### NW Causes Extinction

**Nuclear war causes extinction—prefer the latest studies**

**Choi 11**—writer for National Geographic News [Charles Q., 2/22/2011, National Geographic, “Small Nuclear War Could Reverse Global Warming for Years?,” <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/02/110223-nuclear-war-winter-global-warming-environment-science-climate-change/>, DS]

Even a regional nuclear war could spark "unprecedented" global cooling and reduce rainfall for years, according to U.S. government computer models. Widespread famine and disease would likely follow, experts speculate. During the Cold War a nuclear exchange between superpowers—such as the one feared for years between the United States and the former Soviet Union—was predicted to cause a "nuclear winter." In that scenario hundreds of nuclear explosions spark huge fires, whose smoke, dust, and ash blot out the sun for weeks amid a backdrop of dangerous radiation levels. Much of humanity eventually dies of starvation and disease. Today, with the United States the only standing superpower, nuclear winter is little more than a nightmare. But nuclear war remains a very real threat—for instance, between developing-world nuclear powers, such as India and Pakistan. To see what climate effects such a regional nuclear conflict might have, scientists from NASA and other institutions modeled a war involving a hundred Hiroshima-level bombs, each packing the equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT—just 0.03 percent of the world's current nuclear arsenal. (See a National Geographic magazine feature on weapons of mass destruction.) The researchers predicted the resulting fires would kick up roughly five million metric tons of black carbon into the upper part of the troposphere, the lowest layer of the Earth's atmosphere. In NASA climate models, this carbon then absorbed solar heat and, like a hot-air balloon, quickly lofted even higher, where the soot would take much longer to clear from the sky. (Related: "'Nuclear Archaeologists' Find World War II Plutonium.") Reversing Global Warming? The global cooling caused by these high carbon clouds wouldn't be as catastrophic as a superpower-versus-superpower nuclear winter, but "the effects would still be regarded as leading to unprecedented climate change," research physical scientist Luke Oman said during a press briefing Friday at a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Washington, D.C. Earth is currently in a long-term warming trend. After a regional nuclear war, though, average global temperatures would drop by 2.25 degrees F (1.25 degrees C) for two to three years afterward, the models suggest. At the extreme, the tropics, Europe, Asia, and Alaska would cool by 5.4 to 7.2 degrees F (3 to 4 degrees C), according to the models. Parts of the Arctic and Antarctic would actually warm a bit, due to shifted wind and ocean-circulation patterns, the researchers said. After ten years, average global temperatures would still be 0.9 degree F (0.5 degree C) lower than before the nuclear war, the models predict. (Pictures: "Red Hot" Nuclear-Waste Train Glows in Infrared.) Years Without Summer For a time Earth would likely be a colder, hungrier planet. "Our results suggest that agriculture could be severely impacted, especially in areas that are susceptible to late-spring and early-fall frosts," said Oman, of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. "Examples similar to the crop failures and famines experienced following the Mount Tambora eruption in 1815 could be widespread and last several years," he added. That Indonesian volcano ushered in "the year without summer," a time of famines and unrest. (See pictures of the Mount Tambora eruption.) All these changes would also alter circulation patterns in the tropical atmosphere, reducing precipitation by 10 percent globally for one to four years, the scientists said. Even after seven years, global average precipitation would be 5 percent lower than it was before the conflict, according to the model. In addition, researcher Michael Mills, of the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Colorado, found large decreases in the protective ozone layer, leading to much more ultraviolet [uv] radiation reaching Earth's surface and harming the environment and people. "The main message from our work," NASA's Oman said, "would be that even a regional nuclear conflict would have global consequences."

**More ev**

**Robock and Toon 10**—Toon: chair of the Dept of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences and a member of the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics at the University of Colorado @ Boulder. Robock is a Proff of atmospheric science at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey Local Nuclear War, Global Suffering; January 2010; Scientific American Magazine; 8 Page(s), <http://www.sciamdigital.com/index.cfm?fa=Products.ViewIssuePreview&ISSUEID_CHAR=944156A6-237D-9F22-E8E572150DCA8E65&ARTICLEID_CHAR=97CA0A88-237D-9F22-E861FD76EBEE2611>)

Twenty-five years ago international teams of scientists showed that a nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union could produce a “nuclear winter.” The smoke from vast fires started by bombs dropped on cities and industrial areas would envelop the planet and absorb so much sunlight that the earth’s surface would get cold, dark and dry, killing plants worldwide and eliminating our food supply. Surface temperatures would reach winter values in the summer. International discussion about this prediction, fueled largely by astronomer Carl Sagan, forced the leaders of the two superpowers to confront the possibility that their arms race endangered not just themselves but the entire human race. Countries large and small demanded disarmament. Nuclear winter became an important factor in ending the nuclear arms race. Looking back later, in 2000, former Soviet Union leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev observed, “Models made by Russian and American scientists showed that a nuclear war would result in a nuclear winter that would be extremely destructive to all life on earth; the knowledge of that was a great stimulus to us, to people of honor and morality, to act.” Why discuss this topic now that the cold war has ended? Because as other nations continue to acquire nuclear weapons, smaller, regional nuclear wars could create a similar global catastrophe. New analyses reveal that a conflict between India and Pakistan, for example, in which 100 nuclear bombs were dropped on cities and industrial areas--only 0.4 percent of the world's more than 25,000 warheads--would produce enough smoke to cripple global agriculture. A regional war could cause widespread loss of life even in countries far away from the conflict. Regional War Threatens the World By deploying modern computers and modern climate models, the two of us and our colleagues have shown that not only were the ideas of the 1980s correct but the effects would last for at least 10 years, much longer than previously thought. And by doing calculations that assess decades of time, only now possible with fast, current computers, and by including in our calculations the oceans and the entire atmosphere--also only now possible--we have found that the smoke from even a regional war would be heated and lofted by the sun and remain suspended in the upper atmosphere for years, continuing to block sunlight and to cool the earth. India and Pakistan, which together have more than 100 nuclear weapons, may be the most worrisome adversaries capable of a regional nuclear conflict today. But other countries besides the U.S. and Russia (which have thousands) are well endowed: China, France and the U.K. have hundreds of nuclear warheads; Israel has more than 80, North Korea has about 10 and Iran may well be trying to make its own. In 2004 this situation prompted one of us (Toon) and later Rich Turco of the University of California, Los Angeles, both veterans of the 1980s investigations, to begin evaluating what the global environmental effects of a regional nuclear war would be and to take as our test case an engagement between India and Pakistan. The latest estimates by David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security and by Robert S. Norris of the Natural Resources Defense Council are that India has 50 to 60 assembled weapons (with enough plutonium for 100) and that Pakistan has 60 weapons. Both countries continue to increase their arsenals. Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests indicate that the yield of the warheads would be similar to the 15-kiloton explosive yield (equivalent to 15,000 tons of TNT) of the bomb the U.S. used on Hiroshima. Toon and Turco, along with Charles Bardeen, now at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, modeled what would happen if 50 Hiroshima-size bombs were dropped across the highest population-density targets in Pakistan and if 50 similar bombs were also dropped across India. Some people maintain that nuclear weapons would be used in only a measured way. But in the wake of chaos, fear and broken communications that would occur once a nuclear war began, we doubt leaders would limit attacks in any rational manner. This likelihood is particularly true for Pakistan, which is small and could be quickly overrun in a conventional conflict. Peter R. Lavoy of the Naval Postgraduate School, for example, has analyzed the ways in which a conflict between India and Pakistan might occur and argues that Pakistan could face a decision to use all its nuclear arsenal quickly before India swamps its military bases with traditional forces. Obviously, we hope the number of nuclear targets in any future war will be zero, but policy makers and voters should know what is possible. Toon and Turco found that more than 20 million people in the two countries could die from the blasts, fires and radioactivity--a horrible slaughter. But the investigators were shocked to discover that a tremendous amount of smoke would be generated, given the megacities in the two countries, assuming each fire would burn the same area that actually did burn in Hiroshima and assuming an amount of burnable material per person based on various studies. They calculated that the 50 bombs exploded in Pakistan would produce three teragrams of smoke, and the 50 bombs hitting India would generate four (one teragram equals a million metric tons). Satellite observations of actual forest fires have shown that smoke can be lofted up through the troposphere (the bottom layer of the atmosphere) and sometimes then into the lower stratosphere (the layer just above, extending to about 30 miles). Toon and Turco also did some "back of the envelope" calculations of the possible climate impact of the smoke should it enter the stratosphere. The large magnitude of such effects made them realize they needed help from a climate modeler. It turned out that one of us (Robock) was already working with Luke Oman, now at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, who was finishing his Ph.D. at Rutgers University on the climatic effects of volcanic eruptions, and with Georgiy L. Stenchikov, also at Rutgers and an author of the first Russian work on nuclear winter. They developed a climate model that could be used fairly easily for the nuclear blast calculations. Robock and his colleagues, being conservative, put five teragrams of smoke into their modeled upper troposphere over India and Pakistan on an imaginary May 15. The model calculated how winds would blow the smoke around the world and how the smoke particles would settle out from the atmosphere. The smoke covered all the continents within two weeks. The black, sooty smoke absorbed sunlight, warmed and rose into the stratosphere. Rain never falls there, so the air is never cleansed by precipitation; particles very slowly settle out by falling, with air resisting them. Soot particles are small, with an average diameter of only 0.1 micron (μm), and so drift down very slowly. They also rise during the daytime as they are heated by the sun, repeatedly delaying their elimination. The calculations showed that the smoke would reach far higher into the upper stratosphere than the sulfate particles that are produced by episodic volcanic eruptions. Sulfate particles are transparent and absorb much less sunlight than soot and are also bigger, typically 0.5 μm. The volcanic particles remain airborne for about two years, but smoke from nuclear fires would last a decade. Killing Frosts in Summer The climatic response to the smoke was surprising. Sunlight was immediately reduced, cooling the planet to temperatures lower than any experienced for the past 1,000 years. The global average cooling, of about 1.25 degrees Celsius (2.3 degrees Fahrenheit), lasted for several years, and even after 10 years the temperature was still 0.5 degree C colder than normal. The models also showed a 10 percent reduction in precipitation worldwide. Precipitation, river flow and soil moisture all decreased because blocking sunlight reduces evaporation and weakens the hydrologic cycle. Drought was largely concentrated in the lower latitudes, however, because global cooling would retard the Hadley air circulation pattern in the tropics, which produces a large fraction of global precipitation. In critical areas such as the Asian monsoon regions, rainfall dropped by as much as 40 percent. The cooling might not seem like much, but even a small dip can cause severe consequences. Cooling and diminished sunlight would, for example, shorten growing seasons in the midlatitudes. More insight into the effects of cooling came from analyses of the aftermaths of massive volcanic eruptions. Every once in a while such eruptions produce temporary cooling for a year or two. The largest of the past 500 years, the 1815 Tambora eruption in Indonesia, blotted the sun and produced global cooling of about 0.5 degree C for a year; 1816 became known as "The Year.”

### Yes War

**Even if they win the world is getting better—war is still increasingly possible—multiple reasons**

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So The War of the World, singular, is an attempt to explain why the twentieth century was so astonishingly violent, not only in absolute terms—after all, the world is more populous than ever—but also in relative terms. If you work out how many people died violently in the course of the twentieth century, it was of the order of 180 million. One estimate puts it at one in every twenty-two deaths; that is to say, one in every twenty-two human deaths in the twentieth century was violent, not natural. If you take the most explosive of all the conflicts, the one which is right at the heart of this book, World War II, roughly 60 million people died violently in that war. If you work out what percentage of the population of the world in 1939 that was, it's between 2 and 3 percent. None of the great wars of modern history—I hesitate to go further back than 1600, for reasons I'll explain in a second—had such a terrifyingly high mortality rate as that. So there is a question here about why the twentieth century was so violent. Now, experts on thirteenth-century Asia assure me that Genghis Khan—who I used to call "Genghis" in my ignorance—killed comparable proportions, if not higher proportions, of the world population in his time. And it may even be that if we go back beyond the ancient world to the prehistoric world, that primitive societies were still more violent. Some primitive tribes have astonishingly high mortality rates, according to the anthropologists. But that's not really the point. The twentieth century is astonishing because that kind of violence coincided with unprecedented progress. So there is a paradox here which makes the twentieth century really unique. The average human being got maybe four times better off, possibly five times better off, if you try to work out a figure for per-capita gross domestic product. He or she was more likely to live in democracy at the end of the twentieth century than at the beginning. In all kinds of ways, scientific and cultural, the twentieth century was a time of astonishing progress. So it is really very important for us to try to understand why progress coincided with holocausts of violence, with some sixteen conflicts that claimed a million or more deaths. Seen in these terms, the world wars become part of a **continuum of organized violence**. The book is an attempt to explain why. The best explanations are easy to remember. At least one person besides me in this room will be jet-lagged, and that person will be glad of the fact that my explanation is relatively easy to commit to memory. It has four parts, and each of them begins with the letter "E," which I find always helps under exam conditions. The first is **economic volatility**. Now, why is economic volatility important? I know we're uptown, we're not on Wall Street, but give me a couple of minutes on this. It's important because it helps you to identify the dangerous times. You see, it's crucial that the twentieth century was not evenly violent. Not every year, not every decade, was equally violent. There were huge spikes of organized violence, particularly between 1914 and 1945. I try to show that one reason for this is that the mid-twentieth century was by far the most volatile time. If you look at fluctuations in growth, inflation, asset prices, the interwar period stands out as being roughly seven times more volatile than our own time. We have almost forgotten what volatility feels like these days. The last ten years have seen almost unprecedented smoothness in the pattern of economic growth in the world's developed economies. And yet, transport yourself back to the 1920s and 1930s, and you enter a time when economic activity went up and down like some kind of fairground ride. So economic volatility, the first of my E's, helps us narrow down the timeframe, because we need to understand why, for example, the early 1940s were the most dangerous time of all time. My second E is ethnic disintegration. This is terribly important. In many ways, it's the most important argument—and, I think, original argument—in the book. It matters because it helps you identify where violence happened, because, once again, it wasn't evenly geographically distributed. It was, in fact, heavily concentrated in certain parts of the world. In a fifty-year period I identify, from 1904-1953, violence in the world was extraordinarily concentrated in two places: Central and Eastern Europe; and at the other end of Eurasia, Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula. If you were born in those parts of the world, your chances of dying violently were much, much higher than if you were born in, say, Canada. That is extremely important. Why? Because when you look at those places—look at an ethno-linguistic map of, say, Central Europe in 1900—what leaps out is what patchworks they were, ethno-linguistic patchworks, extraordinarily heterogeneous societies with enormously interlocked minorities. Now, the key to understanding what happened in the mid-twentieth century is to realize that it was a process of disintegration. In 1900, these multiethnic societies looked remarkably stable. Indeed, in some places, particularly in the German-speaking cities of Central Europe, levels of intermarriage, coeducation, or any of the measures you might take when you were looking for evidence of assimilation and integration, suggested that problems of ethnic conflict were diminishing fast. In a city like Hamburg in the 1920s, one in every two marriages involving at least one Jewish partner was to a non-Jewish partner. Half of these marriages were mixed. Looking at the world in the 1920s, you would have said that Germany was the place that had, in effect, solved what late-nineteenth century racists had called "the Jewish question." But that would be wrong, because what happened—and it wasn't only with respect to Jews and Germans—what happened in Central and Eastern Europe in the period after around 1929 was an astonishing ripping apart of multiethnic societies. I talk about the city of Chernovitz as just an example of what a multiethnic city looked like. It is now Chernivtsi in Ukraine, and very little remains of its identity as Chernovitz. But in 1900 Chernovitz was a great multiethnic Hapsburg city inhabited by German bureaucrats, German-Jewish academics, but also by Ukranians, Poles, Romanians. It was a kind of melting pot—and yet, it was a melting pot that exploded, that blew up, as if something went wrong in the recipe. So ethnic disintegration is the key to understanding the location, if you like, of conflict, to understanding why Ukraine was a bad place to be born in and Sweden much less so. 3) My third component in the great equation of disaster also begins with E: it is empires in decline. Counterintuitively from some liberal perspectives, I argue that it is when empires decline and fall that violence is most likely to spike. It is at the moment of this dissolution that the stakes are suddenly terribly high and local elites do battle for, as it were, the political succession. Roughly, twelve empires declined and fell in the course of the twentieth century. That's a very large number, indeed. In fact, I think I can safely say that in no previous century had so many empires hit the deck. I think that helps explain again why the middle of the twentieth century was so tremendously violent. These great waves of imperial decline, which began with the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in China, continued through the dissolution of the Romanov, Ottoman, Habsburg, and Hohenzollern empires in Central and Eastern Europe towards the end of the First World War, experienced another great wave of crisis when the Japanese unleashed their extraordinary assault on the European, and indeed American, empires in Asia. These times of imperial crisis produced great spikes in the level of organized violence. If you want to go beyond that timeframe, think only of 1947, a date much on our minds. That, after all, saw in many ways the highest level of violence in the history of British India, at its end, at its moment of dissolution. It illustrates the key point. As the imperial authority wanes, those on the ground, in the localities, suddenly have a lot to fight for, and particularly in multiethnic societies. And, since most of the great empires were extraordinarily multiethnic, it's not surprising that in the time of imperial dissolution minorities found themselves vulnerable as never before to what was once called "the tyranny of the majority." 4) The fourth, and final, of my E's - just to recap for those of you revising: economic volatility was the first, ethnic disintegration was the second, empires in decline was the third - the fourth is Eastern ascendancy. You see, we often misunderstand the twentieth century. We think of it in terms of the triumph of the West—or even the American century, although I think that was supposed to begin after World War II. I argue that this is a misunderstanding of the trajectory of modern history. It was in 1900 that the West truly ruled the world. In 1900, 82 percent of the world's population lived in empires, and most of those empires were controlled by Western powers. By Western powers, I mean principally the European powers, but also the United States. It is an astonishing statistic to my mind. It also illustrates better than anything the sheer dominance of Western power. When a relatively small percentage of mankind—and, after all, if you figure out the West as I do in the book, it was never as much as 20 percent of the world's population - such a small proportion was able to rule over the majority of the world's population, because 50 percent of the world's population lived in Asia in 1900, and only a very few (the Japanese) enjoyed anything resembling political independence. I think the descent of the West—and I use the term advisedly, not to invoke the memory of Oswald Spengler, a man of whom I disapprove; I use the term because I want to connote, not only a crude decline from power, but also perhaps a descent in moral terms—the descent of the West is the key to understanding the twentieth century. It was a violent and painful process. It was never smooth. That is why the conflict between Japan and the Western powers in Asia and the Pacific was so astonishingly brutal. We should not think of the transfer of power from West to East as a naturally smooth power. The twentieth century suggests that it has been punctuated by violence. That's why 1904 is such an important date. That's the moment Japan succeeds in beating a European empire for the first time, sinking the entire Russian expeditionary force sent to fight over Korea/Manchuria in the Russo-Japanese War. I think I just have time to draw some conclusions from this argument for our own time. In some ways, the problems that bedeviled the first half of the twentieth century were solved horribly; solved by ethnic cleansing, solved by genocide, solved by partition. The killing fields at either end of Eurasia—Central and Eastern Europe, Korea/Manchuria—ceased to be killing fields after 1953. And yet, violence didn't stop. I try to argue in the epilogue that in many ways **the Cold War wasn't cold at all**; it was a third world war if you were in Guatemala or Cambodia or Angola. In fact, I call it the "Third World's war," because all that had happened was that **violence was relocated** to places that people in the dominant powers during the Cold War seldom saw. So violence didn't stop during the Cold War, and there is no reason to assume that it has stopped since the Cold War. There is one part of the world today which already exhibits all the traits that I see as having been explosive in the mid-twentieth century. Where economic volatility, if you just look at growth rates in these countries for the past twenty years, is roughly five times higher than in the United States; where ethnic disintegration is already well underway, a region where a multiethnic city is in the process of tearing itself apart as we speak; and a part of the world where in my view—and those of you who know my last book, Colossus, will see what I am driving at—where in my view an empire is manifestly in decline. I am talking about the Middle East, and the empire I have in mind is, of course, the American empire. To me the most troubling thing about the Middle East today is this conjunction of extraordinary economic volatility. Look at growth rates in Iraq and its neighbors since 1986. You are looking at the kind of volatility Central Europe experienced in the 1920s and 1930s. Look at what is happening in Iraq. Against all expectations—and I include myself in this—a war between insurgents and occupiers has morphed before our very eyes into something very like a civil war between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, not to forget Kurds. The process whereby a multiethnic society tears itself apart is all too familiar to someone like me, who specializes in European history. We have been here before, and we know how it starts, how society's communities that have lived together relatively peacefully despite ethnic and sectarian differences suddenly turn on one another, and neighbor kills neighbor. In The Brookings Institute's recent surveys of Iraq, there are some astonishing findings that leap off the page. **Sectarian violence is an order of magnitude higher** this year than last year. Ninety-two percent of votes in Iraqi elections were cast by sectarian parties. In surveys, enormous percentages of Sunni Iraqis say that they have themselves experienced, or know people who have experienced, ethnic cleansing. All of this is unfolding because it seems to me the dominant empire in that region, which certainly exerted extraordinary informal power in the 1970s, **is waning, losing credibility, losing control**. In 1920, it was possible for an English-speaking empire to quell an insurgency and stabilize multiethnic Iraq. But then the ratio of Iraqis to occupying forces was something like 20:1. Today it is 210:1. In other words, the odds of success were an order of magnitude that is smaller this time around. That demographic transition is part of what I mean when I describe the descent of the West. Today the powers that I call the Western powers account for barely 10 percent of the world's population. The populations of the East have grown relatively. That means the prospect of Western power is, from the very word go, significantly diminished. If I am right and the stakes are right here, this is a somber subject. If I am right, then the ingredients for a **much higher level of conflict than we have yet seen** in the Middle East are in place. That may sound shocking to those of you who think of the Middle East as a terribly violent place. But actually, the amazing thing about the Middle East is how small its wars have generally been, with the sole exception of the Iran-Iraq war. We could see much more violence there. We could see violence of the sort we saw in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1940s, because the ingredients are all in place. In other words, ladies and gentlemen, The War of the World implies, to my deep alarm, **the possibility of a sequel**—a sequel played out, not in the killing fields of Poland/Ukraine, but **in the killing fields** conceivably of Palestine, of Lebanon, of the Persian Gulf.

**The convergence of hyper-competition and hyper-power status make conflict increasingly likely**

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The book's thesis is that there are two systemic drivers of contemporary security and insecurity. The first is what Mittelman calls hypercompetition, the ‘intensified competition that agglomerates markets’. Accelerated by ‘new technologies, the rise of transnational capital and increasing labour mobility’, national production systems are giving way to global firms with supply chains extending across the world. The language of **war has permeated commerce**, with corporations embracing aspects of a Hobbesian ‘warre of all against all’ as they seek to cut costs, raise efficiency and dominate markets. Hypercompetition is ‘heavily but not totally American’ in several of its facets, including the long reach of US markets, investment in R&D, the prevalence of neoliberal ideas about the ordering of the economy and society as well as the prevalence of American popular culture. The second is the concentration of power in an historically unprecedented hegemonic actor: the United States of America. The book puts aside the traditional vocabulary of geopolitics, arguing that the USA is not a superpower or even a great power enjoying a unipolar moment. Rather, ‘in light of the large distance between the United States and the other major powers in a globalizing world’, the preferred term is **hyperpower**.3 The idea builds on the notion of hyperpuissance coined by French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine in 1998, but, drawing on Gramscian notions of consensual hegemony and Foucauldian biopolitics, Mittelman gives it more precision and extracts greater analytic leverage from it. Notably, in his vision, although there can be only one hyperpower, the concept extends beyond the USA as a state. Instead, hyperpower is imperial in character, a ‘weblike structure, including a net of overseas military bases, a clutch of allies, aspects of ideological appeal, and an educational system that widely propagates values associated with those at the epicentre of globalization’.4 When hypercompetition and hyperpower converge (or coincide), **the conditions point to** the book's third core concept: hyper**conflict**. This arises ‘out of the tension between the logic of statecentric and polycentric worlds’ and when ‘a medley of nonstate actors both accommodates and more assertively resists state initiatives’.5 Although only in a ‘nascent’ phase, hyperconflict expresses itself as ‘heightened coercion and weakening consensus’, ‘pervasive uncertainty’ and ‘a rising climate of fear’.6 Contrasting the ‘old’ order of war with the ‘new’ order of militarized globalization, Mittelman argues that the old order was ‘permeated by wars between states and within them, as well as partial safeguards with rules to manage them’. This has been ‘partly supplanted by hyperpower enmeshed in various conflicts, but the most flagrant conflicts deny military solutions. In fact, the application of more and more coercion **inflames tensions**, emboldens unconventional enemies, and inspires recruits for their causes.’7 The three concepts serve less as a model or formal explanation of contemporary insecurity and work more as a heuristic, ‘a grammar for thinking about evolving forms of world order’.8 The author seeks to provide a vocabulary through which the links between globalization and insecurity can be understood holistically and critically explored. One of Hyperconflict's most significant contributions is the wide-ranging theoretical discussion that fills its first two chapters, offering a sophisticated distillation of the vast literatures on globalization and peace and conflict to form a compelling and provocative account.