# **NextGen Case Neg**

### Strategy Sheet ☺

Two versions of this affirmative have been put out. One has a warming advantage, while the other has a terrorism advantage. Both have an economy advantage, and the one with warming also has a competitiveness/hegemony claim.

The plan’s advantages mostly stem off of ADS-B, which is a GPS satellite communications system, so the aff is not topical. :)

I don’t think anybody is running the version with warming, so I will be brief here. The Air Traffic Times CP is made specifically as an advantage counterplan against the warming advantage. You concede that contrails are more important and then show a solvency deficit of the affirmative there. Since the actor is rather arbitrary, the counterplan spikes out of politics, and it doesn’t spend any money. It also doesn’t link to the aerospace lobby DA because the industry would still lobby for NextGen and no more money would be put in. If you want to mitigate the economy advantage, which is better, you may want to read a privatization counterplan as well. Wait, that wasn’t really brief.

The privatization counterplan is a legitimate option for both affirmatives. It probably solves for the whole aff and you could be able to win a solvency deficit. However, it probably links to the Lobbying DA if you’re going to run it. The poor management and inefficiency arguments on solvency probably function as solvency deficits to the plan.

The Lobbying DA is pretty simple. The plan puts more money into the aerospace industry, which uses a portion of it to lobby for what it wants. The passage of the plan also diverts the industry’s attention back to space weaponization. This will allow them to successfully pass a space weaponization bill.

The Security K is a good option on the terrorism advantage, especially seeing as, for some reason, the 1AC says: “Terrorism still a threat ,” “NextGen is key to securitize against aviation threats,” and “NextGen secures America from terrorism.” They are really asking for it. There’s a lot of evidence out there that is specific to securitizing and terrorism, but going for a general security K is better than Terror Talk because you link to all of the advantages.

If they don’t read the warming advantage, you can still read the internal link turn on warming, but it would be a little weird.

Capitalism is legitimate but I didn’t focus on it.

So options are: Privatization CP+Politics/Spending, Security K, Lobbying DA+Case, Cap K, T

Read any combination of these that you want.

# Topicality

### T-Not Communications 1NC

#### “Communications” is a distinct category of infrastructure --- it’s massive

Faulkenberry 11 [Ken, MBA – University of Southern California, “Infrastructure Investment: Energy, Transportation, Communications, & Utilities”, Arbor Asset Allocation Model Portfolio Blog, September, http://blog.arborinvestmentplanner.com/2011/09/infrastructure-investment-energy-transportation-communications-utilities/]

Transportation Infrastructure Over the last several decades America’s infrastructure spending has been less than one-half other developed nations and only a quarter of emerging market countries. Civil engineers give our transport structures low marks. Our roads, railways, ports, and airports are all judged mediocre. It has become well recognized that we must invest more in upgrading our transportation infrastructure. But because of the years of neglect, substantial increases in operation and maintenance budgets will also be required. The above engineering and construction firms could also benefit from transportation infrastructure spending. Communications Infrastructure Communications infrastructure would include items we take for granted everyday, such as the internet, telephone, television (including cable TV), and satellite technology. Individual companies such as Cisco (CSCO) (internet) AT&T (T) and Verizon (VZ) (telephone), Comcast (CMCSA) (television), Boeing (BA) and Loral Space & Communications (LORL) (satellites), all play major roles in developing the communications infrastructure.

#### **NextGen includes ADS-B, which is communications**

FAA 7 [2/14/2007, “Fact Sheet – NextGen” <http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsid=8145>]

Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) is, quite simply, the future of air traffic control. As the backbone of the NextGen system, it uses GPS satellite signals to provide air traffic controllers and pilots with much more accurate information that will help keep aircraft safely separated in the sky and on runways. Aircraft transponders receive GPS signals and use them to determine the aircraft’s precise position in the sky, which is combined with other data and broadcast out to other aircraft and air traffic control facilities. When properly equipped with ADS-B, both pilots and controllers will, for the first time, see the same real-time displays of air traffic, substantially improving safety. The FAA will issue a rulemaking that will mandate the avionics necessary for implementing ADS-B across the national airspace system, and will work closely with stakeholders to determine the timeline.

#### Vote negative for limits and ground – other forms of infrastructure like communications self-evidently explode the topic and require a different and unrelated set of negative arguments – rejecting the plan is necessary to preserve a manageable negative research burden and preserve competitive equity.

### 2NC NextGen is Communications

#### **NextGen is communication infrastructure**

Dillingham 11 [Gerald, Ph.D. and Director of GAO’s Physical Infrastructure Issues and Civil Aviation Issues Teams, 10/5/2011, “Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives” <http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585588.pdf>] LZ

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on the current progress toward implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). NextGen will impact nearly every aspect of air transportation and will transform the way in which the air transportation ¶ system operates today. It will do so, in part, by ¶ • using satellite-based surveillance as opposed to ground-based radars, ¶ • using performance-based navigation instead of cumbersome step-by-step procedures, ¶ • replacing routine voice communications with data transmissions, and ¶ • organizing and merging the disjointed data that pilots, controllers, airports, airlines, and others currently rely on to operate the system.

# **Warming Advantage**

### **Warming Frontline (1/2)**

#### **1. NextGen increases the amount of high—altitude traffic**

Harper 12 [Derek, staff writer for Press of Atlantic City, 3/9/2012, “Federal Aviation Administration says industry's expected growth shows value of NextGen project” <http://www.acbiz.org/News%20and%20Events/pdf/press-of-ac-Federal_Aviation_Administration_says_industry_s_expected_growth_shows_value_of_NextGen_project.pdf>] LZ

The federal NextGen project is expected to replace the current land-based air control system with a satellite-based one. The $11 billion project is expected to help reduce noise and fuel costs, while allowing airports to handle more¶ planes and therefore more passengers.¶ Ronald Esposito, executive director for Egg Harbor Township’s Next Generation Aviation Research & Technology¶ Park, said the air industry’s growth showed the need for the center.¶ “It supports the need for NextGen,” he said.¶ The park has languished since it was first announced in October 2005 with the promise of 2,000 high-paying jobs adjacent to the Hughes center. No buildings have been built, and a watchdog report in The Press of Atlantic City last month showed contractors were still owed hundreds of thousands of dollars.¶ The FAA expects the domestic air travel market to shrink by less than one percent in 2012, but to grow between 2 percent and 3 percent a year over the following 20 years, the forecast said. In all, it expects the 731 million¶ passengers in 2011 to grow to 1.2 billion passengers by 2032.¶ The report said that it anticipated the industry transforming from the boom-bust cycle of recent years into one of¶ sustainable profits. Over the past 10 years, the industry went from a 6 percent drop in 2001 to an almost 12 percent¶ increase just three years later.¶ “The FAA sees a competitive and profitable industry continuing to grow over the long term despite the fact that we¶ are operating in a climate of economic uncertainty and rising oil prices,” Huerta wrote.¶ Federal statistics show that between cargo and passengers, air travel has grown more than 15 percent over the last 10¶ years to 809 million revenue passenger miles. It shrank about 1 percent the following the Sept. 11 attacks, but grew to as much as 842 million revenue passenger miles in 2007.¶ That metric, commonly used in the airline industry, calculates the paying passengers times the distance they traveled.¶ The growth will likely put a strain on the nation’s air traffic control system.¶ Airport tower operations are expected to increase by 23 percent, while the number of planes handled by the FAA’s en-route centers, which separate high-altitude traffic, is expected to jump by 50 percent.¶ The FAA expects that smaller regional jets will retire, replaced by larger planes with greater capacity.¶ The growth will focus in the nation’s already-busiest airports, the report says, with growth of the larger airports¶ outpacing that of the smaller ones.

#### **2. Higher altitude cirrus clouds have greater warming effect**

SDSC NO DATE [San Diego Supercomputer Center, Teacher Tech, “Why is the Air Cooler at Higher Temperatures?” <http://education.sdsc.edu/teachertech/downloads/climate_answ.pdf>] LZ

1. Clouds located low in the atmosphere tend to reflect sunlight and cause cooling at the surface of the Earth. For example, thick clouds obscure the Sun and make for a gray and chilly day. 2. The same clouds also trap heat energy radiated from the Earth’s surface and warm the air near the surface. For example, it’s usually warmer at night on a day with cloud cover rather

than a clear sky. 3. When multiple processes like those in items 1 and 2 occur, the net effect is the sum of each of the changes. There seems to be a tendency for scientists to think that low level clouds will help to cool the surface overall. 4. Thin wispy cirrus clouds located high in the atmosphere act to warm the surface. They’re too thin to reflect much sunlight, but they’re effective at absorbing outgoing thermal energy radiated from the Earth’s surface. Contrails from aircraft may have the same effect. The

altitude and thickness of clouds determine the degree to which they reflect sunlight or trap radiation from the Earth’s surface.

Warming Frontline (2/2)

#### 3. Warming not real - 30,000 scientists signed a petition saying warming is nonexistent**—**their data is skewed

Bell 12 (Larry Bell, Prof at Univ of Houston, Sasakawa International Center for Space Architecture, 7/17/2012, "That Scientific Global Warming Consensus...Not!," Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2012/07/17/that-scientific-global-warming-consensus-not/2/)

Since 1998, more than 31,000 American scientists from diverse climate-related disciplines, including more than 9,000 with Ph.D.s, have signed a public petition announcing their belief that “…there is no convincing scientific evidence that human release of carbon dioxide, methane, or other greenhouse gases is causing or will, in the foreseeable future, cause catastrophic heating of the Earth’s atmosphere and disruption of the Earth’s climate.” Included are atmospheric physicists, botanists, geologists, oceanographers, and meteorologists. So where did that famous “consensus” claim that “98% of all scientists believe in global warming” come from? It originated from an endlessly reported 2009 American Geophysical Union (AGU) survey consisting of an intentionally brief two-minute, two question online survey sent to 10,257 earth scientists by two researchers at the University of Illinois. Of the about 3.000 who responded, 82% answered “yes” to the second question, which like the first, most people I know would also have agreed with. Then of those, only a small subset, just 77 who had been successful in getting more than half of their papers recently accepted by peer-reviewed climate science journals, were considered in their survey statistic. That “98% all scientists” referred to a laughably puny number of 75 of those 77 who answered “yes”. That anything-but-scientific survey asked two questions. The first: “When compared with pre-1800s levels, do you think that mean global temperatures have generally risen, fallen, or remained relatively constant?” Few would be expected to dispute this…the planet began thawing out of the “Little Ice Age” in the middle 19th century, predating the Industrial Revolution. (That was the coldest period since the last real Ice Age ended roughly 10,000 years ago.) The second question asked: “Do you think human activity is a significant contributing factor in changing mean global temperatures?” So what constitutes “significant”? Does “changing” include both cooling and warming… and for both “better” and “worse”? And which contributions…does this include land use changes, such as agriculture and deforestation?

#### 4. CO2 doesn’t cause warming**—variability**

Solomon 11 (Lawrence Solomon, executive director of Energy Probe and Urban Renaissance Institute, 9/17/2011, "Warmed right over; The global-warming theory is nearing its end as evidence against it mounts," The National Post)

The correlation between carbon dioxide and global warming? In the last century, there has been none. While carbon-dioxide emissions have steadily increased, the temperature has gone up and down like a yo-yo. The down period in the 1970s was so severe that many scientists at the time thought we were heading for a period of global cooling, as many do again, now that the planet has again stopped warming.

#### **5. Warming solves itself**

Williams 9 — Andrew Williams, writer for clean technical a website dedicated to environmental news, JANUARY 4, 2009, Clean technical, Green Algae Bloom Process Could Stop Global Warming, http://cleantechnica.com/2009/01/04/green-algae-bloom-process-could-stop-global-warming/

The researchers, aboard the Royal Navy’s HMS Endurance, have found that melting icebergs off the coast of Antarctica are releasing millions of tiny particles of iron into the southern Ocean, helping to create huge ‘blooms’ of algae that absorb carbon emissions. The algae then sinks to the icy depths, effectively removing CO2 from the atmosphere for hundreds of years. According to lead researcher, Prof. Rob Raiswell of Leeds University, “The Earth itself seems to want to save us.” Scientists have known for some time that artificially created algal blooms could be used to absorb greenhouse gases, but the technique has been banned for fear of causing unforeseen side effects in fragile ecosystems. However, based on the UK team’s evidence that the process has been occurring naturally for millions of years, and on a wide scale, the UN has given the green light for a ground-breaking experiment later this month. The team will seek to create a massive algae bloom by releasing several tons of iron sulphate into the sea off the coast of the British island of South Georgia. The patch will apparently be large enough to be visible from space. If successful, the technique could be rolled out across vast swathes of the Great Southern Ocean. Scientists calculate that if the whole 20 million square miles was treated, it could remove up to three and a half Gigatons of C02, equivalent to one eighth of all global annual emissions from fossil fuels. It would be a huge irony if melting icebergs, until now a powerful symbol of the damage caused by global warming, reveal a process that may enable scientists to take steps that might drastically reduce, and potentially even halt, the threat of environmental catastrophe.

### Ext. #1-2 Contrails Turn

#### They try to argue that NextGen increases efficiency and thus reduces contrails, but that efficiency is not the source of the problem**—it’s the height of the plane. Flights at higher altitudes generate contrails that have a larger warming effect because they are thinner. That means they reflection of sunlight is reduced but the heat trapping is the same. NextGen increases high-altitude flights and therefore increases warming.**

### Ext. #3 No Warming

#### Expert consensus is that warming is not real. We have 31,000 scientists backing up this claim. This outweighs any theoretical evidence that they have, and their consensus data is based off of a skewed survey. That’s Bell 12.

#### Warming doesn’t exist**—**history, satellites, and IPCC’s falsified data prove

Arrak 11 (Arno Arrak, author of the book “What Warming?” and was a nuclear chemist on NASA's Apollo program, 12/1/11, “Arctic Warming Is Not Greenhouse Warming” Energy & Environment, Vol. 22, No. 8, Ebsco)

Present Arctic warming started at the turn of the twentieth century. Its probable cause is a change in the North Atlantic current system that directed warm water from the Gulf Stream into the Arctic Ocean. Prior to that there had been only slow cooling for two thousand years according to Kaufman et al. A foraminiferal core taken near Svalbard by Spielhagen et al. also shows the same long term cooling. Rapid warming of Greenland glaciers, polar bears in trouble, permafrost melting, the Northwest Passage becoming navigable etc. have been used as proofs that greenhouse warming is real. Since it is now clear that Arctic warming is not greenhouse warming these observations cannot be used as proof of greenhouse warming. It is therefore incumbent upon us to look at what other proofs remain of the existence of greenhouse warming. Most axiomatic is the claim that we are now living through a greenhouse warming period that started with a global temperature rise in the late seventies. After all, Hansen said so in his testimony to the Senate. But satellites which have been measuring global temperature for the last 31 years cannot even see this so-called late twentieth century warming. What global warming they do see is a short spurt that began with the super El Nino of 1998, raised temperature by a third of a degree in four years, and then stopped. Its origin was oceanic. And this satellite record is in accord with the observations of Ferenc Miskolczi on IR absorption by the atmosphere. A third of a degree may not sound like much but it is half of what is allotted to the entire twentieth century. It, and not the greenhouse effect, was responsible for the very warm first decade of our century. But there are ground-based temperature curves that do show warming in the eighties and nineties. These are simply cooked, as in falsified. It was done by systematically raising up the cool La Nina temperatures and leaving the warm El Nino peaks in place. This fake warming was then used to justify the establishment of the IPCC in 1988. According to satellites there has been no warming in the twentyfirst century either but thanks to the IPCC we still get major governmental efforts to “mitigate” a non-existent warming. The global warming extremists today are not just in charge of government policy but have also infiltrated and taken over control of our scientific organizations. Those who should be our scientific leaders, such as the Royal Society and the National Academies of Science, have all knuckled under to extremist propaganda and now support the global warming movement. As a scientist I repudiate such a mass dereliction of their mission to advance science. Last time the scientific elite espoused such wrong ideas was in the eighteenth century when phlogiston was king. They renamed it caloric to make it more palatable but it still would not fly and both imaginary concepts ended up in the dust bin of history. That is where the global warming doctrine belongs.

#### NASA collected satellite data that proves that feedback theory is wrong and warming is not a problem - heat can escape the atmosphere

Taylor 11 (James M. Taylor, senior fellow for environment policy at The Heartland Institute and managing editor of Environment & Climate News, 5/27/11, “New NASA Data Blow Gaping Hole In Global Warming Alarmism” http://news.yahoo.com/nasa-data-blow-gaping-hold-global-warming-alarmism-192334971.html)

NASA satellite data from the years 2000 through 2011 show the Earth's atmosphere is allowing far more heat to be released into space than alarmist computer models have predicted, reports a new study in the peer-reviewed science journal Remote Sensing. The study indicates far less future global warming will occur than United Nations computer models have predicted, and supports prior studies indicating increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide trap far less heat than alarmists have claimed. Study co-author Dr. Roy Spencer, a principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville and U.S. Science Team Leader for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer flying on NASA's Aqua satellite, reports that real-world data from NASA's Terra satellite contradict multiple assumptions fed into alarmist computer models. "The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show," Spencer said in a July 26 University of Alabama press release. "There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts that is especially big over the oceans." In addition to finding that far less heat is being trapped than alarmist computer models have predicted, the NASA satellite data show the atmosphere begins shedding heat into space long before United Nations computer models predicted. The new findings are extremely important and should dramatically alter the global warming debate. Scientists on all sides of the global warming debate are in general agreement about how much heat is being directly trapped by human emissions of carbon dioxide (the answer is "not much"). However, the single most important issue in the global warming debate is whether carbon dioxide emissions will indirectly trap far more heat by causing large increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds. Alarmist computer models assume human carbon dioxide emissions indirectly cause substantial increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds (each of which are very effective at trapping heat), but real-world data have long shown that carbon dioxide emissions are not causing as much atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds as the alarmist computer models have predicted. The new NASA Terra satellite data are consistent with long-term NOAA and NASA data indicating atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds are not increasing in the manner predicted by alarmist computer models. The Terra satellite data also support data collected by NASA's ERBS satellite showing far more longwave radiation (and thus, heat) escaped into space between 1985 and 1999 than alarmist computer models had predicted. Together, the NASA ERBS and Terra satellite data show that for 25 years and counting, carbon dioxide emissions have directly and indirectly trapped far less heat than alarmist computer models have predicted.

### Ext. #4 CO2≠Warming

#### CO2 empirically has not resulted in greater warming. For the past century anthropogenic emissions have been increasing dramatically, but temperatures have fluctuated like a yo-yo. Scientists even thought there was global cooling in the 1970s. That’s Solomon 11.

#### CO2 cannot affect radiation

Goldblatt & Watson 12 (Colin Goldblatt, School of Earth and Ocean Sciences at U of Victoria AND Andrew Watson, School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich, 1/8/2012, "The Runaway Greenhouse: implications for future climate change, geoengineering and planetary atmospheres," The Royal Society TEX Paper, http://arxiv.org/pdf/1201.1593v1.pdf)

Figure 5 illustrates how increasing the carbon dioxide inventory of the atmosphere aﬀects the change in outgoing longwave radiation with temperature, using a grey atmosphere model. Presently, Earth’s absorbed solar ﬂux is smaller than all of the radiation limits described above and the surface temperature adjusts so that outgoing longwave radiation matches the absorbed solar ﬂux. More carbon dioxide means that the surface must be warmer to provide the same outgoing ﬂux—this is the familiar greenhouse eﬀect. The runaway greenhouse only occurs when the outgoing longwave ﬂux reaches a radiation limit. The fundamental point is that adding carbon dioxide does not increase the outgoing longwave ﬂux, so cannot cause a runaway greenhouse. Whilst this result comes from simple models, a qualitatively similar result can be obtained from spectrally resolved radiative transfer codes (see ﬁgure 9 of Kasting, 1988): even 100 bar of CO2 does not give a radiation limit (Kasting & Ackerman, 1986; Kasting, 1988).

#### Their studies have zero causal warrant

Bell 12 (Larry Bell, Prof at Univ of Houston, Sasakawa International Center for Space Architecture, 7/17/2012, "That Scientific Global Warming Consensus...Not!," Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2012/07/17/that-scientific-global-warming-consensus-not/2/)

Consider the National Academy of Sciences for example. In 2007, Congress appropriated $5,856,000 for NAS to complete a climate change study. The organization subsequently sold its conclusions in three separate report sections at $44 per download. The first volume, upon which the other two sections were based titled Advancing the Science of Climate Change, presents a case that human activities are warming the planet, and that this “poses significant risks”. The second urges that a cap-and-trade taxing system be implemented to reduce so-called greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The third explores strategies for adapting to the “reality” of climate change, meaning purported “extreme weather events like heavy precipitation and heat waves.” What scientific understanding breakthrough did that big taxpayer-financed budget buy? Namely that the Earth’s temperature has risen over the past 100 years, and that human activities have resulted in a steady atmospheric CO2 increase. This is hardly new information, and few scientists are likely to challenge either of these assertions, which essentially prove no link between the two observations. All professional scientists recognize that correlation does not establish causation.

# **Econ/Competitiveness Advantage**

### **Econ/Competitiveness Frontline (1/2)**

#### **1. Airlines resilient**

Huerta 12 [3-7-12, “FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Years 2012-2032,” <http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aviation_forecasts/aerospace_forecasts/2012-2032/media/2012%20FAA%20Aerospace%20Forecast.pdf>] LZ

Since the beginning of the century, the commercial air carrier industry has suffered several major shocks that have led to reduced demand for air travel. These shocks include the terror attacks of September 11, skyrocketing prices for fuel, debt restructuring in Europe and the United States (U.S.), and a global recession. To manage this period of extreme volatility, air carriers have fine-tuned their business models with the aim of minimizing financial losses by lowering operating costs, eliminating unprofitable routes and grounding older, less fuel efficient aircraft. To increase operating revenues, carriers have initiated new services that customers are willing to purchase. Carriers have also started charging separately for services that were historically bundled in the price of a ticket. The capacity discipline exhibited by carriers and their focus on additional revenue streams bolstered the industry to profitability in 2011 for the second consecutive year. Going into the next decade, there is cautious optimism that the industry has been transformed from that of a boom-to-bust cycle to one of sustainable profits. As the economy recovers from the most serious economic downturn and slow recovery in recent history, aviation will continue to grow over the long run. The 2012 FAA forecast now calls for one billion passengers in 2024, three years later than projected last year. Growth over the next five years will be moderate, with a return to historic levels of growth only attainable in the long term. This delayed trajectory represents the downward adjustments of the overall economy, here in the U.S. and abroad, and the aviation sector’s responses. One of the many factors influencing the delayed recovery is the uncertainty that surrounds the U.S. and European economies. The latter, primarily those belonging to the Euro area, have been hit hard by the pressure from bond markets for fiscal austerity. Combined with the slow pace of these economies, debt restructuring pulled the European economy into recession in early 2012. This has not helped the pace of U.S. economic growth given the importance of its trade with Europe. Despite this and the ambiguity surrounding its own fiscal imbalances, the U.S. economy has managed to avoid a double dip recession and trudges along the path of slow recovery

#### 2. New study shows that the airline industry is improving in the status quo**—no risk of collapse**

Costello 12 [Caroline, active member of the Society of American Travel Writers and Travel Deals editor, 4/3/2012, “Surprising New Study Says Airlines Are Doing a Good Job” <http://www.smartertravel.com/blogs/today-in-travel/surprising-new-study-says-airlines-are-doing-good-job.html?id=10946921>] LZ

It may seem like the airline industry is collapsing into an anti-flyer, fee-happy machine of misery, but a new study says otherwise. The 2011 results from a well-known annual industry survey are in, and the findings reveal that U.S. airlines are shaping up in a big way. The study, called the Airline Quality Rating (AQR), was developed by researchers at Purdue and Wichita State universities and focuses on performance data for 15 major U.S. airlines. AQR analysts looked at published Department of Transportation (DOT) statistics for on-time arrivals, bumping (denying seats to passengers on overbooked flights), lost luggage, and customer complaints. Using a mathematical formula, the analysts ranked major domestic carriers based on level of total quality. AirTran—for the third year in a row—has come out on top, with Hawaiian and JetBlue following in second and third place, respectively. Here are the rankings in order based on the results of the AQR study: AirTran, Hawaiian, JetBlue, Frontier, Alaska, Delta, Southwest, US Airways, SkyWest, American, Continental (which now operates as United), United, Atlantic Southeast, Mesa, and American Eagle. AirTran, the carrier with the overall highest quality rating, had the lowest number of mishandled bags for the third year in a row. Hawaiian ranked number one in on-time performance. And JetBlue bumped fewer passengers than any other airline, coming in first in the denied-boarding category. But even the carriers lagging at the end of the list have bragging rights this year. On the whole, the airline industry—despite all the recent news of shrinking seats and panicking pilots—seems to be getting better. According to AQR, fewer bags were lost, more planes arrived on time, and fewer passengers issued complaints in 2011 when compared to 2010. Part of the reason the airlines saw fewer late flights probably had to do with a mostly mild winter at the end of 2011. Still, the numbers show that the industry may be making significant strides. Dean Headley, a coauthor of the study, told the AP,"[The airlines] realize that people are paying a lot more money, and the system is more complex than it was, and they have to do a better job. To their credit, I think they are doing a better job."

Econ/Competitiveness Frontline (2/2)

#### **3. NextGen doesn’t solve congestion even assuming the best conditions**

Smith et. al. 10 [Jeremy Smith, NASA Langley Research Center, Nelson Guerreiro, PhD student at University of Maryland, Masters in Science and Aerospace Engineering, ATK Space Systems, Jeffrey Viken, Langely Research Center, Samuel M. Dollyhigh, ATK Space Systems, and James W. Fenbert, ATK Space Systems, “Meeting Air Transportation Demand in 2025 by using Larger Aircraft and Alternative Routing to Complement NextGen Operational Improvements” <http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100033386_2010036546.pdf>] LZ

This reduction in delays for the most-delayed passengers has a cost. Total system-wide origin-to-destination travel time increases by 0.4% and some of the delayed passengers are inconvenienced to the extent that they abandon their first choice of route or transportation mode. Relying on the adaptive behavior of passengers is not a solution to the capacity problem. The increase in total travel time is undesirable, the avoidance of long delays by the most delayed passengers leads to a small overall increase in trip times. It is clearly preferable to have sufficient capacity to meet demand. If sufficient capacity cannot be achieved at a few airports, adaptive behavior of passengers will likely lead to a system that functions without very large system-wide average delays in ideal weather. ¶ The ACES simulation results from this study determined that: ¶ • NextGen Operational Improvements alone, using the estimated capacity-benefit values, do not provide sufficient airport capacity to meet the projected demand for passenger air transportation in 2025 without significant system delays. ¶ • Using larger aircraft with more seats on high-demand routes and introducing new direct routes, where demand warrants, significantly reduces delays, complementing NextGen improvements. This still does not reduce delays to acceptable levels on some routes. ¶ • Alternative air routes are available avoiding congested routes and, for some shorter trips, passengers will choose to drive, reducing delays on most routes to acceptable levels for the 2025 scenario. Mean delay per flight from simulation, is less than three minutes for this second-choice scenario; this is similar to the 2006 baseline scenario mean delay. The penalty is that the alternative routes and option to drive increases overall trip time by 0.4% and may be less convenient than the first-choice route, if that first choice had sufficient capacity. ¶ The results rely on transportation demand projections from TSAM for the year 2025 and estimates of the ¶ increased airport capacity that may be available, due to both NGIP 2018 and NextGen 2025 improvements. Results are for perfect weather, Visual Meteorological Conditions.

#### 4. Economic decline doesn’t cause war.

Jervis 11 [Robert, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics in the Department of Political Science, and a Member of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Force in Our Times Saltzman Working Paper No. 15 July 2011 http://www.siwps.com/news.attachment/saltzmanworkingpaper15-842/SaltzmanWorkingPaper15.PDF]

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy, and bring back old-fashioned beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were ore internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a pre-existing high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

### Ext. #1 Airlines Resilient

#### **There is no risk of industry collapse. The airline industry has fine-tuned its business models since the 9-11 attack in a way that increases revenue. This makes the industry insusceptible to shocks and has transformed it into a system a sustainable profits. That’s Huerta 12.**

#### **Airlines resilient**

Huerta 12 [3-7-12, “FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Years 2012-2032,” <http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aviation_forecasts/aerospace_forecasts/2012-2032/media/2012%20FAA%20Aerospace%20Forecast.pdf>] LZ

The aviation industry continued to show resilience last year despite tough economic times. The activity of U.S. carriers at home and abroad increased by 3.5 percent in 2011. Despite a slight pause in growth projected for 2012, we expect that over the long run, aviation will continue to experience steady, moderate growth. ¶ U.S. airlines have returned to profitability in the last two years and we expect that trend will continue in 2012 as well. ¶ This forecast looks at how many planes and how many people will fly on U.S. carriers in the future – from 2012 to 2032. We want to see a picture of air travel in the next 20 years, and we want to know what we at the FAA should strive to meet and accommodate. ¶ The FAA sees a competitive and profitable industry continuing to grow over the long term despite the fact that we are operating in a climate of economic uncertainty and rising oil prices. ¶ As the economy continues to recover, the total number of takeoffs and landings and the ¶ number of passengers who board U.S. airlines will continue to climb. This year, we expect that international markets for U.S. carriers will continue to grow faster than domestic markets, as they did last year. ¶ The forecast calls for a slight decrease –less than one percent—in domestic capacity in 2012, as measured by available seat miles. This is after a 2 percent increase in 2011. Despite this pause in growth, the FAA projects continued growth between 2 percent and 3 percent per year over the next 20 years.

### Ext. #4 No War

#### Economic collapse doesn’t risk war because nation’s do not see a profit in attacking other countries. In this last downturn nobody suggested that we nuke another country, and it won’t happen the next time either. That’s Jervis 11.

#### No causal relationship between economic decline and war.

Ferguson 6 [Niall, MA, D.Phil., is Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and William Ziegler Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at Jesus College, Oxford University, and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct, “The Next War of the World”]

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

#### Not enough resources to go to war

Duedney 91 [Daniel, Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society – Princeton University, “Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1991]

Poverty wars. In a second scenario, declining living standards first cause internal turmoil, then war. If groups at all levels of affluence protect their standard of living by pushing deprivation on other groups, class war and revolutionary upheavals could result. Faced with these pressures, liberal democracy and free market systems could increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems capable of maintaining minimum order.9 If authoritarian regimes are more war-prone because they lack democratic control, and if revolutionary regimes are war-prone because of their ideological fervor and isolation, then the world is likely to become more violent. The record of previous depressions supports the proposition that widespread economic stagnation and unmet economic expectations contribute to international conflict. Although initially compelling, this scenario has major flaws. One is that it is arguably based on unsound economic theory. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap natural resources as by capital formation through savings and more efficient production. Many resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more extensive resources are poor. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production of goods and services. In addition, economic decline does not necessarily produce conflict. How societies respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And as people get poorer, they may become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces. As Bernard Brodie observed about the modern era, “The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones.” The experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may be irrelevant, because such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930s increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem.

### Airpower Turns

In cross-ex, ask whether their internal link to heg is airpower, because their card has no warrants. If not, you can use the Lobby DA to access this impact, but I wouldn’t suggest it.

#### Air power is too effective in reducing U.S. casualties—it creates an image of bloodless warfare that encourages constant unnecessary interventions

Record 2002

(Jeffrey, teaches strategy at the Air war College, Parameters, June 22)

An airpower-dominant way of war in which US ground forces--and small ones at that--are ancillary, functioning mainly as target spotters and liaisons to indigenous proxies, is an inherently attractive way of war, especially for a society that values the individual as highly as America's does. It also permits a casualty-phobic political and military leadership to wage war effectively--i.e., to achieve decisive strategic effects without the paying the blood price traditionally associated with attainment of those effects. But the very technology that makes "bloodless" war possible may also serve to encourage the use of force in circumstances where perceptions of stakes and risks might otherwise counsel restraint. Is the United States in fact transforming war into essentially a riskless enterprise--i.e., one in which the level of risk is dwarfed by the magnitude and high probability of strategic payoff? If so, then what is to keep future Presidents from taking a casual approach to military intervention? Should the United States really look forward to creating a capacity to wage "painless" war, war without American death, war dangerous and hurtful only to the other side? Would not the prospect of casualty-free combat invite the use of force over even trivial stakes? After the virtually bloodless US victory over Serbia, Michael Ignatieff warned, New weaponry may force us to reassess an essential assumption about democracies: that they go to war less frequently than authoritarian regimes, and that they rarely, if ever, go to war against fellow democracies. Democracies may well remain peace loving only so long as the risks of war remain real to their citizens. If war becomes virtual--and without risk—democratic electorates may be more willing to fight, especially if the cause is justified in the language of human rights and even democracy itself. (56)

#### Air power is perceived as technologically invincible—this encourages terrorist attacks

ARKIN 2002 [William, Senior Military Adviser, Human Rights Watch, NPR, July 24]

However, here's the other side of this coin. Why are people so uncomfortable with air warfare sometimes? Why are they uncomfortable with this remote mode of warfare in which it appears as if the United States does not take the risks in order to achieve its military and political objectives? And I think the answer isSeptember 11, that the very fact that al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden attacked the United States in this asymmetric way, not attacking our military military-to-military, but attacking the civilian population, I think derives, to some degree,from this sense that exists in many parts of the world that the United States has this vast military capability and is unapproachable militarily, and therefore, the only way that you can attack is by attacking its civilian population. Now I'm not for one minute suggesting, therefore, that we should somehow put our boys at risk on the ground in order to remedy this, but I think we should recognize and understand that the cost that we pay additionally for the exclusive use of air - and missile power in the conduct of warfare is that we provide sort of fodder, if you will, confirmation on the part of those who believe that the United States is conducting military operations and being an imperial superpower without ever putting itself at risk. And so, therefore,there is a greater desire to conduct terrorism and to conduct strikes against the United States. And that's just the world we live in. Again, I think this would be an important factor then to take into consideration. For instance, in a war against Iraq, if you were going to try to think through what you want the endgame to be, beyond just the toppling of Saddam Hussein, how would you want a war in Iraq to be seen in the Arab world? And so, therefore, you might actually decide to fight a certain type of war with a certain type of strategy merely because you want the political outcome to be a certain thing, and it might not necessarily be the most efficient military strategy. It might be something that fulfills your larger political aims.

# **Terrorism Advantage**

### **Terrorism Frontline (1/1)**

#### **1. No economic impact to terrorism**

Thomas 11[Geoffrey, chief editor at Air Transport World, 9/12/2011, “OAG Report: Airline Industry ‘Amazingly Resilient’ to Crises” [http://atwonline.com/airline-finance-data/news/oag-report-airline-industry-amazingly-resilient-crises-0909?cid=nl\_atw\_dn&YM\_RID=`email`](http://atwonline.com/airline-finance-data/news/oag-report-airline-industry-amazingly-resilient-crises-0909?cid=nl_atw_dn&YM_RID=%60email%60)] LZ

An OAG report revealed the airline industry has been amazingly resilient to events such as terrorism, pandemics and natural disasters over the past 30 years, and that most serious events occurred after Sept. 10, 2001, according to its World Crisis Analysis. OAG is a division of UBM Aviation.¶ The report—which rated events as low- (country), medium- (region) and high-impact (global)—found there were seven low-impact events over the prior 20 years before 9/11 that affected aviation growth. However, after Sept. 10, 2001 there have been a total of nine crises—three low-, four medium- and two high-impact events.¶ According to the report, airline capacity grew an average of 3.1% per year since 1979, and has “been largely immune to regionalized events such as natural disasters, conflicts and fuel price spikes.”¶ The report found that the Global Banking Crisis had a far greater effect on aviation growth, with a 9% drop, than the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, at 3%.¶ From 1979 to Sept. 11, 2001, world airline capacity steadily increased an average of 5%, or 94 million seats per year, but since that date—although not because of the terror event—capacity grew an average of 2.6%, or 81 million seats per year.¶ According to UBM Aviation CEO Peter von Moltke, in the vast majority of crises there was a negligible impact on global airline capacity; at a regional level, capacity dropped less than 4% and recovered within three months.¶ "The OAG World Crisis Analysis shows how quickly the aviation industry responds and adapts in the face of almost any disaster, which is reassuring news for world markets and the ancillary industries that depend on aviation," Peter von Moltke said.¶ "Informed by sound historical data and analytics that provide a reliable picture of how external factors affect passenger demand, airlines are able to quickly adjust their flight capacities based on market needs, thus mitigating the impact of crises.".

#### **2. Increasing airport security pushes terrorists into attacking harder to defend targets**

Flintoff 12 [Corey, foreign correspondent for NPR, 5/15/2012, “Why Do Terrorists So Often Go For Planes?” <http://www.kqed.org/news/story/2012/05/15/94125/why_do_terrorists_so_often_go_for_planes?category=u.s.>]

"Terrorists like to do what they know how to do," says terrorism analyst Jessica Stern.¶ But the difficulty of breaching airport security does appear to be generating other approaches.¶ Two Different Types Of Plots ¶ Stern says she sees two trends. One involves developing new and more sophisticated techniques for evading security measures and attacking airplanes.¶ The other involves "looking for low-tech ways to attack softer targets," she says. This is a way of encouraging "leaderless resistance," says Stern, the author of Terror in the Name of God.¶ For example, the latest issue of Inspire, the jihadi magazine produced by the Yemen-based group al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, includes an eight-page feature that encourages readers to start wildfires in Australia and the United States.¶ It recommends that would-be saboteurs in the U.S. study weather patterns in order to determine when vegetation will be dry and winds favorable for a wildfire.¶ It specifically suggests Montana as a good site for practicing pyro-terrorism, because of the residential housing that is in wooded areas.¶ Stern says the aim of terrorism is to frighten the public and push governments into over-reacting — so spectacular, random-seeming attacks like airplane bombings work well.¶ "Terrorists do really aim for what we call symbolic targets," she says. "Terrorism is a form of theater, so they're going to hit targets that will make us maximally afraid, and inflict the maximum amount of humiliation."¶ In that sense, she says, arson in populated forest areas could be "a good second best" for a target.¶ A Range Of Vulnerabilities¶ Security analysts have pointed to dozens of potential terrorist targets and vulnerabilities, from military bases to passenger trains, chemical plants to storage for liquefied natural gas.¶ Former CIA agent Charles Faddis says he expects that there will be more attacks on targets that, by their nature, are hard to defend.¶ Faddis, the author of Willful Neglect: The Dangerous Illusion of Homeland Security, says he particularly fears situations where suicide gunmen might attack people at a public event.¶ "There are an infinite number of targets where you can find large numbers of people — college campuses, pro sports events," he says.¶ Even where such events have security screening, Faddis adds, they often don't have armed guards, so a determined, suicidal shooter would be hard to stop.

#### 3. Why not just stop terrorists from getting onto the plane in the first place? If the terrorists destroy the plane, the aff can’t stop the plane from crashing.

#### 4. Their Ayson evidence is talking about nuclear terror, which they don’t claim to solve. They don’t have an internal link chain that accesses nuclear great power war.

### Ext. #1 No Economic Impact

#### **Terrorism is good for the economy—the negative effects are negligible**

Krugman 1 [Paul, Professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Centenary Professor at the London School of Economics, op-ed columnist for The New York Times, Nobel Prize in Economics, 9/14/2001 “Reckonings; After the Horror” <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/14/opinion/reckonings-after-the-horror.html>] LZ

It seems almost in bad taste to talk about dollars and cents after an act of mass murder. Nonetheless, we must ask about the economic aftershocks from Tuesday's horror.¶ These aftershocks need not be major. Ghastly as it may seem to say this, the terror attack -- like the original day of infamy, which brought an end to the Great Depression -- could even do some economic good. But there are already ominous indications that some will see this tragedy not as an occasion for true national unity, but as an opportunity for political profiteering.¶ About the direct economic impact: The nation's productive base has not been seriously damaged. Our economy is so huge that the scenes of destruction, awesome as they are, are only a pinprick. The World Trade Center contained 12 million square feet of office space; that's out of 375 million square feet in Manhattan alone, and 3.5 billion in the United States as a whole. Nobody has a dollar figure for the damage yet, but I would be surprised if the loss is more than 0.1 percent of U.S. wealth -- comparable to the material effects of a major earthquake or hurricane.¶ The wild card here is confidence. But the confidence that matters in this case has little to do with general peace of mind. If people rush out to buy bottled water and canned goods, that will actually boost the economy. For a few weeks horrified Americans may be in no mood to buy anything but necessities. But once the shock has passed it's hard to believe that consumer spending will be much affected.¶ Will investors flee stocks and corporate bonds for safer assets? Such a reaction wouldn't make much sense -- after all, terrorists are not going to blow up the S.&P. 500. True, markets do sometimes react irrationally, and some foreign markets plunged after the attack. Since then, however, they have stabilized. On the whole it's just as well that our own markets have stayed closed for a few days, giving investors time to calm down; the administration was wrong to put pressure on stock markets to reopen right away. By the time the markets do reopen, the worst panic will probably be behind us.¶ So the direct economic impact of the attacks will probably not be that bad. And there will, potentially, be two favorable effects.¶ First, the driving force behind the economic slowdown has been a plunge in business investment. Now, all of a sudden, we need some new office buildings. As I've already indicated, the destruction isn't big compared with the economy, but rebuilding will generate at least some increase in business spending.¶ Second, the attack opens the door to some sensible recession-fighting measures. For the last few weeks there has been a heated debate among liberals over whether to advocate the classic Keynesian response to economic slowdown, a temporary burst of public spending. There were plausible economic arguments in favor of such a move, but it was questionable whether Congress could agree on how to spend the money in time to be of any use -- and there was also the certainty that conservatives would refuse to accept any such move unless it were tied to another round of irresponsible long-term tax cuts. Now it seems that we will indeed get a quick burst of public spending, however tragic the reasons.

### **Irrational Fear**

#### **Terrorism is an irrational fear**

Zenko 6/6/2012 [Mikah, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the [Council on Foreign Relations](http://www.cfr.org/?cid=oth_partner_site-atlantic-primer_on_airpower-071811%20) “Americans Are as Likely to Be Killed by Their Own Furniture as by Terrorism” <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/americans-are-as-likely-to-be-killed-by-their-own-furniture-as-by-terrorism/258156/>]

Today, the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) released its [2011 Report on Terrorism](http://www.nctc.gov/docs/2011_NCTC_Annual_Report_Final.pdf). The report offers the U.S. government's best statistical analysis of terrorism trends through its Worldwide Incidents Tracking System ([WITS](http://wits.nctc.gov/)), which compiles and vets open-source information about terrorism--defined by [U.S. law](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2656f) as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents."¶ Although I invite you to read the entire thirty-one page report, there are a few points worth highlighting that notably contrast with the conventional narrative of the terrorist threat:¶ "The total number of worldwide attacks in 2011, however, dropped by almost 12 percent from 2010 and nearly 29 percent from 2007." (9)¶ "Attacks by AQ and its affiliates increased by 8 percent from 2010 to 2011. A significant increase in attacks by al-Shabaab, from 401 in 2010 to 544 in 2011, offset a sharp decline in attacks by al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) and a smaller decline in attacks by al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)." (11)¶ "In cases where the religious affiliation of terrorism casualties could be determined, Muslims suffered between 82 and 97 percent of terrorism-related fatalities over the past five years." (14)¶ Of 978 terrorism-related kidnapping last year, only three hostages were private U.S. citizens, or .003 percent. A private citizen is defined as 'any U.S. citizen not acting in an official capacity on behalf of the U.S. government.' (13, 17)¶ Of the 13,288 people killed by terrorist attacks last year, seventeen were private U.S. citizens, or .001 percent. (17)¶ According to the report, the number of U.S. citizens who died in terrorist attacks increased by two between 2010 and 2011; overall, a [comparable number](http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/02/24/america-is-a-safe-place/) of Americans are crushed to death by their televisions or furniture each year. This is not to diminish the real--albeit shrinking--threat of terrorism, or to minimize the loss and suffering of the 13,000 killed and over 45,000 injured around the world. For Americans, however, it should emphasize that an [irrational fear](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety) of terrorism is both unwarranted and a poor basis for public policy decisions.

#### This fear is a form of collective psychosis that endangers everyone

Gleisner 83[John, consultant psychiatrist at the North Western Regional Health Authority in Greater Manchester, new internationalist 121, March, <http://www.newint.org/issue121/enemy.htm>l]

Many were shocked to hear British people chant ‘nuke the Argies’ and to see how the Ministry of Defense and the media portrayed Argentina as a nation of international gangsters. It was a shock, but it should not have been. After all, governments and media throughout the world have perfected a psychological war machine which is highly efficient in fostering fear and hatred of ‘the enemy’. True, for us in the West the enemy these days is usually portrayed as toting a red flag and a fistful of nuclear missiles, but the fear and hatred are free-floating and can be attached, by skillful maneuvering, to any object. Softened by centuries of insecurity, our minds are malleable clay for the psychological war machine. There have often been good grounds in the past for fearing the enemy, and the distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’ was once necessary for survival. But nuclear weapons have changed everything. Today that ancient them us distinction threatens the survival of them and us. As Einstein once said: ‘The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything except our way of thinking. . . we need an essentially new way of thinking if mankind is to survive.’ The old them-us thinking is dangerous because it leads us to accept the unacceptable. And the reasoning goes something like this: ‘The Russians are basically different from us. They are wicked bullies who intend to take over the world. We can stop them only by threatening them because bullies only respond to threats. And because they are basically different from us it is alright to destroy them if necessary. Nuclear weapons are terrible but it may be that the Russians cannot be stopped by any other means. Although nuclear war would be horrible, we have a reasonable chance of surviving. And anyway life under Russian rule would be far worse than death.’ If any individual spoke about another using logic like this they would be diagnosed as paranoid. And, indeed, them-us thinking is a time-honored symptom of psychosis (a psychotic being someone who can no longer distinguish between events in the world and events taking place in their imagination), characterised by what psychologists call ‘denial’ and ‘projection’. ‘Denial’ is refusing to acknowledge one’s own unpleasant motives. ‘Projection’ is attaching these unacknowledged motives onto someone else and then rejecting them. It is the perfect way of having your cake and eating it too: of indulging your own bad motives and criticising them at the same time. Our media and governments depict the Russians as aggressive expansionists bent on our destruction. A powerful perception of threat is created to soften up the public for yet more ‘defence’ spending, And in the Soviet Union precisely the same tricks are used to persuade Soviet citizens to make the necessary ‘sacrifices’ for protection against us. Most of us have never met a Russian. Yet there are few of us without opinions about how dangerous they are. We tend to see our own country as conciliatory, just, trustworthy, rational, legitimate. Theirs is aggressive, unjust, untrustworthy, irrational and illegitimate. Yet anyone travelling in the Soviet Union is soon struck not only by the Soviets’ strong belief in their own peacefulness, but also by their surprise and puzzlement at the fact that foreigners do not view them in the same light. They fear us — for precisely the same reasons that we fear them.

### **Security K Links**

#### **Terrorism is used to justify the destruction of personal privacy in the aim of security**

German 6/8 [Michael is the Senior Policy Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union’s Washington Legislative Office, where he develops policy positions and pro-active strategies on pending legislation and executive branch actions concerning national security and open government. German served sixteen years as a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, where he specialized in domestic terrorism and covert operations. Mr. German served as an adjunct professor for Law Enforcement and Terrorism at the National Defense University and is a Senior Fellow with GlobalSecurity.org. He has a B.A. in Philosophy from Wake Forest University and a J.D. from Northwestern University Law School, 6/8/2012, “INCOMPETENT TERRORISTS, COURAGEOUS AIRLINE PASSENGERS, VENGEFUL WIVES” <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/06/08/michael-german/incompetent-terrorists-courageous-airline-passengers-vengeful-wives/>] LZ

In fact, the available evidence points to the opposite conclusion: despite the increasing scrutiny of Muslim-Americans and the still expanding counterterrorism intelligence gathering authorities, a small number of actual terrorists continue to slip through the cracks while tens of thousands of innocent people become ensnared in the surveillance dragnet. Making this point is crucial in this discussion, because the motive behind the drumbeat of fear-mongering about a growing homegrown threat is to justify continuing expansion of the surveillance industrial complex, even as we see the degradation of al Qaeda and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan winding down. While an honest evaluation of the threat would argue for a reduction in security budgets and a normalization of police and intelligence powers, in March of this year the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) re-wrote its guidelines to remove traditional protections for U.S. person information, even where no terrorism connection exists. This change, which authorizes the NCTC to ingest entire databases belonging to other federal agencies, regardless of the countless innocent Americans impacted, comes closer to realizing Admiral John Poindexter’s dystopian dream of Total Information Awareness than any previous single change in policy. Whether it will help NCTC become any better at finding terrorists is doubtful according to a 2008 National Research Council study of the feasibility of data mining technology for finding terrorists.

#### **Terrorism and the idea of Rogue States are developed due to the security logic engrained within our society.**

Reid 10 (Julian, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, “On the Implications of Foucault’s Security, Territory, Population Lectures for the Analysis and Theorisation of Security in International Relations,” September, 2010, http://www.mcrg.ac.in/Development/draft\_Symposium/Julian1.pdf 4-5)

The security discourses of the global liberal order reproduce so many of the tropes and signatures of the early modern liberal state which Foucault analyses in these lectures. He demonstrates how the liberal state of the early modern era, on account of its problematisation of life as the referent object of security, invented entire new species of enmity and threats. Once the referent object of security became the life of the population so the circulatory infrastructures on which the life properties and processes of the populations of states were said to rely became identified as sites of insecurity and threat. So, new domains and practices of regulation concerned with the governance of roads and highways, the suppression of vagrancy, and so on, came into existence. The development of the contemporary global liberal order is generative of new and yet very comparable forms of security problems. An excellent example of this is the current discourse surrounding so- called ‘rogue states’, the constitutions of which are represented as hostile to the smooth functioning of the circulatory infrastructures of global liberal order. Indeed the extension of this discourse of the rogue and of roguery to the international suggests, as Jacques Derrida has also demonstrated, continuities with liberal regimes of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. In a brilliant analysis which I think in many ways can be read as a supplement to Foucault’s, delivered not long before his death, Derrida demonstrated the genealogical intertwinements of the word ‘rogue’ and its equivalents in French, ‘voyeur’ and ‘roué’, with concepts of humanity and animality, and its roles in the development of liberal practices of security and order. In English the word ‘rogue’ designates deviance in both human and non- human life forms. Derrida demonstrates this by quoting from an article in which ‘a rogue is defined as a creature that is born different...incapable of mingling with the herd, which keeps itself to itself, and can attack at any time, without warning’. Crucially, this concept of the rogue and of roguery derived from early modern theories of biology. In reference to the vegetable kingdom, Charles Darwin in Origin of Species referred to 'roguing' as the practice by which nurserymen would weed out plants that deviated from the proper standard of plants in seed-beds, literally pulling-up what they called the 'rogues'. He then adapted the concept of roguing to describe the process by which natural selection functions throughout living systems to maintain order among species. In French, Derrida argues, the word has a more human resonance, for ‘the word voyou has an essential relation with the voie, the way, with the urban roadways (voirie), the roadways of the city or the polis, and thus with the street (rue), the waywardness (dévoiement) of the voyou consisting in making ill use of the street, in corrupting the street or loitering in the streets, in “roaming the streets”’ Politically, Derrida shows, the representatives of liberal order have consistently tried ‘to present as vo yous all rebels, agitators, and insurgents, indeed all revolutionaries, regardless of whether they come from bad neighbourhoods, or from the suburbs’. Thus, the rogue is marked by its inhumanity, aggression, non-conformity, and disorder, while always being ‘a part of mankind, always human, of our kind.’ The concept of the ‘rogue state’ has, during the post-Cold War era, become a regularly deployed reference for regimes said to threaten the boundaries of global liberal order. This proliferation of the discourse of roguery from the biological to the social to the international tells us a lot about the increasing complexities of liberal security practices as well as their continuities with the early modern era. It tells us also a lot about the power of their biological imaginaries upon the conceptions of fear and danger which have motivated the development of the security practices of liberal regimes historically, and which are proving definitive of their strategic response to the new threats posed by terrorism. In their responses to terrorism, liberal regimes of the present have made the protection of global architectures of circulation and infrastructure a strategic priority. The conduct of the Global War on Terror has been defined in particular by the development of strategies for the protection of ‘critical infrastructure’. In the US, for example, George W. Bush has provided a series of presidential directives in response to the attacks of September 11 for the development of what is termed a National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The response to the directive is expressed in The National Plan for Research and Development in Support of Critical Infrastructure Protection published by the US Department of Homeland Security in 2004. In Europe, the European Union is pursuing what it terms a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection ‘to enhance European prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks involving critical infrastructures’. The United Nations is seeking meanwhile to identify the critical infrastructure needs of member states globally, as well as continuing to ‘explore ways to facilitate the dissemination of best practices’ with regard to critical infrastructure protection.

#### **Rhetoric of terrorism is strategically deployed to create a sense of vulnerability within the lives of citizens**

Reid 10 (Julian, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, “On the Implications of Foucault’s Security, Territory, Population Lectures for the Analysis and Theorisation of Security in International Relations,” September, 2010, http://www.mcrg.ac.in/Development/draft\_Symposium/Julian1.pdf 6-7)

The liberal conception of society as an organism comprising networks and infrastructures of relations gathered apace throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, culminating in the prevailing conception of a networked world society held together and empowered economically, social, politically, and militarily by the density of its critical infrastructures. Likewise the principle that the regimes which govern such societies are vulnerable on account of their reliance on the vitality of those networked infrastructures, the principle governing Al-Qaeda’s strategy, developed simultaneously within liberal regimes themselves. This was evident not least in the development of the practice of interstate warfare. The increasing investment in the strategic value of airpower in the UK, the US, and France during the twentieth century worked on the assumption that enemies could be defeated by inflicting critical damage on the infrastructures on which their security depended. Today we see the same logic being applied not just within the domain of liberal regimes themselves, but in the violent intervention and enforced reconstruction of illiberal states and societies. The solution to Terror is presumed to lie in the destruction of illiberal regimes, in the regeneration of their socio-economic infrastructures of circulation, with a view to reinserting them into the networks of exchange and flows which constitute the global liberal polity. This is especially true of the strategies which are currently and errantly being applied to the so-called rogue states of Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO, for example, once a military alliance to protect Western European states from the geopolitical threat of the former Soviet Union, is currently engaged in a strategy which stands and falls on their ability to convince Afghanis to give up their reliance on poppy seed for an economy centred on the production of grain. The irony of this will not be lost on the reader of Security, Territory, Population. For such military strategies of the liberal present depend on precisely the same assumption that classical liberal strategies against sedition depended in the historical eras which Foucault analysed. That is the assumption that historically constituted peoples can be politically suborned and transformed into the utile stuff of population in accordance with the needs and interests of governmental regimes seeking security from those selfsame peoples.

### **Self-fulfilling Prophecy**

#### **Our policies regarding terror are the root cause of it—it’s a self-fulfilling prophecy**

RT 11 [English news channel, 11/9/2011, “Washington’s Enemy ‘Doesn’t Exist’ <http://www.rt.com/news/us-muslim-policy-sheuer-895/>]

Americans are in the crosshairs of terrorists worldwide purely due to Washington’s policy in the Muslim world, not because there is an Islamic enemy whose only aim is to kill Americans for their freedoms and lifestyle, insists a former CIA officer.¶ Historian Michael Scheuer, an author of "Through our enemies’ eyes", who worked for the agency for over 20 years till 2004 and at one time was the chief of the CIA’s ‘Bin Laden unit’, says America’s greatest enemy – radical Islam – never existed: neither when Bin Laden was alive, nor now.¶ Israeli lobby drag America into wars¶ Actually, “it is America’s relationship with Israel that is causing this war [on Islam]”, and until Americans accept this, “we are not going to defeat this enemy,” the author says.¶ Michael Scheuer believes it is the Israeli lobby in America that is dragging the US into wars.¶ “In Israel itself as a country, it is not a problem. The real problem is the leaders of the Jewish American community in the US, who influence and corrupt our Congress to support Israel when we have no interest there,” he states.¶ “The American political establishment is caught between two things. They are extremely pro-Israel and they are almost Marxist in their belief that the spread of democracy is inevitable in all places, in all peoples, in all time,” evaluates the former CIA officer, adding that in their desire to protect Israel, the US establishment cannot tell what’s real.¶ Radical Islamists will benefit¶ Michael Scheuer predicts that in countries caught up in the Arab Spring like Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, “there is not going to be a democracy that in any way resembles democracy in the west.”¶ At the same time, the anarchy being created in the Muslim world will make radical Islamists the only beneficiaries of the chaos engulfing the Arab countries.¶ According to Michael Scheuer, further radicalization of Islamist groups, particularly in Africa, is inevitable – thanks to guns becoming more affordable.¶ The endless flow of uncounted weapons and the opened prisons in the above countries have reinforced Islamist groups around the world, believes Scheuer.¶ “Their [American political establishment’s] mindless pursuit of secular democracy at the end of the day endangers the stability of the region and probably the whole world,” he says.¶ If Syria falls to Islamists – Israel will go down¶ As for the situation in Syria – it has been interfered in by the US unconscionably.¶ “Until they [the Syrians] removed the US ambassador, he was running around their country trying to encourage groups to overthrow the Syrian government. That is not the role of any diplomat, US, Russian, Chinese or British,” the author points out, saying that “Syrians were urged onto the streets cold-bloodedly,” without mention of the possibility of being shot dead by the government.¶ The author recalls that Syria, with its traditional support of Hezbollah, is naturally an Israeli zone of interest, not an American one.¶ “Syria is a country with no US interest. Since I was a little boy, we’ve been afraid of the Syrians,” the author says, laughing at the fact that “if you look at the map – it’s hard to imagine that this little blat of country called Syria could be a threat to the US.”¶ Clarifying a possible result of any American success in Syria, Scheuer says that “this is another good example of dichotomy in the thinking of the American leaders. Because as we call for democracy in Syria, if Assad goes – Israel’s security goes straight down.”¶ Israel sets US plans on Iran¶ Michael Scheuer reveals that America’s ‘plan on Iran’ depends on that of Israel.¶ “Both Republicans and Democrats are deathly afraid that Israelis will attack Iran off their own work. If Israel attacks Iran, the Americans will get blamed for condoning it, whether we did or not,” he explains.¶ “What we are seeing is a slow, almost non-accelerable advance toward some kind of a conflict with Tehran.”¶ He labels the alleged plot of eliminating a Saudi Arabian ambassador in the US with the help of a Mexican drug cartel “a comic uproar”, saying he can hardly believe Iran would risk a war with the US, Israel and much of NATO, just to kill somebody who is not even a member of the ruling family of Saudi Arabia.¶ “They’ve come down under belief that democracy is better for everybody. The truth is, American and western foreign policy interests in the Middle East have depended for 50 years on the maintenance of tyranny that gave us access to oil, that protected Israel and persecuted Islamists to protect us. All of that going by the wayside,” acknowledges the author, recalling the Israelis, who were first to realize that democracy might not be good for their security.¶ ‘Libya will be anti-American’¶ Answering a question about war-torn Libya, the author pointed out that this country is notorious for having its Islamists fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and then the same men encountering the Americans in Iraq and also in Afghanistan. Michael Scheuer is uncertain whether Libya will become a hotbed for terrorists, but “it will decidedly be anti-American and anti-NATO”.¶ ‘We are fighting a religious war’¶ Despite being largely well-educated and technologically advanced,¶ “America lacks common sense”¶ , claims the former CIA officer, maintaining that for the last 20 years, the US has been very efficient in creating enemies and endangering security. The last four American presidents have been telling the population that the wars the US wages abroad are against a bunch of madmen, and in no way religious wars.¶ “We are definitely fighting a religious war. And until we come to realize that – we are never going to be able to defeat it,” Scheuer concludes.¶ “Let the Chinese deal with these [Islamist] people for the next 50 years, we’ve had enough of it, but the point is – the Americans cannot get out.”

### **Alt for Security K**

#### Policies towards Palestine and Iraq are the root cause of terrorism—addressing these grievances is the only way find an understanding but the political world is silencing it

McGovern 5/3 [Former CIA analyst Ray McGovern is co-founder of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity, 5/3/2012, “The Obama Team Just Doesn't Get It: US Violence and Occupation Spark Terrorism” <http://www.alternet.org/story/155246/the_obama_team_just_doesn%27t_get_it%3A_us_violence_and_occupation_spark_terrorism/?page=entire>] LZ

 “It is clear that al Qaeda increasingly seeks to recruit individuals without known terrorist affiliations … to do their bidding. … And that’s why we must communicate clearly to Muslims around the world that al Qaeda offers nothing except a bankrupt vision of misery and death … while the United States stands with those who seek justice and progress. … That’s the vision that is far more powerful than the hatred of these violent extremists.”¶ But why it is so hard for Muslims to “get” that message? Why can’t they end their preoccupation with dodging U.S. missiles in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Gaza long enough to reflect on how we are only trying to save them from terrorists while simultaneously demonstrating our commitment to “justice and progress”?¶ Does a smart fellow like Obama expect us to believe that all we need to do is “communicate clearly to Muslims” that it is al Qaeda, not the U.S. and its allies, that brings “misery and death”? Does any informed person not know that the unprovoked U.S.-led invasion of Iraq killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and displaced 4.5 million from their homes? How is that for “misery and death”?¶ Rather than a failure to communicate, U.S. officials are trying to rewrite recent history, which seems to be much easier to accomplish with the Washington press corps and large segments of the American population than with the Muslim world. But why isn’t there a frank discussion by America’s leaders and media about the real motivation of Muslim anger toward the United States? Why was Helen Thomas the only journalist to raise the touchy but central question of motive?¶ Peeking Behind the Screen¶ We witnessed a similar phenomenon when the 9/11 Commission Report tiptoed into a cautious discussion of possible motives behind the 9/11 attacks. To their credit, the drafters of that report apparently went as far as their masters would allow, in gingerly introducing a major elephant into the room: “America’s policy choices have consequences. Right or wrong, it is simply a fact that American policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and American actions in Iraq are dominant staples of popular commentary across the Arab and Muslim world.” (p. 376)¶ When asked later about the flabby way that last sentence ended, former Rep. Lee Hamilton, Vice-Chair of the 9/11 Commission, explained that there had been a Donnybrook over whether that paragraph could be included at all.¶ The drafters also squeezed in the reason given by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as to why he “masterminded” the attacks on 9/11: “By his own account, KSM’s animus toward the United States stemmed … from his violent disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel.”¶ Would you believe that former Vice President Dick Cheney has also pointed to U.S. support for Israel as one of the “true sources of resentment”? This unique piece of honesty crept into his speech to the American Enterprise Institute on May 21, 2009.¶ Sure, he also trotted out the bromide that the terrorists hate “all the things that make us a force for good in the world.” But the Israel factor slipped into the speech, perhaps an inadvertent acknowledgement of the Israeli albatross adorning the neck of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Very few pundits and academicians are willing to allude to this reality, presumably out of fear for their future career prospects.¶ Former senior CIA officer Paul R. Pillar, now a professor at Georgetown University, is one of the few willing to refer, in his typically understated way, to “all the other things … including policies and practices that affect the likelihood that people … will be radicalized, and will try to act out the anger against us.” One has to fill in the blanks regarding what those “other things” are.¶ But no worries. Secretary Napolitano has a fix for this unmentionable conundrum. It’s called “counter-radicalization,” which she describes thusly: “How do we identify someone before they become radicalized to the point where they’re ready to blow themselves up with others on a plane? And how do we communicate better American values and so forth … around the globe?”¶ Better communication. That’s the ticket.¶ Hypocrisy and Double Talk¶ But Napolitano doesn’t acknowledge the underlying problem, which is that many Muslims have watched Washington’s behavior closely for many years and view U.S. declarations about peace, justice, democracy and human rights as infuriating examples of hypocrisy and double talk. So, Washington’s sanitized discussion about motives for terrorism seems more intended for the U.S. domestic audience than the Muslim world.¶ After all, people in the Middle East already know how Palestinians have been mistreated for decades; how Washington has propped up Arab dictatorships; how Muslims have been locked away at Guantanamo without charges; how the U.S. military has killed civilians in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere; how U.S. mercenaries have escaped punishment for slaughtering innocents.¶ The purpose of U.S. “public diplomacy” appears more designed to shield Americans from this unpleasant reality, offering instead feel-good palliatives about the beneficence of U.S. actions. Most American journalists and politicians go along with the charade out of fear that otherwise they would be accused of lacking patriotism or sympathizing with “the enemy.”¶ Commentators who are neither naïve nor afraid are simply shut out of the Fawning Corporate Media (FCM). Salon.com’s Glenn Greenwald, for example, has complained loudly about “how our blind, endless enabling of Israeli actions fuels terrorism directed at the U.S.,” and how it is taboo to point this out.¶ Greenwald recently called attention to a little-noticed Associated Press report on the possible motives of the 23-year-old Nigerian Abdulmutallab. The report quoted his Yemeni friends to the effect that the he was “not overtly extremist.” But they noted that he was open about his sympathies toward the Palestinians and his anger over Israel’s actions in Gaza. (Emphasis added)¶ Former CIA specialist on al Qaeda, Michael Scheuer, has been still more outspoken on what he sees as Israel’s tying down the American Gulliver in the Middle East. Speaking Monday on C-SPAN, he complained bitterly that any debate on the issue of American support for Israel and its effects is normally squelched. Scheuer added that the Israel Lobby had just succeeded in getting him removed from his job at the Jamestown Foundation think tank for saying that Obama was “doing what I call the Tel Aviv Two Step.”¶ More to the point, Scheuer asserted: “For anyone to say that our support for Israel doesn’t hurt us in the Muslim world … is to just defy reality.” Beyond loss of work, those who speak out can expect ugly accusations. The Israeli media network Arutz Sheva, which is considered the voice of the settler movement, weighed in strongly, citing Scheuer’s C-SPAN remarks and branding them “blatantly anti-Semitic.” Media Squelching As for media squelching, I continue to be amazed at how otherwise informed folks express total surprise when I refer them to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s statement about his motivation for attacking the United States, as cited on page 147 of the 9/11 Commission Report: “By his own account, KSM’s animus toward the United States stemmed not from his experience there as a student, but rather from his violent disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel.”¶ And one can understand how even those following such things closely can get confused. Five years after the 9/11 Commission Report, on Aug. 30, 2009, readers of the neoconservative Washington Post were given a diametrically different view, based on what the Post called “an intelligence summary”:¶ “KSM’s limited and negative experience in the United States — which included a brief jail stay because of unpaid bills — almost certainly helped propel him on his path to becoming a terrorist … He stated that his contact with Americans, while minimal, confirmed his view that the United States was a debauched and racist country.”¶ Apparently, the Post found this revisionist version politically more convenient, in that it obscured Mohammed’s other explanation implicating “U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel.” It’s much more comforting to view KSM as a disgruntled visitor who nursed his personal grievances into justification for mass murder.¶ An unusually candid view of the dangers accruing from the U.S. identification with Israel’s policies appeared five years ago in an unclassified study published by the Pentagon-appointed U.S. Defense Science Board on Sept. 23, 2004. Contradicting President George W. Bush, the board stated:¶ “Muslims do not ‘hate our freedom,’ but rather, they hate our policies. The overwhelming majority voice their objections to what they see as one-sided support in favor of Israel and against Palestinian rights, and the longstanding, even increasing support for what Muslims collectively see as tyrannies, most notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, and the Gulf States.¶ “Thus, when American public diplomacy talks about bringing democracy to Islamic societies, this is seen as no more than self-serving hypocrisy.”¶ Abdulmutallab’s Attack¶ Getting back to Abdulmutallab and his motive in trying to blow up the airliner, how was this individual without prior terrorist affiliations suddenly transformed into an international terrorist ready to die while killing innocents?¶ If, as John Brennan seems to suggest, al Qaeda terrorists are hard-wired for terrorism at birth for the “wanton slaughter of innocents,” how are they able to jump-start a privileged 23-year old Nigerian, inculcate him with the acquired characteristics of a terrorist, and persuade him to do the bidding of al Qaeda/Persian Gulf?¶ As indicated above, the young Nigerian seems to have had particular trouble with Israel’s wanton slaughter of more than a thousand civilians in Gaza a year ago, a brutal campaign that was defended in Washington as justifiable self-defense.¶ Moreover, it appears that Abdulmuttallab is not the only anti-American “terrorist” so motivated. When the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al Qaeda announced that they were uniting into “al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula,” their combined rhetoric railed against the Israeli attack on Gaza.¶ And on Dec. 30, 2009, Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, a 32-year-old Jordanian physician from a family of Palestinian origin, killed seven American CIA operatives and one Jordanian intelligence officer near Khost, Afghanistan, when he detonated a suicide bomb. Though most U.S. media stories treated al-Balawi as a fanatical double-agent driven by irrational hatreds, other motivations could be gleaned by carefully reading articles about his personal history.¶ Al-Balawi’s mother told Agence France-Presse that her son had never been an “extremist.” Al-Balawi’s widow, Defne Bayrak, made a similar statement to Newsweek. In a New York Times article, al-Balawi’s brother was quoted as describing him as a “very good brother” and a “brilliant doctor.”¶ So what led al-Balawi to take his own life in order to kill U.S. and Jordanian intelligence operatives? Al-Balawi’s widow said her husband “started to change” after the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. His brother said al-Balawi “changed” during last year’s three-week-long Israeli offensive in Gaza, which killed about 1,300 Palestinians.¶ When al-Balawi volunteered with a medical organization to treat injured Palestinians in Gaza, he was arrested by Jordanian authorities, his brother said. It was after that arrest that the Jordanian intelligence service apparently coerced or “recruited” al-Balawi to become a spy who would penetrate al Qaeda’s hierarchy and provide actionable intelligence to the CIA.¶ “If you catch a cat and put it in a corner, she will jump on you,” the brother said in explaining why al-Balawi would turn to a suicide attack.¶ “My husband was anti-American; so am I,” his widow said, adding that her two little girls would grow up fatherless but that she had no regrets.¶ Answering Helen¶ Are we starting to get the picture of what the United States is up against in the Muslim world? Does Helen Thomas deserve an adult answer to her question about motive? Has President Obama been able to assimilate all this? Or is the U.S. political/media establishment incapable of confronting this reality and/or taking meaningful action to alleviate the underlying causes of the violence?¶ Is the reported reaction of a CIA official to al-Balawi’s attack the appropriate one: “Last week’s attack will be avenged. Some very bad people will eventually have a very bad day.” Revenge has not always turned out very well in the past.¶ Does anyone remember the brutal killing of four Blackwater contractors on March 31, 2004, when they took a wrong turn and ended up in the Iraqi city of Fallujah — and how U.S. forces virtually leveled that large city in retribution after George W. Bush won his second term the following November?¶ If you read only the Fawning Corporate Media, you would blissfully think that the killing of the four Blackwater operatives was the work of fanatical animals who got – along with their neighbors – what they deserved. You wouldn’t know that the killings represented the second turn in that specific cycle of violence.¶ On March 22, 2004, Israeli forces assassinated the then-spiritual leader of Hamas in Gaza, Sheikh Yassin — a withering old man, blind and confined to a wheelchair. That murder, plus sloppy navigation by the Blackwater men, set the stage for the next set of brutalities. The Blackwater operatives were killed by a group that described itself as the “Sheikh Yassin Revenge Brigade.” Pamphlets and posters were all over the scene of the attack; one of the trucks that pulled around body parts of the mercenaries had a poster of Yassin in its window, as did store fronts all over Fallujah.¶ We can wish Janet Napolitano luck with her “counter-radicalization” project and President Obama with his effort to “communicate clearly to Muslims,” but there will be no diminution in the endless cycles of violence unless legitimate grievances are addressed on all sides. It might also help if the American people were finally let in on the root causes for what otherwise get dismissed as irrational actions by Muslims.

# **Solvency**

### Solvency 1NC (1/2)

#### 1. FAA is terrible at monitoring programs—undermines effectiveness

Mitchell 10 [Mike, AvStop.com, 4/6/2010, “FAA’s Oversight of Air Carrier Inspection Continues to be Ineffective” http://avstop.com/news\_april\_2010/faa\_s\_oversight\_of\_air\_carrier\_inspections\_continues\_to\_be\_ineffective.htm]

April 6, 2010 - DOT’s Inspector General’s Office testified before congress, Subcommittee on Transportation, in their report they indicated the FAA’s oversight of the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) inspections continues to be ineffective at the national level in large part because the FAA does not collect data on all overdue inspections or fully utilize the data it already collects.¶ ¶ In response to DOT 2008 recommendation, the FAA established a process to compile inspection data at the national level and distribute quarterly reports to alert regional managers to overdue inspections. However, FAA’s data tracking efforts still lack accountability in two key areas. First, FAA does not monitor completion of a key group of inspections, those identified as scheduled, but not yet assigned.¶ ¶ From June 2008 through June 2009, 237 scheduled inspections were left unassigned and uncompleted—and none were being tracked by FAA to completion. While local oversight offices rescheduled some of the inspections, they were not projected for completion for as much as 4 years beyond the original inspection date.¶ Unless the FAA holds regional managers accountable for ensuring that local inspection offices complete these inspections, they will continue to lapse beyond the minimum inspection intervals established by FAA. Inspecting air carrier programs at required time intervals is critical to validate the levels of risk that might exist in air carrier programs.¶ ¶ Second, the FAA’s quarterly inspection status reports do not include any trend analyses or cumulative data roll-up from the rest of the year that could help identify offices where inspections are habitually late. Moreover, regional managers stated that they did not find the Headquarters reports useful and, in many cases, were already tracking the progress of their local oversight offices in completing assigned inspections using locally developed systems. Yet, those systems were not monitoring the 237 overdue inspections identified during DOT review to completion.¶ ¶ The FAA introduced (ATOS) in 1998 as its new tool for conducting air carrier safety inspections. ATOS was a major shift in FAA’s oversight system as it moved beyond the traditional inspection method of simply checking an air carrier’s compliance with regulations to identifying and assessing safety risks to preclude accidents. FAA initially implemented ATOS at 10 of the Nation’s largest passenger air carriers.¶ ¶ Over the past 7 years, DOT has reported on a number of weaknesses within ATOS. In 2002, DOT recommended that FAA establish strong national oversight and accountability to ensure consistent ATOS field implementation. Today, all Part 121 passenger air carriers in the United States are being inspected using ATOS.¶ ¶ In 2005, DOT again recommended that FAA strengthen its national oversight of field offices by establishing policies and procedures to ensure air carrier inspections are conducted in a timely and consistent manner. More recently, in 2008, DOT recommended that FAA implement a process to track field office inspections and alert the local, regional, and Headquarters offices to overdue inspections.¶ ¶ To conduct this review, DOT obtained and analyzed ATOS inspection data and interviewed FAA Flight Standards Division (Headquarters) and regional managers to evaluate their role and effectiveness in analyzing data and ensuring timely completion of inspections.¶ ¶ ATOS is FAA’s approach to air carrier safety oversight. FAA inspectors assigned to local oversight offices use ATOS to conduct surveillance of air carrier operations and maintenance programs at more than 100 Part 121 air carriers in the United States.¶ ¶ ATOS is designed to allow FAA inspectors to use data to focus their inspections on areas posing the greatest safety risks and adapt their inspection plans in response to changing conditions within air carriers’ operations. ATOS helps inspectors assess air carriers across three primary areas:¶ ¶ • System Design: Inspectors evaluate air carriers’ policies and procedures to determine if their operating systems comply with safety regulations and standards. System design evaluations are required every 5 years.¶ • Performance: Inspectors determine whether an air carrier is following its FAA-approved procedures and that those procedures and operating systems are working as intended. Performance evaluations are conducted at prescribed intervals depending on the likelihood of failure in air carrier programs.¶ • Risk Management: Inspectors examine air carrier processes dealing with hazards and associated risks that are subject to regulatory control (e.g., enforcement actions and rulemaking). FAA uses these analyses as a basis to target resources towards the most at-risk programs.¶ ¶ The frequency of performance evaluations is based on the significance of the program to an air carrier’s operations. Inspections of high-criticality maintenance programs, such as Airworthiness Directive Management, are performed every 6 months; lower-criticality programs, such as Carry-On Baggage or Service Difficulty Reports, are inspected every 12 or 36 months, respectively.¶ ¶ Since ATOS is an automated oversight system, results of inspections and decisions made by managers to mitigate risk levels are collected and organized in a centrally located repository within ATOS. This allows Headquarters and regional officials to monitor the current status of all ATOS inspections.¶ ¶ FAA headquarters does not use inspection status data to hold local oversight offices accountable for completing ATOS inspections. Inspections are automatically scheduled in ATOS based on intervals established within the system, and it is the responsibility of local oversight office managers to assign inspectors to complete these inspections.¶ ¶ However, DOT review of inspection data indicates that not all scheduled inspections are being assigned, including those with increased levels of risk. For example, four local oversight offices that transitioned to ATOS since 2006 have yet to complete any scheduled system design or performance inspections for 10 air carrier operations programs. At the time of DOT review, these inspections were unassigned.¶ ¶ In DOT June 2008 report, DOT recommended that FAA implement a process to monitor field office inspections and alert local, regional, and Headquarters management to overdue inspections. In response, the FAA developed a process to track the status of ATOS inspections. In July 2008, the FAA Headquarters ATOS Division Manager began sending quarterly inspection status reports—commonly referred to as the Quarterly ADI Completion Report—to regional managers.¶ ¶ However, DOT analysis of FAA’s quarterly inspection status reports showed that FAA Headquarters only tracks the status of assigned inspections for timely completion. Unassigned inspections pose a greater problem for FAA because managers have not committed inspector resources to complete these inspections.¶ ¶ Once these inspections become past due, there is no sense of urgency to complete them. FAA Headquarters officials also use the quarterly reports during FAA’s “Dashboard” meetings. DOT found 237 instances where ATOS inspections were unassigned and not completed at the required interval. For example, DOT review of ATOS data disclosed 11 inspections that were at least 90 days past due but not yet rescheduled. In other instances, FAA did reschedule unassigned inspections.¶ ¶ FAA officials acknowledged that not all scheduled ATOS inspections will be completed at the required interval. They informed DOT that in a risk-based oversight system such as ATOS, it is not practical or desirable to complete all inspections just for the sake of completing inspections.¶ ¶ Therefore, Headquarters officials do not hold local oversight offices accountable for completing unassigned inspections because doing so would impede the time inspectors need to perform quality inspections for those areas that pose greater risk.¶ ¶ While DOT agreed that higher-risk air carrier programs warrant being inspected ahead of lower-risk programs, some of the unassigned inspections were identified by inspectors as “high risk” programs but not inspected. Additionally, ensuring that all areas, regardless of risk, are inspected is a critical step toward identifying and monitoring risk levels before system failure occurs. Quarterly inspection status reports consistently pointed to a lack of inspector resources as the main reason scheduled inspections have gone unassigned and uncompleted. Headquarters officials acknowledged that they are aware of the resource issues cited by the regions, but they have not addressed this problem.

### **Solvency 1NC (2/2)**

#### **2. NextGen’s slow implementation causes uncertainty**

Halsey 11 [Ashley, Transportation Writer for the Washington Post, 6/30/2011 , “New Guidance System for Skies Could Face Delays” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/antidote-to-air-gridlock-is-complex-undertaking/2011/06/30/AG9bdnwH_story.html>]

The very business of getting aloft — the time that passengers know as the minutes between the “buckle your seat belts” order and “you are free to move about the cabin” — is an intricate choreography between controllers and the cockpit. “Two seventy on the heading, Southwest 658 going to departure,” the pilot says just after liftoff from Dulles, repeating the compass direction given by the Dulles tower. Then he tells a controller based in Warrenton that he’s climbing. “Potomac departure, Southwest 658, passing [1,800 feet] for 3,000, heading 270,” he radios. The new controller tells him to keep climbing to 5,000 feet and maintain that altitude. That keeps him 1,000 feet below flights heading to land at Dulles. When the plane reaches a waypoint known as “Blues,” a new controller takes over and orders Flight 658 to 12,000 feet. When Flight 658 reaches another waypoint, over Linden, Va., the pilot is told to head for 17,000 feet. Then he is handed over to a new controller, on a different radio frequency, who takes the flight to 27,000 feet before handing over to yet another controller who ultimately guides the plane to its 40,000-foot cruising altitude. Now, “you are free to move about the cabin.” If all that sounds complicated and open to human error, one goal of NextGen is to replace almost all of it with new technology, much of it in the cockpit. Can the FAA deliver? NextGen has virtually no credible enemies — not in the administration, not on Capitol Hill and not in the airline industry. But the seemingly simple concept is layered like an onion with complexities. In addition to demanding an enormous investment, there is a confluence of history and technology that creates a hurdle to progress. Airlines fear that the FAA will not meet its timetable for creation of the network of ground-based stations and satellite links that will make it all work. “The FAA’s track record on deployment hasn’t been good,” said Russ Chew, a former airline executive and former FAA chief operating officer. “The FAA could be perfect in meeting NextGen deadlines, but [private investors] are looking at past history.” Michael P. Huerta, the FAA deputy administrator who was given charge of NextGen after an internal shake-up this year, said he is well aware of that. “How can they be sure that FAA will deliver on its commitments? That’s a fair question,” Huerta said As for evidence of the rapid pace of technological advancement, one need look no further than GPS. The technology is advancing so quickly that some car buyers opt against the factory-installed unit for fear that it will be outdated in a year or two. Airlines have the same issue. “If I go first, I’ll have to bear the cost of updating the software, and when [NextGen is] turned on, I’ll have the oldest, most obsolete systems out there,” Chew said. In addition, the FAA must clear through a jungle of procedures and retrain 15,475 air traffic controllers to deal with a system that will entirely replace the old one. “A lot of the tough stuff is new procedures, is human-machine interface and human factors, moving from an air traffic control mind frame to an air traffic management mind frame” that puts greater responsibility in the hands of pilots, said Bobby Sturgell, former acting FAA administrator. Congress has tossed more uncertainty into the mix by extending the current FAA funding plan 20 times rather than approving a comprehensive long-term spending plan that imposes strict NextGen deadlines on the agency. “NextGen is threatened,” Chew said. “Everyone knows it. The FAA budget is under pressure. Even they will say that NextGen is on track, but it’s not.” JetBlue, with $4.2 million in federal funding help, and Southwest Airlines, with federal incentives, have installed some of the technology, but other airlines are reluctant to move ahead. “Absolutely I’m concerned about the schedule,” said Gary Kelly, chief executive of Southwest, which has spent $94 million on NextGen. “I’m concerned that we don’t have metrics in place to measure the progress. Any investment, any project, has to be evaluated based upon the risk of the return, and I’m not going to argue with you, this is a very high risk-return, because we’re not in control of the benefits.”

#### **3. FAA software full of bugs**

Savain 10 [Louis, 4/24/2010, “Why the FAA's Next Generation Air Traffic Control System Will Fail” <http://rebelscience.blogspot.com/2010/04/why-faas-next-generation-air-traffic.html>] LZ

There is no question that the FAA's NextGen effort will fail because of their chosen software model. Current approaches to software construction are crap, primarily because deterministic timing is not an inherent and fundamental part of the programming model. As a result, complex software systems used for automation become unreliable as their complexity increases. Since NextGen falls into the category of extremely complex software systems, it's a guarantee that it will be riddled with bugs, including potentially dangerous and/or costly bugs. However, I would not advise the FAA to abandon their current overall design.

### Ext. #1 Poor Management

#### The FAA historically has been incapable of conducting a monitoring program because unassigned inspections are largely ignored. This leads to a high risk of not being able to find a system failure. That’s Mitchel 10.

#### FAA will manage NextGen poorly

DeHaven, 2010, [Tad, budget analyst on federal and state budget issues for the Cato Institute, 12/3/2010, “Huge Cost Overrun for FAA's NextGen” <http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/huge-cost-overrun-faas-nextgen>] LZ

According to this analysis, implementing the highest performance levels envisioned in the [Integrated Work Plan] for ground and aircraft capabilities by 2025 could increase NextGen’s costs significantly beyond the initial cost estimate of $40 billion (e.g., in some scenarios that require every aircraft to be equipped with extensive avionics in a shorter time frame, estimated costs can go as high as $160 billion). If the highest performance levels are implemented over a longer period, by 2035, the cost estimates would be lower, but still would be considerably higher than $40 billion. As a Cato essay on airports and air traffic control points out, the FAA has a poor track record when it comes to implementing new technologies: The FAA has been attempting to modernize its system, expand capacity, and increase its productivity for decades. But dozens of reports over the years from the Government Accountability Office and the Office of Inspector General in the Department of Transportation have faulted the FAA for poor management of major projects, which are often delayed and over budget. The Advanced Automation System, Wide Area Augmentation System, and other major projects have had large cost overruns and been years behind schedule or cancelled.

### **Ext. #2 Super Slow**

#### **The quick advancement of technology makes the industry unwilling to invest because they know they will have to invest again soon afterwards. In addition, the FAA’s commitment isn’t trusted, compounded by Congress’s short-term funding extensions. This creates huge uncertainty in the investment that slows it down. That’s Halsey 11.**

#### **NextGen will take way over 10 years to put in place because of delays—and they say they solve impacts?**

Farrell 8 [Nick, journalist for The Inquirer and The Sun, 10/13/2008, “US wastes $5 billion running ancient air traffic control, <http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/1037813/us-wastes-usd5-billion-running-ancient-air-traffic-control>] LZ

Funding is a problem, but so are the complexities of the switchover. Currently government does not expect to have it up and running until the early 2020s. However, since there is a lack of commitment to the project supporters warn that even that goal might be not be attainable.¶ Robert Sturgell, the acting administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration said that, since the radar technology was developed, the United States had been to the moon and back.¶ NextGen could save airlines at least 3.3 billion gallons of fuel a year – or more than $10 billion annually – by 2025.¶ Gerald Dillingham, director of civil aviation issues at the US Government Accountability Office pointed out that building the network involves gradually putting together the new system while still relying on radar for day-to-day operations.¶ He said it was "like changing a tire on a car that's going 60 miles an hour. "

#### **Delays compound to greatly increase costs**

Dillingham 11 [Gerald, Ph.D. and Director of GAO’s Physical Infrastructure Issues and Civil Aviation Issues Teams, 10/5/2011, “Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives” <http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585588.pdf>] LZ

Some key acquisitions may soon encounter delays, which can increase overall acquisition costs, as well as costs to maintain current systems. For example, delays in implementing the ERAM program is projected to increase costs by $330 million, as well as an estimated $7 to $10 million per month in additional costs to continue maintaining the system that ERAM was meant to replace. Moreover, due to the integrated nature of NextGen, many of its component systems are mutually dependent on one or more other systems. For example, ERAM is critical to the delivery of ADS-B because ADS-B requires the use of some ERAM functions. ERAM is also pivotal to the on-time implementation of two other key NextGen acquisitions—Data Communications and SWIM. In part due to ERAM’s delay, FAA pushed the Data Communications program’s start date from September 2011 to February 2012, plans to revise the original SWIM segment 1 cost and schedule plan, and delayed the SWIM-segment 2 start date from 2010 to December 2012. The long-term result of this decision is not yet known but it could delay certain SWIM capabilities and hinder the progress of other capabilities that depend, in turn, on the system integration that SWIM is intended to provide. Thus, looking more broadly, the implementation of NextGen—both in the midterm (through 2018) and in the long term (beyond 2018)—will be affected by how well FAA manages program interdependencies.

# **Lobbying DA**

### **Lobbying 1NC**

#### **A. No weaponization now and it’s not inevitable**

Smith 11 [Colonel M.V. Smith, USAF, Director of the Air Force Space and Cyber Center at Air University, 2011, "Spacepower and Warfare," Institute for National Strategic Studies, Spacepower Theory Project, http://www.ndu.edu/press/spacepower-and-warfare.html]

A discussion of the nexus of spacepower and warfare is controversial because space has yet to be overtly weaponized or generally recognized as an arena of open combat. Many, if not most, nations want to keep space a weapons-free peaceful sanctuary, particularly the suprastate actors. Just because all other media are weaponized and used as arenas of combat does not mean that space will automatically follow suit.1 Perhaps this generation will figure out how to keep the beast of war in chains short enough to prevent it from going to space. But the next (and each succeeding) generation must also keep the chains short. Unfortunately, the constant march of technology is making space more important to states at the same time it is making it easier to build space weapons.

#### **B. Aerospace industry spends millions of dollars on lobbying—more funding to the industry lets them slap even more money onto the table**

Dreazen 11 [Yochi, senior correspondent for National Journal Group covering military affairs and national security, 2/25/2011, “Tanker Fight Highlights Washington's Expensive Influence Game” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/tanker-fight-highlights-washington-s-expensive-influence-game-20110225>] LZ

The Air Force’s surprise decision to give Boeing a multi-billion dollar contract for new airborne refueling tankers capped a years-long fight between Boeing and EADS North America that was notable for the ferocity of the two companies’ lobbying efforts and the vast sums of money they were willing to spend along the way.¶ Both companies are veterans of Washington’s influence game, where large firms hire armies of lobbyists to press their case on Capitol Hill and donate significant sums of money to lawmakers who sit on key panels like the Senate Armed Services Committee or the House Appropriations Committee.¶ Defense firms are particularly skilled and aggressive players, and Boeing and EADS appear to have pulled out all of the stops in their fight to win the tanker contract, which could eventually be worth more than $100 billion. ¶ Last year, Boeing spent more than $17.8 million on lobbying expenditures, the most of any firm in the defense aerospace industry, according to data from the Center for Responsive Politics. EADS spent just $3.2 million in 2010, according to the center.¶ The Air Force has been trying to award the contract since 2001, but a surreal mix of outright criminality, corruption, and government incompetence derailed the two prior attempts to finalize a deal to replace the military’s aging fleet of tankers, which are used to refuel jets, bombers, and other planes in mid-flight.¶ The fight to determine which company would make the next-generation tanker has been one of Washington's longest-running—and most contentious—lobbying wars. Both companies have bought large quantities of ads on the Washington Metro and in publications that target Capitol Hill. In its public messaging and private lobbying, Boeing has made the case that EADS enjoys an unfair advantage because it receives large subsidies from European governments. EADS had countered by arguing that it makes a superior plane that could carry more fuel than Boeing’s model.¶ The decision to give Boeing the tanker contract was made in the halls of the Pentagon, not on Capitol Hill, so Boeing’s extensive political contributions don’t mean that the company was able to somehow buy the contract. But the donations could pay clear dividends in the coming weeks as the tanker fight shifts to Congress, which will have to sign off on the Boeing contract, as well as on any follow-on deals to purchase additional planes from the firm.¶ The statistics from the Center for Responsive Politics provide vivid evidence of how the two firms began to sharply increase their lobbying expenditures in 2007, when the Air Force opened the troubled program to new bids. The contract was initially awarded to a joint bid from EADS and Northrop Grumman in 2008, but Boeing successfully appealed the decision to the Government Accountability Office, setting off nearly three more years of heated—and expensive—debate on Capitol Hill.¶ Boeing, for instance, saw its political expenses jump from $10.6 million in 2007 to more than $17.5 million in 2008, while EADS increased its own spending from $2.48 million in 2007 to more than $4.52 million in 2008, according to the center.¶ Much of the money has gone to a veritable who’s who of well-connected retired lawmakers. EADS employs former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss. and former House Appropriations Chairman Bob Livingston, R-La. Boeing’s lobbyists include former House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt, D-Mo., and Tony Podesta, whose brother John helped run the Obama administration’s transition effort and maintains close ties to the White House.¶ Boeing and EADS have also worked to steer money to individual lawmakers from the states that stood to gain the most jobs depending on which firm won the massive tanker contract. In the run-up to Thursday’s decision, Boeing had promised to create thousands of new jobs in California, Washington state, and Kansas, while EADS said it would build a sprawling new factory in Alabama that would provide a much-needed economic jolt to areas still struggling to recover from Hurricane Katrina.¶ In the last election cycle, Boeing’s political action committee spent more than $2.9 million, mainly in support of candidates for federal office, while EADS spent just under $300,000, according to data from the Center for Responsive Politics.¶ The money was carefully targeted. Much of EADS’ money went to lawmakers from Alabama like Republican Rep. Jo Bonner ($10,000) and Democratic Rep. Bobby Bright ($3,000), who was defeated. Alabama lawmakers have long been EADS’ strongest allies on Capitol Hill because of the company’s promise to build a new plant in the state.¶ Boeing, for its part, has shunted money to lawmakers from Kansas, Washington, and California. Sen. Patty Murray, D-Wash., who released a statement shortly after the decision was announced praising Boeing’s successful fight against an “illegally subsidized foreign competitor,” has received $103,560 from people and PACs associated with the company, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. Sen. Pat Roberts, R-Kan., who preempted the Pentagon’s announcement on Thursday by releasing an early press release celebrating Boeing’s win, received $19,750 from PACs associated with Boeing over the same time period, according to the Center.¶ The military’s decade-long push to replace its tankers will now move to Capitol Hill, where lawmakers will have to decide whether to ratify Boeing’s award, rescind it, or divide it between the two companies. EADS is also considering whether to formally appeal the Air Force decision. ¶ The uncertainty means that the tanker fight is far from over—and that the two companies are likely to continue flooding Capitol Hill with both money and lobbyists.

#### C. AIA is pushing space weaponization

Blakey, President and CEO of AIA, 8 [Marion, August 2008 “U.S. Defense Modernization: Today’s Choices for Tomorrow’s Readiness”] LZ

It has been nearly 10 years since the Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization highlighted the growing vulnerability of our space assets and sounded the alarm about the threat of a “space Pearl Harbor.” According to the commission’s report, our increasing dependence on space tempts potential adversaries to employ operations “which are intended to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy U.S. space systems.”8 The report detailed the growing interest of some countries, such as China, in developing and operationalizing systems to hold U.S. space systems at risk. As more and more countries have access to technology designed to attack satellites in space or their requisite ground support systems, it becomes increasingly important to equip the U.S. space infrastructure with the necessary tools to deter and deflect potential attacks. Unfortunately, in the decade since the release of the commission’s report, insufficient progress has been made in developing the space situational awareness and space protection capabilities that our security demands. Though hardly a “space Pearl Harbor,” the Chinese anti-satellite test in January 2007 highlighted how real the threat has become and how much work remains to be done.

#### D. Space weaponization causes global space arms race and deterrence framework is nullified by first strike and miscalculation

Hitchens 08 [Theresa, author of “Future Security In Space: Charting a Cooperative Course,” continues to write on space and nuclear arms control issues for a number of outside publications, March, “Space Wars”, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=31334623&site=bsi-live>] LZ

Perhaps of even greater concern is that several other nations, including one of China's regional rivals, India, may feel compelled to seek offensive as well as defensive capabilities in space. The U.S. trade journal Defense News, for instance, quoted unidentified Indian defense officials as stating that their country had already begun developing its own kinetic-energy (nonexplosive, hit-to-kill) and laser-based antisatellite weapons. If India goes down that path, its archrival Pakistan will probably follow suit. Like India, Pakistan has a well-developed ballistic missile program, including medium-range missiles that could launch an antisatellite system. Even Japan, the third major Asian power, might join such a space race. In June 2007 the National Diet of Japan began considering a bill backed by the current Fukuda government that would permit the development of satellites for "military and national security" purposes. As for Russia, in the wake of the Chinese test President Vladimir Putin reiterated Moscow's stance against the weaponization of space. At the same time, though, he refused to criticize Beijing's actions and blamed the U.S. instead. The American efforts to build a missile defense system, Putin charged, and the increasingly aggressive American plans for a military position in space were prompting China's moves. Yet Russia itself, as a major spacefaring power that has incorporated satellites into its national security structure, would be hard-pressed to forgo entering an arms race in space. Given the proliferation of spacefaring entities [see box at left], proponents of a robust space warfare strategy believe that arming the heavens is inevitable and that it would be best for the U.S. to get there first with firepower. Antisatellite and space-based weapons, they argue, will be necessary not only to defend U.S. military and commercial satellites but also to deny any future adversary the use of space capabilities to enhance the performance of its forces on the battlefield. Yet any arms race in space would almost inevitably destabilize the balance of power and thereby multiply the risks of global conflict. In such headlong competition--whether in space or elsewhere--equilibrium among the adversaries would be virtually impossible to maintain. Even if the major powers did achieve stability, that reality would still provide no guarantee that both sides would perceive it to be so. The moment one side saw itself to be slipping behind the other, the first side would be strongly tempted to launch a preemptive strike, before things got even worse. Ironically, the same would hold for the side that perceived itself to have gained an advantage. Again, there would be strong temptation to strike first, before the adversary could catch up. Finally, a space weapons race would ratchet up the chances that a mere technological mistake could trigger a battle. After all, in the distant void, reliably distinguishing an intentional act from an accidental one would be highly problematic.

### No Weaponization Now

#### Obama not pursuing space weaponization

Broad and Chang, 10[William Broad, lead science writer, and Kenneth Chang, science reporter, New York Times, “ Obama Reverses Bush’s Space Policy”, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/science/space/29orbit.html]

The Obama administration on Monday unveiled a space policy that renounces the unilateral stance of the Bush administration and instead emphasizes international cooperation, including the possibility of an arms control treaty that would limit the development of space weapons. In recent years, both China and the United States have destroyed satellites in orbit, raising fears about the start of a costly arms race that might ultimately hurt the United States because it dominates the military use of space. China smashed a satellite in January 2007, and the United States did so in February 2008. The new space policy explicitly says that Washington will “consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies.” The Bush administration, in the space policy it released in August 2006, said it “rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of the United States to operate in and acquire data from space,” a phrase that was interpreted as giving a green light to the development and use of antisatellite weapons. The policy also stated that Washington would “oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access or use of space,” a phrase that effectively ruled out arms control. In secret, the Bush administration engaged in research that critics said could produce a powerful ground-based laser, among other potential weapons meant to shatter enemy satellites in orbit. By contrast, the Obama policy underlines the need for international cooperation. “It is the shared interest of all nations to act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions and mistrust,” the new policy says in its opening lines. “Space operations should be conducted in ways that emphasize openness and transparency.” Peter Marquez, director of space policy at the White House National Security Council, told reporters on Monday that the policy was reverting to a less confrontational approach that the United States had championed in the past. “The arms control language is bipartisan language that appeared in the Reagan policy and George H. W. Bush’s policy and the Clinton policy,” Mr. Marquez said in a White House briefing. “So we’re bringing it back to a bipartisan agreed-upon position.” Jeff Abramson, a senior analyst at the Arms Control Association, a private group in Washington, said the new policy “sets the stage for progress in space arms control — without getting into specifics.” For many years, diplomats from around the globe have gathered in Geneva to hammer out a treaty on the “prevention of an arms race in outer space,” which would ban space weapons. Arms control supporters say that China and Russia have backed the process, and that the United States during the Bush administration dragged its feet. In 2006, John Mohanco, a State Department official, told the diplomats in Geneva that as long as attacks on satellites remained a threat, “our government will continue to consider the possible role that space-related weapons may play in protecting our assets.” Now, the Obama administration has stopped the saber-rattling and started what might end in a new kind of peaceful accord — though with plenty of caveats and vague conditions.

### A2 Weaponization Inevitable

#### **Saying weaponization is inevitable is a self-fulfilling prophecy**

Park 6 [Andrew T. Park, 2006, "Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enchance the Legal Regime for Space," Houston Journal of International Law, Volume 28, No. 3, page 871-911, <http://www.hjil.org/ArticleFiles/28_3_871.pdf>]

The simplest argument for space weaponization (inevitability) may also be the most reckless because of its self-fulfilling nature. Proponents of the inevitability of space weaponization have proffered multiple theories as to why the realm of space will eventually become weaponized. According to the logic of these inevitability proponents, the United States should lead the way rather than be left in the dust as military technology continues to rapidly develop. However, while the inevitability argument may have some merit, its true danger lies in its unverifiable nature until weaponization actually occurs. Moreover, it is important to note that this premise is driven not only by American insecurities, but also by the need for the United States to control its own future. Since the ideological divide between “space doves” and those who believe space weaponization is inevitable is not likely to be bridged soon, the international community must recognize the need for a legal regime for space with teeth—or, put another way, a legal regime that goes beyond simply establishing a set of norms that have little to no consequences.

#### Space weaponization is not certain – superpowers already abandoned their weapons

Hardesty 05 [David, President of West Virginia University, J.D. from [Harvard Law School](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_Law_School), and a B.A./M.A. from [Oxford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_University), former Tax Commissioner of West Virginia (David C. Hardesty “[Space-Based Weapons: Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives](http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/documents/NWCRSP05.pdf),” Spring 2005, <http://www.usnwc.edu/press/review/documents/NWCRSP05.pdf>]

As for the inevitability argument, Dr. Karl P. Mueller concludes that arguments based on human nature or historical analogies to the air and sea are “thought-provoking but ultimately weak.” They do not account for the fact that though some nations continue to possess banned chemical and biological weapons, there is no clamor in the United States to deploy such weapons in such large numbers on the ground that their further spread is inevitable. “Perhaps most strikingly of all, even among space weapons advocates one does not find voices arguing that the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit is inevitable based on the rule that weapons always spread.” The analogy to the medium of air also has significant holes. Less than fifteen years after the first powered flight, mili- tary aircraft were carrying out reconnaissance, offensive and defensive counterair, and strategic and tactical bombing missions. In contrast, over forty-five years after Sputnik, space-based counterspace and terrestrial bombardment is not being conducted, long after the technical capability emerged. “In fact, both superpowers did develop anti-satellite interceptors, but then abandoned their ASAT programs, something utterly without precedent in the history of air power that casts further doubt on the soundness of the analogy.”

#### Space weaponization not inevitable – no weapons now

Stimson 10 [Founded in 1989, the Henry L. Stimson Center is a nonproﬁt, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security through a unique combination of rigorous analysis and outreach. September 21, 2010, "Key Elements of Space Assurance," http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/key-elements-of-space-assurance/]

Other nations are similarly also engaged in research and development programs relating to space warfare. There is no compelling need, however, to engage in the flight testing and deployment of dedicated space weapons, in part because the United States and many other nations already possess military capabilities designed for other missions that could, in extreme circumstances, serve as a response to the first use of space weapons by another state. Such "residual" space warfare capabilities have paradoxically served as a brake against the flight testing and deployment of space weapons in the past. The weaponization of space is not inevitable. If it were, this would have occurred during the Cold War. Rather than to engage in such a competition now, a far wiser course would be to strengthen efforts to promote space assurance.

#### Even if it is inevitable, we should avoid it for as long as possible

Mueller 6 [Karl P,  Senior Political Scientist at RAND, “Toward a U.S. Grand Strategy in Space,” 3/10/2006, <http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/408.pdf>]

Pete has talked a bit about the argument that weapons in space are inevitable. Somebody will do it eventually and it is probably better to do it first than to play catch-up so we might as well go ahead and do it. You often see statements by people saying that, “I really wish there weren’t weapons in space, but since they are coming, I think we ought to go first.” There are many arguments about why space weapons may not actually be inevitable, but the inevitability is not really the question. Someday somebody will put a weapon in space, but assuming that is true, what really matters is when it is going to happen if we don’t do anything and what form it is going to take and, given the various policy options you might pursue, what impact those will have on when it happens, whether it happens, and what form it takes. Death is inevitable, but if you want to live a long time, you do things to affect when it happens to you and how it happens. This also applies to space policy. It is also important to keep in mind, of course, that what we do with national space security is not going to determine the answer to whether space gets weaponized, except to the extent that if we do it, that answers the question. But it is likely to affect how it happens, even though we are not completely masters of our own fate here.

### Lobby Money Increases

#### Aerospace is lobbying NextGen now**—**the plan switches their focus back to space weaponization

**AIN 9** [Aviation International News, 1/27/2009, “Aviation Lobbyist Urge: Include NextGen in Stimulus” <http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-news/2009-01-27/aviation-lobby-groups-urge-include-nextgen-stimulus>] LZ

In a rare show of unanimity, the Air Transport Association has joined with general aviation and others in lobbying Congress for a $4 billion stimulus package that could jumpstart NextGen and provide many of its benefits during President Barack Obama’s first term. A coalition of 11 aviation-related organizations said that under the FAA’s current plan, NextGen will not achieve significant investment return for the aviation transportation system until 2025. Included in the group are NBAA, the National Air Transportation Association, AOPA and the General Aviation Manufacturers Association. “This is due, in large part, to the challenge of aligning investments in air and ground infrastructure and across the stakeholders–the ‘chicken and egg’ syndrome,” the groups said. “An infusion of stimulus funding would jumpstart this process, dramatically advancing the schedule and resulting in job creation, a reduction in carbon emissions and an air transportation system supporting economic growth.” Under the stimulus proposal, the $4 billion would be used to make grants for 100 percent of the costs to retrofit general aviation and commercial aircraft with NextGen equipment such as on-board avionics, electronic flight bags, cockpit displays, surface moving maps and software upgrades.

#### Funding increases will result in more lobbying money that goes to weaponization

Reich 11 [Robert, former U.S. secretary of labor, 6/5/11, “Reich: The military-industrial-political complex” <http://www.dailynewstranscript.com/opinion/columnists/x1360366511/Reich-The-military-industrial-political-complex#axzz1RoxpdPxL>] LZ

Lockheed has also been spending more than $3 million a year on political contributions to friendly members of Congress. On top of this, Lockheed gives money to the Aerospace Industries Association to lobby for a bigger defense budget and support members of Congress who will vote accordingly. But we don't know how much because it's secret. We don't even know how much Lockheed is giving the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to lobby against the president's proposed executive order requiring disclosure of its political activities. That's secret, too. Don't we have a right to know? After all, you and I and other taxpayers are Lockheed's biggest customer. As such, we're financing much of this lobbying and donating. Lockheed's political activities are built into its costs. So when Lockheed contracts with the federal government for a piece of military equipment, you and I and other taxpayers end up paying for a portion of these political activities. It's one of the most insidious conflicts of interest in American politics. Lockheed is hardly alone in using taxpayer money to get fatter contracts from taxpayers. The 10 biggest government contractors are all defense contractors. Every one of them gets most of its revenues from the federal government. And every one uses a portion of that money to lobby for even more defense contracts. That's one reason the defense procurement budget keeps expanding. Next year's expected drawdown of troops from Afghanistan and Iraq was supposed to save money. But Lockheed and other giant defense contractors have made sure all anticipated savings will go to new weapons systems. Lockheed recently delivered a budget bombshell with a proposed tab of more than $1 trillion for a fleet of F-35 joint-strike fighter jets. That doesn't even include $385 billion that the Defense Department will spend to buy 2,500 of the stealth planes. Tom Burbage of Lockheed acknowledged that the "t" word, as he gently put it, "causes a lot of sensational reaction ... because no one ever dealt with 't's before in the program." That's an understatement. Congress is nonetheless willing to fund these mammoth projects as if the nation didn't have a long-term budget crisis. Brace yourself. In the wake of last year's Supreme Court decision, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, there's no limit on what Lockheed and other defense contractors can spend on politics. But why should you and I and other taxpayers pay Lockheed to lobby for the trillion-dollar F-35 and support politicians who will vote for it? Why should we pay for the political activities of Northrop-Grumman and Boeing to come up with even more aerospace weapons systems? Or for Raytheon and General Dynamics to procure more high-tech weapons? Or for Blackwater and Halliburton to procure more private military contract workers? The answer is, we shouldn't. Over a half-century ago, President Dwight Eisenhower warned of the dangers of an unbridled military-industrial complex, as he called it. It's now a military-industrial-congressional complex. And after Citizens United, it's more unbridled than ever.

### Pushing Space Weaponization

#### **Aerospace lobbies for space weaponization because it would generate revenue**

Ruhm 03 [Brian, major in the US Air Force, April 2003, “FINDING THE MIDDLE GROUND: THE U.S. AIR FORCE, SPACE

WEAPONIZATION, AND ARMS CONTROL” <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/03-1394.pdf>] LZ

The aerospace industry and its associated lobby also influence US policy towards space weaponization. It views space operations at least partially in terms of revenue and growth potential, and this perspective certainly bolsters enthusiasm for a more aggressive US posture in space. Though US defense budget increased from $274 billion to $345 billion (in constant fiscal year 2002 dollars) between 1997 and 2002, the US still spends substantially less on defense, measured in either absolute terms or as a percentage of gross domestic product, than it did at the height of the Cold War.¶ 30¶ This situation could change quickly if the US were to move ¶ aggressively into space though. As an indication of how the development of space weapons might affect defense spending, consider current spending levels for the Ground-Based MidCourse Defense Segment (GMD), a developmental missile defense system designed to intercept Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) threatening the US as they transit the space environment. The FY 2002 acquisition budget for the GMD system and its associated space sensors totaled more than $4.2 billion.¶ 31¶ This figure dwarfed each of the services largest acquisition programs – the Air Force F-22 ($3.9 billion), the Navy AEGIS destroyer ($3.4 billion), and the Army Longbow Apache ($951 million) – though the program is still only in its research, development, test, and engineering (RDT&E) phase.¶ 32¶ Estimates suggest that spending on certain space-based weapon systems would greatly exceed GMD spending.¶ 33¶ These prospects encourage industry support for an aggressive US approach to space weaponry.¶ 34

### ! Arms Race

#### Deployment of space weapons would trigger an arms race in space

Vereshchetin 10 **[**V.S. Vereshchetin, Lawyer for space projects and programs, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE IN THE GENERAL LEGAL FIELD, April, (COMMONALITY AND PARTICULARITIES) Revista Brasileira de Direito Aeronáutico e Espacial, http://www.sbda.org.br/revista/1826.pdf]

Twelve years ago Professor Bin Cheng in his lecture devoted to the thirtieth anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty highlighted four areas of concern existing in people’s minds at the beginning of the space age. In the words of Bin Cheng those concerns were the following:*“(i) The arms race and the military use of outer* *space;* *(ii) Possible scramble for colonies or resources;* *(iii) Worries over responsibility and control, as well* *as over potential harm or damage; and* *(iv) International cooperation and mutual assistance”.(23)* I would like to single out and speak from the current perspective to the first and the fourth of those concerns, and will do so in reverse order. We are all very well aware that the principle of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space permeates the Outer Space Treaty and all other instruments of international space law. The debate over the legal nature and consequences of this principle was a typical feature in the early literature and in different forums on space law. Thanks to my former direct involvement on the legal side in a number of significant space projects and programmes, I clearly remember the impressive evolution of international space cooperation from the mere exchange of results of scientific experiments carried out in outer space to the joint work on the building and operation of the International Space Station and the creation of a number of international space organizations providing indispensable services to all people on earth. It is encouraging that nowadays governments and private enterprises envisage new important projects and space agencies of different nations have established regular meetings and consultations on matters of common interest. But on the other hand, it is disquieting that the breath-taking plans of future human flights to the moon and beyond, requiring tremendous material and intellectual

resources, are sometimes seen in terms of the competition of old between the space actors rather than cooperative endeavors built on the accumulated experience of multinational space projects. The trendy slogan “back to the moon” is often presented as a “race” of different players, including the United States, Russia, China, India, Japan, ESA and the private sector. It would be extremely regrettable, if political, military and commercial interests of individual States and private corporations were to prevail and anew put competition ahead of cooperation. Much more worrisome than the “moon race” would be an arms race in outer space. This would be manifestly inconsistent with “the common interest of all mankind in the progress of exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes” and with “the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples” as directed in the Outer Space Treaty.(24) By recalling those lofty purposes of the Treaty I do not intend to prolong the perennial polemic on the meaning of the terms “peaceful uses” or “peaceful purposes” in the text of that Treaty.(25) The application of space technology for military and so-called “dualuse” purposes has become a fait accompli. However, up to now outer space has remained free from weapons as such. The situation would radically change should the plans for space-based weapons go ahead and trigger a new spiral in the arms race both in outer space and on earth. Even the deployment of “conventional” weapons in outer space, which is not formally and specifically prohibited by any treaty in force, could ultimately make of outer space a “fourth battlefield”. The gloomy prospect of a war in outer space would be in no-one’s interest. It remains to be seen whether the pledge of President Barack Obama, during his election campaign, to seek a ban on space weapons will lead to a substantial change to this effect in the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy formulated by the Bush Administration. That policy was widely viewed as giving a green light to U.S. weapons in space and in the past was translated into the inexorable refusal of the American delegation in the Conference on Disarmament even to start negotiations on a treaty which would secure nonweaponization of outer space. Such negotiations were labelled “pointless and unneeded”.(26) It is against this backdrop that one has to assess the significance for the regulation of outer space military uses of the new proposal announced in the Conference on Disarmament by Bin Cheng are nowadays even more apparent since the plans for space weaponization are sometimes presented as a kind of “peaceful” use of outerspace. As noted before, the mere fact that the EU Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities was introduced in the Conference on Disarmament suggested its close connection with the problem of military uses of outer space. Indeed, many other elements of that proposal, relating to the security of space activities in the broadest sense of the term, such as measures on space debris control and mitigation or registration of space objects, are already being dealt with or could be dealt with by relevant expert bodies, for example UNCOPUOS. But what was actually proposed in the E.U. Draft with regard to military activities in outer space? The authors satisfy themselves with just mentioning among “general principles” the responsibility of States “to take all the adequate measures to prevent outer space from becoming an area of conflict”. This general statement is not supported by any specific commitments, albeit voluntary and nonbinding. On the contrary, it is diluted by numerous reservations, scattered throughout the document, which can be read as justifying different kinds of military activities because they are “vital to national security,” or on such grounds as “legitimate defense interests,” “inherent right of self-defense” or “imperative safety considerations”. In vain does one try to find in the document one single word concerning the need to prevent space weaponization – the most pressing measure required in order to avert outer space from “becoming an area of conflict”. Elsewhere, the authors explain this away by reference to their unwillingness to duplicate or compete with other initiatives to this effect. However there is little persuasive force in this argument. Enhancement of the security of space activities against the risks posed by space debris, collisions and all kinds of harmful interference is a real and important task of space regulation. This was dramatically demonstrated by the collision of two space objects on 10 February 2009. However the main threat to the security of space activities would be an unbridled arms race provoked by space-based weapons. Therefore the enhancement of space security, transparency and confidence building measures announced as the main objectives of the proposed EU Code are incompatible with any kind of neutrality towards the placement of weapons in outer space. Even if non-binding, a multilateral document that claims to be a code of “basic rules to be observed by space-faring nations” (28) cannot neglect this obvious concern.

### O/W Nuke War

#### Even if nuclear war is more destructive – taboo and deterrence prevents the risk. Only space weapons will be utilized in a conflict

Shixiu 7 [Bao, senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, Academy of Military Sciences of the PLA of China, visiting scholar at the Virginia Military Institute, “Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space,” China Security, Winter, 2007, p2-11, <http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_1.pdf>]

Space weapons and their use are unique from other types of weapons, whether nuclear or terrestrial conventional weapons. Although there will be a taboo on the use of space weapons, the threshold of their use will be lower than that of nuclear weapons because of their conventional characteristics. Space debris may threaten the space assets of other “third party” countries, but the level of destruction, especially in terms of human life, could be far less than nuclear weapons or potentially even conventional weapons. Therefore, the threshold of force capability required to launch an effective deterrent will inevitably be higher than for that of nuclear weapons. This unique nature of space weapons will affect the determination of the quantity and technical level of a “deterrent capability” in space.

### Turns Heg

#### Putting Weapons in space kills Heg

Smith 01 [M.V. Smith, researcher at the School of Advanced Air Power Studies, June 2001 “TEN PROPOSITIONS REGARDING SPACEPOWER” http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/smith.pdf]

Conversely, advocates of preserving space as a peaceful sanctuary believe weaponizing space will reduce the overall power of the United States as an actor on the world stage. They are concerned about triggering security dilemmas that will lead to an arms race in space. According to Hays and Mueller: [Sanctuary realists] oppose space Weaponization, because they believe it would reduce rather than enhance US power and security in particular. They argue that the United States, as the leading user of space, has far the most to lose if space systems become increasingly vulnerable to attack and that as the world’s preeminent air and surface power, it has the least to gain from developing such weapons. Sanctuary realists also assert that if the United States takes the lead in developing space weapons, it will be easier for other states to follow suit, thanks to US technological trailblazing. Finally, they tend to be skeptical that the military utility of space weapons, both for power projection and to protect US space assets, will be as great as the weaponization proponents typically claim.204 Undoubtedly, there are numerous concerns over space-based weapons such as monetary costs, a questionable threat, lack of survivability, lack of political will, incompatibility with democratic values, problems with orbital dynamics and laser physics, treaty infractions, and international opinion just to name a few.205 All these concerns are serious and real. In fact, the solutions may not arrive for years, but they will come to fruition sooner or later.

#### Space weaponization destroys soft power which tanks overall hegemony

Brown 9 [Trevor, BA, Indiana University; MSc, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Singapore], “Soft Power and Space Weaponization” <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html#brown>]

The problem for the United States is that other nations believe it seeks to monopolize space in order to further its hegemonic dominance.7 In recent years, a growing number of nations have vocally objected to this perceived agenda. Poor US diplomacy on the issue of space weaponization contributes to increased geopolitical backlashes of the sort leading to the recent decline in US soft power—the ability to attract others by the legitimacy of policies and the values that underlie them—which, in turn, has restrained overall US national power despite any gains in hard power (i.e., the ability to coerce).8 The United States should not take its soft power lightly since decreases in that attribute over the past decade have led to increases in global influence for strategic competitors, particularly Russia and China. The ramifications have included a gradual political, economic, and social realignment, otherwise known as “multipolarism” and translated as waning US power and influence. “Soft power, therefore, is not just a matter of ephemeral popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the United States wants. . . . When the United States becomes so unpopular that being pro-American is a kiss of death in other countries’ domestic politics, foreign political leaders are unlikely to make helpful concessions. . . . And when U.S. policies lose their legitimacy in the eyes of others, distrust grows, reducing U.S. leverage in international affairs.”9 Due to US losses of soft power, the international community now views with suspicion any legitimate concerns that the United States may have about protecting critical assets in space, making it far more difficult politically for the Air Force to make plans to offer such protection.

### ! Airpower

There are impact cards in the answers to the economy advantage.

#### AIA will push Long Range Strike – that’s key to airpower

Blakey 8 [Marion C. Blakey, President and CEO of AIA, August 2008 “U.S. Defense Modernization: Today’s Choices for Tomorrow’s Readiness” <http://www.aia-aerospace.org/assets/report_modernization_aug08.pdf>] LZ

“Air strategy,” wrote World War II Air Force Gen. Carl Spaatz, “starts with range.” The nation’s long-range bomber fleet is a key tool allowing the United States to craft a global aerospace strategy — providing the combat power to hold at risk any spot around the world and ensuring effective deterrence. Today’s Air Force was born in part from the recognition that the nation’s nuclear force should reside in an independent service. While nuclear deterrence alone justifies a strategic bomber fleet, the parallel value and relevance of these forces to conventional theater operations has increased with the advent of precision weapons and real-time intelligence in the cockpit. Today and tomorrow, the current bomber inventory faces a new and more demanding operational environment. First, aviation forces have fewer overseas bases than in the past. In the 1960s the U.S. Air Force operated 70 overseas air-fields. Today, it maintains 15. In addition, U.S. focus has shifted from Europe to the Middle East and Asia. In Europe, military planners have access to 55 airfields per 1 million square miles. In the Middle East and Asia the airfield density decreases to 38 per million square miles. One example of the emerging demand for long-range combat air power is that bombers have flown 10 percent of the missions into Afghanistan but employed 70 percent of all munitions used in that conflict. The proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles exacerbates the distance challenge. More than 30 nations possess ballistic missiles while more than 70 have cruise missiles. As Iraq demonstrated in 2003, antiship cruise missiles can be adapted to a land attack role with relative ease, circumventing air defense missile systems. If the adversary nation also has weapons of mass destruction, the ballistic or cruise missile threat could deter U.S. leadership from deploying forces within the missile’s range or dissuade allies from granting U.S. forces access to their bases. In the future, U.S. forces should expect to operate at longer distances than in the past. U.S. aircraft can also expect to face an advanced threat environment. Eighteen nations have the SA-10 surface-to-air missile system that can reach as far as 125 miles. Russia is starting to market the more advanced and longer range SA-12 and SA-20 systems. In addition, more than two dozen nations operate the MiG-29 Fulcrum or SU-30 Flanker — a sophisticated air defense fighter with several hundred miles range. These air defense systems present an airspace barrier on a level the United States has not faced in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq. An additional change in the operational environment is that U.S. forces have adapted time-sensitive targeting as a core operational concept. During the Cold War and Operation Desert Storm, the air component relied on a deconflicted and detailed air campaign where target decisions were preplanned and few changes allowed. By 2003 more than 80 percent of aircraft-to-target pairings were made after the aircraft launched. The U.S. Air Force has a goal of accelerating the kill chain —the time from locating a target until it is destroyed —to less than 10 minutes. This will demand more versatility, flexibility and connectivity of future combat air forces.

# Spending

The spending links are horrible. The plans costs maximum like $150 billion, and most of the literature says $10-20 billion. ☹

#### NextGen costs $160 billion

Hoover 10 [J. Nicholas, Senior Editor of InformationWeek, “FAA NextGen Air Traffic Control Costs Could Quadruple”, <http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/enterprise-apps/228500257>]

The Federal Aviation Administration's massive, long-term air traffic control systems upgrade risks ballooning in costs from an already expensive $40 billion price tag to as much as a whopping $160 billion, an internal FAA planning office has found. According to a new report by the Government Accountability Office, the FAA's joint planning and development office determined that, if the FAA implements the "highest performance levels" suggested for NextGen, such as requiring extensive electronic systems to be installed on every aircraft, it could make NextGen's cost rise dramatically. In order to keep costs low, the FAA report found, NextGen will have to be developed with fewer ground and aircraft capabilities than envisioned. "Analysis shows a subset of scenarios developed, assuming lower levels of capabilities, whose cost estimates remain in the $40 billion range," the GAO report said. GAO also noted that the FAA has not yet established clear performance goals and metrics for NextGen despite creating an implementation plan through 2018. "Without goals and metrics, FAA could pursue and implement capabilities that fail to produce the desired results," the report said. NextGen is arguably the largest project the FAA has ever undertaken. Today's air traffic systems are decades behind current technologies, and the United States risks falling behind the rest of the world without an upgrade. In response, the NextGen system will transition U.S. air travel from a ground-based, analog system to a satellite-based, data-based and more automated system. It will optimize and automate parts of ground and air traffic control, enable real-time GPS maps of air and ground traffic, employ computerized weather monitoring to help route plans, and let planes fly closer together without any loss of safety, among other benefits. However, with its goals being so ambitious and taking place over such a long time frame, the GAO and Congress have repeatedly raised concerns about maintaining rigorous controls over NextGen in order to keep it on schedule and budget. In April, witnesses told a House of Representatives subcommittee that the FAA's handling of the project called into question its ability to manage it and raised concerns that NextGen would fail to be completed on schedule. Then, in June, the FAA's inspector general reported that the agency needed to do more planning to assure the project's success and had failed to develop the necessary skill sets to make NextGen work. A third negative report came in July when the GAO found the FAA didn't have adequate performance metrics in place for the project. Earlier reports have also noted that significant research gaps remain unresolved that could threaten FAA's proposed schedule, including ways to synchronize numerous weather applications.

# Politics

### Links

#### **Congress hates consolidation plans like NextGen**

Poole, Jr. 07 [Robert, director of transportation policy and Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow at Reason Foundation, March 2007, “The Urgent Need to Reform The FAA’s Air Traffic Control System” <http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/5798.pdf>] LZ

The third impediment to implementing a fundamentally different approach is political. The network-centric model can deliver major cost savings, ultimately providing two to three times the ATC capacity with the same number of—or even fewer—people because the 8 Reason Foundation changed paradigm makes the operations dramatically less labor-intensive. However, realizing these gains requires relatively swift retirement of huge numbers of costly radars and other ground-based navaids and consolidation of numerous ATC facilities. One current proposal would replace 21 en route centers and 171 TRACONs with 35 air traffic service hubs while redesigning all U.S. airspace. 12 Physical control towers located at each airport would gradually be phased out as “virtual tower” functions are built into the new super-hubs. As with the closing of military bases, Congress has a history of resisting the closure and consolidation of ATC facilities. The original 1982 NAS Plan included plans for facility consolidation, which were quietly dropped after it became clear that getting them through Congress would be very difficult. Congress came extremely close to forbidding the FAA’s recent success in outsourcing its Flight Service Station system, which involved consolidating from 58 facilities to 20 facilities. The prohibition was ultimately defeated due to a credible veto threat from the White House. Many observers expect that, if left to the annual appropriations process, a facility consolidation of the magnitude being considered for the next-generation system would suffer the same fate as the consolidations proposed in the NAS Plan.

#### NextGen spending is unpopular, even if the idea is

Langston 11 [Sara M., Reporter – Aviation Week, 2/18/11, “Congressman Introduces Clause To Fund Aviation's Equipage Of Nextgen”, Legal News Dictionary, <http://law.hukuki.net/congressman-introduces-clause-to-fund-aviations-equipage-of-nextgen.htm>]

Rep. Dan Lipinski (D-Ill.) is proposing to add a clause to the FAA reauthorization bill that would provide grants and loan guarantees for aircraft operators to equip for the NextGen program. Lipinski is one of the minority members of the House Transportation &amp; Infrastructure Committee. He has not said how he will attempt to include his proposal in the reauthorization bill that will soon be introduced by Committee Chairman John Mica (R-Fla.). Unless Mica decides to incorporate it, the proposal will likely be offered as an amendment. While there is broad bipartisan support for NextGen, authorizing new spending could be a tough sell in the House. Under the proposal, the FAA would be authorized to issue grants of up to 20% of the cost of equipping aircraft for automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B). The proposal specifies ADS-B "out," which will be used to improve surveillance for controllers. A second part of the proposal would authorize loan guarantees of up to 80% of equipage costs. Under certain conditions, the remaining 20% could be met by the direct grant.

#### Federal loan guarantees of the plan unpopular

Trabish 6/6 [Herman K., writer for Green Tech Media, 6/6/2012, Karl Rove is the chief political strategist for George W. Bush, “Sparks Fly as Bush’s Brain and Obama’s Mouth Talk Wind,” <http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/sparks-fly-as-bushs-brain-and-obamas-mouth-talk-wind/>]

Rove said the present political leadership has “been too focused on the presidential election to get things done." Rove predicted the wind industry’s production tax credit (PTC) would not be extended until after the November election, far too late to save an industry whose development lead times are eighteen months or more from a severe contraction in 2013. Gibbs agreed election year politics will stop all progress. “This should not be a partisan issue,” he said of the effort to get Congress to extend the PTC. “The one reason it would not get done is because somebody deems that to be in their political interest.” When Rove attacked the President’s political tactics, Bode reminded him Mr. Obama has staunchly supported renewables. Rove responded by changing the subject to tax reform. Gibbs agreed there is a need to reform the tax code and added that tax reform is a highly charged political topic. Rove kept the discussion away from wind, instead arguing for tax reforms like a long-term extension of the R&D tax credit. He did not, however, mention the possibility of a similar long-term extension of the PTC. He did take a big step when he noted that, unlike the federal loan guarantees that have become so unpopular in his political party, the PTC is based on performance and is a proven way of leveraging private investment.

More Links

#### Congress is divided over NextGen

McGee 11 [Bill, contributing editor to Consumer Reports – USA Today, 10/26/2011, “Five ways to improve air travel (that government won't act on)”, <http://travel.usatoday.com/experts/mcgee/story/2011-10-26/Five-ways-to-improve-air-travel-that-government-wont-act-on/50925900/1>]

Now consider that the United States, for all its power and wealth, is dependent upon an outdated air traffic control network that relies on radar rather than satellite-based technology. And further consider that the solution has been a political football, and the punting has continued for years now, ever since a new methodology was proposed in 2003. Benefits abound It's called the Next Generation Air Transportation System - better known as NextGen -- and by employing satellite and data technologies it's designed to reduce flight delays 35% by 2018. The Federal Aviation Administration site provides more background information—in both text and video formats—than most air travelers would ever need. For consumers, the simple fact is the FAA promises that modernizing the nation's antiquated air traffic control system would bring immediate and lasting advantages. Here are the top five benefits for air travelers: 1. A more efficient airline network with fewer flight delays, both in the air and on the ground 2. Fewer flight cancellations, providing passengers with savings in both money and time 3. Less time en route from Point A to Point B, aided by more direct flight paths, thus reversing the "padded flight times" trend I wrote about here in 2009 4. An enhanced level of safety "to better predict risks and then identify and resolve hazards" 5. Fuel savings and a reduction in aviation's carbon footprint, not just by lowering fuel emissions but also by curbing noise What's more, these efficiencies and economic benefits would also flow to airlines, corporate customers and communities as well, thereby strengthening the nation's economy. So the only pressing question concerning NextGen would seem to be: What's holding it up? The answer, of course, is funding, and neither the U.S. Government nor the airline industry has quite resolved this issue. In the meantime, the traveling public keeps waiting for NextGen. Footing the bills Support for NextGen crosses party lines and transcends political ideologies. As far back as 1997, Vice President Al Gore was calling for air traffic control modernization that would "make the notion of 'highway lanes in the sky' as obsolete as the bonfires that used to guide early fliers." The Reason Foundation points out that "the technology the (FAA) uses to navigate $200 million jets is less advanced than the GPS technology drivers use to navigate $20,000 cars." A key roadblock has been Congress. Critics on both sides of the aisle complain that the lack of long-term and sustained funding for the FAA is crippling big-picture capital improvement projects such as NextGen. Last summer, Congressional bickering prevented an extension of funding for an FAA Reauthorization bill and led to a temporary "shutdown" of non-essential FAA funding. That incident underscored that the FAA has been working without a long-term reauthorization since 2007, and has been temporarily funded more than 20 times in five years.

# States CP

#### States are up to the task—testing proves

**Huerta, 2-27** (Michael, Acting Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, Master's in international relations from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, "How States Have Fostered NextGen," <http://www.faa.gov/news/speeches/news_story.cfm?newsId=13374>) JD

The reauthorization clearly reflects Congress’ interest in integrating Unmanned Aerial Systems into our national airspace. We are working on how to select six test ranges to serve as pilot programs for the safe integration of UAS, per the reauthorization language. I know a number of states have a very significant interest in this particular provision, and let me assure you that we will have an open and transparent process—but it’s also important to note that no funding was included for this provision. The reauthorization also dovetails with our continued roll out of NextGen flight procedures around the country, which make a better use of airspace and save precious fuel. We are currently analyzing the reauthorization act’s many provisions and expect to have a full evaluation of all the programmatic and budgetary implications completed soon. One thing that I can say for sure is that the FAA is committed to advancing the transformation of our airspace into the Next Generation. The President’s budget for 2013 requests about $1 billion for NextGen programs—and anticipates $4 billion over the next four years. People sometimes wonder exactly what NextGen means. It can be something that seems overwhelming and hard to explain. But in reality, it’s quite simple. It means that we are using the GPS that we all use in our cars—and perfecting it to track and guide aircraft. This is a very simple explanation, so the engineers in the room will have to forgive me. NextGen is a whole lot more. But in the simplest terms, we are transitioning from the 1950s-era radar technology that we have used faithfully and successfully for many decades, to newer satellite technology. As we move forward, I welcome help from all 50 states in maximizing the benefits of NextGen. Two years ago we formally agreed to work with NASAO to advance NextGen and I’m looking forward to signing our formal agreement tomorrow to continue to work together cooperatively on many fronts. The National Association of State Aviation Officials has been around since before Amelia Earhart flew her Lockheed Vega across the Atlantic Ocean. It’s been around even before the FAA. We value our collaborative working relationship. Let me give you a few examples of where state aviation officials have partnered with us to push NextGen forward. First, let me start with the great state of Alaska– where it really all began. Alaska proves to be a wonderful testing ground for NextGen technology. Alaska has very challenging terrain – mountains and vast stretches of territory without radar coverage. As they say, the private aircraft is like a minivan for the people of rural Alaska. It’s how they get around. The FAA outfitted general aviation planes with state-of-the-art NextGen cockpit displays in Alaska to help navigate around mountains that cut off large areas from radar coverage. This gave pilots better weather information and a clearer view of mountainous terrain. It cut the accident rate almost in half. It was a collaborative effort between industry, the FAA, the University of Alaska at Anchorage and the state of Alaska. The project won the National Aeronautic Association’s Collier Trophy. The state of Alaska helped us determine where to put ground-based transmitters to test Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). They helped us choose the best airports for testing, which were mostly small airports in bush Alaska. Later in 2008, the state legislature of Alaska created a low interest loan program to equip aircraft with ADS-B technology. Alaska has been a great partner in helping the development and rollout of NextGen. We’ve also worked closely with other states. In Colorado, NextGen has opened up ski towns to tourists during all kinds of weather. Many times, bad weather causes flight delays and cancellations to remote airports during ski season from the months of November to April. Also, because of the mountainous terrain, air traffic controllers have to follow certain guidelines that slow operations and spreads them out more because they can’t track the aircraft using radar. Radar does not go through mountains. But NextGen has created a better way of tracking those aircraft. A technology that communicates with a plane’s transponder solves the problem of radar blockage in the mountains of Colorado and allows the air traffic controllers to see the planes. Now, just to be fair to Alaska, let me state that yes, this technology was already working at Juneau International Airport. Colorado is making it work in their state at several airports. This has been a great example of cooperation between the FAA and the state of Colorado. The state and each of the four airports contributed a total of $4 million to the project for a technical consultant to work full time to find a solution. The state made available, at reduced cost, the telecommunications towers where the equipment was located.

# Privatization CP

### **Privatization 1NC**

#### **Counterplan: Governance over the Federal Aviation Administration should be given to a private organization in order to invest in the Next Generation Air Traffic Management System.**

#### **Privatizing NextGen solves faster and better**

Orszag 11 [Peter, American economist who is a Vice Chairman of Global Banking at Citigroup, 9/20/2011. “Private Air-Traffic System Can Soar: Peter Orszag” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-21/in-private-world-air-traffic-technology-soars-commentary-by-peter-orszag.html>] LZ

So it’s a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, though, the NextGen system is being rolled out in stages, and it isn’t expected to be fully operational in U.S. airports and aircraft until 2020. Even that slow timetable assumes that the Federal Aviation Administration, the agency overseeing the project, receives the necessary funding from Congress and can meet all its deadlines.¶ Nonprofit Solution¶ We shouldn’t have to wait so long. There is a way to move faster, one that would probably also help the NextGen system work more smoothly once it’s in place: Take responsibility for implementing the new GPS system, and for air-traffic control altogether, away from the FAA and assign it to a private, nonprofit organization. (Disclosure: Aerospace clients I work with at Citigroup Inc. would benefit from faster implementation of NextGen.)¶ Almost two dozen other countries have already assigned air- traffic control to either government-owned corporations, nonprofits or other organizations outside of government, and the results have generally been encouraging. As the U.S. Government Accountability Office concluded in a 2005 review, these operators have maintained or even improved air safety, while they have lowered costs and boosted efficiency by investing in new technology.

### Solvency Ext.

#### Privatizing ATC solves

Poole, Jr. 11 [Robert, director of transportation policy and Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow at Reason Foundation, 8/1/2011, National Journal, “Air Traffic Modernization Held Hostage” http://transportation.nationaljournal.com/2011/08/faa-all-messed-up-is-there-a-w.php#2037816] LZ

Isn’t there a better way to fund ATC modernization? Any business faced with a $20 billion modernization agenda would finance the investment, probably issuing long-term bonds to be paid off from future sales revenue. But as a government agency, the FAA is stuck with annual appropriations, of uncertain timing—and now, a hiatus in the whole program.¶ Among all serious developed countries, the United States is the only one left that funds air traffic control this way. Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Germany, the U.K., Switzerland, and dozens of other countries have all de-politicized their ATC systems, by “commercializing” their air traffic control providers—turning them into separate corporate entities that are self-funding, getting paid by their aviation customers. That revenue stream is predictable enough that the company can issue revenue bonds to fund capital investments in facilities and equipment. Many of these ATC companies (such as Nav Canada) even have investment-grade bond ratings.¶ De-politicizing the ATC system is such a good idea that it was recommended by Vice President Al Gore’s reinventing government shop, the National Performance Review, back in 1994. The Clinton Administration introduced a bill to create a self-supporting ATC corporation in 1995. Congress, however, refused to let go, and the bill died.¶ The current shut-down of FAA’s NextGen modernization program should be a wake-up call to airlines and the traveling public. We desperately need to modernize our 1960s-era ATC system. But if we cling to the government-as-usual status quo, this is increasingly unlikely to happen.

#### The federal government will fail at implementation of NextGen – funding, tech and political problems. Privatization key to solve

Robert Poole is the director of transportation policy and Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow at Reason Foundation and is an MIT-trained engineer and has advised four presidential administrations on transportation policy issues, and Chris Edwards, the director of tax policy studies at the Cato Institute, June 2010, “Airports and Air Traffic Control”; AB

However, the challenge ahead for the ATC system is more complex than just financial. NextGen will be a major paradigm shift—from 20th-century (manual) air traffic control to 21st-century (semi-automated) air traffic management—and it will be more complex and riskier than any other challenge the FAA has previously attempted. Given the FAA's management and cost overrun problems in the past, simply fixing the funding problem for the ATC system without dramatically reforming its governance **poses risks of larger and more dramatic failures and greater congestion down the road.** Here are three key problems with the current government-owned and operated system of air traffic control: Inflexible Funding. Government funding sources tend to be static and subject to political considerations, and they are decoupled from changing market demands. Changes in aviation over the past decade have hurt the FAA's funding base. A large part of the FAA budget comes from aviation excise taxes, especially the 7.5 percent tax on airline tickets. As average ticket prices have fallen over time, ATC funding has been squeezed. Payroll costs of the current labor-intensive ATC system consume most of the available budget, leaving less funding for capital investment. Making the transition to NextGen will require billions of dollars of new investments in advanced technologies. The FAA's capital budget is still focused mostly on patching up the existing system, such as replacing antiquated display consoles. Such investments are needed in the short-term, but won't add very much capacity to the system. But that is nearly all the FAA can afford under the current funding structure. Some people argue that Congress could solve the funding problem by appropriating a larger amount of general federal revenue for the ATC system. But given the giant federal budget deficit, federal discretionary spending is going to be severely squeezed in coming years. The solution, as discussed below, is to create a commercialized ATC system that can flexibly respond to changing conditions and access private capital markets for investment. Technology Implementation Risks. The FAA has been attempting to modernize its system, expand capacity, and increase its productivity for decades. But dozens of reports over the years from the Government Accountability Office and the Office of Inspector General in the Department of Transportation have faulted the FAA for poor management of major projects, which are often delayed and over budget.24 The Advanced Automation System, Wide Area Augmentation System, and other major projects have had large cost overruns and been years behind schedule or cancelled, as discussed above. In 2005 two OIG researchers presented an overview of the FAA's failed efforts over the years to modernization the National Airspace System.25 In reviewing what went wrong, they concluded that FAA modernization efforts had neither reduced costs nor increased productivity: NAS modernization plans have been consistently subverted by requirements growth, development delays, cost escalations, and inadequate benefits management. All these things were symptomatic of the fact that FAA didn't think it needed to reduce operating costs.26 Many experts are greatly concerned that the FAA's institutional culture is poorly suited to implementing anything as dramatic as NextGen. In 2004, the National Academy of Sciences convened an expert panel to assist the GAO in understanding the cultural and technical factors that have impeded previous ATC modernization efforts. It found that "the key cultural factor impeding modernization has been resistance to change... [which is] characteristic of FAA personnel at all levels" and that "the key technical factor affecting modernization... has been a shortfall in the technical expertise needed to design, develop, or manage complex air traffic systems."27 As a government agency, the FAA is not designed to judge risks, aim at the most efficient investments, manage people to produce results, reward excellence, or punish incompetence. It is therefore not equipped to fundamentally reform the ATC system. Thus, major institutional change is probably a prerequisite for implementing the advanced ATC system the nation needs to meet rising aviation demand. Political Constraints. A third impediment to ATC reform is political. The redesign of the ATC system foreseen in NextGen could potentially deliver major cost savings and greatly expand ATC capacity. However, realizing those gains would require retirement of large numbers of costly radars and other ground-based navigation aids and the consolidation of ATC facilities. One current proposal would replace 21 en route centers and 171 terminal radar approach control (TRACON) facilities with just 35 air traffic service hubs in a redesign of U.S. airspace.28 Physical control towers located at many smaller airports would gradually be phased out as "virtual tower" functions are built into the new super-hubs. However, Congress tends to resist consolidating ATC facilities because of concerns about job losses and the like, which is similar to the political resistance to closing post offices and military bases. A major 1982 proposal for consolidating ATC facilities was quietly dropped after it became clear that getting it through Congress would be very difficult. Similarly, Congress came extremely close to forbidding the FAA's recent success in outsourcing its Flight Service Station system, which involved reducing the system from 58 facilities to 20. The prohibition was defeated only by a credible veto threat from the White House. In sum, as long as ATC remains government-owned and controlled, making the needed reforms to improve efficiency and implement NextGen will be very difficult.

# Air Traffic Time CP

### **1NC Air Traffic Time CP**

#### **Counterplan: The airplane industry should shift air traffic in the United States towards sunrise and sunset.**

#### **CP solves for warming**

Clark 1 [Tom, reporter for Nature Science Update, 8/15/2001, “Pros and Contrails: Flying the Redeye May Keep the Planet Cooler” <http://www.nature.com/news/2001/010815/full/news010816-10.html>] LZ

Taking a plane just after dawn or just before sunset could be better for the environment, according to a study of contrails - the lustrous lines of ice crystals that streak the sky in the wake of jets.¶ They may look benign, beautiful even, but by reflecting heat rising from the ground, contrails have a small but significant environmental impact. "Globally they have a warming effect," says atmospheric scientist Gunnar Myhre.¶ To what degree depends on the angle of the Sun in the sky, find Myhre and his colleague Frode Stordal, at the Norwegian Institute for Air Research in Kjeller[1](http://www.nature.com/news/2001/010815/full/news010816-10.html#B1). Around dawn and dusk, contrails act more like reflectors, bouncing incoming sunlight back into space.¶ "With a shift in air traffic towards sunrise and sunset, you could decrease this impact," Myhre says.

#### **NextGen produces more contrails—CP solves best**

Clark 1 [Tom, reporter for Nature Science Update, 8/15/2001, “Pros and Contrails: Flying the Redeye May Keep the Planet Cooler” <http://www.nature.com/news/2001/010815/full/news010816-10.html>] LZ

Myhre and Stordal combined satellite images with data on the journey length and fuel consumption of air traffic. Comparing this with models of how contrails scatter light, they estimated how much heat contrails trap or reflect.¶ Like others before them, the duo found a net warming effect. But taking previous measurements of the reflecting properties of ice crystals in icy cirrus clouds into account, they found that when light hits contrails at low angles - like at dawn and dusk - they in fact reflect light, causing a cooling effect.¶ The researchers plan to keep watching contrails as jet technology and flight patterns are set to change. Although cleaner burning, next-generation jet engines are expected cruise at higher altitudes and to make more contrails.

### **Solvency Ext.**

#### **CP solves**

Gierens 8 [Klaus Gierens works at the Institute of Atmospheric Physics at DLR Oberpfaffenhofen, which is the German Aerospace Center, Ling Lim works for the Centre for Air Transport and the Environment at Manchester Metropolitan University, Kostas Eleftheratos works at the Laboratory of Climatology and Atmospheric Environment, University of Athens, 1/3/08, “A Review of Various Strategies for Contrail Avoidance” <http://www.benthamscience.com/open/toascj/articles/V002/1TOASCJ.pdf>] LZ

In addition to reducing contrail formation, there is also a potential operational mitigation option for reducing the climate impacts from contrails. Meerkötter et al. [49] found that “contrails cool the surface during the day and heat the surface during the night”, with the resulting net effect that is highly dependent on the daily variation of contrail coverage. Whereas the longwave (terrestrial) radiative forcing varies only little over the day, the shortwave (solar) forcing displays a strong diurnal cycle due to the variation of the sun's position (zenith angle). Hence, it has been suggested that “altering the time for aircraft traffic has the potential for reducing the radiative forcing due to contrails” [50]. In a case study [50] it has been shown that “assuming a limited persistence of contrails, any shift in the traffic density towards sunrise and sunset would reduce the RF due to contrails”.

#### A total switch to sunrise and sunset would mean zero warming

Myhre and Stordal 1 [Gunnar Myhre and Frode Stordal, atmospheric scientists at the Norwegian Institute for Air Research, 8/15/2001, “On the Tradeoff of the Solar and Thermal Infrared Radiative Impact of Contrails” <http://www.agu.org/journals/gl/v028/i016/2001GL013193/2001GL013193.pdf>] LZ

We calculate a slightly positive global mean net (solar and thermal infrared) radiative forcing due to contrails. This estimate has several major uncertainties, that are reflected by a deviation of up to 50% on the lower side of previous estimates [Minnis et al., 1999]; the global distribution of the contrail cover, size of the ice crystals, and optical properties. The size of the ice crystals is important for the optical properties and may alter the ratio of the thermal infrared to the solar radiative forcing [Sassen, 1997]. Furthermore the data which we have used for the diurnal cycle of air traffic [Schmitt and Brunner, 1997] are available only for one month. We have confirmed that the diurnal variation in the aircraft traffic is very important for the radiative forcing due to contrails. Further investigations of this variation regarding of the aircraft traffic are therefore of interest. We have shown that it is physically based that the total radiative forcing due to contrails is lower at high solar zenith angles (during sunrise and sunset) than at noon (and of course during the night). In fact, in a case study we found that in the extreme, and unrealistic situation that all flights take place around sunrise and sunset, the radiative forcing was zero. In conclusion we would like to point out that (assuming a limited persistence of contrails) any shift in the traffic density towards sunrise and sunset would reduce the radiative forcing due to contrails. Therefore, this would be one of the several tradeoffs to consider in order to reduce environmental effects of aircraft which is expected to increase substantially in the future [IPCC, 1999]