NextGen Negative

1NC Topicality – Transportation Infrastructure

1. Transportation infrastructure includes roads, transit, rail, airports, waterways, ports, and buses – excludes telecommunications, data streams, and satellites

IEDC 12

(International Economic Development Council, “Economic Development Reference Guide”, http://www.iedconline.org/?p=Guide\_Infrastructure)

Infrastructure Infrastructure encompasses existing transportation, communication and utility networks. Rebuilding the physical infrastructure of a community improves the local business climate and is critical to the redevelopment of distressed neighborhoods. Infrastructure gets people to their jobs and goods and services to their markets. Many distressed neighborhoods suffer from inadequate infrastructure, decreasing their access to economic opportunities and their ability to integrate into wider city, national, and international markets. Programs to build roads, provide water and waste removal, and offer telecommunications services all bestow substantial economic benefits such as job and business creation and retention to a community. Additionally, modernizing physical infrastructure can help improve the image of a distressed neighborhood. Transportation infrastructure includes: Roads Light transit rail networks, inter city, state passenger railways Airports Waterways and ports Bus services Communication infrastructure includes: Copper wire for telecommunications, installed by telecommunications companies High bandwidth and fiber optic cable capable of carrying voice, data and video streams Satellite communications and microwave antenna Mobile phone networks Local area networks (LAN)

1. NextGen is satellites and data and voice communication

FAA 07, 2-14-2007, Federal Aviation Administration, “Fact Sheet – NextGen,” http://www.faa.gov/news/fact\_sheets/news\_story.cfm?newsid=8145 (ED)

ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) is, quite simply, the future of air traffic control. As the backbone of the NextGen system, it uses GPS satellite signals to provide air traffic controllers and pilots with much more accurate information that will help keep aircraft safely separated in the sky and on runways. Aircraft transponders receive GPS signals and use them to determine the aircraft’s precise position in the sky, which is combined with other data and broadcast out to other aircraft and air traffic control facilities. When properly equipped with ADS-B, both pilots and controllers will, for the first time, see the same real-time displays of air traffic, substantially improving safety. The FAA will issue a rulemaking that will mandate the avionics necessary for implementing ADS-B across the national airspace system, and will work closely with stakeholders to determine the timeline. The FY08 budget request includes $85 million for ADS-B. Over five years the President’s Budget request totals $564 million for ADS-B. SWIM System Wide Information management (SWIM) provides the infrastructure and services to deliver network-enabled information access across the NextGen air transportation operations. As an early opportunity investment, SWIM will provide high quality, timely data to many users and applications – extending beyond the previous focus on unique, point-to-point interfaces for application-to-application data exchange. By reducing the number and types of interfaces and systems, SWIM will reduce redundancy of information and better facilitate multi-agency information-sharing. SWIM will also enable new modes of decision-making, as information is more easily accessed by all stakeholders affected by operational decisions. The FY08 budget request includes $21.3 million for SWIM. Over five years the President’s Budget request totals $173 million for SWIM. NextGen Data Communications NextGen transformation cannot be realized through today’s voice-only communications. This is particularly true in the areas of aircraft trajectory-based on operations, net-centric and net-enabled information access. Initially, data communication provides an additional means for two-way exchange between controllers and flight crews for air traffic control clearances, instructions, advisories, flight crew requests and reports. With 70 percent of aircraft data-link equipped, allowing for the exchange of routine controller-pilot messages and clearances via data can enable controllers to safely handle more traffic. This improves air traffic controller productivity, enhances capacity and safety. The FY08 budget request includes $7.4 million for NextGen Data Communications. Over five years the President’s Budget request totals $126 million for NextGen Data Communications. NextGen Network Enabled Weather Seventy percent of NAS delays are attributed to weather every year. The goal of this investment (combined with the other technologies outlined here) is to cut weather-related delays at least in half. The NextGen Network Enabled Weather (NNEW) will serve as the core of the NextGen weather support services and provide a common weather picture across the national airspace system. These services will, in turn, be integrated into other key components of NextGen required to enable better air transportation decision-making. It is anticipated that tens of thousands of global weather observations and sensor reports from ground-, airborne-, and space-based sources would fuse into a single national weather information system, updated as needed in real-time. The FY08 budget request includes $7 million for NextGen Network Enabled Weather. Over five years the President’s Budget request totals $102 million for NextGen Network Enabled Weather. NAS Voice Switch Today there are 17 different baselines of voice switches in the NAS with some of them in the inventory more than 20 years. The NAS Voice Switch (NVS) will replace these switches and provide the foundation for all air/ground and ground/ground voice communications in the future air traffic control environment. The FY08 budget request includes $3 million for the NAS Voice Switch. Over five years the President’s Budget request totals $157 million for NAS Voice Switch. NextGen Demonstrations and Infrastructure Development At this early stage of NextGen, it is critical to better define operational concepts and the technologies that will support them. For the first time, in FY08, FAA is requesting funding for these defining activities. This funding will support two demonstrations and a series of infrastructure development activities. The primary purpose is to refine aspects of the trajectory-based operations concept. The FY08 budget request includes $50 million for NextGen demonstrations and infrastructure development. Over five years the President’s Budget request totals $170 million for NextGen Demonstrations and Infrastructure Development.

1. Topicality is a voting issue for limits. Including communication infrastructure adds an infinite number of affs to an already huge topic – destroys topic education and makes it impossible for the neg to reasonably prepare. Affs that deal with TV, radio, the Internet, etc. would be topical.
2. At best they’re extra-topical – that’s still a voter – extra-topicality forces the negative to win topicality just to get back to square one on the substance

2NC Topicality – Definitions

**NextGen includes satellites and communication networks.**

Mark 08, Roy Mark, staff writer, eWeek.com, IT & Network Infrastructure News, “FAA’s NextGen Air Trans System Planning Criticized,” http://www.eweek.com/c/a/IT-Infrastructure/FAAs-NextGen-Air-Trans-System-Planning-Criticized/ (ED)

NextGen envisions a major redesign of how America flies involving precision satellite navigation; digital, networked communications; and an integrated aviation weather system. NextGen also aims to improve ground infrastructure, aircraft technology and alternative fuels. The project is expected to reach to 2025 and cost between $69 billion and $76 billion, according to the Congressional Research Service.

“Communications” is a distinct category of infrastructure --- it’s massive

Faulkenberry 11

(Ken, MBA – University of Southern California, “Infrastructure Investment: Energy, Transportation, Communications, & Utilities”, Arbor Asset Allocation Model Portfolio Blog, September, http://blog.arborinvestmentplanner.com/2011/09/infrastructure-investment-energy-transportation-communications-utilities/)

Transportation Infrastructure Over the last several decades America’s infrastructure spending has been less than one-half other developed nations and only a quarter of emerging market countries. Civil engineers give our transport structures low marks. Our roads, railways, ports, and airports are all judged mediocre. It has become well recognized that we must invest more in upgrading our transportation infrastructure. But because of the years of neglect, substantial increases in operation and maintenance budgets will also be required. The above engineering and construction firms could also benefit from transportation infrastructure spending. Communications Infrastructure Communications infrastructure would include items we take for granted everyday, such as the internet, telephone, television (including cable TV), and satellite technology. Individual companies such as Cisco (CSCO) (internet) AT&T (T) and Verizon (VZ) (telephone), Comcast (CMCSA) (television), Boeing (BA) and Loral Space & Communications (LORL) (satellites), all play major roles in developing the communications infrastructure.

1NC Privatization CP

**The United States federal government should commercialize the air navigation service provider portion of the Federal Aviation Administration.**

Commercialization of air traffic control solves and avoids funding problems.

Poole 12, Robert Poole, Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow and Director of Transportation Policy at the Reason Foundation, advisor to Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush, 4-19-2012, “Air Traffic Control Reform News #92,” http://reason.org/news/show/1012825.html

No other developed country so inherently politicizes the governance of its ATC system. In recent decades, nearly all developed countries have de-politicized their air navigation service providers (ANSPs), allowing them to operate as businesses, paid directly by their aviation customers, and in several cases (Canada, the UK), with aviation stakeholders on their governing boards. These (mostly governmental) ATC corporations have ready access to the bond market to raise the capital for modernization projects vetted as cost-effective by their customers. This approach is misleadingly labeled "privatization" in the report and therefore dismissed after three paragraphs as politically infeasible. In fact, what nearly all these countries have done is to reform in place the existing ANSP, changing its governance and funding, not turning it over to some outside private provider. Reforming the ATC system's governance and funding in this manner will resolve the questions regarding which technologies and procedures are worthwhile to aircraft operators and which are not. And thanks to access to the bond market and a bondable revenue stream, those capital improvements judged worthwhile can readily be financed.

2NC Privatization CP – Solvency

**Commercialization of air traffic control is empirically successful.**

Poole 08, Robert Poole, Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow and Director of Transportation Policy at the

Reason Foundation, advisor to Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush, 9-1-2008, Reason Foundation, “Air Traffic Control Reform Newsletter #54,” http://reason.org/news/show/air-traffic-control-reform-new-54

Some people don't realize how widespread the commercialization of ATC has become. When the Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO) was founded more than a decade ago, its membership consisted of the dozen or so air navigation service providers (ANSPs) that had been commercialized. That term means that such an entity is organizationally separate from the nation's aviation safety regulator and is financially self-supporting from fees and charges paid by its aviation customers. Well-known examples include government corporations such as Airservices Australia and Germany's DFS, not-for-profit corporation NavCanada, and partially airline and airport-owned NATS in the U.K.

**The CP solves best and revenue would be self-generating.**

Poole 08, Robert Poole, Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow and Director of Transportation Policy at the

Reason Foundation, advisor to Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush, 9-1-2008, Reason Foundation, “Air Traffic Control Reform Newsletter #54,” http://reason.org/news/show/air-traffic-control-reform-new-54

Lewis suggests a few, but none seems very likely, in a climate of massive federal bailouts and budget deficits. But while we're doing thought experiments, think about a version of this proposal that could be implemented in any of the numerous countries with self-supporting (commercialized) air navigation service providers. Instead of asking the government to provide a tax credit, the ANSP could offer to first-third aircraft operators discounts on the user fees they would otherwise be paying, for N years after those specific planes were equipped. The rationale is simple: getting over the hump of that critical first third jump-starts the whole equipage process and starts the operational benefits flowing. And that permits air service to grow, thanks to increased airspace capacity, generating more user-fee revenue, and permitting older, costly-to-maintain ground equipment to be retired. There are many benefits in shifting from annual appropriations of tax money to self-generated revenue from fees for service. Solving the early equipage problem is one of the less-appreciated benefits.

1NC Fiscal Discipline DA Link

**Fully funding NextGen could cost $160 billion – ballooning costs.**

Hoover 10, J. Nicholas Hoover, staff writer, 12-3-2010, Information Week, “FAA NextGen Air Traffic Control Costs Could Quadruple,” http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/enterprise-apps/228500257

The Federal Aviation Administration's massive, long-term air traffic control systems upgrade risks ballooning in costs from an already expensive $40 billion price tag to as much as a whopping $160 billion, an internal FAA planning office has found. According to a new report by the Government Accountability Office, the FAA's joint planning and development office determined that, if the FAA implements the "highest performance levels" suggested for NextGen, such as requiring extensive electronic systems to be installed on every aircraft, it could make NextGen's cost rise dramatically. In order to keep costs low, the FAA report found, NextGen will have to be developed with fewer ground and aircraft capabilities than envisioned. "Analysis shows a subset of scenarios developed, assuming lower levels of capabilities, whose cost estimates remain in the $40 billion range," the GAO report said. GAO also noted that the FAA has not yet established clear performance goals and metrics for NextGen despite creating an implementation plan through 2018. "Without goals and metrics, FAA could pursue and implement capabilities that fail to produce the desired results," the report said.

2NC Fiscal Discipline DA Links

**Funding NextGen fully costs significantly over $40 billion.**

Gibbons 11, Glen Gibbons, Inside GNSS, 4-30-2011, “Air Traffic Control Modernization: FAA, NextGen, GNSS, and Avionics Equipage,” http://www.insidegnss.com/node/2582/ (ED)

The original estimate for implementing NextGen by 2025 — ground infrastructure, airport equipment upgrades, aircraft avionics, and so forth — was $40 billion. The FAA projected that the agency’s total spending over the first 10 years would range from $8 billion to $10 billion, and from $15 to $22 billion through 2025. A recent analysis, commissioned by the FAA’s Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) overseeing NextGen implementation, modeled a variety of scenarios that assumed different levels of ground capability and aircraft capability over the long term. According to this analysis, implementing the highest performance levels envisioned in the NextGen Integrated Work Plan for ground and aircraft capabilities by 2025 could increase NextGen’s costs significantly beyond $40 billion.

**NextGen costs $22 billion.**

The Hill 11, Keith Laing, The Hill, 10-5-11, “Dems Battle GOP over cuts to new FAA air traffic control system,” http://thehill.com/blogs/transportation-report/aviation/185771-faas-nextgen-future-funding-debated%3Fpage%3D2 (ED)

The FAA has proposed implementing its new navigation system to replace World War II-era radar technology in control towers by 2014 at the busiest airports, at a cost of about $22 billion.

Internal Budget Tradeoff DA

1. **The FAA budget is frozen until 2015 – the plan would require internal tradeoffs.**

ArentFox 12, 2-6-2012, ArentFox LLP, “Senate Passes FAA Reauthorization Bill: Long-delayed legislation expected to be signed into law by the President,” http://www.arentfox.com/publications/index.cfm?fa=legalUpdateDisp&content\_id=3541

One of the key sticking points that delayed completion of the bill was how to address funding levels. Past FAA reauthorizations increased funding for the FAA to address the increased cost of operating a major agency and to move forward on major programs like NextGen. However, the federal budget cuts approved in 2011 and the focus on debt reduction means that the FAA cannot expect annual increases in its budget. This is a major concern to the aviation community given the FAA’s responsibility to move air traffic safely and to certify new aircraft to keep the U.S. aerospace industry competitive. In the end, the middle ground approved by the conferees extends current funding levels to 2015. This does not guarantee that Congress won't appropriate less than what is authorized in the bill, but it is an acknowledgement by the conferees that funding is tight and agencies will have to do more with less until the economy improves and the deficit is under control.

1. **Leads to cuts in the Airport Improvement Program**

Kirk 09, Robert S. Kirk, specialist in transportation policy, 5-29-2009, Congressional Research Service, “Airport Improvement Program (AIP): Reauthorization Issues for Congress,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40608.pdf

During the FAA reauthorization debate, virtually all of the policy issues and options concerning AIP will be influenced by the broader budget issues of the adequacy of trust fund revenues and the availability of money for the FAA from the Treasury general fund. Should ample revenues be available, the reauthorization of AIP could maintain the program’s structure and perhaps even increase AIP spending. A constrained-budget scenario would probably increase interest in such issues as defederalization or a tightening of program formula funding and eligibility criteria, which could provide cost savings. It could also increase interest in raising or eliminating the PFC ceiling, which could help airports fund more projects.

1. **The Airport Improvement Program is key to the aviation industry – turns case.**

ACI-NA 11 – local, regional and state governing bodies that own and operate commercial airports in the United States and Canada (Airports Council International – North America, February 2011 “ACI-NA 2011 Capital Needs Survey, $80.1bn in Projects ‘Essential’”, ACI-NA, http://aci-na.org/newsroom/press-releases/aci-na-2011-capital-needs-survey-801bn-projects-%E2%80%98essential%E2%80%99)/

“The 2011 capital needs survey shows that airports must continue to improve airport infrastructure to ensure the safety and security of the traveling public”, said ACI-NA President Greg Principato. “These projects, financed by the self-funded, job-creating Airport Improvement Program (AIP), as well as Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) user fees, allow communities to use local resources to fund local projects, generating local jobs.”“These projects also help reduce passenger delays and facilitate price and service competition for passengers across the United States,” said Principato. The Department of Transportation tells us that $1 billion in transportation infrastructure supports approximately 34,779 jobs. If all of the $80.1 billion in airport capital needs were met, the airport industry could help add 2 to 3 million jobs to our struggling economy.

1. Air power is key to US power projection and hegemony

Walker et al 2 – Chairman of the USAI

Robert Walker, et al, Chair of the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, 2002, “Final Report of the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners,” http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf

Defending our nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the federal govern-ment.2 This translates into two broad missions—Defend America and Project Power—when and where needed. In order to defend America and project power, the nation needs the ability to move manpower, materiel, intelligence information and precision weaponry swiftly to any point around the globe, when needed. This has been, and will continue to be, a mainstay of our national security strategy. The events of September 11, 2001 dramatically demonstrated the extent of our national reliance on aerospace capabilities and related military contributions to homeland security. Combat air patrols swept the skies; satellites supported real-time communications for emergency responders, imagery for recovery, and intelligence on terrorist activities; and the security and protection of key government officials was enabled by timely air transport. As recent events in Afghanistan and Kosovo show, the power generated by our nation’s aerospace capa-bilities is an—and perhaps the—essential ingredient in force projection and expeditionary operations. In both places, at the outset of the crisis, satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, some unmanned, provided critical strategic and tactical intelligence to our national leadership. Space-borne intelligence, com-mand, control and communications assets permitted the rapid targeting of key enemy positions and facilities. Airlifters and tankers brought personnel, materiel, and aircraft to critical locations. And aerial bombardment, with precision weapons and cruise missiles, often aided by the Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Predator unmanned vehicle, destroyed enemy forces. Aircraft carriers and their aircraft also played key roles in both conflicts. Today’s military aerospace capabilities are indeed robust, but at significant risk. They rely on platforms and an industrial base—measured in both human capital and physical facilities—that are aging and increasingly inadequate. Consider just a few of the issues: • Much of our capability to defend America and project power depends on satellites. Assured reliable access to space is a critical enabler of this capability. As recently as 1998, the key to near- and mid-term space access was the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), a development project of Boeing, Lockheed Martin and the U. S. Air Force. EELV drew primarily on commercial demand to close the business case for two new launchers, with the U.S. government essentially buying launches at the margin. In this model, each company partner made significant investments of corporate funds in vehicle development and infrastructure, reducing the overall need for government investment. Today, however, worldwide demand for commercial satellite launch has dropped essentially to nothing—and is not expected to rise for a decade or more—while the number of available launch platforms worldwide has proliferated. Today, therefore, the business case for EELV simply does not close, and reliance on the economics of a commercially-driven market is unsustainable. A new strategy for assured access to space must be found. • The U.S. needs unrestricted access to space for civil, commercial, and military applications. Our satellite systems will become increasingly important to military operations as today’s information revolution, the so-called “revolution in military affairs,” continues, while at the same time satellites will become increasingly vulnerable to attack as the century proceeds. To preserve critical satellite net-works, the nation will almost certainly need the capability to launch replacement satellites quickly after an attack. One of the key enablers for “launch on demand” is reusable space launch, and yet within the last year all work has been stopped on the X-33 and X-34 reusable launch programs • The challenge for the defense industrial base is to have the capability to build the base force structure, support contingency-related surges, provide production capacity that can increase faster than any new emerging global threat can build up its capacity, and provide an “appropriate” return to shareholders. But the motivation of government and industry are different. This is a prime detraction for wanting to form government-industry partnerships. Industry prioritizes investments toward near-term, high-return, and high-dollar programs that make for a sound business case for them. Government, on the other hand, wants to prioritize investment to ensure a continuing capability to meet any new threat to the nation. This need is cyclical and difficult for businesses to sustain during periods of government inactivity. Based on the cyclic nature of demand, the increasing cost/complexity of new systems, and the slow pace of defense modernization, aerospace companies are losing market advantages and the sector is contracting. Twenty-two years ago, today’s “Big 5” in aerospace were 75 separate companies, as depicted by the historical chart of industry consolidation shown in Chapter 7. • Tactical combat aircraft have been a key component of America’s air forces. Today, three tactical aircraft programs continue: the F/A-18E/F (in production), the F/A-22 (in a late stage of test and evaluation), and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (just moving into system design and development). Because of the recentness of these programs, there are robust design teams in existence. But all of the initial design work on all three programs will be completed by 2008. If the nation were to conclude, as it very well may, that a new manned tactical aircraft needs to be fielded in the middle of this century, where will we find the experienced design teams required to design and build it, if the design process is in fact gapped for 20 years or more? • More than half of the aerospace workforce is over the age of 404, and the average age of aerospace defense workers is over 50.5Inside the Department of Defense (DoD), a large percent of all scientists and engineers will be retirement eligible by 2005. Given these demographics, there will be an exodus of “corporate knowledge” in the next decade that will be difficult and costly to rebuild once it is lost. There will be a critical need for new engineers, but little new work to mature their practical skill over the next several decades. Further, enrollment in aerospace engineering programs has dropped by 47 percent in the past nine years6, and the interest and national skills in mathematics and science are down. Defense spending on cutting-edge work is at best stable, and commercial aircraft programs are struggling and laying workers off. As the DoD’s recent Space Research and Development (R&D) Industrial Base Study7 concluded, “[s]ustaining a talented workforce of sufficient size and experience remains a long-term issue and is likely to get worse.” In short, the nation needs a plan to attract, train and maintain a skilled, world-class aerospace workforce, but none currently exists. • The current U.S. research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) infrastructure has a legacy dating back to either World War II or the expansion during the Space Age in the 1960s. It is now suffering significantly from a lack of resources required for modernization. In some cases, our nation’s capabilities have atrophied and we have lost the lead, as with our outdated wind tunnels, where European facilities are now more modern and efficient. In the current climate, there is inadequate funding to modernize aging government infrastructure or build facilities that would support the development of new transformational capabilities, such as wind tunnels needed to design and test new hypersonic vehicles. The aerospace industry must have access to appropriate, modern facilities to develop, test and evaluate new systems. Throughout this dynamic and challenging environment, one message remains clear: a healthy U.S. aerospace industry is more than a hedge against an uncertain future. It is one of the primary national instruments through which DoD will develop and obtain the superior technologies and capabilities essential to the on-going transformation of the armed forces, thus maintaining our position as the world’s preeminent military power.

1. U.S. hegemony’s key to prevent international power vacuums and war.

Thayer 07 (Bradley A., Former research fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, American Empire: A Debate [Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer], pgs. 108-9)

The fourth critical fact to consider is that the security provided by the power of the United States creates stability in international politics. That is vitally important for the world, but easily forgotten. Harvard professor Joseph Nye often compares the security provided by the United States to oxygen. If it were taken away, a person would think of nothing else. If the security and stability provided by the United States were taken away, most countries would be much worse off, and **arms races, vicious security competition, and wars would result**. It would be a world without NATO or other key U.S. alliances. We can imagine easily conflict between traditional rivals like Greece and Turkey, Syria and Israel, India and Pakistan, Taiwan and China, Russia and Georgia, Hungary and Romania, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and an intense arms race between China and Japan. In that world, the breakup of Yugoslavia would have been a far bloodier affair that might have escalated to become another European war. In contrast to what might occur absent U.S. power, we see that the post—Cold War world dominated by the United States is an era of peace and stability. The United States does not provide security to other countries because it is altruistic. Security for other states is a positive result (what economists call a positive externality) of the United States pursuing its interests. Therefore, it would be a mistake to seek “benevolence” in great power politics. In international politics, states advance their self-interest and, most often, what might appear to be “benevolent” actions are undertaken for other reasons. To assist Pakistani earthquake refugees, for example, is benevolent but also greatly aids the image of the United States in the Muslim world—so self-interest is usually intertwined with a humanitarian impulse .The lesson here is straightforward: Countries align themselves with the United States because to do so coincides with their interests, and they will continue to do so only as long as their interests are advanced by working with Uncle Sam. In 1848, the great British statesman Lord Palmerston captured this point best when he said: “We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”

Agenda Politics DA Links

**NextGen is controversial – creates partisan bickering.**

The Hill 11, Keith Laing, The Hill, 10-5-11, “Dems Battle GOP over cuts to new FAA air traffic control system,” http://thehill.com/blogs/transportation-report/aviation/185771-faas-nextgen-future-funding-debated%3Fpage%3D2 (ED)

Lawmakers in the Republican-led House have already cut about $200 million this year from the FAA’s budget that would have gone to the conversion, and on Wednesday they raised questions about the development of the project. “We cannot continue to rely on outdated technology if we are going to ensure our aviation system is as efficient and safe as possible,” House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman John Mica (R-FL) said in a hearing of the panel’s Aviation Subcommittee Tuesday. “Unfortunately, as pointed out by the Inspector General and others, the very foundation of our modernization program is experiencing significant problems. “We need to get a better handle on this important program. It’s not a question of money, it’s a question of management,” Mica continued. FAA Deputy Administrator Michael Huerta said the long-term success of the NextGen proposal, which calls for airlines to spend about an additional $20 billion to upgrade their airplanes' computer systems, is dependent upon Congress’ support of the program. “The willingness of operators and other stakeholders to make these investments depends critically on the business case for them – analyses of how valuable these benefits will be, and that they have confidence that the FAA can deliver the infrastructure in the time frames and manner required for those benefits to be realized,” Huerta said. Democrats on the panel argued that cuts to the NextGen program’s budget now, when Republicans have criticized delays in its development, will only further push back its full implementation. “Because many NextGen programs are dependent on one or more systems, delays in one program mean delays in others,” Rep. Jerry Costello said Wednesday. “My concern is: What happens when we add severe budget constraints on top of logistical program delays?” Costello, a veteran member of the House transportation committee who announced his retirement Tuesday, said “simply providing more funding is not the entire solution to successful NextGen implementation. “There are many factors that must come together in order for NextGen to be successful now and in the future,” he said. “But when we are trying to implement the largest and most important aviation modernization project of our time in a safe and cost-effective manner, at what point is ‘doing more with less’ just adding to the problem and making it even more difficult for it to succeed on time and on budget?” The argument did not appear to fully convince Republicans on the panel Tuesday however, though most acknowledge it was worthy to try to upgrade the national aviation navigation system. “How can we invest in something when a report of the [DOT Inspector General] says the FAA has not approved total cost, schedule or performances baseline for any of NextGen's transformal programs nor developed a...schedule for executing NextGen?” freshman Rep. Chris Cravaack (R-Minn.) asked.

**NextGen unpopular – seen as wasteful and unaccountable.**

EAA News 11, 8-6-2011, EAA, “NextGen in Middle of Congressional Debate,” http://www.eaa.org/news/2011/2011-10-06\_nextgen.asp (ED)

The dilemma arose in front of the House Aviation Subcommittee on Wednesday when some lawmakers asked whether delays in NextGen are causing funds to be wasted in its development. “How can we invest in something when a report of the [DOT Inspector General] says the FAA has not approved total cost, schedule, or performance baseline for any of NextGen's transformal programs nor developed a ... schedule for executing NextGen?” asked Rep. Chris Cravaack (R-MN), as reported in The Hill. Rep. Jerry Costello (D-IL) said that simply adding more funding to NextGen is not the entire solution, but warned that further delays could take place if development funding is cut, making it tougher for FAA to succeed on time and on budget.

**NextGen creates gridlock – disputes over funding.**

NPR 09, Audie Cornish, 4-14-2009, National Public Radio, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102914658 (ED)

Clashes Over Taxes "We're behind because the Bush administration refused to put the money forward to make those investments and to move the system ahead," says Rep. Jim Oberstar (D-MN), who heads the House Transportation Committee. Oberstar rejected the Republican administration's attempts to revamp the FAA's funding system. The FAA currently relies mostly on excise taxes on jet fuel and tickets; the Bush administration wanted to add a system of user fees on takeoffs to provide a steady stream of funding for NextGen. That plan would have shifted some of the cost to smaller planes, which commercial airlines, naturally, supported. House and Senate Democrats have also clashed over aviation taxes. At one point last year, lawmakers agreed on a $70 billion proposal that funded the air traffic control upgrade mostly by raising jet-fuel taxes and doubling the passenger fee. That measure passed in the House, stalled in the Senate and left all sides frustrated. "I'd very much like to catch up with Mongolia on our air traffic control system, but we haven't been able to do that yet," Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-WV), chairman of the Senate Transportation Committee, said at a recent hearing. "The challenge I want to pose to witnesses today and to the aviation industry is to find a way to work together to make this happen."

Elections DA Link – Obama Bad

**NextGen is popular with the public.**

Gibbons 11, Glen Gibbons, Inside GNSS, 4-30-2011, “Air Traffic Control Modernization: FAA, NextGen, GNSS, and Avionics Equipage,” http://www.insidegnss.com/node/2582/ (ED)

Nonetheless, recent polling conducted on behalf of the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) shows considerable public support for fully funding the Federal Aviation Administration and NextGen. Results of a survey conducted in March and released by AIA on April 7 indicate that 68 percent of Americans support new technologies to improve air safety and 65 percent favor maintaining or increasing FAA funding levels. Only 19 percent polled favor cutting FAA's budget. Moreover, a majority of Americans knowledgeable about NextGen support its timely implementation, according to the AIA.

1NC Security K Link

**Risk management in the context of aviation is not meant to actually prevent risks, but to justify expansion of the security business, multiplying the normal activities that come to be governed by the discourse of security.**

Salter 08, Mark B. Salter, School of Politics, University of Ottawa, Canada, 2008, *Security Dialogue* 39:243, “Imagining Numbers: Risk, Quantification, and Aviation Security,” pg. 251-253, Sage Publications (ED)

A primary mode of the security dispositif is risk management, which I argue, at least within aviation security, produces security objects (not risk objects). A preliminary example of the security dispositif can be formulated through an examination of the paradigm of risk management as a security practice.4 This article applies the theoretical work of Aradau & van Munster to the quotidian world of aviation security practices. I want to argue that the security dispositif explains the practice of risk management within aviation because of the securitization of the essential field of the sector. Risk management has become dominant within business and government as a way of managing the unpredictable (Hood, Rothstein & Baldwin, 2001; Leiss, 2001). Two professional templates of risk management are dominant: CAN/ Mark B. Salter Risk, Quantification, and Aviation Security 251 4 In 2004, the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) held a workshop with Richard Ericson, David Lyon, Jean-Paul Brodeur, and Pat O’Malley, among others, to determine whether risk management was the best strategy for CATSA’s screening activities. The results can be read in Brodeur (2006). Risk management is defined as ‘the systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of analyzing, evaluating, controlling, and communicating about risk issues’ (CSA, 1997: 3). With some variation, both standards follow the same assumptions. Risk analysis involves assessment, management, and evaluation.5 Risks to a given enterprise are assessed according to frequency, the vulnerability of the assets involved, and the probable impact.6 The general risk environment and particularities of the enterprise are considered – including stakeholders’ appetite for risk. Enterprises then manage the risk through avoidance, acceptance, mitigation, or transfer. Managers may avoid the risk by ceasing the line of business or activity; they may accept the risk, understanding the frequency, vulnerability, and impact; they may mitigate the risk to bring the consequences in line with the appetite for risk; or they may transfer the risk through insurance, subcontracting, or other methods. As argued by many business analysts, managing risk has become one of the primary duties of an enterprise, however problematic that task might be (see Ericson, 2006). This has proven to be exceptionally popular for governments in Western countries under the paradigm of New Public Management theory (Advani & Borins, 2001; Hood & Peters, 2004). The dispositif of security is particularly useful for understanding how the practice of **risk management is not intended to resolve the risks to an enterprise; rather, risk is used by the ‘managers of unease’ as a justification for expanding their security business**. Foucault (2007: 33) looks at food shortages to explore how the dispositif of security reorients police attention away from a physical lack of food towards the social effects of the consequent revolution. A parallel can be found in the way that the risk management paradigm reorients police attention away from the actual lack of public security in the civil aviation network in a complex, open, interdependent society towards the social consequences of security management. For example, an airline carrier might cease operations in an unstable part of the world because it wishes to avoid the risk of hijacking or terrorist attacks. It may accept the risk of metal cutlery and glass within the first-class cabin. It may mitigate the risk of hijackings similar to those of 9/11 through reinforcing cockpit doors and pressuring the government to provide funding for such refurbishments. It may transfer the risk of a catastrophic attack through war insurance, issued by a national government or commercial insurer. More importantly, **risk is used by airport and air carriers to pressure governments to spend more on aviation security. The presentation of risk is used by governments to justify the expansion of airport screening, no-fly, air marshal, surveillance, and other policing programs**. Risk is also used to manage passenger and stakeholder expectations. Several air carriers now announce that it is their policy that passengers remain seated, that the washrooms in the first-class cabin are reserved for first-class passengers for security reasons, and that crowding near the cockpit is prohibited. As the security dispositif would predict, **the number of activities, practices, and institutions that come to be framed in security language is centripetal and continually increases.** While these controls are framed in the language of risk, they are justified through the appeal to the maintenance of security (not the reduction of risk). Risk management is a strategy of using administrative practices and knowledge structures to mobilize the perception of danger in order to arrange the resources of the public, stakeholders, and a given enterprise itself. Widely shared assumptions about risk and the international standards of risk management are best understood using a security dispositif: **the risk management approach does not aim to eliminate danger, but rather to manage the circulation of risk within an enterprise to shape the conditions of possibility for responsibility, action, and accountability.** To explore this further, I will drill down into the strategy of quantification of security and the particular tactic of the expert panel on aviation security in subsequent sections of this article.

2NC Security K Links

**The airline industry drives the expansion of surveillance technologies in other areas.**

Adey, Budd, and Hubbard 07, Peter Adey, Keele University, Lucy Budd and Phil Hubbard, Loughborough University, 2007, *Progress in Human Geography* 31.6, “Flying lessons: exploring the social and cultural geographies of global air travel,” p. 781, SAGE Publications

The arguments here about surveillance and society are complex, and it might be countered that securitization, surveillance and sorting are endemic features of contemporary capitalist societies, and not just evident in airspace. Yet some have argued that surveillance technologies are most intensely deployed in airspace, rippling out to encompass other social spheres over time through processes of ‘surveillance creep’. For example, surveillance author Lyon (2003) argues the ethos of **the ‘technological fix’ is ingrained in the security and aviation industries** to the extent that technology is normatively assumed to be able to resolve any security problem. As he shows, there are enormous commercial pressures currently in play here, driving carriers to invest in the most secure technologies. Similarly, Dodge and Kitchin (2006: np) explore examples of how these kinds of technologies and related practices are being transferred elsewhere, ‘to other forms of public transport’ and ‘to monitor flows of traffic and goods on highways and through ports’. Of course, the issue is not so much that these techniques are not necessarily innovative but that the air-transport industry has both fuelled and legitimized their use in other spheres of life – with both intrusive and pervasive effects.

**Surveillance within airspace invents new forms of citizenship that further biopolitics.**

Adey, Budd, and Hubbard 07, Peter Adey, Keele University, Lucy Budd and Phil Hubbard, Loughborough University, 2007, *Progress in Human Geography* 31.6, “Flying lessons: exploring the social and cultural geographies of global air travel,” p. 781-782, SAGE Publications

There is plentiful evidence to suggest that surveillance is not merely intensified within airspace, but is deployed in ways that fundamentally invert normal notions of citizenship and sovereignty (with Fuller, 2003, comparing the airport to Agamben’s description of the camp). As such, the deployment of surveillance within contemporary airspace has been read as predictive of imminent societal changes, with the encompassing forms of surveillance evident in airspace rippling out to encompass a wider range of social spaces. Amoore (2006) goes as far as to suggest that the identity ascribed at the airport is carried with one throughout life. Using the example of the Brazilian mistakenly shot by police on the London Underground in the aftermath of ‘7–7’, Amoore (2006: 338) demonstrates that a contemporary state of exception has meant that the body becomes the ‘carrier of the border’ – a place ‘inscribed with multiple encoded boundaries of access’. The exceptional space of the airport, in effect, is made mobile, bringing to the fore what Mark Salter (2006: 175) describes as a new kind of corporeal and confessionary regime where the body ‘comes to testify or confess for the subject without consent or perhaps knowledge’.

1NC Capitalism K Link

**The airline industry is constructed to serve the needs of transnational businessmen – divides society in terms of mobility.**

Adey, Budd, and Hubbard 07, Peter Adey, Keele University, Lucy Budd and Phil Hubbard, Loughborough University, 2007, *Progress in Human Geography* 31.6, “Flying lessons: exploring the social and cultural geographies of global air travel,” p. 782-783, SAGE Publications

Though only briefly commenting on surveillance per se, Crang (2002) also stresses the social inequalities and class differences evident in airspace – something that geographers have not always been quick to highlight. For example, in David Linton’s 1946 speech to the Geographical Association he stated: ‘the air view of the ground … has become a familiar thing to us all’ (cited in Daniels and Rycroft, 1993: 465), indicating that air transport has often been taken for granted by geographers, effacing the unequal access to this form of mobility. Against this, Crang posits that airports are the domains of the privileged, buildings constructed to serve the needs of the most frequent flyers – transnational businessmen, professionals and members of the putative ‘creative class’. Thus, in stark contrast to the ‘wretched test of endurance’ of economy and low-cost travel, ‘typif ed by delays, crowds, the flatulence of your fellow passengers and the cold, hard stares of cabin crew’ (Duerden, 2006: 24), business and executive business class travel offers passengers enhanced standards of service and mobility. Lassen (2006: 309) hence argues that business travellers are ‘easily able to traverse airports and international boundaries.’ For the truly super-rich, fractional jet ownership and charter schemes enable wealthy travellers to bypass check in queues and air traffic delays while buying privacy, prestige, and the flexibility to choreograph flight arrangements to personal schedules (Beaverstock et al., 2004; Maslen, 2004). From this perspective, air transportation provides an example of how society is divided in terms of mobility, with the business/economy divide increasingly mirrored in the different levels of service offered by low-cost and fullservice carriers. The characteristics common to the majority of low cost airlines include high aircraft utilisation, internet booking, use of secondary airports, minimum cabin crew, more seats per aircraft than traditional airlines, short ‘on the ground’ turn around times, no seat allocation, and limited catering (Francis et al., 2006). Low cost airlines generally serve cheaper, less congested secondary airports that are located within the subordinate city region of major World Cities, including Stansted (London) and Hahn (Frankfurt). The development of a homogenized, streamlined, reduced-service airline product thus offers a lower-priced alternative to full service carriers, with operators targeting the ‘mass market’ by piling capacity onto a small number of routes, allowing them to drive down operating costs and offer lower fares. But even though low-cost carriers are sold on the idea of democratizing air travel, the availability of low cost services remains highly uneven, and even in Europe, where it is at its densest, it only accounts for 18% of all fl ights (Dubruszkes, 2006). Moreover, a Civil Aviation Authority (2004) survey of 180,000 passengers at UK airports revealed that passengers at Stansted (London’s lowcost ‘hub’) had average incomes over £50,000; social classes D and E, while comprising 27% of the UK population, made only 6% of the fl ights. Further, half the UK population has never fl own, and a further 25% have fl own only once (Clement, 2006). Rather than bringing frequent fl ying to the masses, it appears lowcost airlines have increased the frequency of fl ying amongst the more affl uent. Accordingly, Sparke (2006) suggests inequitable aeromobilities provide the springboard from which to explore important contemporary issues of uneven mobility. Signifi cant here is the contrast between frequent fl yers and an under-privileged ‘kinetic underclass’ subject to intensive forms of security control, both within and beyond the airport: 3 Club-class passengers still move with signifi - cant speed in the comfy cosmopolitan circuits created by international conference trips, international tourism and international family gettogethers. For the world’s working classes and for those subject to ‘security risk’ codifi cation, by contrast, being in the kinetic underclass has altogether more oppressive and more unpredictable outcomes including, not least of all, much more volatile mixes of movement and immobility. The experience of immobility in these cases means something entirely different to the petty class resentments that come with seeing business suits and Lexus cars speed by in NEXUS lanes. (Sparke, 2006: 169)

1NC National Security Advantage

1. Their impact card assumes a nuclear attack, not an attack on airports – nothing the aff does could prevent a terrorist nuclear attack.
2. **The aff dramatically increases the risk of terrorism – no encryption or authentication.**

Greenberg 7/25, Andy Greenberg, staff writer, 7-25-2012, Forbes, “Next-Gen Air Traffic Control Vulnerable to Hackers Spoofing Planes out of Thin Air,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/07/25/next-gen-air-traffic-control-vulnerable-to-hackers-spoofing-planes-out-of-thin-air/ (ED)

A hacker attack that leads to planes dropping from the sky is the stuff of every cyberwar doomsday prophesy. But some security researchers imagine a less sensational, if equally troubling possibility: Hundreds or thousands of aircraft radioing their approach to an air traffic control tower, and no way to sort through which are real and which are ghost plane signals crafted by a malicious hacker. At the Black Hat and Defcon security conference this week in Las Vegas, two security researchers plan to give separate talks on the same troubling issue: By 2020, a new system known as Automated Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast or ADS-B will be required as the primary mode of aircraft tracking and control for commercial aircraft in the U.S.–earlier in other countries such as Australia. And both researchers say that ADS-B lacks both the encryption necessary to keep those communications private and the authentication necessary to prevent spoofed communications from mixing with real ones, potentially allowing hackers to fabricate messages and even entire aircraft with radio tools that are cheaper and more accessible than ever before. “Anyone can technically transmit these messages,” says Andrei Costin, a Ph.D. candidate at the French security institute Eurecom who plans to give a talk called “Ghosts In The Air (Traffic)” at Black Hat. “It’s practically possible for a medium-technical savvy person to mount an attack and impersonate a plane that’s not there.” ADS-B promises to make air traffic control easier, cheaper and in many ways safer by allowing planes to transmit their locations by radio frequency instead of depending on towers to use radar to track and coordinate them. But without encryption or authentication, ADS-B both exposes flyers to more potential tracking and fails to provide a trusted authority for planes’ location to the same degree as radar, says Costin. Anyone with a radio tuned to the system’s 1090 megaherz frequency can listen in and track planes. That’s a notion that may disturb some privacy-conscious flyers, but it’s hardly a new phenomenon—sites and apps like FlightAware and PlaneTracker already make that data available from the FAA’s databases. More troubling is the ability to fabricate fake signals that are indistinguishable from real ones. Using a software-defined radio, a PC-based receiver and transmitter that’s far more versatile than the average consumer radio, anyone from a prankster to a determined attacker could create a message alerting a tower or a plane to an oncoming jet that doesn’t exist. “This is the most important problem,” says Costin. “You can put out a method that looks valid in the ether, and they can’t verify whether it’s real or malicious.” Pilots and air traffic controllers wouldn’t be entirely helpless against that kind of spoofing attack; They could still check the purported messages against radar signals and against their database of flight plans. But the trick could be scaled up to hundreds or thousands of fake signals, much like a denial-of-service attack that uses thousands of computers to choke a website with a flood of fraudulent requests for information, Costin says.

1. **The risk of a terrorist attack on general aviation is low.**

Peters 09, Katherine McIntire Peters, 6-17-2009, *Government Executive*, http://www.govexec.com/defense/2009/06/general-aviation-presents-limited-security-threat-ig-finds/29387/

The Homeland Security Department's inspector general said Wednesday the national security threat posed by general aviation is "limited and mostly hypothetical." General aviation accounts for 77 percent of all domestic flights and includes air cargo transport, emergency medical flight operations, flight school training, and corporate and private aviation. Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, D-Texas, asked the IG to investigate after a Houston television station alleged "security breaches" occurred at three local airports when reporters were able to approach airfields or aircraft without identifying themselves. In a direct reference to the television report, titled, "Is Houston a Sitting Duck for Terrorism?" the watchdog's report contains a section titled "Houston Is Not a 'Sitting Duck for Terrorism.' " "We reviewed the allegations and determined that they were not compelling," wrote Homeland Security IG Richard Skinner. Reporters were unaware of some passive security and monitoring measures the airports had taken, such as 24-hour video surveillance, locked or disabled planes, and controlled fuel access. Guidelines and alerts the Transportation Security Administration issued, "coupled with voluntary measures taken by owners and operators of aircraft and facilities, provide baseline security for aircraft based at general aviation sites," Skinner wrote. Besides the three Houston-area airports approached by the television reporters, the IG's staff visited a number of large and small, public and privately owned general aviation facilities in metropolitan areas where people could be at risk in the event of a terrorist attack launched from the airports. The IG noted TSA has tailored its security strategy to the range of airfield environments and classes of aircraft and operators, rather than introducing overly broad regulations that are costly to implement. The agency also analyzes credible intelligence information to prioritize existing threats and identify practical, targeted measures to reduce risks in the aviation sector. "Although [TSA's Office of Intelligence] has identified potential threats, it has concluded that most [general aviation] aircraft are too light to inflict significant damage, and has not identified specific imminent threats from [general aviation] aircraft," the IG stated. "Significant regulation of the industry would require considerable federal funding," Skinner added. The watchdog did not make any recommendations to TSA, and agency officials did not submit formal comments in response to the report. "The current status of [general aviation] operations does not present a serious homeland security vulnerability requiring TSA to increase regulatory oversight of the industry," the IG concluded.

1. **Terrorism is inevitable – increasing aviation security will just make terrorists shift to weaker targets.**

 Poole 08, Robert W. Poole, Jr., Reason Foundation, November 2008, Joint Transport Research Centre of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the International Transport Forum, discussion paper no. 2008-23, prepared for the OECD/ITF Round Table of 11-12 December 2008 on Security, Risk Perception, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, “Toward Risk-Based Aviation Security Policy,” pg. 3, http://internationaltransportforum.org/jtrc/DiscussionPapers/DP200823.pdf (ED)

The sector-specific approach that has been applied to aviation is an example of targethardening. The problem with this approach is that we live and function in a target-rich world, and this is inherent in the nature of developed economies. Because resources are limited, all conceivable targets cannot be hardened. But **terrorists can readily shift from hardened to non-hardened targets.** Target-hardening is an example of what analysts have called “asymmetries” between terrorists and their target governments. As Sandler, Arce, and Enders (1) point out, there are a number of such asymmetries. Terrorists operating in loosely connected networks appear to cooperate more readily than governments. Terrorists also seem to operate with longer time horizons than the political process. Because terrorists hide among the general population, they present a target-poor environment to governments, compared with the terrorists‟ target-rich environment. And the cost to terrorists of wreaking destruction and creating fear are modest, in comparison to the costs of governmental attempts to defend (everything) against terrorist attack 2.2 Macro Policy Alternatives to Counter Terrorism In 2008, the Copenhagen Consensus project commissioned a challenge paper on terrorism. In the paper, Todd Sandler and Daniel Arce of the University of Texas at Dallas and Walter Enders of the University of Alabama focus on transnational terrorism as a problem fundamentally different from other global crises.(1) Their basic message is that “**there is no solution to** transnational **terrorism** because it is a cost-effective tactic of the weak against a more formidable opponent.” Thus, they conclude, “terrorism can be put into remission but it cannot be eliminated.”

1. NextGen is a cooperative surveillance system – grave risk that planes just won’t cooperate.

Wood 09, Robert G. Wood Bachelor of Science in Network Management Southern Nazarene University Bethany, OK, 2002, Master of Science in Information Technology University of Texas San Antonio, TX, 2006, Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College of Oklahoma State University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor Of Education, May 2009, Oklahoma State University, “A Security Risk Analysis of the Data Communications Network Proposed in the Nextgen Air Traffic Control System,” pg. 90, http://digital.library.okstate.edu/etd/Wood\_okstate\_0664D\_10245.pdf (ED)

One integrity concern that is partially addressed earlier in this section warrants additional concern and recommendation. Perhaps the greatest potential security threat to cooperative surveillance systems such as ADS-B and NextGen is that some aircraft just will not cooperate. Whether the aircraft is being flown by Jihadists seeking to reign down terror on the evils of America, a drug runner wishing to escape detection, or just a poorly maintained aircraft, there is a grave risk in relying strictly on cooperative surveillance. Some proposals have suggested that eliminating primary radar systems could eliminate more than $300 million per annum in operating costs (ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking Committee, 2008). I would strongly advocate retaining secondary groundbased radar capabilities in at least all high density areas where the risks of accidents and consequences are greatest.

**US - Russian Relations are resilient – they’re based on mutual deterrence**

**Fenenko 11** (a Leading Research Fellow at the Institute of International Security Studies of RAS,“The cyclical nature of Russian-American relations,” June 21, 2011, http://en.rian.ru/valdai\_op/20110621/164739508.html)

There is nothing special or unusual about the current difficulties. Over the past twenty years, both Russia and the United States have experienced several cycles of convergence and divergence in their bilateral relations. It seems that Moscow and Washington are doomed to repeat these cycles time and again. Such changes in bilateral relations are no mere coincidence. Russia and the United States base their relations on mutual nuclear deterrence. The material and technical foundations for Russian-American relations differ little from those underpinning the Soviet-American relations of the 1980s. Thus, these cycles of Russian-American rapprochement are due to two factors. First comes the desire to consistently reduce aging nuclear systems so that during disarmament neither party risked destroying the military-strategic parity. Second, the reaction to a major military-political crisis after which the parties seek to reduce confrontation and update the rules of conduct in the military-political sphere. After confronting these tasks, Russia and the United States returned to a state of low intensity confrontation.

**Alt causes to poor relations – Magnitsky Bill, Syria, and missile-defense shield**

**Meyer 12** (Henry Meyer, 6/7/12, “U.S. Won’t Oppose Russia Sanctions That Risk Putin Reprisal” www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-07/u-dot-s-dot-won-t-oppose-russia-sanctions-that-risk-putin-reprisal)

The U.S. administration will no longer seek to prevent Congress from passing a bill targeting human-rights offenders in Russia, a step that President Vladimir Putin has warned would spark retaliation and damage ties. The House Foreign Affairs Committee today approved by voice vote legislation that would impose U.S. travel and financial curbs on any official abusing human rights in Russia, including 60 people suspected of involvement in the death of anti- corruption lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in a Moscow jail in 2009. Congress will vote on the measure at a later date. “You’d be hard pressed to find anyone who would bet against Congress expressing their concerns on the Magnitsky matter in some way,” U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk said today in Moscow. “It’s important to work with Congress on an appropriate mandatory response to that.” President Barack Obama’s administration is seeking to repeal trade restrictions with Russia to prevent U.S. companies from being penalized once Russian membership of the World Trade Organization takes effect later this year. A bipartisan group of senators has made a repeal of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment conditional on imposing sanctions on Russian officials for human-rights violations. ‘Adequate’ Response Any unilateral steps against Russian citizens would provoke an “adequate” response, Konstantin Dolgov, the Foreign Ministry’s human-rights representative, was cited as saying by Interfax today. Russia still sees a chance the bill won’t be adopted, according to the news service. Such a law would be “a gross interference in Russian internal affairs and, of course, it won’t have any positive effect on U.S.-Russian ties, to put it mildly,” Dolgov told reporters in Moscow on May 15. Russia warned in April it would retaliate with unspecified measures against the law. The U.S. is already at odds with Russia over its efforts to oust Russian ally Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and its plans to build a missile-defense shield in Europe on its former Cold War foe’s borders. Obama is counting on Russia to help push Iran toward a peaceful solution over its nuclear work and is seeking a deal with Putin over a managed transfer of power in Syria.

Ext. No Nuclear Terrorism

Terrorists can’t get a bomb and even if they did they would only use it as a bargaining chip

Schelling 11 (Thomas Schelling was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2005, and is the Distinguished University Professor at the University of Maryland, College Park, 9/6/11, “THOMAS C. SCHELLING: Whatever happened to Nuclear Terrorism?” http://cpost.uchicago.edu/blog/2011/09/06/thomas-c-schelling-whatever-happened-to-nuclear-terrorism/)

If you have weapons-grade uranium for which you know someone is willing to pay a high price you probably need someone able to get it out of the country, who can meet someone somewhere who can be in touch with someone who is in touch with someone who is known to be willing to kill to get the stuff, who may pay handsomely. At every stage someone has much money, someone has stuff worth much money, someone gets a commission, and somebody may be willing to kill for the money or for the bomb material. Eventually, if all goes well, a “supplier” and a “customer” representing the terrorist organization may meet in a public place, each with a few unrecognizable body guards, to consummate the deal. At that point I fantasize that the seller and the buyer recognize each other, one is from the CIA and the other from the Israeli Mossad. Each is engaged in a “sting” operation, and they shake hands and go back to work. Assume the sale succeeds. The terrorist organization needs the people who can convert the fissile material into an explosive. It needs several highly trained scientists in physics, chemistry, computer science, and metallurgy, and highly skilled machinists and others who can produce something technologically demanding. The fact that a bomb design can be found on the internet, doesn’t make it easy. Anyone can find out how to make a Chevrolet, or an MRI or a CAT scan; there’s no secret, but it’s not easy! Recruiting must be a problem. There are three main avenues. Loyal terrorists, if they have the skills, may be happy to join. Pay may attract the needed people. Coercion—threatening family, etc.—may work. But there’s always the chance that the persons approached can become informants. Pay may be unattractive if the potential contractor suspects that any organization willing to kill thousands or millions wouldn’t hesitate to kill a nuclear scientists rather than pay him at the, end of his contract, especially to preclude his becoming an informant. As in the process of avoiding enemy intelligence in the chain of transactions getting the fissile material to the ultimate customer, there is the difficulty of “advertising” for participants in an enterprise that requires leaving job and family and going off to a secret location from which he may never return. The foregoing thoughts may suggest why “terrorists” have not yet acquired a nuclear weapon: it’s more than stealing the fissile material. But they still may! What are we to suppose they will do with one, or a few, that they may yet acquire? If a team is assembled that, in isolation, spends months making a workable bomb, or a few bombs, what will they spend their evening hours talking about? They are all concentrated on a nuclear weapon. Won’t they continually converse about what the thing is good for, what should properly be done with it, how it might be used to advance some important objective, and whether they might have any influence on its use? They will almost certainly have spent more hundreds of hours trying to think strategically about the possible uses of a few nuclear weapons than any head of government, or even senior government adviser has devoted to the question. It’s possible—I think likely—that they may be listened to. And what “strategy” might they propose? I propose that they will conclude that exploding a weapon over Los Angeles or Vladivostok or Bremen will “waste” the weapon. They will think, “we are a nuclear power. There are the USA, Russia, France, Britain, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Maybe Iran, and now US. We have status, power, influence. Let’s use it!” Can they prove they have the weapon? I think they can. I’ve talked to American weapon experts who, when I inquired, would willingly go blindfolded to a terrorist organization’s site to examine the fissile material and the weaponization capability and return home to declare whether it was “real.” (If they couldn’t be attracted, they could be kidnapped, shown it all, and taken home to declare what they had seen.) So what kind of thing might the “terrorist” (now a major diplomatic power) demand under what kind of nuclear threat? I’m not sure I want to give them any ideas, but I think I’d prefer they coerce us than kill a great many of us. A simple example might be that they say that have already introduced a weapon into one American city, and name ten cities that include the one: Port cities like Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, Houston, San Diego, Long Beach, San Francisco, Seattle, and will detonate it New Years Day if the United States has not by then . . . . Do I think, if they pursue this strategy, they would explode it if the United States did not meet their demand by New Years Day. I’m not sure. I think they, whoever they are, might be severely inhibited by the sixty-six years in which no nation has, in the words of President Lyndon Johnson, “loosed the atom against another.”

The chance of nuclear terrorism is between one in a million and three billion

Choong 12 (William Choong, 3/30/12, “Is nuclear terrorism as big a threat as some perceive?” The Straits Times, ProQuest)

The threat of of nuclear terrorism was raised first in 1946 by Robert Oppenheimer, the creator of the A-bomb, who said that a few men could smuggle nuclear bomb units into New York and blow up the whole city. Since 1946, however, no attack as conceived by Oppenheimer has occurred. Brian Jenkins, a scholar at Rand Corp, a United States think-tank, has been writing about nuclear terrorism since the early 1970s - long before the terrorism studies industry became fashionable. And his position has been remarkably consistent through the years - nuclear terrorism is about the threat that terrorists would acquire and use nuclear weapons, while nuclear terror is about the anticipation of that event. There hasn't been any incidents of nuclear terrorism, but nuclear terror is embedded deeply in the public psyche. 'Terrorists were presumed to have nuclear ambitions, which Al-Qaeda did. (But the) absence of evidence was no longer persuasive as evidence that terrorists were not going nuclear,' he says in an e-mail interview. 'Terrorists don't have nuclear weapons, therefore, they get the most mileage psychologically (creating alarm among their enemies while exciting their followers) by fantasising about using them,' adds the former US Army Special Forces officer. In the unlikely event that such terrorists have secured such material, the odds are stacked against them. Professor John Mueller, a political scientist at Ohio University, has done the maths. He lists some 20 steps that terrorists will have to undertake to build a improvised nuclear device (IND) - of which all must be achieved. These include processes centred on producing, transporting and then detonating the IND. Putting a 50 per cent chance that the group would overcome these obstacles, the chances that the group could pull it off is one in a million. If one assumes that each step involves a 33 per cent chance of success - the odds change to one in over three billion.

1NC Economy Advantage

1. Their internal link evidence is about the entire aerospace industry – even if general aviation decreases, other sectors like military aviation and space will sustain the economy
2. They read no internal link card connecting collapse of the US economy to collapse of the world economy
3. **NextGen devastates general aviation.**

Spence 12, Charles Spence, GAN’s Washington Correspondent, 4-10-2012, General Aviation News, “Could NextGen Ground GA?”, http://www.generalaviationnews.com/2012/04/10/could-nextgen-ground-ga/

What does this have to do with aviation? Let’s look at the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). Among the many alleged advantages, NextGen will speed traffic, reduce travel routes, and allow less distances separating flights. These will be needed to safely and more efficiently handle increased air traffic. Forecasts from the FAA expect revenue passenger miles to increase for U.S. airlines from 814.6 billion in 2011 to 1.57 trillion in 2032. The air carrier fleet, including cargo carriers, is forecast to grow from 7,185 aircraft in 2011 to 9,853 in 2032. The number of GA aircraft is expected to increase from 222,520 in 2011 to 253,205 in 2032. One of the secondary effects of this growth will be: Where are we going to put all these airplanes on the ground? By 2015, FAA information indicates that with planned improvements, six major airports will need more capacity. Without these planned improvements, 18 will need more capacity. In some locations not only the current airports need added capacity but so, too, do the entire metropolitan areas. The FAA lists seven metropolitan areas that will need increased capacity. Even with planned improvements at six airports in these areas, four metropolitan areas will still need additional capacity. These constraints are expected in just three years. By 2025, 14 airports and metropolitan areas need additional capacity — and unless there are on-going improvements, 27 airports and metropolitan areas will need improvements and additional capacity. Building airports or improving them is a long, tedious affair. In the past 30 years fewer than five major airports have been built in the United States (Denver, Dallas/Fort Worth, O’Hare, and Austin). There have been a few smaller airports built, but many have closed. Years are required to gain community support for an airport and many more years for construction. Public opposition, environmental issues, funding, and dealing with real estate developers are a few of the issues that must be settled before actual construction can begin. This needed additional capacity is primarily at major airports in metropolitan areas. Why should this concern general aviation? Here, again, secondary effect might come into play. If there is not enough capacity to accommodate aircraft, there is little question about what segment of flight will get restricted. These restrictions could be added fees, regulations for new equipment, denial of use, limited hours, restricted numbers, or any other type of restraint government minds can conceive. Limited capacity is not limited to airports only, but to the airspace around them and the air traffic management system. Reaching capacity maximums at metropolitan areas can have a ripple effect to even the smallest GA facility. Use of a personal or charter aircraft will have reduced value if it cannot be used where and when it is wanted or needed.

1. **Next Gen can’t solve congestion**

Karp 12, Aaron Karp, ATW Editors’ Blog, Air Transport World, 4-4-2012, “Despite FAA Reauthorization, NextGen Questions Persist,” http://blogs.atwonline.com/2012/04/04/despite-faa-reauthorization-nextgen-questions-persist/

David Plavin, formerly president of Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA), cautioned that just implementing NextGen ATC won’t be sufficent to meet future air traffic demand. “The top 17 US airports accounted for 50% of air traffic in the US last year,” he said. “So we need runways … The whole conversation [about NextGen] needs to be expanded.” Satellite ATC will “help a lot” in alleviating system congestion, but unless major US airports’ physical infrastructure also expands, “it’s not enough,” Plavin commented.

1. Deep structural problems with the airline industry that the aff can’t solve – high fuel costs, low demand, and excess capacity

Hume 12, Tim Hume, CNN, 5-4-2012, “Higher fares and more mergers for airline industry, say experts,”

http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/04/business/airline-consolidation/index.html

(CNN) -- Analysts are predicting plane tickets will get more expensive as more airlines merge in response to deep-seated structural problems in the industry. Faced with soaring fuel costs, slack passenger demand and an economic slowdown, mergers are shaping up as a necessary measure to remove excess capacity from the industry. "I think there's more consolidation to come," said Vaughn Cordle, chief analyst for AirlineForecasts. "Lower demand means that there is excess capacity that needs to be taken out of the system, and the best way to do that is through consolidation." There has been much talk of mergers recently. In the United States, workers for three American Airlines unions last month agreed to support a potential merger with U.S. Airways Group, although no deal has been confirmed. And in Europe the CEO of loss-making Scandinavian airline SAS, often rumored to be the target of a takeover, said in a recent interview he anticipated accelerated consolidation given current conditions in the industry. But he would not be drawn on the immediate future of his airline, which German airline Lufthansa was rumored to be close to bidding for in late 2010. Cordle said there were simply too many airlines in the world, with intense competition dropping fares to unsustainably low levels. Rationalization had to take place to move "towards a more viable industry," he said, shifting the business model from a "focus on market share to a focus on profits." "It's not the best solution for the consumer, but the fares were so low in the past that the industry structurally has to change," he added. The "punchline" for travelers was that fares would only rise as a result. He said fares had increased about 20% since their recession lows in 2009 -- and tipped them to rise at least a further 5% as airlines were forced to shoulder higher taxes and user fees in addition to rising fuel costs. Peter Harbison, executive chairman of the Center for Asia Pacific Aviation (CAPA) also said further consolidation was likely, as the industry was "coming to the end of an evolutionary cycle" in which air travel had been dominated by national carriers subsidized by governments. "You've got all these carriers hanging over from the old days, and lots of them are effectively unsustainable," he said. However, he said the process of consolidation would be slow-going, as the merger of airlines across national boundaries remained "extremely difficult and complex." This was because of the "archaic spider's web" of thousands of bilateral agreements which had been the legal framework underpinning international air travel since the post-war period.

2NC Economy Advantage Ext – Alt Causes

Structural problems with the aviation industry– fragmented market, overcapacity, and fuel prices

Steffy 10, Loren Steffy, staff writer, 4-26-2010, Houston Chronicle, “Steffy: Airline mantra is merge, fail, repeat,” http://www.chron.com/business/steffy/article/Steffy-Airline-mantra-is-merge-fail-repeat-1715606.php (ED)

 **The airline industry is confounded by two persistent problems: a fragmented market and too many empty seats.** No single airline in the world controls more than 5 percent of the market, Swelbar said, and the more fragmented a market is , the poorer the profits. The abundance of seats has kept fares low, but it's also left carriers vulnerable to surges in fuel prices. It's no coincidence that United and Continental have come back to the table as fuel prices are once again creeping upward. Once oil gets above about $90 a barrel, a deal becomes more difficult, Swelbar said. Much of the merger talk, then, is aimed at consolidating that capacity without incurring additional costs. Mergers, though, don't necessarily reduce capacity. To win antitrust approval, the carriers need little overlap on routes. Besides, in 2009, U.S. airline capacity fell the most that it has since World War II, according to MIT data, yet airlines are still losing money.

2NC Economy Advantage Ext – Can’t Solve Congestion

**NextGen can’t solve delays.**

Smith et al 10, Jeremy C. Smith, NASA Langley Research Center, and Nelson M. Guerreiro, ATK Space Systems, Inc., with assistance from Jeffrey K. Viken, NASA Langley Research Center, Samuel M. Dollyhig, and James W. Fenbert, ATK Space Systems, Inc., “Meeting Air Transportation Demand in 2025 by using Larger Aircraft and Alternative Routing to Complement NextGen Operational Improvements,” http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100033386\_2010036546.pdf

The ACES simulation results from this study determined that: • NextGen Operational Improvements alone, using the estimated capacity-benefit values, do not provide sufficient airport capacity to meet the projected demand for passenger air transportation in 2025 without significant system delays. • Using larger aircraft with more seats on high-demand routes and introducing new direct routes, where demand warrants, significantly reduces delays, complementing NextGen improvements. This still does not reduce delays to acceptable levels on some routes. • Alternative air routes are available avoiding congested routes and, for some shorter trips, passengers will choose to drive, reducing delays on most routes to acceptable levels for the 2025 scenario. Mean delay per flight from simulation, is less than three minutes for this second-choice scenario; this is similar to the 2006 baseline scenario mean delay. The penalty is that the alternative routes and option to drive increases overall trip time by 0.4% and may be less convenient than the first-choice route, if that first choice had sufficient capacity.

1NC Competitiveness Advantage

1NC economy advantage answers +

1. **Mandated cuts in national security devastate military readiness – plan can’t overcome.**

Slattery 7/24, Brian Slattery, 7-24-2012, Heritage Foundation, “Mandated Sequestration Will Create ‘National Security Nightmare,’” http://blog.heritage.org/2012/07/24/mandated-cuts-will-create-national-security-nightmare/ (ED)

Constituents at a Great Falls, Montana, town hall meeting understand what many in Congress do not seem to understand: Cuts mandated by budget sequestration will erode the defense industrial base to the point where irreversible damage may be done to military readiness. Recounting a town hall meeting with Congressman Denny Rehberg (R–MT) in Great Falls, Heritage’s James Carafano writes that citizens “were worried about jobs.… What made even less sense to these folks was how the cuts could go forward when leaders on both sides of the aisle know it will create a national security nightmare.” The cuts in question are those mandated by sequestration, which, if left unaddressed, will cut more than $500 billion from national security funding over the next 10 years. The concern is not over jobs or economic stimulation; it is about military readiness. As Carafano notes, the defense industry relies a great deal on “human capital.” Many of the skills that go into building, maintaining, and repairing military equipment often take years to master. Losing these skills harms military readiness, because it often means that programs take longer and are more expensive to build. Furthermore, when these workers leave their respective industries, it can take years to get their skills back. Budgetary uncertainty at the Department of Defense can dramatically affect the suppliers on which it relies. The cuts from sequestration are perceived as so catastrophic that they are already affecting defense contractors. These companies are required by law to give 60-day notices of job terminations. They often rely on long-term planning and buying of raw materials and subcontracting to deliver on time and under cost. The closer we get to sequestration’s deadline, the more these companies will have to cut back in preparation. The Armed Forces are already in dire need of modernization. Sequestration will exacerbate this concern—and not only regarding the planes, ships, and vehicles that the forces will have to retire prematurely. The thousands of defense industry jobs lost due to canceled contracts and less work pose a significant readiness challenge as well. While America has ridden through austere defense budgets in the past, the cuts that will begin in January 2013 could possibly weaken the industrial base to an unprecedented level. While the active duty and reserve forces scramble to figure out how to protect the country with fewer resources, their lifeline—the defense industry—will be scrambling for work elsewhere. The government should fulfill its constitutional responsibility and provide for the common defense. First and foremost, this means stopping sequestration.

1. Hegemony is not key to stability – empirically proven.

Fettweis 10 (Christopher, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival (00396338); Apr/May, Vol. 52 Issue 2, p59-82, 24p)

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible ‘peace dividend’ endangered both national and global security. ‘No serious analyst of American military capabilities’, argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, ‘doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace’.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilising presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

1. Retrenchment is peaceful – even when it’s quick.

Parent and MacDonald 11 (Joseph Parent, Assistant professor at the University of Miami, Paul Macdonald, Assistant professor at Williams college, “Graceful decline? The surprising success of Great Power Retrenchment” pages 1-10, 2011, MIT press journal, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00034)

How do great powers respond to acute decline? The erosion of the relative power of the United States has scholars and policymakers reexamining this question. The central issue is whether prompt retrenchment is desirable or probable. Some pessimists counsel that retrenchment is a dangerous policy, because it shows weakness and invites attack. Robert Kagan, for example, warns, “A reduction in defense spending . . . would unnerve American allies and undercut efforts to gain greater cooperation. There is already a sense around the world, fed by irresponsible pundits here at home, that the United States is in terminal decline. Many fear that the economic crisis will cause the United States to pull back from overseas commitments. The announcement of a defense cutback would be taken by the world as evidence that the American retreat has begun.”1 Robert Kaplan likewise argues, “Husbanding our power in an effort to slow America’s decline in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world would mean avoiding debilitating land entanglements and focusing instead on being more of an offshore balancer. . . . While this may be in America’s interest, the very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies. . . . [L]essening our engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity. The disruptions we witness today are but a taste of what is to come should our country ºinch from its international responsibilities.” 2 The consequences of these views are clear: retrenchment should be avoided and forward defenses maintained into the indefinite future.3 Other observers advocate retrenchment policies, but they are pessimistic about their prospects.4 Christopher Layne, for instance, predicts, “Even as the globe is being turned upside down by material factors, the foreign policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nations’ identity and place in world politics. More than most, America’s foreign policy is the product of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to justify the United States’ hegemonic role.”5 Stephen Walt likewise advocates greater restraint in U.S. grand strategy, but cautions, “The United States . . . remains a remarkably immature great power, one whose rhetoric is frequently at odds with its conduct and one that tends to treat the management of foreign affairs largely as an adjunct to domestic politics. . . . [S]eemingly secure behind its nuclear deterrent and oceanic moats, and possessing unmatched economic and military power, the United States allowed its foreign policy to be distorted by partisan sniping, hijacked by foreign lobbyists and narrow domestic special interests, blinded by lofty but unrealistic rhetoric, and held hostage by irresponsible and xenophobic members of Congress.”6 Although retrenchment is a preferable policy, these arguments suggest that great powers often cling to unprofitable foreign commitments for parochial reasons of national culture or domestic politics.7 These arguments have grim implications for contemporary international politics. With the rise of new powers, such as China, the international pecking order will be in increasing ºux in the coming decades.8 Yet, if the pessimists about their prospects.4 Christopher Layne, for instance, predicts, “Even as the globe is being turned upside down by material factors, the foreign policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nations’ identity and place in world politics. More than most, America’s foreign policy is the product of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to justify the United States’ hegemonic role.”5 Stephen Walt likewise advocates greater restraint in U.S. grand strategy, but cautions, “The United States . . . remains a remarkably immature great power, one whose rhetoric is frequently at odds with its conduct and one that tends to treat the management of foreign affairs largely as an adjunct to domestic politics. . . . Perceptions of weakness and declining U.S. credibility will encourage policymakers to hold on to burdensome overseas commitments, despite their high costs in blood and treasure.9 Policymakers in Washington will struggle to retire from profitless military engagements and restrain ballooning current accounts and budget deªcits.10 For some observers, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the ill-advised last gasps of a declining hegemon seeking to bolster its plummeting position.11 In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, **peaceful retrenchment is the most common response**, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are **less likely** to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment **neither requires aggression nor invites predation**. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through **compromise, rather than conflict**. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

2NC Heg no Solve

**Heg solves nothing – the past two decades prove**

**Mearsheimer 11** (John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The National Interest, Imperial by Design, lexis)

One year later, Charles Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment" that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as by far the most powerful country on the planet.2 He urged American leaders not to be reticent about using that power "to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them." Krauthammer's advice fit neatly with Fukuyama's vision of the future: the United States should take the lead in bringing democracy to less developed countries the world over. After all, that shouldn't be an especially difficult task given that America had awesome power and the cunning of history on its side. U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama's and Krauthammer's early analyses. The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison's observation that "no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Washington's pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified. To make matters worse, the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced. Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the "surge" has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran's uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. Finally, every post-Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that "looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think the United States will continue to be the world's leading power." Clearly, the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism.

1NC Warming Advantage

1. Their Braconnier 11 card concedes that CO2 is worse than contrails – even though contrails cause more warming per square meter, CO2 has a longer life and can cause warming for hundreds of years.
2. Their Waitz et al 04 card says aviation could be responsible for anywhere from 3% to 15% of warming and that the impact of aviation is very unclear – with this level of uncertainty give a low probability to this internal link. Also, the plan only affects U.S. aviation – can’t solve for other countries.
3. **Jet contrails reduce the temperature of the Earth several degrees by blocking sunlight – key to check back runaway warming as a result of CO2 emissions.**

Flannery 05, Tim Flannery, 2005, *The Weather Makers*, originally published by Text Publishing Company, Melbourne, Australia, published in the US by Grove Press, an imprint of Grove/Atlantic, pg. 161-162, Google Books (ED)

As I read these results, an anomaly that had long niggled at me resurfaced. At the end of the last ice age, CO2 levels increased by 100 parts per million, and Earth’s average surface temperature rose by 9°F. This suggests that CO2 is a powerful influence on global temperature. Yet in most computer analyses, an increase in CO2 almost three times as large (doubling preindustrial levels) is predicted to result in a temperature rise of only 5.4°F. This anomaly has serious implications for the survival of our civilization and of countless species. Scientists now working on aerosols think that they might have the answer. Direct measurement of the strength of sunlight at ground level and worldwide records of evaporation rates (which are influenced primarily by sunlight) indicate that the amount of sunlight reaching the earth’s surface has declined significantly (up to 22 percent in some areas) over the last three decades. It is as if we had been stopping up that small “window” in the atmosphere through which visible light passes. This phenomenon is global dimming, and there are two ways that it operates: Aerosols such as soot increase the reflectivity of clouds, and the contrails left by jet aircraft create a persistent cloud cover. Soot particles change the reflective properties of clouds by fostering the formation of many tiny water droplets rather than fewer, larger ones; and these tiny water droplets allow clouds to reflect far more sunlight back into space than do larger drops. The story with contrails is different. In 2001, in the three days following September 11, the entire U.S. jet fleet was grounded, over which time climatologists noted an unprecedented increase in daytime temperatures relative to nighttime temperatures. This resulted, they presume, from the additional sunlight reaching the ground in the absence of contrails. If 100 parts per million of CO2 really can raise surface temperature by 9°F, and if aerosols and contrails have counterbalanced this so that we have experienced only 0.63°C (1.13°F) of warming, then their influence on climate must be enormously powerful. It is as if two great forces—both released from the world’s smokestacks—are tugging the climate in opposite directions, only CO2 is slightly more powerful.

1. **Improving air traffic control is a one-off saving – not a sustainable strategy.**

Lee et al 09, David S. Lee, Dalton Research Institute at Manchester Metropolitan University, David W. Fahey, NOAA Earth Systems Research Laboratory, Piers M. Forster, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, Peter J. Newton, Department for Business, Enterprise, and Regulatory Reform, Aviation Directorate, Ron C.N. Wit, Natuur en Milieu, Ling L. Lim, Dalton Research Institute, Bethan Owen, Dalton Research Institute, and Robert Sausen, Deutsches Zentrum für Luft, *Atmospheric Environment* 2009, “Aviation and global climate change in the 21st century,” pg. 13, Elsevier, http://www.tiaca.org/images/tiaca/PDF/IndustryAffairs/2009%20IPCC%20authors%20update.pdf (ED)

Air traffic management and different operational practices hold some prospect for reductions in fuel usage or mitigation of environmental effects of aviation. The most obvious reductions in fuel usage might come about from an improved air traffic management system that would better optimize cruise altitudes through reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) and reduced delays and holding patterns on arrival. A EUROCONTROL study (Jelinek et al., 2002) showed that the introduction of RVSM over Europe might result in a reduction in fuel burn and CO2 emissions of 1.6–2.3% over the prior conditions. However, it should be stressed that optimizing the air traffic management system is a one-off saving and not one that could be incrementally further improved upon.

1. **Aviation is a small part of overall warming and models of future aviation emissions already take into account likely improvements in efficiency like the plan – the growth rate of aviation is the most important variable.**

Lee et al 09, David S. Lee, Dalton Research Institute at Manchester Metropolitan University, David W. Fahey, NOAA Earth Systems Research Laboratory, Piers M. Forster, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, Peter J. Newton, Department for Business, Enterprise, and Regulatory Reform, Aviation Directorate, Ron C.N. Wit, Natuur en Milieu, Ling L. Lim, Dalton Research Institute, Bethan Owen, Dalton Research Institute, and Robert Sausen, Deutsches Zentrum für Luft, *Atmospheric Environment* 2009, “Aviation and global climate change in the 21st century,” pg. 15, Elsevier, http://www.tiaca.org/images/tiaca/PDF/IndustryAffairs/2009%20IPCC%20authors%20update.pdf (ED)

Aviation currently contributes a small but significant radiative forcing of climate change, estimated to be between 3.5% (1.3–10%, 90% likelihood range) and 4.9% (2.0–14%, 90% likelihood range) of total anthropogenic RF, depending on whether the AIC RF is excluded or included, respectively. The aviation contribution (excluding AIC) is projected to grow by a factor of approximately 3–4 by 2050, becoming an increasing proportion of total anthropogenic RF (4–4.7%) (Table 4). As has been shown, the overall transport efficiency of aviation is improving but these factors are already built into the emission scenarios analysed here. Thus, the future total aviation RF likely will depend most strongly on the growth rate of aviation and less on the rate of technological and fleet improvement as currently envisaged on the basis of evolutionary technology development.

1NC Solvency

1. **NextGen’s governance is fundamentally flawed and inefficient– adding more money is just feeding the beast.**

Poole 12, Robert Poole, Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow and Director of Transportation Policy at the Reason Foundation, advisor to Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush, 4-19-2012, “Air Traffic Control Reform News #92,” http://reason.org/news/show/1012825.html (ED)

An even larger failing is that the report seems to consider the main problem with NextGen to be lack of funding. The author's PowerPoint from the April 4th event rightly notes GAO and Inspector General reports citing a long and continuing history of FAA cost overruns and program delays. A growing number of aviation stakeholders express concern that simply providing more funding, without more-fundamental reforms, would amount to "feeding the beast." They have concluded that the underlying problem is that the governance of the ATC system is poorly matched to the task. The FAA's Air Traffic Organization ought to be focused directly on meeting the needs of its aviation customers. Instead, its real customer is Congress, which provides its funding and to which it must be responsive.

1. **Airlines will delay equipping their planes to interact with NextGen – guts solvency.**

Poole 08, Robert Poole, Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow and Director of Transportation Policy at the

Reason Foundation, advisor to Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush, 9-1-2008, Reason Foundation, “Air Traffic Control Reform Newsletter #54,” http://reason.org/news/show/air-traffic-control-reform-new-54 (ED)

The most daunting challenge in transforming air traffic control to the NextGen vision is a massive coordination problem. It's not just a case of $20 billion or so investment by the ATO in new equipment, facilities, software, and training. None of that is any good unless airspace users-airlines, business jets, and some portion of general aviation-equip their planes with the necessary avionics to interact with the ATO's new systems and procedures. But getting either cash-strapped airlines or individual aircraft owners to pony up tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars per plane is a major challenge-especially when it is highly uncertain how soon the ATO will actually implement various NextGen capabilities. If the government sets an equipage deadline (as FAA recently proposed for ADS-B/Out), aviation interest groups push for it to be as far as possible in the future (due to those uncertainties), and the typical pattern is for most of them to wait until near the deadline before they take each plane out of service and spend the money on the new gear. That's a huge problem, because in most cases there will be few if any benefits from a new ATC technology until a critical mass of equipped aircraft are in operation. The problem, then, is how to get that critical mass-sometimes called the "first third" of the users-to make the decision to equip early. As Boeing ATM expert Mike Lewis put it in a paper dealing with this problem, "the critical first 1/3 of users don't equip because they shoulder high risks and early costs, and see no benefits until the last 2/3 begin to follow suit. . . . Financially weak airlines clearly find it in their best interests to delay equipage. Since nearly all airlines are financially weak, all choose to wait, and system innovations are continuously deferred."

1. **The FAA is incapable of effective safety regulation.**

Poole 08, Robert Poole, Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow and Director of Transportation Policy at the

Reason Foundation, advisor to Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush, 9-1-2008, Reason Foundation, “Air Traffic Control Reform Newsletter #54,” http://reason.org/news/show/air-traffic-control-reform-new-54

When it comes to its air safety regulatory functions, the FAA really seems to be taking it on the chin this year. First there were the problems last spring with certain inspectors allowing Southwest and American planes to fly, despite being overdue for safety checks. The contretemps over that led the DOT to appoint an Independent Review Team to take an outside look at how the FAA goes about regulating aviation safety. Just a week after the IRT released its report, earlier this month, came news of FAA certification engineers complaining that senior management ignored their concerns that the Eclipse 500 very light jet had been rushed through certification before it was ready. At a hearing before the House Aviation Subcommittee last week, DOT Inspector General Calvin Scovel and FAA inspectors provided details on problems with the Eclipse jet during the certification process and described pressure from higher-ups to get it certified on schedule. In both cases the common concern was over "coziness" between FAA safety regulators and those being regulated. As Aviation Week put it, in a Sept. 22 story, "[In the April incidents], the FAA had been referring to airlines as 'customers,' and Congress warned that passengers should be the agency's only customers, not airlines, not manufacturers. The intimation was that the agency's safety vigilance degraded the closer its collaboration with industry partners." The IRT noted that some of its observations "tend to confirm our fears that sharply conflicting regulatory ideologies not only exist but are allowed to persist within the FAA with little or no attempt to resolve or manage them." Moreover, they noted that such disparities "persist even now, long after the events of this spring provided the agency a rather serious opportunity to reflect on its met hods, style, and regulatory decision-making processes." I think this problem is real-but none of the media coverage of these problems, either last spring regarding airline inspections or now concerning the Eclipse certification, has identified the underlying cause. It stems from the dual mission of the FAA, as both the air safety regulator and the ATC system operator. Although these functions are nominally separate, thanks to the creation of the ATO to pull together all the ATC functions, the agency still sees itself as one corporate entity, all reporting to one chief executive, the Administrator. In recent years, in a well-intended effort to become more businesslike, the FAA has come to think of the aviation stakeholders as its customers. While that is entirely appropriate for the ATO (it provides a vital service to aircraft operators, which in nearly every other country those operators pay for directly), it is dead wrong for a safety regulator. As Dorothy Robyn wrote in the Brookings paper I highlighted last issue, "Airlines and aerospace firms are the regulatees, not the customers of FAA regulators" (emphasis in original). Robyn went on to explain: "The goal of 'acting more like a business' is appropriate to the FAA's role as a service provider. In fact, that goal was the motivation behind the creation of the ATO. However, it is not an appropriate goal for the regulatory side of the FAA: although the regulators' performance may well need improvement, they are carrying out an inherently governmental function. . . . There seems to be some genuine confusion among rank-and-file employees about the FAA's mission-predictably so, given the agency's dual and potentially conflicting responsibilities." I'll close with these additional thoughts from Robyn's excellent paper. "This kind of confusion as to organizational mission is inevitable when the FAA performs two such different and 'inconsistent' functions, and separation of the two functions would add clarity to the missions of both agencies." And that, of course, is what her paper goes on to recommend.

1. **Lack of control over NextGen guarantees delays and cost overruns.**

Hoover 10, J. Nicholas Hoover, staff writer, 12-3-2010, Information Week, “FAA NextGen Air Traffic Control Costs Could Quadruple,” http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/enterprise-apps/228500257 (ED)

However, with its goals being so ambitious and taking place over such a long time frame, the GAO and Congress have repeatedly raised concerns about maintaining rigorous controls over NextGen in order to keep it on schedule and budget. In April, witnesses told a House of Representatives subcommittee that the FAA's handling of the project called into question its ability to manage it and raised concerns that NextGen would fail to be completed on schedule. Then, in June, the FAA's inspector general reported that the agency needed to do more planning to assure the project's success and had failed to develop the necessary skill sets to make NextGen work. A third negative report came in July when the GAO found the FAA didn't have adequate performance metrics in place for the project. Earlier reports have also noted that significant research gaps remain unresolved that could threaten FAA's proposed schedule, including ways to synchronize numerous weather applications.

2NC Solvency Ext – Bad Management

**NextGen’s implementation structure is ineffective – industry groups can convince Congress to override the FAA, delaying implementation.**

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In my discussions with well-connected people on this issue, I've been told repeatedly that the industry's role in the JPDO has been largely ineffective. Stakeholders do take part in JPDO task forces, but they are not part of the decision-making process. The FAA's Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP) is supposed to be a vehicle for real input on NextGen implementation; its OEP Review Board is chaired by the aforementioned Vickie Cox and JPDO Director Charles Leader. Organized stakeholder input is supposed to be coordinated by RTCA, Inc., functioning as a Federal Advisory Committee composed of nearly all the usual aviation alphabet groups. But there are two big problems with this structure: (1) it must operate by consensus, and (2) its inputs are only advisory. Trying to get consensus among aviation groups including AOPA and ATA is difficult if not impossible. In part, that is because each group knows that it can prevent consensus, and if somehow the FAA ends up taking an action it doesn't like (e.g., mandating ADS-B equipage by 2015 instead of 2020), it can always run to Congress to intervene.

2NC Solvency Ext – Equipage

**Equipping new fleets is too expensive – airlines will delay as long as possible.**

Gibbons 11, Glen Gibbons, Inside GNSS, 4-30-2011, “Air Traffic Control Modernization: FAA, NextGen, GNSS, and Avionics Equipage,” http://www.insidegnss.com/node/2582/ (ED)

Considering the associated costs, the quandary for the aviation community is making the business case for early installation of NextGen avionics, given the uncertainties — such as those raised by the GAO — as to whether the FAA can actually get the NextGen system in place in time for airlines to save money on operations in time to pay for the equipment. Adding to the uncertainty and risk is the fact that an individual airline equipping its fleet — even with FAA’s NextGen infrastructure, ATC procedures, and trained controllers in place — doesn’t guarantee significant cost savings. The NextGen concept won’t work without a substantial portion — at least 50 to 60 percent — of the nation’s aircraft being suitably equipped so that air traffic can be tracked with the new system. For instance, a 2002 study by the MITRE Corporation Center for Advanced Aviation System Development projected detailed delay savings by individual airline for controller-pilot data link communications. Using American Airlines as an example, the MITRE study showed an $8.7 million yearly savings for the airline at its hubs if only American was equipped versus $80 million if all airlines were equipped. Consequently, the temptation will be for strong for aircraft operators to delay purchase and installation of equipment until much closer to the current deadline. This is called the “NextGen Equipage Paradox” by principals with the NextGen Equipage Fund LLC, a recently formed capital fund led by ITT Corporation, NEXA Capital Partners LLC, and leading aerospace companies that believe it has an answer to getting NextGen on board America’s air fleet. The paradox exists, they argue, “because as matters stand today, those operators who are last to equip with NextGen avionics gain the greatest financial benefit, while those operators first to adopt the new technologies will pay a much higher price at a far greater risk.”