# Capitalism Kritik

# Negative

## 1NC

#### Infrastructure investment is historically the state’s weapon in the ongoing expansion of global capitalist accumulation – causes imperialism and environmental destruction.

Smith 8 (Jason Scott Smith, assistant professor of history at the University of New Mexico, "The New Deal Order," Enterprise and Society Vol. 9 Num 3 2008)

For all the attention that has been paid to these subjects, though,¶ many historians have overlooked a revolution in the priorities of¶ the American state that took place during the Great Depression, a¶ revolution that radically transformed the physical landscape, political¶ system, and economy of the United States. We can begin to recover¶ the scope of this transformation by looking directly at how¶ the New Deal state spent its money.6 On average, between 1933 and¶ 1939 over two-thirds of federal emergency expenditures went toward¶ funding public works programs.7 These dollars were allocated to new¶ agencies, such as the Public Works Administration (PWA), and later¶ the Works Progress Administration (WPA). The PWA, created in 1933,¶ received an initial appropriation of $3.3 billion, which it mainly¶ applied to heavy construction and large-scale building. To put this¶ figure in context, this amount was just over 165 percent of the federal¶ government’s revenues in 1933, or 5.9 percent of the 1933 U.S. gross¶ domestic product (GDP). Relying on private contractors, the PWA¶ deployed its funds in all but three of the nation’s 3,071 counties,¶ while helping to pay for projects like the Tennessee Valley Authority¶ and Boulder Dam. Created in 1935, the WPA did lighter construction¶ work and strove to avoid private contracting. Its initial appropriation¶ of $4.88 billion was about 135 percent of the federal government’s¶ revenues in 1935, or about 6.7 percent of GDP in that year. Although¶ primarily intended as a vast relief effort for employing the unskilled,¶ the WPA built an impressive range of projects, including over 480¶ airports, 78,000 bridges, and nearly 40,000 public buildings. Both¶ programs were the beneficiaries of the federal government’s commitment¶ to construction. During these years, the payrolls of the PWA and¶ the WPA were among the largest in the nation, easily dwarfing those¶ of the largest private enterprises. In carrying out their mandates, the¶ two programs integrated a multitude of municipal construction experts,¶ members of the Army Corps of Engineers, and civil engineers¶ into the national state.8¶ By using the lens of political economy to focus on the New Deal’s¶ public works spending, we can begin to see the outlines of a different¶ interpretation. The huge amount of funds devoted to public construction,¶ the far-reaching federal efforts invested in directing this money,¶ and the long-run impact of the infrastructure itself form the components¶ of the story of a public works revolution.9 This revolution¶ helped justify the new role of the federal government in American¶ life, legitimizing—intellectually and physically—what has come to¶ be known as Keynesian management of the economy. By sponsoring¶ this infrastructure, New Dealers remade the built environment¶ that managed the movement of people, goods, electricity, water, and¶ waste. Among the New Deal’s projects were some of the largest and¶ most significant structures ever built in human history.10¶ These programs not only anticipated the national highways and¶ the military-industrial complex; in the postwar period government sponsored¶ economic development also looked abroad. For example,¶ Harry Truman’s Point IV program was conceived of as an international¶ PWA, building roads and airports in countries like Afghanistan and¶ Vietnam. Similarly, Lyndon Johnson’s vision of exporting Keynesian style¶ economic development to Southeast Asia by replicating the¶ Tennessee Valley Authority on the Mekong Delta reflected the powerful¶ example set by the New Deal. After World War II, construction¶ firms like Bechtel and Brown & Root (today a subsidiary of¶ Halliburton) took their expertise overseas as well.¶ The New Deal’s public works programs employed millions of unemployed¶ workers, both urban and rural, while building the infrastructure¶ that helped integrate the disparate regions of the country¶ into a national market. From the beginning, then, New Dealers built¶ a state that was both far more powerful and substantially less liberal¶ than historians have realized: more powerful, in the scale and scope¶ of the federal government’s commitment to economic development,¶ and less liberal, in the sense that the New Deal state was focused on¶ state-sponsored economic development, and not, in contrast, centrally¶ occupied with tasks like implementing its social security program¶ (which began making payments only in 1942), or with more radical¶ goals, such as the direct redistribution of wealth through tax policy.¶ By reinterpreting the New Deal in this way through a political economic¶ lens, we gain a new history of just how the New Deal’s public¶ works programs contributed to American economic development.¶ Public works also had important ramifications for state building¶ and political party building at the federal, state, and local levels.¶ Harry Hopkins, the head of theWPA, once claimed that the New Deal¶ was a political project that could “tax and tax, spend and spend, and¶ elect and elect.” We now know this phrase’s descendant, the derisive¶ expression “tax and spend liberalism,” but at the time Hopkins¶ made his statement it was pure genius—he succinctly identified the¶ qualities that made New Deal liberalism so powerful and controversial:¶ The taxing and spending functions of government could—and¶ did—remake the physical landscape of the nation. Even more striking,¶ though, was that through using the taxing and spending powers¶ of the state, New Dealers were able to remake a society’s politics.11¶ These accomplishments raise a central question: how do we evaluate¶ New Deal liberalism when we attend to its political economy and¶ place its public works programs at its core?¶ The New Deal’s public works programs reflect a number of achievements¶ and shortcomings. These programs built the infrastructure that¶ made a national market more efficient, spurred dramatic advances¶ in economic productivity, created a network of roads and airports,¶ planned for national highways, improved military bases, foreshadowed¶ the rise of the Sunbelt, and gave the New Dealers a policy tool¶ that could be used to shape overseas development, from the Cold War¶ through the Vietnam War. Faced with the Great Depression, the New¶ Deal and its public works projects helped save capitalism, an achievement¶ subsequently consolidated by enormous public spending during¶ World War II and the ensuing postwar economic boom.12¶ Bound up with these triumphs, however, were many limitations.¶ Most notable, of course, was the failure of the public works programs¶ to bring an end to mass unemployment during the Great Depression.¶ Those that the New Deal did manage to employ were white men, for¶ themost part. This was hardly surprising, given their disproportionate¶ presence in the building trades and construction industry, generally.¶ Surely, the New Deal had a remarkable chance to address the crisis¶ of unemployment among African-Americans and women. Yet, in basing¶ so much of their public policy on the building of public works¶ projects, New Dealers largely reinforced the gender and racial boundaries¶ already evident in the labor market, bypassing the maternalist¶ legacies of Progressive Era social policy.13¶ When we turn to the environment, the New Deal’s shortcomings¶ are likewise apparent. While architectural historians have generally¶ praised the New Deal for creating a more democratic landscape, environmental¶ historians have strongly disagreed. From their perspective,¶ the New Deal spent far too much money on roads and not enough on¶ developing alternative mass transportation technologies. They charge¶ that the New Deal’s large hydroelectric projects promoted an imperialist¶ view of resources, leaving nature to be exploited by a coercive,¶ undemocratic power elite composed of technically minded engineers¶ and narrow-minded bureaucrats. Developments such as the TVA displaced¶ thousands of people, while the affordable electrical power¶ generated by dams led only to increased pollution. The main achievement¶ of the New Deal, in this view, is its role in creating an “asphalt¶ nation.” To be sure, the environmental damage caused by the New¶ Deal’s public works projects was real, if difficult to measure. But to¶ blame New Dealers such as Harry Hopkins for not being mindful of¶ the environment is to fail to recognize the historical impact of the¶ New Deal’s public works projects.14¶ Indeed, in setting out to preserve capitalism in the face of the¶ Great Depression, New Dealers turned to what they knew. They experimented¶ with their various policy measures, strengthened federal¶ power to boost the standing of labor and consumers vis ´a vis business,¶ and regulated the nation’s labor and financial markets to address¶ the greatest economic crisis of the twentieth century. Environmental¶ shortsightedness on their part should be viewed within this broader¶ context: despite deficiencies, the New Deal kept the United States¶ from embracing undemocratic political philosophies such as fascism¶ or communism. Through its public works projects, the federal government¶ justified its new presence in the nation’s economy. The New¶ Dealers compellingly demonstrated—in almost every county of the¶ nation—that public investment and state-sponsored economic development¶ were essential to a modern society, not only for surviving the¶ Great Depression, but especially for laying the foundations for a subsequent¶ period of postwar economic growth and sustained productivity¶ rarely equaled in world history. Labeling the trajectory of New Deal¶ liberalism as a narrative of declension leading to the “end of reform,”¶ as a journey away from the 1933 statist intervention of the National¶ Recovery Administration’s industrial codes to the manipulation of¶ fiscal policy in 1937 and 1938, misses the central significance of the¶ New Deal’s commitment to public works throughout these years and¶ afterward. By using the interpretive lens of political economy, we can¶ comprehend more fully the New Deal’s long-lasting achievements in¶ using public investment to spur economic development during and¶ after the 1930s. Indeed, the “mixed economy” constructed by the New¶ Deal—with its public investment, its regulation of banking and capital¶ markets, and its recognition of organized labor’s right to bargain¶ collectively—soon helped to foster tremendous economic growth (between¶ 1940 and 1973 American GDP grew, in real terms, at an average¶ annual per capita rate of 3 percent).15

#### This drive to accumulate is the root cause of exploitation, imperialism, war and eco-doom – threatens our extinction

Foster 07 (John Bellamy, University of Oregon, “The Ecology of Destruction,” MONTHLY REVIEW, February 2007, www.monthlyreview.org/0207jbf.htm, accessed 3-27-08.)

My intention here is not of course to recount Pontecorvo’s entire extraordinary film, but to draw out some important principles from this allegory that will help us to understand capitalism’s relation to nature. Joseph Schumpeter once famously praised capitalism for its “creative destruction.”2 But this might be better seen as the system’s destructive creativity. Capital’s endless pursuit of new outlets for class-based accumulation requires for its continuation the destruction of both pre-existing natural conditions and previous social relations. Class exploitation, imperialism, war, and ecological devastation are not mere unrelated accidents of history but interrelated, intrinsic features of capitalist development. There has always been the danger, moreover, that this destructive creativity would turn into what István Mészáros has called the “destructive uncontrollability” that is capital’s ultimate destiny. The destruction built into the logic of profit would then take over and predominate, undermining not only the conditions of production but also those of life itself. Today it is clear that such destructive uncontrollability has come to characterize the entire capitalist world economy, encompassing the planet as a whole.3

#### The alternative is to **refuse action** in the face of the crisis presented by the Aff and do nothing

Zizek 04 [Slavoj, Professor of Sociology at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana University, “Revolution at the Gates”, p. 169-171]

Indeed, since the “normal” functioning of capitalism involves some kind of disavowal of the basic principle of its functioning (today’s model capitalist is someone who, after ruthlessly generating profit, then generously shares parts of it, giving large donations to churches, victims of ethnic or sexual abuse, etc., posing as a humanitarian), the ultimate act of transgression is to assert this principle directly, depriving it of its humanitarian mask. I am therefore tempted to reverse Marx’s Thesis 11: the first task today is precisely not to succumb to the temptation to act, to intervene directly and change things (which then inevitably ends in a cul-de-sac of debilitating impossibility: “What can we do against global capital?”), but to question the hegemonic ideological co-ordinates. In short, our historical moment is still that of Adorno: to the Question “What should we do?” I can most often truly answer with “I don’t know.” I can only try to analyse rigorously what there is. Here people reproach me: When you practice criticism, you are also obliged to say how one should make it better. To my mind, this is incontrovertibly a bourgeois prejudice. Many times in history it so happened that the very works which pursued purely theoretical goals transformed consciousness and thereby also social reality. If, today, we follow a direct call to act, this act will not be performed in an empty space—it will be an act within the hegemonic ideological cooridinates: those who “really want to do something to help people” get involved in {undoubtedly honourable} exploits like Medecins sans frontiers, Greenpeace, feminist and anti-racist campaigns, which are all not only tolerated but even supported by the media, even if they seemingly encroach on economic territory (for example, denouncing and boycotting companies which do not respect ecological conditions, or use child labour) – they are tolerated and supported as long as they do not get too close to a certain limit. This kind of activity provides the perfect example of interpassivity? Of doing things not in order to achieve something, but to prevent something from really happening, really changing. All this frenetic humanitarian, politically corr0ect, etc. activity fits the formula of “Let’s go on changing something all the time so that, globally, things will remain the same!” If standard cultural studies criticize capitalism, they do so in the coded way that exemplifies Hollywood liberal paranoia: the enemy is “the system”, the hidden “organization”, the anti-democratic “conspiracy” not simply capitalism and state apparatuses. The problem with this critical stance is not only that it replaces concrete social analysis with a struggle against abstract paranoic fantasies, but that – in a typical paranoic gesture – it unnecessarily redoubles social reality, as if there were a secret Organization behind the “visible” capitalist and state organs. What we should accept is that there is no need for a secret “organization-within-an-organization”: the “conspiracy” is already in the “visible” organization as such, in the capitalist system, in the way the political space and state apparatuses work.

## Queer Theory 1NC

#### Infrastructure Investment is a tool to entrench capitalism into every aspect of life.

Mittelstadt ’05 (Jennifer Mittelstadt, Associate Professor of History at Rutgers University, PhD from University of Michigan, “Consumer Politics: A New History of the Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order” Johns Hopkins University Press, September 2005 Reviews in American History, Volume 33 Number 3 Pgs. 431-438)

In 1989, Steven Fraser and Gary Gerstle edited a volume by major American¶ historians that told the story of The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–¶ 1980 (1989). They traced the rise to the 1930s and the fall to the 1960s and¶ 1970s, culminating with the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980. In¶ the decade and a half since the book’s publication, the fabric of the history¶ laid out there has been stretched, torn, and riddled with holes by dozens of¶ historians, including the editors and contributors themselves. The origins of¶ the New Deal order have been tugged back into the progressive era by new¶ political historians even as other historians have shown that New Deal¶ policies and coalitions unraveled before a sixties “backlash” and well in¶ advance of the triumph of conservatism in the 1970s and 1980s. If it was ever¶ stable at all, the coalition of workers and farmers, whites and African¶ Americans, northerners and southerners, who comprised the Democratic¶ Party showed signs of wobbliness and strife as early as the 1940s. The ideals¶ that animated this coalition were also as varied and contentious as the¶ coalition itself.1 Political historians now agree that there was no monolithic¶ New Deal liberal political coalition, but rather a variety of twentieth-century¶ liberalisms, and with them, a variety of liberal agendas, policies, and outcomes.¶ In her new book, Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-¶ Century America, Meg Jacobs strides boldly through the shards of the old,¶ broken narrative and, with her eye on previously overlooked actors and¶ events, constructs a new story of the rise and fall of the New Deal order. This¶ extraordinary work offers a fresh narrative about American liberalism.¶ Though its conclusions leave some unanswered questions, its new synthesis¶ of the main political narrative of the twentieth century renders it one of the¶ most important pieces of political history this decade.¶ At the center of Jacobs’s new story about politics is consumption—a topic¶ that political historians have largely bypassed. The increase in consumption¶ among the twentieth-century U.S. citizenry is probably the greatest in the¶ history of the world. From the rocky turn of the century through the affluent¶ 1960s, Americans became a nation of homeowners, car owners, and buyers of¶ all manner of consumer products. As Americans became consumers of goods¶ that they themselves once produced at home and goods they never dreamed¶ they needed, the country transformed itself into a mass consumption society.¶ Historians of politics and the state, viewing consumption as largely a¶ “cultural” concern, have failed to connect this massive change in the American¶ economy to American politics. When they have, they have by and large¶ invoked it to explain shifts toward political conservatism or apathy, as most¶ histories of the politics of the 1920s and 1950s—classically considered golden¶ eras of consumption—attest.2

**Neoliberal Capitalism enforces the alienation of queers through increasing violence and proliferation of homogenous ideology**

**Rosenberg and Villarejo 12** (Jordana Rosenberg, MA and PhD from Cornell University, and a BA from Wesleyan University. She is the recipient of an Ahmanson-Getty Fellowship from the Center for Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Studies at UCLA (2009- 2010), as well as a Marion and Jasper Whiting Foundation Award, the Catherine Macaulay Prize, and a William Andrews Clark Memorial Library Joint Fellowship Award. Professor Rosenberg's fields of research and teaching include eighteenth-century transatlantic literature and poetry, moral philosophy, political theory, early modern materialism, Marxism, and secularization; Amy Villarejo, Associate Professor in Film and Feminist, Gender, & Sexuality Studies Program. She received her B.A. in English from Bryn Mawr College in 1985, an M.A. in English from the University of Pittsburgh in 1991, and a Ph.D. in Critical and Cultural Studies (in the Film Studies Program) from the University of Pittsburgh in 1997, when she came to Cornell GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 18, Number 1,2012, Published by Duke University Press, “Introduction: Queerness, Norms, Utopia”)

If queer studies is now reencountering the question of utopia within the Marxist tradition, it is only through the kinds of concretizing negations made possible by a recent wealth of work that specifies the baleful cohabitations of queerness and nationalism, queerness and racialization, queerness and the neoliberalization of the globe. In Puar’s words, **queerness may be seen**, in a number of important contexts, **as “a process of racialization” deployed by the neoliberal nation-state to manage and control populations — to ensure ideological homogeneity in queers for whom an oppositional relationship to the state had once been paramount, and to legitimate neocolonial wars and plunder in the name of an empty “revitalizaItion” of liberal subject-formations held to be the ideal citizens of the neoliberal state**.25 This trenchant analysis of **the increasing violence endemic to the neoliberal state’s quest for dominance** shares a theoretical and future orientation with Muñoz’s utopian casting of black radical traditions that **highlights capitalism as the key framework against which radical futurity pits itself**.26

#### Alternative: Rejecting the capitalist ideology through the lens of queer theory allows us to work outside contradictory politics of capitalism

**Rosenberg and Villarejo 12** (Jordana Rosenberg, MA and PhD from Cornell University, and a BA from Wesleyan University. She is the recipient of an Ahmanson-Getty Fellowship from the Center for Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Studies at UCLA (2009- 2010), as well as a Marion and Jasper Whiting Foundation Award, the Catherine Macaulay Prize, and a William Andrews Clark Memorial Library Joint Fellowship Award. Professor Rosenberg's fields of research and teaching include eighteenth-century transatlantic literature and poetry, moral philosophy, political theory, early modern materialism, Marxism, and secularization; Amy Villarejo, Associate Professor in Film and Feminist, Gender, & Sexuality Studies Program. She received her B.A. in English from Bryn Mawr College in 1985, an M.A. in English from the University of Pittsburgh in 1991, and a Ph.D. in Critical and Cultural Studies (in the Film Studies Program) from the University of Pittsburgh in 1997, when she came to Cornell GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 18, Number 1,2012, Published by Duke University Press, “Introduction: Queerness, Norms, Utopia”)

On to the second, methodological question: **what has all this to do with queer studies**? Fortunately, this is a question that we do not have to answer alone. **Marxist and historical-materialist methodologies undergird the foundational texts of the study of sexuality**. From Michel **Foucault’s reflections on capital accumulation** in Discipline and Punish **to** John **D’Emilio’s analysis of gay identity alongside wage labor and** Gayle **Rubin’s “political economy of sex,” sexuality studies has long deployed the matrices of Marxism and political-economic analysis to illuminate the sex/gender matrix**.7 This illuminative relation has become truly reciprocal with the interventions of queer of color critique, which ups the ante on traditional approaches to economic questions, turning the optic of queer theory onto political economy and historical materialism. Under such a lens, **queer of color critique not only exposes the lacunae in historical materialist approaches but also recovers the force of those approaches that seem ever more relevant today. In weaving together questions of sexuality, critical race theory, and the psyche with economic history and capitalist development, recent work has revivified its engagement with historical materialism.** This kind of methodological recovery is founded in Ferguson’s reengagement with the Combahee River Collective and receives an exemplary extension in Muñoz’s engagement with Ernst Bloch.8 Melamed’s weaving together of a conception of “race radical analysis” with Cedric Robinson’s use of “black radicalism” also exemplifies the kind of recovery work that takes up the legacies of historical materialism to think through the relationship of racialization, imperialism, and neoliberalism. Although not explicitly written from a queer studies angle, Melamed’s “Spirit of Neoliberalism” continues to be an important touchstone for queer studies and is vividly engaged with in Eng’s Feeling of Kinship, for example. What this burgeoning reencounter with historical materialism means for our special issue is an emphasis on the relationship between Marxist methodologies and queer studies. **If**, as we argued above, **neoliberalism must be understood as a mode of capitalism, then the turn to analyzing neoliberalism finds a ready analytic tool in the history of Marxist critique.** To our minds, the single most powerful methodological contribution of Marxism is its attention to contradiction in the form of dialectical critique. A dialectical approach to the problematic of neoliberal capitalism, then, is what we aim to provide and provoke here. As such, this special issue begins with one basic presumption: that **the encounter between queer studies and Marxist and historical-material analysis**, at its best, **offers the possibility for analyzing capitalist culture in its dynamic, geographically diverse, and contradictory articulations**. We invited authors to consider how **queer methodologies illuminate the contradictions in current and historical economic patterns and advance our understanding of the complex structures of global capitalism**. In this focus on contradiction, the Marxist tradition we embrace most closely is Adorno’s negative dialectic — a technique that distinguishes itself from the Hegelian idealist dialectic in its fundamentally aporetic quality: a negative dialectic does not posit a comprehensive account of the social world but points up the conceptual barriers to understanding the material conditions of that world. This analytic process is achieved through “thinking in contradictions”: “To proceed dialectically means to think in contradictions, for the sake of the contradiction already experienced in the object, and against that contradiction.”9 **The negative dialectical approach does not posit an alternative to the contradictions that score contemporary capitalism but reaches toward the possibility of overcoming those contradictions through overcoming the conditions of capitalism. This perspectival shift is praxical; it hinges on the existence of social movements working to overcome current conditions.** This praxical viewpoint — a speculative moment necessary to the negative dialectic — is where Adorno invokes the utopian potential of his approach: negative dialectics that exposes the degree to which the conditions under which we live now are “false,” or contingent. “In view of the concrete possibility of utopia,” he says, “dialectics is the ontology of the false condition” (11).

## Links

### Generic

#### Infrastructure investment is historically the state’s weapon in the ongoing expansion of global capitalist accumulation – causes imperialism and environmental destruction.

Smith 8 (Jason Scott Smith, assistant professor of history at the University of New Mexico, "The New Deal Order," Enterprise and Society Vol. 9 Num 3 2008)

For all the attention that has been paid to these subjects, though,¶ many historians have overlooked a revolution in the priorities of¶ the American state that took place during the Great Depression, a¶ revolution that radically transformed the physical landscape, political¶ system, and economy of the United States. We can begin to recover¶ the scope of this transformation by looking directly at how¶ the New Deal state spent its money.6 On average, between 1933 and¶ 1939 over two-thirds of federal emergency expenditures went toward¶ funding public works programs.7 These dollars were allocated to new¶ agencies, such as the Public Works Administration (PWA), and later¶ the Works Progress Administration (WPA). The PWA, created in 1933,¶ received an initial appropriation of $3.3 billion, which it mainly¶ applied to heavy construction and large-scale building. To put this¶ figure in context, this amount was just over 165 percent of the federal¶ government’s revenues in 1933, or 5.9 percent of the 1933 U.S. gross¶ domestic product (GDP). Relying on private contractors, the PWA¶ deployed its funds in all but three of the nation’s 3,071 counties,¶ while helping to pay for projects like the Tennessee Valley Authority¶ and Boulder Dam. Created in 1935, the WPA did lighter construction¶ work and strove to avoid private contracting. Its initial appropriation¶ of $4.88 billion was about 135 percent of the federal government’s¶ revenues in 1935, or about 6.7 percent of GDP in that year. Although¶ primarily intended as a vast relief effort for employing the unskilled,¶ the WPA built an impressive range of projects, including over 480¶ airports, 78,000 bridges, and nearly 40,000 public buildings. Both¶ programs were the beneficiaries of the federal government’s commitment¶ to construction. During these years, the payrolls of the PWA and¶ the WPA were among the largest in the nation, easily dwarfing those¶ of the largest private enterprises. In carrying out their mandates, the¶ two programs integrated a multitude of municipal construction experts,¶ members of the Army Corps of Engineers, and civil engineers¶ into the national state.8¶ By using the lens of political economy to focus on the New Deal’s¶ public works spending, we can begin to see the outlines of a different¶ interpretation. The huge amount of funds devoted to public construction,¶ the far-reaching federal efforts invested in directing this money,¶ and the long-run impact of the infrastructure itself form the components¶ of the story of a public works revolution.9 This revolution¶ helped justify the new role of the federal government in American¶ life, legitimizing—intellectually and physically—what has come to¶ be known as Keynesian management of the economy. By sponsoring¶ this infrastructure, New Dealers remade the built environment¶ that managed the movement of people, goods, electricity, water, and¶ waste. Among the New Deal’s projects were some of the largest and¶ most significant structures ever built in human history.10¶ These programs not only anticipated the national highways and¶ the military-industrial complex; in the postwar period government sponsored¶ economic development also looked abroad. For example,¶ Harry Truman’s Point IV program was conceived of as an international¶ PWA, building roads and airports in countries like Afghanistan and¶ Vietnam. Similarly, Lyndon Johnson’s vision of exporting Keynesian style¶ economic development to Southeast Asia by replicating the¶ Tennessee Valley Authority on the Mekong Delta reflected the powerful¶ example set by the New Deal. After World War II, construction¶ firms like Bechtel and Brown & Root (today a subsidiary of¶ Halliburton) took their expertise overseas as well.¶ The New Deal’s public works programs employed millions of unemployed¶ workers, both urban and rural, while building the infrastructure¶ that helped integrate the disparate regions of the country¶ into a national market. From the beginning, then, New Dealers built¶ a state that was both far more powerful and substantially less liberal¶ than historians have realized: more powerful, in the scale and scope¶ of the federal government’s commitment to economic development,¶ and less liberal, in the sense that the New Deal state was focused on¶ state-sponsored economic development, and not, in contrast, centrally¶ occupied with tasks like implementing its social security program¶ (which began making payments only in 1942), or with more radical¶ goals, such as the direct redistribution of wealth through tax policy.¶ By reinterpreting the New Deal in this way through a political economic¶ lens, we gain a new history of just how the New Deal’s public¶ works programs contributed to American economic development.¶ Public works also had important ramifications for state building¶ and political party building at the federal, state, and local levels.¶ Harry Hopkins, the head of theWPA, once claimed that the New Deal¶ was a political project that could “tax and tax, spend and spend, and¶ elect and elect.” We now know this phrase’s descendant, the derisive¶ expression “tax and spend liberalism,” but at the time Hopkins¶ made his statement it was pure genius—he succinctly identified the¶ qualities that made New Deal liberalism so powerful and controversial:¶ The taxing and spending functions of government could—and¶ did—remake the physical landscape of the nation. Even more striking,¶ though, was that through using the taxing and spending powers¶ of the state, New Dealers were able to remake a society’s politics.11¶ These accomplishments raise a central question: how do we evaluate¶ New Deal liberalism when we attend to its political economy and¶ place its public works programs at its core?¶ The New Deal’s public works programs reflect a number of achievements¶ and shortcomings. These programs built the infrastructure that¶ made a national market more efficient, spurred dramatic advances¶ in economic productivity, created a network of roads and airports,¶ planned for national highways, improved military bases, foreshadowed¶ the rise of the Sunbelt, and gave the New Dealers a policy tool¶ that could be used to shape overseas development, from the Cold War¶ through the Vietnam War. Faced with the Great Depression, the New¶ Deal and its public works projects helped save capitalism, an achievement¶ subsequently consolidated by enormous public spending during¶ World War II and the ensuing postwar economic boom.12¶ Bound up with these triumphs, however, were many limitations.¶ Most notable, of course, was the failure of the public works programs¶ to bring an end to mass unemployment during the Great Depression.¶ Those that the New Deal did manage to employ were white men, for¶ themost part. This was hardly surprising, given their disproportionate¶ presence in the building trades and construction industry, generally.¶ Surely, the New Deal had a remarkable chance to address the crisis¶ of unemployment among African-Americans and women. Yet, in basing¶ so much of their public policy on the building of public works¶ projects, New Dealers largely reinforced the gender and racial boundaries¶ already evident in the labor market, bypassing the maternalist¶ legacies of Progressive Era social policy.13¶ When we turn to the environment, the New Deal’s shortcomings¶ are likewise apparent. While architectural historians have generally¶ praised the New Deal for creating a more democratic landscape, environmental¶ historians have strongly disagreed. From their perspective,¶ the New Deal spent far too much money on roads and not enough on¶ developing alternative mass transportation technologies. They charge¶ that the New Deal’s large hydroelectric projects promoted an imperialist¶ view of resources, leaving nature to be exploited by a coercive,¶ undemocratic power elite composed of technically minded engineers¶ and narrow-minded bureaucrats. Developments such as the TVA displaced¶ thousands of people, while the affordable electrical power¶ generated by dams led only to increased pollution. The main achievement¶ of the New Deal, in this view, is its role in creating an “asphalt¶ nation.” To be sure, the environmental damage caused by the New¶ Deal’s public works projects was real, if difficult to measure. But to¶ blame New Dealers such as Harry Hopkins for not being mindful of¶ the environment is to fail to recognize the historical impact of the¶ New Deal’s public works projects.14¶ Indeed, in setting out to preserve capitalism in the face of the¶ Great Depression, New Dealers turned to what they knew. They experimented¶ with their various policy measures, strengthened federal¶ power to boost the standing of labor and consumers vis ´a vis business,¶ and regulated the nation’s labor and financial markets to address¶ the greatest economic crisis of the twentieth century. Environmental¶ shortsightedness on their part should be viewed within this broader¶ context: despite deficiencies, the New Deal kept the United States¶ from embracing undemocratic political philosophies such as fascism¶ or communism. Through its public works projects, the federal government¶ justified its new presence in the nation’s economy. The New¶ Dealers compellingly demonstrated—in almost every county of the¶ nation—that public investment and state-sponsored economic development¶ were essential to a modern society, not only for surviving the¶ Great Depression, but especially for laying the foundations for a subsequent¶ period of postwar economic growth and sustained productivity¶ rarely equaled in world history. Labeling the trajectory of New Deal¶ liberalism as a narrative of declension leading to the “end of reform,”¶ as a journey away from the 1933 statist intervention of the National¶ Recovery Administration’s industrial codes to the manipulation of¶ fiscal policy in 1937 and 1938, misses the central significance of the¶ New Deal’s commitment to public works throughout these years and¶ afterward. By using the interpretive lens of political economy, we can¶ comprehend more fully the New Deal’s long-lasting achievements in¶ using public investment to spur economic development during and¶ after the 1930s. Indeed, the “mixed economy” constructed by the New¶ Deal—with its public investment, its regulation of banking and capital¶ markets, and its recognition of organized labor’s right to bargain¶ collectively—soon helped to foster tremendous economic growth (between¶ 1940 and 1973 American GDP grew, in real terms, at an average¶ annual per capita rate of 3 percent).15

#### Transportation is the linchpin of capitalist accumulation.

Sheppard 1990, (E. Shepard "Transportation in a capitalist space-economy: transportation demand, circulation time, and transportation innovations" Environment and Planning A 22(8) 1007 – 1024)

Transportation, as the service of moving commodities between places, plays a unique role in a fully competitive capitalist space-economy. The commodity of transportation is consumed as a part of virtually every economic transaction, linking the production and consumption of a commodity; demand for transportation is derived from spatial configurations rather than being fixed by socially necessary techniques and real wages; and the circulation time taken in transportation is a deduction from capitalists' profits. The impact of circulation time on profits may be calculated precisely. The derived nature of the demand for transportation adds a level of uncertainty to the impact of cost-reducing technical change on profit rates. Given this, cost-reducing and time-reducing technical change in the transportation commodity is one of the few ways of ensuring an increased rate of profit for capitalists, ceteris paribus. The public nature of transportation improvements and the high investments in fixed capital that are required help to explain the central role of the state in capitalism in the improvement of transportation and thus in underwriting capital accumulation.

#### Infrastructure Investment is a tool to entrench consumer capitalism into every aspect of life.

Mittelstadt ’05 (Jennifer Mittelstadt, Associate Professor of History at Rutgers University, PhD from University of Michigan, “Consumer Politics: A New History of the Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order” Johns Hopkins University Press, September 2005 Reviews in American History, Volume 33 Number 3 Pgs. 431-438)

In 1989, Steven Fraser and Gary Gerstle edited a volume by major American¶ historians that told the story of The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–¶ 1980 (1989). They traced the rise to the 1930s and the fall to the 1960s and¶ 1970s, culminating with the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980. In¶ the decade and a half since the book’s publication, the fabric of the history¶ laid out there has been stretched, torn, and riddled with holes by dozens of¶ historians, including the editors and contributors themselves. The origins of¶ the New Deal order have been tugged back into the progressive era by new¶ political historians even as other historians have shown that New Deal¶ policies and coalitions unraveled before a sixties “backlash” and well in¶ advance of the triumph of conservatism in the 1970s and 1980s. If it was ever¶ stable at all, the coalition of workers and farmers, whites and African¶ Americans, northerners and southerners, who comprised the Democratic¶ Party showed signs of wobbliness and strife as early as the 1940s. The ideals¶ that animated this coalition were also as varied and contentious as the¶ coalition itself.1 Political historians now agree that there was no monolithic¶ New Deal liberal political coalition, but rather a variety of twentieth-century¶ liberalisms, and with them, a variety of liberal agendas, policies, and outcomes.¶ In her new book, Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-¶ Century America, Meg Jacobs strides boldly through the shards of the old,¶ broken narrative and, with her eye on previously overlooked actors and¶ events, constructs a new story of the rise and fall of the New Deal order. This¶ extraordinary work offers a fresh narrative about American liberalism.¶ Though its conclusions leave some unanswered questions, its new synthesis¶ of the main political narrative of the twentieth century renders it one of the¶ most important pieces of political history this decade.¶ At the center of Jacobs’s new story about politics is consumption—a topic¶ that political historians have largely bypassed. The increase in consumption¶ among the twentieth-century U.S. citizenry is probably the greatest in the¶ history of the world. From the rocky turn of the century through the affluent¶ 1960s, Americans became a nation of homeowners, car owners, and buyers of¶ all manner of consumer products. As Americans became consumers of goods¶ that they themselves once produced at home and goods they never dreamed¶ they needed, the country transformed itself into a mass consumption society.¶ Historians of politics and the state, viewing consumption as largely a¶ “cultural” concern, have failed to connect this massive change in the American¶ economy to American politics. When they have, they have by and large¶ invoked it to explain shifts toward political conservatism or apathy, as most¶ histories of the politics of the 1920s and 1950s—classically considered golden¶ eras of consumption—attest.2

**Specific transportation infrastructure innovations have an underlying presumption that technology is to increase the abilities of human mobility. These innovations change the behavior and approach society has towards the economy.**

**T.R. and Anderson, no date**, (Lakshmanan T.R., Professor, Department of Geography, Director for the Center for Transportation Studies, and executive director of Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Boston University, served as Director of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics at the US department of Transportation in the Clinton Administration; William P. Anderson, Professor of Geography at Boston University, faculty member of the Boston University Center for Transportation Studies, Director of the McMaster Institute for Energy Studies and associate member of the McMaster Department of Civil Engineering; published by Unesco Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, “Transportation Engineering and Planning-Vol II- Transportation in the Twenty-First Century: Technological Innovation”)

The explanation for this historical **progress lies in technological change**, **whose function in transportation-as in other economic sectors- is to expand the arena of practical human possibility**. The traditional view ties transportation progress to innovations or novel physical object embodied in **the two most visible components of the transportation system-vehicles and physical infrastructure.** Indeed, **the pace of technological advances in these two areas has quickened in recent times, as successive waves of innovations**- the steamship, the locomotive, the electric streetcar or trolley-bus, the internal combustion engine, the jet aircraft, containers, the “megaship,” and so on- improved the quality and sharply lowered the costs of transportation. There have been parallel advances **in the physical infrastructure-tunnels, suspension bridges, railroads over all kinds of terrain, the US interstate highway system, modern airports, and new marine terminals. The traditional attribution of technical change in** vehicles and **physical infrastructure as the sources of the secular transportation improvements is only part of the story**. What has not been generally recognized about transportation progress is the roles played by **two other components- the nonmaterial infrastructure of the transport system and the complementary information capital and infrastructure of the transportation system.** Far less visible than its physical counterpart, **nonmaterial infrastructure-comprising economic institutions, regulations, policies, logistical systems, the knowledge base for transport governance, and so on-facilitates the efficient, coordinated use of vehicles and physical infrastructure.** Then there is **the role of the final component, namely the information technologies** (IT) **in increasing the capacity and functionality of transport operations, transport equipment, and transport infrastructure. IT, comprising a broad range of devices, functions, and supporting tools used in sensing, generating, processing, transmitting, and communicating information, offers vital information to transport operators and travelers, enhancing their responsiveness and efficiency, and making possible other transport innovations.** Such knowledge-providing and enabling functions of IT in transport services have historical antecedents in the sextant and chronometer, which enabled more precise global navigation in the eighteenth century; in the telegraph, which promoted transcontinental rail operations in the nineteenth century; and in the radio and radar, which were so critical to navigation in the twentieth century. **The current is massively transforming transportation industries and the scope of their services.** Thus the quantity, variety, and quality of transportation services at a point of time are jointly determined by the technologies embodied in the four system components- vehicles, physical infrastructure, nonmaterial infrastructure, and information infrastructure- and the interactions among them. Transport, as with any other form of technology, comprises not only physical artifacts but also the public knowledge that underlies the artifacts, and the way they are used in a society. An institutional innovation that offers strong incentives for transport actors to engage in productivity-enhancing activities or a new transport management and governance system is therefore just as much technological innovation as any novel vehicle. Indeed, **the success of an innovation process, by which transport technology is conceived developed, and deployed on a large scale, depends on social-supporting systems, which evolve with the introduction, elaboration, and diffusion of any technology.** As elaborated in the body of this article, **the advent of specific transport-related technological opportunities in society creates interests that affect the behavior and evolution of the social-supporting mechanisms, which in turn powerfully affect the transport technology options that are selected in the economy for further development and diffusion**. Over time, the evolution of transport system technologies is a consequence of several factors: the internal logic of the technologies, the evolution of supporting systems that undergird the transport system, and **all this evolution occurs in the context of the broader demographic, economic, technological, and societal forces that govern the demand for transport services.**

#### Transportation systems determine the expansion, design, and ability for capitalism to allow for accumulation, spatial alienation, and production and consumption cycles

**Henderson 2004** (Jason Henderson, Department of Geography and Human Environmental Studies at San Francisco State University, Published by Urban Geography, 2004, “The Politics of Mobility and Business Elites in Atlanta, Georgia”)

In The Limits to Capital. David Harvey (L982) theorized that **the capitalist mode of production actively produces and reproduces a geography that reflects its own needs**, and that **transportation is a major component of this production of space**. Indeed, **transportation is central to any understanding of the political economy of capitalism because it provides the conditions for capital accumulation and provides for the social reproduction of labor** (Hodge. 1990). Thus, **the accumulation of capital is bound with the cost, speed, and capacity of the transport system to accommodate the turnover time of capital. Transportation is essential for production because it provides capitalists with the means to access raw materials, labor, and markets that are spatially separated from the production site. It is central to understanding the circulation of capital because capitalists seek spatial integration that links production localities together for exchange. Transportation minimizes the spatial barriers to the circulation of capital, allowing for smoother spatial integration and facilitating the "annihilation of space by time"** (Harvey. 19S3, p. 219). It is also constitutive of the physical framework for consumption provided in the wider built environment because **it enables the consumer to access commodities**. **The transportation system**, then, **is an example of how "'investment in the built environment entails the creation of a whole physical landscape for the purposes of production, circulation, exchange, and consumption**" (Harvey, I9S3, p. 202).

**Movement separates the classes between those who can use superior methods of movement and the fringes.**

**Massey ’94** [Doreen Massey is a contemporary British social scientist and geographer, working among others on topics typical of Marxist geography. She currently serves as Professor of geography at the Open University, “A Global Sense of Place”, 1994, University of Minnesota Press, <http://www.unc.edu/courses/2006spring/geog/021/001/massey.pdf> AD]

Imagine for a moment that you are on a satellite, further out and beyond all actual satellites; you can see 'planet earth' from a distance and, unusually for someone with only peaceful intentions, you are equipped with the kind of technology which allows you to see the colours of people's eyes and the numbers on their number plates. You can see all the movement and turn in to all the communication that is going on. Furthest out are the satellites, then aeroplanes, the long haul between London and Tokyo and the hop from San Salvador to Guatemala City. Some of this is people moving, some of it is physical trade, some is media broadcasting. There are faxes, email, film-distribution networks, financial flows and transactions. Look in closer and there are ships and trains, steam trains slogging laboriously up hills somewhere in Asia**. Look in closer still and there are lorries and cars and buses, and on down further, somewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, there's a woman - amongst many women - on foot, who still spends hours a day collecting water.** Now I want to make one simple point here, and that is about what one might call the power geometry of it all; the power geometry of time-space compression. **For different social groups, and different individuals, are placed in very distinct ways in relation to these flows and interconnections.** This point concerns not merely the issue of who moves and who doesn't, although that is an important element of it; it is also about power in relation to the flows and the movement. **Different social groups have distinct relationships to this anyway differentiated mobility: some people are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movement, others don't; some are more on the receiving-end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it.** In a sense at the end of all the spectra are those who are both doing the moving and the communicating and who are in some way in a position of control in relation to it - the jet-setters, the ones sending and receiving the faces and the e-mail, holding the international conference calls, the ones distributing films, controlling the news, organizing the investments and the international currency transactions. **These are the groups who are really in a sense in charge of time-space compression, who care really use it and turn it to advantage, whose power and influence it very definitely increases. On its more prosaic fringes this group probably includes a fair number of western academics and journalists - those, in other words, who write most about it. But there are also groups who are also doing a lot of physical moving, but who are not 'in charge' of the process in the same way at all. The refugees from El Salvador or Guatemala and the undocumented migrant workers from Michoacan in Mexico, crowding into Tijuana to make a perhaps fatal dash for it across the border into the US to grab a chance of a new life.** Here he experience of movement, and indeed of a confusing plurality of cultures, is very different. And there are those from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Caribbean, who come half way round the world only to get held up in an interrogation room at Heathrow. Or - a different case again- there are those who are simply on the receiving end of time-space compression. The pensioner in a bed-sit in any inner city in this country, eating British working-class-style fish and chips from a Chinese take-away, watching a US film on a Japanese television; and not daring to go out after dark. And anyway the public transport's been cut. Or - one final example to illustrate a different kind of complexity - there are the people who live in the favelas of Rio, who know global football like the back of their hand, and have produced some of its players; who have contributed massively to global music, who gave up the samba and produced the lambada that everyone was dancing to last year in the clubs of Paris and London; and who have never, or hardly ever, been to downtown Rio. **At one level they have been tremendous contributors to what we call time-space compression; and at another level they are imprisoned in it**. This is, in other words, a highly complex social differentiation. There are differences in the degree of movement and communication, but also in the degree of control and initiation. The ways in which people are placed within 'time-space compression' are highly complicated and extremely varied. **But this in turn immediately raises questions of politics. If time-space compression can be imagined in that more socially formed, socially evaluative and differentiated way, then there may be here the possibility of developing a politics of mobility and access.** For it does seem that mobility, and control over mobility, both reflects and reinforces power. **It is not simply a question of unequal distribution, that some people move more than others, and that some have more control than others. It is that the mobility and control of some groups can actively weaken other people. Differential mobility can weaken the leverage of the already weak. The time-space compression of some groups can undermine the power of others.**

**“Faster is Better” has become the mantra of capitalist accumulation**

**Goldman et. Al. ’03** [Robert Goldman is Professor of Sociology at Lewis and Clark College, Portland Oregon. Stephen Papson is Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University in Canton, New York, Landscapes of Capital, “Representing Global Capital”, 2003, St. Lawrence University, http://it.stlawu.edu/~global/pagesspeed/timescapes.html AD]

**SPEED. ACCELERATION. GROWTH. These are the watch words of a jacked-up market as the mode of production shifts rapidly to electronic digitalization.** Digitalization is most frequently associated with speedier transmission of data and information. Indeed, this is very often the justification for new computer technologies which are seen as boosting productivity by eliminating inefficiencies and by reducing cycle time in the wider circulation process. By harnessing more and more complex database systems, firms have found ways to offset shrinking profit margins by conducting markets more quickly. Companies that achieve the most rapid growth possible also figure to justify the most expanded price-to-earnings ratios and the highest multiples in the stock market. During the late 1990s, **the mantra was repeated over and over** **- Faster is Better.** This is reflected in the advertising pitches employed by many corporate firms. Ads for Smith-Barney Investments (1998) whisked viewers around the planet in search of new investing opportunities. Beginning with questions about the technologies of the future - "Is an arthritis cure around the corner? Will Danang be the next Silicon Valley? Who will get a patent tomorrow?" The narrator then declares that "one thing is for sure, opportunities abound, and everyday we go after them in highspeed pursuit**. Got your seatbelt on? Let's get to work**." Or **Southern Company takes a similar fast-paced excursion around the continents in their ad, projecting a future that will move even faster -- "They [the children of today] will do business at a pace we can't conceive of. Where in the world will they get the energy they need?" The ad goes on to explain how the Southern Company is revolutionizing methodologies for trading gas and electricity,** "**so when they [your children] travel through life at the speed of light we'll be waiting for them."** The twentieth century witnessed an ever accelerating speed in both the capital accumulation process and the cultural circulation process necessary to keeping a system of commodities continuously moving along, fiscal quarter after fiscal quarter. And not just moving along, but growing at a rate that attracts investors who seek high multiples of price/earnings ratios. In this kind of world we see advertising as promoting a "cultural economy of signs." The cultural economy has certain similarities with the conventional economy. Advertisers seek to invest goods and services with iconic status to make them stand out. The more vigorously they compete at this, the greater their risk of oversaturating image markets. In this competitive image environment, companies resort to more and more rapid image turnover. In the frenetic race of advertising imagery to differentiate the value of one commodity over another, there is the risk of devolving into a stew of meaninglessness. For most of the twentieth century, critical social theorists worried about the consequences of organizing cultural spheres of meaning around the operating logic of the commodity form. After nearly a century of treating culture as a range of commodities, we now confront additional layers of historical self-contradictions that have taken shape around the practices of commodity culture. Treating culture as a system of commodities seems to have followed a similar path of contradictions to those Karl Marx outlined in the 1857 Grundrisse when speaking about a capitalist economy of industrial production. In the Grundrisse Marx (1983) demonstrated from one angle after another how the structures of capitalist markets prompt social contradictions which left untended might negate those commodity relations. During the 20th century, commodity culture has come to dominate, first in the US, then in Europe and now globally. In discussions of globalization, the term "Americanization of culture" generally refers to this commodity culture, which grew up first in the US mass media. In our view, this hallmark of the transition to late capitalism shows how the sphere of symbolic interaction has of necessity become increasingly central to the mode of production. This means that the production of Meaning through languages, whether spoken, or written, or pictorial has become a central part of the process of generating and reproducing value in the global capitalist system. We have written extensively about these processes in Sign Wars (1996) and Nike Culture (1998). In those books, we argued that the systematic redirection of symbolic meaning toward the service of building exchange value lends itself to the dispersion and fragmentation of Meaning. This is because processes of cultural commodification feed an accelerating circulation of meaning in the sphere of culture. The technology of digital reproduction has transformed industry after industry, and it now drives markets -- especially stock markets which we view as public and intersubjectively negotiated social spaces. This same digital revolution has also transformed the tools for producing and displaying electronic culture. Hence in order to make our case, we must examine the intensifying digitalization of cultural space both as a material force in the expansion of global capitalism and simultaneously as a representational force. So advertising culture is not only accelerating, it also seeks to represent economic speed as our already-emergent future. In the commercials mentioned above, **speed has become synonymous with Progress. Such advertising casts the future in terms of the benefits to be enjoyed by harnessing technologies of speed.** Ultimately for the consumer, this is the speed of delivery -- of pizza, prescription drugs, information, movies. And particularly around the emergent Internet, it is the speed at which data moves. Qwest ads from 1999-2000 are a case in point: "Moving at the speed of light."

#### **Speeding up the world only serves the capitalistic agenda.**

Massey ’94 [Doreen Massey is a contemporary British social scientist and geographer, working among others on topics typical of Marxist geography. She currently serves as Professor of geography at the Open University, “A Global Sense of Place”, 1994, University of Minnesota Press, <http://www.unc.edu/courses/2006spring/geog/021/001/massey.pdf> AD]

For instance, to what extent does the current popular characterization of time-space compression represent very much a western, colonizer's, view? The sense of dislocation which some feel at the sight of a once well-known local street now lined with a succession of cultural imports - the pizzeria, the kebab house, the branch of the middle-eastern bank - must have been felt for centuries, thought from a very different point of view, by colonized peoples all over the world as they watched the importation, may be even used, the products of, first, European colonization, maybe British (from new forms of transport to liver salts and custard poweder), later US, as they learned to eat wheat instead of rice or corn, to drink Coca-Cola, just as today we try out enchilades. Moreover, as well as querying the ethnocentricity of the idea of time-space compression and its current acceleration, we also need to ask about its causes: what is it that determines out degrees of mobility, that influences the sense we have of space and place? Time-space compression refers to movement and communication across space, to the geographical stretching-out of social relations, and to our experience of all this. The usual interpretation is that it results overwhelmingly from the actions of capital, and from its currently increasing internationalization. On this interpretation, then, it is time space and money which make the world go around, and us go around (or not) the world. It is capitalism and its developments which are argued to determine out understanding and out experience of space. But surely this is insufficient. Among the many other things which clearly influence that experience, there are, for instance, 'race' and gender. The degree to which we can move between countries, or walk about the streets at night, or venture out of hotels in foreign cities, is not just influenced by 'capital'. Survey after survey has shown how women's mobility, for instance, is restricted - in a thousand different ways, from physical violence to being ogled at or made to feel quite simply 'out of place' - not by 'capital', but by men. Or, to take a more complicated example, Birkett, reviewing books on women adventurers and travellers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, suggests that 'it is far, far more demanding for a woman to wander now than ever before'. The reasons she gives for this argument are a complex mix of colonialism, excolonialism, racism, changing gender relations and relative wealth. A simple resort to explanation in terms of 'money' or 'capital' alone could not begin to get to grips with the issue. The current speed-up may be strongly determined by economic forces, but it is not the economy alone which determines out experience of space and place. In other words, and put simply, there is a lot more determining how we experience space than what 'capital' gets up to.

### Highways

#### The State uses the highway machine to enslave the people into the capitalist order – destroys value to life

Kuswa ’04 (Dr. Kevin Kuswa, assistant professor of communications at University of California, “Machinic Rhetoric, Highways and Interpellating Motions” Rhizomes issue 8, spring 2004, http://www.rhizomes.net/issue8/kuswa.htm)

[4] Beginning with the highway machine's movement, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) intervene with a diagram that is indispensable to any discussion of circulation and modernity. They plot the state's shift from "machinic enslavement" to "social subjection" as the components of the nation are captured by an organizing apparatus working through capitalism. As Fordism and the energy crisis demonstrated, machines are tied to nations and states-in this case the highway machine intertwines with America and the United States government. Capitalism, likewise, is effectuated by a law of states that offers the possibility of a "free" flow of labor and capital for a group of producers.¶ More generally, we must take into account a 'materialist' determination of the modern State or nation-state; a group of producers in which labor and capital circulate freely, in other words, in which the homogeneity and competition of capital is effectuated, in principle without external obstacles. In order to be effectuated, capitalism has always required there to be a new force and a new law of States, on the level of the flow of labor as on the level of the flow of independent capital. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p455)¶ A state, then, is a nation that has been realized through the flow of capital (land) and the flow of labor (people). When the land and the people are deterritorialized or overcoded through flows of labor and capital, the nation becomes "the very operation of a collective subjectification, to which the modern State corresponds as a process of subjection" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p456). This does not mean that nations are simply appearances or the consequences of a dominant ideology. Instead, nations "are the passional and living forms in which the qualitative homogeneity and the quantitative competition of abstract capital are first realized" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p456).¶ [5] In the United States, the nation was partially incorporated into the state apparatus (and its subjection of labor and capital) by organizing the land and its citizens through the highway machine. The land and the people, beginning with horses and then through the railroad, also pushed for their own notions of "space"-a desire for specific places to live that necessitated new means of circulation and transportation. The Secretary of the Treasury in 1955, George Humphrey, stated: "America lives on wheels, and we have to keep America living on wheels and keep the kind and form of life that we want" (Rose, 1990, p33). What would the American nation be without the possibility of realizing the dream of space? How does the nation realize its aspirations for space in appropriating and organizing ways? Lewis Mumford (1938, p168) expresses the potency of the American drive for space:¶ The necessity for increasing the amount of housing, for expanding the space, for multiplying the equipment, for providing communal facilities, was far more revolutionary in its demands than any trifling expropriation of the quarters of the rich would be. The former notion was merely an impotent gesture of revenge: the latter demanded a revolutionary reconstruction of the entire social environment-such a reconstruction as we are on the brink of today.¶ As Mumford aptly notes, the reconstruction that swept through America was both enabling for middle-class expansion outside the city and constraining for those groups stuck in the run-down and vacated inner-city. These shifts accelerated much faster after World War II and the ubiquitous status of highways. In the meantime, as the highway machine approached during the beginning of the 20th Century, a national solidification of America became the assumed legacy of coast-to-coast highway circulation.¶ [6] Returning to the abstract plane, we can trace how the highway links into a statist conception of people and territory. Likewise, two types of machines are implicated and consolidated by the state's process of subjection. The human machine conceives of subjects as constituent parts of larger machines composed of humans and perhaps other components such as animals or tools. In short, the human machine brings inhumanity along for the ride in the form of machinic enslavement. On one hand, the human machine is the body and its full array of experiences-a combination of circulating and resistant parts, "each specialized in function, operating under human control to transmit motion and perform work" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p457). On the other hand, machinic enslavement tortures and erases the human body as a means of dehumanizing the person. The person becomes a small (and replaceable) part within a larger exterior. In the extreme, a human (machine) may be enslaved to the highway or even the television such that the driver/viewer "is no longer a consumer or user, nor even a subject, but intrinsic component pieces, 'input' and 'output,' feedback or recurrences that are no longer connected to the machine in such a way as to produce or use it" (Deleuze & Guattari, p458).¶ [7] Alongside the machinic enslavement and embodied circulation of the human machine, the technical machine acts as a coexisting pole. This is not to speak exclusively about metaphor because machines are concrete and physical arrangements. Being machinic, the highway is about macadam, medians, asphalt, ramps, bridges, tar, rubber, and paint just as much as it is abstract or idealized. The important factor is the temporary condensing of the machine into a single line or "a certain simplicity in the non-uniform material" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p344) for the purpose of further analysis. If the line or object is multiplied too many times, a scramble results full of static. Sound effects may offer depth and atmosphere once the machine is territorialized, but the first step requires "a pure and simple line accompanied by the idea of an object, and nothing more" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p.344). Harmonious and even ruptured lines constitute the effects of the machine, but the "richness of the Machine's effects" (p344) depends on the sobriety of assemblages, a simple figure in motion, and a "plane that is itself mobile" (p344).¶ [8] Recognizing that machines are not merely metaphors, but also concrete and physical assemblages, the technical machine works to transform machinic enslavement into social subjection. The technical machine distributes humans as subservient to, and determined by, the machines around them. In other words, "one is not enslaved by the technical machine but rather subjected to it" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p457). In many ways, the state has substituted technical machines for machinic enslavement through technological development. Within the state's coding of the nation, capitalism arises as an axiom or "as a worldwide enterprise of subjectification" (p457). These technical machines function as a governing apparatus by subjecting people to a scheme of wage labor, thereby holding human capital hostage to the goals of production and capital accumulation.¶ [9] Through these machines, "the human being is no longer a component of the machine, but a worker, a user" (Deleuze & Guattari, p457). Instead of just being enslaved by the machine, people are also subjected to it. The highway follows both trajectories, enslaving drivers and workers as constituted parts of the machine, but also subjecting the nation to the ever-expanding needs of infrastructure and circulation. Because these two processes (machinic enslavement and social subjection) constitute two coexistent poles, the aggregate includes subjection and enslavement "as two simultaneous parts that constantly reinforce and nourish each other" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p458). The effects of capitalism and the highway machine are bumper-to-bumper throughout America, often becoming "central to the history of the advanced capitalist countries in the twentieth century, and explaining an especially large part of the history of the American people" (Flink, 1988, pvii).0

### Mobility

**The modes of mobility and its social relations are embedded with different ideologies of what is “better” mobility**

**Henderson 2004** (Jason Henderson, Department of Geography and Human Environmental Studies at San Francisco State University, Published by Urban Geography, 2004, “The Politics of Mobility and Business Elites in Atlanta, Georgia”)

**The politics of mobility is one of the most contentious aspects of urban growth debates** (Hodge. 1990; Hanson. 1995: Wachs. 1995: Dunn. 199S). Yet Hanson (2000) lamented that **urban and economic geographers have ignored the compelling role of mobility in contemporary social, environmental, and cultural analysis in geography, and that an understanding of transportation geography is marginalized**. Some clarifications on the meaning of mobility (as used in this paper) are helpful for understanding why transportation geography is vital for a full grasp of the urbanization process and many contemporary urban growth debates. Traditional understandings of mobility refer to the ability to move among places. Travel behavior and mobility literature has claimed that the organization of the built environment, or of urban space, is central to mobility (Ewing et al.. 1994: Frank and Pivo. 1994: Cervero and Gorham. 1995. Handy. 1996: 1.000 Friends of Oregon. 1997). For example, the ability to walk as a form of mobility is contingent upon the adequacy of a pedestrian-built environment with sidewalks and crosswalks as well as a more compact, mixed-use urban configuration with housing, work, retail establishments, and schools within walking distance. If there are no sidewalks, or if the street is a six-lane, high-speed traffic road with no safe crosswalk, pedestrian mobility is significantly impeded. The latter impediment, the six-lane road, is important to highlight because it reveals that some forms of mobility are incongruent. A wide road with few pedestrian facilities such as crosswalks means that, in effect, car-based mobility is theoretically privileged because cars can speed through without slowing for pedestrians. However, the ability to have good mobility by car requires not just wide, fast roads, but also plentiful and convenient parking, and a low-density, dispersed development pattern that disperses automobiles enough to minimize congestion. Without any of those requirements, car-based mobility is obstructed (see Gordon and Richardson [1997a. 1997b] on the logic of urban dispersal and the automobile). **How space is configured matters when thinking about mobility, but it should be emphasized that one's mobility is more than the consequence of the spatial separation of land uses or the mode used to overcome spatial distance. It is also a measure of the degree of spatial and temporal distance across space.** A person may drive five miles to buy groceries in a typical American suburb, while in a dense, walkable urban core; a person may walk a few blocks for the same ends. The person driving may have covered more distance than the distance traveled by the pedestrian, yet both may have achieved their ends within a similar amount of time. **The pedestrian may have taken five minutes to walk to nearby stores, while the driver made a five-minute trip on a four-lane highway. They achieved the same ends within a similar time budget, but through radically different distances and modes of transport, with differing infrastructure requirements and spatial configurations. Thus, we can say that mobility connects places in space and time, but in discrete ways, based upon the kind of mobility utilized. But which person in the above example has the better mobility? The answer to that question depends on factors beyond simple transportation studies and extends into normative values and ideologies, or a systematic set of fundamental beliefs and principles that assert what mobility should be and for whom**. Just as Lefebvre (1991) theorized that **the character and nature of produced space reflects the dominant modes of production and social relations within a given society**, we must give consideration to how **mobility contains embedded social relations**. As many geographers and urban scholars such as Harvey (1982. 1996) and Logan and Molotch (1987) have analyzed how the contestation of urban space is an extension of struggles over differing values and ideologies, we must consider this with the politics of mobility. **It is necessary to ask who decided what types of mobility are appropriate, why certain normative visions of mobility are favored over others, and to whom these mobilities are available**. In the remainder of this paper I use a case study of business elites in Atlanta seeking to define what vision of mobility is appropriate for Atlanta and how they negotiate the politics of mobility to achieve higher ends. First, it is useful to provide a context for why mobility became such a contentious issue in Atlanta during the 1990s.

### Economy

**Your Econ advantage is a form of capitalistic “crisis” construction that justifies further capital expansion and oppression of the poor. Capitalism also veils the real impacts such as the decades of US war and conflict around the world.**

**Rosenberg and Villarejo 12** (Jordana Rosenberg, MA and PhD from Cornell University, and a BA from Wesleyan University. She is the recipient of an Ahmanson-Getty Fellowship from the Center for Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Studies at UCLA (2009- 2010), as well as a Marion and Jasper Whiting Foundation Award, the Catherine Macaulay Prize, and a William Andrews Clark Memorial Library Joint Fellowship Award. Professor Rosenberg's fields of research and teaching include eighteenth-century transatlantic literature and poetry, moral philosophy, political theory, early modern materialism, Marxism, and secularization; Amy Villarejo, Associate Professor in Film and Feminist, Gender, & Sexuality Studies Program. She received her B.A. in English from Bryn Mawr College in 1985, an M.A. in English from the University of Pittsburgh in 1991, and a Ph.D. in Critical and Cultural Studies (in the Film Studies Program) from the University of Pittsburgh in 1997, when she came to Cornell GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 18, Number 1,2012, Published by Duke University Press, “Introduction: Queerness, Norms, Utopia”)

As to the first question, we begin by noting that **crisis is endemic to the functioning of capitalism and has been since its inception.** By this we mean **not just that capitalism typically produces speculative bubbles and crashes** — though it has, at least since the seventeenth century.1 **More specifically, we emphasize the degree to which capitalism routinely experiences limits to accumulation in the form of resistance on the part of labor, technological and political hurdles, geographic challenges**, and so on.2 **Such crises do not, in themselves, signal the death knell of capitalism. Quite the opposite.** Anyone living through the last five (or forty) years knows well how **the specter of crisis has resulted in the increased centralization of capital in the hands of the rich, the justification of brutal cuts to budgets and services, and the shifting of media attention from ten years of war and plunder to the minutiae of the market. “Crisis,” then, is not new. Rather, it is a tried-and true tactic of the consolidation of class power and imperialist nationalism** that extends back at least to the Panic of 1893. As with our contemporary crisis, **the capitalist classes reaped real benefits in 1893, interrupting the momentum of the thriving populist and labor movements in the United States and justifying a redoubled wave of imperial expansion**.3 Thus **crises are both ideological and structural**. As David Harvey puts it, “**Financial crises serve to rationalize the irrationalities of capitalism**. **They typically lead to reconfigurations, new models of development, new spheres of investment, and new forms of class power**.”4 “Queer Studies and the Crises of Capitalism” turns its attention to the set of crises defining the period we understand as neoliberal capitalism, the long wave of recessions and dispossessions stretching from the 1970s to the present. In this focus, **our special issue comes freighted with the woe of years of war, expropriation of the world’s resources, and the crushing ongoingness of neoliberal capitalism’s assault on humanity**, both domestically and abroad. Yet, caught in the crosshairs of our contemporary moment, we are in good company.

#### Capitalism consumes domestic infrastructure – the system itself allows the decay of infrastructure while using it to expand its deadly grip.

Fraser ’12 (Steve Fraser, Professor at Columbia University, “More than Greed” Dissent Magazine, winter 2012, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=4101)

Why? Maybe that decision stems from Madrick’s aversion to thinking of the crisis as systemic and to a related faith in the Democratic Party as the repository of the New Deal version of capitalism, a version many progressives would like to restore. But the New Deal not only civilized a broken-down economic system, it also sought successfully to extend the reach of the capitalist marketplace and credit networks not abolish them. It created the political and institutional foundations of mass consumption capitalism. Those foundations eventually crumbled as domestic opportunities for profitable enough capital accumulation grew scarce, a process that in turn exerted a relentless downward pressure on labor costs and the social wage. That is to say, in an increasingly fierce struggle to compete with lower cost foreign producers, American business began to undermine the foundations of “effective demand” among ordinary working people that had kept the system upright for so long. It set in motion a perverse dynamic of disaccumulation or what might be called the auto-cannibalism of an economy eating itself alive. The most developed economy in the world began a process of underdevelopment. Its infrastructure—road, bridges, tunnels, railroads, waterworks, dams, airports, electrical grids—were allowed to decay. The industrial core of the economy was hollowed out by precisely those “financial engineers” Madrick writes about. Deindustrialization signaled that the old system had broken down. This became a long, secular crisis. Gradually and then at an accelerated rate, it elicited one overriding response; namely, to leverage everything in sight. Everything in this case included capital assets that produced debt-based asset bubbles in stocks or housing or other securities and commodities that provided a kind of “privatized Keynesian” stimulus package for elite financial institutions. Meanwhile, below, a working population found itself drowning in a sea of usurious credit. ¶ Elements of this analysis do crop up in Age of Greed, and when they do they are enlightening. But if the book fails to cohere and to rise to the promise of its title, it may in part be due to a profound reluctance to break with the New Deal past. No one could object to more vigilant regulation of the financial system, not to mention the rest of the economy, here and abroad. But a globalized version of the regulatory, Keynesian welfare state seems to circumscribe the far horizon of this perspective; one might call it the reinstatement of civilized capitalism. It is strange that progressives should become a party of the past, preoccupied with the restoration of American capitalism’s golden age. It is not an inspiring vision for those seeking a way out of this killing impasse. Indeed, the pathetic state of resistance to a malignant capitalism has suggested as much. Occupy Wall Street may change all that; at least it has pointed its blunt finger at what Madrick and others have avoided: the system. Meanwhile, the price of auto-cannibalism, already steep, will grow ever more draconian. ¶

### Trade

#### **Free trade is based upon a biased system that forces the exploitation of the poor and desperate**

De Angelis 2000 [Massimo, lecturer in Political Economy at University of East London Trade, the global factory and the struggles for new commons, Paper presented at the CSE conference "Global Capital and Global Struggles: Strategies, Alliances, and Alternatives” July 2000 ]

Let us be clear from the outset. There is no such as thing as "faire" trade liberalisation. To the billion of people in the global economy, trade liberalisation is part of the project to impose upon them the discipline of the global factory. This discipline is the competing game itself. Whether is Pakistan’s textiles that replaces Italian’ textile workers or a British telecommunication firm that make Thailand's telecom workers redundant, it is the game itself that sucks. Whatever gains some group of workers obtain due to their competitive advantage, some other group of workers loses out, until they themselves are forced to take notice of a new competitive force which came to displace them. And if we patently follow the economists’ advice to wait for the long-term positive effect of trade, we are left to wonder: isn’t it now the long term of 200 hundreds yeas ago, of 100 years ago, of 50, 40 years ago, of twenty years ago? The people who died as result of the new enclosures accompanying trade liberalisation in all these years, the people who suffered war as result of the disintegration of the social fabric brought about by structural adjustment and associated export promotion, the people of any country of the North has to run in the competing rat race no less, but even more than in the past, just to acquire what is on average necessary to live with dignity, the average people struggling to overcome an imposed condition of scarcity when in fact we live in plenty, can we say these people have benefited of the long term advantage of trade? Nonsense, nobody can make these sorts of judgements. Without a proper assessment of human, social and environmental costs of modern trade, one cannot even to start talking about long term or short term advantages of trade. Without taking into consideration the voice of those without voice the rhetoric of trade benefits is a bias rhetoric. If there is no way anybody can argue whether trade has brought advantages or disadvantages, the only thing we can say with certainty is that because of current patterns of trade the context in which our lives and struggles of today are located is different than the context of our lives and struggles of yesterday and, if trade liberalisation continues, of tomorrow. However, the recomposing factors of various movement in Seattle last November, can be summarised by the slogan “no new round, WTO turnaround.” With this slogan the movement sets against the boundlessness of capital’s accumulation, but there is more. “No new round”, all movements agree. "WTO turnaround”, here is the problem, because people start to ask and debate “where to?” The problem for us is to identify, in the context of the large movement emerged in Seattle and that has set a temporary limit to trade liberalisation, whether it is possible to start to promote a debate towards an independent position of planetary civil society, one that does not bow to the easy traps of the free trade ideology. To do so, we must open a debate on the contradictory nature of trade in this phase of capitalist accumulation, its meaning and implications for a diverse organisation of human and natural resources of the planet. To gain an independent position of planetary civil society, we must start to think about proposals of transformation of current society within a conceptual grid that is independent from the main current dogmas that sustain capital's discourse: competition and, especially, the meaning of growth. Behind these unqualified concepts, there lies the project of today’s capital’s strategies.

### Hegemony

#### US hegemony is a tool to sustain capitalist growth through endless genocidal wars

Meszaros ‘7(Istvan Meszaros, Hungarian Marxist philosopher and Professor Emeritus at U. Sussex. “The Only Viable Economy,” Monthly Review, http://www.monthlyreview.org/0407meszaros.htm)

The quixotic advocacy of freezing production at the level attained in the early 1970s was trying to camouflage, with vacuous pseudo-scientific model-mongering pioneered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the ruthlessly enforced actual power relations of U.S. dominated postwar imperialism. That variety of imperialism was, of course, very different from its earlier form known to Lenin. For in Lenin's lifetime at least half a dozen significant imperialist powers were competing for the rewards of their real and/or hoped for conquests. And even in the 1930s Hitler was still willing to share the fruits of violently redefined imperialism with Japan and Mussolini's Italy. In our time, by contrast, we have to face up to the reality -- and the lethal dangers -- arising from global hegemonic imperialism, with the United States as its overwhelmingly dominant power.7 In contrast to even Hitler, the United States as the single hegemon is quite unwilling to share global domination with any rival. And that is not simply on account of political/military contingencies. The problems are much deeper. They assert themselves through the ever-aggravating contradictions of the capital system's deepening structural crisis. U.S. dominated global hegemonic imperialism is an -- ultimately futile -- attempt to devise a solution to that crisis through the most brutal and violent rule over the rest of the world, enforced with or without the help of slavishly "willing allies," now through a succession of genocidal wars. Ever since the 1970s the United States has been sinking ever deeper into catastrophic indebtedness. The fantasy solution publicly proclaimed by several U.S. presidents was "to grow out of it." And the result: the diametrical opposite, in the form of astronomical and still growing indebtedness. Accordingly, the United States must grab to itself, by any means at its disposal, including the most violent military aggression, whenever required for this purpose, everything it can, through the transfer of the fruits of capitalist growth -- thanks to the global socioeconomic and political/military domination of the United States -- from everywhere in the world. Could then any sane person imagine, no matter how well armored by his or her callous contempt for "the shibboleth of equality," that U.S. dominated global hegemonic imperialism would take seriously even for a moment the panacea of "no growth"? Only the worst kind of bad faith could suggest such ideas, no matter how pretentiously packaged in the hypocritical concern over "the Predicament of Mankind." For a variety of reasons there can be no question about the importance of growth both in the present and in the future. But to say so must go with a proper examination of the concept of growth not only as we know it up to the present, but also as we can envisage its sustainability in the future. Our siding with the need for growth cannot be in favor of unqualified growth. The tendentiously avoided real question is: what kind of growth is both feasible today, in contrast to dangerously wasteful and even crippling capitalist growth visible all around us? For growth must be also positively sustainable in the future on a long-term basis.

### Environment/Warming

#### Economic contradiction makes environmental collapse inevitable

Foster ‘11 (John B Foster, Department of Sociology, University of Oregon, “Capitalism and Degrowth-An Impossibility Theorem”, Monthly Review Vol. 62, Iss. 8; pg. 26, 8 pgs , January 2011)

In the opening paragraph to his 2009 book, Storms of My Grandchildren, James Hansen, the world's foremost scientific authority on global warming, declared: "Planet Earth, creation, the world in which civilization developed, the world with climate patterns that we know and stable shorelines, is in imminent peril . . . .The startling conclusion is that continued exploitation of all fossil fuels on Earth threatens not only the other millions of species on the planet but also the survival of humanity itself - and the timetable is shorter than we thought."1 In making this declaration, however, Hansen was only speaking of a part of the global environmental crisis currently threatening the planet, namely, climate change. Recently, leading scientists (including Hansen) have proposed nine planetary boundaries, which mark the safe operating space for the planet. Three of these boundaries (climate change, biodiversity, and the nitrogen cycle) have already been crossed, while others, such as fresh water use and ocean accidification, are emerging planetary rifts. In ecological terms, the economy has now grown to a scale and intrusiveness that is both overshooting planetary boundaries and tearing apart the biogeochemical cycles of the planet.2 Hence, almost four decades after the Club of Rome raised the issue of "the limits to growth," the economic growth idol of modern society is once again facing a formidable challenge.3 What is known as "degrowth economics," associated with the work of Serge Latouche in particular, emerged as a major European intellectual movement in 2008 with the historic conference in Paris on "Economic De-Growth for Ecological Sustainability and Social Equity," and has since inspired a revival of radical Green thought, as epitomized by the 2010 "Degrowth Declaration" in Barcelona. Ironically, the meteoric rise of degrowth (décroissance in French) as a concept has coincided over the last three years with the reappearance of economic crisis and stagnation on a scale not seen since the 1930s. The degrowth concept therefore forces us to confront the questions: Is degrowth feasible in a capitalist grow-or-die society - and if not, what does this say about the transition to a new society? According to the Web site of the European degrowth project, "degrowth carries the idea of a voluntary reduction of the size of the economic system which implies a reduction of the GDP."4 "Voluntary" here points to the emphasis on voluntaristic solutions - though not as individualistic and unplanned in the European conception as the "voluntary simplicity" movement in the United States, where individuals (usually well-to-do) simply choose to opt out of the high-consumption market model. For Latouche, the concept of "degrowth" signifies a major social change: a radical shift from growth as the main objective of the modern economy, toward its opposite (contraction, downshifting). An underlying premise of this movement is that, in the face of a planetary ecological emergency, the promise of green technology has proven false. This can be attributed to the Jevons Paradox, according to which greater efficiency in the use of energy and resources leads not to conservation but to greater economic growth, and hence more pressure on the environment.5 The unavoidable conclusion - associated with a wide variety of political-economic and environmental thinkers, not just those connected directly to the European degrowth project - is that there needs to be a drastic alteration in the economic trends operative since the Industrial Revolution. As Marxist economist Paul Sweezy put it more than two decades ago: "Since there is no way to increase the capacity of the environment to bear the [economic and population] burdens placed on it, it follows that the adjustment must come entirely from the other side of the equation. And since the disequilibrium has already reached dangerous proportions, it also follows that what is essential for success is a reversal, not merely a slowing down, of the underlying trends of the last few centuries."6 Given that wealthy countries are already characterized by ecological overshoot, it is becoming more and more apparent that there is indeed no alternative, as Sweezy emphasized, but a reversal in the demands placed on the environment by the economy. This is consistent with the argument of ecological economist Herman Daly, who has long insisted on the need for a steady-state economy. Daly traces this perspective to John Stuart Mill's famous discussion of the "stationary state" in his Principles of Political Economy, which argued that if economic expansion was to level off (as the classical economists expected), the economic goal of society could then shift to the qualitative aspects of existence, rather than mere quantitative expansion. A century after Mill, Lewis Mumford insisted in his Condition of Man, first published in 1944, that not only was a stationary state in Mill's sense ecologically necessary, but that it should also be linked to a concept of "basic communism . . . [that] applies to the whole community the standards of the household," distributing "benefits according to need" (a view that drew upon Marx). Today this recognition of the need to bring economic growth in overdeveloped economies to a halt, and even to shrink these economies, is seen as rooted theoretically in Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen's The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, which established the basis of modern ecological economics.7 Degrowth as such is not viewed, even by its proponents, as a stable solution, but one aimed at reducing the size of the economy to a level of output that can be maintained perpetually at a steady-state. This might mean shrinking the rich economies by as much as a third from today's levels by a process that would amount to negative investment (since not only would new net investment cease but also only some, not all, worn-out capital stock would be replaced). A steady-state economy, in contrast, would carry out replacement investment but would stop short of new net investment. As Daly defines it, "a steady-state economy" is "an economy with constant stocks of people and artifacts, maintained at some desired, sufficient levels by low rates of maintenance 'throughput,' that is, by the lowest feasible flows of matter and energy."8 Needless to say, none of this would come easily, given today's capitalist economy. In particular, Latouche's work, which can be viewed as exemplary of the European degrowth project, is beset with contradictions, resulting not from the concept of degrowth perse, but from his attempt to skirt the question of capitalism. This can be seen in his 2006 article, "The Globe Downshifted," where he argues in convoluted form: For some on the far left, the stock answer is that capitalism is the problem, leaving us stuck in a rut and powerless to move towards a better society. Is economic contraction compatible with capitalism? This is a key question, but one that it is important to answer without resort to dogma, if the real obstacles are to be understood .... Eco-compatible capitalism is conceivable in theory, but unrealistic in practice. Capitalism would require a high level of regulation to bring about the reduction of our ecological footprint. The market system, dominated by huge multinational corporations, will never set off down the virtuous path of eco-capitalism of its own accord .... Mechanisms for countering power with power, as existed under the Keynes-Fordist regulations of the Social-Democratic era, are conceivable and desirable. But the class struggle seems to have broken down. The problem is: capital won .... A society based on economic contraction cannot exist under capitalism. But capitalism is a deceptively simple word for a long, complex history. Getting rid of the capitalists and banning wage labour, currency and private ownership of the means of production would plunge society into chaos. It would bring large-scale terrorism. . ..We need to find another way out of development, economism (a belief in the primacy of economic causes and factors) and growth: one that does not mean forsaking the social institutions that have been annexed by the economy (currency, markets, even wages) but reframes them according to different principles.9

### Crisis

**Crisis are just an opportunity to alienate the exploited and further expand capitalism, neoliberal wars divide us into rogue and “rational” states.**

**Rosenberg and Villarejo 12** (Jordana Rosenberg, MA and PhD from Cornell University, and a BA from Wesleyan University. She is the recipient of an Ahmanson-Getty Fellowship from the Center for Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Studies at UCLA (2009- 2010), as well as a Marion and Jasper Whiting Foundation Award, the Catherine Macaulay Prize, and a William Andrews Clark Memorial Library Joint Fellowship Award. Professor Rosenberg's fields of research and teaching include eighteenth-century transatlantic literature and poetry, moral philosophy, political theory, early modern materialism, Marxism, and secularization; Amy Villarejo, Associate Professor in Film and Feminist, Gender, & Sexuality Studies Program. She received her B.A. in English from Bryn Mawr College in 1985, an M.A. in English from the University of Pittsburgh in 1991, and a Ph.D. in Critical and Cultural Studies (in the Film Studies Program) from the University of Pittsburgh in 1997, when she came to Cornell GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 18, Number 1,2012, Published by Duke University Press, “Introduction: Queerness, Norms, Utopia”)

In the pages that follow, the conjoined pressure of our authors’ investigations and the dynamic collaborative work of the roundtable combine to illuminate **the historical relationship between capital accumulation, racialization, and sexualization** — a triumvirate of variously determinate forces whose interpenetration **has been obscured by the deployment of “crisis” as a way to name the current conjuncture**. In the roundtable, we invited authors to speculate on their own innovations on the relationship between political economy, Marxism, and queer studies. In responding, they have encapsulated our aims for the special issue as a set of vivid analytic provocations. As Miranda Joseph reminds us in this issue, **the loud decrying that capitalism is “in crisis” does not necessarily signal a long-term crisis for capitalism. For capitalism has long been fueled by recurrent crises: falling rates of profit, the bridging of gaps between production and consumption with ballooning credit and debt, the explosion of finance capital. Such crises have become occasions for capitalism to “revolutionize” itself — through imperialism, colonization, and increased rates of exploitation, the combined forces of which result in booms and the recuperation of the system**, temporarily at least.11 Following the lead of recent queer theories of sensation and emotion, **we** might **understand** **this latest “crisis**” as, at least partly, **an affect deployed in this moment to put into place and naturalize the intensification of exploitation, the systematic destruction of the gains of labor radicalism, and the unleashing of new, imperialist forms of violence.** As Gopal Balakrishnan has explained, the faltering **dominance of American neoliberal capitalism occasions an almost panoramic military theater in which the “rogue state” designation applies to an unprecedented number of nations and peoples now targeted for the use of violent force**: “For the few remaining fully sovereign states, the use of military force is afforded cover by the ‘international community,’ while **illegitimate ‘rogue’ states are subject to invasive, destabilizing qualifications of their nominal sovereignty in the form of sanctions, international supervision of their weapons programmes, no-fly zones, and regime change**.”12 **In representing** the stumbling of certain **sectors of finance capital as in “crisis**,” **dominant media and political discourses legitimate — through the invocation of panicked affects — both assaults on domestic services and public programs and imperialist acts of violence as necessary steps toward restabilizing those sectors of profit.** In interrogating such ideologies from the perspective of queer studies, we join other recent special issues of GLQ — notably “Sexuality, Nationality, Indigeneity” and “Queer Politics and the Question of Palestine/ Israel” — in bringing together accounts of such cruelty and violence with an analytics of sexuality.13 Such spikes of violence, moreover, reveal the degree to which, as Fred Moten argues in the roundtable, racism and racialization are not only currently but have long been “condition[s] of possibility” for capitalism itself. And, as Gayle Salamon suggests within the roundtable, it is also the case that this violence takes specifically spatial form. The relation between center and periphery, after all, is articulated not only globally but also domestically in a series of intensifying dyads, or what Raymond Williams describes as a relation of “interlocking exploitation.”14 For Harvey, this interlocking is both cause and result of capitalist “crises.” **In its quest to continually produce profit, territories are dispossessed and traditional social structures made insupportable, as capitalism moves within and between nation-states in an endless movement of de-and re-development**. **This movement wreaks havoc** as it makes profit — a spatial logic vividly described by Mike Davis as a vast global network **of sprawling “polycentric urban systems without clear rural/urban boundaries” — “megaslums” populated by a highly exploited informal workforce**.15 **This increasingly violent territorialization of new lands and resources is key to understanding how capitalism manages to reproduce itself as a system despite recurrent crises of overproduction and overaccumulation**. Indeed, an understanding of this process may help us replace what Robert McRuer identifies as the problematic invocation of rhetorics of disability to describe the “terrain” of global capitalism, with a materially grounded and historically based language that describes the mechanisms of capital accumulation. And this hermeneutic of accumulation may also be key to understanding the ideological makeup of the current moment. For if the spatially deployed violence of capitalism exposes the fissures in the current mode of production, perhaps it is the case, as Tavia Nyong’o argues in the roundtable, that traditional ideological patches — such as marriage — no longer cover the wounds of capitalist profiteering. Nor do they cover the sheer brutality — analyzed dynamically here by Dean Spade — of the state.

**Attention to crisis is just an opportunity for privatization to grow and expand the free-market. Leaving the job to private contractors means lopsided development guarantees rich get richer and poor get poorer.**

**Klein 2007**, (Naomi Klein, Canadian author and social activist known for her political analyses and criticism of corporate globalization; Harper’s Magazine, October 2007, “Disaster Capitalism: The New Economy of Catastrophe”, <http://www.angelfire.com/il/photojerk/klein.pdf>)

**The American Society of Civil Engineers has warned that the United States has fallen so far behind in maintaining its public infrastructure roads, bridges**, schools, dams-that it would take more than a trillion and a half dollars over five years to bring it back up to standard. **This past summer those statistics came to life: collapsing bridges, flooding subways**, exploding steam pipes, and the still-unfolding tragedy that began when New Orleans's levees broke. **After each new disaster, it's tempting to imagine that the loss of life and productivity will finally serve as a wake-up call**, provoking the political class to launch some kind of "new New Deal." **In fact, the opposite is taking place: disasters have become the preferred moments for advancing a vision of a ruthlessly divided world, one in which the very idea of a public sphere has no place at all**. Call it disaster capitalism. **Every time a new crisis hits even when the crisis itself is the direct by-product of free-market ideology the fear and disorientation that follow are harnessed for radical social and economic re-engineering**. Each new shock is midwife to a new course of economic shock therapy. **The end result is the same kind of unapologetic partition between the included and the excluded, the protected and the damned, that is on display in Baghdad**. Consider the instant reactions to last summer's various infrastructure disasters. **Four days after the Minneapolis bridge collapsed, a Wall Street Journal editorial had the solution: "tapping private investors to build and operate public roads and bridges**," **with the cost made up from ever-escalating tolls**. **After heavy rain caused the shutdown of New York City's subway lines, the New York Sun ran an editorial** under the headline "Sell the Subways." It called **for individual train lines to compete against one another, luring customers with the safest, driest service-and "charging higher fares when the competing lines, stingier on their investments, were shut down with tracks under water**."[ It's not hard to imagine what this free market in subways would look like: high-speed lines ferrying commuters from the Upper West Side to Wall Street, while the trains serving the South Bronx wouldn't just continue their long decay-they would simply drown. The same week as the bridge collapse, hysteria erupted over canceled flights and delays at London's Heathrow airport, prompting The Economist to demand "radical reform" of the "grubby, cramped" facility. London's airports are already privatized, but now, according to the magazine, they should be deregulated, allowing terminals to compete against one another: "different firms could provide different forms of security checks, some faster and dearer than others." Meanwhile, in New Orleans, schools were getting ready to reopen for fall. More than half the city's students would be attending newly minted charter schools, where they would enjoy small classes, well-trained teachers, and refurbished libraries, thanks to special state and foundation funding pouring into what the New York Times has described as "the nation's preeminent laboratory for the widespread use of charter schools." But charters are only for the students who are admitted to the system-an educational Green Zone. The rest of New Orleans's public-school students-many of them with special emotional and physical needs, almost all of them African Americanare dumped into the pre-Katrina system: no extra money, overcrowded classrooms, more guards than teachers. An educational Red Zone. Other institutions that had attempted to bridge the gap between New Orleans's super-rich and ultra-poor were also under attack: thousands of units of subsidized housing were slotted for demolition, and Charity Hospital, the city's largest public-health facility, remained shuttered. The original disaster was created and deepened by public infrastructure that was on its last legs; in the years since, the disaster itself has been used as an excuse to finish the job. There will be more Katrinas. The bones of our states-so frail and aging will keep getting buffeted by storms both climatic and political. And **as key pieces of the infrastructure are knocked out, there is no guarantee that they will be repaired or rebuilt, at least not as they were before**. **More likely, they will be left to rot, with the well-off withdrawing into gated communities, their needs met by private suppliers.** **Not so long ago, disasters were periods of social leveling, rare moments when atomized communities put divisions aside and pulled together**. **Today they are moments when we are hurled further apart,** when we lurch into a radically segregated future where some of us will fall off the map and others ascend to a parallel privatized state, **one equipped with well- paved highways and skyways, safe bridges**, boutique charter schools, **fast-lane airport terminals, and deluxe subways.**

**This crisis response induces a cycle of privatization as the state power diminishes to rely on the private sector.**

**Klein 2007**, (Naomi Klein, Canadian author and social activist known for her political analyses and criticism of corporate globalization; Harper’s Magazine, October 2007, “Disaster Capitalism: The New Economy of Catastrophe”, <http://www.angelfire.com/il/photojerk/klein.pdf>)

**The reach of the disaster industry extends far beyond policing**. **When the contractor infrastructure built up** during the Bush years is looked at as a whole, what **we see** is **a fully articulated state-within-a-state that is as muscular and capable as the actual state is frail and feeble**. **This corporate shadow-state has been built almost exclusively with public resources**, including the training of its staff: 90 percent of Blackwater's revenues come from state contracts, and the majority of its employees are former politicians, soldiers, and civil servants. **Yet the vast infrastructure is all privately owned and controlled. The citizens who funded it have absolutely no claim to this parallel economy or its resources**. **The actual state, meanwhile, has lost the ability to perform its core functions without the help of contractors**. **Its own equipment is out of date, and the best experts have fled to the private sector**. **When Katrina hit, FEMA had to hire a contractor to award contracts to contractors**. Similarly, when it came time to update the Army manual on the rules for dealing with contractors, the Army outsourced the job to one of its major contractors, MPRI, because it no longer had the in-house expertise. The CIA has lost so many staffers to the privatized spy sector that it has had to bar contractors from recruiting in the agency dining room. "One recently retired case officer said he had been approached twice while in line for coffee," reported the Los Angeles Times. And when the Department of Homeland Security decided it needed to build "virtual fences" on the U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada, Michael P. Jackson, deputy secretary of the department, told contractors, "This is an unusual invitation .... We're asking you to come back and tell us how to do our business." The department's inspector general explained that Homeland Security "does not have the capacity needed to effectively plan, oversee, and execute the [Secure Border Initiative] program." Under George W. Bush, **the state** still has all the trappings of a government the impressive buildings, presidential press briefings, policy battles-but it **no more does the actual work of governing** than the employees at Nike's Beaverton, Oregon, campus stitch running shoes.

**This attention to crisis allows capitalism to expand its military-industrial complex, weakening the states and giving power to the private sector.**

**Klein 2007**, (Naomi Klein, Canadian author and social activist known for her political analyses and criticism of corporate globalization; Harper’s Magazine, October 2007, “Disaster Capitalism: The New Economy of Catastrophe”, <http://www.angelfire.com/il/photojerk/klein.pdf>)

**Iraq and New Orleans both reveal, the markets opened up by crises aren't only the roads,** schools, and oil wells; **the disasters themselves are major new markets**. **The military-industrial complex** that Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against in 1961 **has expanded and morphed into what is best understood as a disaster-capitalism complex, in which all conflict- and disaster-related functions** (waging war, securing borders, spying on citizens, **rebuilding cities**, treating traumatized soldiers) **can be performed by corporations at a profit**. And **this complex** is not satisfied merely to feed off the state, the way traditional military contractors do; it **aims, ultimately, to replace core functions of government with its own profitable enterp**rises, as it did in Baghdad's Green Zone. It happened in New Orleans. **Within weeks of Hurricane Katrina, the Gulf Coast became a domestic laboratory for the same kind of government run by contractors that was pioneered in Iraq**. **The companies that snatched up the biggest contracts were the familiar Baghdad gang**: **Halliburton's KBR unit** received a $60 million contract to **reconstruct military bases** along the coast. **Blackwater was hired to protect FEMA operations,** with the company billing an average of $950 a day per guard. **Parsons, infamous for its sloppy work in Iraq, was brought in for a major bridge-construction project in Mississippi**. Fluor, Shaw, Bechtel, CH2M Hill-**all top contractors in Iraq-were handed contracts on the Gulf Coast** to provide mobile homes to evacuees just ten days **after the levees broke**. Their contracts ended up totaling $3.4 billion, no open bidding required. To spearhead its Katrina operation, Shaw hired the former head of the U.S. Army's Iraq reconstruction office. Fluor sent its senior project manager from Iraq to the flood zone. "Our rebuilding work in Iraq is slowing down, and this has made some people available to respond to our work in Louisiana," a company representative explained. Joe Allbaugh, whose company, New Bridge Strategies, had promised to bring Wal-Mart and 7-Eleven to Iraq, was the lobbyist in the middle of many of the deals. The feeling that the Iraq war had somehow just been franchised was so striking that some of the mercenary soldiers, fresh from Baghdad, were having trouble adjusting. When David Enders, a reporter, asked an armed guard outside a New Orleans hotel if there had been much action, he replied, "Nope. It's pretty Green Zone here." **Since then, privatized disaster response has become one of the hottest industries** in the South. **Just one year after Hurricane Katrina, a slew of new corporations had entered the market, promising safety and security should the next Big One hit.** One of the more ambitious ventures was launched by a charter air service in West Palm Beach, Florida. Help Jet bills itself as "the world's first hurricane escape plan that turns a hurricane evacuation into a jet-setter vacation." When a storm is coming, the charter company books holidays for its members at five-star golf resorts, spas, or Disneyland. With the reservations made, the evacuees are then whisked out of the hurricane zone on a luxury jet. "No standing in lines, no hassle with crowds, just a first class experience that turns a problem into a vacation .... Enjoy the feeling of avoiding the usual hurricane evacuation nightmare." For the people left behind, there is a different kind of privatized solution. In 2006, the Red Cross signed a new disaster-response partnership with Wal-Mart. "It's all going to be private enterprise before it's over," said Billy Wagner, chief of emergency management for the Florida Keys. "They've got the expertise. They've got the resources." He was speaking at the National Hurricane Conference in Orlando, Florida, a fast-growing annual trade show for the companies selling everything that might come in handy during the next disaster. Dave Blandford, an exhibitor showing off his "self-heating meals" at the conference, observed: "Some folks here said, 'Man, this is huge business-this is my new business. I'm not in the landscaping business anymore; I'm going to be a hurricane-debris contractor.''' Much of the parallel disaster economy has been built with taxpayers' money, thanks to the boom in privatized war-zone reconstruction. The giant contractors that have served as "the primes" in Iraq and Afghanistan have spent large portions of their income from government contracts on their own corporate overhead-between 20 and 55 percent, according to a 2006 audit of Iraq contractors. Much of those funds has, quite legally, gone into huge investments in corporate equipment, such as Bechtel's battalions of earth movers, Halliburton's fleets of planes and trucks, and the surveillance architecture built by L-3, CACI, and Booz Allen. Most dramatic has been Blackwater's investment in its paramilitary infrastructure. Founded in 1996, the company has used its steady stream of contracts to build up a private army of 20,000 on-call mercenary soldiers and a military base in North Carolina worth between $40 million and $50 million. It reportedly has the ability to field massive humanitarian operations faster than the Red Cross, and boasts a fleet of aircraft ranging from helicopter gunships to a Boeing 767.2 Blackwater has been called "al Qaeda for the good guys" by its right-wing admirers. It's a striking analogy. **Wherever the disaster-capitalism complex has landed, it has produced a proliferation of armed groups that operate outside the state**. That is hardly a surprise: **when countries are rebuilt by people who don't believe in governments, the states they build are invariably weak, creating a market for alternative security forces**, whether Hezbollah, Blackwater, the Mahdi Army, or the gang down the street in New Orleans.

## Impacts

### Turns Case

**Modeling- Capitalism reinforces other countries’ rich/poor divide through our poor governing of infrastructure. Free trade leads us to ignore public infrastructure.**

**Klein 2007**, (Naomi Klein, Canadian author and social activist known for her political analyses and criticism of corporate globalization; Harper’s Magazine, October 2007, “Disaster Capitalism: The New Economy of Catastrophe”, <http://www.angelfire.com/il/photojerk/klein.pdf>)

Three years ago, when I was in Baghdad on assignment for this magazine, I paid an early-morning visit to Khadamiya, a mostly Shiite area. An Iraqi colleague had heard that part of the neighborhood had flooded the night before, as it did regularly. When we arrived, the streets were drenched in slick green-blue liquid that was bubbling up from sewage pipes beneath exhausted asphalt. A family invited us to see what the frequent floods had done to their once lovely home. The walls were moldy and cracked, and every item-books, photos, sofas-was caked in the algae-like scum. Out back, a walled garden was a fetid swamp, with a child's swing dangling forlornly from a dead palm tree. "It was a beautiful garden," Durdham Yassin, the owner, told us. "I grew tomatoes." For the frequent flooding, Yassin spread the blame around. There was Saddam, who spent oil money on weapons instead of infrastructure during the Iran-Iraq War. There was the first Gulf War, when U.S. missiles struck a nearby electricity plant, knocking out power to the sewage-treatment facility. Next came the years of U.N. sanctions, when city workers could not replace crucial parts of the sewage system. Then there was the 2003 invasion, which further fried the power grid. And, more recently, there were companies like Bechtel and General Electric, which were hired to fix this mess, and which failed. Around the corner, a truck was idling with a large hose down a manhole. "The most powerful vacuum loader in the world," it advertised, in English, on its side. Yassin explained that the neighbors had pooled their money to pay the company to suck away the latest batch of sludge, a costly and temporary solution. The mosque had helped, too. As we drove away, I noticed that there were similar private vacuum trucks on every other block. Later that day I stopped by Baghdad's world-famous Green Zone. There, the challenges of living without functioning public infrastructure are also addressed by private actors. The difference is that in the Green Zone, the solutions actually work. The enclave has its own electrical grid, its own phone and sanitation systems, its own oil supply, and its own state-of-the-art hospital with pristine operating theaters-all protected by walls five meters thick. It felt, oddly, like a giant fortified Carnival Cruise ship parked in the middle of a sea of violence and despair, the boiling Red Zone that is Iraq. If you could get on board, there were pools ide drinks, bad Hollywood movies, and Nautilus machines. If you were not among the E chosen, you could get shot just for standing too close to the wall. Everywhere in Iraq, the wildly divergent values assigned to different categories of people are on crude display. Westerners and their Iraqi colleagues have checkpoints at the entrances to their streets, blast walls in front of their houses, body armor, and private security guards on call at all hours. They travel the country in menacing armored convoys, with mercenaries pointing guns out the windows as they follow their prime directive to "protect the principal." With every move they broadcast the same unapologetic message: We are the chosen, our lives are infinitely more precious than yours. Middle-class Iraqis, meanwhile, cling to the next rung down the ladder: they can afford to buy protection from local militias, they are able to ransom a family member held by kidnappers, they may ultimately escape to a life of poverty in Jordan. But the vast majority of Iraqis have no protection at all. They walk the streets exposed to any possible ravaging, with nothing between them and the next car bomb but a thin layer of fabric. In Iraq, the lucky get Kevlar; the rest get prayer beads. Like most people, I saw **the divide between Baghdad's Green and Red zones as a simple by-product of the war**: This is what happens **when the richest country in the world sets up camp in one of the poorest**. But now, after years spent visiting other disaster zones, from post-tsunami Sri Lanka to post-Katrina New Orleans, I've come to think of **these Green Zone/Red Zone worlds** as something else: fast-forward **versions of what "free market" forces are doing to our societies even in the absence of war**. **In Iraq the** phones, pipes, and **roads had been destroyed by weapons and trade embargoes**. In many other parts of the world, including **the United States**, they **have been demolished by ideology**, the war on "big government," **the religion of tax cuts, the fetish for privatization.** **When that crumbling infrastructure is blasted with increasingly intense weather, the effects can be as devastating as war**. Last February, for instance, **Jakarta suffered one of these predictable disasters**. **The rains had come**, as they always do, but this time the water didn't drain out of Jakarta's famously putrid sewers, and **half the city filled up like a swimming pool**. There were mass evacuations, and **at least fifty-seven people were killed. No bombs or trade sanctions were needed for Jakarta's infrastructure to fail**-in fact, the steady erosion of **the country's public sphere had taken place under the banner of "free trade."** For decades, **Washington-backed structural-adjustment programs had pampered investors and starved public services, leading to** such clichés of **lopsided development** as glittering shopping malls with indoor skating rinks surrounded by moats of open sewers. Now those sewers had failed completely. In wealthier countries, where public infrastructure was far more robust before the decline began, it has been possible to delay this kind of reckoning. Politicians have been free to cut taxes and rail against big government even as their constituents drove on, studied in, and drank from the huge public works projects of the 1930s and 1940s. But after a few decades, that trick stops working.

### Extinction

#### Capitalism makes extinction inevitable

Mészáros 2007, [István, professor emeritus at the University of Sussex “Bolívar and Chávez: The Spirit of Radical Determination,” Monthly Review, Jul/Aug 2007, Vol. 59, Iss. 3]

This is so because capital's incorrigible destructiveness affects in our time every single facet of our life, from the irresponsible wastefulness of profit-oriented productive pursuits to the suicidal degradation of nature as well as the irreversible exhaustion of its vital reproductive resources, and from the dehumanizing mass production of "superfluous people," in the form of chronic unemployment, to the most extreme varieties of current military adventurism. This might be seen together with the outrageous justification of nothing less than the use of nuclear weapons by the dominant imperialist country, the United States, done not only retrospectively, with regard to the unforgivable deed against the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but in a most sinister way also in relation to the future. In this sense the traditional advocacy by capital's personifications "to think the unthinkable"-in their self-congratulatory spirit which claims the virtues of successfully accomplished "productive destruction"-finds its ultimate realization in a form in which contemplating and threatening the destruction of humanity, absurdly in the interest of the ruling socioeconomic system's survival at all cost, is legitimated as a necessary strategic objective by capital's most powerful state formation. At the root of all of these destructive manifestations we find the insurmountable imperatives arising from the established order's self-perpetuating structural hierarchies which necessarily exclude any comprehensive rational alternative to capital's mode of social metabolic control. Naturally, considerations of substantive equality cannot conceivably enter capital's framework of decision making when the fundamentals are at stake. This makes the structural crisis of our system of social reproductive control uniquely acute at the present historical juncture, indicating at the same time the only feasible way of overcoming it. For the destructive determinations of the established order, erupting everywhere on a devastating scale with earlier inconceivable gravity, now call for a fundamental structural change in the interest of humanity's survival. Since structurally enforced inequality is the all-important defining characteristic of the capital system without which it could not function for a single day, the institution of the required fundamental structural change makes it necessary to produce a substantively equitable alternative as humanity's only viable future mode of social metabolic control. Moreover, there could not conceivably be a higher stake for human beings than securing and safeguarding the survival and positive advancement of humankind by instituting a humanly fulfilling order of substantive social equality, which under the present conditions is not an abstract possibility but a vital necessity. For this reason the forces dedicated to this great historic task can pursue the realization of their objective with rationality fully on their side, confident of the complete justification of the values advocated by them in their struggle against imperialism, monopoly, and oppression, in sharp contrast to their adversaries. Truly, we live in an age that might be called the clash of imperatives, although by no means "the clash of civilizations." For the critical confrontation of our time asserts itself as the imperative for creating an equitable and sustainable social order-i.e., an order which is historically sustainable precisely because of its innermost determination as equitable in all of its substantive dimensions-as against capital's insurmountable imperatives of destructive self-preservation. In view of the nature of the issues involved and the urgency of their pursuit, there has never been an even remotely comparable prospect for turning into reality the age-old advocacy of substantive equality as the primary determination of human interchange.

### Laundry List

#### The drive to accumulate is the root cause of exploitation, imperialism, war and eco-doom – threatens our extinction

Foster 07 (John Bellamy, University of Oregon, “The Ecology of Destruction,” MONTHLY REVIEW, February 2007, www.monthlyreview.org/0207jbf.htm, accessed 3-27-08.)

My intention here is not of course to recount Pontecorvo’s entire extraordinary film, but to draw out some important principles from this allegory that will help us to understand capitalism’s relation to nature. Joseph Schumpeter once famously praised capitalism for its “creative destruction.”2 But this might be better seen as the system’s destructive creativity. Capital’s endless pursuit of new outlets for class-based accumulation requires for its continuation the destruction of both pre-existing natural conditions and previous social relations. Class exploitation, imperialism, war, and ecological devastation are not mere unrelated accidents of history but interrelated, intrinsic features of capitalist development. There has always been the danger, moreover, that this destructive creativity would turn into what István Mészáros has called the “destructive uncontrollability” that is capital’s ultimate destiny. The destruction built into the logic of profit would then take over and predominate, undermining not only the conditions of production but also those of life itself. Today it is clear that such destructive uncontrollability has come to characterize the entire capitalist world economy, encompassing the planet as a whole.3

### Environment

#### Capitalism exploits nature - makes extinction inevitable

Foster 09 (John Bellamy, Professor of Sociology at University of Oregon, “The Paradox of Wealth: Capitalism and Ecological Destruction”, November 09, http://monthlyreview.org/2009/11/01/the-paradox-of-wealth-capitalism-and-ecological-destruction)

¶ Behind this tragedy-cum-farce is a distorted accounting deeply rooted in the workings of the system that sees wealth entirely in terms of value generated through exchange. In such a system, only commodities for sale on the market really count. External nature — water, air, living species — outside this system of exchange is viewed as a “free gift.” Once such blinders have been put on, it is possible to speak, as the leading U.S. climate economist William Nordhaus has, of the relatively unhindered growth of the economy a century or so from now, under conditions of business as usual — despite the fact that leading climate scientists see following the identical path over the same time span as absolutely catastrophic both for human civilization and life on the planet as a whole.1

#### Capitalism is destroying the environment

Foster 09 (John Bellamy, Professor of Sociology at University of Oregon, “The Paradox of Wealth: Capitalism and Ecological Destruction”, November 09, http://monthlyreview.org/2009/11/01/the-paradox-of-wealth-capitalism-and-ecological-destruction)

In the Oh shit era, the debate, McKibben says, is over. There is no longer any doubt that global warming represents a crisis of earth-shaking proportions. Yet, it is absolutely essential to understand that this is only one part of what we call the environmental crisis. The global ecological threat as a whole is made up of a large number of interrelated crises and problems that are confronting us simultaneously. In my 1994 book, The Vulnerable Planet, I started out with a brief litany of some of these, to which others might now be added: Overpopulation, destruction of the ozone layer, global warming, extinction of species, loss of genetic diversity, acid rain, nuclear contamination, tropical deforestation, the elimination of climax forests, wetland destruction, soil erosion, desertification, floods, famine, the despoliation of lakes, streams, and rivers, the drawing down and contamination of ground water, the pollution of coastal waters and estuaries, the destruction of coral reefs, oil spills, overfishing, expanding landfills, toxic wastes, the poisonous effects of insecticides and herbicides, exposure to hazards on the job, urban congestion, and the depletion of nonrenewable resources.11The point is that not just global warming but many of these other problems as well can each be seen as constituting a global ecological crisis. Today every major ecosystem on the earth is in decline. Issues of environmental justice are becoming more prominent and pressing everywhere we turn. Underlying this is the fact that the class/imperial war that defines capitalism as a world system, and that governs its system of accumulation, is a juggernaut that knows no limits. In this deadly conflict the natural world is seen as a mere instrument of world social domination. Hence, capital by its very logic imposes what is in effect a scorched earth strategy. The planetary ecological crisis is increasingly all-encompassing, a product of the destructive uncontrollability of a rapidly globalizing capitalist economy, which knows no law other than its own drive to exponential expansion.

#### US Capitalism is the root of the ecological problems

Foster 09 (John Bellamy, Professor of Sociology at University of Oregon, “The Paradox of Wealth: Capitalism and Ecological Destruction”, November 09, http://monthlyreview.org/2009/11/01/the-paradox-of-wealth-capitalism-and-ecological-destruction)

In fact, a new historical period had emerged in the ten years since the Rio summit. Economically, the world had witnessed what Paul Sweezy in 1994 called “the triumph of financial capitalism” with the transformation of monopoly capital into what might be called global monopoly-finance capital.5 By the end of the twentieth century capitalism had evolved into a system that was if anything more geared to rapacious accumulation than ever before, relatively independent from its local and national roots. Global financial expansion was occurring on top of a world economy that was stagnating at the level of production, creating a more unstable and more viciously inegalitarian order, dominated by neoliberal economics and financial bubbles. Declining U.S. hegemony in the world system, coupled with the demise of the Soviet Union, induced repeated and increasingly naked U.S. attempts to restore its economic and political power by military means. Meanwhile, global warming and other crucial environmental problems had crossed critical thresholds. The question was no longer whether ecological and social catastrophes awaited but how great these would be. For those (including myself) in Johannesburg in 2002, watching the U.S. president prepare for war in the petroleum-rich Persian Gulf while the planet was heating up from the burning of fossil fuels, the whole world seemed on fire.

### Value to Life

**Capitalism leads to people making a maximum profit – means no value of life**

**Morgareidge ’98** (Clayton Morgareidge, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Lewis & Clark College. August 22, 1998http://legacy.lclark.edu/~clayton/commentaries/evil.html)

To show why this is the case, let me turn to capital's greatest critic, Karl Marx. **Under capitalism**, Marx writes, **everything in nature and everything that human beings are and can do becomes an object: a resource for, or an obstacle, to the expansion of production, the development of technology, the growth of markets, and the circulation of money.** For those who manage and live from capital**, nothing has value of its own.** Mountain streams, clean air, **human lives -- all mean nothing in themselves, but are valuable only if they can be used to turn a profit**.[1] **If capital looks at (not into) the human face, it sees there only eyes through which brand names and advertising can enter and mouths that can demand and consume food, drink, and tobacco products**. If human faces express needs, then either products can be manufactured to meet, or seem to meet, those needs, or else, **if the needs are incompatible with the growth of capital, then the faces expressing them must be unrepresented or silenced.** **Obviously what capitalist enterprises do have consequences for the well being of human beings and the planet we live on. Capital profits from the production of food, shelter, and all the necessities of life. The production of all these things uses human lives in the shape of labor, as well as the resources of the earth. If we care about life, if we see our obligations in each others faces, then we have to want all the things capital does to be governed by that care,** to be directed by the ethical concern for life. But feeding people is not the aim of the food industry, or shelter the purpose of the housing industry. In medicine, making profits is becoming a more important goal than caring for sick people**. As capitalist enterprises these activities aim single-mindedly at the accumulation of capital**, and such purposes as caring for the sick or feeding the hungry becomes a mere means to an end, an instrument of corporate growth. Therefore **ethics, the overriding commitment to meeting human need, is left out of deliberations about what the heavyweight institutions of our society are going to do. Moral convictions are expressed in churches, in living rooms, in letters to the editor, sometimes even by politicians and widely read commentators, but almost always with an attitude of resignation to the inevitable.** People no longer say, "You can't stop progress," but only because they have learned not to call economic growth progress. They still think they can't stop it. And they are right -- as long as the production of all our needs and the organization of our labor is carried out under private ownership. Only a minority ("idealists") can take seriously a way of thinking that counts for nothing in real world decision making. **Only when the end of capitalism is on the table will ethics have a seat at the table.¶**

### Queer Theory

**Neoliberal Capitalism enforces the alienation of queers through increasing violence and proliferation of homogenous ideology**

**Rosenberg and Villarejo 12** (Jordana Rosenberg, MA and PhD from Cornell University, and a BA from Wesleyan University. She is the recipient of an Ahmanson-Getty Fellowship from the Center for Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Studies at UCLA (2009- 2010), as well as a Marion and Jasper Whiting Foundation Award, the Catherine Macaulay Prize, and a William Andrews Clark Memorial Library Joint Fellowship Award. Professor Rosenberg's fields of research and teaching include eighteenth-century transatlantic literature and poetry, moral philosophy, political theory, early modern materialism, Marxism, and secularization; Amy Villarejo, Associate Professor in Film and Feminist, Gender, & Sexuality Studies Program. She received her B.A. in English from Bryn Mawr College in 1985, an M.A. in English from the University of Pittsburgh in 1991, and a Ph.D. in Critical and Cultural Studies (in the Film Studies Program) from the University of Pittsburgh in 1997, when she came to Cornell GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 18, Number 1,2012, Published by Duke University Press, “Introduction: Queerness, Norms, Utopia”)

If queer studies is now reencountering the question of utopia within the Marxist tradition, it is only through the kinds of concretizing negations made possible by a recent wealth of work that specifies the baleful cohabitations of queerness and nationalism, queerness and racialization, queerness and the neoliberalization of the globe. In Puar’s words, **queerness may be seen**, in a number of important contexts, **as “a process of racialization” deployed by the neoliberal nation-state to manage and control populations — to ensure ideological homogeneity in queers for whom an oppositional relationship to the state had once been paramount, and to legitimate neocolonial wars and plunder in the name of an empty “revitalizaItion” of liberal subject-formations held to be the ideal citizens of the neoliberal state**.25 This trenchant analysis of **the increasing violence endemic to the neoliberal state’s quest for dominance** shares a theoretical and future orientation with Muñoz’s utopian casting of black radical traditions that **highlights capitalism as the key framework against which radical futurity pits itself**.26

### Domination/Control

#### **The capitalist desire to spread the system farther and farther tries to tear down barriers for profit – this annihilates space.**

Goldman et. Al. ’03 [Robert Goldman is Professor of Sociology at Lewis and Clark College, Portland Oregon. Stephen Papson is Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University in Canton, New York, Landscapes of Capital, “Representing Global Capital”, 2003, St. Lawrence University, <http://it.stlawu.edu/~global/pagesspeed/menuframespeed.html> AD]

Karl Marx, writing in the Grundrisse in 1857, anticipated how the contradictions of Capital could spur on the "annihilation of space by time." He wrote, While capital ...must strive to tear down every barrier...to exchange and conquer the whole earth for its markets, it strives on the other side to annihilate this space with time." (538-539) Throughout the pages that comprise this project, we have repeatedly referred to matters of speed - from the speed of production to speed of consumption and gratification to the speed of information flows. Certainly, advertising has done its best to equate gains in speed with general notions of progress - how often have you heard an ad refer to gaining time because of the use of a particular product? In a world seemingly packed to capacity with things to do and places to be, the technology of speed promises to deliver us to a better place. Breaking speed-barriers is not a new obsession. Speed of movement not only signals our capacity for overcoming the fixity of geographical distance (space), it also has come to suggest the possibility for increased efficiency and productivity. Since its inception, capitalism has measured value in terms of time inputs since the amount of labor required to produce a commodity could most easily be measured in units of time. So it stands to reason that our 'common-sense' understanding of technologies of speed connote a future liberation from material scarcity. In contemporary society, where time itself has become perceived as a scarce resource, appeals to instantaneity and immediacy are quite seductive. Has speed annihilated spatial distance? Paul Virilio writes that one of the most revolutionary transformations occurring today "is the invention of a perspective of real time. Real time now prevails above both real space and the geosphere. The primacy of real time, of immediacy, over and above space and surface is a fait accompli and ushers a new epoch. Something nicely conjured up in a (French) advertisement praising cellularphones with the words: "Planet Earth has never been this small". This is a very dramatic moment in our relation with the world and for our vision of the world. (Virilio, 1995) Virilio sees a dark side to the hegemony of speed. Sometimes referred to as time-space compression, sometimes as deterritorialization, this process threatens/promises to transform not only the ways in which we work and do business, but also the ways in which we live our private lives. How do corporate ads represent speed is in our lives? Here it is important once again to distinguish between what actually goes on in the world and how it is represented, or at least leave open the question of how these are related. Our own position at present is that while time-space compression and deterritorialization are real processes, they produce neither homogeneous time nor homogeneous space. Though this is the first impression that one might have after viewing the commercials in our database, closer inspection of these ads reveals a far more contradictory set of representations. Indeed, while "faster" is everywhere presumed to be the goal in these commercials, the technologies of speed and commodification are no less obsessed with repetition - so much so that latent meanings of speed in the ads suggest that efforts at eclipsing space have placed us in an infinite loop. Perhaps this is part of what Virilio means when he says that hyperspeed induces a "loss of orientation."

#### The capitalist system ensures our lives are controlled by time - it decides when and what we do.

Goldman et. Al. ’03 [Robert Goldman is Professor of Sociology at Lewis and Clark College, Portland Oregon. Stephen Papson is Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University in Canton, New York, Landscapes of Capital, “Representing Global Capital”, 2003, St. Lawrence University, http://it.stlawu.edu/~global/pagesspeed/socialtime.html AD]

Advertisements reference numerous kinds of time. In their efforts to reference everyday life, advertisements may portray the time of consumption, the time of labor, the time of capital and markets, the time of reproduction, family time, and the time of transit. We offer these as heuristic categories, recognizing that there is overlap between these representations in advertising. An example from AT&T illustrates an effort to draw together the multiple spheres of time in everyday life. The ad hails middle class women who perform the roles of working mom. "If this is you," yours can be a harried day, divided into distinct blocks of time, each dedicated to a scheduled activity. The typically busy day may begin with a run across the great wide open of the Western landscape to keep one's body and mind fit. This is labeled 'breakfast,' and it is followed by an image of a commuter plane labeled as 'your carpool.' We begin by peeling away one scene at a time, because each scene has been selected as a way of signifying the elements of a fast-paced daily life. So after you take a commuter flight to the city where you work, you check in with your wealth-o-meter - the 'scoreboard' of stock prices, for this has become your measure of well-being. From here, the pace of urban night life starts to get pumped up by a techno beat on the soundtrack. Visually the ad draws on the now-standard signifier of speed - the blurring, pulsing beams of light, produced by using time-lapse photographic techniques of urban traffic to stretch out time visually. We have captured this sequence of scenes and edits from the ad - but we have reduced the number of frames, slowed it down and isolated it from the signifiers on the sound track. This permits us to defuse the speed - not because we want to downplay it, but because we want to highlight how viewers "read" the codes for expressing speed. The pulses of light identified onscreen as "your sandbox" - these are supposedly the space and speed coordinates of your daily life. What does "this is your sandbox" suggest? This is the place where you play? This is where you are the master? The maestro? The connoisseur of consumption in the global city? You are at home here, you are comfortable here? But how does one feel at home in the blurring speeds of green light bursts? The question the ad poses is whether or not 'you' have the tools to keep this lifestyle from flying apart at the seams. The lifestyle in question refers to a suburban, neo-country space where women raise families by scheduling their days into personal time, transit time, market time, work time, family time. AT&T's message is that "finally communications has caught up with the way you live." Under the campaign rubric of "AT&T's personal network," this commercial translates the struggle to keep spatially scattered everyday lifeworlds integrated into well-adjusted and fulfilling family lives into a story of heroic vitality and celebration. Speed and busy-ness of schedules are turned from negatives into the glue of daily life. Where normally having too much to do in too little time in too many places is a recipe for stress and anxiety, the AT&T ad turns the psychology of stress into imagery of heroic vitality and accomplishment. The ad celebrates (toasts) the individual woman who accomplishes the impossible everyday, and does it with a smile. This is a woman who is more full of love for her family at the end of the day than at its beginning; this is a woman able to balance the pressures of professional performance with being a loving parent; a woman who can be everywhere at once. "...Networks are appropriate instruments for a capitalist economy based on innovation, globalisation, and decentralised concentration; for work, workers and firms based on flexibility; for a culture of endless deconstruction and reconstruction; for a polity geared towards the instant processing of new values and public moods; and for a social organisation aiming at the supersession of space and the annihilation of time" (Castells, 1996: 470-71). Time overwhelms space in AT&T's ad. It does not so much eclipse space as to 'fold' it back in itself to form a new kind of space. Here for example, the spatially dispersed family now appears in its sublated form - connected by communications devices rather than actually occupying the same space. Visually, the admakers signify the eclipse of place/space by carving the temporal frame into three simultaneous parts - one holds your significant other, the second symbolizes your baby (children), and the last is you - or at least, your hands doing the communicating. The network holds together your life - in this sense, the ad offers a therapeutic solution to speed insofar as the network becomes the means for holding together the nuclear family. The need for a therapeutic moment is acknowledged in the joky reference to "your analyst," which turns out to be the family dog. Of course, as Sigmund Freud observed, jokes often reveal more of ourselves than we are normally disposed to show. Your pet dog as your analyst is funny because it might be the truest moment in the commercial. It is at once a clever way of acknowledging the necessity of some therapeutic time and space in a world as hectic as this one is, while also admitting that maybe things aren't so socially and psychologically perfect. After all, if the only one you can really talk to honestly is the dog...hmmm, how much good is a new package of communications services going to do? AT&T defines its new product as a highly flexible, customized communications solution for 'the way you live.' They name their service, "the personal network." What is the relationship between self and network? AT&T sounds confident that whatever its nature, it will change "forever, the way you communicate." The last scenes offer a visual representation of the new way of communicating - the relationship conducted between two mobile communications users. Wireless and mobile, they chat and correspond in transit. Making use of otherwise 'wasted' time, they redefine the way they communicate. Is it any accident that the male in this pairing appears as an isolated individual in the most abstracted of spaces?

### Nuclear War

#### Capitalism will cause nuclear war

Marko 3 (“Anarchism and Human Survival: Russell's Problem,” UK Indymedia http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2003/05/68173.html)

Bertrand Russell throughout his long career as a public intellectual and political activist had reason to reflect on the follies of humanity and the real threats to human survival, threats which are self induced. Much speculation and movie making is devoted toward such survival threatening events as asteroid strikes and mantle head plumes. What is totally ignored is the threat to human survival posed by our own institutions. We can notch another one for the propaganda model; it is to be expected that our pathological institutions would not dwell on their inherent pathology. We can expect nothing less of the corporate media. I shall argue that we face what I refer to as "Russell's problem": “are Homo sapiens an intelligent maladaptive organism doomed to self extinction”? There exists good reason to suppose that a maladaptive, intelligent, organism would indeed cause its own extinction simply because of the destructive potential of intelligence. This is one of the farces of many science fiction stories, such as Star Trek, which posit the existence of hideous innately war like but highly intelligent species. This is not a productive mix; surely any advanced species, in order to reach such heights as inter-galactic travel, would need to be a species that places a premium on cooperation and solidarity. An avaricious intelligent species would only over time succeed in destroying itself and much of the ecological basis for the support of life long before it would be able to traverse wormholes. There exist three threats to survival namely nuclear war, ecological change and north-south conflict. All three I would argue can be traced to a single source that being the pathological nature of state capitalism. What is frightening is that eventual self induced extinction is a rational consequence of our system of world order much like the destruction of the system of world order prior to 1914 was a rational consequence of its internal nature. I shall focus in this essay on nuclear war, the most immediate threat. In doing so we will come to appreciate the nexus between this threat, globalisation and north-south conflict. Currently we are witnessing a major expansion in the US global military system. One facet of this expansion is the globalisation of US nuclear war planning known as "adaptive planning". The idea here is that the US would be able to execute a nuclear strike against any target on Earth at very short notice. For strategic planners the world's population is what they refer to as a "target rich environment". The Clinton era commander of US nuclear forces, Admiral Mies, stated that nuclear ballistic missile submarines would be able to "move undetected to any launch point" threatening "any spot on Earth". What lies at the heart of such a policy is the desire to maintain global strategic superiority what is known as "full spectrum dominance" previously referred to as "escalation dominance". Full spectrum dominance means that the US would be able to wage and win any type of war ranging from a small scale contingency to general nuclear war. Strategic nuclear superiority is to be used to threaten other states so that they toe the party line. The Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review stipulated that nuclear weapons are needed in case of "surprising military developments" not necessarily limited to chemical or biological weapons. The Clinton administration was more explicit stating in its 2001 Pentagon report to Congress that US nuclear forces are to "hedge against defeat of conventional forces in defense of vital interests". The passage makes clear that this statement is not limited to chemical or biological weapons.

## Alternatives

### Zizek/Do Nothing

#### The alternative is to refuse action in the face of the crisis presented by the Aff and do nothing

Zizek 04 [Slavoj, Working on some real quals for this guy, Revolution at the Gates, p. 169-171]

Indeed, since the “normal” functioning of capitalism involves some kind of disavowal of the basic principle of its functioning (today’s model capitalist is someone who, after ruthlessly generating profit, then generously shares parts of it, giving large donations to churches, victims of ethnic or sexual abuse, etc., posing as a humanitarian), the ultimate act of transgression is to assert this principle directly, depriving it of its humanitarian mask. I am therefore tempted to reverse Marx’s Thesis 11: the first task today is precisely not to succumb to the temptation to act, to intervene directly and change things (which then inevitably ends in a cul-de-sac of debilitating impossibility: “What can we do against global capital?”), but to question the hegemonic ideological co-ordinates. In short, our historical moment is still that of Adorno: to the Question “What should we do?” I can most often truly answer with “I don’t know.” I can only try to analyse rigorously what there is. Here people reproach me: When you practice criticism, you are also obliged to say how one should make it better. To my mind, this is incontrovertibly a bourgeois prejudice. Many times in history it so happened that the very works which pursued purely theoretical goals transformed consciousness and thereby also social reality. If, today, we follow a direct call to act, this act will not be performed in an empty space—it will be an act within the hegemonic ideological cooridinates: those who “really want to do something to help people” get involved in {undoubtedly honourable} exploits like Medecins sans frontiers, Greenpeace, feminist and anti-racist campaigns, which are all not only tolerated but even supported by the media, even if they seemingly encroach on economic territory (for example, denouncing and boycotting companies which do not respect ecological conditions, or use child labour) – they are tolerated and supported as long as they do not get too close to a certain limit. This kind of activity provides the perfect example of interpassivity? Of doing things not in order to achieve something, but to prevent something from really happening, really changing. All this frenetic humanitarian, politically correct, etc. activity fits the formula of “Let’s go on changing something all the time so that, globally, things will remain the same!” If standard cultural studies criticize capitalism, they do so in the coded way that exemplifies Hollywood liberal paranoia: the enemy is “the system”, the hidden “organization”, the anti-democratic “conspiracy” not simply capitalism and state apparatuses. The problem with this critical stance is not only that it replaces concrete social analysis with a struggle against abstract paranoic fantasies, but that – in a typical paranoic gesture – it unnecessarily redoubles social reality, as if there were a secret Organization behind the “visible” capitalist and state organs. What we should accept is that there is no need for a secret “organization-within-an-organization”: the “conspiracy” is already in the “visible” organization as such, in the capitalist system, in the way the political space and state apparatuses work.

### Reject

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s capitalist domination. Only by withdrawing from the system can we hollow out capitalism and replace it with something else

Herod 4 (James Herod, Faculty at the University of Massachusetts, January 2004, Getting Free 4th edition, http://www.jamesherod.info/Getting\_Free.pdf)

It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. At its most basic, this strategy calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image, then, is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning from them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system; it is an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus, capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist ones, and then continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing everything we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, nonhierarchical, noncommodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution or the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we’re doing and how we want to live, what obstacles have to be over-come before we can live that way, and how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live-and-let-live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (As mentioned earlier, there is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage slavery, that we can’t simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes war, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks; it is a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue to do so. Still, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, dismantling community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, gutting our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell our ability to work for a wage. It’s quite clear, then, how we can overthrow slavery: we must re-verse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage slaves (that is, we must free ourselves from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for re-forming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for totally replacing capitalism with a new civilization. This is an important distinction because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms as a system. We can sometimes, in some places, win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal. Hence, our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capital-ism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed, millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief system that is needed, like a religion, or like marxism or anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise, we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction.

### Queer Capitalism

#### Alternative: Rejecting the capitalist ideology through the lens of queer theory allows us to work outside contradictory politics of capitalism

**Rosenberg and Villarejo 12** (Jordana Rosenberg, MA and PhD from Cornell University, and a BA from Wesleyan University. She is the recipient of an Ahmanson-Getty Fellowship from the Center for Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Studies at UCLA (2009- 2010), as well as a Marion and Jasper Whiting Foundation Award, the Catherine Macaulay Prize, and a William Andrews Clark Memorial Library Joint Fellowship Award. Professor Rosenberg's fields of research and teaching include eighteenth-century transatlantic literature and poetry, moral philosophy, political theory, early modern materialism, Marxism, and secularization; Amy Villarejo, Associate Professor in Film and Feminist, Gender, & Sexuality Studies Program. She received her B.A. in English from Bryn Mawr College in 1985, an M.A. in English from the University of Pittsburgh in 1991, and a Ph.D. in Critical and Cultural Studies (in the Film Studies Program) from the University of Pittsburgh in 1997, when she came to Cornell GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 18, Number 1,2012, Published by Duke University Press, “Introduction: Queerness, Norms, Utopia”)

On to the second, methodological question: **what has all this to do with queer studies**? Fortunately, this is a question that we do not have to answer alone. **Marxist and historical-materialist methodologies undergird the foundational texts of the study of sexuality**. From Michel **Foucault’s reflections on capital accumulation** in Discipline and Punish **to** John **D’Emilio’s analysis of gay identity alongside wage labor and** Gayle **Rubin’s “political economy of sex,” sexuality studies has long deployed the matrices of Marxism and political-economic analysis to illuminate the sex/gender matrix**.7 This illuminative relation has become truly reciprocal with the interventions of queer of color critique, which ups the ante on traditional approaches to economic questions, turning the optic of queer theory onto political economy and historical materialism. Under such a lens, **queer of color critique not only exposes the lacunae in historical materialist approaches but also recovers the force of those approaches that seem ever more relevant today. In weaving together questions of sexuality, critical race theory, and the psyche with economic history and capitalist development, recent work has revivified its engagement with historical materialism.** This kind of methodological recovery is founded in Ferguson’s reengagement with the Combahee River Collective and receives an exemplary extension in Muñoz’s engagement with Ernst Bloch.8 Melamed’s weaving together of a conception of “race radical analysis” with Cedric Robinson’s use of “black radicalism” also exemplifies the kind of recovery work that takes up the legacies of historical materialism to think through the relationship of racialization, imperialism, and neoliberalism. Although not explicitly written from a queer studies angle, Melamed’s “Spirit of Neoliberalism” continues to be an important touchstone for queer studies and is vividly engaged with in Eng’s Feeling of Kinship, for example. What this burgeoning reencounter with historical materialism means for our special issue is an emphasis on the relationship between Marxist methodologies and queer studies. **If**, as we argued above, **neoliberalism must be understood as a mode of capitalism, then the turn to analyzing neoliberalism finds a ready analytic tool in the history of Marxist critique.** To our minds, the single most powerful methodological contribution of Marxism is its attention to contradiction in the form of dialectical critique. A dialectical approach to the problematic of neoliberal capitalism, then, is what we aim to provide and provoke here. As such, this special issue begins with one basic presumption: that **the encounter between queer studies and Marxist and historical-material analysis**, at its best, **offers the possibility for analyzing capitalist culture in its dynamic, geographically diverse, and contradictory articulations**. We invited authors to consider how **queer methodologies illuminate the contradictions in current and historical economic patterns and advance our understanding of the complex structures of global capitalism**. In this focus on contradiction, the Marxist tradition we embrace most closely is Adorno’s negative dialectic — a technique that distinguishes itself from the Hegelian idealist dialectic in its fundamentally aporetic quality: a negative dialectic does not posit a comprehensive account of the social world but points up the conceptual barriers to understanding the material conditions of that world. This analytic process is achieved through “thinking in contradictions”: “To proceed dialectically means to think in contradictions, for the sake of the contradiction already experienced in the object, and against that contradiction.”9 **The negative dialectical approach does not posit an alternative to the contradictions that score contemporary capitalism but reaches toward the possibility of overcoming those contradictions through overcoming the conditions of capitalism. This perspectival shift is praxical; it hinges on the existence of social movements working to overcome current conditions.** This praxical viewpoint — a speculative moment necessary to the negative dialectic — is where Adorno invokes the utopian potential of his approach: negative dialectics that exposes the degree to which the conditions under which we live now are “false,” or contingent. “In view of the concrete possibility of utopia,” he says, “dialectics is the ontology of the false condition” (11).

#### Queer theory is key to understanding and rejecting the corruption of value that capitalist commodity fetishism has created for labor, the individual, and the product

**Rosenberg and Villarejo 12** (Jordana Rosenberg, MA and PhD from Cornell University, and a BA from Wesleyan University. She is the recipient of an Ahmanson-Getty Fellowship from the Center for Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Studies at UCLA (2009- 2010), as well as a Marion and Jasper Whiting Foundation Award, the Catherine Macaulay Prize, and a William Andrews Clark Memorial Library Joint Fellowship Award. Professor Rosenberg's fields of research and teaching include eighteenth-century transatlantic literature and poetry, moral philosophy, political theory, early modern materialism, Marxism, and secularization; Amy Villarejo, Associate Professor in Film and Feminist, Gender, & Sexuality Studies Program. She received her B.A. in English from Bryn Mawr College in 1985, an M.A. in English from the University of Pittsburgh in 1991, and a Ph.D. in Critical and Cultural Studies (in the Film Studies Program) from the University of Pittsburgh in 1997, when she came to Cornell GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 18, Number 1,2012, Published by Duke University Press, “Introduction: Queerness, Norms, Utopia”)

If this special issue seeks to test **the impact of economic analyses on queer theory** — and vice versa — it resolutely does not seek to mark a new orthodoxy for cultural critique. At bottom, we propose that **political philosophy and queer theory together offer powerful ideas for addressing problems of justice, redistribution, and recognition**. **A key idea** that threads through this project — and one that links the above issues and points of departure — **is that of the value form**. As Gayatri Spivak has commented, “The question of value is everywhere. I mean, **there is a value theory of everything, not just a value theory of labor. Because value, simple and contentless, is just a form in use when things are made commensurable**.”28 **The value theory of labor** (as Spivak calls it, reversing the usual order of reference) or labor theory of value (which appears to restrict the latter by the former) **suggests that human labor-power**, the capacity to work, **is what predicates the worker**/ subject; it is what workers/subjects are **because it is what they have to sell. This is labor objectified, labor deadened.** **As people are reified, commodities come to life, and the world of things appears independent**. **But there is more to Marx’s understanding of commodity fetishism than this: these outward appearances of commodities conceal their inner relations, but furthermore these mystifying appearances themselves also and crucially belong to the social realities they conceal. Queer studies has established hermeneutics and methodologies that are particularly sensitive to the imbrication of these social bonds with the economic structures of capitalism.** And the questions originally opened by theories of sexuality rooted in social and economic analysis — like Foucault’s, D’Emilio’s, and Rubin’s — continually press us to reimagine and retheorize the conditions of capitalist modernity and the mediation of these economic structures by sexuality and gender. Indeed, if queer studies has recently engaged with renewed vigor the analytic categories of relations, bonds, and affects, this special issue specifies, historicizes, and analytically situates these bonds, relations, and affects in terms of the contradictions of the value-form: in terms of affective value, the value of labor, and the value of social relationships. In thus framing our issue, we take inspiration from such theorists as Wahneema Lubiano, who has noted how insistently the wage/labor ethos is gendered and how “without any specific contextualization, work is presented as its own absolute good, because work and ownership are what empower men to make decisions, to exercise freedom.”29 Following on a dazzling body of thought from Friedrich Engels (in The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State) to Luce Irigaray (e.g., in her essay “When the Goods Get Together”), Lubiano sees lodged within the production of value a spectrum of human relationality and social regulation not fully captured by the identity-labels of gender, sexuality, race, and kinship or family.

**AT Capitalism inevitable- Using queer theory as a pivot to the various sectors of social value allows us to wake up to the Capitalistic death drive that most consider “inevitable”**

**Rosenberg and Villarejo 12** (Jordana Rosenberg, MA and PhD from Cornell University, and a BA from Wesleyan University. She is the recipient of an Ahmanson-Getty Fellowship from the Center for Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Studies at UCLA (2009- 2010), as well as a Marion and Jasper Whiting Foundation Award, the Catherine Macaulay Prize, and a William Andrews Clark Memorial Library Joint Fellowship Award. Professor Rosenberg's fields of research and teaching include eighteenth-century transatlantic literature and poetry, moral philosophy, political theory, early modern materialism, Marxism, and secularization; Amy Villarejo, Associate Professor in Film and Feminist, Gender, & Sexuality Studies Program. She received her B.A. in English from Bryn Mawr College in 1985, an M.A. in English from the University of Pittsburgh in 1991, and a Ph.D. in Critical and Cultural Studies (in the Film Studies Program) from the University of Pittsburgh in 1997, when she came to Cornell GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 18, Number 1,2012, Published by Duke University Press, “Introduction: Queerness, Norms, Utopia”)

**Lubiano**, like Spivak, **proposes gender and sexuality as internal, necessary to producing both value and freedom.** In her essay for this special issue, Carla Freccero uses the question of value as the occasion to take stock of the spectralization of queers: both in popular culture and in queer theory of the past twenty years. Rather than resist how culture dematerializes queerness, Freccero reclaims this abstraction as the ground for future historiographical work and posits a new theory of queer materiality. In an astounding queer constellation that ranges from an early modern treatise on the family to Louis Althusser, Slavoj Žižek, Jameson, and Irigaray, Freccero traverses the difficult divide between “subject” and “collectivity,” exploring both contemporary and traditional sites where commodity exchange, sexual difference, and sexuality/desire converge. Janet Jakobsen, too, asserts that **sexual relations are part of, not prior or ancillary to, the relations of production**, relying on the economist David Ruccio’s work to understand the historical matrix of social and sexual relations. In an account that spans the inception of Protestant rationality to the contemporary conditions of what she terms the “secular” Protestantism in the United States, Jakobsen **consider**s **heteronormativity** as a name for this matrix. That is, **by understanding sex as a kind of fulcrum or nodal point among saliently interrelated but discontinuous vectors of social life (economic value, moral value, the predication of the subject, the formation of public policy**), Jakobsen **enables us to understand how fully heteronormativity has saturated the realm of late-capitalist production**. Her strong reading of this historical matrix of social and sexual life usefully proliferates further questions. Some are corrective: to what extent does Marx naturalize “the family” as a restrictive model of social organization or follow heteroreproductive logic, where queers are pathologized as non(re)productive? Some inquire into abstraction as such: can we press the value form into new service for thinking desire and sexuality? What routes, following these strands of feminist and queer theory (including the work of Gayle Rubin, Judith Butler, and others), allow for analyses of immaterial labor (or affective labor) that do not merely analogize them with material labor (or claim to supersede it)? Grace Kyungwon Hong’s essay, “Existentially Surplus,” proposes “irrationality” as one rubric that helpfully propels this inquiry. Like the contributors we have been discussing, Hong is energized by a diverse lineage of thought, from Marx himself to queer of color critique. The latter, particularly Ferguson’s Aberrations in Black, enables her to understand the production of surplus forms of life within capitalist social relations. **Capitalism’s death drive, or its irrationality, which is not external but endemic, rears its head in the specific politico-historical formation we call neoliberalism as disposability**: following Zygmunt Bauman, Hong sees mass disposability, or **the production of new categories of disposable people, as fundamental to the globalization of capital**. Her ultimate question, then, has to do with the utility of the categories of race, gender, and sexuality in naming these vectors of valuation in the present moment. **To be surplus**, in other words, **is to be raced, gendered, and sexualized,** as she says, “in ways both old and new.” We should not be surprised that Hong turns to Cherríe Moraga’s body of work (across genres and decades), since Moraga’s relentless and passionate voice has shaped crucial strains of feminist, queer, Chicana activism and art practice since the 1980s. What Hong finds in it for her project is **the very dialectic of loss and utopia** (or “making tribe”) we cited earlier in this introduction, **now crucially mediated through a discourse on death that is key**, in Hong’s understanding, **to the condition of being surplus**.

## Role of the Ballot

### Thought Key

**The idea of something other than capitalism is key to $olve.**

**Kang ’11** (Liu Kang, professor of asian and middle east studies at Duke University, citing Slavoj Zizek, Professor of Sociology at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana University, “Poeticizing Revolution: Zizek’s misreading of Mao and China” Duke University Press, winter 2011)

The March ­‑‑Conference on the Idea of Communism organized by¶ Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou at Birkbeck College, University of London,¶ was planned as an academic event but turned out to be an immense media¶ hype. As one Guardian reporter put it, “The hottest ticket in London this¶ weekend is not for a pop singer or a football match but for a conference on¶ communism which brings together some of the world’s leading Marxist academics.”¶ 1 One year later, the Chinese newspaper Zhongguo shehui kexue bao¶ (Chinese Social Sciences News) reported that **Žižek delivered another speech¶ at Birkbeck College, titled “On the Idea of Communism: A Year After.**”¶ The newspaper, with only several thousand subscribers among Chinese academics,¶ labeled the event “The Return of Communism,” highlighting the¶ conference’s dramatic end, “when Žižek led the choir singing ‘The Internationale.’¶ ”2 Back to March ­‑‑. The Financial Times carried a weekendcolumn by its news editor, “Lunch with the FT: Slavoj Žižek,” with the¶ following concluding remarks: **“The role of philosophers, as [Žižek] sees it,¶ is to help clarify the questions that societies should ask and force us to think,¶ rather than conjuring up ready- made solutions to all our problems. ‘I feel¶ like a magician who is only producing hats and never rabbits,’ he says.”3 The¶ more scholarly review from Criticism echoed the Financial Times in assessing¶ the performance of the “magician”: “Part of the appeal of events such as¶ this conference is simply that they give us an opportunity to see academic¶ superstars in action.** From this perspective, ‘On the Idea of Communism’¶ did not disappoint. Slavoj Žižek was in ne form, manic and excited, and¶ so full of a kind of outward- directed energy that I didn’t really mind his¶ overbearingness.”4 The reviewer reiterated that **Žižek’s purpose was “not¶ to engage in discussion of actual political programs, or to intervene in the¶ harsh realities of day- by- day social and political struggles, but to consider¶ how the philosophical idea, or ideal, of communism might be revitalized¶ and made useful in the twenty- rst century.”5**

### Students Key

#### The educational setting is key to shaping our views for the future. Rejection now is key to changing us and the system in the future.

**Nozick ’98** (Robert Nozick, Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, “Why do Intillectuals oppose capitalism?” Cato policy report, January/February 1998, http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy\_report/cpr-20n1-1.html)

There is a further point to be added. **The (future) wordsmith intellectuals are successful within the formal, official social system of the schools,** wherein the relevant rewards are distributed by the central authority of the teacher. **The schools contain another informal social system within classrooms, hallways, and schoolyards, wherein rewards are distributed not by central direction but spontaneously at the pleasure and whim of schoolmates.** Here the intellectuals do less well.¶ It is not surprising, therefore, that distribution of goods and rewards via a centrally organized distributional mechanism later strikes intellectuals as more appropriate than the "anarchy and chaos" of the marketplace. For distribution in a centrally planned socialist society stands to distribution in a capitalist society as distribution by the teacher stands to distribution by the schoolyard and hallway.¶ Our explanation does not postulate that (future) intellectuals constitute a majority even of the academic upper class of the school. This group may consist mostly of those with substantial (but not overwhelming) bookish skills along with social grace, strong motivation to please, friendliness, winning ways, and an ability to play by (and to seem to be following) the rules. Such pupils, too, will be highly regarded and rewarded by the teacher, and they will do extremely well in the wider society, as well. (And do well within the informal social system of the school. So they will not especially accept the norms of the school's formal system.) Our explanation hypothesizes that (future) intellectuals are disproportionately represented in that portion of the schools' (official) upper class that will experience relative downward mobility. Or, rather, in the group that predicts for itself a declining future. The animus will arise before the move into the wider world and the experience of an actual decline in status, at the point when the clever pupil realizes he (probably) will fare less well in the wider society than in his current school situation. This unintended consequence of the school system, the anti-capitalist animus of intellectuals, is, of course, reinforced when pupils read or are taught by intellectuals who present those very anti-capitalist attitudes.¶ **No doubt, some wordsmith intellectuals were cantankerous and questioning pupils and so were disapproved of by their teachers. Did they too learn the lesson that the best should get the highest rewards and think, despite their teachers, that they themselves were best and so start with an early resentment against the school system's distribution? Clearly, on this and the other issues discussed here, we need data on the school experiences of future wordsmith intellectuals to refine and test our hypotheses.**¶ Stated as a general point, it is hardly contestable that the norms within schools will affect the normative beliefs of people after they leave the schools. The schools, after all, are the major non-familial society that children learn to operate in, and hence schooling constitutes their preparation for the larger non-familial society. It is not surprising that those successful by the norms of a school system should resent a society, adhering to different norms, which does not grant them the same success. Nor, when those are the very ones who go on to shape a society's self-image, its evaluation of itself, is it surprising when the society's verbally responsive portion turns against it**. If you were designing a society, you would not seek to design it so that the wordsmiths, with all their influence, were schooled into animus against the norms of the society.**

### Individuals Key

#### It is the role of the individual to re-envision capitalism – only through individual abstraction can we tear down the system

Li ’12 (Diana Li, Staff writer for Yale daily news; citing Slavoj Zizek, Professor of Sociology at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana University; “Zizek Calls for Reexamination of Capitalism” Yale Daily News, 4/18/12, http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2012/apr/18/zizek-calls-for-reexamination-of-capitalism/)

Philosopher and former Slovenian presidential candidate Slavoj Žižek explained his concerns with the current state of capitalism Tuesday night.¶ In Sheffield-Sterling-Strathcona Hall room 114 packed with Yale undergraduates and prospective freshmen, Žižek and members of the Yale Political Union debated whether capitalism is the “opiate of the masses.” Žižek argued that capitalism and democracy are no longer synonymous — since nations like China and Singapore are developing capitalist economies but are not democratic governments — and that capitalist systems should be reexamined. While he offered no clear revision of what capitalism should look like, Žižek maintained that people need to consider how the system could radically change from its current state.¶ “I am afraid that this eternal marriage between democracy and capitalism is slowly coming to an end,” he said. “We have to reinvent capitalism.”¶ Žižek emphasized that an inability to assess capitalism critically and to consider radical changes to the system have repeatedly caused Western nations to advocate ineffective solutions to the challenges they face. New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, Žižek noted, has argued that even if people had known in the early 2000s that their actions would cause a recession to strike in 2008, they would not have acted differently because of an inability to redefine the capitalist mindset.¶ He cited the European Union’s proposed plans to stabilize Greece’s economy as another example.¶ “Everyone knows these plans are total bulls---,” Žižek said. “They won’t work, and everyone knows this, but nonetheless we pretend to believe.”¶ Žižek said few members of Western societies can imagine a shift in the deeply entrenched capitalist mindset, one he said people accept and practice without questioning. But he said the most important step for people of Western countries to take today is to “start being engaged in radical dreams” rather than resisting change.¶ “We can imagine the end of the earth, or the end of the world — that’s all very easy to imagine,” he said. “But to imagine a small change in capitalism, in the market, is impossible for us.”¶ The Chinese government, on the other hand, introduced a law in April 2011 that prohibited artistic works that involved alternate universes or time travel, Žižek said. He described the law as an attempt to discourage Chinese citizens from imagining how their lives could change, but he added that the law and the government’s concern also demonstrated that the Chinese people are “still at least able to dream.”¶ Žižek attributed part of the failure to question capitalism to the extensive influence of powerful government officials. For example, he said Congress was at first strongly against the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, a $787 billion stimulus package intended to stimulate jobs and spur the economy, but that President Barack Obama and former President George W. Bush, among others, persuaded Congress to pass the act.¶ Žižek cautioned against creating atmospheres in which individuals can wield disproportionate influence, which he said skews democratic processes and damages the capitalist system.¶ “It’s so easy to blame people. The problem is not people like Bernie Madoff — there were always people like that,” Žižek said. “It was the social context that allowed him to do what he did that was the problem.”¶ Four students interviewed said they thought Žižek was a dynamic speaker who expressed his concerns with capitalism persuasively and succinctly.¶ “I think he really shook people’s understandings about the structures that affect their lives and called on us to ask more radical questions, which maybe had a tint of irony on Bulldog Days at an esteemed Ivy League school, but was important to say and hear nevertheless,” said Elias Kleinbock ’14, a member of the Party of the Left.¶ Three prospective freshmen said they were similarly impressed by Žižek’s speech. Zach Plyam ’16 said Žižek kept his discussion “light-hearted” while making important points about redefining the capitalist system.¶ Žižek ran for president of Slovenia in its first free elections in 1990.

## AT - Perm

#### Perm fails – politicizing the revolution causes failure, only on the intellectual level can we create real change

Shumway ‘7 (David R. Shumway, professor of English, and Literary and Cultural Studies, and Director of Humanities Center at Carnegie Mellon University, “Marxism without Revolution: Towards a History of Discouragement”, University of Nebraska Press, 2007)

Fredric Jameson has asserted the need for a theory of discouragement.¶ I will leave the theorizing to him and follow instead another¶ Jamesonian command, the one that says, “always historicize.” I will¶ argue, however, that our present discouragement is not rooted¶ especially in any current conjuncture—though I do not wish to deny¶ that recent events have been especially discouraging—but rather in¶ something like the “longue durée” of the intellectual and Marxism. In¶ other words, my basic argument is that discouragement is built into both¶ the politics and social position that we have inherited. By “we,” I mean¶ practitioners of cultural studies and other left-wing or liberal¶ intellectuals—not just Marxists—who I will claim continue to understand¶ their political role much as Marxism has defined it.¶ There are two conditions that have come to define the critical¶ intellectual as always already discouraged. One of these involves the¶ role of critic or interpreter that intellectuals have historically defined for¶ themselves and the countervailing desire to have an impact on politics,¶ or what has come to be called in recent theory, agency. The other¶ involves the failure of history to conform to the Marxist prediction of¶ revolution or even to the liberal faith in progress. Here a broader¶ concept of historical agency is thrown into question, as the working class¶ failed to achieve its world-historical mission. I will suggest that these¶ two conditions are related, and that they combine to produce a sort of¶ paralysis, a pessimism of the will despite Gramsci’s formula.¶ As Zygmunt Bauman has shown, Western intellectuals have¶ constituted themselves in the space between two opposing identities, the¶ interpreter and the legislator. The interpreters are the more numerousparty, and when we speak of intellectuals, we normally mean this¶ group. As interpreters, intellectuals have placed themselves outside of¶ the political process except as producers of critical discourse. This has¶ allowed them to remain independent of government and often even¶ parties or interest groups, save their own. The legislators, on the other¶ hand, sought to enact their ideas by joining the government. Those¶ who did so successfully found themselves facing the need to¶ compromise the critical positions that they developed before becoming¶ part of the state. As a result, their identity as intellectuals came into¶ question, while their actual activities seldom resulted in what seemed to¶ them significant change.

**AT Perm: Any attempt to do the plan will still link to capitalism**

**Péteri, 08** (György Péteri, PROFESSOR CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN HISTORY, DIRECTOR PROGRAM ON EAST EUROPEAN CULTURES & SOCIETIES NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Volume 9, Number 4, Fall 2008 (New Series), pp. 929-937 (Article), Published by Slavica Publishers, “The Occident Withinâ€”or the Drive for Exceptionalism and Modernity”)

**Socialism**, in short, **had to cease to be a state of scarcity**, austerity, and drabness; **it had to satisfy individual daily needs** so that **the emphasis laid on cultural and collective needs**, and their collective fulfillment, might be seen to be genuine. **But as it moved in that direction it also had to demonstrate that the socialist pattern of consumption was not a tardy imitation but an innovation qualitatively superior to the capitalist pattern**. **Thus far this demonstration has been lacking.** **Everything has happened as though production and consumption policy, even in its long-term implications, was mainly an imitation of capitalism.** **Priority has been given to the type of individual equipment popularized by so called affluent capitalism.** This was normal **in the case of such things as bicycles, motorcycles**, radios, and canned foods but less so in the case of cameras, refrigerators, and individual washing machines, since the housing shortage and smallness of apartments create acute problems for the town dweller, **and since the installation and improvement of cheap collective services—such as public transport**, shops, nursery schools, house canteens or restaurants, delivery laundries—**would free women from domestic chores and hold greater advantage on all levels**. Why, for example, was it thought necessary to produce washing machines, notably in the USSR and Czechoslovakia? And why, since the dismissal of Khrushchev (who had different views on this particular matter), has the USSR been concerned with the development of private motoring?

## AT- Inevitable

**It’s not too late, growing opposition key to unveil capitalism in its true monstrosity.**

**Rosenberg and Villarejo 12** (Jordana Rosenberg, MA and PhD from Cornell University, and a BA from Wesleyan University. She is the recipient of an Ahmanson-Getty Fellowship from the Center for Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Studies at UCLA (2009- 2010), as well as a Marion and Jasper Whiting Foundation Award, the Catherine Macaulay Prize, and a William Andrews Clark Memorial Library Joint Fellowship Award. Professor Rosenberg's fields of research and teaching include eighteenth-century transatlantic literature and poetry, moral philosophy, political theory, early modern materialism, Marxism, and secularization; Amy Villarejo, Associate Professor in Film and Feminist, Gender, & Sexuality Studies Program. She received her B.A. in English from Bryn Mawr College in 1985, an M.A. in English from the University of Pittsburgh in 1991, and a Ph.D. in Critical and Cultural Studies (in the Film Studies Program) from the University of Pittsburgh in 1997, when she came to Cornell GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, Volume 18, Number 1,2012, Published by Duke University Press, “Introduction: Queerness, Norms, Utopia”)

**For even as neoliberal capitalism conscripts subjects to wage slavery, encloses commons, seizes resources, and consigns populations to death and dispossession, movements for resistance and liberation form and flourish in opposition to these depredations**. And, informed by such activist interventions, t**here has been in recent years a wealth of work documenting, defying, and exposing the specificities of neoliberal capitalism and its various poisonous strategies.** The dimensions of neoliberalism as an ideology, a politics, and an economic tactic have been eloquently and passionately analyzed in articles and in book-length **studies** both inside and outside queer studies. Lisa Duggan, David Eng, Jodi Melamed, Jasbir Puar, and Nikhil Pal Singh **have shown how “neoliberal multiculturalism” masks capitalism’s structural reliance on racism and imperialism in its seemingly endless quest to create and sustain profits**.5 Heterodox economists, historians, and critical geographers such as Gopal Balakrishnan, David Harvey, Anwar M. Shaikh and E. Ahmed Tonak, Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy, Chris Harman, and Giovanni Arrighi have charted how financialization, the permanent arms economy, falling profits, stagnant real wages, and the debt economy have convulsed the globe for decades. And, constellating the concerns of American studies, ethnic studies, and queer studies, critics like Roderick Ferguson, Kevin Floyd, Miranda Joseph, and José Muñoz have interrogated the historical lapses of political economy and Marxism in thinking gender, race, and sexuality.6 Such work has initiated critical rapprochements between Marxism and queer studies, through readings of cultural texts marked by neoliberalism’s inception and rise. Thus burdened with the miseries of neoliberal capitalism — and buoyed by the uprisings, liberation movements, and thriving critical approaches that interrogate and resist neoliberalism’s spoliations and havoc — “Queer Studies and the Crises of Capitalism” translates these contradictory castings into a robust engagement with the capitalism in “neoliberal capitalism.” We take to heart Melamed’s acute rendering of the forces of neoliberal multiculturalism, which, in “suturing liberal antiracism to U.S. nationalism,” “depoliticizes capitalism by collapsing it with Americanism” (6). This special issue works to resist such depoliticization by specifying, along with Melamed, that neoliberalism is a qualifier for the more precise analytic and historical category of neoliberal capitalism. For, as Nikhil Pal Singh has argued, “liberalism insists on divorcing universal questions of individual rights from a historical context of unequal property relations and . . . primitive capital accumulation” (28). This is a divorce we must not repeat in our own work. **Liberal ideology longs to veil the violence of capitalism from view, leaving only fantasies about nationalism and the naturalized fiction of a free market in its place**. **Our analytic response to such veilings must be to push capitalism always to the foreground as not simply an object of analysis but as the ground and condition of such analysis as well.** To this end, “Queer Studies and the Crises of Capitalism” invokes quite specifically the Marxist, anticapitalist, and left lineages of thinking neoliberalism. **Neoliberalism, that is, is always neoliberal capitalism.**

# Affirmative

## Inevitable

#### The revolution isn’t coming - capitalism will never die in the United States – despite Marxist expectations of revolution. :’(

Shumway ‘7 (David R. Shumway, professor of English, and Literary and Cultural Studies, and Director of Humanities Center at Carnegie Mellon University, “Marxism without Revolution: Towards a History of Discouragement”, University of Nebraska Press, 2007)

The name “late capitalism “ has only in the last fifty or so years¶ come into Marxist parlance, but the idea—that capitalism’s end is¶ near—is as old as Marxism itself.1 This conception is wedded to the¶ expectation of revolution, and it is a chief condition for discouragement.¶ I want to make two points that undermine the idea that we are entitled¶ to speak of the capitalism of twentieth or twenty-first centuries as “late.“¶ The first point suggests that Marxism’s historic expectation that¶ revolution is just around the corner is theoretically suspect because it¶ derives more from the paradigm Marx borrowed from Hegel and from¶ the memory of the relatively recent French revolution than it does from¶ an actual analysis of the contemporary political and economic situation.¶ Here, a comparison with the history of Christianity is invoked not only¶ to show its influence on Marx (via Hegel) but also to suggest how¶ Marxism might survive after having given up its hope of imminent¶ revolution. The second point is that the history of the United¶ States—presumably the leading instance of capitalism—in the twentieth¶ century does not give us grounds for thinking that a successful¶ revolution of the sort Marxism has imagined might have occurred. The¶ problem is not that capitalism lacks the contradictions and attendant¶ crises that might have brought down the state, but that there is no¶ reason to believe that a genuinely socialist, much less communist,¶ society could have been built in its place.

#### Capitalism is part of human nature – 3 reasons

Wilkinson ‘5 (Will Wilkinson, Center for Trade Policy at Cato Institute, “Capitalism and Human Nature”, Cato Institute, Cato Policy Report January/February 2005, http://www.cato.org/research/articles/wilkinson-050201.html)

We are Coalitional¶ The size of hunter-gather bands in the EEA ranged from 25 to about 150 people. The small size of those groups ensured that everyone would know everyone else; that social interactions would be conducted face-to-face; and that reputations for honesty, hard work, and reliability would be common knowledge. Even today, people's address books usually contain no more than 150 names. And military squadrons generally contain about as many people as Pleistocene hunting expeditions.¶ Experiments by psychologists Leda Cosmides and Robert Kurzban have shown that human beings have specialized abilities to track shifting alliances and coalitions, and are eager to define others as inside or outside their own groups. Coalitional categories can easily lead to violence and war between groups. Think of Hutus and Tutsis, Albanians and Serbs, Shiites and Sunnis, Crips and the Bloods, and so on ad nauseam. However, coalitional categories are fairly fluid. Under the right circumstances, we can learn to care more about someone's devotion to the Red Sox or Yankees than their skin color, religion, or social class.¶ We cannot, however, consistently think of ourselves as members only of that one grand coalition: the Brotherhood of Mankind. Our disposition to think in terms of "us" versus "them" is irremediable and it has unavoidable political implications. Populist and racialist political rhetoric encourages people to identify themselves as primarily rich or poor, black or white. It is important to avoid designing institutions, such as racial preference programs, that reinforce coalitional categories that have no basis in biology and may heighten some of the tensions they are meant to relax. A great deal of the animosity toward free trade, to take a different example, depends on economically and morally inappropriate coalitional distinctions between workers in Baltimore (us) and workers in Bangalore (them). Positively, free trade is laudable for the way it encourages us to see to members of unfamiliar groups as partners, not enemies.¶ We are Hierarchical¶ Like many animals and all primates, humans form hierarchies of dominance. It is easy to recognize social hierarchies in modern life. Corporations, government, chess clubs, and churches all have formal hierarchical structures of officers. Informal structures of dominance and status may be the leading cause of tears in junior high students.¶ The dynamics of dominance hierarchies in the EEA was complex. Hierarchies play an important role in guiding collective efforts and distributing scarce resources without having to resort to violence. Daily affairs run more smoothly if everyone knows what is expected of him. However, space at the top of the hierarchy is scarce and a source of conflict and competition. Those who command higher status in social hierarchies have better access to material resources and mating opportunities. Thus, evolution favors the psychology of males and females who are able successfully to compete for positions of dominance.¶ Living at the bottom of the dominance heap is a raw deal, and we are not built to take it lying down. There is evidence that lower status males naturally form coalitions to check the power of more dominant males and to achieve relatively egalitarian distribution of resources. In his book Hierarchy in the Forest, anthropologist Christopher Boehm calls these coalitions against the powerful "reverse dominance hierarchies."¶ Emory professor of economics and law Paul Rubin usefully distinguishes between "productive" and "allocative" hierarchies. Productive hierarchies are those that organize cooperative efforts to achieve otherwise unattainable mutually advantageous gains. Business organizations are a prime example. Allocative hierarchies, on the other hand, exist mainly to transfer resources to the top. Aristocracies and dictatorships are extreme examples. Although the nation-state can perform productive functions, there is the constant risk that it becomes dominated by allocative hierarchies. Rubin warns that our natural wariness of zero-sum allocative hierarchies, which helps us to guard against the concentration of power in too few hands, is often directed at modern positive-sum productive hierarchies, like corporations, thereby threatening the viability of enterprises that tend to make everyone better off.¶ There is no way to stop dominance-seeking behavior. We may hope only to channel it to non-harmful uses. A free society therefore requires that positions of dominance and status be widely available in a multitude of productive hierarchies, and that opportunities for greater status and dominance through predation are limited by the constant vigilance of "the people"—the ultimate reverse dominance hierarchy. A flourishing civil society permits almost everyone to be the leader of something, whether the local Star Trek fan club or the city council, thereby somewhat satisfying the human taste for hierarchical status, but to no one's serious detriment.¶ We are Envious Zero-sum Thinkers¶ Perhaps the most depressing lesson of evolutionary psychology for politics is found in its account of the deep-seated human capacity for envy and, related, of our difficulty in understanding the idea of gains from trade and increases in productivity—the idea of an ever-expanding "pie" of wealth.¶ There is evidence that greater skill and initiative could lead to higher status and bigger shares of resources for an individual in the EEA. But because of the social nature of hunting and gathering, the fact that food spoiled quickly, and the utter absence of privacy, the benefits of individual success in hunting or foraging could not be easily internalized by the individual, and were expected to be shared. The EEA was for the most part a zero-sum world, where increases in total wealth through invention, investment, and extended economic exchange were totally unknown. More for you was less for me. Therefore, if anyone managed to acquire a great deal more than anyone else, that was pretty good evidence that theirs was a stash of ill-gotten gains, acquired by cheating, stealing, raw force, or, at best, sheer luck. Envy of the disproportionately wealthy may have helped to reinforce generally adaptive norms of sharing and to help those of lower status on the dominance hierarchy guard against further predation by those able to amass power.¶ Our zero-sum mentality makes it hard for us to understand how trade and investment can increase the amount of total wealth. We are thus ill-equipped to easily understand our own economic system.¶ These features of human nature—that we are coalitional, hierarchical, and envious zero-sum thinkers—would seem to make liberal capitalism extremely unlikely. And it is. However, the benefits of a liberal market order can be seen in a few further features of the human mind and social organization in the EEA.

## Alternative Fails

#### Simply thinking about the problem won’t generate change – only action will solve

Kliman ‘04 (Andrew, PhD, Professor of Economics at Pace University Andrew Kliman’s Writings, “Alternatives to Capitalism: What Happens After the Revolution?” http://akliman.squarespace.com/writings/)

Thus the reason of the masses is posing a new challenge to the movement from theory. When masses of people require reasons before they act, a new human society surely cannot arise through spontaneous action alone. And exposing the ills of existing society does not provide sufficient reason for action when what is at issue is the very possibility of an alternative. If the movement from theory is to respond adequately to the challenge arising from below, it is necessary to abandon the presupposition – and it seems to me to be no more than a presupposition – that the vision of the new society cannot be concretized through the mediation of cognition. We need to take seriously Raya Dunayevskaya’s (Power of Negativity [PON], p. 184) claim in her Hegel Society of America paper that “There is no trap in thought. Though it is finite, it breaks through the barriers of the given, reaches out, if not to infinity, surely beyond the historic moment” (RD, PON, p. 184). This, too, is a presupposition that can be “proved” or “disproved” only in the light of the results it yields. In the meantime, the challenges from below require us to proceed on its basis.

**The alternative fails; rejection of capitalism just creates a worse, more ineffective system of bad capitalism; the capitalist system is too ingrained in our infrastructure for any country or state to reject it- empirics**

**Péteri, 08** (György Péteri, PROFESSOR CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN HISTORY, DIRECTOR PROGRAM ON EAST EUROPEAN CULTURES & SOCIETIES NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Volume 9, Number 4, Fall 2008 (New Series), pp. 929-937 (Article), Published by Slavica Publishers, “The Occident Withinâ€”or the Drive for Exceptionalism and Modernity”)

Indeed, as David Crowley puts it, **a “hybrid form of modernity” seemed to be emerging**, generated by what Václav Havel saw as the “historical encounter between dictatorship and consumer society” (791). Of course, in **terms of the master narrative of the socialist project, this kind of modernity was not only unbecoming** (such “hybrids” were produced at the time at a number of places, as in Franco’s Spain or in the Colonels’ Greece) **but also quite displeasing and disturbing in terms of its obvious destructive potential for socialism’s systemic integrity and identity**. In Paulina Bren’s rendering, the communist leadership of “normalized” Czechoslovakia appears to have found an answer to the vexing problem of combining the consumerist turn with sustained systemic exceptionalism. According to her argument, Gustav Husák and his regime recognized that **competition with the West in terms of consumerism would have been a futile enterprise**. Therefore, and unlike their East German counterparts (who were compelled to take up the glove of the West because of their population’s much more direct and intensive exposure to demonstration effects from West Germany), the Czechoslovak normalization regime put the emphasis on what it termed the “socialist lifestyle,” with “self-realization” at its core. **Normalization’s “society of social comforts”** (full employment, blind or half-blind eyes turned toward low work discipline, low work intensity, low productivity and quality, cheap subsidized housing, and services, etc.) **was supposed to provide things the West did not provide. Although this fits well with the “timeless” and general pattern** (which also applies to the GD R) **of emphasizing** (and overvaluing) **items of collective consumption and socialist welfare as opposed to personal consumption, it did not, because it could not, constitute an effective way to absorb all the insecurity caused by the advent of consumerism and the lack of collective** (systemically correct) **forms of appropriating (consuming) the goods that constituted the icons of modern everyday life.** In terms of discursive practices there was in fact a response coming in the late 1960s and during the 1970s. This took various forms: (a) a major wave of publications trying to assert the exceptionalism (systemic identity) of socialist society against contemporary social (“bourgeois”) theories of modernity (“stages of growth,” “industrial, consumer, postindustrial societies,” and various convergence theories); (b) ambitious national and international (Comecon) projects, conducted mostly by sociologists, to study prevailing “ways of life” or “lifestyles” in the socialist countries empirically, in the hope of generating insights that could be helpful in defining what the “socialist way of life” or “lifestyle” might be and what it should be; and (c) attempts to develop a Marxist-Leninist theory of the “socialist mode of consumption.” **The failure effectively to meet the systemic challenge of the West on the “fronts” of everyday life and consumption had partly to do with the fact that these discursive responses came too late to affect what had by then become well-established practices of policy and everyday life.** To cite **an example from the history of automobilism—in Hungary, in the mid-1950s**, when there were only between 1,800 and 2,400 cars in private ownership, **it would have been still feasible to try and steer the development of automobilism along a collectivist design** similar to Khrushchev’s (with major investments to develop readily available and accessible taxi- and car-rental services side by side with the expansion and thorough modernization of the infrastructure and of public transportation services). **By the early 1970s, however, when the number of cars in private hands** exceeded 250,000 and **constituted almost 90 percent of personal cars, the chance to put forward a genuine alternative to the “Western” pattern had been reduced to nil.** Yet, although economic–technological inertia is an important consideration, we would be mistaken to believe that it alone could explain the blurring of systemic boundaries when it came to basic patterns and tendencies of consumption. In the societies of state socialism, where the middle classes (the state-dependent *Bildungs-* and *Statusbürgertum*) were the main beneficiaries of the consumerist turn of the 1960s, where the party-state’s elites were commuting from their homes to workplaces and dachas in the latest Mercedes, and where even lower level officials enjoyed and used their privileges to jump ahead of commoners on the waiting lists for private cars, t**he West was not merely a “mirror” to be used for contrasts and comparisons. However much discourses of systemic identity had to insist on construing the West as the constitutive other, on mapping it without, and on representing it as socialism’s past, the Occident was also part of the self, it asserted itself within, and appeared to be ahead rather than behind.** **State-socialist socio-economic modernization** followed deliberately and programmatically the universal standards of technological and economic success. In this respect it **never transcended, never even aimed beyond, the material culture of capitalism**—rather, it defined itself as a faster, because more rational and more efficient, path in the same direction. Thanks to its early, strong productivist bias (in economic as well as discursive practices), to the pressing needs to pacify societies that had been excessively exploited, oppressed, and harassed during the Stalin years, and to the self-interests of the middle-classes (particularly of the political class of the party-state), **the feeble attempts** in the second half of the 1950s and the early 1960s (under N. S. Khrushchev) **to define new socialist forms for modern everyday life and consumption, to develop the practices of an alternative, socialist “mode of life,” remained unfinished and were then altogether abandoned**. The retrograde nature of the Brezhnev era in this respect is manifest in the nervous and brutal reactions of these regimes particularly against those who tried on a Marxian platform to discuss problems of alienation, everyday life, and human needs, and who tried to present arguments for and ideas of social experimentation in order to promote the development of alternatives to (capitalist) consumerism. Because of the discursive and policy vacuum thus created, the Occident could assert itself also in the dreams, desires, values, and practices of various social groups. Having been to a great extent the child of and shaped by the standards and patterns of the Occident, the rebellious **project of socialism not only failed to be “antimodern**” (which it never wished to be), **but it also failed to provide a workable way toward an alternative modernity. It lost the race for modernity as it failed to assert its systemic exceptionalism by way of offering viable alternatives for everyday life**. **The result was aptly summed up in a joke** that circulated in Budapest in the late 1980s: “Q: **What is socialism?** A: **It is a particularly long and painful transition from capitalism to capitalism**.” Remarkably enough, what makes this joke really funny is its sarcastic resonance with the master narrative of socialism.

**Alt Fails: Capitalism’s adaptability means that rejecting capitalism turns the discussion away from defeating capitalism into studying socialism. The alt doesn’t reject capitalism, but looks the other way.**

**Fukuyama 92** (Francis Fukuyama is a resident consultant to the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C. He has previously been deputy director of the U.S. State Department's policy planning staff, a senior staff member in the political science department at RAND, and a graduate fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. His 1989 article "The End of History?" has been translated into many languages and has become the subject of controversy around the worM. He has just published a fuller exposition of his views on this theme in The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992), Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press, July 1992, “Capitalism & Democracy: The Missing Link” Journal of Democracy, Volume 3, Number 3, pp. 100-110)

But **while socialism was able to produce the level of industrialization represented by the American midwestern "rust belt**"--steel, chemicals, tractors, and the like--**its failure as an economic system lay in its inability to achieve subsequent levels of industrial modernity**. In **predicting that socialism would ultimately replace capitalism**, Schumpeter **failed to anticipate the emergence of what has been variously labeled "postindustrial society," the "information age," the "technetronic era,"** and so forth. **Economic life** in the second half of the twentieth century **came to be far more complex and information-intensive, oriented toward services rather than manufacturing, and dependent on dizzying rates of technological innovation to maintain productivity gains and growth**. Under these circumstances, **central planning and centralized economic decision making became increasingly inefficient**. Since Schumpeter wrote Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy less than a decade after the world had passed through the trough of the Great Depression, at the point of transition between the old and new economic eras, his mistake is quite understandable, but a mistake it nonetheless was. **Schumpeter clearly underestimated capitalism's vitality and ability to adjust to these new circumstances**. Based on historical performance, Schumpeter predicted overall growth in the capitalist world of 2 percent for the period 1928-78; actual performance for the OECD world for this period was double that, and individual countries like Japan and Taiwan managed to achieve rates of GNP growth of 10 percent and higher for extended periods of time. Many of the negative consequences of capitalist development, moreover, either failed to materialize, or else tuned out to be much less decisive than he had believed. For example, much of **Schumpeter's critique of capitalism** was based 102 Journal of Democracy on what he **believed to be the increasingly oligopolistic nature of competition. This assumption was based, in turn, on the idea that technology dictated an ever-increasing optimal size for firms.** 3 In practice, **however, technology did not always favor large firms: in many industries, from computers to retailing, there were clear diseconomies of scale that promoted smaller firms, new market entrants, and increasing levels of competition.** **Nor was there a "routinization" of entrepreneurship**, as Schumpeter feared (p. 132), since **advancing technology opened up enormous new areas of opportunity for risk-taking individuals.** Finally and perhaps most importantly**, capitalism did not dig its own grave by producing an intellectual class unalterably opposed to it.** According to Schumpeter: [T]he capitalist process produced [an] atmosphere of almost universal hostility to its own social order . . . . The capitalist process.., eventually decreases the importance of the function by which the capitalist class lives . . . . Capitalism creates a critical frame of mind which, after having destroyed the moral authority of so many other institutions, in the end turns against its own; the bourgeois finds to his amazement that the rationalist attitude does not stop at the credentials of kings and popes but goes on to attack private property and the whole scheme of bourgeois values (p. 143). **While the anticapitalist biases of intellectuals have remained strong and remarkably persistent, the sheer productivity of capitalist economies succeeded over time in coopting significant numbers of them, to the point where**, by the 1980s, **many of the most incisive critical minds** in Europe and America **were busy dissecting the failings of socialism instead of capitalism.**

#### Comparatively Marxism is worse than Capitalism – Marxism is genocide

Rummel ‘4 (R.J. Rummel, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Hawaii, “The Killing Machine that is Marxism”, 12/15/04, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1301721/posts)

With the fall of the Soviet Union and communist governments in Eastern Europe, too many have the impression that Marxism, the religion of communism, is dead. Hardly. It is alive and well in many countries still, such as North Korea, China, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, a gaggle of African countries, and in the minds of many South American political leaders. However, of most importance to the future of democracy, communism still pollutes the thinking of a vast multitude of Western academics and intellectuals.¶ Of all religions, secular and otherwise, that of Marxism has been by far the bloodiest – bloodier than the Catholic Inquisition, the various Catholic crusades, and the Thirty Years War between Catholics and Protestants. In practice, Marxism has meant bloody terrorism, deadly purges, lethal prison camps and murderous forced labor, fatal deportations, man-made famines, extrajudicial executions and fraudulent show trials, outright mass murder and genocide.¶ In total, Marxist regimes murdered nearly 110 million people from 1917 to 1987. For perspective on this incredible toll, note that all domestic and foreign wars during the 20th century killed around 35 million. That is, when Marxists control states, Marxism is more deadly then all the wars of the 20th century, including World Wars I and II, and the Korean and Vietnam Wars.¶ And what did Marxism, this greatest of human social experiments, achieve for its poor citizens, at this most bloody cost in lives? Nothing positive. It left in its wake an economic, environmental, social and cultural disaster.¶ The Khmer Rouge – (Cambodian communists) who ruled Cambodia for four years – provide insight into why Marxists believed it necessary and moral to massacre so many of their fellow humans. Their Marxism was married to absolute power. They believed without a shred of doubt that they knew the truth, that they would bring about the greatest human welfare and happiness, and that to realize this utopia, they had to mercilessly tear down the old feudal or capitalist order and Buddhist culture, and then totally rebuild a communist society. Nothing could be allowed to stand in the way of this achievement. Government – the Communist Party – was above any law. All other institutions, religions, cultural norms, traditions and sentiments were expendable.¶ The Marxists saw the construction of this utopia as a war on poverty, exploitation, imperialism and inequality – and, as in a real war, noncombatants would unfortunately get caught in the battle. There would be necessary enemy casualties: the clergy, bourgeoisie, capitalists, "wreckers," intellectuals, counterrevolutionaries, rightists, tyrants, the rich and landlords. As in a war, millions might die, but these deaths would be justified by the end, as in the defeat of Hitler in World War II. To the ruling Marxists, the goal of a communist utopia was enough to justify all the deaths.¶ The irony is that in practice, even after decades of total control, Marxism did not improve the lot of the average person, but usually made living conditions worse than before the revolution. It is not by chance that the world's greatest famines have happened within the Soviet Union (about 5 million dead from 1921-23 and 7 million from 1932-3, including 2 million outside Ukraine) and communist China (about 30 million dead from 1959-61). Overall, in the last century almost 55 million people died in various Marxist famines and associated epidemics – a little over 10 million of them were intentionally starved to death, and the rest died as an unintended result of Marxist collectivization and agricultural policies.¶ What is astonishing is that this "currency" of death by Marxism is not thousands or even hundreds of thousands, but millions of deaths. This is almost incomprehensible – it is as though the whole population of the American New England and Middle Atlantic States, or California and Texas, had been wiped out. And that around 35 million people escaped Marxist countries as refugees was an unequaled vote against Marxist utopian pretensions. Its equivalent would be everyone fleeing California, emptying it of all human beings.¶ There is a supremely important lesson for human life and welfare to be learned from this horrendous sacrifice to one ideology: No one can be trusted with unlimited power.¶ The more power a government has to impose the beliefs of an ideological or religious elite, or decree the whims of a dictator, the more likely human lives and welfare will be sacrificed. As a government's power is more unrestrained, as its power reaches into all corners of culture and society, the more likely it is to kill its own citizens.¶ As a governing elite has the power to do whatever it wants, whether to satisfy its most personal wishes, or as today's Marxists desire, to pursue what it believes is right and true, it may do so whatever the cost in lives. Here, power is the necessary condition for mass murder. Once an elite has full authority, other causes and conditions can operate to bring about the immediate genocide, terrorism, massacres or whatever killing the members of an elite feel is warranted. But it is power – unchecked, unconstrained, uncontrolled – that is the killer.¶ Our academic and intellectual Marxists today are getting a free ride. They get a certain respect because of their words about improving the lot of the worker and the poor, their utopian pretensions. But when empowered, Marxism has failed utterly, as has fascism. Instead of being treated with respect and tolerance, Marxists should be treated as though they wished a deadly plague on all of us.¶ The next time you come across or are lectured by one of our indigenous Marxists, or almost the equivalent, leftist zealots, ask them how they can justify the murder of over a hundred million their absolutist faith has brought about, and the misery it has created for many hundreds of millions more.

**Communism and socialism fails, all eventually give way to Capitalism as technology improves.**

**Fukuyama 92** (Francis Fukuyama is a resident consultant to the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C. He has previously been deputy director of the U.S. State Department's policy planning staff, a senior staff member in the political science department at RAND, and a graduate fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. His 1989 article "The End of History?" has been translated into many languages and has become the subject of controversy around the worM. He has just published a fuller exposition of his views on this theme in The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992), Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press, July 1992, “Capitalism & Democracy: The Missing Link” Journal of Democracy, Volume 3, Number 3, pp. 100-110)

Much of this sounds rather strange in light of the experience of Solidarity in Poland. **Not only was the socialist ideal an insufficient substitute for the profit motive; socialism itself became an object of active hatred for large numbers of people living under it.** Thus **capitalism proved to be far more flexible and adaptable than socialism in adjusting to the new economic conditions created by technological change** in the second half of the twentieth century. To put it somewhat schematically, **in conditions of increasing industrial maturity, capitalism tended to evolve into advanced capitalism, while socialism tended to give way to capitalism, both for purely economic reasons**. In retrospect, Walt Rostow's much-maligned characterization of communism as a "disease of the transition [to mature development]" seems quite accurate: however monstrous in other ways, **communism was a perfectly adequate economic system for making the leap from an agrarian to an urban-industrial society, but it proved itself unable to meet the requirements of postindustrial modernity, and therefore had to be transcended or abolished.**

## **Impact Defense**

### Democracy Checks

**Democracy checks capitalism, Authoritarian rule feeds capitalism, but even that will lead to democracy**

**Fukuyama 92** (Francis Fukuyama is a resident consultant to the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C. He has previously been deputy director of the U.S. State Department's policy planning staff, a senior staff member in the political science department at RAND, and a graduate fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. His 1989 article "The End of History?" has been translated into many languages and has become the subject of controversy around the worM. He has just published a fuller exposition of his views on this theme in The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992), Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press, July 1992, “Capitalism & Democracy: The Missing Link” Journal of Democracy, Volume 3, Number 3, pp. 100-110)

It is possible to short-circuit much of this debate on the economic necessity of democracy simply by pointing out that **many of the most impressive economic growth records** in the last 150 years **have been compiled not by democracies, but by authoritarian states with more or less capitalist economic systems.** **This was true of both Meiji Japan and the German Second Reich** in the latter half of the nineteenth century**, as well as any number of more recent modernizing authoritarian regimes such as Franco's Spain, post-1953 South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Singapore, or Thailand**. 1~ Apart from empirical evidence on this score, there is good reason to think that **democracies as a whole should not be particularly efficient economically, or at least not as efficient as competent authoritarian regimes that make economic growth their chief priority. Democracies tend to transfer wealth from rich to poor in the interests of social equality, to protect or subsidize failing industries, to spend more on social services than investment,** and the like. T**he military regime in South Korea accelerated economic growth by suppressing strikes and holding down wages and consumption; the transition to democracy in 1987 led to a wave of labor unrest and rapidly rising wages that ultimately reduced Korea's international competitiveness.** To take an example closer to home, **the United States has amassed a massive budget deficit over the past decade, about whose pernicious effects there is universal agreement; American democracy, however, has not been able to eliminate it because of an inability to agree on how to apportion the pain of either spending cuts or tax increases. Of course, there is no guarantee that authoritarian states will make rational economic choices.** While a military government ruled during Brazil's period of rapid economic growth between 1964 and 1972, **it was another military government that created the Brazilian debt crisis of the late 1970s**. **But in theory, a competent authoritarian government that makes economic growth its top priority should be able to achieve this goal more easily than a liberal democracy,** as many countries in Asia have shown. **Communism was**, arguably, **overthrown** in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union **because people wanted capitalist abundance**. **In countries like Spain and South Korea, however, the choice of prosperity without liberty was available, yet democratic revolutions occurred anyway**. **The reasons why economic development fosters democracy must therefore be found outside the realm of economics. The choice of democracy must spring from the realm of politics and ideology--that is, from man's self-conscious effort to think through his situation in society and to devise rules and institutions that are in some manner in accord with his underlying nature**. **The realm of politics has its own autonomous ends, and therefore cannot be comprehensively explained according to the subpolitical categories of economics or sociology. While certain ideologies are better fostered under certain specific social and economic circumstances, they must first be understood in their own terms**.

### AT – War (Nuclear or Otherwise)

#### Capitalism acts to pacify conflict

Gartzke 7- (Erik Gartzke, PhD- associate professor of political science at UC San Diego, “The Capitalist Peace,” 1/5/07, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/publications/gartzke\_ajps\_07.pdf)

The security dilemma implies that insecurity is a durable¶ facet of international affairs. War can result as each country¶ fears for its own security, even when neither state intends¶ aggression (Glaser 1997; Jervis 1978). Yet, insecurity¶ is predicated on the expectation that at least some countries¶ are revisionist powers. Even “pessimistic” conceptions¶ ofworld affairs appear more sanguine aswe relax the¶ assumption that insecurity is ubiquitous and immutable.¶ The task before peace theorists, then, is to identify when¶ and how nations are liberated from the security dilemma.¶ The argument here is that capitalism resolves insecurity¶ by creating “powerful pacifists” (Lake 1992), countries¶ possessing military strength ensuring that they are largely¶ free from foreign influence or domination, but equally¶ that they lack incentives to act aggressively abroad, at least¶ under certain circumstances.26¶ Warfare results from two stages of interaction. First,¶ states must possess the willingness and ability to compete.¶ Second, states must be unable, or unwilling, to resolve¶ differences through diplomatic means.27 Capabilities¶ constrain weak, distant states (Belize and Burundi do¶ not fight each other), but weakness alone is often insufficient,¶ given the relativity of power. Indeed, weakness is¶ an attractive attribute in a target. For similar reasons, an¶ unwillingness to fight must also be mutual. For the purposes¶ of exposition, imagine that the motives for war are¶ divided between zero-sum (private goods) and nonzerosum(¶ goodswith public properties).Private goods competition¶ involves things like attempts to conquer or control¶ material resources (land, labor, minerals).28 Competition¶ can also occur over efforts to influence or compel policies¶ (norms, alignments, leaders).29 The allocation of resources¶ is inherently conflictual; two states that claim the¶ same territory must compromise, fight, or delay a decision.¶ The allocation of policies may or may not generate¶ significant friction, depending on whether, or to what extent,¶ stateobjectives are compatible.While itwould beodd¶ to speak of countries as having substantially compatible¶ 26Capitalism, like democracy, means many things. The termis used¶ here as shorthand for the three processes discussed in the theory.¶ 27Cost-benefit calculus is insufficient to explain war (Fearon 1995),¶ but can be sufficient to explain the lack of war. Conflict exists in¶ bargaining theory as the result of a set of necessary conditions.¶ The absence of any of these conditions is sufficient to explain the¶ absence of fighting.¶ 28Territory can also have strategic (Fazal 2004), symbolic (Toft¶ 2003), or reputational (Walter 2003, 2006) value.¶ 29A “sphere of influence” suggests precisely a desire to control the¶ choices, though not necessarily the territory, of another state.¶ interests when drawing a common geographic boundary¶ (cf. Collins and Lapierre 1997;Holbrooke 1998), it would¶ be strange not to consider the existence (or absence) of¶ common cause in assessing such topics as ideology, norm¶ enforcement, terrorism, or the organization of the global¶ or regional economy.¶ At least three mechanisms associated with capitalism¶ are capable of addressing the security dilemma and¶ mitigating the causes of war. States with similar policy¶ goals have no need to fight to establish policy since little¶ can be gained from victory, or lost in defeat. States always¶ have dissimilar interests when it comes to resource¶ or territorial issues, but changes in modern economies¶ often make these differences trivial, as resources can be¶ had more easily through commerce. There can be no basis¶ for agreement between two passersby about who should¶ collect a quarter lying on the sidewalk, but fighting over¶ 25 cents makes little sense. If, however, a sack of $100 bills¶ falls from the sky, landing on the quarter, then it is entirely¶ possible that a fight will ensue over who can collect¶ their bag of riches. Yet, even the sack of money need not¶ lead to violence if the passersby can agree on how to divide¶ up the wind fall. States willing and able to fight can¶ still avoid a contest if competitors are able to foresee the¶ likely consequences of fighting and identify appropriate¶ bargains.

### AT – Morality/Ethics

#### **Capitalism is the only moral economic system – morality only thrives in a state of freedom…#Objectivism**

Billings 83 (Donald B., Professor of Economics at Boise State University, The Freeman: Ideas on Liberty, “The Moral Case for Competitive Capitalism”, July, http://www.fee.org/vnews.php?nid=1277)

<Following the lead of the economist Benjamin Rogge, it is in fact the case that “. . . the most important part of the case for economic freedom is not its dramatic success in promoting economic growth, but rather its consistency with certain fundamental moral principles of life itself.”[7] For personal freedom, and therefore economic and political freedom, is not “ethically indifferent” but a necessary condition of morality. Friedrich Hayek reminds us of certain fundamental conditions of the moral life. It is . . . an old discovery that morals and moral values will grow only in an environment of freedom, and that, in general, moral standards of people and classes are high only where they have long enjoyed freedom—and proportional to the amount of freedom they have possessed . . . That freedom is the matrix required for the growth of moral values—indeed not merely one value among many but the source of all values—is almost self-evident. It is only where the individual has choice, and its inherent responsibility, that he has occasion to affirm existing values, to contribute to their further growth, and to earn moral merit.[8] Morality and the Market It appears that the free market system, in which only voluntary and mutually beneficial exchange are permitted, is a necessary condition for a moral order in which the integrity of the individual conscience is respected. Hayek points out in The Road to Serfdom that only: where we ourselves are responsible for our own interests . . . has our decision moral value. Freedom to order our own conduct in the sphere where material circumstances force a choice upon us, and responsibility for the arrangement of our own life according to our own conscience, is the air in which alone moral sense grows and in which moral values are daily recreated in the free decision of the individual. Responsibility, not to a superior, but to one’s conscience, the awareness of a duty not exacted by compulsion . . . and to bear the consequences of one’s own decision, are the very essence of any morals which deserve the name.[9] “Surely,” adds Hayek on another occasion, “it is unjust to blame a system as more materialistic because it leaves it to the individual to decide whether he prefers material gain to other kinds of excellence.”[10] Whatever the goals of individuals, whether virtuous or not, the “vulgar calculus of the marketplace” still seems to be the most humane way mankind has found for dealing with the economic problems of scarcity and the difficult allocation of resources. Murray Rothbard forcefully reminds us that “. . . in a world of voluntary social cooperation through mutually beneficial exchanges . . . it is obvious that great scope is provided for the development of social sympathy and human friendships.” Indeed, “it is far more likely that feelings of friendship and communion are the effects of a regime of contractual social cooperation rather than the cause.”[11] Capitalism tends to favor those who respect the sanctity of their contracts because of the respect for and enforcement of private property rights. The work ethic; encouraged by the institution of private property, represents an important source of moral responsibility as well as a continuous reminder that our actions always entail costs—a pervasive characteristic of human existence. These essential ingredients of a free market order, Arthur Shenfield tells us, define a set of social institutions which encourages mutual respect for each and every individual. What we want above all for ourselves, and which therefore we must accord to our neighbor, is freedom to pursue our own purposes . . . As a corollary to this freedom we want others to respect our individuality, independence, and status as responsible human beings . . . This is the fundamental morality which capitalism requires and which it nurtures. It alone among economic systems operates on the basis of respect for free, independent responsible persons. All other systems in varying degrees treat men as less than this.[12]>

### AT – Environment

#### Capitalism is the only way to solve environmental problems

Taylor ‘3 (Jerry Taylor, director of natural resource studies at CATO, “Happy Earth Day? Thank Capitalism”, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=3073)

Indeed, we wouldn't even have environmentalists in our midst were it not for capitalism. Environmental amenities, after all, are luxury goods. America -- like much of the Third World today -- had no environmental movement to speak of until living standards rose sufficiently so that we could turn our attention from simply providing for food, shelter, and a reasonable education to higher "quality of life" issues. The richer you are, the more likely you are to be an environmentalist. And people wouldn't be rich without capitalism. Wealth not only breeds environmentalists, it begets environmental quality. There are dozens of studies showing that, as per capita income initially rises from subsistence levels, air and water pollution increases correspondingly. But once per capita income hits between $3,500 and $15,000 (dependent upon the pollutant), the ambient concentration of pollutants begins to decline just as rapidly as it had previously increased. This relationship is found for virtually every significant pollutant in every single region of the planet. It is an iron law. Given that wealthier societies use more resources than poorer societies, such findings are indeed counterintuitive. But the data don't lie. How do we explain this? The obvious answer -- that wealthier societies are willing to trade-off the economic costs of government regulation for environmental improvements and that poorer societies are not -- is only partially correct. In the United States, pollution declines generally predated the passage of laws mandating pollution controls. In fact, for most pollutants, declines were greater before the federal government passed its panoply of environmental regulations than after the EPA came upon the scene. Much of this had to do with individual demands for environmental quality. People who could afford cleaner-burning furnaces, for instance, bought them. People who wanted recreational services spent their money accordingly, creating profit opportunities for the provision of untrammeled nature. Property values rose in cleaner areas and declined in more polluted areas, shifting capital from Brown to Green investments. Market agents will supply whatever it is that people are willing to spend money on. And when people are willing to spend money on environmental quality, the market will provide it. Meanwhile, capitalism rewards efficiency and punishes waste. Profit-hungry companies found ingenious ways to reduce the natural resource inputs necessary to produce all kinds of goods, which in turn reduced environmental demands on the land and the amount of waste that flowed through smokestacks and water pipes. As we learned to do more and more with a given unit of resources, the waste involved (which manifests itself in the form of pollution) shrank. This trend was magnified by the shift away from manufacturing to service industries, which characterizes wealthy, growing economies. The latter are far less pollution-intensive than the former. But the former are necessary prerequisites for the latter. Property rights -- a necessary prerequisite for free market economies -- also provide strong incentives to invest in resource health. Without them, no one cares about future returns because no one can be sure they'll be around to reap the gains. Property rights are also important means by which private desires for resource conservation and preservation can be realized. When the government, on the other hand, holds a monopoly on such decisions, minority preferences in developing societies are overruled (see the old Soviet block for details). Furthermore, only wealthy societies can afford the investments necessary to secure basic environmental improvements, such as sewage treatment and electrification. Unsanitary water and the indoor air pollution (caused primarily by burning organic fuels in the home for heating and cooking needs) are directly responsible for about 10 million deaths a year in the Third World, making poverty the number one environmental killer on the planet today. Capitalism can save more lives threatened by environmental pollution than all the environmental organizations combined.

## **Capitalism Good**

#### Capitalism Good - Solves war

Griswold ‘5 (Daniel Griswold, Director of the Cato Institute’s Center for trade policy studies, “Peace on Earth, Try Free Trade Among Men” Cato Institute, 12/28/05)

Many causes lie behind the good news -- the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, among them -- but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role. Far from stoking a "World on Fire," as one misguided American author has argued, growing commercial ties between nations have had a dampening effect on armed conflict and war, for three main reasons.¶ First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies don't pick fights with each other. Freedom to trade nurtures democracy by expanding the middle class in globalizing countries and equipping people with tools of communication such as cell phones, satellite TV, and the Internet. With trade comes more travel, more contact with people in other countries, and more exposure to new ideas. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies -- a record high.¶ Second, as national economies become more integrated with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war.¶ Third, globalization allows nations to acquire wealth through production and trade rather than conquest of territory and resources. Increasingly, wealth is measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Those are assets that cannot be seized by armies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by trading away what they can produce best at home.¶ Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. But deep trade and investment ties among nations make war less attractive.

#### Capitalism good – history has proven that warfare is less likely when global capital is allowed to expand

Gartzke 7- (Erik Gartzke, PhD- associate professor of political science at UC San Diego, “The Capitalist Peace,” 1/5/07, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/publications/gartzke\_ajps\_07.pdf)

¶ What else but democracy could account for liberal¶ peace? One answer might be capitalism. The association between economic freedom and interstate peace has deep¶ intellectual roots, though the liberal political economy¶ tradition has received little attention in recent decades.22¶ Enlightenment figures like Montesquieu and Smith argued¶ that market interests abominate war. Paine wrote¶ that “commerce diminishes the spirit, both of patriotism¶ and military defense” (cited in Walker 2000, 59). Cobden¶ called trade “the grand panacea” ([1867] 1903, 36).¶ Mill saw market forces as “rapidly rendering war obsolete”¶ (1902, 390). Angell argued that it had become “impossible¶ for one nation to seize by force the wealth or trade¶ of another . . . war, even when victorious, can no longer¶ achieve those aims for which peoples strive” (1933, 60).¶ Angell (1933) serves as a useful point of departure¶ in attempting to identify how capitalism contributes to¶ interstate peace. Angell highlights two processes thought¶ to diminish the appeal of conquest among countries with¶ modern industrial economies. First, changes in the nature¶ of production make it difficult to cheaply subdue and¶ to profitably manage modern economies through force.¶ Industrial economies are increasingly dependent on inputs¶ that are more easily and cheaply obtained through¶ commerce than through coercion. Relating tales of Viking¶ raids on the English countryside, Angell asks why, now¶ that the tables have turned, he did not see “our navy¶ loading up a goodly part of our mercantile marine with¶ the agricultural and industrial wealth of the Scandinavian¶ peninsular” (1933, 103). Governments, like individuals,¶ choose between trade and theft in obtaining needed¶ goods and services. Modernity made it easier to profit¶ from production and trade, and harder to draw wealth¶ from conquered lands or confiscated loot.23¶ The second process Angell outlines involves economic¶ globalization. The integration of world markets¶ not only facilitates commerce, but also creates new interests¶ inimical to war. Financial interdependence ensures¶ that damage inflicted on one economy travels through¶ the global system, afflicting even aggressors. Angell imagines¶ aTeutonic army descending on London: “the German¶ General, while trying to sack the Bank of England, might¶ find his own balance in the Bank of Germany had vanished,¶ and the value of even the best of his investments¶ reduced” (1933, 106–7). As wealth becomes less tangible,¶ more mobile, distributed, and more dependent on the¶ good will of investors, it also becomes more difficult to¶ coerce (Brooks 1999; Rosecrance 1985).¶ 22Notable exceptions include, but are not limited to, Mousseau¶ (2000), Tures (2004), andWeede (2003, 2004, 2005).¶ 23The first edition appears in 1909 under the title Europe’s Optical¶ Illusion. Subsequent printings appeared in 1910/1912 as The Great¶ Illusion. The world wars are widely viewed as having repudiated¶ Angell’s capitalist peace thesis, along with the claims of Kant and¶ Wilson (see Gartzke 2007).¶ The chief challenge to the arguments of Angell and¶ other political economists is that they turned out to be¶ wrong (Carr 1939; Morgenthau 1948). Two world wars¶ and associated economic upheaval reversed the trend toward¶ globalization and dissolved optimism about a capitalist¶ peace.24 Cold war tensions ensured that scholarship¶ was preoccupied with balancing and deterrence (Jervis¶ 1978; Richardson 1960; Snyder 1961; Waltz 1959, 1979),¶ and that subsequent generations of researchers remained¶ skeptical about the prospects for liberal peace (Waltz 1970,¶ 1999, 2000). These same events led to the long hiatus¶ in democratic peace research. However, when interest in¶ liberal peace returned, attention centered on democracy.¶ Kantian theory was given a thorough rewrite in an attempt¶ to conform to the evolving evidence, while the capitalist¶ peace received little attention.¶ Of the factors emphasized by liberal political¶ economists, trade has been by far the most closely evaluated¶ in contemporary scholarship (Bliss andRussett 1998;¶ Keohane and Nye 1989; Oneal and Ray 1997; Oneal et al.¶ 1996; OnealandRussett 1997, 1999a;Polachek 1980, 1997;¶ Polachek, Robst, and Chang 1999).25 Yet, of the elements¶ of global capitalism, trade is arguably the least important¶ in terms of mitigating warfare. Classical political¶ economists had yet to consider the strategic nature of conflict¶ (Schelling 1966). If trade makes one partner more pliant,¶ it should allow other states to become more aggressive¶ (Morrow 1999;Wagner 1988), so that the overall decline¶ in warfare is small or nonexistent (Beck, Katz, and Tucker¶ 1998; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001). Economic development,¶ financial markets, and monetary policy coordination¶ all arguably play a more critical role in promoting¶ peace (Gartzke and Li 2003). Much of the impact of free¶ markets on peace will be missed if much of what comprises¶ capitalism is omitted or ignored.¶ What are the “aims for which peoples strive,” which¶ Angell mentions? Much like realists, classical political¶ economists assumed that warfare results from resource¶ competition. If there are other reasons why nations fight,¶ then some wars will occur, despite the basic validity of capitalist¶ peace arguments. It is then necessary to revise, rather¶ than reject out of hand, economic explanations for liberal¶ peace. This article next offers the outlines of a revised¶ theory of capitalist peace.

## **AT – Soft Mobility**

**The CP still links to the K, Capitalism feeds on a combination of hard and soft mobility to create the most efficient structure for both close and far mobility.**

**Henderson 2004** (Jason Henderson, Department of Geography and Human Environmental Studies at San Francisco State University, Published by Urban Geography, 2004, “The Politics of Mobility and Business Elites in Atlanta, Georgia”)

The Northern Arc debate shows us that **divisions over mobility exist between factions of capitalist elites and that these divisions are played-out in the wider political arena, including the struggle over the state's highest elected position**. **The Northern Arc was more than a struggle of suburban versus urban interests, but rather a struggle of competing conceptualizations of how space should be organized and around what types of mobilities space would be organized**. The **mobility crisis** in Atlanta and the response of business elites **reveals that capitalist interests have to mitigate and negotiate the contradictions and tensions over incongruent mobilities** and how they impact exchange values. There is a tension between **the drive of capitalism for "hard mobility." or the energy intensive and speed-intensive highway and air system, and a parallel need for "soft mobility" such as walking and biking in compact built environments**. **The motivation of capitalist interests** in Atlanta **is to overcome the contradictions and tensions between hard and soft mobilities and control implementation of mobility strategies that make the metropolitan region globally competitive and thus securing increased exchange value of the region**. That became the underlying motivation of the collection of business elites that rallied around Atlanta's mobility crisis in the late 1990s. Yet translating their vision into reality has been made difficult by the continued political power of the auto-industrial complex, which, while sharing in an overall ideology of capitalist growth objectives, insists that the growth happens in a conventional automobile-dependent way with further dispersal—hence their vision of the Northern Arc. This inner division of what might otherwise be a cohesive coalition of corporate and real estate executives, public policy-makers, and media elites what Logan and Molotch (1987) called an "urban growth machine" is immediate and not necessarily permanent. Yet it does show that **the politics of mobility is a factor in complicating the coalescence of a hegemonic growth machine**. One of the main debates over growth machine theory concerns the degree of control growth machines have over producing urban space. Logan et al. (1997) suggested variations in the degree at which growth machines dominate localities. **The power of growth machines is not absolute and the real world of politics is more dynamic than implied in the traditional growth machine model** (Logan, et al.. 1997). This is clearly the case with Atlanta's business elites and their immediate contestation with the auto-industrial complex over Atlanta's mobility future.

# **Link from Cap to T-SC**

**Globalization makes space irrelevant – it destroys the old structures and shrinks the world.**

**Sheppard ’02** [Eric Sheppard, Department of Geography, University of Minnesota, Clark University, “University The Spaces and Times of Globalization: Place, Scale, Networks, and Positionality”, July 2002, Economic Geography, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Jul., 2002), pp. 307-330 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4140812.pdf> AD]

**It has been widely asserted that space has become less important as a result of globalization.** Examining international financial relationships, Richard O'Brien (1992, 1-2) gained notoriety among geographers for asserting that "**geographical location no longer matters**, or matters less than hitherto. ... Money, being fungible, will continue to try and avoid, and will largely succeed in escaping, the confines of the existing geography." Similarly, Frances Cairncross (1997, xi) of The Economist wrote: "Distance will no longer determine the cost of communicating electronically. ... No longer will location be key to most business decisions." Both are deliberately provocative, restrict their comments to activities that can be carried out electronically, and describe their vision of the near future rather than the present. Nevertheless, they are consistent with the space/time imaginary of many mainstream neoliberal globalization theorists who argue that **globalization makes old territorial structures irrelevant** and equalizes development possibilities everywhere. Some mainstream economists have recently highlighted an important role for geography as a constraint to realizing full globalization (i.e., ubiquitous development) because of the constraints imposed by tropical climes and distance from the sea (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1999; Hausmann 2001). Yet all these analyses share what Doreen Massey (1999a, 1999b) identified as an impoverished space/time imaginary-one that eliminates spatial difference in favor of a universal narrative of change; a new modernization theory (Porter and Sheppard 1998, chap. 5). While critical of this imaginary, geographers have nevertheless collaborated in mobilizing metaphors that emphasize a "shrinking world" (Kirsch 1995), in which space is progressively dominated by time. This emphasis can be dated to Don Janelle's (1969) writingsa s part of the "spatials cience" tradition of the 1960s, resurrected more recently within both this tradition and political economy. The phrases used to articulate this include "time-space convergence" (Janelle 1969), "collapsing space and time" (Brunn and Leinbach 1991), and "time-space compression"-coined by David Harvey (1989) to express the foreboding that our globalizing world can be "characterized by speed-up in the pace of life, while so overcoming spatial barriers that the world sometimes seems to collapse inwards upon us" (p. 242). These phrases have been applied to a variety of experiences of space, from the lived to the representational (Lefebvre 1974/1991), but present a common imaginary- a simultaneous speeding up of time and collapsing of space in absolute terms. **Harvey made much of the "annihilation of space by time," originally expressed by Karl Marx (1857-8/1983) in Die Grundrisse. Mobilized in conjunction with space/time compression, this phrase has come to mean that, while space is collapsing and time is speeding up in absolute terms, under globalization time is becoming relatively more critical than space** (see also Jessop 2001). **Indeed, speed has become a central metaphor for what is distinctive about contemporary globalization**. Nigel Thrift (1994) discussed the emergence of a "structure of feeling," a culture of mobility emphasizing speed, light, and power. Paul Virilio (1995, 151; 1993, 10) referred to this "third interval" as one in which "the computer motor" is bringing about a situation in which "the tyranny of distances" gives way to the "tyranny of real time." Tim Luke and Gear6id O Tuathail (1998, 90) described an era of postmodern fast geopolitics, in which 310 ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY "global flowmations . .. are re-mastering global space." Like many globalization theorists, Virilio and Luke and 6 Tuathail concluded that the digital revolution is enabling time to trump space (Agnew 2000).

# **Time-Space Compression Kritik**

## 1NC

**Our experience of space and place are distorted by faster methods of travel.**

**James ‘7** (Ian, University lecturer, department of French at Downing College of Cambridge University, “Paul Virilio” Routledge. 2007. P. 30-31)

**This question of the embodied or situated gaze is fundamental to the way in which Virilio¶ understands our relationship to the world. Our gaze shapes our encounter with worldly space as¶ it is immediately experienced in embodied perception.** He speaks, for instance, of: ‘the real¶ horizon of the world, towards which, Merleau-Ponty tells us, We Hrs! move by way ofour gaze¶ [Ie regardl’ (Virilio 1995:81). **For Virilio it is above all the ‘mobility and motility of the body**’¶ which allow our perceptions of the world to occur and with this an experience of ourselves as¶ worldly spatial creatures (Virilio 1993:260). **He is interested in how the landscape of places and¶ things will look or appear differently depending on the way in which they are approached. As¶ an example of this he cites the situation of a passenger on a train viewing the passing scenery:¶ ‘it is the movements of my body that are producing this landscape a bit like a passenger on a¶ train sees trees and horses darting past, sees hills bending away’** (Virilio 2005a: 30). **When¶ travelling by train or car we often think of ourselves simply as passing through space. Yet from¶ the phenomenological perspective this everyday interpretation of our experience is possible¶ only because we first experience the figures and forms surrounding us in a rather different¶ manner: the tree which we might otherwise approach on foot, see looming above us and then¶ touch or even climb, emerges rapidly into our field of vision, reduced in size, and sweeps past,¶ untouched and unclimbed and has disappeared in an instant. The spread of the landscape which¶ might otherwise surround and envelop us is deformed by rapid movement; it is not something¶ experienced in its material dimensions as such since our body does not experience the fatigue¶ or the extended delay of passing across it on foot**. In each case (travelling by train or on foot)¶ the world appears to us or is perceived in a very different manner. This example demonstrates¶ the central importance of bodily perception in Virilio’s thinking. It indicates, clearly, why the¶ reality of movement and speed remains so fundamental. Movement and speed are not, for¶ Virilio, simply thematic concerns. Rather they are structuring principles of the manner in which¶ we experience the space of the world. In this respect Virilio’s, primarily phenomenological, **¶ understanding of space is different from that of science. He does not, as it were, think in three¶ dimensions, but holds rather that the ‘dimensions of space are only fleeting apparitions, in the¶ same way that things are visible only in the trajectory of the gaze, this gaze that is the eye and¶ that defines place'** (Virilio 2005a: 118).

**Time-space compression destroy culture and creates class divisions.**

**Smart ’03** [Alan and Josephine, Annual Review of Anthropology, JSTOR, “Urbanization and the Global Perspective”, 2003, Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 32 (2003), pp. 263-285, JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25064830.pdf> AD]

**Globalization and time-space compression have made it more feasible than ever before to break the link between locale, where one lives, and** milieu, **the environment that is practically relevant to an individua**l (Durrschmidt 1997). Although transnational involvement by ordinary people is not a new thing, technology makes it much easier to act simultaneously in different places so that anonymous neighbors may be intensely involved in communities that include people from around the globe. What does the possibility of "**localities without community and cultures without locality**" (Albrow 1997, p. 42) mean for daily life and the social and cultural organization of cities? How do the implications vary by class, occupation, gender, and lifestyle grouping? **Increased connectivity is conjoined with growing divisions.** The global city literature suggests that world cities magnify more universal trends toward increased social polarization related to neoliberal global projects, economic restructuring, and welfare reform. **Ideas about the increasing salience of knowledge in the econ omy, or informational capitalism, also raise the prospect of an increasing digital divide between knowledge workers and manual workers or the underclass within cities, or divisions between "fast" and "slow" societies on the global scale**. **Polar ization and divisions have also been alleged to encourage the decline of common civic culture and shared public places and lead to the "fortress city" to protect the haves from the have-nots** (Guano 2002, Caldeira 1999, Low 2003). Migration from nontraditional sources may also increase divisions along ethnic lines (Amin 2002), even as it contributes to urban vitality and economic dynamism. **Within these divided and unstable places** (Greenhouse 2002**), people struggle to create or defend meaningful collective activities and spaces**. For example, Darian Smith (2002) describes the resurrection of old practices of "beating the village bounds" in southern England, despite the fact that most of the participants are middle-class newcomers who commute to jobs in London. Vincent & Warf (2002, p. 30) document the recent growth of eruvim, **religious** Jewish **enclaves, in North America and Europe and interpret it as part of a "global surge in ethnic identity that has emerged as a backlash to postmodern capitalism**." Srinivas (2001) argues that the Karaga ritual procession in Bangalore enacts earlier landscapes obliterated by urban planning and uncontrolled settlements. The landscape of urban memory is not a personal or cognitive process alone but is achieved by movement through space that renews linkages between different parts of the urban field. In all these cases, actions claim or maintain boundaries around a space and assert commonali ties that are continually challenged by broader processes. This process happens at all levels of urban space: block parties, neighborhood watch, and regional planning initiatives. Everywhere, people also organize to protest and resist developments that they believe negatively impact their communities (McDonogh 1999, Parnell 2002, Rotenberg 1999).

**Our alternative is to incorporate time into thoughts of space.**

**Massey ’99** –[Doreen Massey is a contemporary British social scientist and geographer, working among others on topics typical of Marxist geography. She currently serves as Professor of geography at the Open University, “Space-Time, 'Science' and the Relationship between Physical Geography and Human Geography”, 1999, Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1999),pp. 261-276 JSTOR AD]

Let me begin, however, with Raper and Livingstone's paper. This is an argument for the importance of a concept of relative space in the representation/modelling of environmental problems. '[T]he way that spatio-temporal processes are studied', they argue, 'is strongly influenced by the model of space and time that is adopted' (1995, 364). **Traditionally, the authors argue, while environmental representations have been somewhat unthinking about the concepts of space and time that they imply and necessarily incorporate, they have in fact been dominated by "'timeless" geometric methods focused on two dimensional planes'** (363). Raper and Livingstone's aim is to disrupt this unthought assumption and to argue for a more self-conscious and 'relative' understanding. In doing this, they turn to 'theoretical developments in physics' (363) and in particular to Einstein and Minkowski. This allows them to do a number of things. First, it provides concepts that enable us to understand space and time as 'dimensions that are defined by the entities that inhabit them and not vice versa': space and time must be considered relative concepts, i e, they are determined by the nature and behavior f the entities that 'inhabit' them (the concept of 'relative space'). This is the inverse of the situation where space and time themselves form a rigid framework which as an existence independent of the entities (the concept of 'absolute space'). (363) Thus they distinguish between two approaches to the spatial modeling of environmental problems: the geometrically indexed (absolute space) and the object-oriented (relative space). Using the former approach makes the coordinate system ... into the primary index of the spatial representation and dictates much of the representational structure of the environmental problem of interest. Doreen Massey **In the object-orienteda pproach the environmental scientist must declare the nature of the real-world entities identified first: their characteristics and behaviour structure the spatial representation**(.3 60) (The implication of this is, of course, that the GIS folk have to receive the spatio-temporal framework from the application domain, rather than, as heretofore, themselves being in a position to decide it.) Second, this approach to space-time enables the conceptualization of entities themselves as a set of 'worlds' (365), where each world has its own four-dimensional reference system. 'Time', they write, 'is a property of the objects' (366). Third, and implicit in all of this, is that for the kind of work that Raper and Livingstone are addressing, **it is necessary to think not in terms of space and time separately, but in terms of a four-dimensional space-time** (364). All of this was, for me, totally engrossing. It rang many bells with my own work, and that of many others, within human geography. We, too, have been struggling to understand space (and spacetime) as constituted through the social, rather than as dimensions defining an arena within which the social takes place. We too have tried to consider the idea of local time-spaces, time-spaces specific to the entities with which they are mutually constitutive. Thrift's (1996) explorations in rethinking theory and space together and Whatmore's (1997) proposals for relational thinking are prominent examples, as is much of the work that draws on the writing of Bruno Latour**. The new Open University course on Understanding cities tries to conceive of cities as open time-space intensities of social relations, themselves encompassing and interlocking a variety of sub-time-spaces of different groups and activities. In brief, a number of human geographers are now trying to rethink space as integrally spacetime and to conceptualize space-time as relative (defined in terms of the entities 'within' it), relational (as constituted through the operation of social relations, through which the 'entities' are also constituted) and integral to the constitution of the entities themselves (the entities are local timespaces)**. Sometimes it can make your head hurt to think in this way, but as Raper and Livingstone argue (1995, 364), 'the way that spatio-temporal processes are studied is strongly influenced by the model of space and time that is adopted.' In other words, it matters; it makes a difference.

## Links

**General**

**Methods of transport are only evaluated by how little time it takes to get between spots.**

**González-Savignat [last cite 1998]** [Mar Gonzalez-Savignant is Associate Professor in Economics and member of the Group of Researchers in Empirical Economics at the Universidad de Vigo, Spain, “COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORT: THE CASE OF THE HIGH SPEED TRAIN”, <http://www.iasi.cnr.it/ewgt/13conference/63_gonzalez.pdf> AD]

Investment decisions and **high-speed service planning will be determinant in defining future demand scenarios. In particular**, price levels and **travel times with which this new alternative competes on the market will affect the size of the deviation from air travel.** In general terms, it is concluded that **the future high-speed alternative will have a considerable impact on the demand for air travel, an important flow of passengers that currently use the plane to the new railway service being expected.** However, as the distance and, therefore, the travel time increases, the advantages of the high-speed train decrease dramatically, losing competitiveness in favour of the plane, especially in the business segment. This has occurred in other experiences known, such as the Tgv on the Toulouse-Paris line. Based on existing evidence and upon our own results, it is possible to conclude that the high-speed train may be considered as a truly competitive product over distances that may be covered in 3 hours, at most. It is in this context where the high-speed train may be able to compete with the plane, given that for longer journeys, the plane continues to be the preferred service. This argument is relevant if we consider that part of the high-speed train’s competitiveness with the plane depends upon this variable, so that the aggregate time that travelling from the point of origin supposes may be considered the same as the times associated with both alternatives.

**Our experience of space and place are distorted by our method of travel.**

**James ‘7** (Ian, University lecturer, department of French at Downing College of Cambridge University, “Paul Virilio” Routledge. 2007. P. 30-31)

**This question of the embodied or situated gaze is fundamental to the way in which Virilio¶ understands our relationship to the world. Our gaze shapes our encounter with worldly space as¶ it is immediately experienced in embodied perception.** He speaks, for instance, of: ‘the real¶ horizon of the world, towards which, Merleau-Ponty tells us, We Hrs! move by way ofour gaze¶ [Ie regardl’ (Virilio 1995:81). **For Virilio it is above all the ‘mobility and motility of the body**’¶ which allow our perceptions of the world to occur and with this an experience of ourselves as¶ worldly spatial creatures (Virilio 1993:260). **He is interested in how the landscape of places and¶ things will look or appear differently depending on the way in which they are approached. As¶ an example of this he cites the situation of a passenger on a train viewing the passing scenery:¶ ‘it is the movements of my body that are producing this landscape a bit like a passenger on a¶ train sees trees and horses darting past, sees hills bending away’** (Virilio 2005a: 30). **When¶ travelling by train or car we often think of ourselves simply as passing through space. Yet from¶ the phenomenological perspective this everyday interpretation of our experience is possible¶ only because we first experience the figures and forms surrounding us in a rather different¶ manner: the tree which we might otherwise approach on foot, see looming above us and then¶ touch or even climb, emerges rapidly into our field of vision, reduced in size, and sweeps past,¶ untouched and unclimbed and has disappeared in an instant. The spread of the landscape which¶ might otherwise surround and envelop us is deformed by rapid movement; it is not something¶ experienced in its material dimensions as such since our body does not experience the fatigue¶ or the extended delay of passing across it on foot**. In each case (travelling by train or on foot)¶ the world appears to us or is perceived in a very different manner. This example demonstrates¶ the central importance of bodily perception in Virilio’s thinking. It indicates, clearly, why the¶ reality of movement and speed remains so fundamental. Movement and speed are not, for¶ Virilio, simply thematic concerns. Rather they are structuring principles of the manner in which¶ we experience the space of the world. In this respect Virilio’s, primarily phenomenological, **¶ understanding of space is different from that of science. He does not, as it were, think in three¶ dimensions, but holds rather that the ‘dimensions of space are only fleeting apparitions, in the¶ same way that things are visible only in the trajectory of the gaze, this gaze that is the eye and¶ that defines place'** (Virilio 2005a: 118).

**HSR**

**The HSR debate is all about speed – it’s about getting one place to another quicker.**

**The Economist ’11** [The Economist Magazine, “How fast is fast enough?” July 3, 2011, Economist, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2011/07/high-speed-rail> AD]

**Yes, bullet trains speeding at 180 mph [290 kph] or more from major city to major city are great for business execs in a hurry and on an expense account.** But the more conventional, cheaper, "fast enough" high-speed rail lines like the West Rhine line are the real backbone of the German passenger rail system and that of most other industrialized nations. And it is from these examples that America has the most to learn, especially since it now looks as if the U.S. isn't going to build any real high-speed rail lines, except possibly in California, anytime soon. In an ironic twist, between the mounting concern over the state and federal deficits and growing Republican and NIMBY opposition to high-speed rail, the Obama administration is being forced to settle for incremental projects that will only bring passenger rail service up to the kind of standards found on the West Rhine line. And that's a good thing, provided Republicans don’t succeed in killing passenger trains in the United States altogether, as they are increasingly wont to try. Mr Longman contends that America's passenger rail system is so bad that even simply upgrading to "fast-enough" trains would represent a vast improvement in service that would build ridership and political support for further upgrades. Right now, he argues, building true high-speed rail in America would be "so expensive, disruptive, contentious, and politically risky that it just might not be possible." **The key tipping point, Mr Longman says, is when taking the train becomes faster than driving.** And several factors are more important than speed. On-time performance is crucial, and perhaps Amtrak's biggest problem. Mr Longman thinks this can be fixed with "incremental investment in new sidings and track capacity to make sure freight trains don’t get in the way." Improving frequency of service could also help, Mr Longman argues.

**We reduce journeys down to the time it takes to travel them.**

**NPR 7/13** [Science Friday, “The Nuts And Bolts Of High-Speed Rail”, July 13, 2012, NPR, <http://www.npr.org/2012/07/13/156731300/the-nuts-and-bolts-of-high-speed-rail> AD]

This is SCIENCE FRIDAY. I'm Ira Flatow. **High-speed trains zip around regions in Europe and - in Asia, and they've been doing it for some time. The Shanghai maglev train in China, for example, has a top speed of 268 miles per hour and can travel nearly 20 miles in less than eight minutes.** On the other hand, America has been on the slow track when it comes to these bullet trains. But recent developments may give some momentum to high-speed rail in this country. Last week, California lawmakers gave the go-ahead to start laying down high-speed track between San Francisco and Los Angeles. And **Amtrak recently unveiled a proposal to upgrade its Northeast Corridor to true high-speed rail. And if that plan materializes, by 2040 the trains will be capable of cruising at speeds of 220 miles per hour. And you would get passengers from New York to Washington in a little over 90 minutes.** Boy, we'd certainly like to see that happen. But you know, is that really going to happen? Is it possible? Will these developments usher in an era of super fast trains or is this just another yeah, I've heard that before, not in my lifetime?

**The only reason why HSR is popular is because it cuts down travel times.**

**Invensys Rail ’12** [Invensys Rail is a multinational leader in delivering state of the art railway signalling and control, Invensys, “The benefits of high-speed rail in comparative perspective”, 2012, <http://www.invensysrail.com/whitepapers/hsh-research-report.pdf> AD]

**The main objectives of Spain’s HSR development were to reduce travel times** and increase capacity on the rail network in order to improve access to large economies from smaller cities and to help mitigate regional disparities and tensions that had persisted since the 19th century. In particular, policy makers sought to encourage growth in cities other than Madrid and Barcelona, which had developed at a significantly faster rate than other cities with smaller industrial and service-based economies. Other objectives were to provide employment opportunities through construction and maintenance outside of the major cities, to increase development opportunities for the domestic rail industry, and to reduce the environmental impact of travel by encouraging shifts from road and air transport. **Efficiency in conventional freight traffic was also expected to benefit from capacity made available as passenger services moved to high-speed lines.**

**The journey is ignored – it’s all about how fast it is.**

**Invensys Rail ’12** [Invensys Rail is a multinational leader in delivering state of the art railway signalling and control, Invensys, “The benefits of high-speed rail in comparative perspective”, 2012, <http://www.invensysrail.com/whitepapers/hsh-research-report.pdf> AD]

**China’s high-speed rail network has resulted in stark improvements in journey times** and reliability in comparison to the conventional network. **On the longest routes, such as that between Wuhan and Guangzhou, travel times have been reduced from ten hours to three.** Frequency of services is increasing on the most popular routes, matching the range of services per day common on the HSR systems of countries such as Spain.

**Our society only cares about speed and going places faster. The journey is evaluated by nothing else but how short it takes.**

**Whitty 6/24** [John Whitty is a reporter for the Des Moines Register, Des Moines Register “John Whitty: Let's move faster than in the 1950s”, 6/24/12, <http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20120624/OPINION01/306240047/John-Whitty-Let-s-move-faster-than-1950s> AD]

**The speaker was NBC News anchor Brian Williams, and he was referring to a strange phenomenon in America: We put a man on the moon, a computer in nearly every room, doctors can perform surgeries with robots and we’re entertained by iEverything, yet we still travel between places at the same speed as we did in the 1950’s**. Sure, we have quadrupled the cup-holders and flat-screens (yet never enough outlets or legroom) in our cars, trains and airplanes, but we aren’t getting places any faster. So imagine my chagrin when Gov. Terry Branstad killed a mammoth opportunity to progress by leaps and bounds. He pulled Iowa out of the Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Coalition, which was an opportunity to develop high speed rail travel through Iowa and the Midwest. It wasn’t surprising to hear Branstad or detractors cite the costs associated with high speed rail as reason to scrap it. That’s become par for the course with every grand investment in this country. Education, health care, infrastructure are all deemed too expensive to even attempt a substantive fix for whatever seems broken. But far too many of our leaders become timid when it comes to investing in **these projects** that **have the potential to** revolutionize and **connect our state**. One of the best things about Iowa is its proximity to Chicago, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, St. Louis and Kansas City. Why are we making it that much harder to connect to them? We take pride in being a fantastic place to live and raise a family. Why not connect and expose as many people to that quality of life? Iowa needs young people, businesses and the exchange of ideas just like the states we compete with need those resources. Why are we not taking advantage of an upgraded transportation system that will make it easier for all of those resources to come to Iowa? While the rest of our Midwest neighbors are seizing economic and social opportunities to connect faster and more efficiently through high-speed rail, Iowa has pulled back; dismissing it with an ill-informed, shortsighted budget excuse. High-speed rail doesn’t require an expensive re-invention of the wheel. It would require a prudent investment, and the dedication of engineers, construction workers and designers (are those jobs I hear?) to improve upon a rail system that’s mostly in place but needs the standard upgrade like anything else that’s still stuck in the 20th century. It’s time for Iowa leaders to come to the same realization that Western Europe, Asia and select cities in the Northeast United States came to years ago: Fast, efficient transportation at the regional level has proven to yield broader and stronger economies. I want to remember my commencement speaker 50 years from now, and I want to remember his words**. I want to remember the exact moment when I was challenged to keep progressing by leaps and bounds, but to also move faster than we did in the 1950’s.**

**Airports**

**Companies assess the success of their planes only by how fast they go – they only care about the fastest jets and the shortest travel times.**

**Several aircraft manufacturers are working to become the first to offer supersonic private jets to the marketplace,** filling a gap left by the termination of the Concorde. Supersonic Aerospace International, a consortium of aeronautics suppliers, investors, designers and engineers anchored by Lockheed Martin, is working to introduce supersonic commercial aviation aircraft by 2011, with customer delivery slated for 2013. SAI has developed the design for the Quite Small Supersonic Transport, which it said will enable transcontinental and intercontinental supersonic travel. The developers said the aircraft would seat 12 passengers and reduce travel times to long-haul destinations, traveling at speeds of up to Mach 1.8 and cutting travel times by up to half**. SAI said its aircraft would reduce an average 8.3-hour flight from Chicago to Paris to 4.5 hours or fly from Seattle to Tokyo in less than five hours. The manufacturer expects each aircraft to cost about $80 million**. The developers said the aircraft is designed to suppress the sonic boom associated with traveling at the speed of sound, noting that its "no-boom" aircraft would be 100 times quieter than the Concorde. Lockheed Martin's Skunk Works is developing the aircraft design, as General Electric, Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-Royce have provided competing engine concepts for the placement in the aircraft. **Meanwhile, Aerion Corp. also has plans to enter the marketplace with its own supersonic aircraft, aiming to take flight by the end of the decade and move into production shortly thereafter**. Through its own market research, the company said there is demand for up to 300 Aerion SBJs in its first 10 years of production.

**People are obsessed with convenience to the point where they sacrifice their own safety for it.**

**Associated Press ’11** [AP, “U.S. to expand tests for faster trips past security”, November 9, 2011, AP, <http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2011/11/us_to_expand_tests_for_faster.html> AD]

**Testing for a new program aimed at getting certain travelers through airport security with less hassle is expanding to airports in Las Vegas, Los Angeles and Minneapolis and St. Paul over the next few months, the government said Wednesday. The expansion will not have an effect on travelers during the busy Thanksgiving travel season. But it shows that the government has seen positive results in the first round of testing for the Obama administration's attempt at moving toward a more intelligence-driven security check at airports. Many people have said the government doesn't use common sense when it screens all travelers the same way.**

## Internal Links

**Focusing on speed creates questions about the role of place.**

**Massey ’94** [Doreen Massey is a contemporary British social scientist and geographer, working among others on topics typical of Marxist geography. She currently serves as Professor of geography at the Open University, “A Global Sense of Place”, 1994, University of Minnesota Press, <http://www.unc.edu/courses/2006spring/geog/021/001/massey.pdf> AD]

**This is an era -- it is often said -- when things are speeding up, and spreading out**. Capital is going through a new phase of internationalization, especially in its financial parts. **More people travel more frequently and for longer distances.** Your clothes have probably made in a range of countries from Latin America to South-East Asia. Dinner consists of food shipped in from all over the world. And if you have a screen in your office, instead of opening a letter which - care of Her Majesty's Post Office - has taken some days to wend its way across the country, you now get interrupted by email. This view of the current age is one now frequently found in a wide range of books and journals. **Much of what is written about space, place and postmodern times emphasizes a new phase in what Marx once called 'the annihilation of space by time'. The process is argued, or - more usually - asserted, to have gained a new momentum, to have reached a new stage. It is a phenomenon which has been called 'time-space compression'.** And the general acceptance that something of the sort is going on the marked by the almost obligatory use in the literature of terms and phrases such as speed-up, global village, overcoming spatial barriers, the disruption of horizons, and so forth. **One of the results of this is an increasing uncertainty about what we mean by 'places' and how we relate to them. How, in the face of all this movement and intermixing, can we retain any sense of a local place and its particularity?** An (idealized) notion of an era when places were (supposedly) inhabited by coherent and homogeneous communities is set against the current fragmentation and disruption. The counterposition is anyway dubious, of course; 'place' and 'community' have only rarely been coterminous. But the occasional longing for such coherence is none the less a sign of the geographic fragmentation, the spatial disruption, of out times. And occasionally, too, it has been part of what has given rise to defensive and reactionary responses - certain forms of nationalism, sentimentalized recovering of sanitized 'heritages', and outright antagonism to newcomers and 'outsiders'. One of the effects of such responses is that place itself, the seeking after a sense of place, has come to be seen by some as necessarily reactionary.

**Place is also significant because it represents human connections – time space compression is changing the human social connection.**

**Massey ’94** [Doreen Massey is a contemporary British social scientist and geographer, working among others on topics typical of Marxist geography. She currently serves as Professor of geography at the Open University, “A Global Sense of Place”, 1994, University of Minnesota Press, <http://www.unc.edu/courses/2006spring/geog/021/001/massey.pdf> AD]

So, at this point in the argument, get back in your mind's eve on a satellite; go right out again and **look back at the globe. This time, however, imagine not just all the physical movement, nor even all the often invisible communications, but also and especially all the social relations, all the links between people**. **Fill it in with all those different experiences of time-space compression**. For what is happening is that **the geography of social relations is changing.** In many cases such relations are increasingly stretched out over space. **Economic, political and cultural social relations, each full of power and with internal structures of domination and subordination, stretched out over the planet at every different level, from the household to the local area to the international.** It is from that perspective that it is possible to envisage an alternative interpretation of place. In this interpretation, what gives a place its specificity is not some long internalized history but the face that it is constructed out of a particular constellation of social relations, meeting and weaving together at a particular locus. If one moves in from the satellite towards the globe, holding all those networks of social relations and movements and communications in one's head, then **each 'place' can be seen as a particular, unique, point of their intersection**. It is, indeed, a meeting place. Instead then, of thinking of places as areas with boundaries around, they can be imagined as articulated moments in networks of social relations and understandings, but where a larger proportion of those relations, experiences and understandings are constructed on a far larger scale than what we happen to define for that moment as the place itself, whether that be a street, or a region or even a continent. And this in turn allows a sense of place which is extroverted, which includes a consciousness of its links with the wider world, which integrates in a positive way the global and the local. This is not a question of making the ritualistic connections to 'the wider system' - the people in the local meeting who bring up international capitalism every time you try to have a discussion about rubbish-collection - **the point is that there are real relations with real content - economic, political, cultural - between any local place and the wider world in which it is set**. In economic geography the argument has long been accepted that it is not possible to understand the 'inner city', for instance its loss of jobs, the decline of manufacturing employment there, by looking only at the inner city. Any adequate explanation has to set the inner city in its wider geographical context. Perhaps it is appropriate to think how that kind of understanding could be extended to the notion of a sense of place. These arguments, then, highlight a number of ways in which a progressive concept of place might be developed. First of all, it is absolutely not static. If places can be conceptualized in terms of the social interactions which they tie together, then it is also the case that these interactions themselves are not motionless things, frozen in time. They are processes**. One of the great one-liners in Marxist exchanges has for long been, 'Ah, but capital is not a thing, it's a process.**' Perhaps this should be said also about places, that places are processes, too. Second, places do not have boundaries in the sense of divisions which frame simple enclosures. 'Boundaries' may be of course be necessary, for the purposes of certain turn of studies for instance, but they are not necessary for the conceptualization of a place itself. Definition in this sense does not have to be through simple counterposition to the outside; it can come, in part, precisely through the particularity of linkage to that 'outside' which is therefore itself part of what constitutes the place. This helps get away from the common association between penetrability and vulnerability. For it is this kind of association which makes invasion by newcomers so threatening. Third, clearly places do not have single, unique 'identities'; they are full of internal conflicts. Just think, for instance, about London's Docklands, a place which is at the moment quite clearly defined by conflict: a conflict over what it past has been (the nature of its 'heritage'), conflict over what should be its present development, conflict over what could be its future. Fourth, and finally, none of this denies place nor the importance of the uniqueness of place. The specificity of place is continually reproduced, but it s not a specificity which result from some long, internalized history. there are a number of sources of this specificity - the uniqueness of place. There is the fact that the wider social relations in which places are set themselves geographically differentiated. Globalization (in the economy, or in culture, or in anything else) does not entail simply homogenization. On the contrary, the globalization of social relations is yet another source of (the reproduction of) geographical uneven development, and thus of the uniqueness of place. **There is the specificity of place which derives from the fact that each place is the focus of a distinct mixture of wider and more local social relations**. There is the fact that this very mixture together in one place may produce effects which would not have happened otherwise. And finally, all these relations with and take a further element of specificity from the accumulated history of a place, with that history itself imagined as the product of layer upon layer of different sets of linkages, both local and to the wider world.

**Networking and globalization shrink the world – they make us ignore place.**

**Sheppard ’02** [Eric Sheppard, Department of Geography, University of Minnesota, Clark University, “University The Spaces and Times of Globalization: Place, Scale, Networks, and Positionality”, July 2002, Economic Geography, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Jul., 2002), pp. 307-330 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4140812.pdf> AD]

**Discussions of the spatiality of globalization have largely focused on place-based attributes that fix globalization locally, on globalization as the construction of scale, and on networks as a distinctive feature of contemporary globalization. By contrast, position within the global economy is frequently regarded as anachronistic in a shrinking, networked world.** A critical review of how place, scale, and networks are used as metaphors for the spatiality of globalization suggests that space/time still matters. Positionality (position in relational space/time within the global economy) is conceptualized as both shaping and shaped by the trajectories of globalization and as influencing the conditions of possibility of places in a globalizing world. The wormhole is invoked as a way of describing the concrete geographies of positionality and their non-Euclidean relationship to the Earth's surface. The inclusion of positionality challenges the simplicity of pro- and anti-globalization narratives and can change how we think about globalization and devise strategies to alter its trajectory.

**Time-space compression changes the role of the city.**

**Smart ’03** [Alan and Josephine, Annual Review of Anthropology, JSTOR, “Urbanization and the Global Perspective”, 2003, Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 32 (2003), pp. 263-285, JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25064830.pdf> AD]

**Global perspective is not new in urban anthropology.** A long line of anthropologists from Horace Miner (1953) to Aidan Southall (1998) have urged urban studies to pay attention to the full range of the urban experience, instead of concentrating on and generalizing from Western cities (Miner 1953, Southall 1998). **Cities have always been key sites for transcultural connections such as long-distance trade and the transmission of innovations.** Thus although globalization1 has a much longer genealogy than credited in recent "global hype" (Wolf 1982, Mintz 1998, Sanjek 1999), this continuity applies particularly to urban settings. **The roles that cities play in the global system, however, have changed considerably, in part owing to time-space compression made possible by new transportation**, communication, and organizational technologies. **In this review we consider "urbanization,, to include not only the growth of cities, but the transformation of existing urban places.** To adequately address the intersection between urbanization and global perspectives, we first provide a brief survey of the contested terrain of the globalization debate. Many authors tend to exaggerate the degree of novelty, and we argue for the need to attend to continuities with the past as well. Cities of the past had many of the features ascribed to "global cities," and early urban anthropologists also made important contributions to the understanding of the global system. The remainder of our review concentrates on three issues about what has been alleged to have changed about cities under late capitalism (since the 1970s). First, we look at whether the extension of production around the world and increased salience of knowledge have decreased the utility of the intermediary roles that cities play. Second, we examine changes in how people live in globalizing cities, which have been seen as increasingly fragmented and unequal, characterized by social exclusion and an emerging digital divide. At the same time, people continue to resist these pressures and actively construct communities and places. Third, we consider the implications of the construction and maintenance of relationships across borders for the transformation of cities, focusing on translocality (Smith 2001), citizenship in the context of transnational affiliation, and transnational social movements.

**Transportation infrastructure shrinks the world – this leads to the loss of culture and expands the hegemony of Western powers.**

**Smart ’03** [Alan and Josephine, Annual Review of Anthropology, JSTOR, “Urbanization and the Global Perspective”, 2003, Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 32 (2003), pp. 263-285, JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25064830.pdf> AD]

**Transportation** and communication **technologies have certainly contributed to the "shrinking" of the world**, but this is not new. Telegraphs and the world's stock markets produced global real time in the nineteenth century. Maintenance of transnational ties by migrants to New York was as significant in 1900 as in 2000 (Foner 2000). Supranational organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN); **technologies such as container terminals, jets,** the Internet, electronic funds transfer; and social movements such as human rights and environmentalism do **allow people to more easily maintain ties across borders.** However, exaggeration of their novelty and inevitability serve political agendas, legitimating changes by claiming that "there is no alternative" in a global world (Hirst & Thompson 1996, Tsing 2000). We limit ourselves to three dimensions in the debate about globalization, the first of which is whether **the world is becoming increasingly homogeneous.** **Some see global homogenization and the loss of cultural diversity, whether this is equated with Americanization or Westernization or the dominance of consumerism** (Sklair 1991, Klein 2000). Others emphasize the proliferation of new hybrid or creolized cultural forms (Garcia Canclini 1997, Hannerz 1992). The second facet of debates concerns whether globalization is driven from above or below**. Many see it as the imposition of the hegemony of American/Western institutions such as WTO and the International Monetary Fund** (IMF) (McMichael 1998). Others emphasize the agency of migrants, NGOs (Paley 2002), and virtual communities (Wilson & Peterson 2002) in building transnational linkages. The third area of debate concerns whether analysts see globalization as involving the erosion of national sovereignty (deterritorialization) or as preserving or even extending the power of (some) national states (Keating 2001). It has been widely argued that globalization generates the greater salience of both sub-national and supra-national arenas for action at the expense of the nation-state, whereas the explosive growth of global finance constrains the freedom of action of national governments. Once primarily structured by their place within a nested national hierarchy, cities have become more influential in defining or defending roles for themselves within global arenas.

**Globalization results space-time compression.**

**Brenner ’99** [Neil Brenner, “Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies”, Theory and Society, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb., 1999), pp. 39-78, JSTOR, AD]

**Since the early 1970s, debates have raged throughout the social sciences concerning the process of "globalization"- an essentially contested term whose meaning is as much a source of controversy today as it was over two decades ago, when systematic research first began on the topic**. Contemporary globalization research encompasses an immensely broad range of themes, from the new international division of labor, changing forms of industrial organization, and processes of urbanregional restructuringt o transformationsi n the natureo f state power, civil society, citizenship, democracy, public spheres, nationalism, politico-cultural identities, localities, and architectural forms, among many others.2 Yet despite this proliferation of globalization research, little theoretical consensus has been established in the social sciences concerning the interpretation of even the most rudimentary elements of the globalization process - e.g., its historical periodization, its causal determinants, and its socio-political implications.3 Nevertheless, within this whirlwind of opposing perspectives, a remarkably broad range of studies of globalization have devoted detailed attention to the problematic of space, its social production, and its historical transformation. **Major strands of contemporary globalization research have been permeated by geographical concepts - e.g., "space-time compression," "space of flows," "space of places," "deterritorialization," "glocalization," the "global-local nexus," "supraterritoriality," "diasporas," "translocalities," and "scapes," among many other terms**. Meanwhileg lobalizationr esearchersh ave begun to deploy a barrage of distinctively geographical prefixes - e.g. "sub-," "supra-,"" trans-,"" meso-,"a nd "inter-,"- to describev ariouse mergent social processes that appear to operate below, above, beyond, or between entrenched geopolitical boundaries. **The recognition that social relations are becoming increasingly interconnected on a global scale necessarily problematizes the spatial parameters of those relations, and therefore, the geographical context in which they occur. Under these circumstances, space no longer appears as a static platform of social relations, but rather as one of their constitutive dimensions, itself historically produced, reconfigured, and transformed.**

#### Our view of space creates inequality – it ignores the social relationships in other places.

**Lobao et al ’07** [Dr. Linda M. Lobao is a professor of Geography, Environmental and Natural Resources, and Sociology at Ohio State University, Dr. Gregory Hooks is a professor at Washington State University, Ann R. Tickmayer is Professor of Sociology and Chair of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at OSU, “THE SOCIOLOGY OF SPATIAL INEQUALITY”, 2007, State University of New York Press, AD]

**Spatial scales, along with spaces and places, illuminate key issues in subnational inequality as well as gaps in sociology’s spatialization project**. As noted in the introduction, rather than viewing any of these as fixed concepts, it is useful to consider the spaces, spatial scales, and places conceptualized by analysts. **Space can be brought into the study of inequality in different ways. Subfields such as cross-national, rural, and urban sociology have an inherent spatial focus. But others remain underspatialized.** For example, chapters in this volume explain how taking a spatial approach to political and economic sociology enriches these fields. Bringing in space requires attention to the scale at which social processes occur. Addressed widely in geography (Gough 2004; Smith 2003), the concept of spatial scales has received little direct attention in sociology. It refers to the territorial resolution at which social processes work out, are conceptualized and studied (Smith 2003:228). Social scientists privilege certain scales in understanding social processes. The urban and national scales have generated distinct explanatory discourses which Swyngedouw (1997) calls “scalar narratives**.” Scalar narratives tend to assert the primacy of their scales of focus while crowding out others. For example, discourse about large, world cities may be directed upward to explain global paths of development, or it may be directed downward, so that subnational development is reduced to a network of large cities. Generalizations about the nation-state may be uncritically assumed to apply at lower scales, leaving regional level processes and explanations unquestioned.** Privileging certain geographic scales creates an unbalanced view of inequality (Lobao 2004). For the most part, ordinary, unexceptional places, such as slow-growing or marginal regions and the subnational scale at large, are left out of discussion. Neglecting these areas and focusing on propulsive urban centers contributes to over-emphasis of globalization as opposed to localization processes (Cox 1997) and change over stasis in inequality and development. Social processes are also fluid and cut across spatial scales. Any one scale provides but a snapshot of a causal moment in studying inequality (Swyngedouw 1997:140). In different historical periods, different geographic scales emerge as significant to social processes. The subnational scale, for example, is increasingly important for understanding the allocation of inequality in part due to decentralization. States and counties have greater responsibility for economic growth and social welfare today relative to the past and the federal government (Lobao and Kraybill 2005). Finally, the scale at which one chooses to direct theory and research affects conceptualization of places. In our introduction, we discussed two traditions, the place-in-society approach, more conventional to sociology, and the society-in-place approach, more articulated in geography, which sees place in an array of conceptualized territories. **Much work on subnational inequality takes the second approach. Here the intrinsic character**

**of places is of less interest, but places still require conceptualization based on the social processes earmarked for attention. Since social processes cut across scales, one way to view place is as a “particular articulation” of those processes (Massey 1994:5). That is, a place represents a particular mix of social relationships** originating from sources at different scales, both internal and external to that place. The literature on spatial scales challenges confining inequality research to cities and nation-states. It opens up the subnational scale as worthy of investigation and increasingly important under neoliberal governance. It cautions against fixing the study of place itself at any particular scale. Finally, it provides an alternative way of thinking about places, as nodes of intersecting relationships involving power and inequality from different scales (Massey 1994).

## Impacts

**We stop caring about those who are in the space – we consider them an inconvenience and unimportant.**

**Massey ’94** [Doreen Massey is a contemporary British social scientist and geographer, working among others on topics typical of Marxist geography. She currently serves as Professor of geography at the Open University, “A Global Sense of Place”, 1994, University of Minnesota Press, <http://www.unc.edu/courses/2006spring/geog/021/001/massey.pdf> AD]

**"**Jumbos have enabled Korean computer consultants to fly to Silicon Valley as if popping next door, and Singaporean entrepreneurs to reach Seattle in a day. The border of the world's greatest ocean have been joined as never before. **And Boeing has brought these people together. But what about those they fly over, on their islands five miles below? How has the mighty 747 brought them greater communion with those whose shores are washed by the same water? It hasn't, of course. Air travel might enable businessmen to buzz across the ocean, but the concurrent decline in shipping has only increased the isolation of many island communities ... Pitcairn, like many other Pacific islands, has never felt so far from its neighbours."** In other words, and most broadly, **time-space compression needs differentiating socially**. this is not just a moral or political point about inequality, although that would be sufficient reason to mention it; it is also a conceptual point.

**Time-space compression destroy culture and creates class divisions.**

**Smart ’03** [Alan and Josephine, Annual Review of Anthropology, JSTOR, “Urbanization and the Global Perspective”, 2003, Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 32 (2003), pp. 263-285, JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25064830.pdf> AD]

**Globalization and time-space compression have made it more feasible than ever before to break the link between locale, where one lives, and** milieu, **the environment that is practically relevant to an individua**l (Durrschmidt 1997). Although transnational involvement by ordinary people is not a new thing, technology makes it much easier to act simultaneously in different places so that anonymous neighbors may be intensely involved in communities that include people from around the globe. What does the possibility of "**localities without community and cultures without locality**" (Albrow 1997, p. 42) mean for daily life and the social and cultural organization of cities? How do the implications vary by class, occupation, gender, and lifestyle grouping? **Increased connectivity is conjoined with growing divisions.** The global city literature suggests that world cities magnify more universal trends toward increased social polarization related to neoliberal global projects, economic restructuring, and welfare reform. **Ideas about the increasing salience of knowledge in the econ omy, or informational capitalism, also raise the prospect of an increasing digital divide between knowledge workers and manual workers or the underclass within cities, or divisions between "fast" and "slow" societies on the global scale**. **Polar ization and divisions have also been alleged to encourage the decline of common civic culture and shared public places and lead to the "fortress city" to protect the haves from the have-nots** (Guano 2002, Caldeira 1999, Low 2003). Migration from nontraditional sources may also increase divisions along ethnic lines (Amin 2002), even as it contributes to urban vitality and economic dynamism. **Within these divided and unstable places** (Greenhouse 2002**), people struggle to create or defend meaningful collective activities and spaces**. For example, Darian Smith (2002) describes the resurrection of old practices of "beating the village bounds" in southern England, despite the fact that most of the participants are middle-class newcomers who commute to jobs in London. Vincent & Warf (2002, p. 30) document the recent growth of eruvim, **religious** Jewish **enclaves, in North America and Europe and interpret it as part of a "global surge in ethnic identity that has emerged as a backlash to postmodern capitalism**." Srinivas (2001) argues that the Karaga ritual procession in Bangalore enacts earlier landscapes obliterated by urban planning and uncontrolled settlements. The landscape of urban memory is not a personal or cognitive process alone but is achieved by movement through space that renews linkages between different parts of the urban field. In all these cases, actions claim or maintain boundaries around a space and assert commonali ties that are continually challenged by broader processes. This process happens at all levels of urban space: block parties, neighborhood watch, and regional planning initiatives. Everywhere, people also organize to protest and resist developments that they believe negatively impact their communities (McDonogh 1999, Parnell 2002, Rotenberg 1999).

**And, globalization impacts the demography of areas through migrations.**

**Smart ’03** [Alan and Josephine, Annual Review of Anthropology, JSTOR, “Urbanization and the Global Perspective”, 2003, Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 32 (2003), pp. 263-285, JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25064830.pdf> AD]

**Globalization involves a vast spider's web of interacting projects. Some of these projects encourage mobility, whereas others try to maintain or impose enclosures, whether of people, goods, capital, or ideas.** Some projects inspire resistance to official projects, and everywhere some people manage to get around the rules (Greenhouse 2002, Heyman 1999a). **Although the mobility of goods and capital has been greatly enhanced, restrictions on the movement of people have been maintained or reinforced. When promoting migration, rich countries increasingly recruit for skilled and educated migrants. Many who do not qualify have responded by migrating illegally. Migration, legal or illegal, has a tremendous impact on the demography and landscape of cities because the vast majority of international migrants settle in the largest cities. In** Canada, which, after Australia, has the highest percentage of foreign-born population, 71.2% of immigrants settled in Toronto, Vancouver, or Montr?al. Nearly half of Toronto's citizens were born outside Canada. The extent of residential segregation and retention of distinct consumption preferences varies considerably between countries and even cities and profoundly influences the texture and vitality of urban spaces (Bauder & Sharpe 2002). The vibrant spaces of diverse cities can serve as powerful magnets for the highly skilled workers and investors attracted to the quality of urban life (Florida 2002), but they can also result in perceptions of urban danger that prompt flight from the central cities. How cities manage diversity seems to be a critical factor in their competitive success.

**And, these migrants are unwanted by the community – they form pockets where they are discriminated against by the government.**

**Smart ’03** [Alan and Josephine, Annual Review of Anthropology, JSTOR, “Urbanization and the Global Perspective”, 2003, Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 32 (2003), pp. 263-285, JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25064830.pdf> AD]

**The involvement of migrants in political and other activities in both the place of residence and place of origin inevitably raises issues of citizenship. Policies of national governments on issues such as dual citizenship, remittances, nonresident voting, pensions, and so on have a major impact on whether and how transnational communities form** (Al-Ali et al. 2001, Glick Schiller 1999). **It is not only national governments that influence migrants' access to rights of citizenship. Sometimes, as in China, local governments can limit the access of domestic migrants to crucial resources** (Solinger 1999, Smart & Smart 2001). Zhang (2001) has provided a vivid account of how such restrictions affect the daily lives of migrants in Beijing. Migrants have responded by constructing their own unofficial spaces in the domains of housing, education, labor markets, and the maintenance of order. **These unofficial translocal spaces have often been subjected to repression owing to fear by local governments that the "political vacuums" developing in these places might "become fertile ground for the growth of social vices and nonstate political forces**" (p. 2). D**enying migrants rights to the city can create serious problems for authorities intent on disciplining space. Transnational migrants have also become involved in the construction of new political spaces that cross conventional boundaries between nations and ethnic groups** (Anderson 2001). However, research on transnational social movements demonstrates that it is not only migrants who help to constitute transnational social fields: Being an activist in Amnesty International, peace movements (Miller 2000), transnational labor advocacy networks (Trubek et al. 2000), or indigenous rights movements (Mato 2000, Vargas Cetina 2001) often involves acting at a distance without leaving home. The so-called anti-globalization movement is a particularly interesting example of the kinds of transnational linkages and cooperation that can be accomplished while explicitly eschewing any kind of formal organization. Graeber (2002, pp. 64-65) argues that the movement is not actually against global ization per se but against the kind of globalization that is "limited to the movement of capital and commodities, and actually increases barriers against the free flow of people, information and ideas." These movements all reflect human struggles to transform global milieux into something closer to the human scale of the locales that for most of human existence have been the dominant focus of activity and concern.

## Alternatives

**Our alternative is to incorporate time into thoughts of space.**

**Massey ’99** –[Doreen Massey is a contemporary British social scientist and geographer, working among others on topics typical of Marxist geography. She currently serves as Professor of geography at the Open University, “Space-Time, 'Science' and the Relationship between Physical Geography and Human Geography”, 1999, Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1999),pp. 261-276 JSTOR AD]

Let me begin, however, with Raper and Livingstone's paper. This is an argument for the importance of a concept of relative space in the representation/modelling of environmental problems. '[T]he way that spatio-temporal processes are studied', they argue, 'is strongly influenced by the model of space and time that is adopted' (1995, 364). **Traditionally, the authors argue, while environmental representations have been somewhat unthinking about the concepts of space and time that they imply and necessarily incorporate, they have in fact been dominated by "'timeless" geometric methods focused on two dimensional planes'** (363). Raper and Livingstone's aim is to disrupt this unthought assumption and to argue for a more self-conscious and 'relative' understanding. In doing this, they turn to 'theoretical developments in physics' (363) and in particular to Einstein and Minkowski. This allows them to do a number of things. First, it provides concepts that enable us to understand space and time as 'dimensions that are defined by the entities that inhabit them and not vice versa': space and time must be considered relative concepts, i e, they are determined by the nature and behavior f the entities that 'inhabit' them (the concept of 'relative space'). This is the inverse of the situation where space and time themselves form a rigid framework which as an existence independent of the entities (the concept of 'absolute space'). (363) Thus they distinguish between two approaches to the spatial modeling of environmental problems: the geometrically indexed (absolute space) and the object-oriented (relative space). Using the former approach makes the coordinate system ... into the primary index of the spatial representation and dictates much of the representational structure of the environmental problem of interest. Doreen Massey **In the object-orienteda pproach the environmental scientist must declare the nature of the real-world entities identified first: their characteristics and behaviour structure the spatial representation**(.3 60) (The implication of this is, of course, that the GIS folk have to receive the spatio-temporal framework from the application domain, rather than, as heretofore, themselves being in a position to decide it.) Second, this approach to space-time enables the conceptualization of entities themselves as a set of 'worlds' (365), where each world has its own four-dimensional reference system. 'Time', they write, 'is a property of the objects' (366). Third, and implicit in all of this, is that for the kind of work that Raper and Livingstone are addressing, **it is necessary to think not in terms of space and time separately, but in terms of a four-dimensional space-time** (364). All of this was, for me, totally engrossing. It rang many bells with my own work, and that of many others, within human geography. We, too, have been struggling to understand space (and spacetime) as constituted through the social, rather than as dimensions defining an arena within which the social takes place. We too have tried to consider the idea of local time-spaces, time-spaces specific to the entities with which they are mutually constitutive. Thrift's (1996) explorations in rethinking theory and space together and Whatmore's (1997) proposals for relational thinking are prominent examples, as is much of the work that draws on the writing of Bruno Latour**. The new Open University course on Understanding cities tries to conceive of cities as open time-space intensities of social relations, themselves encompassing and interlocking a variety of sub-time-spaces of different groups and activities. In brief, a number of human geographers are now trying to rethink space as integrally spacetime and to conceptualize space-time as relative (defined in terms of the entities 'within' it), relational (as constituted through the operation of social relations, through which the 'entities' are also constituted) and integral to the constitution of the entities themselves (the entities are local timespaces)**. Sometimes it can make your head hurt to think in this way, but as Raper and Livingstone argue (1995, 364), 'the way that spatio-temporal processes are studied is strongly influenced by the model of space and time that is adopted.' In other words, it matters; it makes a difference.