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\*NFU CP 1NC

Text: The United States federal government should adopt a nuclear “no-first-use” policy.

Congress doesn’t care about nuclear posture changes- only numbers- doesn’t link to politics

Woolf ‘7

Amy, Non-Proliferation Review, Volume 14, Issue 3, November 2007, pages 499-516

There are a number of reasons why Congress did not take advantage of this post-Cold War opportunity to review U.S. nuclear strategy. First, Congress rarely addresses broad, theoretical constructs, such as the mechanics of nuclear deterrence, in its debates. It focuses instead on specific programs, their funding requests, and, occasionally, their relationship to broader policies and goals. Second, the committee structure, with its divided jurisdiction for nuclear weapons and nuclear policy issues, and the complex nature of the subject, has not lent itself to a comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear weapons policy**.** Third, it is challenging for members to delve into the intricacies of nuclear doctrine and nuclear weapons policy because the information needed to sort through many of the specific details on this subject can be both highly classified and, in many cases, complex. Further,past administrations have been unwilling, in many cases, to divulge the details of U.S. nuclear strategy and employment policy, even to members of Congress cleared to receive such information. Finally, few members, whether or not they sit on the relevant committees, have chosen to become an expert on either the pieces or the full picture of U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Members lack the time, the staff, and the resources to become an expert in more than a few select policy areas, and most choose to focus on policy areas with a high degree of perceived relevance or importance to their constituents; one should not be surprised that representatives from farm states focus on farm policy. Even members who serve on the Armed Services Committees may not concentrate on nuclear weapons issues, focusing instead on manpower issues, naval issues, aircraft, or other topics related to military policy, depending on the interests of their constituencies**.**

2NC- CP Modeled

The plan solves fast – it sends a signal that nuclear weapons are not necessary

Laird 9

Burgess Laird, Carnegie Council, “A Guide to the Challenges Facing President Obama’s Nuclear Abolition Agenda,” July 21, 2009, <http://www.cceia.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/0025.html>.

Advocates of no first use maintain that the U.S. adoption of a no first use policy would improve global security and stability here and now, not in some distant time by further reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy, and further underscoring our commitment to our Article VI disarmament pledge. In so doing, a no first use policy would positively influence the nuclear doctrines and postures of other nuclear weapons states and strengthen international nuclear norms against the acquisition, production, and use of nuclear weapons, and thereby, bolster non-proliferation efforts. At the very least, there would appear to be more than sufficient grounds for the Obama Administration to undertake a careful net assessment of the costs and benefits of adopting a no first use declaratory policy. The Administration's Nuclear Posture Review, now underway in the Pentagon, provides an ideal setting for such an analysis.

Solves globally- only thing that alters enemy calculations

Sagan 9

Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, “The Case for No First Use,” June 5, 2009, *Routledge*, International Institute for Strategic Studies

Nuclear declaratory policy is meant to enhance deterrence of potential adversaries by providing a signal of the intentions, options and proclivities of the US government in different crisis and war-time scenarios. Such signals are similarly meant to enhance reassurance of allies. Declaratory policy can indirectly influence the likelihood of nuclear terrorism by dissuading governments or individuals from providing nuclear weapons or materials to terrorist organizations and by making terrorist use of a nuclear weapon appear immoral and illegitimate to some individuals who might otherwise support the terrorists’ goals. Finally, statements about doctrine can influence both the likelihood and consequences of nuclear proliferation by helping shape global norms about reasonable and legitimate potential uses of nuclear weapons. These norms can in turn influence internal debates in new and potential nuclear-weapons states about their own nuclear doc- trines or potential nuclear-weapons acquisition.

No first use is modeled by other countries.

Laird in ‘9

Burgess Laird, Carnegie Council, “A Guide to the Challenges Facing President Obama’s Nuclear Abolition Agenda,” July 21, 2009, http://www.cceia.org/resources/articles\_papers\_reports/0025.html

There is another initiative that many experts advocate, but that the Obama Administration has not embraced. It is the option of adopting and announcing to the world what is known as a "no first use" declaratory policy (the United States has never had such a policy). Declaratory policy is critically important; it effects procurement decisions, the alert procedures of our nuclear forces, and even our operational plans themselves. Equally important, it affects the analogous nuclear policies of other nations.

2NC- CP=No Nuclear War

A.) Counterplan literally takes the nuclear option off the table- no risk of escalation

Grossman ‘7

Jerome, the Chairman Emeritus of the Council for a Livable World in Washington, Washington Post Writers Group. “U.S. should promise no first use of nukes”, 6/15, http://www.cjonline.com/stories/061507/opi\_177295240.shtml

When American military officials and politicians are asked about relations with Iran and North Korea, too often they threateningly reply: "No military option is off the table." This sentiment is an implicit threat to use nuclear weapons and a violation of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the NPT. One of the politicians making such provocative remarks is Senator Barack Obama, a frontrunner for the Democratic presidential nomination. In a recent speech covering national security, Obama argued that "We must never take the military option off the table" in trying to stop the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. Does he realize that this "option" includes the incalculable human suffering that would be wrought by a preemptive nuclear attack? In 1958, Albert Wohlstetter, an influential Cold War nuclear theorist, concluded that the chief purpose of nuclear weapons is to terrorize. While much attention is paid to terrorism by non-state groups like al Qaeda, the truth is that nations can engage in terrorism as well. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, each of the nine nuclear powers — the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China, France, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea — has threatened to use nuclear weapons. This threat, which is intended to terrorize other states, must stop. These types of threatening remarks could lead to nuclear war by accident, inadvertence, or error, with the most tragic consequences for all humanity. Most importantly, nuclear threats encourage the spread of nuclear weapons to countries seeking to protect themselves in a dangerous world dominated by nuclear aggressors. The world needs a "No First Strike" commitment combined with the elimination of the present policy of keeping nukes on hair trigger alert so they are ready to hit their intended targets thirty minutes after they are launched on intercontinental ballistic missiles. To this day, the United States has never established a policy of "No First Strike" or "No First Use" for its nuclear arsenal. China is the only nuclear weapons state that has a standing "No First Use" declaratory policy. In 1982, the Soviet Union announced such a policy, but its military plans never actually changed. A decade later, the successor Russian government forfeited its commitment to "No First Use." When the NPT was being negotiated in the 1960s, non-nuclear weapons states sought guarantees that agreeing not to acquire nuclear arms would not place them at a permanent military disadvantage and make them vulnerable to nuclear intimidation. This was an important consideration because nuclear intimidation encourages the intimidated to develop their own nukes to deter aggression from larger nuclear powers. While the Reagan Administration developed nuclear weapons and threatened their use, the President himself said on April 17, 1982, that "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." He was right in his rhetoric but wrong in his policies — just as the United States is today. It is time to match our pious words with pious actions and take the nuclear option off the table by declaring a "No First Use" policy.

B.) Counterplan is critical to maintain the taboo- without it nuclear use is inevitable

Huntley ‘6

Huntley 06 - Program Director of the Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research @ University of British Columbia. [WADE L. HUNTLEY (Former Professor of security studies @ Hiroshima Peace Institute and Director of the Global Peace and Security Program @ Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development), “Threats all the way down: US strategic initiatives in a unipolar world,” Review of International Studies (2006), 32, 49–67]

However, the Bush Administration’s approach does break dramatically from US Cold War policy by casting off deterrence as the central justification for US nucleararmament. The break becomes apparent by contrasting the 2002 NPR’s logic to the ‘ war-fighting’ nuclear policy initiatives of the Reagan Administration. While at the time similarly criticised for increasing the danger of nuclear war, Reagan Administration officials emphasised the priority of avoiding nuclear weapons use, underscored that the purpose of US strategic nuclear weapons was ‘ only retaliatory’, and justified tactical nuclear weapons development and threats of nuclear first use only to gird ‘ the effectiveness of deterrence’.7 Cold War era arguments as to the dangers of maintaining such ‘ war-fighting’ capabilities and strategies were well established: capabilities for ‘ escalation dominance’ and ‘first use’ nuclear threats erode the ‘ firebreak’ between conventional and nuclear war long seen as a key psychological impediment to nuclear engagement. The countervailing argument was also well established: escalation dominance actually bolsters deterrence more than it weakens the psychological ‘ firebreak’. Weinberger’s defence of Reagan Administration nuclear policies evinces this latter logic. But both positions converge on the principle that the only legitimate purpose of all nuclear weapons is deterrence of the use of any nuclear weapons. However, in the post-Cold War context, in which there no longer exists a ‘ balance of terror’ shadowing every conflict with the risk of escalation to higher levels of nuclear war, the deterrence logic offered by Weinberger as the only justification for US development of ‘ war-fighting’ capabilities and planning cannot apply.8 The absence of this logic also undermines the argument that a ‘ war-fighting’ posture reduces the prospects of nuclear weapons use. Whether or not that argument ever was persuasive, the Bush administration’s embrace of a wide range of tactical capabilities and first use options cannot serve the deterrence functions (minimal or otherwise) envisioned by Cold War era strategists, simply because that era’s threats no longer exist. Although maintaining the language of deterrence, the 2002 NPR implicitly acknowledges this new post-Cold War logic by positing important non-deterrence roles for US nuclear weapons, including possible first-use of low-yield nuclear weapons for counter-proliferation purposes. This posture constitutes a qualitatively unprecedented erosion of the nuclear ‘ firebreak’.9 Plans to complement broadened tactical nuclear weapons use options with increased non-nuclear ‘ strategic strike’ capabilities within a single integrated strategic motif erode the ‘ firebreak’ from the other side as well. This planning contributes as much as the development of new tactical nuclear capabilities does to increasing the dangers of nuclear weapons use. Thus, while the Bush Administration’s NPR does not introduce truly original thinking about the role of nuclear weapons, it does abandon the limitation of justifying nuclear armament only by deterrence purposes, elevating potential offen- sive uses of nuclear weapons in limited tactical situations to the level of official US government policy.10 This dramatic departure not only from past US strategic and nuclear policies but also from the administration’s own conservative progenitors puts the US nuclear posture in a qualitatively more aggressive stance, carrying with it significant practical and ethical consequences.

2NC- Nuclear War Inevitable Without CP

Maintaing the nuclear first use option creates escalating expectations that makes use inevitable under minor circumstances.

Gerson ‘7

Joseph, Director of Programs of the American Friends Service Committee's New England Regional Office, Peace News, 8/16, “The Obama-Clinton Nuclear Madness”, <http://www.peacenews.info/news/article/406>]

I was in Hiroshima, participating in the World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, when the latest barrage of nuclear madness flailed out from the US presidential campaign trail. Almost inured to Bush's romance of ruthlessness and believing that almost anything else can only be an improvement, people from nations across the world were shocked and angered by the statements on nuclear policy made by Democratic Party Presidential hopefuls Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. It remains to be seen how badly Barack Obama's self-inflicted wounds will be. First he played cowboy sheriff and G.W. Bush - threatening unilateral military attacks against a sovereign and already fragile nation - Pakistan, but attempted to soften the blow by pledging not use nuclear weapons against Al Qaeda. Someone was planning to hit south Waziristan with ]nuclear weapons? He then further demonstrated incompetence and ignorance by saying that he would not use nuclear weapons against civilians. Nuclear weapons can be used without inflicting Hell on earth and taking countless civilian lives? Has he not heard of fall-out or considered the fact that the US tactical (as opposed to "counter-value" strategic) nuclear weapons include many Hiroshima-size A-bombs? Hillary Clinton then went on to confirm what many long suspected: that in its approach to the world, the US's terrorizing first strike nuclear weapons are always on the table, saying: "I don't believe that any president should make any blanket statements with respect to the use or non-use of nuclear weapons." That means that US presidents should never remove the nuclear threat when dealing with other nations. This is consistent with other statements she has made on her presidential campaign trail. Last February, as she was leaving the New Hampshire high school where she had just formally launched her campaign with a carefully-staged event, a young peace activist caught her going out the door. She asked Senator Clinton: "When you say that all options must be on the table with Iran, do you really mean that we should be threatening all of that country's women and children with genocide?" The Senator's chilling response was: "I meant what I said." The Obama and Clinton statements - like President Bush's nuclear threats and campaign to post-modernize the US nuclear arsenal and vastly expand the US nuclear weapons production infrastructure - violate commitments the US has made in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and they stand in stark defiance of the International Court of Justices' advisory ruling on the use and threatened use of nuclear weapons. They also reflect the banality of evil. Regardless of what their personal beliefs about the existence and actual use of nuclear weapons may be, to rise to the pinnacle of power of a nuclear-enforced empire, they and other aspiring politicians have found it necessary to demonstrate that they are tough enough to defend the empire with nuclear weapons. You can't build or maintain an empire without terrorizing people across the planet. However, like symbolic politics, engaging in the banality of evil results in true evil. Statements and threats create expectations. When their bluffs are called George Bush and future US presidents may believe it necessary to back up their words by carrying out their threats. Since the nuclear annihilations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, during international crises, confrontations and wars, every US president has prepared and threatened to initiate nuclear attacks -- primarily to maintain US hegemony in East Asia and the Middle East - most recently during the run up to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. In several cases: The Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1976 "Ax Incident" in the Korean Demilitarized Zone, and Bill Clinton's 1994 nuclear threat against North Korea, the world came perilously close to nuclear catastrophe. These US threats and the refusal of the US and other declared nuclear powers to fulfill their Article VI Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty commitment to negotiate the complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals are the primary forces driving nuclear weapons proliferation, which in turn, further increased the dangers of nuclear war.

2NC- Only CP Solves Conflict Escalation

US First Use Policy makes first strikes inevitable

Ellsberg ‘9

Daniel. Senior Fellow of the [Nuclear Age Peace Foundation](http://www.wagingpeace.org/). 9/11/9. <http://www.bloomingtonalternative.com/node/10137>.

In the United States alone, a whole set of policies persist that have long tended to encourage proliferation. Perhaps most dangerously, such potential proliferators are led by past and present American doctrine and behavior to consider -- among the possible, acceptable and valuable uses of nuclear weapons -- the employment of nuclear first-use threats: i.e., the “option” of threatening to initiate nuclear attacks, and if necessary of carrying out such threats. Precisely that example is set by repeated statements over the last year by President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, echoed by leading members of Congress, that “all options are on the table” in their determination to prevent Iranian nuclear weapons capability. Such threats legitimize the prospect of first-use by any nuclear weapons state, and they have the perverse effect of challenging states without nuclear weapons, including Iran, to acquire them -- to be able to deter or preempt nuclear attack, or to threaten first-use on their own. Years after the former members of the Warsaw Pact, including Russia, began asking to be admitted to NATO, and after China has acquired most-favored-nation status, the United States still refuses to adopt a policy of “no-first-use.” This means that the United States refuses to make a commitment to never, under any circumstance, initiate a nuclear attack. This is also true of Britain, France and now Russia, which abandoned its no-first-use doctrine in late 1993, citing the United States-NATO example and reasoning in doing so.

<Counterplan solves Russia, Iran, North Korea, Indo Pak impacts>

Hitchens 3

Theresa, Vice President, Center for Defense Information Presented at a conference on U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION <http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/counterproliferation-conference.cfm>

The goal of the new policies seems to be to scare potential enemies out of even thinking about obtaining WMD, much less using such weapons against the United States or our interests. Unfortunately, they may be more likely to backfire. By lowering the threshold for nuclear war, the United States risks encouraging rather than dissuading others from pursuing, or possibly using, WMD. First of all, the linking of nuclear weapons with chemical and biological weapons serves to elevate the status of these weapons as potentially useful in deterring attacks by nuclear states. It confers a "great power" status on pursuit of these weapons. This is not a good thing when one thinks about the reasons some dictators have in the past pursued nuclear capability. Second, and even more dangerously, such a U.S. stance is likely to spur nuclear proliferation. Is it reasonable to expect that, with the world's most preeminent military power reasserting the high value of nuclear weapons, that others will continue on the path of nuclear restraint? Won't powers pursuing nuclear weapons be able to justify that pursuit, if for no other reason than to "deter" the use of WMD against themselves — or, in the case of U.S. foes — to deter the United States? This latter point is keenly illustrated in the difference between the Bush administration approach to Iraq, which is about to be attacked by the U.S. military for its pursuit of nuclear weapons, vs. the approach to North Korea, which, at least publicly, is not in the crosshairs, in part because of fears that it has a nuclear weapon. If you were among the leadership of Iran, the third leg in the Bush administration's "axis of evil," might not you now be considering a rush to build the bomb? Finally, how does an itchy U.S. nuclear trigger finger figure into the nuclear plans and doctrines of other nuclear weapon states? Doesn't a U.S. policy of nuclear preemption in regional contingencies set a bad example? Will Russia now consider use of its large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons against suspect facilities in Chechnya; or Israel consider a nuclear preemptive strike against Iran? Or even worse, imagine a similar preemption-based policy being adopted by the new nuclear weapon states, India and Pakistan. These bitter rivals have already shown that they are less constrained, at least rhetorically, about threatening the use of nukes against each other. And couldn't a nuclear North Korea use the U.S. policy against us in justifying it's own nuclear aggression?

Pre-emption Solvency

NFU solves proximate threat of pre-emption

Gerson ‘7

Joseph, Director of Programs of the American Friends Service Committee's New England Regional Office, Peace News, 8/16, “The Obama-Clinton Nuclear Madness”, <http://www.peacenews.info/news/article/406>]

I was in Hiroshima, participating in the World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, when the latest barrage of nuclear madness flailed out from the US presidential campaign trail. Almost inured to Bush's romance of ruthlessness and believing that almost anything else can only be an improvement, people from nations across the world were shocked and angered by the statements on nuclear policy made by Democratic Party Presidential hopefuls Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. It remains to be seen how badly Barack Obama's self-inflicted wounds will be. First he played cowboy sheriff and G.W. Bush - threatening unilateral military attacks against a sovereign and already fragile nation - Pakistan, but attempted to soften the blow by pledging not use nuclear weapons against Al Qaeda. Someone was planning to hit south Waziristan with ]nuclear weapons? He then further demonstrated incompetence and ignorance by saying that he would not use nuclear weapons against civilians. Nuclear weapons can be used without inflicting Hell on earth and taking countless civilian lives? Has he not heard of fall-out or considered the fact that the US tactical (as opposed to "counter-value" strategic) nuclear weapons include many Hiroshima-size A-bombs? Hillary Clinton then went on to confirm what many long suspected: that in its approach to the world, the US's terrorizing first strike nuclear weapons are always on the table, saying: "I don't believe that any president should make any blanket statements with respect to the use or non-use of nuclear weapons." That means that US presidents should never remove the nuclear threat when dealing with other nations. This is consistent with other statements she has made on her presidential campaign trail. Last February, as she was leaving the New Hampshire high school where she had just formally launched her campaign with a carefully-staged event, a young peace activist caught her going out the door. She asked Senator Clinton: "When you say that all options must be on the table with Iran, do you really mean that we should be threatening all of that country's women and children with genocide?" The Senator's chilling response was: "I meant what I said." The Obama and Clinton statements - like President Bush's nuclear threats and campaign to post-modernize the US nuclear arsenal and vastly expand the US nuclear weapons production infrastructure - violate commitments the US has made in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and they stand in stark defiance of the International Court of Justices' advisory ruling on the use and threatened use of nuclear weapons. They also reflect the banality of evil. Regardless of what their personal beliefs about the existence and actual use of nuclear weapons may be, to rise to the pinnacle of power of a nuclear-enforced empire, they and other aspiring politicians have found it necessary to demonstrate that they are tough enough to defend the empire with nuclear weapons. You can't build or maintain an empire without terrorizing people across the planet. However, like symbolic politics, engaging in the banality of evil results in true evil. Statements and threats create expectations. When their bluffs are called George Bush and future US presidents may believe it necessary to back up their words by carrying out their threats. Since the nuclear annihilations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, during international crises, confrontations and wars, every US president has prepared and threatened to initiate nuclear attacks -- primarily to maintain US hegemony in East Asia and the Middle East - most recently during the run up to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. In several cases: The Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1976 "Ax Incident" in the Korean Demilitarized Zone, and Bill Clinton's 1994 nuclear threat against North Korea, the world came perilously close to nuclear catastrophe. These US threats and the refusal of the US and other declared nuclear powers to fulfill their Article VI Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty commitment to negotiate the complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals are the primary forces driving nuclear weapons proliferation, which in turn, further increased the dangers of nuclear war.

Other States Attack US Solvency

US first use posture is baiting other countries – only the counterplan removes the proximate cause of their internal link

Glaser & Fetter ‘5

Professor of Public Policy w/ a focus on security and defense policy @ University of Chicago & Professor of Public Policy w/ a focus on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation @ University of Maryland. [Charles L. Glaser (Deputy Dean of the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago) & Steve Fetter (Dean of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland), “Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review's New Missions,” International Security 30.2 (2005) 84-126Project Muse]

A state with vulnerable nuclear weapons might also have some incentive to use them early in a crisis or conventional war. An adversary that plans to rely on limited nuclear attacks to coerce the United States to back down in a regional conflict or to deter invasion of its homeland could feel pressure to escalate early if it believed the United States might launch a damage-limitation or disarming attack early in the conflict. The prospects for avoiding this nuclear escalation would be better if the adversary’s forces were more survivable. For example, the vulnerability of the adversary’s forces could result in a nuclear attack if it believes incorrectly that the United States is fighting a conventional war with the goal of conquering the state and overthrowing its regime. If the adversary’s nuclear force were survivable, it could wait and would learn that U.S. goals were limited. In contrast, with vulnerable nuclear forces, the adversary could feel pressure to launch its forces early, before the United States launched a disarming attack. In addition, an adversary that valued inflicting damage on the United States and believed its weapons were going to be destroyed would have incentives to use them before the United States attacked. Fortunately, states that place great value on inflicting damage for its own sake (including revenge) are likely to be extremely rare; even the “rogue” states that have been the focus of so much attention by the Bush administration would likely be deterred by the costs of U.S. retaliation. Again, however, if such a state believes that the United States is planning to conquer it and therefore has little to lose, the vulnerability of its nuclear forces could create time pressures that deny the opportunity to learn otherwise. This brief discussion suggests that the combination of an assertive U.S. foreign policy with a nuclear strategy that emphasizes counternuclear capabilities has the potential to be doubly dangerous. Such a foreign policy could lead potential adversaries to believe that the United States is interested in overthrow- ing their regime or conquering their country. The U.S. invasion of Iraq and the Bush administration’s emphasis on regime change have had this effect on North Korea and Iran. Given this belief about U.S. goals, an adversary would be more likely to believe that U.S. aims in a regional conoict are unlimited, which would increase its incentives to rush to alert its nuclear forces and to employ limited nuclear attacks early in a conoict to deter the United States. These incentives could reinforce the pressures created by vulnerable nuclear forces for the adversary to escalate to nuclear use. The danger posed by com- bining these incentives suggests another reason that nuclear proliferation should lead the United States to adopt a more restrained foreign policy. The ability to destroy the adversary’s forces could also create incentives for the United States to attack early in a conoict. If the adversary has the ability to make its capabilities more survivable—for example, by dispersing forces or delegating launch authority—the United States would face pressure to launch counternuclear attacks before the adversary institutes these survivabilitymeasures.74 We can foresee a spiral of crisis interactions that increase the prob- ability of a U.S. attack: improvements in U.S. nuclear forces magnify the adver- sary’s incentives in a crisis to raise the alert status of its forces; this increase in alert status creates pressure for the United States to attack while its forces are still effective; in addition, the United States might interpret the adversary’s move as indicating that it plans to attack, further increasing the pressure on the United States to attack quickly. Consequently, the counternuclear forces that enhance deterrence and limit damage are also likely to create time pres- sures that increase the probability that a crisis would escalate to nuclear war. A variety of costs could result. Although preemption to limit damage might be the best option, pressures to attack early increase the probability of unnecessary attacks—that is, mistaken preemption in cases in which the adversary was not going to escalate to nuclear attacks. If some of the adversary’s force then survives, it might launch a retaliatory nuclear attack against U.S. interests. In addition, the U.S. attack could result in extensive collateral damage with large humanitarian costs. And as noted above, this otherwise avoidable use of nuclear weapons would likely weaken the nuclear taboo and damage the United States’ international reputation.

Miscalc Solvency

An NFU specifically resolves any risk of the impact.

Peng and Rong ‘9

Peng and Rong yu, Peng Guangqian is editor-in-chief of Strategic Sciences and has long been engaged in research on military strategy and international affairs. Rong Yu is a Ph. D. candidate at the Institute of International Strategy and Development, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, China Security, Vol. 5 No. 1 Winter 2009, pp. 78-87, World Security Institute, http://www.washingtonobserver.org/pdfs/Peng\_and\_Rong.pdf

In crisis situations, both first-use and NFU policies are highly problematic. How- ever, NFU policy is more responsible, as it is conducive to escalation control. When both sides suffer from imbalance of information and mutual distrust, the natural tendency would be to assume the worst—the first use of nuclear weapons. In this case, when one side has a declared first-use policy, the other side would be more prone to launch pre-emptive attacks in an effort to destroy or at least alleviate the former’s destructive power. If one party has an NFU policy, to which the other partydoes not give credit, the situation is not much improved. However, if one side be- lieves that the NFU-pledging party would be more moderate for the sake of its own pledge, a pre-emptive nuclear attack launched out of panic would be less likely. Thus, the risk of conflict escalation is much smaller and the destructive power of wars will be under control.

The plan reshapes doctrines globally – ensures first strike is an illegitimate use of nuclear weapons

Sagan 9

Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, “The Case for No First Use,” June 5, 2009, *Routledge*, International Institute for Strategic Studies

Nuclear declaratory policy is meant to enhance deterrence of potential adversaries by providing a signal of the intentions, options and proclivities of the US government in different crisis and war-time scenarios. Such signals are similarly meant to enhance reassurance of allies. Declaratory policy can indirectly influence the likelihood of nuclear terrorism by dissuading governments or individuals from providing nuclear weapons or materials to terrorist organizations and by making terrorist use of a nuclear weapon appear immoral and illegitimate to some individuals who might otherwise support the terrorists’ goals. Finally, statements about doctrine can influence both the likelihood and consequences of nuclear proliferation by helping shape global norms about reasonable and legitimate potential uses of nuclear weapons. These norms can in turn influence internal debates in new and potential nuclear-weapons states about their own nuclear doc- trines or potential nuclear-weapons acquisition.

Accidents Solvency

The plan solves risks of accidental launch

A) False warnings – the Cold War proves

Thompson 9

Nicholas Thompson, “Will Obama Give Up America’s Nuke First Strike?” May 11, 2009, Wired.com.

The argument made by people like McNamara and Kennan was that declaring a policy of no first use could reduce tensions overall and reduce the odds of nuclear war in the other two ways that it was likely to break out between the superpowers. That would be with a conflict that gradually gets hotter and hotter (think Berlin in 1961 or Cuba in 1962) or with an accidental strike. Maybe Soviet radar would pick up what appeared to be incoming American ICBMs and order an immediate retaliation before realizing that it was really geese flying over Finland that they’d spotted. If America promised not to launch weapons first, the Kennan theory went, the Soviets would be less likely to launch theirs as a way of either pre-empting or responding to a false positive of an American attack. I recently asked a number of former Soviet arms officials about this topic while doing research in Moscow. And almost all said that, yes, particularly during the early Reagan years — when tensions were extremely high — it would have made some difference for the U.S. to declare a policy of no first use. They obviously understood that such talk would have been nothing close to technologically or legally binding. But even the words would have soothed Soviet fears that the U.S. was actively planning a first strike and could have reduced the risk of disaster in the two scenarios described above. According to Viktor Koltunov, a Soviet arms negotiator and defense official, that announcing a policy of no first use “would really have had a lot of impact.”

B) Leads to de-alert

Berry 9

Ken Berry, International Commission On Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Research Coordinator and former Assistant Secretary for Arms Control and Disarmament in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, June 2009, “DRAFT TREATY ON NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS” <http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Berry_No_First_Use_Treaty.pdf>.

A NFU commitment could take the form of unilateral or joint pledges by nuclear armed states to each other, or even a Security Council resolution enshrining it as a norm. However, it might now be timely to consider a binding treaty on the subject. The existence of a no first use commitment by all the nuclear armed states could reduce the need for a nuclear deterrent. It would in addition give the United States a somewhat more legitimate basis on which to engage the international community on nuclear non-proliferation issues. It would also conceivably lead to changes in state practice in deployment of their nuclear arsenals (de-alerting, separating warheads from delivery vehicles). Potentially, it could also see the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons which are designed primarily for first use. In doing so, it would produce an environment in which first use is less likely.

China War Solvency

The advantage is reverse causal – a declaration of NFU solves

Arbatov 8

Alexei, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee of the State Duma in the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, “Non-First Use As a Way of Outlawing Nuclear Weapons,” International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, November.

In this context a real problem is US readiness to recognize the legitimacy of China’s nuclear deterrence against itself in the same way in which it is recognized relative to Russia (and fixed in strategic arms control treaties). It seems that an unequivocal rejection by the United States of a nuclear first strike option against China would be the recognition of strategic realities and should be provided anyway for the benefit of international security. US ambivalence on this matter only encourages China’s more intensive nuclear weapons modernization program, but is not able to prevent acquisition of such capability by China. Moreover, the earlier such recognition happens, the sooner China may join in nuclear weapons limitation negotiations. A final peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem would be conducive (but not indispensable) to a mutual NFU pledge by the USA and China.

Modernization leads to miscalc and war

Lewis 9

Jeffrey. Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation. “Chinese Nuclear Posture and Force Modernization.” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July 2009.

The ongoing modernization has profound implications for strategic stability. Over the past few decades, scholars have broadened conceptions of strategic stability from simple rational actor models that emphasize the offense-defense balance to encompass concerns about how leaders and organizations act under times of great stress. The large alert forces deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union precluded any rational decision to initiate a nuclear war but raised the prospect of accidents, miscalculation, or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. On one hand, the failure of Chinese and U.S. political leaders to think through the interaction of new strategic capabilities\*for example, mobile ballistic missiles and antisatellite capabilities in China; missile defenses and conventional strike options in the United States\*raises the prospect of unintended consequences and perverse interactions in the event of a serious crisis over the status of Taiwan.

Nuclear Terrorism Solvency

Counterplan leads to Brazilian signature of the IAEA Additional Protocol

Argüello ‘9

Irma Argüello, Proliferation Analysis, January 8, 2009, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Brazil and Argentina's Nuclear Cooperation,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22597

High quality and profitable production within an adequate commercial scale will not be enough. A relevant fact is that Brazil and Argentina are the only non-signatories of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Model Additional Protocol (AP) within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). If the AP was made a mandatory condition of supply, both states could face difficulties in developing a healthy foreign trade scheme for advanced technological products, since their nuclear industries are still dependent in many ways on imports from other nuclear suppliers. A detailed analysis of the new Brazilian National Defense Strategy suggests that the signature of a "traditional" AP will not likely happen in the short term. In fact, the document clearly states that Brazil will not endorse any further restrictions derived from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), if nuclear-weapon states do not show progress on their own disarmament.[17]

Latin America is key- IAEA safety restrictions solve nuke terrorism.

Arguello ‘9

Irma Arguello, NPS (No-proliferación para la Seguridad Global), “The Future of Nuclear Power in Latin America,” August 2009, http://npsglobal.org/eng/index.php/component/content/article/147-articles/712-nuclear-latam.html

2/ To achieve an adequate integration of new-coming states, to keep the highest standards on nuclear safety and security. This implies shared responsibilities between new-comers and suppliers. The first undertaking should be necessarily seen as a long term process [maybe even decades], when the regulatory framework, the infrastructure and the build-up of human capabilities should be progressively developed. This is a key to the nuclear success, given that human capital and nuclear culture cannot be measured in years, but in decades. In addition, suppliers should support potential new-comers, before, during, and after the decisions are made. “Full service” alternatives including facility, fuel, spent fuel, and waste management should prevail. 3/ To ensure that nuclear power growth in the region is done within a strict, nonproliferation framework. This implies to keep working an effective scheme of verification and control to avoid that sensitive materials or technologies could wind up in the wrong hands. It would be useful to analyze an increasing role of regional control under the IAEA’s supervision, given the successful ABACC’s concept and practices, together with a full adherence to the Additional Protocol.

UN Legitimacy

As long as the US attempts to overawe potential rivals there will be a politics of nuclear dominance- this locks non-nuclear weapons states out of critical dialogues and destroys UN legitimacy.

Subrahmanyam in ‘99

“Clear and Present Danger: US Path to Unipolar Hegemony,” K. Subrahmanyam, The Times of India, 3 May 1999, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27c/519.html

In 1992, the Economist which reflects the views of NATO establishment came out with its thesis about the future of war. Future wars were categorised into two—wars of conscience and wars of interest. The Iraqi war was in the latter category as it involved the control over Middle East oil. The present war in Yugoslavia is the typical war of conscience envisaged by the Economist. Underlying the thesis was the view that the US and its instrumentality, NATO, have now assumed the role of the British empire in the 19th and early 20th century. At that time, interventionist campaigns were conducted to civilise the heathen, give him Christian values and to enforce law and order in turbulent areas of the world. In spite of denials, the US fancies itself as a global policeman—not as an impartial or just one but a corrupt and bullying one who invokes law on the basis of his whim and fancy. Bangladeshis, Cambodians, Rwandans and Burundians were slaughtered and the US looked away. Palestinian refugees outnumber the Kosovars but that does not matter. The Kurds have been oppressed for decades and the oppressors are certified democrats by NATO. The UN has been rendered redundant since there is no balance of power in the world and the entire industrial world, barring a ramshackle Russia, is under US overlordship. If this is not a dangerous international security environment, what is? It is not accidental that today the only countries voicing strong protests against the bombing in Yugoslavia happen to be Russia, China and India, all nuclear weapon powers. The non-aligned nations are silent. The NATO attack is endorsed by the Greens in Germany, Communists in Italy, not to mention the socialists who were the original founders of NATO. While a chemical war has been unleashed in Yugoslavia, the peace movements are not demonstrating.

Inteventionism Bad Affs

And, our attempts to leverage our nuclear arsenal have pushed NATO states to agree to various bombing campaigns- this manufactures consent for various wars and interventions.

Subrahmanyam in ‘99

“Clear and Present Danger: US Path to Unipolar Hegemony,” K. Subrahmanyam, The Times of India, 3 May 1999, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27c/519.html

This is the international security environment India has to adjust itself to. India has to take note of the fact that the US administration conducts this war in spite of the majority of its legislature disapproving sending ground troops into Yugoslavia and not supporting the air strikes with a majority. The US President often involves the forces in combat without legislative or popular approval and then puts pressure on the legislature and the public to support his adventure because the lives of Americans are at stake. The awesome military potential of the US, the dictatorial powers of the US Presidency to launch aggressive interventionist campaigns, at a little or no cost to US servicemen, the ambition of the US strategic establishment to perpetuate unipolar hegemony, the tacit acceptance of that hegemony by the majority of the world and the centrality of nuclear weapons and missiles in the strategic calculations of the NATO powers together constitute the rising threat to international security.

This results in collapsing legitimate humanitarian interventionism and a string of limited wars.

Hodge ‘6

Carl Cavanagh Hodge,, Professor of Political Science at Okanagan University College in British Columbia. He is widely published in history, comparative politics, and international relations in Europe and the United States. His books include Shepherd of Democracy? America and Germany in the Twentieth Century (Greenwood, 1992), The Trammels of Tradition: Social Democracy in Britain, France, and Germany (Greenwood, 1994), All of the People, All of the Time: American Government at the End of the Century (Peter Lang, 1998), and Redefining European Security (Garland, 1999), “Casual War: NATO's Intervention in Kosovo,” Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 14 Issue 1, Pages 39 – 54

One of the most remarkable features of contemporary international relations is the new prestige accorded universal standards of human rights. However, NATO's attempt to redeem the promise of human rights by way of military intervention during the recent Kosovo crisis may have established a disturbing precedent for humanitarianism. The Alliance exploited the capabilities of precision weaponry and digital information systems to wage war with air power alone, thus avoiding entirely the deployment of ground troops and the domestic political exposure such a deployment inevitably involves. The best available evidence is that this approach had little immediate effect on the atrocities carried out by Serbian troops in Kosovo and that NATO's overriding concern with casualty-avoidance in war undermined both the effectiveness and the moral legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Even more disturbing is the question whether NATO's action implies that states endowed with the advanced military assets that were brought to bear against Serbia will adopt a casual policy on the conduct of limited war, a policy at odds with the lessons of the twentieth century.

ILaw Solvency

Plan solves Ilaw

Khan 5

Tahir Khan, Strategic Studies Master from Army College, “Doctrine of Preemption Analysis and Implications for South Asia,” March 2, 2005.

Although preventive military action may seem expedient, a significant body of scholars wrestles with the question of whether it is legally permissible. The general consensus holds that while preemptive action is warranted when facing what former U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt once called ‘a rattlesnake poised to strike’, attempts to justify preventive wars are a bottomless pit of elastic normative principles.9 For example, the so-called ‘father’ of international law, Hugo Grotius, insisted that preemption was only lawful when a danger became ‘immediate, and, as it were, at the point of happening.’10 He considered taking up arms in order to weaken a state that might someday use violence against you as ‘“repugnant to every principle of justice.”11 Likewise, another pioneer of modern international jurisprudence, Emmerich de Vattel, counseled that acting merely on vague suspicions risks transforming the initiator of preventive war into an aggressor.12 The NSS makes the point that international law recognizes preemption in case of an imminent danger of attack, but also conditions its legitimacy on the degree of imminence. It adds to this point that the concept of imminent threat has to be adapted to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. In this regard the NSS states that, “Rogue states and terrorists...rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction– weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning...To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”13 International lawyers accept the first part of the argument but reject the second. Schrijver, for example, concurs that the right to preemptive self-defense is recognized in international law and is also in agreement with the UN Charter but notes that it is limited to acute danger or direct threat, also in the case of terrorist violence. A victim state cannot invoke the right to self-defense in order to justify its attacking another state that, in its opinion, is a supporter or potential supporter of terrorists.14

North Korea Solvency

Plan resolves an inevitable conflict- maintains deterrence.

Makhijani 3

Arjun. President of IEER, holds a Ph.D. in engineering (specialization: nuclear fusion) from the University of California at Berkeley. He has produced many studies and articles on nuclear fuel cycle related issues, including weapons production, testing, and nuclear waste, over the past twenty years. 3/4/3. <http://www.ieer.org/op-eds/radio/4nkorea.html>.

As the world's attention is focused on Iraq, the North Korean nuclear crisis is developing quickly in an alarming direction. The US has put bombers on alert. North Korea is threatening all-out war, including possibly pre-emptive war. It has said that if the US can wage pre-emptive war, it can too. Last December North Korea threw out United Nations inspectors. Then it withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. In late January, North Korea began to take technical steps to extract and refine plutonium, the stuff of nuclear bombs. We do not know if North Korea has one or two nuclear weapons at present. But if the current program continues, it is likely to acquire several in a few months time. It is only right that North Korea's violations of its NPT commitments have received a lot of publicity. North Korea has also violated its 1994 agreement with the United States, called the Agreed Framework. But U.S. violations are also at the core of the dispute, though they are not well publicized. Specifically, in 1994, the United States agreed to "provide formal assurances to the DPRK [that is, North Korea], against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S." The Clinton administration never gave that assurance. Then the Bush administration made matters much worse by naming North Korea as a potential nuclear weapon target. That was a direct violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. After that, President Bush named North Korea as part of the "axis of evil." The United States has also announced that it may use nuclear weapons in retaliation for chemical or biological attack. That's a violation of U.S. commitments related to the NPT. The United States has said that it wants to resolve the issue peacefully and talk. But it refuses to negotiate a new agreement even though both parties have violated the old one. That is a big mistake. The United States must provide a formal assurance that it will not threaten to use or actually use nuclear weapons against North Korea. Such a security assurance should be part of the bargain that would return international inspectors to North Korea immediately and end its nuclear bomb program. The alternative points to war, may be nuclear war and catastrophe. Nuclear weapons are illegal and immoral no matter who possesses them. The U.S. policy of possible first use of nuclear weapons goes back to Hiroshima. Safety and security require that it be scrapped now not only for North Korea but for all countries.

Iran Prolif Solvency

Our posture of calculated ambiguity crushes US’s legitimacy on Iranian prolif.

Sagan 9

Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, “The Case for No First Use,” June 5, 2009, *Routledge*, International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The point is not that potential veiled US nuclear threats were in any way the cause of Iran’s nuclear-weapons programme, which began long before the Bush administration took office. But US nuclear threats, intentional or not, both play into the hands of domestic forces in Iran that favour developing nuclear weapons and reduce international diplomatic support for coercive diplomatic efforts to pressure Iran to end its defiance of UN Security Council resolutions requiring suspension of its enrichment programme. If the United States were to adopt a no-first-use doctrine, the temptation for US politicians to resort to veiled nuclear threats as part of coercive diplomacy against Iran or other potential proliferators would be reduced, as would the ability of Tehran to claim it faces nuclear threats.

Threatening to use nuclear weapons is the primary impetus for iranian nuclearization

Hartung 7

William, director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation, Did We Miss the Lesson of Nagasaki?, http://hnn.us/articles/41781.html

Six decades later the United States remains the only nation to have used nuclear arms as a weapon of war. The absence of additional attacks has been driven in part by the moral opprobrium attached to the use of these weapons of mass terror, and in part by the fear of devastating retaliation by another nuclear power -- particularly on the U.S.-Soviet front. But despite this record, the foundations of U.S. nuclear policy remain morally suspect. There has not been another Nagasaki, but it is U.S. policy to engage in veiled threats to launch just such an attack, even if the target nation does not possess nuclear weapons. The immorality of U.S. declaratory nuclear policy was made evident recently when Barack Obama asserted that "it would be a profound mistake to use nuclear weapons under any circumstance . . . involving civilians." This seemingly common sense statement was roundly criticized by rival presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Christopher Dodd, who essentially argued that the nuclear option should never publicly be "taken off the table." Not only is the prospect of using nuclear weapons in circumstances in which civilians will be killed immoral, but the threat of doing so violates international law, as expressed in an historic 1995 advisory opinion by the World Court. This policy is also counterproductive at the strategic level. The threat to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states is only liable to spur them to seek their own. Taking this stance toward Iran -- even if the actual use of the weapons is extremely unlikely -- will undermine prospects for negotiations to curb Teheran's program while giving leverage to officials within Iran who want to go from nuclear enrichment to nuclear weapons.

Prolif Solvency

A) Security – even if we don’t detonate these weapons against a state, the policy of first use is akin to holding a gun to someone’s head – it is the impetus for proliferation

Ellsberg 9/11

Daniel. Senior Fellow of the [Nuclear Age Peace Foundation](http://www.wagingpeace.org/). 9/11/9. <http://www.bloomingtonalternative.com/node/10137>.

Later in 1990, after Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait, not one of the four nuclear states militarily arrayed against Iraq in the Gulf War -- the United States, Britain, France and Israel -- refrained from tacit threats to initiate nuclear attacks under some circumstances. Under public questioning, high U.S. and other Allied officials pointedly refused to rule out the possible first-use of nuclear weapons against Iraq: in particular, if the Iraqis used chemical weapons extensively, which was regarded as highly possible. Thus, nuclear weapons were used as a threat against a non-nuclear opponent during the Gulf War. By the same token, contrary to the belief of most Americans that U.S. nuclear weapons have never been used in the 50 years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American presidents have employed nuclear threats over a dozen times, generally in secret from the U.S. public, in crises and limited wars in Indochina, East Asia, Berlin, Cuba and the Middle East. The Soviet Union, Israel, and Pakistan have used nuclear weapons in the same way. In each of these cases, nuclear weapons were used in the exact sense in which a gun is used when it is pointed at someone’s head in a confrontation, whether or not the trigger is pulled. To get one’s way without having to pull the trigger is a major reason for acquiring the gun and, often, for brandishing it. In this regard, the Pentagon concluded the tactic was successfully used in the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein did not, after all, use the chemical weapons he then possessed -- some on alert missiles -- either against Allied troops or against Israel. Fear of Israeli nuclear reprisal may have been an especially effective deterrent. But this success, if true, came at a high price. The message that the United States and its allies regarded such threats both as legitimate and as successful was not lost on potential proliferators, who could imagine themselves either as receiving or as imitating such threats themselves in the future. Yet another spur to proliferation was the accompanying thought, among Third World observers, that Iraq might have been spared both these nuclear threats and the heavy conventional bombing it received if Saddam Hussein’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon had already been successful. That inference became inescapable after 2003, with the dramatic difference in the U.S. responses to a supposed nuclear weapons program in Iraq and an actual successful one in North Korea. (A conventional or nuclear U.S. attack in the near future on a yet-non-nuclear Iran would underline that point once again for the rest of the world).

B) Prestige – the policy of first use inscribes military value to nuclear weapons, that reinforces the prestige of the bomb

Mendelsohn 99

Jack Mendelsohn, vice president and executive director of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWS) in Washington, DC, is former deputy director of the Arms Control Association, “NATO’s Nuclear Weapons: The Rationale for ‘No First Use,’” 1999, Arms Control Association, <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/520>

The United States affirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State toward which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.<11> It is important to note that the NSA makes no exceptions to allow for a nuclear response to a chemical or biological weapons attack. NATO's first-use doctrine against conventional forces is clearly contrary to the NPT-related NSA commitments of the United States, Britain and France. In addition, the United States, the key NATO nuclear power, maintains the option to use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapons attack, and implies that NATO has the same policy. While this policy had been present in U.S. Defense Department documents in the early 1990s, it was articulated in April 1996 by Robert Bell, senior director for defense policy and arms control at the National Security Council at the time of the U.S. signature of a protocol to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty. Protocol I of the so-called Treaty of Pelindaba pledges the United States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any treaty party. Bell, however, said U.S. signature "will not limit options available to the United States in response to an attack by an ANWFZ party using weapons of mass destruction." [Emphasis added.] In December 1998, Walter Slocombe, under secretary of defense for policy, stated: "It is simply an issue of making sure that we continue to maintain a high level of uncertainty or high level of concern, if you will, at what the potential aggressor would face if he used [CBW] or indeed took other aggressive acts against the alliance." [Emphasis added.]<12> For the United States, the most powerful nation in the world, and by implication NATO, the most powerful conventional alliance, to insist that they need the threat of first use of nuclear weapons to deter potential adversaries raises the question why other, much weaker nations, confronted by hostile neighbors, do not need them as well. Moreover, a U.S. and NATO first-use policy against, in effect, conventional, chemical and biological weapons suggests that nuclear weapons have many useful military roles. This reinforces the value and prestige attributed to nuclear weapons and undermines efforts by the United States and other key NATO countries to persuade non-nuclear-weapon states to refrain from developing their own nuclear arsenals.

Prolif Solvency- A2: Alt Causes

First use policy sustains both the funding and nuclear bureaucracy that generates all alt causes to our advantage

Schwartz 98

Stephen I. Schwartz, The Acronym Institute, Disarmament Diplomacy, “Miscalculated Ambiguity: US Policy on the Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Issue No. 23, February 1998.

Threatening to do so may sow doubts in the minds of the Iraqi leadership, but it is equally likely to have a far more pernicious effect. Such threats demonstrate that weapons of mass destruction may be required to deter the United States. Is this really the message the United States wishes to communicate to the international community, that threatening the use of nuclear weapons is an acceptable means of diplomacy, much less warfare? This posture is needlessly counterproductive, giving comfort not only to those in other countries who view such weapons as useful but also to the US nuclear bureaucracy which uses such threats to justify its continued existence and high levels of funding.

BMD Co-op Solvency

No first strike declaration is critical to NMD co-operation and solves Russian fears.

Lodal ‘1

Jan Lodal, Arms Control Association, Arms Control Today, March 2001, “Pledging 'No First Strike': A Step Toward Real WMD Cooperation, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/812

Challenges to the Cold War arms control paradigm have been crystallized by U.S. plans to deploy an NMD system. As Russia's nuclear arsenal continues to shrink with age, a significant NMD could give the United States, for the first time in the nuclear age, a true "first-strike" capability—the ability to launch a pre-emptive attack destroying enough of Russia's nuclear force to permit the NMD to intercept any residual retaliation. A nuclear first-strike capability would be the ultimate military advantage, giving the United States enough force to threaten the survival of any rival. Launching a pre-emptive nuclear attack for any reason short of stopping an inevitable WMD attack against the United States would be contrary to all American traditions and values. But just as the United States has always insisted on evaluating any potential adversary's capabilities rather than only its intentions, other nations will evaluate U.S. capabilities in deciding how to respond to the United States. Even if other nations accept the near certainty that the United States would not launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack, they will worry about the diplomatic, economic, and even cultural power such a capability could afford. It is thus not surprising that Russia has held progress in arms control, and therefore greater cooperation in stopping emerging WMD threats, hostage to obtaining America's commitment to the continued prohibition of national missile defenses as codified by the ABM Treaty. To achieve its goals in stopping new WMD threats, the United States should begin with a reassessment of its own nuclear doctrine and force structure. Both remain locked in the Cold War paradigm. The nuclear doctrines of damage limitation and extended deterrence in Europe were responses to a Soviet threat that no longer exists. Yet these doctrines continue to require nuclear forces and war plans that would give the United States a first-strike capability if an NMD were deployed. A U.S. pledge of "no first strike" is a necessary first step in establishing a new nuclear offense-defense relationship that maintains deterrence while motivating the cooperation necessary to stop the growing threats of WMD from terrorists and rogue states.

Plan creates necessary international co-operation for NMD

Lodal ‘1

Jan Lodal, Arms Control Association, Arms Control Today, March 2001, “Pledging 'No First Strike': A Step Toward Real WMD Cooperation, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/812

There are advantages to obtaining Russian agreement to join the United States in reducing forces to 1,200 weapons each, but even if an agreed limit is not possible, the United States should reduce its forces to these levels. Explicitly eliminating prompt retaliatory war plans and the de facto first-strike capability they engender would make it easier to achieve the international consensus necessary to deploy a limited national missile defense and would strengthen U.S. diplomatic leverage in nuclear non-proliferation. These changes to U.S. nuclear doctrine and force structure do not mean, however, that the United States should adopt a no-first-use pledge. Removing prompt retaliatory attack options from war plans and announcing that no such plans will be maintained as a matter of policy would be another step toward a no-first-use policy. But taking the final step of making an explicit no-first-use pledge would be a mistake. Four limited but valid first-use missions remain for nuclear forces: # To destroy deep underground WMD facilities, several of which have been constructed by rogue states. Only nuclear weapons are capable of destroying many such facilities. # To pre-empt a WMD attack by a rogue state or terrorist group. # To retaliate against a non-nuclear WMD attack on the United States, its forces, or its allies when conventional retaliation cannot bring the WMD attacks to an immediate halt. # If a major war were to break out, a nuclear attack seemed imminent, and the destruction of enemy nuclear forces with conventional forces was not feasible, to pre-empt the ability of nuclear powers other than Russia or China to launch nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies.

BMD Co-op w/Russia and China Solvency

Specifically, it will create co-operation over BMD with Russia and China, as well as allies.

Lodal ‘1

Jan Lodal, Arms Control Association, Arms Control Today, March 2001, “Pledging 'No First Strike': A Step Toward Real WMD Cooperation, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/812

Perfecting TMD systems, designing and developing workable boost-phase systems, and building a 100-interceptor limited ground-based NMD will take considerable time. If the United States announces a new strategy for ballistic missile defenses that is not a threat to non-hostile powers and makes clear that this strategy will be pursued consistently, it should be possible to develop a cooperative approach that would be accepted by Russia, China, and U.S. allies and friends. The first step would be dropping the prompt retaliatory strikes from the SIOP and reducing the nuclear force to 1,200 weapons so that, unless the United States deployed a very large ABM system, defenses would not give it a first-strike capability. Sharing ABM technology—for example, by giving all friendly nations the ability to use a common space-based ballistic missile detection and tracking system—would be another important aid to U.S. diplomacy. Finally, a new policy on missile defenses must be integrated with alliance relations and foreign policy objectives. The concerns of NATO, Asian friends and allies, Russia, and China must be directly addressed.

CBW/CBW Prolif Solvency

US commitment to NFS causes massive support for the BWC and CWC.

Lodal ‘1

Jan Lodal, Arms Control Association, Arms Control Today, March 2001, “Pledging 'No First Strike': A Step Toward Real WMD Cooperation, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/812

A U.S. strategy of strong deterrence, including limited threats of nuclear first use, can nonetheless achieve wide acceptance as non-threatening if U.S. forces and war plans are changed as recommended. A reduction in America's total nuclear arsenal to 1,200 weapons and an explicit no-first-strike pledge should eventually ameliorate concern about a limited U.S. national missile defense. These changes should enable the United States to gain stronger international support for its non-proliferation goals. It should be possible to greatly enhance the acceptance and enforcement of the three treaties that prohibit the proliferation of WMD—the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. The role of law enforcement, both domestic and multinational, will have to supersede that of multilateral verification organizations such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The dismal experience of UNSCOM in disarming Saddam Hussein's Iraq demonstrates that there are severe limits to the effectiveness of UN-based enforcement organizations.

Strengthening the BWC is key to solve bioweapons prolif.

Rissanen ‘3

Jenni Rissanen, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies, “The Biological Weapons Convention,” March 2003, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_28a.html>

The BWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and took effect on March 26, 1975 after 22 states had joined the Convention, including its three depositary governments: the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation), the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Convention is of unlimited duration. As of December 2002,more than 30 years after it opened for signature, the BWC has 147 members. An additional 16 countries have signed the Convention but have not yet ratified it, including Egypt and Syria. Some 30 countries still remain outside the BWC, including Azerbaijan, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Sudan, and Tajikistan. The BWC is important because it represents the international community’s will to prevent biological warfare and the deliberate use of disease as a weapon. It is the first disarmament treaty to completely ban an entire class of weapons. The Convention is an indispensable legal and political instrument that reinforces the widespread condemnation of biological weapons. The BWC complements the Geneva Protocol, which banned biological warfare methods in 1925. Although the BWC (in its title and in Article I) does not explicitly prohibit “use” of biological weapons, the Final Declaration of the 1996 Treaty Review Conference reaffirmed that, although “use” is not explicitly prohibited under Article I of the BWC, it is still considered to be a violation of the Convention. By representing a global will and establishing an international standard, it has built confidence and helped to deter countries from acquiring biological weapons for more than 30 years.

CBW prolif causes massive increased risk of use and sophistication of CBW.

CISAC No Date

“Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation and Terrorism,” Dean Wilkening, CISAC, http://cisac.stanford.edu/research/chemical\_and\_biological\_weapons\_proliferation\_and\_terrorism/

With the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical) replaced the U.S.-Soviet nuclear standoff as the dominant U.S. security concern. Chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation and the potential use of these weapons by terrorists deserve particular attention, as CBW capabilities have been confirmed or suspected in some 20 nations. The anthrax mailings to journalists and members of Congress in 2001 drove home the reality of the bioterrorist threat to U.S. citizens, though evidence of global CBW threats had been mounting for several years. Revelations about the size and sophistication of Iraq's CBW programs in the summer of 1995 provided a disturbing reminder of how advanced such programs can become while avoiding international attention. Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and Aum Shinrikyo's use of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995 suggest that inhibitions on CBW use are not as strong as one might like. CISAC scholars examine emerging biotechnologies that could be used to cause catastrophic harm, and how to respond to such threats. Working with colleagues at Stanford and other institutions, CISAC researchers are thinking through related public policy issues such as the best ways to strengthen public health surveillance and emergency response, the utility and drawbacks of oversight of research or research publication, and the advantages and dangers of classified biodefense work.

Russia Relations/Iraqi Stability Solvency

Ending calculated ambiguity is critical to Russian relations and to solve the Iraqi war.

Schwartz in ‘98

Stephen I. Schwartz, The Acronym Institute, Disarmament Diplomacy, “Miscalculated Ambiguity: US Policy on the Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Issue No. 23, February 1998

As we have seen, the policy of calculated ambiguity has already backfired with respect to Russia. The United States can certainly deal with Iraq without Russia, but the ongoing diplomacy and, if necessary, military action would be easier with Russian support. Moreover, the lack of support or even outright opposition would complicate both the Iraqi situation as well as other US-Russian relations, particularly concerning the long-delayed ratification of the START II Treaty, the expansion of NATO, and the issue of Russian nuclear sales to Iran.

NFU key to Russian relations.

Jack Mendelsohn, writer for Arms Control Association, July/August 1999, “NATO's Nuclear Weapons: The Rationale for 'No First Use',” http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999\_07-08/jmja99#authorbios

**The alliance's** overwhelming and **unchallengeable conventional advantages make it difficult to conceive of circumstances under which NATO would require nuclear weapons to successfully manage any crisis in Europe**. **The only state that could** conceivably **mount a serious military threat to NATO** sometime **in the future is Russia. But this likelihood is "extremely remote" and hardly justifies a general NATO policy of nuclear first use. Moreover, NATO's first-use policy is viewed in Moscow as directed** primarily—if not solely—**at Russia and**, as noted above in connection with the Founding Act, remains a major irritant as NATO expands eastward.

US no-first-use policy is key to future US-Russia cooperation on nuclear weapons

Feiveson and Hogendoorn 3 (Harold A. and Ernst J., “No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003)

But for the declaratory policies more generally (considering first the United states alone), in our view, the simplest, most direct, and most powerful approach is an unambiguous U.S. commitment not to use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances. The present formulation focusing on pledges to non-nuclear-weapon states may have seemed prudent when we were devising ways to persuade non-nuclear countries to agree to an indefinite extension of the NPT, or when we were concerned with Soviet aggression in Europe or elsewhere. But, such an approach is no longer necessary. To hold open the option for nuclear use against another nuclear weapon state is unnecessary and awkward, at a time when the United States is drawing closer to Russia and China, and U.S. relationships with India, Pakistan, or Israel are not conflictual. Even if not legally binding, strong, unhedged no-first-use commitments by the United States and other nuclear weapon states would strengthen the nonproliferation regime, and possibly also help set the stage for later, more binding, commitments.

India Solvency

India will model a US no first use pledge – it’s key to preventing escalation

Sagan 9

Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, “The Case for No First Use,” June 5, 2009, *Routledge*, International Institute for Strategic Studies

The best example is India since its 1998 weapons tests. In 1999, for example, the Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine, prepared by the newly created National Security Advisory Board (NASB), recommended a caveat that permitted first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states allied to a nuclear power: ‘India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against states which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapons powers’.34 This subtle alteration of traditional Indian doctrine was a close copy of the US negative security assurances from the 1980s that included the identical exception clause to permit target- ing the forces of the Soviet Union and its allies and urban-industrial targets in the event of a major war in Europe.35 Even more dramatically, in January 2003, New Delhi adopted a doctrine including the explicit threat of nuclear first use in response to biological- or chemical-weapons use; evidence again suggests they were copying the United States and other nuclear states. Indeed, in December 2002, the National Security Advisory Board reportedly recommended a complete abandonment of no-first-use by the Indian government.36 Its rationale reportedly focused directly on the perceived need for India to follow in the doctrinal footsteps of the other nuclear-weapons states: ‘India must consider withdrawing from this [no- first-use] commitment as the other nuclear weapons-states have not accepted this policy’.37 An unidentified member of the board was quoted in the press making a similar argument tying Indian policy to that of the P5 nuclear powers: ‘all five nuclear weapon states . . reserve the right to launch nuclear weapons first. Then why should India not do so?’38 India’s movement away from a strict no- first-use policy is alarming: it makes it more likely that India would use nuclear weapons in a future conflict with Pakistan. It also enhances the pressures inside India to develop a larger and more diverse nuclear arsenal. The signalling and legitimising effects of US nuclear doctrine are by no means the only factors leading to such trends in India, but they should not be minimised. A US no-first-use declaration would likewise have at least some positive influence in pushing India in the opposite direction.

Credibility/Soft Power/Environment Solvency

No first use key to multilateral cooperation

Arbatov 8

Alexei Arbatov, November 2008, “NON-FIRST USE AS A WAY OF OUTLAWING NUCLEAR WEAPONS,” [www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Arbatov\_NFU\_Paper.pdf](http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Arbatov_NFU_Paper.pdf).

Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in world politics and defence strategies would greatly enhance the prospects of security cooperation among the NWS and the possibilities of fortifying the regime of nuclear non-proliferation. The new interest in nuclear disarmament across the world, stimulated by the famous 2007 article of the “four wise men” from the United States6, created a respectable political momentum behind this old notion. Hence there are serious reasons to address anew the most aggressive and dangerous concept of nuclear deterrence—the first strike or first use of nuclear weapons.

Multilateralism is the only way to prevent great power wars that lead to extinction

Dyer 4

Gwynne. Received degrees from Canadian, American and British universities, finishing with a Ph.D. in Military and Middle Eastern History from the University of London. He served in three navies and held academic appointments at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and Oxford University before launching his twice-weekly column on international affairs, which is published by over 175 papers in some 45 countries. 12/30/4. <http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1230-05.htm>.

The "firebreak" against nuclear weapons use that we began building after Hiroshima and Nagasaki has held for well over half a century now. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new powers is a major challenge to the stability of the system. So are the coming crises, mostly environmental in origin, which will hit some countries much harder than others, and may drive some to desperation. Add in the huge impending shifts in the great-power system as China and India grow to rival the United States in GDP over the next 30 or 40 years and it will be hard to keep things from spinning out of control. With good luck and good management, we may be able to ride out the next half-century without the first-magnitude catastrophe of a global nuclear war, but the potential certainly exists for a major die-back of human population. We cannot command the good luck, but good management is something we can choose to provide. It depends, above all, on preserving and extending the multilateral system that we have been building since the end of World War II. The rising powers must be absorbed into a system that emphasizes co-operation and makes room for them, rather than one that deals in confrontation and raw military power. If they are obliged to play the traditional great-power game of winners and losers, then history will repeat itself and everybody loses.

Multilateralism key to solve the environment

Dyer 4

Gwynne. Received degrees from Canadian, American and British universities, finishing with a Ph.D. in Military and Middle Eastern History from the University of London. He served in three navies and held academic appointments at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and Oxford University before launching his twice-weekly column on international affairs, which is published by over 175 papers in some 45 countries. 12/30/4. <http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1230-05.htm>.

Our hopes for mitigating the severity of the coming environmental crises also depend on early and concerted global action of a sort that can only happen in a basically co-operative international system. When the great powers are locked into a military confrontation, there is simply not enough spare attention, let alone enough trust, to make deals on those issues, so the highest priority at the moment is to keep the multilateral approach alive and avoid a drift back into alliance systems and arms races. And there is no point in dreaming that we can leap straight into some never-land of universal brotherhood; we will have to confront these challenges and solve the problem of war within the context of the existing state system.

Multilat=No Solvency Deficits

Multilateralism key to solve a laundry list of problems

Karns 8

Margaret. Professor of Political Science at the University of Dayton and the first director of the University of Dayton’s Center for International Programs from 1983 to 1995. “Multilateralism Matters Even More.” SAIS Review vol. XXVIII no. 2. Summer/Fall 2008. Muse.

Many of the issues and problems in today’s world require multilateral action including: Iraq, Afghanistan, international trade, climate change, migration, piracy, nuclear weapons proliferation, and the threat of global pandemics since none of these can be solved by unilateral action. Much of the diplomatic activity to address these issues, therefore, takes place in multilateral fora and institutions such as various parts of the UN system and its specialized agencies, regional and subregional organizations, special interest groups such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and ad hoc groups such as the Middle East Quartet.

Hegemony Solvency

Counterplan is the only way to revive military readiness

Conley in ‘1

Harry Conley, “Not With Impunity: Assessing US Policy for Retaliating to a Chemical or Biological Attack,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2001/essays2001/04_ch02.htm>

Being ready to retaliate following a CBW attack against the United States also implies an increased emphasis on special operations forces (SOF). In such situations, "SOF, because of their unique skills, regional expertise, cultural sensitivity and operational experience, may be the force of choice for meeting the strategic requirements of the National Command Authorities." 52 Finally, the United States must continue its investment in chemical and biological defense. If CBW defense equipment can mitigate the effects of a CBW attack, the adversary may see no advantage in using weapons of mass destruction. Ultimately, the aim of CBW retaliation policy is deterrence. Although an element of ambiguity certainly can serve to enhance deterrence by keeping adversaries guessing about the response to an attack, it seems more likely that the United States is stuck with the current approach because there has not been much of the critical thinking needed to devise a more robust policy. In other words, the current policy of calculated ambiguity--with its over-reliance on the nuclear "big stick"--is a cop-out. America is paying full price for this half-policy, the result of which is that the Armed Forces may be strategically unprepared to respond when the time comes.

2NC CP Solves Economy

The plan reorients deterrence- it contains the use of deterrence to nuclear weapons only and pushes MAD into strategic irrelevance- it reshapes all war plans.

Stanley Foundation in ‘8

Stanley Foundation, US Nuclear Review project, Reported by Maxims News Service, 8/22/08, “The Stanley Foundation: A New Look at No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” http://www.maximsnews.com/news20080822stanleyfdtnnuclearfirststrikedoctrine10808221601.htm

A NFU policy would send a signal to American war planners that nuclear weapons are not appropriate in almost all contingencies. This would encourage them to develop capabilities and plans for using conventional arms to destroy hardened and deeply buried targets, biological weapons laboratories, and other sites that the current administration has suggested could only be destroyed by nuclear attack. Expanding conventional capabilities in turn reduces the likelihood that the United States would feel the need to use nuclear weapons. As one conference participant noted, “If you rule out the use of nuclear force, you push war planners to think with more discipline…You can’t just let military planners assume that it’s all right to use nuclear weapons to cover a wide range of targets.” Without the discipline imposed by a change in guidance doctrine, one participant said, military planners are prone to including nuclear options in war plans simply because they need a mission for weapons they already have. By cultivating a culture of nonuse within the military, NFU could smooth the way toward adoption of a purely retaliatory nuclear posture, with a nuclear force likely consisting only of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Indeed, conference participants noted that the US armed forces are already far less enthusiastic about nuclear arms than they were during the Cold War. One participant said that the Joint Chiefs now argue about which military branches have to maintain nuclear weapons, rather than which ones get to. One participant suggested that the Air Force is unenthusiastic about maintaining intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), bombs, and nuclear cruise missiles and would not resist a new doctrine diminishing the relevance of nuclear arms. Faced with the nonnuclear culture of today’s Air Force, this person said, “Curtis LeMay would be rolling in his grave.”

Present deterrence system makes breakdowns inevitable

Brecht in ‘9

Lyle A Brecht, National Cyber Systems Infrastructure Security Review, “Nuclear Posture Review: Rethinking Deterrence Doctrine,” June 14, 2009, Scribd.com

The economic consequences of the failure of deterrence and the ongoing costs of maintaining a faulty (and potentially counter-useful) Deterrence Doctrine based on existing Nuclear Posture are prohibitive in the present economic environment and may prevent improvement and long term sustainable growth.3 The U.S. needs to invent a new game to play and stop playing the unwinnable game of deter- rence based on weak-MAD. This deserves a Bletchley Park effort, a Manhattan Project to move beyond a game that must only end in Apocalypse. We propose a three-year, multi-million dollar immediate effort to rethink U.S. Deterrence Doctrine.4

2NC CP Solves Environment/Oil/Cyber War

The plan reorients deterrence- it contains the use of deterrence to nuclear weapons only and pushes MAD into strategic irrelevance- it reshapes all war plans.

Stanley Foundation in ‘8

Stanley Foundation, US Nuclear Review project, Reported by Maxims News Service, 8/22/08, “The Stanley Foundation: A New Look at No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” http://www.maximsnews.com/news20080822stanleyfdtnnuclearfirststrikedoctrine10808221601.htm

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Without domestic change our defense budget will usurp our ability to solve climate change, solar storms, domestic cyberspace disruption and oil supply shocks- outweighs any da’s on probability and magnitude.

Brecht in ‘9

Lyle A Brecht, National Cyber Systems Infrastructure Security Review, “Nuclear Posture Review: Rethinking Deterrence Doctrine,” June 14, 2009, Scribd.com

If a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the continued use of the present Deterrence Doctrine was performed,20 these surprising outcomes may become evident concerning the Deterrence Doctrine, in its present weak form: the consequences of a failure of deterrence are unacceptably large; the probability of the failure of deterrence is beyond acceptable levels of risk; the present Doctrine of Deterrence is not appropriate for use in environments such as cyberspace;21 the present Doctrine of Deterrence in its weak form is a barrier to achieving nonproliferation objectives. It is unlikely that meaningful nonproliferation can be achieved as long as the Doctrine in its weak form persists as deterrence strategy; the Doctrine creates an urgent need for ever increasing National Defense budgets that usurp necessary capital from other threats to the Nation, such as from climate change, solar storms that can disrupt the national electricity grid, protecting the domestic cyberspace, depletion of oil supplies, etc

2NC- Only CP Solves Terrorism

(A) Deterrence collapse inevitable- plan solves perception of necessary retalation.

Sagan in ‘9

Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, “The Case for No First Use,” June 5, 2009, *Routledge*, International Institute for Strategic Studies

Advocates of calculated ambiguity maintain that such threats usefully enhance deterrence because they raise the potential costs any government would face if it considered using chemical or biological weapons. Critics stress that such threats are contrary to US negative security assurances (promises that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons states, not aligned with a nuclear state) and that such threats can encourage nuclear proliferation by leading governments of non- nuclear-weapons states or new nuclear-weapons states to believe that they may need nuclear weapons to deter such WMD threats.17 There is reason to believe both arguments are correct. On the one hand, the policy is clearly inconsistent with earlier US negative security assur- ances which did not make exceptions for responding to chemical or biological a tack, and it has influenced other states, such as India, to adopt a similar nuclear doctrine. On the other hand, it is likely that such declarations do add credibility to the US threat to respond with nuclear weapons, not just by creating ambiguity about the likely response (which can never be entirely eliminated), but also by creating a commitment trap. If deterrence fails despite such threats, a president will feel increased pressure to use nuclear weapons to maintain his or her domestic reputation and America’s international reputation for honouring commitments.18 In short, such threats do not just signal commitment, they create commitment. Thus, unless such threats work 100% of the time, the calculated-ambiguity doctrine increases the likelihood that the United States will use nuclear weapons first in response to a perceived imminent or actual chemical or biological attack. An unambiguous declaratory policy of no first use of nuclear weapons would reduce, but could not entirely eliminate, the calculation of a poten- tial government contemplating the use of chemical or biological weapons that the United States might retaliate with nuclear weapons. In this sense it would likely have some negative impact on deterrence, though consider- able residual ambiguity and deterrent e fect would remain. A no- first-use declaratory policy would also, however, reduce, but not entirely eliminate, the likelihood that the United States would actually use nuclear weapons first, for the first time since 1945. Reasonable people can differ on how to assess these probabilities and how to value each of the outcomes, but a serious comparison of current and no-first-use doctrine should include a clear assessment of the severe consequences of both kinds of deterrence failure: the immediate consequences of a chemical or biological a tack by an adversary, and the long-term consequences of potential nuclear retaliation in the event deterrence fails.

(B) Only retalation would escalate

Speice 6

Speice, Patrick F., Jr. "Negligence and nuclear nonproliferation: eliminating the current liability barrier to bilateral U.S.-Russian nonproliferation assistance programs." William and Mary Law Review 47.4 (Feb 2006): 1427(59). Expanded Academic ASAP.

The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. (49) Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. (50) In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. (51) This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies by hostile states, (52) as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. (53)

2NC- Only CP Solves Cyber War

And, the squo deterrence doctrine invites attacks- it does nothing to stop cyber threats and leaves us wide open.

Brecht in ‘9

Lyle A Brecht, National Cyber Systems Infrastructure Security Review, “Nuclear Posture Review: Rethinking Deterrence Doctrine,” June 14, 2009, Scribd.com

With cyber weapons, there presently is no countervailing strategic ‘game’ doctrine for Deterrence Doc- trine, like MAD (mutual assured destruction), that has the potential to actually ‘deter’ First Use. The no- tion that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence can be retrofitted and used to deter cyber attacks is absurd. Because Deterrence Doctrine threats can be initiated easily by privatized transnational groups, without the knowledge of national governments by rogue elements within the state, and the originating location of the attack readily masked and even transposed to a predetermined DNS, the threat of nuclear armageddon in response appears both unwarranted and unproductive.

2NC- A2: Perception Advantages

Only changing our nuclear posture alters enemy threat perceptions

Lopez ‘8

[Bernardo V., “UPSHOT; Nuclear psywar”, Business World, 7/18, Lexis]

With the proliferation of nuclear missiles, the notion of a nuclear first strike became more urgent. Nuclear confrontation is a war without winners, the mother of all wars. Nuclear weapons neutralize advantage or superiority. Even if the US has 5,000 nuclear multiple warheads, it takes just one from its enemy to destroy half of the US continent. The surprise factor is critical. Hit the enemy now while he sleeps before he hits you. First strike presumes the enemy will resort to a first strike. First strike presumes inevitable confrontation. Nuclear retaliation cannot undo the damage of a first strike but simply add to it, the essence of the war without winners.

US first use posture is modeled- makes perception of first strike inevitable

Blair ‘2

Bruce G. Blair, President of the Center for Defense Information & former launch officer in the Strategic Air Command, 2002

Nuclear Time Warp, http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/time-warp-pr.cfm

Even more dangerously counter-productive is the hidden message to foes and allies alike that it is legitimate for states to unleash nuclear weapons when faced with a non-nuclear threat. If the most powerful nation on earth asserts its right to initiate the use of nuclear force, other states endowed with far less strength and far fewer non-nuclear options now need only to invoke the American logic to justify their nuclear aggression. America, the world's juggernaut in military, economic and diplomatic terms, is inducing the rest of the world to emulate U.S. policy and lift the 50-year old taboo against the use of nuclear weapons. We are virtually inviting other countries to use them under a widening array of circumstances. During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, this policy would have justified Iranian nuclear retaliation for Iraq's use of chemical weapons. Fortunately, Iran did not possess any. But Israel does, and in the future Israel could recite the Bush nuclear review to justify a nuclear strike against, say, Iraqi missiles suspected of carrying a payload of germs. The widespread adoption of the new American first-use principle around the globe will dangerously shorten the nuclear fuse in many regional confrontations.

2NC- Prefer Our Evidence

View aff arguments with skepticism – they exaggerate the costs of a no first use policy

Sagan 9

Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, “The Case for No First Use,” June 5, 2009, *Routledge*, International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Is the threat of the first use of US nuclear weapons still necessary to deter the use of non-nuclear WMD (that is, chemical and biological weapons), and to deter the use of large-scale conventional military force? Or can Washington move toward a policy of no- first-use, limiting the role of nuclear weapons to deter the use of other states’ nuclear weapons against the United States and its friends and allies? Previous analyses of the appro- priate role and missions for US nuclear forces, including earlier official nuclear posture reviews, have been too narrow, focusing exclusively on the contribution of nuclear weapons to deterrence and not examining the e fects of the American nuclear posture and declaratory policy on the wider set of US and allied objectives regarding non-proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Because of this focus, previous government and academic analyses have both exaggerated the potential military and diplomatic costs of a no- first- use doctrine and have seriously underestimated its potential benefits. There were strong and obvious reasons why Washington maintained and adver- tised a range of first-use options throughout the Cold War: NATO faced a massive conventional threat from the Warsaw Pact and the United States and its allies in East Asia were confronted by the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China and North Korea. But these options are no longer neces- sary. Examination of the costs and benefits suggests that the United States should, after appropriate consultation with allies, move toward adopting a nuclear-weapons no-first-use declaratory policy by stating that ‘the role of US nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear weapons use by other nuclear- weapons states against the United States, our allies, and our armed forces, and to be able respond, with an appropriate range of nuclear retaliation options, if necessary, in the event that deterrence fails’.

Politics NB

Counterplan is incredibly popular

Callagher in ‘8

Nancy Gallagher, The Acronym Institute, Disarmament Diplomacy, “US and Russian Public Opinion on Arms Control and Space Security,” Issue No. 87, Spring 2008

There was a strong consensus among both the American and Russian publics that nuclear weapons should play a very limited role in security strategy. When respondents were asked about the circumstances under which their country should use nuclear weapons, 20 percent of Americans and 14 percent of Russians chose "never", while 54 percent of Americans and 63 percent of Russians chose "only in response to a nuclear attack". Only 25 percent of Americans and 11 percent of Russians thought that there were circumstances under which their country should use nuclear weapons even if it had not suffered a nuclear attack. Hence, 71 percent of Americans favoured having an explicit "no first use" policy, while only 26 percent thought that this would be "a bad idea".

Even a Republican congress doesn’t like pre-emption planning

Pincus ‘5

Walter Pincus, Washington Post, “Pentagon Revises Nuclear Strike Plan,” September 11, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/10/AR2005091001053.html

The first example for potential nuclear weapon use listed in the draft is against an enemy that is using "or intending to use WMD" against U.S. or allied, multinational military forces or civilian populations. Another scenario for a possible nuclear preemptive strike is in case of an "imminent attack from adversary biological weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can safely destroy." That and other provisions in the document appear to refer to nuclear initiatives proposed by the administration that Congress has thus far declined to fully support. Last year, for example, Congress refused to fund research toward development of nuclear weapons that could destroy biological or chemical weapons materials without dispersing them into the atmosphere. The draft document also envisions the use of atomic weapons for "attacks on adversary installations including WMD, deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons." But Congress last year halted funding of a study to determine the viability of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator warhead (RNEP) -- commonly called the bunker buster -- that the Pentagon has said is needed to attack hardened, deeply buried weapons sites.

Pre-emption is vastly unpopular- zero support

Pincus ‘5

Walter Pincus, Washington Post, “Pentagon Revises Nuclear Strike Plan,” September 11, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/10/AR2005091001053.html

Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), a member of the House Armed Services Committee who has been a leading opponent of the bunker-buster program, said yesterday the draft was "apparently a follow-through on their nuclear posture review and they seem to bypass the idea that Congress had doubts about the program." She added that members "certainly don't want the administration to move forward with a [nuclear] preemption policy" without hearings, closed door if necessary.

Pre-emption is perceived an unpopular with the public by Congress.

Pincus ‘5

Walter Pincus, Washington Post, “Pentagon Revises Nuclear Strike Plan,” September 11, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/10/AR2005091001053.html

One reason for the delay may be concern about raising publicly the possibility of preemptive use of nuclear weapons, or concern that it might interfere with attempts to persuade Congress to finance the bunker buster and other specialized nuclear weapons. In April, Rumsfeld appeared before the Senate Armed Services panel and asked for the bunker buster study to be funded. He said the money was for research and not to begin production on any particular warhead. "The only thing we have is very large, very dirty, big nuclear weapons," Rumsfeld said. "It seems to me studying it [the RNEP] makes all the sense in the world."

No Nuclear Wars Trick

ET emperically prevent nuclear war

Salla ‘6

“Divine Strake” vs. ‘Divine Strike’ –  Did Extraterrestrials Deter the Pentagon from a Preemptive Nuclear War Against Iran? Exopolitics Research Study #11 Michael E. Salla, PhD in Government from the University of Queensland and Lecturer at American University   
<http://www.exopolitics.org>August 12, 2006 <http://www.exopolitics.org/Study-Paper-11.htm>

**Velasco’s findings are supported in the testimony of a number of military whistleblowers** such as Robert **Salas** who **was stationed at Malmstrom Air Force Base** in 1967 **when seven or eight nuclear** **minuteman missiles that were part of the Strategic Air Command** (SAC) **were deactivated by UFOs**. Salas vividly described the incident as follows: The UFO incident happened on the morning of March 16, 1967. I was ... on duty at Oscar Flight as part of the 490th strategic missile squad and there are five launch control facilities assigned to that particular squadron.... I received a call from my topside security guard... and he said that he and some of the guards had been observing some strange lights flying around the site around the launch control facility…. I said, You mean UFO? He said, well, he didn't know what they were but they were lights and were flying around. They were not airplanes. They were not helicopters. They weren't making any noise... [A little later] **our missiles started shutting down one by one**. By shutting down, I mean **they went into a "no-go" condition meaning they could not be launched**…. These weapons were Minuteman One missiles and were of course nuclear-tipped warhead missiles... this incident was of extreme concern to SAC headquarters because they couldn't explain it.[[15]](http://www.exopolitics.org/Study-Paper-11.htm" \l "_edn15" \o ") Salas also claims that a **similar occurrence involving ten minuteman missiles at another nearby SAC facility**, Echo Flight, led to a high level inquiry by the USAF. Salas described his surprise when the investigation was terminated and he was instructed to remain silent. **Salas’ testimony has been** partially **corroborated by other military whistleblowers** such as Lt Colonel Dwynne Arneson who was also stationed at Malmstrom Air Force base in 1967, and read **a top-secret communication confirming that UFOs were hovering near missile silos**.[[16]](http://www.exopolitics.org/Study-Paper-11.htm" \l "_edn16" \o ") Salas has subsequently written about his experience and the aborted official enquiry in his book, Faded Giant.[[17]](http://www.exopolitics.org/Study-Paper-11.htm" \l "_edn17" \o ") He subsequently has concluded that **UFOs are vitally interested in nuclear weapons and have actively interfered with these in an apparent effort to deter the US and other countries from ever using nuclear weapons. This is supported by the testimony of other whistleblowers such as Colonel Ross Dedrickson who had worked with the US Air Force and Atomic Energy Commission** (ret.): After retiring from the Air Force I joined the Boeing company and was responsible for accounting for all of the nuclear fleet of Minuteman missiles. In this incident **they actually photographed the UFO following the missile as it climbed into space and, shining a beam on it, neutralized the missile.  I also learned of a number of incidents which happened, a couple of nuclear weapons sent into space were destroyed by the extraterrestrials**…. the idea of any explosion in space by any Earth government was not acceptable to the extraterrestrials, and that has been demonstrated over and over. [[18]](http://www.exopolitics.org/Study-Paper-11.htm" \l "_edn18" \o ") So Dedrickson believes that nuclear explosions in space or atmosphere are clearly not acceptable to extraterrestrials and **extraterrestrials interfere with nuclear delivery systems to prevent nuclear explosions**. Salas believes that **UFOs interfere with nuclear weapons** out of an altruistic desire **to prevent nuclear war on Earth.** However Dedrickson gives another explanation that identifies what may be a strong self-interest in UFOs interfering with nuclear weapons. He claims that a nuclear weapons test over the Pacific in the 60s was: … one that the extraterrestrials were really concerned about because it affected our ionosphere. In fact, the ET spacecraft were unable to operate because of the pollution in the magnetic field which they depended upon. It was my understanding that in either the very end of the ‘70s or the early ‘80s that we attempted to put a nuclear weapon on the Moon and explode it for scientific measurements and other things which was not acceptable to the extraterrestrials.[[19]](http://www.exopolitics.org/Study-Paper-11.htm" \l "_edn19" \o ") Dedrickson’s point that extraterrestrial space craft is negatively affected by nuclear testing demonstrates that **a strong self-interest is behind the extraterrestrial interference of nuclear weapons** testing.

Security K Aff Solvency

The perm solves best- ending nuclear threats via the plan solves ontologies of war.

Dabashi ‘7

Hamid Dabashi, 2007, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/831/focus.htm

Once again the drums of war are roaring in Washington DC. Once again the signs and signals of a pending US/Israeli attack on yet another country, this time Iran, are heard louder than ever. The build-up to an anxiety-provoking crescendo has already started to gain momentum. **Direct threats, indirect allusions, guarded remarks, provocative bluffs** -- no one knows exactly what the Bush administration has in mind -- and that precisely seems to be the point: **generating** and sustaining a general condition of suspenseful uncertainty, **an atmosphere of amorphous fear and intimidation, and a perpetual state of war.** The practice of anti-war activism throughout the world has hitherto been a periodic and scattered mobilisation against one war or other that the US/Israel has launched -- very much chasing after the evolving military designs of the neo- conservatives in the US, and the reinvigorated Zionists in Israel, and simply reacting to their proactive acts of global terrorism. **As we are waiting for the Iran war to happen (or not to happen),** **it is now perhaps time to step back** and take stock of what this transcontinental axis of global terrorism -- the United States of America and the Jewish state of Israel -- is up to **and thus rethink the civic manners of opposing and resisting it.** When the US launched its wrath on Afghanistan in October 2001, even such progressive and astute American observers as Richard Falk (seconded by the editorial staff of The Nation ) thought that it was a "just war". This argument was no mere act of historical folly. It was a singular sign of political naiveté. We are now way beyond those perhaps innocent yet angry misreadings of what has fast come upon us. After the mayhem of Iraq, instead of constantly waiting for the other shoe to drop and wonder if US/Israel will or will not attack Iran, will or will not bomb Syria, will or will not completely take over Somalia, will or will not militarily engage North Korea, will or will not try for yet another coup in Venezuela, we need to think beyond such probabilities, and reach into the heart of the state of war that this very waiting game entails. As all indications testify, a Democratic US congress will not make any significant difference in this state of war. Looking at the emerging patterns of this state of war, it is now safe to suggest, for example, that what the US is perhaps (and such conjectural phrases are the symptoms of this very state of war) planning to do in Iran is modelled on what Israel did to Lebanon last July -- hence the necessity of no longer treating these two imperial and colonial nexus of warmongering in the world as two separate political propositions and state entities, but in fact collapse them into a singular axis of state terrorism aimed at undisputed global domination. For that drive towards global domination to be politically effective and psychologically enduring, **the state of war is far more important than the actual act of war, and the threat of violence politically far more destabilising than the act of violence itself. For the state of war, and the threat of violence, change the very political culture in which we receive and interpret any particular act of war, or occurrence of violence, so much so, that the enormity of the human cost, infrastructural damages, and the environmental catastrophes, for example, contingent on any act of war gradually begin to dwindle and dissipate in the miasmic emergence of the omnipresent state of war**. For more than five years now, US/Israel and its European allies have been systematically at it inflaming acts of "shock and awe", as the former US secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld called it, in one place or another, so that now the law of diminishing returns has set in, and the staggering acts of violence in Iraq under the US- led occupation, or the barefaced barbarity of Israel in Palestine and Lebanon cease to register their enormous weight and unfathomable consequences. In other words, **the state of war numbs the human consciousness, and thus we fail to respond** (for we lack any meaningful language) **to the fundamental acts of moral depravity** that we witness on a daily basis in Palestine and Iraq in anything remotely resembling a corresponding calibre. So, as the US/Israeli military and intelligence agencies, think tanks, and, above all, mass media (all integral to the same militarised state of mind) are engaged in discussions on how to deal with "terrorism", the world, as well, needs to reverse the order, return the gaze, and begin to wonder how to deal with these two terrorist states and save humanity from their mutual, complementary, and strategically integrated acts of terrorising the world. These two galvanised military machineries masquerading as nation-states are today the most violent source of militarised madness on our planet (and beyond). The Iraq war, in particular, competing with Israeli atrocities in Palestine, has long since ceased to be a singular crime against humanity. Initiated and sustained as it is by the US-led colonial occupation of a sovereign nation-state, the world needs to invent new terms to name, and grasp it. For this military machinery to work best, **the threat of violence or state of war is a more effective tool** for creating fear and sustaining hegemony, **than is the actual fact of violence or event of war**, which is effectively the neutralising moment of its catharsis. **The key to sustaining the state of war**, the warmongers in Washington DC seem to have learned, **is to constantly keep alive an immanent specter of the enemy**, as the Nazi theorist of political power Karl Schmitt and his philosophical shadow Leo Straus both fully realised. Both Karl Schmitt (in theological terms) and Leo Straus (in philosophical conviction) believed that the absence of this enemy and the neutralising effect of liberal democracies will be tantamount to the death of state as the modus operandi of moral virtues. A pending war, predicated on the ghostly apparition of a monstrous Muslim goblin about to leap from darkness and swallow the earth, is thus politically far more expeditious than is the actual event of war. In this psychopathology of power, the American neo- conservatives have learned their lessons as much from the advocate of the German Nazi Karl Schmitt as from the guru of American neo- conservatism Leo Straus -- and then perfected their theory with widespread practice.

## \*\*\*AFF

### Prolif DA

Plan leads to proliferation

A) Appeasement

Holmes 9

Kim. former assistant secretary of state, a vice president at the Heritage Foundation. 8/6/9. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/06/defense-games-arms-races-not-what-you-think/>.

Mr. Spring, a research fellow in national security policy at the Heritage Foundation, brought together experts to simulate real world reactions by nuclear powers to various crises and arms control proposals. In most cases, instead of responding in kind to U.S. unilateral acts of restraint, a majority of states, including Russia, maximized their nuclear forces to the extent their resources permitted. Three of the seven put their nuclear forces on alert in response to the U.S. "de-alerting" its forces. This so alarmed our allies, who feared we were backing off their defense, that they began taking defense measures on their own that escalated the crisis. Even worse, when the U.S. tried to reassure other nuclear powers by making our nuclear command-and-control activities more transparent, four countries did the opposite, "shrouding" their plans and decisions. Odd behavior? Not really: Some countries see nuclear weapons as instruments to achieve advantage over others. They aren't nuclear powers simply because we are, and their behavior is dictated not by fear of us, but rather by a desire to achieve some gain over an adversary. Saddam Hussein bluffed about his nuclear weapons program because he wanted to deter Iran, not us. Unilateral restraint does not always produce the desired response from others. It can backfire and embolden other powers to take advantage of a perceived opening. When other nuclear powers think the U.S. is serious and capable of defense and retaliation, they are far more likely to behave responsibly and in a stabilizing fashion. America's nuclear superiority is not a provocation, as some think, but a deterrent to aggression.

B) Threat of first strike key to deter

The Guardian 8

1/22/8. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jan/22/nato.nuclear>.

The west must be ready to resort to a pre-emptive nuclear attack to try to halt the "imminent" spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, according to a radical manifesto for a new Nato by five of the west's most senior military officers and strategists. Calling for root-and-branch reform of Nato and a new pact drawing the US, Nato and the European Union together in a "grand strategy" to tackle the challenges of an increasingly brutal world, the former armed forces chiefs from the US, Britain, Germany, France and the Netherlands insist that a "first strike" nuclear option remains an "indispensable instrument" since there is "simply no realistic prospect of a nuclear-free world". The manifesto has been written following discussions with active commanders and policymakers, many of whom are unable or unwilling to publicly air their views. It has been presented to the Pentagon in Washington and to Nato's secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, over the past 10 days. The proposals are likely to be discussed at a Nato summit in Bucharest in April. "The risk of further [nuclear] proliferation is imminent and, with it, the danger that nuclear war fighting, albeit limited in scope, might become possible," the authors argued in the 150-page blueprint for urgent reform of western military strategy and structures. "The first use of nuclear weapons must remain in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction."

C) Allied prolif

DoE 5

Department of Energy, Maintaining Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century, <http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policies/Jun16NuclearMG.pdf>

U.S. nuclear deterrence will fade if adversaries know use of certain weapons is off the table. Strategic deterrence rests on a wide range of tools available to policymakers – a main component of which is nuclear deterrence. Policymakers must also have a range of nuclear capabilities available to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence. As noted in the Joint Operating Concept, “The most important limitation on [nuclear weapons’] cost imposition impact is the credibility of our willingness to use them in conflict. Clearly, this credibility is in large part a function of the threat magnitude that nuclear weapons use would counter. However, selective improvements and innovations in our nuclear capabilities could significantly enhance their use credibility.” 8 Policymakers must still weigh the gravity of employing any weapon in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, but the presence of a range of U.S. capabilities is necessary to influence a potential adversary’s decision calculus.

Perceived decrease in US deterrence credibility causes fast proliferation in multiple hotspots – no risk of a turn from rogue proliferation\*

Campbell and Einhorn 4

Kurt, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security and Robert, senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 321

Given the unprecedented power and influence of the United States today, what it says and does will have a significant impact on the nuclear behavior of individual countries. For example, although a severe new security threat (especially a new nuclear threat) would strongly motivate a country to reconsider its nuclear renunciation, such a threat probably would not be sufficient to elicit this reaction if the country has an American security guarantee that is not perceived to be weakening. Thus as long as the U.S. nuclear umbrella remains credible and U.S. relations with Japan and South Korea remain strong, even a nuclear-armed North Korea would not necessarily lead these two countries to decide to acquire nuclear capabilities of their own. The case studies suggest that the perceived reliability of U.S. security assurances will be a critical factor, if not the critical factor, in whether such countries as Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey reconsider their nuclear options. It is noteworthy that both Taiwan and South Korea became most interested in pursuing nuclear weapons programs in the mid-to-late 1970s, a time when the United States appeared to have adopted a policy of security disengagement or detachment from East Asia following the huml1iation of the Vietnam War. (Germany, which currently does not face a serious threat to its security, has the lux- ury of having both a U.S. nuclear guarantee and dose ties with other nuclear weapons states through NATO and the EU.)

### Iran Strikes Good DA

Plan will stop any chance of a strike on Iran

Hirsch 7

Jorge, Professor, Congress Can Stop the Iran Attack, or Be Complicit in War Crimes, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirsch.php?articleid=10360

President Bush is invoking his "commander in chief" authority to escalate the war in Iraq, and he will likely also invoke it to launch an aerial attack against Iran. Congress has long ago abdicated and delegated to the president its constitutional responsibility to initiate wars. Yet Congress still has one surefire way to influence events: it has the constitutional authority to make the "nuclear option" against Iran illegal. In so doing, it would stop the relentless drive to war against Iran dead in its tracks. Notwithstanding Joe Biden's threat of a "constitutional confrontation" if Bush attacks Iran without Congressional authorization, the fact is that such an attack would be perfectly legal: the War Powers Act gives the US president legal authority to wage war against any country for 60 days. It would also be legal for Bush to order nuclear strikes against Iran: under NSC-30 of 1948, "the decision as to the employment of atomic weapons in the event of war is to be made by the Chief Executive." Neither Congressional "resolutions" nor votes to withold funding will have any effect on preventing such events. However, Congress could pass a law making a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear nation in the absence of Congressional authorization illegal. In so doing, Congress would effectively be preventing Bush from launching any attack against Iran without its authorization, thus reclaiming its broader constitutionally assigned duties. Because Bush will not dare putting 150,000 American lives in Iraq at risk of Iranian retaliation without having the nuclear option on the table. By removing the nuclear option from the Bush toolkit, Congress would be forcefully imposing its will and that of the American people on an administration gone mad. If Congress chooses not to face the fact that US military action against Iran is likely to lead to the first US use of nuclear weapons since Nagasaki, each one of its members will share responsibility for the nefarious chain of events that is likely to follow, and should be preparing to face his/her very own nuclear Nuremberg trial.

If the US doesn’t act, Israel will – leads to massive Middle East war and diplomacy isn’t enough

Wall Street Journal 8/30

8/30/9. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203863204574348533106427974.html?mod=googlenews_wsj>.

The reality that Western leaders don't want to admit is that preventing Iran from getting the bomb is an Israeli national imperative, not a mere policy choice. That's a view shared across Israel's political spectrum, from traditional hawks like Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to current Defense Minister and former Labor Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Israelis can see the relentless progress Iran is making toward enriching uranium, building a plutonium-breeding facility and improving on its ballistic missiles—all the while violating U.N. sanctions without consequence. Iran's march to the bomb also alarms its Arab neighbors, but it represents an existential threat to an Israeli nation that Iran has promised to destroy and has waged decades of proxy war against. This threat has only increased in the wake of Iran's stolen election and crackdown. The nature of the regime seems to be changing from a revolutionary theocracy to a military-theocratic state that is becoming fascist in operation. The Revolutionary Guard Corps is gaining power at the expense of the traditional military and a divided clerical establishment. On the weekend, Ahmadinejad called for the arrest and punishment of opposition leaders, and last week he nominated Ahmad Vahidi, a commander in Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps, to become defense minister. Vahidi is wanted on an Interpol arrest warrant for his role in masterminding the 1994 attack on a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires. That attack killed 85 people and wounded 200 others. Vahidi's nomination shows that when Ahmadinejad talks of wiping Israel off the map, no Israel leader can afford to dismiss it as a religious allegory. Israel also looks warily on the Obama Administration's policy of diplomatic pleading with Iran, which comes after six years of failed diplomatic overtures by the European Union and Bush Administration. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's suggestion in July that the U.S. would extend a "defense umbrella" over its allies in the Middle East "once [Iranians] have a nuclear weapon" may have been a slip of the lip. But Israelis can be forgiven for wondering if the U.S. would sooner accept a nuclear Iran as a fait accompli than do whatever is necessary to stop it. It's no wonder, then, that the Israeli military has been intensively—and very publicly—war-gaming attack scenarios on Iran's nuclear installations. This has included sending warships through the Suez Canal (with Egypt's blessing), testing its Arrow antiballistic missile systems and conducting nation-wide emergency drills. U.S. and Israeli military officials we've spoken to are confident an Israeli strike could deal a significant blow to Iran's programs, even if some elements would survive. The longer Israel waits, however, the more steps Iran can take to protect its installations. The consequences of an Israeli attack are impossible to predict, but there is no doubt they would implicate U.S. interests throughout the Middle East. Iran would accuse the U.S. of complicity, whether or not the U.S. gave its assent to an attack. Iran could also attack U.S. targets, drawing America into a larger Mideast war. Short of an Islamist revolution in Pakistan, an Israeli strike on Iran would be the most dangerous foreign policy issue President Obama could face, throwing all his diplomatic ambitions into a cocked hat. Yet in its first seven months, the Administration has spent more diplomatic effort warning Israel not to strike than it has rallying the world to stop Iran. In recent days, the Administration has begun taking a harder line against Tehran, with talk of "crippling" sanctions on Iran's imports of gasoline if the mullahs don't negotiate by the end of September. Rhetorically, that's a step in the right direction. But unless Mr. Obama gets serious, and soon, about stopping Iran from getting a bomb, he'll be forced to deal with the consequences of Israel acting in its own defense.

Middle East instability goes nuclear

Kam 7

Ephraim, A Nuclear Iran, Deputy Head @ Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo88.pdf

The statements by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad about wiping Israel off the map are not qualitatively new and resemble those by other Iranian leaders. Their reiteration at a time when Iran is under pressure on the nuclear issue, however, suggests increasing extremism on the part of the Iranian leadership towards Israel, as well as diminished sensitivity towards international public opinion. Even if it is unlikely, the possibility that a fanatical group, whether within the regime or a faction emerging from a split in the leadership, will gain control of nuclear weapons and decide to use them against Israel cannot be categorically ruled out. Moreover, the Middle East is a volatile region that has witnessed much violence and military force. Ballistic missiles and chemical weapons have already been used on a large scale, including in wars between Muslim countries. The risk that nuclear weapons will be used in the Middle East is greater than in other regions and is greater than the risk between the superpowers during the Cold War. Rules of behavior and channels for dialogue capable of reducing the risk do not yet exist.

### Links to Politics

Plan costs political capital

Sharp 9

Travis. military policy analyst at the [Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation](http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/). 8/28/9. <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/local-priorities-vs-national-interests-arms-control>.

Counting the key states listed above leads to an inescapable verdict: At least 20 states derive significant economic benefits from the U.S. strategic triad. States that contain nuclear fuel or warhead maintenance facilities, though not considered here, also could be added to the list. If both senators from all 20 key states adhere to traditional congressional behavior and vote purely on local interest, at least 40 senators could oppose an arms control agreement negotiated by the Obama administration. This total would be enough to derail any treaty in the Senate, especially if senators decide to work together in a 40-vote bloc to protect all three legs of the triad. If these lawmakers were joined by Republicans ideologically opposed to arms control, any treaty would be doomed. To overcome these political facts of life, there are two things the Obama administration must do. First and foremost, the administration must consult constantly with senators from key states. If senators feel that the White House is legitimately taking their viewpoints into account during treaty negotiations, they are much more likely to support the final product. Second, the administration must relentlessly reiterate that the future of the planet is at stake. The more forcefully President Obama makes the case that nuclear weapon reductions are bigger than any one lawmaker's narrow local interests, the better his chances of winning Senate approval. Congressional commitment to local priorities is frustrating when trying to achieve national objectives. But the reality for elected officials is that they were chosen by a geographically limited group of people to represent that group's interests in Washington. While the military-industrial complex isn't easily defeated, the recent shutdown of the previously impossible-to-kill F-22 Raptor program proves that it can happen. The question, as with most things in politics, is whether or not the Obama administration is prepared to spend the political capital necessary to do so.

The plan doesn’t occur in a vacuum – will cost capital

Ware 8

Alyn. Director, Aotearoa Lawyers for Peace. 2008. <http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/docs/NWC_and_NPT.pdf>.

Arms control and disarmament does not occur in a political vacuum. In order to overcome the strong political forces which have produced certain weapons systems, there needs to be a significant political sea-change and/or the investment of considerable political capital by those desiring change for progress to be made.

Plan decreases capital – resistance from multiple parts of government

Taubman 9

Philip. consulting professor at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. 7/8/9. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/opinion/09taubman.html?_r=1&ref=opinion>.

Mr. Obama’s moment of truth with his generals is coming later this year when the Pentagon completes its periodic [Nuclear Posture Review](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/d20090602NPR.pdf). This, in the Pentagon’s words, “will establish U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, strategy and force posture for the next 5 to 10 years.” So it will be the American nuclear weapons bible for the remainder of Mr. Obama’s presidency, one term or two. President Obama must make sure it reflects his thinking. That will not be automatic, because the nuclear weapons complex — the array of Pentagon and Energy Department agencies involved in nuclear operations, including the armed services and the weapons labs — harbors considerable doubt about his plans. The same goes for the wider world of defense strategists. There is resistance in Congress, too.

The plan costs political capital

National Interest 9

7/31/9. Google cache of <http://www.nationalinterest.org/PrinterFriendly.aspx?id=20184>.

One of the big accomplishments of President Obama’s meeting with Russian President Medvedev was the creation of a framework for future arms-control discussions. Both leaders want to cut America and Russia’s atomic arsenals; President Obama wants to eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons entirely. While Medvedev and the Russians were eager to assist in this task, Philip Taubman argues that the U.S. Congress and Americans [won’t be very keen on it at all](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/opinion/09taubman.html?ref=opinion). Opining in the New York Times, Taubman writes that Obama will face stiff resistance to his arms-control agenda from sections of the Energy and Defense Departments, the legislature and some quarters of the military. The president’s “moment of truth” will come later this year, “when the Pentagon completes its periodic Nuclear Posture Review.” The document is pretty important and “will be the American nuclear weapons bible for the remainder of Mr. Obama’s presidency, one term or two.” Thus, it’s essential for Obama that the paper match his agenda. This will take a lot of work. The president will have to convince his generals that his way is best—over established objections that the administration’s plans will “dangerously undermine the power of America’s arsenal to deter attacks against the United States and its allies.” If the White House successfully inserts its opinions into the Posture Review, it then will have to convince the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, “which was flatly rejected” by the body in 1999. It is unclear how exactly Obama can sway the Senate, as many of the senators who voted against the treaty a decade ago are still in office. As time moves on, Taubman writes, and his administration uses political capital fighting the Pentagon and Congress over arms control, Obama may find that dealing with the Kremlin was “the easy part.”

NFU leads to political backlash

Lodgaard 2

Sverre. "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons”. Pugwash Meeting no. 279. London, UK, 15-17 November 2002. <http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/lodgaard.htm>.

NFU is not a static proposition. It is more than a doctrine: it is also a strategy to curb and constrain the nuclear sector and pave the way for nuclear disarmament. For if the role of nuclear weapons were confined to that of deterring others from using theirs, the prognosis for nuclear weapons research, development, maintenance and production - currently thriving on extended deterrence - would be bleaker. This is what the proponents would like to achieve, and this is what the material interests in nuclear weaponry oppose. NFU confronts the nuclear industry in the widest sense of the term. Therefore, the opposition to it is not limited to considerations of national security and political weight in international affairs, but comprises powerful economic interests as well.

Military-industrial complex opposes the plan

Guangqian and Yu 9

Peng Guangqian is editor-in-chief of Strategic Sciences and has long been engaged in research on military strategy and international affairs. Rong Yu is a Ph. D. candidate at the Institute of International Strategy and Development, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua Uni­versity. China Security, Vol. 5 No. 1 Winter 2009, pp. 78-87. <http://www.washingtonobserver.org/pdfs/Peng_and_Rong.pdf>.

Therefore, for states that possess large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons and have established nuclear doctrines and postures tailored for first use of nuclear weapons, the cost invested may be highly prohibitive to considering alternative policies. A credible NFU pledge would require such states to make substantial changes to their first-use oriented arsenals, delegation of authority and force deployment. As a domestic player, the military-industrial complex involved in the development and production of nuclear weapons would be opposed to any decline in the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy and would form an obstacle to NFU policy.

### A2: Commitment Trap

3 and 4 are solved by the regime change portion of the counterplan – we can figure out who did it and deterrence works

Fisher 7

Uri Fisher, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Colorado-Boulder, 2007 Deterrence, Terrorism, and American Values, Homeland Security Affairs Journal 3.1, <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=3.1.4>.

Deterring state sponsors of international terrorist organizations presents perhaps the most theoretically straightforward attempt to utilize deterrent strategies in the war on terrorism. Even those who are generally skeptical of deterrence being applied to terrorism believe the U.S. may be able to deter states from harboring or supporting terrorist organizations. Of the many elements that comprise a terrorist network, rogue regimes that support terrorists are the easiest to find. Assets of a rogue regime that can be targeted, such as the territory under its control or the lives of the ruling elite, are more apparent than the assets held by individual members of terrorist organizations. Efforts to dissuade states from forming relationships with terrorists also represent one of the critical aspects of the war on terrorism. Indeed, only days after the September 11 attacks, President Bush articulated what came to be known as the Bush Doctrine: “Any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” 9 The most salient concern for U.S. defense planners is the prospect of rogue states providing CBRN to a group such as al-Qaeda. The U.S. currently lists six countries as potential state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Syria, North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan. In 2006 the U.S. State Department removed Libya because it apparently was assisting the U.S. in its war on terror. It appears that over the past few years, state sponsorship of terrorist organizations has waned. Libya, for example, has been cooperating with the U.S. to find Libyan members of al-Qaeda. Even more noteworthy, in December 2003, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi stated that the Libyan government would cease research and development of CBRN and would allow weapons inspectors to confirm its disarmamanent efforts. While the impetus for such positive steps are multifaceted, the U.S. success in ousting the Taliban from power and killing many of its members in Afghanistan has “served notice” to rogue regimes around the world that the U.S. is willing and able to destroy what rogue regimes value. Moreover, the possibility of Saddam Hussein acquiring CBRN and then passing these capabilities along to terrorists was a significant rationale for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Many argue that Libya’s decision to dismantle its CBRN programs and other governments’ decisions to ratchet up the pressure they exert on al-Qaeda cells within their borders is at least partly due to a growing fear that U.S. military force might be used against regimes that continue to harbor terrorist organizations. 10 As Vice President Dick Cheney stated in the 2004 vice presidential debate with John Edwards, the Libyan decision to abandon its CBRN programs was one of the “great by-products” of U.S. actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. 11 While it appears that U.S. military operations and legal actions since September 11 have established a deterrent mechanism against state sponsorship of terrorism, the threat of these initiatives remains a critical concern to policymakers. Osama bin Laden has voiced an interest in acquiring mass-casualty weapons and many analysts suggest that al-Qaeda would not hesitate to use CBRN weapons if it acquired these capabilities. To do so, however, terrorist groups need help, either by smuggling CBRN materials from poorly secured facilities or by developing relationships with foreign governments willing to transfer CBRN capabilities. Thus far, it appears that al-Qaeda’s pursuit of CBRN capabilities has been unsuccessful. In 2002, The New York Times reported that U.S. administration officials stated that “…analysis of suspected radioactive substances seized in Afghanistan has found nothing to prove that Osama bin Laden reached his decade-long goal of acquiring nuclear materials for a bomb.”

The threat doesn’t lead to a commitment trap, but rather the absence of the threat would lead to attack

Martin 1

Susan. Visiting Assistant Professor at Florida Atlantic University. International Security 25.4 (2001) 193-196. Muse.

Here it is important to examine how both the policy of calculated ambiguity and Sagan's recommended policy of conventional deterrence interact with existential nuclear deterrence. Sagan and I agree, I think, that existential nuclear deterrence helps to protect the United States from attacks--including those with biological weapons--on its vital interests. Sagan argues that the policy of calculated ambiguity reinforces this existential deterrence only if it creates a commitment trap: If the policy of calculated ambiguity does not serve as a costly signal that puts the reputation of the United States at risk, then it does not add any additional power to the existential deterrence that already exists (pp. 97-98). He therefore prefers a policy that relies only on a declared threat of conventional retaliation. This policy, however, could be interpreted as a sign that the United States would be unwilling to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for a biological attack, leading states that consider the use of biological weapons to underestimate the potential costs of such an attack. The policy of calculated ambiguity reinforces existential deterrence not by creating a commitment trap, but by helping to [End Page 195] ensure that states considering the use of biological weapons against the United States do not miscalculate the potential costs of such an attack.

Commitment trap is false – credibility isn’t a reason for escalation

Tertrais 9

Bruno Tertrais is a Senior Research Fellow at the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research. “The Trouble with No First Use.” Survival. October/November 2009. Vol 51 No 5.

Sagan claims that the first-use option opens a ‘commitment trap’: the United States might have to use nuclear weapons to maintain its reputation as a guarantor. But why would there be such a trap as long as there is no promise of a guaranteed nuclear response? That is precisely the point of ‘calculated ambiguity’ (a declaratory policy choice also made by the United Kingdom and France, albeit in different forms). I cannot believe, moreover, that an American president would see ‘reputation’ as a reason to take the most dramatic military decision a Western leader has had to take since 1945.

### A2: India Models

India wouldn’t model – security concerns

Tertrais 9

Bruno Tertrais is a Senior Research Fellow at the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research. “The Trouble with No First Use.” Survival. October/November 2009. Vol 51 No 5.

Sagan argues that first-use options encourage other countries to follow suit, citing the example of India. But nuclear doctrines are hardly a matter of fashion. They are driven by security interests and technical capabilities, political imperative and moral choices. More often than not, the same causes produce the same effects. Other countries’ doctrines are used essentially as legitimising factors. New Delhi abandoned its no-first-use policy in 2003 for fear that Pakistan or China could use chemical or biological weapons in the course of a conflict against India despite their ratification of the relevant conventions.

### AT Proliferation

Can deter and solves proliferation

Davis et al 9

Jacquelyn. The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. “Updating US Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning.” February 2009. <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf>.

Taking into account Iran’s history, its regional aspirations, and its cultural ethnocentricity, it is likely that Iran can in fact be deterred (just as the Soviet Union was) if the threatened retaliation is perceived (by Iranian leaders) as credible and as capable of destroying Iranian culture, Persian civilization, and key elements of the state’s power. This means that future U.S. discussion of deterrence needs should be couched in such a way as to leave no doubt about American in- terests or intentions, including in a crisis, regarding our willingness to use nuclear weapons if circumstances dictate. Although there have been times when ambiguity has served us well, as in the case of how we might respond to non-nuclear WMD threats, countering Iran is a situation in which U.S. declaratory policy must be clear, concise, and leave no room for misinterpretation. By the same token, U.S. declaratory policy must not be unrealistic; in other words, we must be careful not to “promise” something that can not be delivered. Thus, for example, under the present circumstances in which U.S. deterrence forces reside in Trident missiles, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) prompt-response capabilities, and air-delivered gravity bombs and nuclear-tipped missiles, the United States retains a diversified, but nevertheless limited, capacity to tailor strikes at the regional level and to contain collateral damage. Moreover, a declaratory policy that affirms and specifies a U.S. commitment to respond to any Iranian aggression—nuclear, other WMD, or conventional—arguably could open debate among the Iranians about the utility of nuclear weapons. At the very least, it might have the effect of devaluing Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons if the perceived price to be paid included risking national assets or territory. Without question, one of the biggest challenges that we face is communicating intent to an Iranian regime that may not share our vision of deterrence dynamics. Lack of familiarity with Iran’s value structures and with the perspectives of key leaders makes this an even more daunting problem. As there currently is no direct communication between Iran and the United States (or Israel) regarding the other’s red lines, there is great danger of miscalculation and crisis escalation. This is one reason, among others, why the Israelis are building their own missile defense network and why they have launched a diplomatic offensive to strengthen ties with the United States (including potential integration into the U.S. and NATO missile defense architectures) and to explore the possibility of some type of more formal association with NATO. Some Israeli strategists have also proposed confidence-building measures (CBMs) similar to those put into place by India and Pakistan following their respective nuclear tests in 1998, and there is, in this regard, room to consider Iran-oriented threat reduction initiatives similar to those established by the United States for and in relation to Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union. There is little expectation, however, that the current regime in Tehran would be open to any such initiatives, unless it was subjected to intense international pressure to do so. Russia’s cooperation would also be necessary in this regard, and this poses an additional third-party problem for the United States in that Washington’s ability to constrain Russian action in Georgia demonstrated the limits of American power in relation to shaping decision-making in Putin’s Russia.