NATO. Indeed, given the potential destructiveness of a nuclear war with a major-power adversary, the NATO allies appear to have collectively given no consideration to objectives approximating the ‘defeat’ goal for decades;5 and the foremost objectives have remained deterrence and war prevention. It is noteworthy in this regard that the call in MC14/3, NATO’s fundamental strategy document from 1967 to 1991, for ‘direct defence ... to defeat the aggres­sion on the level at which the enemy chooses to fight’, stipulated that ‘successful direct defence either defeats the aggression or places upon the aggressor the burden of escalation’. On the NATO side escalation could have involved, among other options, ‘selective nuclear strikes’. However, the allies agreed, ‘The first objective would be to counter the aggression without escalation and preserve or restore the integrity and security of the North Atlantic area’.6 In other words, during the Cold War the alliance limited its objectives in the event of war to self-defence and the restoration of deterrence and the *status quo ante*. NATO did not entertain a ‘defeat’ goal in the classical sense of defeating the adversary’s armed forces and compelling a surrender and corresponding political and territorial settlement to the advantage of the victor. The QDR notion of ‘favorable balances of military power in critical areas of the world to deter aggression or coercion’ has also been disregarded in the nuclear area in the Euro-Atlantic region. The United States has repeatedly acknowl­edged this with respect to non-strategic nuclear weapons: as Donald Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defense, said in 2002, ‘The Russians unquestionably have many multiples of what we have, I mean thousands and thousands.’7 Furthermore, the parity principle has been consistently upheld in nuclear arms control treaties between Moscow and Washington since the 1972 SALT agreements. The second distinctive point relates to the assurance aspect of US extended deterrence in NATO. Because the non-nuclear-weapon-state NATO allies have depended on the United States for their nuclear protection to a high degree, many of NATO’s nuclear arrangements, such as its consultation mechanisms, have been designed to reassure these allies about their ability to monitor and influence US decision-making as well as about the alliance’s capacity to deal effectively with external threats. The arrangements have included mechanisms for the partici­pation of non-nuclear-weapon states in the alliance’s nuclear posture as well as ongoing analysis and planning forums to assure the allies that they are partners in the formulation of a shared alliance strategy.

NATO Good – Top Shelf\*\*

**NATO is the only organization capable of preventing regional spillover wars from going global**

**Duffield 94**, (John , Winter, Assistant Prof. of Gov and Foreign Affairs @ the University of Virginia, Political Science Quarterly, 109(5) http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-3195%28199424%2F199524%29109%3A5%3C763%3ANFATCW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T accessed 7/9) CM

A second post-cold war **NATO function** that **has assumed greater prominence is the protection of alliance members against an array of newly emerging threats**. Increasing attention has been paid **to possible dangers emanating from** **North Africa** and the **Middle East**, in part **because of the spread of the technology for producing missiles and weapons of mass destruction** to those areas. **Highest on the list** of new external concerns, however, **are ethnic, territorial, and national conflicts within and among the countries** of Central and Eastern Eu­rope, as exemplified by the fighting in the former Yugoslavia. **Such conflicts have the potential to generate large numbers of refugees or even to spill over onto the territory of neighboring countries**, which include NATO members. In a worst case scenario, **outside states might feel compelled to intervene, risking an expansion of hostilities,** **as oc­curred at the beginning of World War I**. Although so far unable to put an end to such conflicts, **NATO helps to address the concerns they raise in several ways**. First**, it protects its members against the possible spillover of military hostilities**. While no alliance countries have yet been seriously threatened in this way, **NATO's long experience with organizing the defense of its members leaves it well prepared to deal with such contingencies**. **NATO also helps to prevent other countries from being drawn into conflicts of this type**. The existence of the alliance reassures member states bordering **on the region that they will not be left alone to deal with nearby wars should they escalate or spill over**, thereby **reducing the incentive to intervene unilaterally**. Instead**,** NATO's presence helps to ensure that Western military involvement in such conflicts**,** where it occurs at all, is collective and consensual.16 At the same **time, the possibility of a sharp**, **coordinated NATO response may inhibit other countries from meddling**. As the fighting in the former Yugoslavia has dragged on, moreover, the alliance has been increasingly seen as having an active role to play in containing and even suppressing conflict among national and subnational groups within Central and Eastern Europe, and it has steadily enhanced its political authority and organizational ability to act should its members choose to do so. In 1992, the allies agreed to make NATO resources available to support peacekeeping operations mandated by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the United Nations (UN)." And in early 1994, they ap­proved the development of a mechanism termed Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) that would enable groups of members — "coalitions of the willing"— to draw upon common alliance assets for specific opera­tions outside of the treaty area.18 Most dramatically, the alliance has gained valuable experience in the former Yugoslavia, firing shots in anger for the first time in its history. NATO forces have enforced both the maritime blockade in the Adriatic and the no-fly zone over Bosnia. They have provided protective air power for UN personnel on the ground. And they have used the threat of air strikes to establish exclusion zones for heavy weapons around Sarajevo and the UN-designated safe area of Gor­azde. Although NATO's impact on the conflict has not yet been deci­sive, this lack of success can be only partly ascribed to the alliance itself; **its ability to intervene effectively in future regional conflicts has clearly increased.**

NATO Good – Top Shelf

**NATO deterrence is the best way to prevent war- Human nature**

**Roberts 8**, (Guy B, Dec. 8 Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD Policy at NATO,Comité de Surveillance OTANhttp://www.csotan.org/textes/doc.php?type=documents&art\_id=441 accessed 7/9) CM

This leads to the question of why nuclear deterrence and more importantly, why nuclear deterrence for NATO? Nuclear weapons provide something that conventional forces cannot: incalculable risks. It is, of course, exceedingly difficult to prove a negative. So let me right up front make a statement of belief: «nuclear deterrence has prevented a catastrophic war for over 50 years and it will continue to be an effective insurance policy for the unstable and unpredictable world we live in.» Given that much of the worst violence in human history has occurred because of great power wars, we should not dispense with the very weaponry that has rendered such devastating conflicts almost obsolete. When a potential aggressor thinks about the nuclear capability of NATO and chooses against an attack, nuclear weapons work. They thus serve as a political and psychological tool capable of maintaining the security of the allies. They are the only current weapon capable of destroying an entire society, raising the cost of aggression to an unacceptably high level. Such is not the case with conventional forces. While you may be outmatched conventionally, the risk of complete annihilation is very low. History is replete with cases of calculated aggression against larger, stronger conventionally armed adversaries, for example the surprise attack on Pearl Harbour. Many statesmen have decried the grim character of deterrence. Deterrence arises from a logical and a moral necessity – as Kenneth Walz pointed out in his 1954 classic, “Man, the State, and War.” Because men are not angels, because states can be malevolent, and because the international system of states is itself a jungle, without an all-powerful world government to enforce order, something like deterrence is required. Deterrence can be thought of as reason’s attempt to check the perpetual temptation of evil. As Edmund Burke warned: “There is no safety for honest men but by believing all possible evil of evil men.” This includes assuming they will lie, cheat and betray. The search for perfect security is a fool’s errand in a world inherently beset by conflict. Deterrence thus seeks to build security on the firmer foothold of a realistic view of human nature. This is one that sees that the most reliable human motive is the preservation of things one holds most dear – particularly one’s own life. Our deterrence posture is such that we believe no regime, no matter how aggressive and risk-inclined, would be so foolish as to attack the Alliance, a move that would yield little advantage, and thereby incur an attack’s clear consequence – utter destruction. Now, it is important to note that deterrence is fundamentally defensive and to be distinguished from its more brazen cousin, coercion, which is the use of threats of violence to accomplish positive ends. Through the threat of overwhelming force it enforces peace, founding it on the firmer ground of respect and fear rather than the shiftier ground of ideology or aspiration. So if President Bush’s effort to diminish international conflict by improving the character of states, by making them democracies, does not work out, deterrence will still be available. Deterrence offers an insurance guarantee against the possible failure of idealists to reduce the likelihood of war by other means.

NATO Good – Top Shelf – Magnitude Cap XT

NATO allows for International cooperation preventing regional backlash and war through Consultation

**Duffield 94**, (John , Winter, Assistant Prof. of Gov and Foreign Affairs @ the University of Virginia, Political Science Quarterly, 109(5) http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-3195%28199424%2F199524%29109%3A5%3C763%3ANFATCW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T accessed 7/9) CM

**An important potential source of international conflict is mispercep­tion and misunderstanding among states. In the absence of detailed and reliable information**, **decision makers may exaggerate the offensive military capabilities of other countries or misinterpret foreign inten­tions, often perceiving them as more hostile than they actually are**. They also tend to overlook the security concerns that their own actions may raise abroad. Consequently, international relations are often char­acterized by suspicion and mistrust.32 **NATO helps to prevent such destructive dynamics from arising among its members and instead promotes mutual confidence by facilitating a high degree of intra-alliance transparency**. **Frequent consultation** **at many levels and on many subjects** **allows members to inform one another of their activities and intentions and, if necessary, to register their concerns and misapprehensions**. Participation in the alliance's force planning process requires members to exchange detailed informa­tion about their military forces, defense budgets, and future plans. As a result of such institutionalized openness, NATO members are able to keep few secrets from each other, and they have fewer incentives to do so **A further way in which NATO fosters reassurance among its mem­bers is by integrating their security policies.3**4 To varying but usually substantial degrees, NATO countries formulate and execute their secu­rity policies as part of the alliance rather than on a purely national basis**. This denationalization of security policy tempers the natural rivalry and competition for military primacy that might otherwise occur among the major European powers, and it helps to preclude any intra­European use of military posturing for political influence.** **Should renationalization occur,** on the other hand, **it "could give rise to con­cerns about internal imbalances in Western Europe**" **and generate** re­newed mistrust, competition, and even **conflict**." NATO promotes the denationalization of security policy in several ways. At the most basic level, **its consultative organs, force planning process, and integrated military structure help forge a common identity among alliance members.** **Regular and in-depth consultation contrib­utes to a high degree of mutual understanding.** Joint force planning helps reshaple each member's military posture to reflect alliance-wide, rather than national interests. And assignments to the alliance's civilian bureaucracy and military organization socialize government officials and military officers into a common NATO culture.36 In addition, participation in NATO's integrated military structure fosters reduced military self-sufficiency on the part of member coun­tries, especially in the central region of Europe, since it allows them to forgo or at least to deemphasize a good number of the ingredients essential to an independent military capability. For example, many European countries depend heavily on NATO's multinational airborne early warning force and its integrated air defense system. In order to husband defense resources, moreover, both small and large countries have sacrificed the ability to carry out certain missions, such as air reconnaissance and mine sweeping, knowing that other allies would perform them. And even the powerful German ground forces have relied on their U.S. counterparts to provide some indirect fire sup­port.37 At the same time, **multinational integration establishes a degree of mutual control by increasing the level of collective involvement in organizational and operational planning**. Indeed, Germany has never developed a full-fledged national planning and command capability above the corps level, counting instead on multinational NATO staffs to conduct those vital tasks. Thus the continued existence of the inte­grated military structure places constraints on the ability of many members to use their forces for exclusively national objectives, at least in the short- to medium-term, and reassures them as to the common purpose of their military power. In its absence, the possibility that the forces of one country could raise alarms in another would be much greater ." The intra-alliance benefits of NATO's integrated military structure are seen most clearly with respect to Germany. The other countries of Western Europe are eager to see that Germany remains tightly bound within the NATO framework. Even France dropped its usual reserve and involved itself in the alliance reform process in the early 1990s out of "its wish to keep NATO as a strong multilateral structure for the integration and control of German military power." German leaders themselves, sensitive to the need to reassure their neighbors in the wake of unification, recognize the opportunity that participation in NATO provides to defuse possible fears of a resurgent Germany and thus to foster a more cooperative European environment.40

NATO Good – Civil Liberties

NATO presence is key to promote respect of civil liberties

**Yamasaki 10** (Lilian, World Poverty and Human Rights Online, March 27 2010, http://wphr.org/2010/lilian-yamasaki/afghanistan-natos-economic-development-and-human-rights-approach-to-global-safety/)IM

On April 4 2009, President Obama met with NATO leaders to discuss the new directions in the Afghanistan war. In a press conference, President Obama answers about a recent law passed in Afghanistan that contradicts with The United Nations Development Fund for Women in which legalizes the rape of a wife by her husband. He emphasizes United States position on this law, promotes NATO’s human rights approach but reassures that global security, traditionally or not, is the goal: PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, first of all, this was actually a topic of conversation among all the allies. And in our communication — communiqué, you will see that we specifically state that part of this comprehensive approach is encouraging the respect of human rights. I think this law is abhorrent. Certainly the views of the administration have been, and will be, communicated to the Karzai government. And we think that it is very important for us to be sensitive to local culture, but we also think that there are certain basic principles that all nations should uphold, and respect for women and respect for their freedom and integrity is an important principle. Now, I just want to remind people, though, why our troops are fighting, because I think the notion that you laid out, Major, was that our troops might be less motivated. Our troops are highly motivated to protect the United States, just as troops from NATO are highly motivated to protect their own individual countries and NATO allies collectively. So we want to do everything we can to encourage and promote rule of law, human rights, the education of women and girls in Afghanistan, economic development, infrastructure development, but I also want people to understand that the first reason we are there is to root out al Qaeda so that they cannot attack members of the Alliance [1]. From this press conference, calling the law “abhorrent” influenced Afghanistan’s government to alter the language of this law, and while it still violates the fundamentals of human rights [3], it signifies how NATO and United States political pressures can impact the respect of civil liberties. While the ‘traditional’ approach to the Afghanistan war is emphasized, the respect of human rights in socio economic development strategies is a new terminology in the global defense system.

NATO Good – Democracy

NATO is key to soft power and democracy promotion and solving terrorism

**Kwok 5** (James, Summer, Staff writer @ the Harvard International Review, Defining Power 27(2) http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb137/is\_2\_27/ai\_n29190903/pg\_5/?tag=content;col1 accessed 7/9) CM

Additionally, there is the frequently ignored humanitarian struggle that fails to garner sufficient attention from geopolitical gurus and pundits. **Poverty, malnutrition, and lack of economic development are still problems that lack satisfactory solutions**. **This is something to which no one country has been paying marked attention**. However, they cannot be blamed, as most countries lack the substantial resources needed to meet their geopolitical goals as well as their humanitarian ones**. NATO provides a broad base from which substantial soft power can emanate.** Recently, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary-General of NATO, told an audience in Spain **that spreading democracy "remains the best answer to terror."** This may well intersect with UN initiatives, but de Hoop Scheffer believes **that "the most effective way [to fight terrorism] is to have a combination of all the things in our inventory, and that goes from nation-building to intelligence to diplomacy, political talks, and if necessary, military power.**" It is here that **NATO has been focusing its attention, and it is in this direction that NATO should focus more of its energies in the future**. Even given these goals, no one onlooker can provide a comprehensive checklist for what NATO needs to accomplish. **The international representatives who arrived in Washington in 1949 to sign the North Atlantic Treaty were probably well aware of this.** Articles 10 to 14 in the Treaty open the possibility for changes that member countries may later enact. The revisions may concern not only "the North Atlantic area," but also "regional arrangements ... for the maintenance of international peace and security." Too often, critics concern themselves with only the concrete aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, they miss the crux of the relationship: **there is an undeniable similarity in ideals between NATO's member countries that needs to be affirmed**. **To say that NATO is obsolete because its function as a military alliance is obsolete confuses means with ends**. In this respect, it is very clear why early proponents of NATO shied away from referring to it only as an alliance.**Renewed commitment is key**; the fundamental problem is that arguing can render liberal democracy ineffective. As Kagan wrote in Paradise and Power, France thinks of the United States as "the American Leviathan unbound," while US cartoonists see Europeans as stuffed shirts. However, the petty differences must be thrown out. What we now think of as "**the West" needs to gain greater coherency not only for its own sake, but for the world's benefit**. **Their role in a great multilateral framework like NATO demands that they also have a measure of responsibility to work together to help maintain the stability of the world order.**

NATO Good – Democracy

Global democracy prevents nuclear wars

**Muravchik 1** (Joshua, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, http://www.npec-web.org/Syllabus/Muravchik.pdf)IM

The fall of Communism not only ended the Cold War; it also ended the only universalist ideological challenge to democracy. Radical Islam may still offer an alternative to democracy in parts of the world, but it appeals by definition only to Moslems and has not even won the assent of a majority of these. And Iranian President Khatami's second landslide election victory in 2001 suggests that even in the cradle of radical Islam the yearning for democracy is waxing. That Freedom House could count 120 freely elected governments by early 2001 (out of a total of 192 independent states) bespeaks a vast transformation in human governance within the span of 225 years. In 1775, the number of democracies was zero. In 1776, the birth of the United States of America brought the total up to one. Since then, democracy has spread at an accelerating pace, most of the growth having occurred within the twentieth century, with greatest momentum since 1974. That this momentum has slackened somewhat since its pinnacle in 1989, destined to be remembered as one of the most revolutionary years in all history, was inevitable. So many peoples were swept up in the democratic tide that there was certain to be some backsliding. Most countries' democratic evolution has included some fits and starts rather than a smooth progression. So it must be for the world as a whole. Nonetheless, the overall trend remains powerful and clear. Despite the backsliding, the number and proportion of democracies stands higher today than ever before. This progress offers a source of hope for enduring nuclear peace. The danger of nuclear war was radically reduced almost overnight when Russia abandoned Communism and turned to democracy. For other ominous corners of the world, we may be in a kind of race between the emergence or growth of nuclear arsenals and the advent of democratization. If this is so, the greatest cause for worry may rest with the Moslem Middle East where nuclear arsenals do not yet exist but where the prospects for democracy may be still more remote.

NATO Good – European Arms Race

NATO is key to preventing a European Nuclear arms race

Espinosa, 94 (Paul E, December, Navel Postgrad School, Monterey, California http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/1994/Dec/94Dec\_Espinosa.pdf accessed 7/7) CM

The political ramifications bring into focus the real issues in the post-cold war NFU debate. U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe are generally perceived by the NATO European allies to be one of the vital links binding North America to Europe. Conversely, the U.S. perceives this "risk-sharing" as proof of a continued European interest in U.S. nuclear commitments.' Alliance cohesion is a key element in the credibility of NATO's deterrent. The belief in "strength through unity" is predominant. Many West European experts in strategic affairs contend that a U.S. NFU declaration would undermine alliance cohesion and therefore raise doubts about the credibility of NATO's deterrent.' In the short-run this argument is likely to be true. However, it is useful to project this scenario into the future to examine potential long-term ramifications. One possibility is that as a result of a U.S. NFU declaration, U.S. nuclear systems are removed, either voluntarily or by request, from Europe. In return, some observers have suggested, the United States could issue reconstitution guarantees and rely on existential deterrence to affirm the continued credibility of U.S. nuclear coinmitments." A second possibility is that a U.S. NFU declaration could be perceived as a conscious effort by the United States to disengage from Europe. This could lead to efforts by Britain and France to compensate by forming a common European nuclear doctrine and/or to efforts by Germany to develop nuclear weapons to guarantee its own security.108 These possibilities might reflect steps in the evolutionary process of greater European integration. The idea of a European nuclear doctrine was introduced by President Mitterrand of France in January 1992 and the general principle of dialogue has since been endorsed by Britain. While this is acknowledged as being a long-term project. some progress is being made. This can be viewed as a hedging strategy against the possibility of a diminished U.S. commitment to European defense.1°9 Whether Germany would accept a European nuclear umbrella is a separate issue. Within the context of this long-term vision of Europe, what are the implications of a U.S. NFU declaration on deterrence? A U.S. NFU policy would probably undermine alliance cohesion, which would weaken deterrence. As states perceive that their security requirements are no longer being met, a fundamental restructuring of Europe could result. The resulting instability could be detrimental to U.S. security interests. This prospect is discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. Within the context of the regional level of deterrence, U.S. nuclear threats are likely to be largely ineffective against some new nuclear-weapon states or regional aggressors. Nonetheless, the presence of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe along with the capability of deploying nuclear cruise missiles on submarines and surface ships may provide a certain level of stability by providing a hedge against a resurgent Russia. strengthening regional deterrence. and reassuring allies.

**A collapse in NATO would result in the collapse deterrence and the EU**

**Binnendijk and Kugler 4** (Hans and Richard, Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Policy and Direction of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy , Distinguished Research Professor at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy with specialty in U.S. defense strategy, global security affairs, and NATO http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/books/transatlantic\_transformations.pdf accessed 7/8) CM

**The biggest loser would not be the United States,** **but, Europe**. **NATO collapse** would not be the United States, but, Europe, NATO collapse **would result in a major U.S political and military withdrawal from the continent.** **The United States might retain a foothold though bilateral ties with Britain and other countries, but it no longer would play a multilateral leadership role**. **Along with this withdrawal would come removal of many strategic roles that the United States plays behind the scene**. **The United States continues to provide extended deterrence coverage over virtually all of Europe, a still-vital protection in this era of nuclear powers and proliferation**. As shown in the Kosovo War, **U.S conventional forces provide about three –quarters of NATO military power projection assets for crises and wars on Europe’s periphery**,. **These nuclear and conventional contributions**, moreover, **enable Europe to defend itself with annual defense budgets that are $100- 1050 billion smaller than otherwise would be the case. In effect, the United States is helping** **fund the European Union**, **because these savings equal the EU budget.** Perhaps the Europeans could fund a big defense buildup to compensate for the loss of American military guarantees, but the price could be quite high, because a **European buildup absent NATO would be costlier than a buildup under its auspices**, NATO offers many economies of scale and opportunities to avoid redundancy through integrated planning. In addition, A European military buildup would be controversial. How would Europe erect an umbrella of nuclear deterrenc7/8e? How would it prepare for crisis operations on its periphery? What would be the European reaction if Germany were compelled to build nuclear forces and a large, mobile military?

NATO Good – European War

**Without NATO Europeans nuclear wars would be inevitable**

**Duffield 94**, (John , Winter, Assistant Prof. of Gov and Foreign Affairs @ the University of Virginia, Political Science Quarterly, 109(5) http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-3195%28199424%2F199524%29109%3A5%3C763%3ANFATCW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T accessed 7/9) CM

Second**, the pessimists failed to consider NATO's capacity for institu­tional adaptation**. Since the end of the cold war, **the alliance has begun to develop two important new functions. NATO is increasingly seen as having a significant role to play in containing and controlling milita­rized conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe**. And, at a deeper level, **it works to prevent such conflicts from arising at all by actively pro­moting stability within the former Soviet bloc.** Above all, NATO pessimists overlooked **the valuable intra-alliance functions** that the alliance has always performed and that remain rele­vant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO **has helped stabilize Western Europe**, **whose states had often been bitter rivals in the past**. **By damping the security dilemma** and providing an institutional mech­anism for the development of common security policies, **NATO has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually inconceivable**. In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, **American economic** **interests in Europe**—as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign investment by American companies — **remain substantial**. If history is any guide, **moreover, the United States could easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe**, **the consequences of which would likely be even more devastating than those of the past**, **given the existence of nuclear weapons** .11 In sum, although NATO now lacks a single compelling raison d'etre, as it had in the past, the alliance continues to perform a number of valuable security functions for its members. As a result**, all of the allies have found it in their interest to preserve NATO**, notwithstanding differences in the importance they may attach to each of these pur­poses. The most significant of the alliance's external and internal func­tions are described in the next two sections. Nato continues to enhance the security of its members with respect to external dangers in several ways. First**, it preserves the strategic balance in Europe by neutralizing the residual threat posed by Russian military power**. Second**, it helps to address emerging new threats, in­cluding the complex perils posed by conflicts within and among the states of Central and Eastern Europe**. Third, **it impedes such threats from arising in the first place by contributing to the process of fostering stability in the former Soviet bloc**.

NATO Good – Hegemony

NATO key to hegemony – leadership and sphere of influence

Rühle 03 Michael, Head of Policy Planning in the NATO Political Affairs Division, summer
Despite the fundamental need for change, www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/**parameters**//**03summer**/**ruhle**.htm accessed 7/7) CM

NATO could take on this reexamination of its internal relationships with considerable self-confidence. After all, 9/11 did not change everything. Despite some American claims that Europe was “fading slowly in the US rearview mirror,” there is a transatlantic connection that has become too firmly entrenched to be easily jettisoned. First, European stability remains a key US strategic interest. The consolidation of Europe as an undivided, democratic, and market-oriented space remains a major objective of US security policy. Only in NATO, the central legitimizing framework for US power in Europe, can the United States pl,ay an undisputed leadership role in advancing this strategic objective. Thus, the United States is not likely to surrender this role. Indeed, many US critics of Europe have yet to grasp the fact that both NATO enlargement and the war on terrorism have actually increased the United States’ immersion in European security affairs. Consequently, there is no serious political force in the United States advocating a withdrawal from Europe. Second, Europeans remain the key strategic allies for the United States. This statement does not exclude a stronger US focus on other regions, nor is it contradicted by the emergence of much wider “coalitions of the willing” along the model provided by the Afghanistan campaign. Europe’s military capabilities lag behind the United States, yet on a global scale, Europe ranks No. 2 militarily. Moreover, although the debate preceding the war against Iraq may have suggested otherwise, it is only in Europe where the United States finds a milieu of countries predisposed to working with the United States. In Asia, by contrast, the United States will have to continue to rely on bilateral relationships with politically and culturally very different countries. In short, if the United States wants to remain the world’s predominant power, it will have to remain a “European power” as well. Third, the United States remains Europe’s most important ally. The United States continues to play a unique role within the transatlantic relationship, as a political crisis manager as well as a military coalition-builder, both within Europe (e.g., the Balkans) and beyond (e.g., the Persian Gulf). This unique US role is widely accepted by the Europeans, notwithstanding ritualistic European criticism of US arrogance or heavy-handedness. As in the United States, there is currently no serious politicalforce in Europe that would advocate a US withdrawal from the continent. On the contrary, with Central and Eastern Europe rejoining the Atlantic community of nations through the enlargement of NATO, the number of countries arguing for a strong US role in Europe has only increased.

**A collapse in NATO would result in the US loss of Hegemony**

**Binnendijk and Kugler 4** (Hans and Richard, Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Policy and Direction of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy , Distinguished Research Professor at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy with specialty in U.S. defense strategy, global security affairs, and NATO http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/books/transatlantic\_transformations.pdf accessed 7/8) CM

**The damaging effects of NATO collapse would extend far beyond the war on terrorism into the strategic realm of traditional security affairs. For the United States, loss of NATO would be a more serious setback than advocates of unilateralism realize. At a minimum**, **the United States would lose influence over Europe’s evolution and would face even greater anti-Americanism**. In other regions, **the United States** might not have its wings clipped to the degree envisioned by some Europeans—a global superpower has many other friends—but it **would suffer from the loss of political legitimacy that European and NATO support often gives to its endeavors in the Middle East and elsewhere**. Although France, Germany, and a few others criticized the U.S. and British invasion of Iraq, fully 75 per cent of current and prospective NATO members gave vocal political support to it. **Such strong support would be less likely in a world without NATO**. Militarily, **the United States would lose valuable infrastructure in Europe that is helpful in projecting power to distant regions. The United States also would be damaged in crises and wars that require allied force** **contributions**. In theory, the United States could still draw upon friendly European countries to create ad hoc coalitions of the willing. But **if NATO no longer exists, few countries may be willing to join U.S.-led coalitions**. Also important, **their military forces might be less able to work closely with U.S. forces because NATO no longer would provide them the necessary interoperability.**

NATO Good – Hegemony

**NATO is a critical factor in the maintenance and spread of US hegemony**

**Petras 8**(James, 2/21, Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University Z Magazine http://www.nezakladnam.cz/en/866\_nato-expansion-is-expansion-of-us-hegemony acessed 7/8)CM

Washington’s rejection of France’s attempt to increase European influence in the command structure of NATO was a prelude to Clinton dictating the terms for new members of NATO: **the three new members (Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic) are U.S. clients; the rejected candidates (Romania and Slovenia) are French and German clients. The real meaning of the "expansion of NATO" is the extension of U.S. hegemony to Central-Eastern Europe. With the U.S. in command that means military bases and deep penetration of the military and security systems of those countries**. Secondly, **through U.S. domination of NATO, the new members will be pushed to accelerate the "free market reforms" and increase the opportunities for Western multinational corporations**. **NATO military forces will back the regimes administrating these "unpopular measures"—strengthening the** repressive **arm of the state**. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office predicts total cost **of NATO enlargement at about $125 billion over 13 years with Washington paying only $19 billion**. That means Eastern and Western Europe will have to pay 85 percent of the cost, or $106 billion. At a time of large-scale unemployment and cuts in social budgets in East and West Europe this is likely to lower living standards and provoke greater social unrest. The new members of NATO in East Europe will have to increase their military spendi**ng** to be on the same footing with their Western partners. U.S. arms manufacturers are the biggest supporters of NATO expansion and will be the principle economic beneficiaries. The president of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO, Bruce Jackson, is also the director of Lockheed Martin Corporation, the world’s best weapons maker. **Entering NATO means buying U.S. weapons**. The potential market for fighter jets alone is $10 billion. Hungary will increase its military spending by 35 percent, Poland 20 percent, and the Czech Republic by similar percentages.

**NATO is the catalyst for US hegemony**

**Layne 2k** (Christopher, Sept, MacArthur Foundation Fellow in Global Security and a Visiting Professor, University of Southern California, (23)3 pg 67-68 http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&hid=7&sid=350dfe58-1f70-449f-a875-220140b5853e%40sessionmgr12 accessed 7/8) CM

**American policymakers had no intention of withdrawing US forces from Europe or dismantling NATO**. To the contrary**, they sought to ensure that the United States would retain its hegemony in Europe notwithstanding the Cold War's end, and that NATO — the instrument through which Washington's continental preeminence was exercised — would remain intact**. As Bush administration officials Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice observe: [The Bush] administration believed strongly that**, even if the immediate military threat from the Soviet Union diminished, the United States should maintain a significant military presence in Europe for the foreseeable future...The American troop presence thus...served as the ante to ensure a central place for the United States as a player in European politics.** The Bush administration placed a high value on retaining such influence, underscored by Bush's flat statement that the United States was and would remain 'a European power' *...The Bush administration was determined to maintain crucial features of the NATO system for European security even if the Cold War ended."* As Bush's National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, has written, `whatever developed with respect to the Cold War', America tad to continue to play a significant role in European security', and **'the vehicle for that role must be NATO**' .4' The United States greeted coldly any suggestions that, in a post-Cold War Europe, NATO could be replaced by a new continental security order based on pan-European institutions such as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).49 In the post-Cold War world, **NATO was key to the US objectives of controlling Germany, preventing Russia's resurgence as a great power, and expanding the geographical and ideological scope of American interests in Europe**.

NATO Good – Int’l Security

NATO presence is key to prevent civil war and global instability

**Yamasaki 10** (Lilian, World Poverty and Human Rights Online, March 27 2010, http://wphr.org/2010/lilian-yamasaki/afghanistan-natos-economic-development-and-human-rights-approach-to-global-safety/)IM

NATO’s war on Afghanistan has taken unconventional directions to achieve global safety by implementing socio economic development programs while preserving the principles of the United Nations Charter, agreed in the 1949 Treaty. This strategy brings new meanings to the respect of human rights in the acts of war. The notion of war, rightly or not, is still in place, however it is no longer entirely based on vigorous armies and resources, but on socio economic development freedoms as well. Maintaining security as the goal, NATO members participate in individual and collective defense strategies from the ‘traditional notions’ of war to development programs. United States and Canada, among other NATO allies, have taken the appropriate steps to promote human rights in Afghanistan. Poverty, inequalities, unstable governments and environments are the main causes of civil wars in many developing nations and consequently affects global safety. The socio economic development strategy has become a new language in the international defense system, but most importantly, it has given new meanings to the respect of human rights in global security and peace goals.

NATO maintains international peace

Robertson 3 (Lord, , Secretary General of NATO and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council formers Defense Secretary of the United Kingdom , Speech at the 9th Conference de Montreal 06-May-2003 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030506a.htm accessed 7/7) CM

For those of you who have heard NATO speeches in the past, this one might have come as a bit of a surprise. This is not your grandfather’s Alliance. Or even your mother’s. This is the NATO for your grandchildren. The 21st century NATO – with new members, new missions, and new capabilities. It is an Alliance that squares the circle of being truly multilateral, and truly effective. It engages the United States, Europe and Canada in common causes, defending common values and interests, in an organisation where each country has an equal voice, and where each can and must make a real contribution. Most importantly, NATO provides security – defending its members, and keeping the peace on behalf of the international community. It has taken up the challenge of relevance and transformed itself. It is demonstrably effective. And it delivers.

NATO forces prevent war

Robertson 3 (Lord, , Secretary General of NATO and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council formers Defense Secretary of the United Kingdom , Speech at the 9th Conference de Montreal 06-May-2003 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030506a.htm accessed 7/7) CM

After 9/11, NATO also played a supporting role in actions against Al Qaida. Most importantly, however, NATO at Prague became the focal point for planning the military contribution against terrorism, a major new role and one which no other organisation in the world could play. In doing so, we have put an end to decades of arid theological debate about whether the Alliance could operate outside Europe. NATO now has a mandate to deal with threats from wherever they may come. We do not pretend to be a world policeman. But we are no longer solely Europe’s neighbourhood cop. If these new roles are to be more than an aspiration, NATO must also retool with new capabilities. As we have seen on our television screens, modern warfare is demanding in new ways: precision weapons, real time intelligence, deploying and sustaining forces over long distances and for prolonged periods. We are having to replace a Cold War sumo wrestler with a 21st century fencer. For NATO that means new capabilities to defend against chemical and biological weapons, give commanders a surveillance picture of the ground battlefield, and increase our heavy airlift and air tanker fleets. All of this will help to close the capabilities gap that has opened between the US and its Allies. That gap is not a myth of the military establishment. Take airlift: the US has 250 long range transport aircraft; the UK has 4; the rest of NATO, including Canada, none at all. How will our forces get to places like Afghanistan quickly, safely and cost effectively if we do not do better? To close the gap, NATO’s nineteen Presidents and Prime Ministers signed up at Prague to a series of firm and specific political commitments to develop and acquire these and other capabilities. That’s not easy in today’s economic climate. But I am keeping their feet to the fire and I am confident that they will deliver. After all, acquiring these capabilities multinationally with your Allies is far cheaper than doing so on your own. Equally important was the decision to create a NATO Response Force, a multinational quick-reaction force with cutting edge technology to act as the point of the fencer’s foil. Militarily, the new NATO Response Force will enable NATO to meet today’s threats with today’s capabilities.

NATO Good – Int’l Security

NATO establishes effective stability

**Yarnell 10** (Mark, Stimson Center's Security for a New Century, Stimson Center, June 29 2010, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=982)IM

In the 2010 National Security Strategy, the Obama Administration emphasizes the critical importance of the U.S.-European relationship in pursuing mutual security interests. To this end, the document cites the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as(is) “the pre-eminent security alliance in the world today.” Throughout the Alliance, however, NATO’s relevance and purpose is in question. This November, at a Summit in Lisbon, the NATO heads of government plan to sign on to a new Strategic Concept. Since its formation in 1949, NATO has served as a key pillar in the North Atlantic security framework. Throughout the Cold War, NATO represented a bulwark against Soviet aggression. In the decade following the end of the Cold War, NATO played a critical role in consolidating the democratic gains of countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as several newly independent former Soviet republics, by opening its doors to accession. Today, though NATO’s founding commitment to collective defense remains intact, it is less clear what this means in practice for its now-28 members. NATO continues to serve as a vital transatlantic security link and a consolidating force for democratic and security gains, and the Obama Administration is correct to identify Europe as “the cornerstone for U.S. engagement with the world.” In its upcoming Strategic Review, however, the Organization must be clear about what collective defense means in practice in this new and uncertain world.

NATO is key to peace and stability

NATO 10 (Apr 17 2010, Together for Security: An introduction to NATO, www.nato.int/ebookshop/introduction\_to\_nato/nato\_security\_en.pdf)IM

One of the keys to the Alliance’s durability is its decision-making process based on consensus. This means that all decisions have to be unanimous. As a result, protracted consultations and discussions are often required before an important decision can be taken. Although this system may appear slow and unwieldy to an outside observer, it has two major advantages. Firstly, the sovereignty and independence of each member country is respected. Secondly, when a decision is reached, it has the full backing of all member countries and their commitment to implement it. On some occasions, there is disagreement, as was the case in spring 2003 when countries differed in their estimations of the threat presented by Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. While differing national positions mean that Allies will not always agree on action to be taken, the purpose of NATO is to facilitate consultations and discussions among them so that consensus can be achieved whenever possible. These consultations are only coordinated by NATO and are crucial to ensuring peace and stability.

NATO Good – Int’l Security

**NATO is critical to maintain stability and global interdependence**

 **Kwok** **5** (James, Summer, Staff writer @ the Harvard International Review, Defining Power 27(2) http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb137/is\_2\_27/ai\_n29190903/pg\_5/?tag=content;col1 accessed 7/9) CM

**Europe and the United States are increasingly framing prognoses of international politics** using these ideas of multipolarity and unipolarity. French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine summed up the pre-eminence of the United States by coining the term "hyperpower." However, **a world with weak powers is inherently unstable**. **During the Thirty Years' War in the 1600s, Europe's population sank and social structure deteriorated, precisely because no one political entity could single-handedly end the war**. **Instability was pervasive** until the French and the Austrian Hapsburgs became dominant powers in Europe. More than three centuries later**, this small-states theory of an international system has lost none of its potency and danger.** Europe, in a truly multipolar world, would not be militarily able to become primus inter pares. A **truly multipolar world then, is not the solution to Europe's problems** with the United States. Rather, **close integration with multilateral institutions like NATO is the best way to attain stability**. Contrary to the central tenet of balance of power politics, conflict does not always lead to an equilibrium state of stability; however, **interdependence ensures it.**

**NATO is cohesive and has an empirical record of success in stabilizing conflicts**

**Kwok 5** (James, Summer, Staff writer @ the Harvard International Review, Defining Power 27(2) http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb137/is\_2\_27/ai\_n29190903/pg\_5/?tag=content;col1 accessed 7/9) CM

**The greatest misperception of the transatlantic relationship is that the United States is incapable of seeing eye-to-eye on any issue with Europe**. The eminent political scientist Robert Kagan has pointed out that the prevailing attitude toward the transatlantic relationship is usually described as that between "cowboys" and stiff Eurocrats. That the two peoples are diametrically opposed is completely false. **Both sides of the Atlantic have the same fundamental beliefs in free markets, liberal government, and democracy**. **This dedication** to liberalism and open societies **was** not only **evident in the joint NATO peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Croatia**, **but also** most recently in **Ukraine.** Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell worked closely with his opposite numbers in Brussels--NATO's headquarters--to ensure that the elections occurring in 2004 went smoothly and according to plan**. NATO**, while playing no military role in the Iraq War, recently **has spearheaded the Training Implementation Mission in Iraq**, which seeks to create a self-sufficient Iraqi army. If argument has made the relationship tenuous, **it certainly has not paralyzed NATO**.

NATO Good – Iranian Prolif

Strong NATO Deterrence is key to preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons

Tertrais 7 (Bruno, May, Senior Research Fellow, Foundation pour la Recherche Stragique, http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/op\_21.pdf pg 94 accessed 7/7)CM

 Failure to dissuade Iran from building a nuclear capability would have serious consequences for the Alliance. It would amount to the emergence of a second nuclear-armed country on its borders. Obviously the existence of a NATO nuclear capability would then be considered an asset to be preserved by many, if not all, members. Calls for the speedy deployment of territorial missile defense on the continent would also be heard. If there was a severe degradation of the relationships between Turkey and Iran, including the prospect of armed conflict, and if there was a Western consensus on the unacceptability of a nuclear-armed Iran, NATO might even be expected to plan for a preventive or pre-emptive strike against Tehran’s nuclear facilities. Note also that voices would be heard in Turkey calling for the consideration of a national nuclear capability if the Alliance’s nuclear umbrella was considered unreliable. To avoid such a severe crisis both for NATO and the NPT, it would be critical for all Alliance members to reaffirm their defense commitment to Ankara. Given the doubts that many Turks have about the willingness of NATO nations to defend Turkey in light of the experience of recent crises (1991 and 2003), a solemn declaration by all NATO members to that effect would be in order. Finally, if Iran was to go overtly nuclear, the risk of an unraveling of the NPT would be magnified.

NATO Good – Iranian Prolif

NATO Deterrence and Consultation is key to stopping Iranian proliferation

Schulte 10 (*G*regory L., Feb 8, U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency from 2005 to 2009,.[http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/iran-nuclear-threat-nato accessed 7/7](http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/iran-nuclear-threat-nato%20accessed%207/7)) CM

Once armed with nuclear weapons, Iran’s leaders may not be so suicidal as to detonate them on NATO territory.  However Iran’s leaders may engage in nuclear brinksmanship to try to intimidate neighbors, deter outside intervention, or impress their own public.  They may feel emboldened to use surrogates, asymmetric means, or conventional force to seize territory, extend influence, or attack neighbors.  And whether Tehran intends it or not, groups like Hezbollah may see Iran’s atomic arsenal as a “nuclear umbrella” for more aggressive action against Israel and others.   Mishandled brinksmanship or nuclear-emboldened aggression may escalate, deliberately or not, to nuclear use.  Others in the region may decide to acquire their own nuclear arsenals.  Candidate proliferants include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps even Turkey, the NATO ally most exposed.  A nuclear arms race is not inevitable, nor would it necessarily be fast.  But it would magnify the risk of accident, miscalculation, or nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.   NATO must prepare to contain the dangers posed by a nuclear-armed Iran.  It should do so in several ways.   First, NATO should reinforce its ability to protect its territory, population, and regional interests.  This requires military capabilities to project force, ensure the security of energy supplies, and conduct operations despite the threat or use of nuclear weapons.  This requires missile defenses that can protect Alliance territory and deployed forces.  This requires command and control and logistical arrangements, perhaps taking advantage of existing U.S. and French bases in the Gulf countries. Second, NATO should strengthen security relations with countries in its Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, particularly Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the states in the Gulf Cooperation Council.  Consultations on the security risks of Iran’s nuclear activities would be a first step.  Subsequent steps could include exercises, combined contingency planning, and deploying missile defenses that can extend protection to regional partners and interoperate with their own defenses.  Cooperation will need to be expanded carefully and quietly, as some countries may not want to be seen as too close to NATO -- or to Israel as one of NATO’s partners. Third, NATO should act to discourage further proliferation.  Strong security relations with the countries most exposed can reduce their incentives to proliferate.  Iran must also be denied any benefit from its nuclear arms.  Other would-be proliferants should see that treaty violations bring penalties instead of prestige, sanctions instead of security, and isolation instead of influence.  A concerted effort to deny Iran any nuclear benefit can also create conditions to “rollback” its weapons program under a future leadership that seeks more positive relations with NATO countries. Finally, NATO should consider the impact on its own nuclear policy.   NATO allies have already dramatically reduced their nuclear forces, particularly in Europe, and most are attracted by the vision of a nuclear free world.  However, the Alliance cannot rush to become nuclear free when nuclear dangers mount in the range of the Shahab 3 or future Iranian missiles.  NATO’s nuclear forces may still have an important contribution to make in deterring Iran’s leaders from trying to exploit new nuclear arms and in reassuring allies and partners who might otherwise seek their own atom bombs.  NATO’s nuclear weapons helped prevent nuclear proliferation during the Cold War; they may play a similar role now, in a very different context and at much reduced levels. Confronting the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran will not be easy for the 28 allies.  Not all are equally concerned, and none want to signal that diplomacy will fail.  NATO is consumed by Afghanistan, where success is important for the region and the Alliance.  Yet a nuclear-armed Iran will pose a direct threat, one that NATO cannot ignore.

NATO Good – Laundry List

NATO provides crucial security, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, responses, scientific research and development for peace

NATO 10 (Apr 17 2010, Together for Security: An introduction to NATO, www.nato.int/ebookshop/introduction\_to\_nato/nato\_security\_en.pdf)IM

Media coverage of NATO inevitably focuses on high-level diplomacy, Alliance summits and military campaigns. However, most of the Alliance’s work takes place away from the glare of publicity. NATO is involved, on a daily basis, in an array of projects helping to improve Europe’s security environment. These include helping reform eastern European militaries, building programmes to retrain former military officers for civilian life, and providing assistance with demining and the disposal of obsolete munitions’ stockpiles. In addition, NATO is crucial to coordinating global humanitarian relief. In 1999 it opened a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Centre (EADRCC) through which it coordinates emergency and humanitarian assistance from NATO and Partner countries in the event of both natural or man-made disasters. For example, NATO provided assistance to the victims of flooding in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in the United States in September 2005. A month later, a devastating earthquake in Pakistan left some 73 000 people dead and four million homeless. The North Atlantic Council agreed to extend assistance through the EADRCC. On numerous occasions, the EADRCC has mobilized resources to come to the assistance of countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, which have been hit by floods, forest fires or earthquakes. NATO has a science programme that sponsors practical cooperation on security- related issues in the fields of civil science, the environment and technology. The NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme has developed recommendations and tangible solutions for a variety of problems, while aiming to respond to the specific needs of participants. Scientists from NATO member, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries participate in these activities, which effectively contribute to overall security by facilitating collaboration, networking and capacity- building.

NATO Good – Multilateralism

NATO is key to multilateralism that preserves global peace

NATO 10 (Apr 17 2010, Together for Security: An introduction to NATO, www.nato.int/ebookshop/introduction\_to\_nato/nato\_security\_en.pdf)IM

With security threats becoming more unpredictable in nature, scope and origin, NATO has extended the reach of its partnerships. This multipolar approach to international relations is key to prevent unnecessary violence, instability and terrorism. It has appealed to global partners to help it tackle the global threats that have emerged since the turn of the century. These so-called “contact countries”, which are neither members nor partners of the Alliance, include countries such as Japan, New Zealand, Australia and South Korea. NATO is also engaged in relations with other international organizations that have a complementary role in promoting peace and security. In the context of crisis management operations, NATO works with organizations that have the tools to ensure a sustainable peace through political, economic and social development. These include the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, as well as other institutions such as EUROCONTROL and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

NATO Good – Nuclear Terrorism

NATO is key to preventing Nuclear Terrorism

Robertson 3 (Lord, , Secretary General of NATO and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council formers Defense Secretary of the United Kingdom , Speech at the 9th Conference de Montreal 06-May-2003 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030506a.htm accessed 7/7) CM

The starting point is a common perspective on both sides of the Atlantic about the challenge for 21st century security. We live in a new era which began when the Berlin Wall fell and has continued to evolve ever since. The first hallmarks of this new era is greater instability. The disintegration of Yugoslavia was the first step. In our increasingly globalised world, instability cannot be confined to the areas in which it originates. It affects us all, wherever we live. Take Afghanistan. Under the Taliban, it exported instability to its neighbours, drugs to Europe, terrorism and refugees throughout the world. And if the international community does not remain fully engaged, we can expect the same symptoms of overspill to reappear. The scale of threats has also increased. Today terrorism is more international, more apocalyptic in its vision, and far more lethal. And despite the best efforts of our diplomats and counter-proliferation experts, the spread of bio-chemical and nuclear weapons is already a defining security challenge of this new century. If not addressed, it will put more fingers on more triggers. And because not all of these fingers will belong to rational leaders, traditional deterrents will not always deter. All this adds up to a guaranteed supply chain of instability. It adds up to a security environment in which threats can strike at anytime, without warning, from anywhere and using any means, from a box-cutter to a chemical weapon to a missile. In the months leading to Prague, NATO’s 19 member countries demonstrated that they understood the nature of this challenge and were united in a common response to it. What this has meant in practice for the Alliance can be summarised under three headings: new roles, new relationships and new capabilities. NATO is worth retaining only if it is relevant. It evolved successfully in the 1990s to engage former adversaries across the old Soviet bloc and then to deal with instability and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Now NATO is radically changing again to play important new roles in the fight against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It already provides the common glue of military interoperability without which multinational operations of any kind would be impossible. Canada’s Joint Task Force 2 and Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry were able to operate effectively against the Taliban and Al Qaida in Afghanistan only because of decades of cooperation in NATO.

NATO Good – Prolif

**Withdrawing nuclear weapons leaves the entire alliance vunerable and encourages rogue states to distribute nuclear weapons**

**Roberts 8**, (Guy B, Dec. 8 Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD Policy at NATO,Comité de Surveillance OTANhttp://www.csotan.org/textes/doc.php?type=documents&art\_id=441 accessed 7/9) CM

One could just as easily question what purpose an aircraft carrier or a Blackhawk helicopter serves. They do not necessarily deter every threat either, but they do serve a deterrent purpose. It is a matter of strategically building up a spectrum of responses to the spectrum of threats prevalent in the world today. Although nuclear weapons play a far smaller role in Alliance strategy than they did during the Cold War, **NATO allies reaffirmed the importance of nuclear deterrence by stating that “to protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces**.” There are a number of reasons why the Alliance continues to believe this to be so. Firstly, **the Alliance must hedge against resurgent nuclear powers and against the potential for a strategic surprise. The Alliance’s conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. If NATO’s nuclear forces were to disappear, the Alliance would be vulnerable**. **Reconstitution of NATO forces would take time, be costly, and be politically challenging as it could be perceived as escalatory.** As confirmed by recent events, we must be prepared for all threats because the future is an uncertain and unpredictable place. States that do not adhere to international norms or fulfill their treaty obligations are unpredictable and potentially hostile. For example, in addition to testing a nuclear device, **the North Koreans also threatened to sell nuclear weapon materials to non-state actors.** The South African, Pakistan, Indian nuclear tests and Iraq’s nuclear weapons program just prior to the Gulf War are but a few examples. Secondly**, in the evolving and ever changing strategic landscape, NATO’s strategy remains one of war prevention**. NATO’s nuclear forces contribute to peace and stability by underscoring the irrationality of attacking us and fulfilling an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies response to aggression. So rejecting the idea of no first use, for example, creates uncertainty for any country that might contemplate seeking political or military advantage through the threat or use of WMD. This deterrence -defensive- posture contributes to the Alliance’s efforts at preventing the proliferation of these weapons. Thirdly, **NATO’s nuclear posture contributes to our non-proliferation goals** – NATO’s security guarantees are disincentives for further nuclear development. As mentioned earlier, **the Strategic Concept refers to the essential political as well as military link nuclear weapons represent within the Alliance**. **Burden sharing and consultation form the basis of this nuclear pillar.** One important rationale for the presence of nuclear weapons is that the nuclear weapon states would consult with the rest of the Alliance before any deployment or employment of such weapons. Further, a palpable demonstration of alliance solidarity will be the visible deployment of this capability demonstrating Alliance resolve with most Alliance members participating. This is consistent with the fundamental guiding principle of common commitment, mutual cooperation and collective security for all Alliance members.

NATO Good – Prolif

**NATO reduces the risk of proliferation and ensures a foundations for relations in Europe**

**Roberts 8**, (Guy B, Dec. 8 Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD Policy at NATO,Comité de Surveillance OTANhttp://www.csotan.org/textes/doc.php?type=documents&art\_id=441 accessed 7/9) CM

NATO’s nuclear deterrence strategy has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War as has the Alliance’s overall policy and force posture in response to the new security environment and, in that context, its stance towards some challenges on the road to nuclear disarmament. But **NATO’s fundamental purpose, as set forth in our founding treaty, remains the same: “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of our peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.**” In doing so, we have agreed to unite for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. While our paths may be different, we all seek the same goal: a free, stable, prosperous, peaceful and secure world**. NATO continues to believe that the path to that world – one in which the risks of nuclear war remain low- requires a strong military posture that, for the Alliance**, **includes both conventional and nuclear forces**. Let us be clear: As stated in the 1999 Strategic concept and every subsequent Defence Minister Communiqué on the subject, NATO continues to see the need for nuclear deterrence, **for the continuing presence of** **U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and the critical importance of consultation and burden sharing between Alliance members**. Today, NATO employs and deploys a minimum nuclear deterrent force. The current and future role and utility of our conventional and nuclear deterrent posture is the same as it was in the past: “**The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. In keeping this goal, the Alliance continues to place great value on the nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO, which provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance**.” **One cannot and should not ignore the fact that the presence of these weapons remains a pillar of the Alliance for political as well as military reasons**. This leads to one of many inconvenient truths which I would ask you to consider. We **believe it is fundamental to our collective security that we meet the current and future threats and challenges of the future security environment from a position of strength**. The Romans said it best: Sic vis pacem, para bellum. We entrust our security to our leaders, not to others. As former President Teddy Roosevelt said at the beginning of the last century: “We must always remember that it would be a fatal thing for great, free peoples to reduce themselves to impotence and leave the despots and barbarians armed.” In fact, consider the world in 1908. The Hague Peace conference had concluded, Andrew Carnegie had started building the Peace Palace in The Hague, many were writing that there would be no more wars. Who would have predicted what the next 40 years would bring? There is no case that I know of in history where a nation has been secure by pursuing a policy of vulnerability

Limiting NATO nuclear options would increase the risk of proliferation

Espinosa, 94 (Paul E, December, Navel Postgrad School, Monterey, California http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/1994/Dec/94Dec\_Espinosa.pdf accessed 7/7) CM

While a U.S no-first-use declaration might help promote some nuclear non proliferation goals (for example, gaining a larger international consensus to support an indefinite extension of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty), it could also undermine the credibility of U.S security commitments and erode alliance cohesion. These developments could, in turn, increase the risk of nuclear proliferation. This thesis identifies and examines the relevant competing arguments and discusses the implications of a U.,S. no-first-use pledge regaurding three issues: deterrence, alliance cohesion, and nuclear nonproliferation. The thesis concludes that adopting a no-first-use policy would probably prove beneficial only in the short term and only in one respect: it might help the United States meet its stated objective for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The arguments in favor of adopting a non-first-use pledge fails to adequately consider the broader long-term implications, in particular the risk that this policy could undermine stability in Europe and the integrity of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The potential shortcomings of the argument on both sides of the no-first-use debate are highlighted, however. In view of these shortcomings, recommendations are made to help minimize possible negative and military effects.

NATO Good – Russia

Russian war is inevitable because the former soviet republics are going to shift towards the west making NATO expansion appear inevitable- only NATO deterrence solves

Bene 97 (Gyula ,Captain of the Hungarian Army , Fas military analysis Network, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/bene.htm, accessed 7/8) CM

 NATO expansion is a critical issue now because leaders of the Central and Eastern European countries have urged they be admitted to NATO membership. The expansion issue arose because Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, all previous victims of Soviet occupation, sought NATO membership. NATO should respond to the requests of these countries as soon as possible. No response or a negative one on such requests could slow down or stop reform in these countries. They do not want to be considered as part of the Russian sphere of influence. Neither do they want to be a so-called "no-man's" land between Western Europe and Russia. These states want to belong to Europe. A refusal of their request, therefore, could lead them to form a new alliance with the surrounding states or to rebuild the old links with Russia, with a hope of restoring the credibility of Russia's security guarantee. The reason for this is because they are not able to defend their territory themselves. For example, for Poland, one of its security options is to build a regional security system among the small- and medium-sized states surrounding Poland[(11)](http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/bene.htm#N_11_) The Alliance would provide security for Central and Eastern Europe. New members will be covered by the alliance's all-for-one, one-for-all security guarantee and its nuclear umbrella.[(12)](http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/bene.htm#N_12_) The instability in Russia and other countries of the CIS is considered by candidate countries as the greatest threat to their national security. Russia may have lost some of its military capabilities, but it still has enough power to wield influence in the Eastern region and it still has a nuclear capability which is a concern not only to the applying countries but to the rest of the world. Chechnya is an excellent example of the potential Russian threat although Russia has been humiliated there. NATO should recognize the importance of its expansion in deterring such a threat. Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan emphasized that "I think that throughout recent history, including this situation in Chechnya, all those who have any say about these matters have come to realize that it is necessary for the Central European countries to become a part of NATO."[(13)](http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/bene.htm#N_13_) NATO expansion would provide assistance to the joining countries to finish domestic reform, to improve relations with their neighbors, and to integrate into Western Europe*.*As Senator Lugar has argued, "Membership in NATO is a way to strengthen domestic forces committed to democracy and market economies. Western policy-makers and analysts tend to overlook the link between democracy and security."[(14)](http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/bene.htm#N_14_) At the same time, the other Central and Eastern European countries temporarily left out of the expansion could have an example and a goal in front of their eyes to achieve. NATO membership could help the new democracies to establish a stable environment in which they could develop democracy internally, carry out economic reform promoting a market economy, and shape the military according to NATO requirements. Meanwhile, candidate countries would realize that their admission to NATO, the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union (WEU) also depends on their relations with their neighbors. As Slovak Foreign Minister Pavol Hamzik noted, "We know very well that the precondition for NATO membership is the settlement of disputes with neighboring countries,"[(15)](http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/bene.htm#N_15_) as his government recently signed a treaty of good neighborliness with Hungary, formally renouncing any territorial claims. Central and Eastern European countries believe that they were artificially separated from the West after World War II and that their integration with the West gives the best warranty for their political, economic, social, and security future. The candidate countries have made significant steps in the achievement of the ideological and educational compatibility for their military establishments. For example, Hungary established a NATO Language Institute in Budapest which teaches Hungarian officers English according to NATO standards. In addition, in Hungary within the General Staff a special NATO Working group was set up which translates and integrates the STANAGs (Standardization Agreement) for adaptation into the Hungarian Doctrine. The transition of military education is happening at the same time. The adoption of the "western way of war" was started a couple years ago and as a result of this general officers trained in NATO countries have taken over the leadership positions in some of the candidate countries' military. For example, the Commander of the Hungarian Home Defense Forces graduated from the United States Army War College, while his Deputy attended the United States National Defense University.

NATO Good – Security Guarantees

A unified international alliance is key to security guarantees

**Torsein and Davis 1** (Christina & Ian, BASIC Publications, Nov. 19 2001, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2001wardog.htm)IM

Ultimately, NATO's most critical role may be to serve as a bridge between European multilateralism and U.S. unilateralism. Going beyond arguments about military capabilities and political symbolism, Lord Robertson has stressed the importance of long-term international goals that would help prevent terrorism, including the advancement of international law and moving the NATO-Russia relationship forward. Moreover, Robertson argues that non-proliferation and missile defense issues should not fade in light of the events of September 11. He adds that NATO needs to develop a holistic approach to internal and external security and to develop dialogue between military and security/law enforcement agencies. Robertson argues, "NATO, the EU [the European Union], the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], the United Nations, and the major international financial institutions need to cooperate far more closely than ever before in tackling transnational security challenges, and in promoting cooperative approaches to building security."12 The attacks on the United States have affected global security, not just the United States' homeland and foreign policy. Under these circumstances, therefore, NATO's swift response to stand by the United States is not surprising. Moreover, the invocation of Article 5 certainly sets a new precedent for transatlantic cooperation. Rather than contributing to U.S. military objectives in Afghanistan, however, in the coming months NATO is likely to prove more valuable to the United States in terms of consolidating political support among the European members of the "coalition against terrorism." The alliance also could provide peacekeeping and logistics should they be required in any future U.N.-administered peace-settlement in Afghanistan. This measured approach by NATO is in keeping with its recent (but still partial) transformation from a hard-nosed military alliance to an organization that is becoming primarily concerned with promoting collective security. It also goes to show that it is possible to teach an old dog new tricks.

NATO Good – Terrorism

US cooperation with NATO is key to combat terrorism – political legitimacy and better counterterror activities

**Bensahel 3** (Nora, Public Policy Expert at RAND, “The Counterterror Coalitions,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1746/MR1746.pdf)IM

However, this does not mean that the United States should write off any NATO role in countering terrorism. The United States should encourage NATO to expand its counterterrorism efforts at the same time it pursues closer bilateral relations with individual allies, be- cause NATO can make two unique contributions. First, NATO can provide diplomatic support for any counterterror operations con- ducted by its members. The Article 5 declaration was an important sign of political support for the United States, which helped establish the legitimacy of subsequent military operations in Afghanistan. The process of conducting threat assessments, identifying possible con- tingencies, and preparing operations plans will reinforce the princi- ple that all of NATO’s members share an interest in countering the common terrorism threat, which makes diplomatic support of any future counterterror operations more likely. Second, a continuing NATO focus on terrorism may encourage the European allies to in- crease their own preparations for counterterror activities, including homeland security and consequence management as well as military preparations. Although France wants the European Union to take responsibility for these sorts of issues, the United States has a strong interest in ensuring that the issues are addressed within NATO, where it has a voice at the table. That way, the United States can en- sure that U.S. and European efforts remain coordinated, so that they complement each other instead of duplicating some efforts and overlooking others.

Terrorism leads to extinction

**Sid-Ahmed 4** (Al-Ahram Mohamed, Weekly political analyst August 26 2004, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)IM

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

NATO Good – US-EU Relations

Abandoning NATO in Afghanistan would cost the US the support of European diplomatic and public opinion

**Torsein and Davis 1** (Christina & Ian, BASIC Publications, Nov. 19 2001, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2001wardog.htm)IM

After seeing evidence that the attacks came from abroad, NATO officially invoked Article 5 on October 2.4 This was the first time in NATO's 52-year history that it has invoked the article. The invocation of Article 5 has been more symbolic than military, but depending on the length of the U.S. military campaign, this may change. To be clear, Member States are not required to assist militarily or otherwise. The fact that NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time, however, shows the outrage and unity of the alliance in the wake of the attacks.5 United States Gives Mixed Response to NATO Offers of Military Help NATO has already provided some limited military assistance. At the request of the United States, NATO deployed five Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft (AWACS) to monitor America's skies. The alliance also is deploying its Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) to the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, NATO has sent the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) to the Eastern Mediterranean where it already has stationed other forces in case they are requested in support of Article 5 operations. Individual member countries also have been forthcoming with military assistance. The most notable of these is the United Kingdom, which has taken on the most prominent ground role aside from the U.S.-dominated combat operations in Afghanistan. Forces offered by other member countries (and from countries outside of the alliance) have to date largely been sidelined by the U.S. administration. Turkey has offered to send 'special forces' to Afghanistan to support the Northern Alliance and to help secure humanitarian aid,7 and a number of countries have provided air transit, landing rights, or have shared information with the United States. Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain all have pledged military support.8 Germany, for example, despite its restrictive anti-war constitution and a deeply skeptical public, has pledged 3,900 troops. France, with a large Muslim minority and a traditional pro-Arab policy, has already provided intelligence support, including the deployment of 2,000 troops in surveillance operations. The cooperation of these NATO countries, for the most part, reflects the independent actions of the respective national governments in a show of solidarity with the United States, rather than any orchestrated campaign through the alliance's auspices. However, speculation began to grow towards the end of October and early November that the European members of the alliance were becoming increasingly nonplussed with the United States' failure to call upon them to do more.9 The U.S. administration's independent policy is a reflection of differences of opinion within Washington as to how the Afghan campaign should be managed. Some officials, most notably those within the Pentagon, have been reluctant to allow NATO allies to be involved in approving bombing targets (as was the case in the 1999 Kosovo conflict). Officials in the State Department, however, have argued for a more inclusive military campaign because it is critical to retain the support of European public and diplomatic opinion.

NATO Good – Democracy XT

**NATO is primary facilitator for democracy promotion**

**Scheffer 7** (Jaap de Hoop,July6, Secretary General of NATO, Speech given at the Croatia Summit, http://newsblaze.com/story/20070706143531tsop.nb/newsblaze/TOPSTORY/Top-Stories.html accessed 7/9)CM

**The positive change we are now witnessing throughout the entire Southeast European region is truly remarkable**. Today, all across this region, **countries are moving away from radicalism and nationalism, and opting for cooperation and integration.** The proverbial Balkan Ghostshave been exorcised. **NATO has played its full part in promoting this positive momentum**. For almost one and a half decades, **the Atlantic Alliance has been strongly engaged to help bring peace and stability to this part of Europe.** Over time, as the situation improved, the nature of NATOs engagement changed. But what never changed and never will change is our determination to stay involved, and to help all the countries in this region chart a path towards a better future. In NATO, we strongly believe that Euro-Atlantic integration is the only viable path for the countries in this region to take. **Only Euro-Atlantic integration offers the framework to make the enormous achievements of this region truly irreversible.** And only Euro-Atlantic integration will enable Southeast Europe, as well as the rest of our continent, to cope with the challenges of globalisation. This Euro-Atlantic integration is now well underway. Four countries Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia have already turned from active partners into valued member countries of the Alliance. They are now an integral part of the vital security link across the Atlantic. And they each make valuable contributions to some very challenging NATO missions and operations to uphold our security, and to defend our common values. Three other countries in this region Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia became Partners of the Alliance late last year, when they joined Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. As partners of **NATO, they now have a range of powerful and tested tools available to them to further reform their security and defence establishments. And they each have access to a unique forum for political dialogue and consultation on key security issues** not just with the 26 NATO Allies, but with the 22 other Partner countries of the Alliance as well. Taken together, that offers our three new partners a real opportunity to turn a corner and catch up with the rest of the region but only, of course, if they look to the future instead of the past. Finally, of course, three other countries in this region Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia1, and the host of this Summit, Croatia , are taking part in NATOs Membership Action Plan, and are all currently pursuing a range of reforms to prepare themselves for the responsibilities, and obligations, of NATO membership. Last week, in Ohrid, at the EAPC Security Forum, I said that NATOs door is open to those countries that meet NATOs performance based standards and are able to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. This has not changed it will not change. The Adriatic Three know that NATOs door is open for them. But they should also know that there is still work to do before they can actually go through it. NATO membership brings with it enormous privileges. A seat at the table where key decisions are taken to shape security in the Euro-Atlantic region and even beyond. A key role in the planning and conduct of major stabilising missions, where NATOs military forces play a central role in providing the security for reconstruction and development to move ahead. And, last but not least, the ultimate security guarantee of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. But with these privileges come responsibilities. New members must play a constructive role within the NATO Council, helping the Alliance to arrive at consensus. They must be able to make a real and significant military contribution, in partnership with their NATO Allies. And they must fully meet the political standards which make **NATO a true symbol of cooperation, democracy and peaceful relations.**

NATO Good – Prolif XT

**NATO is key to stopping proliferation – 4 warrants**

**Larsen 97** (Jeffrey A, Nov, Senior Policy Analyst with Science Applications International Corporation, Proliferation Seris http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/OCP/ocp17.pdf accessed 7/9)CM

**NATO is seen as the only international body with the competence to counter the consequences of proliferation… the political ‘mileage’ for NATO will come from its defense-related contributions in a situation where traditional nonproliferation mechanism have failed**. There was considerable debate at the January 1994 NATO summit over the American push for a new counterproliferation initiative. Germany, in particular, was initially concerned about the US counterproliferation effort. The US did not present the rationale for CPI to the European allies in a very convincing way. Bonn, for instance, perceived that CPI meant a turn away from traditional nonproliferation efforts towards more military responses. 67 The result of the summit discussions was a compromise within NATO to create a policy framework to consider nonproliferation. Some Alliance members were not convinced that “prevention” and “defense” against WMD proliferation outside of Europe were desirable or necessary strategies for the alliance. But when the chance came to link the CPI to NATO through the new effort, Germany was happy to participate, hoping thereby to have some influence on the American program. The debate settled down considerably in the two years after the Brussels Summit decision, as people began to realize that it was a relatively modest effort, and likely to remain so, and that counterproliferation meant more than simply preemptive offensive operations. Counterproliferation is now seen by most participants as an adjunct to nonproliferation, not a substitute for it. **There were four general approaches which the alliance might have taken in developing an agreed policy on counterproliferation**: **defusing proliferation incentives; enforcing international sanctions against proliferators**; **offensive military action against proliferators**; **and developing ballistic missile defenses**. 69 The first two areas would supplement existing operations undertaken by other international organizations. **Defusing incentives would entail measures such as promoting democratic control over military forces, peacekeeping operations, and maintaining stability in Europe for reassurance to the NATO allies**. This could include efforts within existing NATO bodies, including the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Second, **NATO could use traditional military measures to enforce or support international measures sanctioned by the United Nations**, particularly within its sphere of interest—nominally, those states that are members of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The third area, offensive operations against proliferators, is the approach NATO has been least likely to pursue in the past, since it is inherently a defensive alliance. However, **offensive operations in a regional conflict may actually be seen as a form of preemptive defense, particularly when one’s forces are threatened by WMD**. And **recent “out-of-area” operations, such as in Bosnia**, may **reflect greater willingness** on the part of the Alliance **to pursue actions deemed necessary** that in an earlier era may have been politically impossible. One analyst has pointed out that the Atlantic Alliance is no longer a cooperative defense organization, but a “coalition in waiting” as it prepares to respond to the newest threat or conflict on its periphery The last option, pursuing **BMD, would be merely a continuation of NATO’s traditional collective defense role**, extrapolated to the threats posed by the new post-Cold War world. Nevertheless, it must overcome residual skepticism by some European members engendered by the SDI program in the 1980’s—a program to which critics point in comparison with counterproliferation as an example of yet another regularly appearing, big new American program.72 Despite these qualms, some Europeans, especially the French, recognized that proliferation might eventually turn into an acute problem requiring military responses. Even Germany is beginning to accept the possibility that traditional approaches to nonproliferation may fail, so there is a need to think about military preparations should that occur

NATO Good – Prolif XT

**Proliferation is one of the biggest threats facing for the world only NATO has the capability to solve**

**Larsen 97** (Jeffrey A, Nov, Senior Policy Analyst with Science Applications International Corporation, Proliferation Seris http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/OCP/ocp17.pdf accessed 7/9)CM

Why is WMD proliferation a NATO problem? **NATO’s role under its strategic concept involves not only assuring the territorial defense of the members of the Alliance, but providing the foundation for a stable security environment in Europe**. **NATO also serves as a transatlantic forum for consultation on any issue affecting member security and vital interests, and acts as a coordinating body for efforts in these areas**. In this sense, NATO is more than a collective security organization; **it is the cornerstone for Europe’s future security framework.20 The proliferation of WMD could undermine the achievement of a stable security environment in Europe**. Such weapons potentially pose a direct military threat to Alliance members, especially those in Europe, as well as their deployed military forces around the globe. There is no one uniform proliferation threat to NATO. Rather, the potential threats can be thought of in categories such as the following: **opponents armed with weapons of mass destruction and delivery means** (such as ballistic missiles) in a direct confrontation with NATO military forces in a regional setting; **d**irect military threats by rogue states possessing WMD capabilities against the territory and populations of NATO states **risks from shifts in regional power balances with global implications that were created by acquisition of WMD or delivery means regional instabilities that are fueled by the proliferation of WMD** and which negatively impact Western security erosion of international norms and security systems **increased danger of accidents**; **and new avenues for international terrorism Weapons of mass destruction are particularly sought after by states in unstable regions of the world, such as the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia**. It is the Middle East and North Africa that most concern NATO, given the availability and range of existing medium range ballistic missiles. **The purpose of these weapons in the hands of such states**, it has been suggested, would primarily be to deter Western forces from becoming involved in regional conflicts by acting on public opinion within the individual states and international bodies providing the troops.22 **NATO’s counterproliferation policy framework most directly addresses** two of **the categories listed above**—threats against NATO forces involved in regional contingencies, and direct threats against NATO territory.23

NATO Good – Terrorism – Consult K

US consultation of NATO with regard to Afghanistan is key to fight terrorism

**Shanker 6** (Thom, New York Times, Nov 27 2006, http://www.iht.com/archives/articles/2006/11/27/news/afghan.php)IM

"We have seen a maturation in the past 11 years," said Ralston, now a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a policy institute in Washington. "And I think as the nations encounter the high-intensity conflict of Afghanistan, there will in fact be a positive outcome that comes from that." Daniel Fried, the under secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, said that even nations with troops in Afghanistan under combat restrictions contributed to reconstruction and overall security, and that the system, however difficult, was better than a wholly unilateral American mission. The more unilateral missions undertaken by the U.S. the more ground is handed to the terrorists. A multilateral approach, through U.S.-NATO consultation is crucial to establish security in Afghanistan and prevent a Taliban takeover. "It is a success for the trans-Atlantic community that despite disagreements about Iraq, despite politics and partisanship, that NATO has undertaken a set of new missions, with Afghanistan front and center, that changed the nature of the organization," Fried said. NATO is not scheduled to accept any new members at the Riga meeting. Even so, words of encouragement are expected for three nations - Croatia, Macedonia and Albania - in line for membership, perhaps as early as 2008. Members are expected to propose establishing a global partnership initiative to acknowledge the role non-NATO countries play in NATO missions, but R. Nicholas Burns, U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs, said that "for us, the No. 1 issue is Afghanistan." Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the NATO secretary general, said by telephone that "the threats and challenges facing NATO as we speak are of a global nature - terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." "NATO today is transforming and adapting itself," he added. "We need 21st- century answers to 21st-century threats and challenges."

NATO Good – Terrorism XT

NATO is key to fight terrorism – political will

**Nelson 4** (Richard, Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2 2004, www.acus.org/.../0406-NATO\_Role\_Confronting\_International\_Terrorism.pdf)IM

Individually and collectively, national leaders must be able to make a compelling case about why substantial resources and sacrifices are necessary to deal with terrorism. The discussions and arguments will vary in each country, but these will all benefit from the extent to which they reflect a common understanding of the problem with other countries and leaders. There are several fora that have the ability to help build such a common understanding and NATO is certainly one of them. The process of consensus-building is important because international cooperation is critical: the costs of fighting terrorism will be enormous and only the highest political levels can make the difficult choices and national trade-offs that are necessary to commit substantial resources to this purpose. Furthermore, given that confronting terrorism is likely to be a long-term, indefinite struggle, there is a danger of mission fatigue that can be mitigated if individual responses are part of a larger, credible international effort. NATO has a unique way of mobilizing a wide range of important countries. It plays a leading role in defining threats to international security and, in the case of terrorism, has ensured that this problem receives regular attention at the highest political levels in Europe and beyond. By addressing terrorism in the systematic, comprehensive manner that characterizes NATO’s approach to security issues, consensus has been built on the nature of the problem and, in general, on appropriate responses. As a result of this and similar efforts by other institutions, it is no longer acceptable for any nation to provide a permissive environment for terrorists, sometimes justified as “freedom fighters”, in return for terrorists not causing trouble within its territory.

NATO is key to fight terrorism – providing intelligence

**Nelson 4** (Richard, Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2 2004, www.acus.org/.../0406-NATO\_Role\_Confronting\_International\_Terrorism.pdf)IM

Intelligence is critical to fighting terrorism. “Seeing the enemy”, in the case of international terrorism, requires looking beyond one’s borders and exchanging information with other countries in order to understand the international networks through which modern terrorists operate. Discussions with European governments, as well as longstanding U.S. preferences, make it quite clear that specific, “actionable” intelligence will continue to be exchanged almost exclusively on a bilateral basis so that it may be acted upon quickly and without jeopardizing sources and methods. Additionally, NATO typically deals with “finished” intelligence that has already been analyzed by national intelligence agencies, as opposed to “raw” intelligence that involves original source reporting and may be incomplete, or, in some cases, intentionally misleading (if it is derived from double-agents who are not known to the reporting intelligence service). If NATO were to rely on raw intelligence or to try to generate original intelligence, it would be more vulnerable to deception. But there is widespread interest in the possibility that, at a more general level and drawing on a broad set of information from national sources, NATO could act effectively as a clearinghouse for exchanging assessments of the terrorism problem. This is a necessary part of the consensus-building process through which members reach general agreement on the nature of the problem before making decisions on responses. Given the wide range of experiences with terrorism of member and partner countries, NATO can provide a useful forum for comparing views and developing a deeper overall understanding of the phenomenon. These efforts might usefully be expanded to include the sharing of academic perspectives on terrorism and better sharing of information on international criminal activities that offer critical support to international terrorism.

NATO is key to fight terrorism – prevent terrorist operations

**Nelson 4** (Richard, Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2 2004, www.acus.org/.../0406-NATO\_Role\_Confronting\_International\_Terrorism.pdf)IM

States have primary responsibility for protecting their citizens. They must take steps to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist acts, including instituting security measures for transportation systems and other components that constitute their critical infrastructure. In supporting such efforts, NATO plays several useful roles, especially by helping to improve border security in partnership countries. More than 20 partnership countries collaborated to develop the “Partnership Action Plan for Terrorism,” which outlines the steps these states can take individually and collectively to improve their capabilities to confront terrorism. To date, 17 of these states have provided troops to NATO-led stability operations in the Balkans. NATO can also help prevent terrorists from gaining access to weapons, especially of the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear variety. To assist in these efforts, NATO has established a Weapons of Mass Destruction Center, which is undertaking a series of initiatives to improve Alliance capabilities. These include developing a mobile laboratory that may be deployed with NATO forces; a joint assessment team; a virtual center of excellence for defense against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; stockpiles of appropriate chemical and biological defense pharmaceuticals; and a disease surveillance system that will provide NATO commanders with timely information on any outbreak of disease.

NATO Good – Terrorism XT

NATO is key to fight terrorism – cooperation management

**Nelson 4** (Richard, Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2 2004, www.acus.org/.../0406-NATO\_Role\_Confronting\_International\_Terrorism.pdf)IM

The United Nations is responsible for global coordination of efforts to deal with terrorism working through the Counter-Terrorism Committee.15 For most of Europe, the European Union manages coordination of law enforcement, judicial and other efforts. For security issues, however, NATO has some distinct comparative advantages. NATO plays a leading role in developing strategies, doctrine and training for fighting terrorism for those contingencies in which military force may be needed. Of particular note is NATO’s program of exercises that provides opportunities for developing and practicing integrated civil-military operations to deal with a wide range of potential terrorist attacks. A broad network to facilitate cooperation has been established. NATO’s Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons has military representatives from 43 countries, giving it the broadest geographic reach of any international military organization in the world. The NATO-Russia Council and NATO’s partnership with Ukraine are also important venues for cooperation on terrorism-related issues. For example, these venues have been important in developing the capacities of Russian and Ukrainian troops to operate with NATO members in stability operations in the Balkans and in other places where, although terrorism may not be the primary threat, peace operations must be conducted in an environment in which terrorists are active. NATO is noted for enhancing the interoperability of international forces and can bring this expertise to bear on those dimensions of the terrorism challenge to which military force is relevant and on situations, such as that in Afghanistan, in which NATO forces will be operating in an environment in which terrorists are a potential threat. Using English as a common language and using comprehensive NATO Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), more than 50 countries are developing the capacity to work together. Two areas, in particular, that stand out in this regard are communications and logistics. Compatible military communications enable international forces to work well together and, by association, with civil authorities and non-governmental organizations. NATO’s experience in the Balkans has been most helpful in developing such capabilities. In addition, NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) plays a leading role in introducing friendly force identification technologies to the Alliance, which will help reduce the chances of friendly fire casualties in complex multinational combat operations. Also, as NATO undertakes out-of- area operations, such as Afghanistan, new arrangements for logistics support are being developed.

NATO is key to fight terrorism – prevent recruitment and funding

**Nelson 4** (Richard, Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2 2004, www.acus.org/.../0406-NATO\_Role\_Confronting\_International\_Terrorism.pdf)IM

Given the nature, size and typical weapons cache of terrorist groups, these can normally be defeated by national law enforcement, paramilitary and military forces unless the regular military forces of a host country protect them or they are operating in a failing state or sanctuary area. Similarly, national forces can conduct hostage rescue operations in most cases. Interdiction of terrorist finances also falls for the most part to national authorities with cooperation from elements of the international financial system. Nevertheless, counter-terrorism is part of NATO’s mandate. Although approval and authority for NATO to undertake specific combat counter-terrorist operations is not likely to be delegated in advance, generic counter-terrorism planning and training are not only useful but essential. The strength of European countries’ views, as discussed earlier, that military means are not likely to play a significant role in the response to terrorism has prevented NATO’s counter-terrorism mission from becoming a driver in the development of its transformation and in the evolution of the NATO Response Force. And it may indeed be difficult to specify circumstances under which the NRF would be called upon to fight terrorists as a primary mission. However, many of the areas in which the NRF is most likely to be called upon to operate are ones in which terrorist groups are active and will therefore be part of the threat environment. One particular topic that arose in many of the Working Group’s discussions related to the value of the Spanish Guardia Civil, the Italian Carabinieri, the French Gendarmerie and other similar forces in a variety of counter-terrorism roles associated with stabilization and peace operations outside Europe. Cooperation among these forces is already developing within the EU, but the great potential of such forces for these missions – and the fact that they represent a capability that the United States has not yet developed – argues for consideration of the potential of including them in emerging NATO counter-terrorist planning.

NATO Good – Terrorism XT

NATO is key to fight terrorism – managing the consequences

**Nelson 4** (Richard, Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2 2004, www.acus.org/.../0406-NATO\_Role\_Confronting\_International\_Terrorism.pdf)IM

States provide the first responders in the case of terrorist attack. The EU also offers an institutional mechanism for consequence management among its member states. But NATO has developed a unique capacity to provide international back- up support in the event that a problem exceeds national capabilities. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) maintains a NATO-wide registry of capabilities that may be called upon. It also has a force generation process including communications, transport and logistics, as well as monitoring and relief units. These capabilities are exercised regularly and have substantial experience with disaster relief. The EADRCC was established in its present form in 1998 and includes all 46 NATO Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) countries. It draws on the substantial experience of NATO with disaster relief and refugees dating back to 1953. This eight-person coordination center operates around the clock to coordinate timely responses using national assets that are catalogued and deployed regularly, either in training exercises or in response to natural disasters. The EADRCC deals directly with a dedicated organization in each of the 46 countries and it does not need to wait for immediate NAC approval to act. Thus, for example, the Coordination Center was able to respond to Turkey’s request for support in preparing for a possible chemical attack, biological attack or large refugee flow before the Iraq war, even though similar Turkish requests for air defense units were not approved by the NAC. Cooperation between NATO’s strategic commands and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center has been developed and practiced in exercises. One such exercise involved a hypothetical “dirty bomb” incident in Romania and featured search and rescue, decontamination and medical assistance from 16 neighboring countries. The exercise involved real radioactive sources and included coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The on-site coordination concept and procedures used in this and other exercises were developed by the United Nations. With only an eight-person staff and requirements for round-the-clock operations, the EADRCC is over-stretched. It must rely on volunteers to augment the staff during emergencies. Around 40 to 50 people are needed to staff the organization fully and to provide for emergency responses, as well as to develop standard operating procedures, evaluate exercises and develop lessons learned.

NATO is key to prevent terrorism – security assistance

**Nelson 4** (Richard, Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2 2004, www.acus.org/.../0406-NATO\_Role\_Confronting\_International\_Terrorism.pdf)IM

Although the United Nations coordinates assistance and the European Union provides important aid, NATO has a major comparative advantage in regard to security assistance in certain areas. Countries that are not members or partners, such as Jordan, can and do ask NATO for security assistance in their efforts to fight terrorism. In addition to efforts with the partnership countries16, NATO is taking on increasing responsibility for stability operations in Afghanistan, both geographically and functionally. The first step of a “progressive process” is to increase the scope of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond its original mandate to provide security around Kabul. A new mission to provide military support to the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the northern region of Kunduz began on December 31, 2003. NATO will also help with the important task of demobilizing warlords’ forces and local militia. This will likely be followed by NATO taking over support for the other PRTs – teams of 70 to 200 soldiers and civilians in seven provinces who provide security to aid workers and help with reconstruction. As NATO’s roles expand in Afghanistan, ISAF is likely to be increased from 5,000 to 10,000 (or even 15,000) troops. At some point, it would be logical for NATO to take responsibility for all of the roles in Afghanistan, including combat operations now conducted by a U.S. Task Force. At the same time, however, NATO planners are worried about the political will of members to meet force requirements. Afghanistan provides a key test for NATO in meeting the challenges of terrorism and the new international security environment. Mission fatigue will likely post an increasing challenge to the political willingness of member nations to fulfill the requirements of fighting terrorism over the long haul. This suggests that NATO must set priorities lest it become over- committed.

NATO Good – Terrorism XT

NATO is key to fight terrorism – educating the population

**Nelson 4** (Richard, Atlantic Council of the United States, April 2 2004, www.acus.org/.../0406-NATO\_Role\_Confronting\_International\_Terrorism.pdf)IM

One decisive arena in confronting terrorism is the realm of ideas. Although the leadership and structure of al-Qa’ida may have been seriously damaged by the war in Afghanistan and other actions, the ideology of global jihad has grown stronger. Indeed, anti-U.S. sentiment has increased substantially as a result of the war in Iraq. In this war of ideas, radical jihad ideologies must be countered and discredited. The populations in target areas must come to believe that terrorism is neither justified for any political or religious reason, nor likely to achieve political or social goals. The key debate is within Muslim communities and involves differing interpretations of Islam. NATO’s role, will consist primarily of exporting security so that local governments have the possibility of providing good governance and more tolerant, attractive alternatives to tacitly accepting, effectively harboring or even actively encouraging terrorist movements. However, NATO also has the potential, as it did during the Cold War, to offer an attractive, positive vision of diversity, tolerance and progress beneath its security umbrella that could make a valuable contribution to the overall confrontation with the international terrorists. One possibility would be for NATO to sponsor scholarly and other expert studies of the problems of terrorism. Such a systematic exchange could provide a common foundation for understanding the constantly evolving terrorist phenomenon and thus for a more constructive policy dialogue among its members. Additionally, NATO could ensure that a significant share of education, planning, training, doctrine and other efforts reflect a fundamental shift from traditional force-on-force operations to psychological operations with the planned use of communications designed to influence the behavior of key target audiences.

Failure of European cooperation ensures the success of terrorism

**Bensahel 3** (Nora, Public Policy Expert at RAND, “The Counterterror Coalitions,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1746/MR1746.pdf)IM

The long-term success of the counterterror campaign will depend on concerted cooperation from the European states and the U.S. Their strong economies and democratic protections make them attractive loca- tions for terrorist planning—as already demonstrated on September 11. Individual states will continue to make important contributions in identifying and tracking down suspected terrorists, but the ever- increasing interdependence among the European states will also re- quire concerted multilateral action to prevent terrorists from hiding their activities in the gaps between sovereign authorities. Interestingly, the European Union may be a more helpful partner in certain aspects of the long-term campaign against terrorism than NATO. Although terrorism is a major security challenge facing states on both sides of the Atlantic, NATO remains torn by disagreements on the extent to which counterterrorism should shape its agenda. The European Union, by contrast, is strengthening cooperation in law enforcement and other areas in ways that may prove to be cru- cial in preventing future terrorist actions.

NATO Good – US-EU XT

**NATO is key to diplomacy – cooperation with NATO in Afghanistan proves**

**Morini 10** (Daryl ,March 25, International Relations , currently undertaking an Honours Thesis with the School of Political Science and International Studies @ University of Queensland.http://www.e-ir.info/?p=3579 accessed 7/9) CM

So how, we are entitled to ask, is NATO still relevant if its expansion and post-1991 activities are to blame for irritating a resurgent Russia? Three reasons stand out. First of all, **NATO is central to the strategic unity of European countries—most EU states being in the Alliance, and such neutral countries as Sweden increasingly flirting with the idea of joining**. The notorious European inability to speak with one voice at lower policy levels is one thing, in the defence and security realm it is another altogether. For all of its achievements in the past ten years, the **European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is not yet capable of ensuring the protection of a realm of some 500 million human beings.** Indeed, in their tacit division of labour, according to Daniel Keohane, the **“ESDP is potentially meant to do everything but collective defence—the raison d’être of NATO.**”[10] The recently-ratified Lisbon Treaty may have given the EU a more coherent foreign policy and defence structure but, in terms of military capabilities, the changes remain largely theoretical. At a future date, NATO-EU relations themselves may encounter an institutional crisis. This Euro-Atlantic divergence of interests is particularly likely if Washington sees any or all of the dreaded “three Ds” (de-linking, discriminating, and duplicating) being implemented by an autonomous European Defence Force. However, the EU’s trademark “quiet diplomacy” will probably not risk upsetting the current status quo,[11] particularly if the result is to permanently split the Union itself along ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe lines. After all, secession is now a distinct possibility under the Lisbon amendments. It would thus be a diplomatically dangerous move for the EU’s new heads, Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton, to bet on where the allegiance of such firm US-allies as Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and the Baltic states would gravitate to, if made to choose between the EU’s socio-economic enticements and the American security umbrella. Secondly**, alternative institutions lack the diplomatic clout of the Transatlantic Alliance.** This not only stems from the major, some would say overbearing, US engagement in NATO, but also from the membership of such an important regional player as Turkey. Hence, **Europe needs NATO to engage and negotiate with Russia as equals, in matters of common interest**. **The joint-work of these partners in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC**), for example**, is needed to coordinate logistical operations for the international intervention in Afghanistan**. As counter-intuitive as it might sound, a cooperative EU-Russia relationship presupposes that Russian leaders bury the hatchet with NATO. The more Kremlin officials play wedge politics by differentiating between a ‘bad’ NATO bloc and a ‘good’ European Union, the more Europeans will instinctively think twice about the motives behind Russian criticism.[12] **Decoupling the EU from NATO would neither benefit European security, nor Brussels’ relations with Moscow.** Finally, **the argument itself that NATO’s dissolution would once and for all exorcise Cold War ghosts, and extend European perpetual peace and stability across the continent is a spurious one**. The critics seldom explain exactly how this leap of faith might pan out? Furthermore, what is the political viability of this option, especially in the wake of the Russo-Georgian War? Unsurprisingly, the most vehement proponents of NATO’s abolition are the Kremlin and its affiliated media outlets. **President Dmitry Medvedev himself has proposed a novel, pan-European security structure to (tacitly) replace the Alliance.** Its secondary objectives might include the gradual sidelining of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.[13] This effectively translates to diluting American influence in European security institutions, increasing Russia’s representation within these and, ultimately, abandoning the collective security guarantee and treaties on which the post-Cold War European security order was built. A hard sell for most security-conscious Europeans, not to mention American strategists.

AT: I. Law Bad

Unilateral or bilateral international law is colonialist

**Harris-Short 3** (Sonia, Human Rights Quarterly 25(1), Feb 2003, p.130-181)IM

Whether or not such a policy can ever work is highly questionable. In the words of An-Na’im, “to dictate to a society is both unacceptable as a matter of principle and unlikely to succeed in practice.”186 Of even greater concern, however, is that this emphasis on education and sensitization, introduced with the express aim of convincing the local populace to embrace the human rights philosophy, produces an uneasy feeling that we remain deeply entrenched within the imperialist mindset. The idea that the backward culture and traditions of the local populace are a problem to be overcome through education and enlightenment are distinctly reminiscent of the ethos of colonialism. As Falk correctly points out in the context of indigenous cultures: Virtually every government of a sovereign state, north or south, has adopted a modernization outlook that regards pre-modern culture as a form of backward- ness to be overcome for the sake of the indigenous. Proceeding on this basis, the preferred normative response to the existence of indigenous peoples is not deference to their cultural autonomy, but rather their orderly and equitable assimilation into the more benevolent and promising cultural space of the modernising ethos.187 It is perfectly natural that in the post-colonial era local populations are deeply suspicious “of the agenda of the proponents of modernization” and fearful that “the international human rights movement with its individualis- tic inﬂuences will swamp them in its march towards re-creating the world in the image of the West.”188 These fears would appear to be well grounded. Local populations are faced with a model of international human rights law that has yet to listen and respond to their cultural world-view and moreover continues to promote the notion that theirs is “a delinquent culture which requires to be ‘sorted out’ by a more advanced and superior one.”189 As Nhlapo pointedly remarks, this is “the very kind of thinking that many people believed had disappeared with the passing of the early colonial period.”190

State-to-state international law fails to ensure human rights and is imperialist

**Harris-Short 3** (Sonia, Human Rights Quarterly 25(1), Feb 2003, p.130-181)IM

If there is no support among the populace—the now primary abusers—for the standards or norms the state has agreed to uphold, the state’s efforts to implement those norms against the people’s will is fraught with difﬁculties and most likely doomed to failure.209 The system is thus rendered inept and ineffective. To be effective those at the grassroots must accept and embrace the human rights norms in question “as theirs.” They must be culturally legitimate. And thus we come back to the heart of the problem. The crucial difference between imposing obligations on “the state” and seeking to persuade private individuals to comply with interna- tional standards and obligations is that the latter are being asked to comply with an obligation to which they have never agreed and in the creation of which they have played no part. Moreover, it may be a standard or norm that is fundamentally inconsistent with their cultural “world view.” Even the positivist argument in support of universal human rights begins to crumple when the problem is viewed in this way. They may contend that if they have the universal agreement of states they have successfully created a univer- sally binding obligation. They do not however have the consent of the relevant actors. If human rights are to be truly universal and moreover effective, what is required is the consent of those on whom the obligation is really imposed: the people. If that consent is not obtained and international human rights are imposed against the will and consent of the internal populations of states—international human rights remain at their core culturally illegitimate—they remain a tool of the imperialist.

AT: I. Law Bad

NATO is key to making I-Law ethical and effective

**Quenivet 9** (Noelle, Research associate @ U of Bochum, Germany, Center for Strategic Research – Turkey, Nov 25 2009, www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/.../PerceptionVolumeVII3NoelleQuenivet.pdf)IM

The US has based its intervention in Afghanistan on Resolution 1368, which, in its view, supports the right to self-defence and entitles the US government to send troops. Others have claimed that the attack on the World Trade Centre and on the Pentagon was disturbing the classical approach of the international use of force and hence the reply of the United States was in a grey area. Furthermore, in its operation in Afghanistan, the United States is bound by international humanitarian law that requires it to abide by amongst others the principles of humanity, of proportionality and of distinction between civilians and armed forces. This is even more difficult as the planners and executors of September 11 appear to operate free of moral values while America’s “collective psyche believes that is unfair that [Americans], victims of such atrocity, must play by rules that [Americans’] unknown foe disdains.”50 On the other hand, morally, it was clear after the events of September 11 that a strong response was required to suppress international terrorism, including the use of military force. The multilateral allied response of the world was the only way to respond in an ethically proper fashion. Indeed, “[t]he visuals of terror and suffering, coupled with instantaneous satellite communications and the Internet, compress the time period between earning of events and responding to demands to ‘do something’”.51 The American population as well as the international community were longing for a tough answer. NATO’s immediate reaction “on 12 September 2001 to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty underscored the profound link between two continents and nineteen nations, and underlined the Allies’ collective determination to act.”52 This is assuredly the strongest commitment sovereign States can give to each other and the proof that the international community or at least its Western component fully agreed with the US view that military action was necessary against Afghanistan, the country that harboured the alleged perpetrators of the attack on September 11. As Jamie Shea stresses “[t]he acceptance of such shared destiny is at the heart of ethics in international security policy, for it makes opting out or neutrality in the face of the new, transnational terrorist threats much more difficult to justify.”53

Their evidence says that international law is only good when practiced on a multilateral basis, that state-to-state enforcement is bad: this means alliances such as NATO are key to effective international law

AT: Russia

Russia not a threat – laundry list

- Nuclear deterrence – No defense spending/military capabilities – EU Balancing – No imperial ambitions

**Friedman and Logan ‘8** [Benjamin H. Friedman is a research fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies at the Cato Institute, where Justin Logan is associate director of Foreign Policy Studies, “Don’t Expand NATO”, Oct 22, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=9738]

This narrative is devoid of strategic logic. Leaving aside nuclear weapons, which deterrence renders unusable, Russia is not a great power, and is incapable of threatening Western Europe, let alone the United States. Even fattened by oil revenues, which have fallen by roughly 40 percent since the war in Georgia, Russia still only has a GDP roughly equivalent to that of Italy and Portugal combined. Its stock market is down by more than half since August. Its defense spending totals about $70 billion annually (less than what the U.S. spends on defense research and investment alone), for what remains a second-rate military. That might be enough to pummel weak neighbors like Georgia, but shouldn't worry Europe, which spends roughly **four times more**. Balance of power theory tells us that if Russia grows more threatening, the European Union -- now richer than the U.S. -- will respond by investing more on defense than its current average of 2 percent of GDP, and by further integrating its military capacity. No longer driven by a revolutionary ideology, Russia also lacks the Soviet Union's ambitions. True, Russia does not like the democratic governments on its flanks in Ukraine and Georgia. But that is because these governments are pursuing policies that anger Russia, not because they are democratic per se. What Russia wants is pliant neighbors. That desire is typical of powerful states: The long U.S. history of violent interventions in Latin America undermines whatever lectures we might direct at Moscow.

Their ev is all hype – Russia’s not a threat and everyone knows it

**Bandow ’09** –Senior Fellow at the Cato Insitute, former special assistant to Reagan, author [“Old Nato Turns 60”, April 2, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=10092]

First, Russia poses no serious military threat to the U.S. or Europe. Moscow is acting like a traditional great power, concerned about protecting its border security and raising its international status, not waging an ideological contest or launching a war of conquest. Moreover, America spends several times as much as Russia on defense, possesses a superior nuclear force and vastly better conventional military, and enjoys a GDP a dozen times that of Russia. The Europeans have an even greater economic advantage and also outspend Moscow militarily. The Russian Humpty Dumpty has fallen off of the wall and Moscow can't put it back together without spending money it doesn't have. Second, the Europeans are capable of containing Moscow if the latter should threaten the continent. The Europeans do so little to create effective military forces because they don't see any reason to do so. Notes my Cato Institute colleague Ted Galen Carpenter: "The gap between America's military capabilities and those of its European partners has grown to be a chasm." Joint missions might soon become practically impossible. Despite the fears of Russia's immediate neighbors, the "old" Europeans know that the prospect of a Russian invasion is a **paranoid fantasy**. Moreover, they figure America would save them if Russian tanks ever did head down the Unter den Linden and Champs–Elysées. So why do more?

No military threat

**Bandow ’08** [Doug Bandow is the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance, A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire, “Incoherent Empire: The Case for Getting Out of NAT”, Dec 18, http://www.takimag.com/site/article/incoherent\_empire\_the\_case\_for\_getting\_out\_of\_nato/]

Second, Russia is capable of dominating neither Asia nor Europe. China is the emerging superpower-to-be, while the European Union members already outspend and outbuild Russia militarily. Despite the Putin government’s professed power pretensions, Russia’s conventional military has little reach beyond its immediate border. And that isn’t likely to change much in the future; indeed, with the decline in oil prices and crash in stock market values, Moscow is weaker today than during its August war with Georgia. With a GDP and population greater even than that of America, the Europeans can outmatch Russia no matter how much more Moscow devotes to its military.

AT: Russia

**NATO is critical for preventing wars over the former Soviet block- multiple reasons**

**Duffield 94**, (John , Winter, Assistant Prof. of Gov and Foreign Affairs @ the University of Virginia, Political Science Quarterly, 109(5) http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-3195%28199424%2F199524%29109%3A5%3C763%3ANFATCW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T accessed 7/9) CM

**NATO promotes stability in the former Soviet bloc in two ways**. **First, it directly fosters the success of political reform in the region**. Since 1990, **NATO has established a wide array of programs and insti­tutions for dialogue and cooperation on security issues**, **most notably the** North Atlantic Cooperation Council (**NACC**) **and the** Partnership for Peace (**PfP**), through **which it can assist the fledgling regimes in reshaping their defense policies**, **structures**, **and planning processes**.2° In particular, **these new arrangements can reinforce democratic control of the armed forces and respect for civilian authority by exposing Central and East European leaders to Western models of civil-military relations** .**21 Second, NATO enhances the security of Central and East European states by assuring them that they would not have to face external threats entirely on their own**, thereby **helping them to forgo potentially destabilizing actions and to pursue their ambitious agendas of domestic reform with greater confidence**.22 Since 1990, the North Atlantic Council has repeatedly offered strong verbal expressions of interest and sup­port, such as the statement issued during the August 1991 Soviet coup attempt: "We expect the Soviet Union to respect the integrity and security of all states in Europe."23 The **NACC allows former Soviet bloc states to voice their concerns and to discuss a wide range of security issues on a regular basis while sitting as equal partners with their NATO counterparts**.24 And the recently adopted Pt **offers each participant formal consultations with the alliance**, should it perceive a direct threat to its security, and concrete military ties with NATO members via involvement in a variety of military activities and opera­tions .25 Admittedly, such measures are not ideal from a Central and East European perspective. So far, NATO has refused to offer these coun­tries full membership and security guarantees for fear of antagonizing nationalist elements in Russia and of importing potential territorial and ethnic conflicts into the alliance. But even the looser political and military links that have been offered promise greater security than alternative arrangements. And participation in the Pt? is widely seen as an important step toward eventual membership, the possibility of which has been reaffirmed by the alliance even if specific criteria and timetables remain to be established. Consequently, Central and East European states quickly put aside any feelings of disappointment to embrace the program.

AT: Request CP

Request to remove presence from a single country request causes a domino effect resulting in deteriorated deterrence

Tertrais 7 (Bruno, May, Senior Research Fellow, Foundation pour la Recherche Stragique, http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/op\_21.pdf pg 95 accessed 7/7)CM

Some European political leaders have called for the withdrawal of US weapons in recent years, and public opinion in host countries tends to have negative views of this nuclear presence.) The deployment of missile defenses in Europe may be used as an argument to claim that such a presence is no longer necessary. In such a scenario, NATO would have to consider that there could then be a “domino effect” and that other nations would follow suit- especially if the initial demand was made publicly, as it probably would be if it was driven by domestic political considerations. There is also the possibility that one or several NATO nations might refuse to give a nuclear role to the Eurofighter (Typhoon) aircraft, which is due to be the successor to the F-16 in several NATO nations. This might be for such countries a “soft” way to put an end to their nuclear sharing role, even though US nuclear forces could remain on the territory of some European countries for US use. (NATO is believed to currently maintained US nuclear weapons dedicated to US use in four countries: Germany Italy, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Weapons deployed in Belgium and the Netherlands are dedicated to “host nation” use.)

\_\_\_\*\*NATO Bad

NATO Bad – Top Shelf\*\*

**US hegemony through NATO could spark WW3**

**Marshall 10** (Andrew Gavin, June 29, is a Research Associate with the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). He is currently studying Political Economy and History at Simon Fraser University, Global Research http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=19951 accessed 7/8) CM

For the first time in the last 500 years, the East has risen – with China and India – as new global powers, rising within the system not against it; marking the first time that nation-states have not risen against the global power, but with the global power. China and India are being brought within a new global political and economic system that is being constructed: a global totalitarian system of continental colonies to a global state. In 1998, then Secretary-General of NATO, Javier Solana, gave a speech in which he said:   It is my general contention that humanity and democracy - two principles essentially irrelevant to the original Westphalian order - can serve as guideposts in crafting a new international order, better adapted to the security realities, and challenges, of today's Europe.[40]   Further, he explained, “the Westphalian system had its limits. For one, the principle of sovereignty it relied on also produced the basis for rivalry, not community of states; exclusion, not integration.” **Thus, to truly have global power, the international system of nation-states must be ‘re-imagined’ and altered:** first, into continental governance structures, and ultimately a global structure. As Solana said, “In the United Nations, the ideal of a global institution including all nations became a reality,” and “the ideal of European integration was set in motion.” He elaborated:   But an integral part of the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance was the idea of reconciliation: the integration of our militaries, the common project of collective defence, and the willingness to work towards a common approach to defend the Alliance's common values.   Unfortunately, also **out of the same ashes of the second world war** **emerged the East-West confrontation that left Europe deeply divided for more than four decades**. As our century comes to an end, **we at last have the opportunity to overcome this division and to set free all the creative energies this continent can muster to build the new security order which will lead us into the 21st century**.[41**]   It is a difficult balancing act for global powers – particularly the United States** **– to** manage the integration of China into the ‘new world order’, while simultaneously both of them compete for **control of global resources**, located primarily in regions of the world which are experiencing the most rapid and extensive ‘awakening’**. The imperial mindset** – like that of Brzezinski’s – **seeks to rationalize global power as being equated with ‘global stability’**, and that without empire**, there is only ‘chaos’**. Thus, **imperial logic dictates that America must seek to dominate as much of the world as fast as possible**, **and** hence **control global resources**, which will allow it to determine the terms of China and other powers’ inclusion in the new world order. **This has the potential to spark a global war – a World War III type of scenario between the NATO powers and the China-Russia alliance** – the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – who seek to share power, not to be dominated. **Global populations at home and abroad have never been so challenging to control: global war is inevitable in the imperial mindset**. As Brzezinski himself stated in a speech to Chatham House in London in 2009:   But these major world powers, new and old, also face a novel reality: while the lethality of their military might is greater than ever, their capacity to impose control over the politically awakened masses of the world is at a historic low. **To put it bluntly: in earlier times, it was easier to control one million people than to physically kill one million people; today, it is infinitely easier to kill one million people than to control one million people**.[42]

NATO Bad – Top Shelf\*\*

Reducing NATO’s role key to accelerate EU security development – solves conflict and other benefits from the alliance

**Bandow ’08** [Doug Bandow is the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance, A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire, “Incoherent Empire: The Case for Getting Out of NAT”, Dec 18, http://www.takimag.com/site/article/incoherent\_empire\_the\_case\_for\_getting\_out\_of\_nato/]

Europeans have little more enthusiasm for defending Europe. EU ministers recently agreed on creating a deployable force of 60,000 EU troops—but only “in the years to come,” whatever that means. The people and politicians of Europe may view the risk of war as too small to warrant devoting more resources to their militaries. They may decide that the Eastern Europeans and beyond are not in real danger or are not worth saving. That’s fine too. After six decades of treating Europe as a helpless dependent, Washington should metaphorically kick its child out of the house, leaving the Europeans with full control over—and responsibility for—their own destiny. Moreover, turning NATO over to Europe would in no way limit formation of future “coalitions of the willing” to cooperate in military expeditions elsewhere. Recognizing the threat to European commerce posed by increasing piracy caused the EU to send a small naval force to patrol waters off Somalia. Nevertheless, most European states are unlikely to enthusiastically join in real conflicts requiring real forces: witness the reluctance to send a peacekeeping force to Congo or transform the ceasefire monitoring mission into a peacekeeping operation in Georgia, let alone engage in combat in Afghanistan. At best, the alliance encourages some countries which otherwise wouldn’t participate to mollify Washington by reluctantly send minimal forces hobbled by national caveats. The price to the U.S. of such “help” isn’t worth paying.

EU better – common goals, Russian aggression, entanglement

**Conry ’95** [Barbara, former associate policy analyst, was a public relations consultant at Hensley Segal Rentschler and an expert on security issues in the Middle East, Western Europe, and Central Asia “The Western European Union As NATO's Successor”, Sept 18, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-239.html]

Washington unwisely clings to outdated Cold War policies instead of devising new policies that better address America's security requirements in the post-Cold War era. Nowhere is that more evident than in the effort to maintain or even expand NATO, even though the enemy it was created to face, the Soviet Union, no longer exists, and the United States and Europe now have relatively few common security interests. The Western European Union, the security arm of the European Union, should replace NATO as the primary guarantor of European security. A robust WEU would have a number of advantages over NATO. WEU member states have many common security interests, in contrast to the increasingly divergent U.S. and European perspectives that have already produced serious disarray in NATO. The West European nations have ample economic resources and are capable of providing for their own defense without a U.S. subsidy. Finally, Moscow is likely to view the WEU as less provocative than a U.S.-dominated NATO--especially an enlarged version that expands to Russia's borders. Maintaining NATO as the primary European security institution both is expensive and risks drawing the United States into military entanglements even when no vital American interests are at stake. Replacing NATO with the WEU would emphasize that most disputes in Central and Eastern Europe are more relevant to the European nations than to America and that dealing with such problems is properly a European responsibility. Moreover, once the West Europeans develop a full independent military capability, the WEU would be a strong partner for the United States in the event of a future threat to mutual U.S.-European security interests.

NATO Bad – Top Shelf\*\*

No impact – NATO obsolete and can’t solve conflict

- No Russia threat – EU Solves – No troops/military support – Predictive ev, judge

**Guttman 5-1-09** [Robert Guttman, Director of the Center on Politics & Foreign Relations (CPFR) at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. where he co-hosts a series of conferences on politics and foreign policy with the Financial Times newspaper group, “Happy 60th Birthday NATO; Time to Go Out of Business?”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-guttman/happy-60th-birthday-nato\_b\_181734.html]

But, the Soviet Union is gone and has been for a long time. The main threat from Russia comes not from their military but from their economic role as a provider of natural gas and oil to Europe. Europeans fear a cutoff of energy from Russia more than any type of military action. NATO was successful in its original goal and Europe is a peaceful place these days; the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact no longer exist; and the European Union now encompasses most of the countries of Europe. It is a completely different situation now than in the 1940s and during the Cold War years. NATO was successful and NATO was competent and NATO kept the peace but a new era is upon us and NATO is grasping for a new role and it may not have a role to play in **2009 and beyond.** The main threat today to Europe and the United States is the economic meltdown and the huge financial crisis we are all facing. Certainly we are facing terrorist threats but is NATO really the organization to keep terrorists at bay? The crunch for President Obama will come in Strasbourg when he asks for more troops for the NATO mission in Afghanistan. And, the reply from many of our NATO allies will be sorry but we will not provide any more troops because we do not see Afghanistan as that large of a problem. Europeans are more inward looking today. They see no huge threat to their countries from Afghanistan. President Obama is seeking more NATO troops from countries who do not want to provide them and if they do provide them have certain restrictions--not going into battle in the southern part of the country--that makes them almost useless. We now have a military alliance where many of the members do not want to engage in military operations. This is hardly a recipe for a successful future for NATO. When I interviewed NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer several years ago he told me: "We cannot lose in Afghanistan. We have to succeed in Afghanistan. If we fail, then who will have confidence in us again? Our credibility as NATO, as the Euro-Atlantic community is on the line. And our credibility is one of our strongest assets. To preserve it, we have no choice but to succeed. NATO has a tradition to keep. NATO has never made empty promises. So NATO should not make empty promises now." Well, NATO is not succeeding in Afghanistan at the moment and the political will seems to be missing from many of our NATO allies to continue the mission in that war torn nation. There are many military threats in the world today that will rear their ugly head and take over the headlines from the economic crisis in the near future but the question is: Is NATO the right military organization to deal with these crises? Maybe we should call NATO a huge success, pat every one on the back and dissolve the military organization and move on. Could the European Union take on the military role? Could a new military organization take the place of NATO? Instead of planning new missions around the globe for NATO why not ask the basic question: Is NATO still necessary anymore? NATO did its original job and the peace was kept in Europe and Soviet tanks did not attack during the Cold War--its goals were met and met successfully so why keep coming up with new out of area missions that do not have the full backing of most of the members. Re-think NATO. It may be time to say **happy birthday and goodbye.**

NATO Bad – Patriarchy

NATO hurts Afghan women

**Foxley 9** (Tim, Researcher @ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), April 1 2009, The Shadow NATO Summit, p. 5)IM

Selmin Caliskan(medica mondiale) spoke about the critical and deteriorating situation of women in Afghanistan, including increases in maternal mortality rates (around 2,600 per year and higher than military casualties), forced marriages (around 80% of all marriages) and the militarisation of development. She also focused on the difficult civil-military relationship and on the importance of having an exit strategy from the conflict. About half of women prisoners in Afghanistan are convicted of moral ‘offences’ and only 1% of civilian funds are directed towards women. Ms. Caliskan concluded that both extremist and NATO actions in Afghanistan worked against the interests of women, and that ultimately only women and civil society could provide the basis for peace. Conflict resolution starts, she said, in families and community projects, not with arms.

NATO Bad – US-Russia War

**NATO is useless military and actually risks the US being drawn into a nuclear war with Russia**

**Carpenter 9** (Ted Galen Carpenter, Ph.D., is the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, CATO [http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/ pa635.pdf](http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa635.pdf) accessed 7/8) CM

Although **NATO has added numerous new members during the past decade**, **most of them possess minuscule military capabilitie**s. **Some of them also have murky political systems and con­tentious relations with neighboring states**, **including (**and most troubling) **a nuclear-armed Russia**. Thus, **NATO’s new members are weak**, **vulnerable**, **and provocative—an especially dan­gerous combination for the United States in its role as NATO’s leader**. **There are also growing fissures in the alliance about how to deal with Russia.** The older, West European powers tend to favor a cautious, concil­iatory policy, whereas the Central and East Euro­pean countries advocate a more confrontational, hard-line approach. **The** **U**nited **States is caught in the middle of that intra-alliance squabble**. Perhaps most worrisome, the **defense spending levels and military capabilities of NATO’s princi­pal European members have plunged in recent years**. The decay of those military forces has reached the point that **American leaders now wor­ry that joint operations with U.S. forces are becoming difficult, if not impossible**. **The ineffec­tiveness of the European militaries is apparent in NATO’s stumbling performance in Afghanistan**. **NATO has outlived whatever usefulness it had**. Superficially, it remains an impressive institution, but **it has become a hollow shell**—far more a politi­cal honor society than a meaningful security orga­nization. Yet, while the alliance exists**, it is a vehicle for European countries to free ride on the U.S. mil­itary commitment instead of spending adequately on their own defenses and taking responsibility for the security of their own region.** American calls for greater burden-sharing are even more futile today than they have been over the past 60 years. **Until the United States changes the incentives by withdraw­ing its troops from Europe and phasing out its NATO commitment**, the Europeans will happily continue to evade their responsibilities. Today’s **NATO is a bad bargain for the United States**. We have security obligations to countries that add little to our own military power. Even worse, **some of those countries could easily entan­gle America in dangerous parochial disputes. It is time to terminate this increasingly dysfunctional alliance.**

**NATO’s Article 5 policy makes nuclear war with Russia inevitable**

Carpenter 9 (Ted Galen Carpenter, Ph.D., is the vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, CATO http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/ pa635.pdf accessed 7/8) CM

**The new members the alliance has admit­ted since the end of the Cold War are weak client states that expect** **the United States to defend them**. That was largely true even of the first round of expansion that added the mid-sized countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. It was more evident in the second round that embraced such tiny military players as Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. **Such micro allies are security consumers, not security producers. From the standpoint of American interests they are not assets, they are liabilities**—**and potentially very dangerous liabilities. Taking on the obligation to defend the Baltic countries was especially unwise, because NATO now poses a direct geopolitical chal­lenge to Russia right on Moscow’s doorstep. Relations between Russia and its small Baltic neighbors are testy**, to put it mildly. At the moment, **Russia may be too weak to challenge the U.S./NATO security commitment to those countries, but we cannot be certain that will always be true**. **The endorsement of NATO membership for Croatia and Albania confirms that the alliance has now entered the realm of farce**. The military capabilities of those two countries are minus­cule. According to the 2009 edition of *The Military Balance*, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Croatia’s military budget is a mere $962 million, and its military force consists of 18,600 active-duty personnel. Albania’s budget is $233 million, and its force is 14,295. They will augment Estonia’s $425 mil­lion and 5,300 troops, Latvia’s $513 million and 5,187 troops, Lithuania’s $500 million and 8,850 troops, and Slovenia’s $756 million and 7,200 troops. By not offering membership to Macedonia, though, NATO will have to do with­out Skopje’s $163 million and 10,890 troops.5 Collectively, those countries spend less on their militaries in a year than the United States spends in Iraq in two weeks. **Such new allies are not merely useless; they are potentially an embarrassment to the alliance**, **and possibly a serious danger**. When Vice President Dick Cheney asserted during a visit to the Balkans in 2006 that the proposed members would help “rejuvenate” NATO and rededicate the alliance “to the basic and fun­damental values of freedom and democracy,” he showed how out of touch with reality U.S and NATO policy had become.6 **Croatia is just a few years removed from the fascistic regime of Franjo Tudjman** and contin­ues to have frosty relations with neighboring Serbia. **Albania is a close ally of the new, pre­dominantly Albanian state of Kosovo, an entity whose independence both Serbia and Russia** (as well as most other countries) do **not recognize and vehemently oppose**. <CONTINUED>

NATO Bad – US-Russia War

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**Albania also is notori­ous for** being under the influence of **organized crime**. Indeed, the **Albanian mafia is legendary throughout Europe, controlling much of the gambling, prostitution, and drug trafficking**.7 Efforts to add Ukraine and Georgia to the alliance, a policy that the Bush administration pushed and the Obama administration en­dorses, would be even worse than the previous rounds of expansion. Ukraine’s relationship with Russia is quite contentious. Georgia’s relationship, of course, is even worse than that, as last summer’s warfare confirmed. Rational Americans should have breathed a sigh of relief that Georgia was not a NATO member at the time the conflict erupted. Proponents of NATO’s enlargement east­ward sometimes act as though the alliance is now merely a political honor society. Their underlying logic is that, because the nations of Eastern Europe have become capitalist de­mocracies, they deserve to be members of the West’s most prominent club. But nearly all the newer members of NATO, which are the most concerned about possible adverse security developments emanating from Russia, consid­er the alliance to be more than a political body. They are counting on tangible protection from depredations by their large eastern neighbor. And, equally important, **Moscow does not view the current incarnation of NATO as merely political in nature**. The Georgian conflict should remind us that NATO is still officially much more than a political club. It remains a military alliance with extensive obligations—especially for the United States. **Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty proclaims that an attack on one mem­ber is an attack on all. That means the United States is obligated to assist in the defense of every member—no matter how small, how mil­itarily or economically insignificant, or how strategically exposed that member might be** That comes perilously close to being a risky strategic bluff. **The war between Russia and Georgia illustrates the hollow nature of NATO’s ability to protect small, vulnerable members**. True, Georgia was not a member of the alliance, and therefore, Article 5 did not apply. But the country was clearly a client— albeit an informal client—of the United States. U.S. leaders repeatedly hailed Georgian presi­dent Mikheil Saakashvili as an American friend and as a symbol of democratic reform in that part of the world. The conventional wis­dom assumed that Russia would never molest such a client. And the Georgians certainly seemed to expect assistance when trouble arose. As New York Times correspondents Andrew E. Kramer and Ellen Barry reported from Georgia during the early days of the fighting, when retreating Georgian troops met Western journalists, “they all said the same thing: Where is the United States? When is NATO coming?”9 Yet the United States and the rest of NATO did little more than fuss and fume about the Russian military offensive and offer postwar reconstruction aid to Tbilisi. The anemic response of both NATO and the European Union infuriated hardliners in the West. A Wall Street Journal editorial derisively described the policy as one of “Stop! Or We’ll Say Stop Again!”10 Some analysts expressed confidence that, if Georgia had been a NATO member, Russia would have been deterred. Columnist George Will, for example, posed the question: “If Georgia were in NATO, would NATO now be at war with Russia? More likely,” he stated, “Russia would not be in Georgia.”11 Perhaps. But there is reason to be skeptical about that conclusion. **The reality is that if Washington and its NATO partners endeav­ored to carry out their commitments under Article 5 because a fight erupted between Russia and a small alliance member, they would risk war with a nuclear-armed adver­sary**. Such a threat may have had reasonable credibility during the Cold War, when the stakes involved keeping democratic Europe—a major economic and strategic asset—out ofthe orbit of an aggressive, totalitarian power. **The declared willingness to risk a war with nuclear implications is far less credible when the casus belli is merely a dispute between an authori­tarian Russia and one small neighbor—which in the case of the Georgian war was a dispute over the political status of two secessionist regions in that neighbo**r. Not only might deterrence lack credibility in that situation, basic prudence should dictate that such a degree of risk not be incurred except in the defense of vital interests. Georgia’s trou­bles with Russia—and for that matter, the vari­ous disputes that **other tiny nations on Russia’s border have with Moscow—do not come close to meeting that test even for Europe’s major powers, much less for the United States. It seems more likely than not that Washington, if faced with the terrible potential consequences of confronting Russia militarily over such mea­ger stakes, would blink**. And ifthe United States didn’t act, the secondary NATO powers cer­tainly would not. The alliance’s nonresponse to Russia’s offensive against Georgia suggests that the security expectations of NATO’s new mem­bers and prospective members may be wishful thinking.

NATO Bad – AT: Terrorism

**NATO Bad – A2: Terrorism**

NATO is a poor mechanism for dealing with terrorism—unilateral approach solves best

**Asmus ‘02** [Ronald, senior fellow for European studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, NATO Review, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue1/english/debate.html#top]

Finally, you want the Alliance to focus on the new security threats, like terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Of course NATO should do what it can against such threats, but how well suited is it to play a leading role? The fight against terrorism surely requires the sharing of intelligence and speedy decision-taking. A large multinational bureaucracy with — soon, perhaps — 25 members may not be well suited to such a struggle. The same argument applies to WMD. Is not NATO too leaky and slow-moving to manage an offensive operation that would, for example, destroy biological weapons factories? I suspect that the Pentagon would rather fight terrorism and WMD on its own, or with a small group of allies that can be trusted to keep a secret, provide skilled forces and accept US command.

NATO not suited to solve terrorism.

**Bredaun ’03** [Deaglán de Bréadún, The Irish Times centrist, February, 2003 NATO's Growing Pains, NATO: Bigger, Not Better at Fighting Terror, World Press Review, http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/893.cfm]

And yet, there are question marks over [NATO’s] its future and even its current usefulness. The tragic events of Sept. 11 were brought about by a small group of determined zealots wielding nothing more lethal than boxcutters. What use are nuclear weapons in such a scenario? The attacks of Sept. 11 could have been prevented by better intelligence-gathering, sharper police work, proper airport security, a more watchful immigration service, and greater vigilance among ordinary citizens. NATO is no more suited to this job than a bear is to catching wasps. The summit saw a renewal of vows in the war against terrorism. But Al-Qaeda was hardly trembling in its shoes. When this terrorist organization sends out its deadly packages, there is no return address. How can you strike against an enemy when you don’t even know where he lives?

NATO is not key to the War on Terror

**Nevers ‘07** [Renée de, Assistant Professor of Public Administration at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, “NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era” The Center of Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Spring, Lexis]

NATO's contribution to ongoing efforts to prevent terrorist attacks is thus important, but it may not be central to U.S. policy. While OAE's surveillance activities contribute to tracking potential terrorist movements, the intelligence developed through OAE may be more directly relevant to law enforcement than to military missions. To be sure, U.S. officials agree that many NATO members have strong intelligence capabilities, and they can provide valuable intelligence that the United States does not possess. But the most important elements of intelligence gathering in Europe take place outside NATO and are conducted by domestic intelligence organizations. This intelligence is more likely to be shared bilaterally, rather than through NATO. Bilateral intelligence sharing among key allies continued despite severe strains in political relations in the months prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, as revelations about German intelligence cooperation with the United States to designate military targets and civilian locations just prior to the invasion made clear. n41 Five European states with substantial terrorism concerns developed their own forum for intelligence cooperation in March 2005. In 2006 the alliance established a new intelligence "fusion center" to ensure that needed intelligence can be distributed to troops in the field. It also created the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit to provide a forum for joint analysis of nonclassified information. But these are better means to share and interpret information. n42 NATO as such does not generate raw intelligence useful to preventing terrorism. Finally, NATO's effort to develop new defense technologies to protect against terrorist attacks reinforces the U.S. goal of promoting allied defense transformation. Whether the program will contribute to NATO or U.S. defense remains to be seen.

NATO Fails

The US is loathe to coordinate with NATO, and its effectiveness is empirically denied – Kosovo

**Bensahel 3** (Nora, Public Policy Expert at RAND, “The Counterterror Coalitions,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1746/MR1746.pdf)IM

NATO was un- able to provide a command structure—or even substantial capabili- ties—that would override U.S. concerns about using the NATO ma- chinery. European contributions were incorporated on a bilateral basis, but NATO as an organization remained limited to conducting patrols over the United States and deploying ships to the eastern Mediterranean. This U.S. policy choice did not surprise many in the United States. Many U.S. policymakers believed that NATO’s war in Kosovo was an unacceptable example of “war by committee,” where political inter- ference from the alliance’s 19 members prevented a quick and deci- sive campaign. The policymakers were determined to retain sole command authority in Afghanistan, so that experience would not be repeated.37 The deployment of the NATO AWACS demonstrates this point. The United States did not want to deploy the NATO AWACS directly to Afghanistan, because it did not want to involve the North Atlantic Council in any command decisions. Instead, the NATO AWACS backfilled U.S. assets so the assets could redeploy to Afghanistan.38 A military official later described the U.S. decision in these terms: “If you were the US, would you want 18 other nations watering down your military planning?”39