# \*\*\*BRAC Aff-Arnett/Reed/Suh Lab\*\*\*

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#### Contention 1- Base Reorganization

#### The current round of BRAC base realignment has created substantial transportation problems around US military bases. Current DOD and DOT funding is insufficient to cover the infrastructure improvements necessary to support the influx of new personnel.

Transportation Research Board of the National Academies 11 (Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases,” http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302.pdf)

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) 2005 round is fundamentally different from previous rounds. It concentrates tens of thousands of additional personnel at a number of bases, some of which are located in metropolitan areas with already congested transportation infrastructure. The time period by which BRAC decisions must be fully implemented (September 2011) is far too short for some bases and surrounding communities to avoid significant added traffic congestion for military personnel and other commuters during peak travel periods. The resulting traffic delays will impose substantial costs on surrounding communities and may even be harmful to the military. The existing funding mechanisms, through the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Department of Defense (DoD), are incapable of addressing the problems in terms of both the speed with which they can be implemented and the resources they have available. Moreover, base commanders lack incentives, guidance, and resources to address the problems bases cause outside their gates. In cases documented in this report, base growth due to BRAC and other DoD policies outstrips communities’ abilities to respond. This problem is partly due to the controversy and difficulty of expanding capacity in built-up areas in response to growing populations and travel and partly due to severely constrained resources.

#### And, the Defense Access Roads program has not kept up with the infrastructure improvement demands of the recent base changes as a result of the BRAC 2005 round- current eligibility criteria prevent needed investment in local roads.

Moran 2009 James P Moran(Committee on Appropriations),7/27/2009,Congress of The United States(House Of Representations), Letter to Robert Gates, <http://alexandrianews.org/2009/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/gates-letter.pdf>

Congress has repeatedly expressed its concern with the limitations of the DAR program In the report of the Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (Senate Report 110-335), Congress asserted that: The Department of Defense (DOD) has the responsibility to determine whether proposed improvements to roads serving military installations may be eligible for financing through the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program Section 210 of title 23, United States Code, authorizes DOD to pay a fair share of the cost of public road improvements necessary to mitigate an unusual impact of a defense activity if the Secretary of Defense determines the requirement to be important to national defense An unusual impact includes the establishment of a new military installation, a significant increase in assigned personnel at an existing military installation, the relocation of an access gate, compensation for a closure of a public road caused by military activities, transport of heavy equipment over a public road, or a temporary surge of military activity creating intolerable congestion. The committee is concerned that the current DAR eligibility criteria contained in the Federal-aid Policy Guide of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) do not consider the full range of transportation impacts or requirements. The committee is aware that the criteria currently do not account for safety and security concerns for local roads, even though certain DAR projects have been carried out in the past 5 years in order to correct significant deficiencies threatening the safety of military personnel. In addition, the decisions of the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment process, relocations of forces from overseas, and growth in the size of the Army and Marine Corps have led to a substantial increase in the number of personnel on certain military installations over a period of just a few years Yet the staggered nature of these basing decisions make it difficult to show that any one decision meets the strict criterion of at least doubling local traffic, or easily determine the appropriate scope of cumulative impacts As a result, valid transportation requirements may not be considered eligible due to a strict interpretation of the "doubling" criterion, despite a significant expansion of the installation's population.

#### **And, status quo funding of the Defense Access Roads program is not enough –expanding funding and program eligibility are critical for the program to address BRAC transportation problems.**

Collins and Hamptons 12 [Darcel M. Collins – transportation specialist with the Federal Highway Association & M.A. in Management from Webster University, Daryl D. Hampton – senior engineer for the Defense Access Roads program & B.S. in civil engineering from Old Dominion University, June 2012, “Defense Access Roads”, <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/12mayjune/02.cfm>]

As demonstrated by these examples, the DAR program is active across the country, implementing projects in both urban and rural areas. Given the magnitude of anticipated impacts, some congressional leaders have suggested that the DAR program should become an even larger contributor to address transportation needs near military facilities. Congress clearly is concerned about the military's impacts on local transportation systems, as demonstrated by its commissioning of several recent studies by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Transportation Research Board (TRB). These studies suggest that changes to the DAR program may be on the horizon.¶ According to GAO's January 2011 report, High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs Beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program (GAO-11-165), "communities surrounding 18 military installations expecting BRAC-related growth had estimated over $2 billion in defense-related transportation needs. This has resulted in an increased interest in the...DAR program to help mitigate adverse transportation impacts."¶ Similarly, TRB's Special Report 302: Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases, also published in 2011, reports that the "time period by which BRAC decisions must be fully implemented (September 2011) is far too short for some bases and surrounding communities to avoid significant added traffic congestion for military personnel and other commuters during peak travel periods. The resulting traffic delays will impose substantial costs on surrounding communities and may even be harmful to the military."¶ Further still, the TRB report concludes, "the existing funding mechanisms [through DOD and USDOT] are incapable of addressing the problems in terms of both the speed with which they can be implemented and the resources they have available."¶ In addition, a study by SDDC, "Defense Access Road Program Criteria Study," describes how an urban DAR criterion could be added that would allow DOD to contribute a proportional share to projects to fix failing levels of service on congested roadways that would not otherwise meet the program's current eligibility criteria.¶ Recommendations from these studies vary and cover a range of challenging concepts, including expanding the program's scope to include other modes of transportation and incorporating measures to manage transportation demand. The recommendations also describe opportunities for greater communication, coordination, and elevation of defense transportation needs in the local planning process.

#### Thus the plan-

#### The United States federal government should provide necessary funding to the Defense Access Roads program for investing in transportation infrastructure, including local roads, around military bases in the United States.

#### Contention 2- Hegemony- the transportation consequences of base realignment undermine US military power- five internal links:

#### First- base operations and readiness

#### Increased traffic congestion due to BRAC base realignments will be devastating to military readiness.

Tucker 2011 [Cheryl Tucker](http://blog.thenewstribune.com/opinion/author/Cheryl%20Tucker)(Editorial Writer for News Tribune),“JBLM traffic crunch: Pain Congress can help remedy”,2/8/2011, <http://blog.thenewstribune.com/opinion/2011/02/08/jblm-traffic-crunch-pain-congress-can-help-remedy/>

Much of that new traffic on Interstate 5 near JBLM is a result of the military implementing the base closure and realignment plan (BRAC) approved by Congress in 2005 – which is taking units from bases scheduled for closure and distributing them to 18 others that are expanding.¶ JBLM is one that is growing – by leaps and bounds – not only when new units arrive but also when existing ones return from war zones.¶ Of the 18 bases that are growing, only four others are scheduled to get more new personnel and dependents than Lewis-McChord. When the base realignment process is finished, it’s estimated that JBLM’s Department of Defense population will have increased by about 13,500, and they’ll be bringing another 17,400 family members with them.¶ Many newcomers will live in base housing, but most will live in the cities and unincorporated areas of Pierce and North Thurston counties. And they’ll be joining the crush of vehicles on Interstate 5 between Olympia and Tacoma.¶ The new report cites the added impact of base expansion not only on the local community but also on military readiness – because personnel won’t be able to get to work “within acceptable commute times.” While the Defense Department has taken a largely hands-off approach to local transportation needs, the report notes, that’s “unrealistic” in congested metropolitan areas.¶ The military itself must be more proactive, according to the committee that wrote the report, by encouraging teleworking, traveling during off-peak times and carpooling. JBLM already has taken some helpful steps, including opening an additional gate and collaborating with the state Department of Transportation on future projects.¶ While a congressional allocation for road improvements could help in the short term, the committee notes that the Defense Department must accept more financial responsibility for the role its personnel play in adding to transportation problems.¶ The military already pays impact fees for dependents attending civilian schools. This report seems to suggest that similar fees should be paid for traffic impacts. About $3.8 billion is being spent on upgrades at JBLM, much of it to accommodate the increase in personnel. It just makes sense that at least some money be spent making it easier for those people to get to and from the base.¶ The South Sound community greatly benefits from its military presence and federal payroll – which helped it weather the recession better than it otherwise might have. But it’s in the military’s best interest to do whatever it can to make traffic less onerous for its own people as well as the civilian population.¶ Congestion shouldn’t interfere with readiness; the military’s job is too important for that to happen.

#### Traffic congestion limits base functions- infrastructure improvements are critical to DOD missions.

SDDC 2010 (Surface Deployment and Distribution Command-Transportation Engineering Agency, “Defense Access Road Program Criteria Study,” July 29, http://www.tea.army.mil/pubs/nr/dod/briefings/Defense%20Access%20Road%20Program%20Criteria%20Study.pdf)

Cost of Congestion According to the Texas Transportation Institute 8, congestion caused urban Americans to travel 4.2 billion hours more and to purchase an extra 2.8 billion gallons of fuel for a congestion cost of $87.2 billion in 2007. On an individual basis, this equates to an average of 36 hours of annual delay per motorist, with the number of urban areas with 40+ hours of delay per peak traveler increasing from 10 in 1997 to 23 in 2007. As might be expected, the levels are generally worse in larger urban areas. For instance, the average annual delay per motorist in the Washington D.C. area is 62 hours. The Automobile Association of America commissioned a study to compare the costs of congestion versus safety for urban areas 9. The key findings indicate that based on 2005 data the cost of traffic crashes is nearly two and a half times the cost of congestion, and that improving safety may improve congestion since 40 to 50 percent of all nonrecurring congestion is associated with traffic incidents. This information, as well as information presented earlier in this report, demonstrates the link between congestion and safety. Considering the data, the impact to the travelling public is obvious in economic and quality of life terms. However, military personnel are also using the same roadways to support the installations function, whether it be commuting to and from the base on a day-to-day basis, or the movement of goods or equipment from fort to port. Therefore, a sound and efficient transportation system is critical to the installation and DoD mission, which may result in the need to reduce congestion and/or improve safety.

#### Healthy bases are essential to our security- they are a critical part of military strategy.

Cornella et al. 05 [Hon Al. Cornella – Chairman of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, Lewis E. Curtis III – member of the Comission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, May 9, 2005, “Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States”, <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/obc.pdf>]

The military basing structure of the United States is part and parcel of its national¶ security strategy. Where we place our forces, how we stage them for commitment in¶ the pursuit of national interests, where we position sets of equipment and supplies to¶ sustain them and how and with whom we ally and train are more than a reflection of¶ current policy options. It is strategy itself, not the totality of it, but a significant part.¶ The basing posture of the United States, particularly its overseas basing, is the skeleton of national security upon which flesh and muscle will be molded to enable us¶ to protect our national interests and the interests of our allies, not just today, but for¶ decades to come.

#### Second- Naval power-

#### Insufficient transportation infrastructure hurts Naval mission effectiveness- improvements are needed.

Messina 2011 Debbie Messina(PhD In Journalism),PilotOnline.com, “Region's roads impede Navy mobility, report finds”, <http://hamptonroads.com/2011/07/regions-roads-impede-navy-mobility-report-finds>

About 125,000 Navy personnel use area roads daily to get to work. And they could use some help, a draft report by the Hampton Roads Transportation Planning Organization shows.¶ The study identifies transportation needs for the military and recommends improvements, suggesting, among other things, more lanes across the Hampton Roads harbor, replacing or rehabbing deficient bridges, light-rail extensions, and high-speed passenger trains to Washington, D.C., that can get their people to the Pentagon and back in a day.¶ But it does not identify funding.¶ Military personnel - including active duty, reserves, retirees and their families - number 300,000, about 20 percent of the region's population.¶ Military representatives told planners that congestion hurts their ability to maintain military personnel or even bring additional personnel here. Traffic not only affects daily commuting but also travel times between installations during business hours.¶ "Time in transit, particularly when amplified by delays at bridges, tunnels and several traffic congestion delays, significantly detracts from mission-performance effectiveness and efficiency," retired Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Jon A. Gallinetti told regional planners as they prepared the report.¶ Retired Rear Adm. Paul E. Tobin Jr. said a key element of success for the Navy's mission is mobility, but it's impeded "because our transportation infrastructure is in decline and struggling to meet our needs."¶ Traffic safety is so important that the fleet commander gets briefed weekly on accidents and incidents involving Navy personnel, the report says.¶ Among the recommendations:¶ - Emphasize roadways serving the military when prioritizing construction and maintenance needs.¶ - Widen portions of Interstate 64; improve I-264 interchanges; add capacity across the Hampton Roads harbor, whether it be at the Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel or a new crossing; and expand light rail to Norfolk Naval Station and into Virginia Beach.¶ - Replace or rehabilitate structurally deficient bridges, including Victory Boulevard over Paradise Creek in Portsmouth, Granby Street over Masons Creek in Norfolk, and I-264 over Lynnhaven Parkway in Virginia Beach.¶ - Use a minimum vertical clearance of 14 feet as tunnels are constructed or replaced, a minimum vertical clearance of 16 feet at new interstate bridges, and a minimum of 12 feet on new highway lanes to accommodate military vehicles.¶ The planning organization, within the year, will survey military personnel about challenges on their daily commutes.

And, Naval power is key to hegemony.

Harvey 11 [J.C. Harvey – Commander of the U.S. Fleet Forces – October 13, 2011, “What is Readiness?” <http://usfleetforces.blogspot.com/2011/10/what-is-readiness.html>]

While OIF and OEF certainly increased the demand for all forces from every service, the end of those operations do not promise a return to a more sustainable optempo, as our CNO stated in his Sailing Directions, “As ground forces draw down in the Middle East, the Navy will continue to deter aggression and reassure our partners – we will have the watch.” For Navy to successfully stand the watch, to meet the great challenge of our times, we must be resourced to meet the tasks we have been given. Our Navy, in partnership with our primary Joint partner – the U.S. Marine Corps – will be expected to meet simultaneous demands to support multiple regional engagement plans, deal directly with small/mid-sized crises, and prepare for higher intensity conflicts in various regions of the globe. To do all that is now, and certainly will be in the future, expected of us requires a clear delineation of national military priorities so that we can develop coherent answers to the three essential readiness questions. We must then be given the required resources to turn those answers into the forces necessary to be ready to fight and win today while developing the ability to win tomorrow. Strategic clarity in the determination of our current readiness requirements and the proper resourcing of those requirements will enable our Navy to answer the three essential readiness questions and deliver the force our nation needs today and will need tomorrow.

#### Third- retention and training-

#### Lack of sufficient infrastructure has created unmanageable transportation problems for personnel. Traffic congestion negatively impacts military training exercises and undermines quality of life, risking loss of high-skilled military workers.

TRB 11 (Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases,” http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302.pdf)

Increased highway traffic generated by base growth due to BRAC 2005, policies to grow the size of the military services, and rapid redeployments have worsened or will worsen traffic congestion in some metropolitan areas. The potential problems are quite serious for civilian and military users of transport systems in these areas. Even before military redeployments of large numbers of personnel, major metropolitan areas were facing increased traffic congestion, greater traffic delays, and declining trip­time reliability. These areas have been struggling to manage their traffic congestion, improve reliability, and increase safety using a range of transportation options. Personnel increases at a number of bases located in these major metropolitan areas have exacerbated this congestion and threaten to make the situation unmanageable in some locations. As transportation networks reach their saturation points, any additional traffic has a disproportionate, nonlinear impact on delay and can degrade facili­ties from reduced speed to stop­and­go conditions. The consequences are somewhat different from relocations of civilian workers to more secure military locations. Fort Belvoir North, the Mark Center, and much of Fort Meade are office complexes without mili­tary operations, whereas Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Fort Bliss, and Eglin Air Force Base are operating bases made up largely of military personnel. In these cases, civilian workers, many of whom were previously able to rely on transit to get to work, are having their jobs relocated to areas where this option is limited. Surveys of Defense Information Systems Agency employees being moved to Fort Meade in Maryland show that most of them plan to continue commuting from their current residences in Virginia. In other cases, the congestion is caused by the concentration of military personnel and their families, many of whom will be living in housing off the base, often far off the base where housing affordability matches military incomes. These men and women will become new com-muters on already congested facilities, often commuting long distances. In either the case of relocated civilian workers living in the region or of military people moving into the region, the impacts on traffic may be significant but have different options for responding. Finding 2 Military personnel and civilians working for the military are adversely affected by growing congestion. Longer and more arduous commutes risk loss of retention of senior, highly skilled civilian workers. Military personnel face severe congestion accessing Joint Base Lewis–McChord every day. Military training plans are disrupted by the inability to carry out exercises during periods of heavy traffic congestion. Joint Base Lewis–McChord must carry out troop movements to the training facil­ity at night to avoid congestion. Personnel and visitors to the National Naval Medical Center face severe congestion on Rockville Pike (the major state route connecting the base to downtown and I­495 and I­270). Personnel traveling to and from the Mark Center will encounter extreme congestion and lengthened trip times. The cost of this conges­tion is not accounted for in the BRAC 2005 assessment of the impacts of military personnel relocations.

And, training is critical to military effectiveness– quantity of troops doesn’t matter without quality in conflict

DOA 08 [Department of the Army, “Base Realignment and Closure Smart Book for Commanders”, May 14, 2008, <http://cpol.army.mil/library/general/brac/docs/BRAC-Cmdrs-Smart-Book.pdf>]

The DoD is in the process of repositioning and restructuring its stateside and overseas bases and facilities. The plan directs, by 2013, the movement and consolidation of major military elements with the goal to significantly enhance the nation’s capacity to train Soldiers and leaders and to generate combat power during time of war. The plan ¶ integrates BRAC decisions, global defense posture realignments, and the other actions required to build a modular Army. The plan requires careful synchronization of ¶ stationing, construction, and deployment schedules to posture U.S. forces, logistics ¶ activities, and power projection platforms to respond to the demands of the Nation ¶ efficiently and effectively.

And, retention of skilled personnel is **critical to readiness and future combat effectiveness.**

**Beerman 06** (Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Beerman United States Army, Doctor Mark Grandstaff Project Adviser, “INCREASING ARMY RETENTION THROUGH INCENTIVES”, March 15, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448815)

The United States has three core strategic interests: preserve American security, bolster economic prosperity, and promote values. 1 **Supporting the core interest of preserving American security includes the strategic objective of securing the United States from direct attack. 2 The 2005 National Defense Strategy states that we will deter attacks by maintaining capable and2 rapidly deployable forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the will and capability to resolve conflicts decisively on favorable terms. 3 Therefore, it is** strategically vital **for our military to retain our experienced soldiers and NCOs. If we do not, their unavailability will threaten the Army’s readiness and ability to conduct missions to support the National Security Strategy.** **In the near future, the U.S. Army will begin losing substantial numbers of soldiers, especially junior NCOs who have gained valuable technical, tactical, and leadership skills in recent combat operations.** These soldiers will soon tire of the multiple extended deployments and decide to leave the Army so they can spend quality time with their families and enjoy less demanding employment opportunities. **When retention of these critical soldiers declines, our military readiness will also erode because we will lack the required experience, leadership skills and combat experience that our military needs to continue the GWOT. Our experience in the war on terrorism has indisputably revealed the need to reorient our military capabilities to contend with these irregular terroristic challenges more effectively**. 4 Our Army is now fighting small groups of non-state terrorists, not the traditional nation-state armies we faced in the past. This new challenge has drawn us into a conflict in which we are conducting non-traditional operations against small terrorist cells. 5 Junior NCOs and soldiers are critical to the success of such operations because they are learning how to lead and fight in this new operational environment. In small unit operations, critical junior NCO skills and leadership have become essential for success. Clearly, retention efforts should be carefully managed to ensure that the right skills and specialties are retained at sufficient levels to keep the Army ready to fulfill its worldwide commitments.

#### Fourth- military-civilian planning-

#### Lack of DOD assistance with transportation improvements undermines military-civilian planning.

TRB 11 (Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases,” http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302.pdf)

Institutional Misalignment The BRAC 2005 process has illuminated a significant misalignment between military decision processes and expectations and civilian transportation­planning and funding allocation processes in BRAC cases and more generally. Finding 3 There is a substantial institutional misalignment between base planning by the military and planning by civilian authorities responsible for regional transportation infrastructure that the military depends on. Bases are counting on civilian resources to address their off­base transporta­tion needs, but no process is in place to ensure that those needs will be met. There is also not an adequate process in place for funneling the right kind of information (such as information on congestion and subsequent costs to the military) up the chain when BRAC and other military base decisions are made. These difficulties are compounded by several other issues: • DoD policies and guidance regarding base–community collabo­ration and regional planning are inadequate. The required base master plans do not regularly relate to the regional plans of the surrounding communities, nor do they anticipate large­scale troop relocations. • Base commanders do not regularly communicate or work with surrounding communities to resolve transportation problems. In some cases, base commanders are engaged, depending on the perspectives of the commander, but that engagement is not ensured once a commander is reassigned. • Post­9/11, the government is relocating some facilities to remote and more secure locations. In metropolitan areas, this reloca­ tion results in moving people to places accessible primarily by automobile and difficult to serve by transit. This policy direction is the opposite of what many metropolitan agencies are trying to accomplish to reduce energy consumption and attain or maintain Clean Air Act requirements. In some metropolitan areas, plan­ ners are seeking to increase the density of development to reduce vehicle trips and service costs.

#### And, poor military-civilian cooperation and planning undermines military effectiveness.

Orr et al 09 (Kristen, Project Manager, DOD-Office of Economic Adjustment, with Ned McKinley and Jennifer Driemeyer, “Community and Military Compatibility Planning,” Dec 10, http://opr.ca.gov/docs/Military\_GPG\_Supplement.pdf)

The Department of Defense (DoD) has a significant presence in the State of California. The military has made many economic and technological investments including large investments in land and military installations. The State has a strategic location, unique landscape and valuable resources that help further military readiness for actions around the globe. The state’s unique resources and the military’s investments have fostered a strong partnership between the two parties. This partnership and collaboration is vital for economic, resource management, and military readiness reasons. The economies of local communities, as well as the state, are impacted by the militaries presence and California plays an integral role in national security. The burden of maintaining this partnership often falls on the shoulders of cities and counties. In addition to juggling the competing demands of expanding development, promoting economic development and upholding environmental quality standards, local governments must also consider the needs of local military installations in their land use planning. Traditionally military installations were strategically located in underdeveloped areas so as to avoid land use conflicts. As the population of the state continues to grow and the land use needs of communities continue to expand outward, the need for stronger relationships and communication between local governments and the military is needed. Without adequate communication and coordinated land-use efforts, military missions, quality of life and public safety are increasingly jeopardized.

#### This is particularly true for the BRAC realignments- lack of transportation coordination causes the military to make bad planning decisions.

TRB 11 (Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases,” http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302.pdf)

The legislation that established the BRAC 2005 round defined the criteria that the Commission was required to consider with regard to base closures and realignments. 1 The first four criteria cover the value to the military the Commission must evaluate. Four other criteria relevant for this report are also considered, which include “potential costs and savings,” “economic impact on communities,” capability of receiving infrastructure, and environmental impact. Criterion 7 states, “The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.” The BRAC analysis and decision-making process takes place largely behind closed doors. Given the intense political interest in the outcome of these decisions, the process presumably could not work any other way. In the case of consider-ing BRAC consequences for civil transportation infrastructure, however, it appears that the lack of communication between military bases and MPOs may have hindered flows of information that could have influenced the outcome of the decisions. The committee’s understanding is that information is gathered about infrastructure around bases for BRAC determinations by “data calls,” which come from Department of Defense (DoD) staff supporting the Commission; these calls are directed to the bases to ask for basic information about infrastructure carrying capacity. Information about these data calls is closely held during the analysis and decision-making process because of political sensitivity. This required level of secrecy may compound the problem of getting reliable information about transportation capacity back to the Commission. Given that bases typically are not involved in the MPO process, they may be unaware of the true status of the major corridors upon which the bases rely or the difficulty of expanding them in response to concentrations of military personnel. The difficulty of meeting transportation demand on routes serving Fort Belvoir and Joint Base Lewis–McChord, for example, suggests that the Commission either lacked good information or, if it was aware of the limited and constrained transportation capacity, was unaware of how difficult and expensive it would be to expand the capacity to avoid creating gridlocked conditions. Of concern to the committee are the implications of the lack of information about transportation and environmental consequences of BRAC and similar fast-paced military realignments of personnel. Decisions to locate in a metropolitan area may be inadequately informed about the carrying capacity of civil transportation infrastructure and the consequences the military’s decision would have on the surrounding community and, potentially, on the military.

#### Fifth- military medical readiness-

#### BRAC traffic problems will particularly effect the medical installations in San Antonio.

DiLuzio Group no date (The DiLuzio Group is a consulting firm specializing in BRAC Economic development Logistics and transportation systems services, “Military Medical Centers and BRAC 2005,” http://www.diluziogroup.com/base.html)

BRAC 2005 actions in San Antonio will establish a regional medical center with graduate medical education, supporting research functions and five separate centers of excellence. Fort Sam Houston will become the largest medical technical education/training campus in the world, and will host a regional healthcare management center and two Army Management Commands. The BRAC 2005 process is expected to add approximately 12,500 positions to the San Antonio region, of which about 4,500 will be students. The 8,000 non-student jobs represent the largest single economic growth impact in the history of the region. If nothing were done to intervene, new employees arriving at Fort Sam Houston would most likely find homes in disparate locations across the city which would in turn lead to significant increases in traffic congestion, air quality emissions, carbon footprint and incidences of trauma cases.

#### San Antonio is a critical seat of military medical response training- key to quick response combat teams.

DiLuzio Group no date (The DiLuzio Group is a consulting firm specializing in BRAC Economic development Logistics and transportation systems services, “Military Medical Centers and BRAC 2005,” http://www.diluziogroup.com/base.html)

San Antonio is home to a core of the nation’s military medical assets. This core is anchored by two large, closely associated medical research and teaching hospitals, the Air Force’s Wilford Hall Medical Center (WHMC) and the Brooke Army Medical Center (BAMC). Combined, these two medical centers house one of the few emergency-medicine residency training programs in the Department of Defense (DoD), and they provide quick response combat and disaster assistance teams for worldwide deployment. They are supported by numerous other health care related activities.

#### Those quick response teams are key to medical readiness, which is the key internal link to sustaining rapid global mobility for the Air Force.

Mitchell 2001 (Marguerite, Uniformed Services University of Health and Sciences, Defense Technical Information Center, May)

This study concentrated on the core competency of rapid global mobility. Rapid global mobility is and will be the Air Force's most reliable combat force multiplier. Though a number of forward-deployed forces continue to decline, the need for immediate response to areas outside the Continental United States will continue to rise. Rapid global mobility is one of the primary keys the Air Force has to take the joint military services into the 21 st century. At the most manageable level in support of rapid global mobility, medical readiness of personnel needs to be at its utmost level of efficiency. Multiple deterrents to the deployment process include unavailable medical records, medical records not current, immunizations, or medical evaluations not completed or outdated. The present and future protection and defense of the United States requires that military troops have the ability to rapidly deploy when needed. As the Air Force is being called on to support rapid deployments, the level of medical readiness of their personnel becomes vital in the completion of any and all missions requiring rapid mobility of troops. Primary care managers (PCMs) are the first line in elevating the level of readiness. All PCMs should, in every outpatient encounter with active duty members make sure the medical record is current in regards to physical examinations, any medical problems that would prevent deployment, and a statement of whether or not that person still meets deployment qualifications.

#### Fifth- Fort Belvoir-

#### BRAC related traffic around Fort Belvoir threatens its operational effectiveness- its sensitive activities are critical for the DOD.

Moran 2009 James P Moran(Committee on Appropriations),7/27/2009,Congress of The United States(House Of Representations), Letter to Robert Gates, <http://alexandrianews.org/2009/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/gates-letter.pdf>

As you know, I have expressed serious concerns regarding the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission's (BRAC) final recommendations. The magnitude of the realignment of military and civilian personnel throughout Northern Virginia is unprecedented, while realistic planning for how the region will deal with the influx of 19,000 new employees has been severely lacking. With the September 15,2011 statutory deadline drawing near, I ask that the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army reconsider some past decisions regarding the allocation of resources so that the transition is successful for both the military and the surrounding communities. While there are a number of challenges involving implementation of the 2005 BRAC recommendations, my primary concern is the effect the relocation of the 19,000 military and civilian personnel to Fort Belvoir will have on the communities in Alexandria and Fairfax County located in close proximity to the Fort. As you must be aware, nearly 20,000 DoD personnel were relocated out of office buildings proximate to the Pentagon and Metro stations to locations without access to public transit, putting thousands more cars on our local roads. The August 7, 2007 Record of Decision (ROD) and subsequent Army decisions identified three separate Fort Belvoir relocation sites, the Main Post, the Engineer Proving Ground (EPG) and the Mark Center, the last of which is located in Alexandria, several miles from Fort Belvoir, but will also create extreme congestion on 1-395 due to a lack of direct access from the highway. While this bifurcation of the total number of incoming employees across these three sites should help dissipate some of the traffic impact on the region, the Army's own investigations have reached some very troubling conclusions.In the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Fort Belvoii BRAC decisions, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers concluded that "Implementing the Preferred Alternative would result in significant adverse effects to the transportation system with respect to congestion and increased travel time. These effects would lead to reduced employee productivity and degradation of quality of life " According to the Corps, increased congestion would occur on Interstate 95, Route One and the Fairfax County Parkway - major access points to Fort Belvoir and all major commuter routes for employment throughout the National Capital Region Level of Service (LOS) at nine intersections drops to failing. Early Corps estimates stated that severe congestion at the Engineer Proving Ground would last three to four hours each rush hour, and that queuing of traffic waiting to access Fort Belvoir would back up onto 1-95 and extend morning congestion between one and two hours.¶ Moreover, the negative traffic impacts of the 2005 BRAC relocations to Fort Belvoir will erode hard-fought gains in regional traffic mitigation. Bottlenecks resulting from BRAC-induced traffic negate the benefit of the Springfield Interchange "Mixing Bowl," the i-95 Fourth Lane project, and the Woodrow Wilson Bridge project.¶ Not only will anticipated traffic complications roll back gains from these transportation projects, but, without proper action, military readiness will suffer As you are aware, the planned tenant organizations to be located at Fort Belvoir are some of the most sensitive, operationally demanding, and technologically advanced activities undertaken by the Department of Defense Despite their important mission, if staff has to spend 3-4 hours per day in backed-up traffic, then their ability to perform their duties will be negatively impacted¶

#### Finally, hegemony solves conflict- US leadership ensures a peaceful international system.

Keohane 12 [Robert O. Keohane – professor of International Affairs from Princeton University, August 2012, “Hegemony and After”, Vol. 91 Issue 4, p114-118, 5p]

Apart from questions of originality and the specifics of the declinist debate, the central problem with books of present- oriented foreign policy commentary such as these lies in their failure to distinguish between what is known and what is unknowable. By conflating the two, they end up misleading readers rather than educating them. It might be useful, therefore, to indicate half a dozen things relevant to the future of the U.S. global role that can now be said with confidence.First, we know that in the absence of leadership, world politics suffers from collective action problems, as each state tries to shift the burdens of adjustment to change onto others. Without alliances or other institutions helping provide reassurance, uncertainty generates security dilemmas, with states eyeing one another suspiciously. So leadership is indeed essential in order to promote cooperation, which is in turn necessary to solve global problems ranging from war to climate change.Second, we know that leadership is exercised most effectively by creating multilateral institutions that enable states to share responsibilities and burdens. Such institutions may not always succeed in their objectives or eliminate disagreements among their members, but they make cooperation easier and reduce the leader's burdens--which is why policymakers in Washington and many other capitals have invested so much effort for so many decades in creating and maintaining them.Third, we know that leadership is costly and states other than the leader have incentives to shirk their responsibilities. This means that the burdens borne by the leader are likely to increase over time and that without efforts to encourage sharing of the load, leadership may not be sustainable.Fourth, we know that in a democracy such as the United States, most people pay relatively little attention to details of policy in general and foreign policy in particular. Pressures for benefits for voters at home-- in the form of welfare benefits and tax cuts--compete with demands for military spending and especially nonmilitary foreign affairs spending. This means that in the absence of immediate threats, the public's willingness to invest in international leadership will tend to decline. (A corollary of this point is that advocates of international involvement have incentives to exaggerate threats in order to secure attention and resources.)Fifth, we know that autocracies are fundamentally less stable than democracies. Lacking the rule of law and accepted procedures for leadership transitions, the former are subject to repeated internal political crises, even though these might play out beneath a unified and stable façade. China's leadership crisis during the spring of 2012, marked by the detention of the politician Bo Xilai and his wife, illustrated this point.And sixth, we know that among democracies in the world today, only the United States has the material capacity and political unity to exercise consistent global leadership. It has shown a repeated ability to rebound from economic and political difficulties. The size, youth, and diversity of its population; the stability and openness of its political institutions; and the incentives that its economic system creates for innovation mean that it remains the most creative society in the world. Yet it also has major problems-- along with intense domestic partisan conflict that prevents those problems from being resolved and that constitutes a major threat to its continued leadership abroad.What we don't know, however, is at least as important. Will the major powers in the international system, most importantly China, maintain their social and political coherence and avoid civil war? Will the instabilities in the global economy exposed by the 2008 financial crisis be corrected or merely papered over and thus left to cause potential havoc down the road? Will ideologically driven regimes, such as the one in Iran, be prudent or reckless in their quest to develop or even use nuclear weapons, and will potentially threatened states, such as Israel, act prudently in response? Will the trend in recent decades toward greater global democratization be maintained, or will it give way to an antidemocratic reaction?

#### And, US military dominance deters Chinese aggression and war.

Ward 12 (Alex, journalist- worked for the Times of London, March 23, 2012, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/23/is-the-usa-still-the-indispensible-power-in-east-asia/)

In particular, the importance of the US’s bilateral alliance system is exhibited in its role as a “counterweight to Chinese power” (Goh, 2005: 1). Concern over Beijing’s long-term strategic policy and a shift in the balance of power have effectively rendered the US’s role as a regional balancer far more salient, both militarily and politically. Firstly, US military presence in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea inhibits the chance of conflict therein through both diplomatic mediation and military deterrence (Storey, 2002). More fundamentally, US curtailment of a rising China prevents the instability inherent to transitional international systems. Here, the application of AFK Organski’s (1958) Power Transition theory is starkly relevant, as it is based on the zero-sum premise that the decline of a unipolar order gives way to a distinctly unstable balance of power. As bipolarization occurs and economic, political and military capabilities are more evenly distributed, “the system becomes increasingly unstable” (Gilpin, 1985: 595), culminating in cyclical conflict as a status-quo challenger’s disproportionate growth comes into conflict with the declining hegemon (Organski & Kugler, 1980). In this light, the benefits accrued to smaller states deriving from US preponderance would be lost if it gave way to a bipolar standoff between Beijing and Washington, throwing the entire regional security order into chaotic flux (Ikenberry, 2004).

#### And, potential aggressors perceive declines in readiness- sending a signal of preparedness deters hostile actors.

Spencer 2000 [Jack Spencer – Senior Research Fellow for The Heritage Foundation, September 15, 2000, “The Facts About Military Readiness”, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2000/09/bg1394-the-facts-about-military-readiness>]

U.S. military readiness cannot be gauged by comparing America's armed forces with other nations' militaries. Instead, the capability of U.S. forces to support America's national security requirements should be the measure of U.S. military readiness. Such a standard is necessary because America may confront threats from many different nations at once.¶ America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries in a given war. America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America or its interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances. Therefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over any single nation has little saliency.¶ The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives,3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."4According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy.5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6¶ Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

#### Independently, collapse of US airpower causes global great power wars.

Andres 10 (Richard, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College, Up in the Air, American Interest, September – October, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=861.)

Rethinking Strategy As the United States completes its withdrawal from Iraq and contemplates how it will extract its forces from Afghanistan, it must reconsider the state of its sea and air forces in light of its long-term strategic goals. As the world’s most powerful state, defense means something different for the United States than it does for other nations. While states usually build militaries to defend or, less frequently these days, to enlarge their territory, the principle purpose of the U.S. military is to defend the global commons and the open international economic order by ensuring peace among the major powers. There is nothing passé about this purpose. When the military might of states like the United States begins to fail, the result is often global instability and conflict. When the Roman legions could no longer support Rome’s military obligations, Europe fell into a dark age. When the British navy could no longer balance the ambitions of Europe’s major powers at the turn of the 20th century, neither economic interdependence nor the League of Nations could prevent the two world wars that followed. If the U.S. military becomes incapable of supporting its international commitments, it is by no means clear that the current long peace among major powers will endure. Cracks in America’s global power projection capabilities are already visible. Thanks largely to the spread of military technologies the United States introduced and procurement decisions it made more than twenty years ago, the U.S. military has lost capability. In the 1990s, for example, the Navy could confidently send a carrier task force through the Straits of Taiwan; today, a ship that attempted such a feat would risk coming under fire from Chinese anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles. (Some pessimistic analysts even believe that China could win a war in the Straits.) A few years ago, U.S. carriers controlled the Straits of Hormuz; today, carriers in the Gulf could be the first casualty of a war with Iran. As China, Iran and North Korea increase their stocks of ballistic missiles, existing U.S. Army and Air Force bases will become increasingly vulnerable. Big-ticket procurement decisions generally play out over a course of two to four decades. If the United States continues on its current trajectory, within that period U.S. conventional deterrence will lose much of its value abroad. The United States will not necessarily become incapable of defending its friends, but the costs and risks of doing so will grow much higher. As this occurs, U.S. deterrent threats meant to protect Taiwan, the Baltic States, Ukraine, Georgia, Israel, South Korea, Australia and Japan will become increasingly unbelievable. If opponents test U.S. resolve, the United States may be faced with the prospect of either reneging on its commitments or fighting ruinous wars. It is important to get the scale of these potential challenges right: While the counterinsurgency wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have cost more than 5,000 U.S. lives over the past decade, a war over any of the countries listed above could well cost that many lives in the first few minutes of combat. Changing U.S. Military Posture Although the U.S.-led international system cannot last forever, the United States can increase its longevity considerably by executing an intelligent shift in its military posture. We need to reverse the Bush Administration’s move toward a posture emphasizing the transformation of selective enemies into allies through occupation and the creation of democratic political institutions. The current strategy requires the United States to engage in a relatively low-tech, manpower-intensive form of warfare that pits one of its greatest weaknesses against one of its opponents’ greatest strengths. By some calculations, a thousand guerrillas using improvised explosive devices can effectively pin down tens of thousands of state-of-the-art equipped U.S. ground troops. As was the case during the Vietnam War, the United States has attempted to compensate for its disadvantages by throwing vast sums of money at the problem. Well more than $1 trillion has been spent on Iraq and Afghanistan to date, some of it on creative stopgap efforts. If this approach had worked well enough that leaders in Iran, North Korea and similar states believed that it could work again, it would have gone some ways toward extending America’s ability to deter aggressors and maintain the existing system. Unfortunately, it did not. The United States has not achieved the clear, positive and cost-effective outcomes it sought in either Iraq or Afghanistan. As a result, many international leaders believe the United States will be reluctant to use force again in the future. Ironically, then, the U.S. commitment to this form of warfare has reduced its ability to influence the actions of potential opponents. As money becomes scarcer and anti-access threats proliferate, the United States must develop a military posture capable of sustaining the American-led international system over a period of many decades. This means finding ways to pit its strengths in technology and reach against its opponents’ vulnerabilities. It also means working closely with regional allies to deter specific threats. In a sustainable military posture devoted to this larger strategic goal, the Air Force is likely to play a significantly different role than the one currently envisioned for it by defense programmers.

#### Contention 3- Solvency

#### The DoD should increase its investment in the transportation infrastructure surrounding bases through the Defense Access Roads program.

TRB 11 (Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases,” http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302.pdf)

Over the next few years, the specific problems caused by BRAC 2005 can be ameliorated by the committee’s recommendations, which are briefly summarized in the following paragraphs and described in detail in Chapter 5.

• DoD should accept more financial responsibility for problems it causes on the transportation facilities serving military bases in much the same way that private developers are assessed impact fees for the costs they impose. The DAR program should be revised to pay for the military’s share of road improvements and a separate DoD program should be established to fund the transit services necessary to meet military needs. These changes will require increased funding and segregation of these funds within the MILCON budget.

#### **Increasing DAR funding solves infrastructure improvement and fixes traffic problems**

Collins and Hamptons 12 [Darcel M. Collins – transportation specialist with the Federal Highway Association & M.A. in Management from Webster University, Daryl D. Hampton – senior engineer for the Defense Access Roads program & B.S. in civil engineering from Old Dominion University, June 2012, “Defense Access Roads”, <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/12mayjune/02.cfm>]

One effect of base realignment and closure (BRAC) is the impact on local traffic and transportation infrastructure. When personnel from closed bases relocate or commute to another base that remains open, this increase in defense traffic at that installation can place an unexpected burden on nearby State and local roadways. That's where a little-known DOD program known as the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program comes into play.¶ The DAR program, jointly administered by DOD's Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) Transportation Engineering Agency and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), represents a potential means for the military to assist in funding public highway improvements near impacted facilities. Specifically, the program can provide a share of defense funding for off-installation projects to mitigate transportation impacts resulting from sudden and unusual military actions. The terminology "sudden and unusual" is important, as DOD is not in the road-building business.¶ "In the circumstance of sudden and unusual military impacts, the DAR program can be a valuable resource for funding improvements at locations where DOD mission- support efforts have an adverse effect on nearby roads," says Acting Associate Administrator Amy Lucero of the FHWA Office of Federal Lands Highway, which oversees the program.

#### Increasing DAR funding key to solving the infrastructure problems around Fort Belvoir.

Moran 2009 James P Moran(Committee on Appropriations),7/27/2009,Congress of The United States(House Of Representations), Letter to Robert Gates, <http://alexandrianews.org/2009/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/gates-letter.pdf>

The Washington, DC region has the second worst traffic congestion in the nation. The average commuter wastes 62 hours each year sitting in traffic. Unfortunately, the 2005 BRAC relocations will greatly exacerbate the problem The Corps's FEIS identified thirteen necessary transportation projects at Fort Belvoir ''to maintain the transportation system's operational performance at an acceptable level of service and delay". These projects include intersection improvements, road widening, and investments in public transportation infrastructure Unfortunately, the limited criteria used by the Defense Access Road (DAR) program severely restricts DoD or the Army from funding the vast majority of these programs To date, the DAR program has funded $36 million in spot traffic improvements, a mere 8 percent of the S458 million in necessary improvements identified in the FEIS Following its review of the projects eligible for DAR funding, the Army's Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) wrote to the Federal Highway Administration requesting an additional $250 million in transportation funding to complete outstanding public highway improvements surrounding Fort Belvoir. These priorities include: 1) Fairfax County Parkway improvements between 1-95 and Kingman Road and the Fairfax County Parkway/Kingman Road intersection; 2) intersections at Beulah, Telegraph, Backlick, Loisdale, and Newington Roads; and 3) widening US Route One through Fort Belvoir.

[Note- FEIS = Final Environmental Impact Statement- it is the review that investigated what improvements are needed for the Fort]

# Inherency

## --SQ T.I. Sucks

#### DAR Funding

#### **Status quo DAR efforts aren’t enough – broader funds are key**

TRB 11 [Transportation Research Board – division of the National Research Council alongside the Department of Transportation, “Federal Funding of Transportation

Improvements in BRAC Cases”, February 2011, <http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302Summary.pdf>]

DoD sees its responsibilities for off-base transportation facilities as limited. The only DoD program available to assist in funding transportation infrastructure off the base—the DAR program—is inadequate for base ¶ expansion in built-up areas. Eligibility is determined by a number of criteria, but ¶ the most important in metropolitan areas ¶ is the criterion of a doubling of traffic, which is impossible on facilities that are ¶ already congested. Aside from DAR, under DoD policy local and state authorities are ¶ responsible for off-base transportation facilities even if DoD decisions increase ¶ congestion; this policy is unrealistic for ¶ congested metropolitan transportation networks. In addition, off-base projects ¶ compete poorly in the military construction ¶ budget, which also funds the higher ¶ priorities of base commanders for on-base facilities. Finally, DAR is limited to road ¶ projects, whereas transit is often necessary ¶ to serve some travel demand in congested metropolitan areas.

#### **The DoD should give funding to deal with traffic congestion – BRAC will only add more**

TRB 11 [Transportation Research Board – division of the National Research Council alongside the Department of Transportation, “Federal Funding of Transportation

Improvements in BRAC Cases”, February 2011, <http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302Summary.pdf>]

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) is designed to provide an apolitical process that will result in the timely closure and ¶ realignment of military installations inside the United States. BRAC 2005, unlike previous decisions under the law that primarily closed bases, will result in an increase in the number of on-base personnel, military families, and defense related contractors at or near 18 military bases, several of which are located in ¶ major metropolitan areas where traffic problems already exist. According to the committee that developed this report, the time period by which BRAC decisions must be fully implemented (September 2011) is far too short for some bases ¶ and surrounding communities to avoid significant added traffic congestion for military personnel and other commuters during peak travel periods. The report recommends that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) accept more financial ¶ responsibility for transportation problems related to growth on military bases in metropolitan areas, just as private developers pay impact fees for improvements ¶ to access their sites. Communities that benefit economically from the presence of ¶ military bases also should pay their share of needed transportation improvements.

#### **The current DAR program is inadequate**

National Academies 11 (“Implementation of BRAC 2005 Will Lead to Serious Traffic Congestion in Some Major Metropolitan Areas; Report Calls for Appropriation to Mitigate Immediate Problems,” News from the National Academies, Feb 7, <http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=13104>)

The one DOD program that funds off-base transportation infrastructure -- the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program -- is inadequate for highly populated areas. "One of DAR's key criteria is flawed," said Sussman. "Requiring traffic at a base to double to be eligible for off-base road improvement funds is impossible in metropolitan areas with tens of thousands of commuters already on the roads." The committee called for revisions to the DAR program that would establish an impact fee approach to pay for the military’s share of road improvements in metropolitan areas and a separate DOD program to fund transit services for military personnel.

#### We need improvements around commercial areas to relieve the congestion

Diluzio Group, 08 **(**[**http://www.sanantonio.gov/oma/pdf/bracpdfs/Task%203--Transportation%20Infrastructure.pdf**](http://www.sanantonio.gov/oma/pdf/bracpdfs/Task%203--Transportation%20Infrastructure.pdf)**, The DiLuzio Group was formed in November 2003 to provide a full spectrum of cost effective advisory and professional services to business and industry, all levels of government and independent governmental agencies. The DiLuzio Group’s strengths are embodied in the talents and experience of its Associate Staff and with a clear focus and commitment to helping its clients achieve their goals. Our core competencies include: Base realignment and closure (BRAC) Economic development Logistics and transportation systems Homeland Defense/Homeland Security Program management & productivity improvement Business development and marketing services Contracting and acquisition processes Institutional and governmental relationships)**

Though these studies generated lists of roadway network improvements needed on post and among arterial roadways adjacent to the post, no study had yet addressed the implications of post expansion on the San Antonio regional street and highway system. 6 4.0 REDEVELOPMENT AROUND FORT SAM HOUSTON¶ An assessment of redevelopment opportunities within the project study area was conducted by Dixie Watkins III & Associates. The goal of this assessment was to identify the highest and best use of parcels of land that were either undeveloped, underdeveloped, or in need of renewal or rehabilitation due to the condition of current buildings. Though each land owner hopes that their land can be sold at maximum profit or developed to achieve the “highest and best use”, the reality is that the interaction of the transportation system and the surrounding market of “consumers” limit the amount of land that can be marketed in the lucrative “commercial” category. Due to the intensity of traffic generation from commercial development, it takes only a limited number of dense commercial developments to overwhelm surrounding streets and highways. As discussed in previous sections of this report, commercial uses must remain in balance with other uses to make the best use of transportation infrastructure and minimize regional congestion. The amount of traffic generated by a proposed land use is estimated using data from a compendium of statistical research on traffic generation of different types of buildings. These statistics are compiled in a document called the “Trip Generation Manual” published and updated by the Institute of Transportation Engineers. Traffic generation 7¶ is estimated using rates related to the quantity of development. Residential traffic is estimated on a “per dwelling unit” basis while most commercial and industrial traffic is estimated based on square feet of building space. Pending the assessment of the highest and best use of parcels in the FSH revitalization study area, the gross trip generation of all new development was estimated at 560,000 trips per day. This estimate was considered to be a “build-out” projection. A subset of this development plan was derived from the build out plan to represent a near term redevelopment forecast expected to occur over the next 10 years. This development projection produces a total of 300,000 trips per day. The figure on the following page illustrates the spatial distribution of these redevelopment parcels around Fort Sam Houston. Parcel information boxes highlighted in yellow are for Fort Sam Houston and the San Antonio Military Medical Center North campus or the “BAMC Triangle”. Those highlighted in green are uses expected to occur over the next 10 years. Those in white boxes are long term redevelopments beyond 10 years in the future. Key findings from this evaluation were that the highest and best use approach produced levels of commercial real estate traffic drastically greater than that of new residential development by a ratio of six or eight to one. This was true of both the build-out forecast, and the near term development plan. Though some demand for commercial development could be absorbed by existing housing due to rising incomes or diversion from other areas, the ratio is still large enough to require a significant expansion of regional transportation system capacity to make these commercial developments viable. 5.0 REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION NETWORK IMPROVEMENTS¶ This section discusses regional transportation improvements recommended for different timeframes to support BRAC-related expansion at Fort Sam Houston and other development initiatives associated with the growth management plan. 5.1 PREVIOUS BRAC-SUPPORTING IMPROVEMENTS¶ Some BRAC-supporting roadway improvement projects planned prior to the BRAC announcement in 2005 are already under construction or completed. Examples include major expansion to IH-410 north from six to ten lanes, the recently completed US 281/IH-410 directional ramps, and the Walters Road interchange improvements on IH-¶ 35. Other BRAC-supporting critical projects – such as the elevated managed lanes on IH-35 from IH-37 to Loop 1604 north have been studied, but not programmed for final design, funding and construction. Ongoing evaluation of freeway system performance and traffic congestion mitigation measures should continue to be pursued aggressively as BRAC related expansion increases traffic loads from Fort Sam Houston and intensified development of areas surrounding the post. 8 Location of Redevelopment Parcels around Fort Sam Houston Yellow Text Boxes: Fort Sam Houston and BAMC Triangle Green Text Boxes: Short-term Growth Areas (10 year) White Text Boxes: Long-term Growth Areas (beyond 10 years) 9¶ 5.2 SHORT TERM IMPROVEMENTS¶ A majority of the roadway network improvements that can be implemented on a short -¶ term basis have been identified by previous traffic circulation studies prepared for the expansion of Fort Sam Houston and Brooke Army Medical Center.

#### **Current DAR efforts need more a. Direction for the project** b. **Communication with bases**

GAO 11 [United States Government Accountability Office – congressional agency monitoring the use of tax dollars, January 2011, “High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program”, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/315273.pdf>]

The Defense Access Roads (DAR) program is providing some assistance in mitigating transportation needs in communities surrounding growth installations, but program usage has been limited, in part, by a lack of knowledge of the program, outdated regulations, and unclear guidance on how to navigate the program’s complex process. DOD has certified 20 transportation projects at 11 of the 26 military installation locations since 2004. Of the 20 certified projects, 11 have been funded at about $125 million. Considering funding delays and construction time frames, most of the approved projects to date are unlikely to provide relief in the near term. The procedures of the Defense Access Roads program are complex, involving multiple federal, state, and local stakeholders. The guidance describing the program’s procedures and, specifically, the application of the criteria, is difficult to follow and some regulations and guidance are outdated. Despite program outreach efforts and positive experiences with program administrators, military officials from 11 installations said that more information would be helpful to clarify the program’s procedures. Without program guidance that clearly details the program’s procedures and is effectively communicated to all stakeholders, the program may not be used to its fullest extent.

#### Eligibility criteria prevents bases from getting assistance from DAR

GAO 11 [United States Government Accountability Office – congressional agency monitoring the use of tax dollars, January 2011, “High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program”, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/315273.pdf>]

Of the 26 military installations we interviewed, 15 identified at least one of ¶ two main factors related to the current design of the DAR program that ¶ limit their ability to use the program as a tool to provide greatertransportation assistance to affected communities—eligibility criteria and ¶ funding process.First, installation officials noted that the program’s ¶ eligibility criteria limit the number of transportation projects that qualify ¶ for DOD funding. For example, those officials said that the criterion ¶ requiring installations to demonstrate a doubling of traffic is difficult to meet in urban areas, such as the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area, because many of these roadways are already beyond capacity due to the ¶ high volume of traffic and doubling of that traffic is nearly impossible.

## --No funding

#### DAR not enough – even with removed regulations there isn’t enough money

GAO 11 Government Accountability Office (audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of Congress that examines the use of public funds and evaluates federal programs); January 2011; “High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program”; United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees; http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11165.pdf

The unmet needs across the communities most affected by DOD growth exceed the capabilities of the DAR program alone to meet them. One example is at Fort Belvoir’s Mark Center location—the Army’s recently acquired location in Alexandria, Virginia located about 13 miles north of Fort Belvoir’s main post and about 6 miles south of the Pentagon. As a result of the 2005 BRAC process, construction of a high rise facility is currently under way and is expected to accommodate about 6,400 defense agencies’ employees and other tenants that are expected to arrive by September 2011. Local residents, commuters, and elected officials have expressed concerns about the traffic impact along an already congested segment of Interstate 395. Figure 5 shows a typical morning rush hour near the site. In July 2010, DOD finalized a transportation management plan to minimize traffic impacts by encouraging carpooling, walking, and bicycling to work—the effectiveness of which is yet to be determined. In addition, the Virginia Department of Transportation, DOD, and the City of Alexandria have funded various studies on the future traffic impact of the Mark Center and have identified potential traffic mitigation alternatives. However, none of the improvements are planned to be in place prior to the occupancy of the Mark Center in 2011. According to one senior DOD official, it is unclear whether any future plans for improving roads, ramps, and public transportation would qualify for DAR funding.

#### DOD not paying for infrastructure needed to support base reorganization.

TRB 11 (Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases,” http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302.pdf)

DoD sees its responsibilities for off-base transportation facilities as limited. The only DoD program available to assist in funding transportation infrastructure off the base—the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program—is inadequate for base expansion in built-up areas. Eligibility is determined by the criterion of a doubling of traffic, which is impossible on already congested facilities. Aside from DAR, DoD policy states that local and state authorities are responsible for off-base transportation facilities even if DoD decisions increase congestion; this policy is unrealistic for congested metropolitan transportation networks. Moreover, off-base projects compete poorly in the military construction (MILCON) budget, which also funds the higher priorities of base commanders for on-base facilities. Finally, DAR is limited to road projects, whereas transit is often necessary to serve some travel demand in congested metropolitan areas.

#### No funding for transportation needs created by BRAC implementation

Herr 09¶ (Phillip R. Herrr, GAO, “Transportation Impact of Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are Uncertain and Direct Federal Support is Limited”, 9/9/9, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-750>, accessed: 7/9/12)]

Growth resulting from BRAC decisions will have a significant impact on transportation systems in some communities, but estimates of the total cost to address those impacts are uncertain. In addition to BRAC, other defense initiatives will result in growth in communities and also add to transportation needs. BRAC growth will result in increased traffic in communities ranging from very large metropolitan areas to small communities, creating or worsening congested roads at specific locations. Traffic impacts can also affect larger relocation decisions, and were important in DOD's decision to acquire an additional site for Fort Belvoir, Virginia, an acquisition that DOD estimates will cost $1.2 billion. According to a DOD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) survey, 17 of 18 BRAC growth communities identified transportation as one of their top challenges. Near-term transportation projects to address these challenges could cost about $2.0 billion, of which about $1.1 billion is related to projects in the metropolitan Washington, D.C., area. BRAC-related transportation infrastructure costs are subject to a number of uncertainties. For example, not all potential projects are included in the estimate, military staffing levels at some growth installations are in flux and the location decisions of military and civilian personnel have not yet been made, and pre-existing, non-military community growth makes a direct link between transportation projects to military growth difficult. The federal government has provided limited direct assistance to help communities address BRAC transportation impacts, and state and local governments have adopted strategies to expedite projects within the time frame allowed by BRAC. For example, DOD's Defense Access Roads Program has certified transportation projects for funding at three affected communities. Also, OEA has provided planning grants and funded traffic studies and local planning positions. While federal highway and transit programs can be used for many BRAC-related transportation needs, dedicated funds are not available. Instead, BRAC-related transportation projects must compete with other proposed transportation projects. Communities had identified funding for about $500 million of the estimated $2.0 billion needed to address their near term project needs. Some state and local governments have adopted strategies to expedite highway projects, such as prioritizing short-term high-impact projects, because the time frames for completing BRAC personnel moves are much shorter than the time frames for such projects. While legislation mandates that BRAC growth be completed by 2011, major highway and transit projects usually take 9 to 19 years. To complete some critical projects before BRAC growth occurs, state and local officials are reprioritizing planned projects and implementing those that can be completed quickly. For example, Maryland prioritized certain lower-cost intersection projects that will improve traffic flow. In Texas, officials used an innovative financing approach to generate funding quickly for a major highway project at Fort Bliss.

## --DAR fails

#### **DAR regulations prioritize military infrastructure over off-site transportation**

GAO 11 Government Accountability Office (audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of Congress that examines the use of public funds and evaluates federal programs); January 2011; “High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program”; United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees; http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11165.pdf

The second area of the current DAR program design identified by installation officials limiting the usefulness of DAR is the program’s funding process, which calls for potential DAR projects to compete for military construction funding with on-installation infrastructure projects, such as barracks and administrative buildings. The installation officials who cited funding as an issue told us that installation commanders are reluctant to prioritize off-installation roads over on-installation needs for military construction funding and that roads were unlikely to receive military construction funding given the other demands on this funding source. According to a senior Army official, there are currently at least $62 billion in unfunded military construction projects awaiting funding in the Army alone.35 In addition, as we reported in September 2009, communities surrounding installations affected by growth resulting from the BRAC process alone have identified an estimated $2 billion in unmet transportation needs.36

#### **DAR fails – not enough funding, long wait, and project competition**

GAO 11 Government Accountability Office (audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of Congress that examines the use of public funds and evaluates federal programs); January 2011; “High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program”; United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees; http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11165.pdf

The share of the total project cost that DOD will contribute is negotiated between DOD, the Department of Transportation, and appropriate state and local authorities. Based on the eligibility criteria determination and funding negotiations, the Commander of the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command may then certify the project as important to the national defense, as required by the DAR statute.23 The DAR program does not have a separate source of funds; instead, for DOD’s share of the funding, DAR projects must compete against other construction projects— such as child care centers, maintenance buildings, and mission facilities such as piers, hangars, and barracks—across installations and commands.24 In addition, securing funds for a DAR project may take years as many planned projects are already awaiting funds, due in part to DOD’s numerous ongoing growth initiatives. For example, a senior Army official emphasized the competing needs for military construction funds, by noting that as of April 2010, there were 2,500 projects worth $62 billion in the service’s database, of which only about $2 billion could be expected to be funded each year.

# Hegemony Advantage

## Heg Sustinable

### Heg is sustainable

#### Economic strength ensures U.S. Hegemony is sustainable

Michael Beckley 2012 is a PhD student at Columbia University and a predoctoral fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.  His dissertation research focuses on the durability and dynamics of unipolarity, the elements of national power, and U.S. and Chinese foreign policy.  Michael’s research has received several awards, including the International Studies Association’s Carl Beck Award and the Journal of Strategic Studies’ Amos Perlmutter Prize.  Michael has held positions at the RAND Corporation, the Pentagon’s Policy Planning Office, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Carter Center.

If the United States is not a feeble hegemon, as proposed by some declinists, but rather a coercive and capable hegemon, as characterized by the alternative perspective, then these types of variations between the experience of American allies and non-­‐allies should show up systematically in the empirical record. To testthisclaim, I conduct a series of regressions that examine the relationship between countries’ security tiesto the United States andthe effect of inward foreign investment andimports on their innovative capabilities. Theresults show that inflows of investment and goods significantly improve the innovative Chapter 1 18capabilities of the United States and its allies but degrade the innovative capabilities of non-­‐U.S. allies. This finding suggests that the United States is able to shape international flows of technology in ways that benefit itself andits allies while excluding potentialadversaries. In sum, the results of chapter 4 suggest that America’s hegemonic position helps sustain U.S.economicandmilitary dominance. Hegemony allows the United States to coerce others intoproviding disproportionately high shares of global public goods while subsidizing the U.S.military andeconomy,gain special protections for American firms while prying open foreign markets, andmanipulate international flows of technology to maintainits innovative edge. This privileged behavior does not provoke opposition, rather I find that balancing against the United States hasbeen minimal. These results compliment those of a recent study by Carla Norrlof that shows that American hegemony – particularly the sizeof the U.S.domesticmarket, the dollar’s global role, andU.S.military superiority – allows the United States to reap disprorportionate benefits from the international system.25In particular, Norrlof finds that the United States is able to import more than it exports, make more money than it pays on its borrowing, andattract a disproportionate share of global capital, andconcludes that “America’s global advantage” is sustainable for the 25 Norrlof, America’s Global Advantage. Chapter 1 19foreseeable future.26

#### Their evidence is only indicative of a small decline, not a collapse

Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation”, google books)

In today’s debate on American decline redux, scholars continue to assume a substitute relation between economic and political power. Bacevich, for instance, sees the United States as a global enforcer that uses new advanced means to practice old-style gunboat diplomacy, a development he laments and sees as more or less irreversible.48 Ferguson the mores and practices in other countries is seen as especially devastating for its dominance. While Mann too sees the United States as a “military giant,” he does not think military power is of much use, and disparagingly calls it an economic “backseat driver.”50 Mann clearly sees the United States as a power in decline. In two books, Chalmers Johnson describes the proliferation of American bases around the world, the resentment they create, and how it might provoke decline.51 The French analyst Emmanuel Todd indicts the United States for outright banditry, “the mugging of Europeans by Wall Street,” but does not believe the United States has the military wherewithal to ensure that it can continue to reap disproportionate economic benefits, or that it is capable of the kind of political (non-discriminatory) rule that attracts dependable followers.52 Not everyone has been convinced that the United States has declined in any meaningful way. As several authors have pointed out, the relative ascendancy of Europe and Japan was not only to be expected, but an explicit aim of American policy after the war.53 Critics charged that those who believed that the United States had declined in significant ways had failed to grasp important changes in the international economy and the prominent role played by multi-national corporations. 54 To appreciate the full extent of America’s reach one had to take into account the functioning of the world economy, the vitality of the American economy, the diversity of its population, and its military preponderance. Samuel Huntington was particularly prescient in identifying what kept America on top and in spelling out challenges to its lead position. He saw the country’s multi-dimensional power base as difficult for others to replicate and understood that the dynamism of the American economy would take a blow if consumer overstretch got out of hand, even though he believed that the most serious challenge to American power would come from a coalition of European states.55 While Huntington correctly perceived that America’s preeminence is anchored across a wide range of issue-areas, he did not connect these different sources of power. In elaborating an alternative way of thinking about the hegemon’s power arc, I show how various forms of power mutually reinforce one another as the hegemon travels up and down the power ladder. As I have already suggested, the consequences of relative decline are potentially favorable to the hegemon and can in some circumstances activate power.

#### Heg is sustainable- states are highly motivated to keep the U.S. the hegemon for protection

Michael Beckley 2012 is a PhD student at Columbia University and a predoctoral fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.  His dissertation research focuses on the durability and dynamics of unipolarity, the elements of national power, and U.S. and Chinese foreign policy.  Michael’s research has received several awards, including the International Studies Association’s Carl Beck Award and the Journal of Strategic Studies’ Amos Perlmutter Prize.  Michael has held positions at the RAND Corporation, the Pentagon’s Policy Planning Office, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Carter Center.

Hegemonic stability theory assumes that security cooperation exhibits a tendency toward disproportionality in which the hegemon provides the bulk of global security while other states free-­‐ride on this service. 214 A related assumption is that security is a public good. Public goods are non-­‐rival and non-­‐excludable, meaning that their consumption by one actor does not impinge on their consumption by other actors, and no actor can prevent another from enjoying them. Thus, if one state provides for international security, others do not have to. Wallace This explains, precisely because it is large, wealthy, and powerful, the theory suggests a state like the United States will have so much at stake that it will be 214 Olson and Zeckhauser, ÒAn Economic Theoryof Alliances,Ó p. 24. Chapter 4 91 highly motivated to contribute to the collective effort and have the resources to ensure that the collective effort is a success.Ó215

#### Heg sustainable- U.S. too powerful to catch up to, also the U.S. is benign so no nation wants to catch up

Min Ye 2012 Director of the East Asian Studies Program;  Assistant Professor of International Relations. (BA, Beijing University, China; MA, University of South Carolina; PhD, Princeton). Specialization: China Politics, Comparative Political Economy, and Asian International Relations. (http://chinaipa.org/cpaq/v1i1/Paper\_Ye.pdf)First, from the aggregate power perspective, the U.S is simply too powerful for the other nations to catch up. William Wohlforth has done a comprehensive empirical study of U.S power, and concluded that U.S has enormous supremacy in all aspects of military power and almost all aspects of economic power as well, not to mention its normative and cultural powers. He also pointed out the U.S is a “benign hegemon” and it is in the world’s benefit for its presence. Similarly, Joanne Gowa observed that allies of the U.S benefited from trading with the U.S, hence it is in the nations’ interest to have an enduring U.S hegemony.

#### Heg sustainable- no counterbalancing alliances, 4 warrants

Min Ye 2012 Director of the East Asian Studies Program;  Assistant Professor of International Relations. (BA, Beijing University, China; MA, University of South Carolina; PhD, Princeton). Specialization: China Politics, Comparative Political Economy, and Asian International Relations. (http://chinaipa.org/cpaq/v1i1/Paper\_Ye.pdf)

Second, alliance against the U.S is unlikely and ineffective. Stephen Walt has listed the causes for alliance formation. Alliances form not to balance the biggest power but to balance against the biggest threat. Threat, in turn, is determined by (1) aggregate power, (2) geographic proximity, (3) offensive power, and (4) aggressive intention. The U.S is distant from all major powers geographically, although the most powerful nation in the world. Clearly the U.S does not demonstrate aggressive intentions against other major powers. Hence their balancing against the U.S is unlikely.

#### Heg is sustainable- constitutional order

Min Ye 2012 Director of the East Asian Studies Program;  Assistant Professor of International Relations. (BA, Beijing University, China; MA, University of South Carolina; PhD, Princeton). Specialization: China Politics, Comparative Political Economy, and Asian International Relations. (http://chinaipa.org/cpaq/v1i1/Paper\_Ye.pdf)

Finally, as John Ikenberry and other scholars observed, the U.S unipolarity is a hegemony based on “constitutional order”. At the end of the World War II, alongside its supremacy in power, the U.S also established the UN, IMF, World Bank, and other institutions in dealing with weapons proliferation and managing relations with allies. U.S exercise of power was self restraint through its memberships in the international institutions. Consequently, the other nations in the world can not only benefit from this constitutional order but to an extent exercise checks on the sole superpower and feel safer even in the unipolar world.

#### Heg sustainable- hub and spoke system and Indian alliance

[Alex Ward](http://www.e-ir.info/author/alex-ward/) March 23, 2012 (Senior staff rater at international relations.com http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/23/is-the-usa-still-the-indispensible-power-in-east-asia/)

There are, however, considerable obstacles to the trumping of US hegemony by multilateralism, chiefly tying into “the strategic bilateralism that characterised the Cold War era” (Beeson, 2003: 265). Indeed, the US hub-and-spoke alliance system was “expressly designed to keep East Asia divided” (Beeson, 2006: 551), primarily across ideological lines, as to provide a central security role for Washington. As a consequence, “suspicion and political cleavage still characterise relations among the area’s major power” (Kupchan, 1998: 62) owing to Asia’s inherently fractured cultural and political complexion. Contemporary, Washington’s attempt to strengthen its alliance network with the inclusion of India as a response to China’s soft power could perpetuate divisions, as could the possibility of Washington hindering key ASEAN+3 members Japan and South Korea from fully participating.

#### Perception inevitable- President pre-emption

Lieber 9 (Robert J, Professor of Government at Georgetown University, “Persistent primacy and the future of the American era”, International Politics (2009) 46, 119–139. doi:10.1057/ip.2008.44), KH

American national security policy since the end of the Cold War, and especially since 9/11 has often been characterized as an aberration, either because it takes place without the restraint required by adaptation to bipolarity during the Cold War, or because the Bush administration has over-reacted to 9/11 by adopting a doctrine of “aggressive war” and by abandoning past multilateral practice in order to act unilaterally. But these depictions do not serve well as explanations of past and present doctrine or policy. As John Lewis Gaddis and others have noted, the United States has characteristically reacted to being attacked by adopting strategies of primacy and preemption. Its neighbors in the 18th and 19th Century found the United States a “dangerous nation.” 20 And since the War II era, presidents of both parties have invoked a sense of mission in describing America’s international role, in ways that go well beyond the kind of limited engagement that some critics insist is a more consistent or desirable strategy. President Harry Truman, for example, in his March 1947 speech to a joint session of congress setting out what became known as the Truman Doctrine, asserted that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” John Kennedy’s 1961 inaugural address proclaimed that “we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” Ronald Reagan’s State of the Union address in February 1985 insisted, that “We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives--on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua--to defy Soviet aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth. Support for freedom fighters is self-defense.” And Bill Clinton’s administration in July 1994 issued its National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement” aimed at expanding the community of democracies and market economies. In view of these precedents, the Bush administration’s embrace of both democratization and primacy in its 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) and in the second inaugural address of January 2005, are not inconsistent with past rhetorical statements of American doctrine. 21 It is also commonplace to assert that, prior to 9/11, American foreign policy had been multilateral in character, in that Democratic and Republican built international institutions embraced alliances, and deliberately accepted a kind of “self-binding” in order to secure common objectives. 22 But the record of the past six decades is more variegated than a neat bifurcation between the multilateral past and the unilateral present would imply. Harry Truman sent American forces to Korea in 1950 without awaiting UN authorization, President Dwight Eisenhower ordered U.S. troops to Lebanon in 1958, John F. Kennedy appeared ready to launch a preemptive attack on Soviet missiles in Cuba had the Russians not backed down during the October 1962 missile crisis, Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford sent American troops to Indochina. Ronald Reagan invaded Grenada and George H. W. Bush intervened in Panama. The elder Bush also worked closely with Chancellor Helmut Kohl to achieve German unification despite the reservations of Britain, France and Russia, and President Clinton used Tomahawk missiles and combat aircraft to strike targets in Afghanistan and Iraq and launched the 1999 air war in Kosovo with NATO agreement but without the formal approval of the UN Security Council. Other evidence of policy continuity can be found in the more or less bipartisan character of initial decisions to intervene with military force during the period between 1989 and 2001. Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan observe that of eight such interventions during these years, four were carried out by Democratic administrations and four by Republicans. They add that the circumstances in which a president may need to use force have increased since 9/11, these now include terrorism threats, weapons proliferation, prevention of genocide, as well as in response to traditional forms of aggression At the same time, they do advocate a policy of seeking consensus among democratic states as a way of securing domestic consensus for the use of force.

### AT: China counterbalancing

#### China can’t counter balance, faces counterbalancing themselves

Min Ye 2012 Director of the East Asian Studies Program;  Assistant Professor of International Relations. (BA, Beijing University, China; MA, University of South Carolina; PhD, Princeton). Specialization: China Politics, Comparative Political Economy, and Asian International Relations. (http://chinaipa.org/cpaq/v1i1/Paper\_Ye.pdf)Wohlforth observed that the other major powers before they balance against the U.S face counterbalancing of their own. China was perceived as a potential balancer of the U.S in many cases. Yet, China faces counterbalancing from Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Russia, and India in the Asian continent alone. Similarly, the other major powers—Russia, Japan, India, and Europe—have more difficulties dealing with their relationships than their relations with the U.S. In belief, the American hegemon not only does not face substantial balancing but serve as a balancer against others’ balancing actions. As a result, we see more “bandwagoning” with the U.S superpower rather than “balancing”.

#### China is not a threat

Zenko and Cohen 12 (Micah Zenko & Michael A. Cohen, Micah Zenko is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations and Michael A. Cohen was a Senior Research Fellow at the New America Foundation, “Clear and Present Safety”, March 2012, <http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=88d7e0c1-3fae-4f17-bd08-bdc496db0979%40sessionmgr113&vid=1&hid=122&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=76591800>, accessed 7/14/12)

As the threat from transnational terrorist groups dwindles, the United States also faces few risks from other states. China is the most obvious potential rival to the United States, and there is little doubt that China's rise will pose a challenge to U.S. economic interests. Moreover, there is an unresolved debate among Chinese political and military leaders about Chinas proper global role, and the lack of transparency from China's senior leadership about its long-term foreign policy objectives is a cause for concern. However, the present security threat to the U.S. mainland is practically nonexistent and will remain so. Even as China tries to modernize its military, its defense spending is still approximately one-ninth that of the United States. In 2012, the Pentagon will spend roughly as much on military research and development alone as China will spend on its entire military. While China clumsily flexes its muscles in the Far East by threatening to deny access to disputed maritime resources, a recent Pentagon report noted that China's military ambitions remain dominated by "regional contingencies" and that the People s Liberation Army has made little progress in developing capabilities that "extend global reach or power projection." In the coming years, China will enlarge its regional role, but this growth will only threaten U.S. interests if Washington attempts to dominate East Asia and fails to consider Chinas legitimate regional interests. It is true that Chinas neighbors sometimes fear that China will not resolve its disputes peacefully, but this has compelled Asian countries to cooperate with the United States, maintaining bilateral alliances that together form a strong security architecture and limit China's room to maneuver.

### AT: Russian Counterballancing

#### Russia not counterbalancing now

Welch and Shevchenko, 10 – \*Professor of Political Science at UCLA and \*\*Assistant Professor of Political Science at California State University, Fullerton (\*Deborah and \*\*Alexei, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4, Spring 2010, June 29th 2010, p. 27, KONTOPOULOS) PDF

In addition to accepting U.S. bases in Central Asia, Putin made several unilateral concessions indicating that the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and Russia was over,142 evidence that he was following a social creativity strategy. He withdrew from a large Russian electronic intelligence gathering and military base in Cuba and a naval base in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. Putin reacted mildly to the U.S. withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile treaty—one of the few remaining symbols of Russian equality—calling it a “mistake” because it would hurt arms control, not because it would damage Russian security. Putin adopted a softer position toward admission of the Baltic states to NATO. He accepted the creation of the NATO-Russia Council as a vehicle for cooperation, although it did not give Russia a vote. Finally, he accepted a strategic arms reduction treaty that allowed the United States to store dismantled warheads.143

### AT: Iran War

#### No risk in Iran—threat is overstated (<<this could be used as defense for the HSR iran impact and like other iran stuff)

Zenko and Cohen 12 (Micah Zenko & Michael A. Cohen, Micah Zenko is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations and Michael A. Cohen was a Senior Research Fellow at the New America Foundation, “Clear and Present Safety”, March 2012, <http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=88d7e0c1-3fae-4f17-bd08-bdc496db0979%40sessionmgr113&vid=1&hid=122&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=76591800>, accessed 7/14/12)

Of course, the gravest concerns about Iran focus on its nuclear activities. Those fears have led to some of the most¶ egregiously alarmist rhetoric: at a Republican national security debate in November, Romney claimed that an Iranian¶ nuclear weapon is "the greatest threat the world faces." But it remains unclear whether Tehran has even decided¶ to pursue a bomb or has merely decided to develop a turnkey capability. Either way, Iran's leaders have been¶ sufficiently warned that the United States would respond with overwhelming force to the use or transfer of nuclear¶ weapons. Although a nuclear Iran would be troubling to the region, the United States and its allies would be able to¶ contain Tehran and deter its aggression -- and the threat to the U.S. homeland would continue to be minimal.¶ Overblown fears of a nuclear Iran are part of a more generalized American anxiety about the continued potential of¶ nuclear attacks. Obama's National Security Strategy claims that "the American people face no greater or more urgent¶ danger than a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon." According to the document, "international peace and security¶ is threatened by proliferation that could lead to a nuclear exchange. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the risk¶ of a nuclear attack has increased." If the context is a state-against-state nuclear conflict, the latter assertion is patently false. The demise of the Soviet¶ Union ended the greatest potential for international nuclear conflict. China, with only 72 intercontinental nuclear¶ missiles, is eminently deferrable and not a credible nuclear threat; it has no answer for the United States' second-¶ strike capability and the more than 2,000 nuclear weapons with which the United States could strike China.

## Internal Links

### Traffic Congestion

#### Adding commuters to highways going to bases leads to a larger delay

Transportation Research Board 11 (“Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases”, Special Report 302, May 12, <http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302.pdf>)

As shown in Figure 9, the impact of additional traffic on congested ¶ highways is not linear. Travel speeds fall off dramatically at high volumes¶ when new traffic is added. With these congestion levels in place, a traffic ¶ increase of only 5% or 10% could cause a highway facility to transition ¶ from relatively free-flow conditions to stop-and-go conditions, thereby ¶ limiting the maximum number of users. Adding several thousand new ¶ commuters to the few highways serving these bases during the peak period ¶ could have this effect. In some cases reviewed in Chapter 2, major highways are operating at low-speed conditions, and adding several thousand ¶ users during peak hours on these facilities could result in near gridlock. ¶ Thus, it appears that the doubling criterion is not appropriate for determining DAR eligibility for funding transportation improvements in ¶ congested metropolitan areas.¶ When considering travel demand management programs to relieve ¶ congestion, the nonlinearity of a few vehicles having a disproportionate ¶ effect can work in reverse. A small reduction in urban peak traffic volume can result in a proportionally larger reduction in delay. For example, ¶ a 5% reduction in traffic volumes on a congested highway (e.g., from ¶ 2,000 to 1,900 vehicles per hour) may cause a 10% to 30% increase in ¶ average vehicle speeds (e.g., increasing traffic speeds from 35 to 45 mph). ¶ As a result, even relatively small changes in traffic volume or capacity on ¶ congested roads can provide relatively large reductions in traffic delay. ¶ The timing, location, and type of travel changes will have different effects ¶ on reducing congestion.

### Hurts local communities

#### Little commercial development congests traffic a lot. Roads must be able to support this congestion.

Diluzio Group, 08 (<http://www.sanantonio.gov/oma/pdf/bracpdfs/Task%203--Transportation%20Infrastructure.pdf>, The DiLuzio Group was formed in November 2003 to provide a full spectrum of cost effective advisory and professional services to business and industry, all levels of government and independent governmental agencies. The DiLuzio Group’s strengths are embodied in the talents and experience of its Associate Staff and with a clear focus and commitment to helping its clients achieve their goals. Our core competencies include: Base realignment and closure (BRAC) Economic development Logistics and transportation systems Homeland Defense/Homeland Security Program management & productivity improvement Business development and marketing services

Contracting and acquisition processes Institutional and governmental relationships)

Thus**, a small amount of commercial development can do a lot of damage to ¶ surrounding traffic conditions, much like the bricks on the deck.** Most commercial ¶ shopping centers generate traffic in the range of 500 to 3,000 trips per acre. Industrial ¶ uses normally generate 100 to 500 trips per acre. Typical residential uses range from ¶ 10 to 50 trips per acre for single family homes to 50 to 150 trips per acre for duplexes, ¶ townhomes, and apartment complexes. ¶ Another important principle is that residential land uses spread their traffic generating ¶ loads thinly and evenly whereas commercial developments concentrate their traffic ¶ loads, much like the aforementioned stack of bricks. This explains why a weak road ¶ grid rarely results in abandoned housing due to traffic congestion alone, and why large ¶ commercial building projects must be located adjacent to one or more major streets and ¶ highways (stronger beams) to provide the necessary traffic access**. Commercial ¶ development generates traffic with such high intensity that is becomes vulnerable to ¶ road grid weaknesses. Like heavy weights on a weak deck, intense development can ¶ “fall through” the deck**. Examples include vacant shopping centers and office buildings ¶ in areas with severe congestion. Deck collapse can also occur by “overbuilding” too ¶ many shopping centers or office buildings so that traffic exceeds the capacity of the 3¶ surrounding road grid. Yet another source of collapse is removal of the support ¶ structure. Clearly, for example, **closure of the roadway** to through-traffic at Fort Sam ¶ **Houston has resulted in the demise of retail businesses** south of Fort Sam Houston ¶ along New Braunfels Avenue. ¶ As one final note, the intensity of development that a road grid can handle is also ¶ dependent on whether streets and highways connect together in a complete grid which ¶ allows full use of the “strength” or “capacity” of each roadway. **Street networks that ¶ consist of disjointed roads and circuitous roads can not handle the intensity of ¶ development that a complete grid network would support.** This is a significant issue with ¶ the road grid around Fort Sam Houston. Capacity of an incomplete road network is ¶ reduced because the strength of the network diminished by the weak or missing road ¶ segments. ¶ 2.0 TRANSPORTATION/LAND USE SYSTEM STRATEGIES

#### Squo shows that BRAC impacted areas experience skyrockets in traffic and congestion.

(Alexandernews.org, “BraceYourself For New Brac Traffic Patterns And More Congestion”, 9/13/11, <http://www.alexandrianews.org/2011/2011/09/braceyourself-for-new-brac-traffic-patterns-and-more-congestion/>, accessed 7/9/12)

I-395 at Seminary Road where BRAC employees will exit for their new Mark Center home (Photo: James Cullum)¶ ¶ If you thought the commute on last week’s “Terrible Traffic Tuesday” was hellacious, it was just a harbinger or a precursor of things to come on area roads. Better brace yourself for the full brunt of the BRAC impact on area roads in the Greater Washington region. Some area residents and drivers worry that the new jobs will spawn “a vast influx of vehicles onto area roads,” forewarn area transportation departments and AAA Mid-Atlantic.¶ ¶ As a result of the 2005 Pentagon Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) law, more than 35,000 military service personnel, civilian employees, and defense contractors will be redeployed and relocated to new sites in the Washington metro area by the September 15th deadline. And that’s just the beginning, says AAA Mid-Atlantic. Expect upwards of 20,000 additional personnel to converge on the Washington suburbs by 2015, bringing the total count to more than 82, 000 redeployed workers on area roads and transit systems, plus thousands of family members in new homes and kids in area schools, the auto club notes.¶ ¶ “In several senses the BRAC transition will have, and it is already having, an impact on area roads, mass transit lines, schools, and neighborhoods,” said John B. Townsend II, AAA Mid-Atlantic’s Manager of Public and Government Affairs. “Because we live in an area noted for its already congested transportation infrastructure, the impact will be wide-ranging and palatable. Few will escape it, whether you live, shop, dine, commute, go to school or worship in Washington D.C. proper, northern Virginia or central Maryland.”¶ ¶ Some longtime Washington area residents wonder if the metro area can handle the existing and future traffic demands of the BRAC paradigm. One thing is certain: its influence, for good or ill or weal and woe, will be felt on all points of the compass throughout the Washington metro area, ranging from the Marine Corps Base in Quantico, to Fort Belvoir in Fairfax County to the Mark Center along I-395 in Alexandria.

## --K2 Bases

### BRAC kills bases

#### Infrastructure issues due to additional personnel threaten operations at already crowded bases.

TRB 11 (Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases,” http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302.pdf)

The BRAC 2005 round differed fundamentally from previous base realignments. Unlike previous BRAC rounds, which primarily dealt with base closures, BRAC 2005 concentrated tens of thousands of additional personnel at a number of bases located in metropolitan areas with already inadequate transportation infrastructure and experiencing substantial congestion. The date when BRAC decisions must be fully implemented (September 2011) is far too soon for the bases and surrounding commu­ nities to avoid significant added traffic congestion for military personnel and other commuters during peak travel periods. The resulting traffic delays will impose substantial new costs on surrounding communities and the military. The BRAC 2005 round is being implemented under an extra­ ordinary set of circumstances. The nation is fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even as it maintains a substantial troop presence in Iraq, major redeployments are causing sharp spikes of increased personnel at domestic bases, including those affected by BRAC 2005. In the post­9/11 environment, the federal government, particularly the military, is impos­ing security requirements on its facilities to protect them from domestic terrorist acts. Security imperatives are resulting in a concentration of civilian and military personnel in more secure locations within metro­politan areas but away from downtowns and other areas of concentrated commercial activity where transit is an option. In the last three years, the nation has experienced the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, which has had direct consequences for federal, state, and local transportation budgets. The BRAC 2005 consequences for communities located near military bases are occurring when these governments are unusually strapped for funds. Moreover, the civilian transportation programs the Department of Defense (DoD) expects to help support transportation improvements— particularly the federal surface transportation program—are more than a year past due for reauthorization, in part because sufficient funding can­ not be found to meet the needs of states, metropolitan areas, and transit authorities. A near­term resolution of this problem is not at all likely. Federal, state, and local civilian authorities would have struggled to respond to the BRAC 2005 impacts on transportation networks under normal circumstances. In the current context, existing programs and processes are unable to cope with these new and unexpected demands, particularly within the constrained time frame. Many of the bases affected are located in built­up areas within metropolitan regions that already experience heavy congestion in peak periods, which will worsen with additional travelers. The processes required under federal law for envi­ronmental review, citizen participation, and long­range planning often require a decade or more before funding can be committed and construc­tion initiated. At several bases, the required facilities and services will not be in place when personnel are relocated, which may result in severe congestion on facilities serving these bases. The necessarily and largely secret process used in BRAC determi­nations and troop redeployments has compounded demands on civil infrastructure. By all appearances, the Commission did not have a full accounting of the transportation impacts or costs that would be imposed on communities. Once the decisions became known, the affected commu­nities did not have time, especially under current economic circumstances, to locate funds or rearrange long­planned and agreed upon capital plans to support the new demands on their transportation networks. Addressing traffic congestion in dense metropolitan areas is a challenging and complex process. With the addition of military traffic, it becomes even more difficult. The requirements of the military mission and the needs of the surrounding communities must be taken into account when developing strategies to improve the transportation system.

#### Congestion compromises base efficiency – personnel can’t reach their bases in time

NGA 09 [National Governors Association, June 09, 2009, “State Transportation Activities to Support Mission Growth”, <http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/0906MISSIONGROWTH.PDF>]

Scale Challenge: Incoming Population May Put Strain on Current Transportation Capacity ¶ Mission growth will bring large numbers of people to defense communities, many of which may ¶ not have the current transportation infrastructure to accommodate such stress. More than 20 bases ¶ currently are experiencing major mission growth activities.¶ While these bases are spread across ¶ the country, a handful of states— Maryland, Texas, Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia— ¶ have more than one base that will grow. Fort Bliss in Texas will grow by at least 300 percent— ¶ from 9,000 soldiers and 15,000 family members in 2005 to 38,000 soldiers and 53,000 family ¶ members in 2012.¶ The population increase resulting from mission growth is considerable at all ¶ growing bases—on average 35 percent.¶ And at some bases, the population could double or triple. ¶ The large population increase in mission growth communities will likely place a strain on many ¶ roads that may already be overcrowded during peak hours and in need of repair. This can ¶ compromise a base’s mission. DoD’s policy requires that military personnel be able to reach their ¶ installations within 30 minutes in times of crisis. If the transportation network is congested, ¶ accomplishing that is unlikely. ¶ Nationwide, many states and communities face a growing imbalance between demand for the ¶ transportation system and its capacity. More than two-thirds of peak-hour traffic occurs in ¶ congested conditions, and road congestions in 2005 cost the United States $200 billion in net ¶ economic losses, 2.9 billion gallons of wasted fuel, and 4.2 billion hours of lost time.¶ It is under these circumstances that many communities will absorb an influx of new military families and ¶ civilians. The rapid and substantial growth around many military bases will place additional ¶ pressure on many of these communities, forcing them to expand their current transportation ¶ infrastructure or identify alternative transit options.

#### Traffic congestion leads to incompetent military bases

ADC 11 (Association of Defense Communities, “BRAC Transportation Innovation Lab After Action Report”, 7/17/11, <http://www.defensecommunities.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/BRAC-Transportation-Innovation-Lab-After-Action-Report.pdf>, accessed 7/12/12)

Sustainability connects the operations of our military installations to their surrounding communities and region. Gone are the days when installations were stand alone entities and if installations are to endure and become truly sustainable elements of local economies and regions, transportation issues must be dealt with in a mutually beneficial partnership with the communities, governments, and organizations that are all affected. Just as with many other factors, transportation issues contribute to complex challenges for installations/ranges and local communities. This problem has been exasperated lately as many installations have experienced massive growth both inside and outside the fence line and communities, ranging from small towns to large metropolitan areas, are facing significant transportation challenges resulting from BRAC-induced growth.¶ An increase in traffic congestion can lead to reduced employee productivity and degradation in the quality of life for both the military and civilian workforce, as well as affect our nation’s military readiness if employees cannot efficiently travel to and from work. State and local governments are often forced to adopt strategies to expedite the planning and execution of transportation projects due to growing installations in their regions. Yet this must be done in the context of an ever changing mix of factors, both inside and outside the installation and done in a capacity that does not affect the ability of an installation to perform its mission. In the past, DoD has been limited in its own ability to provide the resources and assistance needed to help neighboring communities address the impact on the local transportation infrastructure. Yet, for today’s installation of the 21st Century, transportation sustainability entails proactively planning for the long term. While continuing the mission and promoting the general welfare of the soldiers, the installation must effectively build relationships and partnerships with the surrounding community to effectively manage transportation issues and both internal and external stresses to the regional transportation infrastructure.

#### BRAC leads to major increase in traffic around military base regions

Warner 2005 Mark R. Warner(Virginia Governor),“Report of ¶ Northern Virginia BRAC Working Group”,12/1/2005 <http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/fcdot/pdf/brac/nova_brac_working_group_report.pdf>

The extraordinary workforce shifts expected because of BRAC will have a profound ¶ impact on the Northern Virginia transportation network – which is already struggling from the ¶ current volume of cars and people. The proposal to shift thousands of positions from Metroaccessible sites will generate increased traffic most significantly along the I-95/Route 1 corridor ¶ in Fairfax County around Fort Belvoir, and in Prince William and Stafford County around the ¶ Quantico base. While the BRAC actions will shift some travel patterns away from areas inside ¶ the Beltway, there will be increased congestion between Fort Belvoir and the Pentagon, affecting ¶ Alexandria and Arlington. in traffic between 2000 and 2025 along Route 1 before the projected BRAC-related increase in ¶ employment at Fort Belvoir and Quantico. It is expected that the 12-mile Prince William section ¶ of Route 1 will see a traffic increase of 94 percent from 33,600 vehicle trips to more than 65,000. ¶ In turn, traffic on the Fairfax County portion of Route 1 will increase by 71 percent from 46,000 ¶ vehicle trips to 78,750. According to a summer 2005 study conducted by the Metropolitan ¶ Washington Council of Governments, the BRAC actions will increase automobile trips by ¶ almost 85,000 and reduce transit ridership by more than 6,000 riders throughout the region by ¶ 2020. ¶ The work underway for the Northern Virginia TransAction 2030 Regional Transportation ¶ Plan (the update of the adopted Northern Virginia 2020 Transportation Plan) shows through ¶ modeling that the I-95/Route 1 corridor is one of the most severely impacted transportation ¶ corridors in the region. Even with significant proposed improvements -- totaling over $10 billion ¶ in the next 25 years -- the corridor with still be operating at unacceptable levels of service in ¶ 2030. On a scale with “A” being optimum, I-95 will be at level of service “G” during peak hours ¶ in Prince William County and Route 1 will be between level of service “E” and “G” during peak ¶ hours. The transportation models conducted for the TransAction Plan do not take into account ¶ the significant growth projected as a result of the BRAC actions around Fort Belvoir and ¶ Quantico. ¶ As preparation for this report, transportation staffs from Fairfax, Prince William, and ¶ Stafford Counties identified road, transit, and transportation management proposals to address ¶ traffic impacts in and around Fort Belvoir and Quantico. Most of these proposals are identified in ¶ existing county and state studies and plans, including the Lower Potomac section of the Fairfax ¶ County Plan, the Potomac Communities planning effort in Prince William County, the Stafford ¶ County transportation plan, VDOT’s Route 1 Location Studies, the VRE’s Strategic Plan, the ¶ Northern Virginia 2020 Transportation Plan and TransAction 2030 regional transportation plan. ¶ (See Appendix 1). ¶ The Fairfax County Plan identifies Fort Belvoir as one of its largest employers (and ¶ therefore a significant traffic generator) with approximately 25,000 employees and more than ¶ 6,500 people living on base. BRAC actions could lead up to an additional 21,000 jobs on base. ¶ Final distribution of these jobs within the Fort Belvoir Main Base (east and west of Route 1) ¶ and/or the Engineer Proving Ground (EPG, west of I-95, south of Springfield) has not been ¶ determined. ¶ The National Museum of the United States Army is planned to be located on the west ¶ side of Route 1 across from the Main Gate not included in this report, but will add additional ¶ traffic in and around Fort Belvoir in addition to BRAC. This will add traffic above the current ¶ conditions.¶ More than 13,000 personnel work at Quantico and an increase of up to 5,000 is expected ¶ following the approved BRAC proposals. These figures do not include personnel from the FBI or ¶ DEA employed at the FBI Academy at Quantico. The Base is divided by I-95 with the Mainside ¶ situated east of I-95 and the Guadalcanal area located west of I-95. Mainside is intensely ¶ developed with housing, offices, the Marine Corps Air Facility, and the Quantico Naval Medical The Town of Quantico is located in Prince William County and is surrounded by ¶ Quantico Base. Access to the town is available only through the main Quantico gate. Many ¶ residents from Prince William and Stafford Counties drive and park at the Base to take the ¶ Virginia Railway Express (VRE) commuter rail service to Northern Virginia and Washington, ¶ D.C.

### --Bases K2 Hegemony

#### Bases are essential to our security

Cornella et al. 05 [Hon Al. Cornella – Chairman of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, Lewis E. Curtis III – member of the Comission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, May 9, 2005, “Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States”, <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/obc.pdf>]

The military basing structure of the United States is part and parcel of its national¶ security strategy. Where we place our forces, how we stage them for commitment in¶ the pursuit of national interests, where we position sets of equipment and supplies to¶ sustain them and how and with whom we ally and train are more than a reflection of¶ current policy options. It is strategy itself, not the totality of it, but a significant part.¶ The basing posture of the United States, particularly its overseas basing, is the skeleton of national security upon which flesh and muscle will be molded to enable us¶ to protect our national interests and the interests of our allies, not just today, but for¶ decades to come.

#### Our bases have regressed since initial construction – a revamping of domestic bases is key to our national security

Cornella et al. 05 [Hon Al. Cornella – Chairman of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, Lewis E. Curtis III – member of the Comission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, May 9, 2005, “Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States”, <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/obc.pdf>]

America’s current basing system is an outgrowth of its emergence as a global power¶ in the first half of the 20th century. Its rudimentary overseas basing structure at that¶ time originated with America’s entry into world affairs commensurate with the¶ Spanish-American War and expanded dramatically in the 1940s with the watershed¶ strategic decision to ally with the free nations of the world to resist the global¶ expansion of fascism. ¶ By the end of World War II, America’s domestic and international base structure¶ eclipsed anything the world had ever seen, far surpassing in scale and scope the¶ impressive historical antecedents of the Roman, Mongol, Ottoman, and British¶ empires. More striking, all of the latter had been built over decades and centuries. The¶ U.S. basing structure had been built in five years. ¶ By 1947, it was clear that this very same basing system would be called upon to¶ implement a decades-long policy of containment. Through the many permutations of¶ the Cold War, our basing posture — with appropriate adaptations to meet the particular¶ threats that emerged — more than sufficed to match our strategic resolve. In the end,¶ the threat of communist expansion was defeated, only to be replaced yet again by a¶ variety of threats to our national interests. Beginning in the late 1970s our basing¶ structure was augmented by increasing our access to facilities in Southwest Asia, the¶ Persian Gulf, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. This overlay on the post-World War II¶ basing structure served us well in the first Gulf War.¶ With the end of the Cold War and throughout the 1990s we began to adjust¶ accordingly. Our overseas basing structure and especially our military presence was¶ cut back substantially. The U.S. Army removed a corps headquarters, two divisions,¶ two armored cavalry regiments, and their assigned supporting units from Europe. In¶ the end over 270,000 personnel were cut from the Army structure worldwide. The Air¶ Force removed more than six wings and closed seven air bases in Europe with an¶ overall service reduction of over 160,000 personnel. Only a small fraction of the¶ numbers we once permanently located in Europe remains today. Our armed forces are¶ similarly reduced. We have already substantially modified our Cold War posture.¶ Now, some fourteen years after the successful liberation of Kuwait and sixteen years¶ after the tearing down of the Berlin wall and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the¶ United States faces a variety of strategic challenges that necessitate a further revamping of our basing posture. Simultaneously, we find ourselves embarked on a¶ number of strategic initiatives that run the gamut from a global war on terror, a¶ c o u n t e r- i n s u rgency and nation building campaign in Iraq, containment of the¶ proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — nuclear and otherwise — into the¶ hands of irresponsible nations and non-state actors, a transformation of the means and¶ conduct of warfare, a realignment of traditional alliance and diplomatic relationships,¶ a restructuring of our major combat units, and considerations of emerging challenges¶ to our primacy in the world. ¶ The Commission acknowledges the complexity of taking on the breadth of these¶ strategic issues, and it offers both its admiration and congratulations for the energy,¶ foresight, and commitment with which all of this has been done. As a nation, we have¶ not ducked the hard issues nor failed to recognize the need for transformation and¶ reorientation. Already we have undertaken enormous change in the movement of¶ forces around the globe, the transformation of our armed forces and their supporting¶ structures, our technological developments in air, sea, land, and space capabilities, and¶ in the employment of forces across the entire spectrum of our active and reserve¶ components. All in all, the totality of effort has been commendable. ¶ At the same time, however, the Commission must emphasize that considerations of¶ rebasing cannot be seen as an aside from these major strategic deliberations. It cannot¶ be merely a consequence of domestic political tradeoffs. Nor can it be the fallout of¶ diplomatic compromise, the appeasement of an ally here, a quid pro quo for a bilateral¶ arrangement there. The entire basing structure of the United States, both domestic and¶ international, must be an integrated whole and must relate directly to the national¶ security strategy of the United States.

#### BRAC allows for more efficient force deployment

Cornella et al. 05 [Hon Al. Cornella – Chairman of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, Lewis E. Curtis III – member of the Comission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, May 9, 2005, “Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States”, <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/obc.pdf>]

This significant movement of service members and their families will have a major¶ impact on the infrastructure of the receiving and losing bases, their communities and¶ on the personnel and families involved. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure¶ (BRAC) process will help align the domestic infrastructure for forces that are¶ returning to or departing from U.S. territory.¶ 2 While the most significant movements¶ will affect the facilities located within the Continental U.S. (CONUS), some of the¶ movements will also affect facilities located at U.S. territories.¶ The Department understands that the Quality of Life (QOL) of its service members¶ and their families is an integral part of force readiness. As such, in 2001 the President¶ recognized the need to improve Quality of Life for the military. Shortly after taking¶ office he issued a National Security Presidential Directive entitled “Improving¶ Military Quality of Life.” It tasked the Secretary of Defense to review measures to¶ improve Quality of Life and provide recommendations for implementation

#### Bases allow training of soldiers – quantity of troops doesn’t matter without quality in conflict

DOA 08 [Department of the Army, “Base Realignment and Closure Smart Book for Commanders”, May 14, 2008, <http://cpol.army.mil/library/general/brac/docs/BRAC-Cmdrs-Smart-Book.pdf>]

The DoD is in the process of repositioning and restructuring its stateside and overseas ¶ bases and facilities. The plan directs, by 2013, the movement and consolidation of major ¶ military elements with the goal to significantly enhance the nation’s capacity to train ¶ Soldiers and leaders and to generate combat power during time of war. The plan ¶ integrates BRAC decisions, global defense posture realignments, and the other actions ¶ required to build a modular Army. The plan requires careful synchronization of ¶ stationing, construction, and deployment schedules to posture U.S. forces, logistics ¶ activities, and power projection platforms to respond to the demands of the Nation ¶ efficiently and effectively.

#### Having the capability to do extensive military training at bases located in the states is key to U.S. heg

GAO 2002 Governments Accountability Office,”Military Trainining,4/2002,www.gao.gov, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/234078.html>

Armed forces must be trained and ready in peacetime to deter wars, to¶ fight and control wars that do start, and to terminate wars on terms¶ favorable to the U.S. and allied interest. Historical experiences indicate¶ that there is a correlation between realistic training and success in¶ combat. Hence, training should be as realistic as possible to prepare¶ troops for combat. Service training guidance emphasizes the importance¶ of live fire training to create a realistic combat scenario and to prepare¶ individuals and units for operating their weapons systems.¶ BackgroundPage 4 GAO-02-525 Military Training¶ U.S. forces are required to train for a variety of missions and skills. This¶ training includes basic qualification skills such as gunnery and higher-level¶ unit operational combat skills. Service training requirements typically¶ require the use of air ranges for air-to-air and air-to-ground combat, drop¶ zones, and electronic warfare; live-fire ranges for artillery, armor, small¶ arms, and munitions training; ground maneuver ranges to conduct realistic¶ force-on-force training at various unit echelons; and sea ranges to conduct¶ ship maneuvers for training. To achieve required training, non-CONUS¶ forces use a variety of training areas and ranges that are generally owned¶ by host governments.¶ Ideally, forces conduct the majority of their required training at home¶ station using local training areas or operating areas. However, non-CONUS¶ forces have historically relied on a combination of instrumented training¶ ranges away from home station, major training centers, CONUS training¶ exercises, and multilateral training exercises with countries within their¶ theater to obtain their required training. This includes the Navy and the¶ Marine Corps, which have no permanently stationed combat forces in¶ Europe and no fixed access to training ranges in the European theater.¶ 1¶ We have previously reported that the size of home station training areas¶ available to units varies greatly, particularly between units stationed¶ overseas and those in the United States.¶ 2¶ For example, we reported that¶ local training areas for units stationed in Germany have historically varied¶ in size from 3 acres to 8,000 acres, with divisional units not always housed¶ at the same location. In the United States, we reported that individual¶ installations vary, but far more land is available and typical installations¶ may vary in size from just under 100,000 acres up to more than one million¶ acres. While this report’s focus is exclusively on training constraints outside¶ CONUS, both we and the Department of Defense (DOD) are examining¶ constraints on CONUS training. At the request of the House Committee on¶ Government Reform, we are reviewing the effects of environmental and commercial development restrictions on key training areas within the 48¶ contiguous states and whether DOD is effectively working to address¶ these issues. In addition, DOD is in the process of determining the extent¶ of the training problems at CONUS facilities. DOD’s Senior Readiness¶ Oversight Council initiated a sustainable range initiative spearheaded by¶ the Defense Test and Training Steering Group. The initiative’s purpose is¶ to develop and recommend a comprehensive plan of action to ensure that¶ the department maintains range and airspace capabilities that support¶ DOD’s future training needs. In November 2000, the steering group¶ submitted a sustainable range report to the Oversight Council followed by¶ the publication of nine action plans that addressed eight training-related¶ issues¶ 3¶ confronting CONUS training and an outreach plan. Currently,¶ DOD’s efforts have focused almost exclusively on CONUS training. There¶ is no consolidated DOD-wide listing of non-CONUS training ranges and¶ their associated limitations. Some services have started collecting this¶ information, but a complete inventory is not yet available.

#### BRAC and domestic basing is key to rapid power projection and training

Air Force Institute of Technology 2006 (“Access Based Cost Estimation for Beddown Analysis,” Department of the Air Force University, March 10, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA450217>)

These initiatives are in fact more important in the current environment. As stated ¶ by Secretary Rumsfeld in the current Quadrennial Defense Review: ¶ “We also have been adjusting the U.S. global military force posture, ¶ making long overdue adjustments to U.S. basing by moving away from a ¶ static defense in obsolete Cold War garrisons. . . . BRAC, now being ¶ implemented, will support overseas restructuring and the imperative of ¶ rapid power projection, with domestic basing that provides needed training ¶ infrastructure. BRAC changes will also promote joint and multi-Service ¶ basing in order to achieve economies of scale.” (Rumsfeld, 2006) ¶ It is evident that the current administration is not only actively pushing to accomplish ¶ those previously planned realignments but, with the current emphasis on joint capabilities ¶ based forces, more will be coming in the future.

#### Domestic basing is key to deterring stopping global threats

DoD 2003 (“Report on the Effect of Base Closures on Future Mobilization Options,” July 22, <http://www.defense.gov/brac/docs/remob99pdf.pdf>)

Infrastructure must be expanded, reconfigured, reallocated, and reconstructed to ¶ meet specific needs and threats. The request in Section 2815 was based on a ¶ “remobilization” to 1987 end strength. The term mobilization implies the need for ¶ a rapid response to an imminent threat of war, such as the period prior to WW I I . ¶ If the security scenario required that type of rapid response, then there would be ¶ the need to rapidly move forces overseas after an expedited training period. ¶ Although training facilities would have to be available early, the movement of units ¶ would mean that the total force would not have to be bedded down within the ¶ U.S. infrastructure. Also, a major redirection of U.S. commercial assets into ¶ defense use is likely during a mobilization. Both movement overseas and use of ¶ commercial assets reduces the need for construction of new domestic defense ¶ facilities. Although we believe that both factors will reduce infrastructure ¶ requirements, we have not based our analysis on them. To provide a more ¶ demanding assessment of future defense infrastructure needs, this report is ¶ based upon the reconstitution of a Cold War-type deterrent force requiring ¶ significant domestic basing. Reconstitution, as opposed to mobilization, is more ¶ in-line with the QDR global security assessment of potential global threats. ¶ Following the requirement in Section 281 5, reconstitution to 1987 force levels was ¶ analyzed in this report. The specific forces needed for reconstitution to meet a ¶ potential global peer competitor, however, may be significantly different than the ¶ 1987 force structure. [Note: the report does not address issues of mobilization ¶ needs or infrastructure changes to meet current or projected force or mission ¶ requirements. Instead, the report evaluates the types of infrastructure that would ¶ be needed to reconstitute 1987 force levels within the post-BRAC 1995 ¶ infrastructure.]

#### Domestic bases are key to the military power

Robyn, Deputy under Secretary of Defense, 2010 (“Statement of Dr. Dorothy Robyn,” Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Readiness, March 18, <http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/robyn_testimony031810.pdf>)

Another BRAC 2005 action that my office has championed is the consolidation of ¶ 26 installations into 12 joint bases. At each joint base, a supporting Service Component ¶ provides installation leadership for one or more supported Service Components. By ¶ consolidating installation management and delivery of installation support, joint bases ¶ will be able to provide more efficient and effective support for the overall military ¶ mission. ¶ Our joint bases represent realigned, reconfigured national military assets for the ¶ joint teams they serve. The first five joint bases reached full operational capability on ¶ October 1, 2009. The remaining seven joint bases reached initial operational capability ¶ on January 31, 2010, and are on their way to full operational capability this coming ¶ October. We are no longer implementing joint basing. We are now operating joint bases.

## --K2 Readiness

####  Traffic related to BRAC will devastate military readiness

Moran 2009 James P Moran(Committee on Appropriations),7/27/2009,Congress of The United States(House Of Representations), <http://alexandrianews.org/2009/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/gates-letter.pdf>

In the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Fort Belvoii BRAC decisions, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers concluded that "Implementing the Preferred Alternative would result in significant adveisc effects to the transportation system with respect to congestion and increased travel time These effects would lead to reduced employee productivity and degradation of quality of life " According to the Coips, increased congestion would occur on Interstate 95, Route One and the Fairfax County Parkway - major access points to Foit Belvoh and all major commuter routes for employment throughout the National Capital Region Level of Service (LOS) at nine intersections drops to failing. Early Corps estimates stated that severe congestion at the Engineer Proving Ground would last three to four hours each rush hour, and that queuing of traffic waiting to access Fort Belvoit would back up onto 1-95 and extend morning congestion between one and two hours.¶ Moreover, the negative traffic impacts of the 2005 BRAC telocations to Fort Belvoit will erode haid-lbught gains in regional traffic mitigation Bottlenecks resulting fiom BRAC-induced tiaffic negate the benefit of the Springfield Interchange "Mixing Bowl," the i-95 Fourth Lane project, and the Woodrow Wilson Bridge project.¶ Not only will anticipated tiaffic complications 10II back gains from these ttanspoitation projects, but, without proper action, military readiness will suffer As you are aware, the planned tenant organizations to be located at Fort Belvoir arc some of the most sensitive, operationally demanding, and technologically advanced activities undertaken by the Depaitment of Defense Despite their impoitant mission, if staff has to spend 3-4 hours pei day in backed-up traffic, then their ability to perform their duties will be negatively impacted¶

#### Traffic increase due to BRAC diminishes access to key military bases, destroying military readiness

Moran 2009 James P Moran(Committee on Appropriations),7/27/2009,Congress of The United States(House Of Representations), <http://alexandrianews.org/2009/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/gates-letter.pdf>

  Thank you for your continued service to our nation and to the men and women of our armed forces. ¶ As you know, I have expressed serious concerns regarding the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission’s (BRAC) final recommendations. The magnitude of the realignment of military and civilian personnel throughout Northern Virginia is unprecedented, while realistic planning for how the region will deal with the influx of 19,000 new employees has been severely lacking. With the September 15, 2011 statutory deadline drawing near, I ask that the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army reconsider some past decisions regarding the allocation of resources so that the transition is successful for both the military and the surrounding communities.¶ While there are a number of challenges involving implementation of the 2005 BRAC recommendations, my primary concern is the effect the relocation of the 19,000 military and civilian personnel to Fort Belvoir will have on the communities in Alexandria and Fairfax County located in close proximity to the Fort. ¶ As you must be aware, nearly 20,000 DoD personnel were relocated out of office buildings proximate to the Pentagon and Metro stations to locations without access to public transit, putting thousands more cars on our local roads.¶ The August 7, 2007 Record of Decision (ROD) and subsequent Army decisions identified three separate Fort Belvoir relocation sites, the Main Post, the Engineer Proving Ground (EPG) and the Mark Center, the last of which is located in Alexandria, several miles from Fort Belvoir, but will also create extreme congestion on I-395 due to a lack of direct access from the highway. While this bifurcation of the total number of incoming employees across these three sites should help dissipate some of the traffic impact on the region, the Army’s own investigations have reached some very troubling conclusions.¶ In the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Fort Belvoir BRAC decisions, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers concluded that “Implementing the Preferred Alternative would result in significant adverse effects to the transportation system with respect to congestion and increased travel time. These effects would lead to reduced employee productivity and degradation of quality of life.” According to the Corps, increased congestion would occur on Interstate 95, Route One and the Fairfax County Parkway – major access points to Fort Belvoir and all major commuter routes for employment throughout the National Capital Region. Level of Service (LOS) at nine intersections drops to failing. Early Corps estimates stated that severe congestion at the Engineer Proving Ground would last three to four hours each rush hour, and that queuing of traffic waiting to access Fort Belvoir would back up onto I-95 and extend morning congestion between one and two hours. ¶ Moreover, the negative traffic impacts of the 2005 BRAC relocations to Fort Belvoir will erode hard-fought gains in regional traffic mitigation. Bottlenecks resulting from BRAC-induced traffic negate the benefit of the Springfield Interchange “Mixing Bowl,” the I-95 Fourth Lane project, and the Woodrow Wilson Bridge project. Not only will anticipated traffic complications roll back gains from these transportation projects, but, without proper action, military readiness will suffer. As you are aware, the planned tenant organizations to be located at Fort Belvoir are some of the most sensitive, operationally demanding, and technologically advanced activities undertaken by the Department of Defense. Despite their important mission, if staff has to spend 3-4 hours per day in backed-up traffic, then their ability to perform their duties will be negatively impacted. ¶

#### Traffic congestion significantly detracts from mission-performance effectiveness and efficiency, that kills readiness

Messina 2011 Debbie Messina(PhD In Journalism),PilotOnline.com, “Region's roads impede Navy mobility, report finds”, <http://hamptonroads.com/2011/07/regions-roads-impede-navy-mobility-report-finds>

About 125,000 Navy personnel use area roads daily to get to work. And they could use some help, a draft report by the Hampton Roads Transportation Planning Organization shows.¶ The study identifies transportation needs for the military and recommends improvements, suggesting, among other things, more lanes across the Hampton Roads harbor, replacing or rehabbing deficient bridges, light-rail extensions, and high-speed passenger trains to Washington, D.C., that can get their people to the Pentagon and back in a day.¶ But it does not identify funding.¶ Military personnel - including active duty, reserves, retirees and their families - number 300,000, about 20 percent of the region's population.¶ Military representatives told planners that congestion hurts their ability to maintain military personnel or even bring additional personnel here. Traffic not only affects daily commuting but also travel times between installations during business hours.¶ "Time in transit, particularly when amplified by delays at bridges, tunnels and several traffic congestion delays, significantly detracts from mission-performance effectiveness and efficiency," retired Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Jon A. Gallinetti told regional planners as they prepared the report.¶ Retired Rear Adm. Paul E. Tobin Jr. said a key element of success for the Navy's mission is mobility, but it's impeded "because our transportation infrastructure is in decline and struggling to meet our needs."¶ Traffic safety is so important that the fleet commander gets briefed weekly on accidents and incidents involving Navy personnel, the report says.¶ Among the recommendations:¶ - Emphasize roadways serving the military when prioritizing construction and maintenance needs.¶ - Widen portions of Interstate 64; improve I-264 interchanges; add capacity across the Hampton Roads harbor, whether it be at the Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel or a new crossing; and expand light rail to Norfolk Naval Station and into Virginia Beach.¶ - Replace or rehabilitate structurally deficient bridges, including Victory Boulevard over Paradise Creek in Portsmouth, Granby Street over Masons Creek in Norfolk, and I-264 over Lynnhaven Parkway in Virginia Beach.¶ - Use a minimum vertical clearance of 14 feet as tunnels are constructed or replaced, a minimum vertical clearance of 16 feet at new interstate bridges, and a minimum of 12 feet on new highway lanes to accommodate military vehicles.¶ The planning organization, within the year, will survey military personnel about challenges on their daily commutes.

#### Traffic Congestion due to BRAC will be devastating to military readiness, commute times of personal.

Tucker 2011 [Cheryl Tucker](http://blog.thenewstribune.com/opinion/author/Cheryl%20Tucker)(Editorial Writer for News Tribune),“JBLM traffic crunch: Pain Congress can help remedy”,2/8/2011, <http://blog.thenewstribune.com/opinion/2011/02/08/jblm-traffic-crunch-pain-congress-can-help-remedy/>

Much of that new traffic on Interstate 5 near JBLM is a result of the military implementing the base closure and realignment plan (BRAC) approved by Congress in 2005 – which is taking units from bases scheduled for closure and distributing them to 18 others that are expanding.¶ JBLM is one that is growing – by leaps and bounds – not only when new units arrive but also when existing ones return from war zones.¶ Of the 18 bases that are growing, only four others are scheduled to get more new personnel and dependents than Lewis-McChord. When the base realignment process is finished, it’s estimated that JBLM’s Department of Defense population will have increased by about 13,500, and they’ll be bringing another 17,400 family members with them.¶ Many newcomers will live in base housing, but most will live in the cities and unincorporated areas of Pierce and North Thurston counties. And they’ll be joining the crush of vehicles on Interstate 5 between Olympia and Tacoma.¶ The new report cites the added impact of base expansion not only on the local community but also on military readiness – because personnel won’t be able to get to work “within acceptable commute times.” While the Defense Department has taken a largely hands-off approach to local transportation needs, the report notes, that’s “unrealistic” in congested metropolitan areas.¶ The military itself must be more proactive, according to the committee that wrote the report, by encouraging teleworking, traveling during off-peak times and carpooling. JBLM already has taken some helpful steps, including opening an additional gate and collaborating with the state Department of Transportation on future projects.¶ While a congressional allocation for road improvements could help in the short term, the committee notes that the Defense Department must accept more financial responsibility for the role its personnel play in adding to transportation problems.¶ The military already pays impact fees for dependents attending civilian schools. This report seems to suggest that similar fees should be paid for traffic impacts. About $3.8 billion is being spent on upgrades at JBLM, much of it to accommodate the increase in personnel. It just makes sense that at least some money be spent making it easier for those people to get to and from the base.¶ The South Sound community greatly benefits from its military presence and federal payroll – which helped it weather the recession better than it otherwise might have. But it’s in the military’s best interest to do whatever it can to make traffic less onerous for its own people as well as the civilian population.¶ Congestion shouldn’t interfere with readiness; the military’s job is too important for that to happen.

#### DAR’s public highway improvements are key to efficient transportation to/from BRAC impacted bases.¶¶

Collins and Hampton, 12¶ (Darcel M. Collins and Darryl D. Hampton, U.S. Department of Transportation: Public Roads, “Defense Access Roads” Vol. 75, No.6, May/June 2012,<http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/12mayjune/02.cfm>, accessed: 7/9/12)¶

One effect of base realignment and closure is the impact on local traffic and transportation infrastructure. When personnel from closed bases relocate or commute to another base that remains open, this increase in defense traffic at that installation can place an unexpected burden on nearby State and local roadways. That's where a little-known DOD program known as the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program comes into play. The DAR program, jointly administered by DOD's Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) Transportation Engineering Agency and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), represents a potential means for the military to assist in funding public highway improvements near impacted facilities. Specifically, the program can provide a share of defense funding for off-installation projects to mitigate transportation impacts resulting from sudden and unusual military actions. The terminology "sudden and unusual" is important, as DOD is not in the road-building business. "In the circumstance of sudden and unusual military impacts, the DAR program can be a valuable resource for funding improvements at locations where DOD mission- support efforts have an adverse effect on nearby roads," says Acting Associate Administrator Amy Lucero of the FHWA Office of Federal Lands Highway, which oversees the program.

#### Quick and effective deployment from civil bases is essential to military readiness

Ng 05 [Ka-Po Ng – graduate student at the University of Hong Kong June 2005, “Interpreting China’s Military Power”, <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=gowURTRqi8QC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=%22military+readiness%22+AROUND(20)+hegemony&ots=t0okKYMXaY&sig=4GC_BV9NFfedx7Gw4DBE4vmoDA4#v=onepage&q&f=false>]

Military readiness is defined as a function of speed and effectiveness while effectiveness is the product of mass times efficiency. Bents proposes three stages of readiness after unreadiness - mobilization, structural and operational consecutively. Assuming a discrepancy between potential and actual capability, operational readiness is about how soon a military unit can close that gap and reach full capability. Structural readiness focuses on mass. It imposes a ceiling on the capability of existing forces and asks 'how soon a force of the size necessary to deal with the enemy can be available'. Central to achieving both operational and structural readiness is time. Operational and structural readiness are functions of speed, mass and combat efficiency. But Belts departs from these important building blocks and enters a new conceptual venue when he assesses mobilization readiness. This is defined in terms of the conversion of national demographic and economic resources and the mobilization of a military organizational base. Still, efficiency and speed matter, since civilian and military bases are to be converted constituting a critical mass.

#### Traffic congestion demotivates base staff and severely hurts military readiness – gives an example

Moran 09 [James P. Moran - Representative for Virginia's 8th congressional district, July 27, 2009, Request to Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, <http://alexandrianews.org/2009/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/gates-letter.pdf>]

In the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Fort Belvoir BRAC decisions, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers concluded that "Implementing the Preferred Alternative would result in significant adverse effects to the transportation system with respect to congestion and increased travel time These effects would lead to reduced employee productivity and degradation of quality of life " According to the Corps, increased congestion would occur on Interstate 95, Route One and the Fairfax County Parkway - major access points to Fort Belvoir and all major commuter routes for employment throughout the National Capital Region Level of Service (LOS) at nine intersections drops to failing. Early Corps estimates stated that severe congestion at the Engineer Proving Ground would last three to four hours each rush hour, and that queuing of traffic waiting to access Fort Belvoir would back up onto 1-95 and extend morning congestion between one and two hours.¶ Moreover, the negative traffic impacts of the 2005 BRAC relocations to Fort Belvoir will erode hard-fought gains in regional traffic mitigation Bottlenecks resulting from BRAC-induced traffic negate the benefit of the Springfield Interchange "Mixing Bowl," the 1-95 Fourth Lane project, and the Woodrow Wilson Bridge project.Not only will anticipated traffic complications roll back gains from these transportation projects, but, without proper action, military readiness will suffer As you are aware, the planned tenant organizations to be located at Fort Belvoir arc some of the most sensitive, operationally demanding, and technologically advanced activities undertaken by the Department of Defense Despite their important mission, if staff has to spend 3-4 hours per day in backed-up traffic, then their ability to perform their duties will be negatively impacted.

#### Lack of planning prevents readiness

GAO 11 [United States Government Accountability Office – congressional agency monitoring the use of tax dollars, January 2011, “High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program”, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/315273.pdf>]

High-level interagency coordination regarding policy and funding decisions by DOD and the Department of Transportation could affect the potential of the DAR program to meet the needs of communities most severely affected by DOD growth. Furthermore, unless high-level interagency leadership takes additional steps to improve the utilization of DAR—in conjunction with other federal programs that provide funding for transportation projects nationwide—both installations and communities affected by DOD growth will continue to struggle to address their transportation needs. Moreover, without a strategy for providing priority assistance and leveraging funding for transportation projects surrounding its DOD-growth installations, infrastructure needs both on and off the installation will continue to be subject to funding uncertainties, and both military readiness and the communities’ ability to plan to meet the needs of their citizens could suffer. Specifically, Executive Order 127 provides DOD a tool—the 22-agency Economic Adjustment Committee—to help ensure that the federal government effectively and efficiently leverages scarce resources to assist impacted communities. By convening the committee specifically to address transportation issues surrounding military growth installations, DOD may be able to reach agreement with other federal agencies to meet more of those unmet needs by more fully leveraging federal resources to their best advantage.

## --K2 Retention

### High Skilled workers

#### Traffic negatively effects retention of high skilled workers and disrupts military training.

TRB 11 (Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, “Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases,” http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302.pdf)

Other than the DAR program, the military traditionally accepts no responsibility for transportation congestion and transportation related environmental impacts outside the gates of its bases. As

indicated above, in some cases military personnel are adversely affected through the potential consequences for retention of valued workers and disruption of training for soldiers.

## --Training K2 Hegemony

#### Having training constraints creates poor military performance destroying heg.

GAO 2002 Governments Accountability Office,”Military Trainining,4/2002,www.gao.gov, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/234078.html>

Training constraints have a variety of adverse effects. These include¶ (1) requiring workarounds—adjustments to the training events—that¶ sometimes breed bad habits that could affect performance in combat,¶ (2) requiring military personnel to be away from home more often, and¶ (3) in some instances preventing training from being accomplished.¶ Sometimes workarounds lack realism, and the procedures used during the¶ workaround could lead to individuals practicing tactics that may be¶ contrary to what would be used in combat. While all units have to deploy¶ to obtain some of their higher-level combined arms training skills, we¶ found that all non-CONUS units had to deploy to complete training that¶ normally is performed at home station by CONUS units. While¶ deployments allow the units to complete a great deal more of their training, they result in increased costs and more time away from home.¶ Even with these actions, units are not always able to accomplish required¶ training or accomplish the training to such a limited extent that it just¶ minimally satisfies the requirement. However, the adverse effects of¶ training constraints are often not being captured in readiness reporting.

#### Training soldiers is key to power projection

FAS no date (Defense Strategy Section III, <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/sec3.html>)

Critical to power projection and to our unique ability to both shape the international security environment and respond to the full spectrum of crises are a host of capabilities and assets that enable the worldwide application of U.S. military power. These critical enablers include:¶ Quality people, superbly led by commanders, are our most critical asset. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines are the bedrock of the U.S. military. They will be the deciding factor in all future operations. Recruiting and retaining the best people the United States has to offer, providing them with challenging careers and a good quality of life, and continuously training them to be the best warriors in the world will remain among our top priorities. Our strong commitment to the quality of life of all of our people remains unchanged.

## --Flexibility K2 hegemony

#### Transportation flexibility and BRAC is key to military projection

DOD 2004 (“Base Closure Alert: DOD Releases BRAC 2005 Military Value Principles,” October 26, <http://www.kutakrock.com/publications/federalpractice/BRAC%20military%20value%20principles%2026%20oct%2004.pdf>)

In the post-Cold War world, “the U.S. Army must own speed and surprise,” DuBois said, noting that multiservice cooperation in the transportation field in recent years has greatly leveraged the Army’s combat projection, according to AFPS. DuBois said the 2005 BRAC is aimed at combining that kind of power, including joint training, at installations that best offer it. Also, he noted, duplication can be reduced by merging military research and laboratory facilities. Any new base closures would take into account the need to maintain a military “surge” capacity to deal with potential future threats, Dubois said.

## --Readiness K2 Hegemony

#### Readiness prevents war

Spencer 2000 [Jack Spencer – Senior Research Fellow for The Heritage Foundation, September 15, 2000, “The Facts About Military Readiness”, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2000/09/bg1394-the-facts-about-military-readiness>]

U.S. military readiness cannot be gauged by comparing America's armed forces with other nations' militaries. Instead, the capability of U.S. forces to support America's national security requirements should be the measure of U.S. military readiness. Such a standard is necessary because America may confront threats from many different nations at once.¶ America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries in a given war. America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America or its interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances. Therefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over any single nation has little saliency.¶ The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives,3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."4According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy.5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6¶ Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

#### Readiness requires federal and state efforts – without it the nation is vulnerable

Bucci 12 [Steven Bucci - Senior Research Fellow for Defense and Homeland Security May 29, 2012, “A Homeland Security View of Readiness”, <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/05/29/a-homeland-security-view-of-readiness/>]

In the past, readiness simply meant the status of U.S. [military might](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/05/a-new-decade-of-security-how-ready-is-america). Today, however, national security readiness requires a much broader definition that includes not only conventional defense but also homeland security. If the U.S. persists in restricting the discussion only to the state of military readiness, it will present a false view of where the nation stands.¶ The discussion of readiness certainly includes the military, but it also includes the intelligence community; federal, state, and local law enforcement; and non-law enforcement first responders such as EMTs, firefighters, and private-sector security personnel. Intelligence has made the most progress; law enforcement still requires additional vertical integration; and other responders remain too disjointed.¶ The intelligence community. The intelligence community contributes more to national readiness than ever before. There is an unprecedented level of integration, which is efficient and saves money by lessening redundancy and adding greater depth of analysis. There is no need for multiple agencies to collect the same information, but several organizations analyzing a situation from different angles can give policymakers a broader range of options. Yet a cultural fight lingers between proponents of new ways of thinking and some very old-school turf defenders. Those who long for a return to the primacy and dominance of the CIA need to recognize that this will not happen. The U.S. fields a truly national intelligence structure that includes agencies across the needed disciplines, and it is working.¶ The good news is that maturity and progress are prevailing, and intelligence is becoming more of an asset every day. However, the Administration should continue to push for integration and break down all remaining stovepipes. Particularly amid budget reductions, a leaner and more efficient intelligence community can be leveraged to offset cuts elsewhere. The more U.S. leaders know about the hostile world that surrounds us, the better they can protect America from such hostilities. But if the readiness budget is cut too much, the nation suffers.

#### Readiness is necessary to a capable military

Committee on Armed Services 11 [House Committee on Armed Services – committee of the 112th congress, June 25, 2011, “THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. MILITARY ¶ TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 AND ¶ THE CONSEQUENCES OF ¶ DEFENSE SEQUESTRATION”, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112HPRT71102/pdf/CPRT-112HPRT71102.pdf>]

Let us recognize that today we have the most experienced, professional and capable military force ever to serve our nation. We ¶ must maintain this peerless military readiness and capacity to protect our nation against often uncertain and sometimes unpredicted ¶ threats. We also must avoid repeating past mistakes when numbers and parochial interests, rather than geopolitical realities, ¶ drove decisions and produced unexpected and undesirable second ¶ and third order effects.

Specifically readiness is key for the navy to deliver the force our nation needs to be dominant

Harvey 11 [J.C. Harvey – Commander of the U.S. Fleet Forces – October 13, 2011, “What is Readiness?” <http://usfleetforces.blogspot.com/2011/10/what-is-readiness.html>]

While OIF and OEF certainly increased the demand for all forces from every service, the end of those operations do not promise a return to a more sustainable optempo, as our CNO stated in his Sailing Directions, “As ground forces draw down in the Middle East, the Navy will continue to deter aggression and reassure our partners – we will have the watch.” For Navy to successfully stand the watch, to meet the great challenge of our times, we must be resourced to meet the tasks we have been given. Our Navy, in partnership with our primary Joint partner – the U.S. Marine Corps – will be expected to meet simultaneous demands to support multiple regional engagement plans, deal directly with small/mid-sized crises, and prepare for higher intensity conflicts in various regions of the globe. To do all that is now, and certainly will be in the future, expected of us requires a clear delineation of national military priorities so that we can develop coherent answers to the three essential readiness questions. We must then be given the required resources to turn those answers into the forces necessary to be ready to fight and win today while developing the ability to win tomorrow. Strategic clarity in the determination of our current readiness requirements and the proper resourcing of those requirements will enable our Navy to answer the three essential readiness questions and deliver the force our nation needs today and will need tomorrow.

## --K2 Military Effectiveness

#### BRAC is key for warfighting capability **Defense.gov,,5**(http://www.defense.gov/brac/pdf/vol\_i\_part\_2\_dod\_brac.pdf)

**The Secretary of Defense stated that,** while **BRAC** 2005 must pursue the reduction of excess ¶ capacity, it “**can make an even more profound contribution to transforming the Department by ¶ rationalizing our infrastructure with defense strategy. BRAC 2005 should be the means by ¶ which we reconfigure our current infrastructure into one in which operational capacity ¶ maximizes both warfighting capability and efficiency.” ¶ The Secretary of the Army’s memorandum entitled “Transformation Through Base Realignment and ¶ Closure” stated that the Army’s full participation in BRAC 2005 would enable the Service to realign ¶ its infrastructure in a way that maximizes both efficiency and warfighting capability.** The Secretary ¶ of the Army further emphasized the importance of adhering to BRAC law. He indicated that the ¶ Army would treat all of its installations fairly in the process and stressed that no binding decisions ¶ would be made prior to the Secretary of Defense’s submission of final recommendations to the ¶ Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

#### BRAC is key for our warfighting

Defense.gov 5(<http://www.defense.gov/brac/pdf/vol_i_part_2_dod_brac.pdf>) **BRAC 2005 is a critical component of Army transformation. The BRAC process enables the Army to reshape the infrastructure supporting the current and future forces, making them even more relevant and combat ready for the Combatant Commander. Through participation in BRAC 2005, the Army realigns its infrastructure to optimize its warfighting capability and efficiency.**

#### Key to flexible basing structure, freeing up manpower, and alleviating personnel strains

Spencer and Carafano et al Senior Research Fellow and PhD, 2005 (Jack Spencer and James Jay Carafano, “Defense Priorities for the Next Four Years,” The Heritage Foundation, January 11)

Transforming the Basing Infrastructure. The U.S. global (domestic and foreign) basing infrastructure¶ must be recalibrated to reflect America’s changing and unpredictable national security requirements. President Bush has undertaken two¶ initiatives that will achieve this critical goal—initiating another round of Base Realignment and Closure¶ at home and reconfiguring America’s basing¶ infrastructure abroad. This basing transformation is necessary because the current base structure was developed to defend against a largely static and predictable enemy—the former Soviet Union. Today’s threats, in stark contrast to those of the Cold War, are dynamic and unpredictable, and therefore demand a flexibility that is currently lacking. A flexible basing structure will promote adaptability in a world of diverse political, strategic, and diplomatic interests. America’s commitment to regional stability can no longer be measured by manpower alone. More efficient global basing infrastructure will free up manpower resources and help to alleviate personnel strains. Eliminating excess basing infrastructure will also free up resources that can be reinvested into the Pentagon’s critical transformation initiatives. These efforts should top the Bush Administration’s national security agenda for the next four years.

#### Key to keeping the army organized, equipped, responsive, and optimally located

Department of Defense 2005 (“Base Closure and Realignment Report,” Volume 1, May, <http://www.defense.gov/brac/pdf/Vol_I_Part_1_DOD_BRAC.pdf>)

To assist in the development of scenarios for base realignment or closures, the Department ¶ established the following BRAC principles. Policy Memorandum 2, Appendix E, provides ¶ additional information on the development of these principles. ¶ • Recruit and Train. The Department must attract, develop, and retain active, reserve, ¶ civilian, and contractor personnel who are highly skilled and educated and have access to ¶ effective, diverse, and sustainable training space to ensure current and future readiness, to ¶ support advances in technology, and to respond to anticipated developments in joint and ¶ Service doctrine and tactics. ¶ • Quality of Life. The Department must provide a quality of life, including a quality of ¶ workplace, that supports recruitment, learning, and training and enhances retention. ¶ • Organize. The Department needs its force structure organized, equipped, and located to ¶ match the demands of the National Military Strategy. These forces must be effectively ¶ and efficiently supported by properly aligned headquarters and other DoD organizations ¶ and take advantage of opportunities for joint basing. ¶ • Equip. The Department needs to retain, or make available within the private sector, ¶ research, development, acquisition, test, and evaluation capabilities. These functions ¶ must efficiently and effectively place superior technology in the hands of the warfighter ¶ to meet current and future threats and facilitate knowledge-enabled and net-centric ¶ warfare. ¶ • Supply, Service, and Maintain. The Department needs access to logistical and ¶ industrial infrastructure capabilities that are optimally integrated into a skilled and costefficient national industrial base that provides agile and responsive global support to ¶ operational forces. ¶ • Deploy & Employ (Operational). The Department needs secure installations that are ¶ optimally located for mission accomplishment (including homeland defense); that ¶ support power projection, rapid deployment, and expeditionary force requirements for ¶ reach-back capability; that sustain the capability to mobilize and surge; and that ensure ¶ strategic redundancy. ¶ 20 Chapter 3: Analytical Process ¶ • Intelligence. The Department needs intelligence capabilities to support the National ¶ Military Strategy by delivering predictive analyses, warning of impending crises, ¶ providing persistent surveillance of our most critical targets, and achieving horizontal ¶ integration of networks and databases.

#### Key to mission effectiveness and efficiency

Department of Defense 2005 (“Base Closure and Realignment Report,” Volume 1, May, <http://www.defense.gov/brac/pdf/Vol_I_Part_1_DOD_BRAC.pdf>)

The national security environment in America--the threats it faces and its force to counter them--

has seldom been more dynamic. The military base structure from which our forces are

organized, trained, equipped, and deployed plays an important role in ensuring mission

effectiveness and efficiency. The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process provided a

unique opportunity to reshape the Department’s physical plant, that is, its installations and

associated weapons ranges, as well as the organization and stationing of its forces.

#### Key to increasing military value, consolidation, training, and ready deployment

2005 Base Closure and Realignment Process (Key Provisions of the Law Authorizing the BRAC Commission, <http://www.brac.gov/docs/final/Chap42005BRACProcess.pdf>)

The Army Team’s process for analyzing each DoD recommendation was to assess its justification against established Military ¶ Value selection criteria. In accordance with the statute, Army Team analysts sought to confirm for each recommendation the ¶ consistency of basing and organization plans with final selection criteria and DoD’s Force Structure Plan. Each ¶ recommendation’s justification was analyzed for effects on operational readiness, training, and jointness. All Army rebasing ¶ and closure initiatives were assessed to verify the basing potential for each gaining and losing location, and to ensure that ¶ potential operating and training space, and existing and proposed facilities, supported each recommendation’s objectives. ¶ Every Army-related recommendation was assessed to identify its compatibility with ongoing and planned reorganizations of ¶ Army units, rebasing units from overseas into the US, and strategic repositioning of forces inside the US to support both ¶ operational readiness, training, mobilization, surge, and deployment considerations. DoD’s estimates for costs and ¶ manpower resources to support each realignment or closure action were adjusted for new information, recomputed, and ¶ compared to DoD’s assumptions to confirm or correct characterizations of each recommendation’s effect. ¶ For each military value criteria, community concerns about possible DoD deviations were also evaluated by the Army Team ¶ for accuracy, validity, relevancy, and magnitude. The Commission found that the Army generally followed established ¶ Military Value Selection Criteria in developing its BRAC recommendations. The Army’s Reserve Component-related ¶ recommendations were recognized DoD-wide as properly developed and coordinated in a way that increased the military ¶ value of Reserve Component units nationwide. As the Army developed its BRAC recommendations, it was also waging war ¶ in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the Global War on Terrorism, restructuring its units into modular forces to increase the ¶ number of combat brigades, and rebasing units from Germany and Korea into the US. Consequently, the Army matched its ¶ base structure to its force structure to support plans for both current and future training, operations, and deployment ¶ missions. Examples of recommendations that achieved increases in military value include consolidating Infantry and Armor ¶ training at a single base, consolidating human resources functions at a single base, restationing overseas units to US bases ¶ from which they can readily deploy, and creating new combat brigades with force structure generated from realignments to ¶ reduce soldier assignments to base support functions. On occasion, correctly locating a command to better perform its ¶ mission meant relocating it to a lower ranked installation and exercising military judgment. The Commission found this was ¶ the case for a major Army command that could better perform its command and control mission from a central US location ¶ because of its nationwide mission focus

#### DOD is a leader in BRAC which is great for warfighting efficiency

HQDA 12(Headquarters, Department of the Army, http://www.hqda.army.mil/acsim/brac/brac\_2005\_purpose.htm)

BRAC is a means by which the Department of Defense (DoD) reconfigures its infrastructure into one where operational capacity is optimized for both warfighting capability and efficiency, and joint activity opportunities are aggressively pursued. BRAC furthers Defense Transformation, maximizes joint utilization of defense resources, reallocates military personnel from supporting and security unnecessary and underutilized infrastructure to the point of the warfighting spear, and thus saves taxpayers money**.** BRAC provides DoD a comprehensive review of its installation inventory, elimination of excess physical capacity, alignment of base structure with post-Cold War force structure, and opportunities for jointness.

#### The BRAC program and EFI are both supposed to help the military efficiency

Global security.org no date (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/brac.htm>, GlobalSecurity.org is the leading source for reliable news and security information, directed by John Pike.)

**In July 2001, the Department of Defense announced an Efficient Facilities Initiative (EFI). This consolidation was projected to save an estimated $3.5 billion annually. EFI will enable the US military to match facilities to forces. EFI ensures the primacy of military value in making decisions on facilities and harnesses the strength and creativity of the private sector by creating partnerships with local communities. All military installations will be reviewed, and re**commendations will be based on the military value of the facilities and the structure of the force. The **EFI will encourage a cooperative effort between the President, the Congress, and the military and local communities to achieve the most effective and efficient base structure for America's Armed Forces**. It will give local communities a significant role in determining the future use of facilities in their area by transferring closed installations to local redevelopers at no cost (provided that proceeds are reinvested) and by creating partnerships with local communities to own, operate, or maintain those installations that remain.¶ In mid-December 2001 House and Senate negotiators authorized a new round of military base closings, but delayed any action until 2005. While the Bush administration and the Senate had wanted the base-closing process to begin in 2003, the House had been opposed. Under the compromise plan, the Secretary of Defense will submit a force structure plan and facility inventory, with a certification that proposed closings were justified by the force structure plan and and that they would produce net savings. The closings would also consider environmental costs and community impact. Seven of the nine commission members could vote to add bases to the Pentagon's proposed closure list, but a simple majority would suffice to drop bases from the closure plan. The Bush administration has estimated that 20 percent to 25 percent of military bases are surplus, and that the Pentagon could save $3 billion a year by eliminating surplus facilities.¶ In August 2002 Phil Grone, principal assistant deputy undersecretary of defense for installations and the environment, estimated the next round of base closures in 2005 could save $6 billion a year, even if it cut only 12 percent of DoD's military infrastructure. One 1998 study suggested that 20 to 25 percent of the military's infrastructure could be considered surplus. Grone indicated that an analysis to "shed excess capacity" would be completed in 2004, before the Pentagon decided how many bases must be closed in the 2005 BRAC round.¶ On January 6, 2004, **the Department of Defense** [**announced**](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/01/mil-040106-dod01.htm) **that it had requested commanders of installations in the United States, territories and possessions to gather information about their installations as part of the 2005 round of BRAC.** All installations are to participate in these calls, and every base and military installation in the United States are doing internal assessments of their operations, land, personnel, and facilities. While none of the questions or data associated with the questions will be released to the public prior to the department's recommendations being forwarded to the independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and with all questions and data to be publicly available once the Commission receives them.¶ **The nine members named to serve on the 2005 BRAC Commission will be submitted by the President and congressional leaders for Senate confirmation** in March, 2005. In May, 2005**, the Department of Defense will submit to the BRAC Commission and the Congressional Defense Committees a list of bases that the Department has selected for closure or realignment. Communities across the nation with a military installation are gearing up for BRAC** 2005.¶ The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process had its origins in the 1960s. Understanding that the Department of Defense (DOD) had to reduce its base structure that had been created during World War II and the Korean War, President John F. Kennedy directed Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to develop and implement an extensive base realignment and closure program to adjust to the realities of the 1960s. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) subsequently established the criteria to govern the selection of bases without consulting Congress or the military. Under McNamara's guidance DOD closed sixty bases early in the 1960s without Congress or other government agencies being involved.¶ In view of the political and economic ramifications of the closures, **Congress decided that it had to be involved in the process and passed legislation in 1965 that required DOD to report any base closure programs to it.** However, President Lyndon B. Johnson vetoed the bill. This permitted DOD to continue realigning and closing bases without congressional oversight throughout the rest of the 1960s.¶ Economic and political pressures eventually forced Congress to intervene in the process of realigning and closing bases and to end DOD's independence on the matter. On 1 August 1977 President Jimmy Carter approved Public Law 95-82. It required DOD to notify Congress when a base was a candidate for reduction or closure; to prepare studies on the strategic, environmental, and local economic consequences of such action; and to wait sixty days for a congressional response. Codified as Section 2687, Title 10, United States Code, the legislation along with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) permitted Congress to thwart any DOD proposals to initiate base realignment and closure studies unilaterally by refusing to approve them and gave it an integral role in the process.¶ As economic pressures mounted, the drive to realign and close military installations intensified. In 1983 the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (the Grace Commission) concluded in its report that economies could be made in base structure and simultaneously recommended the creation of a nonpartisan, independent commission to study base realignment and closure. Although nothing came of this recommendation, the defense budget that had been declining since 1985 and that was predicted to continue to decrease in coming years prompted the Secretary of Defense to take decisive action.¶ In 1988 the Secretary of Defense recognized the requirement to close excess bases to save money and therefore chartered the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure in 1988 to recommend military bases within the United States for realignment and closure.¶ Congress has enacted two laws since 1988 that provide for the closure, in part or in whole, and the realignment of facilities. Since 1988, there have been four successive bipartisan Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commissions (BRAC) that recommended the closure of 125 major military facilities and 225 minor military bases and installations, and the realignment in operations and functions of 145 others. By another accounting, the four BRAC rounds achieved 97 base closings and 55 major realignments. This resulted in net savings to taxpayers of over $16 billion through 2001, and over $6 billion in additional savings annually.¶ The principal mechanism for implementing the policy in both statues has been an independent, bipartisan commission. Two of the most pressing issues are providing assistance to local communities economically impacted by base closures and establishing a cost-effective program of environmental clean-up at bases prior to their disposition.¶ During the decade of the 1980's, no major military bases were closed, largely because of procedural requirements established by Congress. After several legislative efforts to break the deadlock failed, Congress introduced a new base closure procedure in P.L. 100-526, enacted October 24, 1988. The original base-closing law was designed to minimize political interference. The statute established a bipartisan commission to make recommendations to Congress and the Secretary of Defense on closures and realignments. Lawmakers had to accept or reject the commission�s report in its entirety. On December 28, 1988, the commission issued its report, recommending closure of 86 installations, partial closure of 5, and realignment of 54 others. The Secretary of Defense approved its recommendation on January 5, 1989.¶ Since the commission approach adopted by Congress was successful, new base closure legislation was introduced which also relied on the services of an independent commission. Congress refined the process in 1990 with another law (PL 101-510) that charged the Defense Department with drawing up an initial list of bases for consideration by the commission. This commission, in accordance with a statutory provision, met in 1991, 1993, and 1995. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment of 1990 (1990 Base Closure Act), Public Law 101-510 established the process by which Department of Defense (DOD) installations would be closed and/or realigned.¶ From 1989 to 1997, the Department of Defense reduced total active duty military end strength by 32 percent, and that figure will grow to 36 percent by 2003 as a result of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR]. After four base closing rounds, only 21 percent of the military installations in the continental United States have been reduced. By 1997 the Department of Defense had already reduced its overseas base structure by almost 60 percent. Before the first base closure round, there were approximately 500 domestic military bases. When all of the bases from the first four BRAC rounds are closed, there will be about 400 bases. Ninety-seven major bases have been closed in the United States. The overseas basing structure has been further reduced, ceasing operations at over 960 facilities. The Army in Europe alone has closed the equivalent of 12 United States major maneuver bases.¶ The 1997 QDR concluded that additional infrastructure savings were required to begin to reduce the share of the defense budget devoted to infrastructure. Retaining excess base infrastructure is unnecessary with a smaller military force, and wastes scarce defense resources that are essential to future military modernization. Base closings are an integral part of this plan. The QDR found that the Department has enough excess base structure to warrant two additional rounds of BRAC, similar in scale to 1993 and 1995. The Department estimated that two additional base closure rounds would result in savings of approximately $2.7 billion annually.¶ The BRAC 1995 commission recommended that the Congress authorize another Base Closure Commission for the year 2001, giving military services time to complete the current closures in an orderly fashion. Implementing the BRAC actions in the first four rounds would result in $23 billion in one-time implementation costs, offset by savings of $36.5 billion, for a total net savings of $13.5 billion between 1990 and 2001 when the implementation of the first four rounds was supposed to be concluded. DOD has not included the total cost of environmental cleanup beyond 2001 in the net savings figures. Approximately half the savings which DOD assumes will come from BRAC during the implementation are due to assumed savings in operation and maintenance costs. Much of those assumed savings are due to reductions in civilian personnel.¶ Under the BRAC process, the Secretary of Defense makes recommendations to a commission, nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate. The commission, after being confirmed by the Senate, reviews these recommendations and makes their own recommendations to the President. The President then reviews the recommendation, either sends those back to the commission for additional work or forwards them, without changes, to the Congress, and then the recommendations of the commission go into effect unless disapproved by a joint resolution of the Congress.¶ In 1995 the BRAC commission recommended closing two maintenance depots - McClellan Air Logistics Center near Sacramento, CA, and Kelly Air Logistics Center in San Antonio, TX. As an alternative to shutting the depots in the two politically powerful states, President Bill Clinton proposed having private contractors take over maintenance work at the sites. The 1995 Base Closure Commission did not recommend or authorize `privatization-in-place' at Kelly or McClellan. Concern was raised about the integrity of the BRAC process in light of this attempt to privatize-in-place the work at the Air Logistics Centers at Kelly Air Force Base in Texas and McClellan Air Force Base in California. Republicans charged that Clinton could not be trusted to respect the apolitical nature of the process.¶ Following Clinton�s action, lawmakers did not agree until 2001 to schedule another round of base closings. Before it was resolved, the dispute held up a conference agreement on the fiscal 2002 defense authorization bill (PL 107-107) and led Bush to threaten to veto the bill if it did not allow a new round in 2005.¶ Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Army Gen. Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Armed Services Committee in July 2001 that the Pentagon maintained 25 percent more facilities than it needs, even after four rounds of base closings in the 1990s. By some accounts, the excess military bases annually cost taxpayers an estimated $3.5 billion.¶ The armed services are focusing on improvement of installation operations, and the OSD are examining efficiencies that could be obtained by such actions as consolidation of functions on installations, regionalization of support, base realignments and closures, and creation of joint installations where facilities are shared by active forces, National Guard, and Reserve components of all the services. At the installation level, better understanding of what facilities (and their condition) exist on an installation permits more efficient use of the space that is available, and is a first step for any base planning. The Army and the Navy have been using procedures that permit them to lease unneeded facilities on their installations to neighboring communities or commercial organizations. In turn, the lessee provides some form of in-kind support to the installation (e.g. construction or operation of a needed facility) or payment to the government.¶ Transformation of the force structure and the return of forces from overseas to the United States will require full analysis of space availability at installations, and forecasts of not only what will be needed for the current force structures, but also for force structures that involve units and weapons systems still on the drawing boards. In forming the Army IMA and the Navy CNI, regional offices were established to coordinate the activities of installations within the regions and to determine where analysis indicates efficiencies of any kind can be generated by combining regional activities such as contracting, cross-leveling of assets, etc.¶ The increased use of National Guard and Reserve components during the Iraq War has pointed out the close links between the installation needs of the Guard and Reserve and the active force and has opened the question of how best to provide support for these units in the future.¶ Some have indicated that BRAC 2005 and concurrent OSD guidance could eventually lead to consolidation of or joint operation of military facilities in areas where there are numerous separate activities. These range from consolidation of contiguous facilities such as Pope Air Force Base, NC and Fort Bragg, NC, to joint control over the numerous military facilities in such areas as Tidewater Virginia. Actions resulting from BRAC can be expected to place a major burden on the services and installations to deal rapidly with the recommendations of the BRAC Commission and to develop well-substantiated, GIS-based plans in response.

## Deployment k/ hegemony

#### A lack of readily deployable forces hurts power projection

Bowie, Senior Member, Professional Staff, RAND Corporation, 2002 (“The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments)

The Department of Defense (DoD) in its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) concluded that¶ the “anti-access” threat—the complex mix of political, geographic, and military factors that could¶ prevent or delay US forces from deploying to a combat theater—is the dominant strategic challenge¶ confronting future US power-projection operations in regions of potential conflict, particularly¶ in Asia.

#### Rapid deployment and mobilization is key to power projection

Shalikashvili, Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, no date (John M., “Power Projection,” GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-10-1/ch1.htm>)

1-3. A central strategic concept in the National Military Strategy of the United States is power projection. Power projection includes the ability of the United States armed forces to deploy air, land, and sea forces to any region in the world and sustain them for missions spanning the operational continuum. US requirements for military force projection include emphasis on rapid deployment of combat power and military operations designed to terminate conflicts as quickly as possible on terms that are favorable to the US and its allies. Within that framework, the Army's contribution to force projection is the demonstrated ability to rapidly alert, mobilize, and field a force that is deployable, lethal, versatile, expandable, and sustainable.

#### Rapid deployment is key to power projection

Force Projection Operations 2005 (Operations Chapter 9, April 6, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/army/fm3-100/CH9.PDF>)

Force projection is key to power projection and central to our national security strategy. Combatant commanders will attempt to resolve crises within their AORs with forward-presence forces. If forces are insufficient to meet the crisis, it will be necessary to project forces from CONUS or another theater. Force projection may be deliberate or time sensitive. The Army’s response to a regional crisis may be time sensitive and may occur in areas of the world where the Army does not have a significant presence. With the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it could be that regional crises will involve nations which have an offensive NBC capability. As NBC weapons will make any operation more difficult, detailed planning is crucial. Chemical units and staffs must be prepared to operate across the range of military operations will play an increasing role in force projection operations. Early entry forces are those operational deploying forces required to support the Commander in Chief’s (CINC) or other Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) concept of operations in a pre-crisis or crisis situation. Early entry forces must possess capabilities to deploy rapidly, enter the operational area, secure the lodgement, and either immediately have decisive effect or create conditions for the arrival of substantial follow on forces that then conduct decisive operations. Early entry forces must consist of lethal and survivable units tailored to support or carry out the operational intent of the JFC. Chemical staffs and units will be integral parts of early entry forces.

#### Versatility, deployability, lethality, and expansibility are key to military projection

Gunzinger, senior advisor to the Air Force, 2011 (Mark A., “Power Projection: Making the Tough Choices,” School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, United States Air Force, <http://aupress.au.af.mil/digital/pdf/paper/t_gunzinger_power_projection.pdf>)

The US Army places a high priority on developing its power projection capability. ¶ AirLand Operations states: "The fundamental mission of the Army is achieving deterrence ¶ through demonstrating a credible capability to project overwhelming combat.¶ To achieve its ¶ mission, the future Army must be versatile, deployable, lethal, and expansible. Versatility ¶ describes the ability to tailor forces as necessary to meet a wide array of threats. Deployability is ¶ a combination of interoperability and ability to rapidly deploy globally. Lethality is the capability ¶ to quickly defeat an opponent while sustaining a minimum of casualties, while expansibility ¶ describes the total-force concept of expanding the active component with reserve forces. ¶ According to AirLand Operations, these four characteristics are absolutely essential to the future ¶ strategic Army.

#### Deployability is key to power projection- maritime forces are not enough

Gunzinger, senior advisor to the Air Force, 2011 (Mark A., “Power Projection: Making the Tough Choices,” School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, United States Air Force, <http://aupress.au.af.mil/digital/pdf/paper/t_gunzinger_power_projection.pdf>)

The Army's initiative to develop a better capability to project forces from the CONUS ¶ instead of maintaining large force complements abroad is a realistic approach to fiscal limitations ¶ and the shrinking availability of foreign basing. Land force deployability will be essential as ¶ units currently stationed in Europe and Korea return home. The future strategic Army will have ¶ the capability of selectively tailoring forces for a given situation, with an array of armored, light, ¶ and special operations units available for packaging. The Army base force will be reduced from¶ eighteen to twelve active divisions by 1995 while reserve divisions will decrease from ten to six. ¶ The Army predicts this mix of heavy, light, and special operations forces will give it the¶ versatility and deployability needed to meet the security needs of the new national strategy.¶ 30¶ ¶ While AirLand Operations acknowledges the need for sea forces capable of protecting ¶ the sea lines of communication, it also states: ¶ Historically, we have relied upon a maritime strategy to protect our nation, our ¶ institutions, and our national interests, and to provide time for preparation when ¶ war became necessary. In our shrinking world with its changing threats, a ¶ maritime strategy is not enough. Given the evolving world environment, the ¶ capability to project and employ land combat power is also fundamental to ¶ securing our national interests. ¶ 31¶ ¶ In other words, a power projection capability based solely on sea power is not enough; it will ¶ take a combination of land and sea forces to do the job. Future crises must be dealt with through ¶ joint and/or combined operations. It is significant to note that Commander of the USAF Tactical ¶ Air Command General Michael Loh signed the document's cover sheet indicating it will ¶ complement existing doctrine in guiding the future development of TAC's power projection ¶ capability. ¶

## --K2 Security

#### BRAC is key to increase our security

Collins and Hampton 12(Volume 75. No. 6, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/12mayjune/02.cfm)

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) oversees more than 27 million acres (11 million hectares) of property in the United States and manages more than 4,300 facilities spread across all 50 States and several U.S. territories. These DOD facilities exist in both urban and rural areas and involve all modes of transport, from roads and rail to sea and air.¶ **In recent years, the department has undergone mission changes that have involved relocating more than 123,000 military and civilian personnel. One of the major initiatives driving this transformation is the Base Realignment and Closure Act of 2005 (BRAC 2005), which is the latest round in a congressionally authorized process to help DOD reorganize its base structure to support the armed forces more efficiently and effectively, increase operational readiness, and facilitate new ways of doing business.** BRAC 2005 aims to eliminate excess capacity, defined as underused or unused facilities or infrastructure, and to encourage "jointness" -- selecting the appropriate organizations from two or more military services to share facilities in some locations to improve combat effectiveness while reducing costs.¶ **One effect of base realignment and closure is the impact on local traffic and transportation infrastructure. When personnel from closed bases relocate or commute to another base that remains open, this increase in defense traffic at that installation can place an unexpected burden on nearby State and local roadways**. That's where a little-known **DOD program known as the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program comes into play.¶ The DAR program, jointly administered by DOD's Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) Transportation Engineering Agency and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), represents a potential means for the military to assist in funding public highway improvements near impacted facilities. Specifically, the program can provide a share of defense funding for off-installation projects to mitigate transportation impacts resulting from sudden and unusual military actions**. The terminology "sudden and unusual" is important, as DOD is not in the road-building business.¶ "In the circumstance of sudden and unusual military impacts, the DAR program can be a valuable resource for funding improvements at locations where DOD mission- support efforts have an adverse effect on nearby roads," says Acting Associate Administrator Amy Lucero of the FHWA Office of Federal Lands Highway, which oversees the program.¶ History¶ The relationship between roads and national defense became clear during and after World War I. One lesson learned was that while railroads alone could not meet the military's logistical needs, the road network was inadequate as well. In 1919, the War Department executed the first coast-to-coast military convoy, going from Washington, DC, to San Francisco, CA. During the 2-month journey, the Army convoy, which included then Lt. Col. Dwight D. Eisenhower, demonstrated that interstate roads were inadequate to military requirements. (See "The Man Who Changed America" in the March/April 2003 issue of Public Roads.)¶ In 1922, at the request of the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR, FHWA's predecessor), the War Department developed a map of the main roads that would be important to the military at a time of war. Named after General of the Armies John J. Pershing, the Pershing Map reflected the general's view that a system of highways that served the country's industrial and commercial needs would serve military needs as well. State highway officials identified these same routes as vital to their needs, and subsequently all these routes were included in the Federal-aid system approved in 1923. The Pershing Map was a precursor to the Strategic Highway Corridor Network, which DOD and FHWA still maintain.¶ During the period between the two world wars, BPR worked closely with the War Department on research that culminated in 1941 in a final study of defense requirements, including an updated version of the Pershing Map. On November 19, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Defense Highway Act of 1941, which initiated funding for two programs that later became the DAR and Highways for National Defense programs. Both initiatives immediately expended hundreds of millions of dollars in Federal funding to support the logistical demands of World War II. The former implemented connections from the major military installations to the network, while the latter focused on ensuring that national defense was served by adequate, safe, and efficient highway transportation and making upgrades to the Strategic Highway Corridor Network. During planning of the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, BPR consulted with defense officials to ensure that military needs were addressed.¶ Investment in the defense transportation programs waned after World War II. However, the Highways for National Defense program worked with BPR -- and continues to work with FHWA -- to ensure that federally funded roadways served defense requirements.

#### DAR needs to help our security just like other programs have by increasing efficiency

Collins and Hampton 12(Volume 75. No. 6, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/12mayjune/02.cfm)

**The DAR program became the action-oriented program it is today, paying for specific impacts on the roadway system caused by changes in DOD mission and infrastructure requirements, such as base relocations and closures, construction related to the Air Force's missile program, and home porting of Navy ships**.¶ In addition to these highway-related defense programs, SDDC today manages similar initiatives focused on rail and maritime interests. **The Railroads for National Defense program ensures that the civil sector's rail transportation system meets the current needs of national defense, while the Ports for National Defense program analyzes the throughput capability of the Nation's commercial seaports to ensure that they are capable of supporting the requirements of military deployment. Together, these programs support DOD's mission of deployability, or the capability to move forces from a home station to anywhere in the world.¶** "Our national defense programs are critical to ensuring that our civil sector infrastructure can support deployment of military forces, even during mission changes like those we are currently experiencing," says Robert Korpanty, chief of the Office of the Special Assistant for Transportation Engineering at SDDC.¶ How the DAR Program Works¶ The legal authority for the DAR program originates in Title 23, United States Code, "Highways," section 210 (23 USC 210). In 1978, to implement the authorities given in Title 23, **DOD and FHWA together developed a set of eligibility criteria that includes replacement roads, new access roads, increased capacity by doubling traffic, and low-type roads**. A replacement road is a new road or upgrade to a parallel road that replaces capacity lost when a public roadway is closed due to military necessity. A new access road is a public road that creates new access to a military facility. Doubling traffic is defined as a 100-percent increase at a particular location or turning movement (such as right or left turns) requiring a transportation upgrade. Finally, a low-type road is a rural county road that has limited carrying capacity and requires upgrade to sustain consistent movements of military equipment.¶ The commanding general of SDDC is the DOD agent responsible for determining eligibility for the DAR program and certifying roads as important to national defense under Title 23. The DAR program office in SDDC and the Office of Federal Lands Highway at FHWA provide oversight for the execution of the eligible projects. **Funding these projects is the responsibility of the military service departments -- Air Force, Army, Marines, and Navy -- which fund DAR projects as part of their construction programs. It is important to note that DAR projects must compete within the normal DOD budgeting process, as is the case with any other military construction projects such as on-base housing, utilities, and roadways**. Thus, a determination of eligibility and certification for the DAR program does not guarantee funding.¶ State and local highway agencies are expected to develop and maintain adequate highways accessible to defense installations in the same way they do for nondefense-related traffic generators, such as new commercial developments or residential subdivisions. Officials with DOD installations coordinate closely with local authorities to ensure that transportation improvement programs include upgrades and maintenance projects to support ongoing, long-term defense transportation needs.¶

## Impacts

### General

#### Empirics show that only the United States can be a leader, and doing so maintains international stability

Keohane 12 [Robert O. Keohane – professional of International Affairs from Princeton University, August 2012, “Hegemony and After”, Vol. 91 Issue 4, p114-118, 5p]

Apart from questions of originality and the specifics of the declinist debate, the central problem with books of present- oriented foreign policy commentary such as these lies in their failure to distinguish between what is known and what is unknowable. By conflating the two, they end up misleading readers rather than educating them. It might be useful, therefore, to indicate half a dozen things relevant to the future of the U.S. global role that can now be said with confidence.First, we know that in the absence of leadership, world politics suffers from collective action problems, as each state tries to shift the burdens of adjustment to change onto others. Without alliances or other institutions helping provide reassurance, uncertainty generates security dilemmas, with states eyeing one another suspiciously. So leadership is indeed essential in order to promote cooperation, which is in turn necessary to solve global problems ranging from war to climate change.Second, we know that leadership is exercised most effectively by creating multilateral institutions that enable states to share responsibilities and burdens. Such institutions may not always succeed in their objectives or eliminate disagreements among their members, but they make cooperation easier and reduce the leader's burdens--which is why policymakers in Washington and many other capitals have invested so much effort for so many decades in creating and maintaining them.Third, we know that leadership is costly and states other than the leader have incentives to shirk their responsibilities. This means that the burdens borne by the leader are likely to increase over time and that without efforts to encourage sharing of the load, leadership may not be sustainable.Fourth, we know that in a democracy such as the United States, most people pay relatively little attention to details of policy in general and foreign policy in particular. Pressures for benefits for voters at home-- in the form of welfare benefits and tax cuts--compete with demands for military spending and especially nonmilitary foreign affairs spending. This means that in the absence of immediate threats, the public's willingness to invest in international leadership will tend to decline. (A corollary of this point is that advocates of international involvement have incentives to exaggerate threats in order to secure attention and resources.)Fifth, we know that autocracies are fundamentally less stable than democracies. Lacking the rule of law and accepted procedures for leadership transitions, the former are subject to repeated internal political crises, even though these might play out beneath a unified and stable façade. China's leadership crisis during the spring of 2012, marked by the detention of the politician Bo Xilai and his wife, illustrated this point.And sixth, we know that among democracies in the world today, only the United States has the material capacity and political unity to exercise consistent global leadership. It has shown a repeated ability to rebound from economic and political difficulties. The size, youth, and diversity of its population; the stability and openness of its political institutions; and the incentives that its economic system creates for innovation mean that it remains the most creative society in the world. Yet it also has major problems-- along with intense domestic partisan conflict that prevents those problems from being resolved and that constitutes a major threat to its continued leadership abroad.What we don't know, however, is at least as important. Will the major powers in the international system, most importantly China, maintain their social and political coherence and avoid civil war? Will the instabilities in the global economy exposed by the 2008 financial crisis be corrected or merely papered over and thus left to cause potential havoc down the road? Will ideologically driven regimes, such as the one in Iran, be prudent or reckless in their quest to develop or even use nuclear weapons, and will potentially threatened states, such as Israel, act prudently in response? Will the trend in recent decades toward greater global democratization be maintained, or will it give way to an antidemocratic reaction?

#### U.S. unipolarity has and will maintain peace, democracy, and sustainable economies

Keohane 12 [Robert O. Keohane – professional of International Affairs from Princeton University, August 2012, “Hegemony and After”, Vol. 91 Issue 4, p114-118, 5p]

Kagan's gracefully written essay notes that the United States has played an essential role in creating the international system of the last 60 years, one in which large-scale warfare has been relatively rare, the global economy has grown at unprecedented rates, and the number of democracies has quadrupled. Harking back to Frank Capra's It's a Wonderful Life, Kagan asks readers to imagine what the world would have been like during this period without American leadership and says the answer is clear: much less attractive. U.S. hegemony helped promote peace, prosperity, and political liberalization, and American power continues to be important in maintaining world order.¶ The World America Made offers a thoroughly conventional reading of world politics, one focusing on the sources and distribution of power in the international system and the ways in which states interpret their interests. The lack of a common government to enforce rules means that order depends on bargaining, which typically involves threats as well as promises. Threats imply some chance of conflict. And so international systems not dominated by a single great power have only rarely managed to sustain peace for long.

### China War

#### U.S. heg key to deter China

[Alex Ward](http://www.e-ir.info/author/alex-ward/) March 23, 2012 (http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/23/is-the-usa-still-the-indispensible-power-in-east-asia/)

In particular, the importance of the US’s bilateral alliance system is exhibited in its role as a “counterweight to Chinese power” (Goh, 2005: 1). Concern over Beijing’s long-term strategic policy and a shift in the balance of power have effectively rendered the US’s role as a regional balancer far more salient, both militarily and politically. Firstly, US military presence in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea inhibits the chance of conflict therein through both diplomatic mediation and military deterrence (Storey, 2002). More fundamentally, US curtailment of a rising China prevents the instability inherent to transitional international systems. Here, the application of AFK Organski’s (1958) Power Transition theory is starkly relevant, as it is based on the zero-sum premise that the decline of a unipolar order gives way to a distinctly unstable balance of power. As bipolarization occurs and economic, political and military capabilities are more evenly distributed, “the system becomes increasingly unstable” (Gilpin, 1985: 595), culminating in cyclical conflict as a status-quo challenger’s disproportionate growth comes into conflict with the declining hegemon (Organski & Kugler, 1980). In this light, the benefits accrued to smaller states deriving from US preponderance would be lost if it gave way to a bipolar standoff between Beijing and Washington, throwing the entire regional security order into chaotic flux (Ikenberry, 2004).

### Middle East War

#### Hegemony key to prevent Middle East war

[Alex Ward](http://www.e-ir.info/author/alex-ward/) March 23, 2012 (http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/23/is-the-usa-still-the-indispensible-power-in-east-asia/)

In November 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the US was “more committed than ever” to a forward presence in East Asia (Clinton, 2011: npn), illustrating the centrality of the region in post-Bush foreign policy interests. Indeed, since WW2, the US has maintained a certain degree of preponderance in the region that has ensured some degree of regional stability, namely though its role as an extraregional balancer and through the stabilizing effect of its hub-and-spoke system of bilateral military alliances (Goh, 2005). The notion of US indispensability can be further interrogated by hegemonic stability theory, which outlines the need for a regional hegemon in promoting stability and emphasises its role in preventing the neorealist assumption of an unstable multipolarity (Snidal, 1985: 614). Accordingly, it is useful to frame the debate through the lens of polarity, as different polar systems have different implications for the contours of the regional system. According to Kupchan (1998: 40) “America’s preponderance [...] will not last indefinitely”. A potential decline in US pre-eminence in East Asia has established the conditions of possibility for “a different regional ordered centered on Chinese rather than American power” (Beeson, 2006: 552), largely due to, amongst other things, the increased ideational purchase that China enjoys through its regional development of smart power. A greater challenge to US primacy in the region however, lies in “glimmerings of security multilateralism” (Ikenberry, 2004: 363) that serve to recalibrate not only the role of the US in Asia but its entire regional security architecture altogether. This shift embodies the notion of peaceful multipolarity, underpinned by mutuality, engagement and interdependence that has largely excluded the participation of outsiders, particularly the US. The formation of such organizations as ASEAN+3 under the rubric of a departure from the American ‘Asia Pacific’ toward an exclusive ‘East Asia’ is symptomatic of a wider decline in US primacy, hinting towards a more multipolar, less asymmetrical strategic order. Perhaps the principal underpinning of the argument for the US indispensability stems from hegemonic stability theory, which primarily privileges unipolarity as an inherently stabilizing configuration of power. First off, it is of critical importance to define the features of hegemony. Put simply, hegemony ties into the notion of unipolarity, whereby one state holds an unassailable position of pre-eminence in which its dominance over military, material and ideational resources bestows upon it the “capacity to write the rules for a particular world order” (Beeson, 2006: 543). Crucially, the notion of hegemony hinges upon the conjuncture of the hegemon’s material power projection and its ideational purchase, with the latter “expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states” (Cox, 1996:137). Here, the exercise of hegemonic power operates through the mechanisms of persuasion, cajolement or coercion and principally not through consistent military expansion (Agnew, 2005). Central to hegemonic stability theory is the assumption that “unipolarity is a structure in which one state’s capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced” (Wohlforth, 1999: 9). Here, the neorealist balance of power theory is inverted; as the leading state entrenches its power primacy, it passes a threshold whereby the likelihood of smaller states counterbalancing is significantly reduced as the costs imposed by resisting the hegemony mount (Tammen & Kugler, 2004), producing a more stable system. Furthermore, according to Liu & Ming-Te (2011) this stability is further consolidated by the hegemon’s provision of public goods, namely regional security, which dissuades potential challengers from disputing the status quo, as they directly benefit from the hegemonic system. With regards to US hegemony in East Asia, Ikenberry (2004: 354) maintains that the an American hegemonic order “will remain a critical component of East Asian order for decades to come” as it reduces the region’s inclination toward balance-of-power politics through inhibiting security competition (Chan, 2008). The foundations upon which hegemonic stability theory are build are underpinned by a neorealist weariness of multipolarity. With multiple competing powers, alliance and enmity structures are more fluid, producing an unstable security landscape (Waltz, 1981: npn), which, in turn, can lead to regional arms races due to the security dilemma (Goh, 2005). Thus, a decline in US hegemony is bound to “trigger sources of competition that well override others sources of peace” (Kupchan, 1998: 42) culminating in arms races (Nye, 1995), especially in view of the volatile mix of social and economic disparities between Asian states due to the rapid political and economic change therein. In particular, US withdrawal could give way to an unstable power vacuum in which Sino-Japanese tensions could develop into a profound political impasse between the two states (Beeson, 2003), heightening security concerns. Overall then, America’s role as an extraregional balancer “keeps in check the competitive jockeying that might otherwise trigger war in East Asia” (Kupchan, 1998: 62) and holds an inherently stabilizing effect upon the contours of the regional strategic order (Christensen, 1999).

### Democ/Japan Prolif

#### Hegemony leads to democracy and prevents Japan Prolif

[Alex Ward](http://www.e-ir.info/author/alex-ward/) March 23, 2012 (http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/23/is-the-usa-still-the-indispensible-power-in-east-asia/)

Another powerful medium through which US presence contributes to regional order is through its hub-and-spoke system of bilateral military alliances (Twining, 2007). It is not solely the presence of the US military in the region that promotes stability; rather it’s development of a coherent alliance structure wherein participants are ostensibly able to mutually set the agenda for regional security. Largely based around its key relationships with South Korea and the ‘linchpin’ of the alliance, Japan, the US hub-and-spoke system constitutes the basis for regional stability in mediating the security dilemma (Nye, 1995). The alliance system further consolidates US primacy in the region through encouraging the bandwagonning of key regional players as they are induced to “rely on American alliance protection” (Ikenberry, 2004: 354). One major avenue for regional stability has been the incorporation and centrality of Japan in the security network. This has the multifaceted advantage of both suppressing the spectre of a remilitarized Japan and, through its inclusion, reducing the potential for the arms races that could arise if it were to rearm (Ikenberry, 2004). The hub-and-spoke alliance system is further strengthened through the mutual adoption of democratic political systems that bestows upon it a degree of coherence. Key members of the alliance such as Japan, ROK, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines are all either republics or have already democratised to some extent (Goh, 2005). The centrality of democracy as the backbone of the alliance system is based in democratic peace theory under the rubric that “the spread of democracy makes more likely the benign exercise of powers” (Kupchan, 1998: 52), which further serves to consolidate the alliance network.

### Nuclear Terrorism

#### US leadership required to prevent nuclear terrorism

Bunn 08 (Matthew Bunn, Matthew Bunn is an Associate Professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, “NEXT STEPS TO STRENGTHEN

THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S

EFFORTS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION”, 4/30/08, <http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policy/us-nuclear-policy/security/Bunn.pdf>, accessed 7/14/12)

The fundamental key to success in these efforts is convincing political leaders and nuclear managers around the world that nuclear theft and terrorism are real threats to their countries’ security, worthy of a major investment of their attention and resources. If they are convinced of this, they will take the needed actions to prevent nuclear terrorism; if they remain complacent about the threat and how much it could affect them, they will not take those actions. Congress should consider making funds available for activities to build this sense of urgency and commitment, including joint briefings on the nuclear terrorist threat, nuclear terrorism exercises and simulations, helping states perform realistic “red team” tests of their nuclear security systems, and more. Such efforts might be implemented under the rubric of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism – which has the potential to become the kind of global campaign to improve nuclear security that is urgently needed, though to date it has focused more on matters such as police training and emergency preparedness than on nuclear security upgrades

#### Spread of democracy solves conflict

Zenko and Cohen 12 (Micah Zenko & Michael A. Cohen, Micah Zenko is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations and Michael A. Cohen was a Senior Research Fellow at the New America Foundation, “Clear and Present Safety”, March 2012, <http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=88d7e0c1-3fae-4f17-bd08-bdc496db0979%40sessionmgr113&vid=1&hid=122&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=76591800>, accessed 7/14/12)

As violence and war have abated, freedom and democratic governance have made great gains. According to¶ Freedom House, there were 69 electoral democracies at the end of the Cold War; today, there are 117. And during¶ that time, the number of autocracies declined from 62 to 48. To be sure, in the process of democratizing, states with weak political institutions can be more prone to near-term instability, civil wars, and interstate conflict. Nevertheless,¶ over time, democracies tend to have healthier and better-educated citizens, almost never go to war with other¶ democracies, and are less likely to fight nondemocracies.

#### Hegemony key to stop international bullying

Conor Sen February 6th 2012 Senior staff writer at Minyanville

One of the most fascinating economic history books I've read is [*The Pursuit of Power*](http://www.amazon.com/Pursuit-Power-Technology-Society-D/dp/0226561585/ref%3Dpd_vtp_b_4)*,* a look at 1,000 years of world history and how changes in technology, military technology in particular, altered the dynamics of power relationships throughout the world. Developments as wide-ranging as the discovery of gunpowder, the introduction of military drilling, and the invention of the internal combustion engine have had profound impacts on society that are often visible only with the benefit of decades or hundreds of years of hindsight. Similarly, we see that as society changes, the institutions that dominate the organization of production and human interaction have tended to wield unchecked power and collect monopolistic profits. Think of the pharaohs, emperors, and kings of the ancient world, or the church in the Middle Ages. Since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, this power transfer has led to the rise of a new set of institutions. At first we saw governments and factories play this role. As capital accrued to factory owners, advancements in energy and technology occurred, and large-scale consumption came of age, factories morphed into corporations and banks, which gradually co-opted governments thanks to political donations and their economic interests. The peak of this era was in the early 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union reduced the influence of military interests and before the development of the commercial internet began empowering individuals.

### AT Heg Causes Conflict

#### Their authors exaggerate. Security is sustainable and conflicts minimal

Zenko and Cohen 12 (Micah Zenko & Michael A. Cohen, Micah Zenko is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations and Michael A. Cohen was a Senior Research Fellow at the New America Foundation, “Clear and Present Safety”, March 2012, <http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=88d7e0c1-3fae-4f17-bd08-bdc496db0979%40sessionmgr113&vid=1&hid=122&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=76591800>, accessed 7/14/12)

Within the foreign policy elite, there exists a pervasive belief that the post-Cold War world is a treacherous place, full¶ of great uncertainty and grave risks. A 2009 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the¶ Press found that 69 percent of members of the Council on Foreign Relations believed that for the United States at¶ that moment, the world was either as dangerous as or more dangerous than it was during the Cold War. Similarly, in¶ 2008, the Center for American Progress surveyed more than 100 foreign policy experts and found that 70 percent of¶ them believed that the world was becoming more dangerous. Perhaps more than any other idea, this belief shapes¶ debates on U.S. foreign policy and frames the public's understanding of international affairs.¶ There is just one problem. It is simply wrong. The world that the United States inhabits today is a remarkably safe¶ and secure place. It is a world with fewer violent conflicts and greater political freedom than at virtually any other¶ point in human history. All over the world, people enjoy longer life expectancy and greater economic opportunity¶ than ever before. The United States faces no plausible existential threats, no great-power rival, and no near-term¶ competition for the role of global hegemon. The U.S. military is the world's most powerful, and even in the middle of¶ a sustained downturn, the U.S. economy remains among one of the world's most vibrant and adaptive. Although the¶ United States faces a host of international challenges, they pose little risk to the overwhelming majority of American¶ citizens and can be managed with existing diplomatic, economic, and, to a much lesser extent, military tools. This reality is barely reflected in U.S. national security strategy or in American foreign policy debates. President¶ Barack Obama's most recent National Security Strategy aspires to "a world in which America is stronger, more¶ secure, and is able to overcome our challenges while appealing to the aspirations of people around the world." Yet¶ that is basically the world that exists today. The United States is the world's most powerful nation, unchallenged and¶ secure. But the country's political and policy elite seems unwilling to recognize this fact, much less integrate it into¶ foreign policy and national security decision-making. The disparity between foreign threats and domestic threat -mongering results from a confluence of factors. The¶ most obvious and important is electoral politics. Hyping dangers serves the interests of both political parties. For¶ Republicans, who have long benefited from attacking Democrats for their alleged weakness in the face of foreign¶ threats, there is little incentive to tone down the rhetoric; the notion of a dangerous world plays to perhaps their¶ greatest political advantage. For Democrats, who are fearful of being cast as feckless, acting and sounding tough¶ is a shield against GOP attacks and an insurance policy in case a challenge to the United States materializes into¶ a genuine threat. Warnings about a dangerous world also benefit powerful bureaucratic interests. The specter of¶ looming dangers sustains and justifies the massive budgets of the military and the intelligence agencies, along with¶ the national security infrastructure that exists outside government -- defense contractors, lobbying groups, think¶ tanks, and academic departments.

# FUNDING ADVANTAGE

#### Effects of infrastructure in communities due to BRAC leads to negative public response to military

Young 2008 Rumanda Kay Young(PhD in philosophy), “Shared Land Use Impacts Between Military Installations and Contiguous Communitites(Post-BRAC): Face and Opinion Differences in planning and Public Policy”,5/2008, <http://dspace.uta.edu/bitstream/handle/10106/944/umi-uta-2031.pdf?sequence=1>

This literature review also attempts to determine the impact public policy (e.g. ¶ planning policy) has on public opinion. In other words, are policy changes driven by ¶ real or perceived reactions to probable consequences of wide-ranging policies? The ¶ reciprocal relationship between opinion and policy is important to this research because 48¶ it studies whether encroachment issues from public policy (e.g. BRAC legislation) are ¶ real or perceived and if public opinion, attitudes, perceptions and social psychology ¶ play any role in the creation of subsequent policies. ¶ Page (1994) posits that “when opinion and policy correspond, it is extremely ¶ difficult to sort out whether public opinion has influenced policy, or policy has ¶ influenced opinion, or there has been some mixture of reciprocal processes; or, indeed, ¶ whether an outside factor, by affecting both, has produced a spurious relationship (26)." ¶ Erikson (1976) studied the differences between public opinion and public policy ¶ outcome. In his research, Erikson shows a “reasonable inference that… certain issuespublic opinion can exert a strong influence on state policy decision (25).” ¶ The fundamental belief is in a normative democracy, governmental policy is ¶ shaped by public opinion (Dahl 1956). Those who view the policy-making process as ¶ technical (cost-benefit method, rational planning), believe that public opinion does not ¶ play a part in neutral policy-making. For this research, the disagreement about the role ¶ opinions play in policy creation is not as important as is the extent that policy shapes ¶ opinion. There is a reciprocal relationship between public policy and public opinion ¶ after policy implementation. Policy may affect public opinion by “citizens learning ¶ about a policy's impact, rationalizing its existence, or heeding the persuasive efforts of ¶ politicians, interest groups, or others” (Page and Shapiro 1983, 187). ¶ Some researchers believe that the impact policy has on public opinion is ¶ minimal. Page and Shapiro posit “pubic opinion is often a proximate cause of policy; ¶ affecting policy more than policy influences opinion” (Page and Shapiro 1983, 176). 49¶ Sometimes the level of influence depends on the direct impacts felt by citizens. For ¶ example, foreign policy may have minimal impact on individuals, whereas domestic ¶ policies, such as BRAC, have direct consequences on citizens employed by the military ¶ or living in a military community. Some direct BRAC policy influences include: ¶ employment, housing, local economic development, and population changes. Domestic ¶ policies affect public opinion greater because the “public presumably tends to care more ¶ about matters close to home and is more insistent that politicians follow its wishes on ¶ domestic policy…and on foreign policy issues…the public tends to be less involved and ¶ have less information, and it might be easier for officials to change policy and get ¶ citizens to go along” (Page and Shapiro 1983, 182). Other research proposes that public ¶ opinion and policy are spuriously related, both affected by other exogenous factors (i.e. ¶ world events, political leadership, interest groups, changes in technology, media ¶ interpretation) (Page and Shapiro 1983), and not necessarily causally dependant on each ¶ other. ¶ This research leans on the literature of policy analysis originally proposed by ¶ Yehezkel Dror (1967) and studies whether a policy is proving effective and predicts the ¶ consequences of policy implementation. Policy analyses that are quantitative at times ¶ do not probe deep enough to discover the impact on public opinion and in turn lead to ¶ further policy creation. In effect, policies lead to the creation of additional policies ¶ because sometimes different groups are affected by either real or perceived impacts ¶ from policy implementation. Conforming to popular opinion can be strong determinants ¶ of public policy adoptions. For instance, when BRAC policy is implemented, 50¶ installations and their surrounding communities implemented new policies to counteract ¶ the effects, whether real or perceived, of BRAC. Ewing (1969) believed that ¶ “effectiveness of a planning (policy) largely depends on how it is received by persons in ¶ an organization” (Lyles 1982). Planning is concerned with implementation and not ¶ necessarily with the social and psychological impact on the individuals affected by the ¶ planning policy. “As a result, planning presents a threat to individuals and to existing ¶ social orders and ways of thinking” (Lyles 1982, 106). The literature suggests that ¶ planning decisions, and the implementation of other domestic public policies, have a ¶ direct impact on public opinions and therefore stimulate further policy creation to ¶ counterbalance the perceived or real effects of the original policy (e.g. encroachment ¶ mitigation policies).

#### Funding for defense programs is shaped around public opinion

**Higgs and Kilduff 1993** [Robert Higgs](http://www.independent.org/aboutus/person_detail.asp?id=489), [Anthony Kilduff](http://www.independent.org/aboutus/person_detail.asp?id=953)(Ph.D. in economics),”Public Opinion: A Powerful Predictor of U.S. Defense Spending”,10/1/1993, <http://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=446>

Defense spending in a particular year is the final outcome of a sequence of actions by various institutionally situated actors who act with greater or lesser influence at various stages of the budget process. The actual change in defense outlays from calendar year t-1 to calendar year t reflects mainly the appropriations legislation enacted by Congress late in calendar year t-1, which sets expenditures for fiscal year t. The detailed budget proposals presented to Congress by the President in January of year t-1 were composed within the executive branch during the course of year t-2. Even earlier, armed forces personnel were making plans with an eye to the future budgetary requirements of research and development for new weapons systems, procurement of existing weapons, changes in force levels and troop deployments, and many other aspects of managing the military establishment.11 Our findings indicate that public opinion in both years t-1 and t-2 affected, more or less equally, the rate of change of real defense outlays in year t. This finding would seem to show that public opinion influenced both the executive branch, as it composed its future budget requests during year t-2, and Congress, as it reacted to the proposals, generally cutting the requested amount of funding to some extent during year t-1. But one ought to be skeptical of such a simple view of the process. The mere fact of congressional cuts of presidential requests during year t-1, for example, is insufficient to establish that the estimated effect of public opinion during that year reflects solely a congressional response to public preferences at that time. Nor is the existence of a two-year-lagged effect necessarily indicative of nothing more than an executive branch response to public preferences at that time (t-2). At no time were decisions by one branch of government independent of what was being sought by the other. In reality the executive branch normally entered into a political arrangement with Congress whereby each side could better achieve its important aims. The armed forces got the resources they wanted most urgently, and Congress got political credit for slashing a “bloated” defense request. Building “cut insurance” into the President’s request was the key to this deal. As described by Richard Stubbing (1986, pp. 96-97), a veteran defense analyst for the Office of Management and Budget, the process worked as follows:¶ each year the executive branch anticipates the congressional need to lower defense spending and therefore includes in its request extra funds for removal by the Congress. . . . [I]n the back rooms DoD and congressional staff are working out mutually acceptable lists of reductions which will cause little or no damage to the program DoD really wants to pursue. These “cut insurance” funds can then be slashed from the defense-budget request by the Congress, permitting members to demonstrate their fiscal toughness to their constituents without harming the defense program. Almost all the so-called “cuts” are simply deferred to the next year’s budget, and the overall total is never cut below the minimum level acceptable to the military leadership.¶ Similarly the President’s proposal normally omits or underfunds certain items (e.g., equipment for the reserves and national guard). The executive branch makes its proposals with full awareness that Congress will “add on” funding for these items and then take political credit for the supplements with the ostensibly favored constituents. It would be unwarranted, however, to interpret our findings simply as follows. Indirectly the mass public decides how the defense budget will be changed, by expressing its preferences to the pollsters. The executive branch, with some preliminary congressional input and provision for “cut insurance,” responds to the polls as it crafts the proposals it will present to Congress the following January. Afterward both Congress and the executive branch, jointly responding to the more recent polls, make the mutual (and partly spurious) adjustments that immediately precede the autumn enactment of appropriations legislation. This view, though an improvement over the usual depiction, is nonetheless still unacceptable, because it takes the public’s opinions themselves to be autonomous or spontaneous. Such autonomy is implausible. In the extreme opposite case, as described by Russett and Graham (1989, p. 257), “policymakers might first form a new opinion and then persuade opinion leaders in the media, who in turn persuade the mass public so that, finally, the very people in government who initiated the change can then ‘respond’ to public opinion.”12 In countless ways the President and other leading political figures, including those in charge at the Pentagon, try to sway public opinion. One may argue about the extent to which, and the conditions under which, they succeed in molding public opinion. There is substantial evidence, however, that their efforts often have some effect (Ginsberg, 1986; Page and Shapiro, 1992). Hence one cannot view public opinion as independent of the desires of the very officials toward whom the public’s preferences for governmental actions are directed. Although surprising at first, the finding that public opinion alone is a powerful predictor of changes in defense spending seems, upon reflection, exactly what one ought to have expected. Despite how defense (and other) analysts normally conceive of public opinion—as one element in a long list of commensurable influences (Looney and Mehay, 1990; Schneider, 1988)—public opinion actually stands conceptually on a plane by itself. It is a different kind of variable. Public opinion expresses people’s preferences regarding policy action. Other “causes” normally advanced by analysts (domestic economic conditions, perceived foreign threats, and so forth) do not directly determine changes of defense spending; rather, they determine what decision makers and the public prefer with regard to changes of defense spending. Once public opinion has revealed itself in the polls (or in other ways), government officials, especially those immediately concerned with reelection, face a constraint. They must either act in accordance with public opinion or bear the political risk inherent in deviating form it. There is, however, a way to loosen the constraint. Politicians who, for whatever reason, do not want to act in accordance with public opinion can argue their case. They can try to mold as well as merely react to public opinion. Clearly a contest for the determination of public opinion goes on ceaselessly, becoming especially active or noticeable from time to time. This contest is at the very heart of the political process. Although certain facts, such as the government deficit or the rate of inflation, cannot be denied, many other “facts,” such as the detailed military capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries, are known—if indeed they are known at all—only to members of the national security elite.13 Given their capacity to control access to important information, defense leaders and insiders have disproportionate ability to mold public opinion. They can also exploit their positions of authority to try to change the meaning or weight the public attaches to known, indisputable facts. Clearly, however, their power is far from absolute, as shown the large fluctuations of public opinion and particularly its movement at times in a direction obviously disfavored by the national security elite.14 Once public opinion has been deflected as much as possible by defense policy makers, whether in Congress or the executive branch, they have substantial incentives to match their defense spending decisions more or less closely with the public’s ultimate preference—hence the close association reported here. We emphasize, however, that important aspects of the defense budget process are (1) the status of public opinion as a single proximate cause incorporating and expressing a variety of more remote determinants of spending decisions and (2) the ceaseless contest among rival interests, within as well as outside the government, to move public opinion in a desired direction.

#### Defense spending cuts destroys the economy

Dinerman 2011 [Taylor Dinerman](http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/author/Taylor%2BDinerman)(For the International Policy Council),“Defense Cuts Will Kill Massive Number of Jobs”,Gatestoneinstitute.org, <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2643/defense-cuts-kill-jobs>

When it comes to jobs in the US aerospace and defense industry, the White House and the Democrats have been responsible for directly killing at least 39.000 jobs between 2008 and 2010. This estimate is based on figures published by the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA).¶ Now the AIA has just published a study showing that roughly one million jobs will be lost if the catastrophic defense budget cuts -- supposed to happen automatically as set up byt the "Supercommittee" in the aftermath of last summer's debt ceiling deal -- has failed to come up with an acceptable solution to the nation's fiscal problems. The Defense Department cut, possibly amounting to as much as a trillion dollars, would entail job losses in the hundreds of thousands. Including jobs that would be lost through indirect effects as reported by the AIA, bringing the total of jobs lost to to more than a million, and adding more than half a percentage point to the national unemployment rate. The losses would be concentrated in California, Virginia, Texas and Massachusetts.¶ Moreover, the million American jobs lost in this round of budget cuts might be just the first. If the US falls into an austerity trap, in which budget cuts and tax increases choke off economic growth, such as the ones currently plaguing the Greeks, Spaniards and Italians, the outlook for jobs could get even worse. Without growth, the sacrifices needed to service the massive national debt and at the same time to pay the Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid benefits, will force even further huge cuts in both the defense and non-defense parts of the Federal budget.¶ There are roughly six million jobs directly associated with America's Aerospace and Defense industries. If the US were to lose one or two million of these jobs on top of all the jobs that have been lost since 2008, the effect would be devastating. The loss of US superpower status would tear into the US Government's ability to borrow money at relatively low interest rates. The future of the dollar as the world's major reserve currency, which depends in part on America's raw military power, would be in doubt.¶

#### A lower in defense spending leads to huge drive in the price of crude oil

Dinerman 2011 [Taylor Dinerman](http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/author/Taylor%2BDinerman)(For the International Policy Council),“Defense Cuts Will Kill Massive Number of Jobs”,Gatestoneinstitute.org, <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2643/defense-cuts-kill-jobs>

If the US were to devote as much to its defense as, say, France -- 2.5% of GDP in 2010 -- instead of the roughly 4.5% it now spends on national security, its ability to secure the peace in places as diverse as Central Europe and Central America or the Indian Ocean would disappear. Middle East and South Asian turmoil would drive up the price of crude oil and other commodities, prolonging the global recession and making it even harder to balance the the US budget.¶ It is important to note that Europe's current economic difficulties are in no way caused by excessive military spending. Greece, largely due to the ongoing tension with Turkey spent 3.2% of GDP in 2010; Italy spent 1.8% and Spain spent 1.1%. As a rule of thumb, serious economic problems caused by defense spending do not develop unless a nation devotes more than 10% of its GDP to its military forces. This is what happened to the Soviet Union in the 1980s, when it devoted at least 14%, perhaps a lot more, of its GDP to its military establishment.¶ The relationship between economic growth, jobs and defense spending is murky, to say the least. Military programs can sometimes result in major commercial technological breakthroughs, such as microelectronics or the internet. Military spending, however, is a wasteful method of producing results that might be done better by venture capitalists; yet history shows that the US defense department has been amazingly successful in fostering new technology. Economists may just have to learn to readjust.¶ One thing Franklin Roosevelt, Nicolas Sarkozy and Mitt Romney have in common is a belief that building naval ships is a good thing -- for both national military power and for employment.

#### Drop in defense spending kills U.S. primacy

Dinerman 2011 [Taylor Dinerman](http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/author/Taylor%2BDinerman)(For the International Policy Council),“Defense Cuts Will Kill Massive Number of Jobs”,Gatestoneinstitute.org, <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2643/defense-cuts-kill-jobs>

 Shipbuilding not only requires a lot of blue collar labor to build the ships, it also uses vast quantities of steel, and other material, most of which comes directly from US industry.¶ In the 1930s, FDR used a portion of his New Deal , and Works Progress Administration to build a class of cruisers for the US Navy. In 2009 when Obama was promoting his Stimulus package -- which conspicuously lacked any military spending --- French President Nicolas Sarkozy pushed through the French Parliament a stimulus bill that included money for an extra amphibious assault ship. Mitt Romney's defense plan, which he recently presented in South Carolina, included a promise to increase shipbuilding from nine ships a year in the current plan to 15. Increased shipbuilding would seem to be a winning policy, both economically and strategically .¶ Military spending is more than just an insurance policy; it is an investment in national power. Other aspects of national power, such as economic growth, science and technology education, and sound fiscal and monetary policy, are all part of the mix that gives a nation significant clout on the global stage. To dismantle US military power in pursuit of government solvency is to throw one part of America's power unnecessarily to the wolves in the hope that the other parts may survive. Military weakness will not balance the budget, grow the economy or find anyone a job.

#### Hegemony key to prevent Middle East war

Ward 2012 [Alex Ward](http://www.e-ir.info/author/alex-ward/) March 23, 2012 (http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/23/is-the-usa-still-the-indispensible-power-in-east-asia/)

In November 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the US was “more committed than ever” to a forward presence in East Asia (Clinton, 2011: npn), illustrating the centrality of the region in post-Bush foreign policy interests. Indeed, since WW2, the US has maintained a certain degree of preponderance in the region that has ensured some degree of regional stability, namely though its role as an extraregional balancer and through the stabilizing effect of its hub-and-spoke system of bilateral military alliances (Goh, 2005). The notion of US indispensability can be further interrogated by hegemonic stability theory, which outlines the need for a regional hegemon in promoting stability and emphasises its role in preventing the neorealist assumption of an unstable multipolarity (Snidal, 1985: 614). Accordingly, it is useful to frame the debate through the lens of polarity, as different polar systems have different implications for the contours of the regional system. According to Kupchan (1998: 40) “America’s preponderance [...] will not last indefinitely”. A potential decline in US pre-eminence in East Asia has established the conditions of possibility for “a different regional ordered centered on Chinese rather than American power” (Beeson, 2006: 552), largely due to, amongst other things, the increased ideational purchase that China enjoys through its regional development of smart power. A greater challenge to US primacy in the region however, lies in “glimmerings of security multilateralism” (Ikenberry, 2004: 363) that serve to recalibrate not only the role of the US in Asia but its entire regional security architecture altogether. This shift embodies the notion of peaceful multipolarity, underpinned by mutuality, engagement and interdependence that has largely excluded the participation of outsiders, particularly the US. The formation of such organizations as ASEAN+3 under the rubric of a departure from the American ‘Asia Pacific’ toward an exclusive ‘East Asia’ is symptomatic of a wider decline in US primacy, hinting towards a more multipolar, less asymmetrical strategic order. Perhaps the principal underpinning of the argument for the US indispensability stems from hegemonic stability theory, which primarily privileges unipolarity as an inherently stabilizing configuration of power. First off, it is of critical importance to define the features of hegemony. Put simply, hegemony ties into the notion of unipolarity, whereby one state holds an unassailable position of pre-eminence in which its dominance over military, material and ideational resources bestows upon it the “capacity to write the rules for a particular world order” (Beeson, 2006: 543). Crucially, the notion of hegemony hinges upon the conjuncture of the hegemon’s material power projection and its ideational purchase, with the latter “expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states” (Cox, 1996:137). Here, the exercise of hegemonic power operates through the mechanisms of persuasion, cajolement or coercion and principally not through consistent military expansion (Agnew, 2005). Central to hegemonic stability theory is the assumption that “unipolarity is a structure in which one state’s capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced” (Wohlforth, 1999: 9). Here, the neorealist balance of power theory is inverted; as the leading state entrenches its power primacy, it passes a threshold whereby the likelihood of smaller states counterbalancing is significantly reduced as the costs imposed by resisting the hegemony mount (Tammen & Kugler, 2004), producing a more stable system. Furthermore, according to Liu & Ming-Te (2011) this stability is further consolidated by the hegemon’s provision of public goods, namely regional security, which dissuades potential challengers from disputing the status quo, as they directly benefit from the hegemonic system. With regards to US hegemony in East Asia, Ikenberry (2004: 354) maintains that the an American hegemonic order “will remain a critical component of East Asian order for decades to come” as it reduces the region’s inclination toward balance-of-power politics through inhibiting security competition (Chan, 2008). The foundations upon which hegemonic stability theory are build are underpinned by a neorealist weariness of multipolarity. With multiple competing powers, alliance and enmity structures are more fluid, producing an unstable security landscape (Waltz, 1981: npn), which, in turn, can lead to regional arms races due to the security dilemma (Goh, 2005). Thus, a decline in US hegemony is bound to “trigger sources of competition that well override others sources of peace” (Kupchan, 1998: 42) culminating in arms races (Nye, 1995), especially in view of the volatile mix of social and economic disparities between Asian states due to the rapid political and economic change therein. In particular, US withdrawal could give way to an unstable power vacuum in which Sino-Japanese tensions could develop into a profound political impasse between the two states (Beeson, 2003), heightening security concerns. Overall then, America’s role as an extraregional balancer “keeps in check the competitive jockeying that might otherwise trigger war in East Asia” (Kupchan, 1998: 62) and holds an inherently stabilizing effect upon the contours of the regional strategic order (Christensen, 1999).

#### BRAC effects on transportation creates negative public views on military policy

Breitenbach 2011 Sarah Breitenbach(Journalist for Maryland Community News), “For BRAC, road congestion, education issues remain”,9/16/2011, [http://www.gazette.net/article/20110916/NEWS/709169715/1039/for-brac-road-congestion-education-issues-remain&template=gazette](http://www.gazette.net/article/20110916/NEWS/709169715/1039/for-brac-road-congestion-education-issues-remain%26template%3Dgazette)

While American flags have been transferred and the shuffle of military personnel among bases in Maryland and surrounding states technically was completed Thursday under the federal BRAC program, Harford County still lacks the accompanying infrastructure and educational resources it needs, its county executive said.¶ The county has gained nearly 20,000 jobs from Base Realignment and Closure.¶ The BRAC initiative, which began in 2005 under the Department of Defense as a means of consolidating the country’s military installations, is creating congestion around Harford County’s Aberdeen Proving Ground and generating a significant demand for colleges and universities that can offer advanced degrees, Harford County Executive David R. Craig (R) said.¶ “That’s kind of like the bride and groom walking up the aisle saying they just got married,” Craig said of the Sept. 15 deadline to complete BRAC personnel and equipment transfers. “The wedding is over, but the marriage is just getting started.”¶ The transfer of military personnel and defense contractors to Aberdeen, which included 5,200 positions from Fort Monmouth in Oceanport, N.J., has meant that Harford County ¶ has suffered less than other places in the national housing market crash and subsequent recession, Craig said. But that also has meant more traffic on roads for which the state lacks funding to upgrade.¶ The county’s 2012 capital budget calls for $8.19 million in road improvements and another $4.9 million in resurfacing projects, paid for with local funds.¶ “Most people look at it as a quality-of-life issue, you can’t get around,” Craig said. “It’s not just the people coming off post, it’s everybody. It makes some people make a decision about where they live.”¶ While Harford County has made several intersection improvements to accommodate BRAC, mass transit and other upgrades are still a ways off, experts say.¶ Maryland’s depleted Transportation Trust Fund, the pot of money used to pay for local road projects, has languished in recent years as lawmakers directed the funds to other programs, and it remains to be seen whether supporters of a gas tax increase can muster enough momentum next year to rebuild the fund. An attempt to increase the state’s 23.5 cents-per-gallon tax by 10 cents died during the 2011 General Assembly session.¶ “One (hurdle) is the challenge of infrastructure, keeping pace with the traffic demands generated by the new jobs,” said J. Michael Hayes, director of military and federal affairs for the state’s Department of Business and Economic Development. “And that in the best of times is a challenge.”¶ Hayes also points to road improvements that are still incomplete under a similar base realignment at Naval Air Station Patuxent River in Southern Maryland in the 1990s.¶ Van-pooling, rapid bus transit and telecommuting centers could help stem traffic problems in Harford County and other areas impacted by BRAC, which is projected to bring 500,000 new households to the state by 2030, including Fort George G. Meade in Anne Arundel County and the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center in Bethesda, Hayes said.¶ In Howard County, where BRAC is responsible for 5,800 jobs, or a third of the growth expected at nearby Fort Meade over the next 10 years, officials are focusing on getting more people into fewer vehicles, said Col. Kent Menser, co-coordinator of the Fort Meade Regional Growth Management Committee.¶ A privatized bus system hopefully will carry the majority of commuters to and from the base, Menser said.¶ “It’s going to take a lengthy period to change that culture of getting one person in one car to look at more efficient means,” said Menser, who also is the executive director of Howard County’s BRAC office. “We’ve got an initial bus system, and so we understand that for people who take buses, they’re going to have to offer more than riding in a car.”¶ In Bethesda, where injured veterans were transferred from the original Walter Reed center in Washington, D.C., BRAC-related traffic is clogging an already-congested area.¶ Before the U.S. Senate in April, Montgomery County Executive Isiah Leggett (D) testified that more federal money must be released for BRAC transportation projects. He cited the $1 billion shortfall in funding for projects on state roads, even though many of those projects are not BRAC-related.¶ The U.S. government subsequently appropriated $300 million toward transportation projects in BRAC-affected communities, including Bethesda. But Leggett said in June that he is still concerned about the short term and has told residents that they face a challenge, particularly from the increase in visitors to the new Walter Reed.¶ It is unclear when the state and federal governments would be able to commit money to such transportation projects.¶ Congress must decide by the end of the month if it will reauthorize its current transportation funding levels and whether to continue an 18.4 cents-per-gallon gas tax.¶ Should lawmakers make changes to funding or tax levels, Maryland might have to eliminate or rethink certain transportation programs, a panel of experts told state legislators last week.¶ While BRAC’s transportation issues have created headaches for planners and lawmakers, the program also has been a catalyst for increased focus on science and math education, Hayes said.

#### Traffic controversy fuels public negativity towards military policy

Carey 2011 [Julie Carey](http://www.nbcwashington.com/results/?keywords=%22Julie+Carey%22&byline=y&sort=date)(News4 reporter focusing on Virginia issues and politics), “$600K for BRAC Art Upsets Those Worried About Roads”,4/1/2011, <http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/600K-for-BRAC-Art-Upsets-Those-Worried-About-Roads-119101464.html>

A new Defense Department building in Alexandria, Va., that's been the center of traffic controversy is now stirring up more controversy because of art.¶ A fairy riding a toad is one of four sculptures that are finalists to adorn the massive new building opening in the fall. More than a half million dollars is being spent on public art at the Mark Center.¶ When many are concerned that there isn't enough federal funding for needed road improvements, the $600,000 price tag for art is causing a furor.¶ "The sculpture that they're talking about is of a child's fantasy," U.S. Rep. Jim Moran, D-Va., said. "The problem is it's in the middle of an adult's nightmare, and that's really the issue. Spending $600,000 on sculpture, regardless of whether you like it or not, when that money needs to be spend on transportation improvement."¶ The DOD-funded sculptures would be placed at the transportation center at the complex, where buses and shuttles will come and go each day.¶ Community members on a BRAC advisory committee were surprised by the expense.¶ "The price tag's shocking, you know, $400,000 to $600,000," David Dexter said. "I was hoping that some of the money could be spent on the road improvements. Until we deal with the traffic issue, we're going to have lots of problems. Nobody will come to see the art if we don't get the roads fixed."¶ Local artists who've worked to develop the public art entries defended the process.¶ Matthew Harwood, co-chair of the city's public art committee, said he first notified the advisory group in 2009 that he was hoping to add public art to the site.¶ Public art is often controversial at first, Harwood said, but he hopes it eventually will be embraced.¶ "Over time, when they realize the complexity of the project, what it contributes, it'll be a lasting gift to the city and I think people will grow to appreciate it," Harwood said.¶ The four finalists formally presented their work to a judging panel Friday.

# Economy Advantage

#### Only few projects related to BRAC expansion will be covered by federal funding. This leaves states in loads of debt.

Moran 2009 James P Moran(Committee on Appropriations),7/27/2009,Congress of The United States(House Of Representations), <http://alexandrianews.org/2009/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/gates-letter.pdf>

The Washington, DC region has the second worst traffic congestion in the nation I he average commuter wastes 62 hours each year sitting in traffic Unfortunately, the 2005 BRAC relocations will greatly exacerbate the problem The Corps's FE1S identified thirteen necessary transportation projects at Fort Belvoh ''to maintain the transportation system's operational performance at an acceptable level of service and delay " These ptojects include intersection improvements, road widening, and investments in public tanspoitation infrastructure Unfortunately, the limited criteria used by the Defense Access Road (DAR) program severely restricts DoD or the Army from funding the vast majority of these programs To date, the DAR program has funded $36 million in spot traffic improvements, a mere 8 percent of the S458 million in necessary improvements identified in the FEIS¶ Following its review of the projects eligible for DAR funding, the Army's Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) wrote to the Federal Highway Administration requesting an additional $250 million in transportation funding to complete outstanding public highway improvements surrounding Fort Belvoir I hese priorities include: 1) Fairfax County Parkway improvements between 1-95 and Kingman Road and the Fairfax County Parkway/Kingman Road intersection; 2) intersections at Beulah, Telegiaph, Backlick, Loisdale, and Newington Roads; and 3) widening US Route One thiough Foit Belvoir Congress has repeatedly expressed its concern with the limitations of the DAR progiam In the report of the Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (Senate Repoit 110-335), Congress asserted that:¶ The Department of Defense (DOD) has the responsibility to determine whether proposed improvements to roads serving military installations may be eligible for financing through the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program Section 210 of title 23, United States Code, authorizes DOD to pay a fair share of the cost of public road improvements necessary to mitigate an unusual impact of a defense activity if the Secretary of Defense determines the requirement to be important to national defense An unusual impact includes the establishment of a new military installation, a significant increase in assigned personnel at an existing military installation, the relocation of an access gate, compensation for a closure of a public road caused by military activities, transport of heavy equipment over a public road, oi a temporary surge of military activity creating intolerable congestion.¶ The committee is concerned that the current DAR eligibility criteria contained in the Federal-aid Policy Guide of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) do not consider the full range of transportation impacts or requirements. The committee is aware that the criteria currently do not account for safety and security concerns for local loads, even though ccttain DAR projects have been carried out in the past 5 years in order to correct significant deficiencies threatening the safety of militaiy personnel In addition, the decisions of the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment process, relocations of forces from overseas, and growth in the size of the Army and Marine Corps have led to a substantial increase in the number of personnel on certain military installations over a period of just a few years Yet the staggered nature of these basing decisions make it difficult to show that any one decision meets the strict criterion of at least doubling local traffic, oi easily determine the appropriate scope of cumulative impacts As a iesult, valid transportation iequiiements may not be consideied eligible due to a strict interpretation of the "doubling" criterion, despite a significant expansion of the installation's population¶ Other language further required DoD to "review the current DAR eligibility requirements and to submit a repoit to Congiess (6)any recommendations for changes in the [DAR] criteria " Moreover, Section 2814 of the same law (Public Law 110-417) lequircd a repoit detailing the tiansportation impacts resulting from DoD actions since January 1, 2005 The report also requires an assessment of the funding requirements necessary to confront these impacts, which would reasonably allow the Secretary of Defense to supersede some DAR requirements to fund determined improvements.

#### BRAC puts large scale infrastructure projects on local communities, that destroys local economies

Jowers 2011 Karen Jowers(Staff Writer for AirForceTimes),“Report: BRAC to bring traffic headaches”,2/7/2011, <http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/02/military-brac-bases-traffic-020711w/>

Some military installations growing as a result of base realignment and closure actions will see traffic worsen to such a degree that little can be done in the short term to alleviate it, according to a congressionally mandated report released Monday.¶ The report calls on Congress to fast-track funds for transportation projects that could be initiated within one year and completed within three years, and says the Defense Department should shoulder its “fair share” of the costs.¶ In the BRAC areas studied, “congestion is certain to increase substantially, to the extent we feel immediate action” is needed, said Joseph Sussman, chairman of the committee that studied federal funding of transportation improvements in BRAC cases.¶ Sussman is a professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and the Engineering Systems Division at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.¶ The committee was formed by the National Research Council’s Transportation Research Board after the 2010 Defense Appropriations Act called on the National Academy of Sciences to study federal funding of transportation improvements in the wake of the BRAC decisions approved in 2005.¶ The report also called on local communities to look at near-term solutions, such as high-occupancy or toll lanes. Sussman said authorities in local communities have more insight for such short-term strategies.¶ The report cites fundamental flaws in the BRAC decision-making process in considering the ability of local infrastructure to handle what will be in some cases will be tens of thousands of additional people. The report also cites flaws in the Defense Department’s ability to fund road improvements, and poor communication between installations and local transportation authorities.¶ Three of the case studies were in the national capital region — Fort Meade and the National Naval Medical Center in Maryland and Fort Belvoir in Virginia; the others were Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash.; Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.; and Fort Bliss, Texas.¶ But BRAC will increase the number of military personnel and civilians, families and contractors at or near 18 military bases.¶ While these fast-track projects would not be completed in time for the BRAC movements that must be completed in September, it would send a message to people in these areas that officials are sensitive to these issues, Sussman said.¶ Federal, state and local civilian officials would have had problems responding to BRAC’s impact even in normal circumstances, the committee said, partly because many localities require more than a decade to complete road projects. But these BRAC decisions come on top of an economic downturn that has strapped communities for funds. In addition, troops are being moved from overseas bases, causing some domestic bases to see additional personnel spikes.¶ Defense Department officials did not immediately respond to the report.¶ Defense Department policy generally calls for state and local communities to fund their own road improvements. Exceptions are made under the Defense Access Road program, under which federal funds are made available if traffic at least doubles in the local community.¶ But that criterion is unrealistic in large metropolitan areas, the committee report noted. In addition, funding under the DAR program is limited to road improvements, even though public transit is essential in some areas.¶ The report recommends that the Defense Department require base commanders to address off-base access congestion problems and provide them with guidance, expertise and resources; and recommends that the Department of Transportation require local authorities to work with the military.¶ The committee found some good news at Fort Bliss, Texas. Although further transportation improvements are still needed, installation, state and local officials have found ways to address their problems. A new segment of highway needed to support base expansion was identified early on, and the project is slated to be completed this year, for example.¶ “The case shows what can happen to accommodate base expansion when a community and state are committed to support it,” the report stated.

#### Investing in transportation infrastructure spurs growth – Increases Productivity, Industrial Output, and Tax Revenue

#### Investing in transportation infrastructure spurs growth – Increases Productivity, Industrial Output, and Tax Revenue

Bradley et al 11 (managing director of Allen & Company LLC. Served in the US Senate from 1979 to 1997, representing New Jersey; Tom Ridge is president and CEO of the international consulting Firm Ridge Global; Dave Walker is founder and CEO of the Comeback America Initiative; “Road to Recovery: Transforming America’s Transportation,” 2011, Carnegie Endowment for Internaional Peace, http://carnegieendowment,org/files/road\_to\_recovery.pdf)

To justify the investment of public funds, spending on highways has historically attempted to increase economic productivity by improving the cost, speed, and reliability of transportation. History suggests that there may be more productive investments to meet future mobility needs. Plowing massive investments into conventional roadways may be ill advised from a growth perspective. Transportation, after all, is a means to an end, not an end in itself. And in a national context, this end is economic growth. Therefore, transportation investments should catalyze growth in three important ways.32 First, transportation projects may lead to gains in TFP (Total Factor Productivity), which are often realized in the form of “agglomeration economies”—which simply means that interconnectedness and density benefit firms through knowledge spillovers, greater supplier access, and larger labor markets. Indeed, it has been asserted that “without increasing returns to scale in the context of transportation improvements, it is impossible to account for the observed spatial concentration of firms and regional specialization in regional and national economies.”33 Second, reduced transportation costs may lead to increased output in transportation-using sectors, mostly by reducing firms’ inventory and logistical costs. And third, macroeconomic benefit is likely to be derived from additional tax revenues to the degree to which transportation investments increase land values and/or enhance access to higher-paying jobs. Public investment in transportation infrastructure remains appropriate. It is estimated that for every 0.1 percent increase in the rate of GDP growth, the deficit could be reduced by $288 billion over ten years.34 The federal government now spends about $70 billion annually on all modes of surface, marine, and air transportation, about $52 billion of which is devoted to roads, rails, mass transit, buses, and connecting infrastructure (stations, transfer hubs, access improvements, and so on). The arguments for additional investment to support America’s competitive position in a growing global economy are well documented and compelling.35 However, the massive sums committed to public capital investments in transportation infrastructure need to be strategic, efficient, and backed up by cost-benefit analyses that target the total benefits to society as the core purpose of

investment.

# Disaster Response Add On

### Military Traffic kills disaster response

#### Traffic congestion around military bases prevents effective disaster response.

Transportation Research Board 04 (TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD of the NAS-NRC, “Transportation Operations Programs: Status & Critical Issues,” Aug 25, http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/archive/notesdocs/20-7(181)%20final%20report.pdf)

The National System of Interstate and Defense Highways (Interstate System), established under

the leadership of President Eisenhower in 1957, recognized the importance of a reliable surface

transportation network to our nation’s security and preparedness. As the Interstate System nears

completion, many of the anticipated benefits of the national “interstate” system for national

defense and preparedness have been eroded through urban traffic congestion. Being able to

rapidly deploy and respond to major incidents and events is critical to our nation. In the event of

a mobilization resulting from a ~~man~~-made or natural disaster, MSTOPs can successfully support

the scale and magnitude of issues involved. The I-95 Corridor Coalition has identified this as a

critical success factor and recognizes that I-95 would be a lifeline through which personnel and

freight would have to deploy quickly. Much of this movement would be to support the

deployment of personnel and materials to the northeast’s major air and seaports for subsequent

movement overseas. Military bases such as Fort Lee and Fort Eustis in Virginia and Fort Drum

in New York and the Navy Complexes in Hampton Roads, Virginia, are all-important

installations from which military operations would be staged.

Transportation Research Board 04 (TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD of the NAS-NRC, “Transportation Operations Programs: Status & Critical Issues,” Aug 25, http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/archive/notesdocs/20-7(181)%20final%20report.pdf)

A Defense Support Corridor In the event of a defense or natural disaster mobilization, the Corridor will be a lifeline through which personnel and freight will have to quickly deploy. Much of this movement will be to support the deployment of personnel and materials to the northeast’s major air and seaports for subsequent movement overseas. Military bases such as Fort Lee and Fort Eustis in Virginia and Fort Drum in New York are all-important installations from which military operations would be staged. Not only does the Corridor support all of these functions, it must support them efficiently and simultaneously. On any given day, a mixture of transportation demands on the Corridor result in extreme congestion, incident-based delays, and unhealthy levels of air pollution – all leading to loss of lives, time, and money in addition to driver and agency frustration. As travel demands continue, the Coalition will continue to identify and promote solutions that address the various problems stemming from these demands. There is a direct correlation between diverse ITS deployments within and between our member agencies and efficient management of traffic and incidents within the corridor. Through Coalition and agency efforts, the mobility of people and goods will continue to improve. (1)

Transportation Research Board 04 (TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD of the NAS-NRC, “Transportation Operations Programs: Status & Critical Issues,” Aug 25, http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/archive/notesdocs/20-7(181)%20final%20report.pdf)

The I-95 Corridor is an essential functional link in the nation’s transportation system that affects

the commerce, defense preparedness, and quality of life of tens of millions of citizens every day.

Nearly 25% of the U.S. population work, play, travel and commute in only 6.2% of its landmass. Increasingly, the Corridor’s 13 major airports, more than two dozen rail stations, 11 major

seaports and 30,000 miles of interstate and primary highways need thoughtful, coordinated

management across multi-jurisdictional lines. This concentration of people, facilities, and goods

makes this region the most congested in the United States. This reality is the driving force behind

ITS needs in the Corridor, and defines the challenges for the I-95 Corridor Coalition.(1)

### Bioweapons Impacts

First, Bio-attacks independently cause extinction

Steinbrauner 97 (Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, December 22, Foreign Policy) jl

That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be. decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. **The use of a pathogen**, by contrast, **is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be** precisely **controlled**. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few **pathogens** - ones **most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore** the ones most likely to **be contemplated for** deliberately **hostile use** -the risk runs in the other direction. **A** lethal **pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might** ultimately **threaten the entire world population**. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.

Even if they win the agent itself doesn’t cause extinction—large casualties ensures nuclear war.

Conley 3 (Harry W., chief of the systems analysis Branch, Directorate of Requirements, Air and Space Power Journal, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/spr03/conley.html>, AD: 6/26/10)

The number of American casualties suffered due to a WMD attack may well be the most important variable in determining the nature of the US reprisal. A key question here is how many Americans would have to be killed to prompt a massive response by the United States. The bombing of marines in Lebanon, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 each resulted in a casualty count of roughly the same magnitude (150–300 deaths). Although these events caused anger and a desire for retaliation among the American public, they prompted no serious call for massive or nuclear retaliation. The body count from a single biological attack could easily be one or two orders of magnitude higher than the casualties caused by these events. Using the rule of proportionality as a guide, one could justifiably debate whether the United States should use massive force in responding to an event that resulted in only a few thousand deaths. However, what if the casualty count was around 300,000? Such an unthinkable result from a single CBW incident is not beyond the realm of possibility: “According to the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 100 kg of anthrax spores delivered by an efficient aerosol generator on a large urban target would be between two and six times as lethal as a one megaton thermo-nuclear bomb.”46 Would the deaths of 300,000 Americans be enough to trigger a nuclear response? In this case, proportionality does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons. Besides simply the total number of casualties, the types of casualties- predominantly military versus civilian- will also affect the nature and scope of the US reprisal action. Military combat entails known risks, and the emotions resulting from a significant number of military casualties are not likely to be as forceful as they would be if the attack were against civilians.World War II provides perhaps the best examples for the kind of event or circumstance that would have to take place to trigger a nuclear response. A CBW event that produced a shock and death toll roughly equivalent to those arising from the attack on Pearl Harbor might be sufficient to prompt a nuclear retaliation. President Harry Truman’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki- based upon a calculation that up to one million casualties might be incurred in an invasion of the Japanese homeland47- is an example of the kind of thought process that would have to occur prior to a nuclear response to a CBW event. Victor Utgoff suggests that “if nuclear retaliation is seen at the time to offer the best prospects for suppressing further CB attacks and speeding the defeat of the aggressor, and if the original attacks had caused severe damage that had outraged American or allied publics, nuclear retaliation would be more than just a possibility, whatever promises had been made.”48

# States T/O Advantage

## Internal Links

## --T/o with Transportation

#### State funded BRAC transportation trades off with statewide transportation

Maryland Transit Administration, 09 “BRAC Public Transportation Report” (; June 2009; Maryland Transit Administration (part of Maryland Department of Transportation responsible for mass transit); pg 73; http://www.mdot.maryland.gov/Office%20of%20Planning%20and%20Capital%20Programming/BRAC/Documents/06-09\_MTA-BRAC\_%20PublicTransReport.pdf

The 2005 BRAC legislation-mandated actions created transportation needs. However, no federal funding sources are available for the resulting transportation needs, despite the misconception that such funding exists. Thus state and county governments must attempt to balance the cost of infrastructure improvements designed to support the influx of people against established statewide transportation needs. MDOT acknowledges that funding current and BRAC-related transportation projects will require working within existing financial budgets. MDOT recognizes it must partner with local counties in order to explore creative new funding mechanisms that could bolster the traditional funding sources.

#### Lack of BRAC-specific transportation funding forces states to prioritize quick fixes over real transportation investment

GAO 09 Government Accountability Office (audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of Congress that examines the use of public funds and evaluates federal programs); September 2009; “Military Base Realignments And Closures: Transportation Impact of Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are Uncertain and Direct Federal Support is Limited”; United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees; http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09750.pdf

The federal government has provided limited direct assistance to help communities address BRAC transportation impacts, and state and local governments have adopted strategies to expedite projects within the time frame allowed by BRAC. For example, DOD’s Defense Access Roads Program has certified transportation projects for funding at three affected communities. Also, OEA has provided planning grants and funded traffic studies and local planning positions. While federal highway and transit programs can be used for many BRAC-related transportation needs, dedicated funds are not available. Instead, BRAC-related transportation projects must compete with other proposed transportation projects. Communities had identified funding for about $500 million of the estimated $2.0 billion needed to address their near term project needs. Some state and local governments have adopted strategies to expedite highway projects, such as prioritizing short-term high-impact projects, because the time frames for completing BRAC personnel moves are much shorter than the time frames for such projects. While legislation mandates that BRAC growth be completed by 2011, major highway and transit projects usually take 9 to 19 years. To complete some critical projects before BRAC growth occurs, state and local officials are reprioritizing planned projects and implementing those that can be completed quickly. For example, Maryland prioritized certain lower-cost intersection projects that will improve traffic flow. In Texas, officials used an innovative financing approach to generate funding quickly for a major highway project at Fort Bliss.

## --California

#### **Federal Support key to future BRAC related economic growth in California – transportation infrastructure makes California attractive to the military**

Freedman and Ransdell 05, Michael Freedman and Tim Ransdell (Executive Director of the California Institute for Federal Policy Research, a nonprofit organization that advises the state’s Congressional Delegation and prioritizes federal issues important to the California economy. UC Berkeley, JD from Georgetown University Law Center, member of the Paicifc Council of International Policy, serves on the National Advisory Council of the Institute of Governmental Studies at UC Berkeley) , April 2005, “California Institute Special Report: California’s Past Base Closure Experiences and the 2005 BRAC Round”; California Institute for Federal Policy Research; http://www.calinst.org/defense/base1a.pdf

Whereas preventing bases from selection for closure may be the state’s first and most immediate priority, it is also incumbent on elected officials and community leaders to look past the initial trauma of base closures and work toward minimizing their impact. Delays and poor planning for reuse of closed bases in earlier rounds exacerbated the state’s bad fortune. In the likely event that bases are closed during the 2005 BRAC, smart investment and quick, careful planning can make the reuse process less damaging to local economies and may ultimately lead to long-term economic growth. Federal and state financial support during the transformation stage can make a significant difference in the outcomes for closed bases. Reuse planning organizations would do well to examine the transitions at Fort Ord, George AFB, and (ultimately at least) Mather AFB to see how best to approach life after the announcement that a base will be closed. The 2005 BRAC round will not be the last time that the Department of Defense closes installations. The most effective inoculation against the myriad ills of inevitable future closures is to make California the best and most hospitable home to the military that it can be. Although the current deficits in the state and federal budgets limit the ability to invest in the infrastructure that supports the military, base proponents can continually plan, organize, collaborate, and act. Local governments can make land use and encroachment regulations friendlier for existing military bases. State and local government and community leaders can promote affordable housing near base sites. Coordination of infrastructure improvement could raise the state’s value as a facility host in the eyes of the Department of Defense. Ultimately, California could put itself in a position to receive, rather than lose, military personnel in future base closure rounds—but only if the state takes proactive steps to be a friendlier home for the military.

#### California key – Most US bases

Freedman and Ransdell 05, Michael Freedman and Tim Ransdell (Executive Director of the California Institute for Federal Policy Research, a nonprofit organization that advises the state’s Congressional Delegation and prioritizes federal issues important to the California economy. UC Berkeley, JD from Georgetown University Law Center, member of the Paicifc Council of International Policy, serves on the National Advisory Council of the Institute of Governmental Studies at UC Berkeley) , April 2005, “California Institute Special Report: California’s Past Base Closure Experiences and the 2005 BRAC Round”; California Institute for Federal Policy Research; http://www.calinst.org/defense/base1a.pdf

Despite the large military base and personnel cuts California experienced during the first four rounds of base closures, the state still houses the most installations and personnel of any state in the country. According to the Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2004 Base Structure Report, the military has 3,727 “locations” in the U.S.—93 large installations, 99 medium installations and 3,535 small installations/locations.62 California has the most total locations of any state, with 424, accounting for 11.3 percent of all locations, 175 more than Montana which is second with 249.63 California’s military strength becomes even more apparent when its large and medium installations are compared to the rest of the country. The Golden State has 15 large and 11 medium installations within its borders, 13.5 percent of the bases in those two categories.64 No other state has more than six large installations, and only one state, Virginia, with 11, has more than six medium installations.

#### California economy key to US economy

Williams 09, Juliet Williams (Columnist for the Huffington Post), 06/29/09, “California’s Ailing Economy Could Prolong US Recession”; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/29/californias-ailing-econom\_n\_222616.html

SACRAMENTO, Calif. — California faces a $24 billion budget shortfall, an eye-popping amount that dwarfs many states' entire annual spending plans. Beyond California's borders, why should anyone care that the home of Google and the Walt Disney Co. might stop paying its bills this week? Virtually all states are suffering in the recession, some worse than California. But none has the economic horsepower of the world's eighth-largest economy, home to one in eight Americans. California accounts for 12 percent of the nation's gross domestic product and the largest share of retail sales of any state. It also sends far more in tax revenue to the federal government than it receives \_ giving a dollar for every 80 cents it gets back \_ which means Californians are keeping social programs afloat across the country. While the deficit only affects the state, California's deepening economic malaise could make it harder for the entire nation's economy to recover. When the state stumbles, its sheer size \_ 38.3 million people \_ creates fallout for businesses from Texas to Michigan. "California is the key catalyst for U.S. retail sales, and if California falls further you will see the U.S. economy suffer significantly," said retail consultant Burt P. Flickinger, managing director of Strategic Resource Group. He warned of more bankruptcies of national retail chains and brand suppliers.

## --K2 Housing

#### We will see a rise in affordable housing

Diluzio Group, 08 **(**[**http://www.sanantonio.gov/oma/pdf/bracpdfs/Task%203--Transportation%20Infrastructure.pdf**](http://www.sanantonio.gov/oma/pdf/bracpdfs/Task%203--Transportation%20Infrastructure.pdf)**, The DiLuzio Group was formed in November 2003 to provide a full spectrum of cost effective advisory and professional services to business and industry, all levels of government and independent governmental agencies. The DiLuzio Group’s strengths are embodied in the talents and experience of its Associate Staff and with a clear focus and commitment to helping its clients achieve their goals. Our core competencies include: Base realignment and closure (BRAC) Economic development Logistics and transportation systems Homeland Defense/Homeland Security Program management & productivity improvement Business development and marketing services Contracting and acquisition processes Institutional and governmental relationships)**

**This imbalance could increase as ¶ the result of BRAC-related expansion. For this reason, development of the ¶ surrounding area should encourage the type of expansion directly support the ¶ mission of the expanded post , and focus on providing affordable housing ¶ opportunities with supporting amenities for FSH employees and employees of ¶ support industries located within the FSH redevelopment study area. ¶ • Encourage the existing commercial buildings by activities which support the postmissions. This strategy consists of providing a comprehensive array of services 4 ¶ that support the post mission rather than locating unrelated enterprises that ¶ would compete with the post for building space and transportation system ¶ capacity. ¶ • Maintain Balance of Stores to Housing. Areas to the west of the post generally ¶ have adequate retail space with some available for renewal along Austin ¶ Highway (Loop 368). Infill retail development is also occurring along Broadway ¶ Street on the west side of the study area. Areas south and east of the post have ¶ a need for additional retail space. ¶ • Maintain a Neighborhood Focus for Retail Development - Unnecessarily large ¶ concentrations of retail space such as big box centers, conventional apparel ¶ shopping malls, outlet centers, or super warehouse stores should be discouraged ¶ until household densities south of the post are sufficient to support such markets, ¶ and then the locations should be consistent with transportation system capacity.**

## Impacts

## --Communities

#### Transportation is key to the success of its communities

Diluzio Group, 08 (<http://www.sanantonio.gov/oma/pdf/bracpdfs/Task%203--Transportation%20Infrastructure.pdf>, The DiLuzio Group was formed in November 2003 to provide a full spectrum of cost effective advisory and professional services to business and industry, all levels of government and independent governmental agencies. The DiLuzio Group’s strengths are embodied in the talents and experience of its Associate Staff and with a clear focus and commitment to helping its clients achieve their goals. Our core competencies include: Base realignment and closure (BRAC) Economic development Logistics and transportation systems Homeland Defense/Homeland Security Program management & productivity improvement Business development and marketing services

Contracting and acquisition processes Institutional and governmental relationships)

The San Antonio BRAC 2005Growth Management Plan addresses a population of ¶ approximately 12,000 persons being relocated to the post as a result of the 2006 Base ¶ Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) decisions and related changes. In ¶ addition, it considers: (1) Actions needed by the City of San Antonio or others to assist ¶ with the BRAC implementation; (2) The possibility of leveraging BRAC to achieve ¶ additional economic growth; and, (3) The possibility of leveraging BRAC to stimulate ¶ revitalization of the communities around the post. There are separate reports which ¶ address transportation, community growth and revitalization and health related aspects ¶ of the BRAC activity. This report considers the traffic and transportation aspects of ¶ BRAC, economic growth and community revitalization. **¶ An adequate transportation network is an integral part of the transportation ¶ management process for any urban development initiative.** Urban life is enriched ¶ through widespread participation in numerous community opportunities. **Transportation ¶ networks are the conduits that facilitate diverse community participation in areas ¶ ranging from employment and shopping, to cultural, recreational and educational ¶ opportunities. The success of communities** around Fort Sam Houston **will depend in to ¶ a significant degree on how well the transportation systems work to serve their needs**. ¶ This task report begins with an overview of principles that aid in the understanding of ¶ transportation systems and the impacts of land use decisions. The introductory section ¶ is followed by discussion of the proposed land uses around Fort Sam Houston that are ¶ part of the redevelopment initiative and their associated traffic impacts. It concludes with ¶ recommended network improvements required to provide accessibility and support ¶ community activities. This preliminary look at potential land uses and traffic impacts is ¶ only the beginning of an ongoing process to foster the goals of the growth management ¶ initiative. Thus, this chapter ends with recommended next steps to support the ¶ implementation process. ¶ ¶ 1.1 STUDY AREA¶ The transportation system evaluation process focuses on the street and highway ¶ system within and surrounding Fort Sam Houston, and generally includes roads ¶ carrying more than 5,000 vehicles per day, with other select corridors included for ¶ continuity. Though the Growth Management Plan land use recommendations extend ¶ little more than two miles from the perimeter of Fort Sam Houston, the transportation ¶ system serving the area extends throughout the metropolitan area. Major streets and ¶ freeways included in this preliminary evaluation extend from IH-410 on the north to IH-2 ¶ 10 on the south and from US 281 on the west to east of IH-35/IH-410 East, but impacts ¶ to and recommendations for other freeways are also mentioned.

## **--Economy**

#### Federal Funding key to State Transportation Infrastructure, which is key to the economy

COEA 12 Council of Economic Advisers, Department of Treasury (“A NEW ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT”, March 23, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/20120323InfrastructureReport.pdf)

Public infrastructure is an essential part of the U.S. economy. This has been recognized since the founding of our nation. Albert Gallatin, who served as President Jefferson’s Treasury Secretary, wrote: “The early and efficient aid of the Federal Government is recommended by still more important considerations. The inconveniences, complaints, and perhaps dangers, which may result from a vast extent of territory, can no otherwise be radically removed or prevented than by opening speedy and easy communications through all its parts. Good roads and canals will shorten distances, facilitate commercial and personal intercourse, and unite, by a still more intimate community of interests, the most remote quarters of the United States. No other single operation, within the power of Government, can more effectually tend to strengthen and perpetuate that Union which secures external independence, domestic peace, and internal liberty.”1 Gallatin spoke in terms of infrastructure shortening distances and easing communications, even when the only means to do so were roads and canals. Every day, Americans use our nation’s transportation infrastructure to commute to work, visit their friends and family, and travel freely around the country. Businesses depend on a well-functioning infrastructure system to obtain their supplies, manage their inventories, and deliver their goods and services to market. This is true for companies whose businesses rely directly on the infrastructure system, such as shippers like UPS and BNSF, as well as others whose businesses indirectly rely on the infrastructure system, such as farmers who use publicly funded infrastructure to ship crops to buyers, and internet companies that send goods purchased online to customers across the world. A modern transportation infrastructure network is necessary for our economy to function, and is a prerequisite for future growth. President Eisenhower’s vision is even more relevant today than it was in 1955, when he said in his State of the Union Address, "A modern, efficient highway system is essential to meet the needs of our growing population, our expanding economy, and our national security." Today, that vision would include making not only our highways, but our nation’s entire infrastructure system more efficient and effective. Our analysis indicates that further infrastructure investments would be highly beneficial for the U.S. economy in both the short and long term. First, estimates of economically justifiable investment indicate that American transportation infrastructure is not keeping pace with the needs of our economy. Second, because of high unemployment in sectors such as construction that were especially hard hit by the bursting of the housing bubble, there are underutilized resources that can be used to build infrastructure. Moreover, states and municipalities typically fund a significant portion of infrastructure spending, but are currently strapped for cash; the Federal government has a constructive role to play by stepping up to address the anticipated shortfall and providing more efficient financing mechanisms, such as Build America Bonds. The third key finding is that investing in infrastructure benefits the middle class most of all. Finally, there is considerable support for greater infrastructure investment among American consumers and businesses.

#### **California default collapses economy – linear risk with each piece of spending**

Watkins 09 Bill Watkins (Ph.D. in economics, economist on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Washington DC, leader of the Economic Forecast Project at UCSB, founder of the Center for Economic Research and Forecasting) ; 12/16/2009; “What Happens When California Defaults?”; http://www.newgeography.com/content/001274-what-happens-when-california-defaults

In my opinion, California is now more likely to default than it is to not default. It is not a certainty, but it is a possibility that is increasingly likely. Then what? Ideally, we’d see a court-supervised, orderly bankruptcy similar to what we see when a company defaults. All creditors, including direct lenders, vendors, employees, pensioners, and more would share in the losses based on established precedent and law. Perhaps salaries would be reduced. Some programs could see significant changes. This is distressing, but it is better than other options. Unfortunately, a formal bankruptcy is not the likely scenario. There is no provision for it in the law. Consequently, absent framework and rules of bankruptcy, the eventual default is likely to be very messy, contentious and political. Other states have defaulted. Nine states defaulted on credit obligations in the 1840s. Most of those states eventually repaid all of their creditors (see William E. English "Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: U.S. State Debts in the 1840s," *American Economic Review*, vol. 86 (March 1996), pp. 259-75.) Unfortunately, the examples in the 1840s are not much help in anticipating the impacts of a modern default. Circumstances are different, and things have changed, a lot. We’re left with the question: what happens when California defaults? The worst case would be the mother of all financial crises. According to the California State Treasurer’s office, California has over $68 billion in public debt, but the *Sacramento Bee’s* Dan Walters has tried to count total California public debt, including that of local municipalities, and his total reaches $500 billion. Whatever the amount, the impact of default could be larger than the debt amount would imply. Other states – New York, Illinois, New Jersey, for example – are in almost as bad shape as California, and they could follow California’s example. The realization that a state could default would shock markets every bit as much as when Lehman Brothers failed. Given the precarious state of our economy and the financial sector, another fiscal crisis would be disastrous, with impacts far beyond California’s borders. What would a California default look like? In a sense, we’ve already seen California default, when that state issued vouchers. If any company tried that, they would be in bankruptcy court in days. Issuing vouchers didn’t trigger a California crisis because banks were willing to honor the vouchers. If banks refuse to honor the vouchers next time, employees and vendors won’t be paid, and state operations will come to a halt. This could happen if our legislature locks up and is unable to act on the current $21 billion problem. Another possible California scenario is that the State will try to sell or roll over some debt, and no one buys it. Already, we’ve seen California officials surprised with the interest rates they have had to pay. What happens if no one buys California’s debt? We saw last September what happens when lenders refuse to lend to large creditors. If we continue on the current path, the worst case is also the more likely case. Bad news keeps dribbling out. One day we find we are paying 30-percent-higher-than-anticipated interest on a bond issue. A few days later, we find the budget shortfall is billions of dollars higher than projected just a short time ago. Every month brings new bad news. The risk that one of those news events triggers a crisis grows with every news event. Given California’s recent history, it is difficult to believe that the people with the authority and responsibility for California’s finances can act responsibly, but that is what we need. Responsible action would be creating a gimmick-free budget that places California finances on a sustainable path, and provides an environment that allows for opportunity and job creation. But, sadly, Sacramento probably cannot draft an honest balanced budget, and will thus need to plan for California’s eventual default. They need to work with Federal Government and Federal Reserve Bank officials to insure a coordinated plan to limit damage to financial markets. That plan needs to be ready to release when markets go crazy, which is exactly what could happen when participants realize that default is possible. It could be needed sooner than they think.

#### Now is key – Default happens by August

Mysak, 7/10 Joe Mysak (Columnist for Bloomberg News, previous editor and publisher of American Banker) “Could California Default? Consider the Possibility” Bloomberg News; July 10, 2012; http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=columnist\_mysak&sid=ai2e6hdnVvzk

That's the good news. The bad news is that this is the first time Moody's has used the word default in their updates on the state. Default is not a word lightly tossed around in the municipal market. Most market participants refuse to believe in the possibility. ``They're not going to default,'' said Gary Pollack, who helps manage $10 billion in bonds for Deutsche Bank Private Wealth Management in New York. ``I know we've got to talk about it, but it would be a major embarrassment they'd carry around with them for the next 25 years.'' Pollack estimated Deutsche Bank owned a little less than $1 billion in California bonds. Power to Pay``It's certainly not in their best interest to default,'' said David Moore, vice president and director of research at American Century Investments in Mountain View, California, which has $1.8 billion of California bonds in its $2.2 billion tax-free funds. ``Most of them are insured,'' Moore said of the California holdings. The previous ``unthinkable'' event in the municipal market was the bankruptcy of Orange County, California, in 1994. The county had the ability to pay, its lawyers said. The county even had the willingness to pay. What the county lacked, according to the lawyers, was the power to pay. The county had no cash, and had no alternative to filing for bankruptcy protection. There is at least the possibility that California will run out of cash. Bond investors should brace themselves. Moody's said there was ``an increased risk that the state may not be able to reach consensus on a budget prior to exhausting its cash resources,'' in its update on the state last week. On Borrowed Time ``There's the risk of a cash crisis,'' said Raymond Murphy, an analyst at Moody's. He defined the term. ``It's where there's a question as to whether they'll have enough cash to meet their obligations.'' Bondholders have what is called a ``second priority lien'' on the state's cash, after public schools and institutions of higher education, said Murphy. Right now, California is living on borrowed time and borrowed money. Borrowed time: The state doesn't have a budget yet. That's not news. The state has missed the June 30 deadline to have a new budget in place 12 times in the past 15 years. What makes the California situation so different this time is ``the enormous magnitude of the state's $38.2 billion projected accumulated budget gap, compared to fiscal 2003 total estimated general fund revenues of just $67.8 billion,'' as Standard & Poor's said in its update on the state last week. The state still spends more than it brings in. Borrowed money: The state sold $11 billion in warrants due in one year in June to help pay its bills. That money, along with tax collections, is expected to last through August, perhaps September, Moody's Murphy estimated. The Future California's budget imbroglio is pure political brinksmanship, at least right now. The Democrats, who dominate the state legislature, need eight Republican votes to pass a budget with the two-thirds majority required under state law. The Republicans are firm in their opposition to a budget that includes higher taxes.

California uniquely suffers – more bases than any other states

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.4 Despite the disproportionate cuts, today California still hosts more military bases and personnel than any other state in the nation. California’s 424 military locations, including 26 large and medium installations, support nearly 200,000 military and civilian Department of Defense personnel.5 DoD directly spends more than $40 billion annually in the state, yielding considerably more in overall benefit to the state’s economy.6 Thus, even though California experienced severe losses in the first four rounds of base closures, the military still plays a very important role in the state.

# Solvency

## --General Solvency

#### We need funding and a plan but we are ready to do it

Diluzio Group, 08 (<http://www.sanantonio.gov/oma/pdf/bracpdfs/Task%203--Transportation%20Infrastructure.pdf>, The DiLuzio Group was formed in November 2003 to provide a full spectrum of cost effective advisory and professional services to business and industry, all levels of government and independent governmental agencies. The DiLuzio Group’s strengths are embodied in the talents and experience of its Associate Staff and with a clear focus and commitment to helping its clients achieve their goals. Our core competencies include: Base realignment and closure (BRAC) Economic development Logistics and transportation systems Homeland Defense/Homeland Security Program management & productivity improvement Business development and marketing services

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**The major constraint to most of these improvements has been funding, and efforts are underway to acquire Federal earmark funds. Among the most important are widening projects for Walters Street from Wilson Street to IH-35, and improvements to the Harry Wurzbach Road corridor from Winans Road to Loop 368 (Austin Highway). The City of San Antonio is developing a new north-south roadway west of the AT&T coliseum and east of the railroad tracks from IH-35 frontage roads to East Houston Street. The regional transit agency (VIA) is also investigating transit and vanpool strategies that can be applied immediately with little or no funding commitment. What is needed on an immediate basis is a plan and supporting strategies that ensure that ongoing improvements will move toward a common goal. Such a plan would ensure that redevelopment initiatives include transportation network improvements and right-of-way preservation to accommodate expected full-build-out of the economic development program proposed in the GMP. Otherwise, short-term improvements should focus on relief routes that will provide alternative points of access to the post while other entry ways are under construction, and provide new capacity for the upcoming increase in post activity. Recommendations are listed below: • Complete the western extension of Petroleum Drive from Holbrook Road to intersect with both Nursery Road and Williams Road inside Fort Sam Houston, and provide adequate access control point (ACP) processing capacity to divert traffic from other gates, and to make more effective used of the Petroleum Drive and Holbrook Road corridors. This corridor should be in place prior to the start of bridge construction on Binz Engleman Road at Salado Creek. A new bridge over Salado Creek for Petroleum Drive has already been funded. • Extend Holbrook Road south of Petroleum Drive to connect with the 26¶ th¶ Street segment that extends south to Binz Engleman Road. • Extend Coliseum Road north from IH-35, across the railroad tracks to connect with the corner where Williams Road and Wilson Street meet inside Fort Sam Houston, and provide an ACP for post entry. Consider relocation of the commercial vehicle entry from Jadwin Road to this new ACP to eliminate redundancy, and take advantage of more direct access for trucks from IH-35 frontage roads using the Coliseum Road underpass. This project should be completed prior to start of reconstruction on the Walters/Scott corridor between IH-35 interchange and Henry T. Allen Road so that it can serve as a relief route. • Extend George C. Beech Avenue east of its IH-35 interchange as a four lane divided roadway to intersect with Binz Engleman Road to improve access to parcels that could accommodate medical-oriented commercial development that supports the BAMC mission. 10 • Reconstruct the existing segment of Binz Engleman Road from IH-35 to IH-410 to a four lane undivided section to support additional development east of the BAMC Triangle. 5.3 MID TERM IMPROVEMENTS¶ Mid-term improvements over a five to ten year timeframe should focus on intersection/interchange improvements, bottleneck removal, and expansion to corridors that can readily accommodate widened due to available right of way. Recommendations include: • Implement emergency widening of IH-35 from the LP 410 south junction to LP 1604. This widening consists of restriping the existing six lane freeway to eight lanes with reduced shoulders from the IH-410 west directional ramps to the IH-¶ 410 south directional ramps, and restriping the existing eight lane freeway to ten lanes from the IH-410 west directional ramps to the SH 218 ramps, and from six to eight lanes from the SH 218 ramps to the LP 1604 collector-distributor road ramps. Such a change will require a safety evaluation including incident management strategies to obtain permission from the Federal Highway Administration. However, IH-35 is a crucial transportation linkage with critical importance to the mission of Fort Sam Houston. Improvement to IH-35 operations should receive the highest priority. • Widen Harry Wurzbach Road from four to six lanes from the Winans Road intersection to the shopping center intersection just south of the LP 368 overpass. Expand the Rittiman Road approaches to Harry Wurzbach Road to include full length turn bays as recommended in previous studies. • Add additional turn lanes to IH-35 interchange intersections at Walzem Road, Eisenhauer Road and Rittiman Road to increase interchange capacity. Turn movement counts and a traffic concept study would need to be conducted to identify the most effective expansion and lane allocation strategy for these interchanges. • Construct a new two-lane realignment of New Braunfels Avenue at Eleanor Avenue to connect with Pine Street at Brahan Blvd. This realignment would reconnect the now-broken New Braunfels Avenue alignment to Pine Street, which also has an IH-35 crossing, and establish a permanent western boundary for the Fort Sam Houston access control boundary. Post lands located west of this alignment would be released for other private sector uses, or military uses that do not require security control. 5.4 LONG TERM IMPROVEMENTS¶ Large scale transportation projects can not be implemented quickly due to the lack of funding, or the need for a time-consuming process that could include environmental clearance, design, right of way, utility relocation and construction activities. Long term improvements must ultimately address deficiencies in high-capacity regional routes including the freeway system. Due to the extensive effort required to design and construct these improvements (issues similar to ongoing expansion of IH-410 north), these projects can only be implemented on a long term time frame. 11¶ • Widen IH-35 from six lanes to ten lanes between the IH-410 south junction and the IH-410 west junction. • Widen IH-35 from eight to twelve lanes between LP 1604 and the IH-410 west junction. • Widen IH-35 from six to at least eight lanes beyond LP 1604. To be effective, this improvement should extend at least three minor interchanges north of Loop 1604. • Widen IH-410 east loop to six lanes from IH-10 on the south to the split between the IH-410/IH-35 ramp legs south of FM 78. • Implement improvements to upgrade FM 78 to an access controlled expressway from IH-410 to Randolph Air Force Base (and potentially beyond). Expressways include control of access from high volume driveways, interchanges at highvolume crossroads that would otherwise produce intersection congestion, and signalized intersections with lower volume feeder roads. • Complete a four lane divided connection between the western end of FM 78 at IH-410 and the north end of Currency Street. Expand Currency Street/Creekview Drive from north of Profit Street to Gember Road to a four lane roadway with a two-way left turn lane. • Develop a new east-west four lane divided arterial street north of Sherman Street in the soon-to-be-abandoned rail yard area south of IH-35. The new roadway should pass under existing roadway crossings an New Braunfels Avenue and Walters Street, and extend from Broadway Street on the west to Coliseum Road on the east, perhaps using the existing Anoil Street industrial cul-de-sac, which extends west of Coliseum Road just south of Gembler Road. Lateral (northsouth) roads should be constructed to connect this arterial to the surrounding street grid. Frank Street would be particularly useful since it can be extended north of IH-35 through an existing unused IH-35 underpass. • Extend Creekview Drive south of Gembler Road to join East Commerce Street adjacent to IH-10 as a four lane divided roadway. 6.0 ROADWAY IMPROVEMENTS FOR NEAR TERM REDEVELOPMENT¶ The following sections describe the traffic impacts of redevelopment proposed for specific parcels of land that have been identified for near term redevelopment over the next ten years. For each parcel the gross number of weekday vehicle trips has been estimated based on the land uses proposed. This near term development plan generates a total of 300,000 gross vehicle trips per day. Of these, only 40,000 are related to residential uses with another 10,000 by transient residential uses (hotels or motels). These road improvements only involve segments required to distribute traffic generated by the parcel to the nearest major streets and highways. The location of each parcel and the associated daily trip generation was illustrated on a previous figure on page 8. Parcel W-3/FSH-W-1 – Cunningham Avenue and Broadway Street¶ Redevelopment of this 37 acre parcel is expected to generate 20,700 trips per day. Due to the lack of street network connectivity, all of these trips would need to load onto 12 Broadway Street. To help improve street network connectivity to better distribute these trips, the following road improvements are recommended: • Extend Pine Street north of Nika Street to intersect Mulberry Street • Extend Austin Street north of Josephine Street to intersect Cunningham Street Parcel SW-2 – Lamar Street east of IH-37¶ Redevelopment of this 20 acre parcel is expected to generate 12,000 trips per day. Though the connectivity of the surrounding street grid is affected by the IH-37 and the rail road tracks, existing traffic volumes are so low that the total site traffic could be easily absorbed. Austin Street extends north and south to provide access to multiple east-west streets that are not blocked by the railroad tracks and/or IH-37, including a crossing under IH-35. Parcel S-3 – North of Sherman Street between Pine Street and New Braunfels Avenue¶ This 56 acre parcel is currently occupied by a rail yard, and redevelopment is expected to generate 24,900 trips per day. The traffic generation is rather large given that surrounding streets are all minor residential streets. However, the recommended new four lane divided arterial north of Sherman Street provides a new arterial street to accommodate site generated traffic. Recommended other improvements include: • Widen Duval Street as a two lane, two way collector street with a two-way left turn lane between Austin Street and Benton Street. • Widen Pine Street to a four lane roadway from IH-35 to Sherman Street • Construct a grid of streets on the site that matches up with adjacent street grid segments north and south of the site. At least one street should cross the remaining railroad tracks at the north end of the site (such as Palmetto Avenue) Parcel SE-3 – Walters Street and Gabriel Street¶ This 20 acre parcel is intended for community service uses that are expected to generate 3,300 trips per day. Major road capacity and connectivity improvements are not needed to absorb the traffic, but changes in intersection control may be needed to establish a preferred route for traffic entering the site from the adjacent residential street grid. The only recommendation is to coordinate site plan development with a traffic circulation study of local streets that would connect site generated traffic to New Braunfels Avenue and Walters Street. This site could also be accessed from the recommended east-west arterial street north of Sherman Street. Parcel SE-2 – Houston Street and Coliseum Road¶ This 210 acre parcel currently contains a large beverage manufacturing plant. An intense commercial mixed-use entertainment-retail district is expected to generate 105,600 trips per day. Such a development would distribute sizeable amounts of traffic to surrounding streets including Coliseum Road, Houston Street and Commerce Street, and would also require regional access via IH-35, IH-37, US 281, IH-410 and IH-10. Though a portion of trips from this site would be absorbed by interaction with the Coliseum events and surrounding neighborhoods, major widening to Commerce Street and Houston Street would be needed. These streets are currently four lane undivided roads over most of their lengths between IH-37 and IH-10. 13¶ • Expand Houston Street to six lanes from the railroad tracks to Commerce Street, and eight lanes from Commerce Street to the IH-10 interchange. Expand approaches to the IH-10 interchange to logically allocate this lane capacity and increase capacity of turn movements between IH-10 east and Houston Street on the west. • Extend Commerce Street north of Houston Street as at four-lane divided roadway to connect with Currency Street. • Implement access management improvements to segments of Commerce Street and Houston Street from IH-37 to the rail road tracks just west of the parcel to mitigate increases in traffic within the existing capacity of these road segments. Parcel SC-1 – Walters Street and Hood Street¶ This six acre parcel is to be used for neighborhood retail uses that would generate 7,000 trips per day. Much of the demand for these uses is expected to be generated from walk-in or drive-in patrons from Fort Sam Houston and the surrounding neighborhood. Thus, road improvement beyond the planned upgrade to Walters Street (from a four lane undivided to a six lane divided arterial) are not needed. Parcel NE-1 – Rittiman Road and Holbrook Road¶ This 7.5 acre parcel is most suitable for neighborhood retail use expected to generate 3,500 trips per day. Though no new roads are needed for such a small parcel, safe and efficient access to Rittiman Road may require that Rittiman Road be widened to include left turn lanes to reach the parcel. • Widen Rittiman Road east of the Salado Creek Bridge to include a two-way left turn lane up to the segment with an existing two-way left turn lane west of IH-35 at Rittiman Plaza Drive. Parcel NE-2 – IH-35 at Petroleum Drive¶ This 106 acre parcel is situated adjacent to a post access control point. A mixed-use development is recommended for this area. Though this are would be suitable as a residential enclave with access to Fort Sam Houston and BAMC Triangle, site access for commercial or other uses is incomplete and awkward. The expected traffic generation of 49,800 trips per day would thus require major improvements to Holbrook Road, Petroleum Drive, the IH-35 frontage roads, and improvements to adjacent interchanges on IH-35 at Rittiman Road and George C. Beach Avenue. Site development would benefit from the previously discussed western extension of Petroleum Drive, and the southern extension of Holbrook Road to connect with 26¶ th¶ Street, which connects to Binz Engleman Road. However, these additional improvements would also be needed: • Expand the southbound IH-35 frontage road from two to three lanes from Rittiman Road to Binz Engleman Road. • Add a u-turn bridge over IH-35 at George C. Beach Avenue for the southbound to northbound frontage road movement. • Improve the northbound IH-35 entrance ramp from George C. Beach Avenue to a two lane on ramp. This improvement involves numerous operational complications affecting the downstream IH-410 merge area on IH-35. 14 • Expand Petroleum Drive to four lanes to accommodate site generated traffic from IH-35 southbound frontage road to west of Holbrook Road. • Consider condemning industrial parcels to the north of the site so that Rittiman Plaza Drive can be extended south to connect the parcel with Rittiman Road. • Additional improvements to the Rittiman Road interchange and arterial roadway adjacent to IH-35 are also necessary, possibly including expansion to six lanes over a limited distance. Parcel E-1 – North of FM 78 between IH-35 and IH-410¶ This 115 acre parcel currently is half developed with industrial uses, but could be redeveloped to commercial medical uses expected to generate 18,700 trips per day. Other than improvements listed below, the surrounding loop of one way frontage roads and freeway ramps along IH-35 and IH-410 otherwise provide full access to freeways for all movements. • Access to the parcel would be improved by extending George C. Beach Avenue east and south to intersect with Binz Engleman Road, as previously recommended for mid term improvements. • An additional two-lane east-west collector is recommended in the same alignment as Petroleum Drive to help improve internal circulation within the triangle between the northbound IH-35 frontage road and the southbound IH-410 frontage road. Parcel E-2 – South of FM 78 and East of IH-410¶ This 82 acre parcel currently contains limited industrial development. If redeveloped to commercial medical uses, the parcel is expected to generate 13,400 trips per day. The parcel is almost completely dependent on FM 78 for access to surrounding streets and freeways. • Add a u-turn ramp south of FM 78 to connect the IH-410 northbound to southbound frontage road. • Conduct a traffic circulation evaluation to identify intersection improvements necessary to distribute traffic from this parcel among the intersections along FM 78 from IH-410 near IH-35 on the west to Old Seguin Road on the east. Parcel E-3 – South of FM 78 at IH-410¶ This 54 acre parcel is currently half developed with industrial uses, but could be redeveloped to commercial medical uses expected to generate 8,800 trips per day. Though access to the site appears awkward, the surrounding loop of one-way freeway frontage roads, FM 78 and adjacent freeway ramps do provide full access to surrounding streets and freeways. Parcel E-4 – South of IH-410 South Spur at FM 78¶ This 60 acre parcel is isolated and undeveloped. Commercial medical uses designated for the site would generate 9,800 trips per day. The site would be viable for commercial development if street network connectivity were improved. The surrounding configuration of railroad tracks and freeway ramps makes this site difficult to get to. Recommended improvements include the aforementioned extension of FM 78 west of 15¶ IH-410 to connect with Creekview Drive on the south, and another connection to the northwest with IH-35 frontage roads at the Salado Creek Bridge. Also included is widening of Creekview Drive to four lanes for another mile to the south to Gembler Road. These improvements were part of the regional mid-term plan. Otherwise, on-site collector streets are needed to provide access to individual parcels. Parcel E-5 – Creekview Drive at Salado Junction¶ This 61 acre parcel is partially developed and has accessibility from the south. Commercial medical development on the site would generate 13,200 trip per day. Like parcel E-4, street network connectivity needs to improve, including the western extension of FM 78, and a connection from Creekview Drive to IH-35 frontage roads using the Salado Creek crossover. An internal network of two lane collector streets would be needed among both parcels E-4 and E-5 to delineate individual parcels for development and provide necessary accessibility. Parcel E-6 – Binz Engleman Road and Nursery Road in Fort Sam Houston¶ This 20 acre parcel is located within Fort Sam Houston along Salado Creek. Residential use of the property would generate 2,900 trips per day. Since residents of this site are likely to be Fort Sam Houston employees, most of this traffic is likely to be absorbed by the internal post circulation system. Development of a collector street extending Holbrook Road south of Petroleum Drive to Binz Engleman Road would improve connectivity and circulation for this and other parcels in the area. Parcel E-7 – Between Seguin Road and IH-35¶ This 25 acre parcel is developed with a mixture of industrial and transient residential (motel) uses. Redevelopment is expected to convert the remaining industrial to transient residential uses generating 2,000 trips per day. Some of this would be offset by the loss of trips from former industrial developments. Despite the rather awkward road network serving the area, it is possible to reach the area from either direction of IH-¶ 35 and from IH-410 south. The biggest constraint to growth would be the capacity of the IH-35/Binz Engleman Road interchange. Some capacity expansion is already planned for this interchange, but future reconstruction of the IH-35 overpass, and installation of a third traffic signal for Seguin Road and Binz Engleman Road are longer term needs. Parcel E-8 – Binz Engleman Road at Salado Creek¶ This 55 acre parcel had mostly industrial uses closer to IH-35, but recently, two apartment complexes had been built on parcels closer to Salado Creek. Redevelopment as a mixed-use residential area is expected to generate 19,100 trips per day. This site is situated south of the BAMC triangle, but is bounded by Salado Creek. The recent construction of two apartment complexes on vacant industrial parcels was unexpected in such an area that is isolated from other services. However, this may be evidence of demand for local rental housing generated by BAMC and Fort Sam Houston. Though road improvements are not absolutely necessary for this site, it would be beneficial to establish a road along Salado Creek that connects Binz Engleman Road with IH-35 at the IH-35/Salado Creek bridge. This bridge also serves as a turn around between the northbound and southbound IH-35 frontage roads, as well as a connection for the south end of Seguin Road. The recommended road along 16 Salado Creek would complete a circulation loop around the entire parcel and provide connectivity to parcel E-7 located between Seguin Road and IH-35. 7.0 SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION¶ The following are recommended future study efforts to support the ongoing evolution of both Fort Sam Houston and redevelopment of surrounding areas. Fort Sam Houston Revitalization Traffic Circulation Study¶ This study is a logical extension of the preliminary work conducted for this Task 3 report, and includes more extensive traffic circulation analysis and site traffic impact analysis to help guide ongoing development of the areas surrounding Fort Sam Houston. This study should consist of the development of a traffic simulation model to evaluate ongoing development and road improvement needs, followed by a retainer to conduct ongoing studies as development and road project occur. As part of a growth management plan, this study effort would provide ongoing support in the areas of transportation planning, traffic engineering, and urban street design. BAMC Medical Core Traffic Circulation Study¶ The purpose of this study is to evaluate the development capacity of the industrial and isolated land parcels around the BAMC campus for potential redevelopment into uses that support the BAMC mission. It is presumed that a mixture of medical oriented commercial and industrial uses will begin to occur in this area, and there are opportunities for supporting higher-density residential uses as well. However, the surrounding road network is broken by large industrial parcels and the intersecting network of rail road tracks and freeways. The goal is to develop a subarea plan that would identify roadway network connectivity improvements, and a rational land use plan that limits zoning to match up with an affordable roadway improvement plan.**

#### **BRAC has caused severe traffic congestion – DAR funding and total reconstruction is necessary**

Serbu 11 [Jared Serbu – DoD reporter for the Federal News Radio, February 7, 2011, “Report: DoD should help solve BRAC traffic problems”, <http://www.federalnewsradio.com/?nid=697&sid=2262222>]

It also found DoD base commanders generally did not consult adequately with local planning officials when making their own facility expansion plans. At Fort Belvoir, for example, the committee reported that DoD made plans to increase access to the base itself by upgrading on-base roads, but did not consult with state and local agencies on traffic impacts when it updated its long-range master plan.¶ By the time the BRAC process is completed this year, Fort Belvoir will host more personnel than the Pentagon - 43,500.¶ The report warned that the early stages of base realignment and other sources of military growth, including troops returning from two wars, already are causing "severe" transportation problems at most of the six facilities studied.¶ "Although the committee cannot predict the consequences, congestion could be sufficiently severe to affect the military and surrounding communities negatively by preventing personnel from reaching work within acceptable commute times," the report said.¶ To help ease congestion, the report recommended that the Defense Department should expand its only program to help pay for transportation infrastructure off-base. The Defense Access Roads program currently requires that traffic double in metropolitan areas from base expansion before funding becomes available - and in any case, the funds are not eligible for transit projects.¶ Communities that benefit economically from the military should pay their fair share, and the military and local communities should improve communication in planning infrastructure improvements, the report said.¶ Congress should consider a special appropriation or reallocation of federal stimulus money to pay for near-term improvements in the communities most severely affected by base realignment, the report recommended.

#### **DAR funding needed to mitigate congestion**

Collins and Hamptons 12 [Darcel M. Collins – transportation specialist with the Federal Highway Association & M.A. in Management from Webster University, Daryl D. Hampton – senior engineer for the Defense Access Roads program & B.S. in civil engineering from Old Dominion University, June 2012, “Defense Access Roads”, <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/12mayjune/02.cfm>]

One effect of base realignment and closure (BRAC) is the impact on local traffic and transportation infrastructure. When personnel from closed bases relocate or commute to another base that remains open, this increase in defense traffic at that installation can place an unexpected burden on nearby State and local roadways. That's where a little-known DOD program known as the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program comes into play.¶ The DAR program, jointly administered by DOD's Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) Transportation Engineering Agency and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), represents a potential means for the military to assist in funding public highway improvements near impacted facilities. Specifically, the program can provide a share of defense funding for off-installation projects to mitigate transportation impacts resulting from sudden and unusual military actions. The terminology "sudden and unusual" is important, as DOD is not in the road-building business.¶ "In the circumstance of sudden and unusual military impacts, the DAR program can be a valuable resource for funding improvements at locations where DOD mission- support efforts have an adverse effect on nearby roads," says Acting Associate Administrator Amy Lucero of the FHWA Office of Federal Lands Highway, which oversees the program.

#### **TAG Needed**

NGA 09 [National Governors Association, June 09, 2009, “State Transportation Activities to Support Mission Growth”, <http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/0906MISSIONGROWTH.PDF>]

The DAR program enables DoD to pay for public highway improvements required as a result of ¶ sudden or unusual defense-generated traffic impacts, such as mission growth. When a base ¶ commander determines that improvements to a public road are needed, the commander raises ¶ these concerns to the state or local transportation authority. In cases where the transportation ¶ authority cannot or will not address the transportation need, the base commander can request the ¶ improvements under the DAR program. Once approved, the state or local highway authority ¶ assumes maintenance responsibility because it is a public highway. ¶ Within DoD, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC)is responsible ¶ for determining whether such transportation projects meet the DAR program criteria. Once a ¶ project is deemed necessary, it is the responsibility of SDDC to determine the eligibility of ¶ proposed improvements for financing through the use of defense access roads funds. Projects are ¶ eligible for funding if they meet one of the following criteria: ¶ • A new access road to an installation is needed to accommodate a defense action; ¶ • A defense action causes traffic to double; ¶ • A new or improved access road is needed to accommodate a temporary surge in traffic to ¶ or from an installation because of a defense action; ¶ • A new or improved access road is needed to accommodate special military vehicles, such ¶ as heavy equipment transport vehicle; and ¶ • A replacement road is required for one closed because of military necessity. ¶ If the SDDC decides that a project meets one of these criteria, it is then the responsibility of the ¶ appropriate military department (Army, Navy, Air Force, or defense agency) to request funding ¶ through a military construction appropriation. If funding is allocated, FHWA acts as the link ¶ between DoD and the state and local authorities who are responsible for local highway ¶ maintenance and who execute the road projects funded under the DAR guidelines

#### The Defense Access Roads program enables the DOD to fund transportation infrastructure

Transportation Research Board 11 (“Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases”, Special Report 302, May 12, <http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302.pdf>)

Under the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program, administered by the ¶ military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), ¶ DoD may pay for public highway improvements to address the impact ¶ on traffic of sudden or unusual defense-related actions (see Box 2). ¶ DAR enables DoD to help pay indirectly for improvements to highways ¶ DoD designates as important to the national defense. Under DAR, DoD ¶ can use funds provided in military construction (MILCON) appropriations to pay for all or part of the cost of constructing and maintaining ¶ roads designated as “defense access roads.”¶ The DAR program began decades ago when many bases were ¶ located, or being located, in relatively undeveloped regions. The program appears to have been designed to pay for access roads used principally by the military or to improve roads that would be harmed by heavy ¶ military equipment. The program has funded road projects that access ¶ missile installations and other military facilities that were off the federal aid primary highway system. These facilities were generally in isolated ¶ areas and not served by access roads.¶ Funds appropriated for DAR projects are transferred from DoD ¶ to FHWA to administer. The provisions of U.S. Federal Code, Title 23, ¶ which includes requirements of federal laws applying to federal-aid ¶ highways, apply to all DAR projects. Allocations are project specific; ¶ therefore, underruns cannot be used on other projects and unused ¶ DAR funds may be reallocated by the Washington Headquarters office ¶ of FHWA or returned to the military. Funds must be obligated within ¶ 5 years of approval. Unobligated balances lapse after the period of ¶ availability. Unexpended funds are canceled 10 years after the last ¶ year of obligation.

#### Funding for BRAC would fund transportation infrastructure improvement

Transportation Research Board 11 (“Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases”, Special Report 302, May 12, <http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302.pdf>)

Nonlinearities of impacts and costs should be accounted for ¶ and reflected in the impact fee. In allocating costs imposed on ¶ traffic flow, the impact of the last marginal user tends to be the ¶ most disproportionate; thus, assigning the responsibility for this ¶ impact imposes a disproportionate cost. Assigning this cost is a ¶ nontrivial matter because, in theory, the last marginal user before ¶ traffic flow in a congested corridor reverses imposes a very large¶ cost. The committee’s recommended resolution of this matter ¶ is as follows: in cases in which expected traffic growth from the civil sector will complement the incremental growth attributable ¶ to base expansion, the military and the civil sector cost should ¶ be shared based on the projected share of growth on the civil ¶ side and the projected traffic added because of the military. Assuming that impact fees were paid by the military in BRAC cases, ¶ the process would require careful accounting to ensure that the proper ¶ payments are made and that the funds are used to improve the transportation facilities in a timely manner. It needs to be understood that ¶ the funds from impact fees would pay for a portion of the cost for the ¶ needed transportation improvement if the military is not the only source ¶ of increased demand.

## --Potential Solvency Mechanisms

#### **The DoD will appropriate funds to initiate projects that reduce congestion near bases**

Tarrier 11 (“BRAC wants Feds to fund new roads,” ABC 2 News, <http://www.abc2news.com/dpp/news/brac/brac_news/brac-wants-feds-to-fund-new-roads>)

The report offers ways to mitigate the effects of BRAC for the near, medium and long term. For the near term, it calls on Congress to consider a special appropriation of the allocation of uncommitted stimulus funds to address the most adverse transportation problems, to initiate projects within the year that would reduce the severity of congestion impacts within the next three.¶ In the medium and long term, the committee recommended creating new funding streams for the transportation infrastructure, calling on the DoD to accept more financial responsibility for transportation problems related to growth on military bases just as private developers pay impact fees.¶ To determine the military's share, a transportation impact study would be necessary to assess traffic delays resulting from additional personnel traveling to and from military bases.

#### The DAR enables DOD to help pay for improving transportation infrastructure

Transportation Research Board 11 (“Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases”, Special Report 302, May 12, <http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302.pdf>)

Under the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program, administered by the military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), DoD may pay for public highway improvements to address the impact on traffic of sudden or unusual defense-related actions (see Box 2). DAR enables DoD to help pay indirectly for improvements to highways DoD designates as important to the national defense. Under DAR, DoD can use funds provided in military construction (MILCON) appropriations to pay for all or part of the cost of constructing and maintaining roads designated as “defense access roads.” The DAR program began decades ago when many bases were located, or being located, in relatively undeveloped regions. The program appears to have been designed to pay for access roads used principally by the military or to improve roads that would be harmed by heavy military equipment. The program has funded road projects that access missile installations and other military facilities that were off the federal aid primary highway system. These facilities were generally in isolated areas and not served by access roads. Funds appropriated for DAR projects are transferred from DoD to FHWA to administer. The provisions of U.S. Federal Code, Title 23, which includes requirements of federal laws applying to federal-aid highways, apply to all DAR projects. Allocations are project specific; therefore, underruns cannot be used on other projects and unused DAR funds may be reallocated by the Washington Headquarters office of FHWA or returned to the military. Funds must be obligated within 5 years of approval. Unobligated balances lapse after the period of availability. Unexpended funds are canceled 10 years after the last year of obligation.

#### USFG can pay for improving transportation infrastructure through the DAR

Federal Regulations 12 (“Title 23:Highways”, Electornic Code of Federal Regulations, July 9, <http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=a0ff3b88699a86240bb3d0307d6c66cb&rgn=div6&view=text&node=23:1.0.1.7.34.3&idno=23>)

The defense access roads program provides a means by which the Federal Government may pay its fair share of the cost of: (a) Highway improvements needed for adequate highway service to defense and defense related installations; (b) New highways to replace those which must be closed to permit establishment or expansion of defense installations; (c) Repair of damage to highways caused by major military maneuvers;¶ (d) Repair of damages due to the activities of contractors engaged in the construction of missile sites; and (e) Missile routes to ensure their continued ability to support the missile transporter-erector (TE) vehicle.

#### There are strategies to reduce traffic

Diluzio Group, 08 (<http://www.sanantonio.gov/oma/pdf/bracpdfs/Task%203--Transportation%20Infrastructure.pdf>, The DiLuzio Group was formed in November 2003 to provide a full spectrum of cost effective advisory and professional services to business and industry, all levels of government and independent governmental agencies. The DiLuzio Group’s strengths are embodied in the talents and experience of its Associate Staff and with a clear focus and commitment to helping its clients achieve their goals. Our core competencies include: Base realignment and closure (BRAC) Economic development Logistics and transportation systems Homeland Defense/Homeland Security Program management & productivity improvement Business development and marketing services

Contracting and acquisition processes Institutional and governmental relationships)

**¶ The decision to intensify the level of traffic generated by urban use of land must be ¶ coupled with a rational strategy to accommodate the added traffic load. Potential ¶ strategies include strengthening the transpo8rtation network, reducing the intensity of ¶ traffic loading, or redistributing the load to better match the strengths and weaknesses ¶ of the transportation grid. ¶ Strategies that strengthen the grid include: ¶ • Strengthen roadway junctions at intersections and interchanges by adding or ¶ lengthening turn lanes, or adding overpasses to at-grade intersections. ¶ • Widen roads at bottlenecks to recover the unusable capacity of sections adjacent ¶ to the bottleneck. ¶ • Connect broken segments of road to create contiguous longer routes. ¶ • Widen roads over their full length between major loading points. ¶ • Upgrade roads to a higher capacity classification (arterial to expressway or ¶ freeway). ¶ • Connect or widen incomplete sections of other road classes. ¶ • Build new roads on new alignments. ¶ Strategies to reduce traffic loads break the expensive cycle of perpetual road expansion ¶ in developed urbanized areas.** These strategies are listed below: ¶ • Maintain Balance of Jobs to Housing - **Since the entire Fort Sam Houston ¶ complex is a primary employer, there were many jobs in the project study prior to ¶ the BRAC program. However, most of these jobs were held by persons living ¶ outside the FSH redevelopment study area.**

## --Funding Mechanism

#### Impact fees key to funding BRAC

Brehm 2011 Denise Brehm (Civil and Environmental Engineering),March 9, 2011,Committee says DOD should pay some of the costs of transportation infrastructure near U.S. military bases, <http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2011/sussman-chair-brac.html>

The report from the National Research Council’s Transportation Research Board (TRB) developed case studies for six military bases located in metropolitan areas that are among the 18 bases that will receive a large influx of military personnel as mandated by the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) process. BRAC requires that base closings and staff relocations be implemented by September 2011, but the TRB report states that responding by the September deadline is unrealistic and calls for a special appropriation for infrastructure-related projects that can begin within the year and be completed in three years. “Normal funding will not be adequate to make near-term improvements needed to avoided significant, even severe, added traffic congestion in some BRAC cases,” said Sussman, the JR East Professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and the Engineering Systems Division. “If the Department of Defense wants to move huge numbers of troops into Fort Belvoir, they don’t have to ask anybody for permission. But the committee recommends the DOD pay an impact fee that would be negotiated and determined using a model like that used in the private sector.” An impact fee is typically imposed on a developer by a local government to cover the cost or partial cost of the infrastructure required for a proposed development. The Department of Defense has not been required to pay an impact fee in the past and has argued that off-base transportation infrastructure is not its responsibility except in cases where development would cause traffic to double in the environs of a military base. That, said Sussman, is an impossibility in already heavily congested areas like Fairfax County, Va., where Fort Belvoir is located. The committee did constrain the impact fees that could be imposed on the DOD by making the fee nondiscriminatory. “If a city or town hasn’t ever asked for an impact fee from past developers, they can’t now ask the DOD to pay one,” said Sussman, who added that local governments would need to pay their fair share. “This could be viewed as reshaping the dialogue between local planners and the DOD to put things much more on a level playing field.” Sussman, who specializes in the study of complex, large-scale systems, chairs the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Intelligent Transportation Systems Program Advisory Committee and has chaired other committees for the National Research Council’s Transportation Research Board. He characterized the committee that looked at the BRAC-related infrastructure issues as perhaps the most interesting TRB committee he’s chaired, and said the review process for the report was much more intense than that of a paper being published in a peer-reviewed journal. “The NRC guards its reputation for publishing unbiased studies and tries to tell it like it is for the good of the country,” Sussman said. The report was reviewed by six independent reviewers, and after the committee had addressed reviewers’ comments, the NRC process requires two additional independent reviewers to determine if the committee’s response was appropriate. “I was very pleased that the special appropriation language survived the review,” Sussman said. “We didn’t specify out of whose pocket the appropriation should come, but we do want to help those communities in need as a result of BRAC-related moves.” The 10 committee members served pro bono. They came from around the country and were drawn from both the public and private sectors. Sussman was the sole academic. The study was requested by U.S. Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.), where three of the 18 military bases are located.

#### Federal transportation grant programs can address BRAC-related transportation challenges

GAO 2009 (United States Government Accountability Office),1/2009, MILITARY BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09750.pdf>

 National security is one of the explicit goals of the Federal-Aid Highway Program; however, DOT does not have special programs to deal with military growth. Nevertheless, many federal transportation grant programs provide state and local governments with funding that they can use to help address BRAC-related transportation challenges. The Federal-Aid Highway program consists of seven core formula grant programs and several smaller formula and discretionary grant programs. Broad flexibility provisions allow for states to transfer funds between core programs and ¶ also to eligible transit projects. Federal capital transit programs include ¶ formula grants to transit agencies and states.¶ Additionally, transit capital ¶ investment grants provide discretionary funds for the construction and ¶ extension of fixed-guideway systems such as rail or bus rapid transit lines. ¶ Federal transportation programs also require states to set their own ¶ priorities for addressing transportation needs.

#### Stimulus funds from congress could be key in addressing adverse transportation problems due to BRAC

National Academies 2011 National Academies(NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL¶ Transportation Research Board¶ Studies and Special Programs Division)2/7/11, <http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=13104>

For the near term, it calls on Congress to consider a special appropriation or the allocation of uncommitted stimulus funds to address the most adverse transportation problems. The intent of these funds would be to initiate projects within the year that would reduce the severity of congestion impacts within three years. ¶ ¶ In the medium and long term, the committee recommended creating new funding streams for transportation infrastructure, calling on DOD to accept more financial responsibility for transportation problems related to growth on military bases just as private developers pay impact fees to cover costs for improvements made to access their sites. DOD's policy is that transportation infrastructure is the responsibility of state and local governments, with limited exception. The committee noted that communities that benefit economically from the presence of military bases should help pay for necessary transportation improvements as well.¶ ¶ Allocation of cost responsibility is complex and requires careful analysis, the committee said. To determine the military's share, a transportation impact study would be needed to assess traffic delays resulting from additional personnel traveling to and from military bases, including delays incurred wherever a bottleneck might occur on the transportation network.¶ ¶ The one DOD program that funds off-base transportation infrastructure -- the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program -- is inadequate for highly populated areas. "One of DAR's key criteria is flawed," said Sussman. "Requiring traffic at a base to double to be eligible for off-base road improvement funds is impossible in metropolitan areas with tens of thousands of commuters already on the roads." The committee called for revisions to the DAR program that would establish an impact fee approach to pay for the military’s share of road improvements in metropolitan areas and a separate DOD program to fund transit services for military personnel. ¶ ¶ Each added vehicle in congested traffic has a nonlinear effect, causing disproportionate delay on other drivers. This nonlinear impact means that modest changes such as teleworking, travelling during off-peak times, and carpooling have real benefits. The military should encourage these types of traffic mitigation measures and provide financial incentives for base commanders who implement them, the committee said.¶ ¶ BRAC 2005 is not the only major initiative that will increase growth at or near bases. There are other military reorganizations and initiatives that, together with BRAC, will relocate an additional estimated 180,000 military and civilian workers at the 18 BRAC-affected bases. "Concentrations of personnel at some military bases will continue. To better prepare for this growth, the military and metropolitan planning organizations must work together," said Sussman. "It is imperative that a process be developed that requires military and state and local officials to communicate, plan, and pay for transportation infrastructure." ¶ ¶ The study was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense. The National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, and National Research Council make up the National Academies. They are private, nonprofit institutions that provide science, technology, and health policy advice under a congressional charter. The Research Council is the principal operating agency of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering.

#### DoD policy means they will never directly aid funding for local infrastructure projects

Transportation Research Board 2011 Transportation Research Board of (The National Academic),2011, Federal Funding oF¶ Transportation improvements ¶ in BRAC Cases Committee for a Study on Federal Funding of ¶ Transportation Improvements in Base Realignment ¶ and Closure (BRAC) Cases, <http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/sr302.pdf> ¶

The official policy of DoD is that, with limited exceptions, the impact of ¶ bases on local government infrastructure is the responsibility of those ¶ governments (DoD 2008) (see also Box 1). The principal argument is that ¶ DoD employees pay taxes into the state and local coffers that fund infrastructure, and those sources should be tapped for making improvements to ¶ meet the demands placed on the infrastructure by soldiers and DoD civilian employees. DoD policy, however, also allows for special circumstances ¶ in which DoD provides funds for transportation improvements. Under the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program, administered by the ¶ military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), ¶ DoD may pay for public highway improvements to address the impact ¶ on traffic of sudden or unusual defense-related actions (see Box 2). ¶ DAR enables DoD to help pay indirectly for improvements to highways ¶ DoD designates as important to the national defense. Under DAR, DoD ¶ can use funds provided in military construction (MILCON) appropriations to pay for all or part of the cost of constructing and maintaining ¶ roads designated as “defense access roads.”¶ It is the responsibility of state and local highway agencies to ¶ provide and maintain adequate highways to serve public needs. ¶ These needs include those of DoD. The needs of defense were ¶ one of the original justifications for the Federal-Aid Highway ¶ Program that includes the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System ¶ of Interstate and Defense Highways. Defense traffic generates the ¶ same road-user revenues for state roadways as does other traffic. ¶ Therefore, DoD expects state and local highway authorities to ¶ develop and maintain adequate highways to serve defense installations just as they do for other traffic generators. It is DoD policy to ¶ not provide funds for the maintenance of non-DoD roads (except ¶ for maintaining the structural section of county gravel roads that ¶ support the Department of the Air Force’s Intercontinental Ballistic ¶ Missile Sites).¶ DoD recognizes that situations occur where defense traffic ¶ places an unexpected burden on state and local highway programs. ¶ These situations may include a dynamic increase in mission-related ¶ activities that result in a significant and sudden increase in defense ¶ traffic. The DAR program may then be able to be used to help fund ¶ highway improvements necessary to accommodate the sudden and ¶ unusual defense impacts.

eeds associated with defense-related¶ growth.

#### BRAC funding comes from approved financial plans by the Under Secretary of Defense. All DoD components are allocated funds based on official budget and justification.

DoD 2012 (Department of Defense), DoD Base Realignment and Closure, February 2012, <http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2013/budget_justification/pdfs/05_BRAC/BRAC_Exec_Sum_Book_FY13.pdf>

The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, Public ¶ Law 100-526, established the Defense Base Closure Account (BRAC I) as a mechanism to ¶ provide the required funding to implement the approved recommendations of the Base Closure ¶ and Realignment Commissions. Public Law 101-510, Title XXIX, Defense Base Closure and ¶ Realignment Act of 1990, established Base Closure Account 1990 (BRAC II) as a mechanism to ¶ provide the required funding to implement the approved recommendations of the BRAC 1991, ¶ 1993, and 1995 Commissions. From aspects of management, budgeting and accounting, both ¶ accounts are treated in the same fashion. Funding approved by Congress in both accounts is ¶ appropriated and authorized in a lump sum amount and may be spent for construction, planning ¶ and design, civilian severance pay, permanent change in station, transportation of things, and ¶ other costs related to the realignment or closure of the subject bases. The management structure ¶ of the program is described below. ¶ 1. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment) is responsible ¶ for issuing policy for management of the BRAC program and overseeing the DoD Components’ ¶ execution of the program. ¶ 2. To properly account for and manage appropriated fund resources, the DoD Base ¶ Closure Accounts were established on the books of the Treasury to aid the DoD Components in ¶ the closure and realignment of certain military installations. Treasury has assigned account ¶ symbol 97-0103 to identify the DoD Base Closure Account - Part I, and 97-0510 to identify DoD ¶ 4Base Closure Account 1990 - Part II, Part III, and Part IV and 97-0512 to identify DoD Base ¶ Closure Account 2005. ¶ Funds made available to the DOD Components are subdivided and distribute to the ¶ activities responsible for base closure actions. Separate allocations are made for each of the ¶ accounts by program year. Each DoD Component distributes the base closure funds in ¶ accordance with its normal fund distribution procedures. The applicable reporting requirements ¶ include: ¶ Military Construction¶ Construction ¶ Planning and Design ¶ Family Housing¶ Construction ¶ Operations ¶ Environmental ¶ Operation and Maintenance (O&M)¶ Civilian Severance Pay¶ ¶ Permanent Change of Station (PCS) costs ¶ Transportation of things ¶ Real Property Maintenance¶ Program Management (civilian work years, TDY travel, and related support dedicated ¶ to implementation efforts)¶ Military Personnel (limited to PCS expenses dedicated to implementation efforts)¶ Other (including procurement-type items)¶ 3. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) makes funds available to the DoD ¶ Components based on their official financial plans. Financial plans are prepared by the DoD ¶ Components in cooperation with and at the direction of the program manager, the Deputy Under ¶ Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment). The DoD Components’ financial plans and ¶ the subsequent allocation of funds are supported by detailed, line-item military and family ¶ housing construction justification. Separate narrative explanations for other planned ¶ expenditures are also submitted to the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in sufficient ¶ detail to support the DoD Component’s Financial plan. The DoD Components are allowed to ¶ revise planned execution as the situation dictates but must notify the Deputy Under Secretary of ¶ Defense (Installations & Environment) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) of all ¶ changes. To keep the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) apprised of these changes, the ¶ DoD Components are required to submit a revised current year financial plan and supporting ¶ documentation on a quarterly basis to reflect the status of the current plan being executed. When ¶ a military construction or family housing construction project is to be executed, but does not ¶ appear on the approved construction project list, the prior approval of the Under Secretary of ¶ Defense (Comptroller), and Congress is required. This will ensure that the Department has ¶ complied with the notification requirements of the House of Representatives Report 101-176, ¶ Military Construction Appropriation Bill, July 26, 1989, prior to the expenditure of DoD Base ¶ 5Closure Account funds. Each DoD Component is allocated funds based upon its official budget ¶ justification and financial plan. ¶ 4. Decision Rule for Determining the Validity of Charging Cost to the DoD Base ¶ Closure Accounts: In addition to being supported by the detailed budget justification, the ¶ general criterion to be applied when deciding whether to charge specific costs to the DoD Base ¶ Closure Account is that the cost in question is a one-time implementation cost directly associated ¶ with the overall base closure effort. For example, the one-time operation and maintenance-type ¶ costs at R&D-funded installations are charged to the appropriate sub-account of “Operation and ¶ Maintenance.” Low-dollar value construction projects budgeted as lump sum under the real ¶ property maintenance category are charged to that sub-account and not the construction subaccount of military construction, which is reserved for projects listed individually on the ¶ financial plan accompanying the fund allocation document. Recurring costs driven by the ¶ transfer of workload from one location to another is budgeted for and charged to the non-base ¶ closure accounts.

## --DAR/BRAC key

#### Brac is key and DAR must lead it

Collins and Hampton 12(Volume 75. No. 6, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/12mayjune/02.cfm)

Change on the Horizon¶ As demonstrated by these examples**, the DAR program is active across the country, implementing projects in both urban and rural areas. Given the magnitude of anticipated impacts, some congressional leaders have suggested that the DAR program should become an even larger contributor to address transportation needs near military facilities. Congress clearly is concerned about the military's impacts on local transportation systems, as demonstrated by its commissioning of several recent studies by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Transportation Research Board (TRB).** These studies suggest that changes to **the DAR program may be on the horizon**.¶ According to GAO's January 2011 report, High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs Beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program (GAO-11-165), "communities surrounding 18 military installations expecting BRAC-related growth had estimated over $2 billion in defense-related transportation needs. This has resulted in an increased interest in the...DAR program to help mitigate adverse transportation impacts."¶ Similarly, TRB's Special Report 302: Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases, also published in 2011, reports that the "time period by which BRAC decisions must be fully implemented (September 2011) is far too short for some bases and surrounding communities to avoid significant added traffic congestion for military personnel and other commuters during peak travel periods. The **resulting traffic delays will impose substantial costs on surrounding communities and may even be harmful to the military.**"¶ Further still, the TRB report concludes, "**the existing funding mechanisms [through DOD and USDOT] are incapable of addressing the problems in terms of both the speed with which they can be implemented and the resources they have available**."¶ In addition, a study by SDDC, "Defense Access Road Program Criteria Study," describes how **an urban DAR criterion could be added that would allow DOD to contribute a proportional share to projects to fix failing levels of service on congested roadways that would not otherwise meet the program's current eligibility criteria**.¶ Recommendations from these studies vary and cover a range of challenging concepts, including expanding the program's scope to include other modes of transportation and incorporating measures to manage transportation demand. The recommendations also describe opportunities for greater communication, coordination, and elevation of defense transportation needs in the local planning process.¶ **The impacts of recent actions resulting from changes in the military mission -- such as BRAC and Grow the Force, an initiative to enhance overall U.S. forces and reduce stress on deployable personnel -- will become more apparent in coming years. DOD will continue to work with communities on solutions to transportation challenges as they arise.**¶ "I have been impressed with how effective the DAR program is at allowing the department to collaborate with Federal, State, and local governments when common infrastructure challenges require development of balanced transportation solutions," says Bruce Busler, director of SDDC's Transportation Engineering Agency.¶ For its part, FHWA is committed to supporting DOD with technical expertise and guidance on all DAR projects. "The two agencies will continue working together to develop and implement recommendations that will make the program better at providing assistance to State and local governments," says FHWA's Haussler, "especially as funding transportation improvements becomes ever more challenging in the coming years."

# **2AC Answers**

## **--AT: 2013 Proposal- Inherency**

#### **2013 BRAC proposal is dead on arrival**

Brown 12 [Matthew Hay Brown – author for the Baltimore Sun, February 13, 2012, “State, local officials preparing for new BRAC”, <http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-02-13/news/bs-md-brac-2013-20120213_1_base-realignment-brac-new-round>]

In his federal budget proposal for 2013 released Monday, Obama seeks congressional approval for two more rounds of BRAC, with the goal of realigning the military infrastructure to reflect a "leaner, more agile, and flexible force."¶ He also proposes cutting defense spending by $31.8 billion, or 5.2 percent, in the coming year.¶ Much of the savings would come at the end of the war in Iraq and winding down the war in Afghanistan. The plan calls for the elimination of several Army brigade combat teams, nine Navy ships, several Marine infantry battalions and hundreds of Air Force aircraft.¶ Maryland stands to benefit from continued funding in cybersecurity, intelligence and research. The Maryland Air National Guard stands to gain a new intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance group and see its network warfare squadron grow. But the cancellation of the C27J Spartan transport plane would leave the Maryland air guard without airlift capabilities for overseas deployments or state disasters.¶ Belt-tightening through BRAC would take years to implement. For now, government officials and business leaders are skeptical a divided Congress will appoint a BRAC commission in an election year — Rep. Buck McKeon, the Republican chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has called the proposal "dead on arrival." But some do see a new round of realignment by 2015.

## --AT: States CP

#### **The states aren’t sufficient – laundry list**

NGA 09 [National Governors Association, June 09, 2009, “State Transportation Activities to Support Mission Growth”, <http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/0906MISSIONGROWTH.PDF>]

States are making considerable progress to meet the challenges associated with mission growth. However, with rising population numbers, significant and costly transportation demands, and a short timeline for responding, state efforts must be complemented with federal action. The Mission Growth Working Group of the NGA Center for Best Practices (see sidebar) has recommended adjustments that should be made at the federal level, including:

• Providing clear and timely DoD military personnel migration data. Information should include the number and arrival time of incoming military personnel, spouses, family members, and civilian employees.

• Directing federal agencies to afford priority consideration to mission growth

communities. Under Executive Order 12788, executive agencies are directed to afford priority consideration to requests from mission growth communities for federal technical assistance and financial resources. This executive order should be widely applied. Creating specific “mission growth” federal program assistance to ensure that adequate resources are available for planning, integrating, and implementing successful projects and strategies.

• Incorporating mission growth transportation projects into new infrastructure investments. For those projects that are part of a state transportation improvement program and/or that are required as a result of BRAC development, making new federal funds available would allow work on these projects to begin promptly. By including mission growth transportation projects as eligible infrastructure projects for new federal funds, important improvements can be made while creating jobs and strengthening national security.

• Promoting federal interoperational collaboration and partnerships through the Economic Adjustment Committee. **To maximize federal support, federal partner agencies should strive to align federal programs, oversight, and regulations;** consolidate redundancy and conflicting regulations where possible and establish transparent levels of responsibility and accountability. The Economic Adjustment Committee (EAC) is uniquely positioned to address these efforts and has the charge to facilitate and support the necessary federal agency relationships.

• Linking federal funding to DoD’s transition timetable and budget cycle so that federal support is available to mission growth states and communities for the duration of the impact of DoD-related growth.

• Adjusting the Defense Access Road (DAR) Program at DoD by:

• Establishing benchmarks. There should be clear traffic-impact-related

benchmarks that trigger the initiation of a DAR project.

• Involving state and local transportation authorities early in the process.

• Adjusting eligibility requirements. Suggested adjustments to eligibility criteria

include:

ƒ Modifying the traffic threshold requirement;

ƒ Broadening the array of eligible transportation projects;

ƒ Expediting DAR funding approval; and

ƒ Establishing a separate and distinct funding source for DAR-approved

projects.

• Improving the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Review Process to be more efficient and timely by:

• Ensuring the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has adequate resources to

fulfill in a timely fashion its role in providing NEPA compliance assistance and

staff training for other federal agencies;

• Ensuring federal agencies conducting reviews conduct their work concurrently;

and

• Ensuring state and federal agencies processing NEPA reviews are adequately

funded and staffed as well as given the necessary tools and training to carry out

timely NEPA reviews.

• Expanding shuttle bus capacity to meet transit demands of mission growth.

• Establishing a federal clearinghouse of mission growth strategies. The sharing of this information would allow states to learn of successfully examples in other states and over costly missteps to be shared with states.

#### USFG key - states can’t plan for defense generated impacts

Transportation Engineering Agency 9 (“Defense Access Road Program (DAR)”, <http://www.tea.army.mil/dodprog/hnd/DAR.htm>)

The DAR Program provides the legal means for DOD to pay its fair share for public highway improvements that are made necessary by sudden or unusual defense-generated impacts. These impacts are such that we cannot reasonably expect State and local authorities to plan for them in their normal highway improvement programs. We are responsible for determining what highway improvements are eligible for the DAR Program. The Federal Highway Administration jointly administers the program with us and connects us to the State and local authorities, who execute the projects. Funding DAR projects is the responsibility of the military services through their Military Construction Programs.

#### Federal government key- multiple state and local governments are uncoordinated and need the DoD’s coordination

US Government Accountability Office 2011 (“High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program,” January, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11165.pdf>)

GAO identified an additional step that may be necessary to meet the large ¶ pool of the transportation needs that are not being met by the Defense Access ¶ program—greater high-level federal interagency coordination. Aside from the ¶ Defense Access Roads program, other sources of funding exist that can be ¶ used to help mitigate unmet needs in the defense-affected communities. Local ¶ and state agencies generally have the responsibility for constructing and ¶ maintaining highways and are the recipients of billions of dollars from federal ¶ sources, such as grants from the Department of Transportation or through the ¶ American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. GAO found that some of the ¶ transportation projects at several of the military growth locations have been ¶ funded by the states in which they are located and others are recipients of ¶ American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds. Because this assistance is ¶ coming from diverse sources and is largely uncoordinated among the ¶ stakeholders involved, it is unclear to what extent priority consideration is ¶ being given to the defense-affected communities as prescribed by Executive ¶ Order 12788. This presidential order provided for a federal committee—the ¶ Economic Adjustment Committee—bringing together 22 agencies, under the ¶ leadership of the Secretary of Defense or his designee to, among other things, ¶ support various programs designed to assist communities most affected by ¶ defense activities. As chair of the committee, DOD has the opportunity to ¶ convene full committee meetings and exercise high-level leadership needed to ¶ ensure that federal agencies are affording priority consideration to defense affected communities. However, the committee has only rarely convened and ¶ has at no time discussed transportation needs affecting all 26 growth ¶ locations. Without this leadership, it is unlikely that the federal agencies can ¶ provide the effective interagency and intergovernmental coordination and ¶ potential funds needed to help address the unmet transportation needs of ¶ defense-affected communities.

#### The Federal government is very involved in BRAC which is supposed to move our forces around more efficiently for military readiness

HUD.gov 12(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program\_offices/comm\_planning/homeless/programs/brac)

"BRAC" is an acronym that stands for Base Realignment and Closure. It is the congressionally authorized process the US Department of Defense has previously used to reorganize its base structure to more efficiently and effectively support our military forces, increase operational readiness and facilitate new ways of doing business.¶ Processes¶ Revelopment Process Overview¶ Major Steps That Make up the Base Redevelopment Process:¶ Step 1: Approval of BRAC Recommendations for Closures or Realignments¶ Step 2: Federal Screening for Potential Federal Reuse¶ Step 3: DOD's Recognition of the LRA¶ Step 4: LRA's Screening (Outreach) Actions¶ Step 5: Completion of the Redevelopment Plan and the Homeless Assistance Submission¶ Step 6: HUD's Review¶ Step 7: Military's Disposal of Buildings and Property¶ HUD's Role in the BRAC Process¶ reviews the LRA's reuse plan and determines whether the plan:¶ Considers the size and nature, and the availability of existing services to meet the needs of the homeless population.¶ Was developed in consultation with homeless assistance providers.¶ Considers the suitability of the buildings and property on the installation for needs and use of the homeless.¶ Balances the needs for economic and other development with the needs of the homeless for the communities within the vicinity of the installation.¶ Considers the economic impact of proposed homeless assistance on communities in the vicinity of the installation.¶ Specifies the manner in which the property will be made available.¶ HUD is available to provide technical assistance to the LRA and may negotiate and consult with the LRA before or during its preparation of the reuse plan. Local HUD Field Office staff can help link the LRA with homeless assistance providers, provide guidance on the process mandated by the Redevelopment Act, and facilitate linkage of the LRA and homeless assistance providers to sources of funding for reuse projects.

#### **States fail/Plan can’t solve (depends on solvency mechanism) – success requires high-level intergovernmental coordination**

GAO 11 Government Accountability Office (audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of Congress that examines the use of public funds and evaluates federal programs); January 2011; “High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program”; United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees; http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11165.pdf

GAO identified an additional step that may be necessary to meet the large pool of the transportation needs that are not being met by the Defense Access program—greater high-level federal interagency coordination. Aside from the Defense Access Roads program, other sources of funding exist that can be used to help mitigate unmet needs in the defense-affected communities. Local and state agencies generally have the responsibility for constructing and maintaining highways and are the recipients of billions of dollars from federal sources, such as grants from the Department of Transportation or through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. GAO found that some of the transportation projects at several of the military growth locations have been funded by the states in which they are located and others are recipients of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds. Because this assistance is coming from diverse sources and is largely uncoordinated among the stakeholders involved, it is unclear to what extent priority consideration is being given to the defense-affected communities as prescribed by Executive Order 12788. This presidential order provided for a federal committee—the Economic Adjustment Committee—bringing together 22 agencies, under the leadership of the Secretary of Defense or his designee to, among other things, support various programs designed to assist communities most affected by defense activities. As chair of the committee, DOD has the opportunity to convene full committee meetings and exercise high-level leadership needed to ensure that federal agencies are affording priority consideration to defense- affected communities. However, the committee has only rarely convened and has at no time discussed transportation needs affecting all 26 growth locations. Without this leadership, it is unlikely that the federal agencies can provide the effective interagency and intergovernmental coordination and potential funds needed to help address the unmet transportation needs of defense-affected communities.

#### States’ budgets are extremely tight and can’t afford to fund transportation infrastructure

Reed 10James B. Reed (Heads the Transportation Program at NCSL); "Stalled: March 2010." Stalled. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 June 2012. http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/transport/stalled.aspx>. AMR

Funding for transportation and virtually all other areas at all levels of government is coming up short, however, in the wake of the worst recession in decades. The extensions of the federal program for two months at a time added to the uncertainty for states. Since states aren’t sure how much money will be available in the expected six-year reauthorization, some have reacted by cutting transportation budgets. The murky future for the legislation also has added to the uncertainty for an already beleaguered construction industry. “We are planning future transportation projects with one hand tied behind our backs, expecting the federal government will pass a reauthorization bill but not sure when,” says Oregon Senator Bruce Starr, summing up the sentiments of many state lawmakers. The previous legislation—referred to as SAFETEA-LU—authorized $286 billion in 2005 for a variety of programs for highway construction and maintenance, public transportation and transportation safety. It was enacted late as well, after eight short-term extensions, so this year’s dilemma is neither new nor unexpected. It could be worse. Reauthorization of an aviation bill is now more than two years late. This time around, the recession has state coffers starved of revenue and has exacerbated the backlog of transportation needs. With money from the 2009 federal stimulus package, states were able to pay for some of the delayed maintenance needs, such as repaving roads and replacing equipment. A second stimulus bill is under consideration in Congress to give additional money for infrastructure. State budgets continue to be battered, however, and more deep cuts will be necessary to close gaps in FY 2011 budgets, already estimated at $54.2 billion in the most recent budget report by the National Conference of State Legislatures. “It makes no sense to me that, after putting the industry to work with the stimulus funds to begin rebuilding the nation’s crumbling transportation infrastructure, the federal government would then turn around and un-employ those workers by not funding the reauthorization,” says New Hampshire Representative Candace Bouchard. As 2010 began, states were preparing to make significant reductions in transportation programs. For example, budget cuts in Kansas reduced highway maintenance funds by $50 million. And Virginia chopped nearly $900 million in transportation projects—and with it, 1,000 jobs—as expected revenues failed to materialize. For transportation, the key funding source is the motor fuels tax at the federal, state and local levels. But less driving and widespread use of fuel-saving hybrid and battery-powered vehicles has cut gasoline use. As a result, revenue from the fixed cents-per-gallon tax on gasoline and diesel has been in a steady decline. To meet escalating transportation needs, 20 states raised transportation funds in 2009 through gas tax increases or vehicle fees. Seven others opted to pursue public-private partnerships to help fund and construct new transportation infrastructure.

## **--AT: Federalism**

#### **The states may design and construct – the USFG just funds it**

Collins and Hamptons 12 [Darcel M. Collins – transportation specialist with the Federal Highway Association & M.A. in Management from Webster University, Daryl D. Hampton – senior engineer for the Defense Access Roads program & B.S. in civil engineering from Old Dominion University, June 2012, “Defense Access Roads”, <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/12mayjune/02.cfm>]

Once appropriated, the DAR funding is transferred to FHWA for project execution. FHWA typically distributes funds to the State, county, or other local transportation authority for completing the project unless one of the division offices of FHWA's Office of Federal Lands Highway takes the lead. A project memorandum of agreement establishes specific roles and responsibilities for the officials involved in the DAR project. Upon completion, long-term maintenance of the improvement becomes the responsibility of the owning highway authority.

#### **The process is bureaucratic**

Collins and Hamptons 12 [Darcel M. Collins – transportation specialist with the Federal Highway Association & M.A. in Management from Webster University, Daryl D. Hampton – senior engineer for the Defense Access Roads program & B.S. in civil engineering from Old Dominion University, June 2012, “Defense Access Roads”, <http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/12mayjune/02.cfm>]

Immediately following September 11, 2001, the Army closed the State-operated Beulah Street/Woodlawn Road corridor through the North Post of Fort Belvoir in Fairfax County, VA, due to security concerns. Prior to the closure, this route handled both Army and non-Army traffic demands and provided a connection between heavily traveled Telegraph Road and Richmond Highway. Removal of the two-lane access routes through this portion of southeastern Fairfax County substantially diminished the flexibility of traffic movement. In 2003, the Army conducted a preliminary engineering and environmental study to evaluate the feasibility of establishing a connector road between Telegraph Road and Richmond Highway.¶ The SDDC commander certified the project as important to national defense on July 15, 2004. After extensive negotiations, in 2006 the Army, Fairfax County, the Commonwealth of Virginia, FHWA, and the National Trust for Historic Preservation settled on a final alignment for the new connector (Mulligan Road), which will cross primarily Army property. The State and county requested that the road include four lanes to handle the projected long-term traffic demand. At the request of the Army and the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT), FHWA's Eastern Federal Lands Highway Division agreed to execute the environmental planning, design, and construction of the project. In late 2007, FHWA completed the environmental planning, which included agreements on land exchanges between the Army, VDOT, and the National Trust for Historic Preservation. The Army agreed to donate the easement for the sections of roadway that will cross Army property and to pay for design and construction of two of the four lanes of Mulligan Road as a replacement for the two taken away as a result of the permanent road closure.

## --AT: Spending DA

#### BRAC will save money in the long term

Global Security no date (“Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)”, GlobalSecurity.org, Military, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/brac.htm>)

In mid-December 2001 House and Senate negotiators authorized a new round of military base closings, but delayed any action until 2005. While the Bush administration and the Senate had wanted the base-closing process to begin in 2003, the House had been opposed. Under the compromise plan, the Secretary of Defense will submit a force structure plan and facility inventory, with a certification that proposed closings were justified by the force structure plan and and that they would produce net savings. The closings would also consider environmental costs and community impact. Seven of the nine commission members could vote to add bases to the Pentagon's proposed closure list, but a simple majority would suffice to drop bases from the closure plan. The Bush administration has estimated that 20 percent to 25 percent of military bases are surplus, and that the Pentagon could save $3 billion a year by eliminating surplus facilities.¶ In August 2002 Phil Grone, principal assistant deputy undersecretary of defense for installations and the environment, estimated the next round of base closures in 2005 could save $6 billion a year, even if it cut only 12 percent of DoD's military infrastructure. One 1998 study suggested that 20 to 25 percent of the military's infrastructure could be considered surplus. Grone indicated that an analysis to "shed excess capacity" would be completed in 2004, before the Pentagon decided how many bases must be closed in the 2005 BRAC round.¶ On January 6, 2004, the Department of Defense announced that it had requested commanders of installations in the United States, territories and possessions to gather information about their installations as part of the 2005 round of BRAC. All installations are to participate in these calls, and every base and military installation in the United States are doing internal assessments of their operations, land, personnel, and facilities. While none of the questions or data associated with the questions will be released to the public prior to the department's recommendations being forwarded to the independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and with all questions and data to be publicly available once the Commission receives them.

## --AT T- Security is not infrastructure

#### Infrastructure in ports includes all equipment, that means security.

Chandrasekhar 2009 Manju Chandrasekhar(Vice President in Port Infrastructure Development), Port Infrastructure Development ¶ Opportunities in these Challenging Times,May/20th/2009, <http://aapa.files.cms>plus.com/SeminarPresentations/2009Seminars/09Commissioners/Chandrasekhar\_Manju.pdf

• “Infrastructure” is broadly considered to include:¶ – Transportation ¶ • Maritime – terminals, ports, equipment ¶ • Surface – tolled and non-tolled roads, bridges, tunnels ¶ • Aviation – terminals, airports, ATC ¶ • Rail – light rail, metros, transit

#### Transportation Infrastructure is defined a moving goods efficiently and in a timely manner

 McNeil 2010 (Professor Sue McNeil, director of the University Transportation Center and ¶ professor of Civil Engineering in the Department of Civil and Environmental ¶ Engineering at the University of Delaware, leads the research team assembling the ¶ information and creating the models), “Transportation Performance Index”, Sep/19/2010, <http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/lra/files/LRA_Transp_Index_Technical_Report_100919.pdf>

Definition: Transportation Infrastructure ¶ · General Definition: Moving people and goods by air, water, road, and rail ¶ · Technical Definition: The fixed facilities (roadway segments, railway ¶ tracks, transit terminals, harbors, and airports), flow entities (people, ¶ vehicles, container units, railroad cars) and control systems that permit ¶ people and goods to traverse geographical space efficiently and in a timely ¶ manner and for the intended purpose. Transportation modes include ¶ highway, rail, air, and marine.

## --AT: T-Substantial

### Plan = 2 billion

#### Funding is substantial, just near term estimated 2.0 billion.

GAO 2009 (United States Government Accountability Office),1/2009, MILITARY BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09750.pdf>

Traffic impacts can also affect larger relocation decisions, ¶ and were important in DOD’s decision to acquire an additional site for ¶ Fort Belvoir, Virginia, an acquisition that DOD estimates will cost ¶ $1.2 billion. According to a DOD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) ¶ survey, 17 of 18 BRAC growth communities identified transportation as ¶ one of their top challenges. Near-term transportation projects to ¶ address these challenges could cost about $2.0 billion, of which about ¶ $1.1 billion is related to projects in the metropolitan Washington, ¶ D.C., area.

### Costs $530 million

#### Expanding DAR around bases costs $530 million.

SDDC 2010 (Surface Deployment and Distribution Command-Transportation Engineering Agency, “Defense Access Road Program Criteria Study,” July 29, http://www.tea.army.mil/pubs/nr/dod/briefings/Defense%20Access%20Road%20Program%20Criteria%20Study.pdf)

The recommended project will, at a minimum, restore the level of service or delay time to levels which existed prior to the military action. For all DAR projects, SDDC conducts an analysis to determine the fair-share that should be funded by DoD. This analysis considers the military impact to traffic on the subject roadway segment and mitigation required to address the impact. The appropriate military funding share is then determined based on the installations proportion of the total traffic which utilizes the subject roadway segment. For large, complex projects involving military and non-military impacts, other factors (such as overall project scope, total project cost, and funding available from other sources) are taken into consideration. A similar fair-share analysis shall be conducted for projects found eligible for DAR funding using the criteria recommended in this study. Based on a review of growth installations, it appears that the potential DoD order-of-magnitude contribution cost could be $530 million or more for the improvement of off-installation roadways. This is based on a very rough extrapolation of four case studies documented in this paper. The cost analysis did not involve a detailed examination of each of the installations specific site conditions.

## --AT: Politics

#### Base closure is popular in house, saves money in end, means funding could be good

DoD 2012 (Department of Defense), DoD Base Realignment and Closure, February 2012, <http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2013/budget_justification/pdfs/05_BRAC/BRAC_Exec_Sum_Book_FY13.pdf>

The Department has complied with the guidance contained in the House of ¶ Representatives Report 101-76, Military Construction Appropriations Bill, 1990, July 26, 1989, ¶ to determine the proper method of capitalizing the DoD Base Closure Accounts. In denying ¶ general transfer authority to the Secretary of Defense, the Committee expressed the belief that ¶ the necessary one-time costs to implement base realignments and closures be requested as new ¶ appropriated amounts to facilitate improved accounting of the funds appropriated. Additionally, ¶ the Committee indicated that any savings or cost avoidance due to base realignment or closure ¶ should be reflected through reduced requirements in the annual budget requests for the affected ¶ appropriations. ¶ The manner in which the impacts of base realignments and closures are reflected in ¶ BRAC 2005 appropriations accounts is consistent with this language. The budget request ¶ includes any funds that are required to be transferred to the Homeowner’s Assistance Program ¶ for the purpose outlined in Section II. ¶ The implementation of base realignment and closures requires the relocation of units and ¶ activities from one site to another. Recurring savings (reduced base operations costs) are ¶ realized through the increased efficiencies inherent in the consolidation of functions on fewer ¶ bases. The net savings are reflected as savings in the specific appropriations, primarily operation ¶ and maintenance, and are not incorporated in the DoD Base Closure Accounts. ¶ Estimates for savings or cost avoidance have been incorporated into the DoD Component ¶ appropriation account where they are to accrue, resulting in corresponding reduced budget ¶ requests for those appropriations. ¶ The recurring savings reflected on all BC-02 financial displays reflect those cost ¶ avoidances that are estimated to accrue each year as a result of implementing the closure and/or ¶ realignment recommendations. These savings, attributable to such areas as civilian salaries, ¶ military personnel entitlements and overhead, are used to fund the implementation of BRAC ¶ recommendations and/or fund other Defense priorities such as equipment, facilities, and military ¶ personnel billets for our forces. The BRAC decisions free up military personnel authorizations ¶ that, in many cases, are re-applied within each Military Department to support new capabilities ¶ and to improve operational efficiencies at worldwide locations. To the extent that savings ¶ generated from military personnel reductions at closing or realigning installations are ¶ immediately used to fund military personnel priorities, these resources are not available to fund ¶ other Defense priorities.

Senator support exists for removal of BRAC-caused traffic

**¶** (Jonathan Wilson, Wamu 88.5, “Senators Want DOD to Address BRAC Traffic”, 9/29/11, <http://wamu.org/news/morning_edition/11/09/29/senators_want_dod_to_address_brac_traffic>, accessed 7/9/11)

Virginia's two U.S. Senators say they still have serious concerns about the traffic around the Department of Defense's new Washington Headquarters Service office at Mark Center. Senators Mark Warner (D) and Jim Webb (D) joined Congressmen Jim Moran (D) and Gerry Connolly (D) in [sending a letter](http://moran.house.gov/list/press/va08_moran/tmppanettaltr.shtml) on the issue to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta today.¶ The letter expresses concern that DOD's transportation management plan for the new Alexandria facility doesn't do enough to prevent crippling traffic congestion in the area.¶ "While the transportation improvements paid for by the Department will not be completed until at least December 2013, the Department’s current occupation plan for the Mark Center will relocate 5,000 personnel to the BRAC site by December 2011, two full years before the transportation improvements will be completed," the lawmakers note in the letter.¶ The agency is phasing in the arrival of the 6,400 employees the building is expected to house as part of the military's larger Base Realignment and Closure ([BRAC](http://wamu.org/topic/brac)). But the lawmakers say the schedule is still too aggressive considering that road improvements have not been made. They want DOD to outline traffic mitigation measures if the gridlock gets worse, and give the public access to traffic monitoring data every 30 days.¶

# \*\*\*BRAC Neg Work\*\*\*

## Links

### Politics/Spending

#### BRAC is expensive and unpopular

Brannen and Weisgerber, defense reporter, Jan 25 (“Pentagon to request 2 new rounds of BRAC,” Army Times, 2012, <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/01/dn-pentagon-to-request-2-new-rounds-of-brac-012512/>)

To close or consolidate military bases in the United States requires legislation from Congress to create a bipartisan Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC), which then studies the problem and makes recommendations to the president and the defense secretary.¶ The last round of BRAC took place in 2005 and the changes it implemented were only completed in this past fall.¶ The new requests would seek authorization for the first BRAC in 2013, to be followed by another in 2015, one source said. The two new rounds of closures could reap savings in five to eight years, sources predict, but would cost money up front.¶ Closing bases is hugely expensive in the short-run, one former Pentagon official said. There are the costs of relocating people and equipment, plus the costs of shutdown and the associated environmental impacts. Proposed base closings often are contentious, too, as legislators fight to keep jobs and spending in their districts.¶ “It’s going to be a tough sell,” a defense source said.

#### Funding is not ready now, makes the plan unpopular

Committee on Federal Funding of Transportation Improvements in BRAC Cases, Transportation Research Board (pg 72, http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record\_id=13104)

Federal Funding OF transpOrtatiOn imprOvements in BraC Cases stAte infRAstRuctuRe BAnks Many of the states with BRAC actions have state infrastructure banks that could be a source of upfront capital to improve transportation facilities at low or no interest if a revenue source could be found to repay the loan. In the case of Fort Bliss, the state is dedicating a share of future federal surface transportation revenues to pay a developer who financed the project. Another possibility is for a local jurisdiction or state to dedicate some portion of existing tax revenues, or raise taxes, to repay a loan from a state infrastructure bank. Some complexities with this approach are obvious. Most of the facilities adversely affected by base expansion are state highways, and local property or business taxes would not apply. The state could dedicate a share of future highway user taxes to repay the loan, but, as indicated above, most state transportation trust funds are inadequate to meet current needs. Given the current status of state and local finances, the concept of diverting existing tax revenues to a new purpose, or raising taxes, would be politically unpopular, but such an approach might be possible in the future for some projects. imPAct fees The situation of a sharp increase in base personnel being transferred to new or expanded facilities is analogous to an unanticipated new, large private development occurring within a metropolitan region. Typically, regional leaders would negotiate with the developer and require that certain conditions be met to ameliorate the negative impacts of the development, and they often impose fees to offset capital improvement needs as a result of the development. If developers in such instances are unwilling to pay the impact fees, local governments can refuse to allow the development. Exactions, the on-site construction of public facilities or dedication of land, have been used for decades.3 Impact fees, a form of exaction, were instituted in the 1920s as a local financing tool. Where no appro- priate land was available for a traditional exaction, off-site land or a fee- in-lieu could be substituted for a dedication. Over time, these fees came to include capital costs for on- and off-site improvements brought about by new development. Rooted in the idea that new development should pay its own way, impact fees increasingly have been used to pay for improvements traditionally paid for by property taxes. According to the California State Controller’s Office, fees and service charges account for See Appendix A, from which this chapter is derived, for a more extended discussion of impact fees. 3 72

#### DAR will spend more and have great affects

Association of Defense Communities, 5-12 (Senate Panel Asks for Details on Planned Changes to DOD’s Roads Program,, http://www.defensecommunities.org/headlines/senate-panel-asks-for-details-on-planned-changes-to-dods-roads-programs/#)

The Department of Defense is considering improving and expanding the Defense Access Roads (DAR) program, according to the committee report accompanying the fiscal 2013 military construction and veterans affairs spending bill approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee on Tuesday.¶ The changes are intended to address the strict eligibility requirements of the program, which is the only mechanism DOD has for upgrading roads outside of military installations. To be eligible for aid through the DAR program, an installation must demonstrate that traffic congestion for commuters has doubled, an extremely high hurdle for urban areas to satisfy, according to the report.¶ The lawmakers direct DOD to provide Congress its plan and recommendations for updating the DAR program when it submits its FY 2014 budget request next February.¶ “Well-planned and maintained transportation infrastructure adjacent to military facilities increases mobility, improves livability and enhances relations between the base and the local community,” the report states.¶ The lawmakers ask DOD to consider ways it can work with the Department of Transportation, state governments and local communities to find alternatives to efficiently address critical transportation infrastructure shortfalls near military installations. The committee also encourages the department to improve interagency coordination to harness other federal resources and address major traffic needs at installations affected by large population increases.

#### Defense cuts do not solve the budget issue

Krugman 11 (Paul, Paul Krugman joined The New York Times in 1999 as a columnist on the Op-Ed Page and continues as professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton University.¶ Mr. Krugman received his B.A. from Yale University in 1974 and his Ph.D. from MIT in 1977. He has taught at Yale, MIT and Stanford. At MIT he became the Ford International Professor of Economics.¶ Mr. Krugman is the author or editor of 20 books and more than 200 papers in professional journals and edited volumes. His professional reputation rests largely on work in international trade and finance; he is one of the founders of the "new trade theory," a major rethinking of the theory of international trade. In recognition of that work, in 1991 the American Economic Association awarded him its John Bates Clark medal, a prize given every two years to "that economist under forty who is adjudged to have made a significant contribution to economic knowledge." Mr. Krugman's current academic research is focused on economic and currency crises.¶ At the same time, Mr. Krugman has written extensively for a broader public audience. Some of his recent articles on economic issues, originally published in Foreign Affairs, Harvard Business Review, Scientific American and other journals, are reprinted in Pop Internationalism and The Accidental Theorist.¶ ¶ On October 13, 2008, it was announced that Mr. Krugman would receive the Nobel Prize in Economics., http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/realism-on-defense-spending/)

One thing I’m hearing and reading from liberal sources is the argument that we can find big savings by ending the war in Afghanistan, and more generally by cutting bloated defense spending. So, a few words on that issue.¶ Yes, there’s a lot of wasteful defense spending — in fact, it’s almost surely the most waste-ridden part of the federal budget, because politicians are afraid to say no to anything for fear of being called unpatriotic. And even aside from the question of the Bush wars, it has long been clear that we’re still spending a lot to head off threats that haven’t existed since the fall of the Soviet Union. Read Fred Kaplan for a sense of just how bad it is.¶ Then there are those wars. I was against Iraq from the beginning — and I was pretty lonely out there on the pages of major newspapers. Afghanistan made sense in 2002, but I have no idea what we’re doing there now.¶ But if we’re talking about fiscal issues, you have to bear the arithmetic in mind. We’re not living in the 1950s, when defense was half the federal budget. Even a drastic cut in military spending wouldn’t release enough money to offset more than a small fraction of the projected rise in health care costs.¶ So by all means, let’s try to crack down on the massive waste that goes on in matters military. But doing so would be of only modest help on the larger budget problem.

#### Spending on a worthless mission would be unpopular

Edwards 10 (Chris Edwards, Chris Edwards is the director of tax policy studies at Cato and editor of www.DownsizingGovernment.org. He is a top expert on federal and state tax and budget issues. Before joining Cato, Edwards was a senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, a manager with PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an economist with the Tax Foundation. Edwards has testified to Congress on fiscal issues many times, and his articles on tax and budget policies have appeared in the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and other major newspapers. He is the author of Downsizing the Federal Government and co-author of Global Tax Revolution. Edwards holds a B.A. and M.A. in economics, and he was a member of the Fiscal Future Commission of the National Academy of Sciences., Department of Transportation, Proposed Spending Cuts; Cato Institute)

Most Department of Transportation activities are properly the responsibility of state and local governments and the private sector. There are few advantages in funding infrastructure such as highways and airports from Washington, but there are many disadvantages. Federal involvement results in political misallocation of resources, bureaucratic mismanagement, and costly one-size-fits-all regulations imposed on the states.¶ The Federal Highway Administration should be eliminated. Taxpayers and highway users would be better off if federal highway spending and gasoline taxes were ended. State governments could more efficiently plan their highway systems without federal intervention. The states should look to the private sector for help in funding and operating highways, and they ought to move forward with innovations such as expressways with electronic tolling.¶ The Federal Transit Administration should be eliminated. Federal transit subsidies have caused local governments to make inefficient transportation choices. Federal aid favors rail systems, which are more expensive and less flexible than bus systems. The removal of federal subsidies and related regulations would spur local governments to discover more cost-effective transportation solutions, such as opening transit markets to private operators.¶ Air traffic control should be removed from the federal budget, and the ATC system should be set up as a stand-alone and self-funded agency or private company. Many nations have moved towards such a commercialized ATC structure, and the results have been very positive with regard to efficiency and safety. Canada's reform in the 1990s to create a private nonprofit ATC corporation is a good model for the United States to follow. U.S. ATC is currently overseen by the Federal Aviation Administration, which has serious funding problems and a poor record on implementing new technologies. Moving to a Canadian-style ATC system would help solve these problems and allow our aviation infrastructure to meet rising aviation demand.¶ Amtrak has provided second-rate rail service for decades, while consuming almost $40 billion in federal subsidies. It has a poor on-time record, and its infrastructure is in bad shape. As a government agency, it is hamstrung in its decisionmaking regarding routes, workforce polices, capital investment, and other aspects of business. Amtrak should be privatized to give it the management flexibility it needs to operate in a more efficient and competitive manner.¶ The table shows that federal taxpayers would save about $85 billion annually by closing down the agencies and programs listed. The department would retain its current activities regarding highway safety, aviation safety, and some other regulatory functions. Those functions could be reformed as well, but the most important thing is to end federal subsidies for transportation activities that would be better handled by the states and private sector. America should take heed of the market-based reforms being implemented abroad, and pursue similar solutions to its transportation challenges.¶

## Case

## --Solvency

#### The DoD doesn’t want to pay for transportation infrastructure and has communication issues

Federal News Radio 11 (“Report: DoD should help solve BRAC traffic problems,” <http://www.federalnewsradio.com/?nid=697&sid=2262222>)

The report, prepared by the National Research Council's Transportation Research Board, examined congestion issues that arise when the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process moves DoD employees en-masse into urban areas that are already saturated with traffic.¶ The board used case studies of six large bases to produce its findings, including three in the Washington metro area: Fort Meade and the National Naval Medical Center in Maryland and Fort Belvoir in Virginia. Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state, and Florida's Eglin Air Force Base and Fort Bliss, Texas also were examined.¶ The board found that DoD generally considers transportation infrastructure improvements to be the responsibility of state and local officials, even when the Pentagon's own decisions are the cause of local congestion.¶ "This policy is unrealistic for congested metropolitan transportation networks," the report stated.¶ It also found DoD base commanders generally did not consult adequately with local planning officials when making their own facility expansion plans. At Fort Belvoir, for example, the committee reported that DoD made plans to increase access to the base itself by upgrading on-base roads, but did not consult with state and local agencies on traffic impacts when it updated its long-range master plan.

#### **DAR too complex – states don’t know how to take advantage of DAR’s complicated regulations**

GAO 11 Government Accountability Office (audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of Congress that examines the use of public funds and evaluates federal programs); January 2011; “High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program”; United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees; http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11165.pdf

The Defense Access Roads program is providing some assistance in mitigating transportation needs in communities surrounding growth installations, but program usage has been limited, in part, by a lack of knowledge of the program, outdated regulations, and unclear guidance on how to navigate the program’s complex process. DOD has certified 20 transportation projects at 11 of the 26 military installation locations since 2004. Of the 20 certified projects, 11 have been funded at about $125 million. Considering funding delays and construction time frames, most of the approved projects to date are unlikely to provide relief in the near term. The procedures of the Defense Access Roads program are complex, involving multiple federal, state, and local stakeholders. The guidance describing the program’s procedures and, specifically, the application of the criteria, is difficult to follow and some regulations and guidance are outdated. Despite program outreach efforts and positive experiences with program administrators, military officials from 11 installations said that more information would be helpful to clarify the program’s procedures. Without program guidance that clearly details the program’s procedures and is effectively communicated to all stakeholders, the program may not be used to its fullest extent.

# CPs

## GAO CP

**CP text: The DOD in coordination with the Department of Transportation should update, clarify, and communicate the program’s guidelines to all stakeholders and ensure regular meetings of appropriate high-level leaders to identify existing federal transportation funding resources and develop a strategy for giving priority consideration to defense-affected communities.**

NB = Spending/Ptix?

#### **CP solves**

GAO 11 Government Accountability Office (audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of Congress that examines the use of public funds and evaluates federal programs); January 2011; “High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program”; United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees; http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11165.pdf

The unprecedented growth at 26 military installations across the country due to the implementation of several concurrent Department of Defense (DOD) initiatives is expected to stress transportation needs for surrounding communities. The Defense Access Roads program, while small when compared to other transportation funding sources, provides a means for DOD to pay a share of the cost of highway improvements due to unusual and sudden DOD-generated activities. In response to a congressional request to review the program, GAO (1) assessed the use of the program to mitigate transportation needs and (2) identified additional steps that may be necessary to address unmet transportation needs. GAO conducted extensive interviews with 26 growth installations and visited installations and state authorities in Maryland, Texas, and Virginia to discuss transportation issues. What GAO Recommends. GAO recommends that DOD in coordination with the Department of Transportation (1) update, clarify, and communicate the program’s guidelines to all stakeholders to promote more effective program utilization, and (2) ensure regular meetings of appropriate high-level leaders to identify existing federal transportation funding resources and develop a strategy for giving priority consideration to defense-affected communities. DOD partially concurred with our recommendations.

## States CP

#### States solve everything

Edwards 10 (Chris Edwards, Chris Edwards is the director of tax policy studies at Cato and editor of www.DownsizingGovernment.org. He is a top expert on federal and state tax and budget issues. Before joining Cato, Edwards was a senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, a manager with PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an economist with the Tax Foundation. Edwards has testified to Congress on fiscal issues many times, and his articles on tax and budget policies have appeared in the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and other major newspapers. He is the author of Downsizing the Federal Government and co-author of Global Tax Revolution. Edwards holds a B.A. and M.A. in economics, and he was a member of the Fiscal Future Commission of the National Academy of Sciences., Department of Transportation, Proposed Spending Cuts; Cato Institute)

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