South Korea Negative

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Position Explanation

This is the case negative to the South Korea aff. It contains answers to the aff’s advantages, links to politics, and a South Korean nuclear proliferation disad. The general theme that runs through this file is that the U.S. ground forces in the ROK are a stabilizing force in the region, and that withdrawal risks instability. The appeasement turns argue that the plan basically rewards North Korea’s belligerent behavior, which only encourages more risk taking and aggression by the North. It’s a turn that complicates both the Korean War and Proliferation Advantage.

The ROK Prolif Disad is pretty solid and straight forward. In response to U.S. withdrawal, South Korea would no longer be able to trust that the US will provide for their security, and thus would develop a program to build a nuclear weapons arsenal. This type of reaction would have a cascading effect in East Asia, and spark an arms race that would be highly destabilizing, increasing the prospect for nuclear war in the region.

ROK Prolif Shell

Withdrawal causes South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons

Kang Choi, Director-General and Professor of American Studies @ Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, and Joon-Sung Park, Distinguished Researcher @ Department of National Security and Reunification @ the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, 2008, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, P. 392-393

The possibility of either a decision by South Korea to go nuclear or a regional nuclear arms race still seems remote, but neither can be ruled out completely. Unless timely and appropriate measures are taken, nonnuclear states in the region, including South Korea and Japan, may be compelled to consider their own nuclear options. At this time, the United States is believed to hold the key to preventing this worrisome development. The key is the continued provision of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.41 The latest reaffirmation of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment to South Korea was made at the thirty-eighth SCM in 2006. What is notable about the SCM was that the term extended nuclear deterrence was inserted in the Joint Communique upon South Korea's insistence.42 Due to this, the excessive fear of nuclear threat in South Korea has been largely mitigated. The insertion of the term altered nothing significant in the ROK-U.S. security relationship. Why then did South Korea so persistently request this wording in the Joint Communique? To answer this question, it is important to revisit the evolution of the ROK's defense strategy. As discussed earlier, it is now clear that "ground-based" nuclear deterrence has been replaced by "offshore" deterrence. The former was viewed as particularly strong since it consisted of a "trip-wire" strategy with forward deployment of the USFK and the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on South Korean soil. Though more flexible, "offshore" deterrence is mainly conventional and is largely symbolic in nature. The trip-wire strategy, which deliberately made the USFK "hostage" in the event of a North Korean attack, was perceived to ensure an automatic U.S. military involvement. It assuaged the FoA among South Koreans. Despite the recent drawdown of USFK strength, the remaining U.S. 2nd Ill still serves this function. Nowadays, though, U.S. officials say that a trip-wire strategy is outdated and no longer valid:43 yet they argue that the United States is firmly committed to the defense of South Korea. Having agreed on a wide range of outstanding military-related issues, such as the relocation of the Yongsan garrison and the 2nd ID, the USFK's strategic flexibility, and the transfer of OPCON to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS), all of which would ultimately dissolve the trip-wire strategy, South Korea and the United States have already moved from trip-wire deterrence to real "offshore deterrence." The present problem is that both Seoul's and Washington's efforts to compensate for the loss of physical links and a weaker security guarantee have fallen short of each other's expectations. Certainly the United States will provide a "bridging capability" for South Korea in the form of time and know-how as the ROK military prepares to assume the current roles and missions of the USFK.44 These military preparations will inevitably take considerable time and money. In particular, their enormous budgetary implications could impede policy implementation. There is only a slim chance that South Korea would acquire enough strategic assets, such as C4ISR, counter-ABC (atomic/biological/chemical), air-defense, long-range strike, and lift capabilities, to meet the schedule. Something has to fill the security gap, and this is exactly why the insertion of the term extended deterrence matters to South Korea. Strangely, though, the continued provision of U.S. extended deterrence seems to have opposite effects on FoA and FoE in South Korea: The continued provision of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for South Korea helps reduce FoA, but the new U.S. nuclear doctrine also increases the level of FoE. Basically, the FoA and FoE issues relate to how the United States will handle the North Korean nuclear problem. South Korea's FoA could soar if the United States tacitly accepted North Korea's nuclear weapon status with a condition of nonproliferation. Conversely, the FoE would linger as long as the public believes that a U.S. military strike on North Korea is possible.45 U.S. missile defense and PSI are concerns as well. To assuage Seoul's concerns, the United States has shown greater flexibility and enthusiasm for diplomatic negotiations while maintaining a strong combined military deterrence.46 Strong reaffirmation of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment has raised South Korea's confidence in its security and strengthened the U.S. position when dealing with North Korea.

That causes Asian prolif and war

Corey Richardson, co-founder of The Korea Liberator, 2006, “South Korea must choose sides,” Asia Times, www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HI09Dg02.html

A Korea faced with an economic dilemma of such magnitude would find maintaining its conventional military forces at current levels impossible. At the same time, it would feel more vulnerable than ever, even with US security assurances. For a nation paranoid about the possibility of outside influence or military intervention, strapped for cash, and obsessed about its position in the international hierarchy, the obvious route might be to either incorporate North Korean nuclear devices (if they actually exist), or build their own, something South Korean technicians could easily accomplish. North Korea, after all, has set the example for economically challenged nations looking for the ultimate in deterrence. One might argue that clear and firm US security guarantees for a reunified Korea would be able to dissuade any government from choosing the nuclear option. If making decisions based purely on logic the answer would be probably yes. Unfortunately, the recent Korean leadership has established a record of being motivated more by emotional and nationalistic factors than logical or realistic ones. Antics over Dokdo and the Yasukuni Shrine and alienating the US serve as examples. But the continuation of the "Sunshine Policy" tops those. Instead of admitting they've been sold a dead horse, the Roh administration continued riding the rotting and bloated beast known as the Sunshine Policy, until all that are left today are a pile of bones, a bit of dried skin, and a few tufts of dirty hair. Roh, however, is still in the saddle, if not as firmly after North Korea's recent missile tests. Japan must then consider its options in countering an openly nuclear, reunified Korea without USFK. Already building momentum to change its constitution to clarify its military, it's not inconceivable that Japan would ultimately consider going nuclear to deter Korea. As in South Korea, there is no technological barrier preventing Japan from building nuclear weapons. While the details of the race and escalation of tensions can vary in any number of ways and are not inevitable, that an arms race would occur is probable. Only the perception of threat and vulnerability need be present for this to occur. East Asia could become a nuclear powder keg ready to explode over something as childish as the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute between Korea and Japan, a Diaoyu/Senkakus dispute between China and Japan, or the Koguryo dispute between Korea and China.

Ext – Withdrawal Causes ROK Prolif

The plan causes regional prolif

Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at CATO, 11-11-2006, “Nuclear Neighbors Might Thwart N. Korea,” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=6772

Faced with a dangerous, nuclear-capable neighbor and a more limited U.S. military commitment to the region, Japan or South Korea (or both) might well decide to build a nuclear deterrent. Although the Japanese public seems reluctant to go down that path, the attitude in South Korea is different. A public opinion poll taken shortly after Pyongyang's nuclear test showed that a majority of respondents believed South Korea should develop a deterrent of its own.

Withdrawal of troops ensures ROK proliferation – it dramatically changes Korean’s decision calculus

Campbell & Einhorn, 04

Kurt M. Campbell, senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, and Robert J. Einhorn, senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program, 2004, “The Nuclear Tipping Point”

Alleviate Security Concerns With the exception of Syria, all the countries covered in this study derive substantial security benefits from their association with the United States. Some (Germany, Japan, South Korea, Turkey) are formally allied with the United States through bilateral or multilateral (that is, NATO) security treaties; one (Taiwan) has received commitments in the form of U.S. legislation and presidential policies; another (Saudi Arabia) has relied on informal understandings and close defense cooperation; and still another (Egypt) has been an intimate partner of the United States in regional peace arrangements and bilateral security ties. These various security relationships with the United States have been instrumental in each country’s nuclear calculus. Indeed, in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, the historical record suggests that perceived erosion in the reliability of security guarantees from the United States can dramatically change the calculation of the costs and benefits of remaining non-nuclear. In the period ahead, questions may arise about the continued value of the U.S. factor in the security equations of a number of the countries studied. In response to fundamental changes in the international security environment since the end of the cold war – especially the demise of the Soviet threat to Europe, the spread of WMD and other asymmetrical military capabilities, the emergence of failed states and militant Islamic movements, and the growth of well-financed, capable terrorist networks operating on a global basis – the United States is now proceeding with a massive overhaul of its force deployments overseas. As U.S. forces are reconfigured and repositioned to meet the evolving requirements of the war on terrorism, friends and allies (including some whose perceptions of the terrorist threat and prescriptions for dealing with it differ from those of Washington) may wonder whether these changes are fully consistent with their own security priorities. For example, many South Koreans, including strong supporters of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, are troubled by plans to relocate U.S. troops away from the demilitarized zone and out of Seoul, especially while the impasse over North Korea’s nuclear program remains unresolved. Japanese are speculating about how U.S. force realignments in Korea and elsewhere will eventually affect them. In Southwest Asia, while U.S. forces are now heavily committed to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan, major questions exist about the future of America’s military presence in the region.

Lack of credible protection causes ROK prolif

Dr. Keith Payne, Professor in Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, March 2010, “U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia,”

http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/US%20Extend-Deter-for%20print.pdf

The adverse consequences of a U.S. nuclear guarantee that no longer assures Seoul should not be underestimated. Coverage by the nuclear umbrella has played an important role in discouraging South Korea from building a nuclear arsenal of its own, for example. If the guarantee were to lack credibility, one of the barriers to a revived South Korean nuclear weapons program would be lowered. And a nuclear ROK would be a wild card in a region already faced with the prospect of greater instability in the future.

A2: ROK Lacks the Tech

ROK has all the pieces necessary for rapid prolif

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow @ CATO, Spring/Summer 2009, “A New Approach to Counter Nuclear Proliferation on the Korean Peninsula”, International Journal of Korean Studies, http://www.icks.org/publication/pdf/2009-SPRING-SUMMER/4.pdf

Seoul possesses 19 nuclear plants and has the industrial, technological, and scientific assets necessary for a program. Peter Hayes of the University of Sydney has observed: "There is little doubt, however, that South Korea now has a near-nuclear option."41

U.S. defense intelligence proves

Sung-Ki Jung, Korea Times, 3-18-2010, “S. Korea, Japan Can Build Nuclear Weapons Quickly,” http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/03/113\_62636.html)

South Korea, like Japan, has the technology to build a nuclear arsenal quickly if it decides to do so, a U.S. defense report said Thursday. "Several friends or allies of the United States, such as Japan and South Korea, are highly advanced technological states and could quickly build nuclear devices if they chose to do so," said the Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010, released on Feb. 18, by the U.S. Joint Forces Command. The biennial report forecasts possible threats and opportunities for the U.S. military. The 2008 report categorized South Korea, Taiwan and Japan as three "threshold nuclear states" that have the capability to develop nuclear weapons rapidly, should their political leaders decide to do so.

They will prolif quickly

Rebecca KC Hersman, Senior Research Professor in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass. Destruction – National Defense University, and Robert Peters, November 2006, “Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback”, Nonproliferation Review, 13(3), http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/133hersman.pdf

Many U.S. analysts believe that this industry, combined with South Korea’s sizable number of highly trained engineers and scientists, gives the South a robust capability to produce nuclear weapons. Therefore, should Seoul reconsider its nuclear weapons future, it could probably restart a program fairly quickly. Additionally, some segments of the South Korean government and population believe that an independent nuclear capability would provide more autonomy on the world stage and greater advantage when dealing with the United States. These groups support those who view a South Korean nuclear arsenal as being the best way to guarantee security in the emerging strategic landscape.

Impact – ROK Prolif Bad

The plan causes rapid prolif

Rebecca KC Hersman, Senior Research Professor in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass. Destruction – National Defense University, and Robert Peters, November 2006, “Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback”, Nonproliferation Review, 13(3), http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/133hersman.pdf

A 2006 snapshot of South Korean and Taiwanese capability and intent places both countries squarely in the passive hedge, medium-capability category. Such data, combined with an understanding of their reasons for pursuing nuclear weapons, suggests that the United States must remain engaged with Seoul and Taipei to ensure that neither country feels the need to attain an indigenous nuclear capability. Should South Korea or Taiwan feel that the U.S. security relationship is weakening and a nuclear weapons program is justified, they could develop a weapons capability in a relatively short period. Alternatively, either country might seek to enhance its hedging strategy and focus on creating a latent nuclear capability short of fully constituted nuclear weapons. Relatively small shifts in intent, consistent with a hedging strategy, could quickly catapult these two states into the ‘‘danger zone,’’ but with far less chance of detection.

It causes Asian arms races and instability

Peter Hayes, Director of the Nautilus Institute, and Michael Hamel-Green, Victoria University, 1-5-2010, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia”, Nautilus Institute Special Report, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf

Given the high stakes involved, North Korean proliferation, if unaddressed and unreversed, has the potential to destabilize the whole East Asian region and beyond. Even if a nuclear exchange does not occur in the short term, the acute sense of nuclear threat that has been experienced for over five decades by North Koreans as a result of US strategic deterrence is now likely to be keenly felt by fellow Koreans south of the 38th Parallel and Japanese across the waters of the Sea of Japan. China, too, must surely feel itself to be at risk from North Korean nuclear weapons, or from escalation that might ensue from next-use in the Korean Peninsula resulting not only in the environmental consequences noted above, but in regime collapse and massive refugee flows. South Korea and Japan appear willing to rely on their respective bilateral security pacts with the United States to deter North Korean nuclear attack for the time being. However, should South Korea and/or Japan acquire nuclear weapons, the outcome would be destabilizing, especially if this resulted from rupture of their alliance relationships with the United States. Both have the technical capability to do so very rapidly. South Korea has previously engaged in nuclear weapons research but desisted after US pressure. Japan still proclaims its adherence to the three Non-Nuclear Principles although recent confirmation that the United States routinely transited nuclear weapons through Japan and retains the right of emergency reintroduction of nuclear weapons has tarnished Japan’s non-nuclear image. Moreover, it has large stockpiles of plutonium that could rapidly be used to produce nuclear warheads. Such responses, already advocated by conservative and nationalist groups within South Korea and Japan, could trigger a regional nuclear arms race involving the Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, and China, with incalculable wider consequences for Southeast Asia, South Asia and the whole Pacific and beyond. These developments would spell the demise of the current global non-proliferation regime as underpinned by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Failure to reverse the DPRK’s nuclear breakout is also an important factor driving a general malaise in the exercise of American power which one of the authors has characterized elsewhere as “the end of American nuclear hegemony.”8

Obama Good Link – 1nc

Withdrawal is massively unpopular – powerful lobbies and an entrenched Congress hate the plan

Selig S. Harrison, Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, 2002, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement, p. 180-182

Why has the presence of U.S. ground forces in South Korea remained politically inviolate in Washington for nearly five decades? Part of the answer lies in the searing psychological legacy of the Korean War and the resulting imagery of North Korea as irrational and threatening, a new "Yellow Peril," an imagery inflated by fears that it will develop long-range missiles. This imagery has persisted despite the North-South summit meeting of June 2000 and the subsequent visits of North Korea's second-ranking leader, Vice-Marshal Jo Myong Rok, to Washington, and of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Pyong¬yang. Indeed, Albright was widely criticized for legitimizing a brutal dictatorship. Some of the answer lies in the superficial appeal of the strategic argu¬ments examined in part 5: that the U.S. presence helps stabilize a volatile part of the world and that any change in the U.S. posture would be seen as a "retreat" from Asia. But the key reason why the United States is stuck to South Korea "like Brer Rabbit was to the Tar Baby" is that Seoul has shown remarkable skill and determination in resisting any change. The impact of the negative images and the positive strategic arguments has been maximized over the years by sustained and effective South Korean lobbying efforts, aided by sympathizers in the Pentagon and in defense industries with a stake in Korea. The payoffs to members of Congress exposed in the 1976 "Koreagate" scandal were not isolated cases. A former Washington station chief of the South Korean CIA, Gen. Kim Yoon Ho, has told of how he arranged support for legislation relating to U.S. military aid and the U.S. force presence by channeling big export contracts to states with cooperative representatives in Congress, especially exports subsidized under a variety of U.S. economic and military aid programs. The manipulation of pricing in such contracts offered easy opportunities for rake-offs to middlemen. In South Korean eyes, anything that will keep the United States in South Korea is morally justified because Washington was largely to blame for the division of the peninsula and remains obligated to stay until reunification is achieved. "The South Korean Embassy swings a lot of weight in Washington," observed David E. Brown, former director of Korean affairs in the State Department, in 1997. "Long-tended friendships between conservatives in both capitals give extra potency to the political clout they wield."' South Korean influence in Washington has been reinforced by the support of legions of U.S. military officers with fond memories of their years in Korea. The semi-imperial trappings of U.S. military life there are epitomized by three eighteen-hole golf courses, one of which occupied some of the most valuable real estate in Seoul until former Ambassador James Lilley persuaded the U.S. Army to relocate it. "The pain it took to do this," Lilley recalled, "is symptomatic of the military's resistance to giving up its perks. They told me about how they have to keep up morale to retain personnel, but you can't do this at the expense of your relations with the host country."" For officers with their families, the nine U.S. military installations in the South are self-sufficient enclaves equipped with most of the comforts of home and largely insulated from the local society. For the footloose, there are kiesang hostesses, the Korean equivalent of Japanese geisha. Most important, for the top brass of the U.S. Army, Korea is the last and only place left in the world where a four-star general can be a "commander in chief" presiding over an operational command in a foreign country. All of the nine other countries with regional and functional commands have their headquarters in the United States.

This saps Obama’s capital

Sreeram Chaulia, Researcher on International Affairs @ Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 2-1-2003, “A Korean Exit Strategy for the US”, Asia Times, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/45/264.html

Obstacles to US disengagement Harrison points with acuity to a number of hurdles blocking a transformation of the US role from a combatant to a neutral honest broker between North and South. The psychological legacy of the Korean War has resulted in an exaggerated imagery of North Korea as a demonic new yellow peril in American eyes. South Korea has also lobbied intensely against the North by roping in sympathizers in the Pentagon, Congress and US defense industries that have a stake in continued militarization of Korea. Another irritant is the semi-imperial trappings of US military life in Korea, where four-star generals command a country’s army and enjoy unparalleled personal privileges. For Korea to have peace, war-economy interests will have to be smashed by a bold and visionary US president.

Obama Good Link – 2nc

Zero political support exists for the plan

Peter Hayes, Director of the Nautilus Institute, 12-17-2009, “Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Global Abolition and Korea”, Nautilus Policy Forum Online, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09096Hayes.html

This is not how many American policy makers view the situation. They see themselves as firmly anchored via bases, forward deployments, nuclear weapons, and alliance relationships. They feel comfortable relying upon nuclear threat to contain North Korea for the foreseeable future. They believe that they have firmly under control the allies' propensity to proliferate. In reality, US leadership is much more tenuous than Americans like to believe due to the cumulative impact of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, nuclear proliferation, and the economic crisis originating in the United States. In this context, the revival of END hastens the demise of American hegemony, at least in this region. Ironically, actual American forces today are primarily non-nuclear rather than "dual-capable" as was almost universally the case during the Cold War when allies were told that the United States military did not distinguish between its nuclear and non-nuclear forces. Although the United States maintains strategic nuclear forces at home, these have little to do directly with realistic military planning or force postures in the alliances, and even less to do with the expanding scope of military operations by US allies working alongside the US military including peacemaking, peacekeeping, disaster relief, nation building, humanitarian intervention, anti-terrorism operations, and rarely, prosecuting conventional war. Unfortunately, Global Abolition as a framework for a new hegemonic leadership is far from displacing the old habits and instruments of nuclear coercive diplomacy, and is almost completely ignored in the core alliance institutions. It has barely begun to take root as a substitute for failing nuclear hegemonic policies, as is most obvious in the case of the DPRK. Generations of Cold War warriors committed to maintaining alliances and comfortable with Cold War habits and ways of thinking are entrenched in alliance institutions and have paid little or no regard to Global Abolition.

Plan will be spun as isolationism

Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ CATO, and Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow @ CATO, 2004, The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, p. 147

But the North Korean crisis is merely the latest and most acute reason why the United States should radically alter its security strategy in East Asia. That strategy no longer serves American best interests on an array of issues. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly unsustainable. The United States needs a new approach to the region. Various scholars have noted that East Asia is the one region in the world where the interests of four major powers—Russia, China, Japan, and the United States—intersect. America's interests in many parts of the world are largely discretionary; those in East Asia are much more intrinsic. Geographically the United States is a Pacific (although not an East Asian) power; eco-nomically America has a large and growing stake in East Asia; strategically the region has been and remains relevant to America's security. That is why it is crucial for the United States to have a wise and sustainable policy toward East Asia. Yet there are warning signals that all is not well with America's current policy and that the need for a new approach is becoming urgent. Members of the U.S. political elite have an unfortunate habit of branding all proposals for meaningful foreign policy change as harbingers of "isolationism"—a term they almost never define with clarity. But the issue is not one of engagement versus isolationism. Few knowledgeable people would dispute the point that the United States has important strategic and economic interests in East Asia, and even fewer would suggest the adoption of a Fortress America policy or the creation of a hermit republic. Recognizing that America has significant interests in the region, however, is not the end point of an assessment of U.S. policy; it is the starting point. One must then apply a rigorous cost- benefit analysis to U.S. policy. Only if the benefits outweigh the costs and risks—and do so by a decisive margin—does the policy merit support.

That’s political suicide

Ross K. Baker, Professor of Political Science @ Rutgers, 10-17-2003, “Presidents Can Outgun Congress”, Newsday, ln

Many of the 126 Democrats who opposed last year's war resolution have felt forced to accede to the White House request not only because it would be political suicide to deny resources to troops already in the field, but because, in 21st-century foreign policy, retreat to isolationism is not an option.

No Korean War

No risk of a war erupting over the sub sinking

Christian Science Monitor, 5-26-2010,“Diplomatic stance trumps tough talk on North Korea ", http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0526/Diplomatic-stance-trumps-tough-talk-on-North-Korea

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appeared in full accord with her South Korean hosts during a four-hour stopoff Wednesday in which the language was tough – but diplomacy rather than a military response toward the North was clearly taking top priority. At a press conference, Mrs. Clinton called on North Korea “to halt its provocations and its policy of threats and belligerence,” as seen in the in the sinking of the Cheonan, the South Korean Navy corvette, that resulted in the death of 46 sailors. But when it came to the bottom-line issue of how to achieve these goals, according to a spokesman for South Korea’s President Lee Myung-bak, Clinton and Mr. Lee agreed that “strategic patience” was the way to go. “Time is on our side,” the spokesman was quoted by South Korean media as saying after the meeting. “We shouldn’t go for an impromptu response to each development but take a longer-term perspective.” The ultimate goal appears to be avoiding another clash that could turn the standoff into a war. “Things are not going to escalate beyond a certain level,” says Lee Jong-min, dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. “The objective is to make sure it does not go beyond a certain point.” That strategy portends a period of rhetoric and recriminations, intermingled with threats from North Korea, while the United States mounts a massive campaign to bring about international condemnation of North Korea and more sanctions by the UN Security Council.

US troops and airforce deter North Korean aggression

Donald Kirk, Asia Times Online, 6-26-2010, “Pyongyang's $65 trillion bill for US enmity,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/LF26Dg01.html

The danger is both much worse and far less than it was then. It's worse in the sense that North Korea now has a number of nuclear devices, has conducted two underground nuclear tests and has exchanged nuclear know-how and components with clients in the Middle East, notably Iran and Syria. North Korea also has missiles, including a long-range model that's capable of carrying a warhead as far as Hawaii, Alaska or even the US west coast . And it has been exporting short- and mid-range missiles to clients in the Middle East and elsewhere. A nuclear war in Northeast Asia appears theoretical, so much so that most people in South Korea just shrug when asked about it. The prevailing sense is, It can't happen here. That's because, in the more immediate sense, a second Korean War on the ground, in the form of North Korean invasion, appears extremely remote. The holocaust that scorched the Korean Peninsula for more than three years remains truly the "forgotten war". It was a bloody interlude that caught the world by surprise when it broke out nearly five years after the end of World War II and then ended in 1953 in an uncertain armistice that endures, somehow, to this day. It's often said that the Korean War ended in a stalemate in which neither side won, that the shooting stopped where it had begun, on the line drawn by distant American and Soviet officials at the 38th parallel before the Japanese surrender in August 1945. That assessment, though, is not really true. Over the years since then South Korea has emerged as the winner by a wide margin. The South, after years of hardship, has exploded into one of the world's major economic powers with sophisticated skills and educational opportunities, markets overflowing and average incomes about 20 times higher than those of North Koreans. While South Korea has undergone political transition from dictatorship to democracy, North Korea's ruling elite remains firmly entrenched, at least to all outward appearances. Kim Jong-il, whose father Kim Il-sung initiated the war and remained in power until his death in 1994, may be ailing but remains strong enough to repress the power urges of his aging generals as well as any signs of dissent by his starving people. His dream is to prepare for take-over by his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, still in his late 20s. If North Korea is far too weak to stage an invasion, however, the North can still foment incidents that show how fragile is the peace. In the wake of the sinking of the Cheonan, the fear persists of more battles in disputed waters in the West or Yellow Sea, the scene of bloody shootouts between North and South Korean vessels in June 1999 and again in June 2002. For that matter, gunfire can always break out across the 155-mile-long demilitarized zone that has divided the peninsula since July 1953. Although we often hear that the war stopped where it began, North Korea retains the city of Kaesong, in South Korean hands before the war, while South Korea holds territory above the 38th parallel in the center and east. Kaesong is important since it's the site of an economic complex in which 120 small South Korean manufacturers operate factories staffed by 44,000 North Koreans. The North still earns money from Kaesong even though South Korea's President Lee Myung-bak cut off trade between South and North Korea, from which the North was netting about $200 million a year, in retaliation for the sinking of the Cheonan. Only 28,500 American troops remain in Korea, but US Navy vessels are joining South Korean vessels next month in drills that are a show of force in the Yellow Sea, and the US Seventh Air Force at Osan, south of Seoul, remains a powerful deterrent. China, whose "volunteers" saved the North from complete takeover by the Americans and South Koreans in 1950 and 1951, is now a huge trading partner with both the US and South Korea. The US-backed South prospers in a peculiar balance in which one fact is clear: nobody wants a second Korean War.

No Korean War

No Korean War – No one would back North Korea and no one wants to start a war with them either

Stuart Whatley, Associate Blog Editor of Huffington Post, 5-28-2009, “Why North Korea’s Antics are Good for Obama”, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stuart-whatley/why-north-koreas-antics-a\_b\_208712.html)

Both China and Russia have in the past been complacent towards North Korean aggression. Though Kim's missile launches and nuclear tests are surely a diplomatic annoyance, it is never enough for Beijing or Moscow to issue more than a verbal wrist-slap to their vestigial Soviet-era ally. But this time is different, and the advantage is all Obama's. Indeed, neither country actually wants a nuclear armed North Korea to join the geopolitical chess match. The global financial meltdown squeezing GDP growth worldwide, and both countries now following up on G-20 pledges for better ties, all bodes well for a concerted, harsh response that finally goes beyond just words. Indeed, the current crisis allows for unprecedented cooperation between global players that could lead to good faith dealings with other prickly issues, such as global security, the economy and climate change. With the mandate that a unified front will provide, harsh sanctions specifically targeting Kim's military will finally be feasible, as will a full-court press on North Korean vessels under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) with South Korea onboard after years of reticence. Most essential of all, however, is the possibility that China will finally close off trade and aid channels that have for years propped up the North's regime. Admittedly, such additional provocations could lead the DPRK to back up its shrill rhetoric with violence. But multiple experts, speaking to the Washington Post Wednesday, for their part, agreed that a large-scale clash is extremely unlikely. All things considered, much good could come out of the current crisis. Sure, Obama didn't ask for any of this. But if the pieces continue to fall into place against the Hermit King, this week's mess could be next week's fortuitous moment.

Without international support, North Korea won’t start a war

Carlton Meyers, Editor – G2 Military, 2003, “The Mythical North Korean Threat,” http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm

The chance of a Korean war is extremely unlikely. North Korean leaders realize they have no hope of success without major backing from China or Russia. The previous South Korean President, Kim Dae Jung, encouraged peace and visited North Korea. The two countries are reconnecting rail lines and sent a combined team to the Olympics. Even the United States is providing $500 million dollars a year in food to the starving North Koreans. The new South Korean President, Roh-Moo-hyun was elected on a peace platform and suggested US troops may be gone within ten years.

North Korea won’t escalate conflict—they’re just trying to build chips for international negotiations

Global Insight, 2-22-2010, “North Korea Seeks Talks on Kaesong Industrial Estate Despite Border Tension,” ln

Significance: The countries' disputed Yellow Sea border has been particularly tense since a clash last November badly damaged a North Korean patrol boat. But despite the friction, North Korea has proposed to hold discussions with the South over Kaesong. The Seoul government had originally proposed the date of 23 February and has not yet decided whether to agree to the revised date. In the security realm, limited provocation from the North towards its southern neighbour is unlikely to escalate into more serious conflict on the Korean Peninsula, as the North's motivations are not to increase hostility, but to improve its bargaining position and pressure the international community for concessions while inching towards nuclear-disarmament talks.

Deterrence prevents conflict

William Perry, Former Secretary of State, 10-12-1999, “Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle”, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/book/perryrpt.html

Under present circumstances, therefore, deterrence of war on the Korean Peninsula is stable on both sides, in military terms. While always subject to miscalculation by the isolated North Korean government, there is no military calculus that would suggest to the North Koreans anything but catastrophe from armed conflict. This relative stability, if it is not disturbed, can provide the time and conditions for all sides to pursue a permanent peace on the Peninsula, ending at last the Korean War and perhaps ultimately leading to the peaceful reunification of the Korean people. This is the lasting goal of U.S. policy.

No Korean War

North Korea’s regime survival motivations prevent conflict escalation beyond limited naval skirmishes

National Post, 5-28-2009, “A ticking bomb on Korean peninsula,” ln

Q What are the chances of war? A Very low. North Korea is highly unlikely to repeat its invasion of the South because this would entail a war with the United States that Mr. Kim would certainly lose. Staying in power is Mr. Kim's one overriding aim. If he begins a general war, this would undoubtedly cause the downfall of his regime. Q What are the other possibilities? A Small-scale clashes are likely. The maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea has never been agreed. This could be the setting for naval skirmishes, especially if the United States and South Korea stop and search ships using Northern ports. Q What about North Korea's nuclear weapons? A North Korea is believed to have built a small arsenal of nuclear bombs -- perhaps fewer than 10 -- using plutonium taken from its reactor at Yongbyon. But these are not as threatening as you might think. North Korea has probably failed to convert them into nuclear warheads for delivery by a missile. So dropping the bombs from a plane would be the only way of conducting a nuclear attack. Any military aircraft taking off in North Korean airspace during a war would probably be shot down very quickly. Q So what is the worst that North Korea can do? A The biggest danger for South Korea is that its capital, Seoul, is only 50 kilometres from the border with the North. This means that 20 million South Koreans live within range of Mr. Kim's heavy artillery. North Korea's army deploys 17,900 artillery pieces, many of them aimed at Seoul. In the event of war, these guns could fire between 300,000 and 500,000 high explosive shells at Seoul every hour.

North Korea won’t provoke war

Washington Post, 5-28-2009, “North Korea Threatens to Attack South”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/27/AR2009052701060\_2.html?sid= ST2009052703825

Analysts in Seoul said they regarded North Korea's warnings as serious but doubted the willingness of Kim to provoke a large-scale confrontation. "The problem is that both sides cannot afford to make a concession," said Dong Yong-seung, a senior fellow at the North Korean division of Samsung Economic Research Institute. "It is like a game of chicken." Andrei Lankov, a professor at Seoul's Kookmin University who has written several books about North Korea, said, "Small-scale shooting is possible and even probable, but nothing more serious than that." "The location of mansions where Pyongyang's leaders enjoy their Hennessy cognac is well known to the American military, and North Koreans know the precision of U.S. cruise missiles," Lankov said. "The North will steer clear of any action which might lead to a real confrontation."

No risk of war. All parties want de-escalation.

 Vyacheslav Nikonov, President of the Politika Foundation, 6-5-2009, “KOREA: WILL THERE BE A WAR”, ln

The nuclear test North Korea run became the most important event in the world. Moreover, the DPRK launched some missiles and voided the truce with South Korea. The international community including the UN Security Council unanimously condemned Pyongyang. Experts began speculating on the possibility of a shooting war. Will there be a war? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider who may attack whom in principle and what the chances that it will happen are. It is from North Korea itself that aggression is expected. Its leaders plainly say that should South Korean ships try to examine North Korean ones, the DPRK will go to war. Granted that this particular danger exists, it is clear nevertheless that North Korean leaders know better than wish for a shooting war. These masters of political survival are not suicidal. They know what is at stake and they know the risks. And what do they need an atomic bomb for? This correspondent heard the following explanation in Pyongyang: nobody will ever convince us after Yugoslavia and Iraq that there is no need for nuclear weapons. The Americans never attack countries with nuclear weapons. North Korean leaders were prepared once to barter the national nuclear program for a direct dialogue and guarantees of security from the United States and for economic aid from the international community. The Americans, however, denied them both the dialogue and the guarantees. The Japanese never even began to fulfill their obligations, and South Korean leadership took a firm stand with regard to Pyongyang. The DPRK therefore decided that its "concessions" (i.e. the promise to suspend its nuclear and missile programs) had been a wasted gesture. The nuclear tests were simply blackmail, a device Pyongyang decided on in order to resume the bargaining first and foremost with the United States. They had nothing to do with preparations for aggression. Besides, who can North Korea attack? The United States is out of reach. Its missiles can reach Japan only in theory, and even that is questionable. In a word, South Korea is the only potential target. Actually, the Koreans living on both sides of the demilitarized zone regard themselves as one and the same people. They hate the government of the other country but not the people. Besides, Pyongyang knows that it will have to fight the United States whose contingent of nearly 40,000 men is stationed in the southern part of the peninsula. What about an attack on North Korea then? What country can launch it? South Korea? This advanced and densely populated country knows all too well what this war will spell. South Korea is not going to attack its northern neighbor. It will even try to keep others, first and foremost the United States, from attacking North Korea. Barack Obama is determined to pull out from Iraq and eventually from Afghanistan. The situation being what it is, Washington is unlikely to launch another intervention where there will be numerous casualties and whose successful outcome is not guaranteed. America's allies in the region will object to a war, both South Korea and Japan, that is earnestly afraid of North Korean rockets. Neither will China and Russia back the decision to go to war. Without them, the United States cannot hope to legitimize its actions at the UN Security Council. Also importantly, China will never permit the fall of the communist regime in the DPRK or a unification of the two Koreas. The prospect of ending up with a country across the border with a population approaching 70 million and an ally of the United States to boot is the last thing Beijing wants.

Withdrawal Causes War

Reducing troop deployments weakens extended deterrence in Asia --- turns the case

Robert Scales, Major Gen. and former Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations of the US Army and PhD in History @ Duke, and Larry Wortzel, Col. – US Army, Dir. Strategic Studies Institute – US Army War College, and PhD in Pol. Sci. – U. Hawaii, 4-6-1999, “THE FUTURE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN ASIA: LANDPOWER AND THE GEOSTRATEGY OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT”, https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB75.pdf

The presence of American military forces in the region was one of the reasons that U.S. nuclear deterrence was extended to our allies in Korea and Japan. As in Europe, the stationing of U.S. conventional forces provided a deterrent option that is reinforced by the nuclear dimension. American nuclear deterrence, therefore, is also welcome in Northeast Asia for its contribution to security and stability in the region. China’s military strategists may complain that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a threat to China; but they acknowledge in private discussion that without extended deterrence, as provided for in the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Republic of Korea defense treaties, Korea might develop nuclear weapons and Japan could follow suit.23 China’s leaders even realize that without the defensive conventional arms provided to Taiwan by the United States under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Taiwan might develop nuclear weapons. Japanese military strategists express their own concerns about South Korea.24 Threatened by the probability that North Korea has developed a nuclear capability, without the protection of U.S. extended deterrence, the South would probably respond in kind by developing its own weapons. Certainly South Korea has the requisite technological level to develop nuclear weapons. In the event of the reunification of the Korean peninsula, because the North already has a nuclear capability, Japan would face a nuclear-armed peninsula. Tokyo might then reexamine its own commitment to defense relying on conventional weapons with the support of the Japanese populace. Strategic thinkers in China and Japan acknowledge that the continuation of extended deterrence might inhibit Japan from going nuclear in such a case.25 Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, two Americans, make this same argument: “. . . Japan’s leaders would be less likely to develop a nuclear arsenal as a hedge against Korean pressure.”26 Strong U.S. diplomacy combined with continued extended deterrence, argue some of Korea and Japan’s strategic thinkers, might convince the regime in charge of a reunified Korea to dismantle whatever devices the North has built instead of improving them.

The plan sends a signal of a fracturing alliance between the US and the ROK – this causes the north to invade

Terry C. Stevens, Naval Post-Graduate School, December 2003, “Deterring North Korea: U.S. Options”, Comparative Strategy, 22(5)

The NIPP Working Group’s analysis indicates that it would be unwarranted to discount a major attack aimed at fulfilling North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s self-proclaimed “destiny”; that is, reunification of the Korean peninsula on the north’s terms. Frankly, it is wishful thinking to believe that this contingency is a relic of the past. Consequently— although addressing North Korea’s nuclear program is important—we chose to structure our scenario around a possible North Korean attack in order to underscore this uncomfortable possibility to U.S. policymakers. Our scenario, crafted in early 2002, posited the following: Given a set of plausible ROK and ROK–U.S. developments, Kim Jong Il perceives that the DPRK has a fleeting opportunity to reunify the peninsula on his terms, and initiates hostilities. Unfortunately, given developments on the Korean peninsula over the last few months, this scenario appears increasingly probable. The “plausible developments” hypothesized in the specific scenario were meant to include such factors as: --A growing rift in the U.S.–ROK alliance; --A United States diverted by other events worldwide; and --Other catalytic developments in South Korea, such as the coming to power of leadership that may act to jeopardize a bilateral cooperative relationship with the U.S. Our analysis of Kim Jong Il’s personality and his regime indicates that these factors, considered together, might lead Kim to calculate that he has a fleeting opportunity to make a military grab at reunification. With such a perception, Kim Jong Il could decide to pursue the culminating military action upon which his entire regime is founded, and which provides a fundamental source of its legitimacy. Such a conclusion on the part of North Korea’s leadership may well prove to be a miscalculated blunder—but it is nonetheless one that would lead to war.

Withdrawal Causes War

U.S. withdrawal causes North Korea to invade

Peter Huessy, Senior Defense Associate at National Defense University, 8-13-2003, “Realism on the Korean Peninsula: Real Threats, Real Dangers,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=18560

However, Carpenter has long advocated a unilateral withdrawal of our U.S. forces from the Republic of Korea, under the guise of arguing that such a reduction of U.S. forces would save tax-payer dollars, as well as U.S. lives, should there be an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, Carpenter, in conversations I have had with him, readily agrees that a U.S. withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula might very well precipitate an invasion by the communists in the North with the aim of quickly capturing Seoul and then suing for peace in an agreement that would eventually give control over a unified country to the communists. Apart from the fact that U.S. forces withdrawn from the ROK would be redeployed elsewhere in the U.S. and thus save the U.S. taxpayers nothing and given that U.S. military forces deployed overseas and at home have declined by over 1 million soldiers since the end of the Cold War, a withdrawal from the ROK by the United States would do nothing except cause another Korean War, kill millions of Korean civilians and soldiers and place in danger the ability of Japan to maintain its economy in the face of a Korean Peninsula in communist hands. As every Commander of U.S. forces in Korea since 1979 has told Congress in public testimony, Japan is not defensible if Korea is taken by the communists. A blockade of trade routes to and from Japan would become a realistic weapon in the hands of the PRC, not dissimilar to a blockade of Taiwan by the PRC portrayed by Patrick Robinson in Kilo Class.

That escalates to global nuclear war

Peter Huessy, Senior Defense Associate at National Defense University, 8-13-2003, “Realism on the Korean Peninsula: Real Threats, Real Dangers,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=18560

It may be wishful thinking, but I believe China has the ability to help shape the future in the region in a positive way. For the U.S. to withdraw from the ROK, as proposed by Carpenter, might very well initiate not only another Korean War but also possibly another World War. When I lived in Seoul and attended Yonsei University in 1969-70, my Korean father and Yonsei professor, Hahm Pyong Choon, later to become Ambassador to the United States and national security adviser to the President of the Republic of Korea, told me there were always those who sought to purchase liberty and freedom on the cheap. At an embassy reception in Washington, he reminded me what he had told me in class: “Those on the left think you are imperialists; those on the right do not want to spend the money”. In 1985, the communists planted bombs in Burma where the ROK cabinet was meeting. Professor Hahm was killed by the very same North Korean communists whom wish to see the withdrawal of American forces from the region. To save a few dollars, however unintentionally, we might end up the North Korean army in downtown Seoul. Certainly, armed with nuclear weapons, the North will be difficult at best to deter from such an attack. To the people of the Republic of Korea: America will not leave, we will not run, we will not forget the extraordinary sacrifices we both have made to secure the freedom of your country and ours. This is the basis for the Bush Administration’s strategy, and with that sufficient reason it should be supported.

Appeasement Turn

The plan doesn’t solve for North Korean insecurity – they fear U.S. nuclear threats

Patrick Morgan, Chair in Peace and Conflict Studies @ UC Irvine, 6-21-2009, “Considerations Bearing on a Possible Retraction of the American Nuclear Umbrella Over the ROK”, http://www.ncnk.org/resources/ publications/Morgan%20Considerations%20Bearing\_on\_a\_Possible\_Retraction\_of\_the\_American\_Nuclear\_Umbrella.pdf)

There are other complications. One would be that US extended deterrence for the ROK can not readily be eliminated. The US will continue to be devoted to democracy and human rights, and thus to the health and well being of the world’s democracies, particularly large and important ones like Japan and the ROK. It will also remain committed to nuclear nonproliferation. Practicing deterrence with these in mind will directly or indirectly involve the possibility of nuclear retaliation unless the US adopts complete nuclear disarmament. If so, how credible can a renunciation of the American nuclear umbrella over South Korea really be, particularly to a government like North Korea’s which is so deeply mistrustful of US intentions. In the same way, how can a regional nuclear umbrella be eliminated when it rests on a massively global nuclear capability? As noted, the US withdrew its nuclear weapons from the peninsula in 1991 but North Korea still worries about a nuclear attack. The US does not need to keep nuclear weapons in East Asia to deliver highly accurate nuclear attacks anywhere in the region, from thousands of miles away. And many of the nuclear weapons the US withdrew from its navy were stored and could readily be reinstalled. The US also has many other stockpiled nuclear weapons for planes, cruise missiles, etc. Analysts have long noted that pledges of nonuse or no first use of nuclear weapons can not be taken seriously because they are unlikely to be honored if the face of a grave attack. Why should a US pledge to not retaliate with nuclear weapons for, say, a nuclear attack on Japan or the ROK, be taken as inviolate? The only reliable way to eliminate American extended nuclear deterrence is to eliminate American nuclear weapons. But that would make the proposed tradeoff even more sensitive and provocative.

Appeasement Turn

Turn -- Moral Hazard – the plan unilaterally appeases North Korea – that only emboldens aggression

David Cortright, Senior Fellow @ the Fourth Freedom Forum, and George A. Lopez, Chair in Peace Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies @ Notre Dame, 1998, “Carrots, Sticks, and Cooperation: Economic Tools of Statecraft”, http://www.fourthfreedom.org/Applications/cms.php?page\_id=40)

In diplomatic practice, carrots and sticks are usually combined. Incentives may be offered to increase the attractiveness of a preferred course of action, while sanctions are threatened if objectionable behavior is not halted. As Alexander George has emphasized, coercive diplomacy often requires offers in addition to threats to achieve success. According to David Baldwin, the use of negative sanctions can lay the groundwork for the subsequent application of positive incentives. 2 In the former Yugoslavia, the promise to lift sanctions was an effective incentive in gaining the participation of the Milosevic regime in the Dayton peace process. The United States has maintained an "outer wall" of sanctions (for example, blocking Belgrade's membership in international financial institutions) and has made the removal of these restrictions dependent on, among other things, cooperation in preventing conflict in the South Balkans, especially Kosovo. In North Korea, the offer of economic and diplomatic incentives was accompanied by the threat of sanctions and the movement of U.S. military forces in and around the Korean Peninsula; this simultaneous coercive message no doubt enhanced the appeal of the proposed inducements. As Alexander George has emphasized, deterrence is most effective, especially with respect to crisis prevention, when it includes inducements for cooperation as well as punishments for resistance. What the stick cannot achieve by itself may be accomplished by combining it with a carrot. 3 Combining sanctions with incentives can help to avoid moral hazards. Researchers have found that incentives work best when they are offered from a position of strength rather than out of weakness. If conciliatory gestures are made pusillanimously as a substitute for decisive action, the recipient may indeed attempt to exploit the situation and engage in further aggression. According to Martin Patchen, incentives work best when they flow from strength and are accompanied by a latent threat capacity. Russell Leng has similarly observed that offers "are more likely to be effective when the influencer has the requisites for the effective use of negative inducements as well." 4 When carrots are mixed with sticks, or at least the threat of sticks, the danger of appeasement and of encouraging wrongdoing can be diminished.

Only maintaining a hardline stance can get north korea to denuclearize

Joshua Stanton, an attorney in Washington, D.C., 9-18-2009, “Reevaluating Obama's North Korean Policy,” http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/09/18/opinion/main5320170.shtml

If talks are going nowhere anyway, then, the focus shouldn't be about talks at all. Yes, talks have cosmetic value for those who still fail, for a variety of reasons, to understand this. But I don't know of a single intelligent person in or out of government who really believes the North Koreans will ever keep an agreement to disarm without being brought to the brink of regime collapse (or, for that matter, beyond it). The focus should instead be on financial and political pressure on the regime itself, and thus, the most important thing is to keep the Chinese, Russians, South Koreans, and Japanese from undermining that pressure. We have levers against each of those countries that will allow us to do that, but what matters is that so far, the Administration shows no signs of relaxing the economic pressure prematurely. And if the message Stephen Bosworth carries to the North Koreans is "disarm or prepare for extinction," I don't see how we've done ourselves much harm.

Appeasement Turn

Prefer our evidence – history and theory prove the plan comparatively increases the risk of Korean prolif and war

Colin Dueck, Assistant Professor of Political Science @ University of Colorado, Spring 2006, “Strategies for Managing Rogue States”, Orbis, 50(2)

With regard to both North Korea and Iran, engagement and rollback advocates each commonly argue that their own approach is the surest road to regime change. But regime change is an aspiration, not a strategy. Kim Jong Il and the mullahs of Iran have already lasted longer than many predicted; there are no signs that either regime is facing imminent collapse.43 A vague policy of integration through engagement risks strengthening these regimes, without necessarily receiving much in return. A policy of rollback risks American isolation at best and war at worst. Since the United States is not about to invade and occupy either North Korea or Iran, a refusal to negotiate directly with these governments is to effectively acquiesce in their development of nuclear weapons. American officials must therefore walk a fine line between opposing dangers, in relation to both countries, by following a firm yet prudent strategy of containment alongside limited bargaining. This is not a strategy that has ringing emotional appeal on the campaign trail. Its only virtue is that it is demonstrably better than any of the alternatives. Appeasement, engagement, containment, rollback, nonentanglement— while no single one of these is always the best option, one can draw some general lessons regarding their use, along with their relative costs and benefits. The first is that strategies that rely solely upon inducements and rewards are unlikely to be effective against revisionist, adversarial rogue states. The notion that such states can and must be accommodated or appeased through positive incentives alone has a long and sorry history. In fact, the dangers of firmness in the face of rogue state aggression are much less than the dangers of weakness. Democracies’ policies of non-entanglement, appeasement, or engagement frequently strengthen rogue states without doing anything to alter their hostile intentions. If anything, these strategies may actually increase the danger of war, by giving a possibly misleading impression of unending indifference or passivity on the part of democratic powers. At a minimum, therefore, the United States and its allies should rely upon strategies of containment in relation to rogue state challengers—that is, upon strategies of deterrence, of military preparedness, of strong alliances, and of clear commitments. Some versions of containment, however, are too simplistic to serve the national interest, and here we come to the second lesson: that containment often works best when supplemented with limited incentives and careful negotiations. Adversaries are most likely to respond to demands when faced with a broad combination of rewards and punishments.44 Economic incentives and diplomatic or political recognition are forms of power that the United States possesses alongside its military and economic tools. Why would we renounce any one of these forms of power? To do so would be to voluntarily reduce our influence over a given rogue state. The key is to treat economic and diplomatic incentives as part of an overall strategy in which incentives are linked to disincentives, as well as to reciprocal, verifiable actions or concessions on the part of other states. A closely related prerequisite is to avoid deluding ourselves about the purpose of diplomacy with such states. Every foreign regime, no matter how hostile, understands the concept of hard bargaining, and under certain circumstances the benefits of negotiating may outweigh the costs for the United States. But negotiations must never be initiated or concluded out of a vague hope in the transformational power of diplomatic or economic contact. Rather, negotiations with rogue states should only be undertaken under the limited assumption that we are bargaining over reciprocal, concrete concessions, and not in the hope of altering our adversaries’ basic intentions. Any other approach is irresponsible. Elements of rollback, like elements of engagement, can be used to supplement baseline strategies of containment, but again, hybrid approaches must be conceived and implemented with great skill and care for each case. To directly roll back a given regime through force is, by its very nature, typically more difficult, costly, and risk-prone than containment. Even indirect forms of rollback carry considerable costs. A declared intention to overthrow a foreign government is obviously provocative and may even encourage the target state to launch a preventive strike. Such strategies are also less likely to attract allied support. In some circumstances, elements of indirect rollback can usefully supplement strategies of containment, for example, by weakening, destabilizing, and/or delegitimizing target states, and/or by holding out hope of change to political dissidents overseas. But making regime change the official U.S. policy against a given state must be based upon demonstrable, concrete advantages—including those for the citizens of the target state—and not simply upon rhetorical, ideological, or emotional appeal. Commentators often fixate on the supposed beliefs or preferences of a given rogue state’s leaders, so that the debate then circles around questions of intentions that cannot really be conclusively or definitively answered in the present. The safest assumption under such circumstances is to presume that rogue leaders are hostile but strategic actors—that is, that they weigh the costs and benefits of their own behavior within a given international framework. The United States has considerable ability to shape that framework by offering, threatening, or withholding various incentives and disincentives. It would be self-defeating for the world’s only superpower to renounce a priori the use of any instrument to promote its own interests. The only sensible conclusion is for the United States to preserve its ability to offer a wide range of rewards and punishments in meeting any particular rogue-state challenge. The default or preferred strategy in most cases, therefore, is containment, supplemented from time to time by a little hard bargaining. Inconsistency, weakness, or confusion in implementing this strategy is usually a greater danger than that of provoking one’s adversary.

Obama = Hard Line Now

Obama isn’t making concessions to North Korea now

Scott A. Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html

Current U.S. Policy Early in his term, President Obama declared that his administration would “not fall into the same pattern [as previous administrations] with North Korea.” Rather, he said, it is “incumbent upon all of us to insist that nations like Iran and North Korea do not game the system. . . . Those who seek peace cannot stand idly by as nations arm themselves for nuclear war.”11 Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates stated that the Obama administration “will not buy this horse for a third time.”12 Sec- retary of State Hillary Clinton said, “The international community failed to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. We are now engaged in diplomatic efforts to roll back this development.”13 These statements, coupled with past negotiating experience, highlight the deep levels of mistrust U.S. policymakers harbor toward North Korea. The dominant American perception of this experience is that North Korea pursues negotiations primarily to extract concessions from its counterparts while making commitments it does not intend to keep.

Obama is taking a hardline stance

Scott A. Snyder, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\_policy\_toward\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html

The Task Force finds that the Obama administration has employed primarily reactive measures in response to North Korean provocations. Secretary Clinton described the baseline for U.S. policy when she stated that “within the framework of the Six Party Talks, we are pre- pared to meet bilaterally with North Korea, but North Korea’s return to the negotiating table is not enough. Current sanctions will not be relaxed until Pyongyang takes verifiable, irreversible steps toward com- plete denuclearization. Its leaders should be under no illusion that the United States will ever have normal, sanctions-free relations with a nuclear armed North Korea.”17

A2: Nuclear Tripwire/Escalation

War won’t escalate – China and Russia won’t back North Korea

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow @ CATO, 11-11-2008, “Seoul Searching”,

http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20218)

Moreover, the North’s one-time military allies, Russia and China, both recognized Seoul as the cold war concluded. The ROK now does more business with Beijing than with America. The likelihood of either Moscow or Beijing backing North Korea in any new war is somewhere between infinitesimal and zero. The rest of East Asia would unreservedly stand behind South Korea.

The U.S. won’t go nuclear

Peter Hayes, Director of the Nautilus Institute, 12-17-2009, “Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Global Abolition and Korea”, Nautilus Policy Forum Online, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09096Hayes.html)

Conversely, noone should ever assume that the US commander-in-chief would automatically launch a nuclear reprisal. It follows that the reduction in putative deterrence effects after first or nth use from committing to non-nuclear response is arguably small or non-existent in such circumstances. After such an attack, it is highly likely that all the nuclear weapons states would stand behind the attacked party to hold the aggressor to account, and conventional force would suffice for this purpose. In fact, because conventional force takes more time to mobilize and deliver, it provides a built-in escalation brake that would enable the United States to conduct forensic analysis, intelligence operations, and diplomatic warfare whereas a countervailing strategy that is based on nuclear counterattack entails the opposite, a compression of decision-making time to absurd levels.

North Korea won’t use nukes

Korea Herald, 2-14-2009, “N.K. Nukes for Survival, Not War”, ln

North Korea is unlikely to use its nuclear weapons unless it feels the regime's survival is at risk, the chief U.S. intelligence official said Thursday. The remark by Dennis Blair, director of national intelligence, signaled a softened U.S. threat perception on North Korea's nuclear ambition. "Pyongyang probably views its nuclear weapons as being more for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy than for war-fighting and would consider using nuclear weapons only under certain narrow circumstances," he said in a report presented at a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing. "We also assess Pyongyang probably would not attempt to use nuclear weapons against U.S. forces or territory unless it perceived the regime to be on the verge of military defeat and risked an irretrievable loss of control," Blair said in the report, titled "Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community." The report said that Pyongyang "is less likely to risk selling nuclear weapons or weapons-quantities of fissile material than nuclear technology or less sensitive equipment to other countries or non-state actors," to avoid "a regime-ending military confrontation with the United States." Experts and analysts here said the new Barack Obama administration may craft its North Korea policy based on the appeased perception, which could contradict that of the conservative South Korean government.

The U.S. and South Korea would face crush the north if war breaks out

Carlton Meyer, Editor of G2 Military, 2003, “The Mythical North Korean Threat,” http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm

Even if North Korea employs a few crude nuclear weapons, using them would be suicidal since it would invite instant retaliation from the United States. North Korea lacks the technical know-how to build an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, despite the hopes and lies from the National Missile Defense proponents in the USA. North Korea's industrial production is almost zero, over two million people have starved in recent years, and millions of homeless nomads threaten internal revolution. The US military ignores this reality and retains old plans for the deployment of 450,000 GIs to help defend South Korea, even though the superior South Korean military can halt any North Korean offensive without help from a single American soldier. American forces are not even required for a counter-offensive. A North Korean attack would stall after a few intense days and South Korean forces would soon be in position to overrun North Korea. American air and naval power along with logistical and intelligence support would ensure the rapid collapse of the North Korean army.

A2: Nuclear Tripwire/Escalation

The U.S. nuclear umbrella ensures that the U.S. would get drawn in even without ground forces in Korea

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow @ CATO, 2-1-2007, “North Korea and Umbrella Proliferation”, National Interest, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=13538

Maybe the United States and its allies will strike an accord with Pyongyang next week, but North Korea has been dashing the hopes of Western diplomats for years. With military pre-emption seemingly off the table, despite the arrival of the F-117 Nighthawk fighters, what can be done if the North forges ahead? The conventional wisdom is to strengthen and extend America’s nuclear umbrella. Umbrella Proliferation Indeed, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice responded to recent talk about possible development of a countervailing Japanese or South Korean nuclear weapon by flying to East Asia. She declared: “It’s extremely important to go out and to affirm, and affirm strongly, U.S. defense commitments to Japan and to South Korea.” Those promises were understood to be nuclear. Tokyo, in particular, responded by disclaiming any interest in going nuclear. Although America’s nuclear umbrella for Japan dates back to the end of World War II, the United States has not limited nuclear guarantees to historic allies. In order to convince Ukraine to disgorge the nuclear weapons that remained on its territory after the break-up of the Soviet Union, Washington reportedly provided Kiev with some security guarantees. Whether they include a promise to use nuclear weapons against Russia on behalf of Ukraine has never been revealed. In any case, Kiev may have given up its ultimate deterrent in the belief that Washington was offering an implicit commitment. Moreover, Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post wants America to provide nuclear guarantees for the Middle East. He writes: “Bush should announce that he wants consultations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan and other Arab states—as well as principal U.S. allies in Europe—on extending a U.S. or NATO nuclear umbrella over friendly states in the Gulf.” This would, Hoagland contends, “enable Arab states to forgo developing their own nuclear programs, just as the U.S.-Japan bilateral security treaty is intended to keep Japan nuclear-free.” It’s one thing to promise to respond to a nuclear attack by a potential global hegemon, the Soviet Union, against a major ally, such as Germany or Japan, especially when Washington has deliberately disarmed them. Very different is to promise to protect Jordan or Kuwait, friendly countries, true, but neither historic nor important allies, against an attack by Iran, a regional power without global reach. The latter is an extraordinary extension of a doctrine fraught with danger. The Tripwire Doctrine The principle behind extending Washington’s nuclear umbrella is deterrence. That is, smaller nations, even if evil or aggressive, will not risk American retaliation by threatening friendly states. Moreover, friendly states, sheltered behind a U.S. guarantee, will avoid taking steps opposed by Washington—most particularly, constructing their own nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly, security commitments help deter. The possibility of U.S. intervention raises the cost of war, and thereby discourages aggression. If aggression is less likely, then so is the likelihood that countries will adopt extreme defensive measures. Advocates of extended security commitments, and particularly nuclear guarantees, emphasize these effects. However, though a military guarantee may help deter conflict in this way, it makes conflict more likely in other ways. First, if the U.S. commitment is not credible, there is no deterrent effect. Even a written treaty may not be enough. The famous Chinese challenge—you won't risk Los Angeles to protect Taipei—suggests some doubt in Beijing that the United States would pay the potential price of confronting a nuclear power in order to protect a peripheral geopolitical interest. Second, if war erupts, U.S. involvement (assuming America makes good on its promise) is automatic. Washington loses the ability to weigh costs and benefits in the particular case at the particular time. For decades the quintessential example of this policy was the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Korea, the so-called “tripwire” that ensured sufficient American deaths in any North Korean invasion to trigger U.S. involvement. That policy may have reduced the likelihood of war breaking out, but only by ensuring U.S. involvement in any conflict. Even a small risk of war would be extraordinarily dangerous when dealing with nuclear-armed states. Confronting China, which has global ambitions, or even Iran or North Korea, assuming they develop a capacity to hit the United States, would be far different than attacking Serbia or Iraq. It would be tragically ironic to survive the Cold War without a nuclear exchange and then blunder into one by intervening in a small conflict of limited importance.

A2: Regime Collapse Causes War

DPRK collapse wouldn’t lead to war or nuclear use

John Bolton, senior fellow at AEI, 10-2-2008, “The World Shouldn't Fear The Collapse of North Korea,” WSJ, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122291070711596789.html

Nightmare predictions of loose nukes, an out-of-control North Korean military, a tsunami of refugees and the prospect that the South might have to absorb over 20 million impoverished new citizens are keeping some awake at night. Unquestionably, a Pyongyang regime crisis carries huge risks and challenges. But let's keep our eyes on the prize. There may be a precious opportunity in the midst of potential disaster to reunite the Korean Peninsula under democratic rule, or at least bring this objective closer. A regime crisis in Pyongyang poses two main challenges: (1) the military and nuclear threat on the Peninsula and more broadly; and (2) the humanitarian and economic consequences of the North's collapse, both the immediate risk of massive refugee flows and the long-term economic impact of reunification. These two challenges actually pose very similar choices for U.S. and South Korean leaders today. First, there is no doubt that North Korea's nuclear arsenal must not be allowed to fall into the wrong hands, outside or inside the country, nor should the North's chemical and biological weapons be made operational. The U.S.-South Korean Combined Forces Command (CFC) has contingency plans for these circumstances, drawn with the full realization that rapid implementation in a period of high uncertainty may mean the difference between securing the North's weapons of mass destruction and seeing them used in chaotic and deadly ways. Despite contrary speculation, there is no motivation for North Korea's generals to attack South Korea. They are far more likely to engage in an internal power struggle, which is where the most destructive weapons would be used, and why we must act rapidly to secure them. If things really come unglued, the generals' main preoccupation may well be simply getting out of Dodge -- an objective we should be happy to facilitate. Critical here is that Beijing be told clearly that any military action across the DMZ is intended only to deal with the regime crisis, and is in no way aimed at China. Indeed, to the extent Beijing has information about, say, the location of the North's nuclear weapons, it would clearly be in China's interest to share that information. Not only would a decisive CFC operation minimize the chances for loose nukes or warlord-minded generals, it could also dramatically help reassure the North Korean population that they could stay in their homes, and prevent massive refugee flows into China. That, in turn, could eliminate any thoughts Beijing might have about its own intervention to keep North Koreans from flowing across the Yalu River.

A2: North Korea = Nuclear Threat

North Korea isn’t a nuclear threat

Chicago Tribune, 7/18/08, 2008, Diplomacy scores a rare win in North Korea

It's rare for happy video footage to come out of North Korea, but the other day, it happened. Camera crews were on hand Friday as authorities set off charges at the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, instantly reducing the cooling tower to a heap of rubble. That was the visual payoff for years of arduous and often exasperating negotiations with Kim Jong-il's regime. Dramatic though the explosion was, it signifies only one step on a journey that may never reach its intended destination. Not so long ago, things were proceeding in a very different direction, marked by Pyongyang's detonation of a nuclear device in October 2006. Now we can see progress, however modest. The Bush administration deserves credit for pushing ahead with a task that is as crucial as it is demanding. The cooling tower's destruction came shortly after North Korea kept a commitment by turning over a 60-page report detailing its production of plutonium, which can be used for nuclear weapons. It didn't provide some vital information, such as a full inventory of Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal and an account of whether it has supplied nuclear technology to Syria. Also missing was an account of its uranium enrichment program. Maybe those facts can be extracted in time from North Korea. Still, it's important to note what has been accomplished, and not just what remains to be done. Even before the cooling tower imploded, the North Koreans had largely disabled the reactor and disgorged thousands of pages of records from it. It looks as though they are out of the business of producing plutonium -- which means they will have no additional supplies to use in weapons or to sell. The United States now has information on how much plutonium there is to account for, and the means to verify the North Korean accounting. That gives us a good idea how many nuclear weapons they may have made (perhaps half a dozen) and how many they will have to give up if they agree to denuclearization.

North Korean prolif deters war

John Park, Director of the Korea Working Group at the U.S. Institute of Peace, and Dong Sun Lee, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Korea University, 2008, “North Korea Existential Deterrence and Diplomatic Leverage,” The Long Shadow

Deployable North Korean nuclear armaments would decrease the likelihood of a U.S. preventative war on the peninsula. Preventative war –military action to stop adversaries from increasing military capabilities—tends to be arisky endeavopr, as demonstrated by the long history of failed attempts and the on going ordeal in Iraq (Lee 2008). Democratic governments usually face daunting challenges in selling such a war to their publics—unless a swift and cheap victory is anticipated (Levy and Gochal 2001; Schweller 1992). Such a victory is a remote possibility, however target states are nuclear armed, because the prospect of nuclear retaliati4 adds to the associated risks. For this reason, there is no historical case of a pre- ventive war against a nuclear—capable state, although some states have seriously considered it. While North Korea’s nuclear arsenal has captured the headlines, the North Korean military does not need it to inflict unacceptable damage to the United States and its allies in the event of a U.S. invasion (Lee 2006). When Pyongyang was believed to possess a meager 2ena1\_comp1s11g only one or possibly two untested nuclear devices and no effective long—range missiles military experts still calculated that a major war on the Korean peninsula would cost the United States approximately 80,000 to 100,000 casualties and US$ioo billion (Oberdorf 2001). When damage to other countries was also considered, the estimated cost of such a war increased to as high as “one million casualties and one trillion dollars in estimated industrial damage and lost business” (Cha and Kang 2003). Another calculated that a second Korean War would entail destruction costing “more than $60 billion and result in 3 million casualties, including 52,000 U.S. military casualties” (Cia and Kang 2003). The prospect of such a costly conventional war clearly suffices to deter the approve such a war. In Decembet 2006, when the number of cgombat deaths in States (Lee 2006). The U.S. gOvetnmeflt could not persuade its public to Iraq surpassed 3,000 and the cost of that war exceeded US$350 billion, 61 per- cent of Americans surveyed said that the war had not been worth fighting (ABC News/WashiflgtOfl Post Poll 2006; Associated Press 2007a). In light of such sensi tivity to war costs, few if any presidents would be able to sell the U.S. public on an obviously more expensive war on the Korean peninsulaunless North Korea were to directly attack the United States or its key allies first or to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. A public opinion poll confirmed this point Even before the test that demonstrated North Korea’s nuclear capabilitY 62 per the absefl cent of Americans opposed military action against North Korea in grave provocation (Balz and Morin 2005; Gallup Poll 2005). military fo1 Policy makers have recognized the political constraint in using against Pyongyang. “I am not saying we don’t have military option5 ident George W. Bush’s most senior advisers reportedly admitted in an inter “I am just saying we don’t have good ones” (Sanger 2003a). Similarly, forn1eS Korean Defense Secretary William Perry stated in a 1999 report on North to preciPit that “the prospect of such a destructive war is a powerful deterrent U.S. or allied action” (Perry 1999). In the face of such a political constrault Clinton and Bush administrations have understandably backed away from the there already are enough hurdles to dissuade a preventive war.

A2: Aff Solves Prolif

North Korea won’t give up nukes

Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 5-3-2010, “Taming Pyongyang,” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11739

In any case, the six-party talks would seem kaput. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said the Obama administration remained committed to the negotiations despite the sinking, stating that "I wouldn't necessarily link those directly." Yet the likelihood that Pyongyang would yield its nuclear weapons while sinking South Korean vessels seems vanishingly small. Even a minimal possibility of a negotiated settlement should be pursued, but at some point the effort simply looks foolish.

Withdrawal doesn’t solve – U.S. military threat is not the only incentive for NK prolif

Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies @ CATO, 7-9-2009, “Going 'All In' with North Korea,” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=10340

North Korea insists that it is pursuing a nuclear-weapons program because of Washington's "hostile policy." In other words, Pyongyang professes to fear that if it does not develop a nuclear deterrent, United States will someday use military force to achieve regime change, as it did in Iraq. It is more likely that fear of U.S. intentions is only one reason why Pyongyang is building a nuclear arsenal. The prestige of being a member of the exclusive global nuclear-weapons club, the belief that a nuclear North Korea would be able to blackmail its nonnuclear East Asian neighbors, and the prospect of lucrative revenues from selling atomic technology or warheads to willing purchasers are probably other factors.

U.S. nuclear threats ensure prolif

APR, 4-10-2010, “North Korea says Obama policy 'hostile,' vows to build more bombs,” http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/290328

North Korea has labeled President Obama’s nuclear policy as ‘hostile’ and vows to expand its atomic weapon arsenal, according to a Foreign Ministry statement. In response to the START treaty between the US and Russia, an unidentified source with the North Korean Foreign Ministry on Friday stated: “What is most urgent is for the U.S. to roll back its hostile policy towards the DPRK in practice, not with an empty talk, and take a confidence-building measure.” The Foreign Ministry statement is in response to a question posed by Korean Central News Agency regarding the US Nuclear Posture Review. “President Obama blustered that the U.S. will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that comply with the provisions of NPT but exception is made for countries such as the DPRK and Iran. This proves that the present U.S. policy towards the DPRK is nothing different from the hostile policy pursued by the Bush administration at the outset of its office during which it was hell-bent on posing a nuclear threat to the DPRK after designating it as a ‘target of preemptive nuclear strike’," the report added. North Korea’s response came after Obama signaled the US would “resist” using nuclear weapons on those countries participating in the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, with the exceptions of North Korea and Iran. The North Korean report added: "As long as the U.S. nuclear threat persists, (North Korea) will increase and update various type nuclear weapons as its deterrent in such a manner as it deems necessary in the days ahead."

Recent nuclear tests prove North Korea won’t do nonprolif

David S. Cloud, Politico, 5-25-2009, “North Korea nuclear test a test for President Obama,” http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/22928.html#ixzz0tMTquARb

The test was further evidence that North Korea has little intention of cooperating with Obama's nonproliferation agenda, outlined last month in a speech in Prague. In the address, Obama called for creating a world without nuclear weapons, holding a global summit on nuclear security, and forging new partnerships to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

A2: Aff Solves Prolif

North Korea may roll back part of the threat, but will re-arm later –will never give up weapons.

Jon Herskovitz, 3/13/2010, “SCENARIOS - Troubled paths for North Korea nuclear diplomacy,” Reuters, <http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-46887520100313?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true>

North Korea may roll back part of the threat it poses to the region in the hopes of winning aid to prop up its economy. That would also finance an ambitious project at home to build a "great and prosperous nation" by 2012 -- the 100th anniversary of the birth of state founder Kim Il-sung. The North, as it has often done, may later step away from its disarmament pledges and make threats that shake security. Most analysts do not expect Kim to ever give up nuclear arms, seen in Pyongyang as worth the immense sacrifice because they have deterred a feared U.S. invasion and are the most powerful symbol of Kim's military-first rule.

North Korea will never abandon weapons program.

AFP, 2/18/2010, “N. Korea vows not to abandon nuclear arms,” <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j1G07BrShyhe7kjGgeDSrgVP_wsQ>

North Korea vowed Friday not to abandon its nuclear weapons in return for economic aid, saying the United States should first change its "hostile" policy. The North has developed atomic bombs for its own defence, "not to threaten anybody or receive economic favours or rewards", the official Korean Central News Agency said. It is a "misjudgement" if the outside world thinks it will dump nuclear bombs in return for economic benefits, the agency added. "Unless (the US) terminates its hostile policy and nuclear threats towards our republic, our abandonment of nuclear weapons will not happen even if the earth breaks." Diplomatic efforts have intensified to bring the communist state back to six-nation nuclear disarmament talks, and there have been reports that China is offering aid as an inducement. Chinese and North Korean negotiators held several days of talks in Beijing last week about restarting the forum, which the North quit last April. The two sides also discussed possible economic assistance, South Korea's Yonhap news agency has reported. But media reports said Pyongyang refused to ease its terms for coming back: a lifting of sanctions and a US commitment to discuss a formal peace treaty.

North Korea will pocket the Aff’s concession – only a strategy of containment can hope to prevent north Korean prolif

Colin Dueck, Assistant Professor of Political Science @ University of Colorado, Spring 2006, “Strategies for Managing Rogue States”, Orbis, 50(2)

The problem with engagement is that it seriously underestimates the Kim regime’s malevolence. It is rather naive to expect that any package of economic, diplomatic, and strategic inducements will necessarily alter the fundamentally hostile and authoritarian nature of the Kim regime by, for example, integrating that regime into regional patterns of economic interdependence. Kim will see any attempted integration as a potential threat to his rule. Nor can negotiations be conducted under the assumption that they will automatically result in softening or satiating the North’s foreign policy goals. All prior experience indicates that Pyongyang will wring whatever concessions it can from this process, without abandoning its revisionist ambitions. It is absurd to suggest that Kim ‘‘feels’’ insecure primarily because of the policies of the Bush administration. Both his insecurity and his clandestine nuclearweapons program predate President Bush. The United States certainly caused alarm in Pyongyang with talk of regime change, but the root cause of this crisis is with North Korea, not George W. Bush. For practical reasons, however, direct rollback is not a plausible alternative. To begin with, any preventive U.S. military strike against North Korea and its weapons sites would probably result in a horrific conflict that would make Iraq look tame. The United States would ultimately win this war, but only at immense cost. Hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians would be killed. So would thousands more American troops. South Korea would be devastated. There would be no coalition support for such a preventive war under current circumstances. Nor are there any guarantees that North Korea’s weapons sites would actually be destroyed and its nuclear weapons unused. This prospect should warn us not only against a preventive strike, but indeed against any actions that might hasten war. A stated American policy of regime change or indirect rollback against Pyongyang risks this very possibility. Insofar as Washington appears to indicate that its primary goal is overthrowing the Kim regime, the fewer incentives Pyongyang will have to abstain from lashing out in a dangerous policy course involving very high risk, coercive diplomacy, and even full-scale preventive war.35 The baseline American strategy in relation to North Korea must therefore be neither rollback nor integration through engagement, but containment, supplemented by some careful, hard bargaining. A successful strategy of containment requires absolute clarity about the deadly consequences for Kim and his government should he choose to act aggressively. It also requires having military capabilities on the spot to make that threat credible. Fortunately, the United States and South Korea have those capabilities. The North can therefore be deterred, so long as U.S. defensive commitments are unambiguous. Kim cares little for the lives of his people, but he does value his own power and survival. For this very reason, even in relation to a leader like Kim, containment can work, as it has in the past.36

A2: China Solves Nuclearization

China won’t pressure North Korea – internal politics

Korea Times, 6-9-2010, “China’s double standard on N. Korea,” http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/06/113\_67338.html

China sided with the rest of the world to impose sanctions on North Korea last year after the latter launched missiles and conducted an underground nuclear test, condemning Pyongyang for escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. However, it has remained silent over the North torpedoing the South Korean Navy ship Cheonan, claiming the lives of 46 sailors in March. China's double standard on the reclusive state's belligerent behavior has prompted experts to speculate over its motives. Professor Kenneth Quinones, dean of research evaluation of Japan's Akita International University, told The Korea Times that there has been a change in China's policy toward North Korea since it supported the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions last year. "China's approval of U.N. sanctions last year caused an intense debate within the Chinese government over whether to use pressure or to try to induce North Korea's cooperation," the former U.S. diplomat said. Quinones said the foreign ministry preferred using international pressure but the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army preferred using inducement. "The party and the army won the debate so after the U.N. sanctions that were approved in June, China moderated its policy toward Pyongyang," he said. Some experts observed China learned a lesson that sanctions beget another bellicose act and that the side effect might cause the patron to rethink punitive actions.

China won’t support a tougher diplomatic stance – they think it provokes North Korea to lashout

Korea Times, 6-9-2010, “China’s double standard on N. Korea,” http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/06/113\_67338.html

'Sanctions beget another provocation' Thompson pointed to the negative fallout of China joining the effort to punish North Korea at the UNSC as a possible clue that can help decode Beijing's double standard. "Some Chinese might determine that China's support for the U.N. resolution last year might have contributed to North Korea's decision to launch a torpedo attack on a South Korean vessel, and therefore conclude that supporting another effort at the UNSC will not deter provocations," he said. "(Sanctions) might even encourage more provocations." \* Drew Thompson is the director of China Studies at the Nixon Center in D.C.

China won’t change its stance on North Korea and endorse a harder line

Korea Times, 6-9-2010, “China’s double standard on N. Korea,” http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/06/113\_67338.html

His comments came hours before Chun Yung-woo, second vice foreign minister, returned to Seoul Wednesday empty handed after wrapping up a two-day visit to China. During the trip, the South Korean envoy met with several high-ranking Chinese officials to try and persuade them to join the Seoul-led effort to lock the North into appropriate codes of conduct. South Korea initiated the diplomatic effort in retaliation for the North Korean torpedo attack. Diplomacy, however, appeared to reveal its limitations as the South Korean envoy allegedly failed to influence China to look beyond its so-called strategic interests on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing reportedly remained unchanged in its position to shield Pyongyang from coordinated punitive measures over the Cheonan case. According to media reports, China is unwilling to join any UNSC statements or resolution if they specify North Korea as a player responsible for the act.

A2: Heg Impact

Heg can’t collapse and great power wars won’t occur

Stephen Evera, Prof of Poli Sci at MIT, 2008, “A Farewell to Geopolitics,” p. 13-14.

The Danger that a Eurasian hegemon might appear and threaten the United States largely disappeared after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. There is now no plausible candidate for Eurasian hegemony on the horizon. China comes closest, but not very close. Someday China may rival the United States in military power, but that day is decades away.4 And even then China will pose little geopolitical threat to the United States for four reasons. First, geography makes China a markedly less plausible candidate for Eurasian hegemony than was Germany in 1917 and 1941 or the Soviet Union in 1947. Germany and the Soviet Union were adjacent to large industrial regions of Europe that they could invade over land. in contrast, China is not adjacent to large, vulnerable industrial regions. Europe’s industrial areas are very far from China. Japan is a major industrial region near China, hut it lies across a vast water barrier from the Asian mainland. A conventional Chinese invasion of Japan across this imposing- water barrier would be nearly impossible. China therefore does not have important industrial targets that it might conquer within easy reach. Geography naturally precludes China from gaining a wider industrial empire. Second, if China nevertheless does somehow conquer other industrial regions, it will gain little strength by doing so. The reason is that today’s postindustrial knowledge—based economies are far harder for a conqueror to harness to aggressive purposes than were the smokestack economies of the 1940S and i 9os. Postindustrial economies depend on free access to technical and social information. This access requires some domestic press freedom and access to the Internet, foreign publications, and foreign travel. But the police measures needed to subdue a conquered society require that these channels he controlled because they also serve-as carriers of subversive ideas. Thus key elements of the economic fabric now must be ripped out to maintain control over conquered polities. Conquerors must stifle the productivity of those they conquer in order to control them, leaving conquerors with little or no net economic gain. ,This is a marked change from the smokestack era, when societies could he conquered and policed with far less collateral harm to their economics. Third, the rising power of nationalism guarantees that China will pay large costs to police any empire that it conquers. The age of empire on the cheap has passed with the spread of nationalist ideas, small arms, and guerrilla tactics. A Chinese reach for empire will likely collide with effective resistance of the kind that defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (1979—1989) and the United States in Vietnam (i 96 i—I 97). Fourth, and most important, the nuclear revolution makes great powers virtually unconquerable. Any state with a secure nuclear deterrent is secure from conquest, as it could annihilate any attacker. And a secure deterrent is far easier to maintain than to threaten, So nuclear powers can defend themselves against states with many times their economic power. As a result, the United States could defend itself against China even if China grew to become the world’s largest economy, conquered its neighbors, and then found a way to harness their industrial power for war. Under such exceedingly far—fetched circumstances. China still could not conquer the United States without first developing a nuclear first—strike capability against the United States. But a Chinese nuclear first—strike capability is a pipe dream and will remain so. It would require an implausibly overwhelming Chinese economic superiority over the United States. An economically fast—growing and politically unchecked China could never gain such vast economic superiority even in a best—case scenario for China. A Chinese nuclear first—strike capability against the United States is not in the cards. Therefore, a plausible Chinese threat to U.S. sovereignty can be ruled out for the foreseeable future. For these reasons, addressing geopolitical threats should have far less priority in U .S. national security policy than in the past. Other major Powers are not the danger to U.S. security that they once were. Even a vast increase in the assets possessed by China—or Russia or the major European powers— would leave them unable to threaten the sovereignty of the United States. The United States can therefore afford to put much less priority on limiting their power.

Their authors exaggerate threats to justify hegemony

Christopher Layne, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing.” International Security. Summer 1997.

The security/interdependence nexus results in the exaggeration of threats to American strategic interests because it requires the United States to defend its core interests by intervening in the peripheries. There are three reasons for this. First, as Johnson points out, order-maintenance strategies are biased inherently toward threat exaggeration. Threats to order generate an anxiety “that has at its center the fear of the unknown. It is not just security, but the pattern of order upon which the sense of security depends that is threatened.”4’ Second, because the strategy of preponderance requires U.S. intervention in places that concededly have no intrinsic strategic value, U.S. policymakers are compelled to overstate the dangers to American interests to mobilize domestic support for their policies.42 Third, the tendency to exaggerate threats is tightly linked to the strategy of preponderance’s concern with maintaining U.S. credibility. The diplomatic historian Robert J. McMahon has observed that since 1945 U.S. policymakers consistently have asserted that American credibility is “among the most critical of all foreign policy objectives.” As Khalilzad makes clear, they still are obsessed with the need to preserve America’s reputation for honoring its security commitments: “The credibility of U.S. alliances can be undermined if key allies, such as Germany and Japan, believe that the current. arrangements do not deal adequately with threats to their security. It could also be undermined if, over an extended period, the United States is perceived as lacking the will or capability to lead in protecting their interests.” Credibility is believed to be crucial if the extended deterrence guarantees on which the strategy of preponderance rests are to remain robust. Preponderance’s concern with credibility leads to the belief that U.S. commitments are interdependent. As Thomas C. Schelling has put it: “Few parts of the world are intrinsically worth the risk of serious war by themselves. but defending them or running risks to protect them may preserve one’s commitments to action in other parts of the world at later times.”45 If others perceive that the United States has acted irresolutely in a specific crisis, they will conclude that it will not honor its commitments in future crises. Hence, as happened repeatedly in the Cold War, the United States has taken military action in peripheral areas to demonstrate—both to allies and potential adversaries—that it will uphold its security obligations in core areas.

A2: Heg Impact

No risk of transition wars – nuclear weapons, military and economic power, and geographic insultation

Christopher Layne, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Summer, 1997, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing,” International Security 22:1. p.115-116. JSTOR.

The strategy of preponderance assumes that multipolar systems are unstable. As a generalization this may be true, but instability does not affect all states equally. Preponderance’s advocates fail to consider geography’s differential effects. An offshore balancing strategy, however, would account explicitly for geography’s impact on grand strategy. Insular great powers are substantially less likely to be affected by instability than are states that face geographically proximate rivals. Hence the United States could effectively insulate itself from the future great power wars likely to be caused by power transition effects. Because of the interlocking effects of geography, nuclear weapons (which enhance insularity’s strategic advantages), and formidable military and economic capabilities, the United States is virtually impregnable against direct attack. The risk of conflict, and the possible exposure of the American homeland to attack, derive directly from the overseas commitments mandated by preponderance’s expansive definitions of U.S. interests.

Heg makes transition wars more likely

Christopher Layne, Professor in the School of International Studies at the University of Miami. World Policy Journal. New York: Summer 1998. Vol. 15, Iss. 2; pg. 8, 21 pgs. “Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?”

In purely economic terms, an open international economic system may have positive effects. But economics does not take place in a political vacuum. Strategically, economic openness has adverse consequences: it contributes to, and accelerates, a redistribution of relative power among states in the international system (allowing rising competitors to catch up to the United States more quickly than they otherwise would). This leads to the emergence of new great powers. The resulting "power transition," which occurs as a dominant power declines and new challengers arise, usually climaxes in great power wars. 24 Because great power emergence is driven by uneven growth rates (that is, some states are growing faster economically than others), there is little, short of preventive war, that the United States can do to prevent the rise of new great powers. But U.S. grand strategy, to some extent, can affect both the pace and the magnitude of America's relative power decline.