# \*\*\*Natives Case Neg\*\*\*

Note: The net benefit to the Bison CP is self-determination.

# Bison Advantage CP

**Text: The United States federal government should establish roaming land for wild bison and declare bison an endangered keystone species**

**CP solves the bison advantage**

**CBC News 10** Bison population needs land to grow: study Last Updated: Tuesday, March 2, 2010 | 7:34 PM ET CBC News http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2010/03/02/alberta-bison-study-calgary-plains.html

Restoring the wild bison population in North America depends on the land made available for roaming and a change in public attitude towards the animal, says a new study co-edited by a Calgary researcher. "We're on the brink of making some major breakthroughs in terms of re-establishing significant populations of bison, restoring them ecologically on the continent," said Cormack Gates, a co-editor of a report released Tuesday called American Bison: Status survey and conservation guidelines 2010. Finding proper land for bison to breed and roam freely is the biggest challenge, said Gates, a professor of environmental design at the University of Calgary. "The message to the government is to look at the bison as legitimate wildlife and find places within their jurisdictions where this is possible to restore them as such to the landscape," Gates told CBC News. The report notes some ideal areas for the massive mammals, including five watersheds within Banff and Jasper national parks.

**No biological issues – land will solve**

**Freese et al. 07** [Curtis H. Freese, Northern Great Plains Program, World Wildlife Fund; Keith E. Aune, Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks; Delaney P. Boyd; James N. Derr, Department of Veterinary Pathobiology, Texas A&M University; Steve C. Forrest; C. Cormack Gates, Faculty of Environmental Design, University of Calgary; Peter J.P. Gogan, USGS Northern Rocky Mountain Science Center; Shaun M. Grassel, Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, Department of Wildlife, Fish and Recreation; Natalie D. Halbert, Department of Veterinary Pathobiology, Texas A&M University; Kyran Kunkel, Northern Great Plains Program, World Wildlife Fund; Kent H. Redford, WCS Institute, Wildlife Conservation Society] Second chance for the plains bison http://www.americanbisonsocietyonline.org/Portals/7/Freese%20et%20al%202007%20-%20Second%20chance%20for%20the%20plains%20bison.pdf

Unlike many endangered species restoration efforts, **there are no signiﬁcant biological challenges to building bison populations**, as evidenced by the success of commercial bison breeders across North America and successful reintroductions of plains bison to the wild in Yellowstone National Park’s northern range, the Henry Mountains of Utah, four areas in Alaska (Boyd, 2003), and wood bison in several locations in Canada (Gates et al., 2001). Millions of acres of bison habitat, particularly native grasslands of the Great Plains, remain largely intact. Rebuilding a population is biologically relatively simple: give a suitable founder herd lots of land to roam and grass to eat and watch their numbers double every 4 or 5 years (Fredin, 1984). The major challenge is primarily a socioeconomic one of securing sufﬁciently large areas of land.

# Natives Economy High

**Status quo solves economy – alternative energy economy – prefer our question of long term economics over snapshots**

**Herald News 4/3/12** By Heather Scofield Herald staff writer Article Last Updated: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 9:56am Tribes power up Clean energy potential on reservations could be a game-changer for tribes and nation http://durangoherald.com/article/20120401/NEWS01/704019915/0/FRONTPAGE/Tribes-power-up

So, for the financial well-being of the nation and in the interest of national security, President Barack Obama has made development of alternative domestic energy sources a cornerstone of his energy policy. That commitment is backed with millions of federal dollars, some of which has gone to many of the hundreds of Native American tribes sitting on resources needed to bring alternative sources of electricity flowing to homes and businesses. “Overall, there’s a huge resource on Indian lands all over the country,” said William Brown, of New Mexico-based Sage West consultants & The Climate Reality project. Brown said if just one-third of the solar capability on the Navajo nation’s vast reservation lands were developed, it would produce enough energy “to power the entire nation through the rest of this century.” Wind resources of tribal lands on the Great Plains from Texas to Canada could power 50 million homes. “That’s a vast amount of energy,” Brown said. If the resources on the nation’s tribal lands, otherwise referred to as “Indian Country,” are heavily developed, it could mean lower rates for electricity, new directions for the nation’s energy industry **and a new economic reality for some Native American tribes** and their neighboring communities. Federal officials and tribes see the potential impacts, too. And many in the energy world, including Tracey LeBeau, director for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Indian Energy Policy and Programs, say the Southern Ute Indian Tribe provided the spark that helped ignite a fire for energy production and potential in Indian Country nationwide. While the Utes spent decades developing, managing and profiting from development of oil and gas resources on their lands, other Native American tribes have taken note. The Southern Utes showed the world that it’s possible for sovereign tribal nations, no matter how small, to gain the training, technical expertise and business savvy needed to turn their lands into energy-producing and economic-development machines. “Historically, tribes have not been in control of developing their resources,” said Carolyn Stewart, managing partner of Red Mountain Energy, a national consulting firm that aids tribes and investors in developing renewable energy resources on tribal lands. “That has been changing over the last 15 to 20 years, and the Southern Utes were the model for that change.” Since 1994, the Department of Energy has invested more than $45 million in more than 200 tribal energy projects, Lebeau said. And millions more were spent last year to help tribes explore, develop and produce energy from their lands. In fact, the U.S. Department of Energy doled out another $6.5 million to fund 19 “clean-energy” projects in Indian Country in February as part of the Obama Administration’s commitment to strengthening partnerships with Tribal Nations and supporting alternative eenergy development. Among the projects funded were a $347,000 Navajo Nation study of the viability of installing 4,000 megawatts of solar power and other renewable energy technologies on 22,000 acres of land in northwestern New Mexico. Grants are just the beginning New federal programs, including the DOE’s Strategic Technical Assistance Response Team, have been launched to advance clean-energy generation in Indian Country. LeBeau said the department also is designing energy-development training programs for tribal leaders. Other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, are shifting focus and creating programs to aid tribal efforts to develop renewable-energy technologies on their lands. William Anderson, chairman of the Moapa Band of Paiutes in Nevada, lauded the support his tribe has received from federal agencies, including the BIA and Department of Interior. The tribe is developing two large-scale solar projects that would produce up to 600 megawatts of energy on 3,000 acres of their reservation. “(Those agencies) have been a big help in pushing our projects forward,” Anderson said. “And because of it, we’re going to set a precedent in Indian Country with one of the largest solar developments to date.”

**Will invest in alternative energy – solves the economy**

**Booth 10** Terrance H. Booth, Sr. – Tsimshian Tribe Substantial Tribal Wealth Development with Alternative Energy By http://tobrukrefinery.org/substantial-tribal-wealth-development-with-alternative-energy/

We see America’s love affair with what is left of fossil fuel causing more damage than good. No pun intended; but, even feeble attempts to store fossil fuel in the ocean. Alaska Native and Native American Tribes should be moving forward on alternative energy projects with formation of Tribal Alternative Energy Parks. Why? By the year 2016 all of America will need 70% more electricity. Alaska Native and Native American Tribes already are taking advantage with funding from US Department of Energy with feasibility studies or have implemented alternative energy with solar and wind. What is available is every tribe across Indian Country; USA has Wind, Solar, Water and Biomass. Indian County, USA can take the lead on full development of alternative energy. The Pueblo of Jemez chose alternative energy over gaming. “Indian tribes control more than 55 million acres of land across the nation, and those lands are capable of producing an estimated 535 billion kilowatt hours of electricity per year from wind power, according to the U.S. Department of Energy’s Tribal Energy Program. Solar has even greater promise, at 17 trillion kilowatt hours per year, or more than four times the amount of electricity generated annually in the US.” http://indiancountrynews.net/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=8284&Itemid=116 ”Tribal lands have the potential to produce 17.6 trillion kilowatt hours of electricity a year from solar power, about 4.5 times the total amount of electricity generated in the US in 2004. The lands also are capable of producing an estimated 535 billion kilowatt hours of electricity per year from wind power. The Campo Kumeyaay Nation outside San Diego hosts the only wind farm on tribal land in the country. It plans to invest $60 million in a second one, securing 20 percent ownership. The tribe will acquire full ownership of both wind farms after 25 years of operation.” http://indiancountrynews.net/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=8284&Itemid=116 ”Indian lands contain 10 percent of the clean energy resources in the United States, according to a new report that details how a lack of financing has kept the 564 recognized tribes from realizing this potential. But a hint of change may be in the air. …..The Bureau of Indian Affairs has identified 77 reservations that could support wind power growth. Other estimates say that wind blowing over tribal lands could provide a full 15 percent of America’s power. Solar alone could deliver 4.5 times the total national energy generation, according to The National Renewable Energy Laboratory.” http://solveclimate.com/blog/20100330/calls-increase-tap-renewable-energy-american-indian-lands “Tribal lands make up only five percent of the United States’ total land area, but represent enormous potential for the production of renewable energy. The 55 million acres of land across the nation controlled by Native American tribes can potentially produce an estimated 535 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity from wind power and more than 17 trillion kilowatt-hours from solar energy. These projections are equivalent to more than four times the amount of electricity generated annually in the United States, and represent new economic and employment opportunities for many Native American communities.” http://beforeitsnews.com/story/82/333/Native\_American\_Tribal\_Lands\_Could\_Produce\_17.5\_Trillion\_Kilowatt\_Hours\_of\_Electricity\_From\_Wind\_and\_Solar\_Power.html Dr. Roy McAlister, CEO/President, American Hydrogen Association, in his book titled “The Solar Hydrogen Civilization, writes: “Total U.S. energy demand is about 100 Quads per year about 100 X1015 BTU /yr. or 29,308, 323,563, 892 kWH/yr. Each state can contribute substantial amounts of renewable energy to overcome present dependence upon fossil fuels.” In area of population Arizona nearly doubled in size from 1990 to 2000. Who provides energy to these growing populated areas of America? Alaska Native and Native American Tribes can provide the growing demand for energy. This article shows the potential to establish Tribal Energy Parks for by year 2016 all of America will need 70% more electricity. By formation of energy parks it can and will provide substantial tribal wealth development. \***Energy production is fundamental to our quality of life and economic security**,” said Tony Dvorak, director of Argonne’s Environmental Science division. “**Despite being rich in renewable resource potential, many tribes struggle with poverty and soaring unemployment. This program helps develop renewable energy resources locally that can create jobs and revenue opportunities for tribal communities**.” http://beforeitsnews.com/story/82/333/Native\_American\_Tribal\_Lands\_Could\_Produce\_17.5\_Trillion\_Kilowatt\_Hours\_of\_Electricity\_From\_Wind\_and\_Solar\_Power.htmlDevelopment

# \*\*\*Politics\*\*\*

# Indian Lobbying Fails

**Indian lobbying fails**

**Porter 05** ROBERT ODAWI PORTER, Senior Associate Dean for Research, Professor of Law, and Dean’s ResearchScholar of Indigenous Nations Law, Syracuse University College of Law. Director, Center for Indigenous Law, Governance & Citizenship. Citizen and former Attorney General of the Seneca Nation of Indians (Heron Clan). Syracuse University College of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series Research Paper No. 05-01 Tribal Disobedience

Lobbying. The most significant limitation associated with lobbying by Indian nations is the fact that lobbying success is tied directly to financial resources. It takes a lot of money to have an impact on the American political system and only a handful of Indian nations have the money that it takes to make a significant impact on the system. Indeed, in recent years, gaming revenues have allowed a few Indian nations to rival some of the largest corporations in America in terms of lobbying expenditures. For most Indian nations, however, devoting considerable resources to lobbying is outside of their means.

**Indian lobbying fails**

**Porter 05** ROBERT ODAWI PORTER, Senior Associate Dean for Research, Professor of Law, and Dean’s ResearchScholar of Indigenous Nations Law, Syracuse University College of Law. Director, Center for Indigenous Law, Governance & Citizenship. Citizen and former Attorney General of the Seneca Nation of Indians (Heron Clan). Syracuse University College of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series Research Paper No. 05-01 Tribal Disobedience

Despite these apparent advantages, however, the lobbying approach carries the formidable limitation that success is ultimately tied to economic and political resources. Indian nations, even the extremely wealthy ones, will never be able to fully offset the economic and political advantages possessed by non-Indians even if they pool their resources. Like litigation, the American political system is designed primarily to serve American interests and so the rules of the game – that money buys success – are reflective of that priority. As a result, on any issue in which more than parochial interests are implicated, American political officials will be able to align their influence if need be to effectively thwart any coordinated Native lobbying agenda.

# \*\*\*Natives Self-Determination DA\*\*\*

# Self-Determination DA Note

**There are a ton of impacts to Scottish succession and Quebec succession in oil**

# 1NC Generic Shell

**The plan sends a signal of self-determination – leads to global secessions**

**Quane 05** Helen Quane is Lecturer in Law, University of Wales, Swansea, United Kingdom The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Development Process Author(s): Helen Quane Reviewed work(s): Source: Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2 (May, 2005), pp. 652-682 Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20069800 . Accessed: 26/07/2012 13:29 http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20069800.pdf?acceptTC=true

However, there is considerable uncertainty about the scope of the right to self-determination under international law. In particular, it is unclear whether indigenous peoples have a right to self-determination that they can exercise separately from the rest of the population of the state. In addition to this**, a right to self-determination for indigenous peoples could have significant implications for the state**. The collective nature of the right could encourage secessionist claims that could have a considerable impact on the political unity and territorial integrity of the state. The right could also have far-reaching implications on a state's development policy particularly where the indigenous people occupy land rich in natural resources and invoke their right to self-determination to prevent the state from exploiting these resources. These concerns arise not only in relation to self-determination but also, albeit to varying degrees, to other rights claimed by indigenous peoples. Consequently, **states and international organizations committed to integrating the rights of indigenous peoples into development programs need to consider the scope of these rights under international law and their potential implications.**

**That causes extinction**

**Gottlieb 93** Gidon, Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at University of Chicago School of Law Nation against state: a new approach to ethnic conflicts and the decline of sovereignty, p. 26-27

**Self-determination unleashed and unchecked by balancing principles constitutes a menace to the society of states**. There is simply no way in which all the hundreds of peoples who aspire to sovereign independence can be granted a state of their own without loosening fearful anarchy and disorder on a planetary scale. The proliferation of territorial entities poses exponentially greater problems for the control of weapons of mass destruction and multiplies situations in which external intervention could threaten peace. It increases problems for the management of all global issues, including terrorism, AIDS, the environment, and population growth. It creates conditions in which domestic strife in remote territories can drag powerful neighbors into local hostilities, creating ever widening circles of conflict. Events in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union drove this point home. Like Russian dolls, ever smaller ethnic groups dwelling in larger units emerged to secede and to demand independence. Georgia, for example, has to contend with the claims of South Ossetians and Abkhazians for independence, just as the Russian Federation is confronted with the separatism of Tartaristan. **An international system made up of several hundred independent territorial states cannot be the basis for global security and prosperity.**

# --Indonesia Impact

**Self-determination in Indonesia causes war and violence**

**Menon and Rathbone 01** Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University; Fellow, New America Foundation Another Year of Living Dangerously? October 1, 2001 The National Interest http://www.cfr.org/world/another-year-living-dangerously/p5202

Washington should also declare its support for a unified Indonesia, particularly because prominent Indonesians have accused it of conniving to destroy their country. Growing violence in Indonesia will bring human rights to the forefront of American debates, and properly so. But the mechanical application of the principle of self-determination to so large and important a country will assuredly not curb but increase long-term violence and disorder. The United States should also favor settlements in Aceh and West Papua that offer autonomy and address in bold, convincing ways the economic and social problems that feed separatism in these provinces. It must, as a corollary, convey to nationalists in these regions that it will support devolution, but not secession. This is because the proliferation of mini-states in Southeast Asia and the implosion of its most important country will increase poverty and violence and unsettle the balance of power in ways that may cast a long and dark shadow. The United States should therefore help identify the providers of arms and training to separatists and militias in Indonesia and use its influence to cut the supply. To help stabilize the Indonesian economy, the United States should organize a fund to support the rupiah and coordinate a long-term program to rebuild what is a ravaged country.

**Escalates**

**Menon and Rathbone 01** Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University; Fellow, New America Foundation Another Year of Living Dangerously? October 1, 2001 The National Interest http://www.cfr.org/world/another-year-living-dangerously/p5202

Indonesia is staggering like a heavyweight boxer who has absorbed too many blows in too many places. A faltering economy, a fractious and feeble central government, communal war and secessionism could culminate in the state's collapse and the country's fragmentation. The result would be more than a local disturbance, for Indonesia is no ordinary place. With 224 million people Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous state, a sprawling archipelago of 13,600 islands (3,000 of them inhabited) nearly three times the size of Texas. While 87 percent of its citizens are Islamic (no country has more Muslims), Indonesia is a kaleidoscope of nationalities, tribes, languages and dialects. The sea lanes that cut through this island constellation-the straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok-connect the Asia-Pacific to Europe and the Persian Gulf, bringing the lifeblood of energy and raw materials and providing an outlet for its manufactured exports. Now that globalization has diminished the distinction between "there" and "here", the disruptions that East Asia's largest economies would suffer if shipments are blocked or delayed will reverberate worldwide. Indonesia is also a fragile democracy in trouble and a humanitarian disaster-in-waiting that threatens to upend the strategic circumstances of Southeast Asia. Obviously, then, the U.S. stake in Indonesia's future is enormous.

# --Kashmir Impact

**Kashmir self-determination causes instability**

**The Guardian 08** Nirpal Dhaliwal is a former London Evening Standard columnist now working for a weekly newspaper in New Delhi Not so fast The last thing Kashmir needs is independence, which would leave it prey to the jihadists who encircle it. Democratic reform in Pakistan needs to come first

Kashmiris do have a right to autonomy and self-determination. But India has an overwhelming right to protect its security and territorial integrity and spread its democratic values. The sole democracy in the region, India is surrounded by states that are either tyrannies or on the brink of collapse (in some cases both) – Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, Nepal and Burma. This has made it impossible for India to negotiate its border disputes reasonably. Tyrannies and military juntas do not have the instinct for dialogue and compromise that democracies do. While having no regard for the human rights of its own people, successive Pakistani regimes have sought to "liberate" Kashmir from Indian control. The issue has become a national neurosis: Pakistani governments have poured more resources and energy into reclaiming Kashmir than they have into achieving civil rights, literacy and democracy on their home soil – a perverse state of affairs to say the least. How can regimes that have no record of good governance within their own borders expect to be co-opted into some form of joint sovereignty as General Pervez Musharraf proposed in 2004? Autonomy for Kashmir or sharing sovereignty with an unstable Pakistan would only create another weak failing state vulnerable to fundamentalism, further threatening India's security. Stein rightly pointed out the suffering of the Kashmiri people in the decade-long conflict that has consumed the region. The Indian security forces do stand accused of some very dark crimes in Kashmir. But Stein made no mention of the fact that Kashmir's insurgency was initially waged not by Kashmiris but by zealous battle-hardened mujahideen unleashed by the Pakistani regime of General Zia ul-Haq. The most bloodthirsty of these terrorist groups, Lashkar-i-Toiba, was formed not in Kashmir but on the battlefields of Afghanistan. Following the defeat of the Soviet Union, it was itching for another holy war and conveniently found one in Kashmir. Pakistan's claim on Kashmir and its demands for Kashmiri autonomy have often been loaded with hypocrisy. It denounces India's human rights record while having an even poorer one in the portion of Kashmir it does govern and calls "Free Kashmir". And while it continuously challenges India's right to rule the territory, it never disputes China's control of the vast area of northern Kashmir it annexed during its brutal 1962 invasion of India, renamed Aksai Chin. For Pakistan, it seems that democratic rule by Delhi has less legitimacy than one-party government by Beijing, a position explained by the huge amounts of nuclear-capable missile technology that has been provided to Pakistan by China. Kashmir is vital to India because it is not only at the heart of India's security policy vis-a-vis Pakistan but also its superpower rival, China. While Kashmir may be a pawn in Pakistan's regional game, the Pakistanis themselves are merely pawns in a much bigger Chinese one. Stein showed little knowledge of the broad range problems that surround Kashmir. But those want to hear an informed discussion of relations between India and Pakistan can do so on June 26-27 when Tehelka, India's leading campaigning left-leaning newspaper, holds a summit at London's Royal Society of Arts on the future of the two countries. Called India-Pakistan: Designing A New Future, it will bring together voices from across Pakistan's and India's military, political and cultural spectrum. Nawaz Sharif, Imran Khan and Jaswant Singh, leader of the Indian opposition, will be among those giving their insights into the prospects for these countries following the recent return of democracy to Pakistan. Stable democratic rule in Pakistan is central to the resolution of the Kashmiri dispute. And India, as a democracy itself, has a moral obligation to help Pakistan achieve that in every way possible. This issue is also critical to the security of the UK, given that Kashmir is often cited as a reason for the radicalisation of young British Muslims who have, on occasion, received training from groups involved in terrorism there.

**Extinction**

**Fai 01** by Ghulam Nabi Fai July 09, 2001 India-Pakistan Summit and the Issue of Kashmir

<http://www.mediamonitors.net/fai6.html>

**The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir**, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, **and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe.** The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.

# --Taiwan Impact

**Causes Chinese nationalism over Taiwan**

**Baogang 03** He Baogang is an associate professor at the School of Government, the University of Tasmania, Australia, and is currently Senior Visiting Research Fellow at East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. Contemporary Chinese Thought, vol. 35, no. 1, Fall 2003, pp. 71–92. © 2003 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN 1097–1467 / 2003 $9.50 + 0.00. HE BAOGANG Why Is Establishing Democracy So Difficult in China? The Challenge of China’s National Identity Question http://www.chinesedemocratization.com/Baogang-English%20articles/21.Why%20Is%20Establishing%20Democracy%20So%20Difficult%20in%20China.pdf

Beijing considers a democratic solution to the Taiwan issue unfeasible and undesirable. Qian Qichen, vice-prime minister, for example, said it is illegitimate, fruitless, and pointless to declare Taiwan’s independence through a referendum. 43 Beijing denounced the Tainan referendum in 1998 as the work of a few extreme separatists in favor of Taiwan independence. If a referendum had been held in Taiwan, it would have gone against unification, for Taiwanese nationalism and a democratic spirit had already developed. For Chinese nationalists, the “One China” policy will never be compromised by democracy, or anything else. They see the unification of mainland China and Taiwan as a primary task in building a strong nation-state. The rationale is that “Taiwan was an inalienable part of China, thus **any self-determination process that might result in a permanent separation was totally unacceptable**.” 44 In the eyes of Beijing, the One China policy presupposes the membership of the political community of China and the precedence of Chinese national identity over the democratic enterprise. For Chinese nationalists, when there is a dispute over what constitutes “the people,” Chinese nationalism provides the answer; it is a guiding principle for unification that overrides the ideological competition between socialism and the three principles of the people. 45 By contrast, democratizing Taiwan increasingly recognizes the important role of the people, civil society, public opinion, and referenda in settling the Taiwan question. Significantly, Taiwan witnessed the establishment of the Promoting Referendum Foundation on July 25, 1990, and the Association for Promoting Referendum on November 17, 1991. Some members of the DPP have been advocating the idea of establishing an independent state of Taiwan through a referendum. After the DPP suffered a setback in the 1998 election, many party members advocated eliminating phrases such as “establishment of a Republic of Taiwan” and “determined by referendum.” This proposal was rejected in early 1999. 46 Hsu Hsin-liang, a former party chairperson, also described prospects for a plebiscite on the future of Taiwan as a “frightening” scenario that would “bring disaster” to Taiwan. 47

**Extinction**

**Strait Times 00** (The Straits Times (Singapore), “No one gains in war over Taiwan”, June 25, 2000, L/N)

The doomsday scenario THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

# --Tibet Impact

**That causes Tibet secession and hyper nationalism in China**

**Dickinson 4/24/12** THE GLOBAL REACH AND LIMITATIONS OF SELF-DETERMINATION Rob Dickinson Dr. Rob Dickinson is a Lecturer in Law at Newcastle Law School, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, England, UK <http://www.cjicl.com/uploads/2/9/5/9/2959791/cjicl_20.2_dickinson_article.pdf>

The territorial entities of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia have already been mentioned above, but of course there are other areas where issues of secession and self-determination are in contention. Tibet is one and here the question has reverberated particularly since 1950 when Tibet fell under the control of the PRC. Independence is at the heart of the Tibet Question, 31 and the question has been referred to as “**a conflict about nationalism—an emotion-laden debate over whether political units should directly parallel ethnic units.**” 32 For China, however, the question is essentially one of territorial integrity, historical continuity in contrast to invasion, and to interference by other states together with human rights proponents in the internal affairs of the People’s Republic. 33 The Tibet Question involves Chinese arguments supporting unification of Tibet within China and territorial integrity of China, on the one hand, and Tibetan arguments regarding the longstanding independence of Tibet on the other. This dissonance resonates over centuries, but a common factor emerges in a comparison of the Mongol conquest of China under Genghis Khan (1162–1227) 34 and the similar absorption of Tibet. Thus, both Tibet and China were subject to Mongol invasion; 35 indeed, the Dalai Lama’s temporal power is said to derive from “a donation” by Kublai Khan, the thirteenth century Mongol Emperor of China. 36 In 1644, having invaded China, the Manchu captured Peking (Beijing) and founded their new dynasty (now known as the Qing), 37 in which the Mongols “became a junior partner.” 38 About that same time, Mongol power established the Dalai Lama as the religious sovereign of Tibet. 39

**That causes war**

**Cambanis 11** (“How China sees the world: An emerging global power hashes out its foreign policy.” 06/26/11. <http://articles.boston.com/2011-06-26/news/29706171_1_foreign-policy-china-opening-south-china-sea/4>. Thenassis Cambanis is a journalist and teacher specializing in the Middle East from a home base in New York City. He contributes regularly to The New York Times, The Boston Globe, and other publications. He teaches at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and at the New School’s Graduate Program in International Affairs.)

As scholars look deeper into China’s approach to the world around it, what they are finding there is sometimes surprising. Rather than the veiled product of a centralized, disciplined Communist Party machine, Chinese policy is ever more complex and fluid—and shaped by a lively and very polarized internal debate with several competing power centers. There’s a clear tug of war between hard-liners who favor a nationalist, even chauvinist stance and more globally minded thinkers who want China to tread lightly and integrate more smoothly into international regimes. And the Chinese public might be pushing a China-first mentality more than its leadership. Scholars believe that the boisterous nativism on display in China’s online forums appears to be a major factor pushing Chinese foreign policy in a more hard-line direction. Today, for all its economic might, China still isn’t considered a global superpower. Its military doesn’t have worldwide reach, and its economy, while prolific, still hasn’t made the transition to producing technology rather than just goods for the world marketplace. Because of its sheer size and the dispatch with which it has moved from Third World economy to industrial powerhouse, however, China’s arrival as a power is considered inevitable. As it does, understanding its foreign policy becomes only more important. Overall, the contours of its internal policy debates suggest a China that’s more isolated, unsure, and in transition than its often aggressive rhetoric would suggest. The candid discussion underway in China’s own public sphere underscores that China’s positions are still under negotiation. And one thing that emerges is a picture of a powerful state that is refreshingly direct in engaging questions about how to behave in the world as it embarks on what it fully expects will be China’s century. For generations, the question of China’s foreign policy was academic at best: The country was chiefly preoccupied with its own developmental great leaps forward. In 1989, with China opening to the world, then-leader Deng Xiaoping articulated a policy of pursuing ambitious goals without alarming the established great powers—or, as he put it, to “hide brightness, cherish obscurity, never take the lead but aim to do something big.” Since then, China’s approach has shifted markedly. China has appeared anything but stealthy and restrained as it has won oil and mining concessions in Iraq and Afghanistan and defied the United States on economic matters like its currency and political flashpoints like Darfur. What has changed is at least in part a story of a maturing state, where a single supreme leader no longer has unfettered authority to dictate foreign policy. Now, government agencies, ministries, and think tanks with competing interests have joined a lively internal debate over China’s best path. Today, a mix of exuberance and self-aware sobriety characterizes the public discourse on foreign policy within China. “How to” books tackle questions of China’s rights and responsibilities as a fledgling superpower. China has no fewer than 428 think tanks involved in policy formulation—a number second only to the United States (although unlike in the United States, all of them have some connection to the state). Even the masses have gotten into the game; state television ran a popular 12-part documentary series in 2006 called “Rising Powers,” which examined the flaws of past empires and analyzed how China could avoid their historical errors. In a widely read article in the most recent issue of The Washington Quarterly, David Shambaugh, a China expert at George Washington University, describes a rich and tumultuous internal foreign policy debate with at least seven discernible schools of thought. “Many new voices and actors are now part of an unprecedentedly complex foreign-policy-making process,” Shambaugh writes. “No nation has had such an extensive, animated, and diverse domestic discourse about its roles as a rising major power as China has during the past decade.” In the 1990s, the dominant factions in China’s policy debate espoused soft power and increasing involvement in global institutions like the United Nations. Today, Shambaugh finds that tougher, more hard-line schools of thought are on top – a consensus he describes as “truculent,” and pushing the nation “to toughen its policies and selectively throw China’s weight around.” It’s not just America that views this turn in China with concern. In recent years, China has asserted that it has full sovereignty over the entire South China Sea, which many nations claim for use as a waterway, fishing ground, and potential field for natural gas and minerals. Last year, a group of neighboring countries, with America’s support, confronted China at an Association of South East Asian Nations meeting. That row sparked angry outbursts from Chinese officials: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact,” Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said in an enraged monologue. At this hard end of the spectrum of Chinese thinking, Shambaugh sees groups he identifies as nativists and realists. Many of them see the international system as a conspiracy to suppress China, and they worry that the Communist Party’s embrace of the global economy could prove its undoing. The realists, whom Shambaugh considers the dominant group today, want China to assert itself aggressively, especially against the powers—including Britain and the United States—that they see as having historically worked against China’s interests. More moderate schools of thought in China, he says, endorse China acting with more authority but focusing its policy attention on a few key relationships. Some Chinese specialists say Russia or the United States should take priority, while others argue that China should cast its lot with neighbors in Asia, or identify with the developing world. At the liberal end of the spectrum, “selective multilateralists” and “globalists” buy into the idea that China will have to take on new responsibilities as its power grows, even if that means embracing international norms that limit China’s ability to maneuver on issues like Tibet, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. Some of these thinkers are still suspicious of international entanglements, but want China to be seen as contributing to the global system rather than behaving as a free rider. The most liberal globalists within China would like to see China concede some limits to its sovereignty and fully integrate with international institutions. The influence of these liberal schools, however, appears to have drastically shrunk since a peak in the 1990s. Predicting what China will do, however, is more complicated than just following the conversation. Unlike the United States, where rival branches of government reach a consensus policy after a comparatively transparent process, China’s real decisions are still made in closed rooms by just a handful of top leaders. And who, exactly, influences those leaders is a question more complicated than it used to be. As an example, MIT political scientist M. Taylor Fravel, who closely tracks Chinese policy, explains that an unlikely group of players contributes to China’s approach to the South China Sea, often forcing the central government’s hand. These include fisheries officials, who often detain foreign fisherman; the state oil company, responsible for exploration and drilling in the sea; the State Oceanographic Administration, which patrols waters claimed by China; and the navy, which conducts exercises in the disputed waters. “The real story is the growth in the number of state actors and the capabilities of these actors that can influence China’s relations with other states and thus impact its foreign policy,” he says.

# --Ext. Tibet Impact

**Causes fights over Tibet and CCP instability**

**Baogang 03** He Baogang is an associate professor at the School of Government, the University of Tasmania, Australia, and is currently Senior Visiting Research Fellow at East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. Contemporary Chinese Thought, vol. 35, no. 1, Fall 2003, pp. 71–92. © 2003 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN 1097–1467 / 2003 $9.50 + 0.00. HE BAOGANG Why Is Establishing Democracy So Difficult in China? The Challenge of China’s National Identity Question http://www.chinesedemocratization.com/Baogang-English%20articles/21.Why%20Is%20Establishing%20Democracy%20So%20Difficult%20in%20China.pdf

In short, Chinese state nationalists reject a democratic solution to the Tibet problem. In their opinion, discourses on democracy and human rights are what brought down the USSR. They argue further that if there is no solution to the Tibet problem, there should be no democracy in Tibet, even if democratization takes place in other parts of China. 37 The Chinese state’s fear of the disintegrating effects of democratization has resulted in resistance to implementing true autonomy in Tibet. The breakup of the Soviet Union and “peaceful evolution” in Eastern Europe were alarming precedents for China. Chen Kuiyuan, Party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), explained China’s tough policies toward Tibet by referring to international changes in the post–cold war era: “Especially under the influence of the international macro-environment, separatist activities have intensified in Tibet and the situation of the antiseparatist struggle has sharpened. These factors are causing political instability.” 38 China’s official press also claimed that the Dalai Lama’s supporters harbored “a hidden motive,” asserting: “They want to take advantage of (turmoil) to split China. To be frank, they want to bring about another ‘BosniaHerzegovina’ in China! But China is not Yugoslavia.” 39 Moreover, the CCP has little faith in democracy. Its monopoly on political power makes it difficult for a solution based on the devolution of power to take place. Because China has always been a unitary state, it will continue to resist any type of federalism that would result in a transfer of power from the center to localities. Beijing thinks that the Hong Kong model of autonomy could not be applied to Tibet because Hong Kong had to be united with the mainland whereas Tibet is already under China’s control. In the eyes of Beijing, a “one country, one system” relationship between the PRC and Tibet has already been in place for several decades, thus rendering the “one country, two systems” model inapplicable to Tibet. 40 Unlike the Indonesian government, which is willing to grant concessions to East Timor and Aceh, since Han Chinese have the predominant position and bargaining power, they are reluctant to make concessions to Tibet. The rise of China as a world power may make it even more unwilling to accept a democratic solution based on compromise and power-sharing. Moreover, China’s self-righteousness about its control of Tibet, and its sense of having suffered under Western imperialism, exclude any democratic thinking on the Tibet issue. Furthermore, the CCP does not recognize the right to self-determination, nor does it allow for the right to secede. In China, only the state has the right to define territorial boundaries, and it does so through diplomatic efforts rather than through democratic mechanisms, as shown by China’s settlement of the Hong Kong issue. Chinese leaders strongly believe that the state has the right to suppress any secessionist movements by whatever measures (e.g., the carrot and stick approach). The argument against secession is grounded on communitarian (or collectivist) claims that are supported by state-sponsored nationalism. Individual consent has little value in this regard and is, at best, a supplement to the power of the state. Furthermore, in the Confucian tradition, secessionists will lose their appeal if their claim is grounded on selfish considerations. What has happened in the Baltic republics would be quite inconceivable in China. It would be regarded as selfish, and secessionists are not able to mobilize people on such grounds. For this reason, the disparity between rich and poor regions may not lead to support for secession, but may undermine the unity of the state by changing the power balance between the center and local regions. In comparison, Tibetan nationalists demand democracy because they believe it will support their cause. The separation of Tibet from China, they argue, will not damage China’s integrity, because China has no legitimate claim over Tibet in the first place. Some Tibetan nationalists cherish the idea of a “Greater Tibet”—one autonomous region that extends into three provinces in China. This radical faction of Tibetan nationalism has been committed to a pan-Tibetan identity since 1959 and its members are on a collision course with Chinese nationalists over the sensitive internal boundary question. If neither is willing to compromise, conflicts are inevitable. By contrast, some more moderate Tibetans argue that Chinese nationalism actually has much to gain from democratization, because it will serve to legitimize the Chinese state and make secession difficult. They maintain that as human rights violations decrease, so the moral force for secession will diminish accordingly. If Tibet enjoys freedom, why should it continue to demand secession? If, despite democratization, it still wanted to secede, this would be seen as little more than a political power struggle among the Tibetans, which would be unlikely to attract international support. If so, radical Tibetans argue, the most favorable timing for Tibetan secession would be before Chinese democratization, not after it. 41

# 2NC Link

**Unique link – the aff functionally changes self-determination in the eyes of international law**

**Quane 05** Helen Quane is Lecturer in Law, University of Wales, Swansea, United Kingdom The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Development Process Author(s): Helen Quane Reviewed work(s): Source: Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2 (May, 2005), pp. 652-682 Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20069800 . Accessed: 26/07/2012 13:29 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20069800.pdf?acceptTC=true>

Recognition of a right to self-determination for indigenous peoples could have a significant impact on the development process. If indigenous peoples constitute a "people" for the purpose of self-determination, they may have the right to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. This could have far-reaching implications for the economic well-being of a state, especially where the group concerned is territorially cohesive, concentrated in an area rich in natural resources, and claiming the right to self-determination in order to secede from the state.36 While the above example concerns the right to external self-determination, others concern the right to internal self-determination. For example, a territorially cohesive group may not want to secede from the state but may want some form of territorial autonomy. This is often the case with indigenous peoples. This scenario can still pose difficulties for the state, particularly when the state wants to exploit natural resources in an autonomous region where the indigenous people oppose such development. Given these potential implications, it is important to determine whether indigenous peoples have a right to self-determination under international law. It is useful to begin with the position under general international law before examining the recent discussions of the issue during the negotiations on the Draft UN Declaration. Under current international instruments, distinct ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups within states do not appear to have a legal right to external or internal self-determination. An examination of the wording, context, drafting history, and subsequent practice of the relevant provisions of the UN Charter, the ICCPR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) tends to support this view.37 This view might seem over cautious, especially when one considers recent events in Central and Eastern Europe. It is also at odds with a growing body of opinion in the academic literature that suggests that groups within states have a right to internal, and possibly external, self determination. Arguably, this cautious approach can be defended, espe cially if one examines the literature in light of the relevant state practice. The importance of state practice cannot be underestimated, even in this age of globalization, because it remains the only means by which new rules of customary international law can be created.