# New Orleans Affirmative- 7wS

## Strategy Page

The 1AC should be flexible. You can add in no great power wars, Ks of politics or more biopower impacts if you like.

There are a number of biopower impacts that are specific to Katrina. I’d avoid making the aff into a general K of biopolitics. The biopolitical disposability of the poor of New Orleans is what the aff corrects, it is not a challenge to all biopolitics everywhere.

## \*\*1AC\*\*

### Contention One: Inherency

**The question is when, not if another hurricane strikes.**

**The Telegraph 05** (Francis Harris in Washington) “City waited for the inevitable but the cost of prevention was just too high” 01 Sep 2005 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1497397/City-waited-for-the-inevitable-but-the-cost-of-prevention-was-just-too-high.html Herm

For decades, New Orleans had been "dodging the bullet" as one hurricane after another whipped in from the Gulf of Mexico. This time the bullet struck. The consequences of Hurricane Katrina's rampage are terrible, but they are not surprising. Experts had warned that the day would come when the protective levees would fail and water would cascade into the streets. Much like Los Angeles, a city built on a fault line, the question among New Orleanians was "when" not "if". Sitting at the mouth of the Mississippi River, New Orleans is what one American academic described as "an inevitable city on an impossible site". But there were few options to save it. Lying six to 20ft below sea level and protected by a system of water-blocking levees, it had faced a growing risk of disaster for years. There had been discussions of raising the levees, but that would have cost countless billions of dollars. In the end, the city had to fight with the defences it had. They weren't enough.

**New Orleans still lacks mass transit evacuation plans. The carless will be trapped again.**

**Renne et al., 08** – Renne is a PhD from the University of New Orleans, Sanchez is a PhD from the University of Utah, and Litman is a director at the Victoria Transport Policy Institute (John Renne, Thomas Sanchez, and Todd Litman, “National Study on Carless and Special Needs Evacuation Planning: A Literature Review”, October 2008, accessed 7/3/12)//BZ

The objective of this study is to research how state departments of transportation (state DOTs), metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), transit agencies, and local governments are considering, in the context of their emergency preparedness planning, the unique needs of minority, low-income, elderly, disabled, and limited English proficient (LEP) persons, especially for households without vehicles (referred to as “carless” in this report). The evacuations of New Orleans and Houston in fall 2005 due to hurricanes Katrina and Rita were two of the largest evacuations in U.S. history. One of **the main shortcomings was the lack of planning to evacuate carless residents, particularly minority, low-income, elderly, disabled, and LEP persons**. In a report to Congress, the U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. Department of Homeland Security revealed that [m]ethods for communicating evacuation options by modes other than personal vehicles are not well developed in most cases. A number of jurisdictions indicate locations where public transportation may be obtained, but many have no specific services identified to assist persons in getting to those designated locations. This situation is a particular problem for people with various disabilities (U.S. Department of Transportation in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006, p. ES - 5) New Orleans is not unique. In fact, according to the 2000 U.S. Census, seven cities had carless populations higher than the 27 percent in New Orleans, including New York (56 percent), Washington, D.C. (37 percent), Baltimore (36 percent), Philadelphia (36 percent), Boston (35 percent), Chicago (29 percent), and San Francisco (29 percent). Nationally, approximately ten percent of the population is disabled and many of these individuals cannot drive, even if a car exists within their household. As the population ages, more and more people will become mobility-restricted. Even the elderly who have cars may be reluctant to drive them during a mandated long-distance evacuation. **These groups face disproportionate risk and suffered loss of life in the flood of New Orleans**. For example, 71% of those who died in Katrina in New Orleans were over the age of 60, and 47% over the age of 75 (AARP 2006a and 2006b). Perhaps, more alarming than the scope of emergency transport for low-mobility populations is the persistence of the problem. The extra risks that carless households face during an evacuation are well-recognized and have been documented in numerous reports and papers (Bourne, 2004; Fischett 2001). Despite this attention, relatively little has been done to improve the situation and only recently has a concerted effort been made to address this problem. Although some plans call for the use of local resources for the movement of indigent and elderly populations during times of emergency, the strategies remain questionable. **Based on the current level of preparedness, it is quite likely that the tragedies seen in New Orleans during and after Hurricane Katrina are bound to be repeated** unless best practices can be understood and adopted widely (Jenkins, Laska and Williamson 2007).

### Plan

**The plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its investment in evacuation transportation infrastructure in New Orleans.**

### Contention Two: the Advantage

**The intersection of race and poverty and car-lessness made the aftermath of Katrina into an overwhelming display of institutional racism. Mass transportation is critical for evacuation.**

**Wailoo et al. 10** (Keith Wailoo- B.A, 1984, Yale University; M.A., 1989, and Ph.D. (History and Sociology of Science), 1992, University of Pennsylvania; joint appointment: Associate Professor of History, Karen M. O’Neill- Karen M. O’Neill studies how land and water policies change the standing of program beneficiaries and experts and change government's claims to authority and power., Jeffrey Dowd- graduate student, Roland Anglin- Associate Research Professor; Director, Joseph C. Cornwall Center for Metropolitan Studies School of Public Affairs and Administration (SPAA) Rutgers University-Newark ; Katrina’s Imprint: Race and Vulnerability in America; 11/2010; pages 23-27)

A landmark decision most known today for its application beyond transportation, Plessy v. Ferguson provided the legal basis for basis for separate schools, restaurants, theaters, hospitals, cemeteries, and public facilities of all kinds from 1896 through 1954, when the legal doctrine of separate but equal was overturned by the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education decision. However, in wake of recent events in New Orleans, the issues involved in Plessy’s support of segregated transportation retain their relevance and are worth revisiting. For, despite the broad applications that would shape its subsequent history, Plessy ultimately turned on the issue of public access to transportation, which Justice John Marshall Harlan, the sole dissenter on the Plessy verdict, discussed with great eloquence. Railroads, he noted, were public “highways.” Although privately owned, they served the public and exercised public functions, as demonstrated by legislatures’ use of the public-spirited right of eminent domain to seize land for the construction of railroad tracks. “The right to eminent domain nowhere justifies taking property for private use,” he emphasized. Accordingly, Harlan reasoned, all citizens should have equal rights to the use of the railroads as a matter of civil rights. “Personal Liberty,” he maintained, citing Black’s Constitutional Law, “consists of the power of locomotion, or changing situation, or removing one’s person to whatsoever places one’s inclination may direct.” **Harlan’s words are newly resonant in the aftermath of** Hurricane **Katrina**, where we saw a tremendous failure in the power of personal locomotion that was largely defined by race. Katrina’s illustration of persistent and pervasive racial inequalities regarding transportation in the United States suggests how little this nation has really traveled since Plessy. Described by some as a wake-up call about racial inequality in America, Katrina left behind – in the Superdome, stranded on the rooftops of their homes, and paddling through the waters that flooded New Orleans – a group of residents who were overwhelmingly black. Also among those unable to evacuate were prisoners, the elderly and disabled people, both black and white – many of whom did not survive. Indeed, the old and the sick number prominently among Katrina’s fatalities – for obvious reasons. What unifies this group is their social status as immobile people, a status overcome during emergencies only if adequate money and planning are in place. But what explains that race, rather than age and physical fragility, was the common factor that united the vast majority of those who remained in the city after Katrina struck? Of the 270,000 Katrina survivors stuck in New Orleans, 93 percent were black. And those left behind shared characteristics that are often unevenly distributed by race. They were predominantly poor and unskilled: 77 percent had a high school education or less, 68 percent had neither money in the bank nor a useable credit card, and 57 percent had total household incomes of less than $20,000 per year. Poverty is one of the major reasons why many of the evacuees did not manage to leave before the storm. They lacked the resources to either travel or support themselves once they had relocated. Moreover, the evacuees also tended to share one characteristic closely related to both their racial and economic demographics: 55 percent had no car or other way to evacuate. In this respect, Hurricane Katrina’s victims were not unique to New Orleans. Although no longer legally prohibited from traveling freely on the nation’s “public highways,” like their segregation era counterparts, many contemporary African Americans both in New Orleans and elsewhere experience a similar restriction on their mobility, largely as a consequence of low levels of car ownership and a deficient public transportation system. Access to Transportation Across the nation, African Americans are three times more likely to lack a car then whites. Latinos come in second when it comes to carlessness – they are two and half times more likely to own no vehicle. The racial shape of this disparity becomes clear when one looks at the statistics: only 7 percent of white families in the United States own no vehicle, as compared with 21 percent of black households, 17 percent of Latino households, 15 percent of Native American households, and 13 percent of Asian Americans households – and disparities with whites are even greater in urban areas. Across the nation, people of color are also less able to rely on the cars they do own for longer trips, as might be required during emergencies like evacuation. Their cars are usually significantly older and cheaper than those owned by whites. Stereotypes about African Americans favoring Cadillacs not withstanding, cars owned by blacks and Latinos have median values in the $5,000 range, while the value of cars owned by white family households averages well over $12,000. Meanwhile, the many blacks and Latinos who own no car are still worse off, as automobile owners typically have better access to employment, healthcare, affordable housing, and other necessities. More to the point, as Katrina demonstrated, in a disaster, access to a car can be a matter of life or death. **This is especially true in urban areas such as New Orleans**, where people of color constitute a larger portion of the population than they do in the country as a whole. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, people of color make up 30 percent of the nation’s population, but 73 percent of the population in New Orleans. In the counties affected by Hurricane Rita, Katrina, and Wilma in 2005, blacks and Latinos made up 24 percent and 14 percent of the carless households, respectively, whereas only 7 percent of white households lacked a car. These statistics acquire real urgency in the case of disasters such as the hurricanes of 2005. Unlike the citizens of nations such as Germany, Japan, Holland, and Britain, all of which have fairly comprehensive public transportation systems in place, Americans who have no access to cars are carless in a society where an automobile is often crucial to both daily life and emergency transportation. The stranding of African Americans in New Orleans, then, can be read through the intersection of economics and racial discrimination. Although urban dwellers in metropolitan areas with effective public transportation, like New York city, sometimes choose not to own automobiles as a matter of convenience, not owning a car is inconvenient in many other American cities. The infrastructure of the highway informs the preparation of America as a nation obsessed with cars and ownership. As a result, in the Big Easy, as in most of the nation’s urban areas, “public transit is considered a mode of last resort or a novelty for tourists and special events. Most middle-class residents seldom use public transit and so have little reason to support it. As a result, service quality is minimal, and poorly integrated into the overall transport system.” African Americans, however, depend on public transportation despite its many limitation. For low-income African Americans in New Orleans and elsewhere, the economic challenges posed by car ownership and American car culture are only compounded by the expensive and exclusionary forms of discrimination that attend virtually every economic transaction required to buy and maintain an automobile. African Americans routinely pay more for cars of similar value than whites. Though no research group has yet produced a national study of this, a 1996 class action suit against an Atlanta-area car dealership revealed that the dealership routinely made between two and seven times as much profit on cars sold to African Americans as compared with vehicles sold to whites. Moreover, broader evidence from a study performed by economists Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman suggests that such practices are not unusual. Audits of the car prices offered to more than three hundred pairs of trained testers dispatched to negotiate with Chicago-area car dealerships produced final price offers on which black males were asked to pay $1,100 more than white males for identical vehicles, while the prices offered to black and whte women exceeded those offered to white men by $410 and $92, respectively. Once they do buy a car, blacks and Latinos alike are often required to pay a significantly higher annual percentage rate than whites on car loans – on average, 7.5 percent as compared with 6 percent, which accounts to a difference of $900 over the life of a six-year loan on a $20,000 car. Car insurance differentials, while they vary from state to state, are even more striking. In California, a recent proposal to eliminate zip code insurance premium pricing by the California Insurance Commissions (the outcome of which has yet to be resolved) illuminates the problem. The Consumers Union found that California’s largest insurance companies typically charge a female driver with a perfect driving record and twenty-two years driving experience an average of 12.9 percent, or $152, more if she lives in a predominantly Latino zip code versus a non-Hispanic white area. In some cases, differentials were as high as 66 percent – the surcharge imposed on the predominantly African American residents of Baldwin Hills, California. Another less well documented, but perhaps more formidable barrier to car ownership among black urbanites is the lack of affordable parking in many of their neighborhoods. Suburban development around cities such as New Orleans was designed with car ownership (as well as white flight) in mind, but the older housing stock and apartment buildings that dominate many urban areas do not include garages or space for parking. Moreover, as tourism and business travel increasingly displace other forms of commerce in many historic cities, even less parking is available to residents – making car ownership ever more expensve and difficult in many inner-city neighborhoods.

**No disaster is natural – who lives and who dies is part of a social calculus based on how much a society decides to care for the under privileged. FEMA didn’t just make mistakes for a few months—the death and suffering stemming from Katrina were decades in the making.**

**Smith 06 –** Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the CUNY Graduate Center where he also directs the Center for Place, Culture and Politics (Neil, “There’s No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster” March 2006, http://www.ladeltacorps.org/uploads/4/3/8/1/4381788/cg-ar-packet.pdf )//ALo

It is generally accepted among environmental geographers that there is no such thing as a natural disaster. In every phase and aspect of a disaster – causes, vulnerability, preparedness, results and response, and reconstruction – **the contours of disaster and the difference between who lives and who dies is to a greater or lesser extent a social calculus**. Hurricane Katrina provides the most startling confirmation of that axiom. This is not simply an academic point but a practical one, and it has everything to do with how societies prepare for and absorb natural events and how they can or should reconstruct afterward. It is difficult, so soon on the heels of such an unnecessarily deadly disaster, to be discompassionate, but it is important in the heat of the moment to put social science to work as a counterweight to official attempts to relegate Katrina to the historical dustbin of inevitable “natural” disasters. First, causes. The denial of the naturalness of disasters is in no way a denial of natural process. Earthquakes, tsunamis, blizzards, droughts and hurricanes are certainly events of nature that require a knowledge of geophysics, physical geography or climatology to comprehend. Whether a natural event is a disaster or not depends ultimately, however, on its location. A large earthquake in the Hindu Kush may spawn no disaster whatsoever while the same intensity event in California could be a catastrophe. But even among climatic events, natural causes are not entirely divorced from the social. The world has recently experienced dramatic warming, which scientists increasingly attribute to airborne emissions of carbon, and around the world Katrina is widely seen as evidence of socially induced climatic change. Much as a single hurricane such as Katrina, even when followed by an almost equally intense Hurricane Rita, or even when embedded in a record 2005 season of Atlantic hurricanes, is not in itself conclusive evidence of humanly induced global warming. Yet it would be irresponsible to ignore such signals. The Bush administration has done just that, and it is happy to attribute the dismal record of death and destruction on the Gulf Coast – perhaps 1200 lives by the latest counts – to an act of nature. It has proven itself not just oblivious but ideologically opposed to mounting scientific evidence of global warming and the fact that rising sea-levels make cities such as New Orleans, Venice, or Dacca immediately vulnerable to future calamity. Whatever the political tampering with science, the supposed “naturalness” of disasters here becomes an ideological camouflage for the social (and therefore preventable) dimensions of such disasters, covering for quite specific social interests. Vulnerability, in turn, is highly differentiated; some people are much more vulnerable than others. Put bluntly, in many climates rich people tend to take the higher land leaving to the poor and working class land more vulnerable to flooding and environmental pestilence. This is a trend not an iron clad generalization: oceanfront property marks a major exception in many places, and Bolivia’s La Paz, where the wealthy live in the cooler valley below 13,000 feet, is another. In New Orleans, however, topographic gradients doubled as class and race gradients, and as the Katrina evacuation so tragically demonstrated, the better off had cars to get out, credit cards and bank accounts for emergency hotels and supplies, their immediate families likely had resources to support their evacuation, and the wealthier also had the insurance policies for rebuilding. Not just the market but successive administrations from the federal to the urban scale, made the poorest population in New Orleans most vulnerable. Since 2001, knowing that a catastrophic hurricane was likely and would in all probability devastate New Orleans, the Bush administration nonetheless opened hundreds of square miles of wetland to development on the grounds that the market knows best, and in the process eroded New Orleans’ natural protection; and they cut the New Orleans Corps of Engineers budget by 80%, thus preventing pumping and levee improvements. At the same time, they syphoned resources toward tax cuts for the wealthy and a failed war in Iraq (Blumenthal 2005). Given the stunned amazement with which people around the world greeted images of a stranded African American populace in the deadly sewage pond of post-Katrina New Orleans, it is difficult not to agree with Illinois senator Barack Obama: “the people of New Orleans weren’t just abandoned during the hurricane,” but were “abandoned long ago” (DailyKos 2005). After causes and vulnerability comes preparedness. The incompetence of preparations for Katrina, especially at the federal level, is well known. As soon as the hurricane hit Florida, almost three days before New Orleans, it was evident that this storm was far more dangerous than its wind speeds and intensity suggested. Meteorologists knew it would hit a multi-state region but the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), overseen by a political appointee with no relevant experience and recently subordinated to the Homeland Security Administration, assumed business as usual. They sent only a quarter of available search and rescue teams to the region and no personnel to New Orleans until after the storm had passed (Lipton et. al. 2005). Yet more than a day before it hit, Katrina was described by the National Weather Service as a “hurricane with unprecedented strength” likely to make the targeted area “uninhabitable for weeks, perhaps longer” (NYT 2005). Days afterward, as the President hopped from photo-op to photo-op the White House, not given to listening to its scientists, seemed still not to understand the prescience of that warning or the dimensions of the disaster. The results of Hurricane Katrina and responses to it are as of this writing still fresh in our memory but it is important to record some of the details so that the rawness of what transpired not be rubbed smooth by historical rewrite. The results can be assessed in thousands of lives unnecessarily lost, billions of dollars of property destroyed, local economies devastated and so forth, but that is only half the story. The images ricocheting around the world of a crippled United States, unconcerned or unable to protect its own population, receiving offers of aid from more than 100 countries, only reaffirmed for many the sense, already crystalizing from the debacle in Iraq, of a failing superpower. The level of survivors’ amply televised anger, bodies floating in the background, shocked the world. Reporters were not “embedded” this time, and so the images were real, uncensored, and raw. As the true horror unfolded, the media were working without a script, and it took almost a week before pre-existing absorptive news narratives regained control. But by then it was too late. Distraught refugees, 1 mostly African American, concluded that they were being left in the New Orleans Superdome and Convention Center to die; they pleaded for help, any help, as they angrily demanded to know why, if reporters could get in and out, they could not. When the National Guard did arrive, it was quickly apparent that they were working under orders to control the city militarily and protect property rather than to bring aid to the desperate. Angry citizens, who waded through the fetid city looking for promised buses that never came, were prevented, at gunpoint, from getting out. “We are not turning the West Bank [a New Orleans suburb] into another Superdome,” argued one suburban sheriff. Groups of refugees who tried to organize water, food and shelter collectively were also broken up at gunpoint by the national guard. Numerous victims reported being besieged and the National Guard was under orders not to distribute their own water (Bradshaw and Slonsky, 2005; Whitney 2005). As late as four days after the hurricane hit New Orleans, with government aid still largely absent, President Bush advised refugees that they ought to rely on private charities such as the Salvation Army (Breed 2005). When the first federal aid did come, stunned recipients opening boxes asked why they were being sent anthrax vaccine. “These are the boxes Homeland Security told us to send,” came the reply. Unfortunately, shocking as it was, the tragedy of New Orleans is neither unique nor even especially unexpected, except perhaps in its scale. The race and class dimensions of who escaped and who was victimized by this decidedly unnatural disaster not only could have been predicted, and was, but it follows a long history of like experiences. In 1976, a devastating earthquake eventually killed 23,000 people in Guatemala and made 1.5 million people homeless. I say “eventually,” because the vast majority of deaths were not the direct result of the physical event itself but played out in the days and weeks that followed. Massive international relief flooded into Guatemala but it was not funneled to the most affected and neediest peasants, who eventually came to call the disaster a “classquake” (O’Keefe et. al. 1976). In communities surrounding the Indian Ocean, ravaged by the tsunami of December 2004, the class and ethnic fissures of the old societies are re-etched deeper and wider by the patterns of response and reconstruction. There, “reconstruction” forcibly prevents local fishermen from re-establishing their livelihoods, planning instead to secure the oceanfront for wealthy tourists. Locals increasingly call the reconstruction effort the “second tsunami.” In New Orleans there are already murmurings of Katrina as “Hurricane Bush.” It is not only in the so-called Third World, we can now see, that one’s chances of surviving a disaster are more than anything dependent on one’s race, ethnicity and social class.

**Transportation policy is the root of transportation inequality – this lies at the heart of racial, environmental inequality, and classism.**

**Pastor et al. 06** [Manuel Pastor is codirector of the Center for Justice, Tolerance, and Community at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Robert D. Bullard is Ware Professor of Sociology and director of the Environmental Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University. James K. Boyce is professor of economics at the Political Economy Research Institute of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Alice Fothergill is assistant professor of sociology at the University of Vermont. Rachel Morello-Frosch is Carney Assistant Professor in the School of Medicine at Brown University. Beverly Wright is professor of sociology and director of the Deep South Center for Environmental Justice at Dillard University.] “Environment, Disaster and Race After Katrina” http://urbanhabitat.org/files/Pastor.Bullard.etc.Env.Katrina.pdf

How consequential is racial inequality in environmental conditions? A Southern California study estimating lifetime cancer risk from air toxins shows, for example, that risk declines as income rises, but is still around 50 percent higher at all income levels for African Americans, Latinos and Asians. And lead poisoning, commonly triggered by conditions in older housing, is five times more common among Black children than white children. Disaster Vulnerability and Environmental Justice The social dynamics that underlie the disproportionate environmental hazards faced by low-income communities and minorities also play out in the arena of disaster prevention, mitigation, and recovery. In a sense, environmental justice is about slow-motion disasters—and disasters reveal environmental injustice in a fast-forward mode. Both revolve around the axes of disparities of wealth and power. Lack of wealth heightens the risks that individuals and communities face for three reasons. First, it translates into a lack of purchasing power to secure private alternatives to public provision of a clean and safe environment for all. Second, it translates into less ability to withstand shocks (such as health bills and property damage) that wealth would cushion. Third, it translates through the “shadow prices” of costbenefit analysis into public policies that place a lower priority on protecting “less valuable” people and their assets. In the aftermath of Katrina, there is an added risk that transfers could turn New Orleans into a little more than a theme park for affluent tourists. In the vicious circle of disaster vulnerability, those with less wealth face greater risks, and when disaster strikes, their wealth is further sapped. But risk is not just about money: even middleclass African Americans, Latinos, and Asians face elevated environmental risks. This reflects systematic differences in power and the legacy of racial discrimination. Power also shows up in private decisions by firms choosing where to site hazards and how much to invest in environmental protection: their choices are constrained not only by government regulations, but also by informal governance exercised by mobilized communities, civil society, and the press (see Pargal et al. 1997; Boyce 2004). In both public and private arenas, then, power disparities drive outcome disparities—and the resulting patterns reflect race and ethnicity as well as wealth. 1 Why? Land, Markets, and Power The power explanation suggests that low-income people and communities of color are systematically disadvantaged in the political decision-making process. This argument can incorporate the other explanations: what seems to be rational land use, after all, may be predetermined by political processes that designate disenfranchised communities as sacrifice zones (see Pulido 2000; Boone and Modarres 1999; Wright 2005). Indeed, land use decisions often build on accumulated disadvantage. In the largely Latino community of Kettleman City in California’s Central Valley, for example, an effort to place a toxic waste incinerator in a landfill already proximate to the city was viewed as building on existing dis-amenities but added insult to injury for an already overburdened community (Cole and Foster 2001). Likewise, income is a marker of political power as well as of market strength. The interplay of land use, income, and power means that certain variables used in statistical analyses—such as zoning and household wealth— carry multiple explanations. To demonstrate convincingly that power is behind siting decisions requires the inclusion of some variables that are directly and irrefutably connected to power differentials. The most important of these variables is race. 2 Disparate patterns by race, particularly when one has controlled for income and other variables involved in the land-use and market-dynamics explanations, most clearly point to the role of unequal influence and racial discrimination. Racially disparate outcomes are also important in their own right. They can result from processes that are not so much a direct exercise of power as essentially embedded in the nature of our urban form, including housing segregation and real estate steering, informal methods that exclude communities from decision-making processes (including less provision of information regarding health risks), the past placement of hazards (which justifies new hazards as rational land use), and other forms of less direct “institutionalized” or “structural” racism (see Feagin and Feagin 1986; Institute on Race and Poverty 2002). And it is precisely racialized risk that has galvanized a movement for environmental equity rooted in civil rights law and activism**. Race and racism therefore are at the heart of the evidentiary debate**. It is Not Just Hazards **Environmental and transportation justice are at the heart of emergency preparedness and emergency response**. The former provides a guidepost to who is most likely to be vulnerable to the disaster itself, and the latter provides information about who will need the most help when disaster strikes. It is to the intersection of disaster vulnerability with race, income, and other social characteristics that we now turn.

**It’s not just about New Orleans—Katrina highlighted the pervasive suffering caused by racialized poverty everywhere.**

**Luft 2009 –** Associate Professor, Ph.D. University of California, Santa Barbara (Rachel, “Beyond Disaster Exceptionalism: Social Movement Developmentsin New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina” *American Quarterly*, Volume 61, Number 3, September 2009, http://www.bupedu.com/lms/admin/uploded\_article/eA.477.pdf )//ALo

Traditionally, scholars have distinguished disasters from other kinds of harmful events by characterizing them as “sudden” or “explosive,” discrete or “unique,” and “acute.” 17 These designations have sought to render exceptional both the disasters themselves and the experience of the people who encounter them. In the 1980s, a new, constructionist school of disaster scholarship began to emphasize the preexisting social conditions that contribute to and exacerbate disaster, pointing to the social origins of disaster and calling into question the notion of their suddenness and discreteness. It emphasized the ongoing conditions of “social vulnerability”—poverty, racism, sexism—that construct and interact with disaster. 18 Understanding these enduring social problems as disastrous in their own right has further challenged the narrow assessment of natural disasters and other emergencies as exceptionally acute. From this perspective, “the line separating the chronic from the acute becomes even more blurred.” 19 Social vulnerability scholarship has helped to identify how **“the challenges of life are a ‘permanent disaster’” for people already oppressed** by class, race, gender, sexuality, disability, age, and other forces of systemic oppression. 20 It moves to **displace “natural” disasters as the greatest risk to human well-being**  and to **replace them with an understanding of the social and ongoing conditions that produce daily risk, suffering, and trauma.** It also helps to explain the behavior of people who already experience daily hazards because they live at the intersection of poverty, racism, and/or sexism when they face what appears to be a discrete disaster. 21 Within weeks of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, social scientists were publishing analyses of the disaster from social constructionist and social vulnerability perspectives. 22 They noted that years of human and infrastructural neglect— the racialized poverty that had 27 percent of New Orleans’s inhabitants living below the poverty line; the poorly designed and maintained levees; and the federal government’s inadequately managed and funded emergency management operations agency, to cite only the most obvious examples—had produced the devastating outcomes of the storm. At the same time, grassroots movement leaders were also pointing to the social construction of the disaster. In addition to identifying the particular race, class, and gender determinants of Katrina’s outcomes, they also contextualized them in the long history of U.S. imperialism, the “national oppression” of Blacks, and the disenfranchisement of women and children. 23 Instead of emphasizing the exceptional elements of Hurricane Katrina, these grassroots leaders saw in the policy decisions that helped produce its outcomes, the standard operating procedure of the U.S. government; they likened the displacement, impoverishment, and service deprivation of hurricane survivors to the **chronic conditions of racialized poverty.** Additionally they predicted that the **reconstruction would turn** the Gulf Coast, and in particular **New Orleans, into a laboratory for** privatization as part of what Naomi Klein calls **“disaster capitalism.”** 24 They further anticipated that the reconstruction of New Orleans would become a bellwether for incursions into domestic infrastructure in other parts of the country, calling it the canary in the mines of U.S. homeland policy. As movement lawyer Bill Quigley put it more recently, responding to the federal bailout of financial institutions in late 2008, “Welcome to Katrina world.” 25 Social constructionist and social vulnerability perspectives were apparent at the grassroots in the narrative devices first-generation movement organizers used to link pre- and postdisaster New Orleans to sites around the country. As they spoke to a steady stream of volunteers, movement leaders urged visitors to “make the connections” between their own communities and New Orleans. They insisted that **“the storm began a long time before Katrina.”**  When they asked visitors if they were “preparing for the Katrina in your own backyard,” they were not referring to the threat of natural disaster elsewhere (though they reminded them of such a threat when nonlocals wondered whether New Orleans should be rebuilt), **but rather to every community’s structures of disenfranchisement**. These refrains were picked up by solidarity activists nationwide, who helped to make the linkages. In an early article, San Francisco–based Catalyst Project organizer Molly McClure tied disaster exceptionalism to a charitable—as opposed to political and systemic—response to the storm: “With charity, I don’t have to connect the dots between sudden catastrophes like Katrina, and the perhaps slower but very similar economic devastation happening in poor communities and communities of color, every day, right here, in my city.” 26 First-generation Katrina movement groups de-exceptionalized disaster in order to reframe the recovery and reconstruction process in the broader context of ongoing U.S. social problems. Second-generation groups did so in order to move beyond Katrina to the ongoing social problems themselves. Although Safe Streets began with Katrina triage, for example, it proceeded to tackle the New Orleans criminal justice system. “The criminal justice and public safety system in New Orleans was in crisis long before Katrina devastated our city,” explained an SSSC brochure in 2007. From the tragic waters of Katrina, we have been given an opportunity for a fresh start.

**The horrors of Katrina justify the statement: ‘Never again’. The victims of Katrina were a result of the neoliberal regime that looked on as thousands perished, reflective of a fascist machine where democracy is lost.**

**Giroux, 06** – Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, previous professors at BU, Miami U, and Penn State (Henry, “Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race, Class, and the Biopolitics of Disposability”, accessed from JSTOR 7/1/12)//BZ

Hurricane Katrina may have reversed the self-imposed silence of the media and public numbness in the face of terrible suffering. Fifty years after the body of Emmett Till was plucked out of the mud-filled waters of the Tallahatchie River, another set of troubling visual representations has emerged that both shocked and shamed the nation. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, grotesque images of bloated corpses floating in the rotting waters that flooded the streets of New Orleans circulated throughout the mainstream media. What first appeared to be a natural catastrophe soon degenerated into a social debacle as further images revealed, days after Katrina had passed over the Gulf Coast, hundreds of thousands of poor people, mostly blacks, some Latinos, many elderly, and a few white people, packed into the New Orleans Superdome and the city’s convention center, stranded on rooftops, or isolated on patches of dry highway without any food, water, or any place to wash, urinate, or find relief from the scorching sun.1 Weeks passed as the flood water gradually receded and the military gained control of the city, and more images of dead bodies surfaced in the national and global media. TV cameras rolled as bodies emerged from the flood waters while people stood by indifferently eating their lunch or occasionally snapping a photograph. Most of the bodies found “were 50 or older, people who tried to wait the hurricane out” (Frosch 2005, 1-4). Various media soon reported that over 154 bodies had been found in hospitals and nursing homes. The New York Times wrote that “the collapse of one of soci-ety’s most basic covenants—to care for the helpless—suggests that the elderly and critically ill plummeted to the bottom of priority lists as calamity engulfed New Orleans (Jackson 2005). Dead people, mostly poor African- Americans, left uncollected in the streets, on porches, hospitals, nursing homes, in electric wheelchairs, and in collapsed houses prompted some people to claim that America had become like a “Third World country” while others argued that New Orleans resembled a “Third World Refugee Camp (Brooks 2005, 1-2).There were now, irrefutably, two Gulf crises.The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) tried to do damage control by forbidding journalists to “accompany rescue boats as they went out to search for storm victims.” As a bureau spokeswoman told Reuters News Agency, “We have requested that no photographs of the deceased be made by the media” (Neal 2005). But questions about responsibility and answerability would not go away. Even the dominant media for a short time rose to the occasion of posing tough questions about accountability to those in power in light of such egregious acts of incompetence and indifference. The images of dead bodies kept reappearing in New Orleans, refusing to go away. For many, the bodies of the poor, black, brown, elderly, and sick came to signify what the battered body of Emmett Till once unavoidably revealed, and America was forced to confront these disturbing images and the damning questions behind the images. The Hurricane Katrina disaster, like the Emmett Till affair, revealed a vulnerable and destitute segment of the nations citizenry that conservatives not only refused to see but had spent the better part of two decades demonizing. But like the incessant beating of Poes tell-tale heart, cadavers have a way of insinuating themselves on consciousness, demanding answers to questions that aren’t often asked. The body of Emmett Till symbolized overt white supremacy and state terrorism organized against the threat that black men (apparently of all sizes and ages) posed against white women. But the black bodies of the dead and walking wounded in New Orleans in 2005 revealed a different image of the racial state, a different modality of state terrorism, marked less by an overt form of white racism than by a highly mediated displacement of race as a central concept for understanding both Katrina and its place in the broader history of U.S. racism.2 That is, while Till s body insisted upon a public recognition of the violence of white supremacy, the decaying black bodies floating in the waters of the Gulf Coast represented a return of race against the media and public insistence that this disaster was more about class than race, more about the shameful and growing presence of poverty, “the abject failure to provide aid to the most vulnerable” (Foner 2005, 8).Tills body allowed the racism that destroyed it to be made visible, to speak to the systemic character of American racial injustice. The bodies of the Katrina victims could not speak with the same directness to the state of American racist violence but they did reveal and shatter the conservative fiction of living in a color-blind society. The bodies of the Katrina victims laid bare the racial and class fault lines that mark an increasingly damaged and withering democracy and revealed the emergence of a new kind of politics, one in which entire populations are now considered disposable, an unnecessary burden on state coffers, and consigned to fend for themselves. At the same time, what happened in New Orleans also revealed some frightening signposts of those repressive features in American society, demanding that artists, public intellectuals, scholars, and other cultural workers take seriously what Angela Davis insists “are very clear signs of. . . impending fascist policies and practices,” which not only construct an imaginary social environment for all of those populations rendered disposable but also exemplify a site and space “where democracy has lost its claims” (2005, 122,124).

**Racism creates a permanent condition of war**

**Mendieta 02**, Eduardo Mendieta, PhD and Associate professor of Stonybrook School of Philosophy, “‘To make live and to let die’ –Foucault on Racism Meeting of the Foucault Circle, APA Central Division Meeting” http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/philosophy/people/faculty\_pages/docs/foucault.pdf

This is where racism intervenes, not from without, exogenously, but from within, constitutively. For the emergence of biopower as the form of a new form of political rationality, entails the inscription within the very logic of the modern state the logic of racism. For racism grants, and here I am quoting: “the conditions for the acceptability of putting to death in a society of normalization. Where there is a society of normalization, where there is a power that is, in all of its surface and in first instance, and first line, a bio-power, racism is indispensable as a condition to be able to put to death someone, in order to be able to put to death others. The homicidal [meurtrière] function of the state, to the degree that the state functions on the modality of bio-power, can only be assured by racism “(Foucault 1997, 227) To use the formulations from his 1982 lecture “The Political Technology of Individuals” –which incidentally, echo his 1979 Tanner Lectures –the power of the state after the 18th century, a power which is enacted through the police, and is enacted over the population, is a power over living beings, and as such it is a biopolitics. And, to quote more directly, “since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it, if necessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics.” (Foucault 2000, 416). Racism, is the thanatopolitics of the biopolitics of the total state. They are two sides of one same8 political technology, one same political rationality: the management of life, the life of a population, the tending to the continuum of life of a people. And with the inscription of racism within the state of biopower, the long history of war that Foucault has been telling in these dazzling lectures has made a new turn: the war of peoples, a war against invaders, imperials colonizers, which turned into a war of races, to then turn into a war of classes, has now turned into the war of a race, a biological unit, against its polluters and threats. Racism is the means by which bourgeois political power, biopower, re-kindles the fires of war within civil society. **Racism normalizes and medicalizes war. Racism makes war the permanent condition of society, while at the same time masking its weapons of death and torture.** As I wrote somewhere else, **racism banalizes genocide by making quotidian the lynching of suspect threats to the health of the social body. Racism makes the killing of the other**, of others, **an everyday occurrence by internalizing and normalizing the war of society against its enemies**. To protect society entails we be ready to kill its threats, its foes, and if we understand society as a unity of life, as a continuum of the living, then these threat and foes are biological in nature.

**Racism outweighs every impact – its the precondition to ethical political decision making.**

**MEMMI** **2000 –** Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Paris (Albert, “RACISM”, translated by Steve Martinot, pp.163-165)

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved, yet for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim(and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated**;** that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduct only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view**,** if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is “the truly capital sin.**”**fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death**.** It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall,” says the bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday. Itis an ethical and a practical appeal – indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

**Transportation infrastructure is critical to evacuation**

**Wolshon, 06** – Assistant Professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Louisiana State University (Brian, “The Aftermath of Katrina”, http://www.nae.edu/Publications/Bridge/TheAftermathofKatrina/EvacuationPlanningandEngineeringforHurricaneKatrina.aspx)//BZ

Although little can be done to alter the weather, we can prepare for the eventuality of hurricanes and other natural and man-made hazards. For decades, engineers and scientists have been developing techniques, strategies, and materials to help the built environment withstand the effects of hurricanes. In addition, building and zoning codes have been changed to keep critical infrastructure away from hazardous areas to minimize the risks of flood and wind damage. The only way to protect people, however, is to evacuate them when threats arise, but this is often easier said than done. At the fundamental level, the concept of evacuation is simple—move people away from danger. In reality, evacuations, particularly evacuations on a mass scale, are complex undertakings. As the nation clearly saw during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, it is not always possible to evacuate everyone who is in danger. The most obvious problem is the sheer scope of the event. Hurricane evacuations may involve millions of people over hundreds of thousands of square miles. In addition, because evacuations are inconvenient and disruptive, evacuees often delay travel decisions until the threat appears imminent, thus compressing the enormous travel demand into shorter time periods. One complicating factor is that **transportation infrastructure is neither planned nor designed to accommodate evacuation-level demand**; building enough capacity to move the population of an entire city in a matter of hours is simply not economically, environmentally, or socially feasible. Roadways are not even designed to be delay-free under routine peak-period conditions. The effectiveness of an evacuation is also greatly affected by human behavior and socioeconomics. No matter how threatening the conditions, some people refuse or are unable to leave. Despite these difficulties, the evacuation of New Orleans for Hurricane Katrina was widely viewed as a success; data show that more people were able to leave the city in a shorter time than had been thought possible. There were also apparent failures, however, particularly in the evacuation of low-mobility groups. This article highlights the development of the evacuation management plan for Hurricane Katrina and summarizes some of the facts, findings, and unresolved issues. The discussion is presented from the perspective of a transportation engineer and centers primarily on the highway-based aspects of the evacuation, including demand, capacity, and issues related to the non-evacuees. This article also presents some lessons learned and how they may be applied to other locations and other threat scenarios and identifies unanswered questions and research needs that should be addressed in the future. The Katrina Evacuation Plan **The city of New Orleans has long been considered “a disaster waiting to happen**.” For those who prepare for, respond to, and study such events, **the level of death and destruction wrought by Katrina was not outside the realm of possibil**ity. Although a complete evacuation of the city has been the cornerstone of hurricane preparedness planning for the region, the highway evacuation plan used for Katrina evolved over a period of many years based on valuable lessons learned from prior storms in Louisiana and elsewhere.

### Contention Three: Framing

**Impacts should be viewed through the lens of environmental and racial justice– this is necessary to understand and rebuild after Katrina.**

**Sze 06** Julie Sze is an assistant professor in American Studies at the University of California, Davis. Her forthcoming book on the culture, politics and history of environmental justice activism in New York City is under contract with MIT Press. It looks at the intersection of planning and health, especially through the prism of asthma, and at changes in garbage and energy systems as a result of privatization, globalization and deregulation. Toxic Soup Redux: Why Environmental Racism and Environmental Justice Matter after Katrina By Julie Sze Published on: Jun 11, 2006

Thus, the Gulf Coast region was, in many ways, “Ground Zero” of the environmental justice movement, and its advocates led the way in publicizing the troubling racial disparity in exposure to pollution from the oil and petrochemical sectors. But environmental racism refers not only to the disparity of pollution effects, it also refers to the larger systemic problems that caused it, such as the exclusion of voices and perspectives of racial minorities and working-class populations from environmental policy-making. **The term “transportation racism**,” for example, is given by sociologists like Robert Bullard among others **to the application of an environmental justice framework to transportation planning and policy**.6 And given that transportation is a key component of disaster planning and evacuation, the fact that the stranded were poor, black, disproportionately elderly, young and old, and without private transportation reflects dimensions of environmental racism. Environmental justice is also a useful framework for understanding Katrina because it is an integrative approach that refuses a divide between the natural/ environmental and the social/ racial. Environmental justice expands the concept of environment to include public and human health concerns, in addition to natural resources such as air, land and water. Thus, taking an environmental justice perspective on Katrina necessarily refuses an analysis that divides natural and social disasters. This analysis is perhaps best represented by Eric Klinenberg’s account of how race and class intersected with the natural disaster discourse in Chicago’s 1995 heat wave that killed 700 Chicagoans, many of them poor and African-American. He rejects the rhetoric of natural disaster adopted by politicians as a simplified mode of explanation for who, why and how so many died.7 Similarly, environmental justice activists reject race and class “neutrality” by forcing a closer look at who benefits and who bears the burdens of environmental and energy policies. Years before Katrina hit, environmental justice activists were anticipating the racially disproportionate effects of climate change, in terms of coastal flooding and the health effects of heat waves, through the Environmental Justice and Climate Change Initiative (EJCC). The EJCC is a coalition of 28 U.S. environmental justice, climate justice, religious, policy, and advocacy groups that formed to pressure the Bush Administration and Congress on climate change and the Kyoto Protocol. As their 2002 fact sheet stated: “People of color are concentrated in urban centers in the South, coastal regions, and areas with substandard air quality. New Orleans, which is 62 percent African-American and 2 feet below sea level, exemplifies the severe and disproportionate impacts of climate change in the U.S.” 8 Lastly, despite the centrality of environmental racism and environmental justice frameworks to understanding the racially disproportionate ways in which Katrina’s effects and its aftermath were and are being experienced, **this analysis has been largely ignored in media, academic, and policy perspectives**. In part, the lack of analysis stems from the literal disappearance of environmental justice activists from the region who, like millions of others, are displaced or in some cases perhaps dead. Without the vigilance of these environmental justice activists in the rebuilding effort, the clean-up and redevelopment of New Orleans will not include perspectives that prioritize environmental justice and community health concerns.9 This trend is already exemplified by the Bush Administration’s temporary suspension of environmental regulations in the wake of rebuilding, which they hope to make permanent in reconstruction legislation (and that echo the Administration’s suspension of environmental regulations in the name of national security).10 Although these moves to dismantle environmental laws are not surprising, they are particularly dangerous given the literal erasure of the meaning of environmental justice by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency just weeks before Katrina. In June, the Administration announced that it was removing race and class from special consideration in its definition of environmental justice, pulling back from Clinton’s 1994 Executive Order on Environmental Justice which mandated that all federal agencies generate agency-specific strategies to address the disproportionate pollution experienced by minority communities, and set a controversial and abbreviated public comment period, ending just 10 days before Katrina hit. Thus, **the moment that the concept of environmental racism is being most attacked**, is paradoxically the most crucial time to bring environmental justice back into the center of the analysis of Katrina in particular, and of how the health and environments of communities of color in the United States in general are fundamentally shaped by race and class considerations. **Inserting an environmental justice framework into Hurricane Katrina ensures that the perspectives of local environmental justice activists, community and environmental health views on rebuilding New Orleans, and the concept of environmental justice in national policy terms, will not be easily erased**. The vibrancy of the regional environmental justice movement was a product of local histories of economic development, environmental pollution, and race relations. With Katrina, we need to hear more, not less, from environmental justice activists who have been long engaged with the toxic, environmental and disaster politics in the region.

**Environmental justice demands federal action; leaving policies up to local populations CREATES Katrina–like disasters as communities fail to live up to their obligations to the poor.**

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Health Policy Institute (Reilly, “Environmental Justice Through the Eye of Hurricane Katrina” 2008, http://198.65.105.204/hpi/sites/all/files/EnvironmentalJustice.pdf )//ALo

The American transportation model unfairly tends to burden minorities and the poor. In general, federal transportation funding is divided so that 80 percent goes to highways and 20 percent goes to public transportation, but states tend to spend less on public transportation. Transportation policy that favors automobiles and highways over public transit systems serves non-metropolitan needs more than metropolitan needs, promotes white flight from urban to suburban areas, displaces low-income urban communities to make room for elevated freeways, weakens inner cities, induces sprawl, and increases air pollution. 188 Even within public transportation, which functions most efficiently in densely developed urban areas with a clear city-center orientation, 189 there is a subsidy bias in favor of higher-income riders using rail service over lower-income riders using buses. This tends to geographically limit the availability of inter-urban passenger rail service. 190 As public transportation is restricted, personal transportation costs increase. This burden falls significantly more heavily on the lowest income quintile, among whom up to 36 percent of the after-tax household budget is spent on transportation, double what the highest quintile spends. 191 Low-income households who use an automobile to commute spend 7 percent more of their income on transportation than those using public transportation. 192 Nationwide, the amount of income spent on transportation among very low-income households increased by 36.5 percent between 1992 and 2000, double the rate of increase for those in the top quintile. 193 Environmental justice highlights the systemic effects of transportation policy on the environment, such as the hybrid benefits of a stronger public transit system—reduced carbon footprint, increased social and community connection, and wider access to jobs, goods, and public services for disadvantaged communities. An emphasis on automobiles and highways, viewed from an environmental justice perspective, produces the opposite results—increased pollution, increased social and community isolation, and decreased access to jobs, goods, and public services. To some, transportation, evacuation, and disaster relief may set the outer limit of the social agenda of environmental justice, but the New Orleans Superdome experience has highlighted the link between increased vulnerability of disadvantaged populations to environmental and natural disasters and decreased governmental response to those populations after disaster strikes. **In the realm of evacuation and disaster response, environmental justice mirrors international human rights obligations of government to provide for internally displaced persons, including the right to return and to adequate interim care and treatment**. 194

**A federal response is the only ethical route. We need to recognize our collective responsibility to vulnerable populations.**

**Giroux, 2006** – Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, previous professors at BU, Miami U, and Penn State (Henry, “Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race, Class, and the Biopolitics of Disposability”, accessed from JSTOR 7/1/12)//BZ

In a May 25, 2001 interview, Grover Norquist, head of the right-wing group Americans for Tax Reform, told National Public Radios Mara Liasson: “I don’t want to abolish government. I simply want to reduce it to the size where I can drag it into the bathroom and drown it in the bathtub” (Qtd. in Hertmann 2005). As a radical right-wing activist and practical strategist, Norquist has been enormously instrumental and successful in shaping tax policies designed to “starve the beast,” a metaphor for policies designed to drive up deficits by cutting taxes, especially for the rich, in order to paralyze government and dry up funds for many federal programs that offer pro tection for children, the elderly, and the poor. Norquist saw his efforts pay off when thousands of people, most of them poor and black, drowned in the basin of New Orleans and upwards of one million were displaced. Under such circumstances, a decades-long official policy of benign neglect became malign neglect, largely rationalized through a market fundamentalism in which the self-interested striving of individuals becomes the cornerstone of both freedom and democracy. This is a politics that wages war against any viable notion of the democratic social. And as Lawrence Grossberg points out, “The free market in neoliberalism is fundamentally an argument against politics, or at least against a politics that attempts to govern society in social rather than economic terms” (117). The neoliberal efforts to shrink big government and public services must be understood both in terms of those who bore the brunt of such efforts in New Orleans and in terms of the subsequent inability of the government to deal adequately with Hurricane Katrina. Reducing the federal governments ability to respond to social problems is a decisive element of neoliberal policymaking, as was echoed in a Wall Street Journal editorial that argued without irony that taxes should be raised for low-income individuals and families, not to make more money available to the federal government for addressing their needs but to rectify the possibility that they “might not be feeling a proper hatred for the government” (Qtd. in Krugman 2002, 31). If the poor can be used as pawns in this logic to further the political attack on big government, it seems reasonable to assume that those in the Bush administration who hold such a position would refrain from using big government as quickly as possible to save the very lives of such groups, as was evident in the aftermath of Katrina. The vilification of the social state and big government—really an attack on non-military aspects of government—has translated into a steep decline of tax revenues, a massive increase in military spending, and the growing immiseration of poor Americans and people of color. Under the Bush administration, Census Bureau figures reveal that “since 1999, the income of the poorest fifth of Americans has dropped 8.7 percent in inflation-adjusted dollars . . . [and in 2005] 1.1 million were added to the 36 million already on the poverty rolls” (Scheer 2005).While the number of Americans living below the poverty line is comparable to the combined populations of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Texas, and Arkansas, the Bush administration chose to make in the 2006 budget $70 billion in new tax cuts for the rich while slashing programs that benefit the least fortunate (Legum et al 2005). Similarly, the projected $2.7 trillion budget for 2007 includes a $4.9 billion reduction in health funds for senior citizens (Medicare) and the State Children s Health Insurance Program; a $17 million cut in aid for child- support enforcement; cutbacks in funds for low-income people with disabil ities; major reductions in child-care and development block grants; major defunding for housing for low-income elderly; and an unprecedented rollback in student aid. In addition, the 2007 budget calls for another $70 billion dollars in tax cuts most beneficial to the rich and provides for a huge increase in military spending for the war in Iraq (Weisman 2006, A10). While President Bush endlessly argues for the economic benefits of his tax cuts, he callously omits the fact that 13 million children are living in poverty in the United States, “4.5 million more than when Bush was first inaugurated” (Scheer 2005). And New Orleans had the third highest rate of children living in poverty in the United States (Legum et al 2005).The illiteracy rate in New Orleans before the flood struck was 40 percent; the embarrassingly ill-equipped public school system was one of the most underfunded in the nation. Nearly 19 percent of Louisiana residents lacked health insurance, putting the state near the bottom for the percentage of people without health insurance. Robert Scheer, a journalist and social critic, estimated that one-third of the 150,000 people living in dire poverty in Louisiana were elderly, left exposed to the flooding in areas most damaged by Katrina (2005). It gets worse. In an ironic twist of fate, one day after Katrina hit New Orleans, the U.S. Census Bureau released two important reports on poverty, indicating that “Mississippi (with a 21.6 percent poverty rate) and Louisiana (19.4 percent) are the nations poorest states, and that New Orleans (with a 23.2 percent poverty rate) is the 12th poorest city in the nation. [Moreover,] New Orleans is not only one of the nation’s poorest cities, but its poor people are among the most concentrated in poverty ghettos. Housing discrimination and the location of government-subsidized housing have contributed to the city’s economic and racial segregation” (Dreier 2005). Under neoliberal capitalism, the attack on politically responsible government has only been matched by an equally harsh attack on social provisions and safety nets for the poor. And in spite of the massive failures of market-driven neoliberal policies—extending from a soaring $420 billion budget deficit to the underfunding of schools, public health, community policing, and environmental protection programs—the reigning right-wing orthodoxy of the Bush administration continues to “give precedence to private financial gain and market determinism over human lives and broad public values” (Greider 2005). The Bush administration’s ideological hostility towards the essential role that government should play in providing social services and crucial infra-structure was particularly devastating for New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Prior to 9/11, the Federal Emergency Management Agency listed a hurricane strike on New Orleans as one of the three most likely catastrophic disasters facing America. The Houston Chronicle wrote in December 2001 that “[t]he New Orleans hurricane scenario may be the deadliest of all” (Krugman 2005). And yet the Bush administration consistently denied repeated requests for funds by the New Orleans Army Corps of Engineers. Ignoring such requests, the Bush administration cut the Army Corps’ funding by more than a half-billion dollars in its 2002 budget, leaving unfinished the construction for the levees that eventually burst. And in spite of repeated warnings far in advance by experts that the existing levees could not withstand a Category 4 hurricane, the Bush administration in 2004 rejected the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Project’s request for $100 million, offering instead a measly $16.5 million. Huge tax cuts for the rich and massive cuts in much-needed programs continued unabated in the Bush administration, all the while putting the lives of thousands of poor people in the Gulf Basin in jeopardy. As David Sirota has reported, this disastrous underfunding of efforts to build the levee infrastructure, coupled with even more tax cuts for the rich and less revenue for the states, continued right up to the time that Hurricane Katrina struck, making it almost impossible for governments in the Gulf region either to protect their citizens from the impact of a major hurricane or to develop the resources necessary for an adequate emergency response plan in the event of a flood.

**The 1AC is a pedagogical advocacy that opens up new opportunities for democratic deliberation and political action. A recognition of our obligations to the materially deprived helps to combat the biopolitics of disposability.**

**Giroux, 2006** – Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, previous professors at BU, Miami U, and Penn State (Henry, “Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race, Class, and the Biopolitics of Disposability”, accessed from JSTOR 7/1/12)//BZ

Biopolitics is not just about the reduction of selected elements of the population to the necessities of bare life or worse; it is also potentially about enhancing life by linking hope and a new vision to the struggle for reclaiming the social, providing a language capable of translating individual issues into public considerations, and recognizing that in the age of the new media the terrain of culture is one of the most important pedagogical spheres through which to challenge the most basic precepts of the new authoritarianism. The waste machine of modernity, as Bauman points out, must be challenged within a new understanding of environmental justice, human rights, and democratic politics (2000, 15). Negative globalization with its attachment to the mutually enforcing modalities of militarism and racial segregation must be exposed and dismantled. And this demands new forms of resistance that are both more global and differentiated. But if these struggles are going to emerge, especially in the United States, then we need a politics and pedagogy of hope, one that takes seriously Hannah Arendt s call to use the public realm to throw light on the “dark times” that threaten to extinguish the very idea of democracy Against the tyranny of market fundamentalism, religious dogmatism, unchecked militarism, and ideological claims to certainty, an emancipatory biopolitics must enlist education as a crucial force in the struggle over democratic identities, spaces, and ideals. Central to the biopolitics of disposability is the recognition that abiding powerlessness atrophies the public imagination and leads to political paralysis. Consequently, its policies avidly attack critical education at all levels of cultural production in an all-out effort to undermine critical thought, imagination, and substantive agency. To significantly confront the force of a biopolitics in the service of the new authoritarianism, intellectuals, artists, and others in various cultural sites—from schools to higher education to the media—will have to rethink what it means to secure the conditions for critical education both within and outside of the schools. In the context of formal schooling, this means fighting against the corporatization, commercialism, and privatization of public schools. Higher education has to be defended in the same terms. Against the biopolitics of racial exclusion, the university should be a principal site where dialogue, negotiation, mutual understanding, and respect provide the knowledge and experience for students to develop a shared space for affirming differences while simultaneously learning those shared values necessary for an inclusive democratic society. Similarly, both public and higher education must address with new courage the history of American slavery, the enduring legacy of racism in the United States, and its interface with both political nationalism and the enduring market and religious fundamentalisms at work in contemporary society Similarly, racism must be not be reduced to a private matter, a case of individual prejudice removed from the dictates of state violence and the broader realm of politics, and left to matters of “taste, preference, and ultimately, of consumer, or lifestyle choice” (Gilroy 2005,146-47). What must be instituted and fought for in higher education is a critical and anti-racist pedagogy that unsettles, stirs up human consciousness, “breeds dissatisfaction with the level of both freedom and democracy achieved thus far,” and inextricably connects the fates of freedom, democracy, and critical education (Bauman 2003,14). Hannah Arendt once argued that “the public realm has lost the power of illumination,” and one result is that more and more people “have retreated from the world and their obligations within it” (1955, 4).The public realm is not merely a space where the political, social, economic, and cultural interconnect; it is also the pre-eminent space of public pedagogy—that is, a space where subjectivities are shaped, public commitments are formed, and choices are made. As sites of cultural politics and public pedagogy, public spaces offer a unique opportunity for critically engaged citizens, young people, academies, teachers, and various intellectuals to engage in pedagogical struggles that provide the conditions for social empowerment. Such struggles can be waged through the new media, films, publications, radio interviews, and a range of other forms of cultural production. It is especially crucial, as Mark Poster has argued, that scholars, teachers, public intellectuals, artists, and cultural theorists take on the challenge of understanding how the new media technologies construct subjects differently with multiple forms of literacy that engage a range of intellectual capacities (2001). This also means deploying new technologies of communication such as the Internet, camcorder, and cell phone in political and pedagogically strategic ways to build protracted struggles and reclaim the promise of a democracy that insists on racial, gender, and economic equality. The new technoculture is a powerful pedagogical tool that needs to be used, on the one hand, in the struggle against both dominant media and the hegemonic ideologies they produce, circulate, and legitimate, and, on the other hand, as a valuable tool in treating men and women as agents of change, mindful of the consequences of their actions, and utterly capable of pursuing truly egalitarian models of democracy. The promise of a better world cannot be found in modes of authority that lack a vision of social justice, renounce the promise of democracy, and reject the dream of a better future, offering instead of dreams the pale assurance of protection from the nightmare of an all-embracing terrorism. Against this stripped-down legitimation of authority is the promise of public spheres, which in their diverse forms, sites, and content offer pedagogical and political possibilities for strengthening the social bonds of democracy, new spaces within which to cultivate the capacities for critical modes of individual and social agency, and crucial opportunities to form alliances to collectively struggle for a biopolitics that expands the scope of vision, operations of democracy, and the range of democratic institutions—that is, a biopolitics that fights against the terrors of totalitarianism. Such spheres are about more than legal rights guaranteeing freedom of speech; they are also sites that demand a certain kind of citizen informed by particular forms of education, a citizen whose education provides the essential conditions for democratic public spheres to flourish. Cornelius Castoriadis, the great philosopher of democracy, argues that if public space is not to be experienced not as a private affair, but as a vibrant sphere in which people learn how to participate in and shape public life, then it must be shaped through an education that provides the decisive traits of courage, responsibility, and shame, all of which connect the fate of each individual to the fate of others, the planet, and global democracy (1991, 81-123). In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the biopolitical calculus of massive power differentials and iniquitous market relations put the scourge of poverty and racism on full display. To confront the biopolitics of disposability, we need to recognize the dark times in which we live and offer up a vision of hope that creates the conditions for multiple collective and global struggles that refuse to use politics as an act of war and markets as the measure of democracy. Making human beings superfluous is the essence of totalitarianism, and democracy is the antidote in urgent need of being reclaimed. Katrina should keep the hope of such a struggle alive for quite some time because for many of us the images of those floating bodies serve as an desperate reminder of what it means when justice, as the lifeblood of democracy, becomes cold and indifferent in the face of death.

**Integrating ethical obligations to the other into politics is the only way to prevent totalitarianism**

**Simmons 99** William Paul, current Associate Professor of Political Science at ASU, formerly at Bethany College in the Department of History and Political Science, “The Third: Levinas' theoretical move from an-archical ethics to the realm of justice and politics,” Philosophy & Social Criticism November 1, 1999 vol. 25 no. 6

Levinas argues for a place for both ethics and politics, or, to employ his metaphor, a place for both the Jewish tradition of ethics and responsibility and, along with it, the Greek tradition of language, justice and politics. This section will analyze the mutual necessity of both ethics and politics. According to Levinas, ethics and politics can both be needed only if there is separation, that is, if each has its own justiﬁcation. Neither ethics nor politics should be taken to their extremes; each must be moderated by the other. ‘I think there’s a direct contradiction between ethics and politics, if both these demands are taken to the extreme.’ 56 Ethics must temper the political because politics unbounded leads to tyranny, absolute power of the strongest. Politics ignores the individuality of each citizen, treating each as a cipher, a member of a species. Further, without a norm outside of the scope of the said, there is no standard to judge political regimes. The call for a standard by which to judge regimes is what Levinas means by a return to Platonism. Plato, in the Republic, had used the good beyond being as his standard. A return to Platonism would be necessary to restore ‘the independence of ethics in relation to history’ and trace ‘a limit to the comprehension of the real by history’. 57 Levinas ﬁnds a standard in the ethical relationship with the Other. The norm that must continue to inspire and direct the moral order is the ethical norm of the interhuman. If the moral-political order totally relinquishes its ethical foundation, it must accept all forms of society, including the fascist or totalitarian, for it can no longer evaluate or discriminate between them. The state is usually better than anarchy – but not always. In some instances, – fascism or totalitarianism, for example – the political order of the state may have to be challenged in the name of our ethical responsibility to the other. This is why ethical philosophy must remain the ﬁrst philosophy. 58 At the same time, ethics needs politics. To reach those others who are far away, ethics must be transﬁxed into language, justice and politics. ‘As prima philosophia, ethics cannot itself legislate for society or produce rules of conduct whereby society might be revolutionized or transformed.’ 59 Although this universalization distances the ego from the Other, it must be done to reach the others. We must, out of respect for the categorical imperative or the other’s right as expressed by his face, un-face human beings, sternly reducing each one’s uniqueness to his individuality in the unity of the genre, and let universality rule. Thus we need laws, and – yes – courts of law, institutions and the state to render justice. 60 Further, politics is necessary because there are those who will refuse to heed the new law, ‘Thou shall not kill.’ Levinas is well aware that this commandment is not an ontological impossibility. Many will take Cain’s position and shun the responsibility for the Other. Thus, politics is necessary to prohibit murder, in all its forms. ‘A place had to be foreseen and kept warm for all eternity for Hitler and his followers.’ 61 Both ethics and politics have their own justiﬁcation. The justiﬁcation for ethics is found in the face-to-face relationship with the Other. The justiﬁcation for politics is to restrain those who follow Cain’s position and ignore the responsibility for the Other. Politics does not subsume ethics, but rather it serves ethics. Politics is necessary but it must be continually checked by ethics. Levinas calls for a state that is as ethical as possible, one which is perpetually becoming more just. Levinas calls for the liberal state.

**The state is inevitable – our obligation is to make it as ethical as possible**

**Simmons 99** William Paul, current Associate Professor of Political Science at ASU, formerly at Bethany College in the Department of History and Political Science, “The Third: Levinas' theoretical move from an-archical ethics to the realm of justice and politics,” Philosophy & Social Criticism November 1, 1999 vol. 25 no. 6

Since ‘it is impossible to escape the State’, 70 Levinas insists that the state be made as ethical as possible. The world of institutions and justice must be held in check by the an-archical responsibility for the Other. Levinas calls for both an-archy and justice. Alongside the an-archical responsibility for the Other there is a place for the realm of the said, which includes ontology, justice and politics. Levinas’ thought is not apolitical as many have charged. His harsh critiques of the political realm refer to a politics unchecked by ethics. For example, in Totality and Inﬁnity, Levinas sees politics as antithetical to an ethics based on the Other. ‘The art of foreseeing war and winning it by every means – politics – is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to naïveté.’ 71 Politics unrestrained, by necessity, totalizes the Other by reducing him or her to abstract categories. Levinas will call for a politics that is founded on ethics and not on ontology. The state must be answerable to the an-archical relationship with the Other, it must strive to maintain the exteriority of the Other. Levinasian heteronomic political thought oscillates between the saying and the said, an-archy and justice, ethics and politics. The liberal state is the concrete manifestation of this oscillation. Levinas calls for a balance between the Greek and the Judaic traditions. Neither tradition should dominate. The fundamental contradiction of our situation (and perhaps of our condition) . . . that both the hierarchy taught by Athens and the abstract and slightly anarchical ethical individualism taught by Jerusalem are simultaneously necessary in order to suppress the violence.0020Each of these principles, left to itself, only hastens the contrary of what it wants to secure.

**Sacrificing agency in the political sphere causes bad policymaking and ends in extinction**

**Boggs 2000** (BOGGS, PF POLITICAL SCIENCE – SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 2K CAROL, THE END OF POLITICS, 250-1) Herm

But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism. While Oakeshott debunks political mechanisms and rational planning as either useless or dangerous, the actually existing power structure replete with its own centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious designs, and indeed, rational plans- remains fully intact, insulated from minimalistic critique. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly acceptable for elites who preside over established governing systems, but not for ordinary citizens or groups to challenge the status quo. Such one sided minimalism gives carte-blanche to elites who naturally desire as much space to maneuver as possible the flight form “abstract principles” rules out ethical attacks on injustices that many pervade the status quo (slavery or imperialistic wars for example) insofar as those injustices might be seen as too embedded in the social and institutional of the matrix of the time to be the target of oppositional political action. If politics is reduced to nothing other than a process of everyday muddling-through then people are condemned to accept the harsh realities disgusting and demeaning way in which that money is spent are testimony to the mounting corruptions of politics and government.” 17 Given such growing corruption, it follows that the often-heard appeals to “realism” and pragmatism- so typical of Oakeshott-style discourse- can only lead right back to established modes of doing business. What this suggests, for example, is that any hope of “solving” deep social problems will have to advanced in a minimalistic framework that will never go further tepid social policies that leave business interests totally unaffected, or cosmetic reforms, or the “greening ” of huge corporations that simply want to profit off environmentally-critical goods, and so forth. A much needed radical agenda geared to sustainable, egalitarian, and ecologically balanced forms of production and consumption is automatically ruled out by the minimalistic scenario. A thorough going revival of politics-one that vigorously questions and seeks to go beyond the routinized liberal pragmatism favored by Oakshott-is a precondition for the transcending this political predicament. Of course, any distinctly political imperative flies in the face of a deeply antipolitical culture where politics has such an unsavory association with money corruption, interest peddling, scandals, PACs, bureaucracy, and largely irrelevant campaign spectacles- where indeed politics has been reduced to a farcial representation of its most enduring motifs. For the most part people in the united state normal politics means little more than false promises and empty discourses that might serve to improve people’s lives. The concept of politics that informs this book, however, holds out prospects for a more empowering, participatory,  transformative legacy compatible with an enlarged public sphere and the subversion of corporate hegemony. While this concept imputes an ethical and visionary dimension to politics, it also points toward the matter of strategic necessity in that politics constitutes the only (potential) countervailing power against corporate domination. Localized, and extrapolitical opposition can lay the groundwork for popular movement , but alone (in the absence of more generalized structural mediations) such opposition will never lead to large scale societal change. Notwithstanding Oakeshott, therefore, an imminent retrieval of politics becomes an urgent imperative at a time when destructive global forces cannot be tamed by a pragmatic, muddling-through modus operandi.

## \*\*INHERENCY\*\*

### Hurricanes inevitable

**Hurricanes are inevitable – and CO2 levels make them more dangerous**

**Finger 2005**  (Anne Society for Disability Studies Board of Directors (2004-2007)) “Hurricane Katrina, Race, Class, Tragedy, and Charity” Disability Studies Quarterly Fall 2005, Volume 25, No. 4Vol 25, No 4 http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/630/807 Herm

I do think we need to rethink our use of the word "tragedy" when applied to this. While these events were undeniably tragic, they were hardly inevitable. For a start, let's think about why the levees broke in the first place. Our nation as a whole may have problems with its infrastructure, but these problems are particularly acute in poor communities. Anyone who has ever wheeled or walked along the sidewalk in an upper middle class neighborhood and also wheeled or walked along one in a poor neighborhood knows this difference in their bones. Infrastructure--from sidewalks to curb cuts to levees--is under-funded in poor communities. That a hurricane would hit New Orleans was inevitable. That the levees, which had been neglected during both Republican and Democratic administrations, were not adequately maintained was also a known fact. On another level, nearly all climatologists predict that increasing sea temperatures, as a result of global warming, will increase the ferocity of hurricanes. In the September 19, 2005 New Yorker, Elizabeth Kolbert makes a compelling case that while the question of whether Katrina's destructive power was increased by global warming is scientifically unanswerable, "climbing CO2 levels will lead to an increase in the intensity of hurricanes, though not in hurricane frequency....Meanwhile, as sea levels rise–water expands as it warms–storm surges, like the one that breached the levees in New Orleans, will inevitably become more dangerous."

**The question is when, not if another hurricane strikes**

**The Telegraph 2005** (Francis Harris in Washington) “City waited for the inevitable but the cost of prevention was just too high” 01 Sep 2005 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1497397/City-waited-for-the-inevitable-but-the-cost-of-prevention-was-just-too-high.html Herm

For decades, New Orleans had been "dodging the bullet" as one hurricane after another whipped in from the Gulf of Mexico. This time the bullet struck. The consequences of Hurricane Katrina's rampage are terrible, but they are not surprising. Experts had warned that the day would come when the protective levees would fail and water would cascade into the streets. Much like Los Angeles, a city built on a fault line, the question among New Orleanians was "when" not "if". Sitting at the mouth of the Mississippi River, New Orleans is what one American academic described as "an inevitable city on an impossible site". But there were few options to save it. Lying six to 20ft below sea level and protected by a system of water-blocking levees, it had faced a growing risk of disaster for years. There had been discussions of raising the levees, but that would have cost countless billions of dollars. In the end, the city had to fight with the defences it had. They weren't enough.

**Erosion makes even small hurricanes breach New Orleans**

**The Telegraph 2005** (Francis Harris in Washington) “City waited for the inevitable but the cost of prevention was just too high” 01 Sep 2005 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1497397/City-waited-for-the-inevitable-but-the-cost-of-prevention-was-just-too-high.html Herm

Founded by the French in 1718 on a rise among the low-lying swamplands at the mouth of the Mississippi, the city has expanded over the years. A conspiracy of circumstances has made the city's prospects ever grimmer. Coastal erosion has created "alleyways" for even weak hurricanes to roar in at New Orleans; the need for water has depleted underground aquifers and led to a further settling; and the hurricanes posed an ever-growing threat. In a chillingly prescient article three months ago, the magazine American Prospect looked at the city's chances once a big storm struck. It reported experts saying that a huge storm would strike the city, filling "the geographical 'bowl' of the Crescent City... with the waters of the lake, leaving those unable to evacuate [the area] with little option but to cluster on rooftops - terrain they would have to share with hungry rats, fire ants, snakes and perhaps alligators". Yesterday, the transformation of one of America's most distinctive cities into a ghost town was near completion. The city is now badly wounded. Some say that it faces the "Atlantis Scenario" and may vanish like the legendary civilisation. New Orleans has risen above the challenge before. Hurricanes, fires, even the threat from the British, have all been seen off. But the floods from Katrina have dealt the city a savage blow. The jasmine that gave the French Quarter its scent, the intricate wrought ironwork of the distinctive colonial buildings and the louche charm of the jazz bars - all have been swamped. remind you of? What message might he have unwittingly brought for you? And why does it have to be a demonstration? You go to a few meetings, a few more demonstrations. You write some letters to legislators. You send an email to the President. And then more meetings. The next thing you know, you’re involved in a political campaign. By then you may have stopped asking why. This is how it goes: demonstrations, meetings with legislators, internet contacts. Does it have to be like this? Are demonstrations and meetings your only means? Do they become, sooner or later, not only means but ends? And what kinds of ends? In some sense they should always be ends: a meeting is a celebration, after all. But there are other ends as well. You go to the meeting because that fulfills your obligation to your political conscience. Does it come to that? There are other means, other ends. Other means/ends. Some people ride bicycles, en masse, slowly through crowded urban streets. You want environmentalism? Then have it. The streets are beautiful with their tall corniced buildings and wide avenues. To ride a bike through these streets instead of hiding in the armor of a car would be exhilarating. If enough of you do it together it would make for a pleasant ride, as well as a little lived environmentalism. Would you want to call it a demonstration? Would it matter? There are others as well who do other things with their bodies, more dangerous things. Some people have gone to Palestine in order to put their bodies between the Palestinians and the Israeli soldiers and settlers who attack them. They lie down next to Palestinians in front of the bulldozers that would destroy homes or build a wall through a family’s olive orchard. They feel the bodies of those they are in solidarity with. They smell the soil of Palestine as they lay there. Sometimes, they are harmed by it. A young woman, Rachel Corrie, was deliberately crushed by a US bulldozer operated by an Israeli soldier as she kneeled in front of a Palestinian home, hoping to stop its demolition. To do politics with one’s body can be like this. To resist, to celebrate, is also to be vulnerable. The world that you embrace, the world of which you are a part, can kill you too. And so you experiment. You try this and you try that. You are a phenomenologist and a genealogist. You sense what is around you, attend to the way your body is encrusted in your political involvements. And you know that that sensing has its own history, a history that often escapes you even as it envelops you. There is always more to what you are, and to what you are involved in, than you can know. So you try to keep vigilant, seeking the possibilities without scorning the realities. It’s a difficult balance. You can neglect it if you like. Many do. But your body is there, woven into the fabric of all the other bodies, animate and inanimate. Whether you like it or not, whether you recognize it or not. The only question is whether you will take up the world that you are of, or leave it to others, to those others who would be more than willing to take your world up for you.

### No transportation

**The carless have no means of escape; mass transit is key.**

**Jarzab et al 2010** (James T. Jarzab Vice-President Emtrac Systems Harvey Alexander Manager, ITS Systems Support Branch Transportation Operations Administration James R. Jarzab Assistant Planner Emtrac Systems) “Potential Use of Technology: Mitigating Disaster Evacuation” Presented at the 5th International Social Science Research Conference September 23-25, 2010 http://www.emtracsystems.com/MitigatingDisasterEvacuation.pdf

Two glaring problems in the design and implementation of emergency planning contributed to logistical inefficiencies and obstacles in the evacuation: the overall minor role mass transit resources played in the evacuation and the resources committed to evacuating population segments with few transportation options. First, there was not a dedicated use of all available mass transit vehicles to help efficiently evacuate residents in the evacuation plan. Though some local jurisdictions used regional transit buses to evacuate, these plans were not coordinated with their surrounding regions and had little communication between district and jurisdictions; furthermore, there was little use of plentiful school buses. In fact, the evacuation plan for New Orleans called for the use of transit services to move population segments with few transportation options from the city but was never initiated. Instead, the Regional Transit Authority was ordered by the Mayor to evacuate residents to the established “refuges of last resort,” such as the Superdome, instead of outside the danger zones. Consequently, the residents in these refuges--the majority of which were mobility-limited or low-income residents--were not evacuated until almost three days later. The second problem--the lack of response to population segments with few transportation options--is unsurprising considering the atmosphere of evacuation planning in New Orleans. Much of theplanning that occurred before the storm to accommodate population segments with few transportation options relied heavily on “neighbor helping neighbor” policies that were of limited success. The Victoria Transport Policy Institute describes New Orleans’s public transport evacuation as follows: “…bus deployment was ad hoc, implemented by officials during the emergency without a detailed action plan… Katrina’s evacuation was relatively effective for people with automobiles but failed transit-dependent residents” 2 . Those regional evacuation plans that did contain the use of bus or transit services to move people from the city were heavily focused on local efforts and only minimally coordinated with local evacuation plans. Also, many of the local transit resources were committed to multiple groups that placed heavy strain on already heavily taxed transit resources. As a result, thousands of low mobility residents were stranded in the several refuges and not successfully evacuated until days later.

**The poor, disabled and carless are left behind. Public infrastructure key to evacuations.**

**Litman 06**, Masters of Environmental Studies, Evergreen State College (Olympia, Washington), 1995. BA, with emphasis on urban planning, Evergreen State College (Olympia, Washington), 1983. Lessons From Katrina and Rita What Major Disasters Can Teach Transportation Planners Todd Litman Victoria Transport Policy Institute 13 April, 2006 http://www.vtpi.org/katrina.pdf

An important test of a transportation system’s effectiveness and fairness is its ability to accommodate the needs of the most vulnerable users under extreme conditions (Litman, 2004). Katrina disaster response failed in those terms. People who had resources were served relatively well because planners are familiar with their abilities and needs. **People who were poor, disabled or ill were not well served**, apparently because decision-makers were unfamiliar with and insensitive to their needs. The City of New Orleans does provided a section on “Emergency Guide for Citizens with Disabilities” in its Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan posted on the City’s website (New Orleans, 2005), but it contains little practical support, placing most of the responsibility for safety and evacuation on individuals. The Guide recommends that people with disabilities develop a “support system” to provide help during disasters. The “General Evacuation Guidelines” advises, “If you need a ride, try to go with a neighbor, friend, or relative,” but provides no directions for people who lack neighbors, friends or relatives who have extra capacity in their evacuation vehicles, which is likely to be common in areas were poverty is concentrated. Non-drivers include a diverse group of people who face various combinations of physical, economic and social disadvantages. A system designed for non-drivers must therefore be able to accommodate a wide range of needs, including poverty, physical and mental disabilities (Access Board, 2005), illnesses, inability to speak or read English, parents with young children, distrust of authority, frustration and anger. Many nondrivers lack convenient access to the Internet, and some lack regular telephone and mail service. Many had nowhere to stay outside of the city and no money to pay for housing, food or return transportation. Understanding and responding to these diverse needs is therefore important for effective disaster management and evacuation planning. Under emergency conditions public infrastructure may be stressed. For example, a typical bus can normally carry about 50 passengers, but in an emergency, with evacuees carrying baggage, some in wheelchairs, and communication systems overwhelmed, 30-40 passengers is a more realistic load. It will therefore be important to provide a generous amount of overcapacity and redundancy.

**Governments are doing nothing to help the carless evacuate.**

**Litman et al. 08** Todd Litman, Victoria Transport Policy John L. Renne, Ph.D., AICP, University of New Orleans Thomas W. Sanchez, Ph.D., University of Utah Institute National Study on Carless and Special Needs Evacuation Planning: A Literature Review http://planning.uno.edu/docs/CarlessEvacuationPlanning.pdf

The objective of this study is to research how state departments of transportation (state DOTs), metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), transit agencies, and local governments are considering, in the context of their emergency preparedness planning, the unique needs of minority, low-income, elderly, disabled, and limited English proficient (LEP) persons, especially for households without vehicles (referred to as “carless” in this report). The evacuations of New Orleans and Houston in fall 2005 due to hurricanes Katrina and Rita were two of the largest evacuations in U.S. history. One of the main shortcomings was the lack of planning to evacuate carless residents, particularly minority, low-income, elderly, disabled, and LEP persons. In a report to Congress, the U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. Department of Homeland Security revealed that [m]ethods for communicating evacuation options by modes other than personal vehicles are not well developed in most cases. A number of jurisdictions indicate locations where public transportation may be obtained, but many have no specific services identified to assist persons in getting to those designated locations. This situation is a particular problem for people with various disabilities (U.S. Department of Transportation in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006, p. ES - 5)

**Evacuation policy fails for those without cars; there is no effective mass transit**

**Jarzab et al 10** (James T. Jarzab Vice-President Emtrac Systems Harvey Alexander Manager, ITS Systems Support Branch Transportation Operations Administration James R. Jarzab Assistant Planner Emtrac Systems) “Potential Use of Technology: Mitigating Disaster Evacuation” Presented at the 5th International Social Science Research Conference September 23-25, 2010 http://www.emtracsystems.com/MitigatingDisasterEvacuation.pdf

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**Despite widespread awareness that people lacking automobiles could not escape New Orleans, nothing was done – this lead to a medical and humanitarian crisis**

**Litman 06**, Masters of Environmental Studies, Evergreen State College (Olympia, Washington), 1995. BA, with emphasis on urban planning, Evergreen State College (Olympia, Washington), 1983. Lessons From Katrina and Rita What Major Disasters Can Teach Transportation Planners Todd Litman Victoria Transport Policy Institute 13 April, 2006 http://www.vtpi.org/katrina.pdf

This indicates that public officials were aware of and willing to accept significant risk to hundreds of thousands of residents unable to evacuate because they lacked transportation. The little effort that was made to assist non-drivers was careless and incompetent. Public officials provided little guidance or assistance to people who lacked automobiles (Renne, 2005). The city established ten pickup locations where city buses were to take people to emergency shelters, but the service was unreliable. Transit dependent people were directed to the Superdome, although it had insufficient water, food, medical care and security. This lead to a medical and humanitarian crisis. New Orleans officials were aware of the risks facing transit-dependent residents. These had been described in recent articles in Scientific American (Fischett, 2001) and National Geographic (Bourne, 2004) magazines, and from previous experience (see box on the next page). A July 2004 simulation of a Category 3 “Hurricane Pam” on the southern Louisiana coast by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), projected 61,290 dead and 384,257 injured or sick in a catastrophic flood of New Orleans. City and regional emergency plans describe likely problems in detail (Louisiana, 2000; New Orleans, 2005)

## \*\*SOLVENCY\*\*

### Transportation

**The racist refusal to allow evacuation is unjustifiable – public transit is needed.**

**Morse 2008** - senior attorney with the Biloxi office of Mississippi Center for Justice; received Equal Justice Works Katrina Legal Fellowship; received Edwin D. Wolf Public Interest Law Award from the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; co-founder of the Steps Coalition; Panelist for the Joint center for Political and Economic Studies, NAACP; published by the Joint Center For Political and Economic Studies

Health Policy Institute (Reilly, “Environmental Justice Through the Eye of Hurricane Katrina” 2008, http://198.65.105.204/hpi/sites/all/files/EnvironmentalJustice.pdf )//ALo

Racial discrimination in transportation extended to pedestrian traffic as well. Four days after the storm’s arrival, approximately 200 dehydrated, mostly African American New Orleans storm victims, too poor to evacuate by vehicle, walked up Highway 90 toward the Crescent City Connection to cross the Mississippi River into Gretna, Louisiana. They were met by Gretna police officers, guns drawn, who ordered them to turn back. The group attempted to remain on the bridge overnight, but were driven away by gunshots and a police helicopter. 206 Gretna officials justified this refusal on the grounds that their city was in a lock-down, prompted by looting. Sixty-four years earlier, the United States Supreme Court ruled that California could not isolate itself from dust-bowl era migration by restraining the transportation of indigent persons across its borders. The Court, speaking through Justice Benjamin Cardozo, observed that the Constitution “was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.” 207 A Louisiana federal judge now must decide whether the indigent African American pedestrian Katrina victims were unlawfully deprived of the constitutional right to travel the Crescent City Connection or whether Gretna’s state of emergency authorized the lock-down of this bridge. 208 In December 2007, a federal judge ordered a trial for claims based upon right to travel and the freedom from unreasonable restraint upon liberty. 209 The connection between race and personal transportation has contributed to significant shifts in the population of New Orleans metropolitan area, according to a Brookings Institute study of U.S. Census data for the four months after Hurricane Katrina. For this period, the New Orleans metropolitan area population dropped by 30 percent, and became more white, wealthy, and mobile than before the storm. 210 The white population rose from 54 percent to 68 percent, while the Black population fell from 36 percent to 21 percent. Households with incomes above $15,000 rose from 80 percent to almost 85 percent, while households in poverty fell from 14 percent to 8.5 percent. Residents who were able to relocate to a different house, either in the same parish or a different parish, rose from 14 percent to 21 percent. 211 The overall percentage of New Orleans households without an automobile declined from 13.6 percent to 5.8 percent in the second half of 2005. As noted in the Brookings analysis, less wealthy evacuees in more distant places like Houston or Atlanta confront a considerable obstacle to returning to their homes if they lack personal transportation. 212 From an environmental justice standpoint, the evacuation’s almost exclusive dependence on personal transportation disproportionately burdened the lowest-income African Americans in New Orleans. It is unknown to what extent municipal under-spending contributed to the lack of a coordinated plan, to any decreased cooperation among municipal transit workers, or to the lack of evacuation signs. Historian Douglas Brinkley observed that New Orleans’ bus drivers were underpaid and working without a contract at the time that Hurricane Katrina struck, which weakened their allegiance to City Hall. 213 What is known is that the New Orleans public transit system was financially under-resourced and it failed to fulfill its necessary emergency relief function for isolated and impoverished African Americans who were left with no transportation alternative except their feet. **No more fundamental expression of environmental injustice can be imagined than for an evacuee to be refused the right to walk away from an environmental hazard, as was seen in the refusal to permit evacuation across** the bridge to Gretna. What is also known is that the sluggish response to evacuate these populations from New Orleans to safety echoes a long-standing history of race and class discrimination. Furthermore, a racial divide between two opposing viewpoints about Hurricane Katrina’s victims was exposed: over three-fourths of Blacks but fewer than half of whites in America agreed that the storm pointed out persistent problems of racial inequality. 214

**Public transit is important to solve**

**Litman et al. 08** Todd Litman, Victoria Transport Policy John L. Renne, Ph.D., AICP, University of New Orleans Thomas W. Sanchez, Ph.D., University of Utah Institute National Study on Carless and Special Needs Evacuation Planning: A Literature Review http://planning.uno.edu/docs/CarlessEvacuationPlanning.pdf

Public transit is important for evacuating carless people (including motorists who experience mechanical failures or other temporary problems) for moderate and long distances, and as a way to evacuate large numbers of people when resources (such as road space or fuel) are limited. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Nationwide Plan Review in 2006 concluded that very few states and large urban areas have adequately planned for evacuating transportation disadvantaged populations (DHS 2006; GAO 2007). The report also noted that, in the past, most evacuation planning efforts focus on evacuation by personal vehicle with little attention given to the role of public transportation systems. In the past, few U.S. public transportation operators had well-defined emergency and evacuation response plans. Public transit can play a substantial role in emergency management planning (Schwartz and Litman 2008, FTA, 2007). Higgins, Hickman, and Weatherby (1999, p.9) identify various roles that transit agencies can play:

**Improving transportation with evacuation transport is critical to mitigate the suffering of New Orleans**

**Masozera et al, 06** – collection of Professors from the University of Vermont, Department of Community Development and Applied Economics (Michel Masozera, Melissa Bailey, and Charles Kerchner, “Distribution of impacts of natural disasters across income groups: A case study of New Orleans”, http://www.d.umn.edu/~pfarrell/Natural%20Hazards/Readings/Katrina%20article.pdf)//BZ

Improve access to transportation” Efforts at rebuilding must address the fact that many of the city's families are poor and do not own their own vehicle. As Katrina illustrated, lack of access to transportation inhibits mobility and increases vulnerability. An evacuation plan which relied on personal automobiles, in a city where one in five families did not own automobiles was an inexcusable institutional failure. Thus, the city needs to invest in public transportation infrastructure, including light rail and buses (Katz, 2005). If we do not address these financial and transportation needs, highly vulnerable communities will continue to exist in New Orleans. Part of planning for disasters must include eliminating socio-economic vulnerabilities that exacerbate the damage from natural disasters and increase human suffering. Investing in the economic well-being of communities will reduce vulnerability and ultimately damages suffered in future natural disasters. While it's time to think about a new New Orleans, it is very important for the federal, regional and local authorities to consider a comprehensive mitigation plan that should: 1) determine the location and nature of potential hazards; 2) characterize the population and structures (present and future) that are vulnerable to specific natural disasters and adopt appropriate mitigation strategies; and 3) ensure effective community participation in the decision making during the reconstruction phase. Community participation will be critical in planning, designing and developing a long-term recovery plan that is just, fair and sustainable. Further, additional research is needed to assess the spatial and temporal impacts of Hurricane Katrina, and the impact of federal reconstruction funds on affected communities. Finally, studies that analyze the long-term reconstruction effort will be useful in developing policies that improve natural disaster management.

**Transportation infrastructure is critical for evacuation of disadvantaged citizens in New Orleans.**

**Masozera et al, 06** – collection of Professors from the University of Vermont, Department of Community Development and Applied Economics (Michel Masozera, Melissa Bailey, and Charles Kerchner, “Distribution of impacts of natural disasters across income groups: A case study of New Orleans”, http://www.d.umn.edu/~pfarrell/Natural%20Hazards/Readings/Katrina%20article.pdf)//BZ

While our analyses show that low-income residents were not more likely to be harder hit by the physical event of Hurricane Katrina, there is evidence to suggest that they were disadvantaged during the response phase due to lack of transportation. Transportation is a major component in any emergency preparedness and evacuation plan. Unequal access to transportation alternatives in natural disasters increases the vulnerability of the poor, elderly, and disabled people. One of the factors that increased the vulnerability of lower income groups in New Orleans was the lack of access to transportation to evacuate the city as Hurricane Katrina approached. As of 2004, 1 in 5 New Orleans households did not have access to a car, truck, or van for private use. However, twenty-eight percent of households had two vehicles and another 6% had three or more (US Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2004). As illustrated in Fig. 3, we found a positive correlation between the percentage of residents living below the poverty level and the percentage of residents who did not own a vehicle for neighborhoods in New Orleans. Thus, there was a wide variance in households' ability to appropriately respond to the hurricane, with those in poverty lacking the resources needed to evacuate. Lack of adequate transportation explains, in part, why more than 20,000-30,000 residents were stranded in the Superdome (Center for Progressive Reform, 2005). Our findings, which suggest that low-income neighborhoods were more vulnerable during the response phase, are consistent with previous research. A study done by Gladwin and Peacock (1997) reported people with lower incomes are less able and less likely to evacuate in the case of a natural disaster, due to a lack of transportation. Morrow and Enarson (1996) found that poor women are generally unable to evacuate when a disaster hits because they lack economic resources for supplies and transportation.

**Katrina and Rita prove – busses and high occupancy vehicles are key to solvency**

**Litman 06**, Masters of Environmental Studies, Evergreen State College (Olympia, Washington), 1995. BA, with emphasis on urban planning, Evergreen State College (Olympia, Washington), 1983. Lessons From Katrina and Rita What Major Disasters Can Teach Transportation Planners Todd Litman Victoria Transport Policy Institute 13 April, 2006 http://www.vtpi.org/katrina.pdf

This paper identifies ways to improve emergency response transportation services based on experience gained during two recent hurricanes. Katrina and Rita provide important and different lessons. Katrina’s evacuation was relatively effective for people with automobiles but failed transit-dependent residents. Non-drivers received better services during Rita’s evacuation, but excessive vehicle traffic created problems for motorists. Counterflow lanes were not implemented, fuel was poorly distributed, basic services (such as washrooms) were not provided along the evacuation route, and traffic was poorly managed. This experience indicates that the best way to quickly evacuate a large city is to give buses, and perhaps private high occupancy vehicles, priority in traffic and fuel access, and then accommodate as many low-occupancy vehicles as resources allow. Individuals can choose between accepting a free and fast bus ride, or driving a private vehicle and facing congestion delays. Planners can help prevent future disasters by demanding that emergency response plans devote at least as much attention to non-automobile evacuation as to automobile-based evacuation, and by developing ways to prioritize use of critical transportation resources, such as road capacity and fuel, during emergencies. Planners need to anticipate the needs of non-drivers, who include many people with various physical, economic and social problems. This may require community outreach to build understanding and trust among public officials and the people they serve before an emergency occurs. Extra effort should be made to offer comfort to evacuees, for example, by providing washrooms and information stations along evacuation routes, and having public officials and community volunteers accompany evacuation buses to provide physical and emotional support.

**Lack of mass transit creates transportation apartheid. The vulnerable were left behind to die.**

**Bullard and Wright 05 – \***Director of the Environmental Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University, \*\*Director of the Deep South Center for Environmental Justice at Dillard University, Hurricane Katrina Survivor (Robert D. and Beverly, “ The Real Looting: Katrina Exposes a Legacy of Discrimination and Opens the Door for 'Disaster Capitalism'” October 11, 2005, http://www.ladeltacorps.org/uploads/4/3/8/1/4381788/cg-ar-packet.pdf )//ALo

Transportation is a major component in any emergency preparedness and evacuation plan. However, unequal access to transportation alternatives in natural disasters heightens the vulnerability of the poor, elderly, disabled, and people of color. Individuals with private automobiles have a greater chance of "voting with their feet" and escaping from hurricanes than individuals who are dependent on government to provide emergency transportation. Too often buses (public transit and school buses), vans (para-transit), and trains do not come to the rescue of low-income, elderly, disabled, and sick people. As in the case of Hurricane Katrina, buses were not used in emergency evacuation. Many vulnerable people were left behind and many died. **Transportation apartheid is made clear** in Just Transportation: Dismantling Race and Class Barriers to Mobility and Highway Robbery: Transportation Racism and New Routes to Equity, which illustrate how chronic inequality in transportation is firmly and nationally entrenched. American society is largely divided between those with cars and those without cars. The nation has been so preoccupied with building roads and highways, that we have neglected public transportation. In urban areas, African Americans and Latinos comprise over 54 percent of transit users (62 percent of bus riders, 35 percent of subway riders, and 29 percent of commuter rail riders). Nationally, only about 5.3 percent of all Americans use public transit to get to work. African Americans are almost six times as likely as Whites to use transit to get around. Urban transit is especially important to African Americans. More than 88 percent of Blacks live in metropolitan areas and 53.1 percent live inside central cities. Nearly 60 percent of transit riders are served by the ten largest urban transit systems and the remaining 40 percent by the other 5,000 transit systems. In areas with populations of one million and below, more than half of all transit passengers have incomes of less than $15,000 per year. The private automobile is still the most dominant travel mode of every segment of the American population, including the poor and people of color. Clearly, private automobiles provide enormous employment access advantages to their owners. Car ownership is almost universal in the United States with 91.7 percent of American households owning at least one motor vehicle. According to the 2001 National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) released in 2003, 87.6 percent of whites, 83.1 percent of Asians and Hispanics, and 78.9 percent of blacks rely on the private car to get around. Before Katrina, transit-dependent people and individuals who don't own cars were "invisible" Americans. Lack of car ownership and inadequate public transit service in many central cities and metropolitan regions with a high proportion of "captive" transit dependents exacerbate social, economic, and racial isolation—especially for disabled, elderly, low-income, and people of color residents. Nationally, only 7 percent of White households own no car, compared with 24 percent of African American households, 17 percent of Latino households, and 13 percent of Asian-American households. Two in ten households in the Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama disaster area had no car. People in the hardest hit areas were twice as likely as most Americans to be poor and without a car. Over one-third of New Orleans' African Americans do not own a car. More than 15 percent of New Orleans residents rely on public transportation as their primary mode of travel. The bill for replacing and repairing the roads and bridges destroyed by Hurricane Katrina could exceed $2.3 billion. Repairing damage to interstate highways and major state roads, such as I-10, alone cold cost $1.5 billion, to be paid with federal funds. An estimated $77 million in repairs are needed on another 9,000 miles of "off system roads" in the disaster area. These roads are not controlled by local government and are not repaired or maintained with federal dollars. The $2.3 billion price tag does not include damage to state ports, airports, levees or mass transit systems, or funds to relieve traffic-gridlock in Baton Rouge streets that are filled with vehicles from New Orleans evacuees. Katrina exposed a major weakness in urban evacuation plans. The problem is not unique to New Orleans and Gulf Coast cities. The recent evacuation of 2.7 million people from Houston fleeing from Hurricane Rita shows that here is no way to evacuate a large U.S. city quickly and smoothly. Many motorists ran out of gas after spending more than fifteen hours stuck in traffic. The disastrous New Orleans emergency transportation plan should alert other cities to the complexities of mass evacuation. Emergency plans that do not provide alternative transportation (buses, vans, trains, etc.) as an integral part of disaster evacuation is destined to fail low-income, disabled, elderly, sick, people of color and others who do not to own cars and drivers licenses.

**Transportation infrastructure is vital for evacuation- key to rescue vulnerable populations.**

**Renne et al., 08** – Renne is a PhD from the University of New Orleans, Sanchez is a PhD from the University of Utah, and Litman is a director at the Victoria Transport Policy Institute (John Renne, Thomas Sanchez, and Todd Litman, “National Study on Carless and Special Needs Evacuation Planning: A Literature Review”, October 2008, accessed 7/3/12)//BZ

Government agencies and non-profit organizations face many challenges when planning emergency response services for special needs populations. Recent disasters have not only illuminated **the limitations of outmoded evacuation plans** that have traditionally accounted for auto-dependent populations but have also highlighted evacuation planning techniques that have safely and effectively evacuated carless populations. Notwithstanding, advancements in information technology can augment existing evacuation plans with the assistance of GIS and evacuation simulating software. **Disaster response analysis should be considered a normal part of transportation planning**. For example, local and regional transportation plans, and transit agency plans, should include analysis of disaster vulnerabilities (the types of disasters that could occur in the service area), risks to the transportation system, emergency response transportation requirements, and how emergency transportation activities will be coordinated. This may reference a general emergency response plan or be a special section of the transportation plan. **Emergency response plans should be evaluated based on their effectiveness at serving the most disadvantaged and vulnerable populations.** This requires emergency response planning to give special consideration to serving people with special needs, including physical and mental disabilities, low incomes, inability to speak the local language, and socially marginalized groups such as homeless populations. Serving disadvantaged populations often requires new perspectives, relationships and tools. Conventional transport planning is based on census data and travel surveys, intended to measure vehicle travel demand and traffic conditions. Travel activity by disadvantaged populations, and nonmotorized travel, tends to be undercounted. Special data collection and planning activities may be needed to identify disadvantaged populations and evaluate their transport needs, including their special needs during emergency evacuations. Conventional transportation planning may provide little information on the number of people with disabilities in an area, or the portion of households that lack a reliable automobile suitable for emergency evacuation. Many people cannot speak or read English, lack telephone and Internet access, lack a reliable mailing address, distrust public officials, and face other complications in their lives. As a result, serving these populations often requires innovative planning and communications programs that respond to their needs. This requires working with social service agencies, community organizations, medical and mental health professionals, and special service providers to understand the needs, obstacles and preferences of these groups. The widest range of possible disasters and transport system risks should be considered, as well as options for responding to these emergencies. For example, New Orleans’ emergency transportation plan should consider risks besides hurricanes, and San Francisco’s emergency transportation plan should consider risks other than earthquakes. Emergency action plans should specifically identify who will do what during disasters. There should be no ambiguity as to planning and decision-making responsibility, although plans should be flexible so they can respond to changing needs and conditions. Such plans should be critiqued by stakeholders and external experts to identify possible weaknesses and potential improvements. The plan should be updated regularly and reviewed after any exercise or actual emergency event. Transportation facilities and equipment should be designed to withstand extreme conditions (earthquakes, storms, etc.). **Critical transport system components should be designed to be fail­safe, self-correcting, repairable, redundant and autonomou**s. For example, designing intersections with roundabouts rather than traffic lights may be safer and more efficient considering that traffic can flow even without electricity. Staff should be cross-trained to perform a multitude of roles. Transportation systems should be designed with redundancy, with multiple routes and modes to each destination, including multiple rail lines, roads, paths and bridges. Emergency response planning should evaluate potential problems from, and responses to, the failure of critical links in the transportation networks during a disaster, such as the collapse of a bridge or closure of a highway due to a major crash.

**Katrina highlighted the daily struggles of the carless—lack of transportation infrastructure cements inequality.**

**Sanchez and Brenman 07 – \***Director and Associate Professor, Urban Affairs and Planning Program, Virginia Tech – Alexandria Center \*\*Executive Director, Washington State Human Rights Commission (Thomas W. and Marc, “TRANSPORTATION EQUITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA”, March 29-31, 2007) //ALo

Americans have become increasingly mobile and more reliant on automobiles to meet their travel needs, due largely to transportation policies adopted after World War II that emphasized highway development over public transportation. According to Census 2000 data, less than 5 percent of trips to work in urban areas were made by public transit; however, this varies significantly by race and location.2 Minorities, however, are less likely to own cars than whites and are more often dependent on public transportation. The “transit-dependent” must often rely on public transportation not only to travel to work but also to get to school, obtain medical care, attend religious services, and shop for basic necessities such as groceries. The transit-dependent are often people with low incomes, and thus, in addition to facing more difficulties getting around, they face economic inequities as a result of transportation policies oriented toward travel by car. Surface transportation policies at the local, regional, state, and national levels have a direct impact on urban land use and development patterns. The types of transportation facilities and services in which public funds are invested provide varying levels of access to meet basic social and economic needs. The way communities develop land dictates the need for certain types of transportation, and, on the other hand, the transportation options in which communities invest influence patterns of urban development. In an examination of the evacuation failures during Hurricane Katrina and Rita, Litman suggests that many of these failures can be attributed to a lack of resilience, or ability to absorb unexpected circumstances through redundancy within the transportation system. Litman notes that the tragedies of Katrina are “simply extreme examples of the day-to-day problems facing non-drivers due to inadequate and poorly integrated transportation services.”3 He suggests, therefore, that many of these failures can be attributed to a lack of resilience, or ability to absorb unexpected circumstances through redundancy, within the city’s transportation system.4 Transportation mobility is a hallmark of American society; without it, one cannot be a full member of this society. The early challenges related to racial discrimination and segregation discussed above involved discriminatory practices that directly limited transportation access and mobility of people of color. The effects of limited transportation mobility persist. The lack of mobility helped create ghettos, de facto segregated schools and housing, and social and community isolation. To cure these ills, many promises have been made by the leadership of the dominant society. These promises are often unfulfilled, as have been promises for housing to replace that destroyed in “blight clearing” projects. These were sometimes referred to as “negro removal,” sometimes considered synonymous with “urban renewal.” Whites in suburbs have foregone physical mobility for a lack of social cohesion, while destroyed inner-city neighborhoods have been left with neither mobility nor social cohesion.

**Mass transit is key to evacuate the carless.**

**Litman et al. 08** Todd Litman, Victoria Transport Policy John L. Renne, Ph.D., AICP, University of New Orleans Thomas W. Sanchez, Ph.D., University of Utah Institute National Study on Carless and Special Needs Evacuation Planning: A Literature Review http://planning.uno.edu/docs/CarlessEvacuationPlanning.pdf

The Report to Congress on Catastrophic Hurricane Plan Evacuation (USDOT & USDHS 2006) found that most evacuation plans were underdeveloped and ineffective, especially with respect to persons with special mobility needs. Multiple federal agencies, including the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the U.S. Department of Transportation, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, as well as Senate and House Committees found that transportation planners, providers, health care agencies, and emergency management officials need to be better coordinated and communicating on this issue long before any disaster. In an examination of the evacuation failures during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Litman suggests that many of these failures can be attributed to a lack of resilience; the ability to absorb unexpected circumstances through redundancy within the transportation system. Littman notes that the tragedies of Katrina are “simply extreme examples of the day-to-day problems facing non-drivers due to inadequate and poorly integrated transportation services” (Litman 2006, p.18). Many evacuation plans simply suggest that during evacuations, carless residents should seek assistance with friends or neighbors who do own cars. Raphael and Berube (2006) point out, however, that due to the socioeconomic and racial segregation existing in most American cities, the lack of an automobile is often a condition shared among neighbors. Cameron (2006) also suggests that emergency planning should involve the disabled community, and recommends that local governments create a registry of all members of the community with special needs. Many examples and case studies show the importance of multimodal emergency response planning. For example, one of the main lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is the importance of deploying buses to evacuate large numbers of people, including those who lack automobile transport (Litman 2006). It is therefore important that emergency response and evacuation plans be multimodal.

**Diverse mass transit is critical for evacuation.**

**Litman et al. 08** Todd Litman, Victoria Transport Policy John L. Renne, Ph.D., AICP, University of New Orleans Thomas W. Sanchez, Ph.D., University of Utah Institute National Study on Carless and Special Needs Evacuation Planning: A Literature Review http://planning.uno.edu/docs/CarlessEvacuationPlanning.pdf

Multimodal transportation refers to the use of multiple modes. Intermodal transportation refers to the use of more than one mode during a single trip, and therefore the connections between modes. Multimodal transportation planning strives to create a transport system that accommodates multiple modes and provide effective connections between modes. Multimodal transportation is desirable for several reasons. A diverse and integrated transport system allows people to choose the combination of accessibility options that best meets their needs, and people rely on a variety of travel modes regardless of what is intended (for example, even roadways that lack sidewalks and paths often have pedestrian and cycling traffic). As a result, increased transport system diversity and integration tends to increase system equity and efficiency. For example, a multimodal transport system allows people to walk or bicycle for local errands, drive to dispersed destinations, and use public transit when they cannot drive or are traveling on congested corridors where it would be impractical to accommodate all trips by automobile. Multimodalism tends to be particularly beneficial to disadvantaged people, who rely significantly on modes such as walking, cycling, ridesharing and public transit. It reduces the degree to which non-drivers are disadvantaged relative to drivers, is progressive with respect to income, and tends to reduce the social stigma associated with use of alternative modes. Even people who do not currently use a particular mode may benefit from its existence. For example, motorists may benefit from the availability of alternative modes that reduce their chauffeuring responsibilities or traffic and parking congestion problems. Increasing transportation system diversity tends to increase its resilience, that is, the system’s ability to accommodate variable and unexpected conditions without catastrophic failure, or “the capacity to absorb shocks gracefully” (Foster 1993; Morlok and Chang 2004). Transportation system diversity includes providing multiple modes, routes and system components (such as redundant maintenance and repair resources, communications systems and fuel sources). Each transport mode has a unique performance profile, that is, a combination of abilities and constraints that determine the role it can play in an efficient transportation system as summarized in Table 4. For example, walking is affordable and does not require special skill or a license, but it does require physical ability and is limited in speed, distance and carrying capacity. Automobile travel is more costly and requires a driver’s license, but it can travel faster, farther and can carry a relatively heavy load. In recognition of these benefits, transportation planning is increasingly multimodal, with increasing emphasis on alternative modes such as walking, cycling, ridesharing, public transit, car sharing and telework (Pedersen 1999). Many communities have policies and objectives to reduce automobile dependence and encourage use of alternative modes. Multimodalism is particularly important for emergency response and evacuation planning because it provides options that can accommodate diverse and uncertain needs, including various: • Types of people, including those with various disabilities and problems • Mobility needs, including longer-distance evacuations • Resource constraints, including limited road space, vehicles and fuel

### Politics of hope

**The affirmation of hope is necessary to dismantle creeping racism, discrimination and biopolitical control in the United States**

**Giroux, 09** – Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, previous professors at BU, Miami U, and Penn State (Henry, “Politics after Hope”, http://www.counterpunch.org/2009/08/14/politics-after-hope/)//BZ

Peter Dreier (“We Need More Protests to Make Reform Possible”) argues that while there is considerable anger among the American public over a number of Obama’s policies, extending from health care reform to the war in Afghanistan, such anger is meaningless unless it is mixed with hope. And as he rightly puts it, “to be effective politically that hope has to be mobilized through collective action—in elections, meetings with elected officials, petitions, e-mail campaigns, rallies, demonstrations and even, at times, civil disobedience.” With the election of Obama, hope, for many progressives, seems to have exhausted itself, as if it had found its final resting place in the election of an African American president. But hope never ends, because no society has perfected democracy or is democratic enough that the “fierce urgency of now” becomes either outdated or irrelevant. Hope needs both a discourse and a sense of possibility, just as it demands a concerted effort on the part of individuals and social movements to combine the pedagogical conditions for creating an informed citizenry with a sense of urgency that demands informed action. At the heart of this struggle, though neither Hedges nor Dreier mentions it, is the need to make the crisis of agency and the importance of education and pedagogy both central to such a politics. A democratic politics demands an informed citizenry, especially at a time when citizenship has been reduced to consumerism while politics and agency appear largely drained of any substance. Obama defied the onset of cynicism for a short time, and one feels compelled to ask the question, how did he successfully resurrect in his presidential campaign the issue of agency through modes of education that helped defeat John McCain? Put more abstractly, what does his victory suggest about the role that intellectuals, unions, educators, workers, parents, youth, and others might play in rethinking how the media, schools, Internet, newspapers, and any other sites can be utilized as important pedagogical spheres that become central sites of struggle? Such a struggle will need to create a sense of public urgency, affirm democratic public values, and provide the conditions for the growth of ready and willing individual and collective agents for change. Ironically, Obama himself has provided both a language for and an example of how this might be done. He used the new media to spread a message of hope, he made clear that the Bush administration had created a nightmarish crisis of such proportions that the very nature of democracy was in peril, and he masterfully reached out and educated a wide range of constituents to support his candidacy. His call for people to educate themselves in the spirit of citizen activism, find cracks in the system, put pressure on politicians (including presidents), and take to the streets for the causes they believed in can be found in many of his speeches—and can be read in retrospect as both a plea and a blueprint within the current historical moment to create new mass movements to continually challenge Obama himself, pushing him to move away from his centrist tendencies and the conservative pressures of corporate-driven party politics. The new era of responsibility that Obama talks about found resonance in his own attempts, against great odds, to inspire people to take chances, take risks, and exercise civic courage in order to deepen and expand the possibilities of a substantive democracy. But that responsibility was not meant to be either privatized or romanticized, or relegated to a strictly individual task that depoliticized politics and furthered the myth of Obama as the iconic, solitary, heroic symbol of a new future. On the contrary, it is a discourse of responsibility Obama forged in the heat of politics, power, and struggle, one in which matters of agency and politics transcended the space of the privatized individual. But once Obama assumed the office of the presidency and surrounded himself with the captains of corporate power, his call to responsibility was fueled by a notion of hope that downplayed its emancipatory potential. Politics after hope was sabotaged by a movement of centrists, lobbyists, market fundamentalists, militarists, and right-wing ideologues who believed that there was no longer any need for either hope or struggle. And it is precisely this bankrupt notion of responsibility and politics that must be challenged by those who imagine a very different politics from both the Obama administration and from emerging social movements. In opposition to a hope uncoupled from a viable radical democratic politics, there is a need to forge a notion of possibility motivated by the collective responsibility of a mass movement that is capable of creating and sustaining a new kind of politics, one that does not end with Obama’s election but sees it as a starting point for a new level of mass protest, collective struggle, and movement building. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s call for “the fierce urgency of now” suggests the need to forge mass movements that can push Obama further to the left and begin the long, difficult, but necessary, task of developing a third political party. There are too many people suffering both in the United States and abroad at the current moment to put all of our efforts toward the one goal of building a third party—we need both short-term and long-term strategies for change. Obama urgently needs to be pushed into reclaiming his democratic sensibilities and attentiveness to the suffering of those most disenfranchised by the dominant society. But there is still one even more foundational, and therefore more pressing, task than calling for bold action from Obama, new social movements, and a radical third party. What is most needed in the present historical moment is a concerted effort to create the educational and political conditions necessary to resurrect a new kind of citizenry capable of thinking through and acting on the problems that threaten to destroy both the United States and the planet. This political precondition suggests that central to any viable notion of political agency is the issue of education and the multifaceted role it must play in developing both the spaces for a new kind of civic and critical subjectivity and the tools and tactics necessary to support a social movement capable of challenging official power while maintaining the sense of urgency needed for restructuring the entire economic, social, and political order in an effort to overcome the current crisis of democracy. This civic culture can then provide the foundation for the emergence of a mass movement that struggles to educate and push Obama in a new direction while at the same time opening up new public spheres for alternative political parties and social movements. There is a dire need for a social movement that not only demands fundamental structural changes but is also capable of connecting diverse struggles as part of a larger movement for political, economic, and social transformation. This is not a question of ignoring particular agendas and often isolated struggles but affirming and reaching beyond them to a set of common interests that can both strengthen their impact and broaden their understanding and struggle for a radical democracy. We need a politics that recognizes the local but is also capable of connecting it with the totality of interrelated and myriad projects that constitute a truly anti-capitalist project. Obama offered hope, but has instead embraced corporate power; in doing so, he has put the democratic connection between hope and politics into exile. Obama’s notion of hope has succumbed to a politics that has lost its hold on the present as he now ignores the sufferings of everyday people, shirks the responsibility to protest injustice, and defies the need to disrupt the workings of empire. At this early stage in his presidency, the cracks and contradictions are clear, but so are the possibilities for a different kind of politics after hope, one that suggests that history is open and power is not confined to the elites and power brokers in the military, financial sectors, or government. The passage from passivity to anger to engagement can begin by recognizing the gap between Obama’s inspiring calls for change and the actual policies he has put into place. It is precisely in the space of this tension between what is and what ought to be that politics can be reinvigorated by educating the public with the very same words that inspired so many of them to vote for Obama in the first place. This education does not rest by pointing to the swindle of fulfillment that followed the election, but asks what can now be done to go back to a politics in which hope is only the beginning, not the end, of what it means to see and act otherwise. Hope provides the conditions for humans to imagine how things can be different from what they are in the present. When armed with knowledge, it links the power of judgment to the urge to change the world around us. When dismantled in the discourse of cynicism, perfection, or finality, it loses its sense of possibility and dissolves into a world where tensions fade away and conflicts and contradictions cease to exist. A politics after hope recognizes that hope is never finished; it always remains uneasy in the face of unchecked power and never stops its quest for equality and justice. Politics after hope recognizes that the fate of the future is never settled and that democracy is always a process of becoming rather than a state of being.

**Katrina has proven the degradation of individuals, cast on the periphery of society. As citizens, it is necessary to take an oppositional stance against the suffering and advocate political action to resist these hegemonic hierarchies of discrimination.**

**Giroux, 2006** – Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, previous professors at BU, Miami U, and Penn State (Henry, “Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race, Class, and the Biopolitics of Disposability”, accessed from JSTOR 7/1/12)//BZ

Katrina reveals that we are living in dark times. The shadow of authori-tarianism remains after the storm clouds and hurricane winds have passed, offering a glimpse of its wreckage and terror. The politics of a disaster that affected Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi is about more than government incompetence, militarization, socio-economic polarization, environmental disaster, and political scandal. Hurricane Katrina broke through the visual blackout of poverty and the pernicious ideology of color-blindness to reveal the governments role in fostering the dire conditions of largely poor African-Americans, who were bearing the hardships incurred by the full wrath of the indifference and violence at work in the racist, neoliberal state. Global neoliberalism and its victims now occupy a space shaped by authoritarian politics, the terrors inflicted by a police state, and a logic of disposability that removes them from government social provisions and the discourse and privileges of citizenship. One of the most obvious lessons of Katrina—that race and racism still matter in America—is fully operational through a biopolitics in which “sovereignty resides in the power and capacity to dictate who may live and who may die” (Mbembe 11-12).Those poor minorities of color and class, unable to contribute to the prevailing con- sumerist ethic, are vanishing into the sinkhole of poverty in desolate and abandoned enclaves of decaying cities, neighborhoods, and rural spaces, or in America s ever-expanding prison empire. Under the Bush regime, a biopolitics driven by the waste machine of what Zygmunt Bauman defines as “liquid modernity” registers a new and brutal racism as part of the emergence of a contemporary and savage authoritarianism. Any viable attempt to challenge the biopolitical project that now shapes American life and culture must do more than unearth the powerful antidemocratic forces that now govern American economics, politics, education, media, and culture; it must also deepen possibilities of individual and collective struggles by fighting for the rebuilding of civil society and the creation of a vast network of democratic public spheres such as schools and the alternative media in order to develop new models of individual and social agency that can expand and deepen the reality of democratic public life. This is a call for a diverse “radical party,” following Stanley Aronowitzs exhortation, a party that prioritizes democracy as a global task, views hope as a precondition for political engagement, gives primacy to making the political more pedagogical, and understands the importance of the totality of the struggle as it informs and articulates within and across a wide range of sites and sectors of everyday life—domestically and globally. Democratically minded citizens and social movements must return to the crucial issue of how race, class, power, and inequality in America contribute to the suffering and hardships experienced daily by the poor, people of color, and working- and middle- class people. The fight for equality offers new challenges in the process of constructing a politics that directly addresses poverty, class domination, and a resurgent racism. Such a politics would take seriously what it means to struggle pedagogically and politically over both ideas and material relations of power as they affect diverse individuals and groups at the level of daily life. Such struggles would combine a democratically energized cultural politics of resistance and hope with a politics aimed at offering workers a living wage and all citizens a guaranteed standard of living, one that provides a decent education, housing, and health care to all residents of the United States.

**An oppositional stance against the politics of disposability is necessary to restore value, politics, and autonomy to dis-privileged individuals as a result of Katrina.**

**Giroux, 2006** – Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, previous professors at BU, Miami U, and Penn State (Henry, “Katrina and the Politics of Disposability”, http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/2822/)//BZ

In the current blitz of media remembrance, memories of the 9/11 victims legitimate the discourses of militarism, national honor and patriotism, while Katrina invokes memories of pathology. A year later, and the victims of Katrina are not only deemed unworthy of state protections, but dangerous and disposable. What does it mean, for example, when CNN’s Anderson Cooper returns to the scene of the crime named Katrina and, rather than connecting the Bush’s administration contempt for social programs to the subsequent catastrophe, focuses instead on the rumors of crime and lawlessness that allegedly spread over New Orleans after the hurricane hit? What are we to think when Juan Williams, a senior correspondent for NPR, writes in a New York Times op-ed that the real lesson of Katrina is that the poor “cause problems for themselves,” and that they should be condemned for not “confronting the poverty of spirit?” Williams invokes the ghost of self-reliance and self-responsibility to demonize those populations for whom the very economic, educational, political and social conditions that make agency possible barely exist. Only a few dominant media journalists such as Bob Herbert of the New York Times attempted to articulate a politics of government abuse that unites both Baghdad and New Orleans. Of course, this last issue is difficult, for here we must connect the painful dots between the crisis on the Gulf Coast and that “other” gulf crisis in the Middle East–between the images of U.S. soldiers standing next to tortured Iraqis forced to assume the indignity of a dog leash and the images of bloated bodies of a redundant populace floating in toxic waters after five long days of government indifference. How else can we explain the Bush administration’s refusal to allocate adequate funds for hurricane and flood control in New Orleans while spending billions on the war on Iraq? What does it mean when a government prioritizes tax relief for the ultra-rich and ignores the most basic needs of minorities of class and color? A new politics now governs American policy, one that I call the politics of disposability. It is a politics in which the unproductive (the poor, weak and racially marginalized) are considered useless and therefore expendable; a politics in which entire populations are considered disposable, unnecessary burdens on state coffers, and consigned to fend for themselves. Katrina laid bare what many people in the United States do not want to see: Large numbers of poor black and brown people struggling to make ends meet within a social system that makes it difficult to obtain health insurance, child care, social assistance, savings, and even minimum-wage jobs. In their place, the youth are offered bad schools, poor public services and no future, except a possible stint in the penitentiary. As Janet Pelz in the Sept. 19, 2005 Seattle Post-Intelligencer rightly insisted, “These are the people the Republicans have been teaching us to disdain, if not hate, since President Reagan decried the moral laxness of the Welfare mom.” As the social state is hollowed out, the category “waste” no longer simply includes material goods but also human beings. This is a result of a revised set of political commitments that have given up on the sanctity of human life for the populations rendered “at risk” by global neoliberal economies. Instead, the right has embraced an emergent security state founded on cultural homogeneity. This is a state that no longer provides Americans with dreams; rather, it protects Americans from a range of possible nightmares. Defined primarily through a discourse of “lack” in the face of the social imperatives of good character, personal responsibility, and hyper-individualism, entire populations are expelled from the index of moral concerns. Defined neither as producers or consumers, they are reified as products without value and then disposed of. Zygmunt Bauman writes in his brilliant book, Wasted Lives, these groups are “leftovers in the most radical and effective way: we make them invisible by not looking and unthinkable by not thinking.” When young black and brown youth try to escape the politics of disposability by joining the military, the seduction of economic security is negated by the violence that is compounded daily in the streets, roads, and battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their symbolic fate is made concrete in the form of body bags, mangled bodies and amputated limbs – sights rarely seen in the narrow vision of the dominant media. The public and private policies of investing in the public good are dismissed as bad business, just as the notion of protecting people from the dire misfortunes of poverty, sickness or random blows of fate is viewed as an act of bad faith. Weakness is now a sin, punishable by social exclusion. The state’s message to unwanted populations: Society neither wants nor cares about nor needs you. Bauman observes that dominant “power is measured by the speed with which responsibilities can be escaped.” To confront the biopolitics of disposability, we need to recognize these dark times in which we live and offer up a vision of hope. We need to work to create the conditions for collective and global struggles that refuse to use war as an act of politics and markets as the measure of democracy. Making human beings superfluous is the essence of totalitarianism. Democracy is the antidote in urgent need of being reclaimed. The tragedy of both gulf crises must do more than provoke despair or cynicism, it must spark a politics in which the images of those floating bodies in New Orleans and the endless parade of death in Iraq serve as a reminder of what it means when justice, as the lifeblood of democracy, becomes cold and indifferent in the face of death.

**Affirmation of political hope is necessary to reinvigorate democracy. Democracy is militarized in the status quo, parallel with disposability. To educate and advocate for hope is to evoke the political power of resistance.**

**Giroux, 2010** – Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, previous professors at BU, Miami U, and Penn State (Henry, “Memories of Hope in the Age of Disposability”, published 9/28/2010, accessed online 7/2, http://archive.truthout.org/memories-hope-age-disposability63631)//BZ

The working-class neighborhood of my youth never gave up on democracy as an ideal in spite of how much it might have failed us. As an ideal, it offered the promise of a better future; it mobilized us to organize collectively in order to fight against injustice; and it cast an intense light on those who traded in corruption, unbridled power and greed. Politics was laid bare in a community that expected more of itself and its citizens as it tapped into the promise of a democratic society. But like many individuals and groups today, democracy is now also viewed as disposable, considered redundant, a dangerous remnant of another age. And yet, like the memories of my youth, there is something to be found in those allegedly outdated ideals that may provide the only hope we have for recognizing the anti-democratic politics, power relations and reactionary ideologies espoused by the new barbarians. Democracy as both an ideal and a reality is now under siege in a militarized culture of fear and forgetting. The importance of moral witnessing has been replaced by a culture of instant gratification and unmediated anger, just as forgetting has become an active rather than passive process, what the philosopher Slavoj Zizek calls a kind of "fetishist disavowal: 'I know, but I don't want to know that I know, so I don't know.'"(16) The lights are going out in America; and the threat comes not from alleged irresponsible government spending, a growing deficit or the specter of a renewed democratic social state. On the contrary, it comes from the dark forces of an economic Darwinism and its newly energized armies of right-wing financial sharks, shout till-you-drop mobs, reactionary ideologues, powerful, right-wing media conglomerates and corporate-sponsored politicians who sincerely hope, if not yet entirely believe, that the age of democratization has come to an end and the time for a new and cruel politics of disposability and human waste management is at hand. We are living through a period in American history in which politics has not only been commodified and depoliticized, but the civic courage of intellectuals, students, labor unions and working people has receded from the public realm. Maybe it is time to reclaim a history not too far removed from my own youthful memories of when democracy as an ideal was worth struggling over, when public goods were more important than consumer durables, when the common good outweighed private privileges and when the critical notion that a society can never be just enough was the real measure of civic identity and political health. Maybe it's time to reclaim the spirit of a diverse and powerful social movement willing to organize, speak out, educate and fight for the promise of a democracy that would do justice to the dreams of a generation of young people waiting for adults to prove the courage of their democratic convictions.

## \*\*IMPACTS\*\*

### Transportation key

**Transportation policy is the root of transportation inequality – this lies at the heart of racial, environmental inequality, and classism.**

**Pastor et al. 06** [Manuel Pastor is codirector of the Center for Justice, Tolerance, and Community at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Robert D. Bullard is Ware Professor of Sociology and director of the Environmental Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University. James K. Boyce is professor of economics at the Political Economy Research Institute of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Alice Fothergill is assistant professor of sociology at the University of Vermont. Rachel Morello-Frosch is Carney Assistant Professor in the School of Medicine at Brown University. Beverly Wright is professor of sociology and director of the Deep South Center for Environmental Justice at Dillard University.] “Environment, Disaster and Race After Katrina” http://urbanhabitat.org/files/Pastor.Bullard.etc.Env.Katrina.pdf

How consequential is racial inequality in environmental conditions? A Southern California study estimating lifetime cancer risk from air toxins shows, for example, that risk declines as income rises, but is still around 50 percent higher at all income levels for African Americans, Latinos and Asians. And lead poisoning, commonly triggered by conditions in older housing, is five times more common among Black children than white children. Disaster Vulnerability and Environmental Justice The social dynamics that underlie the disproportionate environmental hazards faced by low-income communities and minorities also play out in the arena of disaster prevention, mitigation, and recovery. In a sense, environmental justice is about slow-motion disasters—and disasters reveal environmental injustice in a fast-forward mode. Both revolve around the axes of disparities of wealth and power. Lack of wealth heightens the risks that individuals and communities face for three reasons. First, it translates into a lack of purchasing power to secure private alternatives to public provision of a clean and safe environment for all. Second, it translates into less ability to withstand shocks (such as health bills and property damage) that wealth would cushion. Third, it translates through the “shadow prices” of costbenefit analysis into public policies that place a lower priority on protecting “less valuable” people and their assets. In the aftermath of Katrina, there is an added risk that transfers could turn New Orleans into a little more than a theme park for affluent tourists. In the vicious circle of disaster vulnerability, those with less wealth face greater risks, and when disaster strikes, their wealth is further sapped. But risk is not just about money: even middleclass African Americans, Latinos, and Asians face elevated environmental risks. This reflects systematic differences in power and the legacy of racial discrimination. Power also shows up in private decisions by firms choosing where to site hazards and how much to invest in environmental protection: their choices are constrained not only by government regulations, but also by informal governance exercised by mobilized communities, civil society, and the press (see Pargal et al. 1997; Boyce 2004). In both public and private arenas, then, power disparities drive outcome disparities—and the resulting patterns reflect race and ethnicity as well as wealth. 1 Why? Land, Markets, and Power The power explanation suggests that low-income people and communities of color are systematically disadvantaged in the political decision-making process. This argument can incorporate the other explanations: what seems to be rational land use, after all, may be predetermined by political processes that designate disenfranchised communities as sacrifice zones (see Pulido 2000; Boone and Modarres 1999; Wright 2005). Indeed, land use decisions often build on accumulated disadvantage. In the largely Latino community of Kettleman City in California’s Central Valley, for example, an effort to place a toxic waste incinerator in a landfill already proximate to the city was viewed as building on existing dis-amenities but added insult to injury for an already overburdened community (Cole and Foster 2001). Likewise, income is a marker of political power as well as of market strength. The interplay of land use, income, and power means that certain variables used in statistical analyses—such as zoning and household wealth— carry multiple explanations. To demonstrate convincingly that power is behind siting decisions requires the inclusion of some variables that are directly and irrefutably connected to power differentials. The most important of these variables is race. 2 Disparate patterns by race, particularly when one has controlled for income and other variables involved in the land-use and market-dynamics explanations, most clearly point to the role of unequal influence and racial discrimination. Racially disparate outcomes are also important in their own right. They can result from processes that are not so much a direct exercise of power as essentially embedded in the nature of our urban form, including housing segregation and real estate steering, informal methods that exclude communities from decision-making processes (including less provision of information regarding health risks), the past placement of hazards (which justifies new hazards as rational land use), and other forms of less direct “institutionalized” or “structural” racism (see Feagin and Feagin 1986; Institute on Race and Poverty 2002). And it is precisely racialized risk that has galvanized a movement for environmental equity rooted in civil rights law and activism**. Race and racism therefore are at the heart of the evidentiary debate**. It is Not Just Hazards **Environmental and transportation justice are at the heart of emergency preparedness and emergency response**. The former provides a guidepost to who is most likely to be vulnerable to the disaster itself, and the latter provides information about who will need the most help when disaster strikes. It is to the intersection of disaster vulnerability with race, income, and other social characteristics that we now turn.

**Poor and minority populations are far more likely to be impacted by disasters.**

**Pastor et al. 06** [Manuel Pastor is codirector of the Center for Justice, Tolerance, and Community at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Robert D. Bullard is Ware Professor of Sociology and director of the Environmental Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University. James K. Boyce is professor of economics at the Political Economy Research Institute of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Alice Fothergill is assistant professor of sociology at the University of Vermont. Rachel Morello-Frosch is Carney Assistant Professor in the School of Medicine at Brown University. Beverly Wright is professor of sociology and director of the Deep South Center for Environmental Justice at Dillard University.] “Environment, Disaster and Race After Katrina” http://urbanhabitat.org/files/Pastor.Bullard.etc.Env.Katrina.pdf

Relief and Recovery The inequities before and during a disaster are often played out further in the period after a disaster. Many minorities and the poor have had greater difficulties recovering from disasters due to less insurance, lower incomes, fewer savings, more unemployment, less access to communication channels and information, and the intensification of existing poverty (Bolin and Bolton 1986; Bolin and Stanford 1998; Cooper and Laughy 1994; Hewitt 1997; Peacock et al. 1997; Tierney 1988). For example, after Hurricane Andrew (which struck Florida and Lousiana in 1992) Blacks and non–Cuban Hispanics were more likely than Whites to receive inadequate settlement amounts, and black neighborhoods were less likely to have insurance with major companies, a fact that may have been connected to redlining (Peacock and Girard 1997). 3 Studies have also addressed racial, class, and ethnic differences in who receives disaster recovery assistance. Bolin and Bolton (1986) concluded that the Blacks, who had lower income than Whites in their study, needed multiple aid sources to deal with large losses because they did not receive enough support from fewer sources. Blacks were also less likely than Whites to receive Small Business Administration (SBA) loans, more likely to use interfaith disaster services, and tended to recover economically more slowly. Following the 1997 Grand Forks flood in North Dakota, flood relief was geared away from migrant workers, hurting primarily Hispanic single mothers (Enarson and Fordham 2001). Upper middle-class victims in several disasters have been more likely to receive assistance than minorities and the poor because they knew how to navigate the relief system, fill out the forms, and work within the government bureaucracy (Aptekar 1990; Fothergill 2004; Rovai 1994). In addition, poorer victims had more trouble making trips to the disaster assistance centers following Hurricane Andrew because of transportation, child care, and work difficulties (Dash et al.1997). Furthermore, the traditional nuclear family model used by some relief programs left poor, minority women at a disadvantage (Morrow and Enarson 1996). Housing continues to be a significant issue for low-income and minority disaster victims in the recovery period. Past research has found that housing assistance favors middle-class victims, particularly homeowners. Of course, helping homeowners is important and may be especially critical for middleclass black and Latino families. Such families have much lower homeownership rates but, as noted earlier, tend to have more of their net worth tied up in home equity than their white counterparts do. Still, including renters prominently in the relief mix is part of a more racially equitable approach. Legal residency is another critical issue in disaster recovery. Following disasters, many undocumented immigrants, unsure about the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) policy, avoid recovery assistance for fear of deportation (Subervi-Velez et al. 1992; Bolin 1993; Cooper and Laughy 1994; Yelvington 1997). Muñiz (2006) offers anecdotal evidence that this was an issue in Katrina as well. She also shows how the occasional assumption that Latino residents were undocumented rather than legal residents sometimes led FEMA to fail to offer appropriate information about housing assistance to eligible individuals. 4 In addition, the non-traditional family structures of immigrant households can be a challenge for disaster officials. Following Hurricane Andrew, FEMA was not prepared for some of south Florida’s family structures, particularly Haitian families, who often had several families in one household—FEMA’s temporary assistance was set up for nuclear families with one head of household (Morrow 1997). Post-Katrina events have done little to stir new confidence among those fence line communities that have been subject to pollution releases from nearby chemical facilities, or living near the potentially dangerous transit corridors discussed

**Failure to evacuate the poor, disabled and elderly created a humanitarian crisis.**

**Fussel 06** (Elizabeth Fussell is assistant professor of sociology at Tulane University.) “Leaving New Orleans: Social Stratification, Networks, and Hurricane Evacuation” SSRC Jun 11, 2006 http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Fussell/Herm

The evacuation strategies of most upper and middle-income residents were quite straightforward: make a hotel reservation or arrange a visit with out-of-town friends and family, board the house windows if you can, pack the car, get some cash and leave town. These residents most often evacuated during the voluntary or mandatory evacuation period in the 24 to 48 hours before the storm was predicted to hit. For this group, the costs of leaving on Saturday were lower with respect to missing work or school since the storm was projected to arrive on Monday. They were likely to have been informed by television, radio, internet, e-mail, or telephone of the hurricane’s projected path long before it arrived. Nevertheless, the majority of those evacuating waited until Sunday to leave (Anderson 2005). Indeed, riding out the storm is an old New Orleans tradition. In the past, many better-off New Orleanians have chosen to stay in the city during hurricanes, evacuating “vertically” to the upper floors of the downtown hotels. As Hurricane Katrina approached, however, hotel officials denied them their rooms and encouraged them to leave of their own volition (Mowbray 2005). Low-income residents had fewer choices with respect to how to prepare for the imminent arrival of Katrina. Since the storm was at the end of the month and many low-income residents of New Orleans live from paycheck to paycheck, economic resources for evacuating were particularly scarce. Furthermore, low-income New Orleanians are those who are least likely to own vehicles, making voluntary evacuation more costly and logistically more difficult. These residents were also more likely to depend upon television and radio for news of the storm, and alarm from these channels only became heightened in the last 48 hours before the storm arrived. Although most of these residents joined the flow of traffic out of the city on Sunday, many remained in their homes hoping for the best, and others headed to the Superdome rather than taking the few city buses available to out of town shelters (Filosa 2005). Those going to the Superdome and later the Morial Convention Center believed that these shelters would provide sufficient protection until the storm had passed but hadn’t considered the flooding that occurred when several levees were breeched. In fact, the people hit hardest by the flooding were also those from neighborhoods where poverty was most concentrated as a result of the concentration of federally subsidized housing (Katz 2005). Not coincidently, they were least able to leave the city without assistance. Although evacuation strategies were stratified by income, elderly people and those with chronic health conditions or disabilities within each social stratum were less likely to evacuate than those in good health. Jefferson Parish President Aaron Broussard's story of a Kenner City employee's elderly mother calling her son from a nursing home in the first four days and eventually succumbing to the rising water was played out repeatedly in other nursing homes where the oldest old remained due to frailty and poor health (Meet the Press, 2005). During the evacuation for Hurricane Ivan in 2004 most deaths occurred among the elderly who were unable to bear the heat and stress of getting caught in the day-long traffic jams arising from a poorly planned evacuation strategy. During Hurricane Katrina the elderly and disabled died in the Convention Center and in their homes throughout the city of the symptoms of diseases such as asthma, diabetes, and high blood pressure that are easily managed under normal conditions but that become lethal when access to medicine and treatment is cut off. Even though economic resources may mitigate the danger of evacuation for the elderly and disabled, it does not entirely eliminate the additional risks to which they are subject. Understanding this, many elderly and disabled simply chose not to evacuate the city prior to the storm.

**Katrina demonstrated the institutional racism embedded in the lack of transportation infrastructure**

**Sanchez and Brenman 07** Thomas W. Sanchez, PhD, Director and Associate Professor Urban Affairs and Planning Program Virginia Tech – Alexandria Center. Marc Brenman Executive Director Washington State Human Rights Commission Transportation Equity And Environmental Justice: Lessons From Hurricane Katrina http://www.ejconference.net/images/Sanchez\_Brenman.pdf

The substantially adverse and disproportionate effects of Hurricane Katrina on African Americans in August 2005 demonstrated to many advocates that what they call “institutional racism” as one such barrier continues to exist in the United States. Institutional racism includes underlying systems and policies that keep people of color and white unequal. There are certain areas of local policy where racism becomes prominent and visible, including policing, zoning, housing, and transportation. Governmental policies and programs can either promote equality, tolerance, and justice or (consciously or not) promote division and inequality and engender the belief that specific racial and ethnic groups are second-class citizens.

**Transportation might not be the root cause of social injustice but it is a very real example of material deprivation for the poor, elderly and disabled.**

**GAO 06** United States Government Accountability Office GAO Report to Congressional Committees TRANSPORTATIONDISADVANTAGED POPULATIONS Actions Needed to Clarify Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations

The evacuation of New Orleans in response to Hurricane Katrina was considered relatively successful for people with their own vehicles; approximately 1 million people evacuated Louisiana prior to landfall. 1 In contrast, about 100,000 people were not evacuated prior to the storm— many of whom lacked access to a vehicle. Hurricane Katrina ultimately resulted in over 1,300 deaths. Among those who could not evacuate were some of society’s most vulnerable populations: the elderly, low-income individuals, and persons with disabilities. 2 These populations often lack the ability to provide for their own transportation and may also have difficulty accessing conventional public transportation. As a result, evacuating these “transportation-disadvantaged” populations during emergencies has become an important topic of public policy discussion. 3 Evacuations of varying scales are common in the United States and can be triggered by a variety of events, including natural disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, wildfires, and terrorist attacks like those committed on September 11, 2001. In fact, emergency evacuations of more than 1,000 people occur more than three times a month. While evacuation is only one option in response to an emergency, it is complex and contains several critical components, including transportation, shelter, supplies, and security, among others. **Each of these components is** itself complex and often **interrelated to transportation**. Those who, by choice or circumstance, do not have access to a personal vehicle or are precluded from driving may require evacuation assistance during emergencies. The 2000 U.S. Census indicates that the population categories we have previously defined as transportation-disadvantaged—the elderly, lowincome individuals, and persons with disabilities—comprise a large segment of the country’s total population (now over 300 million). For example, Census data indicated that, in 2000, 12 percent of Americans were age 65 and over, 12 percent were living below the poverty line, and 23 percent had a disability. 4 However, the transportation-disadvantaged not only include vulnerable populations, but all those who are car-less during an emergency. In 2000, the top 10 car-less cities had between 29 and 56 percent of households without a vehicle. However, people who require transportation assistance in an evacuation may be an even larger group because, in an emergency, anyone without immediate access to transportation may require assistance.

**The poor are most vulnerable; they can't escape hurricanes**

**Wolshon, 06** – Assistant Professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Louisiana State University (Brian, “The Aftermath of Katrina”, http://www.nae.edu/Publications/Bridge/TheAftermathofKatrina/EvacuationPlanningandEngineeringforHurricaneKatrina.aspx)//BZ

Not all of the evacuation news was positive, however. Images of thousands of desperate people being plucked from rooftops by helicopter, stranded at the New Orleans Convention Center and Superdome, and awaiting rescue on freeways have overshadowed the successes of the highway-based evacuation plan. It has been estimated that **between 100,000 and 300,000 people did not or could not be evacuated from the city.** The most serious questions, however, relate to the city’s poor populations. Local governments have been blamed for poor planning and not providing adequate transportation to shelters of last resort. For example, it was widely known that some **112,000 people did not have access to personal vehicles at the time of the storm** (Russell, 2005). Given these numbers and the limited capability of moving this enormous number of people quickly, public officials have long advocated “neighbor helping neighbor” policies, urging low-mobility individuals to arrange for transportation with friends, family, neighbors, and church members. Local plans also included using Regional Transit Authority buses to carry people to the Superdome from 12 locations around the city (Russell, 2005). A major failure of the plans for evacuating the low-mobility population was the lack of communication. Evacuation plans can only be effective if people are aware of them, and evacuation orders can only be heeded if they are received in time.1 Thus, the of problem evacuating low-mobility populations will be one of the most important issues for all levels of government in future evacuation plans.

**Decades of institutional racism created the urban geography that made the Katrina disaster possible.**

**Morse 08** - senior attorney with the Biloxi office of Mississippi Center for Justice; received Equal Justice Works Katrina Legal Fellowship; received Edwin D. Wolf Public Interest Law Award from the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; co-founder of the Steps Coalition; Panelist for the Joint center for Political and Economic Studies, NAACP; published by the Joint Center For Political and Economic Studies

Health Policy Institute (Reilly, “Environmental Justice Through the Eye of Hurricane Katrina” 2008, http://198.65.105.204/hpi/sites/all/files/EnvironmentalJustice.pdf )//ALo

Public works projects have shaped the natural environment and patterns of settlement in New Orleans. Some opened up back-swamps to white development. In 1896, New Orleans began work on a drainage system to remove standing water from the low-lying back-swamps. As a result, whites moved toward the shores of Lake Pontchartrain into suburbs that explicitly excluded Blacks through deed covenants. 55 The Lakefront Project, completed in 1934, created new white neighborhoods half a mile into Lake Pontchartrain by building levees and pumping sediments into the contained area to form a new upland.56 Other drainage measures included the creation of three drainage canals at 17th Street, Orleans Avenue, and London Avenue. 57 Other projects put Black neighborhoods at greater risk of flooding. In 1918, the New Orleans Dock Board began construction on the five-mile-long Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (the Industrial Canal) to provide a shortcut between the river and the Gulf of Mexico. This canal isolated the predominantly Black Lower Ninth Ward from the rest of the city. In 1958, excavation began on the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MR-GO), a 76-mile-long segment of the Intracoastal Waterway, to provide a shortcut for oceangoing vessels to the Port of New Orleans. The hurricane levees along Lake Pontchartrain, the Industrial Canal, and MR-GO, often of sheet-pile construction, ranged between 13 to 18.5 feet, far less substantial than the wide earthen 25-foot-high Mississippi River levees. 58 Maintenance dredging and disposal of sediments had prompted environmental litigation prior to Hurricane Katrina, which ultimately proved successful in compelling the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to conduct a more thorough environmental impact study. 59 Artificial levees have profoundly weakened the soils and elevations of the city. 60 Subsidence, or the lowering of the elevation of land in relation to sea level, has occurred in several parts of the city as a result of levees that interrupt the natural deposit of water-laden river sediments. 61 Portions of Central City and the Upper and Lower Ninth Wards have subsided up to ten inches; in the Lakefront area, elevations have fallen over 50 inches in 40 years. 62 A greater threat is the loss of the wetlands buffer in the adjacent parishes to subsidence and erosion. An additional foot of gulf water surges inland for every 2.7 miles of wetlands that disappear. To the east of New Orleans, MR-GO is estimated to have caused the loss of 27,000 acres of wetlands in St. Bernard Parish since its construction.63 Hurricane Katrina destroyed over 100 square miles of coastal wetlands, more than half of which was in Breton Sound immediately to the southeast of New Orleans. Discrimination in transportation also influenced patterns of settlement. Railways made possible the development of otherwise inaccessible areas of early nineteenth century New Orleans, such as Lake Pontchartrain and Carrollton.65 Convenient transportation made it possible to live farther from the city and to expand residential real estate development. But **access was not equal**: Homer Plessy was arrested in 1890 for sitting in a “whites-only” car of a New Orleans train. His appeal established the infamous doctrine of “separate but equal,” which buttressed segregation for over half a century. 66 In 1966, New Orleans saw the construction of an elevated interstate highway, known as “I-10,” resulting in the destruction of the quintessentially Creole Seventh Ward’s business district.67 Interstate 10, along with construction of the Mississippi River bridges (1958 and 1988) and the Lake Pontchartrain causeway (1966-71), provided the path for white flight into suburban-style subdivisions in all directions.68 Interstate 10 also drove development beyond the Industrial Canal into flood-prone swamplands to the east of New Orleans in the 1980s.69 These developments were supported by federal policies and expenditures on highways, flood protection, and insurance, and reinforced federal bias toward structural flood control solutions instead of natural buffers. At the outer limit of this area, developer momentum finally failed, and a 23,000-acre parcel of wetlands was brought under protection as the Bayou Sauvage National Refuge in the Lake Catherine area, today the largest urban wildlife refuge in the country. 70

**The horrors of Hurricane Katrina are a result of racial disparities.**

**Morse 2008** - senior attorney with the Biloxi office of Mississippi Center for Justice; received Equal Justice Works Katrina Legal Fellowship; received Edwin D. Wolf Public Interest Law Award from the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; co-founder of the Steps Coalition; Panelist for the Joint center for Political and Economic Studies, NAACP; published by the Joint Center For Political and Economic Studies

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The scope of environmental problems following Hurricane Katrina is wider than can be thoroughly addressed in this paper. It includes disaster cleanup and waste management, releases of oil and hazardous substances, damage to previously contaminated sites, contamination in floodwaters and sediments, air quality, drinking water quality, coastal waters impacts, and water and sewage infrastructure facilities. Instead of an exhaustive treatment of these subjects for Louisiana and Mississippi, this section focuses on particular issues that form a basis for drawing lessons from environmental justice. These include the long-lasting impacts of environmental racism, the need to resist emergency cries to undo environmental protections, and the ways in which recovery from natural disaster may solidify or, in rare cases, reverse structural racism. Direct Impacts in New Orleans Levee Failures On the morning of August 28, 2005, Hurricane Katrina drove a vast 18-foot-high mound of seawater westward across Lake Borgne into a V-shaped funnel formed by two levees. The levee walls forced the waters higher and faster down a 10-milewide entrance into a 260-foot-wide channel until the surge struck a T-shaped intersection with the Industrial Canal.116 At about 7:30 a.m., this head of water buckled levee walls on the west side of the canal and unleashed flooding into the Upper Ninth Ward, Bywater, and Tremé.117 The surge was forced to the north, where it poured into Lake Pontchartrain, and to the south, where it piled up behind closed locks connecting the canal to the Mississippi River. At about 7:45 a.m., two sections of the levee abruptly collapsed on the eastern side of the southern part of the canal, opening a breach of about four hundred yards for a destructive 14-foot-high wall of water to spill into the Lower Ninth Ward.118 MR-GO, which in the 1960s had been welcomed as a conduit of prosperity, was described in 2005 by New Orleans Councilwoman Cynthia Willard-Lewis as the “highway for tidal surge.”1 The riverside Ninth Ward experienced flooding up to 12 feet and the lakeside Ninth Ward had flooding up to 20 feet.Hurricane surges rose in the drainage canals extending two to three miles south from Lake Pontchartrain. Between 9:00 and 10:30 a.m., sections of the London Avenue and 17th Street canals ruptured, flooding Gentilly, Lakeview, and the New Orleans metro bowl areas of Carrollton, Broadmoor, and Mid-City.120 Over the next 24 hours, water poured into the city until the lake level equalized with the floodwaters. Floodwaters along Lake Pontchartrain were up to 15 feet, receding to 8 feet in the mid- and central city areas. 121 The most **striking example of racial disparity** in the New Orleans experience of Hurricane Katrina is the relative lack of flood damage in what research professor Richard Campanella terms the “**White Teapot**,” the modern-day geographic relic of colonial white plantations along the natural levee of the Mississippi River (Figure 9,next page). 122 What these neighborhoods—Uptown, Carrollton, University, the Garden District, and the French Quarter—shared were high elevations and low exposure to riverside nuisances such as industrial sites, railroads, and wharves, or back-swamp nuisances such as floods, mosquitoes, unpaved roads, and dumps. 123 They also had convenient access to public transportation and adequate urban infrastructure. 124 Finally, these neighborhoods generally did not find themselves forced to accept intrusive developments, such as overhead highways or industrial canals. There was very heavy damage in overwhelmingly white Lakeview, next to the 17th Street Canal, and similar neighborhoods on Lake Pontchartrain. However, unlike the neighborhoods discussed below, these areas were opened to development by elimination of the undesirable swamp conditions and were kept white by restrictive deed covenants. 125 Racial disparities in storm damage stem from centuries of white control over the characteristics of land occupied by African Americans—low elevations with high exposure to back-swamp flooding and poor access to transportation. 126 These neighborhoods—Mid-City, Bywater, and the Ninth Ward—were built around or targeted for isolating infrastructure such as railways, the Industrial Canal, and Interstate 10. Mid-City and Bywater also hosted many of the city’s public housing projects, such as Calliope, Iberville, St. Bernard, Florida, and Desire. The isolation produced by federal housing and transportation policy was disastrous for the thirty percent of households (over 105,000 residents) in Orleans Parish’s flooded areas who lacked access to a car. 127 Over a week after the hurricane, a **significantly greater percentage** of African American residences remained flooded in the metropolitan New Orleans area compared to other ethnic groups (Figure 10). Contamination and Spills Chemical contamination of floodwaters was a grave concern in the immediate aftermath of the storm, with widespread fear of a “**toxic gumbo**.” 128 The Army Corps of Engineers estimated the trapped water to be up to 114 billion gallons. 129 The sources of contamination included decaying bodies and sewage, chemicals from properties and vehicles, and oil and gas from damaged tanks and pipes. 130 The floodwaters from the metropolitan New Orleans area were finally removed on October 11, 2005. 131 These waters had concentrations of fecal bacteria at least **10 times above recommended levels for human contact**. The floodwaters also had elevated levels of **lead**, **arsenic**, and other chemicals that exceeded EPA drinking water standards but—according to the EPA—were not likely to produce immediate illness from skin contact. 132 The EPA approved the removal of floodwaters from New Orleans without the requirement of discharge permits based upon an exception in the Clean Water Act, which authorizes the President to remove discharges from onshore industrial facilities that pose substantial threats to public health or welfare. 133 New Orleans had a large number of hazardous materials sites, including National Priorities List sites, Total Release Inventory Sites, and hazardous materials locations such as closed landfills. Their geographic distribution echoes the racially disproportionate pattern of settlement (Figure 11). The EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard received hundreds of reports of Katrina related spills of petroleum or hazardous chemicals, with just eleven spills accounting for a total release of 7 million gallons of oil. 134 EPA and Louisiana Department of EnvironmentalQuality (LDEQ) officials, clad in protective gear, undertook a study of 1,800 samples that scanned for 200 individual chemicals, while many residents were barred from or advised against returning home. 135 The final EPA report deemed most of the New Orleans area to be safe from floodwater sediment contamination. The EPA pledged to monitor Press Park, a public housing complex built on a previously contaminated Superfund site, the Agriculture Street Landfill. Post-Katrina tests detected benzo(a)pyrene levels at almost 50 times the health screening level. 136 Environmental advocates criticized the EPA’s report and asserted that concentrations of hazardous chemicals in most districts of the city normally would trigger investigation and soil cleanup requirements under state law. 137 Supporters of the EPA argued that environmental advocates were misusing screening standards and presenting them as health-based standards. 138 A key difficulty in assessing the hurricane’s impact is the presence of contamination before the storm. When proponents of the EPA’s view argue that lead levels were similar to pre-Katrina conditions, this does not indicate that lead poses no problem in New Orleans. To the contrary, a 2004 study showed that 40 percent of New Orleans soils exceeded the EPA’s lead cleanup standards, and that 20 to 30 percent of inner-city children had blood lead levels in excess of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention health guidelines. 139 The hurricane’s floodwaters also dislodged an above-ground storage tank at the Murphy Oil Refinery, spilling 25,000 barrels (over 1 million gallons) of crude oil into an adjacent residential neighborhood in Meraux, a blue-collar predominantly white community in St. Bernard Parish, downriver from the Lower Ninth Ward. 140 The spill affected 1,800 homes and several canals and has entailed an extensive cleanup effort. Crude oil contains benzene, long-term exposure to which has been linked to leukemia, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH), also a carcinogen. 141 LDEQ sediment samplings as of March 2006 found that 92 percent of the indoor samples and 97 percent of the outdoor samples were below the RECAP screening standard, a protective standard based on long-term exposure. 142 Once again, the gap between screening standards and long-term health standards leaves ordinary citizens in doubt over the health risks they face. Air quality also became a major health concern after the storm. As contaminated sediment dries, it can be disturbed by traffic and breathed in as dust. The burning of disaster debris can expose nearby residents to arsenic, lead, and particulate matter. Preliminary sampling indicated that the chemical concentrations fell below EPA levels of concern. 143 Demolition of structures in Orleans Parish—85 percent of which had regulated asbestos-containing materials—put residents at risk of exposure to this well-known toxic substance. 144 Exposure to mold, mildew, and other fungi is a major risk during the gutting and disposal of flooded residences. Since no federal standard governs mold levels, public health and environmental advocates have undertaken sampling. 145 The sampling results—77,000 spores per cubic meter—are far above the 50,000-spore level deemed to be “very high” by the National Allergy Bureau of the American Academy of Allergy and Immunology. The consequences of such high mold levels are serious allergic and asthmatic conditions that make these homes **uninhabitable**. 146 Additional pollution concerns arise from the disposal of an estimated 22 million tons (55 million cubic yards) of disaster debris in Louisiana. 147 Beginning in the 1980s, some unlined New Orleans landfills were discovered to have released contaminants into the groundwater, and were closed. Following Hurricane Katrina, some of these same landfills were reopened to dispose of disaster debris. One study estimates that 1,740 metric tons of arsenic are expected to be contained in the 12 million cubic meters of demolition wood debris. 148 This study warns that leaching of arsenic from pressure treated wood in unlined landfills poses risks of contamination of groundwater. 149 Federal time limits on payment to remove hurricane debris pressured officials to use emergency powers to reopen unsuitable dumping grounds. The Gentilly landfill is a 230-acre site situated at the throat of the hurricane funnel. 150 It was operated as an unlined solid waste landfill from the 1960s until it was ordered closed in 1983. 151 Groundwater monitoring from 1989 until 2004 detected concentrations of arsenic, cadmium, chromium, and other metals. To the north and northwest are two predominantly Black neighborhoods, the moderate income Read Boulevard West and the low-income Plum Orchard area. Louisiana reopened this site under an emergency decree in September 2005, but subsequent litigation brought by the Louisiana Environmental Action Network resulted in a temporary agreement to limit capacity to 19,000 cubic yards per day pending further studies on catastrophic contamination risks during a hurricane. 152 In later proceedings, the rate of disposal at the Gentilly landfill was raised to 50,000 cubic yards, subject to compliance with increased monitoring and operational requirements. 153 The remainder of the debris was transported across the Mississippi River to a Jefferson Parish landfill. While the Gentilly landfill operated at reduced rates, New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin authorized the reopening of the Chef Menteur landfill. The Chef Menteur landfill is situated in the Village de l’Est neighborhood at the eastern edge of the city, adjacent to the Bayou Sauvage National Refuge. This community is 55 percent African American and 37 percent Asian (predominantly Vietnamese), with 30 percent living in poverty. 154 Over 200 mostly Vietnamese residents, led by Rev. Vien Nguyen, pastor of Mary Queen of Vietnam Catholic Church, pursued a successful effort to convince Mayor Naginto reverse course and close the site. 155 It later surfaced that Waste Management traded a zoning waiver in return for a donation of 22 percent of its tipping fees back to the city—a cost that the company tacked onto its bill and that the federal government now wants the city to repay. 156

**Disadvantaged individuals face much higher risks of inability to evacuate.**

**Renne et al., 2008** – Renne is a PhD from the University of New Orleans, Sanchez is a PhD from the University of Utah, and Litman is a director at the Victoria Transport Policy Institute (John Renne, Thomas Sanchez, and Todd Litman, “National Study on Carless and Special Needs Evacuation Planning: A Literature Review”, October 2008, accessed 7/3/12)//BZ

The objective of this study is to research how state departments of transportation (state DOTs), metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), transit agencies, and local governments are considering, in the context of their emergency preparedness planning, the unique needs of minority, low-income, elderly, disabled, and limited English proficient (LEP) persons, especially for households without vehicles (referred to as “carless” in this report). The evacuations of New Orleans and Houston in fall 2005 due to hurricanes Katrina and Rita were two of the largest evacuations in U.S. history. One of **the main shortcomings was the lack of planning to evacuate carless residents, particularly minority, low-income, elderly, disabled, and LEP persons**. In a report to Congress, the U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. Department of Homeland Security revealed that [m]ethods for communicating evacuation options by modes other than personal vehicles are not well developed in most cases. A number of jurisdictions indicate locations where public transportation may be obtained, but many have no specific services identified to assist persons in getting to those designated locations. This situation is a particular problem for people with various disabilities (U.S. Department of Transportation in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006, p. ES - 5) New Orleans is not unique. In fact, according to the 2000 U.S. Census, seven cities had carless populations higher than the 27 percent in New Orleans, including New York (56 percent), Washington, D.C. (37 percent), Baltimore (36 percent), Philadelphia (36 percent), Boston (35 percent), Chicago (29 percent), and San Francisco (29 percent). Nationally, approximately ten percent of the population is disabled and many of these individuals cannot drive, even if a car exists within their household. As the population ages, more and more people will become mobility-restricted. Even the elderly who have cars may be reluctant to drive them during a mandated long-distance evacuation. **These groups face disproportionate risk and suffered loss of life in the flood of New Orleans**. For example, 71% of those who died in Katrina in New Orleans were over the age of 60, and 47% over the age of 75 (AARP 2006a and 2006b). Perhaps, more alarming than the scope of emergency transport for low-mobility populations is the persistence of the problem. The extra risks that carless households face during an evacuation are well-recognized and have been documented in numerous reports and papers (Bourne, 2004; Fischett 2001). Despite this attention, relatively little has been done to improve the situation and only recently has a concerted effort been made to address this problem. Although some plans call for the use of local resources for the movement of indigent and elderly populations during times of emergency, the strategies remain questionable. Based on the current level of preparedness, it is quite likely that the tragedies seen in New Orleans during and after Hurricane Katrina are bound to be repeated unless best practices can be understood and adopted widely (Jenkins, Laska and Williamson 2007).

**Lack of public transportation creates racism in day to day life**

**D'auvergne 06** Chapman University Southern University and Agricultural and Mechanical College at Baton Rouge Bullard speaks on transportation, racism By NATALIE D'AUVERGNE Published: Monday, February 20, 2006

According to Bullard transportation may be liberating or restricting, but in the case of many black communities it is restricting because of the spatial mismatch between the availability of jobs and the location of black communities "The new trend is for businesses to relocate to the suburbs away from most black areas," Bullard said. He said transit stops encourage development but are not placed in black communities which need developing. Instead they are usually placed in middle class areas where the jobs are, leaving blacks faced with difficulty getting to and from work because of a lack of public transportation available in their areas of residence. "Since 1956 roadway projects undertaken mainly for car owners, have received $205 billion, in contrast, only $50 billion has been spent on public transport since the creation of the Urban Mass Transit Administration over 30 years ago," Bullard said. "A quarter of all blacks do not have cars. In New Orleans, before Katrina, 35 percent of all blacks had no cars making evacuation difficult when public transportation was not provided for everyone."

### Racism

**Racism fuels biopower and genocide**

**Jabri 07**, educator, academic and writer. She is Director of the Centre for International Relations and Senior Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of War Studies, King's College London. Michel Foucault’s Analytics of War:The Social, the International,and the Racial VIVIENNE JABRI King’s College London International Political Sociology (2007) 1 , 67–81 http://www.scribd.com/doc/49532280/foucault

Foucault’s analytic of biopower is indicative of his understanding of the inter-national and practices that constitute humanity in terms of racial division. Foucault identiﬁes a number of domains in which biopower intervenes, from birth control, to old age, to insurance policies. There is, however, another domain in which this technology of power applies, namely relations between human beings ‘‘in so far as they are living beings’’ (Foucault 2003:245) and their environment, the latter including what might be referred to as the inter human environment, relations be-tween human beings sharing spaces. We might understand such spaces as deﬁning the ‘‘urban problem,’’ as Foucault does (2003:245), or expand this yet further to include neighborhoods, communities, and populations linked across state boundaries, taking place at the level of ‘‘general phenomena,’’ the ‘‘mass’’ of population. The remit of biopower is then ‘‘the security of the whole from internal danger,’’ so that wars fought are fought in ‘‘the name of life necessity’’ (Foucault 2003:249). The population in whose name war is fought, however, is a distinct population, one that is racialized as the predominant race, inaugurating in its wake what Foucault understands as state racism, a mechanism ‘‘introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die ... a way of establishing a biological type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain’’ (2003:254–255). It is then through race that the ‘‘relationship of war’’ becomes ‘‘compatible with the exercise of biopower’’(2003:255).What, however, are the spatial connotations of biopower? While Foucault sees the modern state as centrally implicated in generating the compatibility between war(the power to kill) and biopower (the power to give life), the material and representational effects of the distinct territoriality of the state and its limits bring to the fore issues relating to how the sphere of the international has historically been a determining force in ‘‘internal’’ social relations constituting the domestic sphere of European societies and the capacities of different states to project power globally. The inauguration of biopower suggests for Foucault distinct transformations in the place of war in social relations so that from henceforth wars come to be fought in the name of the population. Foucault suggests that the ‘‘death of the other’’ as a guarantee of ‘‘my life’’ is ‘‘not ... a military, warlike, or political relationship, but a biological relationship,’’ in that ‘‘the enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external orinternal, to the population and for the population’’ (2003:255–256). For Michel Foucault, **the right to kill in the context of biopower is a right that is enabled by racism**, that the killing of the other ‘‘sub-species’’ is aimed at the survival of the species as a whole. At the level of representation, ‘‘killing, or the imperative to kill, is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to or the improvement of the species or race’’(2003:256). According to Foucault, this form of discourse enabled relations to be drawn between colonization, ‘‘colonising genocide,’’ and responses relating to criminality, madness, and mental illness. When the above statement is understood at the level of practices, the enemy can no longer be conceived in biological terms, as is implied by Foucault, but comes to acquire a political subjectivity. Racism as a practice can only be understood in political terms.

**Racism creates a permanent condition of war**

**Mendieta 02**, Eduardo Mendieta, PhD and Associate professor of Stonybrook School of Philosophy, “‘To make live and to let die’ –Foucault on Racism Meeting of the Foucault Circle, APA Central Division Meeting” http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/philosophy/people/faculty\_pages/docs/foucault.pdf

This is where racism intervenes, not from without, exogenously, but from within, constitutively. For the emergence of biopower as the form of a new form of political rationality, entails the inscription within the very logic of the modern state the logic of racism. For racism grants, and here I am quoting: “the conditions for the acceptability of putting to death in a society of normalization. Where there is a society of normalization, where there is a power that is, in all of its surface and in first instance, and first line, a bio-power, racism is indispensable as a condition to be able to put to death someone, in order to be able to put to death others. The homicidal [meurtrière] function of the state, to the degree that the state functions on the modality of bio-power, can only be assured by racism “(Foucault 1997, 227) To use the formulations from his 1982 lecture “The Political Technology of Individuals” –which incidentally, echo his 1979 Tanner Lectures –the power of the state after the 18th century, a power which is enacted through the police, and is enacted over the population, is a power over living beings, and as such it is a biopolitics. And, to quote more directly, “since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it, if necessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics.” (Foucault 2000, 416). Racism, is the thanatopolitics of the biopolitics of the total state. They are two sides of one same8 political technology, one same political rationality: the management of life, the life of a population, the tending to the continuum of life of a people. And with the inscription of racism within the state of biopower, the long history of war that Foucault has been telling in these dazzling lectures has made a new turn: the war of peoples, a war against invaders, imperials colonizers, which turned into a war of races, to then turn into a war of classes, has now turned into the war of a race, a biological unit, against its polluters and threats. Racism is the means by which bourgeois political power, biopower, re-kindles the fires of war within civil society. **Racism normalizes and medicalizes war. Racism makes war the permanent condition of society, while at the same time masking its weapons of death and torture.** As I wrote somewhere else, **racism banalizes genocide by making quotidian the lynching of suspect threats to the health of the social body. Racism makes the killing of the other**, of others, **an everyday occurrence by internalizing and normalizing the war of society against its enemies**. To protect society entails we be ready to kill its threats, its foes, and if we understand society as a unity of life, as a continuum of the living, then these threat and foes are biological in nature.

The biopolitical domination has justified normalization against entire populations. This racist rationalization stemming from the state makes violence inevitable.

**Mendieta, 2002** – SUNY at Stony Brook University (Eduardo, “to make or let die”, APA Central Division Meeting on 4/25/2002, accessed online on 7/2/2012)//BZ

Briefly, in Stoler’s work I discern two main criticisms. On the one hand that Foucault failed to give enough attention to the colonial dimensions of the emergence of biopolitics. On the hand, Stoler affirms that Foucault abandoned the line of investigation pursued in the 1976 lectures. The first criticism is only acceptable if we weaken its claims. In other words, Foucault did fail to pay attention to the details of the way in which the normalization of the political body of a population was related to projects of foreign colonization. Yet, Foucault is not conceptually and theoretically unaware of their complicity and interdependence. At one point in the lectures he explicitly talks about the way in which the emergence of the biopower state is a form of internal colonization, in which the tactics of the domestication and normalization of the colonized body are applied on the colonizing body. The second criticism would not stand if we read the 1976 lectures, along with those in 1977, as well as his Tanner lectures, and the lectures gathered in the volume edited by Martin, Gutman, and Hutton (1988). I think that the two last volumes of the history of sexuality to be printed during Foucault’s life time eclipsed his work on governmentality and political rationality (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991) Nonetheless, let me just offer the following synoptic overview of the lectures. The lectures dealt with: First and foremost a retrospective look at what Foucault had been doing over the last five years, since he had been elected to the College de France. This retrospective look sought to cull the conceptual elements of the approach that have been used in works like the Archeology of Knowledge, and Discipline und Punish. In the first two lectures, published in the 1980 volume edited by Colin Gordon, Knowledge/Power, Foucault lays out his understanding of the relationship between archeology, genealogy, and subjugated knowledges, on the one hand, and legitimate, official, and erudite forms of knowledge on the other. Foucault also distinguished between two paradigms or forms of understanding power. On one side we have what he calls the economicist form of power that attributes to the sovereign a legitimate right that this then can exert upon subjects as a form of contract**.** The key words of this representation of power are: right, law, and jurisprudence. This is the juridical idea of power. On the other side we have what Foucault calls a disciplinary form of power, which is above all anti-sovereign, and anti-judicial**.** It is a form of control that exerts force by normalizing, and creating the conditions of surveillance that lead to subjects’ docility. It is a form of power that is diffused and does not act on individuals, but determines a horizon of action. It does not discipline, but normalizes. It does not operate on juridical rules, or rights, but on norms and standards that refer to a social technology. It is a power that emerges with the development of the human sciences, and in particular the sciences of normalization. In this way, this power is not centralized**,** but diffused, not owned, but anonymous, not exerted, but relayed and lived. What is extremely noteworthy is that at the end of the second lecture Foucault links up the question of genealogy as a critical and rebellious or insurrected form of analysis -- or to put it more explicitly, the dialect of the relationship between the effects of truth on power, and the power of truth-- to the question of war. The lectures then concern role of the war in society, and more precisely how war roars behind the peace of society**.** If genealogy is a form of theoretical war against established and normalized knowledge, the question is implied, then is there a way in which genealogy is the continuation of social war by theoretical means, and if this is the case, what kind of war was this that gave rise to this critical form of knowledge, and on whose side were the belligerent forces that forged this new type of weapon? On a second place, therefore, but just as important as the first one, these lectures are a mediation on war: wars of conquest, war of resistance, civil wars, racial wars, class war, and the total war against putative foes, and against the social body itself. This second topic of analysis could be put in still more poignant terms: if politics is war pursued by other means, and critique is politics pursued by other means, is not critique a continuation of war, and if this link can be made, what kind of critique do we want that would not be a perpetuation of war, in which the inauguration of a new political order would go beyond the insidious rationality of having to submit life to the management of the state, and the granting of rights presupposes having been allowed to live, or to be recognized as living by the political order.2 Foucault came to understand his work on biopolitics as a critique of the failures of the revolutionary movements of the sixties, but also as a constructive project that attempted to discern the lineaments of a new political ethos beyond the demonic logic of modern biopolitics states. Here the works of Lemke (1997), Agamben (1998) and Dean On a third place, these lectures are about political reason, or rather about the sources of political authority. These lectures render further evidence to those among us who have been arguing for a political reading of Foucault’s work. It is very clear that Foucault was obsessed with the question of the sources of political authority, and in these lectures, he sets out to relate the development of forms of knowledge, what he calls the political history, with the project of establishing legitimate sources of power -I will return to this in greater detail. Finally, I think the other most important focus of these lectures has to do with totalitarianism, and more specifically, with the total state. The total state becomes in these lectures the acme of biopolitics, or what he called in his Tanner lectures, pastoral political power, which must attend to each and every individual in such a way that their care must entail being ready to sacrifice them if they are to be saved**.** This total state is understood as the culmination of the logic of political authority unleashed by the French revolution and the bourgeois political revolution that gave rise to the modern liberal democratic state, both of which bring together the Greco-Roman and Christian ideas of juridical and political power. In fact, I would hope that once these lectures are made available in English one of the first things that would be done is to read them in tandem with Hannah Arendt’s work on totalitarianism. In the following, I would like to discuss briefly the question of power, its relationship to political rationality, and finally, the production of forms of knowledge that at one point may have been contestational and insurrectional, but that in time became legitimate and normalized, and thus part of a system of normalization and control. I would like to close by discussing in greater detail what I take to be one of Foucault’s central discoveries in these lectures, one that is fundamental to the whole project of understanding biopower.

**Racism outweighs- Extending racism and normalization through the power of the state creates endless war against alterity, inculcating war and genocide into society**

**Mendieta, 2002** – SUNY at Stony Brook University (Eduardo, “to make or let die”, APA Central Division Meeting on 4/25/2002, accessed online on 7/2/2012)//BZ

I have thus far discussed Foucault’s triangulation between the discourses of the production of truth, the power that these discourse enact and make available to social agents, and the constitution of a political rationality that is linked to the invention and creation of its horizon of activity and surveillance. I want now to focus on the main theme of this courses’ last lecture. This theme discloses in a unique way the power and perspicacity of Foucault’s method. The theme concerns the kind of power that biopower renders available, or rather, how biopolitics produces certain power effects by thinking of the living in a novel way. We will approach the theme by way of a contrast: whereas the power of the sovereign under Medieval and early Modern times was the power to make die and to let live, the power of the total state, which is the biopower state, is the power to make live and to let die. Foucault discerned here a telling asymmetry. If the sovereign exercised his power with the executioner’s axe, with the perpetual threat of death, then life was abandoned to its devices. Power was exhibited only on the scaffold, or the guillotine-its terror was the shimmer of the unsheathed sword. Power was ritualistic, ceremonial, theatrical, and to that extent partial, molecular, and calendrical**.** It was also a power that by its own juridical logic had to submit to the jostling of rights and claims. In the very performance of its might, the power of the sovereign revealed its limitation**.** Itis a power that is localized and circumscribed to the theater of its cruelty, and the staging of its pomp. In contrast, however, the power of the biopower state is over life [expand]. And here Foucault asks “how can biopolitics then reclaim the power over death?” or rather, how can it make die in light of the fact that its claim to legitimacy is that it is guarding, nurturing, tending to life? In so far as biopolitics is the management of life, how does it make die, how does it kill? This is a similar question to the one that theologians asked about the Christian God. If God is a god of life, the giver of life, how can he put to death, how can he allow death to descend upon his gift of life -why is death a possibility if god is the giver of life? Foucault’s answer is that in order to re-claim death, to be able to inflict death on its subjects, its living beings, biopower must make use of racism; more precisely, racism intervenes here to grant access to death to the biopower state. We must recall that the political rationality of biopower is deployed over a population, which is understood as a continuumof life. It is this continuum of life that eugenics, social hygiene, civil engineering, civil medicine, military engineers, doctors and nurses, policeman, and so on, tended to by a careful management of roads, factories, living quarters, brothels, red-districts, planning and planting of gardens and recreation centers, and the gerrymandering of populations by means of roads, access to public transformations, placement of schools, and so on. Biopolitics is the result of the development and maintenance of the hothouse of the political body, of the body-politic. Society has become the vivarium of the political rationality, and biopolitics acts on the teeming biomass contained within the parameters of that structure built up by the institutions of health, education, and production. This is where racism intervenes, not from without, exogenously, but from within, constitutively. For the emergence of biopower as the form of a new form of political rationality, entails the inscription within the very logic of the modern state the logic of racism. For racism grants, and here I am quoting: “the conditions for the acceptability of putting to death in a society of normalization. Where there is a society of normalization, where there is a power that i**s**, in all of its surface and in first instance, and first line, a bio-power, racism is indispensable as a condition to be able to put to death someone, in order to be able to put to death others. The homicidal [meurtriere] function of the state, to the degree that the state functions on the modality of bio-power**,** can only be assured by racism “(Foucault 1997, 227) To use the formulations from his 1982 lecture “The Political Technology of Individuals” -which incidentally, echo his 1979 Tanner Lectures -the power of the state after the 18th century, a power which is enacted through the police, and is enacted over the population, is a power over living beings, and as such it is a biopolitics**.** And, to quote more directly, “since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it, ifnecessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics.” (Foucault 2000, 416). Racism, is the thanatopolitics of the biopolitics of the total state. They are two sides of one same political technology, one same political rationality: the management of life, the life of a population, the tending to the continuum of life of a people. And with the inscription of racism within the state of biopower, the long history of war that Foucault has been telling in these dazzling lectures has made a new turn: the war of peoples, a war against invaders, imperials colonizers, which turned into a war of races, to then turn into a war of classes, has now turned into the war of a race, a biological unit, against its polluters and threats. Racism is the means by which bourgeois political power, biopower, re-kindles the fires of war within civil society. Racism normalizes and medicalizes war. Racism makes war the permanent condition of society, while at the same time masking its weapons of death and torture**.** As I wrote somewhere else**,** racism banalizes genocide by making quotidian the lynching of suspect threats to the health of the social body. Racism makes the killing of the other, of others, an everyday occurrence by internalizing and normalizing the war of society against its enemies**.** To protect society entails we be ready to kill its threats, its foes, and if we understand society as a unityof life, as a continuum of the living, then these threat and foes are biological in nature.

### Women

**Disaster experiences are also gendered; poor households headed by women suffered the most.**

**Jenkins et al. 11** Gender Differences in Self-Reported Evacuation Experiences Analysis of the City Assisted Evacuation Program During Hurricane Gustav Pamela Jenkins, John L. Renne, and John Kiefer, University of New Orleans, Louisiana http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/conf/cp46v2.pdf

Findings Overall, there were significant differences by gender for those who reported they were “very dissatisfied” with CAEP as a whole. While almost three-quarters of the participants were satisfied with the CAEP, women were significantly more likely to report they were very dissatisfied than men. Women Less Likely to Own a Vehicle and Use It to Self-Evacuate When asked the question about how they evacuated from the city, significant differences by gender emerged for those who had registered for but did not use CAEP. While almost half the CAEP participants surveyed reported they did not own a vehicle, more than one-quarter of the males who registered for but did not use CAEP during Hurricane Gustav reported they owned their own vehicle and were able to use it to self-evacuate. Only 16.5% of women owned a vehicle and were able to self-evacuate. This indicates that men had access to substantially more transportation resources than did women. For the most part, when CAEP-registered respondents did not use the city evacuation, they used their networks of family and friends. They left with their daughters, brothers, grandsons, or neighbors. Primarily, residents left in vehicles, but a small number reported flying out of New Orleans. Most of the women who registered but did not use CAEP reported that they evacuated by bus or got a ride with a friend or relative. This suggests that **women were far less likely to have the means to self-evacuate, and** hence were **significantly more vulnerable** in an evacuation **due to their lack of reliable transportation.** Finances More Likely to Be a Barrier to Evacuation for Women A wide variety of barriers to evacuation were reported by those who registered for CAEP. Barriers seemed to affect all participants regardless of gender, yet women were significantly overrepresented in reporting that a lack of finances served as a barrier to evacuation. While on its surface this may seem to point to a need to better educate evacuees that there are no costs for CAEP evacuation— that is, transportation, meals, and shelter are provided by the government—in reality, some of those surveyed reported that this was not the case. Most notably, several reported that there was no food at one shelter, and they had to “go to McDonalds.” Although household-head status was not specifically asked of respondents in this survey, lack of adequate finances may have emerged as a significant barrier for women due to the much higher number of female heads of households in vulnerable communities. Sheltering Issues More Likely to Be Reported by Women Shelter experiences were mostly negative and were reported at significantly higher numbers by women. Participant comments indicated that many felt they were negatively stereotyped by shelter personnel. Many residents, particularly the elderly (significantly higher representation by women) and mothers with small children, felt unsafe. While some shelters made special provisions for segregating older evacuees, most did not. Women’s roles as caregivers may certainly have influenced their experience in the shelter; they were not only responsible for their own safety, but the safety of others. Also, shelters often take over the traditional roles of women, so women may be concerned about how these tasks are carried out. Men Needing Evacuation Assistance More Likely to Be Enrolled in CAEP by a Family Member There were significant differences by gender for those who were enrolled in CAEP by a family member. While three-quarters of the participants enrolled in CAEP by calling 311 themselves, men were 2.5 times more likely to be enrolled by a family member than women. Women were far more likely to have either enrolled themselves, or enrolled through a variety of organizations that included volunteers of America, dialysis centers, senior citizen groups, Housing and Urban Development, veterans Administration Hospital ARC, and home health assistance. Referral by outside groups seems to be an important avenue, especially for women. The findings suggest that men are more likely to have a local support system than women, making the latter more vulnerable during disasters. Press reports indicated that there were long delays in registering for CAEP in the days and hours before Hurricane Gustav made landfall. Telephone lines were overwhelmed. Yet the program had been in effect for several years before Gustav. Data showed that only 7% registered for CAEP through external organizations. in a community made up of largely female-headed households, these women were often faced with CAEP enrollment challenges that may have been overwhelming. The competing duties of managing and caring for a household while facing the potential dangers of an impending disaster certainly made opportunities for enrollment in CAEP difficult. As the data indicated, women were more likely to have self-enrolled or to have enrolled through a civic organization. This suggests an opportunity for the city to work with organizations such as volunteers of America, dialysis centers, senior citizens groups, AARP, hospitals, pharmacies, and others well in advance of hurricane season to identify and register vulnerable citizens.

**Disasters affect poor, children, and women the most**

**Redlener et al. 08** [Irwin Redlener, md, Professor of Clinical Public Health, Director, National Center for Disaster Preparedness, Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health David m. Abramson, PHD mph, Associate Research Scientist, Director of Research, National Center for Disaster Preparedness, Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health. Richard Garfield, RN DRPH Professor of Clinical International Nursing, Columbia University Mailman School of Nursing] Lessons from katrina: what went wrong, what was learned, who’s most vulnerable http://www.cardozolawandgender.com/uploads/2/7/7/6/2776881/13-4\_redlener.pdf

Inasmuch as social advantage has often provided a buffer to the consequences of natural disasters, social vulnerability has left other populations precariously exposed. In the Child and Family Health Studies led by David Abramson and Richard Garfield 5 , we interviewed members of 1,248 randomly sampled displaced or impacted households in Louisiana and Mississippi, post-Katrina. The study confirmed domestically what many other international disaster studies have found as well, the presence of a “poverty penalty” in which those with the least often suffer the most. The working class and working poor along the Gulf were particularly vulnerable to the economic consequences of the hurricane. Among Mississippi households with a salaried wage-earner prior to the hurricane, the working poor were two and a half times as likely to be jobless one year after the hurricane as were middle-class households. The impact on children of the social disruption and continued chaos and uncertainty has been devastating as well. Half of the parents and caregivers reported that the children in their homes had experienced emotional or behavioral problems since the hurricane, and the incidence of clinically-diagnosed depression and anxiety among children quadrupled since the hurricane. Nearly two-thirds of the women caregivers reported mental health scores consistent with severe mental health disability and stress. The hallmark of such a mega-disaster as Hurricane Katrina is that it shreds the social networks and institutions, which provide a modicum of stability and coherence in people’s lives. Women are particularly vulnerable when these social institutions deteriorate, particularly in their role as caregivers. Nearly forty percent of children in Mississippi had either not completed their school year or had missed a significant amount of class time. Combined with unsafe housing and neighborhoods, and unreliable systems of criminal justice and police protection, women often find themselves in a volatile home environment—the children are at home, disengaged from school; their spouse or partner is unemployed, with little economic opportunity available; their material possessions have mostly been destroyed; and they are living in extremely close quarters—often four or five family members in a 250 square foot trailer, for over a year, with no certain housing solution in sight. Many respondents spoke to us of the enormous strain on personal relationships, and it is not surprising that mental health disability is so endemic.

**Women disproportionately suffer from natural disasters**

**Kiefer, Renne, and Jenkins 2011** (Dr. Kiefer is Associate Professor and Director, MPA Program in the Department of Political Science at the University of New Orleans John L. Renne is an Assistant Professor and Associate Director of the University of New Orleans Transportation Center in the College of Urban and Public Affairs at the University of New Orleans. He has expertise in the areas of transportation and land use planning, particularly in transit-oriented development PhD in Urban Planning and Policy Development Major Fields: Transportation and Land Use Planning Master of Urban and Regional Planning (Valedictorian)) Concentration: Economic Development Bachelor of Environmental Design (with Honors) Major: Urban Planning and Design Minor: EconomicsPamela JenkinsProfessor Ph.D. Louisiana State “Gender Differences in Self-Reported Evacuation Experiences: An Analysis of the City-Assisted Evacuation Program During Hurricane Gustav,” Research in Women’s Issues in Transportation, Transportation Research Board, forthcoming 2011. Herm

No plan and implementation for evacuating New Orleans or any urban area will be perfect. in the four years after Hurricane Katrina, the city adopted a process of continued improvement in evacuation planning. However, the survey indicated that there are still needs that must be addressed to ensure a more complete evacuation of the city’s most vulnerable citizens. The findings suggest that there are some significant differences in evacuation experiences based on gender. Women have significantly less access to a reliable vehicle for self-evacuation, making them far more dependent on a viable city-assisted evacuation program. Women are also significantly more likely to be dependent upon nonfamily entities for their enrollment in CAEP, relying on various public service agencies. The overrepresentation of female heads of households in vulnerable communities makes lack of adequate finances a significant barrier to evacuation. it also must be recognized that lack of trust remains a barrier to evacuation. New Orleans is not unique among American cities in this distrust. Yet an overrepresentation of female heads of households suggests that women from the most vulnerable communities may be those most likely to consistently engage with city bureaucrats. Trust in government requires the involvement of all the city’s agencies, not just the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. Street-level bureaucrats within the police department, social services, and other agencies often set the tone for the climate in the community. The authors suggest immediate implementation of proactive, two-way communication between citizens and government agencies to achieve a safe environment with regard to disasters.

### Biopolitics/Giroux

**The impact of disposability is that politics disintegrates, with each individual losing their meaning and autonomy. This creates the inhuman, where entire populations are segregated and destroyed.**

**Giroux, 2010** – Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, previous professors at BU, Miami U, and Penn State (Henry, “Memories of Hope in the Age of Disposability”, published 9/28/2010, accessed online 7/2, http://archive.truthout.org/memories-hope-age-disposability63631)//BZ

Welcome to the new era of disposability in which market-driven values peddle policies that promote massive amounts of human suffering and death for millions of human beings. Programs to help the elderly, middle aged and young people overcome poverty, get decent jobs, obtain access to health insurance and decent health care and exercise their dignity and rights as American citizens are denounced in the name of austerity measures that only apply to those who are not rich and powerful.(8) At the same time, the new disposability discourse expunges any sense of responsibility from both the body politic and the ever-expanding armies of well-paid, anti-public intellectuals and politicians who fill the air waves with poisonous lies, stupidity and ignorance, all in the name of so-called "common sense" and a pathological notion of freedom stripped of any concern for the lives and misfortunes of others. In the age of disposability, the dream of getting ahead has been replaced with, for many people, the struggle to simply stay alive. The logic of disposability and mean-spirited cruelty that now come out of the mouths of zombie-like politicians are more fitting for the authoritarian regimes that emerged in Russia and Germany in the 1930s rather than for any society that calls itself a democracy. A politics of uncertainty, insecurity, deregulation and fear now circulates throughout the country as those marginalized by class and color become bearers of unwanted memories, subject to state-sanctioned acts of violence and rough justice. Poor minority youth, immigrants and other disposable populations now become the flash point that collapses moral and political taxonomies in the face of a growing punishing state. Instead of becoming the last option, violence and punishment have become the standard response to confronting the problems of the poor, disadvantaged and jobless. As Judith Butler points out, those considered "other" and disposable are viewed as "neither alive nor dead, but interminable spectral human beings no longer regarded as human.(9) Thinking about visions of the good society is now considered a waste of time. As Zygmunt Bauman points out, too many young people and adults are now pushed and pulled to seek and find individual solutions to socially created problems and implement those solutions individually using individual skills and resources. This ideology proclaims the futility (indeed, counterproductivity) of solidarity: of joining forces and subordinating individual actions to a "common cause." It derides the principle of communal responsibility for the well-being of its members, decrying it as a recipe for a debilitating "nanny state" and warning against care for the other leading to an abhorrent and detestable "dependency."(10) Tea Party candidates express anger over government programs, but say nothing about a government that provides tax breaks for the rich, allows politicians to be bought off by powerful lobbyists, contracts out government functions to private industries and guts almost every major public sphere necessary for sustaining an increasingly faltering democracy. Tea Party members are outraged, but their anger is really directed at the New Deal, the social state and all those others whom they believe do not qualify as "real" Americans.(11) At the same time the American public is awash in a craven and vacuous media machine that routinely tells us that people are angry, but offers no analysis capable of treating such anger as symptomatic of an economic system that creates massive inequalities, rewards the ultra rich and powerful and punishes everybody else. Bob Herbert has recently argued that the rich and powerful are indifferent to poor people and, of course, he is right, but only partly so.(12) In actuality, it is much worse. Today's young people and others caught in webs of poverty and despair face not only the indifference of the rich and powerful, but also the scorn of the very people charged with preserving, protecting and defending their rights. We now live in a country in which the government allows entire populations and groups to be perceived and treated as disposable, reduced to fodder for the neoliberal waste management industries created by a market-driven society in which gross inequalities and massive human suffering are its most obvious byproducts.(13) The anger among the American people is more than justified by the suffering many people are now experiencing, but an understanding of such anger is stifled largely by right-wing organizations and rich corporate zombies who want to preserve the nefarious conditions that produced such anger in the first place. The result is an egregious politics of disconnection, not to mention a fraudulent campaign of lies and innuendos funded by shadowy, ultra right billionaires such as the Koch brothers,(14) the loss of historical memory amply supported in dominant media such as Fox News and a massively funded depoliticizing cultural apparatus, all of which help to pave the way for the new barbarism and its increasing registers of cruelty, inequality, punishment and authoritarianism.

**Biopolitics reduces us to mere biology- life no longer has intrinsic meaning. This justifies complacency in the face of suffering, indicative in the failure of the government to help the poor and the minorities in Katrina.**

**Giroux, 2006** – Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, previous professors at BU, Miami U, and Penn State (Henry, “Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race, Class, and the Biopolitics of Disposability”, accessed from JSTOR 7/1/12)//BZ

Within the last few decades, matters of state sovereignty in the new world order have been retheorized so as to provide a range of theoretical insights about the relationship between power and politics, the political nature of social and cultural life, and the merging of life and politics as a new form of biopolitics. While the notion of biopolitics differs significantly among its most prominent theorists, including Michel Foucault (1990,1997), Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2002, 2003), and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2004), what these theorists share is an attempt to think through the convergence of life and politics, locating matters of “life and death within our ways of thinking about and imagining politics” (Dean 2004, 17). Within this discourse, politics is no longer understood exclusively through a disciplinary technology centered on the individual body—a body to be measured, sur- veilled, managed, and included in forecasts, surveys, and statistical projections. Biopolitics points to new relations of power that are more capacious, concerned not only with the body as an object of disciplinary techniques that render it “both useful and docile” but also with a body that needs to be “regularized,” subject to those immaterial means of production that produce ways of life that enlarge the targets of control and regulation (Foucault 1997,249). This shift in the workings of both sovereignty and power and the emergence of biopolitics are made clear by Foucault, for whom biopower replaces the power to dispense fear and death “with that of a power to foster life—or disallow it to the point of death.... [Biopower] is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Its task is to take charge of life that needs a continuous regulatory and corrective mechanism” (Ojakangas 2005, 6). As Foucault insists, the logic of biopower is dialectical, productive, and positive (1990, 136). Yet he also argues that biopolitics does not remove itself from “introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (1997, 255). Foucault believes that the death-function in the economy of biopolitics is justified primarily through a form of racism in which biopower “is bound up with the workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power” (258). Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have both modified and extended Foucault’s notion of biopower, highlighting a mode of biopolitics in which immaterial labor such as ideas, knowledge, images, cooperation, affective rela-tions, and forms of communication extend beyond the boundaries of the economic to produce not just material goods as “the means of social life, but social life itself. Immaterial production is biopolitical (2004b, 146). In this instance, power is extended to the educational force of the culture and to the various technologies, mechanisms, and social practices through which it reproduces various forms of social life. What is crucial to grasp in this rather generalized notion of biopolitics is that power remains a productive force, provides the grounds for both resistance and domination, and registers culture, society, and politics as a terrain of multiple and diverse struggles waged by numerous groups in a wide range of sites. For my purposes, the importance of both Foucaults and Hardt and Negri’s work on biopolitics is that they move matters of culture, especially those aimed at “the production of information, communication, [and] social relations ... to the center of politics itself” (Hardt and Negri 2004b, 334). Within these approaches, power expands its reach as a political force beyond the traditional scope and boundaries of the state and the registers of officially sanctioned modes of domination. Biopolitics now touches all aspects of social life and is the primary political and pedagogical force through which the creation and reproduction of new subjectivities takes place. While biopolitics in Foucault and Hardt and Negri addresses the relations between politics and death, biopolitics in their views is less concerned with the primacy of death than with the production of life both as an individual and a social category. In Giorgio Agamben’s formulation, the new biopolitics is the deadly administration of what he calls “bare life,” and its ultimate incarnation is the Holocaust with its ominous specter of the concentration camp. In this formulation, the Nazi death camps become the primary exemplar of control, the new space of contemporary politics in which individuals are no longer viewed as citizens but are now seen as inmates, stripped of everything, including their right to live. The uniting of power and bare life, the reduction of the individual to homo sacer—the sacred man who under certain states of exception “may be killed and yet not sacrificed”—no longer represents the far end of political life (1998, 8). That is, in this updated version of the ancient category of homo sacer is the human who stands beyond the confines of both human and divine law—“a human who can be killed without fear of punishment” (Bauman 2003, 133). According to Agamben, as modern states increasingly suspend their democratic structures, laws, and principles, the very nature of governance changes as “the rule of law is routinely displaced by the state of exception, or emergency, and people are increasingly subject to extra-judicial state violence” (Bull 2004, 3). The life unfit for life, unworthy of being lived, as the central category of homo sacer, is no longer marginal to sovereign power but is now central to its form of governance. State violence and totalitarian power, which, in the past, either were generally short-lived or existed on the fringe of politics and history, have now become the rule, rather than the exception, as life is more ruth-lessly regulated and placed in the hands of military and state power. In the current historical moment, as Catherine Mills points out, “all subjects are at least potentially if not actually abandoned by the law and exposed to violence as a constitutive condition of political existence” (2004, 47). Nicholas Mirzoeff has observed that all over the world there is a growing resentment of immigrants and refugees, matched by the emergence of detain-and-deport strategies and coupled with the rise of the camp as the key institution and social model of the new millennium. The “empire of camps,” according to Mirzoeff, has become the “exemplary institution of a system of global capitalism that supports the West in its high consumption, low-price consumer lifestyle” (2005, 145). Zygmunt Bauman calls such camps “garrisons of extraterritoriality” and argues that they have become “the dumping grounds for the indisposed of and as yet unrecycled waste of the global fron- tier-land” (2003,109). The regime of the camp has increasingly become a key index of modernity and the new world order. The connections among dis-posability, violence, and death have become common under modernity in those countries where the order of power has become necropolitical. For example, Rosa Linda Fregoso analyzes feminicide as a local expression of global violence against women in the region of the U.S./Mexico border where over one thousand women have been either murdered or disappeared, constituting what amounts to a “politics of gender extermination” (2006, 109). The politics of disposability and necropolitics not only generate widespread violence and ever expanding “garrisons of extraterritoriality” but also have taken on a powerful new significance as a foundation for political sovereignty. Biopolitical commitments to “let die” by abandoning citizens appear increasingly credible in light of the growing authoritarianism in the United States under the Bush administration (Giroux 2005). Given the Bush administration’s use of illegal wiretaps, the holding of “detainees” illegally and indefinitely in prisons such as Guantanamo, the dis-appearance, kidnapping, and torture of alleged terrorists, and the ongoing suspension of civil liberties in the United States, Agamben’s theory of biopolitics rightly alerts us to the dangers of a government in which the state of emergency becomes the fundamental structure of control over populations. While Agamben’s claim that the concentration camp (as opposed to Foucault’s panopticon) is now the model for constitutional states captures the contrariness of biopolitical commitments that have less to do with preserving life than with reproducing violence and death, its totalitarian logic is too narrow and fails in the end to recognize that the threat of violence, bare life, and death is not the only form of biopower in contemporary life. The dialectics of life and death, visibility and invisibility, and privilege and lack in social existence that now constitute the biopolitics of modernity have to be understood in terms of their complexities, specificities, and diverse social formations. For instance, the diverse ways in which the current articulation of biopower in the United States works to render some groups disposable and to privilege others within a permanent state of emergency need to be specified. Indeed, any viable rendering of contemporary biopolitics must address more specifically how biopower attempts not just to produce and control life in general, as Hardt and Negri insist, or to reduce all inhabitants of the increasing militarized state to the dystopian space of the “death camp,” as Agamben argues, but also to privilege some lives over others. The ongoing tragedy of pain and suffering wrought by the Bush administration’s response to Hurricane Katrina reveals a biopolitical agenda in which the logic of disposability and the politics of death are inscribed differently in the order of contemporary power—structured largely around wretched and broad-based racial and class inequalities. I want to further this position by arguing that neoliberalism, privatization, and militarism have become the dominant biopolitics of the mid-twentieth-century social state and that the coupling of a market fundamentalism and contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of capital accumulation, violence, and disposability, especially under the Bush administration, has produced a new and dangerous version of biopolitics.4 While the murder of Emmett Till suggests that a biopolitics structured around the intersection of race and class inequalities, on the one hand, and state violence, on the other, has long existed, the new version of biopolitics adds a distinctively different and more dangerous register. The new biopolitics not only includes state-sanctioned violence but also relegates entire populations to spaces of invisibility and disposability. As William DiFazio points out, “the state has been so weakened over decades of privatization that it . . . increas ingly fails to provide health care, housing, retirement benefits and education to a massive percentage of its population” (2006, 87). While the social contract has been suspended in varying degrees since the 1970s, under the Bush Administration it has been virtually abandoned. Under such circumstances, the state no longer feels obligated to take measures that prevent hardship, suffering, and death. The state no longer protects its own disadvantaged citizens—they are already seen as dead within a transnational economic and political framework. Specific populations now occupy a globalized space of ruthless politics in which the categories of “citizen” and “democratic representation,” once integral to national politics, are no longer recognized. In the past, people who were marginalized by class and race could at least expect a modicum of support from the government, either because of the persistence of a drastically reduced social contract or because they still had some value as part of a reserve army of unemployed labour. That is no longer true. This new form of biopolitics is conditioned by a permanent state of class and racial exception in which “vast populations are subject to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead” (Mbembe 2003, 40), largely invisible in the global media, or, when disruptively present, defined as redundant, pathological, and dangerous. Within this wasteland of death and disposability, whole populations are relegated to what Zygmunt Bauman calls “social homelessness” (2004, 13). While the rich and middle classes in the United States maintain lifestyles produced through vast inequalities of symbolic and material capital, the “free market” provides neither social protection and security nor hope to those who are poor, sick, elderly, and marginalized by race and class. Given the increasing perilous state of the those who are poor and dispossessed in America, it is crucial to reexamine how biopower functions within global neoliberalism and the simultaneous rise of security states organized around cultural (and racial) homogeneity. This task is made all the more urgent by the destruction, politics, and death that followed Hurricane Katrina.

**The state’s biopolitical regime exerts violence on the citizens, normalizing entire populations to be exterminated.**

**Mendieta, 2002** – SUNY at Stony Brook University (Eduardo, “to make or let die”, APA Central Division Meeting on 4/25/2002, accessed online on 7/2/2012)//BZ

Power is to the social system as computation is to the computing system. In both cases, neither exists apart from what performs them. They are not entities. They are names for what a certain system does. Foucault is a historical nominalist. He did not have a theory of power, but different narratives and hypotheses about how forms of social control were enacted. Power is at best the name for certain effects, but never the name for something that some one either has or suffers without them at some level having participated in its transmittal. Here, I would like to quote Foucault on power from an interview, which merits quoting since it was conducted by way of a written exchange, and because it comes from the same period of the lectures I am discussing. I will quote at length: “That one can never be “outside of power” does not mean that one is in every way trapped. I would suggest rather (but these are hypotheses to be explored): that power is coextensive with the social body; there are not, between the links of its networks, any golden sands of basic freedoms; that power relations are intermingled with other types of relations (of production, kinship, family, sexuality) where they play both a conditioning and a conditioned role, that these relations don’t obey the unique form of interdiction and punishment, but that that they take multiple forms; that their interweaving sketches out the general facts of domination, that this domination is organized in a more or less coherent and (2001) would be indispensable points of departure. I hope to return to their constructive criticisms of Foucault’s work in a future work. unitary strategy; that the dispersed, heteromorphous and local procedures of power are readjusted, reinforced and transformed by these global strategies, and all this with numerous phenomena of inertia, dislocation and resistance; that one must not therefore accept a primary and massive fact of domination (a binary structure with on one side the “dominating” and on the other, the “dominated”) but rather a multiform production of relations of domination which are partially integratable into the strategies of the whole; that relations of power do in fact “serve,” but not at all because they are “in the service” of an economic interest taken as primitive, but because they can be used in strategies; that there are no relations of power without resistances; that the latter are all the more real and effective to the extent that they are formed there where the relations of power are exercised; resistance to power doesn’t have to come from elsewhere in order to be real, nor is it trapped because it is the compatriot of power. It exists all the more insofar as it is there where power is; it is therefore, like power, multiple and integratable into global strategies.” (Morris and Patton 1979 [1977], 55) In the 1976 lectures Foucault is at pains to render discernable the relationships between knowledge production, truth, the effects of power, and political authority that are entailed by the kind of analysis of power suggested by these methodological pointers. If there is no “exercise of power without the economy of discourses on truth,” then we can only exercise power by producing truth. In this case, the production of truth has to do with historical discourse, that is, with the production of historical knowledge. What is distinctive in these lectures is the span that Foucault sets out to cover in order to exemplify the ways in which the use of historical narratives, historical knowledge, contributed to the production of a certain power. From the sixteenth century to twentieth century, Foucault covers the ways in which historical narratives were used to legitimate the power of invaders, a power that was juxtaposed to the power of roman emperors, and the claims of the Church on local lords. In the sixteenth century a form of historical narrative developed that sought to reconcile invaded peoples to their invaders vis-a-vis an imperial invader, whose yoke and rule was grounded on theological and juridical forms of right. Against the divine right of kings, and the power of lords based on a legalistic notion of the rights of nature, the power of rebelled, lifted, insurrected warrior castes, the noble savages (which Foucault tellingly thinks runs through the works that focus on the power of war and struggle, from Boulainvilliers to Nietzsche), who reclaim their lands, or who are returning to their place of origins, or who by descent are rightfully lords of a land, is juxtaposed. In the sixteenth century, the unearthing of sometimes mythical, sometimes folkloric, sometimes historical narratives of the origins of the Franks, the German and the Saxons, is deployed contestationally against the claims of lords and popes. Law and power, right and lordship emerged from the bloody muds, carnage, and fires of wars. So, against the pax romana, and the pax catholica of the Holy Roman Empire, is deployed the war of peoples. These wars of peoples, which in the seventeenth century slowly turned into the war of races, established the conditions for all analyses that operate on the basic assumption that politics is war pursued by other means. In other words, behind the quiet of social peace, rumbles the roar of battle. It is precisely against the war of people, and the war of races that we can begin to make sense of Thomas Hobbes, Nicccolo Machiavelli, and eventually, Klaus von Clausewitz. The transition is summarized in the following formulation: whereas historical narrative up through the sixteenth century had only concerned itself with singing the praises of power, celebrating and chronicling the royal deeds on divinely invested Lords and Kings, a type of historical knowledge is discovered that seeks to unmask the violence that simmers under all law. If one form of history was the memory of kings, priests and popes, the other is the memory of peoples, of warriors, of races. The theory of the raison d’etat, which is so central in the emergence of modern political thought, must also be read against the background of the permanent state of war that suffuses all of society. For the attempts to formalize the power of the state in the legitimate reaches of what the state can do, according to its own interests, is one way in which the Medieval notion of divine and theologically grounded authority were established. But, this power of the state, referred to the aims and health of the state itself, begins to give rise to ideas of what it is that the state must legitimately attend to. And as the state begins to emerge as a sphere of power, the horizon of its power also begins to be configured. To the state is juxtaposed society, over what it rules and oversees. A legitimate state, grounded on its authority, oversees not the power of a sovereign, but its people. The state must attend to its subjects, and thus begins the synthesis of the medieval notion of legislative and divinely sanctioned power with the Judaic-Christian notion of pastoral power. It is this fusing that eventually gives rise to biopower, a power that individualizes through discipline but also massifies, generalizes, and normalizes by making of a people a population. This new form of political power is accompanied with the deployment of new institutions, like the police, madhouses, hospitals, sanatoriums, and new sciences, such as Polizeiwissenschaft, social health, psychiatry, and so on.

**The biopolitical action stemming from Katrina was based in racism and bloodthirsty neoliberal rationalization, rendering citizens disposable.**

**Giroux, 06** – Professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, previous professors at BU, Miami U, and Penn State (Henry, “Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race, Class, and the Biopolitics of Disposability”, accessed from JSTOR 7/1/12)//BZ

Biopower in its current shape has produced a new form of biopolitics marked by a cleansed visual and social landscape in which the poor, the elderly, the infirm, and criminalized populations all share a common fate of disappearing from public view. Rendered invisible in deindustrialized communities far removed from the suburbs, barred from the tourist-laden sections of major cities, locked into understaffed nursing homes, interned in bulging prisons built in remote farm communities, hidden in decaying schools in rundown neighborhoods that bear the look of Third World slums, populations of poor black and brown citizens exist outside of the view of most Americans. They have become the waste-products of the American Dream, if not of modernity itself. The disposable populations serve as an unwelcome reminder that the once vaunted social state no longer exists, the living dead now an apt personification of the death of the social contract in the United States. Having fallen through the large rents in America’s social safety nets, they reflect a governmental agenda bent on attacking the poor rather than attacking poverty. That they are largely poor and black undermines the nation’s commitment to color-blind ideology. Race remains the “major reason America treats its poor more harshly than any other advanced country” (Krugman 2005, A27). One of the worst storms in our history shamed us into seeing the plight of poor blacks and other minorities. In less than forty- eight hours, Katrina ruptured the pristine image of America as a largely, white middle-class country modeled after a Disney theme park. Underneath neoliberalisms corporate ethic and market-based fundamentalism, the idea of democracy is disappearing and with it the spaces in which democracy is produced and nurtured. Democratic values, identities, and social relations along with public spaces, the common good, and the obligations of civic responsibility are slowly being overtaken by a market- based notion of freedom and civic indifference in which it becomes more difficult to translate private woes into social issues and collective action or to insist on a language of the public good. The upshot to the evisceration of all notions of sociality is a sense of total abandonment, resulting in fear, anxiety, and insecurity over one’s future. The presence of the racialized poor, their needs, and vulnerabilities—now visible—becomes unbearable. All solutions as a result now focus on shoring up a diminished sense of safety, carefully nurtured by a renewed faith in all things military. Militaristic values and military solutions are profoundly influencing every aspect of American life, ranging from foreign and domestic policy to the shaping of popular culture and the organization of public schools.7 Faith in democratic governance and cultural pluralism increasingly gives way to military-style uniformity, discipline, and authority coupled with a powerful nationalism and a stifling patriotic correctness, all of which undermine the force of a genuine democracy by claiming that the average citizen does not have the knowledge or authority to see, engage, resist, protest, or make dominant power accountable.8 Lost public spaces and public culture have been replaced with what Nicholas Mirzoeff calls the modern anti-spectacle. According to Mirzoeff, “the modern anti-spectacle now dictates that there is nothing to see and that instead one must keep moving, keep circulating and keep consuming” (2005, 16). Non-stop images coupled with a manufactured culture of fear strip citizens of their visual agency and potential to act as engaged social participants. The visual subject has been reduced to the life-long consumer, always on the go looking for new goods and promising discounts, all the while travelling in spaces that suggest that public space is largely white and middle-class, free of both unproductive consumers and those individuals marked by the trappings of race, poverty, dependence, and disability. Under the logic of modernization, neoliberalism, and militarization, the category “waste” includes no longer simply material goods but also human beings, particularly those rendered redundant in the new global economy, that is, those who are no longer capable of making a living, who are unable to consume goods, and who depend upon others for the most basic needs (Bauman 2000, 2003, 2004). Defined primarily through the combined discourses of character, personal responsibility, and cultural homogeneity, entire populations expelled from the benefits of the marketplace are reified as products without any value to be disposed of as “leftovers in the most radical and effective way: we make them invisible by not looking and unthinkable by not thinking (2004, 27). Even when young black and brown youth try to escape the biopolitics of disposability by joining the military, the seduction of economic security is quickly negated by the horror of senseless violence compounded daily in the streets, roads, and battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan and made concrete in the form of body bags, mangled bodies, and amputated limbs—rarely to be seen in the narrow ocular vision of the dominant media. With the social state in retreat and the rapacious dynamics of neoliberalism, unchecked by government regulations, the public and private policies of investing in the public good are dismissed as bad business, just as the notion of protecting people from the dire misfortunes of poverty, sickness, or the random blows of fate is viewed as an act of bad faith. Weakness is now a sin, punishable by social exclusion. This is especially true for those racial groups and immigrant populations who have always been at risk economically and politically. Increasingly, such groups have become part of an evergrowing army of the impoverished and disenfranchised—removed from the prospect of a decent job, productive education, adequate health care, accept- able child care services, and satisfactory shelter. As the state is transformed into the primary agent of terror and corporate concerns displace democratic values, dominant “power is measured by the speed with which responsibilities can be escaped” (Qtd. in Fearn 2006, 30). With its pathological disdain for social values and public life and its celebration of an unbridled individualism and acquisitiveness, the Bush administration does more than undermine the nature of social obligation and civic responsibility; it also sends a message to those populations who are poor and black—society neither wants, cares about, or needs you (Bauman 1999,68-69). Katrina revealed with startling and disturbing clarity who these individuals are: African- Americans who occupy the poorest sections of New Orleans, those ghettoized frontier-zones created by racism coupled with economic inequality. Cut out of any long term goals and a decent vision of the future, these are the populations, as Zygmunt Bauman points out, who have been rendered redundant and disposable in the age of neoliberal global capitalism.

**Biopolitical sovereignty justifies rule over life, grounded in racism and inhumanity.**

**Mbembe, 2003** – senior researcher at the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of Witwatersrand (Achille, translated by Libby Meintjes, “Necropolitics”, accessed 7/3/12, http://www.jhfc.duke.edu/icuss/pdfs/Mbembe.pdf)//BZ

Having presented a reading of politics as the work of death, I turn now to sovereignty, expressed predominantly as the right to kill. For the purpose of my argument, I relate Foucault’s notion of biopower to two other concepts: the state of exception and the state of siege. I examine those trajectories by which the state of exception and the relation of enmity have become the normative basis of the right to kill. In such instances, power (and not necessarily state power) continuously refers and appeals to exception, emergency, and a fictionalized notion of the enemy. It also labors to produce that same exception, emergency, and fictionalized enemy. In other words, the question is: What is the relationship between politics and death in those systems that can function only in a state of emergency? In Foucault’s formulation of it, biopower appears to function through dividing people into those who must live and those who must die. Operating on the basis of a split between the living and the dead, such a power defines itself in relation to a biological field—which it takes control of and vests itself in. This control presupposes the distribution of human species into groups, the subdivision of the population into subgroups, and the establishment of a biological caesura between the ones and the others. This is what Foucault labels with the (at first sight familiar) term racism. That race (or for that matter racism) figures so prominently in the calculus of biopower is entirely justifiable. After all, more so than class-thinking (the ideology that defines history as an economic struggle of classes), race has been the ever present shadow in Western political thought and practice, especially when it comes to imagining the inhumanity of, or rule over, foreign peoples. Referring to both this ever-presence and the phantomlike world of race in general, Arendt locates their roots in the shattering experience of otherness and suggests that the politics of race is ultimately linked to the politics of death. Indeed, in Foucault’s terms, racism is above all a technology aimed at permitting the exercise of biopower, “that old sovereign right of death.” In the economy of biopower, the function of racism is to regulate the distribution of death and to make possible the murderous functions of the state. It is, he says, “the condition for the acceptability of putting to death.” Foucault states clearly that the sovereign right to kill (droit de glaive) and the mechanisms of biopower are inscribed in the way all modern states function; indeed, they can be seen as constitutive elements of state power in modernity. According to Foucault, the Nazi state was the most complete example of a state exercising the right to kill. This state, he claims, made the management, protection, and cultivation of life coextensive with the sovereign right to kill. By biological extrapolation on the theme of the political enemy, in organizing the war against its adversaries and, at the same time, exposing its own citizens to war, the Nazi state is seen as having opened the way for a formidable consolidation of the right to kill, which culminated in the project of the “final solution.” In doing so, it became the archetype of a power formation that combined the characteristics of the racist state, the murderous state, and the suicidal state.

**Biopower cements the state of exception, justifying endless violence and perpetual normalization**

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In order to answer these questions, this essay draws on the concept of biopower and explores its relation to notions of sovereignty (imperium) and the state of exception. Such an analysis raises a number of empirical and philosophical questions I would like to examine briefly. As is well known, the concept of the state of exception has been often discussed in relation to Nazism, totalitarianism, and the concentration/extermination camps. The death camps in particular have been interpreted variously as the central metaphor for sovereign and destructive violence and as the ultimate sign of the absolute power of the negative. Says Hannah Arendt, “There are no parallels to the life in the concentration camps. Its horror can never be fully embraced by the imagination for the very reason that it stands outside of life and death.” Because its inhabitants are divested of political status and reduced to bare life, the camp is, for Giorgio Agamben, “the place in which the most absolute conditio inhumana ever to appear on Earth was realized.” In the political-juridical structure of the camp, he adds, the state of exception ceases to be a temporal sus- pension of the state of law. According to Agamben, it acquires a permanent spatial arrangement that remains continually outside the normal state of law. The aim of this essay is not to debate the singularity of the extermination of the Jews or to hold it up by way of example. I start from the idea that modernity was at the origin of multiple concepts of sovereignty—and therefore of the biopolitical. Disregarding this multiplicity, late-modern political criticism has unfortunately privileged normative theories of democracy and has made the concept of reason one of the most important elements of both the project of modernity and of the topos of sovereignty. From this perspective, the ultimate expression of sovereignty is the production of general norms by a body (the demos) made up of free and equal men and women. These men and women are posited as full subjects capable of self-understanding, self-consciousness, and self-representation. Politics, therefore, is defined as twofold: a project of autonomy and the achieving of agreement among a collectivity through communication and recognition. This, we are told, is what differentiates it from war. In other words, it is on the basis of a distinction between reason and unreason (passion, fantasy) that late-modern criticism has been able to articulate a certain idea of the political, the community, the subject—or, more fundamentally, of what the good life is all about, how to achieve it, and, in the process, to become a fully moral agent. Within this paradigm, reason is the truth of the subject and politics is the exercise of reason in the public sphere. The exercise of reason is tantamount to the exercise of freedom, a key element for individual autonomy. The romance of sovereignty, in this case, rests on the belief that the subject is the master and the controlling author of his or her own meaning. Sovereignty is therefore defined as a twofold process of self-institution and self-limitation (fixing one’s own limits for oneself). The exercise of sovereignty, in turn, consists in society’s capacity for self-creation through recourse to institutions inspired by specific social and imaginary significations.

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**Savage sovereignty imposes a colonization of life by death, destroying autonomy**.

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This strongly normative reading of the politics of sovereignty has been the object of numerous critiques, which I will not rehearse here. My concern is those figures of sovereignty whose central project is not the struggle for autonomy but the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations. Such figures of sovereignty are far from a piece of prodigious insanity or an expression of a rupture between the impulses and interests of the body and those of the mind. Indeed, they, like the death camps, are what constitute the nomos of the political space in which we still live. Furthermore, contemporary experiences of human destruction suggest that it is possible to develop a reading of politics, sovereignty, and the subject different from the one we inherited from the philosophical discourse of modernity. Instead of considering reason as the truth of the subject, we can look to other foundational categories that are less abstract and more tactile, such as life and death. Significant for such a project is Hegel’s discussion of the relation between death and the “becoming subject" Hegel’s account of death centers on a bipartite concept of negativity. First, the human negates nature (a negation exteriorized in the human’s effort to reduce nature to his or her own needs); and second, he or she transforms the negated element through work and struggle. In transforming nature, the human being creates a world; but in the process, he or she also is exposed to his or her own negativity. Within the Hegelian paradigm, human death is essentially voluntary. It is the result of risks consciously assumed by the subject. According to Hegel, in these risks the “animal” that constitutes the human subject’s natural being is defeated. In other words, the human being truly becomes a subject—that is, separated from the animal—in the struggle and the work through which he or she confronts death (understood as the violence of negativity). It is through this confrontation with death that he or she is cast into the incessant movement of history. Becoming subject therefore supposes upholding the work of death. To uphold the work of death is precisely how Hegel defines the life of the Spirit. The life of the Spirit, he says, is not that life which is frightened of death, and spares itself destruction, but that life which assumes death and lives with it. Spirit attains its truth only by finding itself in absolute dismemberment. Politics is therefore death that lives a human life. Such, too, is the definition of absolute knowledge and sovereignty: risking the entirety of one’s life. Georges Bataille also offers critical insights into how death structures the idea of sovereignty, the political, and the subject. Bataille displaces Hegel’s conception of the linkages between death, sovereignty, and the subject in at least three ways. First, he interprets death and sovereignty as the paroxysm of exchange and superabundance—or, to use his own terminology: excess. For Bataille, life is defective only when death has taken it hostage. Life itself exists only in bursts and in exchange with death. He argues that death is the putrefaction of life, the stench that is at once the source and the repulsive condition of life. Therefore, although it destroys what was to be, obliterates what was supposed to continue being, and reduces to nothing the individual who takes it, death does not come down to the pure annihilation of being. Rather, it is essentially self-consciousness; moreover, it is the most luxurious form of life, that is, of effusion and exuberance: a power of proliferation. Even more radically, Bataille withdraws death from the horizon of meaning. This is in contrast to Hegel, for whom nothing is definitively lost in death; indeed, death is seen as holding great signification as a means to truth. Second, Bataille firmly anchors death in the realm of absolute expenditure (the other characteristic of sovereignty), whereas Hegel tries to keep death within the economy of absolute knowledge and meaning. Life beyond utility, says Bataille, is the domain of sovereignty. This being the case, death is therefore the point at which destruction, suppression, and sacrifice constitute so irreversible and radical an expenditure—an expenditure without reserve—that they can no longer be determined as negativity. Death is therefore the very principle of excess—an anti-economy. Hence the metaphor of luxury and of the luxurious character of death.

**Savage sovereignty imposes a colonization of life by death, destroying autonomy**.

**Mbembe, 2003** – senior researcher at the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of Witwatersrand (Achille, translated by Libby Meintjes, “Necropolitics”, accessed 7/3/12, http://www.jhfc.duke.edu/icuss/pdfs/Mbembe.pdf)//BZ

This strongly normative reading of the politics of sovereignty has been the object of numerous critiques, which I will not rehearse here. My concern is those figures of sovereignty whose central project is not the struggle for autonomy but the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations. Such figures of sovereignty are far from a piece of prodigious insanity or an expression of a rupture between the impulses and interests of the body and those of the mind. Indeed, they, like the death camps, are what constitute the nomos of the political space in which we still live. Furthermore, contemporary experiences of human destruction suggest that it is possible to develop a reading of politics, sovereignty, and the subject different from the one we inherited from the philosophical discourse of modernity. Instead of considering reason as the truth of the subject, we can look to other foundational categories that are less abstract and more tactile, such as life and death. Significant for such a project is Hegel’s discussion of the relation between death and the “becoming subject" Hegel’s account of death centers on a bipartite concept of negativity. First, the human negates nature (a negation exteriorized in the human’s effort to reduce nature to his or her own needs); and second, he or she transforms the negated element through work and struggle. In transforming nature, the human being creates a world; but in the process, he or she also is exposed to his or her own negativity. Within the Hegelian paradigm, human death is essentially voluntary. It is the result of risks consciously assumed by the subject. According to Hegel, in these risks the “animal” that constitutes the human subject’s natural being is defeated. In other words, the human being truly becomes a subject—that is, separated from the animal—in the struggle and the work through which he or she confronts death (understood as the violence of negativity). It is through this confrontation with death that he or she is cast into the incessant movement of history. Becoming subject therefore supposes upholding the work of death. To uphold the work of death is precisely how Hegel defines the life of the Spirit. The life of the Spirit, he says, is not that life which is frightened of death, and spares itself destruction, but that life which assumes death and lives with it. Spirit attains its truth only by finding itself in absolute dismemberment. Politics is therefore death that lives a human life. Such, too, is the definition of absolute knowledge and sovereignty: risking the entirety of one’s life. Georges Bataille also offers critical insights into how death structures the idea of sovereignty, the political, and the subject. Bataille displaces Hegel’s conception of the linkages between death, sovereignty, and the subject in at least three ways. First, he interprets death and sovereignty as the paroxysm of exchange and superabundance—or, to use his own terminology: excess. For Bataille, life is defective only when death has taken it hostage. Life itself exists only in bursts and in exchange with death. He argues that death is the putrefaction of life, the stench that is at once the source and the repulsive condition of life. Therefore, although it destroys what was to be, obliterates what was supposed to continue being, and reduces to nothing the individual who takes it, death does not come down to the pure annihilation of being. Rather, it is essentially self-consciousness; moreover, it is the most luxurious form of life, that is, of effusion and exuberance: a power of proliferation. Even more radically, Bataille withdraws death from the horizon of meaning. This is in contrast to Hegel, for whom nothing is definitively lost in death; indeed, death is seen as holding great signification as a means to truth. Second, Bataille firmly anchors death in the realm of absolute expenditure (the other characteristic of sovereignty), whereas Hegel tries to keep death within the economy of absolute knowledge and meaning. Life beyond utility, says Bataille, is the domain of sovereignty. This being the case, death is therefore the point at which destruction, suppression, and sacrifice constitute so irreversible and radical an expenditure—an expenditure without reserve—that they can no longer be determined as negativity. Death is therefore the very principle of excess—an anti-economy. Hence the metaphor of luxury and of the luxurious character of death.

### Systemic outweighs

**Structural harms outweigh all other considerations.**

**Abu-Jamal 98** (Mumia, award-winning PA journalist, 9/19, <http://www.flashpoints.net/mQuietDeadlyViolence.html>)

We live, equally immersed, and to a deeper degree, in a nation that condones and ignores wide-ranging "structural' violence, of a kind that destroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness. Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes; By "structural violence" I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of the class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting "structural" with "behavioral violence" by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. --(Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996), 192.) This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous is it--really? Gilligan notes: [E]very fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. [Gilligan, p. 196] Worse still, in a thoroughly capitalist society, much of that violence became internalized, turned back on the Self, because, in a society based on the priority of wealth, those who own nothing are taught to loathe themselves, as if something is inherently wrong with themselves, instead of the social order that promotes this self-loathing. This intense self-hatred was often manifested in familial violence as when the husband beats the wife, the wife smacks the son, and the kids fight each other. This vicious, circular, and invisible violence, unacknowledged by the corporate media, uncriticized in substandard educational systems, and un-understood by the very folks who suffer in its grips, feeds on the spectacular and more common forms of violence that the system makes damn sure -- that we can recognize and must react to it. This fatal and systematic violence may be called The War on the Poor. It is found in every country, submerged beneath the sands of history, buried, yet ever present, as omnipotent as death. In the struggles over the commons in Europe, when the peasants struggled and lost their battles for their communal lands (a precursor to similar struggles throughout Africa and the Americas), this violence was sanctified, by church and crown, as the "Divine Right of Kings" to the spoils of class battle. Scholars Frances Fox-Piven and Richard A Cloward wrote, in The New Class War (Pantheon, 1982/1985): "They did not lose because landowners were immune to burning and preaching and rioting. They lost because the usurpations of owners were regularly defended by the legal authority and the armed force of the state. It was the state that imposed increased taxes or enforced the payment of increased rents, and evicted or jailed those who could not pay the resulting debts. It was the state that made lawful the appropriation by landowners of the forests, streams, and commons, and imposed terrifying penalties on those who persisted in claiming the old rights to these resources. It was the state that freed serfs or emancipated sharecroppers only to leave them landless." The "Law", then, was a tool of the powerful to protect their interests, then, as now. It was a weapon against the poor and impoverished, then, as now. It punished retail violence, while turning a blind eye to the wholesale violence daily done by their class masters. The law was, and is, a tool of state power, utilized to protect the status quo, no matter how oppressive that status was, or is. Systems are essentially ways of doing things that have concretized into tradition, and custom, without regard to the rightness of those ways. No system that causes this kind of harm to people should be allowed to remain, based solely upon its time in existence. Systems must serve life, or be discarded as a threat and a danger to life. Such systems must pass away, so that their great and terrible violence passes away with them.

**Structural violence outweighs low probability events.**

**Gilman, 83** Dr. Robert C. Gilman, Ph.D. President of Context Institute Founding Editor of IN CONTEXT, A Quarterly of Humane Sustainable Culture One of the articles in The Foundations Of Peace (IC#4) Autumn 1983, Page 8 <http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:p_T2jwNn8g4J:www.context.org/ICLIB/IC04/Gilman1.htm+nuclear+war+%22structural+violence%22&hl=en>

THE HUMAN TENDENCY toward, and preparations for, open warfare are certainly the most spectacular obstacles to peace, but they are not the only challenges we face. For much of the world's population, hunger, not war, is the pressing issue, and it is hard to imagine a genuine peace that did not overcome our current global pattern of extensive poverty in the midst of plenty. Hunger and poverty are two prime examples of what is described as "structural violence," that is, physical and psychological harm that results from exploitive and unjust social, political and economic systems. It is something that most of us know is going on, some of us have experienced, but in its starker forms, it is sufficiently distant from most North American lives that it is often hard to get a good perspective on it. I've come across an approach that seems to help provide that perspective, and I'd like to describe it. How significant is structural violence? How does one measure the impact of injustice? While this may sound like an impossibly difficult question, Gernot Kohler and Norman Alcock (in Journal of Peace Research, 1976, 13, pp. 343-356) have come up with a surprisingly simple method for estimating the grosser forms of structural violence, at least at an international level. The specific question they ask is, how many extra deaths occur each year due to the unequal distribution of wealth between countries? To understand their approach, we will need to plunge into some global statistics. It will help to start with the relationship between Life Expectancy (LE) and Gross National Product Per Person (GNP/p) that is shown in the following figure. Each dot in this figure stands for one country with its LE and GNP/p for the year 1979. All together, 135 countries are represented (data from Ruth Sivard's World Military and Social Expenditures 1982, World Priorities, Box 1003, Leesburg VA 22075, $4). Kohler and Alcock used a similar figure based on data for 1965, and I'll compare the 1965 data with the 1979 data later in this article. Except for a few oil exporting countries (like Libya) that have unusual combinations of high GNPs and low Life Expectancies, the data follows a consistent pattern shown by the curve. Among the "poor" countries (with GNP/p below about $2400 per person per year), life expectancy is relatively low and increases rapidly with increasing GNP/p. Among the "rich" countries, life expectancy is consistently high and is relatively unaffected by GNP. The dividing line between these two groups turns out to also be the world average GNP per person. The value of the life expectancy curve at that point (for 1979) is 70 years. Thus, other things being equal, if the world's wealth was distributed equally among the nations, every country would have a life expectancy of 70 years. This value is surprisingly close to the average life expectancy for the industrial countries (72 years), and is even not that far below the maximum national life expectancy of 76 years (Iceland, Japan, and Sweden). Kohler and Alcock use this egalitarian model as a standard to compare the actual world situation against. The procedure is as follows. The actual number of deaths in any country can be estimated by dividing the population (P) by the life expectancy (LE). The difference between the actual number of deaths and the number of deaths that would occur under egalitarian conditions is thus P/LE - P/70. For example, in 1979 India had a population of 677 million and a life expectancy of 52 years. Thus India's actual death rate was 13 million while if the life expectancy had been 70, the rate would have been 9.7 million. The difference of 3.3 million thus provides an estimate of the number of extra deaths. Calculating this difference for each country and then adding them up gives the number of extra deaths worldwide due to the unequal distribution of resources. The result for 1965 was 14 million, while for 1979 the number had declined to 11 million. (China, with a quarter of the world's population, is responsible for 3/4 of this drop since it raised its life expectancy from 50 in 1965 to 64 in 1979.) How legitimate is it to ascribe these deaths to the structural violence of human institutions, and not just to the variability of nature? Perhaps the best in-depth study of structural violence comes from the Institute for Food and Development Policy (1885 Mission St, San Francisco, CA 94103). What they find throughout the Third World is that the problems of poverty and hunger often date back hundreds of years to some conquest - by colonial forces or otherwise. The victors became the ruling class and the landholders, pushing the vast majority either on to poor ground or into being landless laborers. Taxes, rentals, and the legal system were all structured to make sure that the poor stayed poor. The same patterns continue today. Additional support is provided by the evidence in the above figure, which speaks for itself. Also, according to Sivard, 97% of the people in the Third World live under repressive governments, with almost half of all Third World countries run by military dominated governments. Finally, as a point of comparison, Ehrlich and Ehrlich (Population, Environment, and Resources, 1972, p72) estimate between 10 and 20 million deaths per year due to starvation and malnutrition. If their estimates are correct, our estimates may even be too low. Some comparisons will help to put these figures in perspective. The total number of deaths from all causes in 1965 was 62 million, so these estimates indicate that 23% of all deaths were due to structural violence. By 1979 the fraction had dropped to 15%. While it is heartening to see this improvement, the number of deaths is staggeringly large, dwarfing any other form of violence other than nuclear war. For example, the level of structural violence is 60 times greater than the average number of battle related deaths per year since 1965 (Sivard 1982). It is 1.5 times as great as the yearly average number of civilian and battle field deaths during the 6 years of World War II. **Every 4 days, it is the equivalent of another Hiroshima**. Perhaps the most hopeful aspect of this whole tragic situation is that essentially everyone in the present system has become a loser. The plight of the starving is obvious, but the exploiters don't have much to show for their efforts either - not compared to the quality of life they could have in a society without the tensions generated by this exploitation. Especially at a national level, what the rich countries need now is not so much more material wealth, but the opportunity to live in a world at peace. The rich and the poor, with the help of modern technology and weaponry, have become each others' prisoners. Today's industrialized societies did not invent this structural violence, but it could not continue without our permission. This suggests that to the list of human tendencies that are obstacles to peace we need to add the ease with which we acquiesce in injustice - the way we all too easily look in the other direction and disclaim "response ability." In terms of the suffering it supports, it is by far our most serious flaw.

**Politics centered on crisis prevention rather than solving structural problems fails.**

**Charlesworth** **02** Director Centere for International and Public Law and PF Law – Australian National University 2002 Hillary “International Law: A discipline of crisis” Modern Law Review, 65:3, May

A concern with crises skews the discipline of international law. Through regarding ‘crises’ as its bread and butter and the engine of progressive development of international law, international law becomes simply a source of justification for the status quo. The framework of crisis condemns international lawyers, as David Kennedy puts it, to ‘a sort of disciplinary hamster wheel’.76 One way forward is to refocus international law on issues of structural justice that underpin everyday life. What might an international law of every day life look like? At the same time that the much-analysed events in Kosovo were taking place, 1.2 billion people lived on less than a dollar a day.77 We know that 2.4 billion people in the developing world do not have access to basic sanitation, and that half of this number are chronically malnourished; we know that the developed world holds one quarter of the world’s population, but holds 4/5 of the world’s income; we know that military spending worldwide is over $1 billion a day and that alternative uses of tiny fractions could generate real change in education, health care and nutrition; we know that almost 34 million people worldwide live with HIV/AIDS;78 we know that violence against women is at epidemic levels the world over. Why are these phenomena not widely studied by international lawyers? Why are they at the margins of the international law world? An international law of everyday life would require a methodology to consider the perspectives of non-elite groups. For example, we should able be to study ‘humanitarian intervention’ from the perspective of the people on whose behalf the intervention took place. International lawyers’ accounts of humanitarian intervention prompted by Kosovo do not take the views of the objects of intervention into account. If they did so, we would be likely to end up with a much more contradictory, complex and confusing account of humanitarian intervention than international lawyers have thus far produced. We should also enlarge our inquiries. For example, with respect to the idea of collective security, how can we think about the global security more broadly? Johan Galtung has developed the notion of structural violence that highlights causes other than warfare, for example poverty, as the major cause of death and suffering.79 Other scholars have identified the interconnections of poverty, environmental degradation, discrimination, exploitation, militarisation and violence as the causes of insecurity.80 Feminist scholars have drawn attention to the threats posed, to women not by foreign states, but by more local actors, including the men in their families. On this analysis security would mean the absence of violence and economic and social justice. If the idea of security is understood more broadly, the futility of the standard form of international collective action becomes clear. Military intervention is an inappropriate mechanism if the causes of insecurity are poverty, discrimination and violence protected by structures within the state.

**Attention to isolated instances of warfare ignores the daily horrors of militarist exceptionalism – a more ethical approach is needed to overcome the political neglect of status quo crisis control.**

**Cuomo 1992** – PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati (Chris, Hypatia Fall 1996. Vol. 11, Issue 3, pg 30)

In "Gender and `Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an event based conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.(1) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.(2) Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.

**Reject their low probability, high magnitude impacts.**

**Campbell and Currie, 06** - University of Nottingham, UK (Scott and Greg, “Against Beck: In Defence of Risk Analysis,” Philosophy of the Social Science, June)GZ

It might be responded that all this is missing the point, which is as follows: what use is a risk analysis if it cannot conclusively rule out an accident? Beck says that “the least likely event will always occur in the long run” (1995, 1; see also 176). Beck seems here to be appealing to purely logical principles of probability to support his claims. Such an argument would go something like this: 1. A large enough nuclear explosion, if it happened, would devastate the Earth (“one accident means annihilation”; Beck 1992, 29). 2. There is a very low probability of such an explosion happening (accord- ing to risk experts). 3. But even a low-probability event must occur in the long run (a fact of probability, according to Beck). Therefore, it is inevitable that a nuclear explosion will happen eventually—its low probability does not change this fact (this follows from 2 and 3). Therefore, eventually all life on Earth will be wiped out by a nuclear explosion (from 1 and 4). This is logically valid, in the sense that the conclusion follows from the premises, and at first glance it might appear to be a strong argument. But premise (3) is false. It is possible that one day King Arthur will be resur- rected. It is possible that one day someone will be kicked to death by a duck. It is possible that pencils will one day evolve into sentient creatures. But none of these low-likelihood events are inevitable in the long run. (Nor can it be said that these events, while not strictly inevitable, are at least highly likely to occur in the long run.) It might be claimed that the probabilities involved with a nuclear explo- sion should be seen to be like the probabilities involved with random series like coin tosses or dice throws, rather than like the probability of someone being kicked to death by a duck. And in a series like a series of coin tosses, every possible sequence must eventually happen in the long run, and so must a world-destroying nuclear power plant explosion eventually happen. 21 The first objection that can be made to this claim is that it is not true that every possible sequence of coin tosses must eventually occur, even in an infinite sequence. Of course, one sometimes hears such a claim being made. But what this talk really means is that the probability that a particular sequence will occur increases toward 1 (i.e., 100%) the larger the series of tosses. 22 It cannot be maintained that it is certain that a particular sequence—say, 1,000 tails in a row—will come up, because it is possible that all the throws from now on will be heads. In response to this, defenders of Beck might moderate their claim, and say that while it is not inevitable that the nuclear explosion will eventually occur, it is at least extremely likely that it will (with the probability increas- ing to a limit of 1), just as it is extremely likely that a particular coin sequence will come up in the long run. There are still two faults with this position, though. The coin example depends upon there being a hypothetically infinite amount of time for the coin tossing to take place in. But there isn’t an infinite amount of time left in the actual universe. And we can expect nuclear fission to only be used for a few more centuries. Even if it is used for thousands more years, that doesn’t come close to infinity. Furthermore, Beck has given us no reason why we should treat the opera- tions of a nuclear power plant as on a par with series that have completely random, patternless outputs, like coin tossing or dice throwing. A closer anal- ogy would seem to hold with the Earth being destroyed by an asteroid. The path of asteroids is somewhat regular, with some randomness, which more closely approximates what happens in a nuclear power station. It is not inevitable, nor even extremely likely, that life on Earth will be destroyed by an asteroid. It may happen, but the laws of probability themselves don’t make it inevitable, or extremely likely. So in basing his argument on an appeal to a supposed log- ical principle of probability, Beck does nothing to advance his position. To say this is to say nothing against someone who has, say, carried out a close empirical analysis of a number of nuclear power stations, and argued that the inherent randomness involved with certain of their opera- tions means that there is a high likelihood of an explosion that destroys all life on Earth within, say, 200 years, despite current safety precautions. Whether or not this is right, it has nothing to do with the current argument that we have been considering, which relied solely upon the supposed a priori principle of probability that even low-probability events are inevitable in the long run, and not upon any additional empirical information about the operations of actual nuclear power stations. (Anyway, Beck is not someone who has carried out any such empirical research.)

**Their “1%” risk calculus makes decisionmaking impossible – only prefer high probability scenarios.**

**MESKILL 2009** (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html)

Tom Friedman's piece today in the Times on the environment (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?\_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" (which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant. It is intellectually incoherent because it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk (Cheney's original scenario), the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs. But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? Why not also choose between them and other, much more cotidien, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five \*past\* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements - for example the early Jesus movement - have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action.

**No impact is inevitable.**

**Campbell and Currie, 06** - University of Nottingham, UK (Scott and Greg, “Against Beck: In Defence of Risk Analysis,” Philosophy of the Social Science, June)GZ

It is possible that the Earth will be destroyed by collision with an asteroid. It is also possible that it will be destroyed by interaction with a black hole. Beck’s argument would have us conclude that both these events are inevitable. But this cannot be; if the one happens, the other cannot. Hence, Beck’s view cannot be right. There is no inevitability about any merely possible event.

## \*\*ETHICS CORE\*\*

### New Orleans key ethics

**New Orleans is a critical ethical exercise—we must recognize our responsibility to rectify centuries of discrimination.**

**Morse 2008** - senior attorney with the Biloxi office of Mississippi Center for Justice; received Equal Justice Works Katrina Legal Fellowship; received Edwin D. Wolf Public Interest Law Award from the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; co-founder of the Steps Coalition; Panelist for the Joint center for Political and Economic Studies, NAACP; published by the Joint Center For Political and Economic Studies

Health Policy Institute (Reilly, “Environmental Justice Through the Eye of Hurricane Katrina” 2008, http://198.65.105.204/hpi/sites/all/files/EnvironmentalJustice.pdf )//ALo

Finally, recognizing how major national policy choices in areas like energy, transportation, and municipal infrastructure affect communities of color is an essential component of environmental justice. Once some background is provided, people from all walks of life readily understand the implications of how different parts of our society interconnect, and it is necessary to push this understanding along to fully grasp the connections between race, environment, and infrastructure systems. An “8-29 Commission”—that is, an in-depth investigation into the disaster and recovery process—is one tool to promote transparency, interdisciplinary solutions, and opportunities to correct structural racial and economic imbalances following natural disasters. Decisions made centuries ago exerted their influence in the lives and deaths of victims of Hurricane Katrina. A mindnumbing parade of zoning and land-use choices, highway and seaway budgets, and social and political desensitization helped to bring this nation to the flooded rooftops of the Lower Ninth Ward. Along the way, isolated voices sounded alarms about the cumulative effects of these choices and the dangerous territory we were entering. But until now, these voices have been ignored, discredited as fear-mongers, enemies of prosperity, or naïve peacemakers. Now when people urge protection of the natural systems that protect us from disaster, the example of Hurricane Katrina makes this plea resonate. The same thing now occurs with demands for a strengthened social safety net for our most vulnerable and marginalized citizens, or for greater care in locating and containing facilities that generate hazardous substances, or for recognition of the inherent value of human life when making dry cost-benefit analyses. This region of our nation has paid an extraordinarily high and unnecessary price for its long history of discrimination against racial minorities and its refusal to rectify systematic economic impoverishment. Ultimately, that price is a shared debt of all Americans, spiritual as well as financial. If this nation truly embraces the sanctity of human life, then it must more forcefully employ the precautionary principle to protect life, from local land-use and zoning decisions to conservation of natural resources, and from the regulation of pollutants and toxins to how we fit our most disadvantaged fellow citizens into the fabric of our communities. Hurricane Katrina’s ultimate lesson for communities planning for or recovering from disaster is captured in the words of Justice Cardozo: “prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.

**There is an infinite obligation for government action on Katrina**

**Jorgenson 11** Hurricane Katrina: Humanitarian Obligations and Lessons Learned Ellen Jorgenson Case-Specific Briefing Paper Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies University of Denver 2011

According to Fred Cuny, the root cause of most disasters is poverty (Van Arsdale 2011). Risk exists in the environment and impinges upon people; vulnerability exists within cohorts of people. Those in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina were at-risk as vulnerabilities such as impoverishment combined with the low-land geography and environmental risks of the 7 hurricane. Poverty is particularly highlighted as a primary construct in protection, relief, and prevention. Long-term vulnerabilities interact with risk factors that exist in the environment, creating problems in humanitarian emergencies. As Barbara Thomas Slater explains, poverty reflects long-lasting systematic inequalities in life chances (Van Arsdale 2011). Furthermore, speaking generally, those systematic inequalities related to ethnicity, gender, religion and caste, lead to unequal outcomes: income, power, privilege, fame, and deference. William Felice states that poverty should be a central concern for humanitarians (Van Arsdale 2011). Thomas Pogge argues that people of the developed world must be mandated to tackle poverty. To paraphrase him, “The inadequate response we’ve had to poverty is in part due to thoughtlessness, and we must morally situate ourselves in respect to poverty and chose to act. If we fail to act we must understand the consequences” (Van Arsdale 2011). **Human accountability and responsibility are associated with a theory of obligation.** These are not options, nor abstractions; **we must help and sustain help to those in need.** Humanitarian action and motivation must revolve around need, not be donor-driven. Within the theory of obligation ethics, practice and theory come into play (Van Arsdale 2011). Regarding ethics in the example of Hurricane Katrina, key philosophical questions must be asked. Can we really afford to proceed as a nation without addressing how race, poverty, and class infiltrate the opportunities of so many citizens? Why is it that the poor of New Orleans, as well as the poor of the nation, are hidden from us? The factors of race and social economic status contribute. The implications are critical as “lessons learned” emerge and as the United States learns to better prevent and respond to future disasters.8 Following the hurricane, the belief that the poor black population of New Orleans brought their suffering on themselves was reflected throughout the media, including remarks made by religious leaders and talk show hosts like Bill O’Reilly and Rush Limbaugh. One journalist argued, “poor, often black hurricane victims brought all the misery and death on themselves, because they weren’t motivated enough to succeed in America” (Dyson 2006, 181). **Race and socioeconomic status in fact are reflected as the theory of obligation is considered in practice. Poverty is not a choice, as several humanitarians previously explained. Yet obligations must exceed simple morality and be underlined in government**, NGO and individual reactions to disasters, **interpreted through policy and practice.**

### Impacts to ethics

**Embracing the Other makes war impossible**

**Caygill 02** Howard, Professor of Cultural History at Goldsmiths College, University of London, Levinas and the Political

The other makes possible the time of labour and possession while also putting it into question. It makes possible the time of war while forbidding murder. This is because the other teaches the I, showing it to be implicated in a totality of opposed forces. Through this teaching, the I ‘discovers itself as a violence, but thereby enters into a new dimension’ (TI, 171). Levinas takes several precautions to ensure that the other cannot be considered to be on a war footing with the I that it has made and now challenges. The other is above totality, not within it; the other is ‘fundamentally pacific’, not another freedom to oppose mine; its ‘alterity is manifested in mastery that does not conquer, but teaches’ (TI, 171). Its teaching is essentially moral, putting into question violence and substituting the word for war in a ‘primordial dispossession, a first donation’ (TI, 173). Yet there is need for more argument to sustain the claims that this dispossession is not an act of war, that we are still not duped by morality, or that the conditions of welcoming the other and making the donation are not themselves a possession that must be defended by war.

**Endorsing the Other is the only way to prevent apocalypse**

**Fasching 93** Darrell, professor of religious studies at the University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia

The apocalyptic threat of our time is that we shall be swallowed up in the abyss of the demonic. Our utopian hope lies in passing over and coming back. Our hope lies in creating a new world where strangers are welcome, a world where bonds of cross-cultural understanding could alter our relation to the technical order and at the same time make total destruction of "the other" unthinkable. I believe such a world is possible, based on a new social-ethical coalition of Jews, Christians, Buddhists, and other more "secular" atheistsone that can have a transformative impact on the rest of the world. What is proposed is not so much a set of answers to the problems of the modern world as it is a process to be engaged in, through which, at the intersection of religions and cultures, we might find our way into the future together. It is not my intent to provide "final solutions" to the world's problems. "Final solutions'' and "having a future," I fear, are incompatible goals. For my part, I prefer living in an unfinished world-one open to the utopian possibilities of our humanity as we approach the coming of the third millennium.

**Obligation to the other**

**Burns 08** Lawrence, Professor in History of Medicine at the King’s University College at the University of Western Ontario, “Identifying concrete ethical demands in the face of the abstract other: Emmanuel Levinas’ pragmatic ethics”, Philosophy Social Criticism March 2008 vol. 34 no. 3

The link between the face of the other and the demand for justiﬁcation establishes the pragmatic character of Levinas’ ethics. To see the other is to be obligated to respond to a need. I may agree, disagree, explain why I cannot help the other, or I may even act to help the other, but the obligation to respond is not diminished no matter what my response may be. Thus, even though the other may call ‘my joyous possession of the world’ into question (TI, 75–6/73), I can still turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to the face and voice of the other and develop an alibi. Given the distinction between shouldering responsibility on the one hand and acting on that responsibility on the other, i.e. between the experience of obligation (the imperative) and the subject’s responsive performance (Gibbs, 2000: 3), we need to situate this pragmatic ethics at the proper level of analysis. Thus, the responsive performance will require that the subject draw up a plan in which traditional moral norms of the kind that Ricoeur envisions are invoked and repaired. The guidance for that repair cannot come from the internal force of the norms themselves because they are broken norms that cause suffering. Instead, a prophetic response is required that looks beyond the norms in order to repair them. However, even though it is necessary to look beyond the norms, those norms do not disappear. They are repaired, revised, and justiﬁed, but only because of the subject’s assumption of responsibility for the other.

**Their vision justifies genocide – Nietzsche may not have been a Nazi but his vision was compatible with theirs – if nothing is true everything is permitted**

**Fasching 93** Darrell, professor of religious studies at the University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia

Scarcely more than half a century after Nietzsche's madman had unleashed his prophecy the Nazis came along to embrace his vision of a normless will to power. Nietzsche had offered a vision of a new type of individual who would have to take charge of human history after the death of God; namely, the Übermensch or self-transcending person. Such individuals would have the courage to "transvalue all values" and remake the world in their own image. Nietzsche, of course, had a somewhat aristocratic vision of these new individuals. But his vision was easily usurped by the Nazis who imagined themselves, the pure Aryan race, as the natural embodiment of this superior human being who would recreate the world through a will to power. The Nazi program of attempted genocide of the Jews is a logical outcome of this new normless situation expressed in Nietzsche's parable of "the Death of God." In a world where power is the final arbiter of values and might makes right, deicide is inexorably followed by genocide.

**Ethics are not relativistic and recognizing this allows us to avoid mass violence**

**Fasching 93** Darrell, professor of religious studies at the University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia

As long as the social order was believed to have "sacred origins" established "in the beginning," its order was the unchangeable fate of humanity. Once that order was desacralized, society was open to being shaped and changed. But to the degree that the values which shaped public order were understood to be part of the sacred normative order of nature, secularization destroyed the normative horizon of order and left human beings naked and adrift in Nietzsche's horizonless world where only a demonic and unchecked will to power reigns. The task of social ethics today is to discover those norms that transcend any given culture, in order to critique the present order of society and imagine and outline a new world in which the human is realizable through its utopian capacity for self-transcendence. And the effecting of social ethics today is the personal, political and managerial task of a shaping a public policy capable of sustaining the utopian order of an open society where, in the face of finitude and tragedy, we can remain willing and able to make new beginnings.

**The mindset that any impacts are inevitable and we should ignore morals causes nuclear omnicide.**

**Fasching 93** Darrell, professor of religious studies at the University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia

In charge of the naked public square we will find the descendants of Nietzsche's madman who came to declare God dead and replace him with the Übermensch who lives by the will to power. Living in a world without horizons, a world of cultural relativism, they propose a politics of realism, a MAD balance of terror, as the essence of human wisdom. Living in a world of relativism, they propose to settle the issue by an arbitrary leap into an absolutized defense of their particular way of life. Nietzsche's madman asked: "How shall we, the murderers of all murderers, comfort ourselves? What was holiest and most powerful of all has bled to death under our knives. Who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves. What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent. Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must not we ourselves become gods simply to seem worthy of it?" 101 We know now what games the descendants of Nietzsche's madman invented. We know now what games the new gods who live by the will to power invented. They were first played at Auschwitz and Hiroshima. The object of the game is to kill in order to heal, to assume total control over life and death. If being a god is being in control then no one is more totally in control of his or her life than the suicidal person who believes that suicide is "the final solution." We have now entered a civilizational era in which this private fantasy has become a public and collective fantasy. We live in a world of realists who offer us a "final solution" to the ambiguity of the human predicament. Nietzsche's Übermensch and Nietzsche's madman are one and the same being. This Nietzschean superior human being is the technological self that assumes its utopian transvaluation of all values can be accomplished through an autonomous will to power. It is no accident that such Nietzschean selves can never leave off from giving in order to receive. This self, which is always trying to fill the naked public square with the works of his or her own ego, ends up trapped in the cycle of eternal return, of eternal repetition. For a self-transcendence that is not empty, that is not open to the infinite, can produce only an infinitizing (or absolutizing) of the self, in which its will to power proceeds from deicide to homicide. The will to power and its violence is never the midwife of the utopian but always and ever returns us to the world of necessity and selfdestruction – the wheel of eternal repetition. There are those who think that the MAD-ness of our civilization has dissipated with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But it remains to be seen whether these changes are profound or merely surface changes. Psychologically, we seem to have been given a reprieve, Nuclear annhilation may seem to us less imminent than at any other time since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yet whether nuclear annihilation is viewed as imminent or relatively remote is more likely a symptom of a shift in the manic-depressive rhythms of the Janus-faced myth that governs our era than of any truly utopian change. There are still enough nuclear weapons in their silos to more than complete our annihilation. And with the break up of the Soviet Union there is less control over these weapons than beforeand more possibilities for their mindless use. But the MAD-ness of our era is not determined by whether such weapons are ever used. The bomb simply brings into dramatic relief the madness that pervades our everyday world. The MAD-ness is in our methods – our techno-bureaucratic methods. Our dehumanizing techno-bureaucratic methods conjoined with our various sacral (dualistic) narratives governed by a Nietzschean will to power feed the conflicts that divide us, both within and between nations – conflicts that have tempted us (and will tempt us again) to seek "final solutions."

**Our politics is necessary to celebrating life. The alternative denies our potential to affirm life and condemns others to unnecessary suffering.**

**May 05** Todd May, prof at Clemson. “To change the world, to celebrate life,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 2005 Vol 31 nos 5–6

To change the world and to celebrate life. This, as the theologian Harvey Cox saw, is the struggle within us. It is a struggle in which one cannot choose sides; or better, a struggle in which one must choose both sides. The abandonment of one for the sake of the other can lead only to disaster or callousness. Forsaking the celebration of life for the sake of changing the world is the path of the sad revolutionary. In his preface to Anti-Oedipus, Foucault writes that one does not have to be sad in order to he revolutionarv. The matter is more urgent than that, however. One cannot be both sad and revolutionary lacking a sense of the wondrous that is already here, among us, one who is bent upon changing the world can only become solemn or bitter. He or she is focused only on the future; the present is what is to be overcome. The vision of what is not but must come to be overwhelms all else, and the point of change itself becomes lost. The history of the left in the 20th century offers numerous examples of this, and the disaster that attends to it should be evident to all of us by now. The alternative is surely not to shift one’s allegiance to the pure celebration of life, although there are many who have chosen this path. It is at best blindness not to see the misery that envelops so many of our fellow humans, to say nothing of what happens to sentient nonhuman creatures. The attempt to jettison world-changing for an uncritical assent to the world as it is requires a self-deception that I assume would be anathema for those of us who have studied Foucault. Indeed, it is anathema for all of us who awaken each day to an America whose expansive boldness is matched only by an equally expansive disregard for those we place in harm’s way. This is the struggle, then. The one between the desire for life celebration and the desire for world-changing. The struggle between reveling in the contingent and fragile joys that constitute our world and wresting it from its intolerability. I am sure it is a struggle that is not foreign to anyone who is reading this. I am sure as well that the stakes for choosing one side over another that I have recalled here are obvious to everyone. The question then becomes one of how to choose both sides at once. III Maybe it happens this way. You walk into a small meeting room at the back of a local bookstore. There are eight or ten people milling about. They’re dressed in dark clothes, nothing fancy, and one or two of them have earrings or dreadlocks. They vary in age. You don’t know any of them. You’ve never seen them before. Several of them seem to know one another. They are affectionate, hugging, letting a hand linger on a shoulder or an elbow. A younger man, tall and thin, with an open face and a blue baseball cap bearing no logo, glides into the room. Two others, a man and a woman, shout, ‘Tim!’ and he glides over to them and hugs them, one at a time. They tell him how glad they are that he could make it, and he says that he just got back into town and heard about the meeting. You stand a little off to the side. Nobody has taken a seat at the rectangle of folding tables yet. You don’t want to be the first to sit down. Tim looks around the room and smiles. Several other people filter in. You’re not quite sure where to put your hands so you slide them into your jean pockets. You hunch your shoulders. Tim’s arrival has made you feel more of an outsider. But then he sees you. He edges his way around several others and walks up to you and introduces himself. You respond. Tim asks and you tell him that this is your first time at a meeting like this. He doesn’t ask about politics but about where you’re from. He tells you he has a friend in that neighborhood and do you know . . . ? Then several things happen that you only vaguely notice because you’re talking with Tim. People start to sit down at the rectangle of tables. One of them pulls out a legal pad with notes on it. She sits at the head of the rectangle; or rather, when she sits down there, it becomes the head. And there’s something you don’t notice at all. You are more relaxed, your shoulders have stopped hunching, and when you sit down the seat feels familiar. The woman at the head of the table looks around. She smiles; her eyes linger over you and a couple of others that you take to be new faces, like yours. She says, ‘Maybe we should begin.’ IV I can offer only a suggestion of an answer here today. It is a suggestion that brings together some thoughts from the late writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with those of Foucault, in order to sketch not even a framework for thought, but the mere outlines of a framework. It is not a framework that would seek to find the unconscious of each in the writings of the other. Neither thinker finishes or accomplishes the other. (Often, for example regarding methodology, they do not even agree.) Rather, it is a framework that requires both of them, from their very different angles, in order to be able to think it. My goal in constructing the outlines of this framework is largely philosophical. That is to say, the suggestion I would like to make here is not one for resolving for each of us the struggle of life-celebration and world-changing, but of offering a way to conceive ourselves that allows us to embrace both sides of this battle at the same time. Given the thinkers I have chosen as reference points, it will be no surprise when I say that that conception runs through the body. Let me start with Merleau-Ponty. In his last writings, particularly in The Visible and the Invisible, he offers a conception of the body that is neither at odds nor even entangled with the world, but is of the very world itself. His concept of the flesh introduces a point of contact that is also a point of undifferentiation. The flesh, Merleau-Ponty writes, ‘is the coiling over of the visible upon the seeing body, of the tangible upon the touching body, which is attested in particular when the body sees itself, touches itself seeing and touching the things, such that, as tangible it descends among them’.2 We must recall this economy of the flesh before we turn to Foucault. There is, for Merleau-Ponty, a single Being. Our world is of that Being, and we are of our world. We are not something that confronts the world from outside, but are born into it and do not leave it. This does not mean that we cannot remove ourselves from the immediacy of its grasp. What it means is that to remove ourselves from that immediacy is neither the breaking of a bond nor the discovery of an original dichotomy or dualism. What is remarkable about human beings is precisely our capacity to confront the world, to reflect upon it, understand it, and change it, while still being of a piece with it. To grasp this remarkable character, it is perhaps worth recalling Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the fold. The world is not composed of different parts; there is no transcendent, whether of God or of subjectivity. The world is one. As Deleuze sometimes says, being is univocal. This oneness is not, however, inert or inanimate. Among other things, it can fold over on itself, creating spaces that are at once insides and outsides, at once different from and continuous with one another. The flesh is a fold of Being in this sense. It is of the world, and yet encounters it as if from a perceptual or cognitive distance. It is a visibility that sees, a tangible that touches, an audible that hears. Merleau- Ponty writes: There is vision, touch when a certain visible, a certain tangible, turns back upon the whole of the visible, the whole of the tangible, of which it is a part, or when suddenly it finds itself surrounded by them, or when between it and them, and through their commerce, is formed a Visibility, a Tangible in itself, which belong properly neither to the body qua fact nor to the world qua fact . . . and which therefore form a couple, a couple more real than either of them.3 For Merleau-Ponty, thought and reflection do not attach themselves to this flesh from beyond it, but arise through it. As our body is of this world, our thought is of our bodies, its language of a piece with the world it addresses. ‘[I]f we were to make completely explicit the architectonics of the human body, its ontological framework, and how it sees itself and hears itself, we would see the possibilities of language already given in it.’4 This conception of the body as flesh of the world is not foreign to Foucault, although of course the terms Merleau-Ponty uses are not his. We might read Foucault’s politics as starting from here, inaugurated at the point of undifferentiation between body and world. The crucial addition he would make is that that point of undifferentiation is not historically inert. The body/world nexus is inscribed in a history that leaves its traces on both at the same time, and that crosses the border of the flesh and reaches the language that arises from it, and the thought that language expresses. How does this work?V Maybe it doesn’t happen that way. Maybe it happens another way. Maybe you walk into a room at a local community center. The room is large, but there aren’t many people, at least yet. There’s a rectangular table in the center, and everyone is sitting around it. A couple of people look up as you walk in. They nod slightly. You nod back, even more slightly. At the head of the table is someone with a legal pad. She does not look up. She is reading the notes on the pad, making occasional marks with the pen in her right hand. Other people come in and take places at the table. One or two of them open laptop computers and look for an outlet. Eventually, the table fills up and people start sitting in chairs behind the table. Your feel as though you’re in an inner circle where you don’t belong. You wonder whether you should give up your chair and go sit on the outside with the others who are just coming in now. Maybe people notice you, think you don’t belong there. At this moment you’d like to leave. You begin to feel at once large and small, visually intrusive and an object of scrutiny. You don’t move because maybe this is OK after all. You just don’t know. The room is quiet. A couple of people cough. Then the woman seated at the head of the table looks up. She scans the room as if taking attendance. She says, ‘Maybe we should begin.’ VI Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the body as flesh is an ontological one. Although he does not see the body as remote from its historical inscription, his discussion does not incorporate the role such inscription plays. For a body to be of the world is also for it to be temporal, to be encrusted in the continuous emerging of the world over time. And this emerging is not abstract; rather, it is concrete. The body/world nexus evolves during particular historical periods. This fold of the flesh, this body, is not nowhere and at any time. It is there, then; or it is here, now. A body is entangled within a web of specific events and relations that, precisely because it is of this world, are inescapably a part of that body’s destiny. As Merleau-Ponty tells us in Phenomenology of Perception, ‘our open and personal existence rests on an initial foundation of acquired and stabilized existence. But it could not be otherwise, if we are temporality, since the dialectic of acquisition and future is what constitutes time.’5 The medium for the body’s insertion into a particular net of events and relations is that of social practices. Our bodies are not first and foremost creatures of the state or the economy, no more than they are atomized wholes distinct from the world they inhabit. Or better, they are creatures of the state and the economy inasmuch as those appear through social practices, through the everyday practices that are the ether of our lives. Social practices are the sedimentation of history at the level of the body. When I teach, when I write this article, when I run a race or teach one of my children how to ride a bicycle, my body is oriented in particular ways, conforming to or rejecting particular norms, responding to the constraints and restraints of those practices as they have evolved in interaction with other practices over time. Through its engagement in these practices, my body has taken on a history that is not of my making but is nevertheless part of my inheritance. It is precisely because, as Merleau-Ponty has written, the body and the world are not separate things but rather in a chiasmic relation that we can think this inheritance. And it is because of Foucault’s histories that we can recognize that this inheritance is granted through specific social practices. And of course, as Foucault has taught us, social practices are where the power is. It is not, or not simply, at the level of the state or the modes of production where power arises. It is, as he sometimes puts it, at the capillaries. One of the lessons of Discipline and Punish is that, if the soul is the prison of the body, this is because the body is inserted into a set of practices that create for it a soul. These practices are not merely the choices of an individual whose thought surveys the world from above, but instead the fate of a body that is of a particular world at a particular time and place. Moreover, these practices are not merely in service to a power that exists outside of them; they are mechanisms of power in their own right. It is not because Jeremy Bentham disliked the prison population that the Panopticon became a grid for thinking about penal institutions. It is instead because the evolution of penal practices at that time created an opening for the economy of visibility that the Panopticon represented. When Foucault writes that . . . the soul has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished – and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives6 his claim is informed by four other ones that lie behind it: that bodies are of a piece with the world, that the body/world nexus is a temporal one, that the medium of that corporeal temporality is the practices a body is engaged in, and that that medium is political as well as social. The last three claims are, of course, of the framework of Foucault’s thought. The first one is the ontological scaffolding provided by Merleau-Ponty. And it is by means of all four that we can begin to conceive things so as to be able to choose both world-changing and lifecelebrating at the same time. VII It could happen yet another way. Increasingly, it does. There is no meeting. There are no tables and no legal pads. Nobody sits down in a room together, at least nobody sits down at a place you know about. There may not even be a leaflet. Maybe you just got an email that was forwarded by someone you know slightly and who thought you might be interested. At the bottom there’s a link, in case you want to unsubscribe. If you don’t unsubscribe you get more notices, with petitions to sign or times and places for rallies or teach-ins or marches. Maybe there’s also a link for feedback or a list for virtual conversations or suggestions. If you show up, it’s not to something you put together but to something that was already in place before you arrived. How did you decide on this rally or teach-in? You sat in front of your computer screen, stared at it, pondering. Maybe you emailed somebody you know, asking for their advice. Is it worth going? If it’s on campus you probably did. It matters who will see you, whether you have tenure, how much you’ve published. There are no Tims here. You’ve decided to go. If it’s a teach-in, you’ve got plausible deniability; you’re just there as an observer. If it’s a rally, you can stand to the side. But maybe you won’t do that. The issue is too important. You don’t know the people who will be there, but you will stand among them, walk among them. You will be with them, in some way. Bodies at the same time and place. You agree on the issue, but it’s a virtual agreement, one that does not come through gestures or words but through sharing the same values and the same internet connections. As you march, as you stand there, nearly shoulder to shoulder with others of like mind, you’re already somewhere else, telling this story to someone you know, trying to get them to understand the feeling of solidarity that you are projecting back into this moment. You say to yourself that maybe you should have brought a friend along. There are many ways to conceive the bond between world-changing and life-celebrating. Let me isolate two: one that runs from Merleau-Ponty to Foucault, from the body’s chiasmic relation with the world to the politics of its practices; and the other one running back in the opposite direction. The ontology Merleau-Ponty offers in his late work is one of wonder. Abandoning the sterile philosophical debates about the relation of mind and body, subject and object, about the relation of reason to that which is not reason, or the problem of other minds, his ontology forges a unity of body and world that puts us in immediate contact with all of its aspects. No longer are we to be thought the self-enclosed creatures of the philosophical tradition. We are now in touch with the world, because we are of it. Art, for example, does not appeal solely to our minds; its beauty is not merely a matter of the convergence of our faculties. We are moved by art, often literally moved, because our bodies and the work of art share the same world. As Merleau-Ponty says, ‘I would be at great pains to say where is the painting I am looking at. For I do not look at it as I do a thing; I do not fix it in its place. My gaze wanders in it as in the halos of Being. It is more accurate to say that I see according to it, or with it, than that I see it.’7 It is only because my body is a fold of this world that art can affect me so. But this affection is also a vulnerability. As my look can happen according to a work of art, so it can happen according to a social practice. And even more so in proportion as that social practice and its effects are suffused through the world in which I carry on my life, the world my body navigates throughout the day, every day. I do not have a chance to look according to a painting by Cezanne very often; but I do encounter the effects of normalization as it has filtered through the practices of my employment, of my students’ upbringing, and of my family’s expectations of themselves and one another. The vulnerability of the body, then, is at once its exposure to beauty and its opening to what is intolerable. We might also see things from the other end, starting from politics and ending at the body. I take it that this is what Foucault suggests when he talks about bodies and pleasures at the end of the first volume of the History of Sexuality. If we are a product of our practices and the conception of ourselves and the world that those practices have fostered, so to change our practices is to experiment in new possibilities both for living and, inseparably, for conceiving the world. To experiment in sexuality is not to see where the desire that lies at the core of our being may lead us; that is simply the continuation of our oppression by other means. Rather, it is to construct practices where what is at issue is no longer desire but something else, something that might go by the name of bodies and pleasures. In doing so, we not only act differently, we think differently, both about ourselves and about the world those selves are inseparable from. And because these experiments are practices of our bodies, and because our bodies are encrusted in the world, these experiments become not merely acts of political resistance but new folds in the body/ world nexus. To construct new practices is to appeal to aspects or possibilities of the world that have been previously closed to us. It is to offer novel, and perhaps more tolerable, engagements in the chiasm of body and world. Thus we might say of politics what Merleau-Ponty has said of painting, that we see according to it. Here, I take it, is where the idea of freedom in Foucault lies. For Foucault, freedom is not a metaphysical condition. It does not lie in the nature of being human, nor is it a warping, an atomic swerve, in the web of causal relations in which we find ourselves. To seek our freedom in a space apart from our encrustation in the world is not so much to liberate ourselves from its influence as to build our own private prison. Foucault once said: There’s an optimism that consists in saying that things couldn’t be better. My optimism would consist rather in saying that so many things can be changed, fragile as they are, bound up more with circumstances than with necessities, more arbitrary than self-evident, more a matter of complex, but temporary, historical circumstances than with inevitable anthropological constraints . . .8 That is where to discover our freedom. And what happens from there? From the meetings, from the rallies, from the petitions and the teach-ins? What happens next? There is, after all, always a next. If you win this time – end aid to the contras, divest from apartheid South Africa, force debt-forgiveness by technologically advanced countries – there is always more to do. There is the de-unionization of workers, there are gay rights, there is Burma, there are the Palestinians, the Tibetans. There will always be Tibetans, even if they aren’t in Tibet, even if they aren’t Asian. But is that the only question: Next? Or is that just the question we focus on? What’s the next move in this campaign, what’s the next campaign? Isn’t there more going on than that? After all, engaging in political organizing is a practice, or a group of practices. It contributes to making you who you are. It’s where the power is, and where your life is, and where the intersection of your life and those of others (many of whom you will never meet, even if it’s for their sake that you’re involved) and the buildings and streets of your town is. This moment when you are seeking to change the world, whether by making a suggestion in a meeting or singing at a rally or marching in silence or asking for a signature on a petition, is not a moment in which you don’t exist. It’s not a moment of yours that you sacrifice for others so that it no longer belongs to you. It remains a moment of your life, sedimenting in you to make you what you will become, emerging out of a past that is yours as well. What will you make of it, this moment? How will you be with others, those others around you who also do not cease to exist when they begin to organize or to protest or to resist? The illusion is to think that this has nothing to do with you. You’ve made a decision to participate in world-changing. Will that be all there is to it? Will it seem to you a simple sacrifice, for this small period of time, of who you are for the sake of others? Are you, for this moment, a political ascetic? Asceticism like that is dangerous. Freedom lies not in our distance from the world but in the historically fragile and contingent ways we are folded into it, just as we ourselves are folds of it. If we take Merleau-Ponty’s Being not as a rigid foundation or a truth behind appearances but as the historical folding and refolding of a univocity, then our freedom lies in the possibility of other foldings. Merleau-Ponty is not insensitive to this point. His elusive concept of the invisible seems to gesture in this direction. Of painting, he writes: the proper essence of the visible is to have a layer of invisibility in the strict sense, which it makes present as a certain absence . . . There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties of the visible; but there is also that which reaches it from below . . . and that which reaches it from above . . . where it no longer participates in the heaviness of origins but in free accomplishments.9 Elsewhere, in The Visible and the Invisible, he says: if . . . the surface of the visible, is doubled up over its whole extension with an invisible reserve; and if, finally, in our flesh as the flesh of things, the actual, empirical, ontic visible, by a sort of folding back, invagination, or padding, exhibits a visibility, a possibility that is not the shadow of the actual but its principle . . . an interior horizon and an exterior horizon between which the actual visible is a partitioning and which, nonetheless, open indefinitely only upon other visibles . . .10 What are we to make of these references? We can, to be sure, see the hand of Heidegger in them. But we may also, and for present purposes more relevantly, see an intersection with Foucault’s work on freedom. There is an ontology of freedom at work here, one that situates freedom not in the private reserve of an individual but in the unfinished character of any historical situation. There is more to our historical juncture, as there is to a painting, than appears to us on the surface of its visibility. The trick is to recognize this, and to take advantage of it, not only with our thoughts but with our lives. And that is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to offer a new form of life-celebration. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this time at a new point, to see what that might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the intolerable. In a complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, there is no certainty about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it. And to seek one aspect without the other – life-celebration without world-changing, world-changing without life-celebration – is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the wellspring of both. If we are to celebrate our lives, if we are to change our world, then perhaps the best place to begin to think is our bodies, which are the openings to celebration and to change, and perhaps the point at which the war within us that I spoke of earlier can be both waged and resolved. That is the fragile beauty that, in their different ways, both Merleau- Ponty and Foucault have placed before us. The question before us is whether, in our lives and in our politics, we can be worthy of it. So how might you be a political body, woven into the fabric of the world as a celebrator and as a changer? You went to the meeting, and then to the demonstration. How was it there? Were the bodies in harmony or in counterpoint? Did you sing with your feet, did your voice soar? Did your mind come alive? Did you see possibilities you had not seen before? Were there people whose words or clothes, or even the way they walked hand in hand (how long has it been since you’ve walked hand in hand with someone out in public?) offer you a possibility, or make you feel alive as well as righteous? And how about those people off to the side, the ones on the sidewalk watching? Maybe they just stared, or maybe nodded as you went past. Or maybe some of them shouted at you to stop blocking the streets with your nonsense. Did you recoil within yourself, see yourself as in a mirror, or as the person at Sartre’s keyhole who’s just been caught? Did you feel superior to them, smug in your knowledge? Or did they, too, show you something you might learn from? Are they you at another moment, a moment in the past or in the future? Are they your parents that you have not explained to, sat down beside, or just shared a meal with? That one over there, the old man slightly stooped in the long overcoat: whom does he remind you of? What message might he have unwittingly brought for you? And why does it have to be a demonstration? You go to a few meetings, a few more demonstrations. You write some letters to legislators. You send an email to the President. And then more meetings. The next thing you know, you’re involved in a political campaign. By then you may have stopped asking why. This is how it goes: demonstrations, meetings with legislators, internet contacts. Does it have to be like this? Are demonstrations and meetings your only means? Do they become, sooner or later, not only means but ends? And what kinds of ends? In some sense they should always be ends: a meeting is a celebration, after all. But there are other ends as well. You go to the meeting because that fulfills your obligation to your political conscience. Does it come to that? There are other means, other ends. Other means/ends. Some people ride bicycles, en masse, slowly through crowded urban streets. You want environmentalism? Then have it. The streets are beautiful with their tall corniced buildings and wide avenues. To ride a bike through these streets instead of hiding in the armor of a car would be exhilarating. If enough of you do it together it would make for a pleasant ride, as well as a little lived environmentalism. Would you want to call it a demonstration? Would it matter? There are others as well who do other things with their bodies, more dangerous things. Some people have gone to Palestine in order to put their bodies between the Palestinians and the Israeli soldiers and settlers who attack them. They lie down next to Palestinians in front of the bulldozers that would destroy homes or build a wall through a family’s olive orchard. They feel the bodies of those they are in solidarity with. They smell the soil of Palestine as they lay there. Sometimes, they are harmed by it. A young woman, Rachel Corrie, was deliberately crushed by a US bulldozer operated by an Israeli soldier as she kneeled in front of a Palestinian home, hoping to stop its demolition. To do politics with one’s body can be like this. To resist, to celebrate, is also to be vulnerable. The world that you embrace, the world of which you are a part, can kill you too. And so you experiment. You try this and you try that. You are a phenomenologist and a genealogist. You sense what is around you, attend to the way your body is encrusted in your political involvements. And you know that that sensing has its own history, a history that often escapes you even as it envelops you. There is always more to what you are, and to what you are involved in, than you can know. So you try to keep vigilant, seeking the possibilities without scorning the realities. It’s a difficult balance. You can neglect it if you like. Many do. But your body is there, woven into the fabric of all the other bodies, animate and inanimate. Whether you like it or not, whether you recognize it or not. The only question is whether you will take up the world that you are of, or leave it to others, to those others who would be more than willing to take your world up for you.

### Ethics o/w Cap

**Marxism remains bound to assimilating the Other**

**Tahmasebi 10**Victoria, assistant professor in women's studies/humanities at the University of Toronto Scarborough, “Does Levinas justify or transcend liberalism? Levinas on human Liberation”, Philosophy Social Criticism June 2010 vol. 36 no. 5

Marx, according to Levinas, is right insofar as he realizes that consciousness, as perceived in modern liberal philosophy, cannot determine being. Marx is the first philosopher who recognizes ‘the whole weight of matter in the present itself’. 26 Marx, according to Levinas, is the only western philosopher who does not view the human as existing in pure freedom; Marx acknowledges the chaining of the body and its consciousness to the concrete existence which no reason can completely undo. In Marxism, the spirit ‘is no longer a pure reason that partakes in a real of ends. It is prey to material needs.’ 27 Consequently, Levinas claims that Marxism ‘is opposed not just to Christianity, but to the whole of idealist liberalism, wherein ‘‘being does not determine consciousness’’, but consciousness or reason determines being’. 28 Yet for Levinas, Marx’s break with liberal, western tradition is not radical enough. 29 By insisting that being determines consciousness, Marx does not take the implications of the original freedom sufficiently seriously. In Marxism, the consciousness is expected to liberate being from that which determines it. If consciousness is solely determined by being, how then is consciousness to free the being from that which determines it? How can an overdetermined consciousness free the being unless it is originally constituted through something beyond itself, through its openness to the idea of transcendence, which is expressed concretely in the face of another human being? Marxism ignores the fundamental sensibility at the heart of subjectivity which inspires the subject to transcend its own being, and his or her thought to think beyond itself in such a way that liberation means something more than resubjugation of one and the other to the domination of another totalized identity. To Levinas, Marx, although he realizes that economic justice is central to human dignity, and opens philosophy to something beyond itself by acknowledging the other and her or his demand on humanity, 30 is unable to open the fundamentally ethical dimension of liberation. Marx’s foundational legitimacy of the human liberation is still trapped within the logic of the same, based on comprehension and identification of the other and the equation of the other’s suffering with one’s own. Levinas’ ethical relation suggests that the legitimacy of human liberation from bondage is not, as it is proposed by new forms of social movements in liberal democracy, based on difference. Nor is it based on a class consciousness that converts members of a class from a ‘class in itself’ to a ‘class for itself’. 31 Rather, human liberation from bondage, justice, ‘consists in recognizing in the Other my master’, 32 a proposition that runs contrary to the foundational narrative of the individual in the liberal tradition.

**Our struggle is a resistance to capitalism**

**Tahmasebi 10**Victoria, assistant professor in women's studies/humanities at the University of Toronto Scarborough, “Does Levinas justify or transcend liberalism? Levinas on human Liberation”, Philosophy Social Criticism June 2010 vol. 36 no. 5

Usually the answer to these objections is met by an argument that Levinas himself admits: as saying is always betrayed by the said, so too the irreducible responsibility for the other must be rectified by justice, necessitating the state, its hierarchical and bureaucratic structures, and even economic inequality. Indeed, Levinas consistently repeats this when confronted by questions of the impossibility of his ethical demand. He reminds us that saying is always betrayed by the said, by thematization, calculation and prioritization. However, betrayal is not inevitably translated into exploitation, oppression and poverty, all of which are tolerated and justified in liberal tradition and the liberal state. As Asher Horowitz argues, almost all Levinas’ readers interpret the relation between saying and the said, between ethics and politics, as paradoxical, viewing the political and the said as necessary and inevitable privations from the ethical relation, imposed by the requirements of being. 72 Such a reading, Horowitz continues, confines Levinas within the liberal framework, accepting rational peace as the limit in politics and conveniently forgetting that the abolition of economic domination and exploitation is to be put as the first ethical task. 73 For Horowitz, the relation between ethics and politics, between saying and the said, is not a paradox but a betrayal that can be reduced. But why cannot those scholars who, much like Cohen, interpret Levinas to justify the liberal state and its institutions, address and expand upon these central themes in Levinas’ ethics? Levinas argues that underlying his philosophy is a concern with reducing this betrayal to the extent that ‘one can at the same time know and free the known of the marks which thematization leaves on it by subordinating it to ontology’. 74 He sees the possibility even of freeing the other from the scars that thematization leaves, above all liberating the other from the economic exploitation and class structure inherent in liberal capitalist societies. In fact, Levinas considers the tearing-away of the human from economic bondage as the meaning of a revolution, suggesting that ‘revolution takes place when one frees man, that is, revolution takes place when one tears man away from economic determinism. To affirm that the working man is not negotiable, that he cannot be bargained about, is to affirm that which begins a revolution.’ 75 Therefore, beyond the objectification necessary to the human condition, bondage and suffering are unnecessary and avoidable, and the struggle against them is central to Levinas’ concept of one-for-the-other.

### Ethics o/w IR

**We need to combine a change in IR with a change in ethical narratives**

**Fasching 93** Darrell, professor of religious studies at the University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia

When I began work on this book in 1988 it seemed as if we were living on the brink of nuclear annihilation in a cold war standoff between Russia and the United States. In the time that elapsed while writing it, the unimaginable happened-in the Fall of 1989 the Berlin Wall and the entire Iron Curtain collapsed. The dust had barely settled from these events when in December 1991 the Soviet Union itself ceased to exist, breaking up into a loose confederation of republics. It might seem, in the light of these events, as if the utopianism of history has overtaken the apocalyptic alarm I have sounded in this book. Indeed, there are genuine utopian possibilities latent in our new situation. However, there are also good reasons to be cautious. We should not equate dramatic changes in the surface structure of events with the needed changes in the deep structure of our world. Although the psychological tension of the cold war between Russia and the United States has thawed, we should not forget that enough nuclear weapons still remain at the ready to annihilate us several times over. I do not think the events we have witnessed can yet be counted as genuinely utopian. Instead, I fear that we have just shifted from the depressive apocalyptic phase to the manic utopian phase of the Janus-faced myth that governs modern life. And so we will assume once again that fundamentally nothing needs changing. But a closer examination of the evidence, I think, will reveal that the geography of the sacred and the profane is not so much giving way to utopia as it has simply shifted, splintering along new lines of apocalyptic dualistic confrontation that may disperse the control over nuclear weapons (both within and beyond the former Soviet Union) in ways that are perhaps even more dangerous than before. In any case, the threat of nuclear war is an extreme symptomone that functions to draw our attention to the demonic tribalistic and technobureaucratic patterns of dehumanization at work in our emerging postmodern world. The point of this book is to analyze those patterns and suggest strategies for breaking them up so as to open up our world to its genuinely utopian possibilities-possibilities which lie beyond the sacral and demonic Janus-faced myth of apocalypse and utopia that presently governs our lives.

### Ethics o/w Ontology

**Our infusion of Levinasian ethics into politics is the only way to solve political concerns – focus on ontology cannot make material change or alter existing systems – this evidence is comparative**

**Kioupkiolis 11** Alexandros, Lecturer in Political Organization at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, “Keeping it open: Ontology, ethics, knowledge and radical democracy,” Philosophy & Social Criticism vol. 37 no. 6

As he understands it, the ‘political’ implies primarily the subversion of social fixity, the questioning of established order, transformative praxis and the construction of new subjectivities and social aggregations. Therefore, politics should break loose from ontology, which is entangled with order, stabilization, unity. 45 Critchley takes issue with notions and practices that ontologize politics and its agent, the people, by tying them up with a unified Volk or a state grounded in a communal essence. He assails Marx’s communism on the grounds that it is informed by an essentialist metaphysic of species-being which comes laden with an organicist notion of community and recalls ideas of fusion, fullness and harmony. 46 Politics, by contrast, is a manifestation of the multiplicity of the people who challenge established relations of power with various demands, 47 expressing a dissensus that disturbs and antagonizes instituted forms of society. Hence, politics should not be confused with any given order. Politics is at one with democracy construed as the ‘deformation of society from itself through the act of material political manifestation’. 48 A further reason for minding the gap between politics and ontology is that political action does not emanate from systemic laws and ontological determinations. It requires the intervention of a subject that is vested with powers of imagination and the will to fight and endure. No ontology can initiate political action and secure its outcomes. ‘We are on our own and what we do we have to do for ourselves.’ 49 Political agency is focused on the creation of a collective will, and this can only be the product of invention, struggle, negotiation and hegemony in specific situations, not the windfall of any pre-given ontology. After the collapse of grand revolutionary aspirations, the politics of resistance, emancipation and empowerment moves, for Critchley, in a particular direction. If the breakdown of the revolutionary proletarian subject has dashed the hopes of a final dissolution of the state, the politics of self-determination in autonomous associations should situate itself at a distance from the state, which operates vertical hierarchies of control and seeks to tighten its grip on society as a whole, stifling human freedom. 50 The politics of radical democracy should strive to bring about fissures in the order of ‘police’ and to carve out spaces of freedom within state-controlled society. Political resistance should undertake transformative praxis by bringing together dissenting subjects that struggle to attenuate the perverse effects of state politics and want to enact relations of conviviality and freedom. ‘True democracy would be an enactment of cooperative alliances . . . that materially deform the state power that threatens to saturate them.’ 51 Ethics in the guise of ‘anarchic meta-politics’ is lodged at the centre of this democratic vision. 52 Critchley’s anarchic ethics captures and upholds the political moment of democracy in which existing relations of control are questioned and unsettled by the dissenting demos – the moment when the contestability and mutability of social institutions are acknowledged and acted upon. But a narrower ethical dimension is equally pivotal for Critchley: the experience of an infinite demand of the other that calls on me to act in the name of my responsibility to the other, in response to particular injustices and conditions of distress. Anarchic meta-politics is propelled by the ‘exorbitant demand at the heart of my subjectivity that defines that subjectivity by dividing it and opening it to otherness’, 53 a demand which is posed concretely in particular situations and can arouse feelings of anger at the injustices suffered by others. In Critchley’s view, this ethical inflection, inspired by Levinas’ ethics of an infinite responsibility to the other, should provide the guide, the fuel and the glue for democratic resistances today. 54 If ontological schemata or structural laws cannot sustain radical politics today, anarchic, Levinasian ethics should step into their shoes. This ethical conception chimes with the disorderly, contestatory politics of democracy as it registers the experience of unruly encounters with multiple singularities, which elude full grasp and could not be contained within a single collective structure. 55 Moreover, if politics is not the outcome of objective mechanisms but consists in uncertain action and struggle, an ethics of responsibility can offer the guidance and motivation that are required for political agency. 56 Critchley commends his Levinasian ethics for these purposes because it stands out as a cogent expression of ethical experience, it can be detected on the ground of contemporary activism, it articulates a demand which is not arbitrary but universal in scope and it is energized by a feeling of anger at a situation of global injustice. 57 These features make the ethics of infinite responsibility well suited to produce the hegemonic glue that will hold the various dissident groups together in collective aggregations that fight global inequities.

**Even if they win ontology is inevitable – focus on it precludes possibilities to resistance against oppression**

**Kioupkiolis 11** Alexandros, Lecturer in Political Organization at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, “Keeping it open: Ontology, ethics, knowledge and radical democracy,” Philosophy & Social Criticism vol. 37 no. 6

Ontology may be pertinent and essentially unavoidable. Discourse and action are never free of certain suppositions about the constitution of human agents and their social world. By deserting the ontological field, radical democratic theory would simply fail to sustain critical reflection about its core commitments and would remain unguarded against the various attempts at entrenching or reviving the spectre of an essentially closed world. 3 Yet, in its conventional mould, ontology is a ‘science’ that covers ‘the very horizon of being in general’. 4 And any generalizing assertions about the being of society and the human subject are bound to strike as dubious, if not untenable, in the light of widely diffused ideas which affirm the contingency of human affairs, the historicity of understanding and the constructed nature of all representations. Moreover, by pinning down the basic structures of the world, ontological frames both disclose and foreclose possibilities. The exclusionary effects cut against the political animus of radical democracy, the drive to open up social relations to challenge and change without predefined bounds.

**The Other goes beyond the ability of ontology to comprehend**

**Simmons 99** William Paul, current Associate Professor of Political Science at ASU, formerly at Bethany College in the Department of History and Political Science. “The Third: Levinas' theoretical move from an-archical ethics to the realm of justice and politics,” Philosophy & Social Criticism November 1, 1999 vol. 25 no. 6

In Totality and Inﬁnity Levinas searched for a new philosophical justiﬁcation for the ethical relationship with the Other. Levinas argued that an adequate ethics can be found only in transcendence, but the predominant traditions in philosophy have erected totalizing systems which subordinate all elements of transcendence. Totalizing philosophies are grounded in an arche, usually a neuter term, like Being, spirit, reason, or history, which is declared to be the origin and guiding principle of reality. Philosophers desire to comprehend all experience through this neuter term. Metaphysics is reduced to ontology and thus philosophy is merely a battle between competing theories of being, literally an ‘ontologomachy’. Even theologians subordinate the divine to a neuter term ‘by expressing it with adverbs of height applied to the verb being; God is said to exist eminently or par excellence’. 5 The transcendent can be subordinated because all objects are reduced to a thing, and as a thing they can be com-prehended or grasped. Whatever is other can always be reduced to the Same; thus, there is nothing beyond the grasp of the Same. Although relative alterity, that is, qualitative differences between objects, may remain, radical alterity or transcendence is destroyed. How is it possible to break the stranglehold of ontology? How can transcendence be rediscovered in the Western tradition? How can Levinas claim that ethics and not ontology deserves to be labeled ‘ﬁrst philosophy’? According to Levinas, the face-to-face relationship with the other person, the Other, is beyond the grasp of ontology. The face cannot be totalized because it expresses inﬁnitude. In other words, the ego can never totally know the Other. In fact, the Other exists prior to the subject and ontology: the Other comes from the immemorial past. How can Levinas reject the Cartesian hypothesis and claim that the relationship with the Other is primary? How can the relationship with the Other precede my being? How can the Other be an-archical? In Totality and Inﬁnity, Levinas develops his an-archical ethics by reviving the Platonic distinction between need and eros or desire. 6 A need is a privation which can be sated, but a desire cannot be satisﬁed. The ego satisﬁes its needs, and remains within itself, by appropriating the world. ‘Need opens upon a world that is for-me; it returns to the self. . . . It is an assimilation of the world in view of coincidence with oneself, or happiness.’ 7 As the desired is approached, on the other hand, the hunger increases. It pulls the ego away from its self-sufﬁciency. Thus, needs belong to the realm of the Same, while desires pull the ego away from the Same and toward the beyond. Nonetheless, desires also originate in an ego who longs for the unattainable. Therefore, desire has a dual structure of transcendence and interiority. This dual structure includes an absolutely Other, the desired, which cannot be consumed and an ego who is preserved in this relationship with the transcendent. Thus, there is both a relationship and a separation. According to Levinas, this structure of desire is triggered by the approach of the Other. The ego strives to com-prehend, literally, to grasp the Other, but is unable. The Other expresses an inﬁnitude which cannot be reduced to ontological categories. The ego is pulled out of itself toward the transcendent. This inability to com-prehend the Other calls the ego and its self-sufﬁciency into question. Have I, merely by existing, already usurped the place of another? Am I somehow responsible for the death of the Other? The face calls the ego to respond before any unique knowledge about the Other. The approach of the human Other breaks the ego away from a concern for its own existence; with the appearance of the Other, Dasein is no longer a creature concerned with its own being. What I want to emphasize is that the human breaks with pure being, which is always a persistence in being. This is my principal thesis. . . . The being of animals is a struggle for life. A struggle for life without ethics. It is a question of might. Heidegger says at the beginning of Being and Time that Dasein is a being who in his being is concerned for this being itself. That’s Darwin’s idea: the living being struggles for life. The aim of being is being itself. However, with the appearance of the human – and this is my entire philosophy – there is something more important than my life, and that is the life of the other. 8 The face as pure expression calls the ego to respond, to do something to justify its existence. However, Levinas’ theory of responsibility does not call for the annihilation of the ego. Levinasian responsibility maintains the dual structure of desire; that is, it questions the privileged place of the Same, but it keeps the ego intact, albeit in a subordinate position. Without a responsible self, responsibility would lose its meaning. Levinas furnishes a new way to think about responsibility: the ego does not choose to answer the Other’s demand; to be human, it must respond to the Other. Responsibility is so extreme that it is the very deﬁnition of subjectivity, the ego is subject to the Other. ‘The I is not simply conscious of this necessity to respond . . . rather the I is, by its very position, responsibility through and through.’ 9 This primordial, an-archical responsibility is concrete, inﬁnite, and asymmetrical. A relationship with the inﬁnite cannot be used as an excuse not to care about the world. My responsibility for the Other must be expressed in a concrete way, with ‘full hands’. Levinas often cites a Jewish proverb: ‘The other’s material needs are my spiritual needs.’ 10 Thus, Levinas’ ethics demand concrete hospitality for the Other, be it the stranger, the widow, or the orphan. What are the limits of this responsibility? According to Levinas, the face of the Other calls the ego to respond inﬁnitely. The ego cannot comfortably rest from this responsibility. ‘At no time can one say: I have done all my duty. Except the hypocrite.’ 11 Just like desire, the more I respond to the Other, the more I am responsible. Responsibility is so extreme that the ego is responsible for the Other’s responsibility. Levinas often cites Alyosha Karamazov as an example of this inﬁnite responsibility. Alyosha boldly claims that ‘each of us is guilty before everyone, for everyone and for each one, and I more than others.’

**Ethics precedes ontology**

**Simmons 99** William Paul, current Associate Professor of Political Science at ASU, formerly at Bethany College in the Department of History and Political Science. “The Third: Levinas' theoretical move from an-archical ethics to the realm of justice and politics,” Philosophy & Social Criticism November 1, 1999 vol. 25 no. 6

The distinction between the saying and the said is best understood in juxtaposition to traditional theories of expression. In the traditional view, language originates with the speaker. The speaker intends to speak, formulates thoughts into words, then expresses them. The ego is preeminent. Levinas, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of the addressee. The focus is thus shifted from the ego to the Other. ‘The activity of speaking robs the subject of its central position; it is the depositing of a subject without refuge. The speaking subject is no longer by and for itself; it is for the other.’ 17 The traditional view of expression emphasizes the content of the communication, the said. In the realm of the said, the speaker assigns meanings to objects and ideas. It is a process of identiﬁcation, a kerygmatics, a designating, a process of labeling ‘a this as that’. 18 This is the realm of totality and autonomy, ‘a tradition in which intelligibility derives from the assembling of terms united in a system for a locutor that states an apophansis. . . . Here the subject is origin, initiative, freedom, present.’ 19 The realm of the said overlooks the most important aspect of communication, the Other. Prior to the speech act, the speaker must address the Other, and before the address is the approach of the Other or proximity. Before any speech, before any intention to speak, there is an ‘exposure of the ego to the other, the non-indifference to another’, which is not a simple ‘intention to address a message’. 20 The saying includes not only the content of the speech, but the process itself which includes the Thou who is addressed and the speaker as attendant to the spoken word. The approach of the Other is non-thematizable, non-utterable, impossible because the saying is diachronous to the said. The realm of the said is a synchronic time where all of reality can be thematized and made present to the mind of the ego. This is the domain of Husserlian time, where time is a series of instants which can be re-presented in the consciousness of the ego. This synchronic, totalizing world is the world of Derrida’s violent language. The saying, on the other hand, ‘is the impossibility of the dispersion of time to assemble itself in the present, the insurmountable diachrony of time, a beyond the said’. 21 The saying comes from a time before the time of Being, and is thus irreducible to ontology. It is the past that was never present. While the said emphasizes the autonomous position of the ego, the saying tears the ego from its lair. In the saying, the ego is more than just exposed to the Other, it is assigned to the Other. Assignation supplants identiﬁcation. ‘The one assigned has to open to the point of separating itself from its own inwardness, adhering to esse; it must be dis-interestedness.’ 22 The saying is a de-posing or de-situating of the ego. Thus, the saying is otherwise than Being. From this new, non-ontological foundation, Levinas continues to extol a responsibility that is concrete, inﬁnite and asymmetrical. Responsibility must be concrete because the ego is not called to respond from a transcendent being or ideal imperative, but from the approach of an incarnate Other. The subject who responds is also an incarnate being, who can only respond with concrete hospitality. This hospitality is so extreme that the ego must be ‘capable of giving the bread out of his mouth, or giving his skin’. 23 Starting from the an-archical saying Levinas has re-developed his ethical philosophy. Before any ontological proofs, before any intentional actions, the ego is responsible for the Other. As in Totality and Inﬁnity, responsibility maintains the dual structure of desire: separation and relation. Although the world of the saying is originary, Levinas does not abolish the important place held by the ontological said. The saying requires the said. For instance, to communicate the saying, indeed, to write Otherwise than Being, Levinas must employ the said. The saying . . . must spread out and assemble itself into essence, posit itself, be hypostatized, become an eon in consciousness and knowledge, let itself be seen, undergo the ascendancy of being. Ethics itself, in its saying which is a responsibility requires this hold.

### Ethics o/w Policy

**Ethics should come before political concerns**

Simmons 3 William Paul, current Associate Professor of Political Science at ASU, formerly at Bethany College in the Department of History and Political Science. “An-Archy and Justice: An Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas’s Political Thought”

Politically, Levinas asks whether politics has its own justification. Does not politics, left to itself, become tyrannical? Is there not something that stands outside of the scope of the ego, the totality, and history that can temper the tyranny of politics? Should it not be the goal of political thought to infuse ethics into the violent realm of the political? Instead of looking at world-historical figures, should we not look at the history of the widow, orphan, and stranger? He writes, "is it not reasonable from now on for a statesman, when questioning himself on the nature of the decisions that he is making, to ask not only whether the decisions are in agreement with the sense of universal history, but also if they are in agreement with the other history?"

### Ethics o/w Reps

**Ethics precedes discursive questions – and our demand combines discourse with ethics to solve discursive violence**

**Jovanovic and Wood 4** Spoma and Roy, Communications/Rhetoric Professors at Denver University and U North Carolina, Philosophy and Rhetoric Vol 37 no 4, 2004

To consider these opening facts of communication is to conceive of language or discourse in a wholly different realm from intentional, predetermined, strategic enterprise where the other is but an object in the self's plans for mastery. Levinas accentuates this by unveiling the properties of communication as ethical encounter, or saying. .One can, to be sure, conceive of language as an act, as a gesture of behavior. But then one omits the essential of language: the coinciding of the revealer and the revealed in the face. (1969, 67). For Levinas, ethics precedes discourse in disclosure. That is, before we even conceive of a freedom that would enable us to choose ethics, there is already the imperative *Yes!*that signals our submission and sacrifice to the other (Levinas 1996c). Why are we pulled toward the other as Levinas suggests? Under what conditions can it be, and matter, that ethics precedes discourse? For Levinas, *being for*the other provides an important insight into how our moral obli gation is grounded not in specific altruistic activity, thorough understanding, or adherence to universal laws. Alphonso Lingis, a translator of many of Levinas.s works, describes the ethical nature of communication succinctly: .What is said is inessential; what is essential is that I be there and speak. (1994, xi). Speech is first and foremost the acknowledgment of sociality that signifies the importance of the encounter with the other. Speech for Levinas is not, as we have been conditioned to think, the link to participation that seeks comprehension of the other (1996a). This limited reading of speech represents for Levinas totality and closure rather than infinity and alterity. Richard Cohen, another of Levinas.s translators, questions in his introduction to *Ethics and Infinity*the role of speech altogether. “Ethics occurs. . . across the hiatus of dialogue, not in the content of discourse, in the continuities or discontinuities of what is said, but in the demand for response” (Levinas 1985, 12). Actually, Cohen points to the force of communication without naming it as such. Transcending dialogue there is ethics, but to instantiate ethics requires communication, whether in the hiatus, the response, or the approach. Ethics evokes then, rather than defines, and in so doing defies our propensity to codify, compare, andcommit to a certain course of action prior to engagement. For Levinas, the face of the other (the other we recognize and the others we do not) is an interruption that arouses a desire to move toward the other, not knowing what may come. The desire and its accompanying responsibility are indicative of a turn outward toward a communal life.

**Our discourse is key to create an ethical relationship with the Other**

**Burns 08** Lawrence, Professor in History of Medicine at the King’s University College at the University of Western Ontario, “Identifying concrete ethical demands in the face of the abstract other: Emmanuel Levinas’ pragmatic ethics”, Philosophy Social Criticism March 2008 vol. 34 no. 3

By teaching that the expressiveness of the face refers to the other’s authority to ‘assist’ his own discourse in and through the act of expression (TI, 66/61), and by privileging oral discourse in the way he does, Levinas reorients language around an encounter between living bodies that share a context of enjoyment. Thus, part of what it means to have a communicative relation to the other is to be required to respond to the other’s questioning and to justify what one says. Coming to the assistance of one’s own discourse is just another way to describe the practice of justifying what one says by providing reasons. The other to whom one expresses oneself always preserves the authority to question that response within what Levinas calls the ‘outstretched ﬁeld of questions and answers’ (TI, 96/98). Engaging in this practice is what makes one an interlocutor. The notion of assisting one’s discourse or being present in one’s speaking is thus an illocutionary act or a performative use of language. The essential characteristic of this performative use of language is the way in which the other’s speaking to the subject carries the demand for a response and thus institutes a practice of justiﬁcation. Moreover, the responsiveness that is constitutive of the practice of justiﬁcation entails recognizing the other’s continued authority to question me: I must relate to the other in such a way that I remain open to her or his response to what I have to say and do (TI, 200/219). Robert Gibbs emphasizes this open-ended responsiveness when he describes semiotics as a responsive performance in which the subject himself or herself becomes a sign for the other (Gibbs, 2000: 8). The subject is given over to the other in communicating with her or him. Following Gibbs, we can highlight what is distinct and valuable about this communicative model of responsibility by adopting a new framework: pragmatics. Reorienting communication around the pragmatic authority of the other, we would then say that being given over to the other in and through the demand for justiﬁcation reveals the pragmatic dimension of responsibility. In its pragmatic sense, the other is the interlocutor to whom I address my speech and who talks back, asks questions, judges, and makes demands. These diverse components constitute the special discursive authority of the other. This pragmatic authority is characteristic of a ‘third dimension’ of language: ‘the direction toward the Other [Autrui] who is not only the collaborator and the neighbour of our cultural work of expression or the client of our artistic production, but the interlocutor, he to whom expression expresses, for whom celebration celebrates, both term of an orientation and primary signiﬁcation’ (Levinas, 1996: 52/50). In pragmatic terms, the other’s capacity to demand and judge my response orients language around a new dimension of meaning: pragmatic meaning. In Levinas’ gloss, the ‘third’ dimension of language complements two related but distinct dimensions of language: the hermeneutic dimension (developed by Heidegger) and the culturally creative or expressive dimension of language (developed by MerleauPonty). Levinas endorses both of these dimensions (with some qualiﬁcations) but subordinates them to the third dimension of language that operates through acts of teaching and command: ‘The calling in question of the I, coextensive with the manifestation of the Other in the face, we call language. The height from which language comes we designate with the term teaching’ (TI, 171/185). Teaching here must be understood in a broad sense, not merely as the teaching of wisdom or virtue (although that is also implied). The teaching (l’enseignement) is meant to carry the dual meaning of instruction (revelation of what is other to me/unknown) and commandment (the imposition of an obligation). Both call the subject into question by forcing him or her to detach from and take responsibility for his or her enjoyment.

### Ethics o/w util

**Util promotes a decision calculus that is inherently racist - prefers the majority over justice**

**Odell 2004** (University of Illinois is an Associate Professor of Philosophy (Jack, Ph.D., “On Consequentialist Ethics,” Wadsworth, Thomson Learning, Inc., pp. 98-103) Herm

A classic objection to both act and rule utilitarianism has to do with inequity, and is related to the kind of objection raised by Rawls, which I will consider shortly. Suppose we have two fathers-Andy and Bob. Suppose further that they are alike in all relevant respects, both have three children, make the same salary, have the same living expenses, put aside the same amount in savings, and have left over each week fifteen dollars. Suppose that every week Andy and Bob ask themselves what they are going to do with this extra money, and Andy decides anew each week (AU) to divide it equally among his three children, or he makes a decision to always follow the rule (RU) that each child should receive an equal percentage of the total allowance money. Suppose further that each of his children receive five degrees of pleasure from this and no pain. Suppose on the other hand, that Bob, who strongly favors his oldest son, Bobby, decides anew each week (AU) to give all of the allowance money to Bobby, and nothing to the other two, and that he instructs Bobby not to tell the others, or he makes a decision to follow the rule (RU) to always give the total sum to Bobby. Suppose also that Bobby gets IS units of pleasure from his allowance and that his unsuspecting siblings feel no pain. The end result of the actions of both fathers is the same-IS units of pleasure. Most, if not all, of us would agree that although Andy's conduct is exemplary, Bob's is culpable. Nevertheless, according to both AU and RU the fathers in question are morally *equal.* Neither father is more or less exemplary or culpable than the other. I will refer to the objection implicit in this kind of example as (H) and state it as: ' (H) Both act and rule utilitarianism violate the principle of just distribution. What Rawls does is to elaborate objection (H). Utilitarianism, according to Rawls, fails to appreciate the importance of distributive justice, and that by doing so it makes a mockery of the concept of "justice." As I pointed out when I discussed Russell's views regarding partial goods, satisfying the interests of a majority of a given population while at the same time thwarting the interests of the minority segment of that same population (as occurs in societies that allow slavery) can maximize the general good, and do so even though the minority group may have to suffer great cruelties. Rawls argues that the utilitarian commitment to maximize the good in the world is due to its failure to ''take seriously the distinction between persons."· One person can be forced to give up far too much to insure the maximization of the good, or the total aggregate satisfaction, as was the case for those young Aztec women chosen by their society each year to be sacrificed to the Gods for the welfare of the group.

**We have intrinsic moral value that comes before consequences of actions. Evaluating consequences first puts our fate in the hands of belligerent others.**

**Primoratz 05** (Igor Principal Research Fellow @ Center for Applied Philosophy amd Public Ethics, The Philosophical Forum, Volume 36, No. 1, “Civilian Immunity in War”, Spring, p. 44-46) Herm

Consequentialist thinkers usually present their view on civilian immunity against the background of a critique of attempts of philosophers and legal thinkers to account for civilian immunity in deontological terms. Having satisfied themselves that those attempts have been unsuccessful, they put forward the claim that civilian immunity has nothing to do with civilians’ acts or omissions, guilt or innocence, responsibility or lack of it, but is merely a useful convention. It is useful since it rules out targeting a large group of human beings, and thus helps reduce greatly the overall killing, mayhem, and destruction in war. The consequentialist view of civilian immunity is exposed to two objections: the protection it offers to civilians is too weak, and the ground provided for it indicates a misunderstanding of the moral issue involved. The protection is too weak because civilian immunity is understood as but a useful convention. This makes it doubly weak. First, if it is merely a useful convention, if all its moral force is due to its utility, then it will have no such force in cases where it has no utility. This is a familiar flaw of consequentialism. It denies that moral rules have any intrinsic moral significance, and explains their binding force solely in terms of the good consequences of acting in accordance with them. Therefore it cannot give us any good consequentialist reason to adhere to a moral rule in cases where adhering to it will not have the good consequences it usually has, and where better consequences will be attained by going against the rule.6 This means that we should respect civilian immunity when, and only when, doing so will have the good consequences adduced as its ground: when it will indeed reduce the overall killing, maiming, and destruction. On the other hand, whenever we have good reasons to believe that, by targeting civilians, we shall make a significant contribution to our war effort, thus shortening the war and reducing the overall killing and mayhem, that is what we may and indeed ought to do. Civilian immunity is thus made hostage to the vagaries of war, instead of providing civilians with iron-clad protection against them. This is not a purely theoretical concern. As Kai Nielsen has pointed out, systematic attacks on civilians in the course of a war of national liberation can make an indispensable contribution to the successful prosecution of such a war. That was indeed the case in Algeria and South Vietnam, and may well have been the case in Angola and Mozambique as well. Then again, if civilian immunity is merely a useful convention, that weakens it by making it hostage to the stance taken by enemy political and military leadership. They may or may not choose to respect the immunity of our civilians. If they do not, on the consequentialist view of this immunity, we are not bound to respect the immunity of their civilians. Being a convention, it binds only if, or as long as, it is accepted by both parties to the conflict. As an important statement of this view puts it, “for convention-dependent obligations, what one’s opponent does, what ‘everyone is doing,’ etc., are facts of great moral importance. Such facts help to determine within what convention, if any, one is operating, and thus they help one discover what his moral duties are.”8 To be sure, even if no such convention is in place, but we have reason to believe we can help bring about its acceptance by unilaterally acting in accordance with it and thereby encouraging the enemy to do the same, we should do that. But if we have no good reason to believe that, or if we have tried that approach and it has failed, our military are free to kill and maim enemy civilians whenever they feel they need to do that. Thus our moral choice is determined, be it directly or ultimately, by the moral (or immoral) choice of enemy political and military leaders. So is the fate of enemy civilians. The fact that they are civilians, in itself, counts for nothing. This brings me to the second objection: The consequentialist misses what anyone else, and in particular any civilian in wartime, would consider the crux of the matter. Faced with the prospect of being killed or maimed by enemy fire, a civilian would not make her case in terms of disutility of killing or maiming civilians in war in general, or of killing or maiming her then and there. She would rather point out that she is a civilian, not a soldier; a bystander, not a participant; an innocent, not a guilty party. She would point out that she has done nothing to deserve, or become liable to, such a fate. She would present these personal facts as considerations whose moral significance is intrinsic and decisive, rather than instrumental and fortuitous, mediated by a useful convention (which, in different circumstances, might enjoin limiting war by targeting only civilians). And her argument, couched in personal terms, would seem to be more to the point than the impersonal calculation of good and bad consequences by means of which the consequentialist would settle the matter.

**The utilitarian viewpoint is flawed. It is impossible for society to be viewed as a single entity without sacrificing the human dignity of the individual.**

**Kymlicka, 1988** (Will Prof. of Philosophy at Queen’s U, Press, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3., pp. 172-190, ‘Rawls on Technology and Deontology” JSTOR) Herm

According to Rawls, then, the debate over distribution is essentially a debate over whether we should or should not define the right as maximizing the good. But is this an accurate characterization of the debate? Utilitarians do, of course, believe that the right act maximizes happiness, under some description of that good. And that requirement does have potentially abhorrent consequences.But do utilitarians believe that it is right because it maximizes happiness? Do they hold that the maximization of the good defines the right, as teleological theories are said to do? Let us see why Rawls believes they do. Rawls says that utilitarianism is teleological (that is, defines the right as the maximization of the good) because it generalizes from what is rational in the one-person case to what is rational in many-person cases. Since it is rational for me to sacrifice my present happiness to increase my later happiness if doing so will maximize my happiness overall, it is rational for society to sacrifice my current happiness to increase someone else's happiness if doing so maximizes social welfare overall. For utilitarians, utility-maximizing acts are right because they are maximizing. It is because they are maximizing that they are rational. Rawls objects to this generalization from the one-person to the many person case because he believes that it ignores the separateness of persons.? Although it is right and proper that I sacrifice my present happiness for my later happiness if doing so will increase my overall happiness, it is wrong to demand that I sacrifice my present happiness to increase someone else's happiness. In the first case, the trade-off occurs within one person's life, and the later happiness compensates for my current sacrifice. In the second case, the trade-off occurs across lives, and I am not compensated for my sacrifice by the fact that someone else benefits. My good has simply been sacrificed, and I have been used as a means to someone else's 2. John Rawls, A Theory ofJz~stice(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, rg71), p. 31 3. Ibid., p. 27. Philosophy G Public Affairs happiness. Trade-offs that make sense within a life are wrong and unfair across lives. Utilitarians obscure this point by ignoring the fact that separate people are involved. They treat society as though it were an individual, as a single organism, with its own interests, so that trade-offs between one person and another appear as legitimate trade-offs within the social organism.

**Recognizing rights and putting them before a utilitarian calculus is the only rational and moral option.**

**Hart 79** (H. L. A. former principal of Oxford University, Tulane Law Review, “The Shell Foundation Lectures, 1978-1979: Utilitarianism and Natural Rights”, April, 53 Tul. L. Rev. 663, l/n) Herm

Accordingly, the contemporary modern philosophers of whom I have spoken, and preeminently Rawls in his *Theory of Justice*, have argued that any morally adequate political philosophy must recognise that there must be, in any morally tolerable form of social life, certain protections for the freedom and basic interests of individuals which constitute an essential framework of individual rights. Though the pursuit of the general welfare is indeed a legitimate and indeed necessary concern of governments, it is something to be pursued only within certain constraints imposed by recognition of such rights. The modern philosophical defence put forward for the recognition of basic human rights does not wear the same metaphysical or conceptual dress as the earlier doctrines of the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Rights of Man, which men were said to have in a state of nature or to be endowed with by their creator. Nonetheless, the most complete and articulate version of this modern critique of Utilitarianism has many affinities with the theories of social contract which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries accompanied the doctrine of natural rights. Thus Rawls has argued in *A Theory of Justice* that though any rational person must know that in order to live even a minimally tolerable life he must live within a political society with an ordered government, no rational person bargaining with others on a footing of [\*679] equality could agree to regard himself as bound to obey the laws of any government if his freedom and basic interests, what Mill called "the groundwork of human existence," were not given protection and treated as having priority over mere increases in aggregate welfare even if the protection cannot be absolute.

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**Utilitarianism is internally contradictory - regarding the whole as one individual undermines its own principles of equality**

**Freeman 94** (Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D. Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, “Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the Priority of Right,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463) Herm

To sum up, though utilitarianism incorporates equality as a property of the justification of the principle of utility, and of the decision process through which that principle gets applied, it does not leave any place for equality in the content of that principle. On its face, this standard of right conduct directs that we maximize an aggregate. As a result neither equality or any other distributive value is assigned independent significance in resulting distributions of goods. Kymlicka claims that, because Rawls sees utilitarianism as teleological, he misdescribes the debate over distribution by ignoring that utilitarians allow for equality of distribution too. But the distribution debate Rawls is concerned with is a (level 2) debate over how what is deemed good (welfare, rights, resources, etc.) within a moral theory is to be divided among individuals. It is not a (level 3) debate over the distribution of consideration in a procedure which decides the distribution of these goods. Nor is it a (level 1) debate over the principles of practical reasoning that are invoked to justify the fundamental standard of distribution.

**Util destroys morality - contradictory obligations to society compromises moral action**

**Freeman 94** (Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D. Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, “Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the Priority of Right,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463) Herm

Kymlicka distinguishes two interpretations of utilitarianism: teleological and egalitarian. According to Rawls's teleological interpretation, the "fundamental goal" (LCC, p. 33) of utilitarianism is not persons, but the goodness of states of affairs. Duty is defined by what best brings about these states of affairs. " [M] aximizing the good is primary, and we count individuals equally only because that maximizes value. Our primary duty isn't to treat people as equals, but to bring about valuable states of affairs" (LCC, p. 27). It is difficult to see, Kymlicka says, how this reading of utilitarianism can be viewed as a moral theory. Morality, in our everyday view at least, is a matter of interpersonal obligations-the obligations we owe to each other. But to whom do we owe the duty of maximizing utility? Surely not to the impersonal ideal spectator . . . for he doesn't exist. Nor to the maximally valuable state of affairs itself, for states of affairs don't have moral claims." (LCC, p. 28-29) Kymlicka says, "This form of utilitarianism does not merit serious consideration as a political morality" (LCC, p. 29). Suppose we see utilitarianism differently, as a theory whose "fundamental principle" is "to treat people as equals" (LCC, p. 29). On this egalitarian reading, utilitarianism is a procedure for aggregating individual interests and desires, a procedure for making social choices, specifying which trade-offs are acceptable. It's a moral theory which purports to treat people as equals, with equal concern and respect. It does so by counting everyone for one, and no one for more than one. (LCC, p. 25)

**Utilitarianism kills ethico-political agency**

**Odell 2004** (Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois (Jack, “On Consequentialist Ethics,” Wadsworth, Thomson Learning, Inc., pp. 98-103) Herm

This objection can, as Samuel Scheffler has pointed out, be integrated with objection . Remember that Rawls claimed that utilitarianism fails to ''take seriously the distinction between persons." One person can be forced by utilitarianism to give up far too much, including the life plan that he or she has formulated for himself or herself. Rational agents who are fully aware of what they would be putting on the line if they were to agree to a utilitarian society would never adopt utilitarianism. They would perceive that such a society could require them to sacrifice their individual projects, their freedom, and even their lives for the sake of the aggregate or total satisfaction of the group. To agree to such a collective approach would be to degrade their autonomy, and this is a matter of integrity. As Scheffler observes regarding the integration of (H) and (J), "the two objections focus on two different ways of making the same supposed mistake: two different ways of failing to take sufficient account of the separateness and nature of persons."

### Ethics o/w extinction

**Extinction doesn’t outweigh – the quest for survival undermines other rights and values.**

**CALLAHAN 73** (Daniel, institute of Society and Ethics, The Tyranny of Survival, p. 91-3)

The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domination has for over two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese-Americans were herded, without due process of law, to detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in the general context that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival: the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B. F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jacques Monod, in Chance and Necessity, survival requires that we overthrow almost every known religious, ethical and political system. In genetics, the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and bearing children. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to surviving populations of nations which have not enacted population-control policies. For all these reasons it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for sake of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny survival as value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life—then how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories.

**No extinction risks – intervening actors solve.**

**Bostrom 11** (“The Concept of Existential Risk.” (2011) Nick Bostrom Future of Humanity Institute Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy University of Oxford http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.pdf)

We may note, first, that many of the key concepts and ideas are quite new, including the very notion of existential risk. Without the requisite concepts in place, momentum for efforts to understand and mitigate existential risk could not build; and this may help explain the primitive state of the art. In many instances, the underlying science and the methodological tools for studying existential risks in a meaningful way have also only recently become available. It is arguably only since the detonation of the first atomic bomb on July 16, 1945, and the subsequent nuclear buildup during the Cold War, that any significant naturalistic (i.e., non‐supernatural) existential risks have arisen—at least if we count only risks over which human beings have some influence.35 The most significant existential risks still seem to lie many years into the future. Until recently, therefore, there may have been relatively little need to think about existential risk in general and few opportunities for mitigation even if such thinking had taken place. Public awareness of the global impacts of human activities appears to be increasing. Systems, processes, and risks are studied today from a global perspective by many scholars, including environmental scientists, economists, epidemiologists, and demographers. Problems such as climate change, cross‐border terrorism, and international financial crises help to direct attention to global interdependency and threats to the global system. The idea of risk in general seems to have risen in prominence.36 Given these advances in knowledge, methods, and attitudes, the conditions for securing for existential risks the scientific scrutiny they deserve are unprecedentedly propitious. Opportunities for action may also increase. As noted, some mitigation projects can be undertaken unilaterally, and one may expect more such projects as the world becomes richer. Other mitigation projects require wider coordination—in many cases, global coordination. Here, too, some trend lines seem to show this becoming more feasible over time. There is a long‐term historic trend toward increasing the scope of political integration—from hunter‐gatherer bands to chiefdoms, city states, nation states, and now multinational organizations, regional alliances, various international governance structures, and other aspects of globalization.(56) Extrapolation of this trend would point to the creation of a singleton.(57) It is also possible that some of the global movements that have been emerging over the last half century—in particular, the peace movement, the environmentalist movement, and various global justice and human‐rights movements—will gradually take on board more generalized concerns about existential risk.37 Furthermore, to the extent that existential‐risk mitigation really is a most deserving cause, one may expect that general improvements in society’s ability to recognize and act on important truths will differentially funnel resources into existential‐risk mitigation. General improvements of this kind might arise from advances in educational techniques, institutional innovations (e.g., prediction markets), advances in science and philosophy, spread of rationality culture, biological cognitive enhancement, and many other sources. Finally, it is possible that the cause will at some point receive a boost from the occurrence of a major (nonexistential) catastrophe that underscores the precariousness of the present human condition. That would, needless to say, be the worst possible way for our minds to be concentrated—yet one which, in a multidecadal time frame, must be accorded a non‐negligible probability of occurrence.38

**No solvency for existential risks**

**Bostrom 11** (“The Concept of Existential Risk.” (2011) Nick Bostrom Future of Humanity Institute Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy University of Oxford http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.pdf)

Basic economics suggests reasons for suspecting that there is too little investment in reducing existential risk. Being a global public (i.e., non‐excludable and non‐rivalrous) good—in fact, a transgenerational public good—existential‐risk mitigation is likely to be undersupplied by markets and national governments.(51, 52) Agents that produce existential safety can hope to capture only a minute fraction of the value of their contributions. In lieu of effective arrangements for global cost‐sharing, the cost of mitigation may be shouldered by altruists and by agents that are large enough to capture a significant fraction of the benefits, such as major states.34 There are further complications beyond institutional incompetence, scaremongering, and free‐rider problems. Some risks can be mitigated through unilateral action; for instance, any state could fund existential‐risk research or, say, build a global defense against asteroid impacts. But other risks require global coordination. Efforts to manage the global climate may require buy‐in by an overwhelming majority of industrialized and industrializing nations. The mitigation of other risks, such as the avoidance of arms races or the relinquishing of dangerous research directions, may require that all states join the effort, since a single abstainer could destroy any positive effects of collaboration. And even then, some dangers might not be averted unless each state could monitor and regulate every significant group or even every individual within its territory. Such internal control within states might become more feasible with advances in surveillance technology, but, as noted, preventing states with such capabilities from becoming oppressive presents its own set of challenges.

**Prefer our impacts – psychological biases prevent logical evaluation of existential risk**

**Bostrom 11** (“The Concept of Existential Risk.” (2011) Nick Bostrom Future of Humanity Institute Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy University of Oxford http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.pdf)

Many kinds of cognitive bias and other psychological phenomena impede efforts at thinking clearly and dealing effectively with existential risk.32 For example, use of the availability heuristic may create a “good‐story bias” whereby people evaluate the plausibility of existential‐risk scenarios on the basis of experience, or on how easily the various possibilities spring to mind. Since nobody has any real experience with existential catastrophe, expectations may be formed instead on the basis of fictional evidence derived from movies and novels. Such fictional exposures are systematically biased in favor of scenarios that make for entertaining stories. Plotlines may feature a small band of human protagonists successfully repelling an alien invasion or a robot army. A story in which humankind goes extinct suddenly—without warning and without being replaced by some other interesting beings—is less likely to succeed at the box office (although more likely to happen in reality). To correct for the good‐story bias, one might want to reduce one’s credence in exciting scenarios and upgrade one’s credence in boring outcomes. At the same time, however, one should avoid relying too heavily on a “silliness heuristic,” which penalizes hypotheses merely because similar‐sounding ideas have been promoted by people viewed as not respectable—crackpots, radicals, science‐fiction aficionados, and other “non‐serious” folk. We might find existential‐risk concerns gaining traction, only to see the ensuing resources funneled almost exclusively to the study of asteroid hazard, climate change, and a few other such “respectable” risks to the neglect of more speculative risks, such as machine superintelligence, advanced nanotechnology weaponry, future dystopian evolutionary scenarios, simulation‐shutdown scenarios, synthetic biology mishaps and misuse, space‐colonization races, and global totalitarianism—even though the cumulative existential risks flowing from these and other “silly‐seeming” sources may be orders of magnitude greater than those from the more respectable and well‐established fields. (Another plausible diversion is that research mainly gets directed at global catastrophic risks that involve little or no existential risk.) The idea of cataclysmic endings seems to cause a peculiar set of cognitive tendencies to come into play—what one observer has termed “the millennial, utopian, or apocalyptic psychocultural bundle, a characteristic dynamic of eschatological beliefs and behaviors.”(50) It has been argued that this millennial impulse is pancultural. While eschatological tropes can help mobilize needed action, they can also easily become dysfunctional or lead to apathy and disengagement: Substantially larger numbers, such as 500 million deaths, and especially qualitatively different scenarios such as the extinction of the entire human species, seem to trigger a different mode of thinking—enter into a “separate magisterium.” People who would never dream of hurting a child hear of an existential risk, and say, “Well, maybe the human species doesn’t really deserve to survive.”(49: 114)

**Moral decision making precedes existential risks**

**Bostrom 11** (“The Concept of Existential Risk.” (2011) Nick Bostrom Future of Humanity Institute Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy University of Oxford http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.pdf)

We discussed above how reducing existential risk emerges as a dominant priority on many aggregative consequentialist moral theories (and as at least a very important concern in many other ethical frameworks). The concept can thus help the morally or altruistically motivated to identify actions that have the highest expected value. In particular, given certain assumptions, the problem of making the right decision simplifies to that of following the maxipok principle. The ethics of existential risk involve distinctive problems in moral philosophy, most obviously population ethics and intergenerational justice but also issues related to the evaluation of scenarios involving the transformation or replacement of humankind and issues related to how we should think about actions with small probabilities of vast consequences. Many other moral issues also crop up in the context of existential‐risk studies, such as the justifiability of unilateral action, how to deal with fundamental moral uncertainty, and issues related to threats and precommitments. Issues in decision theory can also be important.

**Epistemological biases and problems make existential risk decision-making too difficult**

**Bostrom 11** (“The Concept of Existential Risk.” (2011) Nick Bostrom Future of Humanity Institute Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy University of Oxford http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.pdf)

The study of existential risk is a highly multidisciplinary challenge. Some of the work can be done within individual academic areas. Astronomers can observe and model the distribution of near‐ Earth objects, and geologists can study impact craters from past encounters, without necessarily needing to involve epidemiologists, computer scientists, philosophers, or social scientists. But linkages soon emerge between disparate risk areas. For instance, to understand the consequences of a large asteroid impact, one must model the cooling effects on Earth’s climate, and this raises many of the same issues whether the forcing event is an asteroid, a comet, volcanic eruptions, or nuclear war. And to answer them one must use the same climate models employed to study the effects of greenhouse‐gas emissions. Social responses to different stressor events might also have dynamics in common that could be studied by economists, sociologists, historians, and political scientists. And so forth. The epistemological challenges, however, go far deeper than the ordinary difficulties of coordinating academic fields. The biggest existential risks are not yet amenable to plug‐and‐play scientific‐research methodologies. Understanding risks from possible future technologies— especially machine intelligence—may require the creation of novel paradigms and the expertise of scientific generalists, philosophers, thoughtful technologists, and risk analysts, in addition to narrow domain‐experts. Similarly, understanding how different existential risks interact—crucial when planning mitigation strategies, since many of the most powerful mitigations will create existential risks of their own—will require analysts that have broad integrative capabilities and strategic savvy. In general, it may take a special kind of intellect to think effectively about these big‐picture questions. At a more foundational level, there are deep epistemological problems that turn out to be highly relevant to the analysis of existential risk—in particular, ones related to observation selection effects and the foundations of probability theory.(37) Work on the Carter‐Leslie doomsday argument, the simulation argument, and “great filter” arguments are potentially crucial to the assessment of existential risk, yet key theoretical problems remain unsolved.(7, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43) Making progress on observation selection theory (“anthropics”) is a major priority in existential‐risk studies. In an academic context, there is a danger that resources made available to existential‐risk studies would flow, with excessive preponderance, to the relatively minor risks that are easier for some established disciplinary community to study using familiar methods, at the expense of far more important risk areas—machine superintelligence, advanced molecular nanotechnology, totalitarianism, risks related to the simulation‐hypothesis, or future advances in synthetic biology— which would require a greater deviation from business‐as‐usual. In the meantime, though, the most striking misallocation is the overall neglect of existential risk (figure 6).31

### Relativism bad

**Relativism justifies mass genocide**

**Dimitrijevic 10** Nenad, associate professor at CEU Political Science Department, “Moral knowledge and mass crime : A critical reading of moral relativism,” Philosophy Social Criticism February 2010 vol. 36 no. 2

Relativism is not a trivial thesis, and the strength of its arguments deserves careful analysis. In this article I ask how relativism applies to the analysis of responsibility for mass crime. Mass crime is an act committed by a significant number of members of a group, in the name of all members of that group, and against individuals identified as a target on the basis of their belonging to a different group. 1 It is possible to isolate several constitutive features of mass crimes: their ideological justification; the role of the regime in criminal activities; the number of perpetrators and collaborators; the number of victims, and the attitudes and behavior of bystanders. An important facet of these features is the normalization of crime, which in turn has at least two elements. The first consists in ideological, legal and political institutionalization of crime. The system of values, the political arrangements and the legal norms are all shaped in a manner that allows, justifies, and renders routine the killing of those who are arbitrarily proclaimed as enemies. The second aspect of normalization is the support of an important number of subjects for the regime and its practices. If both criteria of normalization are met, a specific sub-type of criminal regime is created, which can be called a populist criminal regime. 2 Mass killing of innocent people is deeply disturbing. Almost equally disquieting is the normalization of the criminal practice: institutionalization and routinization of the machinery of death, which are made possible by the support of ‘ordinary people’. When one thinks about Nazi Germany or Serbia under Milosevic, the gravity of the crimes sometimes prompts very basic questions. How was it possible? What turned decent people into monsters? What happened to the elementary moral standards of right and good? How did human capacity for empathy and solidarity so suddenly disappear? One of the questions that always comes back concerns the ability of an individual to judge and to act autonomously when confronted with the evil that permeates through the whole of society. A negative answer – the inability thesis – is in the core of the relativist argument against moral responsibility of perpetrators, collaborators and bystanders. I will argue that this argument does not hold. The relativist failure to properly conceptualize responsibility for crime follows from the mistaken view of moral autonomy, which then leads to the erroneous explanation of the establishment, authority and justification of moral judgments.

**If you defend moral relativism you have to defend that we can’t say the Holocaust was bad**

**Dimitrijevic 10** Nenad, associate professor at CEU Political Science Department, “Moral knowledge and mass crime : A critical reading of moral relativism,” Philosophy Social Criticism February 2010 vol. 36 no. 2

But relativism is not free of ambiguities. Most importantly, it fails to provide a clear account of the justification of moral judgments. It often reduces moral beliefs to the prevailing points of view, grounded in habits, shared cultural practices, and from this personal choice is derived. 12 On closer examination, this strategy may cut short understanding, relying instead on ready-made convictions and conventions, justified by the recourse to tradition and the majority support. 13 This simple relativism argues that in our search for justification there is always a point at which we stop, concede to the primary fact of our social condition, and stick to the existing rules, beliefs and attitudes: Since all justifications come to an end [with] what the people who accept them find acceptable and not in need of further justification, no conclusion, it is thought, can claim validity beyond the community whose acceptance validates it. 14 Some relativists realize the gravity of this objection. Also, some of them are aware of the potentially frightening implications of the ‘relativity of truth(s)’ and ‘disappearance of moral conl ict’ arguments. Assume that I, a citizen of New Zealand, insist that Auschwitz or Srebrenica are objectively wrong, morally indefensible practices, and that they are such regardless of what some Germans or some Serbs think about them. Confronted with such a claim, a relativist cannot simply maintain that all truths are relative to the given contexts, and that one’s contextually shaped moral position – including the positions of killers, collaborators, and bystanders – cannot be judged from the perspective of any other moral position. A consistent application of this understanding of relativism would lead to the conclusion that only Germans can say that the Holocaust was wrong (or that it was not wrong), or that only Serbs can say the same about Srebrenica. This would be an irresponsibly wrong statement, regardless of where we belong, or which theory we subscribe to. Therefore, relativism has to defend its argument in a manner that would effectively reject the objection of its inability to confront moral questions that arise from the practices which most people, irrespective of their belonging, condemn as morally unacceptable.

**Some things are wrong**

**Dimitrijevic 10** Nenad, associate professor at CEU Political Science Department, “Moral knowledge and mass crime : A critical reading of moral relativism,” Philosophy Social Criticism February 2010 vol. 36 no. 2

How does this abstract theory work when applied to concrete cases in specific contexts? Harman explores Hitler’s case, looking for the proper moral understanding of his role in the Holocaust, and, more generally, for the proper moral attitude towards the whole practice of the Holocaust. Anyone is entitled to make a normative, that is, non-inner and hence non-moral, judgment about the Holocaust, and to assess it as a practice that ought never to have happened. In the same way, anyone can infer that what Hitler did was wrong. Following Harman’s exposition of the analytical conditions for inner judgments, we would expect that only Germans could say that Hitler’s intentions were morally wrong. But, Harman here makes an interesting theoretical turn, arguing that in Hitler’s case even Germans cannot reconstruct an inner, moral judgment: ‘It sounds odd to say that Hitler should not have ordered the extermination of the Jews, that it was wrong of him to have done so.’ 22 What would be ‘odd’ in the statement of a German that Hitler’s intentions were morally wrong, or that the Holocaust was morally wrong, given that it would be a clear instance of the inner judgment? The moral judgment does not work here, argues Harman, because it is too weak – the speakers come to realize that Hitler’s actions were so terrible that they placed him beyond the scope of moral considerations. Hitler remains ‘beyond the pale’. 23 This is where a sophisticated theoretical model reaches its limits. By claiming that ‘Hitler is beyond the pale’, Harman uses a concrete extreme example to make a generalizible inference: distinguishing between external and internal judgments is not a sufficient condition for a precise demarcation of the status and the meaning of morality. As persons in the relation of ‘relevant moral understanding’, we realize that distinguishing between right and wrong intentions is sometimes a matter of degree. However, some intentions transpire as so gravely and indisputably wrong that they obstruct the basic meaning and the very possibility of the moral understanding – it is not possible to acknowledge the moral terms of the internal group relationship any more. The (realized) intention to kill the Jews or the Bosniaks tells us about abandoning the background moral understanding. The society has entered a new condition, to which moral criteria do not apply any more. It follows that the moral judgment about mass crime and its agents is not possible because the agents’ intentions and actions remain ‘beyond the motivational reach of the relevant moral considerations’. 24 Or, they do not fit into the logical form of inner judgments.

**Ignoring morals justifies Nazi Germany and Serbia under Milosevic**

**Dimitrijevic 10** Nenad, associate professor at CEU Political Science Department, “Moral knowledge and mass crime : A critical reading of moral relativism,” Philosophy Social Criticism February 2010 vol. 36 no. 2

When thinking about perpetrators, collaborators or bystanders, we try to understand what made it possible for them to commit or support crimes. We also want to know what led them to abandon moral standards for the sake of the perverted value system imposed by the criminal regime. In this context, both the ability to act and the ability to judge gain special connotations. First, one should not reject nor underestimate the impact of the circumstances on the ability to act freely. The conditions in criminal regimes are so difficult that they sometimes provide excuses for morally wrong (non-)actions. People may be effectively denied freedom of choice, or saddled with a situation they cannot control. They may fail to act out of reasonable fear, or may choose to perform a morally wrong action for the sake of preventing what they see as the direct threat to them or to the people close to them, even though they know that in this way they could cause harm to some other innocent people. In short, the context may perhaps excuse the agent from responsibility for an action or attitude that in normal situations would be considered morally flawed. Second, the question of the status of the autonomous judgment under the criminal regime asks if there can be a reason, or a set of reasons, affecting one’s grasp of the moral character of the criminal intention and action. Can a person be held ignorant of the immorality of crime, on the account of her or his justified ignorance of the moral code? The question is important in the light of the disturbing empirical evidence. In the populist criminal regimes the majority of people supported criminal attitudes, intentions and the practice of the mass crimes committed in their name. They acknowledged the outcomes as right. Looking from the outside, and applying universalist moral standards, we could infer that such an establishment and realization of the perverted ‘ethics of evil’ amounts to a moral breakdown, in which the community and most of its members abandoned basic civilizational standards for the sake of brutal barbarianism. We will see: a lost sense of justice and the absence of an elementary concern for the humanity of the members of the targeted group; indifference of the majority towards suffering of innocent human beings; the institutionalized machinery of violence, and ‘ordinary men’ preaching their loyalty to it. We will identify causal connections between political, societal and individual perspectives. We will conclude that the ruling political and cultural elite somehow brought most of the group members into a state in which they were ready to participate in the crime, and to support it as a legitimate practice. Obviously, this attitude cannot be justified. Something else is the subject of controversy. Can a person, or a group of persons, be absolved of responsibility by pointing to the interpretation of culture that was dominant during the crime, and that presented killing as morally right? Some relativists provide an affirmative answer. Following Michelle Moody-Adams’ critical analysis, I identify this relativist argument as the inability thesis. 26 The claim is that the interplay between culture and agency under the populist criminal regime assumes a distinct form. For instance, the analysis of Nazi Germany or Serbia under Milosevic demonstrates that criminal ideology was so effectively implemented in the processes of socialization, through different measures ranging from education and cultural propaganda to political manipulation, that we can infer a systematically created inability to think, judge, and act morally. Once the enterprise of socialization succeeds, subjects – both perpetrators and ordinary people – do not understand any more the wrongness of the ethical patterns that justify criminal ideology and practices. Culturally induced inability leads to moral ignorance. Morally disabled human beings stop being assumptively responsible agents, simply because they are not autonomous persons any more. They cannot make sense of their place in the world, which is demonstrated both in their inability to judge right from wrong, and in their inability to act morally. This finally justifies the judgment of their diminished legal, political or moral accountability: A graduate of Sandhurst or West Point who does not understand his duty to noncombatants as human beings is certainly culpable of his ignorance; an officer bred up from childhood in the Hitler Jugend might not be. 27 The inability thesis implies that moral corruption at the societal level creates individuals whose patterns of evaluation and action indeed appear to be morally flawed. But the moral corruption of the practice of mass crime can be observed only from the viewpoint of civilized normalcy, in which moral laws are valid. Only people who live in a society whose cultural identity is based on the harmony of the universal and group-specific values, can distinguish between right and wrong. One can know only what is valid in one’s society. Individuals imprisoned in the described cultural contexts remain strictly speaking beyond moral judgment, because they are brought up in a society which has effectively deprived them of the possibility to learn moral standards. This is the standard version of the inability thesis, which argues that the perpetrators and bystanders should be absolved of accountability for crime. But some relativist authors would not stop here – they argue that even in such an extreme context persons remain moral agents. Without denying either the power of duress to diminish the ability to act, or the power of the criminal ideology to destroy one’s ability to judge, they claim that there still exists room for the moral appraisal of one’s actions. It follows that moral guidelines we find in a criminal regime cannot be simply dismissed as morally irrelevant on the account of their unjustified ability. To judge perpetrators, accomplices and bystanders relative to the context, first requires assessing the authenticity of their moral convictions. The second question is whether the agents acted in accordance with their authentic convictions. The conclusion reads that authenticity exculpates.

**Your interpretation destroys moral decency**

**Dimitrijevic 10** Nenad, associate professor at CEU Political Science Department, “Moral knowledge and mass crime : A critical reading of moral relativism,” Philosophy Social Criticism February 2010 vol. 36 no. 2

Put simply, the ability to judge, as the distinguishing feature of one’s moral agency, is not context-dependent. What remains context-dependent is the capacity to act in accordance with moral reasons. Relativism denies this distinction by reducing ability to judge to the contingent effect of circumstances. It claims that in a social, cultural, or historical context which upholds the standards of decency and moral equality, we can suppose that the people are typically assumptively responsible. But when external conditions change, internal ability to judge will crumble, depending on the type and strength of the blow to normalcy our society suffers, and on our character traits. A decent society produces moral individuals, while a rogue society undermines the moral decency of its members. Surely, these are all complex processes, which importantly depend both on human strength and on the character of the societal, cultural, or political crisis. But what really counts, according to the relativist argument, is that in such situations we cannot legitimately expect individuals to be autonomous agents any more. Maybe some of them will be in a better position – due to their status in society or due to their stronger character – to oppose duress and manipulative socialization. And perhaps we can, with Scarre, ‘demand more from those who are capable of more’. Indeed, this looks like a logically correct step, especially if we abandon the principle of moral equality and settle for the claim that one’s morality is a matter of measure. The measure is calculated by dividing the power of the context by the individual’s social position and psychological and mental qualities. When comparing the results of this calculus, we could – following, for instance, Arneson – assume that the bigger numbers denote one’s higher position on the scale of moral capacities.

**The impact is genocide and nuclear war**

**Fasching 93** Darrell, professor of religious studies at the University of South Florida, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia

Living in an age of alienation, I used to think that the experience of alienation was a problem in need of resolution. I have come to see it, however, as a promising opportunity. For when we have become strangers to ourselves we experience a new vulnerability and a new openness to the other: other persons, other ideas, other cultures, and other ways of life. To the degree that secularization alienates us from apocalyptic dangers. The greatest danger created by alienation seems to be that we shall become lost in a sea of relativism, of assuming one way is as good as another. This is just as destructive as those centered theologies that assume there is only one way. Because culture, like nature, abhors a vacuum such relativism inevitably defaults in some arbitrary form of absolutism that refuses to tolerate the pluralism to which it is a reaction. When all values are viewed as equally arbitrary, no good reasons can be offered for one option over another. And when no good reasons can be offered, "the will to power" takes over. In a technological civilization, the autonomous secular rationality of technique, symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima, expresses this arbitrary will to power. The notion that we live in a purely secular civilization needs to be qualified. All public order is structured by experiences of the sacred that, sociologically speaking, legitimate a given social order. The particular form of sacred order that dominates modern civilization simply assumes a secular guise. It is a demonic form rooted in the normlessness of modern cultural relativism and expressed in the paradoxical formula "nothing is any longer sacred not even human life." It is my conviction, however, that a path lies between the extremes of relativism and absolutism, and that path is the way of doubt and self-questioning which accompanies passing over and coming back as a quest for insight through the sharing in the narrative traditions of the stranger. For as a permanent way I believe it prevents one from settling into either a self-complacent absolutism or a self-complacent relativism, replacing both with the experience of self-transcendence as a surrender to doubt and its social correlate, openness to the stranger.

## \*\*AT Section\*\*

### Federal key generic

**Federal key- overarching policy key**

**Renne et al., 2008** – Renne is a PhD from the University of New Orleans, Sanchez is a PhD from the University of Utah, and Litman is a director at the Victoria Transport Policy Institute (John Renne, Thomas Sanchez, and Todd Litman, “National Study on Carless and Special Needs Evacuation Planning: A Literature Review”, October 2008, accessed 7/3/12)//BZ

**The federal government must create a national policy on carless and special needs evacuation planning.** This should include funding to lower-levels of government to plan, implement, test, and continually refine such evacuation plans. Such an endeavor could be embraced by the DHS’s Interagency Coordinating Council on Emergency Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities. Targets should be set with incentives. These regional councils could encourage cooperation amongst local, county and state governments, the metropolitan planning organization, transit agencies, special needs transit providers, the American Red Cross, and other non-profits that provide services to special needs residents.

**Federal key- have to coordinate emergency planning and evacuation.**

**Renne et al., 2008** – Renne is a PhD from the University of New Orleans, Sanchez is a PhD from the University of Utah, and Litman is a director at the Victoria Transport Policy Institute (John Renne, Thomas Sanchez, and Todd Litman, “National Study on Carless and Special Needs Evacuation Planning: A Literature Review”, October 2008, accessed 7/3/12)//BZ

Much of the current evacuation literature focuses on automobile-based evacuations. Some studies focus on traffic models and the pros and cons of various strategies for dealing with massive volumes of congestion during an emergency (Wolshon 2001; Dow and Cutter 2002; Wilmot and Mei 2004). Other studies focus on the decision to evacuate or not (Lindell, Lu and Prater 2005; Willgen, Edwards, Lormand, and Wilson 2005; Bateman and Edwards 2002; Chakraborty, Tobin and Montz 2005) while others call for a more comprehensive model that includes alternative modes of evacuating (Litman 2006; Hess and Gotham 2007). A national survey of hurricane evacuation found that state departments of transportation (DOTs) largely ignored low mobility and special needs groups (Wolshon et al. 2001). States may view evacuation as a local issue and not own transport assets, buses, etc. The report notes that most cities do not have a sufficient number of buses to evacuate all low-mobility evacuees. Ironically, hundreds of transit and school buses were flooded in New Orleans during Katrina. The survey also found that no plans were in place to use rail as a means of evacuation. Historically, trains and buses have played an important role in the evacuation of cities. In an international study, trains and buses were important modes in 20 of the 27 evacuations. In ten of these, the majority of people used trains and buses (see Table 1) (Zelinsky and Kosinski 1991). The *Report to Congress on Catastrophic Hurricane Plan Evacuation* (USDOT & USDHS 2006) found that **most evacuation plans were underdeveloped and ineffective,** especially with respect to persons with special mobility needs. Multiple **federal agencies**, including the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the U.S. Department of Transportation, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, as well as Senate and House Committees found that transportation planners, providers, health care agencies, and emergency management officials **need to be better coordinated and communicating on this issue long before any disaster.** In an examination of the evacuation failures during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Litman suggests that many of these failures can be attributed to a lack of resilience; the ability to absorb unexpected circumstances through redundancy within the transportation system. Littman notes that the tragedies of Katrina are “simply extreme examples of the day-to-day problems facing non-drivers due to inadequate and poorly integrated transportation services” (Litman 2006, p.18). Many evacuation plans simply suggest that during evacuations, carless residents should seek assistance with friends or neighbors who do own cars. Raphael and Berube (2006) point out, however, that due to the socioeconomic and racial segregation existing in most American cities, the lack of an automobile is often a condition shared among neighbors. Cameron (2006) also suggests that emergency planning should involve the disabled community, and recommends that local governments create a registry of all members of the community with special needs. Many examples and case studies show the importance of multimodal emergency response planning. For example, one of the main lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is the importance of deploying buses to evacuate large numbers of people, including those who lack automobile transport (Litman 2006). It is therefore important that emergency response and evacuation plans be multimodal.

### Private CP

**The CP creates capitalist monopolies that assures imperialism**

**Kolanu 12** Abhishek Bose-Kolanu, (Harvard University 2011) Lecture Ten Feb. 18th 02/20/2012 Lecture Ten – Imperialism Concluded http://thinknippon.org/en/lectureten/

I. Returning to Lenin, How do monopolies form? We know that monopolies are an inevitable result of so-called free market competition (why? Hint: Lecture Nine). And we also know that out of industrial monopolization, bank monopolization leads to an age of finance capital and total imperialism. But how do the monopolies form in the first place? What strategies do they use to extend their power? A. Crisis Causes Concentration During times of crisis, capitalists strike. They take advantage of the fact that a crisis distracts the population to ram through economic policies that benefit themselves. Oftentimes they take advantage of the expanded political power we grant the State in times of crisis to abuse it for their own profit. Examples of crises include economic crises (subprime mortgage crisis – American banks extracted billions of dollars from the government for free), natural disasters (immediately after Hurricane Katrina New Orleans was effectively sold to private corporations, apartments were enclosed in barbed wire and people not allowed to return to their homes), war, etc.

**Free market leads to capitalism – growth and innovation necessitates government**

**Clarkston 09** Charles A. Clarkson the founder and chairman of the Clarkson Group, the Chairman of IxReveal, Inc., an analytics software company. AIG Anger and the Free Market Myth Posted: 03/26/09 03:43 PM ET

The fact is, our markets aren't free, nor should they be. The only really free markets we've seen in my adult lifetime were the Miami area after Hurricane Andrew and New Orleans after Katrina. For a day or so, "entrepreneurs" could sell ice, plywood or any other critical item for as much as they could get. Then civilization enforcement stepped in via law enforcement and shut them down. Civilization and a truly free market can't coexist. Even those bastions of free market capitalism, the NYSE and NASDAQ can't function without myriad rules, regulations and laws, and the go-go Alan Greenspan era of market freedom was predicated upon them (in fact, the demise of some those rules, such as the SEC uptick rule repealed in 2007, contributed mightily to the current crisis). I once asked Greenspan in person to describe his notion of a free market. In his inimitable doublespeak, he offered an oxymoronic description of a system in which "actors are free to do what they like with a minimum amount of rules and regulations." Months later he famously testified to Congress expressing some disillusionment. Whatever he once thought was "minimum" regulation, he now thinks we need much more. We now know the "free" market rhetoric of the Greenspan era turned out to be massively destructive. It owed much to Ronald Reagan's mocking catch phrase, "I'm from the government and I'm here to help," as if government involvement was inimical to a functioning market. Once our political discourse branded government as the interfering ogre, we started dismantling the investment and regulatory apparatus, and became prone to the myth that the success of the big winners was due only to their individual skills and talent within a free market. The "free" system supposedly permitted these talents to shine without government interference. Outrageous bonuses and executive compensations came to be viewed as the natural result of the free market at work. But that was just revisionist history, mixed up with Cold War ideology and lots of special interest lobbying. Before the Boomer era of indulgence, the government was viewed not as an adversary but a key player in economic and social welfare, whether it was the GI bill, the interstate highway system or huge federal grants for scientific research and public education. We would never have become the world's economic leader, never would have established our reputation for dynamic innovation and technological advancement, without the anti-free market monopolies enabled by the U.S. Patent Office, and thousands of other public sector investments that shaped markets by fiat. We don't have a free market and we don't want one. A better term for what we actually have would be a private market. The term "free" market has come to diminish or denigrate the role of government, but a private market embodies the notion of government encouraging risk-taking and innovation, capitalism within civilized norms and appropriate guidelines. It is in the private market's interest to understand, respect and support the critical role the government plays in our lives. The creation of wealth, including the bonuses of Wall Street executives, deserved or not, has always stood on the shoulders of public sector money and regulation, without which we would have anarchy and poverty.

**Private sector fails for evacuation – multiple reasons**

**Sanchez et al. 09** [Thomas W. Sanchez, expert on transportation, land use, urban and regional planning, and environmental justice, John L. Renne, Associate Professor of Planning and Urban Studies at the University of New Orleans, Pam Jenkins, University of New Orleans, and Robert Peterson] Challenge of Evacuating the Carless in Five Major U.S. Cities Identifying the Key Issues http://planning.uno.edu/docs/The%20Challenge%20of%20Evacuation%20the%20Carless.pdf

Private-sector issues include conﬂicts between private evacuation contracts and public evacuation demands, as one bus operator noted that a bus contracted to transport hotel occupants was diverted by law enforcement, with no reimbursement received. A local emergency management planner worried that liability concerns and reimbursement difficulties encourage a philosophy of risk avoidance in both public and private sectors. Massive population relocations may overwhelm the limited excess capacity of private transportation and healthcare providers. The bus, airline, and hospital industries are primarily for-proﬁt enterprises, driven to increase efficiency through decreasing underused inventory, which results in less vehicle availability and ﬂexibility in times of increased demand.

**Private efforts fail and reentrench the social disparities of the status quo.**

**Smith 2006 –** Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the CUNY Graduate Center where he also directs the Center for Place, Culture and Politics (Neil, “There’s No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster” March 2006, http://www.ladeltacorps.org/uploads/4/3/8/1/4381788/cg-ar-packet.pdf )//ALo

By contrast, post-Katrina reconstruction in the United States will be dominated by top-down government contracts for tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars to major corporations and by billions of dollars of insurance payments to property owners so that they can reconstruct in the same vulnerable locations already destroyed. Such a solution may be good if measured by the yardstick of capitalist profit—a new buying binge by the Gulf raises all yachts, and, incredibly, insurance company stocks tend to rise following major disasters – but the same private market logic that caused such social destruction spells social and environmental disaster for those not in line to profit from government contracts and property insurance payments. But there is an alternative. “We will not stand idly by while this disaster is used as an opportunity to replace our homes with newly built mansions and condos in a gentrified New Orleans,” reads a statement from a citywide coalition of New Orleans low-income groups, Community Labor United (Klein 2005). They went on to insist that the rebuilding of the city not be dominated by top-down corporate welfare but that those evacuated from New Orleans have the primary power over how the reconstruction proceeds. The billions of dollars already committed by Congress and the funds raised by charities belong by rights to the victims. Some will respond that reconstruction is very complicated, and it is, but the record of companies like Bechtel and Haliburton in Iraq are hardly evidence for the defense of a top-down Iraq model for New Orleans. In the end, the reconstruction question is only secondarily technical. It is in the first place political, and the same corporate and federal abandonment that fostered such a widespread disaster can hardly be expected to perform an about-turn by empowering a disempowered population. Given the visceral response to the hundreds of unnecessary deaths resulting from Katrina, any attempt to impose a top-down solution by force is likely to incite an equally visceral response from below. If the Bush administration’s first instinct was to eschew government and trust private charities to help the victims of Katrina, it should follow that instinct as regards the ordinary refugees of New Orleans and their ability to rebuild from the bottom up. There is no such thing as a natural disaster, and the supposed naturalness of the market is the last place to look for a solution to this disastrous havoc.

**Privatized efforts to rebuild New Orleans causes more oppression.**

**Smith 2006 –** Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the CUNY Graduate Center where he also directs the Center for Place, Culture and Politics (Neil, “There’s No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster” March 2006, http://www.ladeltacorps.org/uploads/4/3/8/1/4381788/cg-ar-packet.pdf )//ALo

The final lesson of environmental geography concerning disasters is that far from flattening the social differences, disaster reconstruction invariably cuts deeper the ruts and grooves of social oppression and exploitation. And so, while abolishing competition by giving no-bid contracts to some of the same companies that operate in Iraq – Bechtel, Fluor Corp., Haliburton – the Bush administration has mandated cutthroat competition among desperate workers by suspending the federal law that requires federal contractors to pay at least the prevailing local wage. Meanwhile, with many of the dead still unaccounted for, developers descended on New Orleans with wallets bulging and chops smacking. In anticipation that the city will be rebuilt with higher and better levees and with many fewer working class and African Americans, New Orleans two weeks after Katrina already looked like a developers’ gold rush (Streitfeld 2005; Rivlin 2005). These people, these developers and these corporations, say many New Orleanians, are the “true looters.” By contrast, those displaced, with no private property to reclaim, face lower wages, escalating costs for scarce housing, and as the initial sympathy wears away, increased stigmatization. When President Bush insists that “out of New Orleans is going to come that great city again,” it is difficult to believe that good quality, secure and affordable social housing is what this administration has in mind. Wholesale gentrification at a scale as yet unseen in the United States is the more likely outcome. After the Bush hurricane, the poor, African American and working class people who evacuated will not be welcomed back to New Orleans, which will in all likelihood be rebuilt as a tourist magnet with a Disneyfied BigEasyVille oozing even more manufactured authenticity than the surviving French Quarter nearby. We can look back and identify any number of individual decisions taken and not taken that made this hurricane such a social disaster. But the larger picture is more than the sum of its parts. It is not a radical conclusion that the dimensions of the Katrina disaster owe in large part not just to the actions of this or that local or federal administration but the operation of a capitalist market more broadly, especially in its neo-liberal garb. The refusal to tackle global warming is rooted in the global power of the petroleum and energy corporations which fear for their profits and which, not coincidentally, represent the social class roots of the Bush administration’s power; the New Orleans population were vulnerable not because of geography but because of long term class and race abandonment – poverty – exacerbated by the dismantling of social welfare by Democratic and Republican administrations alike; the incompetence of FEMA preparations expressed cocooned ruling class comradery, cronyism and privilege rather than any concern for the poor and working class; and the reconstruction looks set to capitalize on these inequalities and deepen them further. Not at any point in the next few decades will African Americans again account for two-thirds of New Orleans’ population.

### Federalism

**The DA is just in place to maintain racial hierarchies**

**Strolovitch et al. 06** Dara Strolovitch is assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota. She has been a research fellow at the Brookings Institution and a visiting faculty fellow at Georgetown's Center for Democracy and the Third Sector. Her research and teaching focus on interest groups and social movements, and politics of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Dorian Warren is a post-doctoral scholar at the University of Chicago's Harris School of Public Policy. He specializes in the study of inequality and the politics of marginalized groups in American politics. Paul Frymer is associate professor of politics and legal studies at UC Santa Cruz. He is the author of Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America (Princeton Press) and is currently writing about race and labor in the twentieth century. Katrina’s Political Roots and Divisions: Race, Class, and Federalism in American Politics Published on: Jun 11, 2006

Federalism then, may be a center of the debate, but it provides a smoke screen more than a concrete barrier to political reform. The reason federalism debates are so powerful is because our national political institutions are fundamentally divided over race, a division that is as old as the nation itself. To maintain racial hierarchies, southern Democrats and racial conservatives consistently invoke states rights when it suits them. These interests, while a minority in American society, have always been important pivots and veto players in the national political arena. Because our political institutions, such as the Senate, the Electoral College, and the party system, are unduly beholden to these pivotal votes, federal distinctions remain politically meaningful at a time when many scholars have argued that they are antiquated and artificial. It is for this reason that even those political actors who support the expansion of racial and economic justice have had to make political calculations that work against such goals. This is perhaps most notable in the way that the two party system has been affected by the pivotal role of the South. With brief exceptions, the two major political parties have been equal opportunity ignorers of racial inequality going back to their formation in the 1820s. To win elections, parties need to appeal to southern whites and racially conservative voters. Democrats as much as Republicans are vividly aware of this, as the actions of national candidates from Bill Clinton to Al Gore to John Kerry have emphatically illustrated. The poor in New Orleans only entered our television screens with Katrina, in part because no major party presidential nominee has made race or poverty a campaign issue in almost four decades

### States CP

**States fail in evacuation planning – government reports**

**GAO 08** GAO-08-544R: United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548: April 1, 2008:

Why GAO Did This Study: During the evacuation of New Orleans in response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, many of those who did not own a vehicle and could not evacuate were among the over 1,300 people who died. **This raised questions about how well state and local governments,** primarily responsible for disaster planning, **integrate transportation-disadvantaged populations into such planning.** GAO assessed the challenges and barriers state and local officials face; how prepared these governments are and steps they are taking to address challenges and barriers; and federal efforts to provide evacuation assistance. GAO reviewed evacuation plans; Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Transportation (DOT), and other studies; and interviewed officials in five major city and four state governments. What GAO Found: **State and local governments face evacuation challenges in identifying and locating transportation-disadvantaged populations, determining their needs, and providing for their transportation**. These populations are diverse and constantly changing, and information on their location is often not readily available. In addition, these populations’ evacuation needs vary widely; some require basic transportation while others need accessible equipment, such as buses with chair lifts. Legal and social barriers impede addressing these evacuation challenges. For example, transportation providers may be unwilling to provide evacuation assistance because of liability concerns. State and local governments are generally not well prepared—in terms of planning, training, and conducting exercises—to evacuate transportationdisadvantaged populations, but some have begun to address challenges and barriers. For example, DHS reported in June 2006 that only about 10 percent of state and about 12 percent of urban area emergency plans it reviewed adequately addressed evacuating these populations. Furthermore, in one of five major cities GAO visited, officials believed that few residents would require evacuation assistance despite the U.S. Census reporting 16.5 percent of car-less households in that major city. DHS also found that most states and urban areas significantly underestimated the advance planning and coordination required to effectively address the needs of persons with disabilities. Steps being taken by some such governments include collaboration with social service and transportation providers and transportation planning organizations—some of which are DOT grantees and stakeholders—to determine transportation needs and develop agreements for emergency use of drivers and vehicles.

**States fail in evacuation planning – empirics**

**National Council on Disabilities 06** The Impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on People with Disabilities: A Look Back and Remaining Challenges Lex Frieden, Chairperson August 3, 2006 http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2006/Aug072006

Often, local evacuation plans failed to adequately provide for the transportation needs of people with disabilities for two reasons: first, many local planners reported that they were unaware that people with disabilities have special evacuation needs; and, second, when local planners were aware of the need to plan for people with disabilities, the plans failed because they did not involve people with disabilities in the planning process. For example, during the Katrina evacuation, many people with disabilities could not evacuate because to do so would require them to abandon support services and personnel. Moreover, since emergency transportation and shelters could not care for them, many people with disabilities were forced to stay behind. For example, Karen Johnson stayed in New Orleans to help her parents, who have disabilities and could not be evacuated. Holdouts like Karen and her parents were "getting dehydrated… running out of food… [and surrounded] by human remains in different houses."30 Other people with mobility disabilities who were forced to abandon wheelchairs could not wait in lines for evacuation buses for hours at a time, and thus were unable to evacuate from threatened cities.31

**Federal government is key – states will get overwhelmed**

**GAO 06** United States Government Accountability Office GAO Report to Congressional Committees TRANSPORTATIONDISADVANTAGED POPULATIONS Actions Needed to Clarify Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations

The experience of Hurricane Katrina illustrated that when state, local, and federal governments are not well prepared to evacuate transportation- disadvantaged populations during a disaster, thousands of people may not have the ability to evacuate on their own and may be left in extremely hazardous circumstances. While state and local governments have primary responsibility for planning, training, and conducting exercises for the evacuation of these populations, gaps in federal assistance have hindered the ability of many state and local governments to sufficiently prepare to address the complex challenges and barriers of evacuating transportation-disadvantaged populations. This includes the lack of any requirement to plan, train, and conduct exercises for the evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged populations as well as gaps in guidance and technical assistance, such as problems with DHS’s Lessons Learned Information Sharing online portal. In addition, information that DOT grantees and stakeholders have could be useful in evacuation preparedness efforts. It is uncertain whether state and local governments will be better positioned to evacuate transportation-disadvantaged populations in the future. Furthermore, the experience of Hurricane Katrina reinforced the fact that some disasters are likely to overwhelm the ability of state and local governments to respond, and that the federal government needs to be prepared in these instances to carry out an evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged populations. Because DHS has not yet clarified in the National Response Plan the lead, coordinating, and supporting federal agencies to provide evacuation support for other transportation-disadvantaged populations nor outlined these agencies’ responsibilities, the federal government cannot ensure that it is taking the necessary steps to prepare for evacuating such populations; this could contribute to leaving behind of some of society’s most vulnerable populations in a future catastrophic disaster. The National Response Plan review and revision process provides DHS with the opportunity to clarify the lead, coordinating, and supporting agencies to provide evacuation assistance and outline these agencies’ responsibilities in order to strengthen the federal government’s evacuation preparedness.

### -Louisiana DA

**Education on the Louisiana chopping block**

**Shirley 5/16/12** By Victoria Shirley Louisiana budget cuts: higher education on chopping block Posted: May 16, 2012 7:21 PM EDT http://www.knoe.com/story/18441433/louisiana-budget-cuts-higher-education-on-chopping-block

MONROE, La. (KNOE 8 News)- A leaner state budget bill is making its way through the Louisiana Legislature. The bill is tighter because Louisiana's budget for next year is in the red. The shortfall is forcing law makers to cut $270 million dollars. With the constitution and federal mandates protecting 70% of the operating budget, Lawmakers have little choice about where the axe will fall. In a spending plan approved by the house Friday, **health care and higher education are the main components on the chopping block.** "We're preparing for the worst and preparing something better for something better than that." said Luke Robins, Delta Chancellor. Robins says programs and faculty will be affected by the cuts and ULM President Nick Bruno agrees, "I can't imagine any department that won't be impacted by this" said Bruno. Northeast Louisiana colleges and universities will see a proposed $30 million dollar funding reduction. Higher education leaders hope the final bill won't have cuts as deep. "We all need to collectively, encourage our legislators and all elected officials that higher education is the key to the future." said Bruno.

**Louisiana education budget okay now but cuts possible**

**Hasten 6/25/12** Mike Hasten, staff writer, 10:58 PM, Jun. 25, 2012 “Universities survived cut, more to deal with” http://www.thenewsstar.com/article/20120626/NEWS01/206260320

But higher education was braced this month for a fifth consecutive mid-year cut because "we saw it coming," Casper said. "There were always rumors of cuts" so campus heads stopped spending to reduce the impact. "We kept hearing that it was a possibility, so we had some plans in advance," she said. The $25 million was absorbed by a hiring freeze and suspension of purchasing equipment. But the new budget presents another problem that universities are still working on, said Jackie Tisdell of the University of Louisiana System. Technically, they don't have to implement their plans until September. UL Systems have not submitted their new budgets, Tisdell said, but the UL System Board of Supervisors is to review the plans for its schools at its August meeting, Commissioner of Higher Education Jim Purcell has said colleges and universities "dodged a bullet" because at one time during the legislative session, the cut would have been about $200 million.

**Louisiana education funding at a critical point now**

**Associated Press 6/5/12** La. colleges hit with new rounds of budget cuts http://www.chron.com/news/article/La-colleges-hit-with-new-rounds-of-budget-cuts-3611346.php

Commissioner of Higher Education Jim Purcell said Tuesday that the cuts will be difficult. But he said higher education "dodged the bullet" after some scenarios envisioned higher education facing steep reductions above $200 million as the House and Senate haggled over the final budget plans. "The size of the cuts to higher education should not be minimized, even though significant funding was ultimately restored by the Senate. The fact is higher education is still in a precarious situation in some instances," said Barry Erwin, president of the nonpartisan Council for A Better Louisiana. That group regularly advocates for education issues.

**That disproportionately affects the poor and kills the state economy**

**Mathis 6/19/12** Tim Mathis, Louisiana Budget Project http://www.labudget.org/lbp/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Good-bad-ugly-about-Louisiana-Budget-VermilionToday-6.16.12.pdf

Universities have made up for some of this with steep **tuition increases**—a troubling trend that **could put a college education financially out of reach for many poorer residents**. Four years ago, state funding made up about 60 percent of university budgets, with the other 40 percent coming from tuition and fees. But that ratio has been reversed, and students now pay more than 60 percent of the cost. Unless it’s reversed, **that trend will have grave consequences for the state’s economy.** Unrelenting **cuts in higher education that make college less affordable and accessible** can contribute to a downward spiral, resulting in a greater concentration of low-wage and low-skilled jobs. By 2018, Louisiana is projected to be second-to-last among states when it comes to the availability of higher-paying jobs requiring a post-secondary education, and near the top for low-paying jobs that require little education.1

**black colleges in New Orleans are key to resolving inequality – ethical obligation**

**Drezner and Gasman 06**, Marybeth Gasman, Ph.D., is a Professor of Education at the University of Pennsylvania Graduate School of Education and one of the leading authorities in the country on historically black colleges, Noah D. Drezner is an assistant professor of higher education at the University of Maryland, College Park, Payback Time: Katrina and the Nation’s Obligation to Black Colleges By: Marybeth Gasman & Noah D. Drezner, 02/03/06

One of the most effective and least costly ways to rectify past injustices would be to support our nation’s black colleges financially. Giving to black colleges now will help repair not only the physical damage done by the hurricane but also the historical damage inflicted over the past century. Although founded and funded on an unequal basis, black colleges have shown remarkable resilience, continuing to enroll a substantial share of African Americans who receive a college education. In most cities across the country, black colleges were sited on undesirable land—a situation amply demonstrated in New Orleans, where Xavier, Dillard, and Southern universities were built on the lowest ground, thereby suffering the greatest damage when the levees broke. Likewise, over the course of their existence, these institutions had fewer resources than did their historically white counterparts. For example, many white philanthropists and state governments historically gave less to black education, believing black colleges cost less to maintain than did white institutions. Despite these circumstances, black colleges, especially those in New Orleans, have educated a distinguished slate of elected leaders, doctors, lawyers, judges, teachers, and college professors. According to the American Medical Association, Xavier University of New Orleans, established in 1915, is responsible for placing more African Americans in medical school than any other institution in America. This institution alone is changing the landscape of the medical professions, producing many future doctors and pharmacists committed to working in low-income urban and rural areas. With an enrollment of only 4,000, Xavier awards more undergraduate degrees in biology and the life sciences to African Americans than any other college or university. Dillard University, founded in 1869, provides a large percentage of New Orleans’ nurses and, like its historically black counterparts across the country, has long been an entry point to the middle class for its graduates. Moreover, Dillard, ranked among the top 15 Southern comprehensive colleges by U.S. News and World Report, educated one of the Ivy League’s most prominent presidents, Brown University’s Ruth Simmons. Southern University, an open admission institution, serves low-income students determined to move themselves out of poverty. The institution has a profound commitment to community service and places its graduates in social service positions throughout the U.S. and abroad. Given the contributions of these three institutions, it is not economically sound to abandon them during this time of need.

### Levees CP

**Levees fail**

**The Times-Picayune 10**, October 17, 2010 Levee Construction Around New Orleans Enters a Period of Uncertainty http://www.planetizen.com/node/46486

Many academics and experts are concerned that relaxed flood protection standards and the acceptance of a higher flood risk would be a step in the wrong direction for threatened communities. The proposal has its fair share of critics, including those who believe that it places too much emphasis on the overtopping of levees by storm surge as the principal component of levee failure: "Ray Seed, a civil engineering professor at the University of California at Berkeley, said the pilot study plan is flawed because it may not adequately consider some of the causes of levee failures in New Orleans, such as floodwaters seeping underneath earthen levees, causing them to collapse or move."

**Levees fail – termites**

**LSU Ag Center 06** Researchers Evaluating Grass For Levee Protection News Release Distributed 07/27/06 http://text.lsuagcenter.com/en/environment/conservation/wetlands/Researchers+Evaluating+Grass+For+Levee+Protection.htm

One of the problems with levees in New Orleans has been the infestation of mature trees by Formosan subterranean termites. The termites not only undermine the levees but also feed on the trees, weakening them and contributing to their tendency to topple easily in high winds. Falling trees that pulled their roots out of the ground are suspected of contributing to the weakening and eventual breaches of levees in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Henderson said termites feeding on bagasse seams between the pilings in the New Orleans levees also are suspected of contributing to levee breaches.

**Levees can fail and magnify the impact**

**Spencer 11**, Spring Arbor University, Mississippi River flood spills into central Louisiana By Naomi Spencer 16 May 2011 http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/may2011/miss-m16.shtml

The Army Corps warned that without opening the Morganza, New Orleans risked being flooded on a scale even worse than in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Even with the spillway diversion, however, **the city’s 20-foot levees are vulnerable to collapse from the force of the flow, and a crest of 19.5 feet.** A levee breach in the city could trigger a “Niagara Falls or more pouring of the river for an extended period of time,” according to John Barry, author of Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How It Changed America. The river is expected to crest at Greenville, Mississippi Monday at 64.5 feet, 16.5 feet above flood stage. An earthen levee near the city collapsed Friday night after being overtopped. Residents in the area had been trying to fortify the half-mile wide wall with extra earth and plastic before the breach. “It’s adding extra stress to the mainline levees, but they are holding,” Army Corps spokesman Kavanaugh Breazeale said Saturday.

**Levees encourage bad city planning and kill wetlands**

**Frank 11**, Jeffrey, "The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Gulf Coast Libraries and Their Disaster Planning" (2011). This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses and Graduate Research at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks.. http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd\_theses/3925

Further, while the levee system has a number of benefits, such as providing bountiful croplands and making vulnerable areas like New Orleans habitable, levees can also sow the seeds of destruction. Problems with levees include soil subsidence and coastal erosion acceleration. Levees also encouraged land development that lured homeowners into hazardous flood plains (Campanella, 2008). Another problem with the levee system is that they starve the wetlands of the Mississippi River Delta of silt and this sediment was not replenished. As a result wetlands have been disappearing at a rate of 20 sq. meters a year (NOVA, 2005). This is a serious issue, considering the protection wetlands provide the Louisiana coast from the devastating effects of storms and floods. In regard to hurricane storm surge protection, Van Heerden (2006) describes wetlands, along with barrier islands, as “the best, most natural, least expensive buffer available” (p. 169). The extent of wetland deterioration over the years has accelerated to the point that their ability to protect the Louisiana coast has greatly diminished.

### Auto Tradeoff

**Auto industry is racist**

**Mugyenyu and Engler 11** Bianca Mugyenyi coordinator of Concordia's Gender Advocacy Centre and Yves Engler Montréal activist and author The Automobile: Promoting Racism and Inequality / August 24th, 2011 http://dissidentvoice.org/2011/08/the-automobile-promoting-racism-and-inequality/

The more cars in a community the worse it is for poor people, especially those in debt. A recent Wall Street Journal article titled “In Debt Collecting, Location Matters” reveals how companies trying to collect overdue bills can “shop around for the best places to bring their claims.” The article details what debt collectors look for when choosing a small claims court; the ability to pursue as much of a debtor’s assets as possible, a sympathetic judge and, get this, a car-dominated landscape. The WSJ explains, “Decatur Township [an Indianapolis suburb] has become the preferred courthouse for lawyers who collect soured debt on behalf of medical providers, according to Pam Ricker, who has managed the court’s operations for more than 25 years. The township has no hospitals. Ms. Ricker says a lack of public transportation discourages many defendants from showing up in court, resulting in automatic wins for debt collectors.” Somewhere along the way debt collectors realized that people who can’t afford to pay their medical bills are more likely to be car-less and thus less able to attend a small claims court far from any bus service. Apparently, these soulless debt collectors care little that those without a vehicle are probably less able to pay their medical bills. Of course, Decatur Township’s medical collection gambit is an extreme example of how a car-dominated landscape exacerbates inequities, but private car transport also places a greater financial burden on lower income folks in many other ways. All other forms of land transportation are much more accessible. Shoes, a bike, or a metro pass are cheaper than a car, which costs on average $8,500 to own and operate annually. Though they drive less, lower income folks are more likely to live on heavily trafficked streets/neighborhoods. Increased car noise and pollution leads to various ills, including higher rates of asthma and cancer. The car contributes to ill health in other ways. As an important means for the wealthy to assert social dominance, the private car heightens cultural inequities and inequality is an increasingly recognized negative health determinant. The private car has made it possible for the wealthier to live far from the poor (or anyone else without an automobile). Partly to keep out poor people and black folks, suburban counties such as Decatur Township have failed to invest in public transit. In Highway Robbery: Transportation Racism & New Routes to Equity Robert Bullard describes how resistance to “urban” infiltration constrained the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) to serving two of the Atlanta region’s ten counties. When Cobb County voted against joining MARTA the unofficial slogan was “Stop Atlanta.” And so, MARTA is filled with lines that bypass wealthy suburban areas or terminate at their boundaries.

### Politics

**No link – Evacuation is popular and pushed by the following groups**

**GAO 06** United States Government Accountability Office GAO Report to Congressional Committees TRANSPORTATIONDISADVANTAGED POPULATIONS Actions Needed to Clarify Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations

There are many relevant federal entities and other entities that have served as advocates for all or subsets of transportation-disadvantaged populations. In the federal government, these include the National Council on Disability; and interagency councils such as the Coordinating Council on Access and Mobility, the Interagency Coordinating Council on Emergency Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities, and the Interagency Council on Homelessness. Outside of the federal government, relevant entities that have advocated for these populations include the National Organization on Disability and the American Association of Retired Persons, as well as transportation groups such as the American Public Transportation Association, the Community Transportation Association of America, and the Association of Metropolitan Planning Organizations.

**Plan bipartisan – funding for New Orleans protection**

**Winchell 09** PRESS RELEASE: Rep. Melancon Secures over $53.4 Million for Projects in South Louisiana FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: February 26, 2009 Robin Winchell http://bayouperspective.blogspot.com/2009\_02\_01\_archive.html

WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Rep. Charlie Melancon (LA-03) announced today that he secured $53,477,250 for projects in Louisiana’s Third Congressional District in the FY 2009 appropriations bills. This includes $48,677,250 in the FY09 Omnibus Appropriations Act (H.R. 1105) and $4,800,000 in the FY09 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 2638). The Omnibus passed the House last night with bipartisan support and should be considered by the Senate for approval in the next week. The Defense bill passed Congress last September.

**Plan bipartisan – FEMA funding**

**Marino 11** Marino Co-Chairs Coalition to Aid Hurricane, Flood Victims CONTACT: Renita Fennick 202-870-3386 or renita.fennick@mail.house.gov Sep 8, 2011 http://marino.house.gov/press-release/bipartisan-panel-help-fema-funding

WASHINGTON (Sept. 8, 2011) – U.S. Rep. Tom Marino, PA-10, will serve as co-chairman of a bi-partisan House coalition aimed at ensuring the Federal Emergency Management Agency has the resources to support recovery efforts in the wake of recent natural disasters. The Hurricane Irene Coalition was formed Thursday morning after a meeting of House members whose districts were devastated by Hurricane Irene. The coalition’s scope is being extended to include the communities ravaged by this week’s flooding. Marino, of Lycoming Township, and more than 30 other members of Congress met with FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate, Deputy Administrator Richard Serino, and White House staff. Fugate briefed the group on the scope of the storm and the ongoing recovery efforts. The coalition’s goal is twofold: It will work to ensure FEMA has the resources it needs to support the recovery effort; and it will serve as a resource for members to support recovery efforts in their districts as they work with FEMA and other federal agencies. “I am encouraged by the formation of this coalition because the devastation that has been wrought on our constituents has nothing to do with political affiliation,” Marino said. “Helping these hard-working Americans get back on track and restoring our roads, bridges and public buildings is not an issue that can be categorized as conservative or liberal.”

**Plan popular – republicans will make exceptions to conservative thoughts**

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Immediately after the meeting, Marino left Washington and headed to his home district where he is expected to spend the next few days visiting the flood-ravaged municipalities. He and his staff have been in contact with emergency management officials in the affected counties. “I am an advocate of a smaller federal government, for sure, but there are some roles that Washington is obligated to fill,” Marino said. “Making sure that we lift people and local government out of the ruins caused by natural disasters is one of them.” Marino said his top priority is to reunite families in a “clean, safe housing by securing federal and state funding immediately.”

### K of Politics

**PC theory is wrong and abiding by it takes away basic rights**

**Ruby-Sachs 09** Emma Ruby-Sachs Attorney, An LGBT Report Card for Obama's First 100 Days Posted: 04/28/09 11:33 PM ET http://www.huffingtonpost.com/emma-rubysachs/an-lgbt-report-card-for-o\_b\_192590.html

But we expect the government to be able to multi-task. We reject the notion that Obama's political power and political capital are all used up by getting this country in basic working order. If we had ranked political problems, like Pelosi urges us to, equality gains, past, present and future, would never have been achieved. She is effectively telling the LGBT community, create a national crisis or good luck getting basic rights.

**Their conception of politics as a series of distinct events results in tunnel vision and serial policy failure.**

Edelman 98 Murray, Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin “Language, Myths and Rhetoric,” Society, January/February, Volume 35, Issue 2

The various issues with which governments deal are highly interrelated in the contemporary world, even though we are cued to perceive them as distinct. Such cuing also influences public opinion about politics in another sense. Because each day's news and governmental announcements evoke anxieties and reassurances about specific "problems" perceived as separate from each other (foreign affairs, strikes, fuel shortages, food shortages, prices, party politics, etc.), our political worlds are segmented and disjointed, focused at any moment upon some small set of anxieties, even though each such "issue" is a part of an increasingly integrated whole. Wars bring commodity shortages and rising prices, which in turn foment worker discontent and a search for enemies. Economic prosperity leads to a decline in theft and vagrancy, an increase in white-collar crime, higher demands for fuel and other ramifications. But our mode of referring to problems and policies creates a succession of crises, respites and separate grounds for anxiety and hope. Where people perceive links among issues, that perception is likely to be arbitrary and politically cued. To experience the political world as a sequence of distinct events, randomly threatening or reassuring, renders people susceptible to deliberate and unintended cues, for the environment becomes unpredictable and people remain continuously anxious. In place of the ability to deal with issues in terms of their logical and empirical ties to each other, the language of politics encourages us to see and to feel them as separate. This is also a formula for coping with them ineffectively, which is bound to reinforce anxiety in its turn.

**Political capital isn’t real and their approach breed violence**

**Ruby-Sachs 08** Emma Ruby-SachsLawyer Posted: November 24, 2008, J.D. from the University of Toronto and practices civil litigation with Sutts Strosberg LLP, Ranking the Issues: Gay Rights in an Economic Crisis, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/emma-rubysachs/ranking-the-issues-gay-ri\_b\_146023.html

The classic approach to politics is to rank priorities and measure the finite bowl of political capital. If Obama pushes hard on a green new deal, he likely won't have much left for universal health care. If he backs off of serious economic regulation, then he might get more support for social programs from Republicans.  Because gay civil rights struggles affect fewer individuals and relate to less quantifiable harms, it's hard to justify putting them at the top of the list.  The alternative is to reject the ranked priorities political model altogether.  There is **little evidence** that sway and support is finite in the American political system. Political capital relates to the actions of the leader, yes, but can be infinitely large or non-existent at any point in time. In some ways, the more you get done, the more the bowl of capital swells.  Ranking America's problems to conserve political influence is a **narrow minded approach** to solving this crisis. Putting banks at the top of the list avoids the plight of large employers (like car companies - as much as we love to hate their executives). Sending health care and other social programs to second or third place, leaves those immediately affected by the crisis with nothing to fall back on. Finally, ignoring the disenfranchisement of a segment of the population breeds discontent, encourages protest, boycotts (a definite harm in this economy) and violence. It divides families (especially those who are still unable to sponsor their partner into the United States), imposes higher tax burdens on gay couples, denies benefits to gay spouses in many employment situations and polarizes social conservatives and social liberals in a time when consensus is essential.

**Politics to anticipate the reaction of citizens objectifies them and allows them to be tuned by the government**

**Oenen 06** Gijs van Oenen is senior lecturer in practical philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Ph.D. from the University of Amsterdam in 1994. Next to the Erasmus University, he has been affiliated with the University of Amsterdam, Webster University Leiden, and the Rotterdam Academy of Architecture and Urban Design. A Machine That Would Go of Itself: Interpassivity and Its Impact on Political LIfe Gijs Van Oenen. Theory & Event. Baltimore: 2006. Vol. 9, Iss. 2;1 pgs 40.

The second mode, the one that follows on the classical model, may be described very broadly as the mode of policy. Of course, politics and government have always involved some form of policy-making. Political decisions need strategies to carry them out, and strategies when discursively laid out tend to become policies. Still, the notion of 'policy' as we use it nowadays can be seen as a distinctive step in the evolution of the praxis of government and politics, indicating a specific form of relation between government and citizen**. The decisive point here is the anticipation of the reaction of citizens** as part of the political proposals themselves on the one hand, and the coordination of the proposals of different political institutions and branches on the other, in an attempt to implement a coordinated 'policy'. The idea of policy is thus intimately related with the rise of the welfare state and the ambition of government to intervene in social processes in order to promote social goals. 41. Citizens thus become 'involved' in politics to a greater extent than just by voting, or being a member of a political party. But they are not supposed to be somehow actively involved in the formation of policy; their involvement in this 'mode' or phase is restricted to being the passive object of evaluation. The formation of policy might thus be considered part of 'political science', in the sense of being a broad, systematic and integrated approach to social adaptation and change.16 42. We may connect 'policy' in this sense with well-known political projects in post-World War II Europe. In a general sense, this era was characterized by the rejection of 'wholesale', revolutionary solutions and by a broad acceptance of the idea of 'piecemeal social engineering'. **Society should be adjusted, fine-tuned and serviced**, as a work for experts, rather than thrown about by rough, revolutionary amateurism. More specifically, the Beveridge report and the Marshall plan were the first examples of strong social policy 'unleashed' on postwar Europe. In some important sense, political confrontation was exchanged for social peacekeeping. 43. The notion of 'the end of ideology' might be seen as simultaneously heralding the 'triumph of policy'. Many European leftwing intellectuals distrusted this development; they suspected that political science, as a way to stimulate the formation and implementation of 'social policy', was implicitly or explicitly sponsored by the Marshall plan - at least in an ideological sense. Still, it is fair to say that the large-scale introduction of social policies constituted an almost unprecedented expression of political optimism and enthusiasm. The new approach promised, perhaps for the first time in history, a 'humane' organisation of labor and of social life in general.

### K of Process CP

**The case is a disad – their focus on process destroys the product**

**Oenen 06** Gijs van Oenen is senior lecturer in practical philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Ph.D. from the University of Amsterdam in 1994. Next to the Erasmus University, he has been affiliated with the University of Amsterdam, Webster University Leiden, and the Rotterdam Academy of Architecture and Urban Design. A Machine That Would Go of Itself: Interpassivity and Its Impact on Political LIfe Gijs Van Oenen. Theory & Event. Baltimore: 2006. Vol. 9, Iss. 2;1 pgs 40.

32. These employees thus had become more flexible and more passive at the same time. Their flexibility enabled them to manufacture many different kinds of products, but simultaneously they had lost touch with any particular product they happened to create. While the employees fitted the system of production better than ever before, they were more than ever detached from the product that this system was meant to realize in the first place. Here we see the quintessential movement expressed by the concept of interpassivity: an increased amount of 'interactivity', that is to say, an optimized interaction between human and system functions in the production process, is accompanied by a loss of involvement and interest in the product itself. 33. This understanding of interpassivity differs from, but accords well with the views espoused by Zizek and Pfaller. For instance, it fits Zizek's observation of the loss of 'substance': series of products are nowadays deprived of their 'malignant properties', that is to say of their substance, the hard resistant kernel of the Real: coffee without coffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol, politics as expert administration, that is, without politics.15 My account also confirms Pfallers and Zizeks thesis that interpassivity implies an increase in activity. In interpassive 'mode' we do indeed exhibit increased activity, but **this activity expresses a shift of involvement,** or 'interest', **from product to process**. In its radical form, interpassivity even implies that **the product is being replaced** (we might say 'negated') **by the process. The product**, once the original goal and purpose of the process, **has become superfluous; it is no longer especially needed or valued**. What is valued, on the contrary, is the ability to be involved in the production process. 34. The whole notion of 'involvement', however, has itself been affected by this development. The commitment has become procedural rather than substantial. To a certain extent, this is inherent in the flexibility they are expected to exhibit. Skills are no longer connected to specific products; the most important skill of modern workers is the ability to 'interact', or be interactive', in a variety of different processes. 35. Let me summarize my theses concerning the way interpassivity affects our contemporary lives, in the sphere of labor. 36. First, we do not much care (anymore) about the end result of the productive process we are involved in. We just do not get around to consummating the product of our involvement. Second, and more precisely, our activity and our 'interest' shifts towards the earlier or preceding phases of the process. Our passivity concerning the product is compensated for by our increased (inter-)activity in the process of production. Third, the process of interactivity itself suffices; the reception and appreciation of the product is taken over, or preempted, by the process of production, or 'provision'.

**There is no “win-win” – process trades off with product**

**Oenen 06** Gijs van Oenen is senior lecturer in practical philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Ph.D. from the University of Amsterdam in 1994. Next to the Erasmus University, he has been affiliated with the University of Amsterdam, Webster University Leiden, and the Rotterdam Academy of Architecture and Urban Design. A Machine That Would Go of Itself: Interpassivity and Its Impact on Political LIfe Gijs Van Oenen. Theory & Event. Baltimore: 2006. Vol. 9, Iss. 2;1 pgs 40.

48. But more importantly, the official view or 'ideology' underwriting interactivity denies that a shift in political interest is taking place. It suggests that the interest of both citizens and government in what politics 'produces' - some form of collective good - is enhanced and supplemented by an increased interest in the process of policy formation. **Against this 'win-win'** view, I want to suggest that the increase in involvement in the political process, the sphere of policy formation, goes along with a loss of involvement in the 'product' of the process. The point here is not merely that people lack sufficient time or means to be involved in both process and result. Rather it seems that people nowadays feel more attached to the process than to its eventual product. Being actively involved in the process has acquired a sense and meaning of its own, that may compete with, or actually override, the interest in what the process aimed to realize. In other words, what the process now mainly realizes, its main 'product', is involvement with itself.

### Media K

**Media is good and we our depictions can be correct**

**March, 95** James Marsh, Professor of Philosophy, Fordham University, 95, Critique, Action, and Liberation

Such an account, however, is as one-sided or perhaps even more one-sided than that of naive modernism. We note a residual idealism that does not take into account socioeconomic realities already pointed out such as the corporate nature of media, their role in achieving and legitimating profit, and their function of manufacturing consent. In such a postmodernist account is a reduction of everything to image or symbol that misses the relationship of these to realities such as corporations seeking profit, impoverished workers in these corporations, or peasants in Third-World countries trying to conduct elections. Postmodernism does not adequately distinguish here between a reduction of reality to image and a mediation of reality by image. A media idealism exists rooted in the influence of structuralism and poststructuralism and doing insufficient justice to concrete human experience, judgment, and free interaction in the world.4 It is also paradoxical or contradictory to say it really is true that nothing is really true, that everything is illusory or imaginary. Postmodemism makes judgments that implicitly deny the reduction of reality to image. For example, Poster and Baudrillard do want to say that we really are in a new age that is informational and postindustrial. Again, to say that everything is imploded into media images is akin logically to the Cartesian claim that everything is or might be a dream. What happens is that dream or image is absolutized or generalized to the point that its original meaning lying in its contrast to natural, human, and social reality is lost. We can discuss Disneyland as reprehensible because we know the difference between Disneyland and the larger, enveloping reality of Southern California and the United States.5 We can note also that postmodernism misses the reality of the accumulation-legitimation tension in late capitalism in general and in communicative media in particular. This tension takes different forms in different times. In the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, social, economic, and political reality occasionally manifested itself in the media in such a way that the electorate responded critically to corporate and political policies. Coverage of the Vietnam war, for example, did help turn people against the war. In the 1980s, by contrast, the emphasis shifted more toward accumulation in the decade dominated by the “great communicator.” Even here, however, the majority remained opposed to Reagan’s policies while voting for Reagan. Human and social reality, while being influenced by and represented by the media, transcended them and remained resistant to them.6 To the extent that postmodernists are critical of the role media play, we can ask the question about the normative adequacy of such a critique. Why, in the absence of normative conceptions of rationality and freedom, should media dominance be taken as bad rather than good? Also, the most relevant contrasting, normatively structured alternative to the media is that of the “public sphere,” in which the imperatives of free, democratic, nonmanipulable communicative action are institutionalized. Such a public sphere has been present in western democracies since the nineteenth century but has suffered erosion in the twentieth century as capitalism has more and more taken over the media and commercialized them. Even now the public sphere remains normatively binding and really operative through institutionalizing the ideals of free, full, public expression and discussion; ideal, legal requirements taking such forms as public service programs, public broadcasting, and provision for alternative media; and social movements acting and discoursing in and outside of universities in print, in demonstrations and forms of resistance, and on media such as movies, television, and radio.7

**Their focus on the media’s representations fragments politics.**

**Boggs 97 –** Professor of Political Science, National University: Los Angeles (Carl, “The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century America” *Theory and Society,* Vol. 26, No. 6 (Dec., 1997), Springer) //ALo

Postmodernism and its offshoots (poststructuralism, semiotics, differ- ence feminism, etc.) have indeed reshaped much of academia, including such disciplines as sociology, history, literature, film, and communica- tions. More than that, the theory (if that is the correct label for some- thing so diffuse) amounts to a kind of anti-paradigm paradigm, which often refocuses debates around defining motifs of the post-Fordist order: commodification of culture, the media spectacle, proliferation of images and symbols, fragmentation of identities, the dispersion of local movements, and loss of faith in conventional political ideologies and organizations. So far as all this is concerned, post-modernism can be viewed as marking a rather healthy break with the past.50 The problem is that the main thrust of postmodernism so devalues the common realm of power, governance, and economy that the dynamics of social and institutional life vanish from sight. Where the reality of corporate, state, and military power wind up vanishing within a post- modern amorphousness, the very effort to analyze social forces and locate agencies or strategies of change becomes impossible. In its reac- tion against the comprehensive historical scope of Marxism, the micro approach dismisses in toto macropolitics and with it any conceivable modern project of radical transformation. An extreme "micro" focus is most visible in such theorists as Baudrillard who, as Steven Best and Douglas Kellner put it, in effect "announce the end of the political project in the end of history and society"S - a stance that replicates the logic of a profoundly depoliticized culture. Postmodern theory has been interpreted as a current fully in sync with the mood of political defeat that has overcome the left in most indus- trialized countries since the early 1980s.52 It is hardly coincidental that postmodernism grew into an academic fashion in the wake of failed hopes after the sixties and the later decline of popular movements in the face of a rising conservative hegemony. The crisis of Marxism and the disintegration of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe further intensified feelings of resignation on the left. The new middle strata that was the backbone of the new left and new social movements turned in larger numbers toward careers and more affluent lifestyles. Radicalism, where it persisted to any extent, took on the veneer of an "aesthetic pose." Thus, at a time of mounting pessimism and retreat, 767 the rhetorical question posed by Alex Callinicos scarcely demands an answer: "What political subject does the idea of a postmodern epoch help constitute?"53 By the 1990s even the discussion of political sub- jectivity or agency among leftist academics seemed rather passe.54 In politics as in the cultural and intellectual realm, a postmodern fascination with indeterminacy, ambiguity, and chaos easily supports a drift toward cynicism and passivity; the subject becomes powerless to change either itself or society. Further, the pretentious, jargon-filled, and often indecipherable discourse of postmodernism reinforces the most faddish tendencies in academia. Endless (and often pointless) attempts to deconstruct texts and narratives readily become a facade behind which professional scholars justify their own retreat from political commitment. In Russell Jacoby's words: "At the end of the radical theorizing project is a surprise: a celebration of academic hierarchy, professions, and success. Never has so much criticism yielded so much affirmation. From Foucault the professor learned that power and institutions saturate everything. Power is universal; com- plicity with power is universal, and this means university practices and malpractices are no better or worse than anything else." 55

**Media response framed the larger debate in order to spur activism – our representations are key to political response.**

**Harris 2006** – Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law; Faculty Director, Critical Race Studies Program. B.A., Wellesley College; J.D., Northwestern University. (Cheryl I., “Whitewashing Race: Scapegoating Culture, Whitewashing Race: The Myth of a Color-Blind Society by Michael K. Brown et al” Book Reviewed published: Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003., Review published: *California Law Review.* Vol. 94, No. 3, (May, 2006). JSTOR) //ALo

Facts, of course, often powerfully disrupt the comfortable stories that we believe we know. Frames are not static. Epic events like Katrina push up against and temporarily displace familiar frames. At least initially, it seemed that the tragedy of Katrina created a rupture in the racial progress narrative that had all but erased the suffering of poor Black people from the political landscape and eliminated considerations of race from legitimate public discourse. The racial character of the disaster contradicted the colorblind frame. This helps to explain the mass public criticism of the snail like pace at which relief was dispensed. Indeed, in contrast to the pre Katrina picture in which Black people were the source of their own condition, in the wake of the storm society perceived Black people as innocent victims with legitimate claims on the nation state. All those people. All that suffering. How could we let this happen? This can't be America.70 Implicit in the frame "This can't be America," is the notion that the nation's neglect in the wake of Katrina violated the duty of care it owes to all citizens. This social contract includes Black people as citizens. Thus, the claim by Blacks in New Orleans that "We are American""7 responded to and relied upon that frame, as did their rejection of the reference to them as "refugees." This refraining triggered an outpouring of empathy that was real and re flected genuine humanitarian concern. Katrina-or the facts that the public observed about its effects-disrupted the tendency to frame Black disad vantage in terms of cultural deficiency. The role of the media in attacking and perpetuating these frameworks was complex. The media exposed and depicted the crisis as not simply the product of nature, but as a failing of human beings and public institutions. Thus, reporters for many of the major networks were visibly moved during the broadcasts and pointedly critical of the lack of government response. CNN reporter Jeanne Meserve broke down in tears during a report on September 1, 2005. The same day, on ABC's Nightline Program, when former FEMA director Michael Brown told anchor Ted Koppel that he had only learned about the conditions at the New Orleans Convention Center that morning, Koppel snapped: "With all due respect, Mr. Brown, don't you guys watch television or listen to the radio? We knew it was happening. Why didn't you?"72

**Perm – do both. A readjustment in our framing resolves the links and opens up space for activism.**

**Harris 2006** – Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law; Faculty Director, Critical Race Studies Program. B.A., Wellesley College; J.D., Northwestern University. (Cheryl I., “Whitewashing Race: Scapegoating Culture, Whitewashing Race: The Myth of a Color-Blind Society by Michael K. Brown et al” Book Reviewed published: Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003., Review published: *California Law Review.* Vol. 94, No. 3, (May, 2006). JSTOR) //ALo

What accounts for this gross exaggeration of the security threat to the rescue mission? Certainly the general chaos and the breakdown of the communications network were major factors in developing a climate in which rumors could and did flourish. Yet under similarly difficult conditions in circumstances involving natural disaster and even war, reporters have been able to adhere to basic journalistic standards. That they did not do so under these conditions could be explained as an isolated case of fail ure under extremely trying circumstances. However, the important part of this story is not the media's failure to observe rules of journalism, but rather the readiness of people to accept the media's story. It was a narrative that made sense within a commonly ac cepted racial frame of "law and order" that activates and depends upon Black criminality. These frames made it difficult to make sense of other images such as reports of "guys [who] look[ed] like thugs, with pants hanging down around their asses," engaged in frantic efforts to get people collapsing from heat and exhaustion out of the Dome and into a nearby makeshift medical facility.84 These images did not make racial sense. There was no ready-made frame within which the images of Black male rescuers could be placed. Indeed, without the standard racial frames, Black male rescuers are a socially unintelligible image. That we have trouble seeing "guys who look like thugs" as rescuers is not a problem of facts. It is a problem of framing. The book's materialist focus on racialized accumulation and disac cumulation leads the authors to consider the question of how to disrupt such an entrenched pattern of inequality. The authors of Whitewashing Race conclude with a chapter in which they advocate increased public in vestment in schools, jobs, and alternatives to incarceration, as well as pro grams to invest assets in wealth creation funded through increased taxes on wealth. They also suggest universal health care and expansion of the earned income tax credit (236-37). Additionally, they propose increased enforcement of civil rights laws and challenging neutral institutional prac tices that generate inequality (237). They are not unaware of the resistance to these reforms born of what has elsewhere been called the wages of Whiteness.85 Yet they assert that the broad sweep of many of these propos als could garner the support of many Whites who would benefit from them along with disadvantaged racial minorities (248). Moreover, they argue that Whites do not uniformly benefit from the continuation of Black disad vantage (249). If the facts about structural racism and cognitive bias are substantial and soundly researched, we may be at a watershed moment that might well lead to the adoption, or at least serious consideration, of a host of ameliora tive measures like those advanced by Whitewashing Race. Such a break through is very possible, particularly since the current set of racial arrangements are unstable. Although it does not necessarily follow that out of instability will result a better and more racially just order, there are signs on the horizon of possible changes. Such signs include the rupture in the status quo created by Katrina and the growing disquiet over governmental priorities that invest in building democratic regimes abroad rather than re building at home.86 However, the distance between current legal doctrine and the changes necessary to achieve a more progressive future is not easily traversed. While I am largely sympathetic to the proposals advanced in the book, as the authors acknowledge, it is telling, in the main, they are strikingly simi lar to many made over thirty-five years ago in the wake of the urban riots of the 1960s. This suggests that the impediments to change lie at a deeper level. Then, as now, epic upheavals in the social structure-the urban riots of the sixties-and now, Katrina-ruptured the dominant racial frames and opened the possibilities for a refraining of public discourse about race and a repudiation of colorblindness. Black people then, as now, were central to illuminating the deficiencies in the prevailing racial script. However, the fact that interventions, even race-neutral ones, were inadequately pursued or discarded in the intervening thirty-five years is a telling reminder that not only is race-conscious remediation unpalatable to many Whites; so too are race-neutral interventions that are seen to benefit significant numbers of Blacks, even if overall they would stand to bring economic benefit to Whites as well. Here is another instance of the frame-Blacks as undeserv ing, criminal, and culturally deficient-overriding the fact of potential benefits to Whites. This Review Essay's modest observation is that empirical interven tions, powerful though they are, cannot in and of themselves do all the work that is required. This is because the vexed nature of American com mon sense about race contravenes the empirical evidence.87 This is perhaps unsurprising given that colorblindness was a racial frame installed not as a result of empiricism but in spite of it: it was the product of a well-financed political project.88 Accordingly, something more than facts is required to undo colorblindness as a racial frame. Facts are important-indeed, crucial, since so much of public opinion is grounded in misinformation. But there is no linear progression between more facts and more enlightened public opinion about race and racism. It turns out that the very questions we ask, and the presumptions we make, shape the facts that we find. What we know about racial inequality-our racial common sense-is shaped not only by facts, but by a framework produced through a complex network of social interactions, official knowledge, media images, and embedded stereotypes. As Michele Landis Dauber has observed, the template for the American social welfare system has been disaster relief, and the entitle ment to government resources has always depended upon the claimants' ability to "narrat[e] their deprivation as a disaster-a sudden loss for which the claimant is not responsible."89 In the specific case of Katrina, this disaster-relief conception of welfare would seem to promote immediate national response to aid the hurricane victims. The problem for Black peo ple and other non-Whites, however, as Dauber has also noted, is that racial minorities' claims to victim status has always been undermined "because they are highly likely to be cast as a 'disaster' for the dominant racial group."90 Implicit in Dauber's analysis is the idea that the move to realign America's racial discourse and policy away from current distortions must confront the complex character of cognitive and societal frameworks that mutually constitute and reinforce scripts that tell us what makes sense. The ability to process facts into a conception of racism that does not depend on Black dysfunction is deeply compromised by the racial frames through which facts are filtered, selected, and processed, and the manner in which we realign the facts to fit pre-existing structures. Facts alone will rarely if ever be able to transcend the gravitational pull of colorblindness. The tragic consequences of Katrina provide a moment through which we might reflect on both the possibilities and impediments to a broader and more just societal consensus about race, class, and rights. The authors of Whitewashing Race, having laid out in compelling fashion their empirical case, cannot fairly be charged with solving the whole problem. Our efforts to shift racial frames have to be grounded in a broader orientation than raw empiricism; what is required is attention to social organization and social movements that open up the space for refraining.

### Generic NU

**Disads are non-unique – several evacuation programs have been started but they do not help the transportation-disadvantaged.**

**GAO 06** United States Government Accountability Office GAO Report to Congressional Committees TRANSPORTATIONDISADVANTAGED POPULATIONS Actions Needed to Clarify Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations

While DHS and DOT have taken several actions in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to improve the federal government’s ability to provide evacuation assistance when state and local governments are overwhelmed by a catastrophic disaster, gaps remain. Although the Stafford Act gives the federal government the authority to assist state and local governments with evacuations and to respond in a catastrophic disaster, the National Response Plan does not clarify the lead, coordinating, and supporting agencies to provide evacuation assistance for transportation-disadvantaged and other populations when state and local governments are overwhelmed. The absence of lead, coordinating, and supporting agencies for providing evacuation assistance was evident in the federal response for New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina. As both the White House Homeland Security Council report and the Senate Government Affairs and Homeland Security Committee report noted, the federal government was not prepared to evacuate transportation-disadvantaged populations, and this severely complicated and hampered the federal response. 18 Both reports recommended that DOT develop plans to assist states and local governments overwhelmed by catastrophic disasters, and that DHS and DOT work with other agencies to develop the federal government’s capability to conduct mass evacuations. To remedy this, the White House report also recommended that DOT be designated as the federal agency responsible for leading and coordinating evacuations when state and local governments are overwhelmed. Amendments to the Stafford Act from October 2006 clarified the responsibility of FEMA (an agency within DHS) in leading and coordinating evacuation assistance when state and local governments are overwhelmed by a catastrophic disaster. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the federal government has taken several steps to improve its ability to respond to a catastrophic disaster. For instance, during the 2006 hurricane season, the government provided additional evacuation assistance to state and local governments. However, despite these improvements, DHS has not yet clarified in the National Response Plan which federal agencies are responsible for leading, coordinating, and supporting evacuation assistance.

### Cap K

**The aff addresses those material deprivations.**

**Jenkins 07** [executive director of The Opportunity Agenda, a communications, research, and advocacy organization with the mission of building the national will to expand opportunity in America.] Inequality, Race, and Remedy ALAN JENKINS APRIL 22, 2007 http://prospect.org/article/inequality-race-and-remedy

Many Americans of goodwill who want to reduce poverty believe that race is no longer relevant to understanding the problem, or to fashioning solutions for it. This view often reflects compassion as well as pragmatism. But we cannot solve the problem of poverty -- or, indeed, be the country that we aspire to be -- unless we honestly unravel the complex and continuing connection between poverty and race. Since our country's inception, race-based barriers have hindered the fulfillment of our shared values and many of these barriers persist today. Experience shows, moreover, that reductions in poverty do not reliably reduce racial inequality, nor do they inevitably reach low-income people of color. Rising economic tides do not reliably lift all boats. In 2000, after a decade of remarkable economic prosperity, the poverty rate among African Americans and Latinos taken together was still 2.6 times greater than that for white Americans. This disparity was stunning, yet it was the smallest difference in poverty rates between whites and others in more than three decades. And from 2001 to 2003, as the economy slowed, poverty rates for most communities of color increased more dramatically than they did for whites, widening the racial poverty gap. From 2004 to 2005, while the overall number of poor Americans declined by almost 1 million, to 37 million, poverty rates for most communities of color actually increased**. Reductions in poverty do not inevitably close racial poverty gaps, nor do they reach all ethnic communities equally.** Poor people of color are also increasingly more likely than whites to find themselves living in high-poverty neighborhoods with limited resources and limited options. An analysis by The Opportunity Agenda and the Poverty & Race Research Action Council found that while the percentage of Americans of all races living in high-poverty neighborhoods (those with 30 percent or more residents living in poverty) declined between 1960 and 2000, the racial gap grew considerably. Low-income Latino families were three times as likely as low-income white families to live in these neighborhoods in 1960, but 5.7 times as likely in 2000. Low-income blacks were 3.8 times more likely than poor whites to live in high-poverty neighborhoods in 1960, but 7.3 times more likely in 2000. These numbers are troubling not because living among poor people is somehow harmful in itself, but because concentrated high-poverty communities are far more likely to be cut off from quality schools, housing, health care, affordable consumer credit, and other pathways out of poverty. And African Americans and Latinos are increasingly more likely than whites to live in those communities. Today, low-income blacks are more than three times as likely as poor whites to be in "deep poverty" -- meaning below half the poverty line -- while poor Latinos are more than twice as likely.

### Education Tradeoff DA

**Education programs aren’t enough – public transportation is out of shape and no program exists to evacuate the poorest from New Orleans**

**Renne 2005** John L. Renne is an Assistant Professor and Associate Director of the University of New Orleans Transportation Center in the College of Urban and Public Affairs at the University of New Orleans. He has expertise in the areas of transportation and land use planning, particularly in transit-oriented development PhD in Urban Planning and Policy Development Major Fields: Transportation and Land Use Planning Master of Urban and Regional Planning (Valedictorian)) Concentration: Economic Development Bachelor of Environmental Design (with Honors) Major: Urban Planning and Design Minor: Economics Car-less in the Eye of Katrina 6 September 2005 http://www.planetizen.com/node/17255 Herm

Mass chaos. A storm of biblical proportions. Hell on earth. These are just a few accounts used by the media to describe the scene in the hours and days after Hurricane Katrina. As I write this, I am refugee in Texas just days after the storm. There are approximately 100,000 people stranded in New Orleans hoping for transport out of the City. An important question not discussed by the media is why so many people were left behind? The reason so many lives are in jeopardy is a result of our extreme dependence on cars and the lack of planning for public transportation, both for regular use and for emergencies. A brief background about my short experience in Nawlins My wife and I moved to New Orleans on August 10, 2005. I was hired by the College of Urban and Public Affairs to help launch a new program in transportation studies at the University of New Orleans (UNO). Upon finding an apartment in the Lower Garden District, I navigated the public transportation system for the first two weeks of my job traveling about one hour in each direction to and from work â€“ a journey that only takes about 20 minutes by car. The actual travel time only takes about 30 minutes on transit but each day I would spend up to 35 minutes in each direction waiting for a transfer, which was only supposed to take about 10 minutes. It was clear very quickly that most middle class locals have long abandoned the transit system in the Big Easy. I should note that last year the Regional Transit Authority (RTA) expanded its streetcar line down Canal Street. This is a positive step forward but only a small band-aid in attempting to revive a transit system mostly used by tourists and those with little or no choice. The poorest in New Orleans rely on the transit system for their travel needs. According to the US Census, in 2000, an astonishing 27 percent of households did not own a vehicle. Not surprisingly, 27 percent of households in New Orleans are also below the poverty line. This translates to approximately 120,000 residents that have little choice in their travel plans outside of walking, cycling, or using public transport. One would assume that a city in danger of hurricanes would have a plan to evacuate the poorest third of its residents by using buses and trains. Over the past year, there has been a massive effort to educate the citizenry about the contra-flow highway lanes. The threat of hurricanes in New Orleans is not new, but to the best of my knowledge, no plans were ever created to evacuate residents who do not have access to cars.

### Cars CP

**Giving people cars doesn’t solve**

**Litman 06**, Masters of Environmental Studies, Evergreen State College (Olympia, Washington), 1995. BA, with emphasis on urban planning, Evergreen State College (Olympia, Washington), 1983. Lessons From Katrina and Rita What Major Disasters Can Teach Transportation Planners Todd Litman Victoria Transport Policy Institute 13 April, 2006 http://www.vtpi.org/katrina.pdf

Some critics argue that the best way to improve emergency transportation is to increase automobile ownership and roadway capacity. In a message distributed after Katrina but before Rita, O’Toole (2005) pointed out most New Orleans residents with automobiles could evacuate with relative convenience and comfort, and so argues that the best evacuation strategy is to subsidize car ownership for households that lack vehicles. **But such arguments ignore several important points** (Litman, 2005). • Many people cannot drive due to disabilities, age, addictions, legal restrictions, or other problems. Encouraging such people to drive is impractical and dangerous. • Many vehicles, particularly the older vehicles typically owned by lower-income people, tend to be unreliable and unsafe. Even people who own a car need backup transport options. • Automobiles cannot be used in some disaster situations. Earthquakes, storms and floods often damage vehicles, highways and bridges (Giuliano and Golog, 1998). • Increased automobile ownership would exacerbate traffic congestion. Hurricane Rita evacuation failed due to too many private vehicles. • **The reduction in hurricane deaths cited by O’Toole has been offset many times over by increased automobile traffic deaths**. O’Toole argues that it would be cheaper to purchase cars for nonmotorists than to build New Orleans’ streetcar system, but his accounting ignores many costs (operating expenses, parking, road capacity, crash damages, etc.), and the used vehicles he proposes purchasing would require frequent repairs and only last a few more years, compared with the 20-40 year operating life of a train and 50+ years of a rail line. The gift of a “free” car can be a curse to financially struggling families since it adds hundreds of dollars in annual expenses for insurance, fuel, tires and repairs. At $3,500 annually ($1,000 in capital and $2,500 in operating expenses), providing cars to 100,000 New Orleans households that lack vehicles would cost $350 million, more than three times the regional transit budget, plus large additional costs to expand road and parking capacity.

**Relying on cars has led to mass destruction**

**Bullard et al. 07** Robert D. Bullard, Glenn S. Johnson, Angel O. Torres Robert D. Bullard is a Ware professor of sociology and director of the Environmental Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University. His most recent book is The Black Metropolis in the Twenty-First Century: Race, Power, and Politics of Place (2007). Glenn S. Johnson is a research associate in the Environmental Justice Resource Center and an associate professor in the Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice at the same university. He has coedited a number of books, including Highway Robbery: Transportation Racism and New Routes to Equity (2004). Angel O. Torres is a geographic information system training specialist with the Environmental Justice Resource Center. He also has coedited several publications, including Sprawl City: Race, Politics, and Planning in Atlanta (2000) and Highway Robbery. Dismantling Transportation Apartheid in the United States Before and After Disasters Strike Vol. 34 No. 3

On August 29, Hurricane Katrina made landfall near New Orleans, leaving death and destruction across the Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama Gulf Coast. Katrina is likely the most destructive hurricane in U.S. history. It was also one of the deadliest in decades, with a death toll of 1,325. Bodies were still being discovered under rubble in New Orleans’s mostly black Ninth Ward nearly a year after the storm. Disaster planners had failed the “most vulnerable” in New Orleans—people without cars, nondrivers, the disabled, the homeless, sick persons, the elderly, and children. The data confirm what many believed: Katrina killed the weakest. Hurricane Katrina also exposed a major weakness in urban mass evacuation plans. It shone a spotlight on the heightened vulnerability of people without cars. Katrina’s evacuation plan did work relatively well for people with cars but miserably failed those depending on public transit. More than one-third of New Orleans’s African American residents did not own a car. Over 15 percent of the city’s residents relied on public transportation as their primary mode of travel. Local, state, and federal emergency planners must have known—for years—of the risks facing these transit dependent residents. At least 100,000 New Orleans residents—and perhaps double or triple that—did not have cars to evacuate in case of a major storm. A 2002 article titled “Planning for the Evacuation of New Orleans” detailed the risks faced by the hundreds of thousands of persons without cars and nondrivers in New Orleans. Brian Wolshon, Planning for the Evacuation of New Orleans, Inst. Transp. Engineers J. 45 (Feb. 2002), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_qa3734/is\_200202/ai\_n9045870/print. Of the 1.4 million inhabitants in the high-threat areas, government officials assumed that only 60 percent of the population—850,000 people, give or take—would be able to leave. Although the various agencies knew that this large vulnerable population existed, there simply was no effective plan to evacuate these New Orleanians. Yet this problem had received national attention in 1998 during Hurricane Georges, when emergency evacuation plans mostly left behind residents who did not own cars. Further, when Hurricane Ivan had struck New Orleans in 2004, many New Orleanians who did not own cars had been left to fend for themselves, while others were evacuated to the Superdome and other “shelters of last resort.” More telling, New Orleans’s post-Ivan emergency plan had been modified to include the use of public buses to evacuate those without private transportation. Transporting an estimated 100,000 to 135,000 people out of harm’s way certainly would have been no small undertaking. Yet when the hurricane hit, most of the city’s five hundred transit and school buses were without drivers. During the storm, about 190 RTA buses were lost to flooding. Afterward, most of the New Orleans Rapid Transit Authority (NORTA) employees were dispersed across the country, and many were left homeless. Before Katrina, NORTA employed more than 1,300 people. A year later, the NORTA Board of Directors laid off 150 of its 730 remaining employees. These layoffs included about 125 of NORTA’s 400 operators, and 21 of its 162 maintenance employees.

### Natural Disasters Good

**Natural disasters do not lead to meaningful action – they are “snooze alarms,” not “wakeup calls”**

**Redlener et al. 08** [Irwin Redlener, md, Professor of Clinical Public Health, Director, National Center for Disaster Preparedness, Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health David m. Abramson, PHD mph, Associate Research Scientist, Director of Research, National Center for Disaster Preparedness, Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health. Richard Garfield, RN DRPH Professor of Clinical International Nursing, Columbia University Mailman School of Nursing] Lessons from katrina: what went wrong, what was learned, who’s most vulnerable http://www.cardozolawandgender.com/uploads/2/7/7/6/2776881/13-4\_redlener.pdf

It is repeatedly said that large-scale or mega disasters of recent years, particularly the attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina were “wake-up calls.” The implication being that we were so wounded and stunned by the impact of such events, that appropriate actions and resources would be devoted to make sure that the nation was prepared to avoid the mistakes and planning failures that exacerbated the consequences of the previous catastrophes. In many ways, however, societal and governmental behaviors suggest that while we certainly got aroused by 9/11 and Katrina, even spending enormous sums on new technologies, planning capacity, and new agencies, the work has, so far, not been measurably effective. Poor leadership around disaster planning, lack of accountability, and persistent absence of necessary coordination among critical sectors continue to plague our ability to prevent or respond optimally to almost any mega-disaster. America awakes, albeit briefly and randomly, after major disasters. But we soon drift back to a state of unreasonable complacency. Perhaps, instead of “wake-up calls,” the recent catastrophes, man-made and natural, would be better termed “snooze alarms.”

**AT: Disasters Crease “Equal Opportunity” – disasters make inequality worse**

**Strolovitch et al. 06** Dara Strolovitch is assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota. She has been a research fellow at the Brookings Institution and a visiting faculty fellow at Georgetown's Center for Democracy and the Third Sector. Her research and teaching focus on interest groups and social movements, and politics of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Dorian Warren is a post-doctoral scholar at the University of Chicago's Harris School of Public Policy. He specializes in the study of inequality and the politics of marginalized groups in American politics. Paul Frymer is associate professor of politics and legal studies at UC Santa Cruz. He is the author of Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America (Princeton Press) and is currently writing about race and labor in the twentieth century. Katrina’s Political Roots and Divisions: Race, Class, and Federalism in American Politics Published on: Jun 11, 2006

In the public imagination, natural disasters do not discriminate, but are instead “equal opportunity” calamities. Hurricanes may not single out victims by their race, class, or gender, but neither do such disasters occur in historical, political, social, or economic vacuums. Instead, **the consequences of such catastrophes replicate and exacerbate the effects of extant inequalities, and often bring into stark relief the importance of political institutions, processes, ideologies, and norms**. In the words of New York Times’ columnist David Brooks, storms like hurricane Katrina “wash away the surface of society, the settled way things have been done. They expose the underlying power structures, the injustices, the patterns of corruption and the unacknowledged inequalities.” Katrina hit the Gulf Coast just as America prepared to mark the fourth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, and consequently, the fourth anniversary of the American government’s quest to bring American-style freedom and democracy to other nations. The hurricane made clear, however, that the U.S. has not resolved fundamental domestic disparities and inadequacies. Katrina did not create these inequities; it simply added an important reminder that they are deeply embedded and constitutive of American political, economic, and social life. From the voting rights violations of 2000, to the vast disparities in drug laws that have resulted in the imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of young African-American and Latino men, to the continued widening of racial and wealth gaps when it comes to finances, education, and health services, the last two decades alone have provided a series of examples that demonstrate the vast inequalities of our democratic system, particularly as they are manifested along racial lines. Were Katrina simply an accident of geography and ecology, we could perhaps be sanguine that its effects might be resolved. But the disparities exposed by Katrina have deep-seated, historical and institutional roots. While it is therefore unlikely that public policies in the aftermath of Katrina will resolve these disparities, perhaps the inequalities laid bare by the hurricane will provide a longer-term wake-up call to those who wish to actively build a more fair and meaningful democracy in the United States. In particular, we hope that new attention will be paid to the role of American political institutions in structuring and perpetuating contemporary racial, economic, regional, and gendered inequities.

### No War

**Great power war is obsolete – cooperation is more likely than competition.**

**Deudney and Ikenberry 09** \*Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins AND \*\*Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University [Jan/Feb, 2009, Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry, “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival: Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail,” Foreign Affairs]

This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what the revivalists describe, the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure of the international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, **the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities-of pushes and pulls-that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict** while **creating** strong **imperatives for cooperative problem solving**. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which **war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become largely obsolete**. Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war from a routine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts. Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge.

**No War—empirics and longitudinal trends—the world is entering a new era of great power peace**

**Fettweis 10** Christopher J. Fettweis, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs in the National Security Decision Making Department at the U.S. Naval War College, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations and Comparative Politics from the University of Maryland-College Park, October 27, 2010 (Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace, Georgetown University Press, ISBN 978-1-58901-710-8, Chapter 4: Evaluating the Crystal Balls, p. 83-85)

The obsolescence-of-major-war vision of the future differs most drastically from all the others, including the neorealist, in its expectations of the future of conflict in the international system. If the post– Cold War world conformed to neorealist and other pessimistic predictions, warfare ought to continue to be present at all levels of the system, appearing with increasing regularity once the stabilizing influence of bipolarity was removed. If the liberal-constructivist vision is correct, then the world ought to have seen not only no major wars, but also a decrease in the volume and intensity of all kinds of conflict in every region as well. The evidence supports the latter. Major wars tend to be rather memorable, so there is little need to demonstrate that there has been no such conflict since the end of the Cold War. But the data seem to support the “trickledown” theory of stability as well. Empirical analyses of warfare have consistently shown that the number of all types of wars—interstate, civil, ethnic, revolutionary, and so forth— declined throughout the 1990s and into the new century, after a brief surge of postcolonial conflicts in the first few years of that decade. 2 Overall levels of conflict tell only part of the story, however. Many other aspects of international behavior, including some that might be considered secondary effects of warfare, are on the decline as well. Some of the more important, if perhaps under reported, aggregate global trends include the following: Ethnic conflict. Ethnonational wars for independence have declined to their lowest level since 1960, the first year for which we have data. 3 Repression and political discrimination against ethnic minorities. The Minorities at Risk project at the University of Maryland has tracked a decline in the number of minority groups around the world that experience discrimination at the hands of states, from seventy-five in 1991 to forty-one in 2003. 4 War termination versus outbreak. War termination settlements have proven to be more stable over time, and the number of new conflicts is lower than ever before. 5 Magnitude of conflict/battle deaths. The average number of battle deaths per conflict per year has been steadily declining. 6 The risk for the average person of dying in battle has been plummeting since World War II— and rather drastically so since the end of the Cold War. 7 Genocide. Since war is usually a necessary condition for genocide, 8 perhaps it should be unsurprising that the incidence of genocide and other mass slaughters declined by 90 percent between 1989 and 2005, memorable tragedies notwithstanding. 9 Coups. Armed overthrow of government is becoming increasingly rare, even as the number of national governments is expanding along with the number of states. 10 Would be coup plotters no longer garner the kind of automatic outside support that they could have expected during the Cold War, or at virtually any time of great power tension. Third party intervention. Those conflicts that do persist have less support from outside actors, just as the constructivists expected. When the great powers have intervened in local conflicts, it has usually been in the attempt to bring a conflict to an end or, in the case of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, to punish aggression. 11 Human rights abuses. Though not completely gone, the number of largescale abuses of human rights is also declining. Overall, there has been a clear, if uneven, decrease in what the Human Security Centre calls “one-sided violence against civilians” since 1989. 12 Global military spending. World military spending declined by one third in the first decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 13 Today that spending is less than 2.5 percent of global GDP, which is about two-thirds of what it was during the Cold War. Terrorist attacks. In perhaps the most counterintuitive trend, the number of worldwide terrorist incidents is far smaller than it was during the Cold War. If Iraq and South Asia were to be removed from the data, a clear, steady downward trend would become apparent. There were 300 terrorist incidents worldwide in 1991, for instance, and 58 in 2005. 14 International conflict and crises have steadily declined in number and intensity since the end of the Cold War. By virtually all measures, the world is a far more peaceful place than it has been at any time in recorded history. Taken together, these trends seem to suggest that the rules by which international politics are run may indeed be changing.

**No great power war – recent studies and trends**

**Robb 12** Lieutenant Doug Robb, U,S. Navy Proceedings Magazine - May 2012 Vol |38/5/I,3I I “Now Hear This - Why the Age of Great-Power War Is Over”

In Proceedings ’ April “Now Hear This,” Navy Lieutenant Commander Rachel Gosnell and Marine Second Lieutenant Michael Orzetti argue that “the possibility of great-power war [between the United States and China] cannot be ruled out.” However, despite China’s rise, which potentially threatens to alter international polarity, a preponderance of evidence suggests that the era of conventional large-scale war may be behind us. For the purposes of my argument, the United States and China are defined as “great powers” because they have stable governments and large populations; influential economies and access to raw materials; professional militaries and a nuclear arsenal. Prussian war theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s “trinity,” which characterizes the interrelationship between the government (politics), people (society and the economy), and the military (in modern terms, deterrence and security), is useful to frame this debate. The 20th century brought seismic shifts as the global political system transitioned from being multipolar during the first 40 years to bipolar during the Cold War before emerging as the American-led, unipolar international order we know today. These changes notwithstanding, major world powers have been at peace for nearly seven decades—the longest such period since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia codified the sovereign nation-state. Whereas in years past, when nations allied with their neighbors in ephemeral bonds of convenience, today’s global politics are tempered by permanent international organizations, regional military alliances, and formal economic partnerships. Thanks in large part to the prevalence of liberal democracies, these groups are able to moderate international disputes and provide forums for nations to air grievances, assuage security concerns, and negotiate settlements—thereby making war a distant (and distasteful) option. As a result, China (and any other global power) has much to lose by flouting international opinion, as evidenced by its advocacy of the recent Syrian uprising, which has drawn widespread condemnation. In addition to geopolitical and diplomacy issues, globalization continues to transform the world. This interdependence has blurred the lines between economic security and physical security. Increasingly, great-power interests demand cooperation rather than conflict. To that end, maritime nations such as the United States and China desire open sea lines of communication and protected trade routes, a common security challenge that could bring these powers together, rather than drive them apart (witness China’s response to the issue of piracy in its backyard). Facing these security tasks cooperatively is both mutually advantageous and common sense. Democratic Peace Theory—championed by Thomas Paine and international relations theorists such as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman—presumes that great-power war will likely occur between a democratic and non-democratic state. However, as information flows freely and people find outlets for and access to new ideas, authoritarian leaders will find it harder to cultivate popular support for total war—an argument advanced by philosopher Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace.” Consider, for example, China’s unceasing attempts to control Internet access. The 2011 Arab Spring demonstrated that organized opposition to unpopular despotic rule has begun to reshape the political order, a change galvanized largely by social media. Moreover, few would argue that China today is not socially more liberal, economically more capitalistic, and governmentally more inclusive than during Mao Tse-tung’s regime. As these trends continue, nations will find large-scale conflict increasingly disagreeable. In terms of the military, ongoing fiscal constraints and socio-economic problems likely will marginalize defense issues. All the more reason why great powers will find it mutually beneficial to work together to find solutions to common security problems, such as countering drug smuggling, piracy, climate change, human trafficking, and terrorism—missions that Admiral Robert F. Willard, former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, called “deterrence and reassurance.” As the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a formidable deterrent against unlimited war. They make conflict irrational; in other words, the concept of mutually assured destruction—however unpalatable—actually had a stabilizing effect on both national behaviors and nuclear policies for decades. These tools thus render great-power war infinitely less likely by guaranteeing catastrophic results for both sides. As Bob Dylan warned, “When you ain’t got nothing, you ain’t got nothing to lose.”

**No risk of nuclear war or great power conflict—nuclear deterrence.**

**Tepperman 9** Jonathan Tepperman, Deputy Editor of Newsweek, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, now Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs, holds a B.A. in English Literature from Yale University, an M.A. in Jurisprudence from Oxford University, and an LL.M. in International Law from New York University, 2009 (“Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” The Daily Beast, August 28th, Available Online at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.print.html, Accessed 01-27-2012)

A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second**, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them**. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it. Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today's nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes—and there's no deterring rogues. But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died … the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.

**Taboo is too strong**

**Perkovich 09** George Perkovich, International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 2009, “Extended Deterrence On The Way To A Nuclear Free World,” International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament

The reality today is that the taboo against using nuclear weapons has become so strong, especially in democracies, that the only threat against which it is justifiable and therefore credible to use these weapons is one where the survival of the U.S. or an ally is clearly jeopardized. Yet, with the possible exception of North Korea whose leadership could be imagined to use nuclear weapons against Japan or South Korea if its own survival were threatened, no other state poses a realistic threat to the national survival of U.S. allies in Europe or East Asia. Russia does not have the intention or capability to sustain an invasion of the new NATO states, let alone threaten their survival. Russia could destroy any state with its nuclear weapons, but because this, more than any other action, would practically guarantee nuclear retaliation, Russia would not run the risk. There is simply nothing important enough that Russia would want in any of the NATO states to merit such risk taking. China has no interest and inadequate capabilities to take mainland Japanese territory or otherwise threaten it militarily. It might pose military threats to Japanese positions regarding southern islands, but the U.S. and China are not going to wage nuclear war over such islands, and Japanese officials and public cannot realistically expect nuclear deterrence to operate here. Beijing does continue to increase its capabilities to deter Taiwan from declaring independence and the U.S. from defending Taiwan in such a scenario, but the surety of U.S. security assurances to Taiwan would be greater, not less, if neither China nor the U.S. possessed nuclear weapons. For the foreseeable future China would be highly unlikely to use nuclear weapons on Taiwanese targets, as the Chinese goal is to integrate Taiwanese into China, not to kill them. China would wish to deter U.S. intervention by threatening the American fleet, perhaps with nuclear weapons, and then deterring U.S. escalation against the Chinese homeland, by holding U.S. cities at risk. But the trigger of nuclear use in these scenarios would be a move by Taiwan to achieve independence. The U.S. has no obligation to fight for Taiwanese independence if China has not committed aggression against Taiwan first.

### State K

**Sacrificing agency in the political sphere causes bad policymaking and ends in extinction – turns Util**

**Boggs 2000** (BOGGS, PF POLITICAL SCIENCE – SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 2K CAROL, THE END OF POLITICS, 250-1) Herm

But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism. While Oakeshott debunks political mechanisms and rational planning as either useless or dangerous, the actually existing power structure replete with its own centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious designs, and indeed, rational plans- remains fully intact, insulated from minimalistic critique. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly acceptable for elites who preside over established governing systems, but not for ordinary citizens or groups to challenge the status quo. Such one sided minimalism gives carte-blanche to elites who naturally desire as much space to maneuver as possible the flight form “abstract principles” rules out ethical attacks on injustices that many pervade the status quo (slavery or imperialistic wars for example) insofar as those injustices might be seen as too embedded in the social and institutional of the matrix of the time to be the target of oppositional political action. If politics is reduced to nothing other than a process of everyday muddling-through then people are condemned to accept the harsh realities disgusting and demeaning way in which that money is spent are testimony to the mounting corruptions of politics and government.” 17 Given such growing corruption, it follows that the often-heard appeals to “realism” and pragmatism- so typical of Oakeshott-style discourse- can only lead right back to established modes of doing business. What this suggests, for example, is that any hope of “solving” deep social problems will have to advanced in a minimalistic framework that will never go further tepid social policies that leave business interests totally unaffected, or cosmetic reforms, or the “greening ” of huge corporations that simply want to profit off environmentally-critical goods, and so forth. A much needed radical agenda geared to sustainable, egalitarian, and ecologically balanced forms of production and consumption is automatically ruled out by the minimalistic scenario. A thorough going revival of politics-one that vigorously questions and seeks to go beyond the routinized liberal pragmatism favored by Oakshott-is a precondition for the transcending this political predicament. Of course, any distinctly political imperative flies in the face of a deeply antipolitical culture where politics has such an unsavory association with money corruption, interest peddling, scandals, PACs, bureaucracy, and largely irrelevant campaign spectacles- where indeed politics has been reduced to a farcial representation of its most enduring motifs. For the most part people in the united state normal politics means little more than false promises and empty discourses that might serve to improve people’s lives. The concept of politics that informs this book, however, holds out prospects for a more empowering, participatory,  transformative legacy compatible with an enlarged public sphere and the subversion of corporate hegemony. While this concept imputes an ethical and visionary dimension to politics, it also points toward the matter of strategic necessity in that politics constitutes the only (potential) countervailing power against corporate domination. Localized, and extrapolitical opposition can lay the groundwork for popular movement , but alone (in the absence of more generalized structural mediations) such opposition will never lead to large scale societal change. Notwithstanding Oakeshott, therefore, an imminent retrieval of politics becomes an urgent imperative at a time when destructive global forces cannot be tamed by a pragmatic, muddling-through modus operandi.

**Ethics depend on context – that makes material action necessary**

**Burns 08** Lawrence, Professor in History of Medicine at the King’s University College at the University of Western Ontario, “Identifying concrete ethical demands in the face of the abstract other: Emmanuel Levinas’ pragmatic ethics”, Philosophy Social Criticism March 2008 vol. 34 no. 3

While we may grant that the face signiﬁes outside of every context and is irreducible to any given set of norms of action, it is also essential to see that the disruption of the particular context is an essential function of the face. The revelation that the prevailing habitual modes of action and belief are problematic and cause suffering is what gives the face its real power to teach responsibility and invests the subject with the power to act on the other’s behalf. On this reading, the concrete context of action is not forsaken in the turn to the other; rather, the particular content of the other’s suffering anchors the other to a particular context of action, while the obligation to repair that suffering is not simply a contextual affair dependent on local norms of action. It is instead an absolute imperative that turns the subject into what Levinas calls a singularity, one who is unique because of his or her responsibility for the other here and now (Levinas, 1987: 116). The justiﬁcation for this more ‘concrete’ view of ethical responsibility in the ‘here and now’ rather than an abstract beyond may be found in Levinas’ explicit claim that the face is a ‘body-expression’ (TI, 258/259). As I show below, we should take this to mean that the face is corporeal (a body) to the extent that it appears within a concrete context oriented around the subject’s powers of enjoyment and action; yet, the face also expresses a command to the subject, namely the command to justify his or her enjoyment to the other. Thus, instead of excluding the calculation of different responses to concrete ethical demands as Ricoeur feared, the demand for justiﬁcation obliges the subject to perform the calculation demanded by Ricoeur. In light of this pressing demand, the context of action and enjoyment within which she or he is situated is transformed. What we are left with is an admittedly thin account of ethics that is rooted in embodiment and the relevant context of action with its contingent features. However, this thin account respects key pragmatist aspects of morality. In order to elucidate Levinas’ account of ethical responsibility, I will present both the corporeal and expressive elements of the face.

**This is especially true in the context of economic oppression**

**Burns 08** Lawrence, Professor in History of Medicine at the King’s University College at the University of Western Ontario, “Identifying concrete ethical demands in the face of the abstract other: Emmanuel Levinas’ pragmatic ethics”, Philosophy Social Criticism March 2008 vol. 34 no. 3

While not a materialist in a Marxist sense, Levinas lends himself to such a reading. However, the goods that I enjoy are not solely economic; rather, given the expansive nature of enjoyment, everything that is constitutive of my egoism is a resource in the relevant sense. Throughout Totality and Inﬁnity, the separated, enjoying subject is characterized as an ego and ethical relations are rooted in the subject’s egoistic enjoyment: ‘Pluralism implies a radical alterity of the other, whom I do not simply conceive by relation to myself, but confront [j’affronte] out of my egoism’ (TI, 121/126). Only egoistic subjects, i.e. subjects who accumulate possessions and capacities for action, can have an ethical relation to the other. This means that I can only encounter the other as situated in a particular context of action, the situation of my egoistic enjoyment of the world. This context of action includes my background beliefs as well as my material resources. And while the other reveals to me exactly how ‘rich’ I am, in so doing he or she also calls my right to that enjoyment into question: The movement toward the other, instead of completing or contenting me, implicates me in a conjuncture which in a way did not concern me and should leave me indifferent – why did I get involved in this business? Whence came this shock when I passed, indifferent – under the Other’s gaze? The relationship with the other puts me into question, empties me of myself and empties me without end, showing me ever new resources. I did not know I was so rich, but I no longer have the right to keep anything for myself. (Levinas, 1996: 52/49) I view this description of how my relation to the other reveals the resources that I possess as a kind of ethical reduction in the phenomenological sense. In detaching from my unique point of view, I can look at my situation from the perspective of the disparity between my enjoyment and the claims of the other (i.e. his poverty). This disparity makes me responsible, i.e. conscious of the injustice suffered by the other, even though it does not mean that I will act in a responsible manner. Instead, I learn to question why and how I am implicated in the injustice I see. Moreover, I need to develop a justiﬁcation as to why these possessions (broadly construed so as to include even my capacity to act) are rightly mine and why they should not instead be given to the other. Given the extent to which the enjoying subject is identiﬁed with his or her possessions, giving to the other also requires that the subject place herself or himself at the disposal of the other. That is to say, the subject enjoys not only her or his material goods but also her or his skills, knowledge, friends, and resources in the broadest sense: in short, the subject enjoys the totality of her or his involvements and habits of action. Descriptions of the weight of the other’s suffering that commands me to justify myself draw attention to the responsiveness presupposed by the communicative encounter. The face that addresses me by ‘undoing the form he presents’ (TI, 66/61) now becomes the recipient of my gift: ‘To recognize the Other is to give’ (TI, 75/73). The awareness of my capacity to give can only be provoked by the other’s need, and so expressiveness and vulnerability must be rooted in the speciﬁcity of our embodied situation in the world. The justification for this claim lies in the meaning of vulnerability itself. Vulnerability and suffering are deﬁcient modes of enjoying, but in order to know that they are deﬁcient one has to be able to compare the enjoyment of the other to one’s own. The question of justiﬁed enjoyment can now be posed, which is essentially the following: why am I entitled to enjoy the world in the way that I do? True, the face is abstract to the extent that it always connotes mastery and height, yet these qualities are anchored to concrete cases of problematic behaviour and suffering that obligate the subject to seek to repair them. Moreover, the face commands the subject to repair that behaviour or give to the other in a way that does have some content, i.e. whatever it takes to repair the suffering. Thus, instead of being an irrelevant abstraction, the face refers to a concrete experience of the other’s suffering for which responsibility is attributed to the subject. The other’s misery and poverty are revealed in relation to my ‘riches’, which means that the other’s demands are concrete rather than empty abstractions because of this focus on my enjoyment and the need to justify it in light of the suffering of the other. Moreover, the imperative is abstract and absolute in that it is not merely a contextual component of action; that is to say, the context as such is the source of the injustice (i.e. the particular contexts, habits, and social norms) and the responsible subject is called upon to repair that context. Nonetheless, the force of the imperative motivates the subject to intervene in the particular context of action and enjoyment in order to justify it.

**Integration of ethics into politics is key to prevent totalitarianism**

**Tahmasebi 10** Victoria, assistant professor in women's studies/humanities at the University of Toronto Scarborough, “Does Levinas justify or transcend liberalism? Levinas on human Liberation”, Philosophy Social Criticism June 2010 vol. 36 no. 5

The liberal readings of Levinas’ ethics, however, point to a deeper dilemma, namely the arrival of the ‘third’. All Levinasian scholars agree that the appearance of the third raises the necessity of thematization, calculation and judgment. From this, the majority of these scholars conclude that the third introduces the question of politics into ethics (and not vice versa). They view the entry of the third as the limitation of the subject’s infinite responsibility – the third, it is argued, demands formal justice, and, by extension, the law, political violence expressed in the state’s institutions and hierarchy. 76 The third is seen only as the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question, What do I have to do with justice? Indeed, Levinas himself seems at times to argue along this line, as the following quote suggests: ‘The self, the I, cannot limit itself to the incomparable uniqueness of each one. . . . Behind the unique singularities, one must perceive the individuals of a genus, one must compare them, judge them and condemn them.’ 77 Alternatively, on the necessity of the state he argues: ‘The State, general laws, are necessary. Institutions are necessary to carry out decisions. Every work of politics and justice is necessary. This order negates mercy. . . . Is this concern for reconsideration . . . not in effect the essence of democracy and of the liberal State, the sign of a mercy and charity that breathe there?’ 78 I argue that there is usually more to what Levinas says when he discusses the third and its relation to sociality and human liberation, creating a different context from the usual, aforementioned interpretation. This surplus is ignored, or not seriously considered, by the majority of Levinas’ readers. 79 The first aspect of the surplus that must be emphasized is Levinas’ repeated insistence that not only is the state required by ethics itself (and not despite it), but the state must be oriented to concretize ethics in politics: ‘it is in the name of that responsibility for the other . . . that goodness to which the face of the other man appeals, that the entire discourse of justice is set in motion.’ 80 For Levinas, not only do politics and the state originate in goodness, but goodness must be present in every working of politics. Levinas’ sense of goodness cannot be reduced to charity or mercy, or to a Kantian goodness that takes as its a priori the will of a rational being, concretized and expressed in reciprocity. 81 Goodness, in Levinas’ thought, originates in positing being as the anarchy of desire, obsessing the subject about substituting for the other. 82 In this sense goodness finds itself in society as prioritizing responsibility for the other over reciprocal exchange. As such, society – plurality – no longer means ‘the coherence of the elements that constitute plurality’, 83 but rather peace. The question that Levinas leaves us with is whether political power (and its state), including the liberal democratic state, can ever reformulate itself to contain, and become the expression of, this anarchical goodness. The second aspect of the surplus in Levinas’ discussion of the third is the resistance of the structure of betrayal against the formation of a political totality. The state must realize the incompleteness of its own formal justice, which is less just than the ethics that instigates it. Levinas states: ‘Inspired by love for one’s fellow man, reasonable justice is bound by legal structures and cannot equal the goodness that solicits and inspires it.’ 84 The third aspect of the surplus is the possibility that the betrayal that stems from the fact of mediation can be minimized or reduced to bare necessity. This realization cannot remain at the level of a formal recognition. Rather the state, whose legitimacy is derived from one’s responsibility for the other, must reduce the effect of this betrayal. Formal justice – laws, institutions and so on – exists to oblige the state to fulfill its social promise, which is ‘the possibility for a man to see the face of the other man’. 85 In contrast to liberal readings of Levinas, the state is not merely the expression of this betrayal; rather, the state must intervene in interhuman relationships to reduce the effects of this betrayal. Forgetting this important aspect, according to Levinas, amounts to sinking the state, and its justice, into a totalitarian and ideological deduction. More importantly, it leads to politics forgetting to invent new forms of human coexistence. 86 We need to put Levinas’ citations on the necessity of the state, introduced at the beginning of this section, into this broader context. Then, the limitations of the reading, which describes the third as necessitating the existing state and which justifies the work of its formal justice, become apparent. This reductive reading articulates both the political and its structures as ontological givens stemming from the unresolved paradox between ethics and politics.

### Roads CP

**Making the roads and highways bigger costs too much and doesn’t solve for people without automobiles**

**Litman 06**, Masters of Environmental Studies, Evergreen State College (Olympia, Washington), 1995. BA, with emphasis on urban planning, Evergreen State College (Olympia, Washington), 1983. Lessons From Katrina and Rita What Major Disasters Can Teach Transportation Planners Todd Litman Victoria Transport Policy Institute 13 April, 2006 http://www.vtpi.org/katrina.pdf

Cox (2005) argues that urban national highways should be expanded to facilitate automobile evacuations, but the costs would be immense since expanding urban highways is particularly costly. Current roadway funding is hardly adequate to maintain the current system and there appears to be little public support for tax increases. It would be inefficient to size all roadways for evacuations that only occur once a century at any particular location, if other strategies can accommodate such needs at lower cost. Described differently, emergency response requires mobility. Automobiles provide mobility, but have high total costs and constraints that limit their use in some situations and for some people, particularly those most vulnerable. Although it makes sense to increase automobile affordability through true cost-saving strategies such as carsharing and Pay-As-You-Drive insurance (“Affordability,” VTPI, 2005), it is wrong to assume that automobile solutions are most appropriate or cost effective in every situation

**Those without vehicles were unable to evacuate because of the lack of mass transit**

**Jarzab et al. 10** James T. Jarzab Vice-President Emtrac Systems Harvey Alexander Manager, ITS Systems Support Branch Transportation Operations Administration District of Columbia Department of Transportation James R. Jarzab Assistant Planner Emtrac Systems Potential Use of Technology: Mitigating Disaster Evacuation Presented at the 5th International Social Science Research Conference September 23-25, 2010 New Orleans, Louisiana Hilton Riverside http://www.emtracsystems.com/MitigatingDisasterEvacuation.pdf

The events following the landfall of Hurricane Katrina is one of the most thoroughly publicized demonstrations of the need for improved planning and capital programming regarding the use of public transit resources in emergency evacuations. Hurricane Katrina forced many New Orleans metro residents to flee and caused severe damage to the structures and facilities throughout the Gulf Coast. Though many considered the evacuation of New Orleans during Katrina a relative success, it revealed many transportation infrastructure failures and the limitation of responders to evacuate groups like the elderly, low income, and chronically ill. Thousands of residents, particularly those from lower income communities, were unable to evacuate the urban area using personal vehicles. According to the plan, these population segments with few transportation options were to be directed by officials to make their way toward “refuges of last resort” in order to be removed using higher capacity transit services. However, this part of the evacuation plan ran afoul of numerous logistical and strategic problems when it came to moving such large numbers substantial distances in such a short period of time. It is estimated that over 100,000 people were left behind in New Orleans as a result of the evacuation and most of these had very few options for evacuating. Two glaring problems in the design and implementation of emergency planning contributed to logistical inefficiencies and obstacles in the evacuation: the overall minor role mass transit resources played in the evacuation and the resources committed to evacuating population segments with few transportation options. First, there was not a dedicated use of all available mass transit vehicles to help efficiently evacuate residents in the evacuation plan. Though some local jurisdictions used regional transit buses to evacuate, these plans were not coordinated with their surrounding regions and had little communication between district and jurisdictions; furthermore, there was little use of plentiful school buses. In fact, the evacuation plan for New Orleans called for the use of transit services to move population segments with few transportation options from the city but was never initiated. Instead, the Regional Transit Authority was ordered by the Mayor to evacuate residents to the established “refuges of last resort,” such as the Superdome, instead of outside the danger zones. Consequently, the residents in these refuges--the majority of which were mobility-limited or low-income residents--were not evacuated until almost three days later. The second problem--the lack of response to population segments with few transportation options--is unsurprising considering the atmosphere of evacuation planning in New Orleans. Much of the planning that occurred before the storm to accommodate population segments with few transportation options relied heavily on “neighbor helping neighbor” policies that were of limited success. The Victoria Transport Policy Institute describes New Orleans’s public transport evacuation as follows: “…bus deployment was ad hoc, implemented by officials during the emergency without a detailed action plan… Katrina’s evacuation was relatively effective for people with automobiles but **failed transit-dependent residents**” 2 . Those regional evacuation plans that did contain the use of bus or transit services to move people from the city were heavily focused on local efforts and only minimally coordinated with local evacuation plans. Also, many of the local transit resources were committed to multiple groups that placed heavy strain on already heavily taxed transit resources. As a result, thousands of low mobility residents were stranded in the several refuges and not successfully evacuated until days later.