Nuclear Kritiks Comprehensive

Nuclear Kritiks Comprehensive 1

\*Prolif K\* 3

Prolif K 1NC 4

Prolif K 1NC 5

Link – General 6

Link – Prolif – Orientalism 7

Link – Prolif – Anti-Nuclear Nuclearism 8

Link – NPT 9

Link – Unstable/Failed States 10

Link – Prolif 11

Link – Prolif – Stability 12

Link – Prolif – Stability 13

Link – Prolif – Stability 14

Link – Chernus 15

Link – Chernus 16

Link – Accidents/Miscalc 17

Link – Accidents/Miscalc 18

Link – Safety 19

Link – Fanaticism/Terrorism 20

Link – North Korea 21

Link – Middle East 22

Link – Asia 23

Link – Hegemony 24

Internal Link – Colonialism 25

Impacts – Colonialism 26

Impacts – Prolif – Root Cause 27

Impacts – Prolif – Root Cause 28

Impacts – Prolif – Turns Case 29

Impacts – Prolif – Turns Case 30

Impacts – Racism – D-Rule 31

Impacts – Racism – Structural Violence 32

Impacts – Racism – Genocide 33

Impacts – Racism – Genocide 34

Impacts – Racism – Genocide 35

Impact Calc – Genocide 36

No Impact – Epistemology 37

Alternative – Rejection 38

Alternative – Rejection 39

Alt Solves – Orientalism 40

Framing – Reps Key 41

Framing – Reps Key 42

A2: Countries Too Poor For Nukes 43

A2: Deterrence Fails in 3rd World Countries 44

A2: Deterrence Fails in 3rd World Countries 45

\*A2: Prolif K\* 46

Solves – Prolif Epistemology Solves 47

NPT/Arms Control Good 48

NPT/Arms Control Good 49

No Impact – Doesn’t Turn Case – Prolif 50

No Impact – Doesn’t Turn Case – Prolif 51

No Impact – Doesn’t Turn Case – Prolif 52

No Impact – Doesn’t Turn Case – Prolif 53

AT: Nuclear Reps Bad – AT: Nuclear Apartheid 54

AT: Nuclear Apartheid – Turns Racism 55

AT: Nuclear Apartheid – N/W Outwieghs 56

\*Kato K\* 57

Kato Shell 58

Kato Shell 59

Kato Shell 60

Kato Shell 61

Link – K Affs 62

\*A2: Kato\* 63

AT: Kato – No Testing 64

A2: Kato – No Uranium Mining 65

AT: Kato – No Impact – Radiation 66

AT: Kato – Hormesis 67

Nuclear Crisis Turns the K 68

Nuclear Crisis Turns the K 69

\*Numbing K\* 70

Numbing Shell 71

Numbing Shell 72

Link – General 73

Link – General 74

Link – General 75

Link – Extinction 76

Link – Extinction 77

Link – Language 78

Link – Language 79

Link – State 80

Link – Hegemony 81

Link – Rationalizing Nukes 82

Link – Arms Control 83

Link – Arms Control 84

Link – Arms Control 85

Link – Impact Framing – “Magnitude OW’s Probability” 86

Internal Link – Movements 87

Internal Link – Fear Key 88

Impact – VTL 89

Impact – VTL 90

Impact – Extinction 91

Impact – Turns Case 92

Impact – Turns Other Adv’s 93

Impact – Proliferation 94

Impact – Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 95

Impact – Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 96

Impact – Genocide 97

Impact Calc – Systemic Outweighs 98

No Impact – Epistemology 99

Alt Solves 100

Alt Solves – Discourse 101

Impact Framing – Psyche First 102

A2: Perm 103

A2: Perm 104

A2: Perm 105

A2: Perm 106

AT: Perm 107

-Climate Change Module- 108

Link – Nuke Focus – Climate Change 109

Link – Nuke Focus – Climate Change 110

Link – Nuke Focus – Climate Change 111

\*A2: Numbing K\* 112

Fear Good – Nukes 113

Fear Good – Nukes 114

Plan Solves Fear 115

No Root Cause 116

Alt Fails – Pyschology 117

Alt Fails – Pyschology 118

Alt Fails – Pyschology 119

Alt Fails – Pyschology 120

Alt Fails – Pyschology 121

Alt Fails – Pyschology 122

Alt Fails – Backlash 123

Alt Fails – Cooptation 124

Aff Answers – Permutation 125

AT: Deterrence = “Hostage Holding” 126

AT: Deterrence = “Hostage Holding” 127

A2: Lifton 128

A2: Lifton 129

AT: Martin – N/W = Extinction 130

A2: Chernus – Non-Falsifiable 131

A2: Chernus – Alt No Solve 132

A2: Chernus – Disproven 133

AT: Chernus – AT: Root Cause 134

\*Weaponitis\* 135

Weaponitis Shell 136

Weaponitis Shell 137

Link – Masking 138

Link – Cooption 139

Link – “Making the World Safe for Conventional War” 140

Link – Restraint 141

Link – Restraint 142

Impact – Root Cause 143

Nukes Don’t Matter 144

Nukes Don’t Matter 145

Alternative – Reject 146

A2: Perm 147

Deterrence Fails 148

Deterrence Fails 149

Deterrence Fails 150

\*A2: Weaponitis\* 151

Link Turn – Arms Control Good 152

Impact Turn – Deterrence Works 153

Impact Turn – Deterrence Works 154

Impact Turn – Deterrence Works 155

Impact Turn – Deterrence Works 156

Impact Turn – Deterrence Works 157

\*Nuclear Fetishism\* 158

Fetishism Shell 159

Fetishism Shell 160

Fetishism Shell 161

Link – Deterrence 162

Link – Nuclear Fetish 163

Link – Reducing Weapons 164

Link – Nuclear Fetish 165

Internal Link/Impact – Nuclear Use 166

Impacts – VTL and Extinction 167

Impacts – VTL and Extinction 168

Impacts – VTL 169

Impact – Root Cause 170

Alt Solves 171

Alternative – Accept Responsibility 172

Alternative – Embrace Despair 173

A2: “Nukes Real” 174

\*General Neg\* 175

A2: Realism 176

A2: Realism 177

Alt Solves – General 178

Alt Solves – Individuals Solve (A2: State Key) 179

A2: Blight 180

A2: Blight 181

A2: Pragmatism 182

A2: Perm 183

\*General Aff Answers\* 184

Nuclear Reps Good 185

Nuclear Reps Good 186

Nuclear Reps Good 187

Kurasawa – Predictions 188

Kurasawa – Predictions 189

Kurasawa – Predictions 190

Kurasawa – Predictions 191

Kurasawa – Predictions 192

Kurasawa – Predictions 193

Kurasawa – Predictions 194

Kurasawa – Predictions 195

Blight – Pragmatism/Policy Making 196

Blight – Pragmatism/Policy Making 197

A2: Militarism Bad 198

Alt Fails – McClean 199

Alt Fails – Aff is a Prereq 200

Perm Solves – Reps 201

Perm Solves – Movements 202

Perm Solves – State Key 203

Perm Solves – State Key 204

Perm Solves – Pragmatism 205

Perm Solves – Pragmatism 206

Perm Solves – Individuals 207

A2: Reps/Discourse Matters 208

No Impact – Movements 209

AT: Chaloupka 210

AT: Chaloupka 211

AT: Chaloupka 212

\*Prolif K\*

Prolif K 1NC

Representations of proliferation shape a policy agenda of technology denial – reinforcing a North-South divide which outweighs and turns the case. The alternative is key to solve security strategies which oversimplify the regions of the topic

Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 36-37)

The discussion in this paper has examined the way in which international security, and international security policy, are constituted in the terms of an assembly of metaphors. An image, comprising a series of metaphors, provides the conceptual frame for a problem, and therefore structures the policy agenda by privileging a particular set of solutions which can be proposed and implemented. In particular, the image highlights certain aspects of a given problem, while downplaying others and hiding still more. The policy solutions which will be advanced will, not surprisingly, focus upon the features highlighted by the image, and ignore those downplayed and hidden. I have shown how in the aftermath of the Cold War, and in the context of the Gulf War, an image of a problem of PROLIFERATION was developed, which comprised three key metaphors: 'proliferation', 'stability' and 'balance'. The entailments of these metaphors provide an image of an autonomous, technical, apolitical process, which if left unchecked spreads its technological offspring outwards from its source, resulting in excessive and destabilising accumulations elsewhere. This image is reflected in, and is driving the further development of, the instruments of control—the policy being applied to the problem defined by PROLIFERATION. There are two classes of conclusion I can draw from this discussion, those relating to policy and those to theory. I would suggest two conclusions concerning the present policies of proliferation control. The first is that the image of PROLIFERATION is giving rise to a policy agenda dominated by strategies of technology denial. Such strategies reflect the technological bias and the 'outward from a source' entailments of proliferation. However, they are profoundly problematic in the contemporary international system. Technology denial is serving to deepen the already wide gap between North and South. It ignores entirely the needs of economic development—needs which are at least as great a security concern as is the spreading of weapons technology. In addition, the strategy is unsustainable. Because the PROLIFERATION image is of an autonomous process, it takes no account of the political and economic interests driving the supply of military technology. These interests are presently being felt in the United States, for example, in opposition to any extension of export controls—despite the United States long being the leader of the supplier control groups.67 The second policy conclusion is related to the first. The metaphors of 'stability' and 'balance' are similarly ill-suited to the contemporary security environment. Even if we accept that they provided useful conceptual frames to understand the superpower relationship in the Cold War, they are not appropriate to the regional security arenas of the post-Cold War. The entailments of 'stability' in particular can not account for the variety and complexity of the Middle East, South Asia or the North Pacific, to mention the regions of contemporary concern. Regional security, and security policy, must then be 'reimagined' on bases other than those provided by 'stability' and 'balance', and hence by PROLIFERATION.

Prolif K 1NC

The alternative is to reframe the affirmative’s images of security around the perspective of the oppressed

Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 38)

These conclusions hold two implications for 'critical' security studies. First of all, the exploration of the metaphors underlying policy will form an important part of a general project of critique, understood as revealing the power relations hidden by security relations. Those power relations are masked by the metaphorical understandings of the images of security, and so to reveal them, the images must themselves be revealed. Secondly, the impulse to critique is rooted in a political stance opposed to the dominant powers, and thus supporting the struggles of the oppressed. In order to create alternative security policies from the perspective of the oppressed, the present argument suggests the need first to construct images of security problems which privilege their interests, rather than those of the dominant powers—(DIS)ARMAMENT rather than PROLIFERATION, for example.

Link – General

Representations of dangerous proliferation are racist and cause proliferation

Lal 9 (Prerna April 5 Freelance blogger for the Immigrant Rights and Race in America blog at Change.org, and serve as an Online Organizer for CODEPINK: Women for Peace. http://prernalal.com/2009/04/north-korea-is-not-a-threat-unveiling-hegemonic-discourses/ TBC 7/1/10)

Tied to the race war schema, is the discourse of nuclearism, which refers to the ideology that nuclear weapons are instruments of peace. Nukespeak in the form of MAD or the hype over so-called precision weapons by our leaders has had trickle-down effects to the point of achieving a mental-wipe or historical amnesia of the U.S. nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This discourse effectively represents a war on history and subjugation of knowledges about the horrors of nuclear war and fallout. Closely related to nuclearism is the issue of whiteness around nuclear weapons, the paternalistic presupposition that Western powers are the responsible and rightful leaders on the issue, the racist ideology that nuclear weapons in the hands of an Islamic country or “terrorist” spells end to world peace or catastrophe while it is perfectly alright for France, Britain, the United States, Russia, China and now India, to have nuclear weapons. The epistemological assumptions of nuclearism are dangerous, besides being racist and morally repulsive. The formation of a “nuclear club” and an exclusive right to possess nuclear weapons makes them a forbidden fruit and an issue of prestige, thereby encouraging proliferation. Indeed, discourse around the North Korea and Iran nuclear buildup denotes that these countries see a successful completion of the fuel cycle or the launching of a rocket as an issue of great prestige. There is absolutely nothing prestigious about owning weapons of mass destruction, weapons that can end civilization. However, countries like North Korea and Iran can be forgiven for their nuclearist mentality; after all, it is an implication of the discourse that has been perpetuated by the West, a discourse that has become common knowledge and culture. Nuclearism must be addressed and put on the table to move past the current impasse over nuclear negotiations and the non-proliferation regime. Without denouncing nuclear weapons and facing our moral conscience as the only nation to have ever used nuclear weapons, we cannot hope to avert nuclear proliferation and prevent ‘rogue states’ from going that route.

Link – Prolif – Orientalism

Representing the dangers of horizontal proliferation to third world nations relies on racist orientalism

Gusterson ’99 (Gusterson, Hugh,”Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination” Cultural Anthropology, 14.1 Feb 1999 http://www.jstor.org/stable/656531 Aug 17/2009 TBC 6/29/10)

Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western dis- course on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the "ver- tical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and im- proved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weap- ons on each side.5 However, the United States and Russia have turned back ap- peals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basi- cally formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998). The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Oth- erness separating Third World from Western countries.6 This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as ineradicably dif- ferent from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said (1978). Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impul- sive and emotional; where "we" are modern and flexible, "they" are slaves to an- cient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contempo- rary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse.

Link – Prolif – Anti-Nuclear Nuclearism

Representations of proliferation are based in anti-nuclear nuclearism which justifies violence against the Third World

BondGraham and Parrish 9 (Darwin, Will, sociologist, anti-imperialist scholar January 12 http://www.fpif.org/articles/anti-nuclear\_nuclearism TBC 6/29/10)

Many disarmament proponents were elated last year when four extremely prominent cold warriors — George P. Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn — announced in a series of op-eds their commitment to "a world free of nuclear weapons." Strange bedfellows indeed for the cause. Yet the fine print of their plan, published by the Hoover Institute and others since then, represents the anti-nuclear nuclearist platform to a tee. It’s a conspicuous yet merely rhetorical commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. These four elder statesmen have said what many U.S. elites have rarely uttered: that abolition is both possible and desirable. However, the anti-nuclear posture in their policy proposal comes to bear only on preventing non-nuclear states from going nuclear, or else preventing international criminal conspiracies from proliferating weapons technologies and nuclear materials for use as instruments of non-state terror. In other words, it’s about other people's nuclear weapons, not the 99% of materials and arms possessed by the United States and other established nuclear powers. This position emphasizes an anti-nuclear politics entirely for what it means for the rest of the world — securing nuclear materials and preventing other states from going nuclear or further developing their existing arsenals. U.S. responsibility to disarm remains in the distant future, unaddressed as a present imperative. Exclusive Route around the CTBT Concerns about the nuclear programs of other states — mostly Islamic, East and South Asian nations (i.e., Iran, North Korea, etc.) — conveniently work to reinforce existing power relations embodied in U.S. military supremacy and neocolonial relationships of technological inequality and dependence. By invoking their commitment to a "world free of nuclear weapons," the ideologues behind the anti-nuclear nuclearist platform justify invasions, military strikes, economic sanctions, and perhaps even the use of nuclear weapons themselves against the "rogue states" and "terrorists" whose possession of weapons technologie svastly less advanced than those perpetually stockpiled by the United States is deemed by the anti-nuclear nuclearists the first and foremost problem of the nuclear age.

Link – NPT

The NPT and non-proliferation argument are grounded in racialized binaries that serves us to paint the rest of the world as a potential threat to the West’s existence

Gusterson 99 (Hugh, professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University. His expertise is in nuclear culture, international security, and the anthropology of science, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Stan-PS-314-2009-Q1\_PNP/Syllabus/EReadings/Gusterson1999Nuclear.pdf, AD: 6/29/10) jl

Proliferation Treaty of 1970.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty embodied a bargain between the five countries that had nuclear weapons in 1970 and those countries that did not. According to the bargain, the five official nuclear states (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China)3 promised to assist other signatories to the treaty in acquiring nuclear energy technology as long as they did not use that technology to produce nuclear weapons, submitting to international inspections when necessary to prove their compliance. Further, in Article 6 of the treaty, the five nuclear powers agreed to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (Blacker and Duffy 1976:395). One hundred eighty-seven countries have signed the treaty, but Israel, India, and Pakistan have refused, saying it enshrines a system of global "nuclear apartheid." Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nuclear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric4-designating only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers-the treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly legitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms. In view of recent developments in global politics-the collapse of the Soviet threat and the recent war against Iraq, a nuclear-threshold nation in the Third World-the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing. It has become an increasingly important way of legitimating U.S. military programs in the post-Cold War world since the early 1990s, when U.S. military leaders introduced the term rogue states into the American lexicon of fear, identifying a new source of danger just as the Soviet threat was declining (Klare 1995).

Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western discourse on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the wordproliferation. This usage split off the "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side.5 However, the United States and Russia have turned back appeals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basically formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998).

The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries. This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as ineradicably different from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said (1978). Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where "we" are modem and flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse.

Link – Unstable/Failed States

Instable States are a metaphor for irrational behavior that western societies project onto other nations – criticism exposes these contradictions

Gusterson 99 (Hugh, professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University. His expertise is in nuclear culture, international security, and the anthropology of science, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Stan-PS-314-2009-Q1\_PNP/Syllabus/EReadings/Gusterson1999Nuclear.pdf, AD: 6/29/10) jl

The Western discourse on proliferation also stresses the supposedly ancient quality of feuds and hatreds in South Asia and the Middle East. As British journalist Nigel Calder puts it, "In that troubled part of the world, where modern technology serves ancient bitterness and nuclear explosions seem like a just expression of the wrath of God, imagining sequences of events that could lead to a regional nuclear conflict is not difficult" (1979:83). Explaining why Pakistan named its new missile the Ghauri, Senator Moynihan said, "Ghauri was a Muslim prince who invaded India in the twelfth century. These things don't go away" (1998). "Nuclear missiles named for ancient warriors will probably be deployed by two nations with a history of warfare, religious strife, and a simmering border dispute," said an ABC News reporter (Wouters 1998). In this vein it was widely reported in the U.S. media that the Indian Prithvi missile was named after an ancient warrior-king and that India's Agni missile was named for the god of fire (e.g., Marquand 1998). This widely circulated claim is particularly striking because, while it resonates with our stereotypes of Hindus enslaved to religion and tradition, it is quite untrue. The word Prithvi means "world" or "earth," and Agni means fire itself and does not refer to a god. The Indians are naming their missiles after elements, not after warriors or gods (Ghosh 1998). Of course, if Western commentators were looking for a country that names its nuclear weapons after ancient gods and dead warriors, they need have looked no further than the United States, with its Jupiter, Thor, Poseidon, Atlas, Polaris, Minuteman, and Pershing missiles. After dictators and religious fanatics, the Western imagination is most afraid of Third World military officers. The academics Brito and Intriligator, for example, tell us that Third World governments might acquire nuclear weapons "mainly for deterrence purposes but might not be able to control such weapons once they were available. . . . Unilateral initiatives by junior officers could lead to these weapons going off' (Brito and Intriligator 1982:140). One finds the same presumption in the writings of Nigel Calder, who also worries about Third World military officers: "An American or Russian general in Europe is not going to let off the first nuclear weapon on his own initiative, even in the heat of battle, but will the same discipline apply to . . . a Pakistani general who has a private nuclear theory about how to liberate Kashmir?" (1979:77). Oliver North notwithstanding, it is taken as so obvious it does not need explaining that Third World junior officers, unlike our own, are prone to take dangerous unilateral initiatives. Calder's passage only makes sense if one accepts the contrast it states as unquestionably natural. It is the kind of ideological statement that the French theorist Roland Barthes characterized as "falsely obvious" (1972:ll). As Edward Said says, once a group has been orientalized, "virtually anything can be written or said about it, without challenge or demurral" (1978:287). This presumption that the Third World body politic cannot control its military loins is, I believe, a coded or metaphorical way of discussing a more general lack of control over impulses, a pervasive lack of discipline, assumed to afflict people of color. But what if one tries to turn these contrasts inside out, asking whether the historical behavior of the Western nuclear powers might also give rise to concerns about undemocratic nuclear bullying, religious fanaticism, and unilateral initiatives by military officers? Because of its contradictions, gaps, and silences, the discourse on proliferation can always be read backward so that our gaze is directed not toward the Other but toward the author. Then the flaws and double standards of the discourse are illuminated. Thus, instead of asking whether Third World countries can be trusted with nuclear weapons, one can ask, how safe are the official nuclear powers from coups d'etat, renegade officers, or reckless leaders?

Link – Prolif

Representations of proliferation are distorted to legitimize western domination over the globe

Gusterson 99 (Hugh, professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University. His expertise is in nuclear culture, international security, and the anthropology of science, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Stan-PS-314-2009-Q1\_PNP/Syllabus/EReadings/Gusterson1999Nuclear.pdf, AD: 6/29/10) jl

These falsely obvious arguments about the political unreliability of Third World nuclear powers are, I have been arguing, part of a broader orientalist rhetoric that seeks to bury disturbing similarities between "us" and "them" in a discourse that systematically produces the Third World as Other. In the process of producing the Third World, we also produce ourselves, for the Orient, one of the West's "deepest and most recurring images of the other," is essential in defining the West "as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience" (Said 1978: 1-2). The particular images and metaphors that recur in the discourse on proliferation represent Third World nations as criminals, women, and children. But these recurrent images and metaphors, all of which pertain in some way to disorder, can also be read as telling hints about the facets of our own psychology and culture which we find especially troubling in regard to our custodianship over nuclear weapons. The metaphors and images are part of the ideological armor the West wears in the nuclear age, but they are also clues that suggest buried, denied, and troubling parts of ourselves that have mysteriously surfaced in our distorted representations of the Other. As Akhil Gupta has argued in his analysis of a different orientalist discourse, the discourse on development, "within development discourse . . . lies its shadowy double . . . a virtual presence, inappropriate objects that serve to open up the 'developed world' itself as an inappropriate object" (1998:4). In the era of so-called rogue states, one recurrent theme in this system of representations is that of the thief, liar, and criminal: the very attempt to come into possession of nuclear weapons is often cast in terms of racketeering and crime. After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, one newspaper headline read, "G-8 Nations Move to Punish Nuclear Outlaws" (Reid 1998:1), thereby characterizing the two countries as criminals even though neither had signed-and hence violated-either the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. When British customs officers intercepted a shipment of krytrons destined for Iraq's nuclear weapons program, one newspaper account said that Saddam Hussein was "caught red-handed trying to steal atomic detonators" (Perlmutter 1990, emphasis added)-a curious choice of words given that Iraq had paid good money to buy the krytrons from the company EG&G. (In fact, if any nation can be accused of theft here, surely it is the United States, which took $650 million from Pakistan for a shipment of F-16s, cancelled the shipment when the Bush administration determined that Pakistan was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, but never refunded the money.) According to an article in the New York Times, "it required more than three decades, a global network of theft and espionage, and uncounted millions for Pakistan, one of the world's poorest countries, to explode that bomb" (Weiner 1998:6). Meanwhile the same paper's editorial page lamented that "for years Pakistan has lied to the U.S. about not having a nuclear weapons program" and insisted that the United States "punish Pakistan's perfidy on the Bomb" (New, York Tinles 1987a:A34, 1987b:A34). And Representative Stephen Solarz (Democrat, New York) warns that the bomb will give Pakistan "the nuclear equivalent of a Saturday Night Special" (Smith 1988:38). The image of the Saturday night special assimilates Pakistan symbolically to the disorderly underworld of ghetto hoodlums who rob corner stores and fight gang wars. U.S. nuclear weapons are, presumably, more like the "legitimate" weapons carried by the police to maintain order and keep the peace.'\*

Link – Prolif – Stability

Representations of stability and balance reinforce a technical understanding of proliferation

Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 30-31)

A second important entailment of the 'stability' and 'balance' metaphors is that they highlight numerical capabilities, while downplaying qualitative capabilities, and hiding other aspects of security—even aspects of the military other than equipment. This entailment is rooted both in the experiential basis of the metaphors and in their use during the Cold War. 'Balance' is by and large a quantitative, not qualitative characteristic—on a scale, a kilo of feathers will balance a kilo of lead. In particular, the accounting of numbers of various kinds, though notably money, involves the metaphor of 'balance'. Thus it should not be surprising that the application of the balance metaphor to the relationships of arms leads to a focus on numerical capabilities. The experience of superpower arms negotiation was in large measure guided by attempts to achieve 'essential equivalences'—in the number of launchers, the number of warheads, the throw weight of missiles, or the number of tanks. What gets downplayed by the numerical entailment of these metaphors is the variation in capability among different weapons and weapon systems. This can be seen in the present proliferation control systems. The MTCR identifies technologies of concern by range and payload, entirely ignoring the reliability of the weapons, and even their accuracy (which is generally well measured)—in other words, ignoring most of what determines whether a weapon will be delivered on target by a given missile. Similarly, the UN Arms Register records weapons in seven categories, so that, for example, all 'tanks' are counted together. Thus, in the first reporting cycle, the United Kingdom included several pieces of obsolete equipment that were transferred for display in museums. The comments that allow the Register's users to realise that these entries are museum pieces were purely voluntary. For example, Britain reported two exports of tanks. Six tanks were sent to Switzerland, and were marked "Obsolete equipment for museums", while 25 were reported sent to Nigeria. Nothing more than that 25 tanks were sent was reported by the UK, and so the character of these weapons is still formally opaque.60 While it is unfortunate that the numerical entailment of the balance metaphor downplays the quality of arms, it is much more problematic that it hides entirely aspects of the security problem other than arms—be this military doctrine and policy, or the more general politics of security.61 Indeed, the entailments of 'stability' and 'balance' in this context tend to reinforce the autonomous, technological character of the problem which is entailed by the 'proliferation' metaphor. Technology 'spreads' through some natural process. We can count the occurrence of this spread, so that we know where the technology is accumulating. We may even be able to control this autonomous process. However, it is these accumulations, if we do not prevent them, which can then 'upset' balances; in the words of Resolution 46/36L: "excessive and destabilizing arms build-ups pose a threat to national, regional and international security."

Link – Prolif – Stability

The representation of proliferation as a threat to stability assumes the norm of international politics as neutral and peaceful. This only increases the separation between “the West” and the rest of the world

Mutimer 0 (David, International Relations lecturer at Keele University and Research Associate at the York Centre for International and Strategic Studies, The Weapons State: Proliferation and the Framing of Security, p. 11-13) jl

The prevailing view of the weapons proliferation problem sees Iraq as the harbinger of a wider security problem in the twenty-first century, a problem produced by the proliferation of weapons and related technologies. That view looks on the actions I outlined in Chapter 1 as the sensible response of an international community to a threat it has recognized only just in time, if not a little late. It is a view neatly presaged by Charles Krauthammer in the same article in which he introduced the weapon state: The post–Cold War era is thus perhaps better called the era of weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery will constitute the greatest single threat to world security for the rest of our lives. That is what makes a new international order not an imperial dream or a Wilsonian fantasy but a matter of the sheerest prudence. It is slowly dawning on the West that there is a need to establish some new regime to police these weapons and those who brandish them. [1](http://www.questia.com/read/105847239)  I want to draw attention to several aspects of this quotation, because they reveal the assumptions on which it, and the proliferation agenda more broadly, are based. The first key aspect of this short text is Krauthammer's claim that weapons proliferation will constitute the greatest single threat to world security for the rest of our lives. I do not want to contest or qualify the claim but instead to ask what it means—and perhaps as important, what is necessary for the claim to be meaningful. It would seem initially that the meaning of the sentence in question is self-evident: the process of weapons proliferation, of the spread of weapons of mass destruction to more countries in more parts of the world, threatens the world's security. Indeed, the meaning seems so apparent that explanation of its meaning are more difficult to read than the sentence itself. But is the meaning indeed so simple or, more to the point, so unproblematic? First, Krauthammer's claim assumes a single, identifiable phenomenon that is “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. ” The way in which the weapons proliferation agenda was advanced following the Gulf War seems to suggest that this has not always been the case. As I will show in more detail in Chapter 3, for much of the Cold War period, issues related to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery were not commonly assumed to be part of a problem known as proliferation. Krauthammer's claim also rests on the assumption that there is an unproblematic whole known as world security that can be threatened. He assumes, that is, that at some level the security of the world (whatever that may mean) is indivisible. But what of the last sentence of the quotation? Krauthammer argues that “it is slowly dawning on the West that there is a need to establish some new regime to police these weapons and those who brandish them. ” Within the space of a few lines, the “world security” with which Krauthammer appeared to be concerned has become a problem confronting “the West. ” Who are “those who brandish” these weapons after proliferation? They are not individuals or even groups of organized criminals, as his use of “police” might seem to suggest. Rather, it is “what might be called the 'Weapon State'” [2](http://www.questia.com/read/105847239) that is holding and brandishing these weapons. Weapon states are members of the international community— Krauthammer cited Iraq, North Korea, and Libya but suggested that it is possible for Argentina, Pakistan, Iran, and South Africa to achieve this status. World security is perhaps less universal than first imagined. It is also worth considering the implications of Krauthammer's suggestion that the problem of proliferation, and the attendant growth of weapon states, is “slowly dawning” on the West. For this assertion to be meaningful, there must be a problem in the world somewhere (or in many places at once) that, for whatever reason, is hidden from the view of “the West. ” There must, in other words, be a rigid separation between the object in question—in this case, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—and the viewing subject—in this case, the West. What is more, there must also be a clear, unproblematic subject. The West is taken as a subject that can view, on which something can “dawn. ” Phrased in this way, perhaps the meaning of Krauthammer's short quotation is less obvious. Although we conventionally speak of something called “the West, ” it is not readily apparent that it is sufficiently singular for problems to “dawn” on it. What ties much of this together, what makes the passage coherent, is suggested by Krauthammer's use of prudence, the watchword of the traditional study and practice of international security, a study founded on political realism. In his classic statement of the principles of political realism, Hans Morgenthau writes, “Realism, then, considers prudence … to be the supreme virtue in politics. ” [3](http://www.questia.com/read/105847239) Realism has been increasingly criticized in recent years in ways that resonate with the questions I have posed regarding Krauthammer's quotation. Realism, particularly the security study that forms a central element of its view of international relations, has been accused of serving Western—particularly U. S. —policy in the name of the international. What allows this political effect to pass unnoticed has been realism's claim to objectivity—to the separation of subject and object. Again, as Morgenthau puts it so succinctly, “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their root in human nature. ” [4](http://www.questia.com/read/105847239) If international politics is governed by objective laws, then security is a neutral state of affairs rather than politically biased. <CONTINUED>

Link – Prolif – Stability

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This objectivity also requires that both the objects of study and the subjects who study or who view those objects are also objectively knowable. Realism takes the objects of social life and the subjects of social action to be constituted prior to their entry into that action. Charles Krauthammer's short summation of the problem of weapons proliferation is much richer in its meaning than it might first appear. His quotation is founded on a series of assumptions, which seem at least problematic once exposed to view. Michel Foucault has written that “practicing criticism is the art of making facile gestures difficult. ” [5](http://www.questia.com/read/105847239) By making difficult what seems at first blush so simple, not just in Krauthammer's formulations but in the general understanding of the agenda of proliferation control, I am joining a growing body of scholars who aim to practice criticism on questions of security. This scholarship begins by suspending what is commonly taken as given: the objects of international security (and security policy), the identities of the subjects of international actions, and even the interests these actors pursue. Each of these—the objects, identities, and interests—is assumed to be self-evident in Krauthammer's quotation, as in security studies in general. In the rest of this chapter I will question their self-evidence and suggest a way of thinking about how the formation of the objects, identities, and interests of weapons proliferation can be investigated rather than assumed.

Link – Chernus

Fear of proliferation replicates the logic of security that makes enemy creation and destruction inevitable

Chernus 91 (Ira, Professor of Religious studies at UC Boulder, *Nuclear Madness: On Religion an Psychology in the Nuclear Age,*, p. 92-93) jl

There is a nearly universal assumption that disarmament through the arms control negotiation process is the only viable way out of the nuclear trap. But this faith in arms control is faith in a process of mutual constriction. It looks forward to a day when the rational ego’s expertise will devise a set of agreements so perfectly balanced that each side will be eternally immobilized and prevented from moving against the other. The test of every prospective arms control treaty is its capacity to eliminate all risk. The disarmament movement’s most successful initiative of the eighties—the nuclear freeze—reflects the same desire to freeze reality as a way of defending ourselves. Images of political stasis, permanence, and rigidity also abound in eras of détente. If the situation can be eternally frozen, we hope, we and the whole world can be eternally safe. So the new-found friendship between the superpowers resembles the friendships developed by schizoids. They are mutually negotiated arrangements for interacting without the prerequisite of all genuine human interaction: The risk of mutual vulnerability. No new political or military initiative can gain popular support unless it is first proven to be virtually risk-free. All the emerging proposals for perfectly secure arms control treaties and negotiated settlements seem reasonable enough. In truth, though, all aim to defend us principally against the schizoid’s real enemy—the inevitable flux of reality itself, whose code name in our political discourse is “instability.” A society suffering acute ontological insecurity must see every change as a threat to its tenuous reality and therefore fear “instability” above all. No doubt the threat may be labeled differently at different times. In some eras it is “the Russians” or “the Communists”; in others it is the Bomb itself or the “terrorists” who could, with a bit of purloined plutonium and a suitcase, incinerate a city. But despite these changes our goal remains the same: “stability,” which is a political code word for the extreme of psychic numbing—a world too petrified even to contemplate change. Therefore, we increasingly pin our hopes for national security on the numbing power of the false self system and its apparently reasonable technological program. Just as we used to prize the “firmness” of a “rigid defense posture” above all, so we now prize “firmness” at the negotiating table as the only way to achieve the parity we must have at all costs. Since our goal is a stable balance that we believe will benefit the whole world, it seems perfectly reasonable, even benign, to cast ourselves as the immovable center from which the newly balanced world order proceeds, and as the rigidly vigilant center from which that balance that we believe will benefit the whole world, it seems perfectly reasonable, even benign, to cast ourselves as the immovable center from which the newly balanced world order proceeds, and as the rigidly vigilant center from which that balance is maintained—by threat of renewed force if necessary. Yet the “stability” we seek is actually the permanent petrifaction that the schizoid fears yet embraces, hoping to avoid death by becoming dead in life. If the world and the nations in it are already dead, it matters little whether a given nation be treated as enemy or friend. In either case, all danger is denied. So an enemy nation can become a friend (or vice versa) very easily, and sometimes surprisingly rapidly. Communist China was transformed from enemy to ally almost overnight by the Nixon administration. The Soviet Union was changed, more gradually but no less strikingly, from “evil empire” to dialogue partner during the Reagan administration. Such eras of détente, even more than eras of over enmity, validate Laing’s perception of the family of nations as a nexus, in which both sides cooperate in keeping the international false self system alive. As Laing notes: “The game’s the thing: not perhaps fundamentally even a matter of winning it, but of perpetuating it.” Détente means that the partners in the nexus openly admit their mutual desire to play the same game. In Laing’s analysis of the nexus, the partners continue to play the game largely because each hopes to get reality from the other. As the false self assumes more and more control, schizoids feel increasingly drained of reality, so they turn to others to try to get reality without incurring any risk. One way to do this is to let the other spy on oneself, as the superpowers do with their growing willingness for mutual inspection of military facilities and nuclear weapons tests. Indeed all the recent moves toward superpower cooperation may be seen as attempts to open oneself up to the other’s reality without risking one’s own. As in any nexus, though, the game still depends on mutual coercion masquerading as mutual concern. The transformation from enemy to ally is so easy because within the nexus one’s closest ally always remains one’s enemy. Therefore the pursuit of détente and disarmament need not mean a halt to weapons production. Most Americans believe that we must still keep up our guard, that new weapons can compel the enemy to negotiate arms reduction, that deterrence is necessary until the disarmament process is complete, and that some nuclear deterrence capability will thus be necessary for a very long time—perhaps forever. But deterrence and disarmament seem very compatible in the public mind because both reflect the same basic principle: that humanity can be saved by a technologically constructed and constricting static balance, using the Bomb itself to save us from its horrors.

Link – Chernus

Threats identified by the 1AC is a form of neurosis that allows us to disregard value in favor of identifying and destroying unidentifiable enemies

Chernus 91 (Ira, Professor of Religious studies at UC Boulder, *Nuclear Madness: On Religion an Psychology in the Nuclear Age,*, p. 56-59) jl

Tillich's understanding of neurosis, coupled with his cri­tique of modernity, shows how the psychodynamics of nuclear images and nuclear numbing in the Cold War world are rooted in the neurotic nears characteristic of modernity. Neurosis tries to avoid unreality by refusing to face the fearful side of reality. "1'h<• t remcndous achievements of science and technology make it virtually fearless in the face of nature. The evil spirits that once populated waterways and wilderness and darkness are banished. So we learn to fear other people: the ethnic and racial minorities, the Communists, or whatever others are most con­venient at the time. We cling to these fears so persistently just because our potential range of fears has become so narrow. Fix­ation on a small number of intensely held fears is a prime characteristic of neurosis.

Neurotic fears assume a special quality of unreality in two senses: they express the threat of unreality in especially vivid symbolic terms, and they are often unrealistic. The pervasive fears of our own day display both these qualities. Among all the others, we especially fear the shadowy, impalpable, unknow­able other: the terrorist, the thief in the night, the infiltrating spy, the stranger on the other side of the street-or the tracks, otheR world-whom we will never meet. All these people are unreal to us, yet we guard ourselves against them with special caution, spending huge portions of our wealth to buy security, because we never know what They will do next. Our publicly shared fears do little to concretize our anxiety. For the most part, they simply reinforce our sense of helplessness in the face of intangible dangers. So we feel compelled to limit our anxiety bv neurotically limiting our world and our own possibilities. Many of these fears may be unfounded and others exaggerated, but we simply have no way to find out the facts.

Neurotics cherish their unrealistic fears as a buffer against reality. They strip genuine dangers of their reality for the same reason. Whenever possible, they ignore real dangers and refuse to feel fear at all. If fear cannot be avoided, the second-best line of defense is to talk about the danger (sometimes incessantly) without internalizing it or intending to respond to it. In our societal neurosis, this verbal defense is quite common. We can­not totally ignore our fears about environmental destruction, ur­ban decay, or the threat of nuclear annihilation. "It's a terrible problem," we say. "Someone really ought to do something." With that we confirm our own impotence. We diminish our reality in the face of the problem so that we can diminish the reality of the fear and danger. In a life of radical finitude this maneuver is especially easy. Subject and object, person and world, life and death are permanently separated in any event. Thus the danger, even if it represents death itself, becomes just one more object "out there," too far away to touch-or to touch our lives. So we deaden ourselves to very real dangers and sink back into psychic numbing. The more dangers there are, the easier it is to feel totally detached and numb.

Yet as we take refuge in our pure subjectivity, we also take refuge in our sense that we are just objects, cogs in the machine, inert and incapable of response. Ignoring our capacity to act, we settle into a convenient fatalism. "It's all too overwhelming," we say. And in fact we are quite easily overwhelmed. In the nar­row shelter of our finitized world, we systematically train ourselves to be incapable of contemplating threats to the whole. Embedded in temporality, we can only deal with concerns of the short run. Our minds boggle in trying to think of global centuries-long consequences. And a nuclear threat that con­jures up eternity with its image of "the end of all life" is impossi­ble to take in-which is just the way neurotics want it.

In the framework of Tillich's thought, this limited perspec­tive must be linked directly to what he calls the dominant form of anxiety today: the anxiety of meaninglessness. Tillich traces the meaninglessness of Western modernity back to the demise of universally shared values, meanings, and symbols. Rapid social change, he says, undermines all specific beliefs and con­cerns in a whirlpool of relativism. But here again his own thought points beyond this focus on change to a broader view of modernity, for he sees the loss of particular meanings as a symptom of a much larger problem: the loss of ultimate con­cern, concern for the infinite meaning and purpose of the whole. Partial meanings can be fulfilling only when they point to and participate in a symbolic vision of perfect meaning and perfect reality. If that vision disappears, partial meanings merely con­firm us in the anxiety of partial reality and soon lose their value.

Link – Accidents/Miscalc

Their accidents and miscalc args frames Western nations as rational actors, but actors in the East inherently become dangerous to them.

Gusterson ’99 (Gusterson, Hugh,”Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination” Cultural Anthropology, 14.1 Feb 1999 http://www.jstor.org/stable/656531 Aug 17/2009, p.120-21)NAR

The discourse on proliferation assumes that the superpowers' massive interlocking arsenals of highly accurate MIRVed missiles deployed on hair-trigger alert and designed with first-strike capability backed by global satellite capability was stable and that the small, crude arsenals of new nuclear nations would be unstable, but one could quite plausibly argue the reverse. Indeed, as mentioned above, by the 1980s a number of analysts in the West were concerned that the MIRVing of missiles and the accuracy of new guidance systems were generating increasing pressure to strike first in a crisis. Although the strategic logic might be a little different, they saw temptations to preempt at the high end of the nuclear social system as well as at the low end (Aldridge 1983; Gray and Payne 1980; Scheer 1982). There were also concerns (explored in more detail below) that the complex computerized early-warning systems with which each superpower protected its weapons were generating false alarms that might lead to accidental war (Blair 1993; Sagan 1993). Thus one could argue-as former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1986) and a number of others have-that deterrence between the United States and Russia would be safer and more stable if each side replaced their current massive strategic arsenals with a small force of about one hundred nuclear weapons-about the size India's nu-clear stockpile is believed to be, as it happens. Further, Bruce Blair (Blair, Feiveson, and von Hippel 1997), a former missile control officer turned strategic analyst, and Stansfield Turner (1997), a former CIA director, have suggested that the readiness posture of American and Russian nuclear forces makes them an accident waiting to happen. The United States and Russia, they argue, would be safer if they stored their warheads separate from their delivery vehicles-as, it so happens, India and Pakistan do.1" In the words of Scott Sagan, a political scientist and former Pentagon official concerned about U.S. nuclear weapons safety, The United States should not try to make new nuclear nations become like the superpowers during the Cold War, with large arsenals ready to launch at a moment's notice for the sake of deterrence, instead, for the sake of safety, the United States and Russia should try to become more like some of the nascent nuclear states, maintaining very small nuclear capabilities, with weapons components separated and located apart from the delivers systems, and with civilian organizations controlling the warheads. [Sagan 1995:90-91 ]12 Given, as I have shown, that the crisis stability of large nuclear arsenals can also be questioned and that it is not immediately self-evident why the leader of, say, India today should feel any more confident that he would not lose a city or two in a preemptive strike on Pakistan than his U.S. counterpart would in attacking Russia, I want to suggest that an argument that appears on the surface to be about numbers and configurations of weapons is really, when one looks more closely, about the psychology and culture of people. Put simply, the dominant discourse assumes that leaders in the Third World make decisions differently than their counterparts in the West: that they are more likely to take risks, gambling millions of lives, or to make rash and irresponsible calculations.

Link – Accidents/Miscalc

Their accidents and miscalc args are double standards that drive prolif

Gusterson 99 (Hugh, professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University. His expertise is in nuclear culture, international security, and the anthropology of science, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Stan-PS-314-2009-Q1\_PNP/Syllabus/EReadings/Gusterson1999Nuclear.pdf, AD: 6/29/10) jl

Second, turning to the surveillance and early-warning systems that the United States has but threshold nuclear nations lack, one finds that these systems bring with them special problems as well as benefits. For example, it was the high-technology Aegis radar system, misread by a navy operator, that was directly responsible for the tragically mistaken U.S. decision to shoot down an Iranian commercial jetliner on July 3, 1988, a blunder that cost innocent lives and could have triggered a war. Similarly, and potentially more seriously, At 8:50 a.m., on November 9, 1979, the operational duty officers at NORAD-as well as in the SAC command post, at the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC), and the alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC) at Fort Richie, Maryland-were suddenly confronted with a realistic display of a Soviet nuclear attack apparently designed to decapitate the American command system and destroy U.S. nuclear forces: a large number of Soviet missiles appeared to have been launched, both SLBMs and ICBMs, in a full-scale attack on the United States. [Sagan 1993:228-2291 American interceptor planes were scrambled, the presidential "doomsday plane" took off (without the president) to coordinate a possible nuclear war, and air traffic controllers were told to bring down commercial planes before U.S. military commanders found that a training tape had mistakenly been inserted into the system (Sagan 1993:230). More seriously still, on October 28, 1962, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis when the United States was at a high level of alert and had its nuclear weapons cocked at the ready, another accident with a training tape caused U.S. radar operators to believe that a missile had been launched at Florida from Cuba. When there was no nuclear detonation, they realized they had mistaken a satellite for a missile (Sagan 1993: 130-1 3 1). Also during the Cuban Missile Crisis, at a time when sentries at U.S. military bases had been told to be alert to Soviet saboteurs, a bear climbing a fence at a base in Duluth was mistaken for a saboteur, and the alarm set off throughout the region was, in Wisconsin, mistaken for the nuclear war alarm. An officer had to drive onto the runway to block the nuclear-armed F-106As, already taxiing, from taking off (Sagan 1993: 1,99). Looking next at the U.S. safety record in transporting and handling nuclear weapons, again there is more cause for relief than for complacency. There have, for example, been at least twenty-four occasions when U.S. aircraft have accidentally released nuclear weapons and at least eight incidents in which U.S. nuclear weapons were involved in plane crashes or fires (Sagan 1993: 185; Williams and Cantelon 1988:239-245). In 1980, during routine maintenance of a Titan I1 missile in Arkansas, an accident with a wrench caused a conventional explosion that sent the nuclear warhead 600 feet through the air (Barasch 1983:42). In another incident an H-bomb was accidentally dropped over North Carolina; only one safety switch worked, preventing the bomb from detonating (Barasch 1983:41). In 1966 two U.S. planes collided over Palomares, Spain, and four nuclear weapons fell to the ground, causing a conventional explosion that contaminated a large, populated area with plutonium. One hydrogen bomb was lost for three months. In 1968 a U.S. plane carrying four H-bombs caught fire over Greenland. The crew ejected, and there was a conventional explosion that scattered plutonium over a wide area (Sagan 1993: 156-203). None of these accidents produced nuclear explosions, but recent safety studies have concluded that this must partly be attributed to good luck. These studies revealed that the design of the W-79 nuclear artillery shell contained a previously unsuspected design flaw that could lead to an unintended nuclear explosion in certain circumstances. In consequence the artillery shells had to be secretly withdrawn from Europe in 1989 (Sagan 1993: 184; Smith 1990). In other words, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has its own safety problems related to its dependence on highly computerized warning and detection systems, its Cold War practice of patrolling oceans and skies with live nuclear weapons, and its large stockpile size. Even where U.S. scientists have developed special safety technologies, they are not always used. The presumption that Third World countries lack the technical competence to be trusted with nuclear weapons fits our stereotypes about these countries' backwardness, but it distracts us from asking whether we ourselves have the technical infallibility the weapons ideally require.

Link – Safety

Sharing safety tech is possible – the only reason it doesn’t happen is because of racist policies

Gusterson 99 (Hugh, professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University. His expertise is in nuclear culture, international security, and the anthropology of science, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Stan-PS-314-2009-Q1\_PNP/Syllabus/EReadings/Gusterson1999Nuclear.pdf, AD: 6/29/10) jl

3. Third World Governments Lack the Technical Muturity to Handle Nuclear Weapons The third argument against horizontal proliferation is that Third World nations may lack the technical maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons. Brito and Intriligator, for example, tell us that "the new nuclear nations are likely to be less sophisticated technically and thus less able to develop safeguards against accident or unauthorized action" (1982:137). And the Washington Post quotes an unnamed Western diplomat stationed in Pakistan who, worrying that India and Pakistan lack the technology to detect an incoming attack on their weapons, said, the United States has "expensive space-based surveillance that could pick up the launches, but Pakistan and India have no warning systems. I don't know what their doctrine will be. Launch when the wind blows'?" (Anderson 1998:Al). In terms of safety technologies, U.S. weapons scientists have over the years developed Insensitive High Explosive (IHE), which will not detonate if a weapon is-as has happened with U.S. nuclear weapons-accidentally dropped. U.S. weapons scientists have also developed Permissive Action Links (PALS), electronic devices that block the arming of nuclear weapons until the correct code is entered so that the weapons cannot be used if stolen and will not go off if there is an accident during routine transportation or storage of the weapons. Obviously the United States could, if it were deeply concerned about safety problems in new nuclear nations, share such safety technologies, as it offered to do with the Soviets during the Cold War.'? It has chosen not to share its safety technologies with such nations as India and Pakistan partly out of concern that it would then be perceived as rewarding proliferation. 122

Your arg is a racist double standard – Even Western nations disregard safety for power projection

Gusterson 99 (Hugh, professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University. His expertise is in nuclear culture, international security, and the anthropology of science, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Stan-PS-314-2009-Q1\_PNP/Syllabus/EReadings/Gusterson1999Nuclear.pdf, AD: 6/29/10) jl

CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY Quite aside from the question of whether the United States itself could discreetly do more to improve the safety of nuclear arsenals in new nuclear nations, if one reviews the U.S. nuclear safety record, the comforting dichotomy between a high-tech, safe "us" and the low-tech, unsafe "them" begins to look distinctly dubious. First, the United States has not always made use of the safety technologies at its disposal. Over the protests of some weapons designers, for example, the Navy decided not to incorporate state-of-the-art safety technologies into one of its newest weapons: the Trident 11. The Trident I1 does not contain Insensitive High Explosive because IHE is heavier than ordinary high explosive and would, therefore, have reduced the number of warheads each missile could carry. The Trident I1 designers also decided to use 1.1 class propellant fuel rather than the less combustible, hence safer, 1.3 class fuel, because the former would give the missile a longer range. After the Trident I1 was deployed, a highlevel review panel appointed by President Bush recommended recalling and redesigning it for safety reasons, but the panel was overruled partly because of the expense this would have involved (Drell, Foster, and Townes 1991; Smith 1990).

Link – Fanaticism/Terrorism

Their representations of dangerous fanaticism are arbitrary and racist

Gusterson ’99 (Gusterson, Hugh,”Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination” Cultural Anthropology, 14.1 Feb 1999 http://www.jstor.org/stable/656531 Aug 17/2009, p.125-26)NAR

It is often also assumed in the discourse on proliferation that Third World nuclear weapons exist to serve the ends of despotic vanity or religious fanaticism and may be used without restraint. In the public discussion of India's nuclear tests in 1998, for example, it was a recurrent theme that India conducted its nuclear tests out of a narcissistic desire for self-aggrandizement rather than for legitimate national security reasons. This image persists in spite of the fact that India, with a declared nuclear power (China) on one border and an undeclared nuclear power (Pakistan) on the other, might be thought to have reasons every bit as compelling as those of the five official nuclear powers to test nuclear weapons. Strategic analyst Michael Krepon said on The News Hour with Jim Lehrer, "These tests weren't done for security purposes .... They were done for reasons of domestic politics and national pride.... We have street demonstrations to protest nuclear weapons. They have them to celebrate them" (1998). Meanwhile, in an article entitled "Nuclear Fear and Narcissism Shake South Asia," a New York Times reporter, speaking of India as if it were a spoiled child, wrote that India, "tired of what it considers to be its own second-class status in world affairs ... has gotten the attention it wanted" (Weisman 1998:16). Similarly, Senator Richard Lugar (Republican, Indiana) said that India tested in part because "there was a lot of indifference, under appreciation of India. ... We were not spending quality time in the Administration or Congress on India" (Congressional Quarterly Weekly 1998:1367-1368). And when Edward Teller, the so-called father of the hydrogen bomb, was asked if India and Pakistan were following his motto that "knowledge is good," he replied, "These explosions have not been performed for knowledge. It may be to impress people. It may be a form of boasting" (Mayer 1998:B 1). The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation is also permeated by a recurrent anxiety that Third World nations will use nuclear weapons to pursue religious squabbles and crusades. Commentators particularly fear an "Islamic bomb" and a Muslim holy war. Said (1978:287) identified the fear of a Muslim holy war as one of the cornerstones of orientalist ideology. Senator Edward Kennedy worries about a scenario in which "Libya, determined to acquire nuclear weapons, receives a gift of the Bomb from Pakistan as an act of Islamic solidarity" (1982:ix). Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan warns that "you could have an Islamic bomb in no time, and God have mercy on us" (Associated Press 1998). Mary McGrory fears that "nothing is more important than keeping the 'Islamic bomb' out of the hands of Iran. Let it be introduced into the Middle East and you can kiss the world we know goodbye" (1998a:A3). The San Francisco Examiner quotes an analyst who explained Saddam Hussein's willingness to forego $100 billion in oil revenues rather than end his nuclear weapons program by saying, "The single most important reason is Saddam's vision of his role in history as a saviour of the Arab world. He is comparing himself with Saladin" (Kempster 1998:A17). Finally, syndicated columnist Morton Kondracke speculates about a despot "like the Shah of Iran" who "secretly builds an arsenal to increase his prestige": Then he is overthrown by a religious fanatic resembling the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who then uses some of the Shah's bombs to intimidate or destroy neighboring countries .And other bomb she passes on to terrorists that will use them to wage holy wars. Be glad that it didn't happen in real life. But something like it could. [1983] The Western discourse on proliferation also stresses the supposedly ancient quality of feuds and hatreds in South Asia and the Middle East. As British journalist Nigel Calder puts it, "In that troubled part of the world, where modern technology serves ancient bitterness and nuclear explosions seem like a just expression of the wrath of God, imagining sequences of events that could lead to a regional nuclear conflict is not difficult" (1979:83). Explaining why Pakistan named its new missile the Ghauri, Senator Moynihan said, "Ghauri was a Muslim prince who invaded India in the twelfth century. These things don't go away" (1998). "Nuclear missiles named for ancient warriors will probably be deployed by two nations with a history of warfare, religious strife, and a simmering border dispute," said an ABC News reporter (Wouters 1998). In this vein it was widely reported in the U.S. media that the Indian Prithvi missile was named after an ancient warrior-king and that India's Agni missile was named for the god of fire (e.g., Marquand 1998). This widely circulated claim is particularly striking because, while it resonates with our stereotypes of Hindus enslaved to religion and tradition, it is quite untrue. The word Prithvi means "world" or "earth," and Agni means fire itself and does not refer to a god. The Indians are naming their missiles after elements, not after warriors or gods (Ghosh 1998). Of course, if Western commentators were looking for a country that names its nuclear weapons after ancient gods and dead warriors, they need have looked no further than the United States, with its Jupiter, Thor, Poseidon, Atlas, Polaris, Minuteman, and Pershing missiles.

Link – North Korea

The North Korean threat is constructed to find a new Other

Lal 9 (Prerna April 5 Freelance blogger for the Immigrant Rights and Race in America blog at Change.org, and serve as an Online Organizer for CODEPINK: Women for Peace. http://prernalal.com/2009/04/north-korea-is-not-a-threat-unveiling-hegemonic-discourses/ TBC 7/1/10)

While this is not a clash of civilizations, it is certainly a race war in that the entire discourse revolves around preventing certain kinds of people from acquiring and using nuclear weapons. Would the United States use the same tactics in France? Or even India? No, in fact it looked the other way on outrageous French nuclear testing in the Pacific and supports India’s nuclear program despite the fact that it is not a signatory of the NPT! Ronnie Lipschutz has some fine lines for us in On Security: To be sure, the United States and Russia do not launch missiles against each other because both know the result would be annihilation. But the same is true for France and Britain, or China and Israel. It was the existence of the Other that gave deterrence its power; it is the disappearance of the Other that has vanquished that power. Where Russia is now concerned, we are, paradoxically, not secure, because we see no need to be secured. In other words, as Ole Waever might put it, where there is no constructed threat, there is no security problem. France is fully capable of doing great damage to the United States, but that capability has no meaning in terms of U.S. security. On the other hand, see the Iran nuclear ‘crisis’ as an example. The United States has demonized Ahmadinejad at every opportunity and conjured him up as an Islamic fundamentalist and nationalist who will defy non-proliferation at all costs. On the other hand, Ahmadinejad cheekily asked the United States to join the rest of civilization in worshipping God. That is the discourse of race war but it is concealed by juridical discourse—the hegemonic discourse. To borrow from Michael Foucault, the United States is using the juridical schema of nuclear non-proliferation to conceal the war-repression schema. North Korea is the historical Other, the terrorist, the threat against whom the world must be protected in the juridical schema. Yet, under the war-repression schema, North Korea is a sovereign nation with the right to develop nuclear and communications technology. And this latest action is really nothing more than a plea for economic help.

Link – Middle East

Securitized depictions of the Middle East fail to describe reality

Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 29

In the Middle East, the region in which the present image could be said to have been born, the relationships among the various states are complex, and yet even accounting for these varied relations misses the sub- and trans-national dimensions of the politics of Middle Eastern security. For instance, the place of the Kurds in Iraq, and their relations to the Kurds in both Iran and Turkey, is an important element of the 'security' relationship in the eastern Middle East—and centrally involved in both Gulf Wars of the past fifteen years.58 Similarly, the Israeli relationship with the Palestinians involves complex relations among Palestinians living in Israel, Jews living in Palestine, Palestinians in neighbouring countries, and those countries' states. Despite this complexity, the power of the dyadic entailment shapes discussions of the region. The most prevalent dyadic construction, of course, is that which characterises the region's complexities as "the Arab-Israeli conflict". Yet the two most recent wars in the region involved an Arab state's army fighting one of another Muslim (though not Arab) state, and a broad coalition destroying an Arab state—a coalition that included both Arabs and, to all intents and purposes, Israel.

Link – Asia

Securitized descriptions of Asia fail – too simplistic

Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 30)

The same problems arise in other regions of concern. South Asia is, at its most simple, an intricate dance among India, Pakistan and the PRC—a construction which ignores the Kashmiris, Tamils and Sri Lanka. Despite the centrality of the triad of powers, there is a strong tendency to speak of the region in terms of the dyadic Indo-Pakistani relationship. Indeed, this tendency can be seen in part to have resulted in the growth of India's arsenal: The Indian military buildup may also be explained by the various decision-maker's political image of the state in international society. One of the problems with Indian leaders and policy-makers since the death of Prime Minister Jawaharal Nehru in 1964, is the feeling that India does not get enough respect, especially compared to China, with which it sees itself as essentially equal in size, population and economic development. Instead, India is constantly equated with Pakistan, a nation at one time one-fifth its size in population and capabilities, and only one-eighth its size since the creation of Bangladesh in December 1971.59 Similarly, in the North Pacific, while the relationship between North and South Korea is of central importance, the security dynamic cannot be understood outside the context of the relations among these two states and the PRC, Japan and the United States, at the very least. These five do not break into two neat groupings, and yet the dyadic, "North against South", representation of the problem is common.

Link – Hegemony

Their arguments for hegemony only drive WMD development

Huntley 7 (Wade L. Huntley, *Nuclear Nonproliferation: Time for New Thinking?*, International Studies Association, 3 March, 2007)NAR

But within the framework of standard deterrence assumptions, this logic is exactly backwards. US threats of retaliatory attack to deter an adversary’s use of WMD against vital US interests are inherently more credible than threats of preemptive attack to deter an adversary’s acquisition of WMD, which may derive from motivations having little to do with US interests. Although this distinction between these two forms of coercion is obfuscated in the 2002 NPR, US Strategic Command advisories to deliberations over the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review recognized the distinction and were skeptical that nuclear weapons could deter WMD acquisition: “Nations with expansionist aims may view development of WMD as the only means of countering US nuclear power… Our nuclear deterrent posture does not influence these reasons to obtain WMD…” 17 Moreover, when preventing nuclear weapons acquisition requires interrupting efforts an adversary already has underway (such as ending an indigenous development program), this “acquisition deterrence” becomes compellence. Many factors make coercion to sustain a status quo (deter gain) easier than coercion to change a status quo (compel loss). Finally, there is the prospect that whatever weak acquisition deterrence might accrue from counterproliferation threats would be more than offset by U.S. adversaries’ increased motivations to obtain capabilities to deter U.S. action, fueled by the general undermining of non-nuclear use and nonproliferation norms that rededicated U.S. reliance on nuclear threats could foster. This factor was also recognized by the US Strategic Command in its advisories to the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review: “As the only true superpower, the approach the U.S. takes to such issues as nuclear policy, START I & II treaty execution, pursuit of a CTBT, and the NPT extension will have a major influence on the action of other countries.” 19 Thus, the acquisition deterrence aspiration also begs numerous questions concerning the motivations of states to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place, and whether US policy – for good or ill – has much bearing at all. This topic is taken up in the fourth section of this paper.

Internal Link – Colonialism

The Aff’s representations begin the path from demonization to regime change and colonization

Lal 9 (Prerna April 5 Freelance blogger for the Immigrant Rights and Race in America blog at Change.org, and serve as an Online Organizer for CODEPINK: Women for Peace. http://prernalal.com/2009/04/north-korea-is-not-a-threat-unveiling-hegemonic-discourses/ TBC 7/1/10)

The Obama Administration has scrambled to battle anti-Americanism with new euphemisms. It is not the ‘global war on terror’ but a ‘global contingency operation.’ Not likely to catch on anytime soon. The people living in dire states and conditions, ravaged by war, poverty and hardship, know precisely what it is–an attack on their existence predicated by the United States and its allies. We have seen and read the master narrative before of demonizing a country, bringing about regime change and killing, colonizing and repressing more peoples while doing it. By unearthing these counter-discourses, we can hope to move towards a ‘solution’ to the North Korea issue. Again, the ‘problem-solution’ is not the missiles, but the manner in which North Korea is seeking help and attention. Finding common ground requires discovering and deconstructing the cultural and discursive constructs. However, the window of opportunity is quite small, as seen by positions and interests of the parties involved. I don’t doubt though, that North Korea will cease to be an entity sometime in the near future and become into Korea again.

Impacts – Colonialism

Colonialism results in the genocidal extermination of populations globally

Street 4 (Paul, Author - writes on imperialism, racism, and thought control, http://www.thereitis.org/displayarticle242.html, AD: 7/2/10) jl

It is especially important to appreciate the significance of the vicious, often explicitly genocidal “homeland” assaults on native-Americans, which set foundational racist and national-narcissist patterns for subsequent U.S. global butchery, disproportionately directed at non-European people of color. The deletion of the real story of the so-called “battle of Washita” from the official Seventh Cavalry history given to the perpetrators of the No Gun Ri massacre is revealing. Denial about Washita and Sand Creek (and so on) encouraged US savagery at Wounded Knee, the denial of which encouraged US savagery in the Philippines, the denial of which encouraged US savagery in Korea, the denial of which encouraged US savagery in Vietnam, the denial of which (and all before) has recently encouraged US savagery in Afghanistan and Iraq. It’s a vicious circle of recurrent violence, well known to mental health practitioners who deal with countless victims of domestic violence living in the dark shadows of the imperial homeland’s crippling, stunted, and indeed itself occupied social and political order.

Power-mad US forces deploying the latest genocidal war tools, some suggestively named after native tribes that white North American “pioneers” tried to wipe off the face of the earth (ie, “Apache,” “Blackhawk,” and “Comanche” helicopters) are walking in bloody footsteps that trace back across centuries, oceans, forests and plains to the leveled villages, shattered corpses, and stolen resources of those who Roosevelt acknowledged as America’s “original inhabitants.” Racist imperial carnage and its denial, like charity, begin at home. Those who deny the crimes of the past are likely to repeat their offenses in the future as long as they retain the means and motive to do so.

Colonialism results in the extinction of entire populations

Porter 98 (Robert B, Seneca and Professor of Law and Director of the Tribal Law and Government Center U of Kansas, 21 University of Michigan Journal of Law and Reform) jl

Nonetheless, this otherwise natural process was dramatically altered by colonization. These colonizing efforts were accomplished by force and often with great speed, producing dramatic changes within Indigenous societies and interfering with the natural process of adaptation and change. This disruption has had a genocidal effect; groups of Indigenous peoples that existed 500 years ago no longer exist. There should be no doubt that their extinction was not an accident – it was the product of a concerted effort to subjugate and eliminate the native human population in order to allow for the pursuit of wealth and manifest destiny. As a result, extinction is the most dramatic effect of colonization. Allowed to run its full course, colonization will disrupt and destroy the natural evolutionary process of the people being colonized to the point of extinction.

Impacts – Prolif – Root Cause

The concept of proliferation hides the necessity of root cause economic development

Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 18-19)

In a similar way, the characterisation of the problem of 'proliferation' highlights certain characteristics of the phenomenon, while downplaying and hiding others. That image contains three key metaphors: 'proliferation', 'stability' and balance'. As such, the image highlights the source)spread)recipient nature of the process of arms production and distribution. At the same time, it downplays the structural nature of the arms production and transfer system which bind the suppliers and recipients to each other and it hides the fact that weapons and related technologies are procured for a variety of factors related to external military threat, internal regime support and economic development.42 I will address these features of the problem in more detail below. What is important at this point is to see that the image and the metaphors it entails privilege a certain set of policy responses—those which address the 'spread' of technology highlighted by the image—while denying place to others—policy, for instance, which would seek to address the problems of economic development which may spur the creation of an arms industry.

Representations of the spread of nuclear weapons ignore the root causes of nuclear weapon acquisition

Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 25)

This image, by highlighting the technological and autonomous aspects of a process of spread, downplays or even hides important aspects of the relationship of nuclear weapons to international security. To begin with, the image hides the fact that nuclear weapons do not spread, but are spread—and in fact are spread largely by the western states. Secondly, the image downplays, to the point of hiding, any of the political, social, economic and structural factors which tend to drive states and other actors both to supply and to acquire nuclear weapons. Finally, the image downplays the politics of security and threat, naturalising the 'security dilemma' to the point that it is considered as an automatic dynamic. The image of PROLIFERATION thus privileges a technical, apolitical policy, by casting the problem as a technical, apolitical one. The Non-Proliferation Treaty controls and safeguards the movement of the technology of nuclear energy. The supporting supplier groups jointly impose controls on the supply—that is the outward flow—of this same technology. The goal, in both cases, is to stem or, at least slow, the outward movement of material and its attendant techniques Such a policy is almost doomed to fail, however, for it downplays and hides the very concerns which motivate the agents of the process. Iraq was driven to acquire nuclear weapons, even in the face of NPT commitments, and so employed technology which is considered so outdated that it is no longer tightly controlled. This simply does not fit with the NPT-NSG-Zangger Committee approach. In addition, in order to gain the necessary material, the Iraqis needed access to external technology. Such technology was acquired by human agents acting for the Iraqi state and was acquired from other agents, who had their own motivational interests to provide the necessary technology. The technology does not 'spread' through some autonomous process akin to that causing a zygote to become a person, but rather they are spread, and so the agents involved are able to sidestep the technologically focused control efforts.

Impacts – Prolif – Root Cause

Representations of proliferation hide the security concerns which drive states to acquire weapons

Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 34)

The image of PROLIFERATION knits together the metaphors of 'proliferation', 'stability' and 'balance' to shape the policy responses of the international community. The metaphors have certain entailments, which serve to highlight, downplay and hide aspects of the security environment. Thus, the policy responses which are being developed address primarily those aspects highlighted, while ignoring those downplayed and hidden. The image is of an autonomously driven process of spread, outward from a particular source or sources. It is an apolitical image, which strongly highlights technology, capability and gross accounts of number. As such, it is an image that masks the political interests of those supporting the present structure of proliferation control—a structure which strongly reflects this image and its entailments. To begin with, the control efforts are classified by the technology of concern. Thus there are global instruments for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons, of chemical and biological weapons, and a register of conventional arms. There is no global instrument for the control of the spread of missile technology, but the MTCR addresses this technology as a discrete problem, and is considering evolving into a global regime. There is thus little or no recognition in the practical response to PROLIFERATION that the spread of these technologies might all be part of a common 'security' problem. The security concerns which might drive states to acquire one or more of these technologies are hidden by the PROLIFERATION image. This division of the problem into discrete technologies persists, despite the fact that the connection among the various technologies of concern manifests itself in a number of ways. I will mention only two by way of illustration. The first is the common reference to biological weapons as "the poor man's atomic bomb". The implication of this phrase is that a state prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons—in this case for reasons of cost—could turn to biological weapons to serve the same purposes. The second example is of the links being drawn in the Middle East between Arab states' potential chemical arms, and Israel's nuclear arsenal. The Arab states are balking at ratifying the CWC until the Israeli nuclear arms are at least placed on the negotiating table. Conversely, supporters of the Israeli position can cite the Arab states' overwhelming conventional superiority as a justification for Israel's nuclear arms.

Proliferation in the middle east is a direct outgrowth of the proliferation of our own weapons.

Gusterson ’99 (Gusterson, Hugh,”Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination” Cultural Anthropology, 14.1 Feb 1999 http://www.jstor.org/stable/656531 Aug 17/2009, p.131-32)NAR

The discourse on nuclear proliferation legitimates this system of domination while presenting the interests the established nuclear powers have in maintaining their nuclear monopoly as if they were equally beneficial to all the nations of the globe. And, ironically, the discourse on nonproliferation presents these subordinate nations as the principal source of danger in the world. This is another case of blaming the victim. The discourse on nuclear proliferation is structured around a rigid segregation of "their" problems from "ours." In fact, however, we are linked to developing nations by a world system, and many of the problems that, we claim, render these nations ineligible to own nuclear weapons have a lot to do with the West and the system it dominates. For example, the regional conflict between India and Pakistan is, in part at least, a direct consequence of the divide-and-rule policies adopted by the British raj; and the dispute over Kashmir, identified by Western commentators as a possible flash point for nuclear war, has its origins not so much in ancient hatreds as in Britain's decision in 1846 to install a Hindu maharajah as leader of a Muslim territory (Burns 1998). The hostility between Arabs and Israelis has been exacerbated by British, French, and American intervention in the Middle East dating back to the Balfour Declaration of 1917. More recently, as Steven Green points out, "Congress has voted over $36.5 billion in economic and military aid to Israel, including rockets, planes, and other technology which has directly advanced Israel's nuclear weapons capabilities. It is precisely this nuclear arsenal, which the U.S. Congress has been so instrumental in building up, that is driving the Arab state to attain countervailing strategic weapons of various kinds" (1990).

Impacts – Prolif – Turns Case

Perception of US hypocrisy is the prime motivation for proliferation

Sagan 4 (Scott D., Prof of Political Science at Stanford Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 10, October,http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2004/oct/saganOct04.html 7/2/10)

There are serious conflicts between these two strategies with regard to nuclear non-proliferation. First, dissuasion strategy implies that the United States must maintain a significant degree of superiority in numbers of nuclear forces over other states to reduce their ability and hence incentives to catch up to the United States (relevant to all other nuclear states, except possibly for Russia), or to reduce the capability and incentives of non-nuclear states to acquire weapons. This policy implication of dissuasion strategy, however logical, clearly conflicts with the Article VI commitment to work in good faith toward the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. While a number of current and former government officials have claimed that global perceptions that the U.S. is keeping that commitment are not an important factor in foreign governments’ decisions to develop or not develop nuclear weapons,[8] the cases they cite are always the most difficult ones: states that have little domestic debate and seem determined to get weapons of mass destruction, such as North Korea and Iraq. In a wider set of non-nuclear weapons "fence sitter" states, especially those in which domestic political actors may hold contrasting positions about getting nuclear weapons, the belief that that the U.S. government has abandoned Article VI commitments had increased.[9] It is impossible to predict precisely how such beliefs will influence future debates by such potential proliferators as Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt. But it is easy to predict that perceptions that the U.S. is not keeping up its side of the NPT bargain will make it easier for hawks in those countries to argue for abandoning their governments NPT commitments. Even the Iranian government’s decisions about nuclear weapons procurement is likely to be increasingly influenced by domestic political debates in the coming years, and perceptions of U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations (while perhaps less crucial than U.S. coercive diplomacy) may have a significant impact on the substance and outcome of such debates.[10]

Hypocrisy encourages nuclear states to proliferate and first strike

Ellsberg 9 (Daniel, “Ending Nuclear Terrorism: By America and Others,” August 8, RAND Corporation Scholar http://www.ellsberg.net/archive/ending-nuclear-terrorism-by-america-and-others TBC 7/2/10)

All these expressions of nuclear policy—what we do, and what we say to ourselves, as opposed to what we say others should do—especially in the absence now of any serious military threats to US national security, can only encourage potential nuclear states to regard nuclear weapons in the same way that the United States and its major allies, along with Russia, evidently do: as having vital, multiple, legitimate uses, as well as being unparalleled symbols of sovereignty, status, and power. Perhaps most dangerously, such potential proliferators are led by past and present American doctrine and behavior to consider—among the possible, acceptable and valuable uses of nuclear weapons—the issuance and possible execution of nuclear first-use threats: i.e., the “option” of threatening to initiate nuclear attacks, and if necessary of carrying out such threats.

Impacts – Prolif – Turns Case

US hypocrisy causes proliferation

Edwards 8 (Gordon Global Research, September 6, President of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibilityhttp://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=10089 TBC 7/2/10)

In fact, under the influence of the USA, NATO maintains that nuclear weapons are necessary for defense and insists that it will; be the first to use nuclear weapons if there is a conventional conflict which they cannot win with conventional weapons. If this is so, then how can one argue that other nations cannot also have nuclear weapons "as necessary for defense?" Thus the idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is seen as a hypocritical charade based on an increasingly obnoxious double-standard : "Do as we say, not as we do." If there is to be any hope of a secure and sustainable planet, there has to be a mass movement calling for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons everywhere. Even" nuclear hawks" like Kissinger and Schultz in the USA, and highly placed officials in other nuclear weapons states suchas Britain, and the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, El-Baradei, have spoken out strongly in recent times for the absolute necessity of reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world to ZERO. It is not because of these men that we should call for abolition of weapons, it is simply an indication of how inescapable the logic has become. We literally have to choose between the Human Race and the Nuclear Arms Race. We cannot hold on to both.

Impacts – Racism – D-Rule

Racism must be rejected in every instance

Barndt 91 (co-director of Ministry Working to Dismantle Racism, *Dismantling Racism*, p. 155) jl

To study racism is to study walls. We have looked at barriers and fences, restraints and limitations, ghettos and prisons. The prison of racism confines us all, people of color and white people alike. It shackles the victimizer as well as the victim. The walls forcibly keep people of color and white people separate from each other; in our separate prisons we are all prevented from achieving the human potential God intends for us. The limitations imposed on people of color by poverty, subservience, and powerlessness are cruel, inhuman, and unjust; the effects of uncontrolled power, privilage, and greed, whicha are the marks of our white prison, will inevitably destroy us as well. But we have also seen that the walls of racism can be dismantled. We are not condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the vision and the possibility of freedom. Brick by brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual, institutional, and cultural racism can be destroyed. You and I are urgently called to joining the efforts of those who know it is time to tear down, once and for all, the walls of racism. The danger point of self-destruction seems to be drawing even more near. The results of centuries of national and worldwide conquest and colonialism, of military buildups and violent aggression, of overconsumption and environmental destruction may be reaching a point of no return. A small and predominantly white minority of the global population derives its power and privelage from the sufferings of vast majority of peoples of all color. For the sake of the world and ourselves, we dare not allow it to continue.

Impacts – Racism – Structural Violence

Racism causes structural violence for individuals globally

O'Neil 9 (Edward, M.D - Tufts, Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Perspectives, Volume 3, Number 1, Muse) jl

In summary, it is clear that through history the force of racism has worked on the international stage to elevate certain dominant groups over others, at times producing genocide, though most commonly inflicting damage more furtively through structural violence. The reallocation of the often scant resources this entails has direct implications for the health of those who receive less, in the form of lowered life expectancies, higher infant mortalities, and reduced access to potentially life-saving health care. Rather than stemming from the character deficiencies of any particular group, sources of disparity originate in the complex interplay of the economic, political, health, and social structures of a given society, themselves tracing origins to foreign conquest, slavery, and segregation.

We have a moral obligation to help others in the face of structural violence even if that leads to extinction.

Watson 77 (Richard, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University, World Hunger and Moral Obligation, p. 118-119)

These arguments are morally spurious. That food sufficient for well-nourished survival is the equal right of every human individual or nation is a specification of the higher principle that everyone has equal right to the necessities of life. The moral stress of the principle of equity is primarily on equal sharing, and only secondarily on what is being shared. The higher moral principle is of human *equity per se*. Consequently, the moral action is to distribute all food equally, whatever the consequences. This is the hard line apparently drawn by such moralists as Immanuel Kant and Noam Chomsky—but then, morality is hard. The conclusion may be unreasonable (impractical and irrational in conventional terms), but it is obviously moral. Nor should anyone purport surprise; it has always been understood that the claims of morality—if taken seriously—supersede those of conflicting reason. One may even have to sacrifice one’s life or one’s nation to be moral in situations where practical behavior would preserve it. For example, if a prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a (perhaps dead) patriot even when reason tells him that collaboration will hurt no one, he remains silent. Similarly, if one is to be moral, one distributes available food in equal shares (even if everyone then dies). That an action is necessary to save one’s life is no excuse for behaving unpatriotically or immorally if one wishes to be a patriot or moral. No principle of morality absolves one of behaving immorally simply to save one’s life or nation. There is a strict analogy here between adhering to moral principles for the sake of being moral, and adhering to Christian principles for the sake of being Christian. The moral world contains pits and lions, but one looks always to the highest light. The ultimate test always harks to the highest principle—recant or die—and it is pathetic to profess morality if one quits when the going gets rough. I have put aside many questions of detail—such as the mechanical problems of distributing food—because detail does not alter the stark conclusion. If every human life is equal in value, then the equal distribution of the necessities of life is an extremely high, if not the highest, moral duty. It is at least high enough to override the excuse that by doing it one would lose one’s life. But many people cannot accept the view that one must distribute equally even in f the nation collapses or all people die. If everyone dies, then there will be no realm of morality. Practically speaking, sheer survival comes first. One can adhere to the principle of equity only if one exists. So it is rational to suppose that the principle of survival is morally higher than the principle of equity. And though one might not be able to argue for unequal distribution of food to save a nation—for nations can come and go—one might well argue that unequal distribution is necessary for the survival of the human species. That is, some large group—say one-third of present world population—should be at least well-nourished for human survival. However, from an individual standpoint, the human species—like the nation—is of no moral relevance. From a naturalistic standpoint, survival does come first; from a moralistic standpoint—as indicated above—survival may have to be sacrificed. In the milieu of morality, it is immaterial whether or not the human species survives as a result of individual behavior.

Impacts – Racism – Genocide

Leads to genocide

Foucault 78 (Michel, Professor of philosophy at the college de france, *The History of Sexuality vol. 1*, p. 136-137) jl

Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. "Deduction " has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-administering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reversal of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death--and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits--now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many [people] to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiated them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle--that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living--has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the judicial existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

Impacts – Racism – Genocide

Racism culminates in genocide

Foucault 76 (Michel, Professor of philosophy at the college de france, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975-1976*, p. 254-258) jl

What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die. The appearance within the biological continuum of the human race of races, the distinction among races, the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as good and that others, in contrast, are described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls. It is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population. It is, in short, a way of establishing a biological type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain. This will allow power to treat that population as a mixture of races, or to be more accurate, to treat the species, to subdivide the species it controls, into the subspecies known, precisely, as races. That is the first function of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower. Racism also has a second function. Its role is, if you like, to allow the establishment of a positive relation of this type: "The more you kill, the more deaths you will cause" or "The very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more." I would say that this relation ("If you want to live, you must take lives, you must be able to kill") was not invented by either racism or the modern State. It is the relationship of war: "In order to live, you must destroy your enemies." But racism does make the relationship of war-"If you want to live, the other must die"-function in a way that is completely new and that is quite compatible with the exercise of biopower. On the one hand, racism makes it possible to establish a relationship between my life and the death of the other that is not a military or warlike relationship of confrontation, but a biological-type relationship: "The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I-as species rather than individual-can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous" I will be. I will be able to proliferate." The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer. This is not, then, a military, warlike, or political relationship, but a biological relationship. And the reason this mechanism can come into play is that the enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population. In the blopower system in other words, killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race. There is a direct connection between the two. In a normalizing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable. When you have a normalizing society, you have a power which is, at least superficially, in the first instance, or in the first line a blopower, and racism is the indispensable precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed. Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State. So you can understand the importance-I almost said the vital importance-of racism to the exercise of such a power: it is the precondition for exercising the right to kill. If the power of normalization wished to exercise the old sovereign right to kill, it must become racist. And if, conversely, a power of sovereignty, or in other words, a power that has the right of life and death, wishes to work with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it too must become racist. When I say "killing," I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder- the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on. War. How can one not only wage war on one's adversaries but also expose one's own citizens to war, and let them be killed by the million (and this is precisely what has been going on since the nineteenth century, or since the second half of the nineteenth century), except by activating the theme of racism? From this point onward, war is about two things: it is not simply a matter of destroying a political adversary, but of destroying the enemy race, of destroying that [sort] of biological threat that those people over there represent to our race. In one sense, this is of course no more than a biological extrapolation from the theme of the political enemy. But there is more to it than that. In the nineteenth century-and this is completely new-war will be seen not only as a way of improving one's own race by eliminating the enemy race (in accordance with the themes of natural selection and the struggle for existence), but also as a way of regenerating one's own race. As more and more of our number die, the race to which we belong will become all the purer. At the end of the nineteenth century, we have then a new racism modeled on war. It was, I think, required because a biopower that wished to wage war had to articulate the will to destroy the adversary with the risk that it might kill those whose lives it had, by definition, to protect, manage, and multiply. The same could be said of criminality. Once the mechanism of biopower was called upon to make it possible to execute or isolate criminals, criminality was conceptualized in racist terms. The same applies to madness, and the same applies to various abnormalities.

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Impacts – Racism – Genocide

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I think that, broadly speaking, racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population, insofar as one is an element in a unitary living plurality. You can see that, here, we are far removed from the ordinary racism that takes the traditional form of mutual contempt or hatred between races. We are also far removed from the racism that can be seen as a sort of ideoloical operation that allows States, or a class, to displace the hostility that is directed toward [them], or which is tormenting the social body, onto a mythical adversary. I think that this is something much deeper than an old tradition, much deeper than a new ideology, that it is something else. The specificity of modern racism, or what gives it its specificity, is not bound up with mentalities, ideologies, or the lies of power. It is bound up with the technique of power, with the technology of power. It is bound up with this, and that takes us as far away as possible from the race war and the intelligibility of history. We are dealing with a mechanism that allows biopower to work. So racism is bound up with the workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power. The juxtaposition of-or the way biopower functions through-the old sovereign power of life and death implies the workings, the introduction and activation, of racism. And it is, I think here that we find the actual roots of racism.

Impact Calc – Genocide

Moral obligation to prevent genocide

Rummel 6 (Rudolph, Prof. Pol. Science at u of Hawaii, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/DBG.CHA, 7/2/10) jl

Genocide is horrible, an abomination of our species, totally unacceptable. It is an obscenity, the evil of our time that all good people must work to eradicate. And at the core there is no doubt as to what this evil is—all recognize that the Nazi program to kill all Jews was genocide. Nor is there any doubt that the current Bosnian Serb massacre of Bosnian Moslems is genocide. But was genocide also the massacre of helpless villagers in the Sudan by government forces fighting a rebellion, the Indonesian army purge of communists, the assassination of political opponents by the Nationalist government on Formosa, the "land-refom" executions of landlords in the Soviet Union, or the rapid death of inmates in Vietnamese reeducation camps? What about non-killing which has been called genocide, such as the absorption of one culture by another, the disease spread to natives by contact with colonists, the forced deportation of a people, or African slavery?

Genocide must be prevented at all costs, its corporate nature makes it morally worse than extinction

Lang 3 (Berel, Prof Philosophy Wesleyan U, Act and idea in the Nazi genocide, p. 12-13) jl

 A number of further questions arise in connection with the act of genocide, in particular with the status of its agents. That genocide entails the intended destruction of a group does not by itself imply that the destruction must itself be the act of a group; but the extent of actions required by any design for genocide is so broad as virtually to ensure that the purpose will involve corporate decisions and effort. Admittedly, the same technological advances (in communications, for example) that make genocide as a collective action increasingly possible also increase the likelihood that an individual acting alone could initiate such actions. (When the push of a single button can produce immeasurable catastrophic effects, we discover the possibility of an order of destruction beyond genocide as well: “omnicide.”) But it is also clear that the opprobrium attending the term “genocide” comes in part from its connotation of a corporate action - as if the same act or set of acts would be a lesser fault, easier to understand or even excuse, if a single person rather than a group were responsible, with the connection of the latter (we suppose)to a public moral code and to decisions that would have had to be made or supported collectively. The fact of corporate responsibility sometimes diminish the enormity of an action, as when the difficulty of assigning specific responsibility gives to the action a vagueness of reference similar to that of a natural or otherwise impersonal force. But the almost necessarily corporate origins of genocide seem rather to accentuate its moral enormity, multiplying the individual acts of consciousness that would have been required to produce the larger corporate act.

No Impact – Epistemology

Their prolif impacts are informed by an epistemology of uncertainty which reifies their ethical imagery – Be skeptical of their ev.

Massumi, 7 (Brian, professor in the Communication Department at the Université de Montréal, “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption”, 10:2, p. Project Muse TBC 6/30/10)

Preemption shares many characteristics with deterrence. Like deterrence, it operates in the present on a future threat. It also does this in such as way as to make that present futurity the motor of its process. The process, however, is qualitatively different. For one thing, the epistemology is unabashedly one of uncertainty, and not due to a simple lack of knowledge. There is uncertainty because the threat has not only not yet fully formed but, according to Bush's opening definition of preemption, it has not yet even emerged. In other words, the threat is still indeterminately in potential. This is an ontological premise: the nature of threat cannot be specified. It might in some circumstances involve weapons of mass destruction, but in others it will not. It might come in the form of strange white power, or then again it might be an improvised explosive device. The enemy is also unspecifiable. It might come from without, or rise up unexpectedly from within. You might expect the enemy to be a member of a certain ethnic or religious group, an Arab or a Moslem, but you can never be sure. It might turn out be a white Briton wearing sneakers, or a Puerto Rican from the heartland of America (to mention just two well-known cases, those of John Reid and Jose Padilla). It might be an anonymous member of a cell, or the supreme leader of a "rogue" state. The lack of knowledge about the nature of the threat can never be overcome. It is part of what defines the objective conditions of the situation: threat has become proteiform and it tends to proliferate unpredictably. The situation is objectively one in which the only certainty is that threat will emerge where it is least expected. This is because what is ever-present is not a particular threat or set of threats, but the potential for still more threats to emerge without warning. The global situation is not so much threatening as threat generating: threat-o-genic. It is the world's capacity to produce new threats at any and every moment that defines this situation. We are in a world that has passed from what "the Architect" called the "known unknown" (uncertainty that can be analyzed and identified) to the "unknown unknown" (objective uncertainty). Objective uncertainty is as directly an ontological category as an epistemological one. The threat is known to have the ontological status of indeterminate potentiality. The unknown unknown is unexpungeable because its potentiality belongs to the objective conditions of life today. Consequently, no amount of effort to understand will ever bring a definitive answer. Thinking about it will only reopen the same uncomprehending question: "why do they hate us so"? This question, asked over and over again by the US media since 9-11, expresses the impossibility of basing a contemporary logic of conflict on a psychological premise. The nature and motives of the adversary strike us as purely incomprehensible. The only hypothesis left is that they are just plain "evil," capable of the worst "crimes against humanity." They are simply "inhuman." The only way to identify the enemy collectively is as an "axis of evil." That characterization does not add new knowledge. It is the moral equivalent of ignorance. Its function is to concentrate "humanity" entirely on one side in order to legitimate acts on "our" side that would be considered crimes against humanity were the enemy given the benefit of being considered human (torture, targeting civilian populations, contraventions of human rights and the laws of war). The ostensibly moral judgment of "evil" functions very pragmatically as a device for giving oneself unlimited tactical options freed from moral constraint. This is the only sense in which something like deterrence continues to function: moral judgment is used in such a way as to deter any properly moral or ethical logic from becoming operative. The operative logic will function on an entirely different plane.

Alternative – Rejection

Rejection reframes the debate around the perspective of the oppressed solving nuclear racism

Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 38)

These conclusions hold two implications for 'critical' security studies. First of all, the exploration of the metaphors underlying policy will form an important part of a general project of critique, understood as revealing the power relations hidden by security relations. Those power relations are masked by the metaphorical understandings of the images of security, and so to reveal them, the images must themselves be revealed. Secondly, the impulse to critique is rooted in a political stance opposed to the dominant powers, and thus supporting the struggles of the oppressed. In order to create alternative security policies from the perspective of the oppressed, the present argument suggests the need first to construct images of security problems which privilege their interests, rather than those of the dominant powers—(DIS)ARMAMENT rather than PROLIFERATION, for example.

Alternative – Rejection

Only by rejecting our current assumptions do we open up the possibility of a world without nuclear weapons

Gusterson 99 (Hugh, professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University. His expertise is in nuclear culture, international security, and the anthropology of science, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Stan-PS-314-2009-Q1\_PNP/Syllabus/EReadings/Gusterson1999Nuclear.pdf, AD: 6/29/10) jl

This article has critiqued policy talk grounded in an unsustainable binary opposition between nations that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and nations that cannot-an opposition that can be found in some antinuclear as well as establishment discourse in the West. I do not want to minimize the potential dangers of nuclear proliferation, which are, surely, clear enough. I do want to argue that these dangers, such as they are, should not be spoken about in terms that demean the peoples of the Third World. Nor should they be represented in ways that obscure both the dangers inherent in the continued maintenance of our own nuclear arsenals and the fact that our own actions are often a source of the instabilities we so fear in Third World nations. So, where does this leave us? This article has set out to critique not a particular policy but the way our conversations about policy choices on the nuclear issue may unthinkingly incorporate certain neocolonial hierarchies and assumptions that, when drawn to our attention, many of us would disown. Nor is this just a matter of policing language, for the embedded orientalist assumptions I have been critiquing here underpin a global security regime that sanctifies a particular kind of Western military dominance in the world. Because I have set out to criticize a particular kind of policy talk rather than a specific policy, I will conclude not with a prescribed policy but by suggesting that there are three different discursive positions on proliferation, each pointing in the direction of a very different global security regime, that do not embody the double standard I have been concerned to criticize here. I call then1 "exclusion," "participation," and "renunciation." The strategy of exclusion is based pragmatically in the conventions of realpolitik. It involves the candid declaration that, while nuclear weapons may be no more dangerous in the hands of Muslims or Hindus than in those of Christians, they are a prerogative of power, and the powerful have no intention of allowing the powerless to acquire them. This is a position that, in its rejection of easy racism and phony moralism, is at least honorable in its frankness. It is the position of New York Times columnist Flora Lewis in her remark that "the 'rights' of nations are limited, and the limits must be imposed by those who can. They may not be more virtuous, but they must strive for it. That is the reason to keep insisting on nonproliferation" (1990:23). The second position, participation, is based on Kenneth Waltz's argument that all countries benefit from acquiring nuclear weapons. This position may have more appeal in certain parts of the Third World than in the West. It is the position of India, Israel, and Pakistan, for example, who have, like the older nuclear nations, sought to maximize their power and freedom by acquiring a nuclear capability. These countries pursued nuclear weapons in search of greater security vis-a-vis regional rivals and out of a desire to shift the balance of power in their client relationships with the superpowers. 134 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY The third strategy would be renunciation. This strategy breaks down the distinctions we have constructed between "us" and "them" and asks whether nuclear weapons are safe in anyone's hands. "What-must-on-no-account-beknown," says Salman Rushdie, is the "impossible verity that savagery could be concealed beneath decency's well-pressed shirt" (1984:219). Our orientalist discourse on nuclear proliferation is one of our ways not to know this. By breaking down the discourse, confronting those parts of our own personality and culture which appear as the childish, irrational, lawless, or feminine aspects of the Other, we could address our doubts about ourselves instead of harping continually on our doubts about others. Then we might accept that "the fact that we urge other nations not to depend on nuclear weapons in this way-­­and urge very strenuously-suggests that we have mixed feelings about how safe they make us" (Ground Zero 1982:221). This acceptance would lead us to the same conclusion reached by George Kennan, former ambassador to the Soviet Union and the originator of the policy of containment in the Cold War: I see the danger not in the number or quality of the weapons or in the intentions of those who hold them but in the very existence of weapons of this nature, regardless of whose hands they are in. I believe that unless we consent to recognize that the nuclear weapons we hold in our hands are as much a danger to us as those that repose in the hands of our supposed adversaries there will be no escape from the confusions and dilemmas to which such weapons have brought us, and must bring us increasingly as time goes on. For this reason, I see no solution to the problem other than the complete elimination of these and all other weapons of mass destruction from national arsenals; and the sooner we move toward that solution, and the greater courage we show in doing so, the safer we will be. [1981:62, quoted in Lichterman, Cabasso, and Burroughs 1995:22-231

Alt Solves – Orientalism

Redepiction of weapons is key to solve their elimination

Gusterson 6 (Hugh, MIT Center for International Studies, “A Double Standard on Nuclear Weapons?” http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/gusterson\_audit.pdf TBC 6/29/10)

The third position, renunciation, breaks down the distinctions we have constructed between “us” and “them” and asks whether nuclear weapons are safe in anyone’s hands. “What-must-on-no-account-be-known,” says Salman Rushdie, is the “impossible verity that savagery could be concealed beneath decency’s well-pressed shirt.” Our orientalist discourse on nuclear proliferation is one of our ways not to know this. This position has been nicely articulated by the late George Kennan: I see the danger not in the number or quality of the weapons or in the intentions of those who hold them but in the very existence of weapons of this nature, regardless of whose hands they are in. ... I see no solution to the problem other than the complete elimination of these and all other weapons of mass destruction from national arsenals; and the sooner we move toward that solution, and the greater courage we show in doing so, the safer we will be.20

Framing – Reps Key

Representation of proliferation shape policy

Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 4-5)

'Proliferation' appears to have been developed as a central image in the new international security agenda in the time between Krauthammer's article and the recent NATO summit. The spur to the construction of this image was the war in the Gulf. In the first section of this paper, I trace the construction of the image of proliferation in the pronouncements and practices of the Western states following the Gulf War. This image of proliferation as a security problem is, as Krauthammer noted, a perception of the state of the world. That perception is a metaphorical one, as the image of a security problem which is created is grounded in metaphor. In the second section I discuss the nature of image and metaphor as they relate to the constitution of international security. Finally, I examine the particular metaphors of the proliferation image, in order to show how they shape the understanding of a problem, and the policy solutions which are developed in response.

Representations of proliferation inform policy

Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 14)

The international security environment is thus being reimagined. The image which guided international security policy and scholarship during the Cold War has given way to a new image centred on 'proliferation'. This image is informing both policy and academic debate, and is found reflected in the instruments and institutions of international arms control and security, as well as in the written record of the academy. What are the implications of this image? How can we understand the way in which this image informs policy, reshaping instruments, institutions and even interests? The images of security comprise a number of metaphors, which shape our thinking about problems and solutions—in the present case, the metaphors of 'proliferation', 'stability' and its related metaphor 'balance'. In order to consider the role that image plays in international security, it is necessary to appreciate the way in which metaphors constitute our understandings, and thereby inform the conception we hold of a policy problem, and the solutions we develop to address those problems.

Representations of security are not objective reality

Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 21)

Finally, to understand my claim that the process detailed above is indeed a 'reimagining', consider the role of the superpowers in creating in the first place the problem now identified as proliferation. The huge regional arsenals (now called 'destabilising accumulations') were in large part the creation of the two superpowers' providing their friends and allies in different regional conflicts—'proxies' in the language of the Cold War. As we have seen, the Middle East is the region of primary concern, and yet here the states which are the most problematic are the ones armed by the US and the USSR ) Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Iran.46 It is only with the breakdown of this conceptual system that 'proliferation' was broadened beyond the narrow field of nuclear weapons to encompass "nuclear, chemical and biological weapons", and their "missile delivery systems", as well as "destabilizing accumulations of advanced conventional weapons".

Framing – Reps Key

Metaphoric reasoning shapes our understanding of nuclear weapons

Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 15-16)

Paul Chilton has provided a useful example of the role of metaphor in shaping understandings in international relations, particularly concerning the Cold War discourses around nuclear weapons and the relationship of 'the West' to 'the Soviet Union'. In doing so, he illustrates how the metaphor naturalises a policy, and the apparent interests underlying it—in this case, the central security policy of Cold War Europe. Chilton works with the example of a fairly common speech from the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, John Nott. Nott used a metaphor of 'a dying giant' to argue that there is a possibility of the Soviet Union attacking Western Europe in order to defend the 'peace through strength' policy of then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and her American mentor Ronald Reagan. As Chilton notes, "What Nott wants to do, it seems, is to assert the likelihood of Russia attacking Europe." On the basis of such an assertion, 'proven' through the analogical reasoning of metaphor, the government can justify a policy of military hostility, to insure against the lashing out of a dying giant.35

Metaphors set up by policy makers and students structure the way policy can approach a problem

Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 16)

Chilton argues that policy makers address problems by means of what I have called 'images'36—that is, the student or policy maker constructs a metaphorical image of problem, an issue or even other actors.37 This image relates the thing being imagined to another, in terms of which the first is understood. These images comprise metaphors, which are used to structure and support our understanding of a problem, and therefore our response to the problem. In Chilton's example, the key relationship is the support the image and its metaphors provide for pre-existing policy. His political concern is with the bellicose nuclear strategy pursued by the Western Alliance, and the consequent danger of nuclear 'war' that the governments foist on the people of Europe and North America through the metaphors supporting the image of the Soviet Union. However, the general relationships between the image of a policy problem, the condition of the problem itself and the policy solution to that problem allow the ideas he develops to be given wider scope than Chilton provides. The metaphors entailed by a given image do more than simply support a policy choice, they structure the way in which the image holder can think about a problem, and so shape that choice in the first place.

A2: Countries Too Poor For Nukes

Double standard – every argument against proliferation is an argument against the West having nuclear weapons as well.

Gusterson 99 (Hugh, professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University. His expertise is in nuclear culture, international security, and the anthropology of science, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Stan-PS-314-2009-Q1\_PNP/Syllabus/EReadings/Gusterson1999Nuclear.pdf, AD: 6/29/10) jl

1. Third World Countries Are Too Poor to Afford Nuclear Weapons It is often said that it is inappropriate for Third World countries to squander money on nuclear (or conventional) weapons when they have such pressing problems of poverty, hunger, and homelessness on which the money might more appropriately be spent. Western disapprobation of Third World military spending was particularly marked when India conducted its "peaceful nuclear explosion" in May 1974. At the time one Washington official, condemning India for having the wrong priorities, was quoted as saying, "I don't see how this is going to grow more rice" (New York Times 1974x8). The next day the New York Times picked up the theme in its editorial page: The more appropriate reaction [to the nuclear test] would be one of despair that such great talent and resources have been squandered on the vanity of power, while 600 million Indians slip deeper into poverty. The sixth member of the nuclear club may be passing the begging bowl before the year is out because Indian science and technology so far have failed to solve the country's fundamental problems of food and population. [New York Times 1974bl Similar comments were made after India's nuclear tests of 1998. Mary McGrory, for example, wrote in her column in the Wushington Post that "two large, poor countries in desperate need of schools, hospitals, and education are strewing billions of dollars for nuclear development" (1998b:Cl); and Rupert Cornwell, writing in the British Independent, said that "a country as poor as India should not be wasting resources on weapons that might only tempt a preemptive strike by an adversary; it is economic lunacy" (1998:9). Such statements are not necessarily wrong, but, read with a critical eye, they have a recursive effect that potentially undermines the rationale for military programs in the West as well. First, one can interrogate denunciations of profligate military spending in the Third World by pointing out that Western countries, despite their own extravagant levels of military spending, have by no means solved their own social and economic problems. The United States, for example, which allots 4 percent of its GNP (over $250 billion per year) to military spending against India's 2.8 percent (Gokhale 1996), financed the arms race of the 1980s by accumulating debt-its own way of passing the begging bowl-at a rate of over $200 billion each year. Meanwhile in America advocates for the homeless estimate that 2 million Americans have nowhere to live,' and another 36 million Americans live below the official poverty line (Mattern 1998). The infant mortality rate is lower for black children in Botswana than for those in the United States (Edelman 1991). As any observant pedestrian in the urban United States knows, it is not only Indians who need to beg. Second, American taxpayers have consistently been told that nuclear weapons are a bargain compared with the cost of conventional weapons. They give "more bang for the buck." If this is true for "us," then surely it is also true for "them": if a developing nation has security concerns, then a nuclear weapon ought to be the cheapest way to take care of them (Rathjens 1982:267). Third, critics of U.S. military spending have been told for years that military spending stimulates economic development and produces such beneficial economic spin-offs that it almost pays for itself. If military Keynesianism works for "us," it is hard to see why it should not also work for "them." And indeed, "Indian decision-makers have perceived high investments in nuclear research as a means to generate significant long-term industrial benefits in electronics, mining, metallurgy and other non-nuclear sectors of the economy" (Potter 1982: 157). In other words, "they" may use the same legitimating arguments as "we" do on behalf of nuclear weapons. The arguments we use to defend our weapons could as easily be used to defend theirs. We can only argue otherwise by using a double standard.

A2: Deterrence Fails in 3rd World Countries

Their warrants are contrived – most deterrence structures of other countries would be more stable

Gusterson 99 (Hugh, professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University. His expertise is in nuclear culture, international security, and the anthropology of science, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Stan-PS-314-2009-Q1\_PNP/Syllabus/EReadings/Gusterson1999Nuclear.pdf, AD: 6/29/10) jl

During the Cold War Americans were told that nuclear deterrence prevented the smoldering enmity between the superpowers from bursting into the full flame of war, saving millions of lives by making conventional war too dangerous. When the practice of deterrence was challenged by the antinuclear movement of the 1980s, Pentagon officials and defense intellectuals warned us that nuclear disarmament would just make the world safe for conventional war.' Surely, then, we should want countries such as Pakistan, India, Iraq, and Israel also to enjoy the stabilizing benefits of nuclear weapons. This is, in fact, precisely the argument made by the father of the Pakistani bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan. He said at apress conference in 1998, alluding to the fact that Pakistan had a nuclear capability for many years before its actual nuclear tests, "The nuclear weapon is a peace guarantor. It gave peace to Europe, it gave peace to us. . . . I believe my work has saved this country for the last twenty years from many wars" (NNI-News 1998). Western security specialists and media pundits have argued, on the other hand, that deterrence as practiced by the superpowers during the Cold War may not work in Third World settings because Third World adversaries tend to share common borders and because they lack the resources to develop secure second-strike capabilities. On closer examination these arguments, plausible enough at first, turn out to be deeply problematic, especially in their silences about the risks of deterrence as practiced by the superpowers. I shall take them in turn. First, there is the argument that deterrence may not work for countries, such as India and Pakistan, that share a common border and can therefore attack one another very quickly.10A s one commentator put it, In the heating conflict between India and Pakistan, one of the many dangers to be reckoned with is there would be no time for caution. While it would have taken more than a half-hour for a Soviet-based nuclear missile to reach the United States-time at least for America to double-check its computer screen or use the hotline-the striking distance between India and Pakistan is no more than five minutes. That is not enough time to confirm a threat or even think twice before giving the order to return fire, and perhaps mistakenly incinerate an entire nation. [Lev 1998:A19] This formulation focuses only on the difference in missile flight times while ignoring other countervailing differences in missile configurations that would make deterrence in South Asia look more stable than deterrence as practiced by the superpowers. Such a view overlooks the fact that the missiles deployed by the two superpowers were, by the end of the Cold War, MIRVed and extraordinarily accurate. MIRVed missiles-those equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles-carry several warheads, each capable of striking a different target. The MX, for example, was designed to carry ten warheads, each capable of landing within 100 feet of a separate target. The unprecedented accuracy of the MX, together with the fact that one MX missile could-in theory at least-destroy ten Soviet missiles, made it, as some arms controllers worried at the time, a destabilizing weapon that, together with its Russian counterparts, put each superpower in a "use-it-or-lose-it" situation whereby it would have to launch its missiles immediately if it believed itself under attack. Thus, once one adds accuracy and MIRVing to the strategic equation, the putative contrast between stable deterrence in the West and unstable deterrence in South Asia looks upside down, even if one were to grant the difference in flight times between the Cold War superpowers and between the main adversaries in South Asia. But there is no reason to grant the alleged difference in flight times. Lev says that it would have taken "more than half an hour" for American and Russian missiles to reach their targets during the Cold War (1998:A19). While this was more or less true for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), it was not true for the submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) the superpowers moved in against each other's coasts; these were about ten minutes of flight time from their targets. Nor was it true of the American Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey, right up against the Soviet border, in the early 1960s. Nor was it true of the Pershing 11s deployed in Germany in the 1980s. When the antinuclear movement claimed that it was destabilizing to move the Pershings to within less than ten minutes of flight time of Moscow, the U.S. government insisted that anything that strengthened NATO's attack capability strengthened nuclear deterrence. Here again one sees a double standard in the arguments made to legitimate "our" nuclear weapons. Finally, even if we were to accept that the superpowers would have half-an hour's warning against five minutes for countries in South Asia, to think that this matters is to be incited to a discourse based on the absurd premise that there is any meaningful difference between half an hour and five minutes for a country that believes itself under nuclear attack (see Foucault 1980a: ch. 1). While half an hour does leave more time to verify warnings of an attack, would any sane national leadership feel any safer irrevocably launching nuclear weapons against an adversary in half an hour rather than five minutes? In either case, the time frame for decision making is too compressed.

A2: Deterrence Fails in 3rd World Countries

This boils down to an argument about culturally psychology – concluding deterrence fails is a mask for racial exclusion

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In other words, the argument about missile flight times, quite apart from the fact that it misrepresents the realities of deterrence between the superpowers, is a red herring. What really matters is not the geographical proximity of the adversarial nations but, rather, their confidence that each could survive an attack by the other with some sort of retaliatory capability. Many analysts have argued that newly nuclear nations with small arsenals would lack a secure second-strike capability. Their nuclear weapons would therefore invite rather than deter a preemptive or preventive attack, especially in acrisis. Thus the New York Times editorialized that "unlike the superpowers, India and Pakistan will have small, poorly protected nuclear stocks. No nation in that situation can be sure that its weapons could survive a nuclear attack" (1998: 14). Similarly, British defense analyst Jonathan Power has written that "superpower theorists have long argued that stability is not possible unless there is an assured second-strike capability. . . . Neither India and [sic]Pakistan have the capability, as the superpowers did, to develop and build such a second-strike capability" (1997:29). This argument has been rebutted by Kenneth Waltz (1982, 1995a, 1995b), a leading political scientist seen as a maverick for his views on nuclear proliferation. Waltz, refusing the binary distinction at the heart of the dominant discourse, suggests that horizontal nuclear proliferation could bring about what he calls "nuclear peace" in troubled regions of the globe just as, in his view, it stabilized the superpower relationship. Waltz argues that, although the numbers of weapons are different, the general mathematical principle of deterrence-the appalling asymmetry of risk and reward-remains the same and may even, perversely, work more effectively in new nuclear nations. Waltz points out that it would take very few surviving nuclear weapons to inflict "unacceptable damage" on a Third World adversary: "Do we expect to lose one city or two, two cities or ten? When these are the pertinent questions, we stop thinking about running risks and start thinking about how to avoid then]" (1 995x8). Waltz argues that, while a first strike would be fraught with terrifying uncertainties in any circumstances, the discussion of building secure retaliatory capabilities in the West has tended, ethnocentrically, to focus on the strategies the superpowers employed to do so: building vast arsenals at huge expense on land, at sea, and in the air. But Third World countries have cheaper, more low-tech options at their disposal too: "Nuclear warheads can be fairly small and light, and they are easy to hide and to move. People worry about terrorists stealing nuclear warheads because various states have so many of them. Everybody seems to believe that terrorists are capable of hiding bombs. Why should states be unable to do what terrorist gangs are thought to be capable of?" (Waltz 1995a: 19). Waltz (1982, 1995a) also points out that Third World states could easily and cheaply confuse adversaries by deploying dummy nuclear weapons, and he reminds readers that the current nuclear powers (with the exception of the United States) all passed through and survived phases in their own nuclear infancy when their nuclear arsenals were similarly small and vulnerable. The discourse on proliferation assumes that the superpowers' massive interlocking arsenals of highly accurate MIRVed missiles deployed on hair-trigger alert and designed with first-strike capability backed by global satellite capability was stable and that the small, crude arsenals of new nuclear nations would be unstable, but one could quite plausibly argue the reverse. Indeed, as mentioned above, by the 1980s a number of analysts in the West were concerned that the MIRVing of missiles and the accuracy of new guidance systems were generating increasing pressure to strike first in a crisis. Although the strategic logic might be a little different, they saw temptations to preempt at the high end of the nuclear social system as well as at the low end (Aldridge 1983; Gray and Payne 1980; Scheer 1982). There were also concerns (explored in more detail below) that the complex computerized early-warning systems with which each superpower protected its weapons were generating false alarms that might lead to accidental war (Blair 1993; Sagan 1993). Thus one could argue-as former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1986) and a number of others have-that deterrence between the United States and Russia would be safer and more stable if each side replaced their current massive strategic arsenals with a small force of about one hundred nuclear weapons-about the size India's nuclear stockpile is believed to be, as it happens. Further, Bruce Blair (Blair, Feiveson, and von Hippel 1997), a former missile control officer turned strategic analyst, and Stansfield Turner ( 1997), a former CIA director, have suggested that the readiness posture of American and Russian nuclear forces makes them an accident waiting to happen. The United States and Russia, they argue, would be safer if they stored their warheads separate from their delivery vehicles-as, it so happens, India and Pakistan do." In the words of Scott Sagan, a political scientist and former Pentagon official concerned about U.S. nuclear weapons safety, The United States should not try to make new nuclear nations become like the superpowers during the Cold War, with large arsenals ready to launch at a moment's notice for the sake of deterrence; instead, for the sake of safety. the United States and Russia should try to become more like some of the nascent nuclear states, maintaining very small nuclear capabilities. with weapons components separated and located apart from the delivery systems, and with civilian organizations controlling the warheads. [Sagan 1995:90-91]12 Given, as I have shown, that the crisis stability of large nuclear arsenals can also be questioned and that it is not immediately self-evident why the leader of, say, India today should feel any more confident that he would not lose a city or two in a preemptive strike on Pakistan than his U.S. counterpart would in attacking Russia, I want to suggest that an argument that appears on the surface to be about numbers and configurations of weapons is really, when one looks more closely, about the psychology and culture of people. Put simply, the dominant discourse assumes that leaders in the Third World make decisions differently than their counterparts in the West: that they are more likely to take risks, gambling millions of lives, or to make rash and irresponsible calculations.

\*A2: Prolif K\*

Solves – Prolif Epistemology Solves

The support of scholars is critical to the success of non-proliferation

KRAUSE 7 (JOACHIM, IR-Christian-Albrechts U., *International Affairs* 83: 3 (2007) 483–499 http://www.politik.uni-kiel.de/publikationen/krause/krauseenlightenment.pdf TBC 6/29/10)

It is no secret that the political agenda of arms control and, in particular, of nuclear non-proliferation has been influenced over the past four decades by the school of liberal arms control. This epistemic community has defined the basic tenets of international arms control and non-proliferation politics. It encompasses not only scholars and researchers, but also a large number of diplomats, politicians, bureaucrats and journalists. Members of this school have shaped US arms control policy since the 1960s, many experts from that community having served various US administrations. But the group has also found adherents outside the United States. International arms control diplomacy has been to a great extent the result of diligent and devoted eff orts by liberal arms controllers from several parts of the world. Without this epistemic community, international arms control and nonproliferation efforts would not have been so successful.

NPT/Arms Control Good

Their argument is premised on 3 faulty assumptions – Arms control agreements have done more good than bad

Yost 7 (David, Naval Postgraduate School Associate Professor, Former DOD Official, Woodrow Wilson International Center Security Studies Fellow, John Hopkins Visiting Scholar, Int'l Affairs, 83.3, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/news/view/-/id/370/, AD: 6/30/10) jl

Applying the method of enlightenment correctly to the area of nuclear nonproliferation would require a major effort to critically evaluate ideologies. Liberal arms control-despite its many successes and merits-has devised over the years a whole set of ideological tenets and attitudes. Some of them have been transformed into beliefs that could be termed myths. The most prominent ideological myth of the liberal arms control school is the notion that the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT) was in essence a disarmament agreement, not a non-proliferation treaty. To depict the negotiations as a premeditated effort of enlightenment, here the governments of this world came together to solemnly decide that some of them would be allowed to have some nuclear weapons for an interim period while the others would renounce their possession immediately, is pure. It would be equally wrong to qualify the 'grand bargain' as one between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots. Another myth of the liberal arms control school is the notion that-in order to gain support for the NPT-the superpowers had altered their nuclear weapons strategy in the 1960s. Again, this contention is not borne out by the development of nuclear strategies and doctrines. The third myth is the contention that there was an abrupt shift in US non-proliferation policy as George W. Bush came into power. The major changes in US non-proliferation policy had already started during the Clinton administration and some of them can be traced back to the tenure of President George W. H. Bush senior. They all rejected the changed international environment and represented necessary adjustments of the non-proliferation strategy. The Clinton administration left some of the traditional paths of arms control and rightly undertook some changes that were necessary because traditional instruments of arms control were no longer adequate. The Bush administration continued that policy, but in a more radical way.

Universal vision or bounded rationality?

William Walker's article takes a strongly universalist view of the requirements of nuclear order. It finds recent American administrations deliberately unwilling to maintain international confidence in the necessary collective narrative of eventual universal nuclear disarmament, so causing a crisis of confidence in the Non Proliferation Treaty regime. This commentary examines how far realistically different recent US policies and declarations could have avoided such problems, given certain underlying realities and dynamics surrounding the management of nuclear weapons. It also questions how indispensable abstract universalism will be in containing future nuclear proliferation.

Enlightenment in the second nuclear age

The debate on nuclear proliferation has become increasingly polarized. While there is widespread agreement on the perilous state of the traditional non-proliferation regime, the analyses of the causes differ widely. The liberal arms control community has sought to salvage the eroding non-proliferation regime both by overplaying its importance ('nuclear enlightenment') as well as by blaming the policies of the nuclear weapons states, notably the United States. However, this view rests on several assumptions that have been increasingly revealed as myths: the myth of a universal non-proliferation norm generated largely by the Nonproliferation Treaty; the myth of a direct relationship between nuclear reductions and proliferation; and the myth of US policy being a cause of, rather than a reaction to, the non-proliferation crisis. Clinging to these myths is counterproductive, as it seeks to perpetuate old policies at the expense of new approaches. However, new approaches to non-proliferation are bound to gain in importance, even if they run counter to established arms control dogmas.

NPT/Arms Control Good

Arms control agreements although not perfect have led to incremental reforms that make the world safer

Yost 7 (David, Naval Postgraduate School Associate Professor, Former DOD Official, Woodrow Wilson International Center Security Studies Fellow, John Hopkins Visiting Scholar, Int'l Affairs, 83.3, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/news/view/-/id/370/, AD: 6/30/10) jl

'All the king's men'? Refashioning global order

Is the moment auspicious, as William Walker has argued, for a rebirth of the world nuclear ordering project? An auspicious moment would be marked by three key factors. First, the United States would seek to assert significant leadership and moreover would be able to do so on a sustained, bipartisan basis. Second, other actors essential to the project would be ready to lend their thinking and power to this effort. Third, a few key ideas about the management of the emerging challenges of deterrence and abstinence would have emerged and garnered substantial international support. All three factors are lacking today. But the time will come. To accelerate the arrival of the necessary vision and will, the policy and analytical communities should set some priorities and focus on a few hard problems.

Towards an NPT-restrained world that makes economic sense

Because most of the world's proliferators have used the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty's (NPT) call on nations to 'share the benefits of the applications of peaceful nuclear energy' to help justify their nuclear activities, it is unclear just how much any proliferator ultimately has been restrained by these rules. This needs to change but is unlikely, unless the NPT's qualifications on the right to 'peaceful' nuclear energy are read in a much more restrictive fashion to only authorize nuclear projects that are clearly beneficial economically and that truly can be safeguarded against diversion to make bombs. In this regard, our best hope is that, as nations consider how to prevent global warming, they might adopt clear economic guidelines that would compel all energy projects-both nuclear and non-nuclear-to compete economically against one another on a much more level playing field. This would make dangerous, uneconomical nuclear projects far less likely to be pursued, and a centering of the world's security on a proper reading of the NPT much more likely and sustainable. Indeed, unless economic discipline of this sort is attempted internationally, it is quite likely that the continued implementation of the current egregious view of the NPT will only serve to accelerate nuclear proliferation more rapidly than if there was no NPT at all.

Analysing international nuclear order

William Walker's article, 'Nuclear enlightenment and counter-enlightenment', raises fundamental questions about the history of efforts to construct order in international politics in relation to nuclear arms and weapons-related capabilities. However, Walker's 'enlightenment' and 'counter-enlightenment' tropes are clumsy and unsatisfactory tools for analysing contemporary policies concerning nuclear deterrence, non-proliferation and disarmament. Walker holds that in the 1960s and 1970s most of the governments of the world came together in pursuit of 'a grand enlightenment project'. This thesis cannot withstand empirical scrutiny with regard to its three main themes-a supposed US-Soviet consensus on doctrines of stabilizing nuclear deterrence through mutual vulnerability, a notion that the NPT derived from 'concerted efforts to construct an international nuclear order meriting that title', and the view that the NPT embodied a commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament. Walker's criticisms of US nuclear policies since the late 1990s are in several cases overstated or ill-founded. Walker also exaggerates the potential influence of the United States over the policies of other countries. It is partly for this reason that the challenges at hand-both analytical and practical-are more complicated and difficult than his article implies. His work nonetheless has the great merit of raising fundamental questions about international political order.

No Impact – Doesn’t Turn Case – Prolif

Alt Cause – National Pride

Bowman 8 (Bradley L. CFR International Affairs Fellow The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran TBC 7/2/10)

In addition to Iran’s desire for security, national pride and prestige apparently play a major role in Iran’s long-term motivation to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. This is not surprising; nonproliferation scholarship has long identified national pride and prestige as major motivators for pursuing nuclear weapons. For example, these factors played a significant role in the nuclear ‘‘roll forward’’ decisions of Argentina, Brazil, France, India, Indonesia, Libya, and Romania. Today, the fact that five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council also represent the acknowledged nuclear powers under the NPT reinforces the idea that nuclear weapons are a prerequisite to great power status. The fact that several nuclear powers appear to attach great worth to their nuclear programs ‘‘reinforces just how important these weapons can be as sources of power and prestige.’’19

Alt Cause – Domestic Politics

Bowman 8 (Bradley L. CFR International Affairs Fellow The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran TBC 7/2/10)

In addition to the prestige and national pride projected internationally, Iran’s nuclear program has served a useful domestic purpose for the regime in Tehran. Ahmadinejad ran for office on an essentially populist platform, promising various economic reforms. For the most part, Ahmadinejad has been unable to deliver on these promises. In fact, the Iranian economy continues to suffer from spiraling unemployment and inflation. In April 2008, the outgoing Iranian economy minister blamed Ahmadinejad for the country’s economic woes.24 Suggesting the degree of frustration that exists in Iran regarding the economy, 50 leading economists, risking regime retribution, published a harshly worded letter to Ahmadinejad decrying high unemployment and inflation in Iran.25 By focusing on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, Ahmadinejad has attempted to shift attention away from his economic failures and promote a degree of unity and regime support that would not otherwise exist due to the country’s economic woes. For Ahmadinejad, to a significant extent, the confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program has served to unify the Iranian people around themes of ‘‘Persian pride’’ and to distract them from his economic shortcomings.

Alt Cause – Security Concerns

Bowman 8 (Bradley L. CFR International Affairs Fellow The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran TBC 7/2/10)

An Iranian desire for security appears to drive long-term Iranian interest in obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. One need not delve into the long history of British, Russian, and American involvement in Iran to appreciate the Iranian desire for security from foreign intervention in domestic affairs. In just the last three decades, Iraq invaded Iran, the United States encircled Iran by invading Iraq and Afghanistan, and the United States threatened Tehran with regime change. To appreciate the central role that security plays in motivating the apparent Iranian nuclear weapons program, each of these events deserves additional attention.

No Impact – Doesn’t Turn Case – Prolif

Multiple alt causes to proliferation

Bowman 8 (Bradley L. CFR International Affairs Fellow The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran TBC 7/2/10)

Since the advent of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II, 29 states have pursued nuclear arsenals. However, 18 of these states willingly abandoned their programs—a decision often called nuclear ‘‘rollback.’’2 These 18 case studies provide ample evidence that states can be dissuaded from pursuing nuclear weapons when the international community—and often the United States in particular—addresses the motivations behind the state’s quest for nuclear weapons. A review of these case studies offers four particularly important lessons. First, rarely is there a single explanation for a nation’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons. According to a National Defense University (NDU) study, the most influential ‘‘roll forward’’ factors have been: assessment of threat, breakdown of global nonproliferation norms, national pride and unity, personal leadership, strategic deterrent, and perceived weakening of security alliances.3

No Impact – Doesn’t Turn Case – Prolif

Proliferation reps don’t cause prolif – 5 Empirical Alt Causes

Garden 1 (Professor Sir Timothy Indiana University 1 March http://www.tgarden.demon.co.uk/writings/articles/2001/010301nuc.html TBC 7/2/10)

Insecurity The most common strategic reason for developing a nuclear weapon capability is insecurity. If a state feels extremely threatened, it may see a nuclear capability as its only defense. This will be particularly the case if the perceived threat is itself nuclear (or more lately perhaps Biological). The first nuclear weapon programme was developed as the answer to the potential development of atomic weapons by Germany in World War 2, and was continued for similar fears about the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union developed its nuclear capability as part of its armoury against a hostile West. China saw itself as vulnerable to a surprise attack from the United States, and it needed nuclear capability to deter such an attack. Israel saw itself as surrounded by enemies who wanted to sweep it into the sea. Iraq sees itself at risk from Israeli nuclear weapons, and from western nuclear powers and potentially from Iran. Similarly Iran fears Iraq, Israel and the United States. India saw itself vulnerable to Chinese nuclear weapons in any war, and Pakistan saw itself at risk from Indian weapons. International isolation can increase a state’s sense of insecurity, and therefore its need for a nuclear capability. This was the case for South Africa in apartheid times, and has been true of North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya at various times. The international isolation today will normally deepen if there are signs of a nuclear weapon programme under development, and this may reinforce the belief that such weapons are needed. On the other hand an extended security arrangement with a friendly nuclear power reduces the need to undertake a national nuclear programme. Aids to Victory While the acquisition of nuclear weapons for reasons of insecurity will primarily be centred on deterring nuclear attack, the weapons have also been seen as warfighting capabilities. The United States used them against the Japanese in order to secure victory in 1945. The use of them against Russia and China may also have been contemplated. Certainly the use of nuclear weapons in the Korean War was considered by President Truman. The Soviet Union had a military strategy which incorporated its tactical nuclear weapons into its warfighting doctrine. It can also be argued that the NATO doctrine of flexible response recognised nuclear weapons as having some utility in war. However, the main purpose of this doctrine was to reinforce deterrence rather than conceive of victory over the Warsaw Pact through nuclear use. While military victory through the use of nuclear weapons may have been a conceptual possibility in the early days, it is unlikely to be a convincing rationale for acquisition today, given the likelihood of massive retaliation by another nuclear state. Status and Influence A powerful motivation for acquiring nuclear weapons has been the effect on national status and prestige. Britain seems to have thought least deeply about the implications of embarking on a post-war programme independent from the United States. There was a natural assumption that it would need to have atomic weapons in order to retain its place as a leading world power. Similarly France saw the need for a nuclear capability to underpin its return to the world stage as a leading player. Given that each of the five permanent members of the security council are also the first five nuclear weapon states, the association of national status and influence with nuclear weapons is visible to others. It is possible that India may have had such motivation in its bid to become the regional leader. It certainly feels that its population and economy merit much greater international influence than it is accorded. However, the changing international approach to proliferation means that India has not gained greater international status from its weapons. Indeed it is likely to have put back the possibility of it gaining permanent security council membership. Argentina and Brazil may also have been looking for status from their programmes. If prestige is a declining factor in nuclear weapon acquisition, influence still remains important. In the post Cold War world, potential intervention by the more powerful international actors is a threat that worries a number of smaller countries. There is an assumption that this threat can be much reduced by the ownership of strategic weapons of mass destruction. The question is asked 'Would NATO have intervened in Kosovo against a nuclear armed Serbia?'. Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Taiwan can all use this thinking to justify weapons acquisition. Bigger Bang for your Buck In the early days, both American and British governments argued that nuclear weapons could provide a cheaper military capability than large conventional forces. John Foster Dulles is credited with boasting that they could give a 'bigger bang for a buck'. While the absolute cost of building an atomic bomb has dropped over the years, this argument is a less significant factor. Nuclear weapons do not replace conventional forces given their lack of utility for warfighting in the modern world. While the direct research, development and production costs may be much reduced, the economic implications for aspirant nuclear states can be adverse. The international community may show its disapproval of a nuclear programme through the use of economic sanctions as has been seen in Iraq. Nevertheless Iran seems to have decided that a nuclear programme may save it from spending more on conventional forces. Internal Civilian and Military Pressures

**[CONTINUED]**

No Impact – Doesn’t Turn Case – Prolif

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While nations will justify their nuclear weapon programmes for external security reasons, there are often internal domestic pressures driving the procurement. The main drive in Britain immediately after World War 2 came from the military establishment. It was bureaucratic momentum that kept the French programme in being before de Gaulle came to power. Pakistan officials made it clear that they would have to respond quickly to India’s test as much for domestic political reasons as anything else. Today it is more difficult to envisage the decision to embark on a nuclear weapon programme as being taken as routinely as it was by Britain. The international community ensures that any state has to weigh up all the factors before taking on the restrictions which will inevitably follow. Internal pressures may accelerate (or inhibit) a programme which is already in being. They will also have an effect on the decision to remain a nuclear weapon state. Thus South Africa was able to stop its programme as part of its new internal structure. Britain has reduced its capability to just four submarines with missiles, and has no tactical weapons left. Yet internal political issues make it very difficult for it to go to the final step of nuclear disarmament. Just in Case An important consideration in nuclear doctrine is an inability to predict the future. China has never had a particularly consistent or logical nuclear doctrine. I appears that it wished to ensure that it had nuclear capability in case it became crucially important at some time in the future. Britain and France both used the arguments that they reinforced deterrence by being second centres of decision. If the Soviet Union were to think that the United States would not risk nuclear retaliation in order to defend Europe, then the French and British nuclear weapons entered the deterrence equation. They increase Soviet uncertainty and strengthened deterrence. Today the British nuclear force is entirely justified as an insurance policy against an uncertain future. While such arguments are used to retain nuclear weapons, they are insufficiently strong to be the primary drivers in the acquisition of such capabilities today, given the international difficulties that a potential proliferator faces.

AT: Nuclear Reps Bad – AT: Nuclear Apartheid

Nuclear apartheid arguments are wrong – the K replicates racial hierarchies through effacing difference with broad generalizations of nuclear haves and have-nots

Biswas 1 (Shampa, Whitman College Politics Professor, Alternatives 26.4, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb3225/is\_4\_26/ai\_n28886584/, AD: 7/1/10) jl

Where does that leave us with the question of "nuclear apartheid"? As persuasive as the nuclear-apartheid argument may be at pointing to one set of global exclusions, its complicity in the production of boundaries that help sustain a whole other set of exclusions also makes it suspect. It is precisely the resonances of the concept of apartheid, and the strong visceral response it generates, that gives it the ability to bound and erase much more effectively. In one bold move, the nuclear-apartheid argument announces the place of nuclear weaponry as the arbiter of global power and status, and how its inaccessibility or unavailability to a racialized Third World relegates it forever to the dustheap of history. It thus makes it possible for "Indians" to imagine themselves as a "community of resistance." However, with that same stroke, the nuclear-apartheid position creates and sustains yet another racialized hierarchy, bringing into being an India that is exclusionary and oppressive. And it is precisely the boldness of this racial signifier that carries with it the ability to erase, mask, and exclude much more effectively. In the hands of the BJP, the "nuclear apartheid" position becomes dangerous--because the very boldness of this racial signifier makes it possible for the BJP to effect closure on its hegemonic vision of the Hindu/Indian nation. Hence, this article has argued, in taking seriously the racialized exclusions revealed by the use of the "nuclear apartheid" position at the international level, one must simultaneously reveal another set of racialized exclusions effected by the BJP in consolidating its hold on state power. I have argued that comprehending the force and effect of the invocation of "race" through the nuclear-apartheid position means to understand this mutually constitutive co-construction of racialized domestic and international hierarchical orders.

AT: Nuclear Apartheid – Turns Racism

The concept of the Nuclear Apartheid replicates the colonial logic of oppression their K criticizes

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It is clear that the concept of apartheid draws its enunciative force from the category of race, and I will argue that the deployment of the nuclear-apartheid position by the Indian government points to a racially institutionalized global hierarchy. In other words, scrutinizing the nuclear-apartheid position means at the very least taking seriously the manner in which the deployment of such a racial signifier by the Indian government is able to unsettle a certain taken-for-granted terrain in the conduct of international relations and in the writing of the discipline. What happens if we take seriously the opposition of the Indian government to some of the most prominent international arms-control treaties, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), as well as its decision in 1998 to declare itself as a nuclear-weapons state (NWS) despite the emerging global norms against nuclearization and the threat of economic sanctions, in the name of nuclear apartheid-- using perhaps one of the most potent racial signifiers of our contemporary times to register its frustrations with, and resistance to, the unequal distribution of global warfare resources? Rather than simply dismissing this position because of the level of abhorrence that has come to be attached to weapons of mass destruction, I argue that there is an epistemic gain from seeing the Indian decision to test as a statement against a racialized inequitable global order.

However, despite the critical leverage that the category of apartheid as used by the Indian government carries, the category itself is analytically problematic, and its deployment is politically disturbing in other ways. On the one hand, as the article will show, there are a whole host of ways in which the concept of apartheid that lays implicit claim to certain inalienable democratic entitlements is simply untenable, given the fundamentally undemocratic character of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the political implications of India's nuclearization under the aggressive, exclusivist regime of the Hindu nationalist party (the BJP), does not bode well either for regional security or for the global disarmament agenda. But much more importantly, this article argues that the use of race through the nuclear-apartheid position can also simultaneously mask a series of exclusions--domestically and internationally--and indeed in its use by the BJP government comes to play a "racialized, boundary-producing" role tha t maintains that division at the expense of marginalized sections of the Indian population. In addition to exploring the usefulness of "race" as a category of analysis in examining the BJP's imagination of the Hindu/Indian nation, I also look at how the BJP draws on a racist global discourse on Islam and Muslims. Recently, critical-security scholars within JR have raised and problematized quite compellingly the questions of "whose security?" and "what kind of security?" does nuclear/military security provide. (2) Taking seriously the global racialized exclusions that the nuclear-apartheid position points to, I want to problematize the implicit referent (i.e., the Hindu/Indian nation) in whose name this position is being deployed by the BJP and raise questions about the political interests that are served by this deployment.

The nuclear apartheid argument simply generates new forms of racialization

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The ultimate purpose of this article, then, is to interrogate, critically, the category of nuclear apartheid as deployed by the Indian government in order to think through how the silence on race within the field of international relations enables and constrains its deployment as a postcolonial resource, and what implications that offers for peace and justice. The article begins with discussing the security environment and the domestic political context within which the decision to test was made. This first section of the article looks at the rise of Hindu nationalism in contemporary Indian politics, finding the immediate trigger to the tests in this domestic political environment, and scrutinizes the realist "external threats" argument from within this context. The next section of the article presents and analyzes the nuclear-apartheid position as articulated with respect to the two prominent arms-control treaties--the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--and points to the global structural and racial hierarchies that make possible the effective deployment of such a position by the Indian government. Finally, the article turns to a deconstruction of the nuclear-apartheid position to demonstrate both its analytical paucities as well as the political function it serves in the contemporary Indian context in effecting "new kinds of racializations." I conclude with some reflections on conceptualizing race within global politics and the implications of taking race seriously for issues of peace and justice.

AT: Nuclear Apartheid – N/W Outwieghs

Impacts of nuclear weapons outweighs – The idea of nuclear equality destroys accountability

Biswas 1 (Shampa, Whitman College Politics Professor, Alternatives 26.4, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb3225/is\_4\_26/ai\_n28886584/, AD: 7/1/10) jl

At one level, as Partha Chatterjee has pointed out, the concept of apartheid relates to a discourse about "democracy." (49) To use apartheid to designate the unequal distribution of nuclear resources then is also simultaneously to draw attention to the undemocratic character of international relations--or, more literally, the exclusion of a group of people from some kind of legitimate and just entitlement. More specifically, to talk in terms of nuclear haves and have-nots is to talk in terms of a concept of democratic justice based on the "possession" (or lack thereof) of something. "Apartheid," as Sumit Sarkar points out, "implies as its valorised Other a notion of equal rights." (50) But that this something is "nuclear weapons" complicates the issue a great deal. If the vision of democracy that is implicit in the concept of nuclear apartheid implies a world of "equal possession" of nuclear weapons, a position implied in the Indian decision to test, that is a frightening thought indeed. Yet surely even India does not subscribe to that vision of democracy. "Would India," asks Sarkar, "welcome a nuclearised Nepal or Bangladesh?" (51) If Jaswant Singh is serious that "the country"s national security in a world of nuclear proliferation lies either in global disarmament or in exercise of the principle of equal and legitimate security for all," (52) then it should indeed support the "equal and legitimate" nuclearization of its neighbors, which is extremely unlikely given its own demonstrated hegemonic aspirations in the South Asian region. (53) Further, if India does indeed now sign the NPT and the CTBT, and sign them in the garb of a nuclear power as it wants to do, what does that say about its commitment to nuclear democracy? Even if India and Pakistan were to be included in the treaties as NWSs, all that would do is expand the size of the categories, not delegitimize the unequal privileges and burdens written into the categories themselves.

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Kato Shell

Predictive scenarios about nuclear war ignore the on-going nuclear genocide committed against the fourth world

Kato 93 (Masahide, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, Alternatives 18, 339-360) jl

Nuclear war has been enclosed by two seemingly opposite yet complementary regimes of discourse: nation-state strategic discourse (nuclear deterrence, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and so on) and extra-nation-state (or extra-territorial) discourse (antinuclearism, nuclear criticism, and so on). The epistemology of the former is entrenched in the "possible" exchange(s) of nuclear warheads among nation states. The latter, which emerged in reaction to the former, holds the "possibility of extinction" at the center of its discursive production.

In delineating the notion of "nuclear war," both of these discourses share an intriguing leap: from the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the "possible" nuclear explosions in an indefinite-yet-ever-closer-to-the-present future. Thus any nuclear explosions after World War II do not qualify as nuclear war in the cognitive grid of conventional nuclear discourse. Significandy, most nuclear explosions after World War II took place in the sovereign territories of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations. This critical historical fact has been contained in the domain of nuclear testing. Such obliteration of the history of undeclared nuclear warfare by nuclear discourse does not merely posit the deficiency of the discourse. Rather, what it does is reveal the late capitalist form of domination, whereby an ongoing extermination process of the periphery is blocked from constituting itself as a historical fact.

In the first half of this article, I trace this disqualification process of nuclear war against the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations to the mode of perception that objectifies the periphery in order to subordinate it to a reconstructed homogeneous time and space.

Kato Shell

The notion that nuclear war causes “extinction” ignores the on-going nuclear war conducting against indigenous nations

Kato 93 (Masahide, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, Alternatives 18, 339-360) jl

Nuclear criticism finds the likelihood of "extinction" as the most fundamental aspect of nuclear catastrophe. The complex problematics involved in nuclear catastrophe are thus reduced to the single possible instant of extinction. The task of nuclear critics is clearly designated by Schell as coming to grips with the one and only final instant: "human extinction—whose likelihood we are chiefly interested in finding out about"35 Deconstructionists, on the other hand, take a detour in their efforts to theologize extinction. Jacques Derrida, for example, solidified the prevailing mode of representation by constituting extinction as a fatal absence: Unlike the other wars, which have all been preceded by wars of more or less the same type in human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), nuclear war has no precedent. It has never occurred, itself; it is a non-event The explosion of American bombs in 1945 ended a "classical," conventional war; it did not set off a nuclear war. The terrifying reality of the nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or text. At least today apparendy.36 By representing the possible extinction as the single most important problematic of nuclear catastrophe (posing it as either a threat or a symbolic void), nuclear criticism disqualifies the entire history of nuclear violence, the "real" of nuclear catastrophe as a continuous and repetitive process. The "real" of nuclear war is designated by nuclear critics as a "rehearsal" (Derrik De Kerkhove) or "preparation" (Firth) for what they reserve as the authentic catastrophe." The history of nuclear violence offers, at best, a reality effect to the imagery of "extinction." Schell summarized the discursive position of nuclear critics very succincdy, by stating that nuclear catastrophe should not be conceptualized "in the context of direct slaughter of hundreds of millions people by the local effects."38 Thus the elimination of the history of nuclear violence by nuclear critics stems from the process of discursive "derealization" of nuclear violence. Their primary focus is not local catastrophe, but delocalized, unlocatable, "global" catastrophe. The elevation of the discursive vantage point deployed in nuclear criticism through which extinction is conceptualized parallels that of the point of the strategic gaze: nuclear criticism raises the notion of nuclear catastrophe to the "absolute" point from which the fiction of extinction" is configured. Herein, the configuration of the globe and the conceptualization of "extinction" reveal their interconnection via the "absolutization" of the strategic gaze. In the same way as the fiction of the totality of the earth is constructed, the fiction of extinction is derived from the figure perceived through the strategic gaze. In other words, the image of the globe, in the final instance, is nothing more than a figure on which the notion of extinction is being constructed. Schell, for instance, repeatedly encountered difficulty in locating the subject involved in the conceptualization of extinction, which in turn testifies to its figural origin: "who will suffer this loss, which we somehow regard as supreme? We, the living, will not suffer it; we will be dead. Nor will the unborn shed any tears over their lost chance to exist; to do so they would have to exist already."39 Robert Lifton attributed such difficulty in locating the subject to the "numbing effect" of nuclear psychology. In other words, Lifton tied the difficulty involved here not to the question of subjectivity per se but to psychological defenses against the overwhelming possibility of extinction. The hollowness of extinction can be unraveled better if we locate it in the mode of perception rather than in nebulous nuclear psychology: the hollowness of extinction is a result of "confusing figure with the object"40 This phenomenon, called "the delirium of interpretation" by Virilio, is a mechanical process in which incorporeal existence is given a meaning via the figure.41 It is no doubt a manifestation of technosubjectivity symptomatic of late capitalism. Hence, the obscurity of the subject in the configuration of extinction results from the dislocation of the subject by the technosubject functioning as a meaning-generating machine. Technosubjectivity deployed in configuring "extinction" is the product of interfaces among the camera's eyes, photo (or video) image, the ultimate speed materialized by rockets and satellite communications, and nuclear warheads. Carol Cohn persuasively analyzed one such aspect of the interface in shaping and structuring the discourse of defense intellectuals: in the discourse, of nuclear war, national security, and nuclear criticism, it is the bomb that is the subject of discourse.42 The satellite communications, rockets, camera's eye, nuclear warheads, and other technostrategic gadgets, which are rendered subject in the field of discourse and perception, are essentially a fixed capital. Therefore, although the problem of technosubjectivity seems to be a new phenomenon in the age of high technology, it remains part of an ongoing process of subject-object inversion inherent in the very concept of capital. Having established the link between the disqualification (or derealization) of the history ("real") of nuclear catastrophe on the one hand and the mode of Nuclear criticism offers preservation of self and matter as a solution to its own imaginary/ideological construct of extinction (as manifested in the buzzword "freeze"). Accordingly, preservation of self and matter as an alternative to the inertia of the "unthinkable" cannot be anything but an imaginary/ideological construct It is in this fantasy that one can find the ideological content of globalism. The proposition of preservation as a solution to the imagined extinction at the same time involves redefinition of the notion of "humanity." The image of extinction drove even a Marxist, namely, E. E Thompson, to abandon "class" analysis, embracing humanity instead: "exterminism itself is not a 'class issue': it is a human issue."43 In this sense, nuclear criticism recreates the Renaissance in the late capitalist era in its reinvention of humanity through technosubjectivity. Robert Lifton defined the collectivity in danger by comparing the threat of extinction with the hostage-taking, which I turn entails a very revealing redefinition of humanity: But unlike ordinary hostage taking, nuclear terror encompasses everyone. Precisely for that reason it throws us back on our collective humanity. In calling into question the idea of human future, it raises equally ultimate questions about our evolutionary equipment for shaping that threatened future.” <CONTINUED>

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But what does "humanity" designate? Who are "we"? Sontag also encountered this obscure notion of humanity created by the photo images, and she deciphered it as "a quality things have in common when they are viewed as photographs."45 Again we cannot escape from finding the figural origin (i.e., photo image of the globe) of the construction of "humanity." Herein the "interpretative delirium" proceeds with the disguise of "universalism," establishing a total "deregulation" in exchanges among what are reconstructed as objects by way of figure. The regime of the "absolute" subject (i.e., technosubject) governs this deregulated image economy where heterogeneous existence of subjectivity (whose epistemological basis is anchored in locality) is reduced to one of many objects. The notion of humanity is thus a reification of the regime of the absolute technosubject cloaked in pseudo-universality.

This erasure of history is the logic that legitimizes nuclear atrocities

Kato 93 (Masahide, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, Alternatives 18, 339-360) jl

Let us recall our earlier discussion about the critical historical conjuncture where the notion of "strategy" changed its nature and became deregulated/dispersed beyond the boundaries set by the interimperial rivalry. Herein, the perception of the ultimate means of destruction can be historically contextualized. The only instances of real nuclear catastrophe perceived and thus given due recognition by the First World community are the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which occurred at this conjuncture. Beyond this historical threshold, whose meaning is relevant only to the interimperial rivalry, the nuclear catastrophe is confined to the realm of fantasy, for instance, apocalyptic imagery. And yet how can one deny the crude fact that nuclear war has been taking place on this earth in the name of "nuclear testing" since the first nuclear explosion at Alamogordo in 1945? As of 1991, 1,924 nuclear explosions have occurred on earth.28 The major perpetrators of nuclear warfare are the United States (936 times), the former Soviet Union (715 times), France (192 times), the United Kingdom (44 times), and China (36 times).29 The primary targets of warfare ("test site" to use Nuke Speak terminology) have been invariably the sovereign nations of Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples. Thus history has Shoshone Nation) (814 times), the Christmas Islands (24 times), Hawaii (Kalama Island, also known as Johnston Island) (12 times), the Republic of Kazakhstan (467 times), and Uighur (Xinjian Province, China) (36 times).30 Moreover, although I focus primarily on "nuclear tests" in this article, if we are to expand the notion of nuclear warfare to include any kind of violence accrued from the nuclear fuel cycle (particularly uranium mining and disposition of nuclear wastes), we must enlist Japan and the European nations as perpetrators and add the Navaho, Havasupai and other Indigenous Nations to the list of targets. Viewed as a whole, nuclear war, albeit undeclared, has been waged against the Fourth World, and Indigenous Nations. The dismal consequences of "intensive exploitation," "low intensity intervention," or the "nullification of the sovereignty" in the Third World produced by the First World have taken a form of nuclear extermination in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations.

Thus, from the perspectives of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations, the nuclear catastrophe has never been the "unthinkable" single catastrophe but the real catastrophe of repetitive and ongoing nuclear explosions and exposure to radioactivity. Nevertheless, ongoing nuclear wars have been subordinated to the imaginary grand catastrophe by rendering them as mere preludes to the apocalypse. As a consequence, the history and ongoing processes of nuclear explosions as war have been totally wiped out from the history and consciousness of the First World community. Such a discursive strategy that aims to mask the "real" of nuclear warfare in the domain of imagery of nuclear catastrophe can be observed even in Stewart Firth's Nuclear Playground, which extensively covers the history of "nuclear testing" in the Pacific:

Nuclear explosions in the atmosphere ... were global in effect The winds and seas carried radioactive contamination over vast areas of the fragile ecosphere on which we all depend for our survival and which we call the earth. In preparing for war, we were poisoning our planet and going into battle against nature itself. Although Firth's book is definitely a remarkable study of the history of "nuclear testing" in the Pacific, the problematic division/distinction between the "nuclear explosions" and the nuclear war is kept intact. The imagery of final nuclear war narrated with the problematic use of the subject ("we") is located higher than the "real" of nuclear warfare in terms of discursive value. This ideological division/hierarchization is the very vehicle through which the history and the ongoing processes of the destruction of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations by means of nuclear violence are obliterated and hence legitimatized. The discursive containment/obliteration of the "real" of nuclear warfare has been accomplished, ironic as it may sound, by nuclear criticism. Nuclear criticism, with its firm commitment to global discourse, has established the unshakable authority of the imagery of nuclear catastrophe over the real nuclear catastrophe happening in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations almost on a daily basis.

Kato Shell

The alternative is to reject their technosubjective approach to politics

The alt forges a link to the periphery that avoids the erasure of sub-state conflict

Kato 93 (Masahide, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, Alternatives 18, 339-360) jl

Frederic Jameson's proposed formula to cope with the global strategy of late transnational capitalism is for us to gain a firmer grip on global space so that such space is brought to the social level. According to him, in the process of socializing this latest spatial horizon (becoming "Symbolic" of the "Imaginary" to use Lacanian terminology), "we may again begin to grasp our positioning as individual and collective subjects and again a capacity to act and struggle which is at present neutralized by our spatial as well as our social confusion."54 Nevertheless, let us not forget that the Symbolic in the global configuration of space and time is none other than the discourse of technosubjectivity. The construction of global space and time, accordingly, has been the ontological horizon of the transnational capital/state with its control over the ultimate form of violence. The "social and spatial confusion" (which again resonates in Lifton's formulation of the "numbing effect") in the postmodern aesthetics that Jameson urges us to overcome, stems not so much from the inadequate socialization of global space as from the very meaning-generating machine of technosubjectivity. Thus Jameson's formula has a strong possibility of legitimating technosub­jectivity, which leads us nowhere but to a further global integration of capital with its increased power of pure destruction.

The dialectic (if it can be still called such) should be conceived in terms of resistance to and possibly destruction of global space, time, perception, and discourse for the possibility of reinventing space. The nuclear warfare against the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples should be viewed in this context. It is not their expendability or exclusion from the division of labor; rather it is their spatial-temporal construction that drives transnational capital/state to resort to pure destruction. In other words, what has been actually under attack by the nuclear state/capital are certain political claims (couched in the discourse of "sovereignty") advanced by the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples for maintaining or recreating space against the global integration of capital.55

The question now becomes: Can there be a productive link between the struggles of the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples against the exterminating regime of nuclear capital/state, and First World environmentalist and antinuclear social movements? This link is crucial and urgent for a subversion of the global regime of capital/state. Nevertheless, we have not yet seen effective alliances due to the blockage that lies between these social movements.56 The blockage, as I have shown in this article, is produced primarily by the perception and discourse of the social movements in the North, which are rooted in technosub­jectivity. The possibility of alliances, therefore, depends on how much First World environmenalist and antinuclear movements can overcome their globalist technosubjectivity, whose spatio-temporality stands in diametrical opposition to the struggles of the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples. In other words, it is crucial for the former to shater their image-based politics and come face to face with the "real" of the latter.

Link – K Affs

Leftist criticisms of nuclear war are premised on warfare waged between superpowers which continues to ignore the periphery of native Americans

Kato 93 (Masahide, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, Alternatives 18, 339-360) jl

Nuclear criticism flourished particularly during the early 1980s in reaction to the imminent "threat of limited nuclear warfare," which swept the entire European continent as well as other countries in the First World bloc. Nuclear criticism has variants depending on the perspectives and targeted audiences. The most notable critics belong to what I call "popular nuclear criticism," which includes such authors as Jonathan Schell, Robert Lifton, and Freeman Dyson. The leftists, most notably E. R Thompson, on the other hand, made a less popularized and yet very serious critique of superpower nuclear imperialism. Those earlier versions of nuclear criticism have offered a good text for deconstructionists such as Jacques Derrida et al. in Diacritics.

Reflecting the historical context mentioned above, in which nuclear critique gained unprecedented popularity, one can say that nuclear criticism has been shaped and structured by the logic of superpower

 rivalry.32 The superpower rivalry has distracted our attention from the ongoing process of oppression/violence along the North-South axis. After all, the superpowers have functioned complementarily in solidifying the power of the North over the South.33 Therefore, nuclear criticism has successfully mystified the North-South axis as much as the superpower rivalry. Just as the facade of superpower rivalry (or interimperial rivalry in general for that matter) gave legitimation to the strategy of global domination of capital, nuclear criticism has successfully legitimated the destruction of periphery through nuclear violence. What is significant here is to locate the discourse in a proper context, that is, the late capitalist problematic. To do so, we need to shift our focus back to the questions of strategy and technology discussed earlier.

Let us recall our discussion on the genealogy of global discourse. The formation of global discourse has been a discursive expression of the formation of technological interfaces among rockets, cameras, and media furnished by the strategy of late capitalism. In a similar vein, nuclear criticism, whose epistemological basis lies in the exchange of nuclear ballistic missiles between superpowers, emerged from yet another technostrategic interface. Significantly, the camera on the rocket was replaced by the nuclear warhead, which gave birth to the first Inter Continental Ballistic Missile in the late 1950s both in the United States and the former Soviet Union.34 Thus, the discourse of nuclear criticism is a technostrategic interface to the formation of discourse.

\*A2: Kato\*

AT: Kato – No Testing

Kato needs to do some updates – Nuclear weapons testing is exclusively virtual now

IEEE Spectrum 5 (Tech News, http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/nuclear-testing-goes-virtual. AD: 7/2/10) jl

In October, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration officially dedicated two state-of-the-art supercomputers that should allow the United States' nuclear weapons arsenal to be kept in working order without the need for underground testing. One of those is now the fastest computer ever built.

According to the NNSA, a new IBM BlueGene/L and an IBM Purple system have been successfully installed and tested at the recently completed Terascale Simulation Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in California. Nuclear scientists will use the two supermachines to run three-dimensional simulations at dizzying speeds to achieve much of the nuclear weapons analysis that was formerly accomplished by underground nuclear testing, capping a long campaign to use virtual testing in place of physical weapons detonations.

"The unprecedented computing power of these two supercomputers is more critical than ever to meet the time-urgent issues related to maintaining our nation's aging nuclear stockpile without testing," said NNSA Administrator Linton F. Brooks. "Purple represents the culmination of a successful decade-long effort to create a powerful new class of supercomputers. BlueGene/L points the way to the future and the computing power we will need to improve our ability to predict the behavior of the stockpile as it continues to age."

Brooks announced on 27 October that the BlueGene/L had performed a record 280.6 trillion floating-point operations per second on the industry standard Linpack benchmark test suite. The Linpack test is used to determine the performance of the world's fastest computers, which are ranked in the routinely updated Top 500 list. The new record doubles the previous top performance, achieved in March by an earlier configuration of this same Livermore BlueGene/L system.

This computing advance is a significant accomplishment. It should improve the prospects of the United States' agreeing to permanently stop physical nuclear weapons testing, under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which was concluded in 1996. And on a related front, the award of this year's Nobel Peace Prize to the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency and its director general, Mohamed ElBaradei [see William Sweet's news commentary "The Atomic Energy Agency's Peace Prize"] is a victory for the defenders of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Taken together, virtual testing technology and the reaffirmation of the importance of nuclear arms control promise to make the real world a safer place.

The US virtual tests now – no physical tests

Labott 10 (Elise, Senior State Department Producer for CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/04/16/nuclear.testing/index.html, AD: 7/2/10) jl

At Livermore, you can cut the explosives in half by laser without melting or sparking. We learned that this means you don't disturb the atoms inside the high explosive. Goodwin said the test vibrates the atoms at a rate of a millionth-billionth of a second, so fast that heat and shock waves can't be conducted. This removes the atoms one at a time from the high explosive and provides a more accurate reading of the condition of the explosive.

"We found failure modes in the stockpile that we could never have found with nuclear testing because we're able to do these massive simulations," he said. "These are the largest calculations that man has ever done."

All of these simulations are cataloged on Livermore's [supercomputers](http://topics.cnn.com/topics/supercomputers), which are some of the fastest in the world. Michel McCoy, the lab's associate director for computation, showed us around the supercomputer rooms, which he calls the lab's "crown jewel." There, thousands of computers pull together all of the physics necessary to model a nuclear weapon's reliability and safety.

Did I mention these computers are fast? We are talking about a hundred trillion operations per second. It is about to get even faster, with a new computer system called the petaflop, which would be able to do about a quintillion operations per second. McCoy said even that isn't fast enough for what the U.S. needs to do to fix the nuclear weapons as they age.

We ended our day at Livermore's National Ignition Facility, where the world's largest laser generates the temperatures and pressures found only in stars, the sun and in nuclear weapons. The equipment looks like a spaceship about to take off.

This summer, NIF will begin experiments that will focus the energy of 192 giant laser beams on a tiny target filled with hydrogen fuel. The goal is to obtain fusion energy, which is what powers the sun and stars.

Inside the target chamber, the target that each of the lasers needs to hit is smaller than the diameter of a human hair. The director of the NIF, Edward Moses, showed us a full-scale target, which can fit in his hand. Inside a little gold can is a red dot the size of a pencil eraser. There, Moses said, "the isotopes of hydrogen sit ... and get ready to be blown to bits."

"We can model parts of physical processes that go on inside a weapon without testing," Moses said. "This is the only place in the world where you can get to the nuclear phase of the weapon without blowing up a bomb."

In fact, we found that at Livermore, scientists could learn more about what's going on inside a nuclear weapon without actually testing it than they can with a nuclear test. Every night, the control room, modeled on NASA's command center, runs a laser experiment using 2,000 computers and 60,000 control points.

A2: Kato – No Uranium Mining

Current and future mining bans prevent harvesting of uranium

Spencer and Loris 8 (Jack – Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy, and Nicolas – Research Assistant in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation., http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/13605.pdf, AD: 7/2/10) jl

Despite rising energy prices, government at all levels continues to deny Americans access to significant portions of the nation's energy resources. These legislative, bureaucratic, and procedural barriers are even more bizarre considering growing calls for energy independence. This affects uranium mining as well as Alaskan oil drilling, off-shore gas exploration, and wind farms. Ironically, Virginia has a rich history of supporting nuclear power and continues to depend on it today. Its ban on uranium mining demonstrates the impact that anti-nuclear propaganda has had on the population. Virginia gets 38 percent of its electricity from four nuclear reactors and will likely be among the first to build a new reactor in the United States. Beyond that, Virginia hosts a variety of other nuclear-related industries, including the nuclear qualified Newport News naval shipyard, which is one of the nation's only two with that capability. Virginia will surely not be the only place in the U.S. that attempts to prohibit access to uranium reserves as rising demand spurs exploration activities. Three decades of anti-nuclear propaganda continues to influence the public perception of nuclear power.

AT: Kato – No Impact – Radiation

Radiation is everywhere – even high levels of radiation have no impact on health

Wigg 7 (David, Associate Professor of Radiation Oncology, Clinical Radiobiology Unit, Cancer Services, Royal Adelaide Hospital, Australasian Radiology Volume 51 Issue 1, http://www.boldenterprise.com.au/bio/bigbang.pdf , AD: 7/2/10) jl

Natural background radiation comes from cosmic sources (approximately 0.39 mSv per annum), terrestrial sources (0.58 mSv p.a.), inhaled sources especially radon (1.26 mSv p.a.), and ingested sources (0.29 mSv p.a.). Typical total annual values vary between 1.0 and 3.5 mSv (average 2.4 mSv p.a.). In some regions the background radiation is up to 100 times higher. No adverse genetic or other harmful effects including cancer formation have been observed in plants, animals or humans in these areas despite such exposure for countless generations (1). Our own bodies also contain radioactive potassium 40 and carbon 14 which disintegrate with a combined total of about 7500 disintegrations per second.

Even the radiation from nuclear weapons has no effect or can be beneficial

Ray 8 (Ben, freelance writer working in Louisville and Lexington, http://www.environmentalgraffiti.com/ecology/positive-effects-of-nuclear-radiation/1066, AD: 7/2/10) jl

National Geographic has announced that the ARC Centre for Coral Reef Studies has surveyed the 1.2-mile crater from the hydrogen bomb tests at Bikini Atoll and discovered something phenomenal: the corals are bouncing back from nuclear annihilation.

 How is this even possible? The [first round](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Crossroads) of tests there sank 13 warships the U.S. Navy itself wanted to get rid of after World War II. Radiation is poison to every living thing. What could have possibly happened?

As it happens, radiation may not be the end of the world after all. How bad is radiation, really?

First there's this news out of Chernobyl--the surrounding ecosystems are thriving, and, while the enthusiasm is tempered, I'll reprint the key quote here:

"By any measure of [ecological](http://www.environmentalgraffiti.com/ecology/positive-effects-of-nuclear-radiation/1066) function these ecosystems seem to be operating normally," Morris told Nature. "The biodiversity is higher there than before the accident." How has this happened, given that radiation levels are still too high for humans to return safely? Morris thinks that many of the organisms mutated by the fallout have died, leaving behind those that have not suffered problems with growth and reproduction. "It's [evolution](http://www.environmentalgraffiti.com/ecology/positive-effects-of-nuclear-radiation/1066) on steroids.

That only explains the ability of nature to make up for man's complete screw-ups, however. Edward Calabrese, a professor at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, claims that radiation may fall into a concept called hormesis: poisons that are lethal at high doses, are beneficial in low ones. Calabrese has spent his career studying the concept, and universally found that low doses of toxins lead to longer lifespans and enhanced growth-- as well as that high doses kill.

AT: Kato – Hormesis

Radiation increases immune system stability and decreases the risk of cancer

Luckey 8 (T.D, Professor Emeritus of the University of Missouri, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2592990/, AD: 7/2/10)jl

Media reports of deaths and devastation produced by atomic bombs convinced people around the world that all ionizing radiation is harmful. This concentrated attention on fear of miniscule doses of radiation. Soon the linear no threshold (LNT) paradigm was converted into laws. Scientifically valid information about the health benefits from low dose irradiation was ignored. Here are studies which show increased health in Japanese survivors of atomic bombs. Parameters include decreased mutation, leukemia and solid tissue cancer mortality rates, and increased average lifespan. Each study exhibits a threshold that repudiates the LNT dogma. The average threshold for acute exposures to atomic bombs is about 100 cSv. Conclusions from these studies of atomic bomb survivors are:

One burst of low dose irradiation elicits a lifetime of improved health.

Improved health from low dose irradiation negates the LNT paradigm.

Effective triage should include radiation hormesis for survivor treatment.

“The collected data strongly suggest that low-level radiation is not harmful, and is, in fact, frequently ‘apparently beneficial’ for human health.”

—[Kondo, 1993](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2592990/#b7-drp-06-0369)

Most people believe the LNT (linear no threshold) paradigm for radiation and its corollary: all ionizing radiation is harmful. The devastation and harm from atomic bombs in Japan dominated the media and confirmed the LNT dogma for people around the world. The LNT dogma must be true: it is in our texts; it is taught in schools and universities; it is constantly assumed in the media; and it is the law in many countries.

However, there is a fallacy. As the French philosopher, Jean de la Bruyere (1645–1696), noted: “The exact contrary of what is generally believed is often the truth.” ([Bruyere, 1688](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2592990/#b4-drp-06-0369)). In order to make them believe the LNT dogma, radiobiologists have consistently misled students, physicians, professors, the media, the public, government advisory boards, and heads of nations. About thirty specific examples of this deception have been presented ([Luckey, 2008a](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2592990/#b14-drp-06-0369)).

This report reviews unpublicized studies of low dose exposures from atomic bombs in Japanese survivors. The consistent benefits from low dose exposures to radiation from atomic bombs negate the LNT paradigm and indicate a single exposure to low dose irradiation produces a lifetime of improved health.

Over 3,000 case studies disprove your claim – no scientific basis for their impacts

Luckey 8 (T.D, Professor Emeritus of the University of Missouri, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2592990/, AD: 7/2/10)jl

Focus on harm from miniscule doses of ionizing radiation has blinded people to the benefits of low doses of ionizing radiation. For over a century it has been known that exposure of whole organisms to low doses of ionizing radiation consistently induces biopositive effects. These are recorded in over 3,000 reports ([Luckey 1980](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2592990/#b9-drp-06-0369), [1991](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2592990/#b10-drp-06-0369), [Muckerheide, 2002](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2592990/#b19-drp-06-0369)). No statistically valid scientific report was found in which low doses of ionizing radiation showed harm for genetically normal humans or laboratory animals. Thus, the LNT dogma has no scientific support from whole body exposures in humans or laboratory animals. The elite committee of the French Academies of Sciences and the National Academy of Medicine agreed: “In conclusion, this report doubts the validity of using LNT in the evaluation of the carcinogenic risk of low doses (<100 mSv) and even more for very low doses (10 mSv).” ([Auringo et al, 2005](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2592990/#b1-drp-06-0369)).

Nuclear Crisis Turns the K

Nuclear crisis turns the K – causes political repression and tyranny

Martin 82 (Professor of Social Sciences in the School of Social Sciences, Media and Communication at the University of Wollongong, 1982 Brian, “How the Peace Movement Should be Preparing for Nuclear War,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1982, pp. 149-159 TBC 7/2/10)

In addition to the important physical effects of nuclear war there would be important indirect political effects. It seems very likely that there would be strong moves to maintain or establish authoritarian rule as a response to crises preceding or following nuclear war. Ever since Hiroshima, the threat of nuclear destruction has been used to prop up repressive institutions, under the pretext of defending against the 'enemy'.[3] The actuality of nuclear war could easily result in the culmination of this trend. Large segments of the population could be manipulated to support a repressive regime under the necessity to defend against further threats or to obtain revenge. A limited nuclear war might kill some hundreds of thousands or tens of millions of people, surely a major tragedy. But another tragedy could also result: the establishment, possibly for decades, of repressive civilian or military rule in countries such as Italy, Australia and the US, even if they were not directly involved in the war. The possibility of grassroots mobilisation for disarmament and peace would be greatly reduced even from its present levels. For such developments the people and the peace movements of the world are largely unprepared.

Preventing nuclear war key to social justice

Martin 82 (Professor of Social Sciences in the School of Social Sciences, Media and Communication at the University of Wollongong, 1982 Brian, “How the Peace Movement Should be Preparing for Nuclear War,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1982, pp. 149-159 TBC 7/2/10)

The primary objective of national security bureaucracies in the event of nuclear war is survival of the state apparatus. This has two components: continued defence against the outside enemy, and defence against challenges raised by the native population. The health and welfare of the general population is a secondary consideration, mainly important in its effects on the two primary goals. This emphasis is reflected in preparations for the survival of key officials, for continuity of official decision-making apparatuses and communications, and for quelling 'civil disturbances'. In the absence of any significant countervailing force, a nuclear war will not be the end of war but the beginning of the age of many nuclear wars. Although nuclear war may lead to mass revulsion, there will also be strong government and citizen pressures for retaliation, revenge, efforts to 'do better next time' and not to be caught unprepared. The rise of Nazism after World War I should point to the danger. Scenarios for World Wars IV, V, VI and so forth may be repulsive, but cannot be discounted solely for that reason. During World War II, several key groups in the US developed plans for the post-war world.[5] More generally, post-war political and economic considerations played a large role in many decisions, military and otherwise, during the war. The same pattern is being and will be replayed prior to and during a nuclear war. It is not for lack of anything better to do that nuclear strategists have elaborated numerous scenarios for nuclear war, recovery and future wars. During and after a nuclear crisis or war, powerful interest groups will attempt to sway developments through management of the news, mobilisation of sympathetic groups, creating scapegoats, suppressing dissent, and using many other mechanisms familiar to us today. If these developments are to be opposed, peace activists need to be prepared to act during nuclear crisis and nuclear war and afterwards. Preparation for nuclear war by the peace movement could increase the chances of success in struggles for social justice, especially in the poor countries, during a period of chaos in the rich countries resulting from nuclear war or nuclear crisis.

Nuclear Crisis Turns the K

Nuclear crisis would lead to oppression of minority groups

Martin 82 (Professor of Social Sciences in the School of Social Sciences, Media and Communication at the University of Wollongong, 1982 Brian, “How the Peace Movement Should be Preparing for Nuclear War,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1982, pp. 149-159 TBC 7/2/10)

As mentioned earlier, one likely consequence of nuclear war, or even the threat of it, is declaration of states of emergency by national governments, detention of 'subversives' (trade union leaders, leaders of opposition parties, leaders of leftist groups, ethnic groups, feminists, etc.), and perhaps formal military rule. Plans, infrastructure and methods for such repressive measures already exist in many countries, having been developed to defend the status quo against various citizen based initiatives.[7] Furthermore, many plans for government action in the event of nuclear war seem specifically oriented to perpetuate the state structure rather than to defend people. The peace movement as well as the general population are not prepared for these contingencies, partly because nuclear war is seen as 'the end'. Yet if significant segments of the population were able to resist repression, to push for democratic initiatives and establish an alternative voice to that of the state in a nuclear emergency, the government and military would be much more reluctant to risk the occurrence of nuclear war. When the population is prepared, a nuclear war becomes a threat to the government itself as well as to the population. Resistance to repression is important now as well as in a nuclear emergency, and hence preparation, training and strategising with this aim in mind serves a double purpose, and also links peace movement activities with other social movements.

\*Numbing K\*

Numbing Shell

Abstract fear of nuclear war numbs people to the danger of nuclear weapons

Sandman and Valenti 86 (Peter M., Professor of Public Health, Rutgers University, Founder and Director of the Environmental Communication Research Program, and Communications Counsel for Environmental Defense Fund, and JoAnn M., Professor of Communications, Brigham Young University, January http://www.psandman.com/articles/scarstif.htm TBC 6/30/10)

In the following analysis of the fear of nuclear Armageddon and its implications for antinuclear advocacy, we will argue that most people are neither apathetic about nuclear war nor actively terrified of it but rather, in Robert Jay Lifton’s evocative phrase, “psychically numbed”; that it is ineffective to frighten audiences who have found a refuge from their fears in numbness; and that there exist more effective keys to unlocking such paralysis. THE CENTRAL ENIGMA of antinuclear activism is why everyone is not working to prevent nuclear war. Activists who can understand those who disagree about what should be done are bewildered and frustrated by those who do nothing. Such inaction is objectively irrational; as Caldicott asked in a 1982 cover article inFamily Weekly, “Why make sure kids clean their teeth and eat healthy food if they’re not going to survive?”(2) Advocates of all causes chafe at their neighbors’ lack of interest. When the issue is something like saving whales or wheelchair access to public buildings, the problem is usually diagnosed as apathy. Psychiatrist Robert Winer argues that the same is true of the nuclear threat, which most of us experience as remote, impersonal, and vague. For Winer, “one of the genuinely tragic aspects of the nuclear situation is that immediacy may be given to us only once and then it will be too late to learn.”(3) There is obviously some truth to this view. When asked to describe their images of nuclear war, people do tend to come up with abstractions – and those with more concrete, immediate images are likely to be antinuclear activists.(4)

Nuclear numbing devalues life

Lifton and Falk 82 (Robert – Professor Psychology at John Jay College, Richard – Professor of International Law at Princeton, *Indefensible Weapons*, p. 104-105) jl

Here too psychic and physical survival require a balance between feeling and not feeling. And that balance can readily go out of kilter, causing us to feel either too much or too little. Indeed, our contemporary nuclear threat not only contributes to upsetting that balance but raises questions about just what kind of balance between feeling and numbing is desirable or possible.

In Hiroshima, people I interviewed told me how, when the bomb fell, they were aware of people dying around them in horrible ways but that, within minutes or even seconds, they simply ceased to feel. They said such things as "I simply became insensitive to human death," or referred to a "paralysis of the mind." I came to call this general process psychic numbing and, in its most acute form, psychic closing-off. For survivors it was a necessary defense mechanism, since they could not have experienced full emotions in response to such scenes and remained sane. The numbing entailed derealization of what was actually happening along such inner psychological sequences as: "If I feel nothing, then death is not taking place," or "then I cannot be threatened by the death all around me," or "then I am not responsible for you or your death."

As useful to them as it was at the time, the numbing process did not necessarily end when the immediate danger was over. It would continue over weeks, months, or even years, and become associated with apathy, withdrawal, depression, despair, or a kind of survivor half-life with highly diminished capacity for pleasure, joy, or intense feelings in general.

Numbing Shell

Alternative: Reject their fear appeals regarding nuclear weapons

The alt generates activism against nuclearism

Sandman and Valenti 86 (Peter M., Professor of Public Health, Rutgers University, Founder and Director of the Environmental Communication Research Program, and Communications Counsel for Environmental Defense Fund, and JoAnn M., Professor of Communications, Brigham Young University, January http://www.psandman.com/articles/scarstif.htm TBC 6/29/10)

“The main obstacle to action,” writes Frank, “is neither apathy nor terror but simply a feeling of helplessness. To combat it, I have perhaps overemphasized the small signs that antinuclear activities are at last beginning to influence the political process.”(19) Helplessness, hopelessness, futility, and despair are words one hears even more often than fear from the barely active and the formerly active. And like fear, these emotions can easily lead to psychic numbing. Those who feel powerless to prevent nuclear war try not to think about it; and it serves the needs of those who do not wish to think about nuclear war to feel powerless to prevent it. Messages of hope and empowerment, however, break this vicious circle. The label “hope,” as we use it, subsumes a wide range of overlapping concepts: for example, optimism, a sense of personal control and efficacy, confidence in methods and solutions, a sense of moral responsibility, and a vision of the world one is aiming for. It is well established (and hardly surprising) that hope is closely associated with willingness to act. Activism appeals most to people who feel positive about both the proposed solution and their personal contribution to its achievement. Over the long term, this means that antinuclear organizers must communicate a credible vision of a nuclear-free world. Meanwhile, they must offer people things to do that seem achievable and worthwhile. The nuclear-weapons-freeze campaign attracted millions of new activists in 1982 because it offered credible hope. By 1985 many of those millions could no longer ground their hope in the freeze; some found other approaches and some returned to inactivity. Most social psychologists today see the relationship between hope and action as independent of fear or other feelings. For example, Kenneth H. Beck and Arthur Frankel conclude that three cognitions (not emotions) determine whether people will do something about a health risk: recognizing the danger as real, believing the recommended plan of action will reduce the danger, and having confidence in their ability to carry out the plan.(20) Similarly, Sutton’s review of the fear-appeal literature finds inconsistent support for the notion that people can accept higher levels of fear if they feel the proposed solution will remedy the problem, but strong evidence that, regardless of fear, people are more inclined to act on solutions they see as more effective.(21)

Link – General

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Nuclear fear generates psychic numbness which prevents resistance to nuclearism

Sandman and Valenti 86 (Peter M., Professor of Public Health, Rutgers University, Founder and Director of the Environmental Communication Research Program, and Communications Counsel for Environmental Defense Fund, and JoAnn M., Professor of Communications, Brigham Young University, January http://www.psandman.com/articles/scarstif.htm TBC 6/30/10)

If people are not apathetic, then, are they perhaps so fearful that they cannot act? Certainly terror is capable of producing paralysis, and the threat of nuclear war is capable of producing terror. The notion that we have all lived with terror since 1945 is powerfully evocative of the moments of nuclear terror that many people do experience. Yet, although children and antinuclear activists report high levels of nuclear fear, the adults whose inaction we are trying to understand acknowledge little fear. Nor should this surprise us. Continuous nuclear fear is undoubtedly rational, but it is also intolerable. To stay sane, people transmute much of the fear into anger and action – or they deny it and go about their business. Neither apathetic nor frightened, those who are inactive are actively working at not caring. Lifton, the psychiatrist who studied Hiroshima survivors before turning his attention to the ways Americans avoid facing nuclear reality, coined the phrase “psychic numbing” to describe the price paid for unwillingness to confront nuclear terror. Like the terror it masks, psychic numbing is immobilizing. The struggle not to feel saps the energy to act – certainly on nuclear issues and arguably even on other issues. This active, total, and chronic flight from feeling into paralysis must be distinguished from the partial numbing that can actually facilitate action. Even Caldicott has acknowledged, “Most of the time I don’t think about it. I pretend that life will go on. I sew for the kids. I make cakes and look after the family.… Life’s a fantastic, precious thing. I don’t think about it ending except when I write or talk about it.”(7) It may be useful to think of psychic numbing as a strong and dangerous medicine for fear; in overdose it leads to paralysis, and most people are in overdose.

Link – General

Nuclear terror rules over our lives and numbs our psyches

Wolman 7 (Carol Psychiatrist lifelong peace-advocate August http://www.opednews.com/author/author20.html TBC 7/1/10)

NUCLEAR TERROR strikes at the very heart of consciousness, which ultimately is about continuation of the species. As individuals, we are concerned about ourselves. As members of a species, we are concerned about reproduction, about having healthy children and providing for them. As continuation of the species looks more and more unlikely, we develop more and more PSYCHIC NUMBING- a deep loss of hope for the future: shutting down of the basic biological urge to propagate our kind. We stop having children, or don't care for them. We live in the moment and don't plan for the future of our children, our grandchildren, our planet. Our psyches are terribly distorted, and the distortions are embedded in the developing brains of everyone born after 1945. Since we all are affected, we don't notice, just as fish aren't aware of water. We are psychically split. We act as if life will go on for many generations to come, ignoring the ever-growing danger of nuclear war. We live AS IF life were the same as it was 100 years ago. Nuclear war is a taboo subject, not fit for polite company. Essentially, we are all living a lie, ignoring the overwhelming threat to continuation of life on earth. Psychic numbing shows up in our trouble making and keeping long term commitments, such as the marriage vow.

Imagery of nuclear war invokes the notion of the being the sole survivor looking down upon a post-apocalyptic world – this devotion makes nuclear warfare desirable as it’s disguised as the world’s creator and destroyer

Chernus 86 (Ira, Professor of Religious studies at UC Boulder, *Dr. Strangegod*, p. 86-87) jl

If this kind of mythological imagery was a common response to bombs dropped in the past, it is even more common in responding to bombs that might fall in the future. Perhaps this is inevitable. In order to think about a nuclear war at all, as we have seen, the mind is compelled to put itself in the role of survivor. It is compelled to assume that something must follow cataclysmic destruction, and so it finds itself willy-nilly in the age-old scenario of death and rebirth. Nuclear war easily comes to appear, especially in the unconscious fantasy, as the “big bang” that will wipe away the accumulated terrors of history and bring the birth of a pristine new world. The Bomb therefore comes to symbolize the endlessness of the chain of death-and-life, playing the role of destroyer and creator that was once reserved for a less technological deity. The inescapable lure of this mythic pattern is surely evident in the myriad fictional nuclear wars that have filled literature, television film, and comic books for forty years. In these science-fiction depictions, there is always at least a hint—often much more than a hint—that annihilation is acceptable, or even desirable, as the necessary prelude to new creation. The appeal of science fiction, like the appeal of myth, comes in part from the very act of experiencing the story. As reader or listener or viewer, one is taken out of the normal everyday world and projected into a “fabulous” time, in which the events are more powerful, more intense, more grandiose than any we have actually known. Thus the world of myth and science fiction is “surreal”—more real than real. Yet at the same time it is, in the modern view, unreal, as in our characteristic equation of “mythical” with “unreal.” But this, too, as we have seen, is a consolation and even an attraction when speaking of nuclear weapons; by casting them into an unreal setting we can make our own world with its precariousness and all-enveloping danger unreal as well. Thus mythicizing can make nuclear war more appealing, while the terrible danger of nuclear war makes the mythicizing of it more appealing as well. Just as we are ambivalent about the dangers of nuclear war, so are we ambivalent about the powers spoken of in myth.

Link – General

The image of nuclear conflict obscures the difference between literal and symbolic meaning of the bomb which results in lashing inward at ourselves outward toward external enemies

Chernus 86 (Ira, Professor of Religious studies at UC Boulder, *Dr. Strangegod*, p. 153-155) jl

Moreover, even if we could imagine the reality of nuclear war in purely literal terms, there is good reason to believe that we should not follow this path. Literal thinking and literal language impose a particular mode of thought and feeling one that is intimately linked with the Bomb and its symbolism. Literalism insists that in every situation there is one single meaning and one single truth to be found. Thus it divides the world into true and false, right and wrong, good and evil, with no middle ground allowed. It is the characteristic language of a culture bent on an apocalyptic crusade to wipe out *all* evil. It allows no ground for a unified vision of good and evil or life and death together. At the same time, literalism underscores our psychic numbing. With its statistics, computer projections, and abstract theoretical models, the literal approach reduces the world to a set of finite means and ends, each with a single simple meaning. It fails to grasp the complexities of human reality and human response. It creates a dehumanized world amenable to manipulation and control, in which we learn to see other people and ultimately ourselves as mere inert objects. It is the characterstic language of a technological culture that has made a death-machine its deity. The inert words of literalism create an inert world, in which every thing is just the thing it is and can be nothing else. In this one-dimensional world it is increasingly difficult to give possible realities and imagined realities any meaningful place. So we are prevented by our mode of speaking and thinking from exploring genuine alternatives to the existing situation. We are also prevented from recognizing the reality and power of our symbolisms and fantasies. Since we define literal truth as the only valid form of truth, we deny that our unconscious processes have any valid truth at all. So literalism becomes part of the process of psychological repression. This is especially dangerous in the nuclear age, when the difference between literal reality and fantasy is so hard to find. With fantasy images affecting us so powerfully, we must exert ever more powerful processes of repression. One way to achieve this is simply to intensify our numbing—to refuse to feel at all. Another way is to project our inner thoughts and feelings onto external objects—to make the Enemy responsible for all the anger and hatred and dark feelings that wells up inside us. As numbing reinforces our commitment to dehumanizing technology, projection reinforces our commitment to an apocalyptic crusade against the Enemy. So literalism against ties together both our ways of thinking about the Bomb and our efforts to avoid thinking about it. Yet even the most ardent literalism cannot banish the symbolic dimensions of our mind and our symbolic responses to the Bomb. Indeed, our conviction that literal truth is the only truth paradoxically strengthens the grip of symbolic meanings. The more literalism starves our supply of symbolic thinking and feeling, the more it feeds our hunger, and the more intensively we cling to our symbols. Since we are convinced that these nuclear symbols are actually literal realities, they take even deeper root in our psyches. When warnings of the dire realities of nuclear war are cast in purely literal terms, they are received on the symbolic level (even if we consciously deny them) and their threatening aspect is largely nullified. Perhaps this explains, in part, the relatively limited success of the nuclear disarmament movement. The movement has tried to move us from the level of numbing to the level of awareness by urging us to imagine the literal horrors of nuclear war. Yet its alarms have fallen largely on deaf ears. The movement itself has explained this deafness by pointing to the conflict between the first two levels of awareness and numbing. But in its commitment to literal thinking it has ignored the third level of symbolic meaning. This literalism is just part of a larger picture—the disarmament movement’s roots in the liberal humanism of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. This rationalistic humanism strips the issue of its religious and psychological complexities and sees it as a purely ethical matter: humanism and life against global death, one value against another. It assumes that ethical problem must be resolved by literal factual analysis and clear logical analysis alone. It assumes, furthermore, that all people are rational and can be shown the convergence of morality and self-interest. Therefore the movement puts all its energies into education based solely on facts and logical arguments. Yet it is clear that the nuclear issue goes beyond ethical considerations, and it is equally clear that the antinuclear campaign cannot succeed merely by stressing the irrationality of nuclear armament, for the Bomb’s nonrational symbolic meanings lie at the heart of its appeal. Moreover, the Enlightenment tradition still links its faith in rationality to a belief in “progress,” which means the triumph of the forces of life over the forces of death. Yet all these Enlightenment values are the very values held just as ferverently by nuclear policymakers, strategists, and political and military leaders. We have ample evidence that they too put their faith in logical analysis and the triumph of life over death, always holding the opposites apart. And proponents of nuclear armament have always couched their arguments in the most literal terms. The media have largely accepted this literal treatment and passed it along to the general public. Media presentations of the issue have been saturated with symbolic meanings that have gone unrecognized as symbolism because we have assumed that all truth must be literal truth. So the disarmament movement’s own roots are closely intertwined with the roots of the very tree it hopes to feel. As long as it fails to recognize the role of symbolism and the irrationality in the psyche, it will fail to grasp the fascinating appealing qualities of the Bomb. If we are to “imagine the real,” the first step is to understand that the reality we must imagine is largely a symbolic reality that crosses the line between literalism and fantasy.

Link – Extinction

Fantasies of world destruction feed into nuclearism

Lifton 1 (Robert Jay Spring, Illusions of the Second Nuclear Age World Policy Journal, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb6669/is\_1\_18/ai\_n28841497/?tag=content;col1 TBC 7/1/10)

The larger point is that trickle-down nuclearism can tap the widespread human potential for fantasies of world destruction and organize the fantasies so that they become concrete and even respectable. To be sure, such malignant fantasies can hardly be eliminated by a test ban treaty or by any single international or domestic act. But the very existence of these weapons is a constant stimulus for world-ending fantasies, along with the potential means of carrying them out.

Link – Extinction

Extinction imagery causes nuclear numbing

Lifton and Falk 82 (Robert – Professor Psychology at John Jay College, Richard – Professor of International Law at Princeton, *Indefensible Weapons* Pg.57-64 TBC 7/2/10)

The image in question, really imagery of extinction, \* has never taken on sharp contours for me. Rather than experience the ready psychic flow associated with most lively images, I must struggle amorphously to encompass the idea of violently attained nothingness. Further blurring occurs around the process by which this happens—and here the imagery contains scenes and description from Hiroshima, pictures of later thermonuclear explosions, consuming fire storms, decimated cities, and variable additional suggestions of total destruction. All of this, however, never fully coheres and never takes a clear place among the many more limited and specific images that regularly connect with my mind's continuing encounters with prosaic events and larger matters. Yet that image, amorphous though it may be, is never entirely absent from my ongoing mental activities. To grasp something of the image we need to approach it a bit indirectly and to make a few comparisons. We know that religious images of the end of the world go back to the beginnings of history: for instance, images of Armageddon or "final judgment." These have undoubtedly been terrifying to many people, but they are part of a worldview or cosmology. Humankind is acted upon by a higher power who has his reasons, who destroys only for spiritual purposes, such as achieving "the kingdom of God." For the believer, terror is accompanied by a structure of meaning; there is a larger purpose and even an image of a future—again the kingdom of God. Extinction by technology would seem to be from a different tradition. Technological prophets have envisioned this modern, secular version of the world's end from at least the time of the Industrial Revolution. This is the literary tradition of the "mad scientist" who either, like Frankenstein, creates world-destroying technological monster or else invents equally lethal "death rays" (this image predating but much influenced by the discovery of radiation). Perhaps the greatest exemplar of this tradition was H. G. Wells, who not only projected technological world destruction, but invoked something he named the "atomic bomb" as the agent of that destruction. In his 1913 novel, The World Set Free, Wells describes a world war of the 1950s in which the world's great cities are destroyed, each by an individual atomic bomb the size of a bowling ball. Ironically enough, it was through reading H. G. Wells in the mid-1930s that Leo Szilard became convinced that actual atomic bombs could indeed be built. But there is much more to the story. Wells himself had been greatly influenced by Frederick Soddy, collaborator on radioactivity studies with the great physicist Ernest Rutherford, and a man with sufficient vision to declare as early as 1903 that anyone who controlled nuclear energy "would possess a weapon by which he could destroy the earth if he chose." Wells, who had a background in science and had taught biology for a number of years, could fully grasp Soddy's ideas. So much so that in The World Set Free, he even described the radioactive chain reaction making possible the atomic bombs. 4 Soddy himself, much earlier had also been deeply impressed by this Wells novel, which seemed to give greater reality to his own nuclear fear. Soddy's increasing concern about nuclear weapons, as well as his reaction to World War I and the death in battle of a friend and fellow scientist, caused him to change his life focus and devote his remaining years to social and economic studies on behalf of world peace. But when Szilard came to H. G. Wells, the nuclear chain reaction was not merely a scientific projection; it had been specifically identified and demonstrated. We may assume that Wells's images brought to awareness Szilard's already-existing preconscious knowledge that such a bomb was not only possible but imminently feasible. And from that moment on Szilard's life actions were dominated by that awareness: first in trying to prevent scientists from publishing findings that might lead to the making of a bomb; next by initiating (through a letter to President Roosevelt he convinced Einstein to sign) the American Manhattan Project, largely out of fear that if that were not done the Germans would produce one first; then, in his desperate efforts (with other scientists) to prevent the bomb from being dropped on a populated city without warning; and finally in his heroic post-World War II leadership of the scientists' movement to bring about nuclear disarmament. In any case, the actual use of the weapons on the two Japanese cities gave substance to the image and disseminated it everywhere, making it the dubious psychic property of the common man and woman. Moreover, other events have contributed to imagery of extinction. Here I would include Nazi genocide during World War II; various nuclear accidents involving weapons (the coming apart of a bomb in Arkansas in 1980) or energy (Three Mile Island, in 1979); the idea of destroying the environment or its outer supports (the ozone layer); or of the depletion of the world's resources (especially food and energy). Nuclear weapons are simply the destructive edge of our technology gone wild in its distorted blend with science—or what Lewis Mumford calls the final apotheosis of the contemporary megamachine. But the weapons remain at the heart of our fear as the most extreme expression of that aberration. Undoubtedly these technological versions draw upon emotions that went into earlier theological images. Or to put the matter another way, the technological version of the end of the world probably owes a great deal, imaginatively speaking, to its theological predecessor. Moreover, just as we have seen that literary and scientific versions influence one another in back-and-forth ways, the same can be said of theological and scientific image structures. In that sense traditions are not so distinct after all. (We will return to this merging of imagery in the discussion of "nuclear fundamentalism" in chapter 9.) But there are several special features to this contemporary, technical end-of-the-world imagery. There is first the more specific suggestion of the end of our species, of something on the order of biological extinction. Second, it is related to specific external events of recent history, namely Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the Nazi death camps. And third, unlike earlier imagery—even that associated with such external events as the plagues of the Middle Ages—the danger comes from our own hand, from man and his technology. The source is not God or nature but we ourselves. Our "end" is perceived as a form of self-destruct, and try as we may we are hard put to give it purpose or meaning. What does such imagery do to us? Until recently psychological science had no reason to ask such a question. And now, when the question comes to haunt us no less than the end-of‐ the-world imagery itself, psychologists, like others, remain mostly silent. Yet there is every reason to believe that we are indeed affected by this imagery in ways that are both ambiguous and profound.

Link – Language

The idea of ‘nuclear war’ is unthinkable – the affirmative creates the very world they attempt to avoid.

Gyngell 1-3 (Adam Gyngll, January 3rd 2010, http://www.brainwaving.com/2010/01/03/writing-the-unthinkable-narrative-the-bomb-and-nuclear-holocaust/)

The atomic bomb and the prospect of universal annihilation place an interminable stress on the capacity of language to articulate the realities of the nuclear age. Ideas that were formerly unthinkable now required a semantic structure, a new language. In Physics and Philosophy, Heisenberg questions how we might understand nuclear physics when we cannot speak about the atom in ordinary language. Physicists found themselves confronted with a mystery, a power that defied the vocabulary that first tried to encompass it: sub-atomic particles whose behaviour could be explained only in the densest mathematical equations. We see the human world replaced by a statistical one: death and destruction are reduced to a neat collection of fractions and figures. Our vertiginous sense of dislocation, our awareness of the helplessness of words to express such precise annihilation, is one shared by those whose task it is to narrate nuclear holocaust. Derrida observes how, faced by the bleak prospect of nuclear ending, we seek to neutralize its horror, “to translate the unknown into a known, to metaphorize, allegorize, domesticate the terror, to circumvent (with the help of circumlocution…) the inescapable catastrophe’ (Derrida 1984, 201). Unable to comprehend the unprecedented destructive force of nuclear war, we are reduced to rolling out clichés, exchanging dead metaphors. Nuclear war is ‘unthinkable’: it is a site where language stops, for reasons of both internal logic and social proscription. If the unthinkable cannot be thought, it is both in terms of possibility and prohibition. Striving to reveal the secrets of apocalypse becomes an attempt to uncover forbidden knowledge. The scientists at Los Alamos strove to unlock the secrets of the universe.  In doing so, they discovered the means by which the world might be destroyed. In 1944, while work on Oppenheimer’s Manhattan Project proceeded, Niels Bohr arrived in Washington from Europe. He warned that the plan to release nuclear energy through a bomb constituted ‘a far deeper interference with the natural course of events than anything ever before attempted’ (Jungk 1958, 345). Scientists, Bohr reckoned, were dealing with something beyond their control, beyond their comprehension. A decade earlier, Szilard had been quick to realize the potential dangers of nuclear chain reaction, and called on his colleagues to keep the discovery secret from the Germans. Szilard was painfully aware of the need to restrict this knowledge. Unlike the apocalypses of the Bible, nuclear holocaust precludes the possibility of a ‘secret pointing to salvation’. It offers no revelation, no judgment, no definition. The title of Derrida’s seminal essay, ‘No Apocalypse, Not Now’, does not imply that the world cannot be destroyed by nuclear war: rather, it underlines that there will be no revelation, ‘not now’. Nuclear holocaust makes revelation of meaning impossible: it represents ‘the historical and ahistorical horizon of an absolute self-destructibility without apocalypse, without revelation of its own truth, without absolute knowledge’ (Derrida 1984, 27). As in Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five, the apocalypse that will consume the world is an absurd accident. Death is accidental, random, meaningless. At the point of critical mass, the light does not illuminate, but incinerate.

Link – Language

**Nuclear War is fictitious – because it has never happened it exists only within texts and our mind, the 1AC creates war by legitimizing these constructed scenarios to the world stage.**

Gyngell 1-3 (Adam Gyngll, January 3rd 2010, http://www.brainwaving.com/2010/01/03/writing-the-unthinkable-narrative-the-bomb-and-nuclear-holocaust/)

Derrida famously observed that nuclear apocalypse as a ‘phenomenon is fabulously textual… a nuclear war has not taken place: one can only talk and write about it’ (Derrida 1984, 23). Denied its all-consuming reality, nuclear holocaust can exist for Derrida only within the secure confines of the text. It seems suitable, then, that the history of nuclear war itself seems to be so ‘fabulously textual.’ Over thirty years before the Alamogordo explosion, Wells’ The World Set Free depicted a devastating global war fought with ‘atomic bombs’ – a Wellsian coinage. Dedicated to Soddy and his ‘Interpretation of Radium’, the novel would later influence Szilard in his development of the nuclear chain reaction: a discovery that paved the way for the first atomic bomb. The bomb germinated in the mind of a writer of speculative fiction. By 1980, faced with the nightmarish prospect of human extinction as a result of global nuclear conflict, the American Office of Technological Assessment compiled a mammoth report called The Effects of Nuclear War. The report concludes by abandoning its hypothetical empirical assessments of a surviving society, ending, ironically: ‘In an effort to provide a more concrete understanding of what a world after a nuclear war would be like, OTA commissioned a work of fiction’ (O.T.A 1980, 9). The bomb’s genesis was located in a work of fiction: staring at a future more unbelievable and overwhelming than the most dystopian of novels, it seems appropriate that a work of fiction should be commissioned to find its solution. Apocalypse is a product of the imagination. The scientific imagination has produced weapons with the destructive capability to end the world, leaving no remainders, no aftermath. Within the artistic imagination, the end becomes a permeable boundary, an event that can be rehearsed, reversed and repeated – like the looped footage of blossoming mushroom clouds, accompanied by Vera Lynn’s ‘We’ll Meet Again’, at the end of Dr Strangelove. In a world where there is no-one left alive to watch his film, Kubrick permits this primal scene, the sight forbidden to humanity on pain of death, to repeat itself indefinitely.

Link – State

Placing responsibility in the state obscures our responsibility for genocide

Nandy 98 (Ashis The Times of India July 10, 1998 http://www.ofbjp.org/news/0798/0024.html TBC 7/1/10)

The other way of avoiding accountability is to remove it from individuals and vest it in institutions and aggregates. As if institutions by themselves could run a death machine without the intervention of individuals. After a while, even terms like the military-industrial complex, fascism, imperialism, Stalinism, ruling class or American hegemony become ways of freeing actual, real-life persons from their culpability for recommending, ordering, or committing mass murders. In a society where genocidal mentality spreads, intellectuals also find such impersonal analyses soothing; they contribute to the creation of a business-as-usual-ambience in which institutions are ritually blamed and the psychopathic scientists, bureaucrats and politicians who work towards genocides move around scot-free.

Link – Hegemony

Their hegemony advantage blinds us to the dangers innate in nuclear weaponry

Lifton 1 (Robert Jay Spring, Illusions of the Second Nuclear Age World Policy Journal, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb6669/is\_1\_18/ai\_n28841497/?tag=content;col1 TBC 7/1/10)

Bound up with the nuclear dynamic, but not much addressed, are various currents of superpower psychology. America's superpower status, what we may call its "superpower syndrome," is inexorably tied--not only militarily and politically but psychologically--to its nuclear domination. A superpower, by definition, transcends ordinary limits of power. When, as today, there is only one nation so designated, its leaders and its citizens as well run the danger of feeling themselves to be part of something that is more than natural, that is mystical, even omnipotent and deified (tendencies hardly absent from American history in general). Above all, a superpower cannot be vulnerable, and any indication of vulnerability or weakness must be negated. Within that mentality, other countries might suffer horrendous damage in a nuclear war, but the superpower must emerge unscathed. Hence the persistent American illusions about antiballistic missiles and national missile defense, and the commitment (disturbingly strong in the new Bush administration but hardly absent elsewhere) to a project that does not and cannot work--cannot ever effectively counter incoming nuclear missiles--while radically undermining worldwide arrangements for actually reducing the nuclear threat. The superpower syndrome adversely affects other nations as well. They may become deeply resentful of the superpower's aggressive claims to omnipotence and its resistance to sharing the international responsibilities of ordinary nations. At the same time, they may find themselves becoming deeply dependent upon the superpower as the only source of effective action in the world. But the most profound danger of this syndrome is its denial of the universal vulnerability to nuclear holocaust. This denial in turn further feeds the illusions of nuclearism.

Link – Rationalizing Nukes

The affirmative plays the role of rationalist “defense intellectuals” who construct logical scenarios which necessitates nuclear weapons

CHERNUS 85 (J WAR AND MYTH: "THE SHOW MUST GO ON" Am Acad Relig.1985; TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 449)

The "defense intellectuals" who have forged America's nuclear weapons policy are often called the high priests of nuclear theology- and with some justice. There is a foundation of faith buried beneath the intricate logic of their doctrines. Unlike other priesthoods, how- ever, the "defense intellectuals" make logical reasoning not only the tool but the very content of their faith. Abstract, technical, mathemat- ical reason is the god at whose throne they worship-though the Bomb seems to be seated at this god's right hand. The story of American nuclear policy is the story of their unbounded faith in the modern rational mind. These "intellectuals" direct their religious zeal to two related tasks. First, they must identify rationally meaningful purposes for nuclear weapons; these are pragmatic political and economic gains that the nation can reasonably hope to achieve with its nuclear arsenal. Second, they must design rational ways of using the weapons to attain these ends. The two tasks are dialectically related, for "technically sweet" means can dictate ends as often as ends deter- mine means. The search for the perfectly rational combination of means and ends has been going on for nearly three decades now. Ever since the Kennedy administration, with its own faith in rationality, brought the "defense intellectuals" to Washington, they and their computerized creations have shaped American nuclear strategy (Kaplan)

Rational explanations for nuclear war rely on an underlying myth of purifying sacrifice

CHERNUS 85 (J WAR AND MYTH: "THE SHOW MUST GO ON" Am Acad Relig.1985; TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 459-460)

This model has not totally replaced the earlier mythic paradigms. The nuclear issue still evokes strong overtones of purifying sacrifice, redemptive regeneration, the extermination of evil, and the return to primal chaos. It offers the satisfaction of legitimizing the traditional nomos by re-enacting archetypal patterns; it holds all the appeals that have always drawn nations to war. But these pre-nuclear traditions remain viable in the nuclear age largely because the new mythology that has been laid over them is compelling and diverting enough to camouflage their troubling irrationalities. In the process, the magni- tude of paradox had been significantly increased. Yet this only strengthens the appeal of the paradigm, for the myth of rational balance that now dominates is built on the assumption that human reason can keep the opposites of life in balanced tension indefinitely. Nuclear armament, deterrence strategy, arms control, and all the other strands of our nuclear policy receive public support because they seem to give the Bomb rational uses as something other than a weapon of war. But all of these "uses" are valued, at a deeper level, because they are so many ways of acting out our boundless faith in technical reason on a stage of cosmic power and significance. The act of constructing and maintaining a humanly controlled nomos is itself the chief paradigm for the nuclear contest. Insofar as the contest is directed against an enemy, the enemy is primarily irrationality itself, and only secondarily irrationality as embodied in the policies of the U.S.S.R. In other words, the paradigm has no specific content beyond the formal element common to all paradigmatic enactments-the mainte- nance of order as an end in itself. It would seem that once nuclear weapons spelled out the ultimate consequences of the modern view of war as work, the next step had to be a leap to the opposite view of war as play, replicating nomos for the sake of the replication. Yet at the very center of the paradigm's bewildering paradoxes sits the Bomb, our prime symbol of infinite power and chaos. As in all war myths, it is the seamless weave of order and chaos, woven against a backdrop of "wholly other" power, that lures us to the brink of our own destruc- tion. But now, for the first time, we hope to make that power our permanent-and permanently harmless-possession.

Link – Arms Control

Nuclear arms control policies only suppressing our drive toward conflict – this makes nuclear conflict inevitable

Chernus 2 (Ira, UC-Boulder, http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/cra0759.htm, AD: 6/30/10) jl

For some of us, abolition was a calling, a mission, perhaps even a religion. Antinuclearism was our creed and faith. Jonathan Schell s book, The Fate of the Earth, was our Bible. August 6th and 9th were our holiest days. Each year at this time, we came together for rituals of remembrance and rededication to our sacred mission. We knew how difficult the struggle would be. We were prepared to celebrate this annual rite for the rest of our lives, if necessary, so we could pass on to our children a nuclear-free world.

Now it all seems like a distant memory. The cold war is long over. Republicans and Democrats alike create rituals of their own, disarmament negotiations and nuclear warhead reductions and nuclear test moratoriums. Along with these symbolic gestures, they give us comforting words about their solemn dedication to ending the nuclear threat.

And they succeed, in the same way that all effective rituals and incantations succeed. They offer reassurance. They produce a sense that the problems that once plagued us with so much anxiety are now safely under control. They create an image of national security. To most Americans, the nuclear threat seems to have vanished. The antinuclear movement seems to be a superfluous anachronism.

Meanwhile, the people we pay with our tax dollars to provide real national security are busy inventing the next generation of nuclear weapons. Now they have the world's fastest computers to test them in cyberspace. Yet they refuse to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, because they know that some day they will want to test them in that huge underground space in Nevada. And soon they plan to put nuclear weapons in outer space.

They no longer make nuclear weapons just down the road from my home, at Rocky Flats. Now they are getting ready to make them at Los Alamos instead. They may be making them there already. This, like so much else about nuclear weaponry, is still kept in tight secrecy. We have nothing to say about it. Democracy fell victim to the atomic bomb even before Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Today, as every day since August, 1945, our government's plans for winning wars include an unquestioned willingness to use nuclear weapons. But the new generation of nukes are smaller, more versatile, designed for a wide variety of specialized tasks. They are meant to be part of the integrated computerized network which is supposed to give the U.S. total control of every battlefield.

The atomic bombs of 1945 spawned a fantasy of omnipotent control that still shapes U.S. strategy. Indeed, it is easy to see the whole nuclear phenomenon as a ritual, unconsciously intended to give governments and nations an illusion of global control.

In the U.S., it began as an illusion of control over the Red Menace. Now, we have no communists to fight, no nuclear-armed superpower to oppose us. So our leaders pursue a fantasy of total control over every nation. They look for any nation, large or small, that may possibly be developing their own nukes. If our leaders don't like their leaders, they claim a sacred right to go to war, and to use nuclear weapons if they deem it necessary.

Like every ritual, this one tends to create an imagined world of simplistic absolute truth. We are the good guys with good nukes. Those we label as enemies are the bad guys with bad nukes. Our leaders say that we must threaten to use our good nukes, because there is a remote chance that some day the bad guys may get bad nukes. With perfectly straight faces, they call this policy not only reasonable, but moral. Unless people of conscience act fast, and massively, this ritualized fantasy will soon be acted out in Iraq.

Nuclear fear may have gone away. Nuclear weapons have not. As long as those weapons exist, they will some day be used again. It is still not a question of If, but When. Isn t it time to bring back our own sacred rituals, to dedicate ourselves once again to the abolition?

Link – Arms Control

Removal of weapons without asking the “why?” question only makes our military posture more effective while appearing benign

Lifton and Falk 82 (Robert – Professor Psychology at John Jay College, Richard – Professor of International Law at Princeton, *Indefensible Weapons*, p. 254-256) jl

If moderate postures (that is, as a weaponry of ultimate recourse when total defeat is in prospect) evolve into purely defensive nuclear postures (that is, a weaponry retained only as protection against the nuclearism of others), then a fundamentally different situation would exist. True, even a defensive conception of nuclear weaponry might produce various forms of anxiety about whether the capabilities and intentions of the other side could not mount a successful disarming first strike (thereby destroying the hedge), and such speculation, possibly induced by maliciously false intelligence reports, could, if believed, create renewed pressures to resume the nuclear arms race despite the adoption of declarations of prohibition, freeze arrangements, and a host of other arms control measures. As long as the weaponry continues as an existing part of the security package then the structure of nuclearism, however contained, will cast its long shadow across our lives, posing in some form risks to human survival, impairing democratic relations between state and society, and, very likely, inducing a tensed reliance on nonnuclear militarism to offset the diminishing role of nuclear weaponry in an unchanged global political context. A central source of persisting anxiety will be the forward march of technology, making the weaponry of mass destruction more and more accessible to virtually all governments and discontented groups; the problems of proliferations will remain and jeopardize any international framework based on purely defensive conceptions. Furthermore, so long as the war system persists, a purely defensive posture for nuclear weapons would always be drawn into question whenever a government possessing nuclear weapons was facing the prospect of a major military defeat. Worthy and ambitious as is the shift to a purely defensive posture, it cannot hope to be entirely stable, and yet, as Jonathan Schell tirelessly underscores, the weaponry cannot be disinvented. We again confront here the apparent unresolvable tension between our need to get totally rid of this weaponry and the apparent impossibility of doing so. This tension expresses in clearest form the specific nature of the nuclear trap. History must be reversed, but history, by its nature, is irreversible. Yet the finality of this formulation may itself be a trap set by ourselves, by our way of thinking. Nuclear weapons may "disappear" when other arrangements render them "irrelevant," when, for instance, the defense of our national boundaries relies no more on military capabilities than does the security of Pennsylvania in its relationship to New Jersey or Ohio. We get a glimpse of this possibility in the mutual relations of Western European countries since 1945 or of Canada and the United States in this century.

To overcome nuclearism, as such, requires quite a different sort of action than increasing the rationality and prudence of existing political leaders or of moderating institutional arrangements. It rests on the live possibility of establishing an orientation toward security that is not wedded to militarist strategies of geographical defense. It presupposes, in other words, supplanting the Machiavellian world picture with some version of a holistic world picture. Such a process would automatically transform the role and character of political institutions, eliminating a society's dependence on the existence of an enemy to achieve identity and coherence. A holistic world picture defines group coherence positively by a capacity to satisfy basic human needs of all people without damaging the biosphere or weakening reverence for nature. This holistic alternative is struggling in various ways to emerge in our thought and action,

although as yet its influence seems weak and marginal, often expressing itself more in relation to ideas about diet and health than reshaping our sense of the political. It is important for the movement against nuclearism to grasp that realizing its goals is inseparable from the triumph over time of this holistic orientation. At this stage, this understanding may require nothing more substantive than a receptivity to such a possibility and a clarity about the desirability, yet limited horizons, of actions designed to diminish the dangers of nuclearism in its current forms.

Link – Arms Control

Even attempts to move away from nuclear weapons only represses our psychological desires for destruction that culminates in nuclear holocaust

Chernus 91 (Ira, Professor of Religious studies at UC Boulder, *Nuclear Madness: On Religion an Psychology in the Nuclear Age,*, p. 92-93) jl

Perhaps the greatest danger of the "safe Bomb" fantasy is that precisely because it represses our former fantasies of annihilation and omnipotence it insures their continued hold upon us. Hillman agrees with most depth psychologists that repressed thoughts, emotions, and images will inevitably return. But he stresses that, when repressed through literalism, they will return literally, in "ungainly, obsessive, literalistic ways, affecting consciousness with precisely the qualities it strives to, exclude."" This principle plays a central role in shap­ing our nuclear images. When we deny the call of irrational death for a place in our imaginal life, we find ourselves bedaz­zled by compelling obsessions with irrational death-and kill­ing-as physical realities. Always bent on domination, living in a world of constant challenge, and taking every conflict on the level of literal physical concreteness, we are inevitably fascinated by images of physical power, aggression, and destruction. Even when we pursue policies to control destructive technologies, we are held by nuclear images and technologies in an apparently mysterious grip. Even when political realities as well as rhetoric seem to dictate dissolving our nuclear arsenals, real progress toward that goal is agonizingly slow. Even when declaratory policy finds no reasonable use for the weapons, actual policy may plan to use them as traditional instruments of war. Hillman's theorizing helps to clear up the mystery: the shadow side, he contends, returns in its most ungainly literal form as the indispensable tool for virtuously repressing the shadow side. No matter how well intentioned our "safe Bomb" ideologies may be, these attempts to repress the shadow side are inevitably self-defeating because they actually preserve the shadow they hope to dispel. In light of declaratory policy, nuclear holocaust may occur only as an apparent accident, countering all the world's best intentions to avert it. Or, in light of the actual policy pursued in some military quarters, it may appear to be the most moral act of all, in a perverse conclusion to the heroic ego's perversely self-righteous morality. Regardless of declaratory or actual policies, however, holocaust remains a very real possibility because we have psychologically negated the Bomb's living actuality.

Link – Impact Framing – “Magnitude OW’s Probability”

High magnitude low probability fear scenarios prevent action

Sandman and Valenti 86 (Peter M., Professor of Public Health, Rutgers University, Founder and Director of the Environmental Communication Research Program, and Communications Counsel for Environmental Defense Fund, and JoAnn M., Professor of Communications, Brigham Young University, January http://www.psandman.com/articles/scarstif.htm TBC 6/30/10)

It is worth distinguishing between the magnitude of a risk and the probability of its occurrence. Terror and numbness, we think, are predominantly responses to risks too horrible to think about, while preventive action may be likelier when the risk is high in probability but not so high in magnitude. Though the empirical evidence is scanty, this distinction may explain why campaigns against drunk driving seem to work better when they focus on loss of license (a likely occurrence) instead of loss of life (a horrible consequence), or why so many ex-smokers say social pressure, not health, made the difference. Similarly, there is mixed evidence that fear appeals displaced onto one’s friends and family are more effective than fear appeals aimed at oneself. And as most parents figure out themselves, fear seems a better motivator for avoidance (“don’t cross the highway”) than for action (“cross carefully”), since action requires attention to the fear-arousing stimulus. All these complexities argue against the use of fear in antinuclear organizing.

Internal Link – Movements

Threats of nuclear extinction are counter-productive to the peace movement – encourages resignation

Martin 84 (Brian, Research Associate – Australian National University, SANA Update, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/ sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html, AD: 7/1/10) jl

Nuclear doomsdayism should be of concern because of its effect on the political strategy and effectiveness of the peace movement. While beliefs in nuclear extinction may stimulate some people into antiwar action, it may discourage others by fostering resignation. Furthermore, some peace movement activities may be inhibited because they allegedly threaten the delicate balance of state terror. The irony here is that there should be no need to exaggerate the effects of nuclear war, since, even well short of extinction, the consequences would be sufficiently devastating to justify the greatest efforts against it.

The effect of extinction politics is apparent in responses to the concept of limited nuclear war. Antiwar activists, quite justifiably, have attacked military planning and apologetics for limited nuclear war in which the effects are minimized in order to make them more acceptable. But opposition to military planning often has led antiwar activists to refuse to acknowledge the possibility that nuclear war could be 'limited' in the sense that less than total annihilation could result. A 'limited' nuclear war with 100 million deaths is certainly possible, but the peace movement has not seriously examined the political implications of such a war. Yet even the smallest of nuclear wars could have enormous political consequences, for which the peace movement is totally unprepared.[[6]](http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/84sana1.html#n6)

The peace movement also has denigrated the value of civil defence, apparently, in part, because a realistic examination of civil defence would undermine beliefs about total annihilation. The many ways in which the effects of nuclear war are exaggerated and worst cases emphasized can be explained as the result of a presupposition by antiwar scientists and activists that their political aims will be fulfilled when people are convinced that there is a good chance of total disaster from nuclear war.[[7]](http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/84sana1.html#n7)

Internal Link – Fear Key

Fear is the root cause of the aff

Massumi, 5 (Brian, professor in the Communication Department at the Université de Montréal, “Fear (The Spectrum Said)”, Positions, 13.1, TBC 6/29/10 Project Muse p. 35-6)

The necessity for a pragmatics of uncertainty to which the color system alerts us is related to a change in the nature of the object of power. The formlessness and contentlessness of its exercise in no way means that power no longer has an object. It means that the object of power is correspondingly formless and contentless: post 9/11, governmentality has molded itself to threat. A threat is unknowable. If it were known in its specifics, it wouldn’t be a threat. It would be a situation—as when they say on television police shows, “we have a situation”—and a situation can be handled. A threat is only a threat if it retains an indeterminacy. If it has a form, it is not a substantial form, but a time form: a futurity. The threat as such is nothing yet—just a looming. It is a form of futurity yet has the capacity to fill the present without presenting itself. Its future looming casts a present shadow, and that shadow is fear. Threat is the future cause of a change in the present. A future cause is not actually a cause; it is a virtual cause, or quasicause. Threat is a futurity with a virtual power to affect the present quasicausally. When a governmental mechanism makes threat its business, it is taking this virtuality as its object and adopting quasicausality as its mode of operation. That quasicausal operation goes by the name of security. It expresses itself in signs of alert. Since its object is virtual, the only actual leverage the security operation can have is on threat’s back-cast presence, its pre-effect of fear. Threat, understood as a quasicause, would qualify philosophically as a species of final cause. One of the reasons that its causality is quasi is that there is a paradoxical reciprocity between it and its effect. There is a kind of simultaneity between the quasicause and its effect, even though they belong to different times. Threat is the cause of fear in the sense that it triggers and conditions fear’s occurrence, but without the fear it effects, the threat would have no handle on actual existence, remaining purely virtual. The causality is bidirectional, operating immediately on both poles, in a kind of time-slip through which a futurity is made directly present in an effective expression that brings it into the present without it ceasing to be a futurity. Although they are in different tenses, present and future, and in different ontological modes, actual and virtual, fear and threat are of a piece: they are indissociable dimensions of the same event. The event, in its holding both tenses together in its own immediacy, is transtemporal. Since its transtemporality holds a passage between the virtual and the actual, it is a process—a real transformation that is effected in an interval smaller than the smallest perceivable, in an instantaneous looping between presence and futurity. Since it is in that smaller-than-smallest of intervals, it is perhaps best characterized as infra-temporal rather than transtemporal.

Nuclear fear is a self-fulfilling prophecy

Massumi, 7 (Brian, professor in the Communication Department at the Université de Montréal, “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption”, 10:2, p. Project Muse TBC 6/30/10)

Now for a future cause to have any palpable effect it must somehow be able act on the present. This is much easier to do and much less mysterious than it might sound. You start by translating the threat into a clear and present danger. You do this by acquiring a capability to realize the threat rather than prevent it. If your neighbor has a nuke, you build the nuclear weaponry that would enable you to annihilate the adversary, even at the price of annihilating yourself by precipitating a "nuclear winter." In fact, the more capable you are of destroying yourself along with your enemy, the better. You can be certain the enemy will follow your lead in acquiring the capability to annihilate you, and themselves as well. The imminent threat is then so imminent on both sides, so immediately present in its menacing futurity, that only a madman or suicidal regime would ever tip the balance and press the button. This gives rise to a unique logic of mutuality: "mutually assured destruction" (MAD). Mutually assured destruction is equilibrium-seeking. It tends toward the creation of a "balance of terror." MAD is certainty squared: to the certainty that there is objectively a threat is added the certainty that it is balanced out. The second certainty is dynamic, and requires maintenance. The assurance must be maintained by continuing to producing the conditions that bring the cause so vividly into the present. You have to keep moving into the dangerous future. You have to race foward it ever faster. You have to build more weapons, faster and better, to be sure that your systems match the lethality of your opponent's, give or take a few half-lives. The process soon becomes self-driving. The logic of mutually assured destruction becomes its own motor. It becomes self-propelling. Now that you've started, you can't very well stop.

Impact – VTL

Fear of impending disaster destroys it. Rational attempts at preventing impacts kill value to life.

CHERNUS 85 (J WAR AND MYTH: "THE SHOW MUST GO ON" Am Acad Relig.1985; TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 462-463)

We might discover, too, that we need not justify our lives as means to some end which is in turn only a means to some other end. As our world overflows with more and more means, it is increasingly drained of consciously perceived ends to give meaning to those means. Surely this sense of meaningless futility is deeply related to our numbed apathy in the face of impending disaster. The more we try to calculate purely rational means to save ourselves, the more firmly we fasten ourselves into this trap. The myths and teachings of religious tradi- tions can help to free us-not so much by preaching the moral sanctity of life as by teaching us to value ends over means and to find fulfillment in the play of life as an end in itself. Only if we see life as an end in itself will we cherish it and preserve it. The world will always be filled with conflict and folly and evil. We will always be tempted to ask, as Walt Whitman once did, what good life and self can be amid "the empty and useless years." If we learn to see life as an infinite theater, though, we may find deep meaning and comfort at such moments in Whitman's simple answer: "That you are here-that life exists and identity, that the powerful play goes on, and you may contribute a verse."

Nuclear numbing destroys all value to life

Lifton and Falk 82 (Robert – Professor Psychology at John Jay College, Richard – Professor of International Law at Princeton, *Indefensible Weapons*, p. 104-105) jl

Here too psychic and physical survival require a balance between feeling and not feeling. And that balance can readily go out of kilter, causing us to feel either too much or too little. Indeed, our contemporary nuclear threat not only contributes to upsetting that balance but raises questions about just what kind of balance between feeling and numbing is desirable or possible.

In Hiroshima, people I interviewed told me how, when the bomb fell, they were aware of people dying around them in horrible ways but that, within minutes or even seconds, they simply ceased to feel. They said such things as "I simply became insensitive to human death," or referred to a "paralysis of the mind." I came to call this general process psychic numbing and, in its most acute form, psychic closing-off. For survivors it was a necessary defense mechanism, since they could not have experienced full emotions in response to such scenes and remained sane. The numbing entailed derealization of what was actually happening along such inner psychological sequences as: "If I feel nothing, then death is not taking place," or "then I cannot be threatened by the death all around me," or "then I am not responsible for you or your death."

As useful to them as it was at the time, the numbing process did not necessarily end when the immediate danger was over. It would continue over weeks, months, or even years, and become associated with apathy, withdrawal, depression, despair, or a kind of survivor half-life with highly diminished capacity for pleasure, joy, or intense feelings in general.

Impact – VTL

Numbing divides cognition and affect

Nandy 98 (Ashis The Times of India July 10, 1998 http://www.ofbjp.org/news/0798/0024.html TBC 7/1/10)

In the genocidal person there is, first of all, a state of mind called "psychic numbing" - a "diminished capacity or inclination to feel - and a general sense of meaninglessness". Numbing "closes off" a person, deprives him of his sensitivities and emotions and leads to a "constriction of self process". To him or her, the death or the possibility of the death of millions begins to look like an abstract, bureaucratic detail, involving the calculation of military gains or losses, geopolitics or mere statistics. Such numbing can be considered to be the final culmination of the separation of affect and cognition - that is, feelings and thinking - that the European enlightenment sanctioned and celebrated as the first step towards greater objectivity and scientific rationality.

This division is the root cause of anthropocentrism and makes life unlivable

Wah Man 1 (Eva Kit, Hong Kong Baptist U., http://iifb.org/journal/Vol\_1/PartsI/V1P1-No10\_Man\_1179607914091.pdf)

Throughout this history the feminists claim that a male bias manifests in the fact that active, determinate form is considered to be male while femaleness is passive, indeterminate matter. Throughout the parallel dualisms such as culture vs. nature, mind vs. body, reason vs. emotion, objectivity vs. subjectivity, and the public realm vs. the private realm there is a dominant and subdominant term. In each dichotomy the former must dominate the latter and the latter in each case seems to be systematically associated with the feminine.[14] The feminist critique of oppressive dichotomies extends to biological thinking of male/female, nature/culture, androgen/ oestrogen, cognitive/affective, left brain/right brain. These hierarchical dualisms reveal one of the depths of the ways in which gender has affected the development of science. It is because of the deep and systematic penetration of these themes of dominance that feminism calls for a total rejection of the hierarchical epistemology of modern Western science. 8. To look further, what does a man being a subject mean? In explication, feminists look into the notion of the Cartesian cogito which is said to express the most individual

experience and the most "objective" truth. They hold that the Cartesian subject is inherently phallocratic, yet is a partially autonomous constituting role and agency. As Irigaray said, "We can assume that any theory of the subject has always been appropriated by the 'masculine'".[16] She goes beyond this to claim that all dichotomies are both hierarchical and gendered, thus she rejects the epistemology that produces them. The gendered character of contemporary science is summarized by other feminists as follows: 1) women cannot be subjects but objects, they can only be the ego-less objects of scientific study; 2) the active, knowing subject that is essential to science has been defined as exclusively masculine. 9. The net result is the entrenchment of an objectivist "male" ideology and a correlative devaluation of "female" subjectivity. The scientific, intellectual interest in prediction is already seeking control and this is seen as the highest characteristic of Man and an expression and fulfillment of a distinctively human potential. It is this which raises humankind above animals and man above woman. This same ideology of objectivity which asserts an opposition between "male" objectivity and "female" subjectivity denies the possibility of mediation between the two. The feminists reconceptualize objectivity as a dialectical process.[19] They claim for a Feminist Science which is de-centered, pluralistic, non-hierarchical, hermeneutic and is analogous to women's unique association with Nature. While the Masculine Science is operated as competitive, related to absoluteness and abstraction, the Feminist Science should emphasize on relativity and interrelatedness.

Extinction & ethics

Science Encyclopedia 1 (http://science.jrank.org/pages/403/Anthropocentrism.html)

The anthropocentric view suggests that humans have greater intrinsic value than other species. A result of this attitude is that any species that are of potential use to humans can be a "resource" to be exploited. This use often occurs in an unsustainable fashion that results in degradation, sometimes to the point of extinction of the biological resource, as has occurred with the dodo, great auk, and other animals. The view that humans have greater intrinsic value than other species also influences ethical judgments about interactions with other organisms. These ethics are often used to legitimize treating other species in ways that would be considered morally unacceptable if humans were similarly treated. For example, animals are often treated very cruelly during the normal course of events in medical research and agriculture. This prejudiced treatment of other species has been labeled "speciesism " by ethicists.

Impact – Extinction

The impact is extinction

Lifton and Falk 82 (Robert – Professor Psychology at John Jay College, Richard – Professor of International Law at Princeton, *Indefensible Weapons*, p. 80) jl

We have been talking about the most vicious of vicious circles—the nuclear entrapment. By impairing our imagination of the future, the bombs enter into all the crevices of our existence. And at every point they diminish us, thereby making it still more difficult for us to confront the extraordinary threat they pose. And that assault on our humanity includes, as we know, an illusory sequence of devastating consequence. We feel the pain of loss of security, credibility, and stability; we embark on the literally impossible quest to regain these by stockpiling the very nuclear devices (along with accompanying secrets) responsible for their loss; and we are left with a still greater sense of vulnerability and insecurity, along with further decline in credibility and integrity. Moreover, that bomb-induced futurelessness becomes a psychological breeding ground for further nuclear illusion, which in turn perpetuates and expands current arrangements including bomb-induced futurelessness and so on. We sense that the cycle cannot continue indefinitely. Either we will do something to interrupt it, or we are likely to exterminate ourselves. For everything is at stake.

Impact – Turns Case

Turns case – arms control makes use more likely

Lifton and Falk 82 (Robert – Professor Psychology at John Jay College, Richard – Professor of International Law at Princeton, *Indefensible Weapons*, p. 180-181) jl

At this point in such reasoning, one might expect an abrupt retreat from nuclearism, but alas no, Iklé's proposed amendment of policy entails, of all things, a tighter embrace. What we need to do (actually what we have been, in any event, doing all along) is to concentrate our nuclear strategy on accuracy, sophisticated plans, and additional weaponry so that we can supposedly concentrate our nuclear firepower on Soviet military targets. Iklé, as is characteristic of this kind of "counterforce morality," urges a greater effort at civil defense, dispersal of industry, and the like so that we will be in a better position to fight and survive a nuclear war should it occur.

A double moral illusion envelops the notion of using nuclear weapons as instruments of discriminate destruction and of moderating to acceptable levels a Soviet nuclear attack. Attacks with nuclear weapons on missile sites, airfields, naval bases, command centers, and the like would cause collateral civilian

damage in the millions without even taking into account any of the gruesome secondary effects on the human and natural environment. Civil defense and emergency war plans seem like a sham when it comes to offering genuine protection to the civilian population. But worse than this, there is an implicit implausible assumption that we can persuade the Soviet Union to play this game of killer diplomacy according to our rules, thereby allowing our leaders to make use of nuclear weapons to shape the outcome of specific encounters and, in accordance with limited war scenarios, that is according to rules that cash in unilaterally on threats and uses of nuclear weapons. As such, Iklé's kind of "moralism," which is atypical of the nuclear use theorists (the so-called NUTS versus the MAD men), puts people in a more nuclearist frame of mind by emphasizing the military mission of the weapons and their potentially nongenocidal function in a redesigned strategy. What is strange about this line of reasoning coming from insiders in the dialogue is that they argue as if they are contesting the actual policy. As I have explained, military-oriented targeting schemes have consistently incorporated the essence of Iklé's position, although his emphasis on civil defense and damage limitation has not been national policy in a serious way, partly because it is such an obvious sham as to worry people more than it reassures or protects them.

Impact – Turns Other Adv’s

Nuclear numbing spills over to cause apathy on every single impact

Gregory 3 (Robert J. The Ohio State University Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society 8.2 (2003) 232-237 TBC 7/1/10)

In that frightening era from the 1950s to the 1980s and perhaps even part of the 1990s, the only way many of us managed to maintain our psychological health was by making use of psychic numbing. Intelligent, well educated, alert to the physical and human environment, and aware of the potential disasters that could come from the presence of nuclear weapons and the nuclear industry, we individually and collectively withdrew our minds from contemplation of the awesome possibilities of a nuclear holocaust. We concentrated to the best of our abilities on other, more pleasant, aspects of living. Further, we were so convinced by the sheer scale of the military-industrial establishment, the awesome power of the nuclear bombs, and the huge security force assembled to provide guard, that resistance would be totally futile anyway. More than any technology of the past, the bomb meant that running away was impossible. Every now and then an event, announcement, prediction, or other warning triggered our minds into fleeting moments of panic, alleviated only by our subsequent withdrawal of attention to what could happen. Truly, the nuclear age was a time of psychic numbing. Released partially from those particular worries by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the slow dismantling of the "Evil Empire," we are only now coming to grips with other very real problems. These include the damage to the environment that has already taken place, the massive costs of cleaning up environmental pollution, the continued potential of nuclear war by accident, the spread of nuclear capabilities to other countries or agencies, and the population problem that threatens to ravage the entire earth. More recently we have learned about the potential and realities for financial and economic collapse, terrorism and bio-terrorism, global warming, and some of the potential dangers of genetic engineering. Numerous other major concerns may join the present cascade to generate a veritable unstoppable onslaught. We are anxious and fearful, and yet we are strangely quiescent. We live our lives as if these problems were distant, as if "we'll be all right." Too, we are also becoming more aware of the previously hidden potentials, the ideals set aside for so long, dreams of peace, joy, and harmony on earth. Perhaps we are now looking deeper at the other side of the so-called evil empire—that is, we are reflecting on and understanding better our own selves and our own Western culture. Indeed, we may be learning about our role as contrary, opposite, nemesis and yet, partner, ally, friend, and co-dependent with the former evil empire, as the Soviet Union was labeled, and other peoples and nations. We are certainly sharing in a virtual global explosion of connections, information, and ideas via the Internet. This ferment is enabling us to examine both positive and negative options, alternatives, and futures as never before. Paradise lies seemingly [End Page 232] within reach, while wars, conflicts, and terrorism continue to reign.

Impact – Proliferation

The deification of nuclear weapons leads to proliferation

Lifton 1 (Robert Jay Spring, Illusions of the Second Nuclear Age World Policy Journal, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb6669/is\_1\_18/ai\_n28841497/?tag=content;col1 TBC 7/1/10)

Even worse, nuclearism can "trickle down" (the Reaganite term is more accurate here than in its usual economic application) to smaller and smaller groups. Nuclearism arose initially in the country that produced the first atomic bombs, the United States, and could be observed in the intensity of our early commitment to the new weapon--and to its investiture, however inaccurately, as the "winning weapon" of World War II. The Soviet Union did not take long to evolve its own sustained version of nuclearism, so that, over the long years of the Cold War, that spiritual deformation was centered mainly in the two great superpowers--whatever its additional manifestations in France, England, and China. Other countries could and did have nuclearistic aspirations of their own, but it was very clear to everyone that vast resources of money, science, and technology were needed to create and maintain a nuclear arsenal. Now, however, there is all too much evidence that smaller, less wealthy nations--such as Israel, India, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran--can entertain the possibility of stockpiling their own ultimate weaponry, or are already doing so. The Indian-Pakistani confrontation is instructive in both its terrible danger and its psychological nakedness. In both India and Pakistan, the leaders who ordered the detonation of nuclear weapons saw themselves as not only protecting their "national security" but as also enabling their nations to leap onto the world stage as great powers--of gaining global respect while evoking in others terror and awe. The reactions of many ordinary Indian and Pakistani people--the celebrations, the dancing in the streets, and the exuberant assertions of pride and triumph--were just as troubling. They were experiencing in themselves as individual people, as well as in their country, a new dimension of power bound up specifically with nuclear weaponry. The explosion of their country's nuclear weapon s had unleashed a triumphalist nationalism, a nuclearized nationalism.

Impact – Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

Nuclear fear is a self-fulfilling prophecy

Massumi, 7 (Brian, professor in the Communication Department at the Université de Montréal, “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption”, 10:2, p. Project Muse TBC 6/30/10)

Now for a future cause to have any palpable effect it must somehow be able act on the present. This is much easier to do and much less mysterious than it might sound. You start by translating the threat into a clear and present danger. You do this by acquiring a capability to realize the threat rather than prevent it. If your neighbor has a nuke, you build the nuclear weaponry that would enable you to annihilate the adversary, even at the price of annihilating yourself by precipitating a "nuclear winter." In fact, the more capable you are of destroying yourself along with your enemy, the better. You can be certain the enemy will follow your lead in acquiring the capability to annihilate you, and themselves as well. The imminent threat is then so imminent on both sides, so immediately present in its menacing futurity, that only a madman or suicidal regime would ever tip the balance and press the button. This gives rise to a unique logic of mutuality: "mutually assured destruction" (MAD). Mutually assured destruction is equilibrium-seeking. It tends toward the creation of a "balance of terror." MAD is certainty squared: to the certainty that there is objectively a threat is added the certainty that it is balanced out. The second certainty is dynamic, and requires maintenance. The assurance must be maintained by continuing to producing the conditions that bring the cause so vividly into the present. You have to keep moving into the dangerous future. You have to race foward it ever faster. You have to build more weapons, faster and better, to be sure that your systems match the lethality of your opponent's, give or take a few half-lives. The process soon becomes self-driving. The logic of mutually assured destruction becomes its own motor. It becomes self-propelling. Now that you've started, you can't very well stop.

Impact – Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

Threat construction demonizes enemies which are perpetually generated

Massumi, 7 (Brian, professor in the Communication Department at the Université de Montréal, “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption”, 10:2, p. Project Muse TBC 6/30/10)

Preemption shares many characteristics with deterrence. Like deterrence, it operates in the present on a future threat. It also does this in such as way as to make that present futurity the motor of its process. The process, however, is qualitatively different. For one thing, the epistemology is unabashedly one of uncertainty, and not due to a simple lack of knowledge. There is uncertainty because the threat has not only not yet fully formed but, according to Bush's opening definition of preemption, it has not yet even emerged. In other words, the threat is still indeterminately in potential. This is an ontological premise: the nature of threat cannot be specified. It might in some circumstances involve weapons of mass destruction, but in others it will not. It might come in the form of strange white power, or then again it might be an improvised explosive device. The enemy is also unspecifiable. It might come from without, or rise up unexpectedly from within. You might expect the enemy to be a member of a certain ethnic or religious group, an Arab or a Moslem, but you can never be sure. It might turn out be a white Briton wearing sneakers, or a Puerto Rican from the heartland of America (to mention just two well-known cases, those of John Reid and Jose Padilla). It might be an anonymous member of a cell, or the supreme leader of a "rogue" state. The lack of knowledge about the nature of the threat can never be overcome. It is part of what defines the objective conditions of the situation: threat has become proteiform and it tends to proliferate unpredictably. The situation is objectively one in which the only certainty is that threat will emerge where it is least expected. This is because what is ever-present is not a particular threat or set of threats, but the potential for still more threats to emerge without warning. The global situation is not so much threatening as threat generating: threat-o-genic. It is the world's capacity to produce new threats at any and every moment that defines this situation. We are in a world that has passed from what "the Architect" called the "known unknown" (uncertainty that can be analyzed and identified) to the "unknown unknown" (objective uncertainty). Objective uncertainty is as directly an ontological category as an epistemological one. The threat is known to have the ontological status of indeterminate potentiality. The unknown unknown is unexpungeable because its potentiality belongs to the objective conditions of life today. Consequently, no amount of effort to understand will ever bring a definitive answer. Thinking about it will only reopen the same uncomprehending question: "why do they hate us so"? This question, asked over and over again by the US media since 9-11, expresses the impossibility of basing a contemporary logic of conflict on a psychological premise. The nature and motives of the adversary strike us as purely incomprehensible. The only hypothesis left is that they are just plain "evil," capable of the worst "crimes against humanity." They are simply "inhuman." The only way to identify the enemy collectively is as an "axis of evil." That characterization does not add new knowledge. It is the moral equivalent of ignorance. Its function is to concentrate "humanity" entirely on one side in order to legitimate acts on "our" side that would be considered crimes against humanity were the enemy given the benefit of being considered human (torture, targeting civilian populations, contraventions of human rights and the laws of war). The ostensibly moral judgment of "evil" functions very pragmatically as a device for giving oneself unlimited tactical options freed from moral constraint. This is the only sense in which something like deterrence continues to function: moral judgment is used in such a way as to deter any properly moral or ethical logic from becoming operative. The operative logic will function on an entirely different plane.

Impact – Genocide

The fear of nuclear war mandates the genocidal annihilation of populations in the name of making the world safe from nuclear weapons

Bussolini 8 (jeffery, Associate Professor of Sociology and Women's Studies, College of Staten Island, CUNY, eighth annual metting of the foucault circle, p. google, http://foucault.siuc.edu/pdf/abs08.pdf TBC 6/29/10)

The very real threat of Armageddon from these weapons easily gives way to thinking of expediency and triage which instrumentalizes certain populations The fate of those at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the continuing collection of data about them by the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, has been described in Robert Jay Lifton’s Death in Life. Thousands of soldiers and scientists from different nations have been exposed in tests and research. Indigenous people from the American southwest to the Pacific Islands, Kazakhstan, and Algeria have been forcefully relocated to make room for atomic tests, exposed to radiation, or both. Groups such as prisoners and mental patients have been subjected to radiation experiments against their will or knowledge, supposedly for the purpose of building up crucial knowledge about nuclear effects, as documented in Eileen Welsome’s Plutonium Files and Department of Energy reports on Human Radiation Experiments. These weapons, then, are intimately tied to power over life and death and the management of subject populations. As such, it seems that the exigency related to nuclear thinking justifies (or is the expression of) significant sovereign power over bare life. In the histories mentioned here, survival and protection of the population at large was seen to validate causing death or illness among smaller subsets of that population. One can note that, given their scale, nuclear weapons force consideration of population-level dynamics, as whole populations are placed at risk. In this respect, these arms follow on and accentuate the massive strategic bombing of World War II in which enemy populations were targeted as vital biopolitical resources.

Impact Calc – Systemic Outweighs

Systemic impacts outweigh nuclear war

Martin 84 (Brian, Research Associate – Australian National University, SANA Update, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/ sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html, AD: 7/1/10) jl

A related factor linked with nuclear extinctionism is a belief that nuclear war is the most pressing issue facing humans. I disagree, both morally and politically, with the stance that preventing nuclear war has become the most important social issue for all humans. Surely, in the Third World, concern over the actuality of massive suffering and millions of deaths resulting from poverty and exploitation can justifiably take precedence over the possibility of a similar death toll from nuclear war. Nuclear war may be the greatest threat to the collective lives of those in the rich, white Western societies but, for the poor, nonwhite Third World peoples, other issues are more pressing.

No Impact – Epistemology

Be skeptical of aff evidence – It is biased towards threats – structural incentive

Betts 97 (Richard K Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University Project muse Should Strategic Studies Survive? TBC 6/30/10)

A specter is haunting strategic studies--the specter of peace. This sounds odd so long after the burst of euphoria at the end of the cold war, which dissipated into so many nasty little wars. Political science, however, has been less interested in war per se than in cataclysmic war among great powers, war that can visit not just benighted people far away, but people like us. Half a century of world war and cold war provided that impetus for strategic studies. After the cold war, however, universities face other demands as resources shrink. Has the warrant for feeding this field expired? Certainly not. First, one interest alone fully justifies keeping the flame burning: to have expertise on the shelf in case great-power conflict arises again, which is more likely to happen than not. For whatever reason, the United States finds itself in a war or crisis in almost every generation.

Alt Solves

Overcoming fear is crucial to activism against nuclearism

Sandman and Valenti 86 (Peter M., Professor of Public Health, Rutgers University, Founder and Director of the Environmental Communication Research Program, and Communications Counsel for Environmental Defense Fund, and JoAnn M., Professor of Communications, Brigham Young University, January http://www.psandman.com/articles/scarstif.htm TBC 6/29/10)

“The main obstacle to action,” writes Frank, “is neither apathy nor terror but simply a feeling of helplessness. To combat it, I have perhaps overemphasized the small signs that antinuclear activities are at last beginning to influence the political process.”(19) Helplessness, hopelessness, futility, and despair are words one hears even more often than fear from the barely active and the formerly active. And like fear, these emotions can easily lead to psychic numbing. Those who feel powerless to prevent nuclear war try not to think about it; and it serves the needs of those who do not wish to think about nuclear war to feel powerless to prevent it. Messages of hope and empowerment, however, break this vicious circle. The label “hope,” as we use it, subsumes a wide range of overlapping concepts: for example, optimism, a sense of personal control and efficacy, confidence in methods and solutions, a sense of moral responsibility, and a vision of the world one is aiming for. It is well established (and hardly surprising) that hope is closely associated with willingness to act. Activism appeals most to people who feel positive about both the proposed solution and their personal contribution to its achievement. Over the long term, this means that antinuclear organizers must communicate a credible vision of a nuclear-free world. Meanwhile, they must offer people things to do that seem achievable and worthwhile. The nuclear-weapons-freeze campaign attracted millions of new activists in 1982 because it offered credible hope. By 1985 many of those millions could no longer ground their hope in the freeze; some found other approaches and some returned to inactivity. Most social psychologists today see the relationship between hope and action as independent of fear or other feelings. For example, Kenneth H. Beck and Arthur Frankel conclude that three cognitions (not emotions) determine whether people will do something about a health risk: recognizing the danger as real, believing the recommended plan of action will reduce the danger, and having confidence in their ability to carry out the plan.(20) Similarly, Sutton’s review of the fear-appeal literature finds inconsistent support for the notion that people can accept higher levels of fear if they feel the proposed solution will remedy the problem, but strong evidence that, regardless of fear, people are more inclined to act on solutions they see as more effective.(21)

Solving nuclear fear is key to mobilizing a movement

Sandman and Valenti 86 (Peter M., Professor of Public Health, Rutgers University, Founder and Director of the Environmental Communication Research Program, and Communications Counsel for Environmental Defense Fund, and JoAnn M., Professor of Communications, Brigham Young University, January http://www.psandman.com/articles/scarstif.htm TBC 6/30/10)

THE ALTERNATIVE – the wholesale answer to psychic numbing – is reassurance. By reassurance we do not mean empty promises that everything will be all right, but rather communications designed to reduce fear and thus reduce the need to keep it numbed. Four antidotes to numbing are anger, love, hope, and action. These concepts – not terror – are the keys to mobilizing a huge popular movement against nuclear weapons.

Alt Solves – Discourse

Discourse is key to solvency

Wolman 7 (Carol Psychiatrist lifelong peace-advocate August http://www.opednews.com/author/author20.html TBC 7/1/10)

We PEACE ACTIVISTS, who see through the gulf and keep the threat of nuclear war ever in our consciousness, still have our own layers of psychic numbing to go through. How do we avoid despair? How do we talk to the ostriches all around us? How do we find the strength to deal with a police state? How can we look our children in the eye and honestly encourage them to have babies? We must never forget the urgency of the threat, and the magnitude of the destruction. Let us not be diverted by electoral politics or Michael Jackson, but keep our eye on the sword of Damocles, as we struggle to remove it. We must keep faith that humanity has enough common sense to avoid catastrophe. Nuclear weapons up to now have provided an iron discipline for mankind, which has developed more self-restraint and international cooperation in the last 50 years than in the preceding 2000. I believe that God will not destroy His creation. We must bring the damage done to our own troops by depleted uranium to the forefront. Potentially, this slow form of nuclear war affects enough Americans now to create public outrage similar to the Strontium 90 uproar in the late 50's, which led to abolition of aboveground nuclear testing. We must realize that as peacemakers, we are engaged in spiritual warfare against the warmongers. We must speak the truth, sound the warning, denounce the lying criminals who would destroy us. Our words, our tongues, our writings, are our weapons.

Impact Framing – Psyche First

The psyche comes first – it’s the bridge that connects the subject with reality

Lifton and Falk 82 (Robert – Professor Psychology at John Jay College, Richard – Professor of International Law at Princeton, *Indefensible Weapons*, p. 100-101) jl

Diminished feeling, in one sense, begins with the structure and function of the human brain. Neurophysiologists make clear that the brain serves as much to keep out stimuli as it does to receive them. In other words, our brain is so constructed as to limit what we can eventually feel, lest it be so overwhelmed as to lose its capacity to organize or to respond at all.

For as human beings we must do considerable psychic work in connection with anything we take in. That is, we perceive nothing nakedly but must re-create anything we encounter by means of our marvelous and vulnerable cerebral cortex. If we can speak of anything as human nature, it is this symbolizing principle as such. Hence I speak of a "formative process," the constant creation and re-creation of images and forms that constitutes human mentation. Much of this process takes place outside of awareness, or is what we call "unconscious." But it is the existence of this formative-symbolizing tendency that makes possible the wonders of our imagination on the one hand, and our psychological disturbances and destructive impulses on the other.

A2: Perm

Fear is cyclical – It crowds out the alt

Massumi 5 (Brian, professor in the Communication Department at the Université de Montréal, “Fear (The Spectrum Said)”, Positions, 13.1, TBC 6/29/10 Project Muse p. 40-41)

A startle without a scare, however, is like a grin without a cat. The separation between direct activation and controlled ideation, or affect in its bodily dimension and emotion as rationalizable subjective content, is a reflective wonderland that does not work this side of the mirror. James is quick to make the discomfiting point. “Where an ideal emotion seems to precede [or occur independently of ] the bodily symptoms, it is often nothing but a representation of the symptoms themselves. One who has already fainted at the sight of blood may witness the preparations for a surgical operation with uncontrollable heart sinking and anxiety. He anticipates certain feelings, and the anticipation precipitates their arrival.”9 What he calls a representation here is clearly a re-presentation: the heart-sinking is the anticipation of the emotion, in the same way that he argues that in a case like running in fear, “our feeling of bodily changes as they occur is the emotion” in its initial phase of emergence.10 Anticipation is similarly a triggering of changes in the body. That affective reactivation of the body then develops unrefusably into a reemergence of the fear. What we sloppily think of as the idea of an emotion, or the emotion as an idea, is in fact the anticipatory repetition of an affective event, precipitated by the encounter between the body’s irritability and a sign. In the surgical example, the blood functions as a sign of fear. Like a red alert, it directly activates the body. But the context obviates the need to run. You are in a condition to react to the blood precisely because you’re not the one under anesthesia on the operating table. This is also a reason why actually running away would be somewhat off the point. The particular nature of the context inhibits the acting out of the movement. The activation of the body, however, was already that movement in incipient form. The failure of the movement actually to express itself does not prevent the development of the emotion proper, which should rightly phase in, on pause, after the action’s actualization. Here, the body gives pause in advance, due to contextual constraints. In this context, the emergence of the emotion preempts action. Actual action has been short-circuited. It is in-acted: it remains enveloped in its own activated potential. The development of the emotion is now bound entirely to potential action. It can regenerate itself without the detour through actual movement: it can be enacted through in-action. Part of the affective training that the Bush color alert system assures is the engraining in the bodies of the populace of anticipatory affective response to signs of fear even in contexts where one is clearly in no present danger. This significantly extends the purview of threat. An alert about a suspected bombing plan against San Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge (one of the early alert episodes) can have direct repercussions in Atlanta. As a plus, the enaction of the affective event in inaction has obvious political control benefits. The purview of threat is extended in another way as well. When an emotion becomes enactable in anticipation of itself, independent of action, it becomes its own threat. It becomes its own virtual cause. “I am told of a case of morbid terror, of which the subject confessed that what possessed her seemed, more than anything, to be the fear of fear itself.”11 When fear becomes the quasicause of itself, it can bypass even more readily any limitation to contexts where a fearful action is actually called on and, in so doing, bypass more regularly the necessity to cycle through an unfolding of phases. The phases telescope into each other, in a short circuit of the affective process. The affective event rolls ever more tightly around the time slip of threat, as fear becomes its own pre-effect.“We see plainly how the emotion both begins and ends with what we call its effects.”12 Fear, the emotion, has revirtualized. Its emergence as an end effect has threateningly looped back to the beginning as its cause. This marks another turning point. Now, fear can potentially self-cause even in the absence of an external sign to trigger it. This makes it all the more uncontainable, so much so that it “possesses” the subject. It wraps its time-slip so compellingly around experience that it becomes experience’s affective surround. Without ceasing to be an emotion, it has become the affective surround of existence, its in-which. Self-caused and all around: at once the ground and background of the experience it now tends to take over. Call an emotion that has revirtualized in this way, to become self-caused ground and enveloping background of overtaken existence, an affective tone or mood (as equally distinct from action, vitality affect, pure affect, and emotion proper).

A2: Perm

Perm Fails – Fear prevents successful action against nuclearism

Gregory 3 (Robert J. The Ohio State University Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society 8.2 (2003) 232-237 TBC 7/1/10)

Psychic numbing (Zur) alone was perhaps insufficient to describe this gradual process of accommodation [End Page 233] to the bomb. But psychic numbing, the ostrich-like, head-in-the-sand attitude, was certainly a strong part of the means that people used to handle their anxieties. Psychologists studied the effects of the nuclear confrontation, with early research focused on attitudes and beliefs about weapons and their possible effects (Zur). The role and responsibility of psychologists themselves remained unclear, but the mental health implications of living in the nuclear age often turned toward the study of power and denial that the weapons might be used. For example, responses of 66 antinuclear activists were studied (Locatelli and Holt) on a self-administered questionnaire on nuclear issues to learn more about them and to understand their motivation and emotional life. In addition, about half were interviewed on their feelings regarding political activism. Those who scored in the powerless direction reported significantly lower levels of antinuclear participation and total antinuclear activism. People believed that no matter what they did, they were powerless to create change. If effective options for action were available, and if fear was reduced, then people might be more likely to believe that their actions could create change (Lifton). Those relatively active in the movement tended to focus on small gains or on the intrinsic values of active involvement. The researchers concluded that activists varied in their awareness of the nuclear threat because of their psychological defenses. Some psychologists noted the casual attitudes of those who succumbed to the ethos created by the bomb (Oderberg). Though many people were aware of the dangers of the nuclear weapons and industry (Sandman and Valenti), the fear generated was largely dissipated as anger or was simply denied.

A2: Perm

This is the link to the criticism – permutations of paranoia and optimism maintain devotion to the bomb since both rely on elimination of instability

Chernus 91 (Ira, Professor of Religious studies at UC Boulder, *Nuclear Madness: On Religion an Psychology in the Nuclear Age,*, p. 137) jl

Most of the time, of course, paranoid Cold War fantasies and optimistic detente fantasies are acted out simultaneously in ever-changing permutations. Paranoia and optimism are so readily compatible because they are merely two different manifestations of the same dynamic of madness: in both cases, images of world- and self-destruction make it not only possible but necessary to imagine ourselves invulnerable and omnipo­tent through the agencies of the state. In both cases, images of annihilation and images of perfect security flourish side by side because each fosters the other.

The two sets of nuclear fantasies are also compatible because madness allows contradictions without number. Public madness, mediated through the state's national security policies, lets us live out the most contradictory fantasies without doubting our own sanity. Logically incompatible ideas, aims, and behaviors are maintained side by side quite comfort­ably, simply because everyone else maintains them too. Con­fronting the nuclear threat, the public madness clings to several "quasi-autonomous partial systems." It insists that only a mad­man bent on suicide would start a nuclear war; but in the next breath it insists that we must retain the right of first use and have enough weapons to defeat the enemy. It affirms military strength as the highest virtue; but in the next breath it decries "the military-industrial complex" for sapping the nation's economy. It praises the Bomb as the "umbrella" that keeps us out of war; but in the next breath it yearns for the simplicity and security of the prenuclear era. It praises the technology that builds ever more sophisticated weapons; but in the next breath it curses that technology as an ineffable danger. It is thankful that the danger of nuclear` confrontation is past; but in the next breath it laments having to live in a world that is "falling apart."

The permutation paralyzes us into inaction – amplifies our links

Chernus 91 (Ira, Professor of Religious studies at UC Boulder, *Nuclear Madness: On Religion an Psychology in the Nuclear Age,*, p. 40-41) jl

Every description of reality is also an injunction to experience reality and respond to it in a certain way. When others describe reality falsely, they lead us to feel and act falsely—often directly contrary to our own best intrests. Through injunctions, a nexus can go one step further and mystify individuals to the point where they cannot feel or act at all. The simplest way to achieve this is to give an individual two or more conflicting injunctions and demand that all be accepted simultaneously. “Various internal and external systems playing off against each other neutralize the command system so that one can’t move: one is immobilized, actually brought to a standstill by the contradiction.

Like a classic double bind, the constant barrage of conflicting nuclear images evokes such a no-win situation while blocking all the exit routes. Things must change to build a better future so that we can continue standing fixedly for firm tradional values. Something must be done to improve our security, yet every step to make us more secure simultaneously makes us less secure. For example, if we want to make the world safer, we should build smaller, more accurate bombs that provide a more compelling second-strike deterrent. But smaller bombs can also be used for a decapitating first strike, so they destabilize the world and increase the risk of war. So to make the world safer we should build bigger bombs. But if you get rid of two big bombs for every new small bomb, you are reducing nuclear arsenals; so reducing arms means increasing the risk of war. To do the right thing, you must do the wrong thing. To do good, you must do evil.

It is little wonder that the average person, assaulted by this welter of contradiction, ends up immobilized. When language and reality are so thoroughly bent out of any meaningful shape we cannot begin to look for truth even if we want to. The rare individual who suspects that things are not what they are said to be usually succumbs to bewildering confusion, emotional exhaustion, and the fear of madness. It is just too difficult, and too frightening, to know the truth when “everyone knows” that one’s truth is “really” a lie. One can quickly come to feel like Alice, but the world is hardly a wonderland. The surprising fact is not that so few speak up and raise questions but that anyone speaks up at all.

A2: Perm

The permutation fails – the motivation behind actions matter

Kovel 83 (Joel, an American politician, academic, writer, and eco-socialist. Adjunct Professor of Anthropology at the Graduate Faculty in the [New School for Social Research](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_School_for_Social_Research); Visiting Professor of Political Science and Communications at the University of California (1986-7); Visiting Professor at [San Diego State University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/San_Diego_State_University) (1990); Visiting Professor of Communication at the[University of California](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_California) (1993); and Alger Hiss Professor of Social Studies, [Bard College](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bard_College) between 1988 and 2003, and Distinguished Professor of Social Studies at the institution from 2003[[1]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joel_Kovel#cite_note-KovelSite-0) to 2008. *Against the State of Nuclear terror*. South End Press, Boston, p. 155-6) jl

If this is the value of the facts, what is the value beyond the facts? I think this can best be seen through a critique of mere survival as the ground for antinuclear politics. The point is not only to survive, but to struggle for a life worth having. This means the realization that nuclear war has already been going on for some time—and that it has assaulted and degraded us during this time. Therefore, a life worth living is to be attained through the struggle against the weapons and not simply as an abstract condition for controlling or eliminating them. Once one appreciates this value, there is no settling for arms control. Strategic arms are themselves an abomination, wielded all the time whether or not they ever get exploded. Therefore only elimination will do. If Messrs. McNamara and Bundy are willing to recognize this truth and to own up to all the havoc that their decisions and ways of governing have wreaked upon the world, then I, for one, would welcome them into the peace movement. If, however, they are simply afraid for their lives because their machine has gone haywire, and wish to confine themselves to tinker¬ing with it so that it becomes a more efficient instrument of domination, then I would prefer to keep my distance from them. One does not attack nuclear arms because they do not work properly, nor because they have become suddenly dangerous to their masters. One attacks them because they are fiendish instruments of domination. The fact that they will kill us unless checked is not the main point, since we are all here to die in any case. What galls us is the way this will happen, the wanton, omnicidal, future-destroying way of it, and what the system of nuclear states means to the world, right now. To break with technocracy is also to break with what it conceals and allows to fester beneath the blanket of techno-logical reason; the omnipotence of mind, the inflation of self through an identification with the machine, the Cartesian split from nature within and without, the endless cycle of historical revenge, suspicion and paranoid projection. It is to reject a species of false reason, or rationalization—but not to give up on reason itself. Quite the contrary, it means rescuing reason from the clutches of the technocratic state.

AT: Perm

Combination of the plan and the alt only reify hopelessness multiplying psychic numbing

Lifton and Falk 82 (Robert – Professor Psychology at John Jay College, Richard – Professor of International Law at Princeton, *Indefensible Weapons*, p. 105-106) jl

Finally, there is the problematic category of the numbing of everyday life. Here we may say that the ordinary brain function of keeping out stimuli becomes strained by the image overload characteristic of our time. Apart from nuclear weapons, the mass-media revolution creates the unique situation in which virtually any image from anywhere on the globe, and indeed from any point in our historical or cultural past, becomes available to any individual at any moment. This historically new situation contributes to a contemporary psychological style of perpetual experimentation and increasing capacity for shifts from one kind of involvement (with people, ideas, ways of living) to another. I speak of this as the Protean style, after the talented but unsteady Greek sea god who was a notorious shape-shifter and could readily change into virtually any natural, animal, or human form, but who had great difficulty holding on to a functional form of his own.

Our current image overload, moreover, comes at a time of considerable loss of confidence in traditional symbols and forms as discussed in chapter 9 in connection with a sense of historical dislocation. That sense also contributes importantly to the pain and possibilities of the Protean style. It deprives us of the channels of feeling that had existed around earlier rituals and symbols. We then grasp at the extraordinary array of images available to us, seeking to recover significant forms of feeling. But our successes are spasmodic, and we run the risk of diffusion and unconnectedness, potential sources of further numbing.

Relying on arsenals for security embraces the terror in the potential use—limiting some weapons while retaining others entrenches the system

Lifton and Falk 82 (Robert – Professor Psychology at John Jay College, Richard – Professor of International Law at Princeton, *Indefensible Weapons*, p. 152) jl

Relying on a nuclear advantage also evades the moral challenge. To the extent that "security" is associated with a discretionary option to threaten or even to use nuclear weapons, a government embraces a policy of terror on the largest imaginable scale. It seems hardly an accident that the widespread outbreak of political terrorism should coincide in time with the full embrace of nuclear terrorism, and not only as a weaponry of last resort but rather as a legitimate choice available to leaders in periods of national crisis. Much of our political life is shaped by the combined force of terrorism from above and terrorism from blow. Decent individuals are caught in the crossfire and rendered helpless and impotent. In this crucial respect the process of claiming a nuclear advantage, even if no firm resolve to use these weapons exists, has serious demobilizing effects on political life, discouraging the very questioning and alternative thinking needed to release us from the tightening trap of the arms race. Of course, it should be realized that removing the burdens and menace of the arms race would not entirely end the danger arising from the possession of nuclear weapons. Proposals such as "the freeze," deep cuts, and no first use are all efforts to live with the existence of the bomb. Put differently, such proposals are made with the awareness that at this stage any wider effort to destroy nuclear stockpiles altogether would seemingly create an acute vulnerability to nuclear blackmail by any government or terrorist group that possessed (or even acted as if it possessed) some nuclear weapons. Thus retention of a small, secure stockpile operates as a minimum hedge against blackmail for the foreseeable future.

-Climate Change Module-

Link – Nuke Focus – Climate Change

Focus on nuclear weapons empirically causes failure to confront climate change

Masco 10 (Joseph February Bad Weather: On Planetary Crisis Social Studies of Science 40/1 () 7–40 TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 9)

We live in an age of crisis – multiple overlapping crises, in fact, involving war, capital, law, public institutions – and have witnessed in recent years an extraordinary normalization of violence in everyday life via the ‘war on terror’.This cinematic depiction of ecological fury contains within it a basic question about how to identify crisis, as well as expressing the conceptual power of war to override all other concerns. Revisiting these trees from a perspective of environmental risk reveals, I think, both the technoscientific contribution the Cold War arms race made to our understanding of the planet as an ecosystem, but also the power of the bomb to block collective thought and action. For when, and under what conditions, does it become possible for citizens to imagine a truly planetary crisis? I argue here that the Cold War nuclear project enabled a new vision of the planet as an integrated biosphere, but that it is precisely the security state’s reliance on nuclear weapons to constitute US superpower status that blocks action on non-militarized planetary threats, and specifically, on climate change. As we shall see, the ColdWar nuclear arms race produced an unprecedented commitment to research in the earth sciences, enabling a new vision of the globe as integrated political, technological, and environmental space. The US nuclear project was linked very early on to concerns about weather and climate, enabling new public fears and visions of planetary threat. But, by elevating nuclear fear to the core instrument of state power, the ColdWar arms race established a nationalized vision of planetary danger on very specific terms. In the early 21st century, the security state’s effort to monopolize risk under a discourse of ‘nuclear terror’ came into direct confrontation with the scientific evidence of rapid ecological change. For the GeorgeW. Bush administration, the ‘terrorist’ armed with a ‘WMD’ trumps global warming as a planetary threat, underscoring the extraordinary politics involved in defining both ‘terror’ and the ‘state of emergency’. The burnt and breaking limbs of this post-nuclear forest, however, not only offer an alternative genealogy of the nuclear age, but also allow an assessment of the distorting effects of the bomb on contemporary American ideas of threat.

Worst case scenario nuclear scenarios prevent environmental thinking

Masco 10 (Joseph February Bad Weather: On Planetary Crisis Social Studies of Science 40/1 () 7–40 TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 17)

Thus, if a concept of the biosphere was shaped by the technoscience of the early ColdWar state, the nuclear arsenal also severely distorted and limited the biopolitical lessons of the trees of Upshot-Knothole, Project Sunshine, or theTeak Shot. The nuclear state continued to privilege the military threat of state actors over that posed by a fragile biosphere. Nuclear policymakers did so by privileging a specific ‘worst case’ scenario form of military planning. Narratives of a sudden nuclear attack by the Soviet Union were supported by fantasies of bomber gaps, missile gaps, and other forms of US technological weakness. Predictions of large-scale genetic defects from radioactive fallout, contaminated food chains, and environmental damage on an unprecedented scale from the combined effects of nuclear industry and atomic tests were not constructed as ‘national security’ problems, except as they threatened nuclear production. Both discovered as an object of state interest and repressed as a political project, the damaged biosphere was ultimately contained by early Cold War geopolitics. The ‘worst case’ scenario mode of official thinking was limited, in other words, to the realm of state actors (and thus located in international relations) not radical environmental change (the biosphere), even as ColdWar technoscience was developing a portrait of the planet as a fragile and integrated system.

Link – Nuke Focus – Climate Change

Obsession with nuclear catastrophe coopts responses to environmental catastrophe

Masco 10 (Joseph February Bad Weather: On Planetary Crisis Social Studies of Science 40/1 () 7–40 TBC 6/29/10 Pg.28-29)

Surveying the wreckage left by Hurricane Katrina on his first visit to the storm ravaged Gulf Coast in 2005, President George Bush invited Americans to think of the event as if it were a nuclear attack.29 Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour was more specific, presenting the unprecedented wind and flood damage in his state as equivalent to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima (Martel, 2005). For Barbour, Katrina produced ‘nuclear destruction’. He declared in a wide range of media interviews: ‘The coast is just the greatest devastation I’ve ever seen. It’s as if they set off a nuclear weapon there.’30 Officials, rescue workers, and victims involved along the Gulf recovery similarly relied on nuclear imagery to transform a Category-4 hurricane and failed levy system into a de facto act of nuclear warfare (see Fig. 7).31Thus, Hurricane Katrina was, in the first case, only understandable to America’s political leadership, and many of its citizens, in terms of nuclear catastrophe. Indeed, for many media commentators in the US, the first issue raised by Hurricane Katrina was not about violent weather – and the potential linkage of increasing hurricane strength to climate change – but rather about the national security state’s ability to respond to a nuclear attack. Even as stranded residents of the Gulf Coast awaited rescue, cable news talk was significantly devoted to the failures of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), not in response to an unfolding natural emergency but to an imagined nuclear one. On MSNBC, Chris Mathews asked FEMA and Department of Homeland Security officials what would we be facing if ‘it was a bomb that went off, rather than a thunderclap of God’s will?’32 In addition to marking the failures in governmental emergency response, cable television used Katrina to rehearse ‘WMD’ preparedness, focusing not on floods, levy systems, and environmental change, but on biological warfare, chemical weapons, and terrorists armed with nuclear weapons. Commentators from across the political spectrum asked what the disaster revealed about the state of US civil defense, using the destruction left by Katrina to foment an image of future nuclear devastation in other cities. Not surprisingly, citizens of the gulf coast states called on the government to respond as promised in a state of nuclear emergency. These responses to a devastating storm reveal how embedded nuclear concepts are in US political culture, and underscore the strange reliance Americans now have on nuclear threat to organize politics and experience – both foreign and domestic. Informing each of these comments is not only the trauma of Hurricane Katrina but also the powerful psychosocial effects of the atomic bomb on American security culture. For how is it that so many Americans, from so many different social positions, could understand this non-nuclear, non-military event, in decidedly nuclear terms?What does it mean that a natural catastrophe could so immediately be transformed into an act of nuclear warfare in the public imagination? And what other logics about nature and security are blocked by this nuclear discourse?

Link – Nuke Focus – Climate Change

Nuclearism trades off with our ability to respond to climate change

Masco 10 (Joseph February Bad Weather: On Planetary Crisis Social Studies of Science 40/1 () 7–40 TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 29-30)

The Cold War nuclear arms race, however, also installed an idea of apocalyptic destruction, one that has been deployed by the national security state for generations to enable a variety of state projects. Indeed, the ‘balance of terror’ during the ColdWar – the minute-to-minute possibility of a global exchange of thermonuclear warheads – transformed a specific image of apocalyptic destruction into an intimate space of state- and nation-building (see Masco, 2008). The Cold War arms race taught Americans that they could live on the knife’s edge of total war, and do so in perpetuity. The national–cultural effects of this project are evident in many domains of everyday life, but are clearest in the contemplation of planetary risks that are not nuclear, and not subject to a policy of deterrence. To linguistically transform Hurricane Katrina into an atomic explosion is in part to evoke mass destruction in its ultimate form, but it is also a way of capturing the event on terms historically useful to the national security state. A week after thestorm, President Bush promised a thorough review of the emergency response effort, stating ‘We want to make sure that we can respond properly if there is aWMD attack or another major storm.’33 In doing so, he again inserted the nuclear terms of the ‘war on terror’ into a natural disaster. Mass death and destruction has meaning when framed within a nuclear discourse in the US precisely because the ColdWar arms race turned the bomb into an organizing principle in American society. In other words, the Katrina as Hiroshima discourse is an act of translation, rather than misrecognition. As we have seen, the 1950s, 1980s, and 2000s have all witnessed politically charged moments in the US in which the dangers posed by climate change and nuclear weapons were transposed. The designation of the US as a ‘superpower’ largely depends on the ability of the state to monopolize a discourse of risk, and to this end the atomic bomb has been an extraordinary instrument of state power. In declaring war on ‘terror’ in 2001, the Bush Administration did not declare war on all terror but rather expressed a more specific fear of the ‘WMD’. Today, climate change directly competes with the ‘WMD’ as primary planetary threat, and demands a different political response.The tools for fighting climate change are in fact diametrically opposed to those informing the ‘war on terror’ – for a global response to CO2 emissions requires a new kind of political cooperation, innovative economic and technological change, a shared vision of ecological sustainability, and above all, a willingness to substitute global concerns for national interests. Rather than sustaining a military–industrial economy, engaging climate change requires a new form of global governance.

Nuclearism causes failure to solve climate change

Masco 10 (Joseph February Bad Weather: On Planetary Crisis Social Studies of Science 40/1 () 7–40 TBC 6/29/10Pg. 30-31)

In the early 21st century, the imbrications of nuclear weapons and planetary threat remain so profound as to block both thought and action, allowing the security implications of a warming planet to elude the national security state. However, the ties between the bomb and climate change remain ever present: today, the same supercomputers that maintain the US 30 Social Studies of Science 40/1 nuclear stockpile at the national laboratories are also modeling climate, even as the cars traveling the interstate highway system (designed by the Eisenhower administration as a part of a nuclear civil defense program) contribute to global warming every second of the day. Moreover, the increasing calls for a ‘Manhattan Project’ to deal with climate change still embed the biosphere within a purely militarized and nationalized logic, while presuming that a single state actor can remedy a global climate crisis.34 But to attend to the shrinking artic ice caps or the intensifying weather patterns is to reject the idea of a national security and replace it with a planetary vision of sustainability. The technoscientific questions of biospheric sustainability are profound, requiring the integration of states and diverse environmental problems as objects of collective responsibility, a proposition that offers a new means of coordinating global order. Today ‘security’ remains embedded within an extremely narrow concept of threat and national advantage in US political culture, both legacies of ColdWar stateand nation-building. But the lessons of the synthetic forest from 1953 – reiterated in the disappearing frogs, the melting ice caps, the intensifying hurricanes, and the dying coral reefs of today – are that more profound changes are at hand, and that securing the biosphere requires nothing less than a post-national vision of American power.

\*A2: Numbing K\*

Fear Good – Nukes

Fear is a constructive emotion for peace

Lifton 1 (Robert Jay Spring, Illusions of the Second Nuclear Age World Policy Journal, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb6669/is\_1\_18/ai\_n28841497/?tag=content;col1 TBC 7/1/10)

The trouble is that in other ways the dangers associated with nuclear weapons are greater than ever: the continuing weapons-centered policies in the United States and elsewhere; the difficulties in controlling nuclear weapons that exist under unstable conditions (especially in Russia and other areas of the former Soviet Union); [2] and the eagerness and potential capacity of certain nations and "private" groups to acquire and possibly use the weapons. In that sense, the nuclear quietism is perilous. Or, to put the matter another way, we no longer manifest an appropriate degree of fear in relation to actual nuclear danger. While fear in itself is hardly to be recommended as a guiding human emotion, its absence in the face of danger can lead to catastrophe. We human animals have built-in fear reactions in response to threat. These reactions help us to protect ourselves--to step back from the path of a speeding automobile, or in the case of our ancestors, from the path of a wild animal. Fear can be transmuted into constructive planning and policies: whether for minimizing vulnerability to attacks by wild animals, or for more complex contemporary threats. Through fear, ordinary people can be motivated to pursue constructive means for sustaining peace, or at least for limiting the scope of violence. Similarly, in exchanges between world leaders on behalf of preventing large--scale conflict, a tinge of fear--sometimes more than a tinge--can enable each to feel the potential bloodshed and suffering that would result from failure. But with nuclear weapons, our psychological circuits are impaired. We know that the weapons are around--and we hear talk about nuclear dangers somewhere "out there"--but our minds no longer connect with the dangers or with the weapons themselves. That blunting of feeling extends into other areas. One of the many sins for which advocates of large nuclear stockpiles must answer is the prevalence of psychic numbing to enormous potential suffering, the blunting of our ethical standards as human beings.

Fear of nuclear weapons has prevented their use – deterrence has checked conflict.

**Rajaraman 2** (Professor of Theoretical Physics at JNU, 2002 [R., “Ban battlefield nuclear weapons,” 4/22/2, *The Hindu*, http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/2002042200431000.htm[

There were a variety of different reasons behind each of these examples of abstinence from using nuclear weapons. But one major common factor contributing to all of them has been an ingrained terror of nuclear devastation. The well documented images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the awesome photographs of giant mushroom clouds emerging from nuclear tests in the Pacific and the numerous movies based on nuclear Armageddon scenarios have all contributed to building up a deep rooted fear of nuclear weapons. This is not limited just to the abhorrence felt by anti-nuclear activists. It permeates to one extent or another the psyche of all but the most pathological of fanatics. It colours the calculations, even if not decisively, of the most hardened of military strategists. The unacceptability of nuclear devastation is the backbone of all deterrence strategies. There is not just a fear of being attacked oneself, but also a strong mental barrier against actually initiating nuclear attacks on enemy populations, no matter how much they may be contemplated in war games and strategies. As a result a taboo has tacitly evolved over the decades preventing nations, at least so far, from actually pressing the nuclear button even in the face of serious military crises.

Fearing nuclear weapons is the only way to prevent nuclear omnicide.

**Harvard Nuclear Study Group** **83** (“Living With Nuclear Weapons,” p. 47)

The question is grisly, but nonetheless it must be asked. Nuclear war [sic] ca**nnot be avoided simply by refusing to think about it**. Indeed the task of reducing the likelihood of nuclear war should begin with an effort to **understand how it might start**. When strategists in Washington or Moscow study the possible origins of nuclear war, they discuss “scenarios,” imagined sequences of future events that could trigger the use of nuclear weaponry. Scenarios are, of course, speculative exercises. They often leave out the political developments that might lead to the use of force in order to focus on military dangers. That nuclear war scenarios are even more speculative than most is something for which we can be thankful, for it reflects humanity’s fortunate lack of experience with atomic warfare since 1945. But imaginary as they are, nuclear scenarios can help identify problems not understood or dangers not yet prevented because they have not been foreseen.

Fear Good – Nukes

Absent fear of nuclear war, use of nuclear weapons becomes inevitable.

**Beres** **98**. Professor of Political Science at Purdue University. Louis Rene, American University International Law Review, lexis.

Fear and reality go together naturally. Unless both Indian and Pakistani decision-makers come to acknowledge the mutually intolerable consequences of a nuclear war in South Asia, they may begin to think of nuclear weapons not as instruments of deterrence, but as "ordinary" implements of warfighting. [40](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d8702167be5246310fe1182a76473ec2&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAV&_md5=428e79743141f1211f375dcf66dd4608#n40) With such an erroneous view, reinforced by underlying commitments to Realpolitik [41](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d8702167be5246310fe1182a76473ec2&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAV&_md5=428e79743141f1211f375dcf66dd4608#n41) and nationalistic fervor, [42](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d8702167be5246310fe1182a76473ec2&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAV&_md5=428e79743141f1211f375dcf66dd4608#n42) they might even begin to take steps toward the atomic brink from which retreat would no longer be possible. "In a dark time," says the poet Theodore Roethke, "the eye begins to see." [43](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d8702167be5246310fe1182a76473ec2&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAV&_md5=428e79743141f1211f375dcf66dd4608#n43) Embedded in this ironic observation is an important mes [\*515]  sage for India and Pakistan. Look closely at the expected consequences of a nuclear war. Look closely at the available "arsenal" of international legal measures, at available treaties, customs, and general principles. [44](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d8702167be5246310fe1182a76473ec2&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzb-zSkAV&_md5=428e79743141f1211f375dcf66dd4608#n44) Do not be lulled into complacence by anesthetized and sanitized accounts of nuclear warfighting. Acknowledge the mutually beneficial expectations of world order.

Plan Solves Fear

Advocating a plan to address harms of nuclear war overcomes impact of numbing.

**Sandman and Valenti 86** (Peter and JoAnn, Professor of Human Ecology at Rutgers and Preeminent Risk Communications Expert published over 80 articles and books on various aspects of risk communication, Scared stiff — or scared into action, , Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1986, pp. 12–16, http://www.psandman.com/articles/scarstif.htm)

WHEN THE MOVEMENT against nuclear weapons celebrates its heroes, a place of honor is reserved for Helen Caldicott, the Australian pediatrician who revived Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) in 1978 and made it the vehicle for her impassioned antinuclear crusade. In countless communities since then, Caldicott has briskly narrated the devastation that would result if a small nuclear warhead exploded right here and now. Thousands of activists trace their movement beginnings to a Helen Caldicott speech, wondering if it wouldn't help reverse the arms race just to make everyone sit through that speech — and each week hundreds of activists do their best to give the speech themselves. Nonetheless, PSR Executive Director Jane Wales, while acknowledging a huge debt to Caldicott, said in 1984 that the time for the “bombing runs” (as insiders call the speech) was past. “We knew it was past when someone interrupted the speech one evening, actually interrupted it, and said, ’We know all that, but what can we do?’” In a 1985 newsletter, similarly, Sanford Gottlieb of United Campuses to Prevent Nuclear War warned that many students were “being numbed by the emphasis on nuclear blast, fire and radiation” in courses on nuclear war and were therefore “feeling more impotent and depressed than before the class began.”(1) Perhaps the first broad awareness that shock therapy may not be the best therapy came, ironically, in 1983 in the weeks preceding the broadcast of the television film The Day After, when Educators for Social Responsibility and others worried that the program might do children more harm than good. The Day After turned out to be less frightening than expected, but other films (Threads, Testament, and Caldicott’s own The Last Epidemic) raise the same worry — and not just for children. In the following analysis of the fear of nuclear Armageddon and its implications for antinuclear advocacy, we will argue that most people are neither apathetic about nuclear war nor actively terrified of it but rather, in Robert Jay Lifton’s evocative phrase, “psychically numbed”; that it is ineffective to frighten audiences who have found a refuge from their fears in numbness; and that there exist more effective keys to unlocking such paralysis. THE CENTRAL ENIGMA of antinuclear activism is why everyone is not working to prevent nuclear war. Activists who can understand those who disagree about what should be done are bewildered and frustrated by those who do nothing. Such inaction is objectively irrational; as Caldicott asked in a 1982 cover article in Family Weekly, “Why make sure kids clean their teeth and eat healthy food if they’re not going to survive?”(2) Advocates of all causes chafe at their neighbors’ lack of interest. When the issue is something like saving whales or wheelchair access to public buildings, the problem is usually diagnosed as apathy. Psychiatrist Robert Winer argues that the same is true of the nuclear threat, which most of us experience as remote, impersonal, and vague. For Winer, “one of the genuinely tragic aspects of the nuclear situation is that immediacy may be given to us only once and then it will be too late to learn.”(3) There is obviously some truth to this view. When asked to describe their images of nuclear war, people do tend to come up with abstractions — and those with more concrete, immediate images are likely to be antinuclear activists.

No Root Cause

The idea of a single vital internal link causes over determination which ignores the litany of factors that may motivate are – you should prefer the plan to their overarching link claims

Sagan 0 (Scott, Department of Polisci @ Stanford, www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/sagan.doc, AD: 7/1/10) jl

To make reasonable judgements in such matters it is essential, in my view, to avoid the common "fallacy of overdetermination." Looking backwards at historical events, it is always tempting to underestimate the importance of the immediate causes of a war and argue that the likelihood of conflict was so high that the war would have broken out sooner or later even without the specific incident that set it off. If taken too far, however, this tendency eliminates the role of contingency in history and diminishes our ability to perceive the alternative pathways that were present to historical actors.

The point is perhaps best made through a counterfactual about the Cold War. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, a bizarre false warning incident in the U.S. radar systems facing Cuba led officers at the North American Air Defense Command to believe that the U.S. was under attack and that a nuclear weapon was about to go off in Florida.[[1]](#footnote-1) Now imagine the counterfactual event that this false warning was reported and believed by U.S. leaders and resulted in a U.S. nuclear "retaliation" against the Russians. How would future historians have seen the causes of World War III? One can easily imagine arguments stressing that the war between the U.S. and the USSR was inevitable. War was overdetermined: given the deep political hostility of the two superpowers, the conflicting ideology, the escalating arms race, nuclear war would have occurred eventually. If not during that specific crisis over Cuba, then over the next one in Berlin, or the Middle East, or Korea. From that perspective, focusing on this particular accidental event as a cause of war would be seen as misleading. Yet, we all now know, of course that a nuclear war was neither inevitable nor overdetermined during the Cold War.

Alt Fails – Pyschology

Psycholoanalysis does not explain nuclear risks and if it did, even an effective project could not solve.

Blight 86 (james, political psychology, vol 7 no 4 1986. 617-660, JSTOR) jl

But nuclear depth psychology is distinguished principally by the em-phasis its advocates place upon deep psychological processes, the pathology of which is believed to explain an arms race they regard as patently irrational -in the sense that the end toward which they believe it is taking us, nuclear war, is the very inverse of the goal sought by advocates of a vigorous nuclear weapons competition between the superpowers. In short, nuclear depth psychologists believe that what they take to be our present and escalating nuclear danger can be traced to problems in our collective think-ing about nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and that these problems are deep and usually outside the awareness of those who make and execute nuclear policy. They thus conceptualize risk of nuclear war as mainly a psychological problem: If we could alter the way we think in fundamental ways, chiefly by shifting to a less parochial, more global perspective, the deep psychopathology would be cured, the arms race would be terminated, and the risk of nuclear war could be greatly reduced, perhaps ultimately even to zero. Two schools of thought dominate nuclear depth psychology. I will characterize them within the terminology suggested by Holt (1984, pp. 211-212). On the one hand, there are the cognitivists, those who believe that the deep psychopathology driving the arms race is a pathology of personal cognition, albeit one involving the cognitions of a great many leaders in the United States and the Soviet Union. To put the point somewhat colloquial-ly, but pointedly: Cognitivists believe the arms race is crazy because crazy people are running it. As we shall see presently, this approach to the pro-blem of nuclear risk has led many people straightaway to the view that the cure for superpower psychopathology is not fundamentally different in kind from the psychotherapeutic process required to cure any sort of psychological illness involving thought disorder. For most cognitivists, not only may the problem of nuclear risk be conceptualized psychologically, but so also may the cure, which is some process akin to psychotherapy. The other principal school of nuclear depth psychology is that of the interactionists. Advocates of this view tend to believe that there is no evidence suggesting the presence of widespread pathology in the cognitions of the individual leaders of either superpower. Rather, they argue that the deep psychopathology is more abstract, embodied in what they take to be a pathological relationship between the two countries. Within what nuclear depth psychologists take to be crazy patterns of interaction between the super-powers, especially institutionalized mistrust and assumptions of ubiquitous hostile intent, the leaders are seen as functioning quite rationally, as a rule, and one of the forms taken by their rational adaptation to a crazy system is participation in the nuclear arms race. Thus, according to the interactionists, if risk of nuclear war is to be reduced significantly, the quality of the super-power relationship must be changed fundamentally, and this implies a mainly political, rather than psychotherapeutic, cure for superpower psychopathology. The most famous cognitivist among nuclear depth psychologists is Helen Caldicott. Categorical and self-righteous in her assertions, shrill in her writing and speaking, Caldicott might easily be ignored by serious students of nuclear psychology if it weren't for her astonishing popularity. She is a best-selling author, a speaker who is much in demand, a founding member of the reestablished Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) and, more recent-ly, a driving force behind Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament (WAND). Thus one must assume that a great many people have, in Caldicott, found a voice commensurate in content and tone with their own deep fears and beliefs about risk of nuclear war (but see Coles, 1984). Caldicott's writing is filled with ad hominem psychological assaults like the following: The definition of a paranoid patient is someone who imagines a certain scenario in his or her own mind, decides (with no objective evidence) that this is exactly what someone else is thinking, and then decides to act on that notion. The paranoid delusions projected onto the Russian leaders come straight from the minds of American strategists and leaders, and these ideas probably reflect exactly what the Americans are planning to do themselves and bear little relationship to Soviet strategy or reality. (1984, pp. 174-175). Leading candidates for this diagnosis of paranoia are, according to Caldicott, "so-called broad-minded intellectuals who sat on Reagan's M X Commission" (The Scowcroft Commission). Moreover, she asserts, "such fantasy thinking is still practiced at the highest levels of government, including President Reagan and Defense Secretary Weinberger, and is overt paranoia" (1984, p. 174). One may find similar diagnoses in Kovel ( "paranoid madness"; 1983, p. 84) and Menninger( "exhibitionistic drunken gesturing of two suicidal giants"; 1983, p. 350). Unfortunately for Caldicott and her cognitivist colleagues, however, her

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Alt Fails – Pyschology

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diagnoses are simply, demonstrably wrong. The Soviet shave avast nuclear arsenal; their missiles and bombers really are aimed at us; they really do have rather precise plans for using them to destroy us in a nuclear war (see, e.g., Holloway, 1985; Meyer, 1985). However this state of affairs may have come about, our leaders do not simply imagine the Soviet nuclear threat. It is real, as anyone who examines the evidence may see. In moving from her analysis of the problem of nuclear risk-crazy leaders-to her therapeutic prescriptions for a cure, Caldicott's irrelevance to the world of nuclear policy-making becomes total. Because she believes that deeply sick people are driving the risk of nuclear war upward, she must choose between two broad prescriptive alternatives: something akin to political revolution, by which our leaders, at any rate, would be forcibly replaced; or therapy, by which they would be healed. Kovel (1983) leans toward the former alternative; Caldicott, however, favors some novel forms of therapy, such as a kind of marriage counseling, in which each superpower would be required to "pledge "its "troth "to the other (1984, p. 292), monthly wrestling matches between "the men who control the superpowers...to alleviate the built-up aggressions" (p. 305), and parental advice to "grow up and become responsible nations" (p. 337). One may at first wonder whether Caldicott puts forward such suggestions as these seriously but, noting the unrelentingly humorless tone of her writing, one suspects that she does. But because her cognitivist diagnoses are patently false, and because the realization of her prescription is so wildly improbable, the likelihood that the course she advocates w ill actually l ead to a reduction in the risk of nuclear war ought to be rated at very nearly zero.

Alt Fails – Pyschology

Psychology is totally irrelevant to nuclear policymakers – alternative are too unrealistic for political action

Blight 87 (James, Presently Prof. IR – Brown U. Watson Institute for International Studies, Former Cognitive Psychologist, PhD History of Behavioural Science – U. New Hampshire, Faculty Fellow and National Endowment for Humanities Research Fellow – Harvard U. and Lecturer – Harvard JFK School of Government, American Psychologist, 41:1, January, p. 12-29) jl

Predictably, clinicians among the nuclear depth psychologists tend to view the U.S.-Soviet relationship as psychopathological, whereas the experimentalists are inclined to hold that, based on scientifically derived data gathered from quarters other than international politics, the relationship is defective and likely to produce upward movement in a spiral of nuclear risk. I will argue here that these differences between the clinical and experimental formulations of nuclear depth psychology are neither as large nor as important as the much greater conceptual divide that separates the views of both groups from the policymaker's typical understanding of the requirements for managing and reducing the risk of nuclear war. Metaphorically, the present situation is something like an exemplification of Whorf's (1956) hypothesis: Nuclear depth psychologists of all persuasions, on the one hand, and nuclear policymakers and analysts on the other, speak different languages of nuclear risk, with the psychologists holding that the forces that drive risk of nuclear war upward are "deeper" than, or beyond, the awareness of policymakers. The respective psychological realities of psychologists and policymakers are thus very different, and this has led to the central dilemma of nuclear depth psychology: It is ignored almost universally in the policy community at just the time when interest in nuclear issues among psychologists is greater than it has ever been. Why this should be so and what ought to be done about it constitute the leading questions of this essay. Summary of the Argument: The Nuclear Depth Psychologists' Fallacy and What to Do About It Let us begin with the policy-relevant question: What is to be done about the problem thus formulated by nuclear depth psychologistsma deeply pathological superpower relationship, which drives an arms race, which, in turn, drives the risk of nuclear war ever higheff There has been no shortage of solutions. Indeed, the recent great and general awakening among psychologists to the prospect of a major nuclear war has sparked an unprecedented, creative explosion of "solutions." Yet many of these are difficult to take seriously, because they are either impossibly ambitious or pitifully inconsequential. Among those least likely to succeed are a catl for what amounts to a worldwide political revolution (Kovel, 1983), a worldwide transformation in our patterns of behavior (Skinner, 1982), or the initiating of meetings between American and Soviet psychologists (Klineberg, such proposals are necessarily or intrinsically bad. The point is that either the probability of their occurrence is so low or the probability of their having any noticeable effect on U.S.-Soviet nuclear policy is so vanishingly small, that they cannot begin to satisfy the members of a group like the nuclear depth psychologists, who seem universally to believe that risk of nuclear war is much too high at present and is rising fast. The point has been made poignantly by Wagner (1985). In a useful, critical review of psychological approaches to reducing the risk of nuclear war, he admired that the solutions put forward are too often "overwhelming and paralyzing" (p. 533). "Where we go," he said, " . . . is unclear" (p. 533). And so it is.

Alt Fails – Pyschology

Psychoanalysis is too counter-intuitive to be used in effective policy making – it will be ignored

Blight 87 (James, Presently Prof. IR – Brown U. Watson Institute for International Studies, Former Cognitive Psychologist, PhD History of Behavioural Science – U. New Hampshire, Faculty Fellow and National Endowment for Humanities Research Fellow – Harvard U. and Lecturer – Harvard JFK School of Government, American Psychologist, 41:1, January, p. 12-29) jl

But the policy irrelevance of depth psychological solutions to the problem of nuclear risk is not restricted only to those that seem obviously extrav~nt or ineffectual. It applies also to psychological solutions that are widely regarded in the psychological community as having great potential policy relevance, due in part to their having been substantiated by a good deal of empirical research and in part to the apparent complementarity between psychologists' approaches to the problem and throe of nuclear policymakers. The following example is meant to illustrate the point (argued at length below) that even the best and brightest psychological solutions to the problem of nuclear risk are remarkably beside the policymaker's point and thus quite unlikely to affect the poficymaking process. Probably the best known and most highly regarded attempt (among psychologists) to grapple psychologically with risk of nuclear war is Charles E. Osgood's (1962) "Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction," or GRIT. It is in many ways the locus classicus of nonclinical nuclear depth psychology. According to Osgood, the key problem is the arms race, which at the psychological level is exemplified in a spiral of mutual mistrust, which in turn leads in his view to tension and fear, which, finally, leads to further stein in the arms race. And it is the arms race itself, in Osgood's view, that continually raises the risk of nuclear war. Here, in sum, is Osgood's assessment, solution, and evaluation of the probability of successfifily reversing the arms race with GRIT: An arms race is obviously a tension-increasing system; it is a spiral of terror. By reversing one of the characteristics of an arms race, we may be able to transform it into a ~ of trust- This would be a graduated and reciprocated unilaterally initiated, internation system that was tension-decreasing in nature [GRIT]... with anything like the energy now being thrown into the arms race, GRIT would be feasible. (Osgood, 1986, p. 196) Worked out in fine-grained detail by Osgood and many others, GRIT has become the solid core of received wisdom for psychologists who, working now a quarter century after the publication of Osgood's An Alternative to War or Surrender, seek to bring their professional knowledge directly to bear on the risk of nuclear war. What, then, is fallacious in Osgood's assumption that GRIT is "feasible"? Why, after nearly 25 years, does GRIT (and its many successors) still strike those few members of the nuclear policy community who have studied it as unreal and irrelevant? An answer to this critical question may be approached in a more exact manner by comparing Osgood's rationale for GRIT with the following summary statement of the central goal of nuclear strategy: deterrence by means of crisis stability. Thomas C. Schelling, writing at almost the same time as Osgood, specified more clearly than anyone else, and probably more influentially, the policymaker's conceptual ground rules for the maintenance of nuclear deterrence. It is widely accepted that the United States has the military power virtually to obliterate the USSR, and vice versa... But \_9 . . we are worried about whether a surprise attack might have such prospects of destroying the power to retaliate as to be undeterred itself by the threat of retaliation... There is a difference between a balance of terror in which either side can obliterate the other and one in which both sides can do it, no matter who strikes first. It is not the "balance"--the sheer equality or symmetry in the situationmthat constitutes nuclear deterrence; it is the stability of the balance. The balance is stable only when neither, in striking first, can destroy the other's ability to strike back. (Schelling, 1960, p. 232) To Schelling~ as to entire generations of nuclear strategists, nuclear war is prevented by means of deterfence, which is a function of the credibility and "audibility" of threats that, finally, are computed mainly on the basis of a net assessment of the relative capabilities and vulnerability of warheads, delivery vehicles, and command and control systems. No one----certainly not SchellingDwould claim that these principles have always guided our nuclear policy in practice (Schelling, 1985/ 1986). But almost all nuclear policymakers have argued over the years that Schelling's principles of strategic stability ought to have guided their decisions, in principle. What needs to be noticed first and appreciated about these formulations of Osgood and Schelling is how utterly incommensurable they are with respect to the determinants of risk of nuclear war. Using a method one might call fear assessment, Osgood attributed the rising risk of war to deep fear and tension caused by continued participation in the arms race. To Schelling, however, risk of war has little to do with any hypothetical psychological strain and everything to do with coming off second best in a net threat assessment. To characterize the conceptual gulfbetwegn them in its starkest form, Osgood (and most psychologists) believe that any nuclear war will likely be caused by threats, whereas Schelling (and most policymakers and analysts) believe it will be prevented by them. No wonder that GRIT, a pillar of received wisdom among psychologists, is regarded as a curiosity among policymakers. It is important to notice, finally, why GRIT and its descendants are so wide of the mark of policy relevance. It is because they represent a "depth" psychology, an attempt at psychological unveiling of processes that are deeper than the conscious experience of nuclear policymakers. The implicit claim is that efforts to deter nuclear war by the maintenance of strategic stability, which seems to policymakers to be the cornerstone of war prevention, are "really" the very opposite--they are the likely cause of nuclear war. Psychologists tend to see this as a tale of two zeitgeists, one superficial and false (the policymakers') and one deep and true (the psychologists'). Obviously policymakers have had none of this. They are in fact much more likely to echo the remark of the Viennese journalist Karl Kraus, who described the original depth psychology this way: "Psychoanalysis is that spiritual disease ofwhich it considers itself to be the cure" (cited in Janik & Toulmin, 1973, p. 75). The lack of seriousness with which nuclear policymakers have viewed schemes like GRIT seems to prove the point rather conclusively. This point cannot be emphasized too much; its unravelling represents the critical thrust of this article: Nuclear depth psychology does not lead to policy-relevant conclusions. It is a conceptual cul-de-sac within which psychologists are likely to remain endlessly trapped, without a reasonable hope of contributing to the reduction of nuclear risks, the fear of which drove them into the nuclear arena in the first place. If psychologists seek a realistic hope of influencing nuclear policy, they must, as I argue in the last two sections, begin again after they have divested themselves of their spurious nuclear depth psychology.

Alt Fails – Pyschology

Psychoanalytic alternatives are politically irrelevant – It’s viewed as too unreal and alien

Blight 87 (James, Presently Prof. IR – Brown U. Watson Institute for International Studies, Former Cognitive Psychologist, PhD History of Behavioural Science – U. New Hampshire, Faculty Fellow and National Endowment for Humanities Research Fellow – Harvard U. and Lecturer – Harvard JFK School of Government, American Psychologist, 41:1, January, p. 12-29) jl

The nub of their central error was captured many years ago by William James. He called it, on one occasion, "the psychologists' fallacy par excellence," which confi.~ts in "confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report" (James, 1890, Vol. 1, p. 196). "We must," cautioned James, "be very careful, therefore, in discussing a state of mind from the psychologists' point of view, to avoid foisting into its own ken matters that are only there for ours" (James, 1890, Vol. 1, p. 197). But this is precisely what nuclear depth psychologists have not done. In Jamesian terms (James, 1890, Vol. 1, pp. 221-223), our nuclear policymakers are well acquainted with the fear of crises leading potentially to nuclear war, and thus they spend much of their time thinking about the determinants of strategic stability in such a way as to try to drive downward the probability that deterrence will fail. This, schematically, is the psychological reality of the nuclear policymakers. It bears no resemblance whatever to the "reality" that nuclear depth psychologists seek to attribute to them: Acquaintance with pathological suspicion and attention to arms "racing," each of which is ultimately attributable to superpower psychopathology. This, finally, is responsible for the policy irrelevance of the whole approach: Its premises are totally alien, psychologically completely unreal, to those who actually manage the nuclear risks. In an 1899 essay, James generalized this problem of egocentric psychologism by calling it "a certain blindness in human beings" that leads to the "injustice of our opinions, so far as they deal with the significance of alien lives" (James, 1899/1977a, pp. 629-630). His remedy was tolerance, based on a radically empirical approach to human knowledge. The more we understand what the lives of others are really like, from the inside, the more likely we are, James believed, to formulate a problem in a way that is appropriate to its context and thus pertinent to plausible solutions. This essay is conceived as just such a Jamesian exercise--in nuclear radical empiricism--of clearing away some of the fallacious depth-psychological assumptions that are leading nowhere. It is also, finally, an attempt to respond to the provocative challenge issued recently by Morawski and Goldstein (1985) to develop a policy-relevant psychology of avoiding nuclear war by engaging in "blunt honesty about the influence of politics, the constraints of methodology, and the risks of expertise" (p. 283). My belief is that if we psychologists are honest with ourselves, if we begin to acknowledge the hard reality of political variables, if we try to face up to the limitations of the analogy between world politics and the consulting room or laboratory, and if we begin to face the fact that nuclear policymakers are almost oblivious to psychology as such, then we will want to chart a new course, one that will begin with phenomenological analyses of nuclear crises (Blight, 1985a, in press-a, in press-b). If we thus try to enter the "alien lives" of those who manage the nuclear risks under which we all must live, we may indeed begin to assist them in lowering the likelihood of a catastrophic nuclear war.1984).

Alt Fails – Pyschology

They have to prove the alternative overcomes political opposition otherwise it solves zero of their links

Blight 87 (James, Presently Prof. IR – Brown U. Watson Institute for International Studies, Former Cognitive Psychologist, PhD History of Behavioural Science – U. New Hampshire, Faculty Fellow and National Endowment for Humanities Research Fellow – Harvard U. and Lecturer – Harvard JFK School of Government, American Psychologist, 41:1, January, p. 12-29) jl

The central fact to be faced by advocates of nuclear depth psychology is this: Nuclear policymakers are almost totally uninterested in any advice offered them by psychologists. Remonstrate as we might, in seeking to bring to bear clinical insights and scientific research that we believe to be both paradigmatically true and pragmatically pertinent to nuclear risks, there is no one listening at the policy end of what we hoped would be a conversation. In a recent timely article, Teflock took note of this "steely resistance" and observed that for policymakers, "the problems for which solutions are being proposed [e.g., Osgood's GRIT] are not widely understood or ~iTed to be problems" (Tetlock, 1986, p. 560). The discouraging but realistic conclusion Tetlock (1986) drew from thi~ central fact of policymakers' profound disinterest in psychology is that, no matter how relevant or potentially relevant psychologists believe their ideas to be, the prospects for what he calls psychologically based "procedural reform" are practically nil (p. 560). Thus psychology remains functionally irrelevant to the nuclear policy-making process.

Alt Fails – Backlash

Critique of nuclear weapons causes backlash among policymakers

Lifton 1 (Robert Jay Spring, Illusions of the Second Nuclear Age World Policy Journal, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_hb6669/is\_1\_18/ai\_n28841497/?tag=content;col1 TBC 7/1/10)

The good news about nuclearism is that it has been subjected to a great wave of intellectual and ethical criticism, and that it is no longer a respectable ideology in most thinking environments. It has become what the weapons scholar Sheldon Unger, in The Rise and Fall of Nuclearism, calls a "tarnished faith." The bad news, as Unger (along with others) also makes clear, is that such a sensible nuclear critique--what we can call ideological backsliding--does not extend to our present policymakers, nor for that matter to many leaders throughout the world. That is, nuclearism is all too alive, though I would not say well, among decisionmakers whose countries already possess, or wish to possess, these mystical objects. Here it is important to keep in mind the double character of the weapons. They are physical entities that are unprecedentedly murderous and at the same time they are perversely spiritualized objects. Nuclearism, then, is a beleaguered ideology, still in flux. Ideologies, like people, can be most d angerous when threatened and under duress. From that standpoint, the very force of the contemporary critique of nuclear weapons now being put forward by thoughtful and dedicated world statesmen could lead less thoughtful, less compassionate leaders and groups to reassert their devotion to and deification of nuclear weapons.

Alt Fails – Cooptation

The alternative is too abstract and allows political cooptation

Summers 91 (Craig, Mt Allison U – Psych, http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/ntc/NTC6.pdf, AD: 6/30/10) jl

People with different political agendas could make completely different conclusions using the material in Nuclear Madness. It is also the case that completely different premises and images could be used to arrive at the same conclusions. A discussion of sexual and pornographic images of the nuclear threat in Rosenbaum (1978) is equally metaphorical. It is descriptive, but not explanatory. Perhaps no real explanation is necessary in Nuclear Madness, though, or even any conclusions on religious thinking or psychological processes. Chernus’s description of “the bomb” as “a symbol of neurotic ambivalence” (p. 67; also 56, 61) is almost just an abstract, artistic image. This would be okay if presented this way in the introduction. As it is, though, we are misled from the title on into thinking that this book will provide an understanding of psychological perceptions and responses to the nuclear threat.

Aff Answers – Permutation

Pure rejection causes a crash landing – Powerful elites will be more aggressive without the perm

Lifton and Falk 82 (Robert – Professor Psychology at John Jay College, Richard – Professor of International Law at Princeton, *Indefensible Weapons*, p. 264-265) jl

This great struggle for global transformation encompasses normal politics, but it is also far broader than any strictly political experience, resembling more the emergence of a new religion or civilization on a global scale than a change, however radical, in the personnel or orientation of political leaders. In essence, as the transformation proceeds, the ground of politics will shift, and by shifting, will cause turmoil and confusion as new tendencies grow stronger, while the old structures, despite being undermined, remain in place and may through the desperate efforts of their stalwarts, embark on even more aggressive and adventurist paths. The avoidance of a crash landing of the old order is obviously a high priority under these circumstances. One form of constructive politics in such a setting are forms of thought and action that incorporate positive aspects of the past rather than insisting on its utter repudiation of a complete break. The pain of transition could be considerably eased by regarding attitudes of reconciliation as a cardinal virtue alongside those of perseverance and commitment.

Complete rejection causes a crash landing

Lifton and Falk 82 (Robert – Professor Psychology at John Jay College, Richard – Professor of International Law at Princeton, *Indefensible Weapons*, p. 247-48) jl

Since popular movements are difficult to sustain (Americans being particularly prone to quick disillusionment), it is essential that its guiding spirits possess and impart a vision of what needs to be done, and how to do it. There is a special requirement present here, as well. To oppose nuclearism effectively does impose a difficult and special requirement that we connect tactical demands with a commitment to perseverance in pursuit of essential long-range objectives. Either without the other will collapse: the moral passion that gives grassroots politics its edge depends largely on an overall repudiation of nuclearism in any form, while the emphasis on attainable goals builds needed popular confidence that victories over nuclear forces are possible, that ordinary people can mobilize and wield decisive power, and that a path can be eventually found to overcome once and for all, the nuclear menace.

AT: Deterrence = “Hostage Holding”

This analogy not only doesn’t make any sense but nuclear weapons have made societies safer from massive conventional conflict

Shaw 84 (William, London School of Economics, Ethics, Political and Social Philosophy Professor, Ethics, 94.2, JSTOR) jl

On closer inspection, however, this line of reasoning is less conclusive than Ramsey and Lackey think. First, their analogies involve kidnapping, yet "holding hostage" the opposed population with nuclear weapons in no way limits its movement or activities. The mere pointing of French ICBMs at Soviet cities, scary as it may be, restricts no Soviet citizen's liberty. Soviet civilians are not being tied to bumpers or wired to explosives; their lives of joy and sorrow will unfold much the same whether or not they are "held hostage."7 Second, McCoy need not claim a "right" to threaten the Hatfield child (let alone to kidnap him), in the sense of putting Hatfield under an obligation not to remove his child from that threat. Rather, McCoy need only advance the weaker claim that he has no obligation not to threaten conduct harmful to Hatfield's child in order to dissuade Hatfield from an immoral action. Does Hatfield's child have some right, which could furnish the ground of this putative obligation, not to have his life made the basis of a threat directed at his father (indeed the child himself may not know about the threat), or do the denizens of Leningrad have a right not to have French missiles pointed their way? Talk of rights is frequently rather loose these days, but even so it is hard to see what would be the basis of these supposed rights. Third, does McCoy's threat actually increase the chance of Hatfield's child dying, as Lackey assumes? If McCoy's threat were a bluff, then it would not enhance the child's danger. On the other hand, if the threat is real but deters successfully, then no harm comes to the youngster. Has his chance of dying nonetheless been increased? The answer will obviously depend upon the circumstances, but if the predictable response to Hatfield's actions involves some risk to his family in any case (perhaps they will inevitably be endangered when he is pursued), then McCoy's threat may in fact lower the actual, though perhaps not the perceived, risk to Hatfield's child. Many people assume that the nuclear era has made our lives more perilous, but if it were the case that the American hydrogen arsenal has prevented not just nuclear war, but a conventional conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that would have occurred in a non-nuclear post-World War II world, then it may actually have increased not only our safety, but the safety of the civilians held "hostage" in the USSR.

AT: Deterrence = “Hostage Holding”

Nuclear coercion is extremely rare

Beardsley & Asal 9 (Kyle – Emory, Victor – NYU, *Jnl of Confl Resolution*, 53:2, p. 278-9)

Use of atomic weapons, however, has not been attempted since 1945, and they are rarely explicitly threatened (Betts 1987). Whether they can be credibly threatened as coercive devices remains in question because the potential costs to the user are prodigious, especially against another nuclear state. A substantial literature exists attempting to explain how nuclear weapons can be useful for coercive diplomacy in light of such credibility issues (e.g., Schelling 1966; Powell 1987, 1988, 1990; Snyder and Diesing 1977). Such studies tend to explain only how nuclear weapons can be used in deterrence, with the ability to compel left in doubt. Zagare and Kilgour (2000) have also pointedly observed that much of this “classical deterrence”

literature uses irrational constructs to explain how rational actors threaten higher risk of escalation to make a foe to back down.

They’re not credible threats and that applies even to nonnuclear states

Beardsley & Asal 9 (Kyle – Emory, Victor – NYU, *Jnl of Confl Resolution*, 53:2, p. 279)

We cannot, however, take as given that nuclear weapons actually increase the expected conflict costs of conflict. While this is something that has often been argued, there are few systematic empirical tests for whether the observed world conforms to what one would expect if nuclear weapons do increase costs of conflict. Some scholars discount the role that nuclear weapons have played in increasing an opponent’s

costs of conflict and stabilizing peace. Mueller (1988) has argued that nuclear weapons are actually irrelevant, as they can never credibly be threatened. Geller (1990) has also argued that nuclear weapons are generally irrelevant against nonnuclear actors and finds that nuclear-weapon states are unable to deter nonnuclear states from aggression. Proliferation pessimists such as Sagan (2003) argue that some decision makers, particularly military leaders, will not weigh the costs the same way as civilian leaders.

Nukes make war threats less likely simply bc of the risks involved

Beardsley & Asal 9 (Kyle – Emory, Victor – NYU, *Jnl of Confl Resolution*, 53:2, p. 281)

While the costs of the maximum-escalation scenarios will increase in the shadow of nuclear weapons, the associated probabilities should decrease. The size of these weapons and their clumsy inability to not cause horrific damage even when used in a limited sense make them an unlikely option in war. Against a nuclear opponent, especially one with second-strike capabilities, the costs to the using state would likely be in the form of a catastrophic response. Such a threat of retaliation from a nuclear adversary is obvious, but there are also substantial costs to using nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear state. The use of nuclear weapons can hinder the using state from pursuing some of its strategic objectives, such as winning the support of an adversary’s domestic population or even gaining control of a disputed area that becomes irradiated. Beyond these instrumental incentives, Tannenwald (1999, 2005) has traced the development of a nuclear taboo, in which there are substantial normative costs to a first-strike nuclear attack. Once the nuclear taboo is established, decision makers may never consider using a nuclear first strike because it simply always lies outside of the range of possible appropriate actions or they risk sanction from the greater international or domestic communities for violating a deeply rooted norm.

A2: Lifton

Lifton’s wrong – he labels different opinions disorders and simplifies reality into moral absolutes

DEL SESTO 00 (CRISTINA November 18, 2000 NY Times http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/18/arts/champion-of-human-survival-tries-to-awaken-academics-to-a-nuclear-menace.html?pagewanted=1 TBC 7/1/10)

Dr. Lifton's psychological analysis has its critics. Theodore Postol, professor of science, technology and national security policy at M.I.T., said that Dr. Lifton and those who subscribe to his approach tended to ascribe psychological disorders to those whose opinions differed from their own. ''Characterizing existential dilemmas in psychological terms strikes me as not capturing the problem,'' said Mr. Postol, who is also a speaker at the nuclear conference. ''Lifton talks of psychic-numbing. There's numbing for all kinds of things. I'm not sure what that tells us. The real world is complex and sometimes none of the choices we have are good ones. If Attila the Hun is coming through, it's not a matter of being moral. It's kill or be killed.''

A2: Lifton

Lifton’s failure to confront the material realities of power gut solvency

Kovel 84 (Joel, Against the state of nuclear terror, Comm-UC-SD, google books TBC 7/1/10)

That Lifton dwells on our imaging of the world rather than upon how we actively make it, automatically puts everything in a passive light. We receive reality instead of construct it; and so the way it is constructed, and for whose profit and benefit, becomes secondary. The stage of history shifts from the real world to the mental registration of that world. Therefore, psychic numbing, which is surely Lifton's leading concept (in The Broken Connection, his major theoretical work, he claims that numbing "undermines the most fundamental psychic process," and is "the essential mechanism of mental disorder"), at its most extreme "consists of the mind being severed from its own psychic /brms"(italics Lifton's).'3 Since these "forms" are only images, their source in reality becomes a matter of some indifference. Thus, we see why for Lifton the actual presentation of the bomb doesn't matter very much. All that is required is that there be a bomb out there to provide a collective focus for numbing. Paradoxically, this is a quantitative kind of psychohistory, for all its concern with the imagination. The concrete history of the bomb, and the critically different meanings given to it by people in different social places, are cancelled out by the one denominator, the form of "bombness." A psychology whose central concept is imaging is a poor psychology, opaque to the great forces that actually move people in the world: self-interest, sexuality, dependency on others. There is not a mention in Indefensible Weapons, for example, of the essential sexual element in militarism. Yet as any viewing of Stanley Kubrick's great film. Dr. Strangelove, can instantly clarify, there is much more to nuclearism than numbing and the search for immortality. Lifton, however, will have nothing of such coarse realities. Thus even the nuclear state of being is inadequately treated. Lifton's insights help insofar as they give some shape to the inchoate dread that characterizes life under the nuclear state. Beyond this point, however, they trail off into pious exhortation. The politics of psychotechnocracy basically come down to a variety of psychotherapy. Therapy is, after all, the specific technology of psychology; and if one's appreciation of the world does not extend beyond psychologism, then one's prescription for changing the world cannot extend beyond the technology of psychologizing. In practice this amounts to nothing more than the mouthing of worthy sentiments and the reassurance that one is after all on the side of the angels. In fact, Lifton scarcely ever descends to the particulars of what changing the nuclear state would really entail. Given the degree of Lifton's indifference to its actual structure, it is not too hard to understand why he would place one of his more concrete discussions of the pitfalls in the path of a non-nuclear world in a footnote to his contribution to Indefensible Weapons. It might be worthwhile to consider this passage in full: Part of the awareness (that we would be safer without nuclear weapons than with their insane accumulation! must include anticipation of possible responses from those in power. They too would be the subject of a change in consciousness, and that possibility must be ardently pursued. But they could also react with a resurgence of nuclearism all the more primitive because of its gnawing disbelief in itself. They could then take steps to repress the new awareness, whether by attempting to dishonor, threaten or otherwise undermine those who became associated with it, or by further control of information and manipulation of media. In this way our society could become dangerously divided into antagonistic camps embracing and rejecting precisely this awareness. For that reason its dissemination needs to be as broad and encompassing as we can make it, so that rather than further divide, the awareness can serve to unify disparate groups within our society.1\* This is the politics of therapy. It seeks change through elevation of consciousness, or "awareness," as if an act of imagination would directly transform history. It completely ignores the fact that "those in power" are shaped by the power they serve, and assumes instead that they promote nuclear weapons because of their own distorted awareness of them, specifically "nuclearism" (which to Iifton is the belief that immortality can be attained through the power of the bomb). Put another way, Lifton has no conception that these people serve empire and capital, i.e. a worldwide system of oppression, the military juggernaut that enforces it, and the homegrown monster known as the military-industrial complex with its accomplices in government and the academy. Because of his inattention to these gross realities, Lifton can blithely offer awareness and warn us about the divisiveness it could cause—as though our society were not already "dangerously divided," by the schisms inherent in power, into "antagonistic camps." Not the camps of one kind of awareness or another, but the camp of those whose power has led them to use nuclear weaponry as enforcers and that of everyone else who is the victim of that power. One is the camp of the subject of history and the other that of history's object; one camp for those who have monopolized reason, science and technology and the other camp for those who have not.

AT: Martin – N/W = Extinction

Brian is wrong – doesn’t assume combustible material injected into the stratosphere

Pittock 84 (Barrie, Atmospheric Research Scientist, published over 200 articles, Climate Impact Group Chair, CSIRO Senior Scientist, Australian Public Service Medal Winner, http://www.uow.edu.au/~bmartin/pubs/84sanap.pdf AD: 7/1/10) jl

Next Brian attacks Jonathan Schell for discussing the implications of human extinction in The Fate of the Earth. Brian never acknowledges that Schell quite explicitly said that human extinction is not a certainty (see Schell p. 93), and ignores the powerful arguments which Schell advances for regarding the mere possibility of human extinction as important. These are developed further in Schell's more recent articles in The New Yorker (Jan. 2 & 9, 1984). Brian then claims that the scientific basis of the ozone depletion problem has "almost entirely evaporated". In fact, while we now know that the nuclear winter effect is almost certainly far more serious than ozone depletion, the ozone depletion problem has not been dismissed except in so far as the trend to smaller warheads may limit the quantity of oxides of nitrogen injected into the 2 stratosphere by the nuclear explosions themselves. Ozone depletion could in fact end up being more serious due to injections of combustion products, including smoke, into the stratosphere.

Every claim made by Brian assumes unrealistic scenarios – the possibility for extinction is high

Pittock 84 (Barrie, Atmospheric Research Scientist, published over 200 articles, Climate Impact Group Chair, CSIRO Senior Scientist, Australian Public Service Medal Winner, http://www.uow.edu.au/~bmartin/pubs/84sanap.pdf AD: 7/1/10) jl

Brian claims that the impact on populations nearer the Equator, such as in India, "does not seem likely to be significant". Quite to the contrary, smoke clouds are likely to spread into the tropics within a matter of weeks and would probably lead to below freezing temperatures for months on end. Populations and the ecology in such regions are the least able to withstand such a climatic onslaught and must be very seriously affected. Then he says that major ecological destruction "remains speculative at present". Is he suggesting that a sudden and prolonged plunge to below freezing temperatures, with insufficient light for photosynthesis, might have little harmful effect, or is he denying the reality of "nuclear winter"? There have been a number of specific criticisms of the various published papers on nuclear winter, but after more than two years in print there has been no criticism which has substantially altered the basic conclusions. The most prominent criticism has come from John Maddox, editor of Nature (307, 121: 1984), who completely failed to take account of the vital difference in optical properties of soot and volcanic dust (La Marche and Hirschboeck, 1984). Principal uncertainties exist as to the war scenarios, the fraction of soot in the smoke, the height of injection of the smoke, the amount which would be removed by washout in the initial plumes, and the later rate of removal. In most cases the published papers made assumptions which tended to under-estimate the effects, especially with regard to the height of injection of the smoke and its lifetime. Two possible exceptions are the war scenarios, in which the so-called "baseline" case may be too large by a factor of 2, and perhaps the particle coagulation rates if the initial plumes are not rapidly dispersed. My judgement now is that the initial effects would be much as described in the published papers, even with a 2,000 megatonne war, except that the lifetime of the effects could well turn out to be years rather than months. I will discuss the technical details elsewhere. Brian goes on to suggest that the worst effects might be avoided by "migration to coastal areas, away from the freezing continental temperatures", but fails to realise that the huge temperature gradients induced between the continents and oceans will cause violent storms to lash these coastal zones, which in any case are likely to be subject to a strong outflow of cold air from the continental interiors. Brian then invokes the advantages of turning to grain rather than meat to extend "reserves of food". The fact is of course that in the event of a nuclear winter any human survivors will have little choice but to eat whatever food is available, be it meat or grain. But where are there huge grain reserves sufficient to feed the survivors for one or more years, and will such reserves survive in convenient proximity to the human survivors? Is Brian going to seriously 3 advocate creating grain reserves sufficient to feed a couple of thousand million people for one or two years?

A2: Chernus – Non-Falsifiable

Chernus’s ignorance of empirical research makes his argument non-falsifiable and useless

Summers 91 (Craig, Mt Allison U – Psych, http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/ntc/NTC6.pdf, AD: 6/30/10) jl

As a central theme, Nuclear Madness: Religion and the Psychology of the Nuclear Age states that: “The question to be asked about nuclear weapons . . . is: What fantasy images are embedded in our attitudes and behaviors?” (p. 83). But Psychology as a discipline and profession is based on empirical research, not fantasy images. Author Ira Chernus does acknowledge that his approach is not easily interwoven with formal psychological research (discussing theologian Paul Tillich, p. 48; also pp. 105- 106). But he nevertheless uses arguments, such as those from Mircea Eliade, that “can be neither verified nor falsified by empirical research” (p. 193), an ominous note for social scientists reading the book. Chernus overlooks vast areas of empirical research in political science, economics, political psychology, and even the scientific evidence on nuclear winter, stating that “the empirical reality of a large-scale use of nuclear weapons eludes scientific understanding” (p. 64). As one example to the contrary, in psychology there have been innumerable experimental studies of imagery, both in terms of imaginal thinking, and a narrower literature specifically focusing on nuclear imagery (e.g., Journal of Social Issues, v. 39[1]). Skirting these seems to be a gross omission in a book purporting to use imagery as a basis for a psychological understanding of the nuclear age.

A2: Chernus – Alt No Solve

Alt can’t solve the links – ignore larger motivation in the military industrial complex

Summers 91 (Craig, Mt Allison U – Psych, http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/ntc/NTC6.pdf, AD: 6/30/10) jl

This is a book that relies heavily on lofty language and philosophical jargon (e.g., “radical finitude”, p. 53). Relating mythological terms like “the underworld” (p. 254) to nuclear deterrence is about as useful to a real understanding of the nuclear threat as former U.S. President Reagan’s references to “the evil empire.” These grandiose descriptions fail to recognize simple economic realities. The scientific-military-industrial complex and the nuclear industry are often supported simply because they provide companies and shareholders with profits, and employees with jobs. Therefore, it may not be that numbing occurs because of the magnitude of the threat, but that rationalization occurs because of vested interests in the threat. It would therefore be worth considering whether there is any difference between numbing in the hibakusha that survived Hiroshima, and rationalization (or numbing) for questionable work that pays well. This distinction may perhaps be studied empirically. As with imagery, there are also empirical studies that could have been considered in any book dealing with these types of psychological mechanisms (e.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959 and all of the subsequent studies validating cognitive dissonance).

A2: Chernus – Disproven

Chernus’s method relies on out dated and disproven psychoanalytic theory

Summers 91 (Craig, Mt Allison U – Psych, http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/ntc/NTC6.pdf, AD: 6/30/10) jl

The only evidence for numbing in the book is Lifton’s observations of victims in Hiroshima, which are then linked to potential victims of the contemporary nuclear threat. Lifton himself recently associated the thought processes in perpetrating Nazi mass killing, and in contemporary “perpetrators” of the nuclear threat, which would have been very relevant to reference here (Lifton and Markusen, 1990). The tendency throughout Nuclear Madness is to increasingly leave the initial evidence and begin describing events as schizophrenic, neurotic or mad. The mental health metaphors in Nuclear Madness are rooted in pre-1950s psychoanalysis. (Even continual reference to “The bomb” rather than “smart missiles,” for example, is outdated.) Chernus states Psychologists may identify nuclear weapons with interpersonal hostility, dominance needs, repressed rage, or magical defenses against insecurity. Freudians will find a mapping of infantile omnipotence desires. Jungians will find archetypal patterns of all sorts. Theologians will consider the bomb a mapped replication of our traditional image of God. But all will attest the existence of social fantasy. (p. 32. Infantile omnipotence desires? All will attest to the existence of social fantasy? Nuclear Madness does, but it is surely a step backwards for any reader attempting to learn something of explanations in contemporary political psychology. In relying on clinical metaphors from over forty years ago, Chernus has tied his philosophy to a clinical approach with little actual evidence, and which is generally no longer accepted. Psychic numbing and mental illness could be used successfully if not treated as just a metaphorical explanation for nuclear irrationality. This is a difference between Lifton’s (1967) actual psychiatric observations and Chernus’s numbing metaphor. But Nuclear Madness dwells on descriptive images and similes, not actually pursuing responses to the nuclear threat using either side of psychology: (a) the experimental and observational bases, which have been extensively documented, or (b) clinical psychopathology, which would be worth seriously pursuing. One could propose very real psychiatric grounds for the suicidal nature of being a passive bystander or having vested interests in the nuclear arms race (see Charny, 1986). Masking, numbing, rationalizing, or however ignoring the potential for nuclear omnicide is a psychological process that poses a very real threat to human life, and may thus fit the criteria for inclusion as a pathological disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III (American Psychiatric Association, 1987).

AT: Chernus – AT: Root Cause

Psychology is not the root cause and even if it was policy makers would ignore it

Blight 87 (James, Presently Prof. IR – Brown U. Watson Institute for International Studies, Former Cognitive Psychologist, PhD History of Behavioural Science – U. New Hampshire, Faculty Fellow and National Endowment for Humanities Research Fellow – Harvard U. and Lecturer – Harvard JFK School of Government, American Psychologist, 41:1, January, p. 12-29) jl

The central, salient assumption of all nuclear depth psychologists is that our "thinking" may be regarded as a kind of independent variable (or cause), whereas risk of nuclear war, evidenced in a spiraling arms race, is the dependent variable (or effect). This formulation, consistent with, and in many instances derived from, Einstein's manifesto, is radically different from the way nuclear policymakers tend to approach the problem. The policymaker is inclined to regard risk of nuclear war as both a cause and an effect: a cause of the manner of piecemeal, cautious thinking required to manage international affairs, and an effect of deeply rooted, hardly understood factors that operate to maintain the quasi-anarchic nationstate system. The functional result of this discrepancy is that the main causal arrow for each group is nearly the reverse of what the other takes it to be. Nuclear depth psychologists seek to alter our thinking, thus altering a particular international relationship and lowering nuclear risks. Policymakers, on the other hand, see their main task as managing nuclear risks within the context of an essentially unalterable international situation that determines the form, if not all of the content, of our manner of thinking. An obvious, if superficial, conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that nuclear depth psychologists and nuclear policymakers see the problem of nuclear risk very differently, in fact almost inversely. This is no doubt why members of the policy community have, by and large, concluded that the arguments of the depth psychologists are irrelevant to the management of nuclear risks (Klineber~ 1984, p. 1248). But a closer examination of the psychological assumptions underlying each approach reveals the reasons not only why the formulations and prescriptions of nuclear depth psychology seem strange and irrelevant to policy makers but also why they really are irrelevant and are likely to remain so. In taking such a closer look we may get a clearer picture of why the policymakers' formulation accounts for the historical record whereas the clinical diagnosis and prescriptions of the depth psychologists do not.

\*Weaponitis\*

Weaponitis Shell

Their focus on weapons masks the militarism at the heart of nuclear crises

Schwartz and Derber 90 (The Nuclear Seduction, William A., and Charles, Prof of Sociology Boston College http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&brand=ucpress TBC 6/30/10)

Weaponitis persists, while the real sources of nuclear peril are ignored, partly because of an error in thought—the incorrect diagnosis of the arms race as the main danger of the nuclear age. The error, however, is useful; weaponitis serves important interests of the parties to the nuclear debate. Weaponitis most obviously benefits those who profit from the continual arms buildup it legitimates: the huge defense corporations that build the weapons, the military bureaucracies that buy and control them, and the professional military strategists and intellectuals who make their livings and their reputations by rationalizing and planning the arms race. To acknowledge that the arms race no longer matters to the security and power of the United States would be bad business for military contractors and bad politics for the military. Corporate executives want to increase, not undermine, the market for their products, just as military officers want to command more, not fewer, nuclear weapons systems and new ones rather than old ones. Similarly, to dominate the nuclear debate after existential deterrence took hold in the 1950s, the experts on throw weight, hard target kill capability, and the like had to make it appear that such matters continued to be important. They erected an imposing edifice of deterrence theory and related historical lore that only the specialists can fully master and that makes the details of the hardware seem vitally important. Looking at the nuclear problem from a different, more political, point of view would cede the issue to other intellectual approaches—and to other intellectuals.

Militarism causes extinction and turns the case

**Mészáros 3** (István, June 2003, Phil. @ U of Sussex, *Monthly Review* Volume 55, Number 2)

It is not for the first time in history that militarism weighs on the consciousness of the people as a nightmare. To go into detail would take far too long. However, here it should be enough to go back in history only as far as the nineteenth century when militarism, as a major instrument of policy making, came into its own, with the unfolding of modern imperialism on a global scale, in contrast to its earlier—much more limited—varieties. By the last third of the nineteenth century the British and French Empires were not the only prominent rulers of vast territories. The United States, too, made its heavy imprint by directly or indirectly taking over the former colonies of the Spanish Empire in Latin America, adding to them the bloody repression of a great liberation struggle in the Philippines and installing themselves as rulers in that area in a way which still persists in one form or another. Nor should we forget the calamities caused by “Iron Chancellor” Bismarck’s imperialist ambitions and their aggravated pursuit later on by his successors, resulting in the eruption of the First World War and its deeply antagonistic aftermath, bringing with it Hitler’s Nazi revanchism and thereby very clearly foreshadowing the Second World War itself. The dangers and immense suffering caused by all attempts at solving deep-seated social problems by militaristic interventions, on any scale, are obvious enough. If, however, we look more closely at the historical trend of militaristic adventures, it becomes frighteningly clear that they show an ever greater intensification and an ever-increasing scale, from local confrontations to two horrendous world wars in the twentieth century, and to the potential annihilation of humankind when we reach our own time. We are, thus, concerned with a set of interdeterminations which must be viewed as parts of an organic system. If we want to fight war as a mechanism of global government, as we must, in order to safeguard our very existence, then we have to situate the historical changes that have taken place in the last few decades in their proper causal framework. The design of one overpowering national state controlling all of the others, following the imperatives emanating from capital’s logic, can only lead to humanity’s suicide. At the same time it must be also recognized that the seemingly insoluble contradiction between national aspirations—exploding from time to time in devastating antagonisms—and internationalism can only be resolved if regulated on a fully equitable basis, which is totally inconceivable in capital’s hierarchically structured order. In conclusion, therefore, in order to envisage a historically viable answer to the challenges posed by the present phase of global hegemonic imperialism, we must counter the systemic necessity of capital for globally subjugating labor through whichever particular social agency can assume the role assigned to it under the

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Weaponitis Shell

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circumstances. Naturally, this is feasible only through a radically different alternative to capital’s drive to monopolistic/imperialist globalization, in the spirit of the socialist project, embodied in a progressively unfolding mass movement. For only when it becomes an irreversible reality that “patria es humanidad,” to say it with JosE9 Marti’s beautiful words, only then can the destructive contradiction between material development and humanly rewarding political relations be permanently consigned to the past. For the weapons already available for waging the war or wars of the twenty first century are capable of exterminating not only the adversary but the whole of humanity, for the first time ever in history. Nor should we have the illusion that the existing weaponry marks the very end of the road. Others, even more instantly lethal ones, might appear tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. Moreover, threatening the use of such weapons is by now considered an acceptable state strategic device. Thus, put reasons one and two together, and the conclusion is inescapable: envisaging war as the mechanism of global government in today’s world underlines that we find ourselves at the precipice of absolute irrationality from which there can be no return if we accept the ongoing course of development.

Alternative: Reject the affirmative’s focus on weapons

Undermining rationalist nuclear policy is key to prevent nuclear war

Schwartz and Derber 90 (The Nuclear Seduction, William A., and Charles, Prof of Sociology Boston College http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&brand=ucpress TBC 6/30/10)

The complex analyses of first strike by the right, the left, and the professional experts have only obscured the simple truth. No state ever has the slightest rational incentive to launch strategic nuclear weapons first or in haste, and certainly not before confirming beyond any doubt the explosion of many nuclear warheads on its territory. Even in that instance elementary morality would dictate that retaliation be withheld, since it would be little more than the mass murder of innocents—on a scale that would make the Nazi slaughter seem modest by comparison—with no prospect of accomplishing any legitimate goal. Of course the threat of retaliation may be important to mutual deterrence and the prevention of nuclear war; but that threat, as we emphasize throughout this book, is existential, inherent in the existence of the weapons. The threat to launch first or to launch hastily is not important to deterrence. Does it matter if an attacker is destroyed minutes, hours, days, or even weeks after it launches its missiles? Morton Halperin gives much wiser advice: avoid launching nuclear weapons suddenly, perhaps by making it physically impossible, while maintaining the option of retaliating after considerable time for reflection and perhaps negotiation.[19] The best way to reduce the danger of a first strike is to encourage wider recognition that launching nuclear missiles first or launching them precipitously is insane regardless of the hardware on either side. In addition, our overwhelming concern should be to avoid the extreme political conditions in which Soviet or American leaders could actually believe that their counterparts had decided to launch World War III—when leaders, seduced by the prevailing nuclear nonsense, might make a split-second decision that could terminate human civilization. In the nuclear age, the desperate feeling that the ax is about to fall is the key factor—not the size, speed, or accuracy of the ax.

Link – Masking

Their focus on weapons masks the militarism at the heart of nuclear crises

Schwartz and Derber 90 (The Nuclear Seduction, William A., and Charles, Prof of Sociology Boston College http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&brand=ucpress TBC 6/30/10)

Weaponitis persists, while the real sources of nuclear peril are ignored, partly because of an error in thought—the incorrect diagnosis of the arms race as the main danger of the nuclear age. The error, however, is useful; weaponitis serves important interests of the parties to the nuclear debate. Weaponitis most obviously benefits those who profit from the continual arms buildup it legitimates: the huge defense corporations that build the weapons, the military bureaucracies that buy and control them, and the professional military strategists and intellectuals who make their livings and their reputations by rationalizing and planning the arms race. To acknowledge that the arms race no longer matters to the security and power of the United States would be bad business for military contractors and bad politics for the military. Corporate executives want to increase, not undermine, the market for their products, just as military officers want to command more, not fewer, nuclear weapons systems and new ones rather than old ones. Similarly, to dominate the nuclear debate after existential deterrence took hold in the 1950s, the experts on throw weight, hard target kill capability, and the like had to make it appear that such matters continued to be important. They erected an imposing edifice of deterrence theory and related historical lore that only the specialists can fully master and that makes the details of the hardware seem vitally important. Looking at the nuclear problem from a different, more political, point of view would cede the issue to other intellectual approaches—and to other intellectuals.

Link – Cooption

Withdrawing nuclear weapons allows the state to coopt criticism of nuclearism to allow for violence against the Third World

Schwartz and Derber 90 (The Nuclear Seduction, William A., and Charles, Prof of Sociology Boston College http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&brand=ucpress TBC 6/30/10)

For the government itself, and for those who support the essentials of its long-standing, bipartisan foreign policy, weaponitis has an irresistible virtue: in a society deeply alarmed by the possibility of nuclear war, it diverts attention from Third World U.S. military interventionism and toward the far less important nuclear arms competition. Arms control plays a particularly important role in this process, as we noted in Chapter 9. It is a widely popular, seemingly progressive, and highly visible activity that the state can use to show its commitment to reducing the nuclear danger. The executive branch manages the negotiation process and the information flow about it. The Soviets can be blamed for problems even when the Americans are balking. Years can be spent working out treaties on minor issues such as the Euromissiles, with tremendous public relations bonanzas at the end if the efforts succeed. And all the while Soviet and American leaders can bomb Third World countries, support unstable dictatorships, arm belligerents, pursue foreign policy as usual, and still receive relatively good press on the nuclear question because of their "commitment to arms control." This manipulation cleverly coopts the peace movement's critique of the arms race into a slick government public relations tool. It is an effective way to manage an issue that could explode into serious popular dissent and unrest if the public grasped where the real hazards lie.

Link – “Making the World Safe for Conventional War”

The aff makes the world safe for conventional war

Azael 3 (blogger, 6-30, http://www.hellblazer.com/2003/06/making-the-world-safe-for-conventional-warfare.html)

All throughout the nuclear weapons reduction talks, the one reoccurring thought I kept having was "they're just making the world safe for conventional warfare". They weren't doing this to make us safer, they were just fixing things so that we could all engage in a bit of friendly combat without the fear of triggering global thermonuclear warfare and the end of the world. And the doctrine of preemption is just another logical step along this process. Once we get people to agree to give up those expensive nuclear programs, we then announce that we're going to slap anyone down who threatens to even reach parity with the US.

This is the critical internal link to conflict in a post-Cold War world – The revolution in military affairs fundamentally alters the thinking implied in the 1ac

Beyoghlow 99 (J.H., Rutgers, *American Political Science Review*, sept 1, p. questia)

The authors of The Absolute Weapon Revisited set out to "parallel" or build on the original essay by reflecting rather than proving or disproving a specific set of hypotheses in the original thesis. In so doing, old assumptions about the credibility and guarantee of these weapons are examined and reassessed. Most of the contributors conclude that nuclear weapons are here to stay, but nuclear deterrence is likely to be moderated by the so-called revolution in military affairs--the emergence of new advances in conventional weapons technology and in military organizations and doctrines. Total force is what powerful states are likely to seek in the next century, not just nuclear weapons. As one author states, "fostering a post-nuclear ethic requires neither abandoning deterrence nor making the world safe for conventional war: Bosnia suggests that superpower nuclear weapons will have little bearing on post--Cold War regional/ethnic disputes.... The benefits for U.S. security of maintaining a robust, global nuclea r triad will be surpassed by the advantages of the revolution of military affairs in a denuclearization world" (pp. 264-5).

These conventional strategies will be uniquely destabilizing because of the unknowns involved in arms racing

Du Preez 8 (Jean, Martin Center, cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/op14\_dupreez.pdf)

Third, in all cases that belong to the second category (mission precedes status), nuclear weapons sup

port deterrence of vastly superior conventional forces. In these situations, straightforward downgrading of the role of nuclear weapons is particularly difficult. These efforts are likely to encounter strong domestic resistance because the logic of such missions seems credible to domestic constituencies, and policy of nuclear minimization is likely to be regarded as “making the world safe for conventional war.” There will be reluctance to engage in “asset substitution” because it is likely to be more expensive. Nuclear weapons are expensive during the R&D and initial buildup period, but after that they could in some cases serve as a cheaper substitute for conventional assets; this is particularly true today when conventional weapons have to be high-tech to be effective. Furthermore, an attempt at asset substitution risks causing a conventional arms race.

The plan improves US and NATO conventional freedom of action

Joyner 3-5 (James, Atlantic Foundation, http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/are-nuclear-weapons-obsolete)

At first blush, it sounds like a wonderful idea. After all, nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction that can kill innocents by the thousands if not the millions. Who wouldn't want to be rid of them? Getting to that point might be absurdly fanciful from a practical standpoint, but it's a wonderful ideal, no? Certainly from an American standpoint it is. By most estimates, we spend more on defense than the rest of the planet combined. A nuclear-free world would be one in which our conventional military might would give us even more freedom of action than we now enjoy. North Korea would be rendered a minor irritant and our relationships with Iran and Russia would improve decidedly in our favor. Presumably, the same is true of the Western Europeans and the NATO countries, who would be far less constrained in their relations with Russia and far less worried about Iran.

Link – Restraint

Nuclear weapons restrained U.S. power; cuts lead to aggressive prosecution of local conflicts

United Nations University 9 (http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu09ue/uu09ue08.htm)

Although the spectre of global nuclear war is fading for the first time, local conflicts are far from over. Military R&D efforts will continue to concentrate on miniaturization and on improving the precision of conventional weapons, as well as perfecting the systems of surveillance, monitoring, and response peculiar to electronic warfare. As General Poirier [42] has stressed, nuclear weapons, paradoxically, restrained the level of violence, because potential enemies knew that they must act and stop each other from acting in a haze of shared uncertainties, which led to political moderation and strategic prudence. In the "balance of terror," uncertainty brought a degree of order to relations between the superpowers, as deterrence only works when the enemy acknowledges the same rules. Nuclear proliferation may lead to an "imbalance of terror," where uncertainty generates disorder and where disorder on the periphery in fact adds to general uncertainty. The death of communism and the collapse of the Soviet system have removed the basis for the whole post-war strategic confrontation, and it is hard to imagine the biggest nations relying upon their nuclear deterrence in the event of hostilities initiated by "non-rational" smaller countries without atomic weapons. However, given that the sources of conflict throughout the world have not been eliminated, the "watch" will continue to mobilize substantial scientific resources. The heyday of the military-industrial complex is not yet over; that of defence-related R&D even less so.

We’ll use the plan as a pre-text to use our conventional military power against countries like Iran

Eckel 3-1 (Matt, U of Chicago – Grad Student, Foreign Policy Watch, http://fpwatch.blogspot.com/2010/03/nuclear-weapons-in-twenty-first-century.html.)

This brings us to the second reasonably credible use: regime protection. Though American leaders try not to say it out loud too often, one of the reasons Iran's nuclear program is unsettling to Washington is that it constrains the ability of the United States to topple the Iranian regime by force, should push come to shove. As a global hegemon, having the ability to wave our conventional military around and implicitly threaten recalcitrant middle powers with conquest is something America likes to be able to do. It's much harder if the recalcitrant middle power in question can credibly threaten to take out a couple of allied capital cities. Israel's nuclear program was originally founded on this logic, as was that of France (consider De Gaulle's famous statement that "...we shall have the means to kill 80 million Russians. I truly believe that one does not light-heartedly attack people who are able to kill 80 million Russians, even if one can kill 800 million French, that is if there were 800 million French").

Link – Restraint

Nukes deter U.S. aggression – Cuts allow us the freedom to intervene without fear of reprisals or escalation

LA Times 9 (http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/16/opinion/oe-scoblic16.)

During the Cold War, one could argue that that dynamic helped the U.S. because Warsaw Pact forces outnumbered NATO's. But today, with the specter of rogue-state nuclear programs, it's more likely that we are the ones who would be deterred. For example, would we have waged Operation Desert Storm (let alone Operation Iraqi Freedom) if Saddam Hussein had been able to strike New York or Washington with a nuclear weapon? Probably not. Our half-trillion-dollar-a-year military can, in essence, be defanged by any dictator with a handful of A-bombs. That is a remarkable waste of America's incredible conventional superiority. Our fleet of stealth fighters and bombers can establish air dominance in virtually any scenario, allowing us to obliterate an adversary's military infrastructure at will. At sea, our fleet is larger than the next 17 navies combined and includes 11 carrier battle groups that can project power around the globe. (By contrast, few of our potential adversaries field even a single carrier.) All in all, the U.S. accounts for just shy of half the world's defense spending, more than the next 45 nations combined. That's six times more than China, 10 times more than Russia and nearly 100 times more than Iran. Yet despite potential flash points with nations such as Russia (over Georgia) or China (over Taiwan), it would be lunacy to engage in combat with either because of the risk of escalation to a nuclear conflict. Abolishing nuclear weapons would obviously not make conflict with those states a good idea, but it would dramatically increase American freedom of action in a crisis. That should make hawks, with their strong faith in the efficacy of American military power, very happy. Indeed, if anyone opposes disarmament, it should be our rivals.

Nukes cant be credibly used to compel behavior – Cuts increase U.S. domination

Christian Science Monitory 3-4

The ability to compel enemies of the US to alter their behavior with these nonnuclear systems is far more plausible than with nuclear weapons, since America’s enemies rightly doubt that Washington will ever pay the political price of a nuclear first strike. A nonnuclear environment will favor the technologically advanced, since postnuclear systems are more sophisticated. As the country with the largest military- industrial complex, the US would benefit the most from the transition to a postnuclear world. Mr. Obama’s detractors say this push to rid the world of nuclear weapons is dangerous, or a product of a lofty attitude. The Nobel Peace Prize Committee says this is a noble goal. But it’s much more probable that Obama sees just how much more powerful the US can be with a nonnuclear sword held over its enemies’ heads.

Impact – Root Cause

Aggressive US imperialism is the root cause of the nuclear danger

Schwartz and Derber 90 (The Nuclear Seduction, William A., and Charles, Prof of Sociology Boston College http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&brand=ucpress TBC 6/30/10)

The United States has consistently acted in the nuclear age much as leading states did in the prenuclear one (including states with significant elements of internal democracy, such as ancient Athens and imperial Britain): seeking wealth and power wherever possible, a process requiring much violence, sometimes against big-power competitors but usually against indigenous populations. Formerly the inevitable military disasters of great powers—the fall of ancient Rome, the British defeat by American revolutionaries, the Ottoman collapse in the First World War, the defeat of Nazi Germany in the second—might ravage an empire or, in the last case, a continent and more. Today it could destroy the planet. What threatens the world today is not nuclear weapons per se—the nuclear danger would be small, though real, if nuclear states pursued peaceful foreign policies—but an ancient pattern of aggressive political behavior mindlessly carried forward by the United States, the Soviet Union, and others into the nuclear era.

Nukes Don’t Matter

No misperceptions - Nukes aren’t actually that important

Schwartz and Derber 90 (The Nuclear Seduction, William A., and Charles, Prof of Sociology Boston College http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&brand=ucpress TBC 6/30/10)

There is little solid information about how leaders in various countries perceive the importance of new weapons systems—a scandalous omission since purported misperceptions have become a central part of the official case for more U.S. nuclear weapons. As Schilling writes, there is very little knowledge about how perceptions of the strategic balance are actually influenced (if at all) by such household words as throw-weight, one-megaton equivalents, or prompt hard-target kill capability. The Soviets keep their perceptions to themselves…. As for allies and other states, there is no evidence that the United States government has engaged in any systematic research as to how relevant foreign elites reach their judgments about the state of the strategic balance or even what those judgments are.[5] But there has been sufficient real-world experience with nuclear weapons in international affairs to suggest the probable role of perceptions. True, leaders on both sides urgently decry the dangers of their opponent's nuclear weapons and constantly seek new systems of their own. In the peacetime budgetary and domestic political process, weapons certainly matter to them. But leaders do not necessarily act in the international arena on the basis of these exaggerated assessments of the weapons' import. Historical experience suggests that military and political leaders on both sides have a "schizophrenic" view of nuclear weapons. For in real foreign policy decisions and in the handling of real crises, their behavior does not appear to be affected by which weapons each side has built. They may still be willing to run the risk of nuclear war—as we document in Part II—but when they do so the details of the nuclear balance do not influence them and certainly do not delude them about the risk they are running.

No benefit to US – No one perceives a nuclear threat

Schwartz and Derber 90 (The Nuclear Seduction, William A., and Charles, Prof of Sociology Boston College http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&brand=ucpress TBC 6/30/10)

The nuclear weapons balance does not seem to have affected the outcome of superpower confrontations or the division of real power in the world. Bundy believes that even during the four years of U.S. nuclear monopoly, 1945–1949, "aside from the debatable European case, there is very little evidence that American atomic supremacy was helpful in American diplomacy…. To whatever degree atomic diplomacy may have tempted this or that American leader at this or that moment in those years, it did not work."[14] World opinion alone proved an enormous barrier not only to actual nuclear use but also, as Truman and Eisenhower discovered, to believable nuclear threats.

Nuclear weapons don’t affect diplomacy

Schwartz and Derber 90 (The Nuclear Seduction, William A., and Charles, Prof of Sociology Boston College http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&brand=ucpress TBC 6/30/10)

In a major study of American military operations, Force Without War, Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan also conclude: "Our data would not support a hypothesis that the strategic weapons balance influences the outcome of incidents in which both the United States and the U.S.S.R. are involved." To the contrary, in surveying dozens of incidents from 1946 to 1975, they found that, from the point of view of American objectives, "short-term outcomes were positive 43 percent of the time when the U.S. strategic advantage was 100 to 1 or greater, 82 percent when the U.S. strategic advantage ranged between 10 and 99 to one, and 92 percent when the U.S. advantage was less than 10 to 1…. If we look at [only) those incidents in which the Soviet Union used or threatened to use force, these figures were 11, 50, and 90 percent, respectively." These conclusions cover not only the period of existential deterrence but also the earlier period of enormous American nuclear superiority. The numerous detailed case studies in Force Without War likewise "provide little support for the notion that decisions during crises are strongly influenced by aggregate strategic capabilities."[20] We likewise found no evidence of even the most casual discussion of relative nuclear strength or the characteristics of nuclear weapons systems during the many superpower crises and confrontations discussed in Part II. This neglect stands in surreal contrast to the near obsession with the numbers and performance characteristics of nuclear arms in noncrisis times documented throughout Part I. It is as if everyone takes a powerful weaponitis pill on the days when the world is relatively safe and an equally potent reality pill when it is not. Thank goodness it is not the other way around.

Nukes Don’t Matter

No First Strike

Schwartz and Derber 90 (The Nuclear Seduction, William A., and Charles, Prof of Sociology Boston College http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&brand=ucpress TBC 6/30/10)

Still, specialists claim that in at least one extreme circumstance a first strike might logically be considered a rational move: when one side feels that nuclear war is inevitable no matter what steps it takes. If a nuclear war cannot be avoided, the argument goes, then preemption—striking before the enemy does—might be the best way to fight it. Richard K. Betts argues that "there are few plausible circumstances in which striking first could seem to make sense—at least for the superpowers. … when one believes the enemy is about to strike … is the only situation in which the initiator would have reason to believe that starting a nuclear war could cost less than waiting to try other options."[13] But as Stansfield Turner writes, "I cannot imagine a Director of Central Intelligence [Turner's former position] ever having anything approaching 100 percent confidence in his prediction that the Russians were truly going to attack. The President would be faced with a choice between the total probability of nuclear destruction" if he launched a preemptive strike that brought down the almost inevitable Soviet response and "some lesser probability" if he waited. Richard Ned Lebow, in an unusually sensible discussion of first strike, agrees that "the judgment that the other superpower is about to strike can never be made with full certainty. … the side that strikes first risks making its fear of nuclear war unnecessarily self-fulfilling. … preemption is an altogether irrational act."[14] Preemption is, in Bismarck's phrase, "suicide for fear of death." No arms control treaties are needed to ensure that preemption is suicidal and totally irrational, and this reality cannot be altered by any plausible development in the arms race. It is an existential fact of life in the nuclear age."[15]

Alternative – Reject

Undermining rationalist nuclear policy is key to prevent nuclear war

Schwartz and Derber 90 (The Nuclear Seduction, William A., and Charles, Prof of Sociology Boston College http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&brand=ucpress TBC 6/30/10)

The complex analyses of first strike by the right, the left, and the professional experts have only obscured the simple truth. No state ever has the slightest rational incentive to launch strategic nuclear weapons first or in haste, and certainly not before confirming beyond any doubt the explosion of many nuclear warheads on its territory. Even in that instance elementary morality would dictate that retaliation be withheld, since it would be little more than the mass murder of innocents—on a scale that would make the Nazi slaughter seem modest by comparison—with no prospect of accomplishing any legitimate goal. Of course the threat of retaliation may be important to mutual deterrence and the prevention of nuclear war; but that threat, as we emphasize throughout this book, is existential, inherent in the existence of the weapons. The threat to launch first or to launch hastily is not important to deterrence. Does it matter if an attacker is destroyed minutes, hours, days, or even weeks after it launches its missiles? Morton Halperin gives much wiser advice: avoid launching nuclear weapons suddenly, perhaps by making it physically impossible, while maintaining the option of retaliating after considerable time for reflection and perhaps negotiation.[19] The best way to reduce the danger of a first strike is to encourage wider recognition that launching nuclear missiles first or launching them precipitously is insane regardless of the hardware on either side. In addition, our overwhelming concern should be to avoid the extreme political conditions in which Soviet or American leaders could actually believe that their counterparts had decided to launch World War III—when leaders, seduced by the prevailing nuclear nonsense, might make a split-second decision that could terminate human civilization. In the nuclear age, the desperate feeling that the ax is about to fall is the key factor—not the size, speed, or accuracy of the ax.

A2: Perm

The permutation is a lie which undermines activism

Schwartz and Derber 90 (The Nuclear Seduction, William A., and Charles, Prof of Sociology Boston College http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&brand=ucpress TBC 6/30/10)

Continuation of the weapons strategy by those who understand the near-irrelevance of the arms race would amount to a calculated deception—something no democratic movement should tolerate and few activists would support. It is unconscionable to cause people to fear that they and their children face grave new dangers when the first MX missiles are deployed or when arms talks break off without an agreement. There are surely enough real problems to worry about today without terrifying people about false ones. It would be better for the movement in the long run to mobilize fewer people around the real issues than more around the false ones—if that is the choice.

Deterrence Fails

The logic of deterrence fails

Payne 3 (Dr. Keith B., President, National Institute for Public Policy, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, December 2003 “Deterrence: A New Paradigm” http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Archives/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/Deterrence%20Paradigm.pdf TBC 6/29/10)

Nevertheless, highly confident generalizations about deterrence remain par for the course, including with respect to the rogue states. Those who oppose U.S. deployment of ballistic missile defense, for example, typically insist that there is no need for missile defense because deterrence will work. Others offer equally confident claims that our nuclear deterrent is no longer credible, and therefore we should step back from nuclear deterrence altogether. Such confident generalizations—whether that deterrence study will work, or that it will not—reflect no more than intuitive guesses in the absence of a close examination of local conditions. These assertions are based on the old Cold War simplifying assumption that we can make confident predictions about deterrence based simply on the character of the military threats involved. We cannot. The problem is that those local conditions I’ve described can be decisive in the functioning of deterrence; and unfortunately, we probably will not know in advance how those local conditions will affect the functioning of deterrence. In the emerging security environment, there is an irreducible level of uncertainty that will attend the deterrence, not because rogue leaders are irrational, as is sometimes suggested, but because we don’t know when or how local conditions are going to shape the functioning of deterrence.

The logic of deterrence fails – assumes perception is universal

Payne 3 (Dr. Keith B., President, National Institute for Public Policy, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, December 2003 “Deterrence: A New Paradigm” http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Archives/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/Deterrence%20Paradigm.pdf TBC 6/29/10)

First, we should immediately challenge any force posture recommendations that come from a highly confident assertion about how deterrence will work. Confident assertions that nuclear weapons no longer are credible for deterrence are as hollow as assertions that nuclear weapons can ensure deterrence. We need to recognize that opponents will evaluate the credibility of our deterrent threats differently than we do. Perceptions of what is and isn’t a credible deterrent are driven by culture and context, i.e., those local conditions I mentioned. During the first gulf war, for example, we attributed little credibility to our nuclear deterrent, but it was highly credible to Saddam Hussein, and it worked. Second, we should stop defining the concept of deterrence stability in the narrow Cold War terms of mutual societal vulnerability, i.e., the balance of terror. In some cases that Cold War approach might be stable. In other cases, it may be irrelevant. And in some cases, it may actually engender conflict. There are alternative approaches to deterrence stability that may now serve U.S. and allied security interests far better, including vis-à-vis China. Third, we no longer have the past luxury of calculating deterrence requirements by reference to a single opponent; we may need to deter across a wide spectrum of local conditions and contingencies. Keys to making U.S. deterrence policy all it can be will be flexibility, adaptability, and a wide spectrum of deterrent threat options. In some cases, non-military approaches to deterrence may work, in others, conventional force options may be adequate. In still other cases, nuclear deterrence may be necessary to deter. Having such a spectrum of capabilities and threat options will not ensure deterrence. Nothing can do that. But, it may help to ensure that we will have the capacity to tailor our deterrent threat to the extent possible across a very diverse range of foes and contexts. Fourth, because we can no longer assume that deterrence will operate reliably, we no longer have the past luxury of focusing so exclusively on deterrence as the determinant of our force requirements.

Deterrence Fails

Traditional deterrence fails – assumes Cold War conditions

Payne 3 (Dr. Keith B., President, National Institute for Public Policy, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy, December 2003 “Deterrence: A New Paradigm” http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Archives/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/Deterrence%20Paradigm.pdf TBC 6/29/10)

Our optimistic Cold War assumption about local conditions and Soviet decision-making may have been appropriate during the Cold War, but, we have no basis for assuming the presence of those necessary conditions in our attempt to deter various contemporary rogue states, nor can we be confident that the lethality of our deterrent threat will be universally decisive in the decision-making of the willing martyr, the desperate gambler, the incommunicado, the ignorant, the self-destructive, the foolish, or those rogue leaders who are motivated by absolute, immaterial goals and immaterial goals. We simply are insufficiently familiar with the myriad of pertinent local conditions to assume that deterrence will “work” predictably. Consequently, the typical confident Cold War assertions about how deterrence will operate are now little more than hopeful guesses against contemporary foes.

Government Actors will have always ulterior motives –they do not act as ‘rational states’ as the affirmative wants you to assume, they just people.

du Preez 89 (Peter, U of S Cape Town – Aust, Psych, *Political Psychology*, 10(3), p. 547-8)NAR

The big mistake is that psychologists look at governments as though they were persons or agents. This comes out most clearly in Blight's arguments against the application of Deutsch's (1983) work on malignant spirals in which each deterrent threat leads to an escalating threat. Blight argues that cooperative and malignant spirals may well be produced by trust and mistrust between persons, but not between sovereign nations (Blight, 1987, p. 18). Governments act on the basis of interests, not on the basis of motives or psychological factors. He cites George Kennan: "Government is not an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents; not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience" (Blight, 1987, p. 18). There are two large difficulties with this formulation. First, persons take on the various roles of government and act as they think they ought to act in these roles, interpreting them and bringing to bear all the resources and failings they might have. We may cite a prescriptive role definition, but this has to be interpreted and enacted by a particular person. The definition of rationality (serving the national interest and avoiding moral impulses) and the definition of performance (behaving as persons in their positions are supposed to behave) do not obliterate psychodynamics. We may define homo economicus and homo sociologicus-the ideal calculator and the ideal role taker-but we cannot expect any dynamic individual to fit these exactly or ideally. In fact, psychodynamic analysis is never the analysis of persons in the abstract, but always of persons in roles and situations, whether as parents, teachers, farmers, or whatever. The roles change the behavior; persons change the roles. The second thing that is wrong with Blight's grounds for rejecting Deutsch is his own practice. After telling us that governments or nations are not persons he invites us to focus on a phenomenological study of leaders in crisis situations. There is nothing wrong with this except that it doesn't agree with his rejection of psychology. Presumably, phenomenology is the phenomenology of persons and not abstractions, or "governments." He urges us to "try to get inside the thinking of its key participants" and comments on Rusk's analysis of crisis behavior that "personality, perception, even psychophysiology, and especially learning - these all veritably leap from Rusk's retrospective analysis" (1987, p. 27). When we look at the ways in which persons assess risks, experience fear, or imagine responses, we are in the realms of psychology. We discover that government is made up of people (playing specialized roles) and that these people have interests as well as motives. As Stein (1987, p. 690) observes, policies emerge from the depths and are only later rationalized. To reject the contributions of psychologists because policy makers think their problems are exclusively rational is, therefore, a poor reason for doing so. It is true that problem solving in the crisis may be experienced as purely rational decision making, but the assumptions on which that decision making is based, the interests which are served, and the definition of events which lead to the crisis will each have to be analyzed multifactorally, to include psychological variables. This brings us to the next reason for rejecting psychological contributions to the avoidance of nuclear war.

Deterrence Fails

This means that the concept of deterrence is a fatally flawed idea – fear of another country’s military capability is both the cause of conflict, and why arms races occur.

du Preez 89 (Peter, U of S Cape Town – Aust, Psych, *Political Psychology*, 10(3), p. 548-550)NAR

Blight argues that, because psychologists are attached to a dogma called "nuclear depth psychology", they state the problems of preventing nuclear war incorrectly and in a way which is incommensurable with that of nuclear policy makers. This makes them both wrong and irrelevant. The first error of nuclear depth psychology is the claim that the arms race in itself drives the risk of nuclear war upward. The second is that a pathological superpower relationship can be identified and that defective interactions provide "the psychological fuel for the arms race" (Blight, 1987, p. 12). Blight maintains that the belief that the arms race drives the risk of nuclear war is based on a poor understanding of nuclear strategy. Policymakers base their strategies on the stability of deterrence-the principle that the balance of terror is stable only when neither, striking first, can destroy the other's ability to strike back. This is true, yet the relentless search for a first strike capacity which will eliminate second strike capacity has continued to the point of overkill, as has the drive to devise an effective nuclear shield. What is the effect of this accumulation of nuclear weapons? Even if we assume that the probability of a nuclear war remains constant as the supply and power of nuclear weapons increases, the risk or danger level increases with that increased power, where it is the product of probability and power. This is a system which is indeed driven by fear-the fear that the other side will succeed in eliminating one's capacity to retaliate. Yet Blight rejects GRIT (Osgood, 1962, 1986) and argues that it is credible fear alone which prevents war. Is there a contradiction? On the one hand, we postulate that fear is an essential ingredient in the process which leads to escalation; on the other, that the balance of fear at any given moment prevent war. What is unstable, what leads to an arms race, is the attempt to change the balance of fear. (There is also an indirect effect of building up nuclear arms which the superpowers might consider. As they invest more and more heavily in their confrontations with each other, third parties may - like the mammals which stole the game from the dinosaurs- run off with the prize!) So far the implications of the prevailing "operational code" of policy realism have been of the kind:" Anything you can do I can do better!" There is no reason why psychologists should not expose this code and its implications, and work for the acceptance of a new operational code which might save the bacon of both superpowers( Holt, 1988). Psychologists may play supporting roles rather than lead, but there is enough work to be done. The second fallacy, according to Blight, is the fallacy that there is an analogy between the pathologies of communication and interaction patterns in families and small face-to-face groups and the processes of superpower relationships. He denies the possibility of this, apparently on three grounds. The first is that governments are not persons. I have already considered and rejected this argument. The second is that the languages of psychologists and policy makers are incommensurable. This, however is something theorists have to accept as they keep insisting, with all the persuasive skills they can command, on their views (if correct). If they can solve problems better than others can solve them, people will come to listen. The third is that psychology is irrelevant when it refers to "levels" deeper than the experiences the typical nuclear policy maker knows (1987, p. 19).

Deterrence fails

Massumi, 7 (Brian, professor in the Communication Department at the Université de Montréal, “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption”, 10:2, p. Project Muse TBC 6/30/10)

Deterrence does not work across different orders of magnitude. Only powers perceiving themselves to be of potentially equal military stature can mutually assure destruction. Neither does it work if one of the adversaries considers the other inhuman or potentially suicidal (mad in uncapitalized letters). Where the conditions of deterrence are not met, the irruption of a nuclear threat feeds a different operative logic. This is the case today with North Korea. Kim Jong Il's nuclear capabilities will never counterbalance those of the established nuclear powers. In the Western press and policy literature, he is regularly portrayed as unbalanced himself, mad enough to have the inhumanity to come to the point of willing the destruction of his own country. Prevention has failed, and neither the quantitative conditions nor psychological premise necessary for deterrence are in place. In view of this, a different operative logic must be used to understand the current nuclear situation, in North Korea and elsewhere. That logic, of course, is preemption. The superficial condition of the presence of a nuclear threat should not be mistaken for a return to a Cold War logic.

\*A2: Weaponitis\*

Link Turn – Arms Control Good

Arms control reduces sovereignty and promotes cooperation

LARSEN 2 (Jeffrey senior policy analyst with Science Applications International Corporation in Colorado Springs in Arms Control ed. Jeffrey Larsen p. 3-4 http://www.rienner.com/uploads/47d6f750a53eb.pdf TBC 6/30/10)

The founding premise of traditional arms control theory—that arms control can be an important adjunct to national security strategy—has, in practice, not always been obvious or consistently observed because arms control is inherently a counterintuitive approach to enhancing security. As Kerry Kartchner has written, arms control makes national security dependent to some degree on the cooperation of prospective adversaries. It often involves setting lower levels of arms than would otherwise appear prudent based on a strict threat assessment. It mandates establishing a more or less interactive relationship with potential opponents and, in the case of mutual intrusive verification and data exchanges, exposes sensitive national security information and facilities to scrutiny by foreign powers. It requires seeking and institutionalizing cooperation where the potential for conflicts of interest seemingly far outweigh common objectives. It is fundamentally a high-stakes gamble, mortgaging national survival against little more than the collateral of trust and anticipated reciprocal restraint, often in a geopolitical context fraught with political hostility and tension. It is, in fact, a voluntary (and not always reversible) delimitation of national sovereignty. Viewed from this perspective, arms control is not obviously better than its alternative—unilaterally providing for one’s own security.14 What compels the United States and other nations, then, to structure so much of their national security posture on an approach that seemingly contradicts a country’s natural instincts toward self-sufficiency and selfpreservation? An answer to this apparent paradox is that arms control allows security to be established by negotiation at levels of weapons lower than would be the case if these levels were determined unilaterally. The mere act of negotiating arms control also may lead to better communication, deepened understanding, and reduced hostility among adversaries.

**Impact Turn – Deterrence Works**

**Deterrence Works, even against rouge states – and even if it doesn’t, abandoning deterrence causes a reliance on ‘preventive war’ which is worse.**

Record 4 (Jeffery Record, former professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, *Policy Analysis,* no. 519, July 8th 2004, http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0407record.pdf, Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation)

To substitute preventive war for deterrence is to ignore the fact that traditional nuclear deterrence was directed at states already armed with nuclear weapons and was aimed at deterring their use in time of crisis or war; it was not enlisted as a means deterring the acquisition of nuclear weapons. That task was, at least until 9/11, left primarily to the regime established by the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and to the U.S. policy of providing nuclear guarantees to allies that might otherwise have felt the need to develop their own nuclear weapons. The administration’s security strategy is further challenged by the broader question of whether it is possible over the long run to prevent proliferation of WMD on the part of states determined to acquire them. Traditional nonproliferation policy implied that nuclear proliferation could be contained and treated all proliferation as undesirable despite evidence that it could be stabilizing as well as destabilizing.3 Moreover, as the American experience with Iraq has shown, preventive war is a costly and risky enterprise subject to the law of unintended consequences. And it is not at all self-evident that preventive war is necessary, at least against states (as opposed to nonstate entities); on the contrary, preventive war may actually encourage proliferation, although the impact of Operation Iraqi Freedom on North Korean and Iranian attitudes toward nuclear weapons remains as yet unclear. In the final analysis, it is not the mere presence of WMD in hostile hands—but rather their use—that kills and destroys. Accordingly, if their use can be deterred—and the evidence suggests that deterrence does work against rogue states if not terrorist organizations, then deterrence of their use is manifestly a much more attractive policy option than war to prevent their acquisition. That is not to deny the inherent difficulty of maintaining credible deterrence, especially against adversaries whose culture and values are alien to our own. Deterrence is a psychological phenomenon, and as such is inherently unstable. Nor can one ignore the impossibility of proving the negative. The success of deterrence is measured by events that do not happen, and one cannot demonstrate conclusively that an enemy refrained from this or that action because of the implicit or explicit threat of unacceptable retaliation. The argument here is that deterrence should continue to be the policy of first resort in dealing with hostile states acquiring or seeking to acquire WMD and that preventive war—as opposed to preemptive military action aimed at disrupting an imminent attack—is almost always a bad and ultimately self-defeating option. Richard K. Betts at Columbia University observes that past American arguments for preventive war against the Soviet Union and Mao’s China “proved terribly wrong.”4

**Impact Turn – Deterrence Works**

Deterrence is only effective why we are credible – plan returns credibility,

Record 4 (Jeffery Record, former professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, *Policy Analysis,* no. 519, July 8th 2004, http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0407record.pdf, Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation)

 With respect to nuclear deterrence, nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter, in his seminal January 1959 Foreign Affairs article, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” put it in a nutshell: “To deter an attack means being able to strike back in spite of it. It means, in other words, a capability to strike second.”8 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara explained U.S. policy in 1968: The cornerstone of our strategic policy continues to be to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies. We do this by maintaining a highly reliable ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon any single aggressor or combination of aggressors at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first strike. This can be defined as our assured-destruction capability. Assured destruction is the very essence of the whole deterrence concept. We must possess an actual assured destruction capability, and that capability also must be credible. . . . If the United States is to deter a nuclear attack on itself or its allies, it must possess an actual and a credible assured-destruction capability.9 The key to such a capability was possession of secure retaliatory capabilities—that is, second- strike forces that could “ride out” the enemy’s first strike and in turn inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy’s homeland. Such capabilities would in essence make the enemy’s first strike an act of national suicide. Continued McNamara: When calculating the force required, we must be conservative in all our estimates of both a potential aggressor’s capabilities and his intentions. Security depends on assuming a worst possible case, and having the ability to cope with it. In that eventuality we must be able to absorb the total weight of nuclear attack on our country—on our retaliatory forces, on our command and control apparatus, on our industrial capacity, on our cities, and on our population— and still be capable of damaging the aggressor to the point that his society would be simply no longer viable in twentieth-century terms. That is what deterrence of nuclear aggression means. It means the certainty of suicide to the aggressor, not merely to his military forces, but to his society as a whole.10 It remains unclear whether the Soviet Union fully accepted the logic of assured destruction, which was based on the American assumption of rational decision making on both sides, and on the more specific assumption that the Soviets would, in the face of nuclear threats, behave reasonably by U.S. standards.11 What is clear is that until the mid- 1960s the United States enjoyed a substantial superiority in both first- and second-strike nuclear forces, and that subsequent Soviet attainment of quantitative superiority in landbased first-strike capabilities vis-à-vis the United States never effectively compromised the security of America’s devastating secondstrike capabilities. By the early 1970s a condition of mutually assured destruction had emerged, prompting American nuclear strategists to assume that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union “would ever be sufficiently motivated, foolish, ignorant, or incoherent to accept the risk of nuclear war; both would be rational when it came to calculating the potential costs and benefits in the conduct of their foreign policies.

Abandoning deterrence causes the rise of preventive war – allows the rise of aggressive nations like Japan in WW2.

Record 4 (Jeffery Record, former professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, *Policy Analysis,* no. 519, July 8th 2004, http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0407record.pdf, Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation)

Preventive war is thus prompted, not by a looming enemy attack, but rather by longrange calculations about power relationships, and it is attractive to states that believe themselves to be in decline relative to a rising adversary. Preventive war assumes that conflict with the rising state is inevitable, and therefore striking before the military balance worsens becomes imperative. Thus, the Japanese in 1941 not only assumed the inevitability of war with the United States but also the necessity to attack before America’s growing rearmament tipped the military balance hopelessly against Japan. The Japanese were well aware of America’s enormous latent military power and felt compelled to strike before it was fully mobilized. On the eve of Pearl Harbor, Japanese naval and air power was unrivaled in East Asia; France, Britain, and the Netherlands were no longer in a position to defend their empires in the region; and the Soviet threat to Japan had vanished with Hitler’s invasion of Russia. Never again would Japan enjoy such a favorable military position relative to her enemies in East Asia.64 Though one can question Copeland’s thesis that the perceived necessity for preventive war is the root cause of all major great power wars, preventive wars are certainly far more numerous than preemptive military actions. Indeed, notes Richard Betts, “preventive wars . . . are common, if one looks at the rationales of those who start wars, since most countries that launch an attack without an immediate provocation believe their actions are preventive.” 65 Preventive war is thus hard to distinguish from aggression, which explains why it, unlike preemption, has no legal sanction. As foreign policy analyst David Hendrickson at Colorado College observes, preventive war “is directly contrary to the principle that so often was the rallying cry of American internationalism in the twentieth century,” during the first half of which “doctrines of preventive war were closely identified with the German and Japanese strategic traditions.”

**Impact Turn – Deterrence Works**

Deterrence works and deters rogue states – better than preventive war which tries to uphold American primacy.

Record 4 (Jeffery Record, former professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, *Policy Analysis,* no. 519, July 8th 2004, http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0407record.pdf, Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation)

The real issue, however, is whether the United States should initiate wars against rogue states to prevent their acquisition of nuclear weapons. The United States did so against Iraq and has declared a use-of-force doctrine that includes preventive war as a means of counterproliferation that in turn serves the stated goal of perpetual global military primacy. Military primacy is of course a necessary prerequisite for preventive war. For the United States, however, preventive war can rarely if ever be a more attractive policy choice than deterrence—unless one has completely lost confidence in deterrence. Yet that seems to be just what has happened. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 persuaded the Bush administration that nuclear deterrence was of little use against fanatical nonstate terrorist organizations and insufficient to prevent rogue states from using WMD, including nuclear weapons, against the United States. The view is that such weapons are, for both terrorist organizations and rogue states, weapons of first choice rather than last resort, and therefore that anticipatory U.S. military action is the safest policy response. While there is general agreement that a suicidal enemy is exceptionally difficult (if not impossible) to deter or dissuade, rogue state regimes have displayed an overriding determination to survive and therefore to accommodate the realities of power. They may in fact seek nuclear weapons for the same basic reason that other states have: to enhance their security (as of course they themselves define it). A. F. Mullins at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory asks: Why do countries seek to acquire nuclear weapons? Not for reasons markedly different from those that drive them to seek conventional weapons: to defend against or to deter attack; to compel submission or perhaps to carry out an attack; or to play a self-defined role in the international system (i.e., to gain status or prestige, either in the context of an alliance or in regional or global politics).124 The assumption that rogue states seek nuclear weapons solely for offensive purposes (coercion, blackmail, attack) serves the argument for preventive war against them, but it ignores the deterrent/defensive functions those weapons also perform, as well as the record of rogue state non-use of WMD against hated enemies capable of inflicting unacceptable retaliation. That record demonstrates that deterrence has worked. In the case of Iraq, Iran, and other Gulf states, nuclear weapons acquisition motives include deterrence of another regional power (a powerful motive for blood enemies Iraq and Iran vis-àvis each other), strategic equality with Israel, and deterrence of intervention by outside powers, especially (in the post-Soviet era) the United States. It is eminently plausible, as Mullins observes, that “a Gulf state might believe that, by obtaining a nuclear capability that could put at risk the forces deployed for intervention by outside powers or that could put at risk the cities of any regional state providing bases for these forces, it could deter an intervention.”125 Anthony Blinken at the Center for Strategic and International Studies contends that “Putting military preemption at the heart of national security policy signals America’s enemies that their only insurance policy against regime change is to acquire WMD as quickly as possible, precipitating the very danger Washington seeks to prevent.”126 Indeed, the underlying objective of preventive war as a means of counterproliferation may well be to prevent rogue states from deterring the United States. This objective certainly supports the declared goal of perpetuating U.S. global military primacy; the president has stated that rogue states seek nuclear weapons “to attempt . . . to prevent us from deterring [their] aggressive behavior.”127 Rogue state possession of nuclear weapons is thus seen as a threat not so much to the United States itself but rather to the U.S. freedom of military action necessary to sustain U.S. global military primacy. (Not surprisingly, missile defenses—which are a significant component of the administration’s defense policy—are also seen to enhance U.S. freedom of action by denying rogue states the ability to hold U.S. cities hostage and thereby deter U.S. use of force against rogue states.)128 International relations theorist Robert L. Jervis at Columbia University, writing on the eve of the Iraq War, concluded that “it is clearly a mistake to jump from the fact that Saddam is evil to the conclusion that his possession of WMD threatens the United States and world peace,” and then asked the following two questions: “Would Saddam’s nuclear weapons give him greater influence in the region, especially in the face of resistance by a much more powerful United States? Could these weapons do anything other than deter an unprovoked attack on him?”129 Jervis concluded that, “Absent an American attack, the U.S. should be able to protect itself by the combination of the credibility of its threat to retaliate and Saddam’s relatively low motivation to strike.”130 Of course, the United States 23 In the case of Iraq, Iran, and other Gulf states, nuclear weapons acquisition motives include deterrence of another regional power, strategic equality with Israel, and deterrence of intervention by outside powers did attack Iraq in 2003, but Saddam Hussein had no nuclear weapons, or even, it seems, chemical weapons, to fire or not to fire, thus leaving a critical question unanswered. We do know, however, that he withheld use of his ample stocks of chemical munitions against Israel and coalition forces in the Gulf War under clear threat of nuclear retaliation.

**Impact Turn – Deterrence Works**

Nuclear weapons provide protection from counter-enlightenment ideals – they stop aggressive nations.

KRAUSE 7

 (JOACHIM KRAUSE, 2007 The Author(s). Journal Compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Aff airs, *“Enlightenment and nuclear order”*, p.485-86, http://www.politik.uni-kiel.de/publikationen/krause/krauseenlightenment.pdf)NAR

Had the US embarked on mutual assured destruction as the guiding principle of its nuclear weapons doctrine, it could not have deterred the Soviet Union from an invasion of western Europe. The result would have been the collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, since this was based on a credible extended deterrence for states that otherwise would have gone nuclear. It is true that there is a historical link between nuclear non-proliferation and deterrence; but this link is not the one claimed by adherents of the liberal arms control school. Rather, the readiness of the United States to pursue nuclear deterrence options even under conditions of an increasing Soviet nuclear threat made it possible for nuclear weapons candidates to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons options of their own.30 It sounds paradoxical, but the often criticized nuclear arms race was, on the US side, a desperate attempt to uphold extended deterrence under adverse conditions, and was thus responsible for the continued effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This logic is almost incomprehensible for many liberal arms controllers, since it totally contradicts another of their most cherished tenets: that arms races are always dangerous and that arms races cause wars. Again, these notions are hardly reconcilable with historic facts. The only war that was conspicuously preceded by an arms race—the naval arms race between Germany and Great Britain—was the First World War. There is, however, hardly anything to suggest that that war broke out because of that arms race, or that the naval competition between Germany and Great Britain was of great relevance for the outcome of that war. All the evidence available, as well as scholarly works, militate against this notion, although it has been repeated time and again and was a widely held view in the 1920s and 1930s. The damage that could be caused by such ideologies became evident in the late 1930s: the outbreak of the Second World War was facilitated by the pacifism of the western powers. The armaments efforts by the Third Reich after 1933 went on for many years without eliciting adequate responses by the governments of Great Britain and France—not to speak of the United States— because public opinion in these countries was so much in favour of avoiding an arms race. In Britain and America especially, most people wanted to negotiate instead of preparing themselves for war, and the pacifist movements were most instrumental in perpetuating that momentum.31 The result was that any option of building up a credible deterrent against Hitler’s expansionist schemes between 1934 and 1938 was forfeited.32 Winston Churchill, who was one of the first to warn against the armaments efforts of the Third Reich, later called the Second World War the ‘unnecessary war’. He continued by writing that ‘there never was a war more easy to stop than that’.33 This war ended with 35 million dead in Europe alone. The East–West conflict saw an armaments competition, but it was not the cause of that conflict and it did not do much harm. On the contrary, the armaments competition provided scope for the intrinsic weakness of the communist regimes to become apparent. It resulted in a stalemate which, as Philip Bobbitt rightly put it, ‘gave the political systems of the Warsaw Pact states enough time to collapse of their own inner inefficiency and self-disgust’.34 One of the reasons members of the liberal arms control community tend to ignore these historical facts is that they have a generally negative attitude towards nuclear weapons. For William Walker, nuclear weapons are an ‘unintended consequence of the scientific enlightenment’. He calls them ‘intrinsically illegitimate and dangerous’ and claims that it was the wish of ‘mankind’ to abolish them. Again, this runs counter to all established facts of history. Walker overlooks the fact that nuclear weapons were developed during the Second World War as the final line of defence of the last remaining powers that upheld the idea of enlightenment against the storm of forces that were the end-product of different sorts of counter- enlightenment: Nazi Germany and the authoritarian and racist Japanese regime. Nuclear weapons ended the war in the Asian theatre and later became the most efficient weapon to defend the West against another powerful force of counter-enlightenment—the Soviet Union. Without US nuclear weapons, the political breathing space for enlightenment would have vanished in Europe some 50 years ago.

**Impact Turn – Deterrence Works**

Deterrence Succeeds – plan instills fear only in attacking, not fear in U.S. in co-existence.

Zins 91 (Daniel, The Nightmare Considered: Critical Essays on Nuclear War Lit, ed. Nancy Anisfield, p. 133, Atlanta College of Art)NAR

What Wilmer fails to realize, however, is that there may be two very different kinds of fear, and that it may not be in a nation's best interests to attempt to induce both of these in an adversary. In his important discussion of "dissuasion versus appeasement," Dietrich Fischer writes: "It is often said about potential opponents that the only language they understand is military strength. This may be true in some cases, but there must be a clear distinction as to when that strength should be applied. A potential aggressor should feel afraid if he attacks a country, but only then" (38). But what is important to keep in mind is that deterrence as it appears to be understood by most Americans—that the leaders of the Soviet Union would be unlikely to initiate a nuclear attack against the United States because sufficient second-strike capability would remain to annihilate the aggressor— has long been only one purpose of our immense nuclear arsenal. For that purpose merely, far fewer nuclear weapons would surely suffice, even if the Soviets were to retain their own absurdly redundant arsenal. Why, then, the obsession not only with the chimerical pursuit of "superiority" but also with parity or maintaining the "nuclear balance"? When he discovers that Trent is unable to comprehend why we need even more nuclear weapons, Wilmer informs him that he recently gave a talk at Princeton on this very topic.

\*Nuclear Fetishism\*

The answers to nuclear numbing and nuclear psychology (Blight) all apply to this K. Also, A2: Chernus replies to most of De Santana’s args.

Fetishism Shell

The aff fetishizes nuclear weapons – Their presumptions of rationality and focus on logical mechanized responses to nuclear withdrawal reinforce the value of nukes

Santana 9 (Anne Harrington de Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, November NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE CURRENCY OF POWER Deconstructing the Fetishism of Force http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-3\_harrington\_de\_santana.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 331)

Fetishism is irreducibly material; it requires a physical presence, as opposed to a purely ideational or linguistic existence. Thus, fetishism always refers to a pattern of human behavior organized with respect to a material object: the African worshipping a trinket, or the capitalist exchanging a commodity. This configuration differentiates a fetish object from a symbolic object. A symbol is referential. Its purpose is communicative. A physical change in the status of a symbolic object does nothing to alter the nature of its social context. A fetish object, on the other hand, is essential to the functioning of the social context in which it is embedded. Nationalists do not require a flag, but capitalists require a commodity. The destruction that can be wrought by nuclear weapons is required for them to be properly understood as an instrument of force and to mediate relations between states; states require nuclear weapons in order to practice nuclear deterrence. The significance of a nuclear weapon’s capacity for physical destruction is that it pushes the logic of accumulating power to its logical extreme. In that way, nuclear weapons are the ultimate expression of a historically particular fetish form, the fetishism of force. They are the most destructive force the world has ever known. The fact that a relatively small amount of fissile material can release a very large amount of explosive energy differentiates nuclear weapons from other explosive technologies. The combination of nuclear explosive technology with advanced missile systems maximized the capacity for physical destruction while minimizing the human presence necessary to engage in the act of destruction. All of these characteristics of their physical embodiment are significant for understanding how nuclear weapons embody the culmination of a socio-historical process that created and sustained a relationship between the capacity for destruction and the exercise of power. Yet, it is not their capacity for destruction that is the source of their power. The act of large-scale nuclear destruction will not contribute to achieving rational political ends; only compliance with the threat of destruction will further those ends. The same way the materiality of money has no use-value apart from its exchange-value, the value of nuclear weapons resides in their threat- (exchange-) value rather than their use-value. In essence, their material form is nothing but a carrier of their social function.24 The particularities of their physical embodiment that make them desirable for consumption\*properties such as their explosive yield\*are not what make them appropriate carriers of social value. The same material properties that are germane to the physical embodiment of money\* durability and scarcity\*are the physical properties that provide the foundation for nuclear weapons to serve as the embodiment of power.

Fetishism Shell

The fetishism of the nukes is a dangerous slope – our amazement and wonder at them creates them as tools of consumption, to finally be used.

Santana 9 (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, November 2009, Anne Harrington de Santana, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-3\_harrington\_de\_santana.pdf, 330-31)

The destruction that can be wrought by nuclear weapons is required for them to be properly understood as an instrument of force and to mediate relations between states; states require nuclear weapons in order to practice nuclear deterrence. The significance of a nuclear weapon’s capacity for physical destruction is that it pushes the logic of accumulating power to its logical extreme. In that way, nuclear weapons are the ultimate expression of a historically particular fetish form, the fetishism of force. They are the most destructive force the world has ever known. The fact that a relatively small amount of fissile material can release a very large amount of explosive energy differentiates nuclear weapons from other explosive technologies. The combination of nuclear explosive technology with advanced missile systems maximized the capacity for physical destruction while minimizing the human presence necessary to engage in the act of destruction. All of these characteristics of their physical embodiment are significant for understanding how nuclear weapons embody the culmination of a socio-historical process that created and sustained a relationship between the capacity for destruction and the exercise of power. Yet, it is not their capacity for destruction that is the source of their power. The act of large-scale nuclear destruction will not contribute to achieving rational political ends; only compliance with the threat of destruction will further those ends. The same way the materiality of money has no use-value apart from its exchange-value, the value of nuclear weapons resides in their threat- (exchange-) value rather than their use-value. In essence, their material form is nothing but a carrier of their social function.24 The particularities of their physical embodiment that make them desirable for consumption\*properties such as their explosive yield\*are not what make them appropriate carriers of social value. The same material properties that are germane to the physical embodiment of money\* durability and scarcity\*are the physical properties that provide the foundation for nuclear weapons to serve as the embodiment of power.

Alternative: Reject Nuclear Fetishism

Rejection is a deconstruction of nuclear fetishism. It overcomes anti-nuclear nuclearism

Santana 9 (Anne Harrington de Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, November NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE CURRENCY OF POWER Deconstructing the Fetishism of Force http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-3\_harrington\_de\_santana.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 340-1)

The perception of what it is acceptable to propose\*which policies get taken seriously and which ones get laughed out of the room\*is governed by unspoken assumptions about what it is possible to change, and what lies outside our ability to alter. Does the existence of nuclear technology determine that nuclear deterrence is an inherent feature of the international system of states? Or is it within the realm of human capability to successfully implement another policy alternative? Just because deterrence was considered to be the only realistic policy choice in the past does not necessarily mean that the same will be true in the future. To suggest that the Soviet Union would peacefully splinter, bringing an end to the Cold War, seemed unthinkable up until the moment it happened. Likewise, to suggest that prominent Cold War statesmen would come together to advocate for disarmament seemed improbable, if not impossible, but it too has become a reality.52 The decision by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn to speak out in favor of nuclear disarmament has helped to change the nature of what is taken for granted in policy circles, reviving the hopes of the established disarmament lobby and placing disarmament on the agenda of the Washington policy establishment.53 In a speech delivered in Prague on April 6, 2009, President Barack Obama announced the intention of his administration to pursue an agenda that embraces complete nuclear disarmament.54 It is exciting to be thinking about problems of national security and nuclear nonproliferation at a time when the status quo is being criticized and questioned and variations on deterrence are not automatically assumed to be the only possible policy alternatives. However, I would like to suggest that this is also a time during which academics and policy makers should not limit themselves to reproducing the same Cold War era debate between disarmament and deterrence.

<Continues…>

Fetishism Shell

<Continued…>

A transformation of U.S. nuclear policy may require not only that we question deterrence, but also that we question the underlying assumptions that focus our attention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons to the exclusion of policy initiatives that may not target nuclear weapons specifically but could have the effect of deconstructing their status as fetish objects. If the logic of deterrence provides the conceptual foundation for nuclear fetishism, deconstructing the fetishism of force will require a decision to no longer practice deterrence in the sense we understand it today. However, arguments for nuclear disarmament sometimes unintentionally participate in the construction of nuclear fetishism by reproducing the association between nuclear weapons and power in two ways. First, historically, the discourse of disarmament has in common with the discourse of deterrence a rhetoric of nuclear fear.55 The problem with emphasizing the potential end to nation and life as a reason for the abolition of nuclear weapons is that nuclear fear is also the primary justification for the continued practice of deterrence. Nuclear fear contributes in important ways to what Ward Wilson has identified as the ‘‘myth of nuclear deterrence,’’ which rests on a ‘‘belief that the threat to destroy cities provides decisive leverage.’’56 This is consistent with and reinforces a perception of nuclear weapons as the embodiment of power. Secondly, there is no better way to produce desire than through prohibition. Being told that you cannot have something implies that you should want it. For nuclear abolition to be successful there must be policy alternatives that act on the desire of states to make nuclear weapons undesirable. That having been said, preliminary implications of a theory of nuclear fetishism support many of the disarmament initiatives that are already in existence, as well as point the way to new possibilities for policy and research.

Link – Deterrence

Deterrence creates global instability – nukes are powerful because we choose them to be, we are obsessed with them.

Santana 9 (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, November 2009, Anne Harrington de Santana, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-3\_harrington\_de\_santana.pdf, 326-27)

Yet policies of nuclear deterrence did not escape the fundamental paradox of nuclear weapons. Policy debate about how to achieve a successful nuclear deterrent followed the closed loop of a Mo¨ bius strip, the critique of one course of action leading ineluctably to a conclusion in favor of the other, and vice versa.7 This phenomenon is referred to as the ‘‘stability-instability paradox.’’8 On the one hand, maintaining a minimum arsenal with only as many weapons as were necessary to absorb a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union and retaliate with an ‘‘assured destruction’’ capability promoted stability between the superpowers because neither superpower had an incentive to launch an allout nuclear attack.9 However, the more invulnerable the retaliatory forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union became, and the more stable the balance was, the more likely it was that large-scale nuclear threats would be ineffective against limited forms of aggression. Thus, stability at the level of ‘‘mutual assured destruction’’ created instability at lower levels of violence. On the other hand, maintaining a wide range of nuclear options, including tactical weapons for use on the battlefield, provided the possibility of retaliating proportionally to limited aggression. The capacity for a limited response to limited aggression made the threat of nuclear retaliation more credible. However, flexible options deployable at a variety of levels provided no reliable mechanism for controlling escalation and could in fact provide an incentive to launch a preventive attack. If the Soviet Union feared that alimited conflict could escalate to all-out war, then it may have decided that it would be better to destroy as much of the U.S. arsenal as possible in order to limit the U.S. capacity for retaliation in kind. Thus, creating stability at lower levels of violence could lead to instability at the level of all-out war, closing the policy loop by bringing us back to the solution of maintaining a minimum capacity for retaliation in kind. If there is no escape from the paradox of nuclear deterrence, and therefore no decisive resolution to the policy debate over the military requirements of deterrence, why is its logic so persuasive? For more than half a century the practice of nuclear deterrence has been treated as if it were both a natural and inevitable result of the existence of nuclear technologies. Rather than attempt to escape or resolve the paradox of nuclear weapons, in this article I posit an explanation for its existence and its persistence. I argue that the recurrent paradox of nuclear weapons is a symptom of their status as fetish objects. More specifically, I argue that the production of nuclear weapons as fetish objects is the culmination of a pattern of behavior that I refer to as the fetishism of force.10 There are important similarities between the pattern of behavior Karl Marx sought to identify with respect to commodities\*a pattern he called ‘‘fetishism’’\*and the pattern of behavior I identify here with respect to military force.11 Marx identified money as the mature expression of commodity fetishism; I identify nuclear weapons as the mature expression of the fetishism of force. Money is the physical embodiment of a form of social value, namely, wealth. Likewise, nuclear weapons are the embodiment of power. Just as access to wealth in the form of money determines an individual’s opportunities and place in a social hierarchy, access to power in the form of nuclear weapons determines a state’s opportunities and place in the international order. In both cases, the physical form of the fetish object is valuable because it serves as a carrier of social value. In other words, the power of nuclear weapons is not reducible to their explosive capability. Nuclear weapons are powerful because we treat them as powerful.

Link – Nuclear Fetish

Nuclear deterrence relies on self-fulfilling fetishism

Santana 9 (Anne Harrington de Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, November NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE CURRENCY OF POWER Deconstructing the Fetishism of Force http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-3\_harrington\_de\_santana.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 329)

The behavior of nuclear deterrence is explicitly justified and sustained with respect to the belief that others believe. Thomas Schelling lays out the logic in his explanation of the rationality of irrationality.20 He argues that the rationality of nuclear deterrence does not rest on whether or not it is rational to carry out an irrational nuclear attack, but rather on whether or not it is rational to make your opponent believe that you will do so. It was not important whether policy makers in the United States believed that they would actually carry out an irrational nuclear attack. The success of nuclear deterrence rested on the ability to make the Soviet Union believe in the credibility of the threat to do so. Thus it is possible to be aware of the fact that there is something about the power of nuclear weapons that exceeds the logic of rational approaches to international politics and yet continue to engage in the process of implementing a particular type of fetishistic deterrent policy.21

Link – Reducing Weapons

Withdrawing the weapons increases their fetishization – scarcity is key to social value

Santana 9 (Anne Harrington de Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, November NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE CURRENCY OF POWER Deconstructing the Fetishism of Force http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-3\_harrington\_de\_santana.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 333)

Also like money, it is the ‘‘scarcity’’ of nuclear weapons that makes them an appropriate carrier of social value. The degree of industrial and technological capability that is required to manufacture nuclear weapons makes them available to any state with the necessary level of development to produce them. Such capacity is not equally shared by states. With the progressive sophistication of industrialization, warfare developed into a contest of innovation and productive capacity only possible in the context of a particular political and economic structure. The sophisticated processes necessary for the production of nuclear weapons allow for their quantity to be controlled through the institutional mechanisms associated with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The NPT regulates access to nuclear weapons for all signatories who are not recognized nuclear weapon states (defined in the treaty as those states that had tested a nuclear weapon prior to January 1, 1967) and calls for IAEA inspections to ensure that parties to these agreements do not divert plutonium or highly enriched uranium from nuclear power reactors to nuclear weapons programs.

Link – Nuclear Fetish

Rational deterrence theory fetishizes nuclear weapons

Santana 9 (Anne Harrington de Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, November NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE CURRENCY OF POWER Deconstructing the Fetishism of Force http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-3\_harrington\_de\_santana.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 333-4)

The hegemonic interpretation of the new technologies that had been used to produce the atomic bomb was developed by a small group of men associated with the RAND Corporation and was retrospectively unified under the label ‘‘rational deterrence theory.’’ It was at RAND that an explicit distinction between military use-value and threat value became the basis for recommendations on nuclear policy. As research on nuclear weapons progressed, researchers had a tendency toward becoming both more quantitative and abstract in terms of the methods they employed, as well as progressively more ambitious in terms of what they set out to explain. Both tendencies were conducive to the developing fetish. The application of new methodologies, such as systems analysis and rational choice, made it possible to isolate the analysis of military forces from the political context in which they were being developed and produced. By expanding the scope of the questions they were answering, researchers moved from the terrain of the battlefield, where the use of quantitative techniques to answer engineering questions was effective and appropriate, to political questions of motive that were less easy to quantify and depended upon a myriad of unverifiable assumptions. The tendency to abstract from the political context in which the weapons were being developed, while at the same time seeking to make progressively larger claims about the nature of that context, resulted in the attribution of an increasingly more determinant role to the weapons themselves. Concepts such as second-strike capability and counterforce targeting emphasized opportunities in the material environment as a rationale for action. It was possible to believe that war could be provoked by what were essentially military factors.30

Internal Link/Impact – Nuclear Use

The fetishism of the nukes is a dangerous slope – our amazement and wonder at them creates them as tools of consumption, to finally be used.

Santana 9 (Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, November 2009, Anne Harrington de Santana, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-3\_harrington\_de\_santana.pdf, 330-31)

The destruction that can be wrought by nuclear weapons is required for them to be properly understood as an instrument of force and to mediate relations between states; states require nuclear weapons in order to practice nuclear deterrence. The significance of a nuclear weapon’s capacity for physical destruction is that it pushes the logic of accumulating power to its logical extreme. In that way, nuclear weapons are the ultimate expression of a historically particular fetish form, the fetishism of force. They are the most destructive force the world has ever known. The fact that a relatively small amount of fissile material can release a very large amount of explosive energy differentiates nuclear weapons from other explosive technologies. The combination of nuclear explosive technology with advanced missile systems maximized the capacity for physical destruction while minimizing the human presence necessary to engage in the act of destruction. All of these characteristics of their physical embodiment are significant for understanding how nuclear weapons embody the culmination of a socio-historical process that created and sustained a relationship between the capacity for destruction and the exercise of power. Yet, it is not their capacity for destruction that is the source of their power. The act of large-scale nuclear destruction will not contribute to achieving rational political ends; only compliance with the threat of destruction will further those ends. The same way the materiality of money has no use-value apart from its exchange-value, the value of nuclear weapons resides in their threat- (exchange-) value rather than their use-value. In essence, their material form is nothing but a carrier of their social function.24 The particularities of their physical embodiment that make them desirable for consumption\*properties such as their explosive yield\*are not what make them appropriate carriers of social value. The same material properties that are germane to the physical embodiment of money\* durability and scarcity\*are the physical properties that provide the foundation for nuclear weapons to serve as the embodiment of power.

This process overtakes the entirety of the social scene – Reifies nuclear worth

Santana 9 (Anne Harrington de Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, November NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE CURRENCY OF POWER Deconstructing the Fetishism of Force http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-3\_harrington\_de\_santana.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 329)

Importantly, denaturalizing a fetish object in theory does nothing in and of itself to deconstruct the meaning of that object in reality. It is possible to be aware that what is being treated as if it were natural is in fact a social construction, yet continue to behave as if it were natural and thus participate in a fetishistic process. In other words, as Slavoj Zizek put it, it is possible to be ‘‘fetishists in practice, but not in theory.’’19 The fetish object exists not only at the level of what individuals think or know they are doing. Insofar as a fetish object is the result of a collective social practice, it confronts individuals at the level of behavior. Regardless of what individuals think or know, the fetish exists in what they actually do. Zˇ izˇek explains this dynamic with reference to commodity fetishism. Commodity fetishists know very well that money is not valuable in and of itself. They realize that money is simply an expression of social relations, and who is entitled to what portion of the social product as represented by money is a function of market ideology. Yet, although individuals are very well aware that there are relations between people behind the relations between things, they continue to act as if money were the immediate embodiment of wealth as such. The illusion does not necessarily exist at the level of the knowledge of reality, but rather in the structuring of social reality itself. Each time that social reality confronts individuals by enabling or limiting their social activities, the conviction is reinforced that even if they do not believe, the belief is out there\*everyone believes that someone else believes, and thus a behavior that might otherwise appear illogical is justified as rational.

Impacts – VTL and Extinction

Our devotion to the bomb makes us perpetually push the stakes to keep death interesting – The end point is our metaphoric and literal death

Chernus 86 (Ira, Professor of Religious studies at UC Boulder, *Dr. Strangegod*, p. 136-140) jl

The similarities between the Bomb and other religious realities tells us part of what we need to know. But we must also ask how our new God differs from all previous gods, for only then can we see clearly how it affects us in unprecedented ways. One point, which has been implicit in our previous discussions, must now be brought out explicitly: this God is a machine, a technological device invented by human beings. Yet the machine, being infinitely more powerful than the humans who invented it, has become a Frankenstein’s Monster, independent of its creators and capable of turning violently upon them. And “them” is now, of course, all of us. We have the choice of either cooperating or resisting when the machine acts; because of many appealing symbolic qualities, we generally cooperate. We become partners in the machine’s action and thus, in a very real sense, parts of the machine. We are all soldiers in the front-line trenches, but the Bomb is our commander and we do its bidding. This is especially clear in the concept of MAD; the citizen of all superpowers become linked together in a single machine, which demands more and more sacrifices; the actions of one side must (according to this theory) necessarily evoke corresponding actions from the other side. The way in which we prepare for war reflects and foreshadows the way we shall wage war: “In a push-button war involving nuclear missiles, there will be no direct contact between adversaries. The techniques of war are fast becoming as impersonal and mechanized as pulling a lever to start a production chain belt. In such a setting, the best soldier is not the ‘hero’ but the ‘automaton.’” We voluntarily become automatons, mere parts of a machine, in part because of our age-old mythic dream of being heroes and our mythic desire to embody in ourselves the power inherent in the divine machine. What Moss says of the Strategic Air Command bomber pilot may be true for all of us: “He is equally remote from the human will that makes a decision on using or not using the bomb, and the human suffering that its use would cause. He sees himself as a part of a complex instrument, an agent between someone else’s will and its effect, a living button. His pride is to function in this role perfectly. He has a sense of importance.” Ultimately, though, in our symbolic perception, it may very well be the bomb itself whose will we obey, for how can any human will dare to interfere with that of the divine? Even the greatest nation al leaders are merely parts of the machine. And, as we have seen, our importance becomes not merely social or political, but in fact sacred and cosmic in scope. At the same time, psychic numbing reinforces the pattern effected by symbolic meaning. For if we are in fact “dead in life,” already suffused with the death taint of the Bomb, then it is that much easier to see ourselves as machines and to take pride in being perfectly functioning machines. Of course, this sense of the mechanization of human life was hardly created by the nuclear age. Here, as in so many other instances, the Bomb is both a reflection and a shaper of our relationship with reality. But the elevation of a machine to a central place in our symbolic world—the deification of a machine—surely makes it much more likely that we shall see ourselves as automatons. Moreover, the technologically induced problem offers itself as a solution. As this machine God intensifies our psychic numbing, we seek to escape that numbing by finding meaning in a symbolic form of immortality that is itself technological, as Lifton suggests: “Everyone in this age participates in a sense of immorality derived from the interlocking human projects we call science and technology.” Thus, as technology absorbs those provinces of life that were previously considered spiritual, it may be fair to say that technology has become the soul of the body of humanity. Yet we cannot be totally content with being machines. In fact as we saw previously, the existentialist movement may be said to have started with Dostoevski’s revolt against being a mere piano key, a part of a machine. The sense of dehumanization and the sheer boredom—the flatness of life—which afflicts automatons can be challenged only in situations of great intensity. Russian roulette may easily become, as in the film The Deer Hunter, a primary symbol for the modern world’s escape from the dehumanization of a technological God. The intensity of risk is combined with the joy of being entertained in a theater of life-and-death. But for the ultimate “kick,” the stakes must be ultimately high. Thus the machine deity leads us to give ourselves over to it in a game of global Russian roulette in which we all hold the pistol. And apparently we do so willingly. Machines must inevitably see all the world as a machine: “The more a man [sic] acts on the basis of a self-image that assumes he [sic] is powerless, an impotent cog in a huge machine, the more likely he [sic] is to drift into a pattern of dehumanized thinking and action towards others.” “We have become masters of the impersonal and the inanimate. Our energy and even our emotions have gone into things; the things serve us but come between us, changing the relationship of man to man. And the thing takes on an authority that men accept without protest. The impersonality is epidemic. It is almost as though we feared direct contact, almost as though the soul of man has become septic.” Thus we find our identity not by relating to other individuals as individuals, but by seeing ourselves merely as a part of “the crowd” or “the nation,” whose emblem and savior is the Bomb, the ultimate machine. We lose the subtleties and nuances of human complexity and see the world in absolutes, “us versus them.” We view human relationships in terms of the mythic, apocalyptic vision, a vision whose ultimate promise is the annihilation of “their” machine and unlimited license for “our” machine to do whatever it wants. In fact, the ultimate goal of machine people is always to have total dominance, unlimited autonomy to manipulate the environment—both human and natural—in endless technological ways. Thus the machine God also shapes our relationship with our physical and material environment, leading us to the environmental crisis that we now face. Again, the fouling of the air, water and land was hardly

Impacts – VTL and Extinction

>CONTINUED<

begun in the nuclear age, but the symbolism of the Bomb makes it much more difficult to escape from this predicament too. Behind our callousness toward the natural realm there is not only a desire for quick and easy profit, but a more fundamental view of ourselves as radically separated from nature. In the battle of the machines to dominate the elements, we are clearly on the side of the machines—we are the machines—and this battle is seen in radically dualistic, even apocalyptic, terms. Thus, having no meaningful relationship with nature, we are free, perhaps even compelled, to manipulate it endlessly. The transformation of raw materials into manufactured goods thus becomes our primary goal and value; if the Bomb is God, the GNP is the chief of the angels.

Yet our commitment to material goods as highest good may have a more complex significance. It is fostered not only by the symbol of the Bomb as divine controller, manipulator, and dominator, but also by the psychic numbing that the Bomb creates. If we dare not think about the true reality of our lives—the sword of Damocles that constantly threatens total extinction at a moment’s notice—then we must divert ourselves, making the other, numbed level so complex and interesting that we shall not have time to think about the truth. And we must make ourselves so comfortable that we shall not care to deal with the danger. Thus the Bomb and the economy are interlocked not only from the strictly economic point of view (though most people do believe that more bombs are good for the economy, despite the doubts raised by economists), but also from the psychological and symbolic standpoints.

The Bomb, the economy, and our lives all form parts of one interlocking machine, offering us enough satisfaction that we refuse to ask about the deeper meaning of the machine’s life. When this question threatens to arise, the diversions of life as theater of the absurd and global Russian roulette are there to entertain us and soothe our doubts. Thus we desperately desire the security that we hope to gain from total domination and manipulation of our world, but we simultaneously demand the insecurity that will make life interesting and entertaining. And we certainly get this insecurity, for we have based our hopes of security on a God that, as we have seen, cannot provide it. We hope to dominate the Enemy with a weapon that by its very nature cannot offer the freedom that we seek through domination. We are caught in a vicious circle in which the quest for security can only breed the anxiety of insecurity. But machines can’t feel anxiety, so it may be easier, for this reason too, to live as a machine.

Finally, then, we come to treat not only the natural world and our fellow human beings as machines, but ourselves as well. We offer ourselves, our thoughts and feelings, to the machine and the nation that embodies it, and we perceive those feelings, to the machine and the nation that embodies it, and we perceive those feelings and thoughts as parts of the unreality that surrounds us: “Faced with the prospect of the destruction of mankind, we feel neither violent nor guilty, as though we were all involved in

a gigantic delusion of negation of the external and well as our internal reality. We allow ourselves to be numbed, finding it the easiest way to cope with an impossible situation, and thus we commit “partial suicide,” which in turn allows us to continue preparing for total suicide on a global scale. We commit ourselves to a machine that is infinitely violent and must wreak its violence on us if it is to be used on others. Therefore, as much as we fear the Enemy, we must fear ourselves in equal measure, and this fear of ourselves reinforces the numbing.

Impacts – VTL

Questions about policy is the link to our criticism – Nuclear hegemony confines certain values as valid while marginalizing others

Chernus 91 (Ira, Professor of Religious studies at UC Boulder, *Nuclear Madness: On Religion an Psychology in the Nuclear Age,*, p. 59) jl

This is just what has happened, Tillich indicates, in modernity. Under the guise of scientific objectivity, a wall has been erected between public institutions and private feelings. The public realm of the production/consumption machine is now proclaimed morally neutral. The state, as manager of the machine, exempts itself in principle from questions of value and religion; all its policies, including its nuclear policies, are (at least theoretically) based solely on rational calculations and "reasons of state." All questions of meaning are relegated to the subjective dimension of personal feelings and private opinions. But even this private realm consists only of partial realities. Reality can no longer be experienced by the whole person, and the person can no longer experience the whole of reality. So one can ask about the meanings of parts of one's life, but the ques­tion of the meaning of the whole is in principle meaningless. Every value becomes simply a means to some other value, which is in its turn just a means. Each can only be a link in a chain whose sole purpose is to perpetuate itself to no end. The more passionately we search for our own unique meanings in the privacy of our own unique lives, the more our lives are radically finitized and emptied of meaning.

Occasionally threats to the whole may arise that force us to consider the nature of our concern for the totality of life. The nuclear threat is the most obvious case in point. But we avoid confronting this issue, as we avoid confronting our realistic fears, by claiming that it is just too big to comprehend. Again, there is truth in this claim. In a rare private moment we may wonder about the ultimate meaning of our individual lives, though we are denied an answer. But the Bomb is squarely in the middle of the public realm, where questions of ultimate meaning are impossible. We cannot connect our finite lives with ultimate meaning, nor can we connect our private lives with public meaning, so we cannot hope to connect our finite private lives with the ultimate public question of meaning implicit in the Bomb. We simply cannot ask that question. The language of public political discourse has no place for it.

Those who try to inject ultimate value terms into the nuclear weapons debate inevitably face this problem of language boundaries. First they are asked to reduce their terms to a concrete policy option within the parameters of the current political debate. If they comply, their value concerns may be ap­pended to the political discussion as useful embellishment. Even when these value terms are genuinely the source of political opinions, they are only received into mainstream discourse when presented as appendages to currently debated political options. If questions of ultimate meaning can not be reduced to the "realistic" terms of finite public policy questions, they will probably be written off by the mainstream as "idealistic" and therefore irrelevant. Through these various maneuvers we insure that we can not ask such questions in the public realm. Nor do we want to. By and large, we feel saved from the threat of anxiety by our meaninglessness.

Impact – Root Cause

The desire from nuclear proliferation comes from nuclear fetishization

Santana 9 (Anne Harrington de Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, November NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE CURRENCY OF POWER Deconstructing the Fetishism of Force http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-3\_harrington\_de\_santana.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 336-7)

Fetish objects always act on the self-identity of the actor who possesses them. As Pietz describes it, the fetish object establishes ‘‘an intense relation to and . . . power over the desires, actions, health, and self-identity of individuals whose personhood is conceived as inseparable from their bodies.’’39 This dimension is an important aspect of the African religious practice that Pietz describes in which the fetish was worn on the body and believed to have tangible effects, such as the ability to heal.40 Nuclear weapons work on the self-identity of states in two ways: states are formally and informally classified with respect to their possession of nuclear weapons, and their possession provides security. Formally, the NPT classifies states as nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. This classification differentiates them in meaningful ways with respect to what privileges and restrictions they enjoy with respect to that status. Informally, the possession of nuclear weapons is a constitutive element of great power status within the international system. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were distinguished as ‘‘superpowers’’ by their ability to produce nuclear arsenals. While France, Britain, and China maintained nuclear arsenals that numbered only in the hundreds, at its peak the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained 32,000 deployed warheads. No one outside of Russia knows for certain how many nuclear weapons the Soviet Union built, but the best unclassified estimate of the peak level of the Soviet stockpile is 45,000 warheads.41 It is in this realm of informality that proliferators operate. States who desire the same recognition accorded the great powers also desire nuclear weapons.42 For example, it has been argued that India’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons cannot be explained with respect to strategic considerations alone. India’s decision to develop a nuclear capability was motivated by a desire for status within the international system. The problem with this argument is that this status is often interpreted as symbolic, and therefore not actual. However, a theory of nuclear fetishism suggests that the power that accrues to states with nuclear weapons based on that status is very real.43 Most importantly, the possession of nuclear weapons works on the body of the state to provide security. The logic of deterrence describes how and under what conditions the threat of a nuclear attack dissuades military aggression. However, the security they provide is much like the healing effect of the Africans’ fetish objects. Nuclear weapons provide no material protection against attack. To be effective, nuclear deterrence requires that an opponent believe in the credibility of a retaliatory threat. The security that nuclear weapons provide operates at the level of belief that may or may not correspond to the level of reality.

Alt Solves

Rejection is a deconstruction of nuclear fetishism. It overcomes anti-nuclear nuclearism

Santana 9 (Anne Harrington de Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, November NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE CURRENCY OF POWER Deconstructing the Fetishism of Force http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-3\_harrington\_de\_santana.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 340-1)

The perception of what it is acceptable to propose\*which policies get taken seriously and which ones get laughed out of the room\*is governed by unspoken assumptions about what it is possible to change, and what lies outside our ability to alter. Does the existence of nuclear technology determine that nuclear deterrence is an inherent feature of the international system of states? Or is it within the realm of human capability to successfully implement another policy alternative? Just because deterrence was considered to be the only realistic policy choice in the past does not necessarily mean that the same will be true in the future. To suggest that the Soviet Union would peacefully splinter, bringing an end to the Cold War, seemed unthinkable up until the moment it happened. Likewise, to suggest that prominent Cold War statesmen would come together to advocate for disarmament seemed improbable, if not impossible, but it too has become a reality.52 The decision by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn to speak out in favor of nuclear disarmament has helped to change the nature of what is taken for granted in policy circles, reviving the hopes of the established disarmament lobby and placing disarmament on the agenda of the Washington policy establishment.53 In a speech delivered in Prague on April 6, 2009, President Barack Obama announced the intention of his administration to pursue an agenda that embraces complete nuclear disarmament.54 It is exciting to be thinking about problems of national security and nuclear nonproliferation at a time when the status quo is being criticized and questioned and variations on deterrence are not automatically assumed to be the only possible policy alternatives. However, I would like to suggest that this is also a time during which academics and policy makers should not limit themselves to reproducing the same Cold War era debate between disarmament and deterrence. A transformation of U.S. nuclear policy may require not only that we question deterrence, but also that we question the underlying assumptions that focus our attention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons to the exclusion of policy initiatives that may not target nuclear weapons specifically but could have the effect of deconstructing their status as fetish objects. If the logic of deterrence provides the conceptual foundation for nuclear fetishism, deconstructing the fetishism of force will require a decision to no longer practice deterrence in the sense we understand it today. However, arguments for nuclear disarmament sometimes unintentionally participate in the construction of nuclear fetishism by reproducing the association between nuclear weapons and power in two ways. First, historically, the discourse of disarmament has in common with the discourse of deterrence a rhetoric of nuclear fear.55 The problem with emphasizing the potential end to nation and life as a reason for the abolition of nuclear weapons is that nuclear fear is also the primary justification for the continued practice of deterrence. Nuclear fear contributes in important ways to what Ward Wilson has identified as the ‘‘myth of nuclear deterrence,’’ which rests on a ‘‘belief that the threat to destroy cities provides decisive leverage.’’56 This is consistent with and reinforces a perception of nuclear weapons as the embodiment of power. Secondly, there is no better way to produce desire than through prohibition. Being told that you cannot have something implies that you should want it. For nuclear abolition to be successful there must be policy alternatives that act on the desire of states to make nuclear weapons undesirable. That having been said, preliminary implications of a theory of nuclear fetishism support many of the disarmament initiatives that are already in existence, as well as point the way to new possibilities for policy and research.

Alternative – Accept Responsibility

We must accept our responsibility for the production of violence – this is the only way to step out of the cycle

Chernus 1 (Ira, Professor of Religious studies at UC Boulder, http://www.commondreams.org/views01/0916-02.htm*,*, AD: 7/2/10) jl

In 1938, in Germany, the great rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel rose to speak about the Nazis. Surprisingly, the rabbi did not point the finger of blame. He did not speak of the horrors that "they" were committing. He spoke in the first person plural: "We have failed to fight for right, for justice, for goodness. As a result we must fight against wrong, against injustice, against evil." Then he quoted an even greater rabbi, the saintly mystic Baal Shem Tov: "If a man has beheld evil, it was shown to him in order that he learn his own guilt and repent. For what is shown to him is also within him."

This week, on our television screens, the United States was shown evil. But we were also shown a huge question posed to our nation: Do we have the courage to see that evil within our own land? Do we have the courage to speak in the first person? Will we take any share of responsibility for the complex causes of this evil?

This is difficult for anyone. But it may be especially difficult for those of us raised in the United States. Here we are steeped in a culture of innocence. We learn from our earliest days to believe in the essential goodness of our nation. We learn that even when our country makes "mistakes," it is always guided by the best of intentions. From the very beginnings of our nation, European-Americans wanted to believe that this was a pure land, an Eden, and each of us an Adam or Eve before the Fall.

We learn, too, that this is a uniquely sheltered land. Some say it is guarded by God, others say simply by its favored natural place, between two wide oceans. We expect to be forever safe. If we are indeed as innocent and sheltered as our cultural traditions tell us, it is all the more galling to be attacked out of the blue.

Nothing in our cultural heritage prepares us to think deeply about why this has happened, and certainly not to ask what role we may have played in sowing the seeds of destruction. Everything in our heritage prepares us to point the finger of blame elsewhere, to seek out enemies and vow vengeance against them. We want so badly to believe that if we find the right enemy and take enough vengeance, it will somehow make us once again inviolable.

It is a terribly difficult time to be a pacifist, as the Daily Camera editorialized on the day of the tragedy. But the essence of pacifism is not simply "turning the other cheek." Pacifism means living by the words of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.: "We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. All life is interrelated. "

Pacifism means recognizing that every act, no matter how evil, arises from an infinite web of human relationships, and that each of us is part of that web. Evil emerges from a long history of abuses and counter-abuses, whose beginning no one can ever recover. The Baal Shem Tov, Dr. King, and so many other great spiritual leaders came to teach us that we are all part of that history. None of us, if we are honest, can stand outside that history of evil and say, "They alone are responsible."

To ask about our share of responsibility does not in any way condone the evil. It does not lessen by one whit the responsibility of those who actually did the deed. In death as in life, they remain fully responsible for their own heinous choices.

But pacifists cast the net of responsibility more widely because that is the only way to end the cycle of violence. If we go on putting all the blame on others, and thereby justifying vengeance, we simply perpetuate the suffering and anger that led to the violence.

Alternative – Embrace Despair

The alternative is to embrace a politics of despair

Imagining all aspects of our total destruction is a pre-requisite to new forms of politics

Chernus 86 (Ira, Professor of Religious studies at UC Boulder, *Dr. Strangegod*, p. 160-162) jl

We must face more honestly and more deeply the distortions in our lives—the insecurity of a fragmented and chaotic world whose survival hangs on such a slim thread. In doing so, we must admit that we feel ourselves living in desperate times and immersed to some degree or other in feelings of despair. Joanna Rogers Macy has written eloquently on this subject, showing how our numbing leads us to repress the despair that must arise from an honest assessment of our situation: “This refusal of feelings takes a heavy toll….The energy expended in pushing down despair is diverted from more creative uses.” Macy suggests that we must allow ourselves to feel this despair if our life energy is to be freed again; this opening up of despair, as she describes it, clearly has initiatory dimensions. For in feeling the depth of our despair we may, in fact, “disintegrate.” But this is a “positive disintegration”: “It is helpful in despair work to realize that going to pieces or falling apart is not such a bad thing. Indeed, it is as essential to evolutionary and psychic transformation as the cracking of outgrown shells….Our going to pieces,’ however uncomfortable a process, can open us up to new perception, new data, new responses….There is healing in such openness, for ourselves and perhaps for the world.” In admitting our craziness, we must face our despair. And in facing despair, we deepen our craziness. Yet it is a necessary part of our initiation.

We need to confront these images of despair in order to get over the attractiveness of total destruction

Chernus 86 (Ira, Professor of Religious studies at UC Boulder, *Dr. Strangegod*, p. 159-160) jl

We may also, temporarily, deepen our numbing. In any “positive disintegration” there is resistance, a natural refusal of the psyche to fall apart, and thus there is a refusal to feel. But this, too, may have to be accepted as necessary, with trust that it is merely temporary and that those who accept the need to transcend their present state will transcend the numbing as well. Every facet of our “death in life” must be tasted to its fullest. In order to “imagine the real” we must open ourselves to the feelings of total craziness, total despair, and total numbing, as moments on our way to the fourth level.

This painful necessity points back to the central importance of symbolism. Macy writes: “To acknowledge and express our despair, we need images and symbols….Exercise of the imagination is especially necessary, because existing verbal constructs seem inadequate to what many of us are sensing….We are groping in the dark, with shattered beliefs and faltering hopes, and we need images for this phase if we are to work through it.” While the Bomb shows us once again our need for symbolic images, it also shows us that we may already have the images we need. For what better image of madness and of “death in life” than nuclear catastrophe? But the problem we have consistently encountered is the relatively unthreatening and even appealing elements in all these images. And it may be that all such images of chaos, expressing numinous power and the coincidence of opposites in the big whoosh, must inevitably have attractive aspects. Yet there may be some which come closer to reflecting the total horror of nuclear war. These are the images we must agree to face if we are to confront our despair and the reality that lurks behind it.

A2: “Nukes Real”

Nukes have no intrinsic value but only matter in a certain field of social relations

Santana 9 (Anne Harrington de Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, November NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE CURRENCY OF POWER Deconstructing the Fetishism of Force http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-3\_harrington\_de\_santana.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 337-8)

Thus fetishism is a circular pattern of behavior characterized by a tautological inversion of value. On the one hand, the fetish object has a determinate effect on the structure of social relations only because a given social community treats it as if it has a determinate effect on the structure of social relations. On the other hand, the value embodied in the fetish object confronts individual members of that community as an objective reality (think of the value of a dollar). Insofar as the object’s presence (or perceived absence) reproduces a certain hierarchical structure of interactions between individuals, it is easy to treat the object as if its value were inherent in its physical embodiment\*as if it would be valuable even outside its relation to the network of social relations that brought it into being. Each time an individual actor is confronted with the objective value of the fetish object, the dynamic through which the behavior of the community constructs the fetish object as valuable is reinforced

\*General Neg\*

A2: Realism

Realism fails – war is not rational

CHERNUS 85 (J WAR AND MYTH: "THE SHOW MUST GO ON" Am Acad Relig.1985; TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 450-1)

If we want to define the changes that nuclear weapons have wrought in our understanding of war, we must start by questioning this implicit assumption. Do wars, and preparations for war, begin only because nations see pragmatic gains to be had? Thomas Powers, who has done some of the most insightful thinking about past wars as well as the next war, thinks not. He suggests that the "reasons" for wars are post hoc inventions created by the victors to justify the slaughter. The winner decides what the war was about. In fact, Powers claims, nations go to war because they have the means to go to war. Yet nations must convince themselves that they act upon rational motives. This is more true than ever in the nuclear age, for if our infinitely destructive arsenals are not rational means to rational ends, the implications are simply too terrifying to contemplate. Powers may overstate his case a bit. Surely nations honestly hope for some pragmatic benefits whenever they go to war. But his analysis is valuable, for just as surely something other than rational purpose is fueling the nuclear arms race. Nuclear annihilation, which might occur any day now, could not possibly be initiated out of logical motivations. If we have arrived at this situation, there must be something fundamentally irrational about war. Yet Powers does not take us very far in understanding that "something." "It is our nature," he concludes, "that makes us draw lines in the earth and grimace when anyone approaches in strange garb" (1984: 55). Those of us who study human life, particularly in its religious dimensions, will under- standably want to probe this matter more deeply. The academic study of religion gives us some valuable resources to do so.

Realism fails – discursive representation shapes its problematic assumptions

Muttimer 94 (David, professor of political science at suniversity of Vermont. Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation” 1994 http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP25-Mutimer.pdf TBC 6/29/10 Pg. 14-15)

Scott Sagan has recently argued that the dominant approach to the proliferation problem within the academic community has been rooted in rational deterrence theory, based on an "assumption that states behave in a basically rational manner, pursuing their interests according to expected-utility theory".32 There are a variety of problems with a theory based on the maximisation of expected utility as a basis for a theory of political action. Sagan proposed to use organisation theory as a corrective to some of these problems. This theory introduces two limitations on rational choice: "large organizations function within a severely 'bounded' form of rationality", and "have multiple conflicting goals and the process by which objectives are chosen and pursued is intensely political."33 In other words, Sagan recognises that the interests on the basis of which actors choose are not pre-constituted as rational deterrence theory supposes. Ned Lebow and Janice Stein broaden this critique beyond the organisational: Neither theories of deterrence nor rational choice say anything about the all important preferences that shape leaders' calculations. Achen and Snidal correctly observe that deterrence theory assumes exogenously given preferences and choice options. It begs the question of how preferences are formed. Empirical analyses of decision making suggest that individuals often identify their preferences and options in the course of formulating and reformulating a problem.34 The problem can be stated in general terms: rational choice theory assumes: a) a set of preconstituted utilities (or interests) and b) a pre-constituted problem. Lebow and Stein, along with Sagan's organisational corrective, draw attention to the first, but only hint at the second. The argument I am advancing is that the problem, interests and possible solutions are shaped, at least in part, metaphorically. Lebow and Stein's 'formulation and reformulation of a problem' involves adducing and refining an image. In the preceding section I have detailed the emergence in state pronouncements and practices of an image of the international security environment following the Cold War. In other words, a problem is not presented to policy makers fully formed, but is rather constituted by actors in their (discursive) practices. This practically constituted image of a security problem shapes the interests states have at stake in that problem, and the forms of solution that can be addressed to resolve it. Central to this function of shaping interests and responses is the metaphorical character of the image so constituted. To understand how an image shapes interest and policy is it first necessary to consider how metaphor shapes understanding.

A2: Realism

**Realism is the root cause of violence – We’re not pacifists, but radically political**

Steger 2 (Manfred B. Steger teaches political and socialtheory at Illinois State University and the University of Hawai’i-Manoa, Steger, Manfred B. 2002. "Ends, Means, and the Politics of Dissent." Dissent (00123846) 49, no. 4: 73, EBSCOhost )

The idealization of realism is very much part of the dominant ideology of violence. Once people accept that large scale war constitutes the only “realistic” response to September 11, then its many failings are easily shrugged off as “unavoidable byproducts” or “collateral damage,” while its often meager achievements are blown out of proportion to maintain the public’s faith in the effectiveness of violence. A truly “realistic” evaluation of the retaliatory violence employed by the United States and its allies in the war on terrorism reveals the remarkable ineffectiveness of the violent method. What has actually been achieved? We toppled the Taliban regime, but the fighting in Afghanistan hasn’t come to an end. We killed between a thousand and thirty-seven hundred Afghan civilians. The oppressive situation for Afghan women has improved only marginally. The example of a large-scale “war on terrorism” has been copied by various regimes to justify aggressive action against “subversives.” Take, for example, conflicts in Israel/Palestine, India/Pakistan, Colombia, Central Asian republics, and so on. Although the war on terrorism costs U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars, our government has steadily expanded it to other parts of the world. The United States has struck questionable alliances with groups and nations that are profoundly undemocratic and have long records of human rights abuses. Civil rights and liberties in our country are being undermined in the name of national security—think of the 2001 Patriot Act. Finally, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al- Zawahiri, Mullah Omar, and other leading Taliban and al-Qaeda members have not been captured. This is by no means a great scorecard for the violent method, but because large-scale war is supposedly the only “realistic” course of action, most Americans tolerate the failures of our military response. Let me emphasize, finally, that I agree with Isaac’s assertion that finding a proper relationship between means and ends is the most difficult challenge for both political thinkers and activists. Contrary to his account, however, I believe that the pacifist campus left has played a constructive role by countering realist mainstream arguments that favor an all-out war on terrorism. This overreliance on military means has only pulled us further into the apocalyptic scenario of terrorist strikes, counterstrikes, and deepening misery. It has also contributed to the rapid buildup of a national security regime that threatens our liberties and democratic arrangements. Isaac’s pigeonholing of the pacifist campus left is wrong; on balance, its members have expressed morally nuanced opinions and offered pragmatic alternative strategies.

Alt Solves – General

Realizing the logic of nuclear weapons leads to extinction solves

Bittock 84 (A. Barrie, Post-Retirement Fellow with the Climate Impact Group, CSIRO Atmospheric Research and a Contributing Author for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, September (“Comment on Brian Martin’s ‘Extinction Politics’” – Scientists Against Nuclear Arms Newsletter) http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sanap.pdf TBC 6/30/10)

In my experience most people already feel rather helpless to influence the political process - what they need in order to act politically is the motivation of feeling personally threatened or outraged to the point of anger, plus a sense of hope which we in the peace movement must provide. The key political impact of nuclear winter and the possibility of extinction, however, lies in the way it forces proponents of reliance on nuclear weapons back on deterrence as the only possible rationalisation, and at the same time makes the risks inherent in nuclear deterrence unacceptable to rational human beings. There can in my view be no more radicalising realisation than that the logic of reliance on nuclear weapons leads to extinction, if not now, then some time in the foreseeable future. The possibility of extinction makes a qualitative difference to how we view nuclear weapons.

Alt Solves – Individuals Solve (A2: State Key)

We must individually confront nuclear weapons

Krieger 7 (David, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, May 17, , “Responsibility in an Era of Consequences.” http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2007/05/17\_krieger\_Responsibility\_In\_An\_Era.htm TBC 6/30/10)

The inaugural meeting of the World Future Council was recently held in Hamburg, Germany. It brought together 50 Councilors from all continents, chosen for their diversity and pioneering commitment to building a better world. At the conclusion of the four-day meeting, the Council released the Hamburg Call to Action, a document calling for action to protect the future of all life. It began, “Today we stand at the crossroads of human history. Our actions – and our failures to act – will decide the future of life on earth for thousands of years, if not forever.” The Call to Action is a challenge to each of us to take responsibility for assuring a positive future for humanity and for preserving life on our planet. The document states: “Today there is no alternative to an ethics of global responsibility for we are entering an era of consequences. We must share, co-operate and innovate together in building a world worthy of our highest aspirations. The decision lies with each one of us!” We are challenged to consider what we are individually and collectively doing not only to radically undermine our present world through war and its preparation, resource depletion, pollution and global warming, but also the effects of what we are doing upon future generations. Those of us alive now have the responsibility to pass the world on intact to the next generation, and to assure that our actions do not foreclose the future. The Hamburg Call to Action is a great document and I urge you to read and reflect upon it. But I draw your attention specifically to the section on nuclear weapons: “Nuclear weapons remain humanity’s most immediate catastrophic threat. These weapons would destroy cities, countries, civilization and possibly humanity itself. The danger posed by nuclear weapons in any hands must be confronted directly and urgently through a new initiative for the elimination of these instruments of annihilation.”

Individuals matter – key to holding policy makers accountable for their actions

Stimson Center 1 (www.stimson.org/n2d2/?sn=n22001110726, AD: 6/30/10) jl

Ironically, a full decade out since the end of the Cold War, many Americans believe that much of the heavy lifting for dealing with the legacy of the Cold War has been done. They no longer sense the dangers of nuclear weapons as they did during the Cold War, when the reality is that nuclear dangers are more clear and present now than ever before. Thus, most Americans are not tuned in to the debates over the nuclear posture of the United States, let alone Russia or China, or whether or how missile defenses can be injected into the global security calculus.

Consequently, policymakers either ignore or discount the American people on these critically important issues. To date, they have not had to pay a political price for doing so. Policymakers, then, are free to pursue policies for which they will not be held accountable. Few, if any, US senators who voted against the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999 believed that there would be political consequences for doing so, despite overwhelming public support for the treaty.

The public, then, through the efforts of this report and others like it, must be informed and fully engaged in the discussions on these very pivotal issues. The role of the public then, is to ask for explanations and justification for having these weapons, and at what levels, from its national leaders. Without this input and feedback from the public, not only is the discussion on these issues conducted within the halls of Congress, the scope of the discussions is limited to the opinions of a handful of lawmakers who follow the issues. Most importantly, not until Americans insist they be heard and accounted for on nuclear policy issues will policymakers begin to be held accountable for not acting on the need for bold steps to leverage existing opportunities to reduce nuclear dangers. These matters are far too important to the lives of all Americans to have decisions and policies made by so few policymakers who act with political impunity.

A2: Blight

Blight’s theories are flawed – some members, through misinformation or patriotism, do not experience fear, making deterrence fail.

Wirtz 91 (James, Naval Postgrad School – Poli Sci, *Poli Sci Quarterly*, 106(3), p. 546)NAR

Blight's provocative alternative to the dominant theories of crisis decision making is not, however, without shortcomings. His analysis cannot explain why fear was not experienced by all members of the EXCOMM. Paul Nitze, Douglas Dillon, and Maxwell Taylor, for example, claimed during and after the crisis that they believed that the risk of nuclear war was extremely low and that the United States should have removed the missiles by force. Given the Kremlin's haste to end the crisis when the Strategic Air Command was placed on alert, it would appear unjustified to dismiss the position of these hawks out of hand. Yet, by not forward living the crisis from the hawks' perspective, Blight fails to address the main anomaly confronting his theory. Some of Blight's evidence is less than convincing. Participants' fear of inadvertent nuclear war is more apparent in interviews conducted twenty-five years after the crisis than in the EXCOMM transcripts. Additionally, Blight acknowledges that participants would be likely to confirm his theory because it offers a complementary description of their performance. In a sense, these empirical problems demonstrate the difficulty inherent in Blight's theoretical enterprise. In practice, it appears impossible to eliminate hindsight in reconstructing the past. Despite these shortcomings, Blight plausibly argues that Soviet and American policy makers shared a unique experience when they sensed that they were creating the distinct probability of nuclear war. That they saw this danger and averted it might not be a realistic source of optimism about the future. Nevertheless, Blight's analysis represents an interesting contribution to the literature on crisis decision making.

Blights theory is filled with contradictions – dismiss it.

Fleming 92 (Paula, *Jnl of Politics,* 54(4), CSU-LA poli sci, p. 1236)NAR

In fact, Blight's treatment of the rational school suggests that he has learned deterrence theory more from the irrationality critique of the 1980s than from the early seminal works on the subject. For instance, Herman Kahn called deterrence a psychological phenomenon, and wrote that it "prevents an enemy from doing something by making him fear the consequences that will follow" (On Escalation, 277). But Blight calls the rational school "psychologically bankrupt," and states that "it has no place in its lexicon" for fear (49). The influence of the irrationality school can also be seen in Blight's surprising conclusion that future leaders might forget the characteristics of nuclear weapons, thus "shattering" the crystal ball-in both its perceptual and physical senses. But if Blight is indeed a pupil of the irrationality school, he has rebelled against his master. For the value of The Shattered Crystal Ball lies precisely in its incisive criticisms of this school of thought. The book is also absorbing, short, beautifully written, and contains several striking and memorable metaphors and parables for "the nuclear fear."

Blight votes neg – He’s opposed to objective science for all of the reasons we are – His criticism ONLY takes out the negative’s turns that are premised in “objective” science

Rogers 84 (Roberts, SUNY – Sociology, *Poetics*, 13, p. 311-312)

Blight shows that the view that psychoanalysis is nothing like a natural science is based on a reaction, essentially a mis-directed one, against the positivistic stereotype of science as coldly mechanical, manipulatory, impersonal, and devoid of human feeling. In Blight’s opinion, science can be intensely personal and he says that “humanists, like scientists, seek to make real discoveries about really existing states of affairs” (p. 151). Blight goes on to argue (p. 191), with some passion, that we must give up the distorted notion of science as purely objective in contrast to the subjectivity of the humanities, we must relinquish the idea that science verifies while the humanities merely conjecture (in Blight’s Popperian view, all knowledge is conjectural), and we must finally abandon the misguided belief that whereas science seeks causal explanation the humanities merely strive for intuitive understanding.

A2: Blight

Psychoanalysis is relevant to policymakers – Blight’s plainly wrong

Du Preez 89 (Paul, U of S Cape Town – Aust, Psych, *Political Psychology*, 10(3), p. 547-8)

The big mistake is that psychologists look at governments as though they were persons or agents. This comes out most clearly in Blight's arguments against the application of Deutsch's (1983) work on malignant spirals

in which each deterrent threat leads to an escalating threat. Blight argues that cooperative and malignant spirals may well be produced by trust and mistrust between persons, but not between sovereign nations (Blight, 1987, p. 18). Governments act on the basis of interests, not on the basis of motives or psychological factors. He cites George Kennan: "Government is not an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents; not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience" (Blight, 1987, p. 18). There are two large difficulties with this formulation. First, persons take on the various roles of government and act as they think they ought to act in these roles, interpreting them and bringing to bear all the resources and failings they might have. We may cite a prescriptive role definition, but this has to be interpreted and enacted by a particular person. The definition of rationality (serving the national interest and avoiding moral impulses) and the definition of performance (behaving as persons in their positions are supposed to behave) do not obliterate psychodynamics. We may define homo economicus and homo sociologicus-the ideal calculator and the ideal role taker-but we cannot expect any dynamic individual to fit these exactly or ideally. In fact, psychodynamic analysis is never the analysis of persons in the abstract, but always of persons in roles and situations, whether as parents, teachers, farmers, or whatever. The roles change the behavior; persons change the roles. The second thing that is wrong with Blight's grounds for rejecting Deutsch is his own practice. After telling us that governments or nations are not persons he invites us to focus on a phenomenological study of leaders in crisis situations. There is nothing wrong with this except that it doesn't agree with his rejection of psychology. Presumably, phenomenology is the phenomenology of persons and not abstractions, or "governments." He urges us to "try to get inside the thinking of its key participants" and comments on Rusk's analysis of crisis behavior that "personality, perception, even psychophysiology, and especially learning - these all veritably leap from Rusk's retrospective analysis" (1987, p. 27). When we look at the ways in which persons assess risks, experience fear, or imagine responses, we are in the realms of psychology. We discover that government is made up of people (playing specialized roles) and that these people have interests as well as motives. As Stein (1987, p. 690) observes, policies emerge from the depths and are only later rationalized. To reject the contributions of psychologists because policy makers think their problems are exclusively rational is, therefore, a poor reason for doing so. It is true that problem solving in the crisis may be experienced as purely rational decision making, but the assumptions on which that decision making is based, the interests which are served, and the definition of events which lead to the crisis will each have to be analyzed multifactorally, to include psychological variables.

Their argument is a rigged game – Policymakers also don’t listen to them and psychoanalytic perspectives do influence elites

Du Preez 89 (Paul, U of S Cape Town – Aust, Psych, *Political Psychology*, 10(3), p. 548-9)

The second fallacy, according to Blight, is the fallacy that there is an analogy between the pathologies of communication and interaction patterns in families and small face-to-face groups and the processes of superpower relationships. He denies the possibility of this, apparently on three grounds. The first is that governments are not persons. I have already considered and rejected this argument. The second is that the languages of psychologists and policy makers are incommensurable. This, however, is something theorists have to accept as they keep insisting, with all the persuasive skills they can command, on their views (if correct). If they can solve problems better than others can solve them, people will come to listen. The third is that psychology is irrelevant when it refers to "levels" deeper than the experiences the typical nuclear policy maker knows (1987, p. 19). Let us focus as clearly as we can on the contribution of the psychologist. It is probably true that psychologists cannot contribute, as psychologists to the logic and strategy of the nuclear game, just as they cannot teach Spassky how to play chess. However, they can contribute to an understanding of group processes which lead policy makers to accept particular objectives, definitions of the situation, characterizations of their opponents, and alternatives. They may also study the group dynamic processes which lead to fatigue, unwillingness to consider relevant evidence, and premature decisions. Phenomenology is not enough, if by that we mean the exclusive study of "levels" of experience which are immediately accessible to policy makers. That is simply repeating their own definitions of the situation. It throws away all that we have learnt about unconscious processes, both intrapsychic and interpsychic. This search for causes beyond the awareness or report of the participants is not peculiar to psychologists. Historians have long known that the situation and reasoning of the principal actors in history both explain events and have to be explained. Psychologists will certainly not be able to give the whole explanation, but can add a dimension to that explanation.

A2: Pragmatism

The search for peace can be both pragmatic and effective. Our alternative does not abandon violence, but instead rejects the problematic claims of the 1AC.

Steger 2 (Manfred B. Steger teaches political and socialtheory at Illinois State University and the University of Hawai’i-Manoa, Steger, Manfred B. 2002. "Ends, Means, and the Politics of Dissent." Dissent (00123846) 49, no. 4: 73, EBSCOhost )

For two long days and nights, we engaged passers-by and hecklers in heated debates on exactly those tough political and ethical issues that Isaac claims are rarely raised by the pacifist campus left. In our closing statement (published in a local progressive weekly), we emphasized that “any search for peace and justice in response to the attacks of September 11 is a difficult, complicated, and less-thanperfect search. There is no ‘golden’ solution waiting to be found.” Moreover, we explicitly acknowledged the impossibility of adhering to unblemished moral standards. In fact, our preferred practical strategy—to treat the attacks as crimes against humanity and therefore respond with an international criminal investigation and prosecution within the framework of international law—relied on the employment of some violence through the apparatus of international law enforcement. At the same time, however, we consciously evoked the moral and political insights of the Gandhi-King tradition of nonviolence. Isaac’s version of campus left pacifism is a grotesque caricature that works well for rhetorical rhetorical purposes but hardly corresponds to the “real world” he extols in his essay. To be a “pacifist” means to believe that peace is better than war, social justice better than injustice; it does not lock pacifists into an absolutist position. Even the two grand figures of twentieth-century pacifism—Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.—consistently acknowledged the difficulty of reconciling ethical principles with political power. In fact, Gandhi counseled his son to choose violent resistance to evil over indifference and cowardice. He admitted that perfect nonviolence and absolute moral truth remained ultimately unrealizable, but nonetheless emphasized that ahimsa (non-harming) and satya (truth) constituted central ideals that ought to guide political action. King, too, noted that nonviolence always contains a “disruptive dimension.” In a 1967 speech, the civil rights leader coined the phrase “aggressive” or “militant” nonviolence to refer to forms of direct action designed to interrupt the functioning of unjust institutions and social forces. Moreover, King consciously relied on police and federal troops to enforce laws repealing Jim Crow. As he put it, “I believe in the intelligent use of police force….And I think that is all we have in Little Rock. It’s not an army fighting against a nation, or a race….It’s just police…seeking to enforce the law of the land.” And that’s exactly the position taken by many groups on the pacifist campus left: respond to the attacks of September 11 with the intelligent use of police force within the framework of international law. Such alternative strategies consistent with the Gandhi-King tradition are easily distinguishable from the conventional militaristic posture favored by political “realists.”

A2: Perm

Perm Fails – Representations are critical to building movements

Benford 93 (Robert D. Social Forces, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Mar., 1993) Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement, pp. 677-701 01/07/2010 TBC)

Recent theoretical advances in the social movement literature have stressed the centrality of grievance interpretation and reality construction processes to social movement participation and emergence. The constructionist approach to social movements builds on the contributions of resource mobilization theory by examining the negotiated and interactive processes by which movement actors identify and articulate grievances, fashion collective attributions, and seek to neutralize opponents while persuading other audiences to contribute resources to mobilization campaigns. The present article has sought to contribute empirically to these developments by examining the dynamics of such processes

Empirically – Peace movements which bridge moderate and radical agendas fail

Benford 93 (Robert D. Social Forces, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Mar., 1993) Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement, pp. 677-701 01/07/2010 TBC)

A total of 51 disagreements were coded as frame disputes. The frame disputes recorded within the Austin nuclear disarmament movement are displayed in Table 1 by the SMOs involved. The Texas Mobe (TM), the oldest local group, engaged in more total frame disputes than any other SMO. Of the 51 frame disputes recorded, Texas Mobe was involved in some fashion in 32 (62.7%) of them. Interviews, documents, and field observations suggest a number of reasons for this finding. Texas Mobe was more active than any other group in terms of numbers of members as well as actions. Consequently, Texas Mobe representatives interacted with other peace movement organizations more frequently. Moreover, as the vanguard group of the movement's radical faction, Texas Mobe often proposed and used tactics that other wings of the movement, especially the moderates, found problematic, counterproductive, or offensive. Several of its members were among the movement's most battle-hardened, experienced radicals. As veterans of nearly two decades of New Left activism, most Texas Mobe activists displayed little patience or tolerance for neophytes or compatriots with more moderate agendas and less confrontational tactical repertoires. Finally, because it was the oldest and most visible group, Texas Mobe was often the target of rhetorical vollies lobbed at it by less well-known challengers who sought to loosen Texas Mobe's hegemonic hold over the local movement.

Representations are crucial to shaping the alternative, if we win a link, the perm goes away

Benford 93 (Robert D. Social Forces, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Mar., 1993) Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement, pp. 677-701 01/07/2010 TBC)

What is often at stake in such intramural conflicts are meanings. Social movement organizations devote considerable time to constructing particular versions of reality, developing and espousing alternative visions of that reality, attempting to affect various audiences' interpretations, and managing the impressions people form about their movement. Consensus within and among a movement's organizations regarding such interpretive matters is at best tenuous and more often than not absent. Complicating the process further is the fact that movement participants and potential adherents are not tabulae rasae upon which activists may draw any picture of reality they would like. Rather, as Goffinan (1974) suggests, people operate under the guidance of frames or "schemata of interpretation." A frame enables an individual "to locate, perceive, identify and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms" (21). It "provides a first answer to the question 'What is it that's going on here?"' thereby "rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful" (25, 21). Frames are crucial to social movement dynamics because they serve to guide individual and collective action.

\*General Aff Answers\*

Nuclear Reps Good

Using representations of Nuclear War allows us to criticize the existence of dangerous weapons

Foard 97 (Associate Professor of Religion, Arizona State, (James, “Imagining Nuclear Weapons: Hiroshima, Armageddon, and the Annihilation of the Students of Ichijo School,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, http://jaar.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/LXV/1/1.pdf TBC 7/1/10)

This ambivalence about Hiroshima has been partially ameliorated by displacing it with Armageddon in our imagination of nuclear weapons In America the images of the atomic bomb, particularly after the Soviet Union's successful test in 1949 (Boyer.341), were pressed into the service of apocalyptic speculations, both scientific and otherwise, a process which has until recently assigned the horror that Hiroshima represented to a superpower war in an imagined future (cf. Pease'562). Specifically, images of a nuclear Armageddon have helped us perform two sorts of cultural tasks fundamental for imagining nuclear weapons: those involving difference and those involving representation. By "difference" I mean both the articulation of what makes nuclear weapons different from other weapons and the consequent reflection on the different human situation engendered by them. By "representation" I mean the expressions which seek to describe the use of nuclear weapons and incorporate that description into structures of meaning Armageddon permits us to define the difference of nuclear weapons by their capacity to destroy the human species in a war that no one will win. It also has suggested to many, particularly literary critics but also some nuclear strategists, that nuclear war is but an imaginary event, divorced from reality, such that all representations are, to use the most famous phrase, "fabulously textual" (Derrida'23).

Imagery of Armageddon is crucial to understanding nuclear weapons

Foard 97 (Associate Professor of Religion, Arizona State, (James, “Imagining Nuclear Weapons: Hiroshima, Armageddon, and the Annihilation of the Students of Ichijo School,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, http://jaar.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/LXV/1/1.pdf TBC 7/1/10)

With the end of the Cold War, however, apocalyptic imagery itself appears doomed, as our geo-political situation no longer sustains its plausibility Our images of the nuclear threat are now as obsolete as our strategies. Without such imagery, though, we are left with little to think with in contemplating the meaning of these weapons, a situation that could well prove dangerous Since nuclear weapons now appear to threaten cities more than the human species as a whole, we might do well to return to Hiroshima to discover their difference and the possibilities for their representation. At the very least, doing so will expose the Armageddon imagery as a cultural construct rather than a selfevident fact

Nukespeak doesn’t naturalize nuclear weapons but allow us to challenge them

Foard 97 (Associate Professor of Religion, Arizona State, (James, “Imagining Nuclear Weapons: Hiroshima, Armageddon, and the Annihilation of the Students of Ichijo School,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, http://jaar.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/LXV/1/1.pdf TBC 7/1/10)

Despite their deep suspicion of the adequacy of any expressions, the survivors relate their narratives in formal ritual and pilgrimage settings in which their repetition and redundancy seem appropriate. (These are, of course, the public rather than the traditional settings ) They justify their attention to story and place in terms of preserving memory, not because their stories can ever be fully understood, but "to bring peace " Without any clear understanding of what political mechanisms might be required, they claim that the telling of stories itself can, in fact, help do this The experience of the Ichijo people, then, suggests that nuclear talk can neither be fully denied nor fully accommodated into our sense of community over time. The only representation possible, then, strives not to domesticate the experience of the bomb into human memory, but to use the memory of its reality for apotropaic purposes The reality of the bomb is asserted—indeed must be asserted—only so that it can be refused a permanent place in human history

Nuclear Reps Good

We still have to confront nuclear issues, apocalyptic imagery is one way to do so

Foard 97 (Associate Professor of Religion, Arizona State, (James, “Imagining Nuclear Weapons: Hiroshima, Armageddon, and the Annihilation of the Students of Ichijo School,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, http://jaar.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/LXV/1/1.pdf TBC 7/1/10)

Since the onset of the superpower conflict, nuclear reflection has yoked itself to the Cold War and indulged itself in opposing human extinction As a consequence, the end of the Cold War has meant the obsolescence of not only our strategies toward but also our images of the nuclear threat Although excluded from our apocalyptic obsession, harder moral issues have been with us since 1945, moral issues that are as pressing now as they were then: Is the instantaneous extinction of cities different from other war death? If using a nuclear weapon (or two) does not endanger the human species, is it permissible under certain conditions? If so, how do we represent such death in our religious and cultural systems of "just war" and other meanings7 Such questions are beyond the range of this historian of religions What is clear is that the efforts of Hiroshima survivors suggest measuring the difference of nuclear death by the impossibility of theodicy, of which the apocalyptic imagination is but one culturally specific and historically bound expression Following such a measurement of difference can help us see that we have not achieved freedom from nuclear danger in the past few years solely because the apocalyptic scenario seems less plausible and that we need new theological and philosophical reflections. Furthermore, the survivors' insistence on the reality of references for nuclear language, in contrast to our own critics' insistence on the opposite, affirms that the use of nuclear weapons is indeed possible because it has already happened. In the end, incorporating these victims' voices can transform our sense of difference and modes of representation to reflect more accurately our post-Cold War situation, when more than ever we should imagine the nuclear threat through Hiroshima rather than Armageddon As the Smithsonian controversy exposed, however, Americans still recoil from peeking under the mushroom cloud

Criticizing nuclear discourse prevents us from confronting pervasive nuclearism

James 94 (Doctoral student in English Literature at the University of Iowa, Clair, “Book Reviews,” Configurations, 2.2, 367-371)

Chaloupka first analyzes the politics of the antinuclear movement, arguing that it has failed to have a larger impact because it shares with pronuclear forces both a "confidence in a world that passes naturally into speech and writing" and, more tellingly, "the identification of a 'values' realm--limited but available for political debate" (p. xiii). Two of the antinuclear positions that he criticizes are the acceptance of survival as a universal value and the idea that nuclear war is unspeakable. Because the pronuclear camp argues that nuclear weapons are necessary for survival in the face of international threat, antinuclear rhetoric based on the need for human survival can either lead to a stalemate position or actually strengthen the other side. In order to emphasize the horrors of nuclear war and thereby discourage people from supporting pronuclear policies, some people would claim that nuclear weapons are "unspeakable": the horrors of nuclear war go beyond the human capacity for description and such a war would leave no survivors to describe it. But Chaloupka argues that the idea of unspeakability, instead of encouraging opposition to nuclear weapons, has silenced the voices of protest and abetted the secrecy surrounding nuclear weapons management. A large portion of the book is devoted to demonstrating how thoroughly and covertly nuclear weapons influence our lives. In one chapter Chaloupka uses Jacques Lacan's analysis of metonymy, which Lacan calls the rhetorical trope of absence and desire, in order to argue that "the computer and the robot are the metonymic processes we use to deal with the nuke" (p. 61). In other words, "in the now out-dated metaphor of rationalism, the computer is the brains of this operation, the bomb the muscle. In its physicality, the robot is the encoded sign of nuclearism" (p. 45). At the same time that industrial robots are replacing humans in factories, fictional humanoid robots have become the model for the ideal human, exhibiting absolute efficiency and self-control--exactly the qualities necessary to operate well a nuclear arsenal. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this desire for widespread robot mentality was the popular "Just Say No" campaign, which refused to analyze the cultural conditions that make drug use an attractive alternative to many and instead asked us all, but especially children, to become automatic message machines.

Nuclear Reps Good

Imagery of nuclear extinction motivates political activism toward peace

Pittock 84 (Barrie, Atmospheric Research Scientist, published over 200 articles, Climate Impact Group Chair, CSIRO Senior Scientist, Australian Public Service Medal Winner, http://www.uow.edu.au/~bmartin/pubs/84sanap.pdf AD: 7/1/10) jl

It is difficult to assess the motivation behind Brian's consistent bias towards dismissing the possibility of extinction, but perhaps there is a hint at it in his protest that believing in such a possibility fosters resignation. In my experience most people already feel rather helpless to influence the political process - what they need in order to act politically is the motivation of feeling personally threatened or outraged to the point of anger, plus a sense of hope which we in the peace movement must provide. The key political impact of nuclear winter and the possibility of extinction, however, lies in the way it forces proponents of reliance on nuclear weapons back on deterrence as the only possible rationalisation, and at the same time makes the risks inherent in nuclear deterrence unacceptable to rational human beings. There can in my view be no more radicalising realisation than that the logic of reliance on nuclear weapons leads to extinction, if not now, then some time in the foreseeable future. The possibility of extinction makes a qualitative difference to how we view nuclear weapons.

Depicting nuclear catastrophe is good – it enables us to express our anxieties about dangers

Seed 0 (Professor of English literature at the University of Liverpool, 2000 David, “Imagining the Worst: Science Fiction and Nuclear War,” Journal of American Studies of Turkey, Vol. 11, pp. 39-49 http://ake.ege.edu.tr/new/jast/Number11/Seed.htm TBC 7/1/10)

A number of recurring features emerge from these narratives. In virtually every case the USA plays a reactive role, never attacking first. Secondly, the nation’s capacity to cope with such an attack becomes a test of its morale and for that reason the nuclear aftermath, in the short and long term, occasions an interrogation of cherished national values. Thirdly, because nuclear attack can only be mounted with the latest technology, these novels explore anxieties about problems of control. Finally this fiction expresses a collective horror of ultimate endings. Some human presence persists however tenuous or displaced. Cherished human values like reason might be transposed on to extraterrestrial beings; or reader might play out the role of a survivor through the very act of reading a narrative whose deliverer has died. Ultimately there is an unusual circularity to such narratives. By deploying a whole range of strategies to imagine a dreaded future, they function as warnings against such imminent developments[33]. The more the future fails to develop along these imagined lines, the more necessary is the reconfirmation of these narratives as mere imaginary extrapolations.

Kurasawa – Predictions

Predictions are necessary for pragmatic political change – ignoring humanities ability to make predictions keeps us in a state of political dead-lock

Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology – York University of Toronto, Constellations, 11(4)) jl

As we float in a mood of post-millennial angst, the future appears to be out of favor. Mere mention of the idea of farsightedness – of trying to analyze what may occur in our wake in order to better understand how to live in the here and now – conjures up images of fortune-telling crystal balls and doomsday prophets, or of eccentric pundits equipped with data-crunching supercomputers spewing forth fanciful prognostications. The future, then, has seemingly become the province of mystics and scientists, a realm into which the rest of us rarely venture. This curious situation goes back to a founding paradox of early modernity, which sought to replace pagan divination and Judeo-Christian eschatology with its own rational system of apprehending time. Thus came into being the philosophy of history, according to which human destiny unfolds teleologically by following a knowable and meaningful set of chronological laws leading to a final state of perfection; Condorcet, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, to name but a few, are the children of this kind of historicism that expresses an unwavering faith in the Enlightenment’s credo of inherent progress over time. Yet in our post-metaphysical age, where the idea of discovering universal and stable temporal laws has become untenable, the philosophy of history lies in ruins. What has stepped into the breach is a variety of sciences of governance of the future, ranging from social futurism to risk management. By developing sophisticated modeling techniques, prognosticators aim to convert the future into a series of predictable outcomes extrapolated from present-day trends, or a set of possibilities to be assessed and managed according to their comparative degrees of risk and reward.1 Although commendable in their advocacy of farsightedness, these scientistic forms of knowledge are hampered by the fact that their longing for surefire predictive models have inevitably come up short. If historicism and scientistic governance offer rather unappealing paradigms for contemplating the future, a turn to the conventional political forecasts of the post-Cold War world order hardly offers more succor. Entering the fray, one is rapidly submerged by Fukuyama’s “end of history,” Huntington’s “clash of civilizations,” Kaplan’s “coming anarchy,” or perhaps most distressing of all, the so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’ of unilateral pre-emption. For the Left, this array of unpalatable scenarios merely prolongs the sense of hope betrayed and utopias crushed that followed the collapse of the socialist experiment. Under such circumstances, is it any wonder that many progressive thinkers dread an unwelcomed future, preferring to avert their gazes from it while eyeing foresight with equal doses of suspicion and contempt? But neither evasion nor fatalism will do. Some authors have grasped this, reviving hope in large-scale socio-political transformation by sketching out utopian pictures of an alternative world order. Endeavors like these are essential, for they spark ideas about possible and desirable futures that transcend the existing state of affairs and undermine the flawed prognoses of the post-Cold War world order; what ought to be and the Blochian ‘Not-Yet’ remain powerful figures of critique of what is, and inspire us to contemplate how social life could be organized differently. Nevertheless, my aim in this paper is to pursue a different tack by exploring how a dystopian imaginary can lay the foundations for a constructive engagement with the future.

Kurasawa – Predictions

Our form of political predictions allows us to avoid catastrophe

Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology – York University of Toronto, Constellations, 11(4)) jl

Rather than bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a dystopian imaginary, I am claiming that it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action, a manifestation of globalization from below that can be termed preventive foresight. We should not reduce the latter to a formal principle regulating international relations or an ensemble of policy prescriptions for official players on the world stage, since it is, just as significantly, a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society. In other words, what I want to underscore is the work of farsightedness, the social processes through which civic associations are simultaneously constituting and putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes. Although the labor of preventive foresight takes place in varying political and socio-cultural settings – and with different degrees of institutional support and access to symbolic and material resources – it is underpinned by three distinctive features: dialogism, publicity, and transnationalism. In the first instance, preventive foresight is an intersubjective or dialogical process of address, recognition, and response between two parties in global civil society: the ‘warners,’ who anticipate and send out word of possible perils, and the audiences being warned, those who heed their interlocutors’ messages by demanding that governments and/or international organizations take measures to steer away from disaster. Secondly, the work of farsightedness derives its effectiveness and legitimacy from public debate and deliberation. This is not to say that a fully fledged global public sphere is already in existence, since transnational “strong publics” with decisional power in the formal-institutional realm are currently embryonic at best. Rather, in this context, publicity signifies that “weak publics” with distinct yet occasionally overlapping constituencies are coalescing around struggles to avoid specific global catastrophes.4 Hence, despite having little direct decision-making capacity, the environmental and peace movements, humanitarian NGOs, and other similar globally-oriented civic associations are becoming significant actors involved in public opinion formation. Groups like these are active in disseminating information and alerting citizens about looming catastrophes, lobbying states and multilateral organizations from the ‘inside’ and pressuring them from the ‘outside,’ as well as fostering public participation in debates about the future. This brings us to the transnational character of preventive foresight, which is most explicit in the now commonplace observation that we live in an interdependent world because of the globalization of the perils that humankind faces (nuclear annihilation, global warming, terrorism, genocide, AIDS and SARS epidemics, and so on); individuals and groups from far-flung parts of the planet are being brought together into “risk communities” that transcend geographical borders.5 Moreover, due to dense media and information flows, knowledge of impeding catastrophes can instantaneously reach the four corners of the earth – sometimes well before individuals in one place experience the actual consequences of a crisis originating in another. My contention is that civic associations are engaging in dialogical, public, and transnational forms of ethico-political action that contribute to the creation of a fledgling global civil society existing ‘below’ the official and institutionalized architecture of international relations.6 The work of preventive foresight consists of forging ties between citizens; participating in the circulation of flows of claims, images, and information across borders; promoting an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism; and forming and mobilizing weak publics that debate and struggle against possible catastrophes. Over the past few decades, states and international organizations have frequently been content to follow the lead of globally- minded civil society actors, who have been instrumental in placing on the public agenda a host of pivotal issues (such as nuclear war, ecological pollution, species extinction, genetic engineering, and mass human rights violations). To my mind, this strongly indicates that if prevention of global crises is to eventually rival the assertion of short-term and narrowly defined rationales (national interest, profit, bureaucratic self-preservation, etc.), weak publics must begin by convincing or compelling official representatives and multilateral organizations to act differently; only then will farsightedness be in a position to ‘move up’ and become institutionalized via strong publics.7 Since the global culture of prevention remains a work in progress, the argument presented in this paper is poised between empirical and normative dimensions of analysis. It proposes a theory of the practice of preventive foresight based upon already existing struggles and discourses, at the same time as it advocates the adoption of certain principles that would substantively thicken and assist in the realization of a sense of responsibility for the future of humankind. I will thereby proceed in four steps, beginning with a consideration of the shifting socio-political and cultural climate that is giving rise to farsightedness today (I). I will then contend that the development of a public aptitude for early warning about global cataclysms can overcome flawed conceptions of the future’s essential inscrutability (II). From this will follow the claim that an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism – of solidarity that extends to future generations – can supplant the preeminence of ‘short-termism’ with the help of appeals to the public’s moral imagination and use of reason (III). In the final section of the paper, I will argue that the commitment of global civil society actors to norms of precaution and transnational justice can hone citizens’ faculty of critical judgment against abuses of the dystopian imaginary, thereby opening the way to public deliberation about the construction of an alternative world order (IV).

Kurasawa – Predictions

No link to their offense – our paradigm of predictions is comparatively different

Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology – York University of Toronto, Constellations, 11(4)) jl

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.

Kurasawa – Predictions

We must embrace an ethic of responsibility toward future generations – this sparks resistence against the predictions they criticize

Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology – York University of Toronto, Constellations, 11(4)) jl

By contrast, Jonas’s strong consequentialism takes a cue from Weber’s “ethic of responsibility,” which stipulates that we must carefully ponder the potential impacts of our actions and assume responsibility for them – even for the incidence of unexpected and unintended results. Neither the contingency of outcomes nor the retrospective nature of certain moral judgments exempts an act from normative evaluation. On the contrary, consequentialism reconnects what intentionalism prefers to keep distinct: the moral worth of ends partly depends upon the means selected to attain them (and vice versa), while the correspondence between intentions and results is crucial. At the same time, Jonas goes further than Weber in breaking with presentism by advocating an “ethic of long-range responsibility” that refuses to accept the future’s indeterminacy, gesturing instead toward a practice of farsighted preparation for crises that could occur.30 From a consequentialist perspective, then, intergenerational solidarity would consist of striving to prevent our endeavors from causing large-scale human suffering and damage to the natural world over time. Jonas reformulates the categorical imperative along these lines: “Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life,” or “Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life.”31 What we find here, I would hold, is a substantive and future-oriented ethos on the basis of which civic associations can enact the work of preventive foresight. Having suggested a way to thicken the normative foundations of farsighted cosmopolitanism, I would now like to discuss the socio-cultural strategies that global civil society participants have begun employing in order to create a sense of intergenerational solidarity. Both the moral imagination and reason constitute triggers of farsightedness that have entered public discourse in a variety of settings, with the objective of combatting the myopia of presentism.32 The first of these catalysts appeals to us to carefully ponder our epoch’s legacy, to imagine the kind of world we will leave to future generations (what will social life be like if today’s risks become tomorrow’s reality?). Left dystopianism performs just this role of confronting us with hypothetically catastrophic futures; whether through novelistic, cinematic, or other artistic means, it conjures up visions of a brave new world in order to spark reflection and inspire resistance.33 By way of thick description, dystopian tales call upon audiences’ moral imagination and plunge them into their descendants’ lifeworlds. We step into the shoes of Nineteen Eighty-Four’s Winston Smith or are strongly affected by The Handmaid’s Tale’s description of a patriarchal-theocratic society and The Matrix’s blurring of simulacra and reality, because they bring the perils that may await our successors to life. NGOs and social movements active in global civil society have drawn upon the moral imagination in similar ways, introducing dystopian scenarios less as prophecies than as rhetorical devices that act as ‘wake-up calls.’ Dystopias are thrust into public spaces to jolt citizens out of their complacency and awaken their concern for those who will follow them. Such tropes are intended to be controversial, their contested character fostering public deliberation about the potential cataclysms facing humankind, the means of addressing them, and the unintended and unexpected consequences flowing from present-day trends. In helping us to imagine the strengths and weaknesses of different positions towards the future, then, the dystopian imaginary crystallizes many of the great issues of the day. Amplifying and extrapolating what could be the long-term consequences of current tendencies, public discourse can thereby clarify the future’s seeming opaqueness. Likewise, fostering a dystopian moral imagination has a specifically critical function, for the disquiet it provokes about the prospects of later generations is designed to make us radically question the ‘self-evidentness’ of the existing social order.34 If we imagine ourselves in the place of our descendants, the takenfor- granted shortsightedness of our institutionalized ways of thinking and acting becomes problematic. Indifference toward the future is neither necessary nor inevitable, but can be – and indeed ought to be – changed. Aside from the moral imagination, and given that the idea of gambling with humanity’s future or failing to minimize its possible sources of suffering is logically unsustainable, the appeal to reason represents another main trigger of intergenerational solidarity. Since actual deliberation between current and future generations is obviously impossible, a Rawlsian contractualist thoughtexperiment allows us to demonstrate the soundness of a farsighted cosmopolitanism. If, in the original position, persons were to operate behind a chronological veil of ignorance that would preclude them from knowing the generation to which they belong, it is reasonable to expect them to devise a social order characterized by a fair distribution of risks and perils over time. Conversely, it is unreasonable to expect them to agree to a situation where these burdens would expand over time and thereby be transferred from one generation to the next. “The life of a people,” Rawls writes, “is conceived as a scheme of cooperation spread out in historical time. It is to be governed by the same conception of justice that regulates the cooperation of contemporaries. No generation has stronger claims than any other.”35 Via the practice of preventive foresight, this norm of crossgenerational fairness may acquire sufficient weight.

Kurasawa – Predictions

Acknowledging the dytopic future harms is a catalyst for political action

Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology – York University of Toronto, Constellations, 11(4)) jl

Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary (or what Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster”).11 Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, two groundbreaking dystopian novels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like The Matrix and novels like Atwood’s Oryx and Crake – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts.13 Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

Kurasawa – Predictions

Repoliticization of futurism reclaims critical judgement over threats

Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology – York University of Toronto, Constellations, 11(4)) jl

On top of their dubious assessments of what is to come, alarmism and resignation would, if widely accepted, undermine a viable practice of farsightedness. Indeed, both of them encourage public disengagement from deliberation about scenarios for the future, a process that appears to be dangerous, pointless, or unnecessary. The resulting ‘depublicization’ of debate leaves dominant groups and institutions (the state, the market, techno-science) in charge of sorting out the future for the rest of us, thus effectively producing a heteronomous social order. How, then, can we support a democratic process of prevention from below? The answer, I think, lies in cultivating the public capacity for critical judgment and deliberation, so that participants in global civil society subject all claims about potential catastrophes to examination, evaluation, and contestation. Two normative concepts are particularly well suited to grounding these tasks: the precautionary principle and global justice.

Predictions don’t mean our impact aren’t true – determining relative risk allow us to make accurate predictions about the future

Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology – York University of Toronto, Constellations, 11(4)) jl

The evaluative framework proposed above should not be restricted to the critique of misappropriations of farsightedness, since it can equally support public deliberation with a reconstructive intent, that is, democratic discussion and debate about a future that human beings would freely self-determine. Inverting Foucault’s Nietzschean metaphor, we can think of genealogies of the future that could perform a farsighted mapping out of the possible ways of organizing social life. They are, in other words, interventions into the present intended to facilitate global civil society’s participation in shaping the field of possibilities of what is to come. Once competing dystopian visions are filtered out on the basis of their analytical credibility, ethical commitments, and political underpinnings and consequences, groups and individuals can assess the remaining legitimate catastrophic scenarios through the lens of genealogical mappings of the future. Hence, our first duty consists in addressing the present-day causes of eventual perils, ensuring that the paths we decide upon do not contract the range of options available for our posterity.42 Just as importantly, the practice of genealogically inspired farsightedness nurtures the project of an autonomous future, one that is socially self-instituting. In so doing, we can acknowledge that the future is a human creation instead of the product of metaphysical and extra-social forces (god, nature, destiny, etc.), and begin to reflect upon and deliberate about the kind of legacy we want to leave for those who will follow us. Participants in global civil society can then take – and in many instances have already taken – a further step by committing themselves to socio-political struggles forging a world order that, aside from not jeopardizing human and environmental survival, is designed to rectify the sources of transnational injustice that will continue to inflict needless suffering upon future generations if left unchallenged.

Kurasawa – Predictions

Refusal to engage in our predictions allows preventable impacts to materialize – we have an ethical responsibility to engage and adjudicate the consequences of our actions or inactions

Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology – York University of Toronto, Constellations, 11(4)) jl

In recent years, the rise of a dystopian imaginary has accompanied damning assessments and widespread recognition of the international community’s repeated failures to adequately intervene in a number of largely preventable disasters (from the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and East Timor to climate change and the spiraling AIDS pandemics in parts of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia). Social movements, NGOs, diasporic groups, and concerned citizens are not mincing words in their criticisms of the United Nations system and its member-states, and thus beginning to shift the discursive and moral terrain in world affairs. As a result, the callousness implicit in disregarding the future has been exposed as a threat to the survival of humanity and its natural surroundings. The Realpolitik of national self-interest and the neoliberal logic of the market will undoubtedly continue to assert themselves, yet demands for farsightedness are increasingly reining them in. Though governments, multilateral institutions, and transnational corporations will probably never completely modify the presentist assumptions underlying their modes of operation, they are, at the very least, finding themselves compelled to account for egregious instances of short-sightedness and rhetorically commit themselves to taking corrective steps. What may seem like a modest development at first glance would have been unimaginable even a few decades ago, indicating the extent to which we have moved toward a culture of prevention. A new imperative has come into being, that of preventive foresight. Does this mean that we can expect all impending disasters to be comprehensively addressed before long? Apart from the unabashed assertion of national and commercial interests, at least two other structural factors make such an outcome unlikely within the existing world order. In the first place, because of the decentralized institutional design of global civil society, there exist few coordination mechanisms between its different participants and no single clearing-house for the collection and analysis of information about possible cataclysms – information that could then be transmitted to the general public, governments, or international organizations. Warnings may not always reach these addressees, or may get lost in the clamor of multiple campaigns and messages. The second problem is the asymmetry between the official and unofficial spheres of world politics. Despite mounting evidence that states and multilateral institutions are responding to preventive claims and requests, global civil society remains a weak public deprived of direct decision-making power. It has made important advances in gaining lobbying influence over and access to decision-making bodies, yet its main tool continues to be the mobilization of public opinion to pressure or convince these bodies to act. Until global civil society can convert itself into a strong public, it is not in a position to ensure the translation of demands for prevention from below into prevention from above. We should acknowledge that these two limits pose serious obstacles to a more muscular culture of prevention without meaningful institutional reforms of the global system. At the same time, and in lieu of a major overhaul of the regime of international governance, it would be a mistake to underestimate or simply dismiss the impact of the web of treaties, summits, judicial innovations, and grassroots ‘naming and shaming’ tactics and protest movements that have come to form, in recent years, a vast preventive infrastructure. I have argued that this dynamic is itself constitutive of global civil society and can thus best be appreciated when observed from below. Civic associations are engaging in dialogical, public, transnational struggles to avert catastrophe, cultivating a farsighted and dystopian flavored form of social action that is ethically and politically oriented toward the future. I further claimed that the work of preventive foresight is composed of three sets of practices striving to overcome difficulties constituent of the predicament of our times. Participants in global civil society are engaged in developing an early warning capacity about upcoming crises by collecting evidence, disseminating it, and laboring to have it publicly recognized. This sort of farsightedness responds to the contingent nature of the future without succumbing to the conviction that it is absolutely unknowable and indecipherable. Transnational associative groups are also nurturing intergenerational solidarity, a sense of care for those who will follow us. I suggested that, to adequately combat the presentist and shortsighted indifference toward the future that is typical in the contemporary world, a more explicitly farsighted cosmopolitanism needs to take root within global civil society. Normative thickening of this ideal could be accomplished via the long-term consequentialism of Jonas’s imperative of responsibility, a prospect whose basis we can already find in growing public appeals to the moral imagination and reason to activate our concern for later generations. Lastly, I contended that the work of preventive foresight can parry alarmist misappropriation or resignation by advocating a process of public deliberation that blends the principles of precaution and global justice. A farsighted politics can function through the public use of reason and the honing of the capacity for critical judgment, whereby citizens put themselves in a position to debate, evaluate, and challenge different dystopian narratives about the future and determine which ones are more analytically plausible, ethically desirable, and politically effective in bringing about a world order that is less perilous yet more just for our descendants. Many fora, ranging from local, face-to-face meetings to transnational, highly mediated discursive networks, are sowing the seeds of such a practice of participatory democracy. None of this is to disavow the international community’s rather patchy record of avoiding foreseeable calamities over the last decades, or to minimize the difficulties of implementing the kinds of global institutional reforms described above and the perils of historical contingency, presentist indifference toward the future, or alarmism and resignation. To my mind, however, this is all the more reason to pay attention to the work of preventive foresight in global civil society, through which civic associations can build up the latter’s coordination mechanisms and institutional leverage, cultivate and mobilize public opinion in distant parts of the world, and compel political leaders and national and transnational governance structures to implement certain policies. <CONTINUED>

Kurasawa – Predictions

<CONTINUED>

While seeking to prevent cataclysms from worsening or, better yet, from occurring in the first place, these sorts of initiatives can and must remain consistent with a vision of a just world order. Furthermore, the labor of farsightedness supports an autonomous view of the future, according to which we are the creators of the field of possibilities within which our successors will dwell. The current socio-political order, with all its short-term biases, is neither natural nor necessary. Accordingly, informed public participation in deliberative processes makes a socially self-instituting future possible, through the involvement of groups and individuals active in domestic and supranational public spaces; prevention is a public practice, and a public responsibility. To believe otherwise is, I would argue, to leave the path clear for a series of alternatives that heteronomously compromise the well-being of those who will come after us. We would thereby effectively abandon the future to the vagaries of history (‘let it unfold as it may’), the technocratic or instrumental will of official institutions (‘let others decide for us’), or to gambles about the time-lags of risks (‘let our progeny deal with their realization’). But, as I have tried to show here, this will not and cannot be accepted. Engaging in autonomous preventive struggles, then, remains our best hope. A farsighted cosmopolitanism that aims to avert crises while working toward the realization of precaution and global justice represents a compelling ethico-political project, for we will not inherit a better future. It must be made, starting with us, in the here and now.

Blight – Pragmatism/Policy Making

Neg authors fail, No alt solvency without convincing policy arguments

Blight 88 (James G. Must the Psychology of Avoiding Nuclear War Remain Free and Insignificant? Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University TBC 7/2/10)

Psychologists concerned with involving themselves professionally in reducing the risk of nuclear war continue, with only a few exceptions, to live and work in a dream world, a fantasy-land, within which they continue to tell themselves that they are doing just fine, that policymakers are indeed listening, or that, even if they are not, it is simply the bad fortune of nuclear policy types to continue to ignore so much good psychological advice, or that, at the least, psychologists should never give in to the nihilistic pessimism of one such as myself, who seems to have returned from a sojourn in policy-land brainwashed by his new colleagues--the inventors and purveyors of the nuclear arms race. This seems to me to be the gist of the responses to my piece in the January 1987 American Psychologist (AP): Whatever we as psychologists are doing that we believe may help reduce the risk of nuclear war, we should just keep doing it as best we can. We should not listen to Blight. I can vouch for the representativeness of the responses AP has seen fit to print. Since I began writing and speaking on the policy irrelevance of nuclear psychology about a year ago, I have received dozens of letters and phone calls and verbal rejoinders. The main message of these has been: Leave us alone. Let us be, in our cozy world composed exclusively of psychologists. Go back to your foreign policy think tank; turn in your psychological credentials; and stop trying to tell us how to go about our business. I have gotten the message. Except for a few more exchanges like this one, I am finished trying to tell the psychologists of Newcastle that few, if any, in the greater world are interested in buying their coal. I reiterate: There have been some notable exceptions to this rule, but very nearly all psychologists with whom I have had contact about policy relevance and nuclear war have urged me in no uncertain terms to beat it.

Perm Solves – policy relevance is key

Blight 88 (James G. Must the Psychology of Avoiding Nuclear War Remain Free and Insignificant? Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University TBC 7/2/10)

The central collective act for which psychologists must answer is their irresponsible failure to remember what is at stake, and to keep that problem primarily in front of their minds, rather than their supposed responsibilities to psychology as such. Milan Kundera has said all this much better than I. Kundera, a Czech emigre living in Paris, has tried to remind us of the truth and profundity of what I call "Kundera's Law": That in order to affect the world of affairs one must have a thickly textured, hands on, complexly informed view of the situation. If one does, then one may call oneself a realist. The alternative is to stand aside from the complex crawl of daily life as it occurs, to spout solutions to whatever problem interests one, and to meet no need greater than one's need to appear brilliant. Kundera wanted us never to forget--indeed, he warned us that it is truly irresponsible to forget--what life was like in his native land before the Nazis overran it, before the Soviets made it a part of their captive Central European Empire. Where Kundera wrote "burden," psychologists ought to read "policy relevance," which, in turn, is (or was) required by the sense of great nuclear danger. According to Kundera, The heaviest of burdens crushes us, we sink beneath it, it pins us to the ground. But... the heavier the burden, the closer our lives come to the earth, the more real and truthful they become . . . . The absolute absence of a burden causes man to be lighter than air, to soar into the heights, take leave of the earth, and become only half-real, his movements as free as they are insignificant. (Kundera, 1985, p. 5) He then posed the pivotal question: "What then shall we choose? Weight or lightness?" (Kundera, 1985, p. 5). I contend that psychologists have chosen lightness, that they would rather be free to proffer ingenious psychological solutions to problems of nuclear risks, rather than to remember why they got into this stuff in the first place, and what that implies for speaking plainly, and with effect, to the people who manage the risks. The burden seems to have been too heavy for most psychologists to bear.

Blight – Pragmatism/Policy Making

Pragamatic policy making is crucial

Blight 88 (James G. Must the Psychology of Avoiding Nuclear War Remain Free and Insignificant? Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University TBC 7/2/10)

Based on these considerations, Earle is emboldened by the end of the article to "set forth an alternative framework within which international relations could be conducted" (Earle, 1986, p. 374). By refusing to begin where the policymakers must begin, by beginning instead with the world of his undergraduate students and informed by some introductory psychology, Earle has decided to reinvent international relations. As a purely theoretical enterprise, this is unobjectionable. However, if he believes that this ought to be the prerequisite to reducing the risk of nuclear war, how long does he believe it will take to reinvent the wheel with which leaders drive international politics? If the answer is the correct one--forever!--what has happened to the memory of the fear that drove us all as psychologists to work in this area in the first place? It seems to have been conveniently and irresponsibly forgotten.

Nuclear policy making is key to avoid nuclear holocaust

Blight 88 (James G. Must the Psychology of Avoiding Nuclear War Remain Free and Insignificant? Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University TBC 7/2/10)

This, finally, ought to be the goal of all psychologists who recall, or who can be encouraged to recall, why they began to look into nuclear questions: policy-relevant knowledge. Optimism without the knowledge that justifies it is irresponsible. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a Lutheran theologian hanged by the Nazis, once said that theology, if it is to live significantly, must first die formally, so that it can enter the world that needs it so desperately. The same is true for psychology now. If it is to have any impact on the risk of nuclear war, psychology as such must die, and psychologists must enter as best they can into the stream of life as it is known to nuclear policymakers. In so doing, the discipline of psychology is unlikely to get any credit for helping out, but its practitioners, a kind of invisible college of people devoted to what James called the science of mental life, will have acted responsibly. They will have remembered why they are doing what they are doing--because, at some moment, the world as we know it could be destroyed in a nuclear holocaust

A2: Militarism Bad

Arms control should be militarized to ensure safe denuclearization

LARSEN 2 (Jeffrey senior policy analyst with Science Applications International Corporation in Colorado Springs in Arms Control ed. Jeffrey Larsen p. 6-7 http://www.rienner.com/uploads/47d6f750a53eb.pdf TBC 6/30/10)

First, arms control was conceived as a way to enhance national security. As Hedley Bull explained: “arms control or disarmament was not an end in itself but a means to an end and that end was first and foremost the enhancement of security, especially security against nuclear war.”17 Or as Schelling and Halperin stated near the end of their book: “the aims of arms control and the aims of a national military strategy should be substantially the same.”18 This principle established national security as the dominant goal of arms control, not the reduction of arms per se. In fact it was understood that not all reductions were necessarily useful. There was an explicit recognition that arms control could be harmful if not properly guided by overall national security strategy. Second, the superpowers shared a common interest in avoiding nuclear war; this common interest could and should be the basis for effective arms control agreements. According to Bull, “The fact that the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a political and ideological conflict, one moreover that sometimes took a military form, did not mean that they could not recognize common interests in avoiding a ruinous nuclear war, or cooperate to advance these common interests.”19 This assumption was one of the most important and controversial conceptual departures from past thinking promulgated by the new arms control theory. Previously, it was assumed that relaxation of political tensions had to precede the achievement of substantive arms control agreements. The founders of traditional arms control theory, in contrast, believed that the threat of global nuclear annihilation was so paramount that it transcended political and ideological differences. It was not necessary to fully resolve political conflicts before proceeding to negotiate arms control agreements; solutions to both could be advanced simultaneously. Third, arms control and military strategy should work together to promote national security. The unity of strategy and arms control was a central tenet of traditional arms control theory. Such unity was essential if arms control and defense policy were to avoid working at cross-purposes. For example, if the implementation of U.S. defense strategy required deploying certain types of weapons that were restricted by arms control agreements, this could defeat the overall purpose of our national security posture and erode the legitimacy of both the arms control process and U.S. defense policy.

Alt Fails – McClean

Abstract philosophizing kills alt solvency – it fails at policy prescription

McClean 1 (David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Am. Phil. Conf., www.americanphilosophy .org/archives/ past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm TBC 6/29/10)

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

Alt Fails – Aff is a Prereq

Only the risk of a link turn – Nuclear Weapons are inherent tools for violence – we should withdraw them to be pragmatic. Keeping the weapons ensure perpetual violence.

SINGHA AND SETHIA 07 (Jasjit & Manpreet, CSIS, International Centre for Peace and Development, Futures 39, 963–972, http://www.icpd.org/defense\_studies/Elimination%20of%20nuclear%20weapons.htm) NAR

The persistence of nuclear weapons long after there is any conceivable justification for their existence is symptomatic of a deeper human dilemma. The very fact that we as human beings can remain complacent and patient in the face of such a gross violation of common sense and human welfare, taken in by facile arguments, lured by assurances that nothing will ever happen, points to a more fundamental problem in the way we think and live. That problem can be traced back to the division between mind and matter conceptualized by Descartes in the 17th Century and embodied in notion of the scientist as a detached observer of the world around him. Somewhere along the way, we have all acquired the scientific outlook of regarding the world around us with impartial detachment, even when that world along with its people and institutions are actively taking steps to destroy themselves and ourselves in the process. Reason has its limits, especially the reason arising from narrow perspectives and egoistic interests, which have no legitimate place in science. Here we sit discussing, analyzing and debating an issue dispassionately when our very lives and those of our children are at stake. It is not a question of morality or idealism. It is a question of pragmatism. The nuclear issue touches upon the very roots of our thinking process. It is a result of the destructive power arising from infinite division, a symbol of the violence arising from the egoistic division of reality into self and not-self. Science has reached the point at which the undivided wholeness of life is revealed. We need to accept and respect that reality and learn to act on it. Our concept of life as a finite or zero sum game consisting of winners and losers is hopelessly out-of-date and inconsistent with the fact that everywhere we see evidence that there is a way for everyone to win, as every member nation and citizen of the European Union stands to win from their growing association. It is time we shift from a finite to an infinite game in international affairs, a game in which the narrow, exclusive concept of competitive security is replaced with an inclusive concept of cooperative security. No longer should the security of each nation be based on enhancing its military capabilities so as to present an increasing threat or apparent threat to other nations. That is a game that generates at least one loser for every winner. It is a game that no nation can ever fully and finally win. The recent efforts to establish a unified European Army are evidence that a different kind of game is possible. The very battlefields which witnessed the most frequent, prolonged and horrible conflicts of the past 10 centuries have become a place where war against neighboring states and even against other nations is becoming increasingly ‘unthinkable’. That example should serve both as profound food for thought as well as an inspiring example for us to ponder and act upon.

Perm Solves – Reps

Combination of concrete improvements and the alternative solve best – The possibility of total extinction can morph human nature into idealistic unity

Zamoshkin 1 (Yuri, Russian Academy of Science, http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/zamoshkin.html, AD: 6/30/10) jl

Long- and Short-Range Goals Even among those who actively work to eliminate the threat of nuclear disaster, the obvious discrepancy between ideal and reality can generate contradictory types of behavior. One reaction, typical of some arms control advocates, consists of concentrating attention on concrete and very important steps such as reducing one or another type of weapon, or increasing confidence and mutual understanding between people, but with a complete lack of faith in the ability to achieve the long-range goal of total nuclear disarmament. Another type of reaction is the mirror image of the first. Here, the necessity of achieving the ideal of nuclear disarmament is stressed, but without paying adequate attention to the immediate, concrete measures needed to restore confidence - confidence without which nuclear weapons will not be reduced significantly, much less eliminated. Today, as never before, it is important to have a twofold combination in the peace movement - theoretical and practical, short range and long range. Working for the ideal of nuclear disarmament is not enough by itself. Neither is working to bring about concrete, immediate improvements. Only together do these beliefs and actions provide an effective means for step-­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­by-step advancement along the difficult, contradictory, and lengthy road that leads to the ideal.   Working for the ideal of nuclear disarmament is not enough by itself. Neither is working to bring about concrete, immediate improvements. Only together do these beliefs and actions provide an effective means for step-by-step advancement along the difficult, contradictory, and lengthy road that leads to the ideal."     Politicians as Idealists The existence of the potential for nuclear annihilation creates, for the first time in history, a situation in which the traditional, practical concern of a professional politician for the security of his own nation new, nontraditional way of thinking. The threat of the death of the entire human species, his own country included, may prompt the use of such heretofore idealistic concepts as "unity," "integrity of mankind," and "the preeminence of general human interests over any private interests" as working tools in the search for effective ways of resolving the very practical problems of national security of his own state. The problem of security for one's own state is vividly seen as the problem of creating conditions for universal and equal security for all nations. Political idealism and pragmatism have become one.

The possibility of total extinction combined with the alternative creates a transformative state in which peace is possible

Zamoshkin 1 (Yuri, Russian Academy of Science, http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/zamoshkin.html, AD: 6/30/10) jl

This situation, for the first time in history, directly, practically, and not purely speculatively, confronts human thought with the possibility of death for the entire human race. The continuity of history, which earlier had seemed to be a given, suddenly becomes highly questionable. As with the individual, this global grenzsituation may contribute to a "revelation" in human thinking and to a positive change of character previously thought impossible for our species. The global grenzsituation could give rise to the critical self-reflection needed to resolve the contradictions between ideals and political reality. It could prompt rethinking the essence and importance of everything that constitutes the "human experiment." In this unique situation, and the hope that humanity will come to comprehend it, lies the real possibility for ideal to finally be translated into practice.

The permutation allows humanity to be united under a common bond of vulnerability which solves the impacts to the K

Zamoshkin 1 (Yuri, Russian Academy of Science, http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/zamoshkin.html, AD: 6/30/10) jl

If we look further, we find that the fragility of humanity's existence extends beyond nuclear weapons, or even conventional war. When the complexity and fragility of the systems needed today to feed, clothe, and nurture humanity are considered, we have all reason to say that the global grenzsituation will hardly disappear after the elimination of nuclear weapons or war. Rather this condition is a new and essential feature of our existence. But nuclear disarmament will be a critical step in that it will show that mankind really is capable of learning to overcome the threats created by his own technological genius.

Perm Solves – Movements

Your alternative doesn’t assume global momentum toward a world without nuclear weapons – combination of political and the alternative result in a transformed world

Evans and Kawaguchi 9 (Gareth and Yoriko - Co-Chairs of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, http://beta.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article26243.ece, AD: 6/30/10) jl

The time is right to make a renewed effort to break the logjam, building the global momentum led by the U.S. and Russia, to ensure that historic opportunities are not lost to indifference. There has been a range of appeals from current and former world leaders and nuclear decision makers urging a renewed effort to move the nuclear disarmament agenda forward: for new cuts to nuclear arsenals, bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and to commence negotiation of a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for weapons use. It is highly significant that President Barack Obama chose to convene this month a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament seeks to contribute to the current global effort, to help build a new momentum to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in international relations and eventually to eliminate them. This is not an issue which we can allow to be pushed aside by new threats, be they concerns over the global financial crisis or the prospect of pandemics and climate change. The nuclear threat is an ever present danger which must be addressed in parallel. And after a decade of neglect, the issue demands priority attention from our political leaders world-wide.

Indeed nuclear weapons could still be the biggest risk of all to the peace and stability of our world — at the global level and regionally: nuclear weapons arsenals are still huge. The possibility remains that still more countries will acquire them, and the danger persists of their deliberate or accidental use by states or non-state terrorist actors.

That is why we, the Commission, and indeed the international community, were greatly encouraged by the results of the April summit between Presidents Medvedev and Obama. The agreement to pursue a deal on cutting nuclear weapons that would replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), Russia should kick start movement on broader disarmament and non-proliferation measures.

Leadership from Russia and the U.S. is crucial, but so too is the commitment of other nuclear armed states if nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament momentum is to be regenerated. But there has to be buy-in from many other international players as well. The moment has to be seized by governments, and civil society activists around the world, working to a common action agenda that is both idealistic and realistically pragmatic. The countries of South Asia have made it clear that they share with most other nations the conviction that every effort should be made to eliminate the world’s store of nuclear weapons. But it is clear that there are still major regional challenges to be addressed to bring about the circumstances whereby this process can be moved forward. The effort has to be global but it must be matched by addressing regional challenges.

Perm Solves – State Key

Perm Do Both: Combining the political process with outside alternatives is critical to creating real political change.

Burke 7 (Pf Politics & International Relations @ U of New South Wales, Sydney, 07 Anthony Burke, Theory & Event, Vol. 10, No. 2)NAR

But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action. This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

Perm Solves – State Key

Permutation key to solvency – rejecting the use of state power kills alt solvency

Hawkes 87 (Dr. Glenn. W. Hawkes, Executive Director, Parents, Teachers & Students for Social Responsibility, [Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, “Sex, power, and nuclear language,” Sept., v43, no.7, pg. 59-60 TBC 6/30/10)

My third concern is with Conns call for "alternative voices." I agree that we must explore alternatives, and in the process we will no doubt create something of a new language that will guide us on new paths. But there is a strong tendency in the peace community to employ language that is perceived on Main Street, U.S.A., as "alternative"— and thus as unacceptable. We have a rich tradition of exposing nukespeak for what it is, but we have not been skillful in using the public language to our advantage. We have generally avoided using motherhood and apple pic symbols, like the flag. We've seen those symbols abused, and consequently have chosen not to identify with them. Meanwhile, the right wing has successfully manipulated main-stream language to advance its agenda. Just as there is an elitist core of men who monopolize the technostrategic discourse, there is also (to a lesser degree. I think) in the progressive ranks a core of thinkers who tend to use alternative language in a way that diminishes rather than enhances our power. In fact the very idea of possessing political power is often construed as something negative from the activist perspective of which I speak, and from which I hail. The struggle for an alternative future is thus, at times, led by individuals and organizations with an aversion to power politics and a disdain for the public language, a stance that most surely guarantees failure in the political arena. There is an ironic dialectic at work here: the pursuit of alternative futures depends in part upon our understanding and using mainstream symbols. We must use the system to beat the system, employing mainstream language to change mainstream patterns of thought and action. For example, if we are to increase the prospects for a new world order, we might promote nationalism in order to transcend nationalism. We can use any number of historical examples from the founding of our nation: national sovereignty on this continent was pursued in order to preserve the several states, all threatened—as nations are today—with destruction in their condition of disunity. In other words, if we love our nation we must promote a more viable international order to preserve it. It was Jefferson, I think, who always claimed to be a Virginian first and foremost, even after serving as president. He supported national sovereignty because he thought it was the best way to protect and preserve his beloved Virginia. Let's dig out such examples and put them to work in the public language, reinforcing concerns for defense, security, and national interest. Rather than calling for "compelling alternative visions," we should explore "compelling mainstream visions." Changing that one word alerts us to the importance of communicating with the farmer, the auto mechanic, the school teacher, the person selling insurance, and the people who live next door. One way of dealing with the technostratcgic thinkers might be to ignore them while at the same time developing the political clout needed to change national policy.

Perm Solves – Pragmatism

Perm is key – Utopianism fails

Schwartz and Derber 90 (The Nuclear Seduction, http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft1n39n7wg&brand=ucpress TBC 6/30/10)

One reason for the tendency to ignore Lebow's warning is the widespread feeling that, whatever the dangers of political conflict and war, they cannot be eliminated for the foreseeable future. True, peaceful coexistence among nationalities, races, states, and classes is still inconceivable. There is little hope that the leading states will renounce violence as a means to maintain and extend their political power wherever they feel it can succeed. But neither nuclear arms nor war—which together produce the nuclear threat—is likely to disappear soon. The only sensible question to ask is whether chipping away at them can make a difference to the danger. Incremental steps toward the abolition of nuclear weapons, as we have emphasized, are almost meaningless considering the absolute destructive potential and uncontrollability of those that remain. The same is not true of efforts to prevent war and other forms of conventional political violence. Successful incremental steps in this direction matter a great deal—both to those who would have been maimed and killed and to the rest of us, who are thereby spared one more occasion on which events could slip out of hand and terminate civilization. Today George Kennan's proposed 50 percent across-the-board cut in nuclear arms would mean little. A 50 percent cut in superpower military intervention and nuclear risk taking in the Third World might save the planet and would certainly save many lives. The long- term visions of a nonnuclear world and of a world beyond war should not be cast aside. Ultimately they may be the only chance for planetary survival, and they are certainly the only chance for a decent way of life. But we must accept that neither goal can be reached easily or rapidly, and that they may never be reached. We must take what steps we can to reduce the nuclear threat now. Otherwise there may be no long run to worry about.

Perm Solves – Pragmatism

The negative’s alternate can’t generate real change – obtaining a peaceful society requires a way to combat violence. The perm is the best option.

Isaac 2 (Jeffrey C Isaac, Indiana University James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life director, Spring 2002, Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent Magazine Vol. 49 Issue 2, p35-6)

And yet the left’s reflexive hostility toward violence in the international domain is strange. It is inconsistent with avowals of “materialism” and evocations of “struggle,” especially on the part of those many who are not pacifists; it is in tension with a commitment to human emancipation (is there no cause for which it is justifiable to fight?); and it is oblivious to the tradition of left thinking about ends and means. To compare the debates within the left about the two world wars or the Spanish Civil War with the predictable “anti-militarism” of today’s campus left is to compare a discourse that was serious about political power with a discourse that is not. This unpragmatic approach has become a hallmark of post–cold war left commentary, from the Gulf War protests of 1991, to the denunciation of the 1999 U.S.-led NATO intervention in Kosovo, to the current post–September 11 antiwar movement. In each case protesters have raised serious questions about U.S. policy and its likely consequences, but in a strikingly ineffective way. They sound a few key themes: the broader context of grievances that supposedly explains why Saddam Hussein, or Slobodan Milosevic, or Osama bin Laden have done what they have done; the hypocrisy of official U.S. rhetoric, which denounces terrorism even though the U.S. government has often supported terrorism; the harm that will come to ordinary Iraqi or Serbian or Afghan citizens as a result of intervention; and the cycle of violence that is likely to ensue. These are important issues. But they typically are raised by left critics not to promote real debate about practical alternatives, but to avoid such a debate or to trump it. As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of “aggression,” but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime—the Taliban—that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most “peace” activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power.

Perm Solves – Individuals

Permutation, do both: The affirmative is an individual response to the state’s control of nuclear weapon. We stop engaging in the rhetoric described in the 1NC, that’s the status quo.

Lichterman 9

(lawyer and policy analyst Western States Legal Foundation, 09, Andrew Lichterman, Disarmament work amidst a global economic crisis, 8/6, disarmamentactivist, http://disarmamentactivist.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/Lichterman%20Hiroshima%20Day%202009.pdf) NAR

We also must take back our politics from the technocrats and professionals, people with little to sell us except how to sell. Their language of “branding” and “entrepreneurship” pervades the political culture, reaching now far into the so-called “nonprofit” sector and even down to community groups. Far too many mouth the words without thinking about what they mean. They are in fact expressions of the corporate attitudes and practices that have pushed our economy into bankruptcy and our ecosphere to the brink of disaster. The path to a more just and peaceful world will be one of cooperation and solidarity, not more competition. The road to Martin Luther King’s revolution in values will not be “branded” or advertised. We face this dangerous and difficult moment without much in the way of recent analysis and discussion that helps us understand the relationship between nuclear weapons and the structures of a global society and politics that are in crisis and are changing fast. In these circumstances, we must discard much of the “expert” analysis, beginning again with what we know about nuclear weapons, what every human being can know about them. As the Russell- Einstein Manifesto put it over a half century ago, “remember your humanity and forget the rest.” Nuclear weapons represent the threat of unlimited violence, and of willingness to sacrifice the people for the State.6 The decision to acquire nuclear weapons raises to the level of an absolute the willingness of those in power to risk all of us, and everything, to achieve their ends. And it is a decision that in every case has first been taken in secret, with neither the means nor ends open to question, much less choice, by the vast majority of those affected. Both the decision to acquire nuclear weapons and the manner in which it always is taken should tell us that the “state” that we live in significant ways does not “represent” us. We must understand that it represents someone, or something, else– and that our very survival may depend on finding out who or what, and doing something about it. This is what it means for the state we live in to have nuclear weapons, at the simplest and most basic level. It is in this context that educating ourselves and others about the terrible realities of nuclear warfare can have positive meaning. This must not, however, be the end of the discussion, but the beginning. Stopping here, we risk contributing to a climate of fear and hopelessness that can demoralize those we hope to organize, and that can reinforce the fearbased ideologies of those who offer more armaments as the only “practical” form of “security” in a dangerous world. Starting here, we can begin to understand the violence that sustains both stratified societies and the inequities of the global system as a whole.

A2: Reps/Discourse Matters

Our rhetoric is irrelevant – outcomes are the only moral things that have weight in the political process, our intentions are irrelevant.

Isaac 2 (Jeffrey C Isaac, Indiana University James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life director, Spring 2002, Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent Magazine Vol. 49 Issue 2, p35-6)

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught. An unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) it fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing, but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters: (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness: it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion- pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect: and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions: it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, this is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism on the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic: it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

No Impact – Movements

Nuclear movements fail

Totten 9 (M Samuel, U of Arkansas Professor Review of Not on Our Watch: The Mission to End Genocide in Darfur and Beyond, Genocide Studies and Prevention, Volume 4, Number 1, Spring 2009, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/genocide\_studies\_and\_prevention/v004/4.1.totten01.html TBC 7/1/10

The authors correctly assert that ‘‘throughout American history, social movements have helped shape our government’s policy on a variety of issues’’ (13), but what they do not seem to appreciate (or do not want to admit, as it would interfere with their argument and their agenda) is that such social movements dealt with single self-contained national issues such as the emancipation of women, the Civil Rights movement, the anti–Vietnam War movement. Some, such as the anti-nuclear movement, had an international focus, but one has to question just how much good the anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s did, given the nuclear arsenals that exist around the world today: both the number of weapons in these arsenals and the number of nations belonging to the so-called nuclear club are slowly but inexorably growing.

AT: Chaloupka

No Alt Solvency – Chaloupka’s method is completely inaccessible through political action

Brians 92 (Paul, Prof Department of English WSU, http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/ntc/NTC8.pdf, AD: 7/1/10) jl

One of Chaloupka’s greatest strengths is this penetration of political and nuclear paradoxes. The survival and accident arguments familiar to the antinuclear camp are riddled with contradiction (3-7, 13-16). Opponents argue for controls and then use them against nukes; proponents justify widespread surveillance and disciplinary measures and then proclaim the advancement of freedom. “Repeatedly, the sign of the paradox presents itself as the characteristic sign of an era that strains to ignore those signs and to present a politics of values in response” (16). And so on throughout the book. It is in this terrain of the paradoxical that Chaloupka affirms postmodernism as a better way to interact with power in a world without absolute values. For both nuclearists and their opponents, he argues, share “more than they dispute” regarding reality and values. (I will return later to this substratum critique of liberal humanistic values and procedures.) The result has been the perpetuation and extension of the “institutions, habits, and contexts” of nuclear arms. The Richland High School (near the Hanford Nuclear Reservation) students who defend their sports name—the Bombers— and their symbol—the mushroom cloud—suggest an alternative attention to “images and problematizations.” Chaloupka would engage “the conundrums and incongruities of the nuclear age” exhibited by both proponents and opponents by employing the philosophy and methods of postmodernism, which he links with postructuralism and deconstructionism (xiii) (à la Michel Foucault) and labels, for the specific context of his book “nuclear criticism.” Postmodernism is poststructuralist (deconstructive) literary analysis intended “to problematize institutions and practices [power] that had become so resistant to criticism” (ix); because nuclear power and all of its adjuncts are textual, enwoven in language, especially in paradoxical language, this new approach of literary criticism offers a new way to “interact with power.” But if the book were only this straightforward throughout. James Soderholm recently asked, “Why do progressive intellectuals often write and speak in a language foreign to the very audience in whose interests they claim to campaign?” He complains of Foucault’s, Fredric Jameson’s, and Gayatri Spivak’s “supernaturally difficult jargon” and “willful obscurantism,” which he contrasts to Vaclav Havel’s direct, non-technical language. Sometimes Chaloupka seems to be trying to out-Baudrillard Baudrillard. For example, he writes sympathetically of Baudrillard’s “notion of contemporary power” as spread “throughout society without acting.” “Such power implodes and leukemizes.... In this instance of power (which clarifies and exemplifies Foucault’s controversial argument), there is no action, intention, or conspiracy . . this is precisely postructuralist power” (17). He means that the nuclear mangers do not escalate to red alert and nuclear holocaust. But what would Baudrillard and Chaloupka have us do short of the bombs that would end all conversation? Yes, understand “how some of our fables have posed a very strange plot” (137). Nuclear opponents (Noam Chomsky notably) have done that extensively. The U.S. National Security State infects everything with systematic intent and action and even conspiracy, as Richard Curry’s and thousands of investigations have shown. So what does Buadrillard/Chaloupka means by non-intentional, non-active postructuralist power in a world of machination?

AT: Chaloupka

Chaloupka’s alternative is politically useless – no mechanism for deployment

Brians 92 (Paul, Prof Department of ENglish WSU, http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/ntc/NTC8.pdf, AD: 7/1/10) jl

The confusion underlying this apparent tangle has two closely related sources: Chaloupka plunges in, dismisses careful initial conceptualization, and defines by accretion. Of course this book’s audience is scholarly, but I do not believe anyone can say what Chaloupka means by “modernism,” without which “postmodernism” becomes a slippery term. In their anthology, Bradbury and McFarlane define modernism as a literary movement between 1890 and 1930. In the Preface to his anthology, Peter Brook describes postmodern as the capitalist world (television, mass production, and consumption) and its opponents. What is modernism to Chaloupka? We are provided a key summary of features near the end: liberal and Marxist commitment to scientific certainty (134). And he is still defining postmodern/postructural/deconstructive and liberal humanist discourse in the last chapter. I do not have space to describe all the reasons why this book makes difficult reading. (Is “nukespeak” criticism “a simple critique of euphemism,” when Hilgartner, et al.’s Nukespeak is a major analysis of secrecy and censorship in the United States?) But let me end mainly positively. By insisting upon the failure of the traditional Enlightenment liberal humanistic, scientific, opposition to nuclear war preparations (Chap. 4 on Star Wars and the Freeze), and by urging an alternative strategy of postmodern irony, he nudges all of us in the peace movement to rethink our assumptions and methods. Liberal humanist antinuclearist politics has offered (referring to Helen Caldicott) “a sober, anti-ironic terrorism of images” (133–34), but has it generally degenerated into finalities that resolve questions, reify value choices, and avoid realistic politics (137)? He too sweepingly dismisses the flexibility and the achievements of the liberal humanist antinuclearists. But of great value, postmodern politics seeks “to delegitimize the subtle, contemporary forms of authority” in both nuclearists and antinuclearists (128), an discards programs but offers ironic possibilities in the face of the paradoxes of power. However, the “discourse that would raise those discomforts in a critical manner has hardly begun to be identified” (138).

Alt can’t solve the links – Chaloupka’s exclusion of non-European perspective ignores the alternative casualties to the Ks impacts

Caputi 95 (Jane, University of New Mexico, American Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 165-175, JSTOR) jl

While Chaloupka looks almost exclusively to European men such as Baudrillard, Derrida, and Foucault to offer essential insights, he ignores relevant perspectives from those who occupy less privileged realms (and use far more accessible language) but long have "problematized" nuclearism by deconstructing its signs and wrenching it out of traditional Western paradigms. For example, European-American feminist thinkers (including Diana E. H. Russell, Charlene Spretnak, and Carol Cohn) have pointed to the investiture of patriarchal (rapist and domineering) desire/sexuality into nuclear weaponry.4 Simultaneously, feminists of color (including June Jordan, Alice Walker, and Winona LaDuke) have pointed to a continuing legacy of colonialism, environmental racism, and genocide against peoples of color, particularly indigenous peoples, who have been disproportion- ately afflicted by the acknowledged and unacknowledged atomic experi- mentation and development.

AT: Chaloupka

Permutation solves best – the totalizing nature of Chaloupka’s critique fractures effective coalitions against nuclear weapons

Krishna 93 (Sankaran, Professor of Political Science, U of Hawaii, Alternatives 1993, v. 18. p. 400-1) jl

The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to “nostalgic,” essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions.

In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the move mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines, emphasizing “facts” and “realities,” while a “postmodern” President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program (See KN: chapter 4)

Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue based) criticism of what he calls “nuclear opposition” or “antinuclearists” at the very outset of his book. (Kn: xvi) Once again, the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms.

This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the “failure” of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives.

The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and “ineffective” partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)