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# 1NC Counterplan

**Text – The United States federal government should maintain its military presence at current levels by \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**and offset it by redeploying those troops to \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.**

**Not topical – the counterplan violates the word “reduce” in the resolution – which requires a net reduction**

**Friedman, 99** – Senior Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CUNA MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee. 98-5033 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 169 F.3d 737; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1832; 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50,245; 83 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 799 February 9, 1999, Decided, lexis)

CUNA's position has another fatal flaw. Section 808 is captioned "Policy Dividends Deduction," and § 808(c) states: (1) In general, except as limited by paragraph (2), the deduction for policyholder dividends for any taxable year shall be an amount equal to the policyholder dividends [\*\*15]  paid or accrued during the taxable year. (2) Reduction in case of mutual companies In the case of a mutual life insurance company, the deduction for policyholder dividends for any taxable year shall be reduced by the amount determined under section 809. "The amount determined" under § 809, by which the policyholder dividend deduction is to be "reduced," is the "excess" specified in § 809(c)(1). Like the word "excess," the word "reduced" is a common, unambiguous, non-technical term that is given its ordinary meaning. See San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co., 297 U.S. at 499. "Reduce" means "to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number." Webster's Third International Dictionary 1905. Under CUNA's interpretation of "excess" in § 809(c), however, the result of the "amount determination" under § 809 would be not to reduce the policyholder dividends deduction, but to increase it. This would directly contradict the explicit instruction in § 808(c)(2) that the deduction "be reduced." The word "reduce" cannot be interpreted, as CUNA would treat it, to mean "increase."

**The CP doesn’t reduce military presence. It maintains presence at its current level and changes the composition of them. Any perm must sever the plan’s reduction, which is a voting issue for ground**

**Its legitimate – offset counterplans are good – they disprove the resolution. Resolutional focus is good –it fairly divides ground by proposing a controversial policy option. Pure plan focus destroys all utility of the resolution.**

**And – Offsets counterplans are good for debate – Redeployment is discussed robustly in the literature**

**Cashner 09** (<http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/redeployment_process.html>)

Redeployment is defined as the transfer of forces and materiel to support another Joint Force Commander's operational requirements, or the return of personnel, equipment, and materiel to home/demobilization stations for reintegration/out-processing. Redeployment operations have four phases: Redeployment Planning Pre-Redeployment Activities Movement Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (see Joint Publication 3-35) Historically, redeployments have been considered "administrative movements" with no emphasis on aggregating unit cargo or expeditiously returning the cargo. Therefore, units often had their equipment returned on multiple ships (20 or more) or received their equipment 120 to 150 days after returning to their home station. However, **due to dwell times averaging 12 months or less between deployments**, the Army shortened unit redeployment timelines in order to meet Army Force Generation Process and RESET requirements. **What has the Army done?** The Army has influenced the Joint redeployment process in two key areas. The first is updating old and creating new Joint and Army doctrine and policy to operationalize the redeployment process and stress its importance in sustaining combat operations. The second is convincing the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) to take a thorough look at their business processes and determine ways to reduce redeployment timelines; particularly the time it takes from the seaport of embarkation to the destination (e.g., depot, home station, or mobilization station). **Joint and Army doctrine now addresses redeployments as operational (as opposed to administrative) movements that are critical in "re-establishing Joint Force readiness**" that must be planned and managed as intensively as deployments. Specific examples include: Joint Publication 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, dated May 7, 2007, Draft Army Regulation 525-30, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, and the Defense Transportation Regulation, Part 3, Mobility, Chapter 305 Redeployment dated August 17, 2007. In 2008, the Army influenced USCENTCOM and USTRANSCOM to conduct redeployments as operational movements, reduce timelines, and establish firm metrics. Brigade Combat Team (BCT) sealift timelines are now programmed to take less than 58 days for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 65 days for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The OEF timelines were reduced to a relatively low cost by increasing ship speed and reducing the time it takes to return equipment from "port to fort". For example, the sailing time from Fujairah, United Arab Emirates to the East coast of the United States has been reduced from 32 days to 26 days by increasing the average sailing speed from15 to 18 knots**. –CONTINUES-**

# 1NC Counterplan

**-CONTINUES-**

Furthermore, USTRANSCOM compressed the discharge and movement of unit equipment from the seaport of debarkation to home station from 14 to 8 days. Subsequently, the Army G-4 standardized BCT redeployments from OEF by way of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The TTPs provide continuity and will help deployed BCTs clearly identify "who does what, when, and where" so that the process remains the same from one rotation to the next. The Army requires redeployment equipment to be returned to depot or home installation in 50 days or less. This represents an 8 to 15 day decrease in current metrics. The USTRANSCOM and USCENTCOM are now looking at ways to reduce OIF timelines by looking at similar efficiencies as discovered when examining the OEF redeployment process. From June to August 2008, USCENTCOM and USTRANSCOM conducted a proof of principle to redeploy a Stryker BCT from Iraq in 50 days or less. Remarkably, the entire movement took 42 days - exceeding the current standard by 16 days. Subsequently, on October 3, 2008, the Department of the Army G4, USTRANSCOM, and CENTCOM staff officers conducted an after action review and analysis of this movement. As a result, CENTCOM validated, and USTRANSCOM confirmed, the feasibility of a 50 day redeployment for two additional BCTs redeploying in January 2009. On December 8, 2008, the USTRANSCOM staff was scheduled to brief their commander on the Army's 50 day initiative, and recommend approval of the concept as "a goal" for future BCT redeployments. If their analysis indicates a 50 day sealift timeline is not feasible, they will provide an amended "projected closure date" and attempt to come as close to 50 days as possible. The Army staff will continue its efforts to improve redeployment doctrine and policy and institutionalize the ethos that redeployment operations are as critical as deployment. Current redeployment metrics allow BCTs approximately 9 months to conduct collective training between consecutive deployments. This time allows units to meet minimal standards for preparing for counterinsurgency operations. Collective training for full spectrum operations requires approximately 12 months of training (9 months for counter insurgency trainng and 3 months for major combat operations training). In order to allow units the time to train for full spectrum operations, equipment must be returned to depot or home installation for RESET, inventory, and individual training no later than 50 days after its sealift available load date. POC: LTC Mike Cashner (703) 614-5066

# \*\*\*Theory and Perms\*\*\*

# Reduce = Net Reduction

**Reduce means to lower**

**Dictionary.com , 10** (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/reduce)

re·duce   [ri-doos, -dyoos] Show IPA verb, -duced, -duc·ing. –verb (used with object) 1. to bring down to a smaller extent, size, amount, number, etc.: to reduce one's weight by 10 pounds.

**The resolution specifies a net reduction.**

**Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 10** (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reduce)

3 : to bring to a specified state or condition

**Reduce results in a net reduction**

**Hoffman and Yang,** **91** - Washington Post Staff Writer (7/17/91, David and John E, U.S., Soviets Reach Pact Reducing Nuclear Arms)

If signed and ratified by the Senate, the new treaty would be the first to require absolute reductions in nuclear warheads; earlier treaties just slowed the rate of growth in the arsenals. Under its terms, hundreds of missiles on both sides capable of carrying about 7,000 warheads would be destroyed.

The treaty is projected to result in a net reduction of 20 to 35 percent in existing arsenals that total nearly 23,000 warheads. The treaty would give the United States the capability to deploy about 10,000 warheads and the Soviet Union 8,000.

# AT: Plan Focus Good

**1) Hurts education- we would only learn about one plan and not the resolution. Makes debate poor, we no longer learn as much as we can about the topic by just debating one plan**

**2) Huge aff side bias- the aff will always have more knowledge of the topic if we always debate only the plan**

**3) Lit checks- there won’t be the same amount of literature on one plan as there would be on the whole resolution**

**4) Debating the whole resolution is good because both the aff and neg can research multiple plans and counterplans**

**5) Fairness- The aff would win every round and get an advantage over the neg if we focus on only the plan**

# AT: CP Steals Aff Ground

**1) The aff chose their advantages- they should be able to defend them**

**2) Key to real-world policy making- all policy makers evaluate all policy options when implementing a plan**

**3) Education- If we can solve all of the aff’s advantages with just one cp, then the aff should research the resolution and read a better plan. Offsets cps force the aff to research the plan and resolution thoroughly. Both the aff and neg should research all alternative policy options**

**4) No loss of aff ground- we’re only reading one cp, not several conditional cps**

**5) Our offsets cp is predictable- we aren’t shifting troops to random countries- we’re shifting troops to countries included in the resolution**

**6) Fairness- if the aff can read a plan with conditional advantages, we should be able to read a condition cp**

# AT: Perm- Do the Plan and Shift Troops

**1) The aff has to be a net reduction- withdrawing troops and shifting them to another resolution country is not a net reduction – that’s our 1nc definition and evidence**

**2) Not topical – the perm does not reduce presence. Even if its legitimate,wholly non-topical perms are a reason to vote Neg – they prove the Aff has severed their topical advocacy of the 1AC and proves the resolution false.**

**3) Education- the aff can perm out of any cp without researching answers to it. Make them research answers to the cp. It promotes better debates when both the aff and neg have substantive answers and knowledge on the topic**

**4) Fairness- if the aff always gets to read a plan and the neg has to research answers to the plan, the neg should always be able to read a cp and have the aff research answers to it.**

# AT: Perm Do the CP

**1) The perm is severance – the affirmative must defend a net reduction in troops**

**This is a voting issue – a reduction is vital to all Neg ground – it sets the direction of research, ensuring politics, economy, spending, and trade-off links. They explode the mechanism of topic and make preparation impossible**

**2) The perm kills neg ground- we can no longer read disad- the aff would avoid the link with the cp**

**3) The aff must defend their plantext- they chose their plan, they should be able to defend it against any argument**

**4) Steals neg ground- it would be impossible to win debates if the aff can always sever out of the plan and make a perm that just does the cp**

**5) Time skew- the perm changes the neg strat. If the aff gets to perm the cp, then not only do we no longer have a cp, but we also don’t have a disad**

**6) The perm justifies reading delay cps**

# AT: Many Things to Offset

**1) There aren’t that many things to offset out of the resolution**

**2) We can only offset 6 countries- Turkey, Afghanistan, Iraq, South Korea, Kuwait, and Japan.**

**3) Key to education- the aff should research all six countries to choose the best plan- there’s no reason why they can’t research answers to the cp**

**4) Offsets Cps are predictable under this topic- they should come prepped to rounds with answers**

**5) If the aff gets to read a plan, we get to read one conditional cp- key to neg ground.**

\*\*\*NET BENEFITS\*\*\*

\*\*\*JAPAN\*\*\*

# Presence Good- Key to Asian Stability

**Increased troops in Japan Key to Japanese internal Politics, Korean Stability, US-Japan Relations, and Asian Stability**

Bruce **Klinger 10** - Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation(The Heritage Foundation, “ New Japanese Government Should Affirm Support for Agreed Repositioning of U.S. Forces” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/06/New-Japanese-Government-Should-Affirm-Support-for-Agreed-Repositioning-of-US-Forces>)

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has bowed to the inevitable and announced his resignation, abruptly terminating his troubled administration. Hatoyama’s Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a historic victory in the powerful lower house election last August, ending the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) 50-year reign. The DPJ’s landslide win ushered in unfounded expectations for the dawn of a new, stable, accountable era in Japanese politics. In the actual course of events, Hatoyama’s indecisiveness, ineptitude, and repeated challenges to the U.S.–Japan alliance drove his approval ratings from 70 percent to 17 percent in just eight months, thereby damaging DPJ’s prospects in next month’s upper house election. DPJ Secretary-General Ichiro Ozawa will also resign. Hatoyama Tenure Was a Slow-Motion Train Wreck “Hatoyama leadership” proved to be an oxymoron. The prime minister was criticized for lacking a vision and was widely perceived as beholden to Ozawa, the “shadow shogun.” During Hatoyama’s time in office, it became common for cabinet ministers to publicly contradict each other, only to be repudiated by the prime minister who himself would later reverse policy course—sometimes all on the same day. U.S. officials often privately referred to the DPJ as “amateurs” in light of the party’s non-existent policymaking process and inability to make decisions. The DPJ’s initial strong public support raised hopes that Hatoyama would break the streak of Japan’s revolving door of failed leaders. Instead, Hatoyama could not even match the year-long tenure of his three immediate predecessors. That the DPJ chose Hatoyama as its first leader after its unprecedented electoral victory reflects poorly on the party and its future potential for success. DPJ Struggling to Regain Credibility DPJ supporters hope that jettisoning the twin albatrosses of Hatoyama and Ozawa will reverse the party’s loss of the public trust. Such an optimistic scenario remains far from certain, however, since the problems lie not just with the prime minister but also with the party and its processes. After assuming power, the DPJ predicted a sweeping victory in the July 2010 upper house election, thereby stretching its majority to ensure smooth passage of legislation. At the time, DPJ legislators privately sought to allay U.S. concerns over the policies of the left-of-center party by commenting that a strong DPJ showing would enable it to abandon its two small coalition partners, including the Social Democratic Party. But the DPJ has been tarnished by amateurish policymaking, repeated policy flip-flops, and money scandals involving Hatoyama and Ozawa. The LDP, disgraced and abandoned by the public after the August 2009 election, has enjoyed a recent resurgence and, in the run-up to the House of Councilors election, is scoring higher in public opinion polls. The DPJ remains besot by factionalism that is constraining the party’s ability to define—let alone implement—policies. The DPJ encompasses broadly divergent ideological factions, which has prevented articulating a coherent foreign policy strategic vision. On domestic issues, the party is divided between those advocating populist pump-priming economic stimulus initiatives to secure an election victory and those calling for fiscal restraint to overcome Japan’s burgeoning public debt. New Government Should Reaffirm Futenma Decision Of greatest concern to the United States is the impact Hatoyama’s decision will have on Japanese commitment to abide by the bilateral Guam Agreement. This accord committed Washington and Tokyo to an integrated series of 19 initiatives to transform the U.S. military presence in Japan. The only contentious issue was the planned redeployment of U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to a replacement facility off the shore of Camp Schwab, located in a less populated area of Okinawa. Less than a week ago, Hatoyama abandoned the DPJ’s campaign promise to evict the Marine Corps air unit after he belatedly came to understand the geostrategic necessities of maintaining viable and comprehensive U.S. security capabilities. The prime minister cited the rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula resulting from North Korea’s sinking of a South Korean naval ship as a primary factor in his decision. As soon as possible, the new Japanese government should indicate its intention to abide by the Guam Agreement. It should honor the commitment Japan made in 2006 and that Prime Minister Hatoyama himself ultimately endorsed. Hatoyama may have ultimately sacrificed his government for the U.S.–Japan alliance; he also vastly complicated what should have been a much easier repositioning of U.S. forces on Okinawa. At this point, public opinion polls show strong Japanese support for the alliance with the U.S. but also strong disapproval of Hatoyama’s decision to renege on his campaign promise to evict a U.S. Marine Corps unit from Okinawa. A Japanese decision to again abandon the bilateral accord would exacerbate tensions with Washington and seriously degrade U.S. abilities to defend Japan and maintain peace and stability in Asia. It is essential that the Obama Administration better explain the benefits of the alliance—as well as the necessity of forward-deployed U.S. military forces—to the next DPJ leader

# Presence Good- Key to Asian Stability

**Increased Presence in Japan Key to Check Back China and to Respond to Policy Shifts in the Region**

**Eagen and Talent 10** - Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation and Distinguished Fellow in Military Affairs at The Heritage Foundation and served as a U.S. Senator from 2002 to 2007 (1/4/10 The Heritage Foundation, “Planning for the Future: How and Why to Salvage the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/Planning-for-the-Future-How-and-Why-to-Salvage-the-Pentagons-Quadrennial-Defense-Review)

Despite again adding to the military's missions, the QDR did not call for an increase in military endstrength or funding. Instead, it called for personnel cuts, increasing only the number of Special Operations Forces. In addition, Pentagon leaders decided that the QDR's recommendations should be resource-neutral and proposed to pay for any new directives by cutting other programs. As a result, the 2006 QDR, like the previous two reviews, was excessively budget-constrained and failed to address a growing funding gap that was increasingly being filled by emergency supplemental spending bills. Because it was treated as a zero-sum budget game, the major participants fought hard to protect their particular programs from being cut at the expense of engaging in an honest and disinterested strategic debate. Furthermore, there was no independent panel to broaden the public debate, offer Congress an alternative assessment, or hold the Department of Defense to account. The Forthcoming QDR's Force Planning Construct Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is preparing the Pentagon's upcoming QDR, which is scheduled for release in February 2010. According to a preliminary Pentagon fact sheet,[19] the QDR will consider threats posed by extremist movements, the spread of WMDs, the rise of sophisticated military powers, and failing or failed states, as well as air, sea, space, and cyberspace threats. It will also emphasize other trends that may pose threats to national security, including the global economic downturn and the effects of climate change. The fact sheet signals that the 2010 QDR will prioritize the development of capabilities to prevail in irregular warfare--likely at the expense of many conventional capabilities. More worrying, there are indications that the forthcoming QDR will rationalize further cuts to major programs--in addition to those already made in President Obama's FY 2010 defense budget--in the absence of a foreign policy strategy. President Obama's budget projections show flat or slightly declining defense budgets from FY 2011 to FY 2014.[20] If the QDR is being developed under this constraint, the gap between defense strategy and resources will likely only widen in the future. A reduction in force size and investment will make America's military less flexible. A larger and more technologically superior force allows for responses to unforeseen events and decisions. A larger force and a larger arsenal of weapons systems allow for rapid accommodations to policy shifts that a limited force simply cannot achieve as quickly or without bearing unnecessary and significant risk. For example, shifting circumstances in Asia may necessitate agile policy shifts over the next decade. In Japan, the previous government was a close U.S. ally, but the new government is less amenable. Policymakers may need to adopt a new approach to address the potential challenges posed by China's military ambitions. If this were to require more comprehensive systems or a larger presence in the Pacific, a flexible military that is robustly sized and equipped could more easily and effectively hedge against uncertainty. No QDR can foresee every development, but the long-term strategy should assume that unpredictable events and shifts will occur. After all, this was the purpose of the expanded missions and mandates adopted in the 2001 and 2006 QDRs. If Secretary Gates reduces force structure in the upcoming QDR instead of increasing it to match America's commitments, he will be significantly altering the long-standing U.S. defense posture without a guiding foreign policy strategy from the White House or rigorous independent oversight. The Administration's failure to issue a National Security Strategy, Future Years Defense Plan, 30-year shipbuilding plan, or long-term aviation plan is rightly fueling congressional fears that many large and permanent defense decisions are being made without sufficient debate and without due consideration of the consequences. Despite calls by some Members of Congress to reestablish the National Defense Panel to assess the QDR's recommendations, the conference report for the final defense authorization bill directed the establishment of a semi-independent, bipartisan watchdog body.

# Presence Good- Key to Asian Stability

**Increased US Defense Posture in Japan Reassures US Commitment, Balances the Region, and Staves Off Miscalculation**

**Eaglen 9** - Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation (9/29/9 The Heritage Foundation, “ 2010 Defense Appropriations Bill: Conference Report Should Defer to Senate Bill on Many Programs” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/2010-Defense-Appropriations-Bill-Conference-Report-Should-Defer-to-Senate-Bill-on-Many-Programs)

This week, the U.S. Senate will continue debate on the fiscal year (FY) 2010 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 3326). As the bill moves into conference, Members should retain funding for many important programs. Specifically, Members of the conference committee should: Maintain Senate language allowing the Pentagon to use appropriated funds to develop an export variant of the F-22A Raptor; Retain funding in the House and Senate bills for nine additional F/A-18E/Fs above the President's budget request for a total of 18 aircraft; Continue funding C-17 Globemaster III production by purchasing 10 additional planes as proposed in the Senate bill; Keep Senate funding for an additional DDG-51 above the President's budget request; Retain funds in the Senate bill for an additional $1.5 billion above the President's budget request to the critical National Guard and Reserve Equipment account; and Maintain added funding in the Senate version of the bill for ground-based missile defense and six additional Standard Missile-3 Block 1A interceptors. Authorization to Research an Allied Variant of F-22 Even though the House included language reiterating support for the Obey amendment banning the sale of the F-22 overseas, the Senate appropriations bill includes a provision allowing the Air Force to use existing funds to develop an export version of the Raptor. While the ban may have previously made sense, America's stronger relationships with its most supportive and influential allies in the Pacific--Japan and Australia--demand that the Air Force explore a version suitable for sale. Allowing some of America's closest allies the opportunity to field the most advanced fifth-generation fighter in the world would help ensure a stable balance of power in the region, hedging against uncertainty and staving off miscalculation. Aside from the noteworthy domestic industrial base benefits, permitting the sale of a modified F-22 would strengthen America's defense posture in the region and reassure Japan, Australia, and other U.S. allies that America's commitment to the Pacific remains strong.

**Significantly more troops are necessary to protect Japan**

**Kyodo News Service 4** (November 18, “Japan's Defence Agency says 162,000 ground troops needed to defend nation”, BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, Lexis)

Tokyo, 18 November: The Defence Agency said Thursday 18 November it estimates that at least 162,000 ground troops will be needed to defend Japan in the case of an attack by terrorists, guerrillas or special forces of other states, and 170,000 will be necessary to effectively respond to a massive earthquake or other disasters in the country. The agency, which is at loggerheads with the Finance Ministry over the reduction target of personnel in the forthcoming defence outline, is believed to have drawn up the figures to counter the ministry's proposal that Ground Self-Defence Force troops be sharply reduced to about 120,000, down a quarter from the current 167,000. The agency also projects that 55,000 ground troops will be needed to respond to an invasion of Japanese outlying islands and 15,000 in the case of overseas dispatches to international operations. Of the 162,000 troops to counter attacks on the main islands, the agency said 120,000 will be needed to guard about 140 important facilities across the country.

**Lack of U.S. troops in Japan and U.S. troop focus elsewhere leads to Asian Instability**

**Ikegami, 7**

**<**Dr Masako Ikegami is Professor and Director of the Center for Pacific Asia Studies (CPAS) at Stockholm University. NATO Review in 2007. “NATO and Japan: Strengthening Asian Stability.” http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/art4.html>

In post-Cold War Europe, the risk of major armed conflicts has been significantly reduced. Unconventional threats such as terrorism now dominate European security concerns. In Asia the picture is much gloomier. After the disintegration and transformation of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, it was inevitable that the Alliance would change and extend its mission scope. Without a grave, imminent threat, the 'softening' of the Organisation's mission was a logical result. The changing nature of the external menace - from the Soviet Union to shadowy, amorphous non-state actors - has also blurred NATO's threat definition. As a result, the Alliance was reformulated on the basis of "shared values and will". The extension of the Alliance's collaboration with partners beyond the Euro-Atlantic area was to be expected as NATO's resources and operations spread into wider theatres. And so Japan and NATO have strengthened ties to promote effective burden-sharing in global security. However, Japan's security environment changed in a very different way from that of Europe after the Cold War. Unlike NATO, Japan has gradually become exposed to new and more imminent military threats, while US forces have been increasingly engaged in the Gulf and in Afghanistan. There are still two major flash-points in East Asia, the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, where in a worst-case scenario, the risk of inter-state conflict involving WMDs cannot be ruled out. Additionally, the East China Sea and Spratly Island disputes, among others, count as risk zones for armed conflicts over territory and natural resources. And China's hunt for those resources is intensifying, backed up by its growing military muscle. Meanwhile, the United States' overseas forces are undergoing global redeployment which affects the Asia-Pacific region, adding another factor of uncertainty for regional security in the coming years. The absence of credible regional confidence- and security-building measures only aggravates this already volatile situation.

# Presence Good- Key to Asian Stability

**US troops key to deterrence in Asia**

**Klingner 10**

( Bruce Klingner, Senior research fellow at Heritage Foundation, NorthEast Asia branch. Chief of CIA’s Kore Branch, “Military Base Dispute Strains U.S.-Japan Alliance” Heritage Foundation, <http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2010/pdf/wm_2769.pdf>)

To garner increased Japanese support for the realignment plan, Washington should boost public diplomacy efforts to better educate Japanese officials and the populace on the necessity of forward-based U.S. forces to not only defend Japan but to also maintain peace and stability in Asia. Washington should explain how U.S. military capabilities are dependent on coordinated, integrated strategies, including that of the Marine Air Ground Task Force. As such, the U.S. Marines on Okinawa are an indispensable and irreplaceable component of any U.S. response to an Asian crisis. Washington should also call on the DPJ to define a coherent national security policy, including the specifics of the party’s repeated demands for a more equal alliance Japanese support for the realignment plan, Tokyo would have to assume greater responsibilities for its own defense as well as addressing global security challenges. A year ago, the 50th anniversary of the U.S.–Japan defense treaty was seen as an opportunity for transforming the military alliance to a broader security relationship. Now, discussion is focused primarily on repairing the status quo or even saving the alliance. It is worrisome that U.S. officials are expressing growing frustration and mistrust of DPJ intentions, particularly when North Korean and Chinese security threats to Asia are expanding. It is important that both countries understand that Japanese and U.S. national interests are best served by maintaining and strengthening the alliance. U.S. forward-deployed forces in Japan and South Korea provide a tangible sign of Washington’s commitment to defending its allies as well as the values that these countries share.

**U.S. Military Presence In Japan Key to Asian Stability**

**Kyodo News 10** <Kyodo News, June 25th 2010. “U.S. House Offers Thanks to Okinawa for hosting U.S. Forces.” <http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/us-house-offers-thanks-to-okinawa-for-hosting-us-forces>>

The U.S. House of Representatives on Thursday offered thanks to the people of Japan, especially in Okinawa, for continuing to host U.S. forces, which it says provide the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of peace, prosperity and stability in Asia-Pacific region. The House passed the resolution in the day’s plenary session by an overwhelming majority of 412 to 2 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the revised Japan-U.S. security treaty, which went into force on June 23, 1960. It apparently passed the bipartisan resolution with the intention to help restore bilateral ties between Japan and the United States, which deteriorated over plans to relocate a key U.S. Marine Corps air station in Okinawa, political sources said. Okinawa, an island prefecture in southwestern Japan, hosts much of U.S. military presence in Japan and is hoping to reduce its burden. Congress also hopes to enhance ties with the Japanese government of new Prime Minister Naoto Kan, who succeeded Yukio Hatoyama earlier this month. The House ‘‘recognizes Japan as an indispensable security partner of the United States in providing peace, prosperity, and stability to the Asia-Pacific region,’’ the resolution says. It also ‘‘recognizes that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the stationing of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, the core element of the United States-Japan security arrangements that protect both Japan and the Asia-Pacific region from external threats and instability.’‘ The House ‘‘encourages Japan to continue its international engagement in humanitarian, development, and environmental issues; and anticipates another 50 years of unshakable friendship and deepening cooperation under the auspices of the United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.’‘ The resolution notes that the United States and Japan ‘‘reconfirmed’’ a commitment to relocate the Marines Futenma base in the densely populated area in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture, to a less populated coastal area in Nago, also in the prefecture. People in Okinawa have hoped for the air station to be relocated out of Okinawa. Hatoyama, who earlier vowed to relocate the Futenma base out of Okinawa at the worst, resigned in early June to take responsibility for money scandals and the fiasco involving the relocation issue.

# Presence Good- Key to Asian Stability

**Ground U.S. Troops in Japan key to Stability in the region  
Tandon 3/17** <Shuan Tandon, March 17, 2010. “U.S. Says Okinawa Base Needed to Defend Japan.” Defense News. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4544167>

The United States said March 17 that it needs to maintain a base on the Japanese island of Okinawa to defend the region, as the new government in Tokyo considers scrapping a previous plan. Senior U.S. officials told Congress that while they respected the decisions of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's six-month-old government, they hoped to go ahead with a plan to move the Futenma air base within Okinawa. Michael Schiffer, a senior Pentagon official, told a congressional panel that troops in Okinawa were the only ground forces "between Hawaii and India" which the United States could quickly deploy. "Futenma may be but one base and one part of a larger alliance relationship, but peace and stability in the region depend in no small part on the enduring presence of forward deployed U.S. forces in Japan," said Schiffer, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia. "The United States cannot meet its treaty obligations to defend Japan, cannot respond to humanitarian crises or natural disasters, cannot meet its commitments for regional peace and stability without forward deployed ground forces in Japan," he said. He said the Futenma move was a "lynchpin" of a 2006 deal under which more than 8,000 U.S. troops would leave Okinawa for the U.S. territory of Guam. Under the agreement, Futenma would move from the crowded urban hub of Ginowan to a quiet village. Schiffer and Joseph Donovan, his counterpart at the State Department, both testified that the deal was the best solution to limit the impact on Okinawa while maintaining troops in the region. But some of Hatoyama's left-leaning allies want the base moved entirely out of Japan, blaming the troops for noise and crime. Despite President Barack Obama's support for the 2006 deal, several lawmakers from his Democratic Party have voiced sympathy for Okinawans' grievances. Rep. Eni Faleomavaega, a Democrat who heads the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Asia, pointed out that Okinawa accounts for one percent of Japan's land but two-thirds of U.S. bases deployed there. "The Okinawans feel like they're always being the whipping boy for the last 50 years. We just put our military people there and don't have to worry about it," Faleomavaega said. But Republican Rep. Ed Royce of California said that the Hatoyama government had "badly handled" the Futenma issue. "The alliance has been a force for stability in a very tough neighborhood but there is cause for concern," Royce said. "Japan's government is inexperienced. Some Japanese leaders would like to see Tokyo tilt more towards Beijing," he said. Hatoyama has called for a more equal relationship between Tokyo and Washington and suggested creating an East Asian regional network without the United States, which stations 47,000 troops in Japan under a security treaty. Ichiro Ozawa, the backroom powerbroker of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan, in December took hundreds of lawmakers to visit Beijing, sending the United States scrambling to invite more Japanese MPs to Washington. But most U.S. analysts are doubtful about a wider shift toward Beijing, noting that Japan has deep-rooted historical tensions with China and longstanding concerns about the giant neighbor's soaring military budget. U.S. expectations of Japan may be colored by the 2001-2006 premiership of Junichiro Koizumi who broke taboos by sending troops to Iraq and defying China, said Michael Auslin, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute think tank. "If anything, current trends in Japanese policymaking, including Japan's recent outreach to China, reflect a return to a more traditional Japanese position that attempts to maintain some level of balance in Japanese foreign policy," Auslin said.

**Significantly more troops are necessary to protect Japan**

**Kyodo News Service 4** (November 18, “Japan's Defence Agency says 162,000 ground troops needed to defend nation”, BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, Lexis)

Tokyo, 18 November: The Defence Agency said Thursday 18 November it estimates that at least 162,000 ground troops will be needed to defend Japan in the case of an attack by terrorists, guerrillas or special forces of other states, and 170,000 will be necessary to effectively respond to a massive earthquake or other disasters in the country. The agency, which is at loggerheads with the Finance Ministry over the reduction target of personnel in the forthcoming defence outline, is believed to have drawn up the figures to counter the ministry's proposal that Ground Self-Defence Force troops be sharply reduced to about 120,000, down a quarter from the current 167,000. The agency also projects that 55,000 ground troops will be needed to respond to an invasion of Japanese outlying islands and 15,000 in the case of overseas dispatches to international operations. Of the 162,000 troops to counter attacks on the main islands, the agency said 120,000 will be needed to guard about 140 important facilities across the country.

# Presence Good- Deters China-Taiwan War

**U.S. troops in Japan only thing preventing Chinese invasion of Taiwan**

**Ikegami, 7 <**Dr Masako Ikegami is Professor and Director of the Center for Pacific Asia Studies (CPAS) at Stockholm University. NATO Review in 2007. “NATO and Japan: Strengthening Asian Stability.” http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/art4.html>

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has deployed nearly a thousand short- and medium-range ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan and US forces based in Japan. Beijing claims that these missiles are intended to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence - but a surprise attack using hundreds of missiles is also regarded as an effective opening gambit for any attempt to seize Taiwan by force. Further, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is increasingly procuring offensive weapon systems, including an amphibious assault ship which will significantly improve the Chinese navy's sealift and power projection capabilities. The PLA is also intensifying preparations for operations against Japan on the assumption that Tokyo would provide logistical support for any American intervention in a cross-Strait conflict. In 2004, a Chinese nuclear submarine intruded into Japanese territorial waters, and PLA electronic warfare planes have frequently violated Japan's air defence zone. Measured by cases in which Japan's Air Self-Defence Forces scrambled against PLA aircraft, the frequency of air intrusions by China's air force jumped from 13 occasions in 2004 to 107 the following year. And in an unpleasant surprise in 2006, a submerged PLA attack submarine shadowed a Japan-based US aircraft carrier in the East China Sea undetected until the submarine surfaced. These actions are allegedly for the purposes of collecting anti-submarine warfare (ASW) data and electronic intelligence. But the fact is that the PLA is intensifying actions that target US-Japan security cooperation, which is presently the only major obstacle to China's ambition for unification with Taiwan by force. All of this has happened against the background of rapid growth in China's military spending over the last decade, with a 165 per cent rise in military expenditure since 1996. Beijing purchases large quantities of advanced weapons, including 43 per cent of all Russian arms exports in 2005. And in terms of the 2001 to 2005 aggregate imports of major weapons systems, China was ranked the top arms recipient with an import value of over US$13 billion. China's rapid military build-up of advanced weapon systems, recent large-scale military exercises with Russia linked to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO; current members are China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), and repeated intrusions into Japanese airspace and territorial waters all suggest that the PLA's preparations for the use of force against Taiwan are not a bluff.

**War over Taiwan causes extinction**

**Tucker,** professor at GeorgetownUniversity, **05** [Nancy, “Dangerous strait: the U.S.--Taiwan--China crisis”, p. google books]

At the beginning of this new century, **nowhere is the danger** for Americans **as great** as in the Taiwan Strait where the potential for a war with China, **a nuclear armed** great power, could erupt out of miscalculation, misunderstanding, or accident. Skeptics might argue that other threats are more volatile or more certain—conflict in the Middle East, terrorism at home and abroad, clashes with angry and chaotic rogue or failed states. But although the United States risks losing lives and repu- tation in these encounters **none but a collision with China would be as massive and devastating.** War with China over Taiwan may or may not be inevitable. The pros- pect, nevertheless, shapes the course of U.S.-Taiwan relations and signifi-cantly influences the texture of Taiwan's domestic affairs. Similarly, though the level of tension between Washington and Beijing fluctuates, depending on security, proliferation, trade, and human rights concerns, the dilemma of Taiwan's future remains a constant and can become incendiary with little warning. Optimists believe that, with time, ground for reconciliation be- tween China and Taiwan can be found and the two sides will be able to ar- rive at a mutually acceptable solution despite an impasse that has produced repeated military skirmishes and political upheaval for more than fifty years. Pessimists argue that the road to war has been laid, and nothing that anyone does, short of realizing the immediate unification demanded by Beijing, will deter combat. Indeed some feel that progress toward such a calamity has speeded up, making Washington's struggle to keep the rivals at peace, and the United States out of war, much more difficult. It is not surprising, therefore, that those who write on the interactions among the United States, Taiwan, and the PRC inevitably are drawn to, and quickly become preoccupied with, the situation in the Taiwan Strait. The tendency to focus on the clash of interests surrounding Taiwan's status and future follows naturally from the hazards inherent in the existing situation. For decades the contending parties have struggled toward largely incom- patible objectives. China insists upon recovery of the island of Taiwan which it asserts is a part of China's sovereign territory, severed from the mainland first by imperialists and then by the losing side in a civil war. Tai- wan's rulers initially believed as adamantly as those of the PRC in the uni- ty of China, but declared that Taipei not Beijing was the legitimate capital. More recently, Taiwan has sought increasing autonomy and international space despite Beijing's objections, with the majority of the population fa-voring a status quo that shuns both independence and Chinese control. For the United States also, the status quo is desirable since Washington has acknowledged, without accepting, the one-China principle asserted by Bei- jing. At the same time, the United States **has legally obligated itself**, in a way some sec as a contradiction, to help provide for Taiwan's defense and has asserted its preference for a solution to the problem that will meet with the assent of the people of Taiwan.

# Presence Good- Economy

**Presence in Japan has been increasingly beneficial for the US politically and economically**

**The New York Times 94** (July 4, “U.S. Troops in Japan Benefit Both Nations”, Lexis)

While Japan is dependent on the United States for external security, the United States, in stationing armed forces in Japan, has pursued its national interest, not performed charity. The United States has had tangible and intangible benefits: a stable market (Japan is the second largest importer for the United States), political leverage (which Americans may want to keep), strategic advantage during and after the cold war. Thus it has been mutually beneficial. Moreover, Japan has in recent years paid about 40 percent of the total annual cost for the United States presence there, including personnel and housing expenses. This has made Japan the cheapest site in the world for the United States military. Still, Japan should eventually have a truly independent military, keeping some form of alliance with the United States, to become a real sovereign state.

\*\*\*TURKEY\*\*\*

# Surge Good- Fighting PKK

**US troops key to coordinating w/ turkey to fight PKK**

**Asbarez 10** (Armenian newspaper, Asbarez on foreign policy in middle east US Reiterates Support for Turkey’s War on PKK as Troops Deploy Along Iraqi Border. June 21. <http://asbarez.com/82334/us-reiterates-support-for-turkeys-war-on-pkk-as-troops-deploy-along-iraqi-border/>

ANKARA (Combined Sources)–The United States actively supports the efforts of its Turkish allies to defeat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the U.S. ambassador to Turkey said Monday after Turkish troops deployed along the Iraqi border to stage fresh attacks against Kurds in Northern Iraq. Twelve Turkish soldiers were killed in PKK attacks over the weekend, with most of the deaths occurring when members of the outlawed group assaulted a border unit at the Iraqi frontier. Turkish state media said elite troops rappelled down from helicopters and poured out of mechanized infantry units Monday to mount an operation to surround the Kurds. Meanwhile, security sources were quoted as saying helicopter gunships bombed suspected PKK positions in the provinces of Hakkari and Sirnak, bordering Iraq. U.S. Ambassador James Jeffrey said the United States would “urgently” consider any requests from Ankara asking for help fighting the PKK, which Washington considers a terrorist group. “We stand ready to review urgently any new requests from the Turkish military or government regarding the PKK,” Jeffrey said in a written statement, echoing remarks made Sunday by an embassy spokeswoman. Following the weekend attacks there had been speculation that the U.S. might not have passed on actionable intelligence in its possession regarding PKK movements toward the border. While Turkey’s “no” vote on fresh U.N. sanctions against Iran and a simmering crisis with Israel has sparked concern in Turkey that the United States may withhold support from Ankara’s struggle against the PKK, Jeffrey stressed “there has been no change in the level of U.S.-Turkey intelligence sharing regarding the PKK in northern Iraq.” Describing the PKK as a terrorist group and a “common enemy” to both Ankara and Washington, Jeffrey said the U.S shared Turkey’s grief at the loss of its heroic troops and police in the joint struggle against terrorism. “Our sincere condolences go out to the families of the victims,” he said.

**Increased US support key to fight pkk**

**Hurryet Daily news 10** (Turkish news organization, specializing foreign policy, US ready to offer Turkey more help to fight PKK. June 20 20010. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=us-says-ready-to-offer-more-assistance-against-pkk-2010-06-20>

The United States is ready to offer more assistance to Turkey in the fight against terrorism, an embassy spokeswoman said Sunday, denying allegations of a drop in actionable intelligence in response to Turkey’s stance on Iran. “We stand ready to review urgently any new request from the Turkish military or government,” Deborah Guido, a spokeswoman for the U.S. Embassy in Ankara told the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review on Sunday. Allegations that Washington has slowed its sharing of actionable intelligence with the Turkish military following Turkey’s U.N. Security Council vote against new sanctions on Iran were brought back to the country’s agenda with the weekend’s deadly attacks, which killed a total of 12 Turkish soldiers. The Turkish press had speculated that the attacks by the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, were carried out by a group of around 250 terrorists whose crossing of the border would surely have been noted by American intelligence. Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ corrected the news reports Sunday, saying the attacks were committed by 57 terrorists.

# Presence Good- Deters Turkish Proliferation

**If we don’t increase TNWs in Turkey, they will develop their own nuclear arsenal**

**IKV Pax Christi 5/12** (US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in TURKEY <http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/files/Documenten/Veiligheid%20en%20Ontwapening/Nucleaire%20ontwapening/TNW%20Italy%20and%20Turkey.pdf>)

Incirlik’s proximity to potential Middle-East adversaries gives it an added geopolitical importance. While the TNW in other European countries have lost their military relevance, the Incirlik bombs could in deterrence logic still function as a deterrent. However, Turkish officials indicated in 2009 and 2010 that ‘Turkey would not insist’ that NATO retain a TNW arsenal in Turkey, and that that conventional NATO forces are sufficient to satisfy Ankara’s security requirements. Another rationale heard to support keeping TNW in Incirlik is that Turkey may develop its own nuclear arsenal if it feels it can no longer rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Indeed one official in November 2009 stated that Turkey would immediately arm itself with a bomb if Iran were to develop one.

\*\*\*KUWAIT\*\*\*

# Surge Good- Key to Iraq Success

**Increased troops in Kuwait key to success in Iraq  
Kay 06** (http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/dec2006/iraq-d30.shtml)  
  
The Pentagon announced December 27 that it will send 3,500 additional US soldiers to Kuwait in January, a clear step toward the increase in American combat troops and escalation of the war in Iraq that President Bush is expected to announce early in the new year. On Thursday, Bush met with top administration officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Corps General Peter Pace, to discuss preparations for a renewed military offensive. The *New York Times* reported on Friday that a “surge” of between 17,000 and 20,000 troops was discussed, to be achieved by moving into Iraq the new troops in Kuwait, delaying the departure of two Marine regiments, and speeding up the deployment of several Army brigades. The troops would be used to “clear neighborhoods and to conduct other operations to regain control of the capital,” the *Times* reported, citing Pentagon officials. This can only mean a vast increase in violence and killing, intended to reassert American control of areas in the capital where mass opposition to the US occupation is concentrated. This “clearing” operation will likely be focused on the impoverished Shia slum of Sadr City, which is controlled by militias associated with the Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. On December 27, Sahib al-Amiri, a top aide to Sadr, was killed by US troops in Najaf in an operation that bears all the hallmarks of a targeted assassination. After fleeing to the roof of his home, Amiri was shot four times, once in the head, by American soldiers. The move was likely intended to scuttle negotiations between Sadr and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for the return of Sadr loyalists to active participation in the Maliki government. Allies of Sadr withdrew from the government last month to protest Maliki’s decision to meet with President Bush in Jordan. While an increase in troop strength in Iraq is being billed as a “temporary surge,” what is being planned is a long-term operation. This was made clear by two of the figures most closely associated with the plan, Frederick Kagan of the right-wing American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and retired general Jack Keane. The two co-authored an AEI report issued earlier this month that calls for an increase of at least 30,000 US combat troops and a massive escalation of military violence aimed at exterminating the anti-American resistance. Keane was among the military experts who met with Bush this month to discuss options for increasing troops. In an opinion piece published in the *Washington Post* on December 27, Kagan and Keane argued that “bringing security to Baghdad . . . is possible only with a surge of at least 30,000 combat troops lasting 18 months or so.” What is needed, they wrote, is a “traditional counterinsurgency mission” which would reverse “a history of half-measures.” They added, “The only ‘surge’ option that makes sense is both long and large.” An estimated 655,000 Iraqis have been killed as a result of the American invasion and occupation, and Iraqi society has been devastated. But this, according to Keane and Kagan, is the product of “half-measures.” In planning the military escalation, Bush is able to count on the support of the Democratic Party. Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman, a strident advocate of a major troop increase, wrote an opinion piece published in the *New York Times* Friday entitled “Why We Need More Troops in Iraq.” Lieberman declared that “failure in Iraq would be a strategic and moral catastrophe.” He argued that the crisis of the occupation “is the predictable consequence of the failure to ensure basic security and, equally important, of a conscious strategy by al-Qaeda and Iran, which have systematically aimed to undermine Iraq’s fragile political center.” The phrase “failure to ensure basic security” is coded language for not deploying from the outset a sufficient number of troops to drown Iraqi opposition to the occupation in blood. This is a criticism that has been frequently raised by Democratic leaders against the Bush administration and his ousted defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. Lieberman’s emphasis on the role of Iran reflects the aim within sections of the political establishment, including the Bush administration, to combine an increase in troop strength in Iraq with an escalation of military preparations against Iran. Other leading Democrats, including Senator Hillary Clinton and incoming Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, have indicated they will support such an increase as long as it can be sold as a first step toward eventually drawing down US forces in the future. A few leading Democrats have come out in opposition to an increase of troops, most prominently the incoming chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joseph Biden. On Tuesday, Biden declared that an increase in troops was “the absolute wrong strategy,” while making clear his general support for the Iraq occupation. Biden’s position reflects concern within sections of the military and political establishment that an increase in the number of US troops in Iraq will only intensify the crisis of the occupation and increase opposition to the war both in Iraq and the United States. The Democrats have already rejected any measures that could force the administration to begin drawing down troops, including a cut-off of funding for the war. Biden repeated this position on Tuesday, arguing that “there’s nothing the United States Congress can do by a piece of legislation to alter the conduct of a war that a president decides to pursue.” Sections of the military brass have resisted a “surge” out of concern for the enormous strains that have been placed on the American military. Earlier this month, the Bush administration announced that it would support a permanent increase in the size of the military in order to address this problem, a proposal that has been championed by the Democratic Party. The move to escalate repression in Iraq is part of a broader policy of intensifying militarist violence throughout the world. Recent days have seen stepped up provocations against Iran as well as the launching of a proxy war in Somalia that has the potential of evolving into a regional conflict throughout North Africa. The Bush administration, with the open support of sections of the Democratic Party and the acquiescence of the rest, is—in the name of “democracy”—directly flouting the will of the American people, who are massively opposed to the war in Iraq. The utter fraud of the government’s democratic pretensions abroad is demonstrated by its contempt for democratic public opinion at home. Recent polls show that the option of sending more troops to Iraq is supported by only 11 percent of the population, while a clear majority supports a withdrawal of US forces. The mid-term elections in November, which ended Republican control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, were a popular repudiation of the Bush administration and the Iraq war. It is clear, however, that elections will not bring an end to the war or the policies of neo-colonialism and militarism of which it is a part so long as political life in the US continues to be monopolized by two parties of the US corporate-financial elite.

# Presence Good- Deters Iraq/Kuwait War

**U.S. Key to deter Iraqi invasions of Kuwait-Gulf War Proves  
Klein in 3** <David Kelin, January 2003. California State University, Northridge. “Mechanisms of Western Domination: A Short History of Iraq and Kuwait” http://www.csun.edu/~vcmth00m/iraqkuwait.html>

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and quickly gained control of the country. The United States, along with the United Nations, demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces. Attempts by Iraq to negotiate withdrawal were rebuffed by the United States. U.S. military forces in the region had already rehearsed battle plans to repel an Iraqi invasion. On January 16, 1991, U.S. and other allied forces launched a devastating attack of Iraq and its armed forces in Kuwait. The Allied bombing was intended to damage Iraq's infrastructure so as to hinder its ability to prosecute war by lowering both civilian and military morale. The United States led the allied forces, but 34 nations also provided troops and/or financial support for the military operations. Among these are: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Britain, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Honduras, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, The Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, and The United Arab Emirates. (See: [http://www.historyguy.com/GulfWar.html#gulfwardates](http://www.historyguy.com/GulfWar.html) or <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/facts/gulfwar/>) U.S. media portrayed the Iraqi military as a global threat and as a formidable military opponent to the United States. Nevertheless, the military outcome of the war was one-sided in the extreme. Of the more than 500,000 U.S. troops engaged in the war, 148 died in battle, many from "friendly fire." Total allied losses were minimal. By contrast, in June 1991, the U.S. military reported more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers killed, 300,000 wounded. Some human rights groups claimed a higher number of Iraqis killed in battle. According to Baghdad, civilian casualties numbered more than 35,000. However, after the war, some scholars report that the number of Iraqi soldiers killed was significantly less than 100,000. Whatever the numbers, the Iraqi army was completely routed, and all surviving Iraqi military units withdrew to Iraq. "Desert Storm," as the war was called, destroyed 80% of Iraq's weaponry, and the international monitoring and inspections that followed the war (see the next section), resulted in at least 90% of Iraq's pre-invasion weaponry eliminated. Former U.S. Attorney General, Ramsey Clark, and International Action Center have reported devastating effects of the U.S. and British bombing on the Iraqi civilian population, including the use of depleted uranium from U.S. bombs that have led to cancer and unprecedented levels of birth defects in Iraq. More than 600,000 pounds of depleted uranium was left in Iraq after the war.

# Presence Good- Deters Iraq/Kuwait War

**Kuwait-Iraq Tensions are high now  
Lipschutz 6/11** <Kari Lipschutz, June 11, 2010. “Global Insider: Iraq-Kuwait Relations” World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/5769/global-insider-iraq-kuwait-relations>

There are two sets of unresolved issues between Iraq and Kuwait -- tangible and intangible. They are closely related and are sources of continuous friction between the two countries. Additionally, they have the ability to feed off of each other and as a result perpetuate a tense atmosphere. The tangible issues include the U.N.-mandated reparations that Iraq has to pay Kuwait as a result of the 1990 invasion, which total more than $52 billion. Currently 5 percent of Iraq's annual oil revenue is allocated to these payments. The Iraqi government acknowledges that Kuwait suffered tremendously from the invasion and that the reparations are valid, and has expressed its willingness to fulfill its obligations. Nonetheless, Iraqi officials often plead with Kuwait to forgo some of the reparations, citing Iraq's need of the revenue for rebuilding purposes. For similar reasons, Iraqi officials make the case that Kuwait should be as generous as some non-Arab states in forgiving Iraq's debt to Kuwait. These statements are usually met with outright rejection by Kuwaiti officials. In addition to the financial issues, Iraq and Kuwait have yet to delineate their maritime and land borders. The lack of clear border lines has resulted in some Iraqi fishermen being arrested by Kuwaiti authorities and reportedly mistreated while under arrest, thus leaving some Iraqis indignant. Finally, Kuwait is still searching for the remains of Kuwaitis who were rounded up and bussed into Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the 1990 invasion and who are now presumed dead. The overriding intangible issue -- and the most difficult to overcome -- is the profound lack of trust. The August 1990 invasion is still traumatic for Kuwait and has created a psychological barrier for dealing with Iraq. Kuwait therefore needs assurances about Iraq's future intentions. The lack of trust is usually deepened whenever any tensions arise between Iraq and Kuwait, and has been exacerbated by statements made by some Iraqi politicians questioning Kuwait's status as an independent state. The appointment of an Iraqi ambassador to Kuwait is certainly a welcome development, especially for its great symbolic value. But the degree to which it can help create a new paradigm shift in Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations is unclear. Kuwait has had an ambassador in Iraq since 2008 and officials from both countries have exchanged visits. That this has not helped in eliminating tensions is an indication that such gestures alone cannot lead to improved relations.

**Iraqi-Kuwait Tensions are high over compensation for the invasion during the gulf war  
Nayouf in 9** <Hayyan Nayouf, June 11, 2009. “Iraq and Kuwait Battle it Out For War Damages.” http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/06/11/75618.html>

Neighboring Arab states, Iraq and Kuwait, have been engaged in an escalating war of words as both countries' demand compensation from each other for the wars they have endured. While Iraq demands that Kuwait pay reparations for facilitating the 2003 U.S.-led invasion by allowing American troops to enter Iraq via its territory, Kuwait similarly called for Baghdad to pay for its former president Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion. Adding to the spat are accusations from each side that the demands are unreasonable and go against the neighborly spirit as well as a charge that Iran has a hand in Iraq's demands. I remember a famous saying by an American congressman. He said that 'no war has ever broken out between two countries that have a McDonalds.' Now, Iraqis eat McDonalds like us, so there will be no war " Kuwaiti writer "Iraq's demands are part of an Iranian agenda in the region," prominent Kuwaiti writer Fouad al-Hashem told Al Arabiya. "This is not an Iraqi agenda. It is all Iran's planning. This should be an issue between Iraq and Kuwait over implementing U.N. resolutions," he said, adding promoting Iran's political agenda was not in Iraq's interest. Hashem also said he believed Iraqi officials should be grateful to the Americans. "They shouldn't forget that hadn't it been for the Americans, they wouldn't have been in power in the first place. Therefore, talking about compensation for the American invasion doesn't make sense." Hashem said he thought it unlikely that the situation would escalate because they both eat fast food. "I remember a famous saying by an American congressman. He said that 'no war has ever broken out between two countries that have a McDonalds.' Now, Iraqis eat McDonalds like us, so there will be no war," he joked. The golden arches theory of conflict prevention comes from New York Times journalist Thomas Friedman, who famously wrote in his 2000 book the Lexus and the Olive Tree that "[n]o two countries that had McDonald's had fought a war against each other since each got its McDonald's." Iraqi perspective " The Iraqi citizen is wondering why he should pay for a war Saddam waged. Why is Kuwait being so harsh on Iraq at a time when it should offer a helping hand instead? " Iraqi editor From the Iraqi perspective, Saddam's past actions should not be blamed on the current government or on its people. "We all know the huge damage that Kuwait sustained after the Iraqi invasion," prominent Iraqi journalist Fallah Mashaal told Al Arabiya. "But the invasion was not the people's decision; it was Saddam's decision. I don't think it is fair that the Iraqi people pay for his mistakes." Mashaal, who is the editor-in-chief of the state-owned newspaper al-Sabah, said that the problem lies in Kuwait's insistence that Iraq pays the compensation in full. "I am surprised that Kuwait does not want to waive part of the compensation although other Gulf countries have done so. What Kuwait is doing is not in line with the concept of brotherhood and the historic ties between both countries." Mashaal denied the involvement of Iran in Iraq's demands for compensation and argued that Iraq suffers from shortages in basic services like water and electricity. "The Iraqi citizen is wondering why he should pay for a war Saddam waged. Why is Kuwait being so harsh on Iraq at a time when it should offer a helping hand instead?" Mashaal stressed the importance of peace and echoed the Interior Minister Jawad Bulani's call for establishing dialogue with Kuwait. "Any threat from either of the two countries is not in the interest of either of them," Mashaal concluded.

# Presence Good- Deters Iraq/Kuwait War

**Tensions high- Iraq is angry about Kuwait drilling into its oil reserves  
Iraq Business News 3/28** <Iraq Business News. March 28, 2010. “Outrage in Basra as Kuwait Drills Cross-Border Deposits.” http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/?p=1872

**A Kuwaiti project to drill an oil deposit shared with Iraq has sparked outrage in Iraq’s southern oil province of Basra, where the Iraqi side of the shared cross-border deposit is located.** Local politicians in Basra said Kuwaiti work on the Ratqa field, an extension of Iraq’s supergiant Rumaila field, could tap into Iraq’s reserves. Kuwait denies it is anything but routine work. Iraq has not signed bilateral agreements on protocol for developing the fields crossing or near the border with its neighbors, which has prompted diplomatic controversies with neighbors, including Iran in December. The head of Basra’s provincial council, Jabar Ameen al-Latif, alleged that drilling was taking place around 180 meters from the Iraqi border. “We call for the federal government to close the borders issue,” Latif said, “to avoid many border problems which appear from time to time between Iraq and neighboring countries, especially Iran and Kuwait.” He said the Basra province government had sent a delegation to Kuwait calling for diplomatic resolution to these problems instead of unilateral drilling. Basra oil expert Abdul Jabar al-Haifi said countries that share joint deposits have the right to drill wells inside its own borders because Iraq has not signed any agreements on managing any shared fields. “It is like the situation between Iraq and Turkey about water,” he said. “There is no obligation on Turkey about the amount of water it gives to Iraq,” referring to the ongoing debate between Iraq and its upstream neighbor on distribution of water resources. However, there are concerns that because Kuwait has better equipment than Iraq, it will be better able to exploit the joint deposit. Kuwait’s ambassador in Iraq, Ali al-Mumim, however denied that any new projects had begun. He said that routine maintenance work was being carried out on the Ratqa field. “This oil field is a developed and a producing field. The work on this field has been ongoing for a long time,” he said. He went on to say that the wells being maintained were more than 180 meters from the border. He also said that there had been meetings of Iraqi and Kuwaiti committees to discuss cross-border oil wells, and that a proposal had been made for each side to drill only 250 meters or more from the border. “But, so far, the Iraqi side has not responded to this,” he said. The Oil Ministry declined to comment on the issue when contacted by the Iraq Oil Report. The issue of oil fields on or near the border is a thorny one. After the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, borders including areas with oil fields were never clearly redrawn. A dispute over the Fauqi (aka Fakka) field on the border in December 2009 became stand-off involving mobilization of Iranian and Iraqi soldiers. The Kuwait border dispute will have loud resonance in Iraq. In 1990, Iraqi accusations that Kuwait was using slant drilling to tap Iraqi oil were part of the build-up to the surprise Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of that year.

# Presence Good- Deters Iraq/Kuwait War

**Iraq will initiate conflict with Kuwait over Kuwaiti taking its oil reserves-empirically proven  
Allan in 98** <January 11, 1998. Tony Allan received his doctorate from the University of London in 1971. He specializes in the renewable natural resources of arid regions and especially water in the Middle East. He has written and edited a number of publications on the subject and advises governments and international agencies on water issues. “Avoiding War Over Natural Resources” http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JPL4>

It is a universally held belief that surface water that crosses boundaries is prone to dispute. In the arid Middle East and North Africa, where water symbolizes communal security, the tendency is for water to be perceived as a prime factor in determining the course of regional international relations. Since about 90% of the usable water in the region crosses one or more international borders, such an assumption is understandable. Tony Allan shows that, while water is important in international relations, its role in bilateral and multilateral international relations is complex and never determining, because water issues are always linked with other factors. "When nations negotiate, often the toughest bargaining is not between nations but within them. The reason is simple: international agreements, no matter how much in the national "interest", inevitably have differential effects on the factional concerns...experienced negotiators almost invariably insist that the more difficult part of their job consists not in dealing with the adversary across the table but in handling interest groups, bureaucrats and politicians at home." [2] Individuals and communities can pick a fight over any issue, including tangibles like territory and resources - water among them. Disputes can also arise over what can be described as transgressions of national honour. The seizure, or attempted seizure, of territory or resources by one State from another occurs when power relations enable an acquisitive initiative to be first considered, then judged feasible and subsequently attempted. In 1990 just such a cycle culminated in armed conflict when Iraq occupied Kuwait in pursuit not of water but of oil. Sovereignty over oil resources is only rarely ambiguous. Only a tiny proportion of crude oil reservoirs are located directly beneath international borders. **Kuwait's excessive pumping of the oilfield beneath the Iraq-Kuwait border was in this case cited as the reason for the invasion**. In fact, the pumping of oil from a particular oilfield was much less important than the perceived irresponsibility of Kuwait in pumping and exporting oil at a rate which had the effect of softening the international price for producers with substantially greater needs for oil revenues than Kuwait. Iraq's economic security was severely affected by global oil prices**. Nations will go to war over natural resources**. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the reactions of its neighbours and especially the responses of the United States and the other industrialized economies were historic in their confirmation of this contention. The response of the OECD [3] economies was swift, so threatened were their interests. They deployed their military might, or gave it their financial support, when there was a threat to the secure flow of cheap Middle East oil. The Iraqi invasion signalled either unacceptable regional instability or Iraq's equally unacceptable regional hegemony over the world's major oil reserves. The intervention was effective in terms of ejecting Iraq from Kuwait and ending its attempt to control the Gulf crude oil trade.

**New Tensions means Iraq could initiate conflict with Kuwait  
Gamal in 10** <Rania Gamal, January 17, 2010. Reuters. “Kuwait Fears Iraq Violence Could Spread” http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE60G03C>

Kuwait fears a rise in militant attacks and sectarian tensions in Iraq could cause a new security threat for the Gulf Arab oil producer, a minister said in remarks published on Sunday. The sectarian bloodshed unleashed by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq has largely abated but U.S. and Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi authorities expect attacks by Sunni militants to increase ahead of key parliamentary elections in March. Large-scale bombings killed dozens this month across Iraq, which Baghdad blamed on al Qaeda militants and elements of former leader Saddam Hussein's outlawed Baath party. "I'm worried about the collapse of the security system in Iraq, which could drive many Iraqis to seek refuge in Kuwait," Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammad al-Salem al-Sabah told al-Qabas daily. "I am worried about ... a sectarian conflict that would spread to Kuwait ... I'm worried that conflicts, terrorism and al Qaeda groups could spread to Kuwait," he said. Kuwait, which is almost one-third Shi'ite, waged a largely successful campaign to stamp out violence by Islamist militants after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on U.S. cities and Iraq war. Last year, Kuwait said it had foiled an al Qaeda-linked plan to bomb a U.S. army camp and an oil refinery in the OPEC oil exporting state. Relations between Iraq and Kuwait became tense last year because of a dispute over billion of dollars Baghdad owes to Kuwait in reparations for 1990-91 occupation of the small state in the era of Saddam Hussein.

# Presence Good- Deters Iraq/Kuwait War

**If provoked, Iraq could launch another attack on Kuwait**

**Chilcott in 3** <Ryan Chilcott, January 3, 2003. “Kuwait Still Recovering from Gulf War Fires”. CNN http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/01/03/sproject.irq.kuwait.oil.fires/index.html>

In the waning days of the Persian Gulf War, as Iraqi forces retreated to Baghdad, Saddam Hussein sent a team of engineers into the Kuwaiti oil fields and blew up hundreds of wells. Over the next seven months, more than 1 billion barrels of oil went up in flames, and Kuwait and much of the Persian Gulf was engulfed in a poisonous smoke, creating a large-scale environmental disaster. As the specter of a new conflict between a U.S.-coalition and Iraq looms, some fear that Saddam Hussein could repeat the tactics of 1991 within his own borders, plunging the region into another, even greater, environmental and economic catastrophe. In Kuwait, the Persian Gulf War left behind heavy environmental damage. Day vanished into night, black rain fell from the sky, and a vast network of lakes was born ... lakes of oil as deep as six feet. Saddam also poured 10 million barrels of oil into the sea. Thousands of birds perished, and the people of the Persian Gulf became familiar with new diseases. "My child, my son, now he has a problem with his breathing. He can't breathe very well. ... Sometimes he's coughing and feel dizzy," said oil worker Mohammad Najaf. "The doctors they told me that [it was] because of the smoke that came after the invasion," he said. "Right now in Kuwait we are noticing an increasing number of cases of cancer. We think it's related to what happened in '91 when we had the oil fires. A lot of people breathe very bad air," said Dr. Meshal Al-Mesham, head of the Kuwait Environment Protection Agency. Indeed, Kuwait is still recovering from the environmental damage it suffered during the Persian Gulf War, according Jonathan Lash president of the World Resources Institute, a Washington-based think tank that focuses on global environmental and development issues. "What many recall as a short-lived conflict resulting in the liberation of Kuwait was an environmental disaster -- one from which the region and its people have yet to recover," Lash said in a written statement, adding: "The oil that did not burn in the fires traveled on the wind in the form of nearly invisible droplets resulting in an oil mist or fog that poisoned trees and grazing sheep, contaminated fresh water supplies, and found refuge in the lungs of people and animals throughout the Gulf." "Today," Lasher said, "Saddam could deliberately create another catastrophe if attacked."

\*\*\*SOUTH KOREA\*\*\*

# Presence Good- South Korean Relations

## American military presence in Korea maintains peace and strong US-ROK relations

Sharp, 10 (Gen. Walter Sharp, Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Congressional Documents and Publications, March 26) Calum

The Korean Peninsula sits at the center of Northeast Asia - a dynamic region that has significant national interests for the U.S. n1 Northeast Asia is home to four of the world's six largest militaries in terms of personnel and two nuclear powers (China and Russia). n2 The region contains 25% of the world's population and is an economic powerhouse. n3 In 2009, Northeast Asia housed five of the world's 19 largest economies that collectively accounted for 24.8% of global gross domestic product during that year. n4 Countries in the region also accounted for 25.8% of U.S. trade in goods during 2009. n5 At the end of 2008, the U.S. direct investment position in Northeast Asia was valued at $220.7 billion. n6

While Northeast Asia has grown into a major economic region, it is also characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change. Historical animosities, territorial disputes, competition over access to resources, and struggles for regional hegemony have combined to pose difficult and long-term security challenges not only for regional states but also for the international community. U.S. force presence in the ROK is a long-term investment in regional peace and stability and both maintains security commitments to the ROK established under the Mutual Defense Treaty and reinforces American engagement with actors throughout Northeast Asia. U.S. force presence in the ROK also helps set the conditions for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and eventual reunification of the two Koreas in a peaceful manner. A strong ROK-U.S. Alliance, with a meaningful U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula, is essential to meet the security challenges posed in the dynamic and economically growing region of Northeast Asia. As observed in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, achieving core missions of American armed forces requires strong security relationships with allies and partners that are best enabled and maintained through long-term presence and sustained interaction.

**Troops are key to U.S.- South Korea relations- increases trade and econ**

**U.S. Department of State 5/28/10 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm**

U.S.-KOREAN RELATIONS The United States believes that the question of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula is, first and foremost, a matter for the Korean people to decide. Under the 1953 U.S.-R.O.K. Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States agreed to help the Republic of Korea defend itself against external aggression. In support of this commitment, the United States has maintained military personnel in Korea, including the Army's Second Infantry Division and several Air Force tactical squadrons. To coordinate operations between these units and the over 680,000-strong Korean armed forces, a Combined Forces Command (CFC) was established in 1978. The head of the CFC also serves as Commander of the United Nations Command (UNC) and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). The current CFC commander is General Walter “Skip” Sharp. Several aspects of the U.S.-R.O.K. security relationship are changing as the U.S. moves from a leading to a supporting role. In 2004 an agreement was reached on the return of the Yongsan base in Seoul--as well as a number of other U.S. bases--to the R.O.K. and the eventual relocation of all U.S. forces to south of the Han River. Those movements are expected to be completed by 2016. In addition, the U.S. and R.O.K. agreed to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Korea to 25,000 by 2008, but a subsequent agreement by the U.S. and R.O.K. presidents in 2008 has now capped that number at 28,500, with no further troop reductions planned. The U.S. and R.O.K. have also agreed to transfer wartime operational control to the R.O.K. military on April 17, 2012. As Korea's economy has developed, trade and investment ties have become an increasingly important aspect of the U.S.-R.O.K. relationship. Korea is the United States' seventh-largest trading partner (ranking ahead of larger economies such as France, Italy, and India), and there are significant flows of manufactured goods, agricultural products, services and technology between the two countries. Major American firms have long been major investors in Korea, while Korea's leading firms have begun to make significant investments in the United States. The implementation of structural reforms contained in the IMF's 1998 program for Korea improved access to the Korean market and improved trade relations between the United States and Korea. Building on that improvement, the United States and Korea launched negotiations on the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) on February 2, 2006. The KORUS FTA was signed by the United States and Korea on June 30, 2007 and is currently awaiting ratification. The KORUS FTA is a comprehensive FTA that eliminates virtually all barriers to trade and investment between the two countries. Tariffs on 95% of trade between the two countries will be eliminated within three years of implementation, with virtually all the remaining tariffs being removed within 10 years of implementation; the FTA also contains chapters that address non-tariff measures in investment, intellectual property, services, competition policy, and other areas. The KORUS FTA is the largest free trade agreement Korea has ever signed, the largest free trade agreement for the United States since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992, and the United States’ first FTA with a major Asian economy. Economists have projected that the FTA will generate billions of dollars in increased trade and investment between the United States and the Republic of Korea, and boost economic growth and job creation in both countries.

# Presence Good- South Korean Relations

**Increasing U.S. troops are key to South Korean stability**

**GI Korea 5/5/10** <http://rokdrop.com/2010/03/05/are-us-troops-still-needed-in-south-korea/> Korea from North to South

Here is an interesting article by journalist Ben Hancock in The Diplomat about the US troop presence in South Korea that readers here at the ROK Drop should find of interest. Hancock interviews a number of people about this issue to include one of my Useful Idiots, John Feffer: ‘It’s almost like a temperature gauge,’ says John Feffer, co-director of the Washington-based Foreign Policy in Focus and editor of The Future of US-Korean Relations. ‘When the United States reduces the number of troops [in South Korea] it has historically been an indication of displeasure.

**Troops in South Korea to U.S.- South Korean relations**

**IBN ‘10** http://ibnlive.in.com/generalnewsfeed/news/skorea-us-to-complete-details-for-delay-of-command-transfer/92651.html

Seoul, Jun 28 (Yonhap) South Korea and the United States plan to complete consultations in October to map out follow-up measures on an agreement to delay Seoul's retaking of wartime operational control (OPCON) of its military from Washington, an official said today.President Lee Myung-bak and US President Barack Obama reached the agreement in Toronto on Saturday to extend Washington's holding of OPCON over Seoul troops until late 2015 in a public display of strengthening their alliance.South Korea had planned to regain the control in April 2012.The two allies will discuss follow-up measures at the Security Policy Initiative talks scheduled for early next month in the US, and basic principles for the measures will be set at a "two plus two" meeting of their foreign and defence ministers in Seoul, deputy defence minister Chang Kwang-il said. The joint meeting is scheduled for July 22."If a broader agreement is reached at the 'two plus two' talks, final consultations will be made at the Security Consultative Meeting to be held in October in the US," Chang told reporters, referring to the annual talks of defence ministers between the two nations.The two countries need to adjust a variety of military systems, including command, control, communications and intelligence as well as joint military exercises,

**Troops in South Korea are key to U.S.- South Korea relations and readiness**

**The Korea Times, 7** Kim Yun-sik <http://211.234.100.245/www/news/opinon/2010/04/162_10413.html>

There is no other program like the KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the United States Army) at U.S. Army units stationed overseas. It is a unique system for the U.S. Army that allows South Korean soldiers to serve under the U.S. chain of command. The program began after retreating South Korean soldiers were driven down to the Nakdong River front during the 1950-53 Korean War, South Korean stragglers joined in with American units for rations and shelter. U.S. General Douglas MacArthur struggled with manpower shortages. In order to meet manpower requirements, the KATUSA program was proposed. This followed an informal agreement between the President of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Gen. MacArthur. In early August, the U.S. Army made it official, and planned to take 30,000 to 40,000 Korean army recruits and integrate them with U.S. combat units. The original conception of the program was to augment U.S. fighting forces with a ``buddy." The buddy would teach the KATUSA basic English and combat skills. The ROK Army would pay and administer the KATUSA while the U.S. Army would provide rations, U.S. combat uniforms with a Korean army rank and special service items. The first KATUSA class was made up of schoolboys and young men swept up from the streets and refugee camps of Busan and Daegu. My unit was assigned to activate KSC (Korean Service Corps) first and then to organize the first KATUSA soldier unit. To support this program I was ordered to serve as a liaison officer between the 8th U.S. Army and the Civil Affair Office in Daegu. In late August, Gen. MacArthur ordered General Walker to ship 8,000 Koreans to Japan as KATUSA forces for training. These unfortunate civilians were poured ashore at Yokohama, Japan, they were bewildered and scared. Many of them were sick and wore only sandals and shorts. They were herded to U.S. camps where they were unenthusiastically welcomed by U.S. commanders. These trainees were classified into two groups, those middle school educated and those not. However, they were trained in the use of small arms. After being poorly trained, those recruited were assigned to units earmarked for the Incheon amphibious landing operation on Sept 15. They supported the deployment of U.S. 5th Marine and ROK Marine 17th Regiment to secure the bridgehead at the Green-Beach Wolmi Island. It would be a long time before the majority of KATUSA troops could be considered effective combat troops. Lacking understanding of their U.S. allies and training behavior, their performance was spotty at best. Some of them seemed to not even have a clear understanding of which end of a rifle the bullets came out. By early November, when Chinese troops intervened in the Korean campaign, a new dimension was added to the war. 700 KATUSA soldiers were assigned to the 7th U.S Infantry Division which deployed to the Chosin Reservoir campaign where many U.S. service members were lost. The sad truth was the U.S. Army was aware that their South Korean allies were extremely unprepared and could not be relied on for combat support The 7th Division commander complained that the KATUSA could not be considered combat effective and the division was composed of ineffective augmentation troops. The commander described them as being stunned, confused and exhausted. He, however, added it must be remembered that these were civilians who had been shanghaied out of the rice paddies and valleys of South Korea and simply dispatched to the 7th Division without warning. They were unpaid, cut off from their families, poorly equipped, poorly trained, and indifferently supplied. However, soon after stabilization of the frontline, the picture drastically changed as the KATUSA could be better trained. Their duties expanded to scouting, intelligence, guarding POWs and assisting refugees where their interpreter's skills proved to be invaluable. The U.S. troops came to acknowledge their KATUSA buddies were equal on the battlefield. By 1952, the frontline of U.S. troops was gradually being replaced with KATUSA. At the time the armistice was signed at the Panmunjeom, the number of KATUSA serving in the U.S. Army was about 24,000. After the ceasefire the program remained to enhance their mission capability with the U.S. units. The KATUSA program offered greater prestige and more tangible benefits than those of the regular ROK Army, and so the government limits the number of new recruits. Today KATUSA soldiers comprise approximately 10 percent of the total 8th Army manpower in Korea. It is a prestigious service for young Korean men to serve as KATUSA soldiers, strict competitive examinations are held in a screening process in order to be recruited as KATUSA members. The KATUSA program established an enviable reputation as they gallantly fought side by side with the U.S. and other U.N. forces in defending the ROK and preserving democracy and freedom. It has been 57 years since the KATUSA program began, and more than 250,000 South Koreans have served their country. The KATUSA program continues to increase combat readiness for the U.S.-ROK alliance.

# Presence Good- South Korean Relations

**Troops are key to U.S.- South Korea relations- increases trade and econ**

**U.S. Department of State 5/28/10**  <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm>

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# Presence Good- Deters Asian War

**U.S. military presence key to South Korean Marines**

**Defense News ‘8** Jung Sung- Ki http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3307279

SEOUL - South Korea's Marine Corps is seeking to develop its rapid-force-projection capability beyond the traditional roles of coastal protection and amphibious assault on the North Korean shoreline. Central to the plan was the July commissioning of the 14,000-ton Dokdo-class large-deck landing ship, able to rapidly deploy 700 Marines from the sea, Marine officials said. "South Korean Marines' landing operations are becoming more efficient and three-dimensional by using different types of amphibious equipment - amphibious assault vehicles, helicopters and other combat assets - aboard the Dokdo ship at the same time,'' said Lt. Col. Joo Jong-hwa of the Marine Corps' public affairs office. Joo referred to November's massive joint amphibious training exercise of South Korean and U.S. sailors and Marines in the coastal waters off Pohang, some 400 kilometers southeast of Seoul, as a "model'' for South Korean Marines' warfare plans. During the division-level exercise Nov. 14 involving 8,000 troops of both nations, the Dokdo functioned as a command vessel for the first time, using its state-of-the-art C4ISR and battle command system. About 1,500 U.S. troops from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit based in Okinawa participated in the drill with the 45,000-ton USS Essex (LHD-2) amphibious assault ship, with Harrier fighter jets and three Landing Craft Air Cushions (LCACs), Joo said. South Korea mobilized about 20 ships led by the 4,500-ton Munmu the Great, a KDX-II destroyer; 60 aircraft, including F-4 and F-5 fighters, P-3C maritime patrol and anti-submarine planes, and UH-60/UH-1H helicopters; and 28 Korea Amphibious Assault Vehicles (KAAVs), he said. The South Korean Navy's underwater demolition teams and SEAL forces also took part, commanded by a Korean Navy rear admiral and a Marine Corps brigadier general. "That exercise was meaningful in that the South Korean military commanded a large-scale joint amphibious exercise for the first time," Joo said. He was referring to Seoul's pursuit of independent defense capabilities to prepare for the transition of wartime operational control of its armed forces from the U.S. military in 2012. "It was possible because of the Dokdo ship's high-tech command-control and supporting systems," he added. The Dokdo Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH 6111), built by Hanjin Heavy Industries & Construction, has been operational with the Navy since July after two years of sea trials. Two more Dokdo-class carriers are to be launched by 2016. The 199-meter-long, 31-meter-wide vessel is the largest helicopter transporter in Asia, bigger than the Osumi-class landing ships (8,900 tons) of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. The vessel will serve as a light aircraft carrier to orchestrate the future strategic mobile squadron, consisting of 7,000-ton KDX-III Aegis destroyers, 4,500-ton KDX-II stealthy destroyers, 214-type submarines and advanced frigates, Navy officials said. It also will take the lead in conducting international peacekeeping operations and disaster relief, they said. The Dokdo ship program was based on the concept of "over-the-horizon assault," aimed at conducting amphibious landing operations with high-speed air-cushioned vehicles and helicopters from beyond the horizon, where they can't be easily detected by the enemy. A conventional landing ship tank (LST) risks being detected by the enemy as it approaches the coastline for a landing. The Dokdo is capable of carrying 300 crew members, 700 Marines, 28 KAAVs, two LCACs and seven helicopters. Self-defense armaments include a RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile system and two Goalkeeper Close-in weapon systems. The vessel can sail at a maximum speed of 43 kilometers per hour. When the landing ship is equipped with a ski jump module, vertical or short takeoff and landing aircraft such as the Harrier or the F-35B can be launched from the deck. The Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) approved the $850 million LST-II project on Nov. 9 to build four indigenous, 4,500-ton amphibious warfare ships between 2014 and 2017. The ships will be fitted with 76mm 62-caliber guns and anti-guided missile systems, DAPA officials said. South Korea's Navy operates four 2,700-ton LSTs, and has three Murena-E hovercraft from Russia. BOOSTING AIR-TO-GROUND POWER Military experts here call for enhancing the Marine Corps' air-to-ground capability not only to develop its rapid deployment force, but to combat terrorism and pirates, secure sea lanes, protect national interests and perform peacekeeping. "We have one of the best Marine forces in the world, but force-projection capability from the sea to inland targets is limited due to the lack of long-range mobility," said Park Chang-kwon at the Center for Security and Strategy at the state-run Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. "To successfully project power deep inland while avoiding the enemy's surveillance network, operations of advanced helicopters and high-speed amphibious assault vehicles and air-cushioned ships are essential." Park also stressed the need to procure advanced littoral combat ships and high-speed patrol ships to cope with unconventional warfare and territorial claims, like the dispute over the Dokdo islets in South Korea's eastern waters, to which Japan has laid claim. Currently, the Marine Corps has no aircraft of its own, relying on air support from the Army and Navy. The service plans to create an aviation brigade with transport and attack helicopters by 2015, according to military sources. To strengthen its intelligence-gathering and surveillance capabilities, the service also is considering deploying unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles by 2014, they added. "Nothing has been fixed yet about the creation of an aviation brigade," Joo said. "But it's obvious that South Korea's Marine Corps should have its own air support unit, like the U.S. Marine forces, to increase its operational capability."

# Presence Good- Deters Asian War

**US needs to take control in the event of a Korean war**

**The Economic Times 06/18** (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/US-to-retake-control-of-S-Korea-war/articleshow/6059080.cms)

SEOUL: US forces will regain control over a major annual military exercise with South Korea amid rising tensions with the North following the sinking of one of Seoul's warships, officials said on Thursday. Seoul's defence ministry said the Combined Forces Command led by US General Walter Sharp will retake control of the computerised war game called Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) from this year. In 2008 and last year the South's military took control of the exercise, to prepare for a scheduled transfer of wartime command in the military alliance. UFG, which is due to start in mid-August, is the world's largest computerised war game and rehearses defending the South from an attack by North Korean. "The Combined Forces Command will take back control of the annual drill, with the US military playing a leading role, from this year," a defence ministry spokesman told AFP. "It is a decision made in consideration of heightened tensions over the sinking of the Cheonan (warship)." The spokesman declined to confirm a local media report that the change was requested by Sharp. South Korea is scheduled from April 2012 to take control of its military forces in the event of war. Under the current arrangement a US army general in wartime would command 650,000 South Korean troops as well as 28,500 American troops stationed in the country. There have been calls in both countries to rethink the command handover as cross-border tensions flare. The South accuses the North of torpedoing the Cheonan, a South Korean corvette, on March 26 with the loss of 46 lives. The North denies involvement and has threatened attack in response to reprisals. The US Senate's Armed Services Committee has called on Defense Secretary Robert Gates to present by December 1 a report on the implications of the wartime command change.

**ROK military deployments stabilize Middle East and South Asia**

**Twining, 10** – Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (4/1/10, Daniel, “Strengthening the U.S.-Korea Alliance for the 21st Century,” http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct\_publication\_attachments/AsiaDanTwiningU.S.KoreaAlliance.pdf)

With regard to land power, South Korea’s military deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq set **an important precedent** for future contributions by the Korean armed forces to stabilization and security operations in the arc of instability encompassing the Middle East and South Asia. U.S.-ROK combined training and exercises could increasingly focus on enlarging the South Korean army’s capacities for counterinsurgency and post-conflict stabilization with an eye on future challenges beyond the peninsula. This program to add a global-operations dimension to the interoperability between the American and South Korean armies on the peninsula would build on existing joint training and planning for stabilization operations following a potential collapse of the North Korean regime.

**Increasing U.S. troops are key to South Korean stability**

**GI Korea 5/5/10** http://rokdrop.com/2010/03/05/are-us-troops-still-needed-in-south-korea/ Korea from North to South

Here is an interesting article by journalist Ben Hancock in The Diplomat about the US troop presence in South Korea that readers here at the ROK Drop should find of interest. Hancock interviews a number of people about this issue to include one of my Useful Idiots, John Feffer: ‘It’s almost like a temperature gauge,’ says John Feffer, co-director of the Washington-based Foreign Policy in Focus and editor of The Future of US-Korean Relations. ‘When the United States reduces the number of troops [in South Korea] it has historically been an indication of displeasure. International Actors: Alliances haven't changed much in 50 years. The U.S. backs South Korea, while China supports the North. Neither country would likely remain neutral in a Korean war, but it's unclear how involved they would be -- unless North Korea employed nuclear weapons, which would almost certainly trigger an immediate U.S. response. Since 1978, the U.S. has pledged to protect South Korea from a nuclear threat from the North. "Under the extended nuclear deterrence pledge, the U.S. military would use some of its tactical nuclear weapons, such as B-61 nuclear bombs carried by B-2/52 bombers and F-15E, F-16 and F/A-18 fighters, as well as Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from nuclear-powered submarines, to strike North Korea's nuclear facilities in retaliation for any such attack on the South," military experts told The Korea Times. China will not support North Korean nuclear aggression, though it's unlikely to sit by idly if American and South Korean forces take over the North. Meanwhile, the main U.S. tensions with China will remain over Taiwan, which could exacerbate if Taiwan used the distraction of a Korean conflict to declare independence. The Aftermath: Were full-scale war to break out, the endgame likely would be the end of North Korea's dictatorship; the U.S. would not settle for a peace that left Kim Jong-il in power. But what would you do with his brainwashed subjects, whose leader has done everything he can to block their access to the modern outside world? Hitchens, again: "The dirty secret here is that no neighboring power really wants the North Korean population released from its awful misery. Here are millions of stunted and unemployable people, traumatized and deformed by decades of pointless labor on the plantations of a mad despot. The South Koreans do not really want these hopeless cases on the soil of their flourishing consumer society. The Chinese, who have a Korean-speaking province that borders North Korea, are likewise unwilling to suffer the influx of desperate people that is in our future." This reintegration project would be much more difficult than the one following the reunification of Germany, where Soviet control in the East, however draconian, never approached the cult state that is North Korea. Whatever military challenges war would bring would be dwarfed by these postwar social challenges.

# Presence Good- Deters Asian War

**Increasing troops in South Korea is key to the perception of commitment.**

**Jung Sung-ki 09 (**http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/06/205\_54265.html)  
  
A top U.S. military commander hinted that U.S. troops stationed in South Korea could be temporarily deployed to the Middle East in the coming years. Won Tae-jae, spokesman for South Korea's Ministry of National Defense, said the two governments have not discussed any troop redeployment, adding his ministry is checking the comments made by Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Oct. 22 in Seoul. According to the Stars and Stripes, a military newspaper in Seoul, Mullen told U.S. troops during a town hall meeting in Seoul that the U.S. Department of Defense was discussing whether to deploy troops stationed in South Korea to the Middle East. The remarks have caused controversy over the ``strategic flexibility'' aim of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). Strategic flexibility is aimed at changing the mission of American forces abroad from stationary ones focused on defending host nations to rapid deployment troops that can be swiftly dispatched to other parts of the world where the United States faces conflict. Seoul and Washington agreed on the scheme in 2006, but the plan has not been fully implemented amid concerns that it could weaken the Korea-U.S. combined forces against North Korea. ``That's something we're looking very specifically at,'' the admiral was quoted as saying. ``We really haven't closed on whether it's going to be one way or the other. ``The concern that gets raised with respect to rotating forces out of here is that it lessens the commitment to the alliance and the Republic of Korea, and nothing could be further from the truth.'' The USFK has pushed ahead with a plan to lengthen the tours of U.S. troops here and have them live with their family members as part of ``tour normalization'' efforts. USFK Commander Gen. Walter Sharp said earlier that his command would have one-half of its 28,500 members serve three-year accompanied tours, similar to those served by soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines in Japan and Europe for decades. ``The timing of that will depend on how fast we can build the schools and housing to accommodate the increased population,'' Sharp told U.S. journalists. Phase I of the expansion, now under way, is designed to increase the number of accompanied tours from 2,400 to 4,300 by early 2001, he said. The second phase is scheduled for 2011-2016, and will involve moving forces from Yongsan Garrison in Seoul and the 2nd Infantry Division posts north of the capital into Camp Humphreys in Gyeonggi Province.

# Presence Good- Deters North Korea

**Withdrawal from South Korea could cause a stop in North Korean nuclear testing.**

**Brookes 06/24** (Defending South Korea, Published on June 24, 2004 by Peter Brookes, Peter Brookes, a veteran of the CIA and naval intelligence, is a senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2004/06/Defending-South-Korea)

South Korea should do more for its own defence. As the world's 11th largest economy, South Korea can spend more on its own defence -- and should. The reduction in U.S. forces will provide the Roh government an opportunity to do more for South Korea's national security. This supports both Washington's need for more flexibility in deploying its forces to global hot spots and Seoul's desire for a bigger role in its national defence. Lastly, though unlikely, there's a sliver of a chance that the reduction of U.S. forces could help reduce North-South tensions. The North long has demanded that U.S. troops leave the peninsula. This reduction could be seen as a gesture of goodwill to the North that might lead to some political openings between Seoul and Pyongyang in addressing issues of national reconciliation or even the North's nuclear programme. But because no one is naive regarding North Korean intentions, the force reduction is matched by an increase in force capabilities. The bottom line is that despite these changes, America's commitment to South Korea's defence is as strong as ever. The U.S.'s obligation to the security of the South against the North is a moral one in the defence of a fellow democracy, not to mention codified in the 1953 U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defence Treaty. The real "tripwire" is the treaty, not the number of U.S. troops in South Korea. The alliance has successfully deterred North Korean aggression for over 50 years. It will do so for as long as needed. A military confrontation between the North and the South would invariably result in the demise of the regime in Pyongyang. Fortunately, Kim Jong Il understands this. Adjusting the U.S.-South Korea partnership for the 21st century makes ultimate sense. The future of the alliance will be better for this, making the relationship ready for challenges on the Korean peninsula and beyond.

**Seoul is demanding increased military presence as a deterrent against North Korea.**

**Kim 06/30** ( By HYUNG-JIN KIM, Associated Press Writer Hyung-jin Kim, Associated Press Writer – Wed Jun 30, 6:57 am ET, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100630/ap\_on\_re\_as/as\_skorea\_ship\_sinks)

SEOUL, South Korea – South Korea's Defense Ministry requested a sharp increase Wednesday in its budget for next year to improve its fighting capability amid tensions over the sinking of a warship blamed on North Korea. The ministry said it asked for about 31.6 trillion won ($25.8 billion) next year to introduce new weapons and improve military hardware and welfare for troops. The amount would be a 6.9 percent increase from the 29.5 trillion won budgeted this year, which was a 3.6 percent increase from the year before, a ministry official said on condition of anonymity, citing policy. An international investigation concluded last month that North Korea torpedoed the South Korean warship Cheonan near the tense Korean sea border in late March, killing 46 sailors. North Korea denied it launched an attack and warned that any punishment would trigger war. The Cheonan's sinking was reflected in the ministry's request for a higher budget, the official said. The official declined to elaborate on what kinds of new weapons the ministry is seeking with the proposed budget. Yonhap news agency, citing an unidentified military official, reported that the ministry wants to bolster its defense capability to cope with limited warfare with North Korea. The Ministry of Strategy and Finance said it plans to review the budget request and consult with other ministries before submitting a total proposed government budget for next year to the Cabinet and National Assembly for final approval. Earlier this week, North Korea threatened to take unspecified military action against South Korea and the United States, accusing the allies of deploying heavy weapons to the border truce village of Panmunjom. The U.S.-led U.N. Command on Tuesday dismissed the allegation. North Korea also said Monday it must bolster its nuclear capability, citing hostile U.S. policies and military threats, although the U.S. has repeatedly said it has no intention of attacking. The two Koreas are still technically at war because no peace treaty was signed at the end of the 1950-53 Korean War. The U.S. stations about 28,500 troops in South Korea as a deterrent against the North.

# Presence Good- Deters North Korea

**Increased US Troops in South Korea are key to prevent nuclear war**

**Wolfsthal 2004** (“US Troop Reductions Risk War in Korea”, Jon Wolfsthal 8/6/2004, Originally published June 8, 2004 in the Munhwa Ilbo. Jon Wolfsthal is deputy director of the Non-Proliferation Project, http://www.carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=1581)

The security situation in Iraq is bad and continues to worsen. While the recent appointment of interim leaders in Iraq is a positive political step,it is increasingly clear that the United States has mismanaged its occupation of Iraq and that the prolonged post-war chaos shows no signs of improving any time soon. The need for additional US troops in Iraq has become so acute that the United States has announced the reduction and transfer of US troops from South Korea to Iraq. While the realignment of US forces in South Korea has been a joint goal for the US and the Republic of Korea for several years, the timing and decision to redeploy those troop directly to Iraq sends the wrong signal to US allies and enemies in the region and raises questions about the willingness of the US to stand by its friends in East Asia. In fact, the US should be looking to increase its military capabilities in the region, not reduce them. The decision to move 3,600 support troops out of South Korea does not directly affect the ability of the United States to help defend South Korea from any attack by the North. Moreover, it is not clear that the troops add any significant capability to US forces in Iraq. By some estimates, many tens of thousands of additional troops are needed in Iraq to secure cities and borders with neighboring countries. But the symbolism is clear around the world - the US is in trouble in Iraq and appears to be scavenging troops from anywhere and everywhere to bolster its position in the Middle East. If troops had to be removed from South Korea, they should have been rotated back to the United States or better yet on temporary assignment to Japan. The events in Iraq, however, are not the only reason the timing of this move was a mistake. The continued progress of North Korea' nuclear program that may now include up to 9 nuclear weapons has influenced the way the troop realignment may be seen on Pyongyang and elsewhere. While it is always difficult to understand North Korean perceptions, it is possible that Pyongyang will interpret the US troop move as a sign of weakness and further embolden Kim Jong Il to advance his nuclear program as a way of encouraging further US military reductions. The current US administration has approach on North Korea's nuclear program has failed. Pyongyang's capabilities have increased in the 3 plus years this administration has been in office with no real progress in site. It is time to face the increasingly realistic possibility that North Korea may never give up its nuclear program -or may never be offered a deal attractive enough to tempt it to do so. The United States, South Korea, Japan and China must quickly begin to make adjustments in its political and military positions to ensure that North Korea is deterred from taking any provocative military action and that the alliances between the ROK, Japan and the United States are reinforced. To ensure the future credibility of US security commitments to both South Korea and Japan, the United States should consider increasing, not decreasing, the level of troops in the region as well as continuing to enhance regional military capabilities. This would send a clear signal to North Korea that its continued nuclear efforts are worsening its security situation, while reassuring US allies that Washington remains committed to their protection. Lastly, it is time for the United States to communicate a new set of messages or red lines to North Korea, including what North Korean moves the US would consider so dangerous as to warrant military action. Among these are any attempt by North Korea to export any nuclear materials and any moves to conduct a nuclear weapons test. Most importantly, the US should make it clear to Pyongyang that any signs that North Korea is preparing to launch a long-range ballistic missile would be interpreted as possible preparation for a nuclear attack against the United States or one of its allies. Former US Secretary of Defense William Perry warned last year that the current direction of US policy risked both sides "drifting into war" through miscalculation. Now that the US has lowered its military presence in South Korea and North Korea expanded its nuclear arsenal, his predictions are coming closer to reality.

# Presence Good- Deters North Korea

**Increased troops in South Korea key to the economy, hegemony, Korean nuclear war, and the war on terrorism.**

**Tuazon 03** (http://www.converge.org.nz/abc/pr28-84.html)

In 2001, RAND came up with a report, "The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force Posture" (Lead Author: Zalmay Khalilzad). This report recommends shifting US forces toward the Philippines, Guam, Southeast Asia and other countries close to Taiwan. A year earlier, this think tank in a report, "The Role of Southeast Asia in US Strategy Toward China," also stressed that China's emergence as a major regional power over the next 10-15 years could intensify US-China competition in Southeast Asia and increase the potential for armed conflict. "Economic growth in the region, which is important to the economic security of the US, depends on preserving American presence and influence in the region and unrestricted access to sea lanes," RAND said. The COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, on the other hand, in a Memorandum to Bush in May 2001 ("The US and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New Administration") argued for a more assertive US military stance in the region: "The (Bush) Administration should preserve a credible military presence and a viable regional training and support infrastructure" specifying "high-priority efforts" in the areas of "joint and combined military training exercises and individual and small group exchanges and training". The HERITAGE FOUNDATION also said that the "war against terrorism" would ultimately be pursued in Southeast Asia with or without the express approval of local governments. Again, PNAC envisions some specific operative plans for Asia Pacific: \* In Asia, deploying more troops to beef up the presence of 100,000 US forces to address new challenges for the 21st Century; \* Key to coping with the rise of China to great-power status is the increase in military strength in East Asia and Southeast Asia; \* A heightened US military presence in Southeast Asia will provide the core around which a de facto military coalition (a la the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO]) will be formed; \* Reduce the frequency of aircraft carrier presence in the Mediterranean and the Gulf while increasing US Navy presence in the Pacific; \* For this reason, it is preferable, for strategic and operational reasons, to create a second major home port for a carrier battle group in the southern Pacific - in the Philippines or Australia; \* Establish a network of "deployment bases" or "forward operating bases" to improve the ability to project force to outlying regions. Prepositioned materiel would speed the initial deployment and improve the sustainability of US forces when deployed for training, joint training with the host nation, or operations in time of crisis. (e.g. the Military Logistics Supply Agreement, between the US and the Philippines). The CARLYLE GROUP, which is worth $US13.5 billion, a private empire which operates in the shadows of government, military and industry and spans three continents including Asia; owns companies making tanks, aircraft wings and other military hardware. In the company are former US President George Bush Senior (head of the Asia advisory board); former British Prime Minister John Major; Frank Carlucci, who was President Reagan's Defense Secretary; former Philippines President Fidel Ramos (Asia advisory board); and other world leaders. Carlyle has large investments and big acquisitions in South Korea, Taiwan and China. Carlyle has a $US4 million infrastructure project in the southern Philippine island of Basilan, part of the joint US/Philippine military exercise, Balikatan 02-1. Summary At this point, let me summarise that most public declarations and policy statements made by the US government emphasise that the targets of America's current security objectives are to prevent the rise of a regional hegemonic Power like China, "regime change" in North Korea for possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), to wage war against "transnational terrorism" and insurgencies and other security threats. But the secret reports, security strategies and doctrines of the US government that give emphasis on the use of military power reveal beyond reasonable doubt that the main objective is to consolidate and preserve US hegemony and domination in Asia Pacific and the whole world. The objective is to prolong Pax Americana through the 21st Century. Current US Hegemonic Operations In Asia-Pacific \* US maintains the largest military command here (US Pacific Command [PACOM]). PACOM interacts with the armed forces of 14 of Asia Pacific's 45 countries; \* The number of US troops on land and afloat in the region has surpassed those forward deployed in Europe: 100,000 troops are based in Japan (60,000) and South Korea (37,000), with the rest in Guam, afloat or on various attachments. \* US-Japan alliance - the lynchpin of US security in the region, with Japan playing an increasingly aggressive role; \* Bilateral military alliances with Australia, Thailand and the Philippines; reinforced by access or basing agreements with Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Sri Lanka; \* A stronger military partnership with Australia; \* New strategic partnership with India and Pakistan; \* Plan to reinstall its military bases in Southeast Asia (either in the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, Indonesia or Singapore) \* Laying the ground for a regional military alliance or treaty in the guise of fighting terrorism The September 11, 2001 events, which ignited Bush's "war without borders" (or "Operation Enduring Freedom") were seized upon by Bush to reverse the decline of the US military presence in Asia Pacific and to aggressively assert US hegemonic interests. They: - Opened the "second front" in Bush's "war without borders" using the Philippines as a template (or model) for greater military presence and power projection in the region. The Philippines will serve as the epicentre in the new US military strategy in the circumference of Asia Pacific. - Increased military aid to Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines and other countries; increased arms sales; - Increased military training and funds to support these; - Increased "forward deployed forces" and enhanced their capability through the deployment of Special Operations Forces, covert operations, war materiel and other equipment; - Launched offensive moves against North Korea, hastened plan to build a missile defence system in the Korean Peninsula.

# Presence Good- Deters North Korea

**Increased US Military exercises in South Korea key to check North Korean aggression**

**Higgins 05/25** http://blog.alexanderhiggins.com/2010/05/25/world-stocks-drop-north-korea-orders-troops-prepare-war/)

The United States and South Korea will hold joint military drills to practice the interception of submarines “in the near future,” Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said on Monday. Tensions between the two Koreas, which are technically at war as the 1950-1953 conflict ended with an armistice, have risen following the March 26 incident in the Yellow Sea, when South Korea’s 1,200-ton Cheonan corvette sank near the disputed Northern Limit Line after a sudden explosion. South Korea has accused the North of sinking the ship, which resulted in the deaths of 46 sailors. An international investigation concluded last week that the ship was destroyed by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine. Whitman told reporters in Washington the planned military exercises “are a result of the findings of this recent incident.” The international community has condemned Pyongyang for attacking the South Korean warship. The North has denied the allegations. The United States has said Pyongyang should face consequences and expressed its “unequivocal” support to South Korea. U.S. President Barack Obama has directed his military commanders to coordinate with South Korea to “ensure readiness” and “deter future aggression.” North Korea has called the results of the investigation into the Yellow Sea accident “a fabrication,” and warned Seoul of a stern response if the South retaliated with new sanctions against Pyongyang. Whitman said there would be no changes in a U.S. plan stipulating the transmission of military command to South Korea in 2012. The United States has 28,000 troops on the peninsula to provide military support. In line with an agreement reached after the end of the 1950s inter-Korean war, South Korean soldiers should follow U.S. military orders in case of war on the Korean Peninsula.

**690,000 additional troops needed to prevent Korean conflict.**

**Rozoff 2k** (http://cndyorks.gn.apc.org/caab/articles/korea.htm “ U.S. to deploy 690,000 troops in any new Korean conflict: Report”, 4 December 2000, From: rrozoff@webtv.net (Rick Rozoff), Dec 3 2000)

SEOUL, Dec 4 (AFP) - The United States would deploy up to 690,000 troops on the Korean peninsula if a new war breaks, according to a South Korean defense ministry white paper published Monday. The United States, which has 37,000 troops permanently in the South, remains concerned about North Korea's military strength despite the North-South reconciliation process launched this year. US defense chiefs have considerably increased the number of troops that would be deployed in any new Korean conflict. The figure has risen from 480,000 in plans made in the early 1990s and 630,000 in the mid-1990s, the policy document said. "The latest Time Phased Forces Deployment Data for any contingency on the Korean Peninsula is comprised of 690,000 soldiers, 160 navy ships and 1,600 planes," it said. The United States fought with the South against the communist North in the 1950-53 Korean War and has kept troops in South Korea under a mutual defense pact to deter any new invasion attempt. The war only ended in a truce and the de-militarized zone remains one of the world's most volatile conflict flashpoints. A summit in June between the South's President Kim Dae-Jung and the North's supreme leader Kim Jong-Il produced an accord to move toward reconciliaton. But it has done little to reduce military tensions, according to US and South Korean military chiefs. "We always have various options," a US military official told AFP, refusing to give details on the deployment of extra troops and equipment planned by the Pentagon. The South Korean defense ministry, however, described the increase as the result of a new US "win-win strategy," which would require the United States to have the capability to fight two wars simultaneously, such as in the Middle East and East Asia. The US military numbers a total of 1.37 million service men and women. "This shows a strong US determination to guard the Korean peninsula despite its plan to reduce the entire number of troops," said the White Paper. Along with equipment to counter weapons of mass destruction, the US plan focused on the deployment of aircraft carriers and advanced aircraft to attack enemy artillery units in the early stages of any war, it said. The white paper also called for a strong military partnership between the allies to deter war on the Korean peninsula. "South Korea's partnership with the United States will ensure peace and deterrence of war on the peninsula and create an atmosphere for peaceful unification," it said. "And with sights beyond unification, this partnership will contribute to the stability of Northeast Asia. "Based upon a robust combined defense posture, (South Korea) and the United States continue close consultation in implementing a policy of reconciliation and cooperation toward the North." Until the June summit, North Korea had insisted on the withdrawl of US forces from South Korea. President Kim has said he wants US troops to remain and said his North Korean counterpart agreed on the need for a US military presence on the peninsula. This has led to speculation that US troops in South Korea could, after any eventual reunification, become a regional peacekeeping force.

# Presence Good- South Korea Ready

**South Korea is prepared to receive an increase in US forces.**

**Donna Miles 05/26 (**American Forces Press Service, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=58484)

The old Camp Humphreys is transforming from a quiet aviation base off the beaten track from Pyongtaek into a major hub for U.S. forces in South Korea. It’s part of a major realignment of the 28,500 servicemembers in Korea, with nearly all of them to move south of the Han River within the next several years. All but a tiny residual force will leave U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan, current home to U.S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Korea in the heart of Seoul, and the 2nd Infantry Division and its supporting elements will relocate from Camp Casey and its tiny satellite bases north of the capital. Most will consolidate at a U.S. military base being built here that’s unlike anything ever seen before on the Korean peninsula. The project is moving forward, full speed ahead, Army Gen. Walter “Skip” Sharp, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, reported to the House Armed Services Committee yesterday. “We are on track, over the next five or six years, to complete all of the construction down there,” he told the panel. “We will actually start moving down there in 2012, and then phase that in over the next several years following that.” Sharp resisted setting a definitive timetable for completion, but said the effort is on the fast track. “We're trying to do it as quickly as possible, to be able to return this land of the Republic of Korea and to consolidate our forces to improve the quality of life for our service members,” he told Congress. At Humphreys, Army Col. Joseph Moore, the garrison commander, gets excited talking about the enormity of the project and the unprecedented quality of life it will offer. Initial plans called for the post’s population to more than quadruple from the current 10,000, which includes 4,200 military members and about 2,500 U.S. civilian employees, contractors and family members. But a new dynamic added to the mix just as the relocation plan was being launched – the normalization of tours in South Korea – is expected to further increase the scope of the project, Moore said. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates announced in December 2008 the extension of tour lengths in Korea. Under the normalization plan, U.S. Forces Korea is planning for single service members to serve two-year tours, and married troops who bring their families will stay for three years. So instead of about 1,900 family members currently here, and about 15,000 expected to arrive as U.S. forces relocate south and more command-sponsored slots are offered, Moore estimates that the post ultimately could become home to as many as 30,000 family members, swelling the base’s total population to more than 62,000. Bulldozers are busy at work, preparing for their arrival. The result essentially will be a brand-new installation, unrecognizable to anyone who has served in the hodgepodge of buildings built at Humphreys over the decades to accommodate troops serving one-year, unaccompanied tours. Seventy percent of those existing buildings will be razed, explained Todd Dirmeyer, chief master planner for the project. Replacing them will be a state-of-the-art community planned from the ground up to accommodate servicemembers and their families. The new Humphreys complex will dwarf the current post, tripling its size to almost 3,600 acres and providing about 30 million square feet in finished building space, compared to the current 4 million. For comparison’s sake, Fort Bliss, Texas, the U.S. installation experiencing the most growth due to base realignment and closure mandates, is adding 13 million square feet of facilities, Moore noted. “It really is an awesome thing, if you think about it, because we are going to build a city here,” he said. “This is like starting with a blank canvas that considers the whole of the property and the timing of the demolition and construction. At the end of it, we will have essentially a new installation, instead of a new one adjoined to an old one.” That new installation will provide state-of-the-art unit training, maintenance and equipment storage facilities, as well as modern housing, dining and recreational amenities, Dirmeyer said. The plan incorporates lessons from Fort Bliss and other BRAC installations, from the multi-story post exchange that’s proven successful at Kadena Air Base, Japan, and from the transformation Moore oversaw at the Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany. “This represents a new vision, with efficient and thoughtful facility placement,” Dirmeyer said as he looked over a map of the post dotted with different-colored squares and rectangles representing facilities to be built. “The maneuver and training areas designated for local training are situated away from the housing, recreational and commercial areas. The industrial areas and vehicle maintenance facilities are away from those areas,” he said. “Troop housing is within walking distance of working areas. Family housing is in a commercial area, with family-friendly facilities and schools within walking distance or an easy commute.” Barracks will be the popular “one plus one” design, in which service members have private bedrooms and bathrooms, but share a common living area. A private company will pay for, build and manage most family housing units, similar to the residential communities initiative being used at stateside posts. A downtown shopping area, built around a food, beverage and entertainment complex, will give garrison residents a sense of Hometown USA, Dirmeyer said. An aquatics park that opened in 2006 already has proven to be a big hit, as well as the new community fitness center, affectionately called the “Super Gym.” While providing these and other quality-of-life amenities, the planners took pains to preserving green spaces. Walkways connect living and working areas, and ball fields, picnic areas and a riverfront jogging path will beckon residents outdoors. Even with his latest challenge -- accommodating an additional 15,000 family members due to tour normalization -- Moore is committed to preserving sweeping outdoor areas. “We’re looking at a lot of different options, and we have a lot of ideas,” he said. “What we don’t want is to sacrifice what is really a great plan by plugging additional buildings in almost randomly.” As these final decisions get made and the weather warms up, Humphreys is buzzing with construction activity. Eighteen construction projects, with a contract value of $1.2 billion, already are under way on the existing post. Another 57 projects are in the planning and design process. Meanwhile, a massive effort is under way to build up the rice paddies surrounding the post to accommodate the new construction. The land needs to be built up almost 15 feet to bring it above the 50-year flood plain, Moore said. That, Dirmeyer explained, takes a lot of dirt. “On a busy day this summer, you would see upward of 3,000 vehicles in a single day, bringing dirt in here,” he said. “If you took all the mileage from the first truck to the very last truck required to do this land expansion, it would equal 17 round-trips to the moon. And if you took allthe fill, it would fill the Hoover Dam.” As the land is built up, giant piles are being driven into the ground to provide a stable building site. As the planning and building processes take place, Moore said, the biggest challenge is ensuring it never interferes with the U.S. mission here. “My first goal is to support General Sharp’s first priority: to be prepared to fight tonight,” he said. “So everything we do has to be connected to that first goal. We cannot do something that would interrupt a unit’s ability to do its mission.” The effort here also supports Sharp’s priority of strengthening the U.S.-South Korea alliance because of the cooperative way it’s being planned, funded and built, Moore said. Moore said he’s particularly proud of the quality-of-life improvements the new U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys will provide U.S. servicemembers and their families, fulfilling Sharp’s third command priority. Ultimately, Moore said he expects Humphreys to be the assignment of choice for U.S. forces who come to see it as the best place to serve in South Korea. “This ought to sell itself. We ought not have to sell Humphreys,” he said. “If we do it well, it will sell itself, and servicemembers will tell other servicemembers that this is a great place to live.”

\*\*\*IRAQ\*\*\*

# Presence Good- Middle Eastern Stability

**US presence is key to stop middle-east wars from escalating**

**China Daily 9-** researcher with the Council for National Security Policy Studies

(July 1, “The Good and Bad of US Pullout”, Lexis )

Iraq fought an 8-year-long war with Iran. Just a couple of years after the end of that war, Iraq invaded Kuwait, leading to the Gulf War in 1991. Even after the war, Iraq has had many disputes with Iran, especially over Islam. The US military presence ensured that the two countries did not clash over sectarian beliefs. But if the Shi'ite-Sunni conflict in Iraq is not controlled after the US withdraws its troops, it could escalate into a conflict with Iran.

# Presence Good- Iraqi Economy

**US presence is necessary to improve the Iraqi economy**

**Elliott 10** (Lindsey, March 10, “Fort Riley commander says troops still needed in Iraq”, http://www.ktka.com/news/2010/mar/10/fort-riley-commander-says-troops-still-needed-iraq/)

Brooks and the 1st Infantry Division Headquarters are currently deployed in Iraq. He says despite the voting success, Iraqi security forces still need help from US troops.

"One of the reasons we remain here is because the economic situation is just beginning to blossom and to help and mature, whether it is working with international oil companies that are concluding their own deals with the government of Iraq but ensuring the environment remains secure for economic growth," he said.

# Surge Good- Democracy Promotion

**More troops are needed to guarantee security and democracy in Iraq**

**Lieberman 6**-Independent Democratic Senator from Connecticut (Joseph, December 29, “Why we need more troops in Iraq”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/28/AR2006122801055.html)

The most pressing problem we face in Iraq is not an absence of Iraqi political will or American diplomatic initiative, both of which are increasing and improving; it is a lack of basic security. As long as insurgents and death squads terrorize Baghdad, Iraq's nascent democratic institutions cannot be expected to function, much less win the trust of the people. The fear created by gang murders and mass abductions ensures that power will continue to flow to the very thugs and extremists who have the least interest in peace and reconciliation. This bloodshed, moreover, is not the inevitable product of ancient hatreds. It is the predictable consequence of a failure to ensure basic security and, equally important, of a conscious strategy by al-Qaeda and Iran, which have systematically aimed to undermine Iraq's fragile political center. By ruthlessly attacking the Shiites in particular over the past three years, al-Qaeda has sought to provoke precisely the dynamic of reciprocal violence that threatens to consume the country. On this point, let there be no doubt: If Iraq descends into full-scale civil war, it will be a tremendous battlefield victory for al-Qaeda and Iran. Iraq is the central front in the global and regional war against Islamic extremism. To turn around the crisis we need to send more American troops while we also train more Iraqi troops and strengthen the moderate political forces in the national government. After speaking with our military commanders and soldiers there, I strongly believe that additional U.S. troops must be deployed to Baghdad and Anbar province -- an increase that will at last allow us to establish security throughout the Iraqi capital, hold critical central neighborhoods in the city, clamp down on the insurgency and defeat al-Qaeda in that province.

**A troop surge in Iraq is needed for a successful Iraqi military, democratic government, and economy**

**Lieberman 6**-Independent Democratic Senator from Connecticut (Joseph, December 29, “Why we need more troops in Iraq”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/28/AR2006122801055.html)

In nearly four years of war, there have never been sufficient troops dispatched to accomplish our vital mission. The troop surge should be militarily meaningful in size, with a clearly defined mission. More U.S. forces might not be a guarantee of success in this fight, but they are certainly its prerequisite. Just as the continuing carnage in Baghdad empowers extremists on all sides, establishing security there will open possibilities for compromise and cooperation on the Iraqi political front -- possibilities that simply do not exist today because of the fear gripping all sides. I saw firsthand evidence in Iraq of the development of a multiethnic, moderate coalition against the extremists of al-Qaeda and against the Mahdi Army, which is sponsored and armed by Iran and has inflamed the sectarian violence. We cannot abandon these brave Iraqi patriots who have stood up and fought the extremists and terrorists. The addition of more troops must be linked to a comprehensive new military, political and economic strategy that provides security for the population so that training of Iraqi troops and the development of a democratic government can move forward.

# Surge Good- Iraqi Security/Civil War

**Deployments necessary to deter conflict**

**Engelhardt 10**

Co-founder of the American Empire Project, Article published in Asia Times (3/13/10, Tom, “Premature Withdrawal from Iraq,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/LC12Ak01.html) SP

And a chorus of the usual suspects, Washington's warrior-pundits and "warrior journalists" (as Tom Hayden calls them), are singing ever-louder versions of a song warning of that greatest of all dangers: premature withdrawal. Ricks, for instance, recommended in the Times that, having scuttled the "grandiose original vision" of the George W Bush invasion, the Obama administration should still "find a way" to keep a "relatively small, tailored force" of 30,000-50,000 troops in Iraq "for many years to come". (Those numbers, oddly enough, bring to mind the 34,000 US troops that, according to Ricks in his 2006 bestseller Fiasco, deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz projected as the future US garrison in Iraq in the weeks before the invasion of 2003.) Kenneth Pollack, a drumbeater for that invasion, is now wary of removing "the cast" - his metaphor for the US military presence - on the "broken arm" of Iraq too soon since states that have "undergone a major inter-communal civil war have a terrifying rate of recidivism". For Kimberley and Frederick Kagan, drumbeaters extraordinaires, writing for the Wall Street Journal, the US must start discussing "a long-term military partnership with Iraq beyond 2011", especially since that country will not be able to defend itself by then. Why, you might well ask, must we stay in Iraq, given our abysmal record there? Well, say these experts, we are the only force all Iraqis now accept, however grudgingly. We are, according to Pollack, the "peacemakers, the lev[ee] holding back violence ... Iraq's security blanket, and .. the broker of political deals ... we enforce the rules." According to Ricks, we are the only "honest brokers" around. According to the Kagans, we were the "guarantor" of the recent elections and have a kind of "continuing leverage" not available to any other group in that country, "should we choose to use it". Today, Iraq is admittedly a mess. On our watch, the country crashed and burned. No one claims that we've put it back together. Multi-billions of dollars in reconstruction funds later, the US has been incapable of delivering the simplest things like reliable electricity or potable water to significant parts of the country. Now, the future sits empty and threatening before us. So much time in which so many things could happen, and all of them horrifying, all calling out for us to remain because they just can't be trusted, they just don't deliver.

**US presence in Iraq prevents Iraqi civil war that spreads to surrounding nations**

**China Daily 9-** researcher with the Council for National Security Policy Studies

(July 1, “The Good and Bad of US Pullout”, Lexis )

But the US troop withdrawal could leave Iraq with some problems and uncertainties, too. For example, Iraqi security forces have to maintain security and social order. Iraq has a 750,000 security personnel, but not the combat capability of US troops. And if the much better trained US troops couldn't wipe out insurgency in Iraq, can the Iraqi forces do so? Bombings and suicide attacks have increased since the beginning of this year, but only some of them have been targeted at US troops. Most of them have targeted the Iraqi government and people. This raises the fear that once the US troops withdraw the insurgents' war against the US could turn into a civil war, especially between Shi'ites and Sunnis.

In the absence of US troops and a highly capable security force in Iraq, there is fear that the radical armed wings of the two religious factions could declare war against each other to get as much power and privileges as possible in the new dispensation.

In fact, almost every domestic conflict in Iraq has the potential of snowballing into a deeper crisis, and spreading to neighboring countries.

**US presence is vital to Iraqi security**

**Alaaldin 9** – Middle East analyst; Guardian columnist (Ranj, August 22, “US troops are still needed in Iraq; The US withdrawal from Iraq in June has failed to live up to expectations, with devastating consequences for the Iraqi people”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/aug/22/iraq-us-troop-withdrawal)

It was hailed as National Sovereignty Day – a day when Iraq was being handed back to Iraqis. But the US withdrawal from Iraqi towns and cities on 30 June has failed to live up to its expectations, and with devastating consequences for the Iraqi people. An escalation of attacks since that day, including a multitude of near-simultaneous attacks on Wednesday that killed at least 95 people and injured more than 560, suggest the Iraqi security forces are not yet able to combat the insurgent and terrorist threat independent of US supervision. What makes Wednesday's attacks – blamed on Sunni extremists – particularly significant is that they were carried out with an unusual level of sophistication in some of the most secure areas of Baghdad. Reports suggest the attackers had the backing of political actors high-up within the Iraqi government, something that becomes worryingly plausible when trying to comprehend how exactly a lorry packed with explosives was able to make its way through countless checkpoints and up to 30ft near a heavily guarded ministry.

# Surge Good- Iraqi Security/Civil War

**More troops are needed in Iraq and Afghanistan to stabilize the countries overall**

**Knowlton 3** – staff writer for International Herald Tribune (Brian, August 26, “Senators urge Bush to increase Iraq force; 'A lot more money' is needed, one says”, Lexis)

Senior senators of both parties have urged the Bush administration to send thousands more American troops to Iraq, saying that many billions more dollars were needed to stabilize and rebuild that country and Afghanistan.

Senator John McCain, an Arizona Republican who was in Baghdad the day the UN headquarters was bombed, said Sunday that "at least another division" of American troops, or about 18,000 soldiers, was needed. "Time is not on our side," he said.

Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware, the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, put the need at 40,000 to 60,000 more troops, a substantial increase over the current 139,000.

**Resistance groups and unrest have spurred due to an inadequate number of troops in Iraq**

**Jansen 3** - Irish Times staff writer (Michael, November 4, “Not enough US soldiers - at home or overseas; The Americans did not commit a sufficient number of troops to pacify Iraq”, Lexis)

Iraqi resistance groups have been able to entrench themselves and operate freely because the Bush administration did not commit the number of troops required for post-war stabilisation. Before the war, the US army chief, Gen Eric Shinseki, warned the Defence Secretary, Mr Donald Rumsfeld, that several hundred thousand troops would be needed to provide post-war security. Other military experts advised that 500,000 troops would be necessary if the recommended ratio of 20 soldiers per 1,000 was observed. They argued that a base of 2.5 million troops would be needed to sustain such a deployment. The half-million level was considered adequate if there was not a state of insurrection, but unrest would require more troops.

**Troops are needed in Iraq to stabilize the government and insure national security**

**Heilprin 6** – Staff writer for Associated Press (John, November 19, “McCain Says More Troops Needed in Iraq”, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8LG86M01&show\_article=1)

WASHINGTON (AP) - Sen. John McCain, a front-runner among GOP presidential contenders for said Sunday the U.S. must send an overwhelming number of troops to stabilize Iraq or face the possibility of more attacks in the region and on American soil. "I believe the consequences of failure are catastrophic. It will spread to the region. You will see Iran more emboldened. Eventually, you could see Iran pose a greater threat to the state of Israel," said McCain, R-Ariz. "We left Vietnam. It was over. We just had to heal the wounds of war," said McCain, who spent 5 1/2 years as a prisoner of war after his Navy plane was shot down in 1967. "We leave this place, chaos in the region, and they'll follow us home. So there's a great deal more at stake here in this conflict, in my view, a lot more. McCain said he based his judgment partly on the writings of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the al-Qaida leader in Iraq who was killed in a U.S. air raid, and of Osama bin Laden. "The consequences of failure are so severe that I will exhaust every possibility to try to fix this situation. Because it's not the end when American troops leave. The battleground shifts, and we'll be fighting them again," McCain said. "You read Zarqawi, and you read bin Laden. ... It's not just Iraq that they're interested in. It's the region, and then us."

**Iraqis want us to continue deploying troops to deter internal conflict**

**Engelhardt 10**

Co-founder of the American Empire Project, Article published in Asia Times (3/13/10, Tom, “Premature Withdrawal from Iraq,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/LC12Ak01.html) SP

Hubris? We're bigger than that! We've now been at war with, or in, Iraq for almost 20 years, and intermittently at war in Afghanistan for 30 years. Think of it as nearly half a century of experience, all bad. And what is it that Washington seems to have concluded? That in Afghanistan, where one disaster after another has occurred, we Americans can finally do more of the same, somewhat differently calibrated, and so much better. And in Iraq, we seemed to have decided that enough was enough and we should simply depart. Yet the calls from a familiar crew for us to stay in Iraq are growing louder by the week. The Iraqis, so the argument goes, need us. After all, who would leave them alone, trusting them not to do what they've done best in recent years: cut one another's throats? Modesty in Washington? Humility? The ability to draw new lessons from long-term experience? None of the above is evidently appropriate for “the indispensable nation”, as former secretary of state Madeleine Albright once called the United States, and to whose leaders she attributed the ability to "see further into the future". None of the above is part of the American arsenal, not when Washington's weapon of choice, repeatedly consigned to the scrapheap of history and repeatedly rescued, remains a deep conviction that nothing is going to go anything but truly, deeply, madly badly without us, even if, as in Iraq, things have for years gone truly, deeply, madly badly with us. An expanding crew of Washington-based opiners is now calling for the Barack Obama administration to alter its plans, negotiated in the last months of the George W Bush administration, for the departure of all American troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. They seem to have taken Albright's belief in American foresight - even prophesy - to heart and so are basing their arguments on their ability to divine the future.

# Surge Good- Iraqi Security/Civil War

**The future of Iraq is so unstable that U.S. troops are necessary**

**Engelhardt 10**

Co-founder of the American Empire Project, Article published in Asia Times (3/13/10, Tom, “Premature Withdrawal from Iraq,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/LC12Ak01.html) SP

The problem, it seems, is that, whatever may be happening in the present, Iraq's future prospects are terrifying, making leaving, if not inconceivable, then as massively irresponsible (as former Washington Post correspondent and bestselling author Tom Ricks wrote recently in a New York Times op-ed) as invading in the first place. Without the US military on hand, we're told, the Iraqis will almost certainly deep-six democracy, while devolving into major civil violence and ethnic bloodletting, possibly of the sort that convulsed their country in 2005-2006 when, by the way, the US military was present in force. The various partial winners of Iraq's much delayed March 7 election will, we were assured beforehand, jockey for power for months trying to cobble together a functioning national government. During that period, violence, it's said, will surely escalate, potentially endangering the marginal gains made thanks to the US military "surge" of 2007. The possibilities remain endless and, according to these doomsayers, none of them are encouraging: Shi'ite militias could use our withdrawal to stage a violence-filled comeback. Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs is likely to increase and violently so, while al-Qaeda could move into any post-election power void with its own destructive agenda.

**Deployment in Iraq is necessary until they have a government of their own**

**Washington Post, 10**

(6/18/10, “The Senate Picks a Bad Time to Slash Funds for Iraq,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/17/AR2010061705091.html, published in the Washington Post) SP

IRAQ IS at a tipping point. The parliament elected in March's elections was finally seated this week, but the formation of a new government is still weeks or months away. Meanwhile, a big withdrawal of U.S. forces is going forward -- the number of troops will be halved, to 50,000, by the end of the summer. If a stable government forms by then and Iraqi security forces are able to fill the gap left by American units, the U.S. mission in Iraq will be on the homestretch to a successful conclusion. But a lot could still go wrong -- especially if Iraqis begin to perceive that what is supposed to be a transition from occupation to strategic partnership with the United States is becoming an American rush for the exits, complete with the disavowal of past commitments. That's why it's particularly concerning that the Senate has chosen this sensitive moment to slash more than $1 billion from the aid programmed for the Iraqi transition -- including critical funding for security forces. The most dangerous cut was initiated in the Senate Armed Services Committee last month by Chairman Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.). Mr. Levin persuaded his committee to cut by half the $2 billion requested by the Obama administration for the funding of Iraqi forces in the 2011 defense authorization bill. The administration's request was the product of a careful Pentagon study of what is needed to complete the transition to full control by Iraqi security forces at the end of 2011, when the last U.S. troops are due to depart. The total sum is $8 billion, of which $4 billion is coming from the Iraqi government. The Levin amendment could make it impossible for the United States to provide Iraq with equipment its forces will need -- and the trouble will only be exacerbated if a separate, $300 million Senate reduction in funds for Iraq in the 2010 supplemental appropriations bill holds up. Mr. Levin's cut has little to do with fiscal probity. After all, he allowed some $2.8 billion in earmarks to be added to the $700 billion bill, including hundreds of millions for construction that the Pentagon neither requested nor wanted. Instead the senator was piqued by the Iraqi parliament's decision to reduce the government-requested defense budget from $7.4 billion to $4.9 billion. He argues that Iraqis, not Americans, should make up the $1 billion he took out. This position ignores a few facts: that Iraq is already covering half the cost of the military transition; that its defense spending is far higher than that of the United States as a percentage of gross national product; that it already needed bailouts from both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to fund its budget and even so "will have to issue new debt to cover its budget deficit in 2010," according to a letter signed by U.S. ambassador Christopher R. Hill and U.S. forces commander Gen. Raymond T. Odierno. But the biggest problem with the Senate cuts is the message they send: that the long-term strategic partnership that the United States has promised Iraq is likely to be barren. As Iraqis deliberate over the nature and course of their next government, there could hardly be a worse time for Congress to give that impression.

# Surge Good- Iraqi Security/Civil War

**If we leave Iraq now, we will leave the country in a state of disarray with potential ethnic conflicts**

**Strobel, 10**

Foreign Affairs and State Department at Mcclatchy Paper, he used to conver national security and intelligence for US News and World Report(3/5/10, Warren, “As US prepares to leave after 7 years, Iraq’s Future Uncertain,” http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/03/05/89934/as-us-prepares-to-leave-after.html) SP

WASHINGTON — When the Bush administration invaded Iraq seven years ago, it pledged to leave behind a democracy that would be a model for the entire Middle East. Instead, it now appears that the United States will leave behind a big question mark. Sunday's parliamentary elections in Iraq will start the clock on the withdrawal of U.S. troops, with 50,000 soldiers remaining in an advisory role after Aug. 31 and all of them gone by the end of 2011, if current plans hold. The elections are, in a sense, the final act of a U.S.-led invasion that the George W. Bush White House sold on false pretenses — nonexistent weapons of mass destruction, an imaginary nuclear-weapons program and fictional al Qaida ties — and that's cost nearly 4,400 American lives, at least 100,000 Iraqi ones, as much as $3 trillion and untold political capital. Senior U.S. officials and top generals, using football terminology, like to speak of the American effort in Iraq as being in the "red zone," close to the goal line of a reasonably stable and democratic country after years of struggle and sacrifice. Others who've spent significant time in Iraq, however, say that the country's future, while vastly more hopeful than it was four years ago, is nonetheless still in doubt. "This can go either way. And it can go either way for a long time to come," said Ryan Crocker, the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad from 2007 to 2009. Crocker liked to say that the important events of the Iraq war might not have even happened yet. "I believed it then. I believe it now," he said. Violence in Iraq is down markedly, but political, ethnic and secular reconciliation has remained elusive. The fault line between Sunni Muslim Arabs and Sunni Kurds still tears at the country's northern tier. Iraq's neighbors, particularly Shiite Muslim Iran and Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia, see it as a potential regional battleground. The elections, in which 6,200 candidates are vying for 325 parliament seats, will open a months-long effort to form a new government. That path will be strewn with pitfalls and could stretch beyond the self-imposed Aug. 31 U.S. deadline for withdrawing combat brigades. The situation is so fragile that President Barack Obama is hearing more calls to consider slowing the troop withdrawal if Iraq takes a turn for the worse. During a recent visit to Washington, Army Gen. Raymond Odierno, the commander of American forces in Iraq, signaled that he might ask Obama to keep one combat brigade, about 3,000 troops, in the powder keg city of Kirkuk, on the Arab-Kurdish fault line, after Sept. 1. If he does need the troops, he's expected to ask for them this summer, defense officials told McClatchy. However, Obama, who pledged during his election campaign to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq, appears determined to keep to the schedule no matter what.

# Surge Good- Iraqi Security/Civil War

**Without Americans, Iraq would collapse into ethnic conflicts, terrorism, and political divisions**

**Butters, 10**

Journalist for TIMES Magazine (3/2/10, Andrew, “Dangerous Omens for an Iraq Without Troops,” http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1968853,00.html) SP

For a glimmer of what Iraq might look like without Americans, take a drive east of Baghdad to Diyala province, whose mixed Sunni, Shi'ite and Kurdish population is the country in microcosm. U.S. soldiers now rarely leave their bases outside Iraq's cities and towns, leaving security on the road to Diyala largely in the hands of the Iraqi security forces. The soldiers and police who man the many checkpoints wear the latest fashion in pattern-disrupting camouflage uniforms and patches that say "Special Forces" or "SWAT." But they still rely on controversial antenna-rod bomb detectors that may in fact be useless. Their transport consists primarily of high-performance Ford trucks that break down without clean high-octane gasoline that's hard to find in Iraq. And such is the capacity of their resupply operation that they beg for water from passing foreign convoys. "They'd die out here in summer if it wasn't for us," says one American security contractor. Baquba, the provincial capital and center of Iraq's citrus-growing region, is a largely colorless place, except for the winter orange harvest and the hundreds of campaign posters for Sunday's nationwide elections that now line the city's trash-filled streets. Still, at least the sectarian power struggle between Sunnis and Shi'ites that once raged through the city is now mostly confined to the ballot box.

(See pictures of Iraq's revival.) Inside the fortified government headquarters, Diyala Governor Abdul-Nasser al-Mahdwe is relatively optimistic that the elections — the fourth poll since the U.S invasion brought democracy to Iraq — will go smoothly. "The country is getting better at elections," he tells TIME. "In the first, the fraud was about 40%. In the second, let's say 20%. Now it's not going to be that much at all." But the governor worries that as the U.S. begins to withdraw its soldiers from Iraq later in the year, Iraqis could revert to settling their political disputes in the streets. "The problem is the police," he says. "The police are all local, so the local parties can manipulate them." For now, though, al-Mahdwe, who belongs to a Sunni party that opposes Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Shi'ite-led governing coalition, is more worried about an élite counterterrorism unit run by Maliki's office, which he accuses of arresting scores of opposition politicians and government critics in Diyala. Two months ago, they took the deputy governor, Mohammad Hussein al-Joubouri, and nothing has been heard since about his case. "Of course it's totally political," says one of the governor's aides. "If he is really a terrorist, why didn't they arrest him before he was elected?" (See pictures of life inside a Baghdad prison.) Thus, democracy Iraqi-style — a little fraud, sectarianism, extralegal government intimidation and the underlying fear of violence. Iraq has by now had more practice at choosing its own leaders in relatively open elections than perhaps any other Middle Eastern country besides Israel and Lebanon. But while the Bush Administration had hoped this would create a democratic ripple effect throughout the region, the results of Iraq's elections have been less than edifying. The politicians who came to power after the country's first parliamentary elections four years ago have been unable to resolve such core issues as sharing oil revenue, balancing power between the regions and the central government, and national reconciliation. Still, the U.S. is betting heavily that through the democratic process, Iraq's contending factions will achieve a consensus that will prevent a relapse into civil war. Under the Status of Forces Agreement concluded between the Bush Administration and the Iraqi government, all U.S. combat forces will be withdrawn from Iraq by the end of July, and the remaining support troops and training personnel will leave by the end of 2011. The Obama White House, which needs extra soldiers for its expansion of the war in Afghanistan, is committed to that timetable and optimistic about the country that they will leave behind. But on the streets of Baquba, it seems that the goal of a stable, independent and somewhat democratic Iraq has yet to be achieved. The U.S. and its local allies have certainly made massive security gains in Diyala. The al-Qaeda-inspired insurgent groups that once rampaged through the province have been reduced to a handful of criminal cells that attempt the occasional assassination, according to Sheik Hussam al-Mojjma, head of the local Awakening Council — the Sunni citizens brigade largely responsible for defeating al-Qaeda. "When we started fighting al-Qaeda [in 2007] it was just us and the Americans," he says. "Not the army, not the police." But he isn't happy about the way he and his men were treated by the Shi'ite-dominated government once they began to disband. Only 4,000 of the Awakening Council's 23,000 men were given jobs in the police and security forces, according to al-Mojjma. "It's all sectarian," says the sheik, whose headquarters are a concrete hut with no furniture on the eastern edge of Baquba. "The government doesn't trust us because we are Sunni. [But] if they push us any more, we are going to explode." He is particularly worried about what will happen once the U.S. pulls out of Iraq. "Iran will take us," he says. "Everyone in the region will try to occupy Iraq." But what makes the sheik even angrier is the possibility that a future government in Baghdad might turn over disputed areas of northern Diyala to the Kurdistan Regional Government, a body governing a semi-independent Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq. "If that happens, we won't even wait five seconds," he says. "We'll go to war at once."

# Surge Good- Iraqi Security/Civil War

**Long term residual troop presence in Iraq is necessary to prevent a civil war**

**Beehner, 7**

Master’s degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs,, PhD candidate at Yale University in political science (7/11/07, Lionel, Council on Foreign Relations, “What Model Should Iraq Follow after U.S. Forces Withdraw?” http://www.cfr.org/publication/13667/what\_model\_should\_iraq\_follow\_after\_us\_forces\_withdraw.html) SP

Even as they disagree on how long American forces will remain in Iraq, U.S. officials and foreign policy experts suggest a number of scenarios for what Iraq might resemble after coalition forces eventually pull out. President Bush has proposed the so-called South Korean model, a long-term residual troop presence to prevent civil war from breaking out. Many have also likened the conflict to Vietnam, where the fall of Saigon did not unleash the massive “domino” effect many predicted. Others have offered Lebanon, which suffered from a long civil war before an uneasy truce was inked, as a more accurate template. Then there are those who say Iraq should become a federalized state, akin to post-1995 Bosnia. Experts disagree over the degree to which the conflict in Iraq could spread to neighboring countries. Over fifty years after the Korean War, some thirty thousand U.S. troops remain stationed along the DMZ, which divides the peninsula between North Korea and South Korea (the number is expected to diminish to 24,500 next year). The U.S. forces are there to keep an uneasy peace between the two Koreas and prevent war from erupting again. The analogy to Korea is meant to portray the Iraq conflict as a long-term one that requires a residual “over-the-horizon” military presence, mainly to support indigenous forces and keep the peace. “The idea is more a model of a mutually-agreed arrangement, whereby we have a long and enduring presence, but one that is by consent of both parties and under certain conditions,” Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told reporters in early June. He also said the Korean model stood in contrast to the aftermath of the Vietnam War, where “we just left lock, stock and barrel.” Still, some opponents of the war, including several presidential aspirants, have seized on this comparison as a justification for keeping U.S. forces in Iraq indefinitely.

# Surge Good- War on Terror

**A surge of US troops is key to winning the war on terror**

**Washington Times, 05** (January 26, “Increasing our ground forces”, Lexis)

Official Washington is quickly reaching consensus that U.S. ground forces need to be bolstered by a significant margin over the long-term. The proposals are in the range of 40,000 to 150,000 more troops. We're inclined toward the high end of those proposals, and maybe even higher. Historically speaking, expenditures on ground troops are absurdly low, even by peacetime standards. As the Congressional Budget Office's September 2004 report on long-term defense spending showed, U.S. expenditures on ground forces are about half what they were at the height of the Reagan defense buildup in the mid-1980s, when the United States was without a hot war to fight and waged the Cold War mostly by proxy. That decline - most evident at the Cold War's end and reaching a nadir during the Clinton administration - was unsustainable well before the September 11 attacks. All the more is it unsustainable afterward, in an era with new and challenging commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. As retired Army Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales pointed out on the opposite page yesterday, these days, if all Army and Marine infantrymen were collected together in one place, they wouldn't even fill FedEx Field. It hasn't always been this way. Five years after World War II ended, amid the postwar "peace dividend" and a pre-Korean War retrenchment, the end-strength of the U.S. Army was almost 700,000. Right now, it's about 480,000. Last week, Senate Democrats, including John Kerry and Carl Levin - the ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee - proposed increasing the Army and the Marines by 40,000 over the next two years. In a statement explaining the move, Sen. Levin pointed up troop needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even in the short term this won't do: The Army estimates it takes about two years for any increases to affect the number of "boots on the ground" at all, so Iraq and Afghanistan would scarcely benefit. Maj. Gen. Scales proposes a ground-force hike of 150,000 over the next four years, which is closer to the mark. He calls to increase the number of Army brigades to 50 from the current 33 and adding two Marine Expeditionary Brigades. Maj. Gen. Scales' proposal includes the 30,000 already authorized by the Secretary of Defense, and so is really an increase of 120,000 over current levels. The price tag of those 150,000 additional ground troops will be in the tens to scores of billions. We will probably need even more than this over the long run. The war on terror's conflicts will require a significant presence on the ground - surely that is proving to be the case in Iraq. About a quarter of all active-duty U.S. forces are currently in Iraq, but the ratio of U.S. troops to population in Iraq is about a quarter what it was in Germany after World War II, and about one-third what it is currently in Kosovo. What's more, as the historical data show, even in peacetime the United States has usually marshalled larger forces than what we currently have, not considering the counter-insurgency and counter-terror nature of the current wars. It's time to rectify that situation by increasing the number of ground troops by a significant and historically justifiable amount.

**Retaining some form of troops in Iraq is necessary to counter terrorism and train Iraqi security forces**

**Ricks 10**

Senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security who covered the war in Iraq for the Washington Post and writes the Best Defense blog for Foreign Policy magazine (2/23/10, Thomas, NYT, “Extending Our Stay In Iraq,” http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/opinion/24ricks.html?pagewanted=2&\_r=1) SP

Extending the American military presence will be even more politically controversial in Iraq, and for that reason, it would be best to let Iraqi leaders make the first public move to re-open the status of forces agreement of 2008, which calls for American troops to be out of the country by the end of next year. But I think leaders in both countries may come to recognize that the best way to deter a return to civil war is to find a way to keep 30,000 to 50,000 United States service members in Iraq for many years to come. These troops’ missions would be far narrower than during the surge era; their primary goal would be to train and advise Iraqi security forces and to carry out counterterrorism missions. (It is actually hard to get below 30,000 and still have an effective force; many troops are needed for logistics, maintenance, medical, intelligence, communications and headquarters jobs, and additional infantry units are then needed to protect the people performing those tasks.) Such a relatively small, tailored force would not be big enough to wage a war, but it might be enough to deter a new one from breaking out. An Iraqi civil war would likely be a three- or four-sided affair, with the Shiites breaking into pro- and anti-Iranian factions. It could also easily metastasize into a regional war. Neighboring powers like Turkey and Iran are already involved in Iraqi affairs, and the Sunni Arab states would be unlikely to stand by and watch a Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad slaughter the Sunni minority. A regional war in the middle of the world’s oil patch could shake the global economy to its foundations and make the current recession look mild. In addition, a continued American military presence could help Iraq move forward politically. No one there particularly likes having the Americans around, but many groups seem to trust the Americans as honest brokers. And there would be a moral, humanitarian and political benefit: Having American soldiers accompany Iraqi units may improve the behavior of Iraqi forces, discouraging relapses to Saddam Hussein-era abuses, or the use of force for private ends and feuds. Advisers not only instruct Iraqi commanders, they also monitor them. As a longtime critic of the American invasion of Iraq, I am not happy about advocating a continued military presence there. Yet, to echo the counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen, just because you invade a country stupidly doesn’t mean you should leave it stupidly. The best argument against keeping troops in Iraq is the one some American military officers make, which is that a civil war is inevitable, and that by staying all we are doing is postponing it. That may be so, but I don’t think it is worth gambling to find out.

# Surge Good- War on Terror

**A surge of US troops is essential to clear out insurgents**

**Grier 6** – Staff writer (Peter, “What a 'troop surge' in Iraq might accomplish”, The Christian Science Monitor, Lexis)

A surge of extra US troops into Iraq, a strategy reportedly under active consideration by the White House and US generals in Baghdad, might mean more than increased manpower. It could herald a shift in military strategy, as well.

With more troops, American ground forces could clear insurgents out of troubled Baghdad neighborhoods and then stay, say some proponents of a surge. Units could live in abandoned homes or government buildings, providing round-the-clock security in districts where death squads now roam.

# Surge Good- U.S. Credibility

**Surge good- signals a change in American attitudes and increasing U.S. credibility**

**Ricks 10**

Senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security who covered the war in Iraq for the Washington Post and writes the Best Defense blog for Foreign Policy magazine (2/23/10, Thomas, NYT, “Extending Our Stay In Iraq,” http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/opinion/24ricks.html?pagewanted=2&\_r=1) SP

President Obama may find himself later this year considering whether once again to break his campaign promises about ending the war, and to offer to keep tens of thousands of troops in Iraq for several more years. Surprisingly, that probably is the best course for him, and for Iraqi leaders, to pursue. Whether or not the elections bring the long-awaited political breakthrough that genuinely ends the fighting there, 2010 is likely to be a turning-point year in the war, akin to the summer of 2003 (when the United States realized that it faced an insurgency) and 2006 (when that insurgency morphed into a small but vicious civil war and American policy came to a dead end). For good or ill, this is likely the year we will begin to see the broad outlines of post-occupation Iraq. The early signs are not good, with the latest being the decision over the weekend of the leading Sunni party, the National Dialogue Front, to withdraw from the elections. The political situation is far less certain, and I think less stable, than most Americans believe. A retired Marine colonel I know, Gary Anderson, just returned from Iraq and predicts a civil war or military coup by September. Another friend, the journalist Nir Rosen, avers that Iraq is on a long-term peaceful course. Both men know Iraq well, having spent years working there. I have not seen such a wide discrepancy in expert views since late 2005. The period surrounding the surge of 2007 has been misremembered. It was not about simply sending 30,000 more troops to Iraq; it was about using force differently, moving the troops off big bases to work with Iraqi units and live among the people. Perhaps even more significantly, the surge signaled a change in American attitudes, with more humility about what could be done, more willingness to listen to Iraqis, and with quietly but sharply reduced ambitions.

**Withdrawing troops displaces our original goal of democracy promotion and combating terrorism**

**Ricks 10**

Senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security who covered the war in Iraq for the Washington Post and writes the Best Defense blog for Foreign Policy magazine (2/23/10, Thomas, NYT, “Extending Our Stay In Iraq,” http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/opinion/24ricks.html?pagewanted=2&\_r=1) SP

The Bush administration’s grandiose original vision of transforming Iraq into a beacon of democracy that would alter the Middle East and drain the swamps of terrorism was scuttled and replaced by the more realistic goal of getting American forces out and leaving behind a country that was somewhat stable and, with luck, perhaps democratic and respectful of human rights. As part of the shift, the American commander, Gen. David Petraeus, also effectively put the Sunni insurgency on the American payroll. Looking back now, I think the surge was the right thing to do. In rejecting the view of the majority of his military advisers and embracing the course proposed by a handful of dissidents, President Bush found his finest moment. That said, the larger goal of the surge was to facilitate a political breakthrough, which has not happened. All the existential questions that plagued Iraq before the surge remain unanswered. How will oil revenue be shared among the country’s major groups? What is to be the fundamental relationship between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds? Will Iraq have a strong central government or be a loose confederation? And what will be the role of Iran (for my money, the biggest winner in the Iraq war thus far)? Unfortunately, all of these questions have led to violence in the past, and could again just as the Obama administration’s timeline calls for troops to leave areas that are far from quiet. The plan this year is to pull out about 10,000 troops a month for five months, beginning in late spring. That will halve the American military presence, with the remainder (other than a “residual force” of unspecified size) scheduled to be withdrawn in 2011. The withdrawal plan was written on the assumption that the elections would be held late in 2009 or early in 2010. Under the plan, troop numbers would be kept level to ensure stability in a vulnerable period, especially if the Sunnis were to feel that the electoral process was unfair, or if they were not given a role in the new government commensurate with their success at the polls. But given the changed timetable, just as Iraqi political leaders are struggling to form a new government, American military leaders will be distracted by the myriad tasks of supervising major troop movements. On top of that, the deeper the troop withdrawals go, the more potentially destabilizing they will be — because the first withdrawals will be made in areas that are considered more secure, or where Iraqi forces are deemed more reliable or evenhanded.

# Surge Good- U.S. Credibility

**Troop surges in Iraq have made great progress**

**Brooks 8** –New York Times journalist (David, June 25, “Opponents of the surge have to admit that Bush got it right; Comment & Debate”, Lexis)

The additional fact is that Bush, who made such bad calls early in the war, made a courageous and astute decision in 2006. More than a year on, the surge has produced large, if tenuous, gains. Violence is down sharply. Daily life has improved. Iraqi security forces have been given time to become a more effective fighting force. The Iraqi Government is showing signs of strength and even glimmers of impartiality. Iraq has moved from being a failed state to, as Vali Nasr of the Council on Foreign Relations has put it, merely a fragile one. The whole episode is a reminder that history is a complicated thing. The traits that lead to disaster in certain circumstances are the very ones that come in handy in others. The people who seem so smart at some moments seem incredibly foolish in others.

**Even if we’re currently not winning in Iraq, we can’t just back down- we need to fight on the side of freedom and life and evaluate the impacts under that paradigm**

**Hendrickson 07**

Faculty member, economist, and contributing scholar with The Center for Vision and values at Grove City College (July 2007, Mark, “Reasons for Leaving Iraq” http://www.christianexaminer.com/Articles/Articles%20Jul07/Art\_Jul07\_oped1.html) SP

If you are reading this sentence, let me apologize for the somewhat misleading title of this article. I am not arguing for the withdrawal of our military from Iraq; rather, I am asserting that those making that argument owe it to the American people to be more forthcoming in stating their reasons why they favor that course of action. Troop withdrawal may or may not be the right policy. I’ll take the cowardly approach and say that I favor whatever policies lead to the least loss of human life—especially American lives—in the coming years, even though I don’t know which policies those would be.

What concerns me is that some Americans advocating withdrawal are doing so for inferior reasons and without consideration of the consequences. Some are ideological holdovers from the anti-Vietnam War era who believe that America has been “on the wrong side of history.” This belief took hold in the Democratic Party and was explicitly reiterated in 1988 by Michael Dukakis in a presidential debate. What a grotesque error. We tried to prevent Indochina from being subjugated by murderous tyrants; when we evacuated from Vietnam, the dominoes fell, including the Cambodian genocide that accompanied the brutal enslavement of the South Vietnamese. Those horrors, and the illiberal ideology underlying them, were not, as Dukakis implied, the “right side of history.” While we failed to accomplish our objective in Indochina, we must never forget that we fought on the right side—the side of life and freedom. Similarly today, despite our multiple blunders in Iraq, we are fighting on the side of freedom and self-determination against murderous, potentially genocidal tyrants. We are not the bad guys.   All is lost Another factor motivating those advocating withdrawal is take-no-prisoners partisanship. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid declares the war “lost,” and then strives to make his assessment a self-fulfilling prophecy by attempting to cut off funding to the military. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi recently refused to meet with Gen. David Petraeus, the commander of the current troop surge. She has already made up her mind to hang her party’s electoral future on the strategy of guaranteeing America’s defeat in “Bush’s war.”

In February, the brilliant Doug Bandow advocated withdrawal from Iraq so that fewer American troops would die. Here, at last, is an excellent and worthy reason for withdrawal. But was Bandow right?

**If we stopped working to win the war in Iraq now, the lives lost previously would all have been for naught**

**Terkel, 9**

Deputy Research Director at American Progress and Managing Editor for The Progress Report (6/29/10, Amanda, “Cheney Worried that Iraq Withdrawal Will ‘Waste’ The Sacrifice By US Troops,” http://thinkprogress.org/2009/06/29/cheney-waste-iraq/) SP

Tomorrow is the deadline for U.S. troops to withdraw from Iraq, a date Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is calling a “great victory.” But in a new interview with Washington Times radio, Vice President Cheney was still pushing the U.S. to stay in Iraq, saying that withdrawal would “waste” the sacrifice of U.S. troops: Mr. Cheney told The Washington Times’ America’s Morning News radio show that he is a strong believer in Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, and that the general is doing what needs to be done. “But what he says concerns me: That there is still a continuing problem. One might speculate that insurgents are waiting as soon as they get an opportunity to launch more attacks. “I hope Iraqis can deal with it. At some point they have to stand on their own. But I would not want to see the U.S. waste all the tremendous sacrifice that has gotten us to this point.“ Cheney said that he respects Odierno, who is concerned that there “is still a continuing problem.” Cheney was referencing Odierno’s comments from a CNN interview yesterday. However, Cheney left out the rest of the general’s comments, in which he said that he doesn’t see such “a breakdown in stability” likely to happen: ODIERNO: Well, again, I think — I think it has to do with if we see a breakdown in stability in Iraq; if we see a consistent increase in violence; if we see that the Iraqi security forces aren’t able to respond; if we have some event that it caused some instability, then that would cause us to, maybe, after we’re asked by the government of Iraq, to help. I don’t see that right now. I believe we’re on the right path. And I want to make sure you understand that. I believe we are still on the right path. I think security and stability is headed in the right direction as we move through 30 June.

# Withdrawal Bad-Bottle Necking

**Withdrawal bad- removing US forces faster than planned leads to bottle-necking**

**Tristam, 9**

Graduate of the United Nations International School in New York and holds a B.A. in politics and history from New York University (Pierre, “When Will U.S. Troops Withdraw from Iraq?” http://middleeast.about.com/od/iraq/f/iraq-troops-withdrawal.htm) SP

Obama's pledge indicates he was going with Option 3, which means the draw-down would not begin until January 2010.

The withdrawal would take 16 months mostly for logistical reasons. "The withdrawal of significant numbers of U.S. military personnel before the Iraqi elections could increase security risks during a time of high tensions in Iraq," the Congressional Budget Office wrote. "And removing U.S. forces and their associated equipment faster than the Administration has planned could place U.S. forces that remain in Iraq at greater risk of attack and result in the buildup of equipment at Kuwaiti ports awaiting shipment to the United States or at U.S. ports awaiting transportation to bases in the United States." The United States had roughly 37 brigade equivalents in Iraq as of September 2009. Removing the equipment will require moving roughly 37,000 military vehicles, including trucks, armored vehicles, almost 400 helicopters, large quantities of communications gear, small arms, and medical equipment. Materiel could weigh 750,000 tons and could fill between 37 and 74 large sealift ships. Transporting roughly 13,500 tons of usable ammunition could require three additional ships in the strategic sealift fleet that are configured to carry ammunition. All told, up to 80 shiploads of material weighing more than 750,000 tons could need to be moved from Iraq to the United States, Europe, or South Korea.

# Withdrawal Bad—Presence still necessary

**Iraq bombings in May by terrorists prove that U.S. presence is still necessary**

**AP 10**

(5/11/10, “US Reconsidering Pace of Iraq Withdrawal,” http://rawstory.com/rs/2010/0511/reconsidering-pace-iraq-withdrawal/) SP

American commanders, worried about increased violence in the wake of Iraq's inconclusive elections, are now reconsidering the pace of a major troop pullout this summer, U.S. officials said Tuesday. The withdrawal of the first major wave of troops is expected to be delayed by about a month, the officials said. Waiting much longer could endanger President Barack Obama's goal of reducing the force level from 92,000 to 50,000 troops by Aug. 31.

More than two months after parliamentary elections, the Iraqis have still not formed a new government, and militants aiming to exploit the void have carried out attacks like Monday's bombings and shootings that killed at least 119 people — the country's bloodiest day of 2010. The threat has prompted military officials to look at keeping as many troops on the ground, for as long as possible, without missing the Aug. 31 deadline. A security agreement between the two nations requires American troops to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. In Baghdad and Washington, U.S. officials say they remain committed to the deadline, which Obama has said he would extend only if Iraq's security deteriorates. Getting out of Iraq quickly and responsibly was among Obama's top campaign promises in 2008. Extending the deadline could be politically risky back home — but so could anarchy and a bloodbath following a hasty retreat. Two senior administration officials said the White House is closely watching to see if the Aug. 31 date needs to be pushed back — if only to ensure enough security forces are in place to prevent or respond to militant attacks. Both spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the administration's internal discussions. Already, the violence, fueled by Iraq's political instability, will likely postpone the start of what the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Army Gen. Ray Odierno, has called the withdrawal "waterfall" — sending home large numbers of troops in a very swift period. In a January interview with the AP, Odierno said he hoped to start withdrawing as many as a monthly average of 12,500 troops, starting in May, to meet the August deadline. He has long said he would not start the withdrawal until two months after Iraq's March 7 elections to ensure stability. But three U.S. officials in Baghdad and a senior Pentagon official said that the "waterfall" is now expected to begin in June at the earliest. All cited ongoing concerns about whether the political impasse would lead to violence, and spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the process more candidly. "From a military perspective, the best way for us to maintain security is to hold as many forces on the ground until we need to redeploy them," said one of the senior officials in Baghdad. The official said it would be wise for Odierno to wait as long as he can, given the unsettled political conditions in Iraq. At the Pentagon, "there's been a renewed focus on Iraq lately," said the senior military official there. He said all options were being considered, including later delays, adding that "we need to get out in an appropriate way ... not completely tied to a timeline." Maj. Gen. Stephen Lanza, the top U.S. military spokesman in Iraq, said Tuesday that troops "are on track" to draw down by the president's Aug. 31 deadline, but he would not discuss whether the pace was being slowed. Although "there is still work to be done here," Lanza noted that overall violence across Iraq is lower than it has been in years. "There are still terrorists who wish to disrupt Iraq's forward progress and Monday's attacks are an example of that," Lanza said. Shortly before the election, there were 96,000 U.S. troops in the country. About 4,000 troops were sent home in April — including military dentists, postal workers, truck drivers and other support personnel. As of last week, there were about 92,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, meaning an average of 10,500 a month would have to be pulled out. Odierno can wait only so long to start the "waterfall."

**Violence continues to increase in Iraq- No reason to pull out troops**

**AP 10**

(4/4/10, “Al Qaeda Linked to Iraq Massacre,” http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/middle-east/3546325/Al-Qaeda-linked-to-Iraq-massacre) SP

Gunmen trying to pass themselves off as US and Iraqi soldiers have raided a Sunni village outside Baghdad and killed at least 24 people in an execution-style attack, apparently targeting a Sunni group that revolted against al-Qaeda in Iraq. The bloodshed late Friday comes amid increasing concerns that insurgents will take advantage of Iraq's political turmoil to further destabilise the country, nearly a month after parliamentary elections failed to give any candidate a decisive win. Many fear a drawn-out political debate could spill over into violence and complicate American efforts to speed up troop withdrawals in the coming months. Details remained sketchy, but police said gunmen traveling in at least four cars raided three homes in Hawr Rijab, killing 19 men and five women after binding them in handcuffs. Some of the victims, police said, were marched on to the roofs of their homes and slain there. Some had broken arms and legs, indicating they had been tortured before they were shot, police said. One witness said many were so badly brutalised that they were "beyond recognition." At least seven people were found alive, bound with handcuffs, authorities said. The killings were reminiscent of those that plagued Iraq at the height of the sectarian bloodshed of 2006 and 2007, when men, sometimes dressed in police or army uniforms, snatched people from their houses at night before killing them and dumping the bodies. Similar violence still plagues the country, but it has ebbed sharply. In November, gunmen in Iraqi army uniforms abducted and killed 13 people in the village of al-Saadan near the town of Abu Ghraib on Baghdad's western outskirts. One survivor of Friday's attack said the gunmen gained entry to her home by speaking English and convincing her mother they were US soldiers on a patrol. "My mother thought they were Americans who came to search the house, that's why she opened the door," said the woman, who ran to another room after seeing the attackers. Her mother and two brothers were killed.

\*\*\*AFGHANISTAN\*\*\*

# Surge Good- Counterinsurgency/Terrorism

**Need more troops in Afghanistan for counterinsurgency – afghan police force fails. Kagan, Frederick 8/16/2009** “Why We Need More Troops In Afghanistan” –The Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/14/AR2009081403596.html

U.S. Army doctrine calls for one counterinsurgent for every 50 people. The Afghan insurgency is confined to the Pashtun and some mixed areas of the country -- perhaps 16 million people requiring about 320,000 counterinsurgent troops. U.S., international and Afghan forces will total around 275,000 by the end of this year, or roughly 45,000 below the doctrinal norm. In reality, most of the Afghan police are ineffective at best, and several thousand coalition forces are legally prevented from fighting. The actual gap between the forces we have in Afghanistan and what doctrine recommends is significantly higher. In fact, we may not need as many counterinsurgency troops in Afghanistan as doctrine would dictate, but we need more than we have. Almost certainly we do not need 45,000 more. Forces do not need to be everywhere. Counterinsurgency units must focus on areas critical to the enemy and to the host government. Sprinkling troops throughout the population (as the current ISAF deployment does) is bad strategy. But even reorienting those forces we have in Afghanistan will not permit decisive operations in important areas.

**More troops are needed to secure Kandahar province**

**VOA News, 10** (Voice of America, “Kandahar Governor Appeals for More Troops”, March 14th, 2010. <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Taliban-Claims-Responsibility-for-Afghan-Bombings-87613492.html>)

The governor of Kandahar province in Afghanistan is appealing for troop reinforcements after a series of suicide attacks killed at least 35 people Saturday evening. Officials say Taliban militants detonated five large blasts in the city as part of an operation that appeared to target the city's main prison. In a similar Taliban assault in 2008, militants freed hundreds of inmates, but officials say Saturday's prison-break failed. The dead included 13 police officers and 22 civilians. Officials say 57 people were wounded in the attacks. Another explosion took place early Sunday near a Kandahar construction company. Authorities say at least five people were wounded. Kandahar is the birthplace of the Taliban movement and is still considered a key militant stronghold. U.S. and NATO commanders are planning a large-scale assault in the coming months to clear the city of militants and improve security and local governance. In claiming credit for Saturday's attacks, a Taliban spokesman said they were a "message" to commanders planning the coming assault.

**Taliban controlled Afghanistan would doom the country to instability and terrorism**

**Curtis 09 -** Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, focusing on analyzing America's economic, security, and political relationships with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal

(September 23, 2009 Lisa, “Scaling Back in Afghanistan Would Jeopardize Security of U.S. Homeland” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/09/Scaling-Back-in-Afghanistan-Would-Jeopardize-Security-of-US-Homeland )

The Taliban and al-Qaeda have a symbiotic relationship, and they support each other's harsh Islamist, anti-West goals. It would be folly to think a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would be anything but a deadly international terrorist safe haven.

Success in Afghanistan requires that those Taliban who support international terrorists are not in a position to threaten the stability of the government. This will ultimately require a strong, well-equipped, and well-trained Afghan national army and police force. But this will take time.

In the meantime, the U.S. must prevent the Taliban from regaining influence in Afghanistan, which requires increasing U.S. troop levels. Success in Afghanistan does not require the complete elimination of anyone who has ever associated with the Taliban. But it does require that the Taliban leaders still allied with al-Qaeda and supportive of its destructive global agenda do not have the ability to reassert power in Afghanistan.

**Even though we haven’t been that successful in Afghanistan, more troops are necessary to serve as a deterrence against terrorists.**

**Tristam, Pierre ’09** “Escalating Debate: Should Obama send more troops to Afghanistan?” – Pierre Tristam – journalist and middle east expert, http://middleeast.about.com/bio/Pierre-Tristam-28362.htm

Following his election, President Obama shifted strategy. He agreed to send 21,000 more troops but also to devote most of them to train Afghan soldiers, not battle the Taliban, even though seven years of training Afghan soldiers had done little to build an Afghan military. The surge not only proved insufficient, but it deteriorated the situation further in favor of the Taliban, as McChrystal noted. Still, McChrystal argues that too much has been invested in Afghanistan, in blood and dollars, to retreat now. Five factors argue strongly for a troop escalation: More than 1,300 foreign troops, including 850 American troops, have been killed so far in Afghanistan. Retreating would diminish their sacrifice to a mere waste of lives. **Retreat would send the wrong message to Islamists and American enemies in the region, al-Qaeda among them, who would interpret the withdrawal as a victory and feel emboldened to resume assaults on American interests or the West more aggressively.** Certainly, the Taliban's position in Afghanistan would be strengthened, and its return to power likelier. Afghanistan would possibly revert to open-ended civil war and a return to the 1990s' conditions when tens of thousands of Afghan civilians were massacred every year. Pakistan and possibly Saudi Arabia would more aggressively resume their support of the Sunni-dominated Taliban, which the two nations created in the 1990s as Pakistan's proxy force in Afghanistan and as a hedge against diminished American involvement in the region. American prestige would suffer a blow similar that the one it suffered after retreating from South Asia in the mid-1970s and from Lebanon in 1984.

# Surge Good- Counterinsurgency/Terrorism

**More troops key to protect civilian operations in Kandahar.  
Nordland, Rod 6/8/2010** “Afghanistan Strategy Focuses on Civilian Efforts” – The New York Times - <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/world/asia/09kandahar.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1>

The Kandahar civilian operation increased to 110 Americans from 8 last year, with 50 more on their way this summer, United States officials say. They are providing subsidized seeds and tools, carrying out cash-for-work programs and even hiring employees for Afghan government offices here. The program for agricultural vouchers alone has been given a quarter of a billion dollars to spend in southern Afghanistan, $90 million of that in Kandahar. “It’s huge,” said one official. “We’ve employed 40,000 people in cash for work.” The idea, said Frank Ruggiero, the senior United States Embassy official in the south, is to make sure “the government at the most basic level, the district level, is able to provide some services so that people who are sitting on the fence are able to say, well, the government has something to offer.”

**More troops necessary to find terrorists groups.  
BBC, 12/3/2009** “Paper Justifies Dispatching Extra U.S Troops in Afghanistan” - http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/

Obama has fired his last arrow to defeat the Taleban and establish peace and freedom in Afghanistan. Of course, his decision on resorting to military means is a risky one. Obama's strategy on Afghanistan is focusing on strengthening troops at the time when sending extra troops to a dangerous country like Afghanistan has been always accompanied with fear and concern about high casualties among soldiers. On the other hand, Obama's decision will be followed by the US public's dissatisfaction and opposition, because with after eight years of war, without any real improvement in the stability of this country, the Americans have been compelled to hear news of the death of their sons and such an issue has been followed with the waning of US public support from this mission, an issue which led to the increasing domestic pressure. But is it necessary to send additional forces to Afghanistan? In view of the extraordinary increase in the level of violence in Afghanistan and its expansion even to the northern areas of the country, where the Taleban were not expected to easily reach, turning of terrorists groups into a serious threat, the connection of the West, especially America's prestige with the fate of the war in Afghanistan, prolongation of war and several other reasons, **it seems that dispatching additional** **troops to Afghanistan in such a situation was** **necessary.**

**More troops needed to combat insurgency**

**Schmitt and Shanker, 09**. (Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, analysts for the nations war on terrorism for the New York Times, New York Times. General Calls for More U.S Troops to Avoid Afghan Failure.” September 20th, 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/world/asia/21afghan.html>)

General McChrystal’s view offered a stark contrast, and the language he used was striking. “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near term (next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks an outcome where **defeating the insurgency is no longer possible**,” General McChrystal writes. A copy of the assessment, with some operational details removed at the Pentagon’s request to avoid compromising future operations, was posted on The Post’s Web site. In his five-page commander’s summary, General McChrystal ends on a cautiously optimistic note: “While the situation is serious, success is still achievable.” But throughout the document, General McChrystal warns that unless he is provided more forces and a robust counterinsurgency strategy, the war in Afghanistan is most likely lost. Pentagon and military officials involved in Afghanistan policy say General McChrystal is expected to propose a range of options for additional troops beyond the 68,000 American forces already approved, from 10,000 to as many as 45,000.

**More troops are needed to combat al-Quaida and the Taliban, and to restore NATO’s credibility**

**Klein, 09** (Kent Klein, VOA News, Obama: 30,000 More US Troops to Afghanistan by Mid-2010. <http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/Obama_Troops_Afghanistan_strategy_announcement-78273987.html>

U.S. President Barack Obama is sending 30,000 more U.S. troops to Afghanistan by the summer of 2010, and plans to start withdrawing American forces a year later. The president laid out his strategy for winning the war in Afghanistan. After several months of deliberation, President Obama has announced his plan for deploying additional troops to Afghanistan. He unveiled his strategy before an audience of cadets at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, New York, late Tuesday and a nation watching on television. "The 30,000 additional troops that I am announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010 - the fastest pace possible - so that they can target the insurgency and secure key population centers," said President Obama. The added troops will join an estimated 68,000 U.S. service members already in Afghanistan, and tens of thousands of allied forces. The president spoke as Americans' support for the war continues to erode. A new survey by the Gallup organization shows only 35 percent of Americans surveyed approve of Mr. Obama's handling of the war - 55 percent disapprove. At West Point, Mr. Obama said Afghanistan is not lost, but has been moving backwards for several years. He said al-Qaida is planning new acts of terror from its safe havens along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, with the support of the Taliban. "We must deny al-Qaida a safe haven," said Mr. Obama. " We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government, so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future." The president appealed to America's allies to contribute more troops to the fight in Afghanistan, and said he is confident that they will. "Our friends have fought and bled and died alongside us in Afghanistan," said President Obama. "Now, we must come together to end this war successfully. For what's at stake is not simply a test of NATO's credibility - what's at stake is the security of our Allies, and the common security of the world." Mr. Obama said his strategy will allow U.S. troops to begin returning home by the middle of 2011, depending on the conditions on the ground. "Taken together, these additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011," said Mr. Obama. The top Senate Republican, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, said after the speech he supports the president's plan, as long as the withdrawal does not begin until conditions in Afghanistan permit it. "

# Surge Good- Counterinsurgency/Terrorism

**More forces essential to defeat the Taliban**

**Woodward, 09** (Bob Woodward, Washington Post, McChrystal calls for more troops in Afghanistan. September 21st, 2009. <http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-09-21/news/17206077_1_afghan-security-gen-stanley-mcchrystal-afghan-government>)

McChrystal concludes the document's five-page Commander's Summary on a note of muted optimism: "While the situation is serious, success is still achievable." But he repeatedly warns that without more forces and the rapid implementation of a genuine counterinsurgency strategy, defeat is likely. McChrystal describes an Afghan government riddled with corruption and an international force undermined by tactics that alienate civilians. He provides extensive new details about the Taliban insurgency, which he calls a muscular and sophisticated enemy that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan's prisons to recruit members and even plan operations. McChrystal's assessment is one of several options the White House is considering. His plan could intensify a national debate in which leading Democratic lawmakers have expressed reluctance about committing more troops to an increasingly unpopular war. Obama said last week that he will not decide whether to send more troops until he has "absolute clarity about what the strategy is going to be." The commander has prepared a separate detailed request for additional troops and other resources, but defense officials have said he is awaiting instructions before sending it to the Pentagon. McChrystal makes clear that his call for more forces is predicated on the adoption of a strategy in which troops emphasize protecting Afghans rather than killing insurgents or controlling territory. Most starkly, he says: "Inadequate resources will likely result in failure. However, without a new strategy, the mission should not be resourced." The assessment offers an unsparing critique of the failings of the Afghan government, contending that official corruption is as much of a threat as the insurgency to the mission of the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, as the U.S.-led NATO coalition is widely known. "The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government," McChrystal says. The result has been a "crisis of confidence among Afghans," he writes. "Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents.

# Surge Good- Afghan Army Training

**The new addition of troops isn’t sufficient, more troops needed to train Afghan army and police**

**Press TV, 10** (Press TV, Iranian top television network, “NATO Begs for Additional Troops to Train Afghans”, February 1st, 2010. <http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=117620&sectionid=351020403>)

NATO says it needs more contributions from member states to train Afghan soldiers in their fight against the Taliban militants. Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, speaking at a monthly press conference on Sunday, said the 40,000 extra troops that are to be deployed in Afghanistan through August will include training teams. But, he emphasized, "it isn't yet sufficient." The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force could require additional troops for the purpose of training Afghan soldiers and police forces over the next five years, he said, adding that he will press on this issue at the upcoming Istanbul meeting. Rasmussen reiterated that if the Afghan security forces are to grow to 300,000 personnel by 2011, as reported, then even more training teams will be needed. Currently, according to the NATO chief, the alliance is short of 21 teams for training the Afghan army and more than 100 teams for training the police. The year 2010 will prove to be a real challenge for the NATO forces in the country, he said; though, he claimed, the military alliance enjoys the unity, the strategy, and the resources essential in combating the Taliban.

# Surge Good- Proliferation

**Taliban controlled Afghanistan hundredfolds their power and risk nuclear Pakistani chaos**

**Gerson 09** - op-ed columnist for *The Washington Post* and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.[1] He served as President George W. Bush's chief speechwriter from 2001 until June 2006, as a senior policy advisor from 2000 through June 2006, and was a member of the White House Iraq Group.[2] (September 4, Michael, “In Afghanistan, No Choice but to Try”

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/03/AR2009090302862.html

On the left, some view every conceivable war as a "war of choice" that should never be chosen. With Iraq miraculously unscathed by the attentions of the antiwar movement -- whose success in encouraging untimely withdrawal might have sparked a genocide -- Afghanistan is the next obvious target of their idealism.

The strategic importance of Afghanistan is difficult for critics of the war to deny. The events of Sept. 11, 2001, which began in state-sponsored terror academies there, are not yet generally regarded as a myth. The spread of Taliban havens in Afghanistan would permit al-Qaeda to return to its historical operating areas. This would allow, according to one administration official to whom I spoke, "perhaps a hundredfold expansion of their geographic and demographic area of operation." And Taliban advances in Afghanistan could push a fragile, nuclear Pakistan toward chaos.

**Afghan instability spills over causing arms race**

**Salam, 9**- previously an associate editor at The Atlantic, a producer for NBC News, a junior editor and editorial researcher at The New York Times, a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a reporter-researcher at The New Republic (9/17/09, Reihan, “Don’t Short the Surge,” <http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2009/dont_short_the_surge_12856>)

It's impossible to tell what is going on in President Obama's head. His domestic priorities might lead him to "play it safe"--to short-change the war effort with a wait-and-see, halfway approach that will lead to higher casualties and an even stronger drive to withdraw from Afghanistan in six months. Or he might recognize that stabilizing Afghanistan could be his great contribution to America and the world. When the president recently argued that Afghanistan is a "war of necessity," he seemed to understand the threat posed by failure in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a real domino--if it falls, Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation of 180 million, risks falling with it, radiating instability across India and Iran and sparking a news arms race that the world can't afford.

\*\*\*REDEPLOYMENT\*\*\*

# Readiness = Normal Procedure

**Redeployment is a normal procedure for the army—dwell times between deployments can be less than 12 months, and are key to readiness.**

**Cashner 09** (<http://www.army.mil/aps/09/information_papers/redeployment_process.html>)

Redeployment is defined as the transfer of forces and materiel to support another Joint Force Commander's operational requirements, or the return of personnel, equipment, and materiel to home/demobilization stations for reintegration/out-processing. Redeployment operations have four phases: Redeployment Planning Pre-Redeployment Activities Movement Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (see Joint Publication 3-35) Historically, redeployments have been considered "administrative movements" with no emphasis on aggregating unit cargo or expeditiously returning the cargo. Therefore, units often had their equipment returned on multiple ships (20 or more) or received their equipment 120 to 150 days after returning to their home station. However, **due to dwell times averaging 12 months or less between deployments**, the Army shortened unit redeployment timelines in order to meet Army Force Generation Process and RESET requirements. **What has the Army done?** The Army has influenced the Joint redeployment process in two key areas. The first is updating old and creating new Joint and Army doctrine and policy to operationalize the redeployment process and stress its importance in sustaining combat operations. The second is convincing the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) to take a thorough look at their business processes and determine ways to reduce redeployment timelines; particularly the time it takes from the seaport of embarkation to the destination (e.g., depot, home station, or mobilization station). **Joint and Army doctrine now addresses redeployments as operational (as opposed to administrative) movements that are critical in "re-establishing Joint Force readiness**" that must be planned and managed as intensively as deployments. Specific examples include: Joint Publication 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, dated May 7, 2007, Draft Army Regulation 525-30, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, and the Defense Transportation Regulation, Part 3, Mobility, Chapter 305 Redeployment dated August 17, 2007. In 2008, the Army influenced USCENTCOM and USTRANSCOM to conduct redeployments as operational movements, reduce timelines, and establish firm metrics. Brigade Combat Team (BCT) sealift timelines are now programmed to take less than 58 days for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 65 days for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The OEF timelines were reduced to a relatively low cost by increasing ship speed and reducing the time it takes to return equipment from "port to fort". For example, the sailing time from Fujairah, United Arab Emirates to the East coast of the United States has been reduced from 32 days to 26 days by increasing the average sailing speed from15 to 18 knots. Furthermore, USTRANSCOM compressed the discharge and movement of unit equipment from the seaport of debarkation to home station from 14 to 8 days. Subsequently, the Army G-4 standardized BCT redeployments from OEF by way of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The TTPs provide continuity and will help deployed BCTs clearly identify "who does what, when, and where" so that the process remains the same from one rotation to the next. The Army requires redeployment equipment to be returned to depot or home installation in 50 days or less. This represents an 8 to 15 day decrease in current metrics. The USTRANSCOM and USCENTCOM are now looking at ways to reduce OIF timelines by looking at similar efficiencies as discovered when examining the OEF redeployment process. From June to August 2008, USCENTCOM and USTRANSCOM conducted a proof of principle to redeploy a Stryker BCT from Iraq in 50 days or less. Remarkably, the entire movement took 42 days - exceeding the current standard by 16 days. Subsequently, on October 3, 2008, the Department of the Army G4, USTRANSCOM, and CENTCOM staff officers conducted an after action review and analysis of this movement. As a result, CENTCOM validated, and USTRANSCOM confirmed, the feasibility of a 50 day redeployment for two additional BCTs redeploying in January 2009. On December 8, 2008, the USTRANSCOM staff was scheduled to brief their commander on the Army's 50 day initiative, and recommend approval of the concept as "a goal" for future BCT redeployments. If their analysis indicates a 50 day sealift timeline is not feasible, they will provide an amended "projected closure date" and attempt to come as close to 50 days as possible. The Army staff will continue its efforts to improve redeployment doctrine and policy and institutionalize the ethos that redeployment operations are as critical as deployment. Current redeployment metrics allow BCTs approximately 9 months to conduct collective training between consecutive deployments. This time allows units to meet minimal standards for preparing for counterinsurgency operations. Collective training for full spectrum operations requires approximately 12 months of training (9 months for counter insurgency trainng and 3 months for major combat operations training). In order to allow units the time to train for full spectrum operations, equipment must be returned to depot or home installation for RESET, inventory, and individual training no later than 50 days after its sealift available load date. POC: LTC Mike Cashner (703) 614-5066

**Redeployments are normal and key to readiness and unit cohesion**

**Pike 05** (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/55-65/ch9.htm)

Redeployment is the preparation for and movement of forces, manpower, and materiel from an AO to follow-on designated CONUS/OCONUS locations. The physical act of moving includes theater and strategic movement. This chapter focuses on redeploying a force from an OCONUS base of operation to a CONUS HS. Theater commands may tailor this redeployment process to meet unique requirements. The objective of a redeployment is to maintain unit integrity of equipment, supplies, and personnel. Redeployment should not be considered as retrograde movement, but as a new deployment. Units may conduct successive deployments into other crisis scenarios.

# Readiness = Normal Procedure

**Military readiness is key to hegemony**

**Spenser 2k (**Jack Spencer, Policy Analyst – Heritage Foundation, “The Facts About Military Readiness”, 9-15, jlk, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1394.cfm>)

Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace. Readiness Defined. Readiness measures the ability of a military unit, such as an Army division or a carrier battle group, to accomplish its assigned mission. Logistics, available spare parts, training, equipment, and morale all contribute to readiness. The military recognizes four grades of readiness. 7 At the highest level, a unit is prepared to move into position and accomplish its mission. At the lowest level, a unit requires further manpower, training, equipment, and/or logistics to accomplish its mission. There is evidence of a widespread lack of readiness within the U.S. armed forces. Recently leaked Army documents report that 12 of the 20 schools training soldiers in skills such as field artillery, infantry, and aviation have received the lowest readiness rating. They also disclose that over half of the Army's combat and support training centers are rated at the lowest readiness grade. 8 As recently as last November, two of the Army's 10 active divisions were rated at the lowest readiness level, and none were rated at the highest. 9 Every division required additional manpower, equipment, or training before it would be prepared for combat, due largely to the units' commitments to operations in the Balkans. 10 And 23 percent of the Army's Chinook cargo helicopters, 19 percent of its Blackhawk helicopters, and 16 percent of its Apaches are not "mission-capable." 11 In other words, they are not ready. The Facts about Military Readiness The reduction in forces of the U.S. armed forces began in the early 1990s. After the end of the Cold War, the Bush Administration began to reduce the size of the military so that it would be consistent with post-Cold War threats. 12 Under the Clinton Administration, however, that reduction in forces escalated too rapidly at the same time that U.S. forces were deployed too often with too little funding. The result was decreased readiness as personnel, equipment, training, and location suffered. Since the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. military has been deployed on over 50 peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. 13 Yet the resources available to fund these missions have steadily decreased: The number of total active personnel has decreased nearly 30 percent, and funding for the armed services has decreased 16 percent. The strain on the armed forces shows clearly now as the reduced forces deploy for too long with insufficient and antiquated equipment. The result is indisputable: Readiness is in decline. Because the security of the United States is at stake, it is imperative to present the facts about military readiness: FACT #1. The size of the U.S. military has been cut drastically in the past decade. Between 1992 and 2000, the Clinton Administration cut national defense by more than half a million personnel and $50 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars. 14 (See Table 1.) The Army alone has lost four active divisions and two Reserve divisions. Because of such cuts, the Army has lost more than 205,000 soldiers, or 30 percent of its staff, although its missions have increased significantly throughout the 1990s. In 1992, the U.S. Air Force consisted of 57 tactical squadrons and 270 bombers. Today the Air Force has 52 squadrons and 178 bombers. The total number of active personnel has decreased by nearly 30 percent. In the Navy, the total number of ships has decreased significantly as well. In 1992, there were around 393 ships in the fleet, while today there are only 316, a decrease of 20 percent. The number of Navy personnel has fallen by over 30 percent. In 1992, the Marine Corps consisted of three divisions. The Corps still has three divisions, but since 1992, it has lost 22,000 active duty personnel, or 11 percent of its total. The Clinton Administration also cut the Marine Corps to 39,000 reserve personnel from 42,300 in 1992. Effect on Readiness. In spite of these drastic force reductions, missions and operations tempo have increased, resulting in decreased military readiness. Because every mission affects far greater numbers of servicemen than those directly involved, most operations other than warfare, such as peacekeeping, have a significant negative impact on readiness. For each service[person]man who participates in a military operation, two others are involved in the mission: one who is preparing to take the participant's place, and another who is recovering from having participated and retraining. Therefore, if 10,000 troops are on peace operations in the Balkans, 30,000 troops are actually being taken away from preparing for combat. Ten thousand are actively participating, while 10,000 are recovering, and 10,000 are preparing to go. Coupled with declining personnel, increased tempo has a devastating effect on readiness. Morale problems stemming from prolonged deployments, equipment that wears out too quickly, and decreased combat training levels heighten when troops are committed to non-combat operations. Further exacerbating the military's declining readiness is the tendency to take troops with special skills from non-deployed units. Thus, a mission may affect non-deployed units as well because they will not be able to train properly. The soldiers integral to the non-deployed mission are not present, and there is no one to take their place. A mission's spillover effects are clearly illustrated by a July 2000 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) on the U.S. commitments in the Balkans: In January 2000 ... four active divisions and one Guard division were affected by these operations [in the Balkans]. Among the active divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division was recovering from a 1-year deployment in Bosnia, the 10th Mountain Division was deployed there, and elements of the Guard's 49th Armored Division were preparing to deploy there. At the same time, the European-based 1st Infantry Division was deployed to Kosovo, and the 1st Armored Division was preparing to deploy there. Although none of these divisions deployed in its entirety, deployment of key components--especially headquarters--makes these divisions unavailable for deployment elsewhere in case of a major war.

# South Korea -> Middle East

**Forces in South Korea should be moved to the Middle East  
Liewer 05/19** (http://www.stripes.com/news/study-weighs-costs-benefits-of-options-in-shifting-u-s-overseas-forces-1.20063)

Rumsfeld has argued that the current basing structure, rooted in Cold War politics, is badly in need of an update. Rumsfeld instead has called for a smaller, more mobile force that is based closer to the likely sites of future conflicts — places such as Africa, the Middle East or the oil-rich Caspian Sea region of the former Soviet Union. Many of the older bases, such as Yongsan Garrison in Seoul, stand in areas that once were isolated but now are surrounded by cities, causing battles with local people over pollution and noise. Last year, Rumsfeld negotiated a deal with the South Korean government to pull Army forces out of Seoul and into new bases farther from the North Korean border. Jones outlined an ambitious plan to reduce the Army’s presence in Germany while boosting it in Eastern Europe and Africa, and returning thousands of troops to stateside bases. The Pentagon expected to announce specific base closures by fall, and rumors spread of shutdowns in Germany as early as this year. Since then, the process has slowed down. Instead of announcing base closures last winter, Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith announced a period of consultation with other branches of government and with allies. Lt. Cmdr. Rick Haupt, a EUCOM spokesman, said the command just learned of the CBO study Tuesday and doesn’t yet have any comment on the findings. “A fundamental decision has not been made yet,” he said.

**Troops in South Korea should be moved to Iraq or Afghanistan**

**Brookes 06/24** (Defending South Korea, Published on June 24, 2004 by Peter Brookes, Peter Brookes, a veteran of the CIA and naval intelligence, is a senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2004/06/Defending-South-Korea)

The United States-South Korean defence relationship took a major step into the 21st century last week with the announcement that Washington would withdraw one-third of its 37,000 troops from Korea by the end of 2005. The news, not completely unexpected in the light of the U.S.'s decision in May to send 3,600 combat troops from South Korea to Iraq, still has observers on both sides of the Pacific nervous. They need not be. Even though this is the largest drawdown of American forces from Korea since the end of the Korean War -- and the most significant since 1992, when 7,000 troops left -- the reduction in 12,500 soldiers from the peninsula, viewed optimistically, is a win-win situation for America and South Korea.First, the number of troops does not completely determine military capability. In fact, despite the decrease in American soldiers in Korea, U.S. firepower will actually increase due to expected changes in force structure over the next several years. Although technology cannot replace soldiers in some missions, today's hi-tech equipment can provide significant firepower advantages over the common foot soldier. Therefore, the U.S. can withdraw some of its Korean-based troops for other soldier-intensive missions, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and the war on terrorism, while actually improving the lethality and deterrence of its forces in Korea. Improving the defense capability of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) can be accomplished by bringing to bear such systems as Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles for air defence, the army's new Stryker brigade, the navy's High-Speed Vessel, and the forward-deployment of additional air and naval assets to Hawaii and Guam. Washington is also planning an $11 billion investment in some additional 150 military capabilities over the next four years that will enhance defense against any North Korean attack. Secondly, it is useful for Seoul and Washington to reduce the visibility and "footprint" (that is, the size and number of bases) of U.S. forces because of trends in Korean public opinion, which has been mixed about USFK's presence. Moving the U.S. Army out of Seoul, drawing down troop levels and consolidating bases will reduce pressures from some sectors of Korean society for all U.S. troops to leave. Of note, one should not conclude that the reductions in Korea will be matched in Japan. Some American troops may be shifted from Okinawa in the south to Hokkaido in the north to reduce local political tensions arising from Okinawa hosting the bulk of American forces. But bases in Japan remain critical for the defence of Japan and are more important now for other possible Northeast Asian contingencies -- including Korea. Next, President Roh Moo Hyun early on stated his belief that South Korea should do more for its own defence. As the world's 11th largest economy, South Korea can spend more on its own defence -- and should. The reduction in U.S. forces will provide the Roh government an opportunity to do more for South Korea's national security. This supports both Washington's need for more flexibility in deploying its forces to global hot spots and Seoul's desire for a bigger role in its national defence. Lastly, though unlikely, there's a sliver of a chance that the reduction of U.S. forces could help reduce North-South tensions. The North long has demanded that U.S. troops leave the peninsula. This reduction could be seen as a gesture of goodwill to the North that might lead to some political openings between Seoul and Pyongyang in addressing issues of national reconciliation or even the North's nuclear programme. But because no one is naive regarding North Korean intentions, the force reduction is matched by an increase in force capabilities. The bottom line is that despite these changes, America's commitment to South Korea's defence is as strong as ever. The U.S.'s obligation to the security of the South against the North is a moral one in the defence of a fellow democracy, not to mention codified in the 1953 U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defence Treaty. The real "tripwire" is the treaty, not the number of U.S. troops in South Korea. The alliance has successfully deterred North Korean aggression for over 50 years. It will do so for as long as needed. A military confrontation between the North and the South would invariably result in the demise of the regime in Pyongyang. Fortunately, Kim Jong Il understands this. Adjusting the U.S.-South Korea partnership for the 21st century makes ultimate sense. The future of the alliance will be better for this, making the relationship ready for challenges on the Korean peninsula and beyond.

# South Korea -> Middle East

**Troops in South Korea should be redeployed to Afghanistan.**

**Hankyoreh 05/04** (http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\_edition/e\_international/353127.html)

U.S. government has recently requested that the South Korean government re-examine the deployment of soldiers from the South Korean army as part of support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, sources indicate. A government official said Sunday that the U.S. government recently presented specific requests through diplomatic channels, including troop deployment and increased financial support from the South Korean government toward the reconstruction of Afghanistan. “The U.S. said that increasing South Korean financial support for Afghanistan was a pressing issue at this time,” the official added. The requests from the U.S. were communicated immediately following a series of meetings between U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke during his April 16 visit to South Korea and high-ranking South Korean figures in foreign affairs and national security, including President Lee Myung-bak and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yu Myung-hwan, sources said. In connection with the requests, Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Yong-joon met with Holbrooke during a visit to the U.S. from April 29 to May 1. A representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade said that during the meeting, Lee “listened to and exchanged opinions on the U.S. explanation of the regional situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and efforts by the international community related to peace and reconstruction in the region.” While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade officer only stated that Lee “engaged in comprehensive policy discussions on immediate issues in South Korea-U.S. relations,” another government official said that the core reason for Lee’s visit to the U.S. was to have a “concrete discussion between South Korea and the U.S. on plans for support on the reconstruction of Afghanistan.” Experts are predicting that the government will expand its financial support for reconstruction projects in Afghanistan in the short term, and carefully examine the issue of troop redeployment before the South Korea-U.S. summit set to take place in Washington on June 16. “If we ultimately do have to deploy troops to Afghanistan, it will be in the form of humanitarian non-combatant troop support,” a government official said. “There is a possibility that it will mean the redeployment of the Dongui and Dasan units that were withdrawn from Afghanistan in late 2007 or the Zaytun unit in Irbil in Iraq,” the official predicted.

\*\*\*REVERSE SPENDING DA\*\*\*

# 1NC Shell- ALTB

**1. The defense budget exceeds $700 billion a year and accounts for 22% of federal spending**

**Friedman 8**

Benjamin Friedman, Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies at The CATO Institute, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2008, “The Defense Budget,” in CATO Handbook for Policymakers, 7th Edition, online: <http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb111/hb111-19.pdf>) SP

The defense budget increased dramatically in the last eight years (Figure 19.1). A buildup that began in 1998 accelerated dramatically after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The fiscal year 2009 baseline or nonwar request of $518 billion is $228 billion higher than the FY00 defense budget in current dollars, or about 43 percent higher in real, inflation-adjusted terms. Another $22.8 billion in spending that falls outside the Department of Defense, mostly in the Department of Energy’s nuclear weapons management and research programs, is usually counted as defense spending and brings the total to about $541 billion. This will be the highest nonwar budget ever. Including war supplementals, which now include modernization funds scarcely connected to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the defense budget in FY09 will likely exceed $700 billion—a total higher in real terms than in any year since World War II. Defense spending now accounts for over 22 percent of federal spending, more than Social Security and more than all other federal discretionary spending. That total still excludes $66 billion for homeland security and $94 billion for veterans planned for FY09, which the Office of Management and Budget does not consider defense spending. The explosion in defense spending since 2001 results from several factors. First, the cost of personnel has risen far faster than inflation, driven by health care costs and benefits. Second, the services have allowed the cost of procurement programs to spiral out of control in case after case, mostly because they insist on pressing the technological envelope. Third, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan now approach $200 billion annually and have driven up personnel and operations and maintenance costs. Fourth, he Pentagon has failed to make sufficient tradeoffs in its force structure choices. Although increased fear of terrorism helped cause the spike in defense spending, little of the base defense budget goes to counterterrorism- related activities. There are many problems with the current defense budget; this chapter highlights only the three most important. First, it is too large for the threats we face and therefore wasteful. Second, it fails to adhere to a strategy that would force choices among competing means of providing defense. Third, it funds the Iraq War, which detracts from American security at great expense and spends too much to remake the military, particularly the ground forces, into a force meant to fight more wars like Iraq.

**2. The Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) was put on hold because of funding issues, but will be revived if more money is available**

**SFC 10**

San Francisco Chronicle (April 16, 2010, “Laser in limbo mirrors tech weapons decline,” online: http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-04-16/business/20851874\_1\_lockheed-workers-silicon-valley-system) SP

Two football-size mirrors stored in a spotless warehouse in Sunnyvale reflect the fortunes of Lockheed Martin Space Systems Co. and Silicon Valley's aerospace and defense sector. Coated with special reflective treatments, these mirrors were designed to aim the energy beam created by a massive airborne laser to destroy a missile before it could roar into space. But the Obama administration has put the Airborne Laser Test Bed on hold, turning it into an experimental project instead of buying additional systems from its three main contractors: Lockheed, which created the aiming system, Northrop Grumman, developer of the laser, and Boeing, which packaged the weapons system in a special airplane. Job losses. As a result, a project that had employed 350 Lockheed workers at its peak in 2000, and roughly 200 employees before Obama, now has a staff of 110. "By the end of the year we'll be at 60 people," said Douglas Graham, a vice president at the Lockheed division running the program. "The fate of the airborne laser is somewhat emblematic of how the Pentagon views California and Silicon Valley as sources for science-based systems," said Loren Thompson, a defense analyst with the Lexington Institute, a think tank in Washington. Thompson said defense planners want high-tech contractors to keep generating ideas, but with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq sapping the defense budget, costly weapons like the airborne laser may not get deployed. Overextended. Defense critic John Pike of GlobalSecurity.org gave the same notion a different spin. "The Pentagon is famous for starting more programs than it could possibly fund," he said. Lockheed is one of the foundations of the defense sector in Silicon Valley, which took off during the Cold War by designing high-tech, high-ticket systems for the military. Lockheed opened its Sunnyvale facility in 1956 to build fleet ballistic missiles and surveillance satellites. By 1990, the division's employment had peaked at 26,500 people. But by then the Berlin Wall had fallen, and as the United States cut defense spending, employment at Sunnyvale fell. By 2000, the local division was down to 6,941 people. Employment rose in the wake of 9/11 to 7,984 by the end of the George W. Bush era. Today Lockheed Martin Space Systems employs 7,700 people in Sunnyvale. On a tour of the Sunnyvale site, Lockheed's Graham characterized the airborne laser as a success. He also cast the administration's decision to keep it in an experimental mode in a favorable light. Graham said the weapon proved itself during a test mission in February, when the airborne laser destroyed an unarmed ballistic missile as it boosted toward space. Many of the details remain classified but Graham said the laser is designed to deliver a basketball-size beam of intense heat over a distance of hundreds of kilometers. "It's kind of like 'Star Wars' except that it works," he said. But that success came too late. Last April, Defense Secretary Robert Gates cited "affordability and technology problems" as justifications for reducing the program, which has cost roughly $5 billion since its inception in the 1990s, to R&D status. Work on aim. Graham said the main problem was the laser. To achieve the intense energies required, the laser used massive chemical reaction chambers, roughly the size of six SUVs, parked aboard the aircraft. Graham said the Pentagon continues to fund research into more compact solid-state lasers that would be more practical to deploy. Meanwhile, the test bed will allow Lockheed to refine and improve its aiming system. "Between five and 10 years out I believe we will have a wide range of laser weapons," he said.

# 1NC Shell- ALTB

**3. Nobody will accept the START treaty if ALTB is continued and taken off R&D status**

**Chisak 10**

Alex Chisak, Centre for Research on Globalization (February 6, 2010, “Dangerous Crossroads in US Military Strategy: From Deterrence" to "Nuclear Compelence",” online: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=17446>) SP

Currently, official discussions are progressing that relate to the drafting of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to replace the former treaty which expired on December 5. Despite the seemingly promising development of a nuclear arms reduction treaty between the U.S. and Russia, it is worth noting that U.S. efforts to secure a nuclear arms reduction treaty will also substantially enhance the effectiveness of the new globally deployed anti-missile systems (SM-3, PAC-3). It is unlikely that any nation would launch a nuclear first strike to remove a strategic opponent absent of an existing military conflict.  There is however the possibility of a relatively small conflict triggering a far larger confrontation (due to treaty obligations), which is considered by many analysts as being the most probable situation eventuating in a nuclear exchange. An anti-satellite/anti-missile system can intercept surviving nuclear missiles used to retaliate after a first strike (pre-emptive attack), therefore enhancing the strategic phenomenon of nuclear primacy.  This threatening situation can be used to coerce compliance (subjugate) other nations.  No nation would willingly accept such a situation or be subject to the existential threat created by the nuclear primacy capabilities of another nation. Various Russian advisors and strategists are aware of this situation as they have publically published their concerns.  Recent changes to Russia’s nuclear weapon policy (from only retaliatory to the possibility of a pre-emptive attack option) also reflect recognition of developing U.S. strategic actions. 'Spheres of Influence and Full Spectrum Dominance' It is interesting that the U.S. publically rejects notions of spheres of influence while in fact expanding its military globally and engaging in foreign political engineering.  It is important to recognise that U.S. policies of pursuing ‘Full Spectrum Dominance’ and ‘Nuclear Primacy’ are inconsistent with strategies of preserving global stability.  These polices also imply a global sphere of influence.  These types of threatening actions and strategies create existential threats to other nations and therefore naturally invite a response. Despite Russia's legitimate concerns regarding the expansion of military blocks (NATO) and new missile system architecture (SM3, PAC3) around its borders, creating an existential threat to the nation through a published and stated U.S. doctrine of nuclear primacy, successive  U.S. administrations arrogantly continue to pursue these dangerous and provocative polices. 'Recognising parallels in history' The phenomenon of global U.S./NATO military expansionism, planned global deployment of new missile systems and more dangerously the pursuit of nuclear primacy (the ability to launch a pre-emptive nuclear first strike and defeat any surviving retaliatory missiles), risks resulting in an unplanned global conflict.

**4. START key to improving U.S. Russian relations and stopping nuclear proliferation**

**Isaacs, 9**

[<http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearweapons/articles/how_the_new_start_treaty_increases_us_security/>, John Isaacs is the Executive Director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation where his work focuses on national security issues in Congress, Iraq, missile defense, and nuclear weapons. Isaacs has published articles in the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Atlanta Journal, St. Louis Post Dispatch, Christian Science Monitor, Nuclear Times, Arms Control Today, American Journal of Public Health, and Technology Review.”How the New Start Treaty Increases U.S. Security”]

New START is a key part of global efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The new treaty sends a strong signal that the U.S. plans to play a key leadership role in reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and that it is committed to upholding its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). U.S.-Russian nuclear reductions can help augment U.S. efforts to secure international support for tougher nonproliferation and nuclear security measures, which in turn would strengthen the NPT. It will also strengthen the Obama administration’s hand at the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit and NPT Review Conference.New START is an important means to improve U.S.-Russian relations and sets the stage for discussions on deep nuclear reductions.  The formal arms control process can enhance U.S.-Russian relations, thereby making it easier to pursue other vital U.S. objectives that require Russia’s help, including buttressing programs to secure and safeguard nuclear material stockpiles and warheads and reigning in Iran’s nuclear program.

# 1NC Shell- ALTB

**5. U.S. Russian relations solve every impact**

**CFR Task Force, 6**

[Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force for Russia, Chaired by John Edwards and Jack Kemp, “RUSSIA’S WRONG DIRECTION: WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN AND SHOULD DO,” http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Russia\_TaskForce.pdf]

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, American presidents and policymakers have believed that the interests of the United States are served by engagement with Russia. This Task Force, too, began its review of U.S. policy—and concludes it—convinced of the extraordinary importance of getting U.S. relations with Russia right. U.S.-Russian cooperation can help the United States to handle some of the most difficult challenges it faces: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, tight energy markets, climate change, the drug trade, infectious diseases, and human trafficking. These problems are more manageable when the United States has Russia on its side rather than aligned against it. Good relations between Moscow and Washington also bolster one of the most promising international realities of our time—the near absence of security rivalries among the major powers. That the world’s leading states deal with each other in a spirit of accommodation is a great asset for American policy, and the United States will be in a better position to protect that arrangement if relations with Russia are on a positive track.

# 1NC Shell- F-22’s

**1. Pentagon is currently cutting funding for F-22’s in exchange for money towards sustaining military presence**

**Reuters 9**

(“Pentagon budget would reshape military priorities,” May 7, 2009, online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE54674820090507>) SP

President Barack Obama asked Congress for $663.8 billion for the Defense Department in the coming fiscal year as part of a shift in priorities designed to bolster U.S. forces for wars like Iraq and Afghanistan. "We're going to save money by eliminating unnecessary defense programs that do nothing to keep us safe," Obama said in unveiling the budget plan. A new helicopter being developed by Lockheed Martin Corp to carry the president was one of the highest-profile programs killed after its costs threatened to nearly double to over $13 billion. Adding to programs targeted for cancellation last month by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, the request would kill the kinetic energy interceptor, a missile defense program developed by Northrop Grumman Corp.

The proposal for fiscal 2010, which starts October 1, includes $130 billion in war funding, mainly for Iraq and Afghanistan. It would end a controversial reliance on "emergency" supplemental requests to fund post-September 11, 2001, conflicts. The proposed core Pentagon budget would grow $20.5 billion from the total provided by Congress this year, an increase of 4 percent, or 2.1 percent real growth after inflation. Fleshing out the plan outlined by Gates on April 6, the Defense Department's chief financial officer, Robert Hale, said the fiscal 2010 budget had been "crafted to reshape the priorities of America's defense establishment." It would end production of Lockheed's premier F-22 fighter and Boeing Co's C-17 military cargo aircraft, moves that that already have sparked opposition from lawmakers keen to save high-paying jobs around the country. Also eliminated, at least for now, would be an $87 billion Army ground vehicle modernization plan, and an alternate engine for the Lockheed F-35 fighter that Congress keeps funding despite Pentagon resistance. The budget, which must be approved by Congress, also calls for terminating a new long-range bomber, which the Defense Department had planned to begin fielding in 2018 to boost the existing Cold War-era bomber fleet. Sixty-two Republican and Democratic members of the House of Representatives sent Obama a letter on Wednesday reminding him of his outspoken public support for the C-17 program and calling the decision to stop production "an enormous mistake" that would strain the military's future airlift capability. They said the program supported 30,000 jobs across 42 states and had an economic impact of $8.4 billion, and massive layoffs were ill-advised given the state of the economy. A bipartisan group of 14 senators sent a separate letter to Gates on Tuesday, urging him to reconsider his decision to halt F-22 and C-17 production until a mobility capabilities study and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review were completed. Hale said the kinetic energy interceptor had been canceled because it had been having "technical problems." In April, Gates announced plans to turn Boeing's Airborne Laser, designed to destroy ballistic missiles at the speed of light in the early moments of their flight, into a research program. But the budget would add nearly $2 billion to the budget for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems that support U.S. forces, including more round-the-clock battlefield coverage by unmanned aerial vehicles.

The spending plan would also would grow "special operations" personnel by more than 2,400, or 4 percent. Not all U.S. money spent on security and defense is part of the Pentagon's core budget. Tens of billions of additional dollars fund the Energy Department's nuclear weapons complex and security operations of the Department of Homeland Defense. The Pentagon's plan calls for shifting the Navy's aircraft carrier program to a five-year build cycle that would delay procurement of the next carrier one year and result in a fleet of 10 carriers after 2040, down from 11 currently. "The healthy margin of dominance at sea provided by America's existing battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow production of several shipbuilding programs," a Pentagon statement accompanying the budget said. The budget seeks $6.8 billion to buy 30 Lockheed F-35 Joint Strike fighters plus $3.6 billion in research and development funding. The Pentagon said it planned to buy 513 F-35s over the current five-year plan, and 2,443 overall. The budget request also asked for $2.9 billion to buy 31 F/A-18 and E/A-18 fighters built by Boeing, but no extra planes to cover a projected strike fighter shortfall. The Pentagon said it would cut $1.2 billion from missile defense spending in fiscal 2010 and set its budget request for the Missile Defense Agency at $7.8 billion.

# 1NC Shell- F-22’s

**2. F-22 involvement increase war casualties and helps U.S. opponents more than America itself**

**Wheeler et al 8**

Winslow Wheeler, director of the Straus Military Reform Project of the Center for Defense Information, previously worked for four U.S. senators from both political parties and the Government Accountability Office on national security issues, et al. (February 19, 2008, “F-22 Analysis: The Good, the Mad and the Surly,” online: http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=4212) SP

According to the "scorecard" of the Office of Management and Budget on how well U.S. agencies are run, the Pentagon has ranked among the worst since the ratings began. By bad management, don't think of just "waste, fraud, and abuse" and incompetent book-keeping - the measures OMB uses. Add to those the incessant decisions in the Pentagon and Congress that favor bureaucratic and selfish interests, rather than the needs of war. Those latter factors provide most of the explanation for why the Pentagon budget delivers less for more. Consider just one example; the Air Force's F-22 fighter aircraft. It began in the early 1980s as the Air Force's solution to maintaining air superiority over the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, a lot of history unfolded between the "Raptor's" conception back then and the Air Force's announcement on December 12, 2007 that after more than two decades of development the F-22 had finally reached "full operational capability," meaning that it was ready to go to war. There is, however, no war for it to go to. While there are, of course, two very real ones in Iraq and Afghanistan, the F-22 is yet to fly a single sortie over the skies of either country. Nor has the Air Force announced any intention to send the F-22 to either theater. The Air Force is quite right to keep the F-22 far away from those conflicts. The airplane is irrelevant to both, since its primary mission - to shoot down enemy aircraft - is useless against our opponents - al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other insurgents - who have no air force and don't want one. Worse, if the F-22 were it to appear in those theaters, it would almost certainly harm our war efforts. It is not just that its huge logistics tail would strain our already overstretched support forces in both theaters. But also, the F-22 has operating limitations. While it can carry two medium sized bombs to attack ground targets, it is a capability so modest our opponents in Iraq and Afghanistan might not even notice. It would also be ungracious to compare the F-22 to the ridiculously cheap, simple A-10 close air support aircraft that is built specifically for the ground support role and that has been indispensable for supporting soldiers in combat in both wars. It would be even more bad-mannered to point out that each A-10 can deliver per day eight times, or more, the payload that an F-22 can. More to the point, the F-22 would be counter-productive. Data from Afghanistan indicate that U.S. and allied forces may have killed more innocent civilians than the enemy has in the past year, and from Iraq we read report after report of civilians killed as a result of US action. A major part of those "collateral" civilian casualties come from aircraft flying too fast and too high to positively identify exactly what they are guiding their munitions to. As such, the F-22 is too "thin-skinned" to endure ground fire, even from assault rifles, and it is too expensive to risk flying close enough to the ground to identify targets. In a form of conflict where winning over the civilian population is key to success, F-22 participation - along with that of other high flying, high speed aircraft - may help the enemy more than us. By keeping the F-22 at its US bases, the Air Force is doing our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan a great favor. Counter-productivity in 21st century warfare notwithstanding, the F-22's advocates would leap to argue that in its intended role - shooting down enemy fighters - it is unsurpassed. Let's pretend for the moment that there exists, or will soon, an enemy air force for which the F-22 would be relevant. How, then, could the F-22 help? We contend that as an individual performer in real world air-to-air combat, the F-22 is a huge disappointment. The Air Force vociferously disagrees - based on its hypothesis that air wars can be fought and won by long range, radar-controlled missiles fired at enemies you cannot see or visually - that is, reliably - identify. This "beyond-visual-range," radar-missile hypothesis has been tested in real world combat, and it has failed repeatedly. If ever the F-22 finds itself in an air war against a serious opponent, all of us will find out who is right. Here, we will focus on three issues about which there can be little argument and that explain how the F-22 contributes mightily to our shrinking, less ready-to-fight forces, while bringing vastly increased cost.

# Uniqueness XT- General

**Funding for military presence in other countries and funding ballistic missile defense trade off with each other**

**Tiron 9**

Roxana Tiron, reporter for The Hill (February 24, 2009, “Defense budget under tighter scrutiny,” online: <http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/3928-defense-budget-under-tighter-scrutiny>) SP

Lawmakers in the Senate and House are pushing initiatives to curb — and in some cases drastically reduce — defense spending, as the tough economic climate brings increased scrutiny to the massive Pentagon budget. Sens. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.) on Tuesday introduced a bill seeking to reform the way the Pentagon buys weapons systems. The ultimate goal of the bill is to rein in the ballooning costs of high-tech weapons and, eventually, to establish fixed-price contracts for most weapons systems, according to Levin. “We are going to do everything we can legislatively to put an end to these horrific cost overruns that we have seen,” Levin said at a press conference on Tuesday. The Pentagon’s largest programs are at least two years behind schedule and have exceeded their original budgets by a combined total of almost $300 billion, Levin said. “Particularly at this time, when the federal budget is under immense strain as a result of the economic crisis, we simply cannot afford this kind of continued waste and inefficiency,” Levin said in a statement. “As far as defense acquisition is concerned, the defense budget is concerned and spending is concerned, we are facing a train wreck,” McCain, the former Republican presidential candidate, said at the same press conference. McCain may prove instrumental in helping the White House implement the necessary reforms at the Pentagon. The new reform bill seeks to compel the Pentagon and its contractors to pay more attention to the initial engineering going into weapons systems and institute more effective planning and management of the technology risk that comes with the development of high-tech weaponry. The legislation also emphasizes the Pentagon’s growing acquisition workforce. The bill seeks to re-establish the position of the Pentagon’s director of developmental test and evaluation, which was eliminated several years ago, and is directing each military service to asses and address any shortcomings with its own organizations testing weapons in development. The bill also establishes a new position for a director of independent cost assessment to ensure that cost estimates for major defense acquisition programs are reliable and unbiased. Another essential aspect of the bill, Levin and McCain pointed out, is that it “puts some teeth” into the so-called Nunn-McCurdy law. The Pentagon is required by law to inform lawmakers when a program surpasses the cost thresholds set by Congress. Nunn-McCurdy requires the military services or the Pentagon leadership to tell Congress when the price tag of a program increases by 50 percent. Most recently, the Navy informed Congress that the presidential helicopter program has experienced such an increase. While most programs that have breached the threshold are allowed to continue, or receive the necessary certification from the Pentagon to make the argument to Congress that they should continue, Levin said that the Pentagon will now have to give the troubled programs the same financial assessment that it would give to completely new programs and present all the alternatives. A certification of whether the new costs are reasonable would have to be supported by an independent cost estimate. Both Levin and McCain said that they are not trying to undercut Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s efforts to reform the weapons-buying practices — a goal he has made clear over the last several months. The two lawmakers said that everything they are doing is helping Gates “do his job” and that they will require his input. Before the new legislation gets a vote — either as a standalone bill or part of the 2010 defense authorization bill — the Senate Armed Services Committee will hold several hearings on the issue. In the House, meanwhile, several members of the Progressive Caucus, with Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.) headlining the effort, are pressing harder this year for some significant cuts in defense spending. Frank, the chairman of the House Financial Services panel who has overseen much of the economic recovery effort, is pushing ahead with a plan to cut 25 percent of the Pentagon’s budget. Frank at a press conference Tuesday said that it is “absurd” to talk about reducing the ballooning budget deficit while “giving a pass” to the military budget. The Pentagon’s budget in 2009 is nearing $700 billion. Frank warned that without freeing up some of the military spending, the United States would not be able to overhaul healthcare, for example, or deal with other emerging social issues. Frank said he is going to distribute some 1999 remarks by Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve chairman, asserting that defense spending is one of the least productive ways to boost the economy and that a decrease in military spending at the time contributed to the lack of inflation between 1995 and 2000. In an intense effort to save several high-profile programs, such as Lockheed Martin’s F-22 fighter jet, the defense industry has argued that defense contracts create and sustain thousands of jobs. Frank acknowledged that he may not find immediate support among fellow Democrats in the House for the reduction, but he indicated he is going to make a concerted effort to “connect the dots” and have people understand the “opportunity cost of the military budget.” Frank’s cost-cutting plan is based on a timely troop withdrawal from Iraq that would create $100 billion in savings per year once all combat and support troops are withdrawn. According to his calculations, the net savings from a complete withdrawal from Iraq over the next four years would be $316 billion, taking into account the troop growth in Afghanistan. According to Frank’s plan, another $60 billion could be saved by eliminating or trimming several high-profile defense programs, such as General Dynamics’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, Lockheed’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and Boeing’s Future Combat Systems, alongside cuts for submarine programs, nuclear forces and ballistic missile defense.

# Uniqueness XT- South Korea

**U.S troop deployment is roughly $40 billion in South Korea.**

**Stanton, 7**

Stanton, Joshua, Attorney practicing in Washington, DC. U.S. Army Judge Advocate in Korea, 1998-2002. Left active duty, 2003.

Member, North Korean Freedom Coalition since 2003, and of Liberty in North Korea since 2004, 9/24/2007 “One Free Korea” - http://freekorea.us/2007/09/24/some-usfk-stats-and-history/

A few days ago, a reader asked me how much the presence of the USFK cost American taxpayers.  This is a research project I’ve taken on before, only to be confronted by few answers from credible sources.  You’re about to see what I mean here.

Writing for the Nautilus Institute, Selig Harrison claimed in 2001 that the annual cost was [$42 billion per year.](http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0628Harrison.html)  Another Nautilus alum, Doug Bandow, claimed in [his recent Korea book](http://www.amazon.com/Tripwire-Korea-Foreign-Policy-Changed/dp/1882577302) that withdrawing from the ROK would save us $40 billion a year; presumably that’s an annual cost estimate.  But then [here](http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9671), Bandow said the annual cost was “upwards of $15 billion;” while here, Bandow said the figure was “[about $15 billion](https://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-308.pdf).” Another interesting stat:  writing at Cato, Bandow estimated the cost of IMF bailout of South Korea at [$57 billion.](http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-308.pdf)  It isn’t clear whether Bandow means to U.S. taxpayers or to the IMF as a whole.  We pay most of the bill, of course.

# Uniqueness XT- Iraq/Afghanistan

**Iraq and Afghanistan troop withdraw saves the U.S. up to $1.1 trillion on defense related spending**

**Army Times 9**

Rick Maze, Staff Writer, (September 5, 2009, “Faster troop withdrawal may save $1 trillion,” online: <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/09/military_troopwithdrawals_cost_090309w/>

news/2009/09/military\_troopwithdrawals\_cost\_090309w) SP

A speedier withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq and Afghanistan would shave $1.1 trillion off the budget in the next decade, a new congressional budget projection says. That would be a sizeable cut in defense-related spending from 2010 through 2019, which the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates at $7.4 trillion. The budget forecast, issued as Congress is about to return from a summer break and confront questions about budget priorities and deficit spending, says defense costs are uncertain because budget analysts cannot predict the number of deployed troops and the pace of operations. The $7.4 trillion price tag is based on the number of deployed troops remaining at about 210,000, but looks at two scenarios for reductions: A sharp reduction in troops over three years, resulting in $1.1 trillion in savings. Under this projection, the number of deployed troops falls to 160,000 in 2010; to 100,000 in 2011; to 35,000 in 2012 and to 30,000 from 2013 to 2019. A more gradual decline that shaves $700 billion off the $7.4 trillion defense spending estimate. It assumes 210,000 deployed troops in 2010; 190,000 in 2011; 150,000 in 2012; 100,000 in 2013 and 75,000 in 2014 and beyond. The report does not suggest what the money saved from the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan should be used for, but the Defense Department surely would make a bid to keep at least some of it to pay for unfunded weapons modernization programs. The budget and economic update notes that Congress has allocated $944 billion so far for Iraq and Afghanistan operations — $849 billion in direct spending by the Defense Department, $51 billion for diplomatic efforts, $42 billion to aid Iraq and Afghanistan police and military forces and $2 billion to cover costs such as increases in veterans benefits and services.

**Military costs in Afghanistan and Iraq each billions of dollars per month.**

**Stiglitz, 8**

Joseph 2/23/2008 “The Three Trillion Dollar War” – The Sunday Times - http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest\_contributors/article3419840.ece

As the fifth year of the war draws to a close, operating costs (spending on the war itself, what you might call “running expenses”) for 2008 are projected to exceed $12.5 billion a month for Iraq alone, up from $4.4 billion in 2003, and with Afghanistan the total is $16 billion a month. Sixteen billion dollars is equal to the annual budget of the United Nations, or of all but 13 of the US states. Even so, it does not include the $500 billion we already spend per year on the regular expenses of the Defence Department. Nor does it include other hidden expenditures, such as intelligence gathering, or funds mixed in with the budgets of other departments.

Because there are so many costs that the Administration does not count, the total cost of the war is higher than the official number. For example, government officials frequently talk about the lives of our soldiers as priceless. But from a cost perspective, these “priceless” lives show up on the Pentagon ledger simply as $500,000 - the amount paid out to survivors in death benefits and life insurance. After the war began, these were increased from $12,240 to $100,000 (death benefit) and from $250,000 to $400,000 (life insurance). Even these increased amounts are a fraction of what the survivors might have received had these individuals lost their lives in a senseless automobile accident. In areas such as health and safety regulation, the US Government values a life of a young man at the peak of his future earnings capacity in excess of

$7 million - far greater than the amount that the military pays in death benefits. Using this figure, the cost of the nearly 4,000 American troops killed in Iraq adds up to some $28 billion.

**The monthly military costs in Afghanistan and Iraq are over 3 billion dollars.**

**Belasco, 9**

Amy 9/28/2009, Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget at the Congressional Research Service “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11” - http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf

As of July 2009, DOD’s average monthly obligations for contracts and pay were about $10.9on, including $7.3 billion for Iraq, and $3.6 billion for Afghanistan. Compared to a year ago when the surge ended but troop levels remained high, average obligations have fallen by about 12%. Decreases in costs as troops are withdrawn from Iraq have been largely offset by increases in costs for additional troops for Afghanistan.

# Uniqueness XT- Iraq/Afghanistan

**The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have cost $1 trillion.**

**RAWA News, 10**

6/10/10, “US Military Campaigns In Iraq And Afghanistan Cost More Than USD1 Trillion: Report” – The Reality of Life in Afghanistan” - http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2010/06/10/us-military-campaigns-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-cost-more-than-1-trillion-report.html

The U.S. military has so far appropriated 7.3 billion for the Iraq operation and 9 billion for the campaign in Afghanistan.

A report by a non-profit organization which tracks American military spending says the total cost of the US military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan has crossed $1 trillion. According to a report released Thursday by "National Priorities Project," the ongoing military operations in the two war-ravaged nations are the most expensive ever carried out by American forces since the end of the Second World War.

Taliban militants in Afghanistan started in October 2001, the invasion of Iraq took place in March 2003. Besides the economic aspect, the report also throws light on what all public initiatives that could have been realized using the vast sums spent on the military operation. It would have financed grants to all Americans attending college for the next nine years as well as payment of annual salaries to 21 million cops. The conflicts in the two Asian countries claimed the lives of around 5500 US service personnel with more than 4,400 dying in Iraq. In addition to this, servicemen and women wounded in the operations run into tens of thousands. The U.S. military has so far appropriated $747.3 billion for the Iraq operation and $299 billion for the campaign in Afghanistan. A bill for supplementary grants of $37 billion for both the wars, in addition to $136.8 billion allocated for the current financial year, is now pending with the Congress. A few areas that would have otherwise benefitted with the funds allocated for these military missions include health care, public safety, energy efficiency and affordable housing, the NPP said in its report.

# Uniqueness XT- Japan

**Even though Japan helps fund 75% of military costs, the U.S. still has to pay at least $1 billion a year**

**Japan Times 8**

(“Basics of the U.S. military presence,” March 25, 2008, online: http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20080325i1.html) SP

How much support, both direct and indirect, does Japan provide to help shoulder the cost of the U.S. forces in Japan? According to a 2004 report by the U.S. Department of Defense, Japan contributed direct financial support worth $3.23 billion and indirect support worth $1.18 billion in fiscal 2002, which offset as much as 74.5 percent of the total costs for the U.S. to station its forces in Japan. "Japan . . . provides over $4 billion in host-nation support — the most generous of any U.S. ally — and remains steadfast in supporting its share of the costs of alliance transformation," Adm. Timothy Keating, naval commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 11. Japan's direct financial support includes paying the salaries of some 25,000 nonmilitary workers at U.S. military facilities in Japan. Japan also pays for the electricity, gas, water and sewage as well as for the cooking and heating fuels at U.S. military housing facilities.

# Uniqueness XT- Turkey

**U.S. military presence in Turkey costs nearly $90 million a year**

**Ciarroca and Hartung, 2**

Michelle and William, World Policy Institute, arms Trade Resource Center, (10/4/02, “Report: Increases in Military Spending and Security Assistance Since 9/11,” http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/news/SpendingDOD911.html) SP

The 2003 ESF budget request is $2.29 billion. Top recipients include: $600 million for Israel, $615 million for Egypt, $200 million for Pakistan, $60 million for Indonesia, and $25 million for India. The 2003 FMF budget request of $4.107 billion includes $2.1 billion for Israel, $1.3 billion for Egypt, $20 million for the Philippines, $50 million for Pakistan, $50 million for India, and $98 million for Colombia. This year’s $80 million IMET budget request represents a 27.5% increase over 2001. Top recipients include major allies in the war on terrorism: India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Philippines, Jordan, Oman, and Yemen. The following funds were doled out as part of the emergency supplemental bills: $600 million in ESF for Pakistan; $40.5 million in economic and law enforcement assistance for Uzbekistan; $45 million in FMF for Turkey and Uzbekistan; $45.5 in Non-proliferation Anti-terrorism Demining and Related programs; $42.2 million for training and equipment for border security forces in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan; $108 million for a variety of counter-terrorism training programs and demining in Afghanistan. The FY 2002 Supplemental (Pl-107-206) included $665 million for ESF, $387 million for FMF, $110 million for Assistance for Independent States of the former Soviet Union, and $88 million for Non-Proliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and Related programs ($12 million of which will go to Indonesia).

# Link XT- General

**Pentagon is currently cutting funding for missile defense in exchange for money towards the Iraq and Afghanistan wars**

**Reuters 9**

(“Pentagon budget would reshape military priorities,” May 7, 2009, online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE54674820090507>) SP

President Barack Obama asked Congress for $663.8 billion for the Defense Department in the coming fiscal year as part of a shift in priorities designed to bolster U.S. forces for wars like Iraq and Afghanistan. "We're going to save money by eliminating unnecessary defense programs that do nothing to keep us safe," Obama said in unveiling the budget plan. A new helicopter being developed by Lockheed Martin Corp to carry the president was one of the highest-profile programs killed after its costs threatened to nearly double to over $13 billion. Adding to programs targeted for cancellation last month by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, the request would kill the kinetic energy interceptor, a missile defense program developed by Northrop Grumman Corp.

The proposal for fiscal 2010, which starts October 1, includes $130 billion in war funding, mainly for Iraq and Afghanistan. It would end a controversial reliance on "emergency" supplemental requests to fund post-September 11, 2001, conflicts. The proposed core Pentagon budget would grow $20.5 billion from the total provided by Congress this year, an increase of 4 percent, or 2.1 percent real growth after inflation. Fleshing out the plan outlined by Gates on April 6, the Defense Department's chief financial officer, Robert Hale, said the fiscal 2010 budget had been "crafted to reshape the priorities of America's defense establishment." It would end production of Lockheed's premier F-22 fighter and Boeing Co's C-17 military cargo aircraft, moves that that already have sparked opposition from lawmakers keen to save high-paying jobs around the country. Also eliminated, at least for now, would be an $87 billion Army ground vehicle modernization plan, and an alternate engine for the Lockheed F-35 fighter that Congress keeps funding despite Pentagon resistance. The budget, which must be approved by Congress, also calls for terminating a new long-range bomber, which the Defense Department had planned to begin fielding in 2018 to boost the existing Cold War-era bomber fleet. Sixty-two Republican and Democratic members of the House of Representatives sent Obama a letter on Wednesday reminding him of his outspoken public support for the C-17 program and calling the decision to stop production "an enormous mistake" that would strain the military's future airlift capability. They said the program supported 30,000 jobs across 42 states and had an economic impact of $8.4 billion, and massive layoffs were ill-advised given the state of the economy. A bipartisan group of 14 senators sent a separate letter to Gates on Tuesday, urging him to reconsider his decision to halt F-22 and C-17 production until a mobility capabilities study and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review were completed. Hale said the kinetic energy interceptor had been canceled because it had been having "technical problems." In April, Gates announced plans to turn Boeing's Airborne Laser, designed to destroy ballistic missiles at the speed of light in the early moments of their flight, into a research program. But the budget would add nearly $2 billion to the budget for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems that support U.S. forces, including more round-the-clock battlefield coverage by unmanned aerial vehicles.

The spending plan would also would grow "special operations" personnel by more than 2,400, or 4 percent. Not all U.S. money spent on security and defense is part of the Pentagon's core budget. Tens of billions of additional dollars fund the Energy Department's nuclear weapons complex and security operations of the Department of Homeland Defense. The Pentagon's plan calls for shifting the Navy's aircraft carrier program to a five-year build cycle that would delay procurement of the next carrier one year and result in a fleet of 10 carriers after 2040, down from 11 currently. "The healthy margin of dominance at sea provided by America's existing battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow production of several shipbuilding programs," a Pentagon statement accompanying the budget said. The budget seeks $6.8 billion to buy 30 Lockheed F-35 Joint Strike fighters plus $3.6 billion in research and development funding. The Pentagon said it planned to buy 513 F-35s over the current five-year plan, and 2,443 overall. The budget request also asked for $2.9 billion to buy 31 F/A-18 and E/A-18 fighters built by Boeing, but no extra planes to cover a projected strike fighter shortfall. The Pentagon said it would cut $1.2 billion from missile defense spending in fiscal 2010 and set its budget request for the Missile Defense Agency at $7.8 billion.

# Link XT- ALTB

**ALTB has potential application for missile defense technology**

**Missile Defense Agency 10**

(2/11/10, Department of Defense Website, “Airborne Laser Test Bed Successful in Lethal Intercept Experiment,” http://www.mda.mil/news/10news0002.html) SP

The Missile Defense Agency demonstrated the potential use of directed energy to defend against ballistic missiles when the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) successfully destroyed a boosting ballistic missile. The experiment, conducted at Point Mugu Naval Air Warfare Center-Weapons Division Sea Range off the central California coast, serves as a proof-of-concept demonstration for directed energy technology. The ALTB is a pathfinder for the nation’s directed energy program and its potential application for missile defense technology. At 8:44 p.m. (PST), February 11, 2010, a short-range threat-representative ballistic missile was launched from an at-sea mobile launch platform. Within seconds, the ALTB used onboard sensors to detect the boosting missile and used a low-energy laser to track the target. The ALTB then fired a second low-energy laser to measure and compensate for atmospheric disturbance. Finally, the ALTB fired its megawatt-class High Energy Laser, heating the boosting ballistic missile to critical structural failure. The entire engagement occurred within two minutes of the target missile launch, while its rocket motors were still thrusting. This was the first directed energy lethal intercept demonstration against a liquid-fuel boosting ballistic missile target from an airborne platform. The revolutionary use of directed energy is very attractive for missile defense, with the potential to attack multiple targets at the speed of light, at a range of hundreds of kilometers, and at a low cost per intercept attempt compared to current technologies. Less than one hour later, a second solid fuel short-range missile was launched from a ground location on San Nicolas Island, Calif. and the ALTB successfully engaged the boosting target with its High Energy Laser, met all its test criteria, and terminated lasing prior to destroying the second target. The ALTB destroyed a solid fuel missile, identical to the second target, in flight on February 3, 2010.

# Impact XT- ALTB

**Relations with Russia key to prevent conflicts**

**Graham, 9**

Senior director at Kissinger Associates, Inc. and special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff

(Thomas, http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/graham.pdf) SP

President Barack Obama will face few greater foreign-policy challenges than putting relations with Russia on a more constructive, sustainable foundation. Few countries are more important to U.S. national interests, and no great power currently has worse relations with the United States: when President Obama took office, U.S.-Russian relations were at their lowest point since the end of the cold war twenty years ago. Many observers would take issue with this judgment. For some, the United States should seek to contain rather than engage a Russia that they see as increasingly authoritarian at home and aggressive abroad, intent on countering the United States wherever and whenever it can. The Georgian events of last August and the more recent Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict, in this view, under­score Russia’s neo-imperialist tendencies, while its sophisticated conventional arms sales to and nuclear cooperation with Iran illustrate its opposition to the United States. For other observers, Russia simply does not matter that much any longer, despite its remarkable recovery of the past decade and its recent visible role in world affairs. The current global economic crisis, in this view, will put an emphatic end to the recovery; lay bare the fragility of an economy and political regime excessively reliant on oil and gas for revenue, stability, and legitimacy; and fatally erode the basis for a resurgent Russia. And for still others, even though Russia is regaining its strength, it still does not bring enough to the table to warrant the frustrations of dealing with a prickly government that always wants a voice on major international issues but exaggerates its capabilities and appears little inclined toward constructive interaction. No one would gainsay the Russian temptation to counter the United States at times, especially along Russia’s periphery; or the obstacles to Russia’s long-term accumulation of power; or the vexations in engaging Russia, particularly now. A decade of socioeconomic collapse and national humiliation (at the hands of the West, Russians believe), followed by the remarkable recovery of the past eight years and efforts to reclaim Russia’s great power status (against the West’s wishes, they are certain), now threatened by the mounting global economic crisis (made in the United States, they say) has produced a heady nationalism, a petulant brew of pride and resentment, of self-confidence and self-doubt, often expressed in caustic anti-American rhetoric and actions. The case for U.S. engagement with Russia, however, is not based on the absence of conflicts in interests and values, an exaggerated assessment of its future power, or expectations that dealing with Russia will be easy. It is based on a hardnosed assessment of American long-term strategic interests, and the impact engagement or conflict with Russia could have on our ability to protect and advance them.

**Russian relations key to economy and preventing proliferation**

**CSIS 9**

(Center for Strategic and International Studies “Pressing the reset button on US-Russian relations” March, 2009http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090405\_policy\_briefing\_russia\_balance.pdf)

US engagement with Russia on economic integration presents an opportunity to broaden and deepen their bilateral relationship. Economic cooperation will build goodwill and mutual confidence, which can facilitate discussion of other areas of interest such as cooperation on nonproliferation and dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. Yet one of the most underdeveloped areas of the US-Russia relationship is commerce. The two countries’ very limited mutual trade and investment—the United States accounts for only 4 percent of Russian trade and foreign direct investment (FDI)—indicate a very significant potential to expand bilateral economic relations to the benefit of both Americans and Russians. One reason direct US investment in the Russian economy is so small is that the United States does not have a ratified bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with Russia, unlike 38 other nations that represent most of the major global economies and most members of the European Union. As a consequence, Americans usually invest in Russia through a European subsidiary that enjoys better legal protection. Although Russia did not ratify the 1992 BIT, it has clearly indicated that it welcomes such an agreement (which became part of the bilateral April 2008 Sochi Declaration), but the Bush administration sought to negotiate a new, better BIT only in its final months.

**Relations key to reduce carbon emissions and improve energy efficiency**

**CSIS 9**

(Center for Strategic and International Studies “Pressing the reset button on US-Russian relations” March, 2009http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090405\_policy\_briefing\_russia\_balance.pdf)

The United States, together with its European and Asian allies, should make cooperation with Russia for better energy efficiency a priority. In several ways, the United States and Russia are in similar situations: In comparison with Europe, they are highly inefficient consumers of energy and, with large carbon emissions, are likely to opt for a cap-and-trade regime of emissions control in multilateral negotiations. A recent World Bank (2008) study concludes that Russia can save up to 45 percent (nearly 6 million barrels/day of oil equivalent) of its total primary energy consumption by adopting measures that could pay for themselves within four years. Russia will thus be a significant player in any multilateral solution to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the years ahead. Dramatically improving energy efficiency in Russia is the most cost-effective means to improve European energy security as well as reduce carbon emissions.

# Impact XT- ALTB

**US-Russian relations key to US credibility**

**CSIS 9**

(Center for Strategic and International Studies “Pressing the reset button on US-Russian relations” March, 2009http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090405\_policy\_briefing\_russia\_balance.pdf)

The current situation has several advantages for US-Russia relations. One is that these relations have deteriorated so badly that there is a strong feeling in both Washington and Moscow that something has to be done to improve them**.** Another advantage is that both the United States and Russia have new, young presidents who aspire to do better than their predecessors. A third precondition is that the global financial crisis offers all world leaders an opportunity to think big and reach out to international cooperation. In this situation, President Obama needs to enhance the credibility of the United States in the eyes of the world, including the Russians, reach out to US allies, and establish a positive interaction with President Medvedev based on an early formulation of a Russia policy.

\*\*\*AFF ANSWERS\*\*\*

# Aff Answers- Iraq Withdrawal Good

**Even if there will be consequences to Iraq withdrawal, withdrawal now is better than any other time**

**Mitchell 10**

Arnold A. Saltzman Assistant Professor in the Practice of International Politics at Columbia University (2/26/10, Lincoln, “Still Choosing Between Bad and Worse in Iraq,” http://thefastertimes.com/foreignpolicy/2010/02/26/still-choosing-between-bad-and-worse-in-iraq/) SP

When an apologist for the Bush administration or partisan Republicans argue that President Obama is making a mistake by planning to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq in the coming months it can be ignored as rhetoric or vitriol. However, when somebody like Tom Ricks, who has written extensively and thoughtfully about the war since its inception arrives at a similar conclusion, it should be considered more seriously. Ricks essentially argues that sticking to the timeline for withdrawing troops from Iraq which Obama presented early in 2009, of pulling out 10,000 troops a month beginning around May, would be a mistake and endanger whatever progress is being made in Iraq this year, particularly around the elections. Ricks is concerned that if this plan is implemented “just as Iraqi political leaders are struggling to form a new government, American military leaders will be distracted by the myriad tasks of supervising major troop movements. On top of that, the deeper the troop withdrawals go, the more potentially destabilizing they will be.” Ricks’ analysis exposes, and reflects, one of the fundamental truths about U.S. involvement in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad-withdrawing today will be very, very difficult, but withdrawing tomorrow will be harder; and, of course, withdrawing the day after tomorrow will be harder still. This is a very disempowering situation as there is no good time to withdraw and postponing decisions, or action, only makes it worse. This easily leads to the conclusion that the U.S. should have begun withdrawing troops years ago. However, at no given moment was it a good time to do this. It also leads to the more obvious conclusion that the U.S. should not have walked so cavalierly into this war in 2003, but neither of these conclusions are useful now. One lesson which can be drawn is that waiting for the right time to withdraw troops from Iraq is not a realistic option. There are no good times to withdraw, only bad or worse times. Because of this circumstance, at any given moment a good argument, like the one Ricks made, can be made against withdrawing. Accordingly, there will be no moment in 2011 or 2012, just as there was no moment in 2007 or 2008, when withdrawing from Iraq will be easy and will not jeopardize whatever gains have been made, or are about to be made there. Thus, at any given moment, the best option is to begin withdrawing troops from Iraq, but because there are always such immediate and negative consequences for doing that, it is easy to postpone this decision. Another possible option would be to recognize that the effort in Iraq cannot realistically be achieved in a few more months or years and to prepare for a longer commitment in Iraq or as Ricks puts it “30,000 to 50,000 United States service members in Iraq for many years to come.” This approach is also flawed because even a longer commitment would be far from a guarantee of success and because it is hard to imagine the American people supporting an essentially open-ended commitment in Iraq that could be measured in decades, not months, As Ricks’ analysis shows, perhaps inadvertently, while the decision in Iraq is not easy, it is clear.

# Aff Answers- South Korean Troop Withdrawal Good

**South Korean troop withdrawal key to stable governments and to stop human trafficking.**   
**Allred 06** (http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/english/analysis.html)

The United States also suffered an embarrassing incident that demonstrated the overly close relationship between troops and trafficked women. In May 2002, a Fox News television report suggested that US troops in South Korea carried out "courtesy patrols" to protect brothels that exploited trafficked women. The broadcast of this television exposé in the United States caused 14 Congressmen to write to the Department of Defense Inspector General urging him to investigate what appeared to be official participation in or support for human trafficking. While the Inspector General concluded that there was no overt military support for human traffickers in South Korea, he did find an "overly familiar" relationship between US forces there and the sex trade. US forces in South Korea were embarrassed by these findings and took swift steps to prevent US soldiers from any further involvement. Human trafficking threatens to destabilize governments and embolden criminal networks

Sex Trafficking is the worst exploitation of women and is the root of all other dehumanizing acts

Human Security Journal 08 (“Human Security, Sex Trafficking and Deep Structural Explanations”) http://www.peacecenter.sciences-po.fr/journal/issue6pdf/HSJ6\_Dunlop.pdf

This view is endorsed by both LeMoncheck and Walby. LeMoncheck states that "the dehumanization of women in their sexual relations with men is but a reflection of their subordination in other areas of their lives."54 This view reflects the problems of male domination which are engrained into many aspects of society, perpetuating the acceptance of female exploitation and objectification. It is clear that a prominent explanation and argument for the status and use of women within the sex trade is the eroticization of male dominance and how gender has become sexualized, especially under heterosexuality.55 Walby declares that "while some radical feminists argue that specific forms of sexual domination are important to gender inequality, MacKinnon contends that sexuality constitutes gender. The eroticization of dominance and subordination creates gender as we know it,"56 and MacKinnon states that "being a thing for sexual use is fundamental to it." Women therefore become socialized into a particular role and socially accepted and legitimated norms of behaviour, such as heterosexuality, reinforce the male position. The political institution of heterosexuality may be patriarchal in the sense that its effects differ for men and women. It will: "Turn a mere boy into a respectable, fully developed man. Such sexual asymmetry is simply an outgrowth of our cultural double standard for men and women. In the patriarchal culture of contemporary western society, the role of men is to rule and provide, while that of women is to obey and support the rulers and providers… women are considered the subordinates of men, not their moral equals. The sexual sphere is no exception.” Such perspectives make it easier to dehumanize and exploit women in the sex trade. MacKinnon enhances our understanding and moves the debate further by using gender socialization to explain the objectification of women in sex trafficking and other walks of life. She emphasizes that "socially, femaleness means femininity, which means attractiveness to men, which means sexual attractiveness, which means sexual availability on male terms… Gender socialization is the process through which women come to identify themselves as sexual beings, as beings that exist for men."59 However, it may be argued that such a statement is flawed by its reduction of women to mere passive victims, with no agency or ability to overcome their position, and also deterministic in that it supposes all men reduce women to objects, and all women are subordinated. Jennifer Oriel reinforces the role masculinity plays within sex trafficking of women, by highlighting the issue of male sexual pleasure and a male sex "right." Oriel states that: "The construction of sexuality as gender-neutral in sexual rights literature conceals how men's demand for sexual pleasure often reinforces the subordination of women… Research on sexuality from the fields of feminism, political science, public health, and HIV/AIDS reveals that violence against women is fundamental to the construction of masculinity. This violence is manifested through rape, sexual coercion, sexual objectification, and prostitution."60 Oriel analyzes how male sexual pleasure reinforces masculinity: "according to men's own research, male sexual pleasure demands the use of women as objects for male sexual dominance."61 For Pateman and Oriel,"[t]he general display of women's bodies and sexual parts, either in representation or as live bodies, is central to the sex industry and continually reminds men—and women—that men exercise the law of the male sex-right, that they have patriarchal right of access to women's bodies."62

# Aff Answers – Troop Deployment Bad

**Troop deployment bad—laundry list**

**Joseph Gerson 2007** (Ten Reasons to Withdraw all US Foreign Military Bases, Peacework, Issue 372 - February 2007, Joseph Gerson is a Director of Programs at the American Friends Service Committee, and the author of The Sun Never Sets: Confronting the Network of US Military Bases. The full-length version of the "Ten Reasons" list is available for download from www.afsc.org/pes.

**Bases Increase the Likelihood of War** The US maintains an unprecedented infrastructure of more than 700 US foreign military bases. In recent years such bases have been essential to the US wars against Iraq, the 1998 war against Serbia, the US invasion of Panama, and the current wars within Colombia and the Philippines. The 200-plus US military bases and installations in Japan and South Korea increase the likelihood of future US wars against North Korea and China. Bases Provide a Launching Point for Nuclear Attack In many ways, the US first-strike nuclear doctrine is made possible by the forward deployment of nuclear weapons in Belgium, Britain, Greece, Germany, Holland, and **Turkey**. US communications bases in Britain, Japan, Australia, and other nations are essential for communicating orders to initiate nuclear war and for targeting nuclear and other high-tech weapons. **Bases Undermine the Sovereignty of Nations** Hawai'i, the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Cuba were invaded and occupied by the US because they were ideal sites for bases needed to conquer markets in China, elsewhere in Asia, and Latin America. Colonial and client governments were imposed or created by the US to ensure continued US access to the bases. After the wars in which they were defeated, the US has insisted that Japan, Germany, Serbia and other nations "host" US military bases for the long term. Consistent with this tradition, the Bush administration is spending $1 billion a year for "enduring" military bases in Iraq. **Bases Hurt Democracy and Human Rights** The US has supported or imposed dictators and other repressive governments to gain or preserve access to military bases. For more than a decade, Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan supported the brutal Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines to preserve the US hold on strategically located air and naval bases. In Saudi Arabia and **Kuwait**, the US has defended repressive monarchies to secure its military bases as well as privileged access to oil reserves. The presence of US military bases contributes to the cultural genocide of indigenous peoples in Hawai'i and Guam. Many Bases are Built on Seized Property The recent bulldozing of Daechuri village in South Korea to make way for a new US military headquarters while inhabitants protested was not unique. Military bases are often built on seized private property, on land which the host nation forces its citizens to "rent" to the US, or on communal property. The most extreme case is Diego Garcia. There, to make way for two mile-long runways, a massive naval port, and pre-positioned US weapons, all of the island's people were deported. **Bases are a Source of Sexual Violence** The use of communities near bases for "Rest and Relaxation" makes local children and women, especially sex workers, vulnerable to sexual harassment, rape, beatings, and murder. Levels of sexual violence can be a function of the relative power of host nations. Last year, Marines involved in the rape of a Filipina were shielded by provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement in the Philippines. In contrast, comparable agreements between the US and oil-rich Gulf states have at least partly shielded local women from sexual aggression by US troops. **Off-Duty Troops Commit Many Crimes** Most GIs are law-abiding, but many alienated and drunken troops do commit a disproportionate number of crimes. Worse, they are often protected by the provisions of unequal treaties which give the US military "primary right to exercise jurisdiction over members of the US armed forces." In Korea, a deep wound was the killing of two schoolgirls who were run over by a US tank; no-one was held accountable. This year in the Philippines, after a US Marine was convicted of rape in a Philippines court, the US exerted diplomatic pressure at the highest level to effect his removal, during the appeal process, to the US Embassy (rather than the Philippines jail to which the judge had consigned him). **Bases Cause Environmental Damage** In 2000, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright conceded the legacy of "serious public and environmental problems" caused by US military bases in the Philippines but she reiterated that the US has no legal obligation to clean up the deadly residue. The US Defense Department has identified at least 70 military sites in Europe where its bases have caused serious environmental damage. In one egregious case, the US military was caught disposing of deadly formaldehyde directly into the Han River which runs through Seoul, **South Korea**. Bases Bring the Risk of Life-threatening Accidents Military accidents can kill and injure people. The most dangerous accidents involve nuclear weapons. An attack aircraft rolled off the US aircraft carrier Ticonderoga 80 miles off the coast of **Okinawa**, embedding its hydrogen bomb in the sea bed two miles below. More common are accidents like the Marine pilot whose low-flying jet severed a ski lift cable in Italy, killing 20 people; bombs that missed their practice targets, killing a civilian in Vieques, Puerto Rico and destroying homes in the Korean village of Maehyangri; and the stray bullets and shells used in live-fire exercises that strike people's homes and property in Kin Town, Okinawa. Military Spending Jeopardizes Human Needs and Opportunities The Pentagon squanders tens of billions of dollars on foreign military bases. In addition to war-fighting capabilities, expenses include housing for families of US warriors, commissaries where US troops and their families enjoy special discounts, and pristine golf courses. Meanwhile, human needs of both US and host nation people go unmet. **In Japan** and other host nations, anger is building as their tax dollars are used to help pay for the intrusive military bases and their luxury accommodations, while local people go without adequate housing and social services.

# Aff Answers- Kuwait

**No longer need military in Kuwait since Hussein’s regime collapsed**

**Taylor and Youngs in 3** <May 23, 2003. Claire Taylor and Kim Youngs. “The Conflict in Iraq” http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2003/rp03-050.pdf>

There was speculation in the media on the nature of the future US military presence in the Gulf region. An article in the *Financial Times* reported: General Richard Myers, the highest-ranking US military officer, said that large numbers of American forces might no longer need to be based in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia following the downfall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Noting that US forces - about 8,000 in Kuwait and 8,000 in Saudi Arabia prior to the build-up for the Iraqi invasion - have been in the Gulf region largely to enforce Iraq-related United Nations resolutions, Gen Myers said the Pentagon would "in the fairly near future" announce a new "footprint" for the postwar American military presence. "Clearly, one of the reasons we had US forces in the region was to enforce the UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq," said Gen Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Those forces that were in Turkey for that purpose, they've already returned home. We had forces in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as well, and, clearly, they're not going to be needed in the future for that." Gen Myers acknowledged US forces would remain a presence in Iraq for the long term. The size of the force has been a point of debate inside the Pentagon, with generals insisting it could constitute 200,000 troops, a figure Defense Department civilians have termed "wildly off the mark".

\*\*\*AFF ANSWERS—THEORY\*\*\*

# A2: Perm severs out of resolution

**1) Not true we defend the resolution: even if they win that reduce has to be a net reduction, the placement of the phrase “in one or more of the following” means that we can reduce in just one country, and still meet the resolution, regardless of whether we increase in another**

**2) The placement of the word or in the resolution means we only have to defend a net reduction in one of the topic countries**

**Merriam Webster’s 10** (Merriam webster’s online dictionary, < http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/or>)

1 —used as a function word to indicate **an alternative** <coffee or tea> <sink or swim>, the equivalent or substitutive character of two words or phrases <lessen or abate>, or approximation or uncertainty <in five or six days> 2 archaic : [either](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/either) 3 archaic : [whether](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/whether) 4 —used in logic as a sentential connective that forms a complex sentence **which is true when at least one of its constituent sentences is true** — compare [disjunction](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disjunction).

# Offsets CP’s Bad

**1) Perm- do both. Proves the CP is plan plus.**

**2) Our interpretation is that the negative cannot do the entirety of plan**

**3) Plan plus CPs are a voter.**

**a. Not predictable- they can literally do the plan and anything else, then claim a net benefit off of it.**

**b. Moots the 1ac- Doesn’t allow the aff to defend their plan because it’s already part of the CP.’**

**c. Destroys plan focus-skirts around discussing around the merits of the plan with technicalities and silliness**

**d. They still get pics and agent cps-we give them plenty of ground**

**e. Even if we do limit your ground, we only limit out abusive and overly generic cps based off implementation or technicalities**

**4) Perm- Do the plan and all non-repetitive parts of the CP. Solves literally the whole link to the net benefit.**

**5) Explodes neg ground—too many things that the neg can offset with, drastically increases research burden and destroys predictable ground.**

# Plan Focus Good

**1) It’s key to education-filters out overly generic and abusive counterplans that shouldn’t be run**

**2) Under their interpretation the affirmative would have to defend whole topic not just the plan. That destroys plan focus and makes negative arguments unpredictable. The aff would either lose on T or abusive cps**

**3) Key to topic specific education-Their cp destroys topic education because instead of arguing over the merits of the plan we’re stuck arguing over generic technicalities**