Iraq Negative

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\*\*\*Permanent Occupation Negative\*\*\*

\*\*Generic Democracy Good\*\*

Demo-Promo Solves: War

Democracy promotion solves famine and war, key to sustainability.

Phar Kim Beng, “Should the US Plug Democracy in Asia,” THE STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), January 14, 2000 LN.

The spread of democracy can enhance US national interests in four major ways. Firstly, by encouraging other nations to democratise, the political conditions of otherwise repressive republics would improve. The pressure and attraction for others to enter America illegally would thus be reduced significantly. Secondly, as more countries democratise, that is by instituting multi-party electoral competition, the prospect of governments launching wars against one another would decline exponentially. This is because the decision to go to war would not be made by any one man or party at the helm, but would be subject to the purview and discretion of the public. Given the greater degree of public accountability, it would be correspondingly difficult for any government to justify the launching of an open war against the US or other nations. Democratic peace would, therefore, prevail across the world, much to the US' interests. Thirdly, democracy is also conducive to economic growth. A World Survey of Economic Freedom for 1995 to 1996, found that the countries rated "free" generated 81 per cent of the world's output even though they had only 17 per cent of the world's population. In another study by The Heritage Foundation, it was found that countries classified as "free" had annual 1980-1993 real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates of 2.88 per cent. In "mostly-free" countries, the rate was 0.97 per cent; in "mostly-not-free" ones, minus 0.32 per cent; and in "repressed" countries, minus 1.44 per cent. Fourthly, the US should spread democracy because the citizens of democracies do not suffer from famines. Most of the countries that have experienced severe famines in recent decades have been among the world's least democratic: the Soviet Union (Ukraine in the early 1930s), China, Ethiopia, Somalia, Cambodia and Sudan. Throughout history, famines have occurred in many different types of countries, but never in a democracy. Democracies do not experience famines for reasons of greater transparency and accountability. To the extent that the incidence of famine continues to fall, massive cross-border human emigration would cease, too. Global and regional security would thus be enhanced, by which the US would no doubt stand to gain due to its extensive political and economic interests abroad.

Democracy promotion solves occupation: (1) fosters peace; (2) leads to development/good governance

Minxin Pei, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Implementing the Institutions of Democracy,” INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE v. 19 n. 4, December 2002, p. 3+.

The international community's support for democracies in developing countries is based on many considerations. For instance, geopolitics played a role in the West's support for democracies in certain parts of the world during the Cold War when supporting democracy was compatible with the West's strategy of containing the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the same set of strategic concerns also led the West to a policy of inconsistency in the support of democracies. In the post-Cold War era, supporting democracies has gained greater importance as the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the Soviet threat and allowed the West to focus greater efforts on democratic promotion. Two theories underlie the West's strategy of democratic promotion. First, the establishment of democracies around the world is considered conducive to world peace because liberal democracies do not wage war with each other. Second, democracies are thought to have the more effective political institutions for economic development and good governance.

Demo-Promo Solves: War

THE PROMOTION OF AMERICAN STYLE CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IS ESSENTIAL FOR LASTING PEACE AND STABILITY

Susan S. Gibson, Lt. Colonel, JAG, The Misplaced Reliance On Free And Fair Elections In Nation Building: The Role Of Constitutional Democracy And The Rule Of Law,” HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW v. 21, Fall 1998, LN.

Democracy: Just as there are many definitions of peacekeeping, there are also many definitions of democracy. n18 A "democratically elected" government is all that many people require for democracy. n19 For them, the modern view of democracy is satisfied once elections are held. n20 However, further inquiry into the subject will often elicit other requirements for true democracy--requirements such as the rule of law, protection of individual and human rights, protection of minority rights, separation of governmental powers, checks and balances of power, and protection of private property rights. n21 As Anthony  [\*8]  Lake recognized in a 1993 address to the School of Advanced International Studies: "Our strategy must view democracy broadly--it must envision a system that includes not only elections but also such features as an independent judiciary and protections of human rights." n22 In his first Annual Report, Secretary General Kofi Annan includes many of the same elements when he defines what he calls "good governance": Good governance comprises the rule of law, effective state institutions, transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs, respect for human rights, and the meaningful participation of all citizens in the political processes of their countries and in decisions affecting their lives. n23 Clearly, something more than elections are required before a country can be said to have a democratic government--rather than merely having a democratically-elected government.
It is "constitutional democracy" that has the power to bring lasting peace and stability, as opposed to the "elective despotism" that can come from mere free and fair elections. n24 The importance of the distinction between elective democracy and constitutional democracy cannot be overstated. "The former stresses the process by which people freely choose their representatives, who, in turn, enact whatever laws they deem necessary on behalf of the people; while the latter, suspicious of the process, sets limits on what the people, through their representatives, may do." n25 The term democracy, as used in this paper, refers to a constitutional democracy that is designed "not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part." n26 It is a democracy based on fundamental human rights,  [\*9]  sound governmental structures that control the powers of those who govern, and the rule of law. n27. II. The Evidence for Democracies and Free-Market Economies. The focus on the importance of constitutional democracies and free-market economies is more than American arrogance about the superiority of our system of government. Ours is not the only democratic, free-market nation, nor is our Constitution or exact form of government capable of being exported wholesale to every nation in the world. n28 The evidence for democracies and free-market economies is based on the growing realization, supported by empirical research, that democracies foster peace, that free-market economies bring prosperity, and that both encourage individual freedom and the protection of human rights.

Demo-Promo Solves: Violence

Money spend on democracy promotion saves far more through checked violence than it costs.

Rudolph J. Rummel, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Hawaii, “Appendix 1.1: Q And A On the Fact that Democracies Do Not Make War on Each Other,” POWER KILLS: DEMOCRACY AS A METHOD OF NONVIOLENCE, 1997. Available from the World Wide Web at: <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/PK.APPEN1.1.HTM>, accessed 4/28/05.

Q: Since everyone is in favor of democracy anyway why make a big thing of this?

A: Because it will take the investment of much resources by the United States and other democracies to help nations democratize. Russian alone needs tens of billions in aid to further democratization. Such aid will be more forthcoming and more broadly supported if there is a wider understanding among the democracies that by providing human and financial resources to democratize we are not only promoting the freedom and prosperity of other countries but also peace and nonviolence. Such aid is cheap compared to the likely human and material cost of future wars.

\*\*Democracy Good: Mideast\*\*

Mideast Democratization Good 1NC (1/4)

Democratization key to stabilizing the arab world, solving terrorism

The Guardian, staff, August 3, 2006, LN.

There has always been a Republican "realist" position, associated with figures such as Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser to Bush Sr. After Iraq, and this latest imbroglio, it could regain the upper hand in the run-up to the 2008 presidential election. It could win out on the other side of American politics too. If one looks at the foreign-policy debate among Democrats, one finds a strong strain of such "realism" - though tagged with "progressive". The argument that the US should pull back from this poisonous world, look to its own economic interests and find allies wherever it can appeals to a significant part of the Democratic electorate. For many Democrats, the fact that the current president has identified himself so strongly with the promotion of democracy is another reason for being sceptical about the promotion of democracy. If democratising the Middle East means Iraq, Hizbullah and Hamas, better not try it. I believe this is precisely the wrong conclusion to draw. In the long run, the growth of liberal democracies is the best hope for the wider Middle East. It's the best hope of modernisation, which the Arab world desperately needs; of addressing the root causes of Islamist terrorism, inasmuch as they lie in those countries rather than among Muslims living in the west; and of enabling Arabs, Israelis, Iranians, Kurds and Turks to live side by side without war. But it will be a long march. We know from elsewhere that the intermediate period of transition to democracy can be a dangerous time, that it can actually increase the danger of violence, especially in countries divided along ethnic and religious lines, and where you rush to the party-political competition for power without first having a functioning state with well-defined borders, a near-monopoly of force, the rule of law, independent media and a strong civil society. That's what happened in the former Yugoslavia. That's what's been happening, in different ways, in Palestine, in Lebanon and in Iraq. Full, liberal democracy contributes to peace; partial, half-baked democratisation can increase the danger of war. What we in the community of established liberal democracies should do is not abandon the pursuit of democratisation but refine it. Recognise that only in exceptional circumstances (such as postwar Germany and Japan) do democracies grow from under military occupation, and that the purpose of building democracy does not justify military intervention. Accept that, as the Iranian dissident Akbar Ganji wrote in the New York Times, it's better for people to find their own paths to freedom, and our job is to support them. Learn from experience that well-defined borders, the rule of law and independent media are as important as an election - and may need to precede it. That along the way you have to negotiate with nasty people and regimes, such as Syria and Iran. And that, in this dirty, complicated world, advocates of armed struggle - terrorists, if you will - can become democratic leaders. Like Menachem Begin. Like Gerry Adams. Like Nelson Mandela. So let's not throw out the democratisation baby with the Bush bathwater. There's a seriously good idea there. It just needs to be a lot better executed, and with patience for the long haul. The right conclusion is strange but true: a little democracy is a dangerous thing - so let's have more of it.

Mideast Democratization Good 1NC (2/4)

Instability of Iraqi political transitions inevitable--is in our best interests to direct that transition towards democracy

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Research Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, “The Promise of Arab Liberalism,” POLICY REVIEW n. 125, June 2004, p. 61+.

But this counterterrorist variant of democratic peace theory (2) is not the only driver for the new policy. The necessity of promoting Arab reform is also rooted in the inevitability of change over the coming years in the fundamentals of Arab politics and U.S.-Arab relations. While American interests in the Middle East have generally favored status quo regimes that could guarantee regional stability, those status quo regimes rest on increasingly tenuous foundations. (3) A massive bulge of youth entering the labor force, stagnated state-led economies, bureaucratic stasis, and rampant corruption all suggest looming instability as the gap for Arab citizens between expectations and reality widens. With the decline of pan-Arab ideology as a way to legitimate governments and insulate them from citizens' demands, and with the growth of independent information sources through satellite television, the internet, and video and cassette tape, popular resentment against local leaderships has grown. At the same time, developments in Iraq and Israel, and sustained American support for conservative Arab autocrats, all have led over the past 10 years to an increase in popular anti-Americanism, which many regimes have tolerated as a way of diverting public attention from domestic troubles. (4) In short, the political status quo in the region is unsustainable, and achievement of a new equilibrium in Arab politics and a new environment for U.S.-Arab relations will necessitate short-term disruption and change. The increasing urgency of internal Arab challenges was a driving force behind the oft-cited Arab Human Development Report, in which a group of Arab scholars blamed the region's failure to progress on "deficits" of freedom, knowledge, and women's empowerment. But the inevitable changes coming in Arab politics may or may not bring democracy. Given this, an American failure to try to shape these changes would be a missed opportunity that could, if the region's governments do not meet their looming challenges successfully, threaten core U.S. strategic interests in the region for decades to come. Consequently, idealism and realism have converged behind the same policy for the United States in the Middle East: promote a regional transformation toward democratic development, liberal values, and open markets that will improve individual opportunities and standards of living; enable the emergence of a more moderate political discourse; promote rational, efficient, and accountable governance; and integrate the region into the broader global network of Westernized, developing countries.

Mideast Democratization Good 1NC (3/4)

Democracy can succeed in Middle East—Lebanon, reformers prove

Joshua Muravchik, American Enterprise Institute, “Bringing Democracy to the Arab World,” CURRENT HISTORY, January 2004, npg.

Could it be that something particular to the Arab world makes it especially allergic to democracy or incapable of practicing it? As I have said, it is impossible to refute this supposition categorically until we have our first functioning Arab democracy. But two pieces of evidence inspire confidence that that day is not far off. First, the world has seen an Arab democracy, namely Lebanon. From the time of its independence around the end of World War II until the mid 1970s, Lebanon was essentially .democratic. It was an odd democracy, to be sure, with offices carefully parceled out to the various religious and ethnic groups that make up the national mosaic, but the government rested on elections, free debate, and parliamentary give and take. Foreign intervention by Palestinians, Israelis, and Syrians destroyed this relatively successful system. Today Lebanon remains a Syrian suzerainty, but for roughly three decades it afforded a glimpse of Arab democracy. Second, increasingly forceful voices can be heard within the Arab world urging democratization. These include not only dissidents such as Egypt’s Saad Edin Ibrahim but also members of ruling governments. The kings of Jordan and Morocco have taken steps toward democratization, as have the rulers of most of the small Persian Gulf states. Perhaps most important, a team of several dozen Arab scholars from many countries working under the auspices of the United Nations issued the Arab Human Development Report in 2002. This report, which decried three “deficits” in the Arab world freedom, knowledge, and women's participation created a sensation that had not yet abated when the authors struck again. They issued a second report in October 2003 elaborating on the knowledge deficit and linking it directly to the absence of “social and individual freedoms.” The authors also announced that two more reports are in the works, each to focus on one of the other “deficits.”

No uniqueness for them—anti-Americanism has been high since the 90’s

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Research Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, “The Promise of Arab Liberalism,” POLICY REVIEW n. 125, June 2004, p. 61+.

But this counterterrorist variant of democratic peace theory (2) is not the only driver for the new policy. The necessity of promoting Arab reform is also rooted in the inevitability of change over the coming years in the fundamentals of Arab politics and U.S.-Arab relations. While American interests in the Middle East have generally favored status quo regimes that could guarantee regional stability, those status quo regimes rest on increasingly tenuous foundations. (3) A massive bulge of youth entering the labor force, stagnated state-led economies, bureaucratic stasis, and rampant corruption all suggest looming instability as the gap for Arab citizens between expectations and reality widens. With the decline of pan-Arab ideology as a way to legitimate governments and insulate them from citizens' demands, and with the growth of independent information sources through satellite television, the internet, and video and cassette tape, popular resentment against local leaderships has grown. At the same time, developments in Iraq and Israel, and sustained American support for conservative Arab autocrats, all have led over the past 10 years to an increase in popular anti-Americanism, which many regimes have tolerated as a way of diverting public attention from domestic troubles. (4) In short, the political status quo in the region is unsustainable, and achievement of a new equilibrium in Arab politics and a new environment for U.S.-Arab relations will necessitate short-term disruption and change

Mideast Democratization Good 1NC (4/4)

They can’t win uniqueness—we’re already trying to promote democracy

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Research Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, “The Promise of Arab Liberalism,” POLICY REVIEW n. 125, June 2004, p. 61+.

So far the administration's forward strategy of freedom contains four concrete elements to back up the rhetorical escalation evident since 9-11. The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), launched in December 2002, is meant to provide assistance to Arab civil society groups; to promote economic, educational, and political reforms; and to improve the status of women. In Fall 2003, Bush also called for a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2010: So far, the "area" includes signed free trade treaties with Jordan and Morocco and negotiations underway with Bahrain. The United States is also, through MEPI, supporting WTO membership bids by several other Arab states. More recently, in January of this year, the administration added to its pro-democracy phalanx a proposal to double funding for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a government-supported foundation that sponsors pro-democracy research and activism. Finally, the State Department is negotiating with its European counterparts a joint statement of reform principles and a series of coordinating bodies that would guide Western engagement with Arab governments in the economic, diplomatic, and defense arenas.

Ext: Last Holdout

The Middle East remains the world’s only democratic holdout region

Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, “Universal Democracy?” POLICY REVIEW n. 119, June 2003. Available from the World Wide Web at: [www.policyreview.org/jun03/diamond.html](http://www.policyreview.org/jun03/diamond.html), accessed 3/31/06.

In one respect, democracy is still not quite a global phenomenon. In every region of the world — except for one — at least a third of the states are democracies. Thirty of the 33 states in Latin America and the Caribbean are democracies, and about half of them are now fairly liberal in terms of their levels of freedom. Two-thirds of the former communist countries, half of the Asian states, and even about two-fifths of the African states are now democracies. Only in the Middle East is democracy virtually absent. In fact, among the 16 Arab countries, there is not a single democracy and, with the exception of Lebanon, there never has been. The exceptionalism of the Middle East becomes even more striking when we examine trends in freedom. Every region of the world has seen a rather significant improvement in the level of freedom — except for one. Regions that had been strongholds of authoritarianism have seen their average freedom score on the combined seven-point scale improve by at least a point. There is only one region of the world where the average level of freedom has declined, by almost half a point — again, the Middle East.

Mideast Democratization Solves: Terrorism

Mideast democratization key to winning war on terror--will help check islamic extremism

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Research Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, “The Promise of Arab Liberalism,” POLICY REVIEW n. 125, June 2004, p. 61+.

As this second quotation attests, the U.S. government has embraced the necessity of democratizing the Middle East in order to, as the phrase goes, drain the swamp from which Islamist terrorism emerges. The president's "forward strategy of freedom" is the first attempt by the Bush administration to enunciate a positive vision for American engagement in the post-Saddam Middle East. But it is also, quite consciously, a strategy for winning the war on terrorism by transforming the dysfunctional politics of the region that, in the president's view, makes resentful and repressed citizens vulnerable to the appeals of extremist ideology. The forward strategy is thus the long-anticipated political face of America's counterterrorism effort. Deeper and more meaningful than any attempt to "win hearts and minds" for America itself, it is an effort to win Arab hearts and minds over to the practice of American values and virtues--whether the new practitioners ultimately embrace America and its policies or not. From this perspective, democracy in the Arab (and broader Muslim) world is necessary to marginalize the Islamist extremists, delegitimize political violence, and so to make the world safe for Americans.

Mideast democratization key to checking terrorism recruitment

Joshua Muravchik, American Enterprise Institute, “Bringing Democracy to the Arab World,” CURRENT HISTORY, January 2004, npg.

These are questions to which few Americans--and few American governments--have usually given much thought. But that changed along with so much else on September 11, 2001. Recognizing that a war against terrorism could not be won solely on the battlefield, the United States looked to remove terrorism’s underlying causes. To some, such as United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, the chief cause is poverty. But for the administration of President George W Bush, it is tyranny. As the president put it in his address at London's Whitehall Palace in November 2003: “Democracy, and the hope and progress it brings, [are] the alternative to instability and to hatred and terror. We cannot rely exclusively on military power to assure our long term security. Lasting peace is gained as justice and democracy advance. In democratic and successful societies, men and women do not swear allegiance to malcontents and murderers; they turn their hearts and labor to building better lives. And democratic governments do not shelter terrorist camps.” Accordingly, Bush set the goal of spreading democracy to the Middle East as a way to drain the fever swamps in which terrorism breeds. As the president has explicitly acknowledged, his initiative constitutes a break with 60 years of American foreign policy. Until recently, the Middle East had been regarded as exotic and forbidding; Washington’s view was that, as long as it pumped oil, the United States had little interest in trying to change the region's ways. Now America is betting its security on its ability to overhaul Arab political culture.

Ext: US Key

The U.S. can successfully promote democracy in the Mideast—axis powers transitioning proves.

Joshua Muravchik, American Enterprise Institute, “Bringing Democracy to the Arab World,” CURRENT HISTORY, January 2004, npg.

This leads to the question of whether America can be the instigator of that change. Intuitively, since democracy means self rule, it would seem that this is something people must do for themselves, not something that can be introduced by outsiders. But history contradicts this intuition. America, the first modern democracy, has been a powerful engine spreading democracy elsewhere. At its most active, America has done this by force of arms; at its most passive, simply by setting an example from which others have borrowed. In between these two extremes, the United States has intervened on behalf of democracy by nonviolent means: with diplo y, foreign aid, international broadcasting, and even covert political manipulations. Germany, Japan, and other members of the Axis alliance of World War II are democracies today thanks to us military occupation. The states of the former Soviet bloc are mostly democracies in part because of American efforts to undermine Soviet power. us broadcasting that kept truth and hope alive behind the iron Curtain and us financial and technical assistance that aided the transition from communism also contributed to this outcome. The states of Latin America are almost all democracies in part because of diplomatic pressures by the Carter and Reagan administrations that delegitimated military dictators. Much the same can be said of the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. To foment democracy in the Middle East, overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein was a good start. His was the most entrenched, recalcitrant, murderous, and dangerous of the Arab tyrannies. And historically Iraq stands second only to Egypt as a pole of influence in the Arab world. If us efforts to implant democracy in Iraq take hold, as they did so successfully elsewhere in the post World War II occupations, this will greatly encourage democrats in the other Arab countries. And it will greatly increase the pressure for concessions felt by their rulers. It will have just as much effect on neighboring Iran, not an Arab country but one that significantly influences and is influenced by its Arab neighbors. The replacement of Iran's theocracy by a genuine democracy would also reverberate loudly across the region. Beyond the mission in Iraq, it is not likely that subsequent us moves to spur democracy will consist of military measures. What impelled the use of force in Iraq was the combination of the threat that America felt Iraq’s long history of developing and using weapons of mass destruction, its support for various terrorist groups, its aggression against neighbors and the belief that there was no other way to achieve regime change given Saddam’s ultra repressive methods. The other nondemocratic regimes of the Middle East seem either less threatening or (in the case of Iran, which outdistances Saddam's Iraq in its nuclear programs and support for terrorists) more susceptible to change by other methods. Outside of Iraq, America will use such nonmilitary methods as diplomatic pressure, foreign aid, increased international radio and television broadcasting, and direct assistance to democracy advocates. By these means it will try to foster a regional tide of democratization that will bring the Middle East into sync with the rest of the world. A dramatic revolution in the methods by which people are governed has taken place this past 30 years. In this brief span of time, the proportion of states ruled by governments elected (in meaningful, competitive elections) by their citizens has gone from less than one third to nearly two thirds. Democracy, or at least its rudiments, has suddenly become the norm a norm that one day will extend to the Arab world.

\*\*Calculability/Util\*\*

Utilitarianism Good 1NC (1/2)

First, extinction of the species is the most horrible impact imagineable, putting rights first is putting a part of society before the whole

Schell 1982

(Jonathan, Professor at Wesleyan University, *The Fate of the Earth*, pages 136-137 )

Implicit in everything that I have said so far about the nuclear predicament there has been a perplexity that I would now like to take up explicitly, for it leads, I believe, into the very heart of our response-or, rather, our lack of response-to the predicament. I have pointed out that our species is the most important of all the things that, as inhabitants of a common world, we inherit from the past generations, but it does not go far enough to point out this superior importance, as though in making our decision about ex- tinction we were being asked to choose between, say, liberty, on the one hand, and the survival of the species, on the other. For the species not only overarches but contains all the benefits of life in the common world, and to speak of sacrificing the species for the sake of one of these benefits involves one in the absurdity of wanting to de- stroy something in order to preserve one of its parts, as if one were to burn down a house in an attempt to redecorate the living room, or to kill someone to improve his character. ,but even to point out this absurdity fails to take the full measure of the peril of extinction, for mankind is not some invaluable object that lies outside us and that we must protect so that we can go on benefiting from it; rather, it is we ourselves, without whom everything there is loses its value. To say this is another way of saying that extinction is unique not because it destroys mankind as an object but because it destroys mankind as the source of all possible human subjects, and this, in turn, is another way of saying that extinction is a second death, for one's own individual death is the end not of any object in life but of the subject that experiences all objects. Death, how- ever, places the mind in a quandary. One of-the confounding char- acteristics of death-"tomorrow's zero," in Dostoevski's phrase-is that, precisely because it removes the person himself rather than something in his life, it seems to offer the mind nothing to take hold of. One even feels it inappropriate, in a way, to try to speak "about" death at all, as. though death were a thing situated some- where outside us and available for objective inspection, when the fact is that it is within us-is, indeed, an essential part of what we are. It would be more appropriate, perhaps, to say that death, as a fundamental element of our being, "thinks" in us and through us about whatever we think about, coloring our thoughts and moods with its presence throughout our lives.

Second, survival of political order key to ethics

Stenlisli, 2003 (“Pace nr.1” accessed onlinehttp://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/ )

The debate on political realism, a set of ontological assumptions about international politics, has been a central theme in international relations over the past 40 years. Many scholars and politicians have wrestled over the question of the limitations and insights of realism. Still, realism seems very much alive today, one reason perhaps being that the value of realism as an analytical tool seems to become more relevant to policymakers in times of crises. In turn, such changes cause further debate among realists and their critics. In PACEM 5:2 (2002), Commander Raag Rolfsen[(1)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/%20%5C%5C%201%231%20%5C%5C%20_blank) in practise argues that we are in need of a new framework for analysing international politics. According to Rolfsen, A situation characterized by globalisation, democratisation and a new sense of shared vulnerability demands a novel theoretical framework for world politics. Rolfsen`s aim is indeed ambitious, but his state of departure is surprising: political realism cannot provide this framework because, again according to Rolfsen, it was developed in an undemocratic environment.[(2)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/%20%5C%202%232%20%5C%20_blank) Thus, we are not far from concluding that realism is corrupted and that realists are conspicuous people.[(3)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/%20%5C%203%233%20%5C%20_blank) This bold proclamation illuminates the front between idealism and realism in a manner that is not typical of Norwegian academic discourses on international relations. Rolfsen has delivered a substantial and refreshing article. It is of such originality and importance that it deserves to be debated and criticised, which is no evident feature in contributions on world politics in Norway. Having said that, my motivation to engage in such a debate does not spring from a wholehearted embracement of realism. Rather, its source is the belief that a theory of foreign policy cannot do without significant elements of realism. Traditional security policy can never remove our vulnerability. At this point there simply is no disagreement between “realists” and “idealists”. However, security has an instrumental value in ensuring other ends. Thus, acknowledging our vulnerability does not remove the value and importance of security as phenomenon and concept.[(4)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/%20%5C%204%234%20%5C%20_blank) In this article, I will discuss whether the effort to construct a new security concept possibly can succeed when it simultaneously becomes an attack on political realism (PR). Rolfsen undoubtedly deals some blows against Hans Morgenthau’s Theory of International Politics, although the same points have been made by others before him.[(5)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/%20%5C%205%235%20%5C%20_blank) Indeed, political realism has to be anchored to ideals and visions of desired end states beyond its basic assumptions,[(6)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/%20%5C%206%236%20%5C%20_blank) but my main line of argument is that any attempt at establishing a basis for ethical conduct in politics is bound to remain a purely theoretical construction without empirical relevance if it is not mixed with a sound and thorough understanding of PR. The reason simply is, that since the existence of a polity is a precondition for thinking about, implementing and evaluating policies in other areas, politics based on realism is required in the first place in order to secure the polity. There can be no democracy without a modern state, and no state without a minimum level of security through a monopoly of violence. Herein lies a significant aspect of what makes the state legitimate to its citizens. In this way, one can even claim that all normative evaluations and - theories implicitly rest on minimum requirements both to the practises and theoretical considerations of realism.[(7)](http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/%20%5C%207%237%20%5C%20_blank) Indeed, one should at least question whether attempts at denying the empirical relevance of PR could lead us into paralysis or hypocrisy. The latter can even serve, unintentionally to be sure, as a basis for demonising opponents, thus functioning as a (moral) sentiment that forms the basis of a more hawkish or brutal conduct in international crisis than is necessary. The prudence found in Morgenthau should not be seen as cynical or a-ethical, but rather as a configuration of thought that should balance our aspirations to fulfil what Morgenthau calls the ultimate aims of politics. The central political problem is exactly how to translate these aspirations (like democracy and human rights) into feasible and efficient decisions. But in order to pursue these important goals, the ability to use power, be it hard or soft, is required.

Utilitarianism Good: 2AC (2/2)

Deontology locks us into a deadlock when values conflict, only way to resolve that is by using consequentialism

Person, 1997

(lngmar. Lund University. Three Methods of Ethics: a debate. Eds. Baron, Marcia, Philip Petit, and Michael Stole. Pg 13-14. )

 Now the natural rights theorist maintains, of course, that. the presence of a right is such a relevant factor, or reason, that may justify departing from the goal of fulfilment maximization. In Ronald Dwor. kin's phrase, rights could in this way `trump' the pursuit of maximal fulfilment. A right to M provides a reason for holding that one morally should have M even if this is at odds with the goal mentioned. I do not say that it ensures that one should have M because the rights theorist may like to impose a limit on the weight of rights, on how great the loss of fulfilment overall may be if a right is not to be outweighed. Suppose that my hair has a unique healing quality: thousands of terminally ill patients could be saved if a couple of strands are removed and made into a medicine. What should the rights theorist say if I none the less refuse to have these strands removed? Surely, something like this: the suffering caused by respecting my right to my strands of hair is so great that we are morally justified in violating the right. But then there is a limit on the weight of my right, on its capacity to restrain maximiza- tion; a right provides a moral reason that can be outweighed. As an aside, note that, like the limit on the extension of rights, this limit would seem to have to be based on consequentialist considera- tions, on weighing the frustration and confusion occasioned by infring- ing our deep-seated intuitions about rights against the frustration and suffering caused by respecting them. Thus, when It comes to the precise weight of rights, no less than their extension, we see that it cannot be fixed unless we transcend the natural rights framework in favour of a consequentialist one.

Utility calculus allows action, moral dogmatism freezes us into inaction

Smart, 1973

(J.J.C prof. of philosophy, Australian riatibual university. Utilitarianism: For and Against)

lf we are able to take account of probabilities in our ordinary prudential decisions it seems idle to say that in the field of ethics, the field of our universal and humane atti- tudes, we cannot do the same thing, but must rely on some dogmatic morality, in short on some set of rules or rigid criteria, Maybe sometimes we just will be unable to say whether we prefer for humanity an improbable great advantage or a probable small advantage, and in these cases perhaps we shall have to toss a penny to decide what to do. Maybe we have not any precise methods for deciding what to do, but then our imprecise methods must just serve their turn. We need not on that account be driven into authori.- tarianism, dogmatism or romanticism.

Utilitarianism Good: 2NC Ext

Life is key to ethics—supreme human right.

Diana Meyers, prof of Philosophy @ Connecticut University, 1985  Inalienable Rights, p. 54

The right to life prohibits other persons from killing the person who possesses the right and allows this person to defend himself if he is attacked. It is obvious that a person cannot be a moral agent unless he is alive (at least, not within the moral sphere in which we presently find ourselves), and so it is also obvious that this right protects something essential to moral agency. But it is doubtful that it is always supererogatory when it is appropriate for a person to sacrifice his life for the benefit of others. Two representative cases can be adduced to call this claim into question: I) a soldier has a duty to follow orders to participate in battles if her army is involved in a just war, and 2) a citizen may have a duty to join her country’s army in wartime.

Utilitarianism is the only alternative to extinction, outweighing rights

Ratner ‘84

[Leonard G., Legion Lex Prof. Law @ USC, “The Utilitarian Imperative: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Evolution,” 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 723, Spring, LN// ]

The search for the ought is a search for the goals of human behavior. Underlying the ought of every goal is an implicit description of reality that predicts the consequences for humans of compliance or noncompliance with the ought. n49 Humans choose the goals. n50 And the perceived accuracy of the description, along with the perceived value of the consequences predicted by the description, influence the choice. Ought and is thus coalesce.

The goal of enhanced human need/want fulfillment implies that such enhanced fulfillment is possible and will facilitate long-run human existence.Goals that facilitate human existence are persistently chosen by most humans, because human structure and function have evolved and are evolving to facilitate such existence. The decisionmaking organism is structured to generally prefer survival, although some may trade long-term existence for short-term pleasure, and physiological malfunction or traumatic experience may induce the preference of a few for personal nonsurvival. Intermediate human goals change with human structure and function; long-run human survival remains the ultimate human goal as long as there are humans.

Calculability Good: 1NC (1/2)

First, failure to calculate allows totalitarianism by denying institutional responsibility

Campbell ‘98

[David, Int’l Relations Prof @ UM, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998, 186]

The undecidable within the decision does not, however, prevent the decision nor avoid its urgency. As Derrida observes, “a just decision is always required immediately, ‘right away.’” This necessary haste has unavoidable consequences because the pursuit of “infinite information and the unlimited knowledge of conditions, rules or hypothetical imperatives that could justify it” are unavailable in the crush of time. Nor can the crush of time be avoided, even by unlimited time, “because the moment of decision as such always remains a finite moment of urgency and precipitation.” The decision is always “structurally finite,” it a”always marks the interruption of the juridico- or ethico- or politico-cognitive deliberation that precedes it, that must precede it.” That is why, invoking Kierkegaard, Derrida, declares that “the instant of decision is a madness.”

The finite nature of the decision may be a “madness” in the way it renders possible the impossible, the infinite character of justice, but Derrida argues for the necessity of this madness. Most importantly, Derrida argues for the necessity of this madness. Most importantly, although Derrida’s argument concerning the decision has, to this pint, been concerned with an account of the procedure by which a decision is possible, it is with respect to the ncessity of the decision that Derrida begins to formulate an account of the decision that bears upon the content of the decision. In so doing, Derrida’s argument addresses more directly – more directly, I would argue than is acknowledged by Critchley – the concern that for politics (at least for a progressive politics) one must provide an account of the decision to combat domination.

That undecidability resides within the decision, Derrida argues, “that justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinalbe cannot and should not serve as alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state, or between institutions or states and others.” Indeed, “incalculable justice requires us to calculate.” From where do these insistences come? What is behind, what is animating, these imperatives? It is both the character of infinite justice as a heteronomic relationship to the other, a relationship that because of its undecidability multiplies responsibility, and the fact that “left to itself, the incalculable and given (donatrice) idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst, for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation.” The necessity of calculating the incalculable thus responds to a duty a duty that inhabits the instant of madness and compels the decision to avoid “the bad,” the “perverse calculation,” even the worst.” This is the duty that also dwells with deconstructive thought and makes it the starting point, the “at least necessary condition,” for the organization of resistance to totalitarianism in all its forms. And it is a duty that responds to practical political concerns when we recognize that Derrida names the bad, the perverse, and the worst as those violences “we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism.”

Second, even if we obscure the incalculable, we have an ethical responsibility to calculate death because it’s our only means of fighting injustice

Santilli 2003

[Paul C., Siena College, “Radical Evil, Subjection, and Alain Badiou’s Ethic of the Truth Event,” *World Congress of the International Society for Universal Dialogue*, May 18-22, [www.isud.org/papers/pdfs/Santilli.pdf](http://www.isud.org/papers/pdfs/Santilli.pdf), acc. 9-24-06// ]

From the standpoint of an ethics of subjection there is even something unnecessary or superfluous about the void of suffering in the subject bearers of evil. For Levinas, the return to being from the ethical encounter with the face and its infinite depths is fraught with the danger the subject will reduce the other to a "like-me," totalizing and violating the space of absolute alterity. As Chalier puts it, "Levinas conceives of the moral subject's awakening, or the emergence of the human in being, as a response to that pre-originary subjection which is not a happenstance of being." But if there really is something inaccessible about suffering itself, about the 'other' side of what is manifestly finite, subjected, and damaged, then to a certain extent it is irrelevant to ethics, as irrelevant as the judgment of moral progress in the subject-agent. Let me take the parent-child relation again as an example. Suppose the child to exhibit the symptoms of an illness. Are not the proper "ethical" questions for the parent to ask questions of measure and mathematical multiples: How high is the fever? How long has it lasted? How far is the hospital? Can she get out of bed? Has this happened before? These are the questions of the doctor, the rescue squads and the police. They are questions about being, about detail, causes and effects. Ethically our response to the needs of must be reduced to a positivity simply because we have access to nothing but the symptoms, which are like mine. Our primary moral responsibility is to treat the symptoms that show up in being, not the radically other with whom I cannot identify. Say we observe someone whose hands have been chopped off with a machete. How would we characterize this? Would it not be slightly absurd to say, "He had his limbs severed and he suffered," as though the cruel amputation were not horror enough. Think of the idiocy in the common platitude: "She died of cancer, but thank God, she did not suffer", as though the devastating annihilation of the human by a tumor were not evil itself. For ethics, then, the only suffering that matters are the visible effects of the onslaught of the world. All other suffering is excessive and inaccessible. Therefore, it is in being, indeed in the midst of the most elemental facts about ourselves and other people, that we ethically encounter others by responding to their needs and helping them as best we can

It is precisely by identifying being and not pretending that we know any thing about suffering, other than it is a hollow in the midst of being, that we can act responsibly. What worries me about Levinas is that by going beyond being to what he regards as the ethics of absolute alterity, he risks allowing the sheer, almost banal facticity of suffering to be swallowed in the infinite depths of transcendence. Indeed, it seems to me that Levinas too often over emphasizes the importance of the emergence of the subject and the inner good in the ethical encounter, as though the point of meeting the suffering human being was to come to an awareness of the good within oneself and not to heal and repair. I agree with Chalier's observation that Levinas's "analyses adopt the point of view of the moral subject, not that of a person who might be the object of its solicitude." Ethics has limits; there are situations like the Holocaust where to speak of a moral responsibility to heal and repair seems pathetic. But an ethics that would be oriented to the vulnerabilities of the subjected (which are others, of course, but also myself) needs to address the mutilation, dismemberment, the chronology of torture, the numbers incarcerated, the look of the bodies, the narratives, the blood counts, the mines knives, machetes, and poisons. Evil really is all that. When the mind does its work, it plunges into being, into mathematical multiples and starts counting the cells, the graveyards, and bullet wounds. Rational practical deliberation is always about the facts that encircle the void inaccessible to deliberation and practical reason.

Calculability Good: 1NC (2/2)

THIRD, Infinite justice requires calculation

Jacques Derrida**,** in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, Drucilla Cornell, ed, 92, p. 28-9.

That justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds the determinable cannot and should not serve as an alibi for staying out of juridico-political battles, within an institution or a state or between institutions or states and others. Left to itself, the incalculable and giving (donatrice)idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation. It's always possible. And so incalculable justice *requires* us to calculate. And first, closest to what we associate with justice, namely, law, the juridical field that one cannot isolate within sure frontiers, but also in all the fields from which we cannot separate it, which intervene in it and are no longer simply fields: ethics, politics, economics, psycho‑sociology, philosophy, literature, etc. Not only *must* we calculate, negotiate the relation between the calculable and the incalculable, and negotiate without the sort of rule that wouldn't have to be reinvented there where we are cast, there where we find ourselves; but we *must* take it as far as possible, beyond the place we find ourselves and beyond the ‑already identifiable zones of morality or politics or law, beyond the distinction between national and international, public and private, and so on. This requirement does not properly belong either to justice or law. It only belongs to either of these two domains by exceeding each one in the direction of the other. Politicization, for example, is interminable even if it cannot and should not ever be total. To keep this from being a truism or a triviality, we must recognize in it the following consequence: each advance in politicization obliges one to reconsider, and so to reinterpret the very 4bundations of law such as they had previously been calculated or delimited. This was true for example in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, in the abolition of slavery, in all the emancipatory battles that remain and will have to remain in progress, everywhere in the world, for men and for women. Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. We cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely or with sophistication, at least not without treating it too lightly and forming the worst complicities. But beyond these identified territories of juridico‑politicization on the grand geopolitical scale, beyond all self‑serving interpretations, beyond all determined and particular reappropriations of international law, other areas must constantly open up that at first can seem like secondary or marginal areas. This marginality also signifies that a violence, indeed a terrorism and other forms of hostage‑taking are at work (the examples closest to us would be found in the area of laws on the teaching and practice of languages, the legitimization of canons, the military use of scientific research, abortion, euthanasia, problems of organ transplant, extra‑uterine conception; bio‑engineering, medical experimentation, the social treatment of AIDS, the macro‑ or micro‑politics of drugs, the homeless, and so on, without forgetting, of course, the treatment of what we call animal life, animality. On this last problem, the Benjamin text that I'm coming to now shows that its author was not deaf or insensitive to it, even if his propositions on this subject remain quite obscure, if not quite traditional).

\*\*Human Rights Negative\*\*

Withdrawal L2 Nuclear War

US withdrawal from Iraq risks Middle East nuclear winter, Saudi oil prices spikes, and guts US soft power.

Ryan **Mauro (**national security advisor to the Christian Action Network, and an intelligence analyst with the Asymmetrical Warfare and Intelligence Center (AWIC)). “The Consequences of Withdrawal from Iraq.” 5/7/**2007** http://www.globalpolitician.com/22760-foreign-iraq

While the movement for democratic change will continue, its prospects for victory will diminish and come at a much higher cost. The Middle Eastern countries, faced with the threat of Iranian interference, will probably increase the oppression of its dissidents in order to stifle any attempt at foreign subversion. Iran, the #1 sponsor of terrorism and home to several Al-Qaeda leaders, will grow in power and become the leader of the region. It will become easier for Iran’s government, who denies the holocaust has ever happened and has repeatedly cited the destruction of Israel and the United States as its goal, to obtain nuclear weapons. The West will find its options to deter isolate and affect Iran’s behavior very limited. In response to the growth of Iran’s power, countries in the region like Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the states in the Gulf will obtain nuclear weapons. Iran’s leadership has expressed willingness to share its nuclear technology with other rogue states like Syria and Venezuela. Saudi Arabia will increase its support to Sunni jihadists and Wahhabists (which spawned Osama Bin Laden) in order to counter Iran’s influence. There may very well be a bloody civil war inside Saudi Arabia, causing oil prices to hit a new spike and possibly bringing the American economy into a deep recession. The growth in power of terrorist elements will lead to a complete breakdown in the Middle East Peace Process, and renewed fighting between Israeli and militant Palestinian groups. Israel will have to take an even more hawkish stance towards Iran, quite possibly leading to a nuclear showdown. One of the problems the United States has had among Iraqis is that they don’t believe we will stay to protect them, so they sit on the sidelines and won’t stand up to the terrorists. A premature withdrawal would forever eliminate any goodwill and trust between America and the people of the Middle East, instead replaced by bitterness and hatred as its people watch their family members die due to American selfishness. Any hope of having a foreign ally would diminish, as no one would trust the United States to stand by them in tough times.

HR Cred Low Now

**Human Rights Credibility low now**

**China Daily, 3-23**-10. “China Reports on US Human Rights Record.” http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-03/12/content\_9582218.htm

The US is looked down upon internationally for human rights abuses now BEIJING - China Friday retorted US criticism by publishing its own report on the US human rights record. The report is "prepared to help people around the world understand the real situation of human rights in the United States," said the report. The report reviewed the human rights record of the United States in 2009 from six perspectives: life, property and personal security; civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; racial discrimination; rights of women and children; and the US' violation of human rights against other countries. It criticized the United States for taking human rights as "a political instrument to interfere in other countries' internal affairs, defame other nations' image and seek its own strategic interests." China advised the US government to draw lessons from the history, put itself in a correct position, strive to improve its own human rights conditions and rectify its acts in the human rights field. This is the 11th consecutive year that the Information Office of China's State Council has issued a human rights record of the United States to answer the US State Department's annual report. "At a time when the world is suffering a serious human rights disaster caused by the US subprime crisis-induced global financial crisis, the US government still ignores its own serious human rights problems but revels in accusing other countries. It is really a pity," the report said.

UQ Overwhelms the Link

**Past human rights abuses has already sealed the fate of the United States in many parts of the world**

**Paddock and Stack ‘4** (Richard C. Paddock and Megan K. Stack, Los Angeles Times Staff Writers, Abuse 'Makes the U.S. Totally Lose Credibility' , May 5th 2004, <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=1259&paper=1584>)

JAKARTA, Indonesia - Photographs depicting the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. troops prompted a wave of outrage across the Islamic world Tuesday as Muslims condemned the United States for what they perceived as cruelty and hypocrisy. For many Muslims already angry about the invasion of Iraq and Washington's support for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the photos of naked and hooded Iraqis subjected to humiliation at the hands of their American guards confirmed the widespread view that Washington has no desire to bring human rights to the occupied country. "People are outraged," said Mona Makram-Ebeid, a professor of political science at American University in Cairo. "Even after everything else that's happened, this is the final drop that makes the U.S. totally lose credibility. Whatever they say about human rights, about democracy, nobody is listening anymore."

Troops abuses aren’t perceived

**No link – US soldiers aren’t visible in Iraq because of legal agreements**

**Chulov, 10** (Martin, “Iraq Violence Set to Delay Troop Withdrawal,” May 12th, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/12/iraq-us-troop-withdrawal-delay>)

US patrols are now seldom seen on the streets of Baghdad, where the terms of a security agreement between Baghdad and Washington are being followed strictly: this relegates them to secondary partners and means US troops cannot leave their bases without Iraqi permission. US commanders have grown accustomed to being masters of the land no longer, but they have recently grown increasingly concerned about what they will leave behind. Zebari said: "The mother of all mistakes that they made was changing their mission from liberation to occupation and then legalising that through a security council resolution."

Military Will Still Abuse People

**They don’t access the advantage—even if they withdraw the military, the plan doesn’t change military violence toward civilians when deployed to other places. The military will still be violent.**

**Human Rights First. “**Military Commissions Lack Credibility, Ultimately Make United States Less Safe.” July 7, **2009**. http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/darfur/2009/alert/482/index.htm

Noting the existence of widespread international skepticism about the United States' use of military commissions, Human Rights First stated that continuing to prosecute terrorists using this model will undermine President Obama's ongoing efforts to 'enlist the power of our fundamental values.' For example, the ban on the use of coerced statements as evidence is a fundamental tenet of due process that military commissions do not respect. For more than 60 years, the Supreme Court has held that it is the prohibition of coerced evidence that distinguishes the American system from those of abusive governments where police bring suspects into custody and "wring from them confessions by physical or mental torture." Human Rights First today said that bending such laws will do little to protect American lives, but will instead turn military commissions into a powerful recruiting tool for terrorists. "Military commissions lack domestic and international credibility," said Human Rights First counsel Devon Chaffee. "By trying detainees before military commissions, the United States gives terrorist suspects the warrior status they so often seek and wastes an opportunity to delegitimize them as common criminals." Human Rights First has urged the Obama Administration and Congress to abandon military commissions and has convened distinguished military leaders who have joined in this call. The organization notes that military commissions are a nondurable solution that violate international law, lack domestic and international credibility, and are out-of-step with America's long tradition of adhering to the Constitution and the core value of fairness. Alternatively, U.S. federal courts have a proven track record of successfully handling terrorism cases without violating basic due process.

A2: Soft Power Impact

**Obama is increasing soft power now- not going to collapse.**

**The Guardian 9,** Hawks depart as Clinton ushers in a new era of US ‘soft power’, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/11/obama-white-house-clinton?keepThis=true&TB\_iframe=true&height=650&width=850

Barack Obama will mark a radical break in American foreign policy this week by unveiling a team of diplomats tasked with ushering in a new era of dialogue with enemies abroad. As Hillary Clinton prepares for Senate confirmation hearings this week, she will head a group of advisers who are virtual opposites to the appointees made by President George W Bush. While Bush favoured aggressive neoconservative ideologues, Obama has selected people whose doveish credentials seem impeccable. They will be responsible for reversing the political unilateralism of the Bush years and opening direct negotiations with hostile states, potentially ranging from Syria to Cuba and Venezuela and maybe including Iran and even Islamic militant group Hamas. The Obama foreign policy team that has emerged is focused on know-how and experience - often gained during the Clinton era. Many of the appointments have a clear focus on the Islamic world. Former UN ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who brokered a peace deal in the Balkans, will be appointed a special adviser to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Former Middle East negotiator Dennis Ross will be a special adviser on Iran and the surrounding region, showing that Obama is keen on opening a diplomatic front in America's dispute with Tehran. Ross has a history of personal involvement in Middle East peace talks, including numerous negotiations between Palestinians, Arab states and Israel. Other picks are Kurt Campbell, another former Clinton official, who will be an assistant secretary of state for east Asia and the Pacific, and Philip Gordon, a former member of the National Security Council, will be assistant secretary of state for Europe. "These are people who reflect Obama's world-view that sees the world less from a power-projecting perspective and more from looking at problems and seeing how to solve them," said Michael Fullilove, a fellow at two independent thinktanks, the Brookings Institution in Washington and the Lowy Institute in Australia. Obama's choices back up his stated aims during his presidential election campaign. During the Democratic primaries, Obama said he would hold direct talks with hostile states. Despite a firestorm of criticism in the media - including from his then rival Clinton - Obama held to his position. Now Clinton will be in charge of implementing it. "He showed he would not be dictated to by the foreign policy establishment. He also showed he would stick to his guns," said Fullilove. The list of potential enemies for America to talk to is long. First and foremost is Iran, whose nuclear ambitions are the subject of deep suspicion in Washington and many other world capitals. Obama has held out the prospect of negotiating directly with Tehran about its programme, reversing years of open hostility from Bush's White House. Other states where diplomatic relations could improve include Cuba, Syria, Venezuela and North Korea. The list could also include non-state groups such as Hamas. Last week the Guardian reported that Obama officials were open to establishing lines of contact with the Islamic militant group as a necessary step in trying to push forward the Middle East peace process. An Obama aide subsequently denied that direct talks were envisaged. But, given the make-up of his emerging foreign policy team, it seems unlikely that Obama will simply replicate the style of the Bush administration when it comes to dealing with extremist groups.

**Alt causes are undermining US soft power**.

**Asia Times 8**, “How to Manage an Imperial Decline” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/JJ18Ak03.html

Diminishing US economic and military influence only underscores a third trend: the wilting of America's "soft power." At the UN in September, for instance, Bush faced a tsunami of whispered complaints about America's flawed stewardship of the global economy. Manifest failure in an area in which Americans took such pride saps Washington's ability to persuade and build alliances in areas like resisting slaughter in Darfur, fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden, or stemming Russian designs on what it calls its "near abroad". What, in retrospect, must be termed the Dick Cheney White House, has reduced America's reputation as a moral beacon to junk-bond level. As Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama and Republican presidential candidate John McCain have both recognized, any claim to human rights leadership the United States may have once possessed has run aground on the shoals of its torture and "extraordinary rendition" policies, all approved at the highest government levels.

A2: Soft Power Impact

**Soft power low now**

Joseph S. **Nye**, Jr., is former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. “The Decline of America's Soft Power.” May **2004**. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59888/joseph-s-nye-jr/the-decline-of-americas-soft-power

Anti-Americanism has increased in recent years, and the United States' soft power -- its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them -- is in decline as a result. According to Gallup International polls, pluralities in 29 countries say that Washington's policies have had a negative effect on their view of the United States. A Eurobarometer poll found that a majority of Europeans believes that Washington has hindered efforts to fight global poverty, protect the environment, and maintain peace. Such attitudes undercut soft power, reducing the ability of the United States to achieve its goals without resorting to coercion or payment.

**Soft Power Empirically fails, resulting in international conflict and prolif**

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The use of soft power did not prevent Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia and the end of the League of Nations. Soft power extracted a "peace in our time" from Hitler in Munich, but accelerated the advent of the Second World War. There are more recent examples of soft power producing disastrous results. Between 1980 and 1988, Germany and France used soft power to persuade the mullahs of Tehran to agree to a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war. The mullahs saw those efforts as a sign that a weak and divided West would do nothing to stop the hoped-for march of Khomeinist "volunteers for martyrdom" to Baghdad and thence to Jerusalem. By 1988, Iran was firing missiles at Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, and sending warplanes on intimidation missions in the Saudi airspace. All that was stopped only when the United States, then led by Ronald Reagan, decided to use a small dose of hard power to knock some sense into the mullahs' heads. A U.S. task force was sent to the Gulf, where it managed to sink half of the Iranian navy in a few minutes. The mullahs understood a message that France and Germany had tried to impart for seven years, with no success. A shaken Ayatollah Khomeini appeared on TV to announce that he had "swallowed the poisoned chalice "by accepting an end to the war. Another example: For 12 years ,Turkey used soft power to persuade Syria to close the bases of Kurdish terrorists on its soil. The Syrians simply mocked the Turks. Then one day in 1999 a Turkish army appeared on the Syrian border with the mission to go and close those bases. The Syrian rulers instantly backed down, closed the bases and expelled the Kurdish Marxist rebel leaders. The anti-war crowd forget that soft power was used on both Saddam Hussein and Afghanistan's Taliban. In 1990 when Saddam invaded and annexed Kuwait, he was offered a range of soft power goodies in exchange for withdrawal. One formula worked out by French President Francois Mitterrand and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev was to extend the Iraqi coastline on the Persian Gulf by 25 kilometers at the expense of Kuwait. Saddam was also to receive the Kuwaiti islands of Warbah and Bubiyan plus the entire Kuwaiti part of the Rumailah oilfields. Saddam refused. He saw all this as a sign of weakness and was persuaded that, if he was being offered so much as a reward for aggression, there was no reason why he should not keep everything. Until his overthrow last April, Saddam continued to laugh at soft-power attempts at curbing his murderous excesses. The 18 United Nations resolutions that he ignored represented so many attempts at "soft powering" a situation that required hard power. The world had a similar experience with the Taliban. By the end of 2001, it was clear that if they did not hand over Osama bin Laden for trial on charges related to the 9/11 attacks, Washington would have no choice but to use force. They were offered a range of inducements, including diplomatic recognition by the European Union and a massive package of aid. One of the only two Arab states that had recognized the Taliban even offered Mullah Omar and his cohorts a special sweetener in the form of $300 million in cash. Those efforts only confirmed the Taliban in their belief that the West would not have the stomach for a real war. "The fact that they are all begging at our door shows what cowards they are," said Taliban Information Minister Mullah Muttaqi in December 2001. There are individuals and regimes that would not stop unless they hit something hard on their path. A world without hard power would be a paradise for bullies, tyrants, terrorists and other aggressors. With soft power, Mullah Omar and Saddam Hussein would still be filling mass graves. The Oslo Accords, the most praised fruit of soft power, led to years of intensified conflict in which more Palestinians and Israelis have died than in the whole of the preceding 50 years. (As discussed yesterday, the so-called Geneva Accord can only have similar effect.) Bill Clinton's soft-power approach to North Korea gave Kim Jong-il four years in which to develop his nuclear arsenal and continue to thumb his nose at the world.