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\*\*\*Offshore Balancing Bad\*\*\*

Offshore Balancing Bad – Afghanistan

Offshore balancing only prolongs conflicts – boots on the ground are necessary.

Albon 9 (Christopher, political science Ph.D. candidate at the U of California, Davis, September, [http://blog.usni.org/?p=4288] AD: 7/7/10)JM

In 1999, NATO airpower did not defeat Milošević, it only drove him to the bargaining table. This result is unlikely to be repeated in Afghanistan. Years of airstrikes — essentially offshore balancing — against the Taliban and their allies in Pakistan’s tribal region have yet to force Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar to negotiate. Even if they did offer to negotiate like Milošević, is this a victory the US public would accept? Not a chance. The strategic use of airpower is about coercion, not victory. Despite all the advances in technology, victory still requires boots on the ground. Granted they do not have to be American boots, but victory is far more likely if they are. Offshore balancing can prevent the Taliban from defeating the Afghan government, by bombing the villages they are staying in and the roads they are driving on. But, preventing defeat is not victory. Airpower can force the Taliban to keep one eye on the sky, but not to give up the fight. Victory in Afghanistan requires reliable, sustainable, and capable ground forces to protect and win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people and through their support, a stable state. Ironically, the losers in offshore balancing would be the Afghan people, trapped between the brutal Taliban, the undisciplined Afghan Army, and the American cruise missile.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Asia

Forward deployment is sustainable and preferable to offshore balancing.

Tellis 2K (Ashley, Ph.D, The U of Chicago, April 1, [http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6433] AD: 7/7/10)JM

In one sense, the United States is no stranger to this situation. During the Cold War, Washington mustered the resolve and the resources to develop the requisite capabilities that enabled it to stay securely ensconced in the European promontory, despite all the threats posed by the large inventory of disruptive technologies possessed by the Soviet Union. At that moment in time, Europe was the great prize, and defending it through the assertion of American power was judged to be preferable to either disengagement or the nurturing of a regional multipolarity which would justify U.S. retrenchment or offshore balancing. The situation in Asia today is much the same. The Asian continent will become the great geopolitical prize, if it has not already; and the United States will be confronted with the same grand strategic choices it once faced in Europe, if indeed it does not confront them yet. The key difference, of course, is that there is no Soviet Union in Asia — yet. That, however, could change. The best way to preempt such change (and to cope with it if it does materialize) is to preserve American regional preeminence in the form of potent forward deployed — and forward deployable — forces capable of dealing with contingencies ranging from local disruptions all the way to the rise of a peer competitor. This is no doubt the worst strategy imaginable, except for all the others. Fortunately, the U.S. already enjoys many advantages that make such a strategy quite sustainable: The Asian allies demand such a presence and have been willing historically to support it in both political and financial terms; both the current threats and those on the horizon, though nasty in absolute terms, are still puny in comparison to the Soviet challenge, which was itself mastered by the United States; and, finally, America continues to enjoy comprehensive power-political advantages — reflected in technological, financial, military, and ideological terms — that few of its current and emerging competitors, even with their unidimensional capabilities in disruptive technologies, can hope to match. Used wisely, these resources can douse the "Fire in the East" and preserve American preeminence there — an outcome that wins on strategic points and utilitarian ones as well.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Arms Race

A. Offshore balancing leads to Asian arms races and attacks on the US.

Tellis 2K (Ashley, Ph.D, The U of Chicago, April 1, [http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6433] AD: 7/7/10)JM

The first critical interest consists of preventing, deterring, and reducing the threat of attack on the continental United States and its extended territorial possessions. In the simplest sense, this interest has two components. The first and most important involves preserving the continental United States (conus) and its possessions from threats posed by weapons of mass destruction in Asia. These weapons are important because of the extensive damage they can inflict in relatively compressed time frames. Equally important, as Bracken points out, are the challenges posed by sophisticated delivery systems, like ballistic and cruise missiles and advanced attack aircraft, currently deployed by the wmd-capable states as well as prospective delivery systems that may be acquired by other Asian states over time. This includes both spin-off technologies emerging from space and commercial aviation programs as well as other kinds of non-traditional, covert delivery systems. The other component of this national objective involves protecting the conus and its possessions from conventional attack. Because of the vast distances involved in the Asia-Pacific region, the critical variables here are battlespace denial and power-projection capabilities — both sea- and air-based — that may be acquired by one or more Asian states. Given the changes in technology, these capabilities must be expanded to include other, newer, approaches to conventional war-fighting like strategic information warfare and the technologies and operational practices associated with the "revolution in military affairs." In all instances, U.S. interests suggest the following preference ordering: preventing potential adversaries from acquiring such capabilities; if prevention is impossible, deterring their use becomes the next logical objective; and, if even deterrence is unsuccessful, attenuating their worst effects through either extended counterforce options or effective defensive measures finally becomes necessary. It is immediately obvious that disengaging from Asia in any significant way does little to minimize the threats posed by the spread of both wmd and other strategic technologies. Only if highly robust forms of strategic defense become available in the future does the disengagement option become viable, and even then it may not necessarily be preferable, if it implies the inability to influence the wmd procurement and deployment decisions of the Asian states. Disengagement, moreover, has other corrosive effects: It would certainly compel many current American allies to acquire disruptive technologies in order to compensate for American absence, and these responses would only generate a regional arms race that would lead to the further diffusion of such capabilities.

B. Asian arms races escalate to nuclear war.

Cirincione 2K (Joseph, adjunct faculty of the Georgetown U School of Foreign Service and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, March, “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain”, Lexis)JM

The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Arms Race

Without a ground presence, our allies doubt our commitment – that leads to an arms race.

Tellis 2K (Ashley, Ph.D, The U of Chicago, April 1, [http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6433] AD: 7/7/10)JM\

The third critical interest consists of ensuring the survival of American allies. The first and most obvious reason for this objective is that the United States has treaty obligations to three important Asian states — Japan, South Korea, and Australia — and political commitments to another, namely Taiwan. While meeting these obligations is certainly important to maintain the credibility of the United States in the international arena, it is also consequential for directly substantive reasons that go right to the heart of Bracken’s book: controlling the leakage of disruptive technologies in Asia. In at least two of these three instances, the assurance of U.S. protection has resulted in important implicit bargains that are indispensable to the American conception of stable international order. Thanks to American security guarantees, South Korea and Japan have both enjoyed the luxury of eschewing nuclear weapons as guarantors of security. Should American protective pledges be seen as weakening, the temptation to resurrect the nuclear option on the part of both states will increase — to the consequent detriment of America’s global antiproliferation policy. Equally significant, however, is that Japan, and possibly South Korea as well, would of necessity have to embark on a significant conventional buildup, especially of missile, maritime and air forces. The resulting force posture would in practice be indistinguishable from a long-range power projection capability possessing an offensive orientation. Even if such forces are developed primarily for defensive purposes, they will certainly give rise to new security dilemmas region-wide — which, in turn, would lead to an intense arms race, growing suspicions, and possibly war.

That causes nuclear war.

Rozoff 6 (Rick, author and geopolitical analyst, November 14, [http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/a-list/2006-November/063410.html] AD: 7/9/10)JM

"If this happens, South Korea could claim nuclear status and China would no longer put up with the small nuclear arsenal it has. The chain reaction would then entangle India, Pakistan and Iran," the Russian expert said. "This race could ultimately result in the use of such weapons," he said.

An Asian arms race would be the most probable scenario for nuclear war – the region would be a powder keg.

Jackson 9 (Van, Ph.D candidate in world politics at the Catholic University of America, July 6, [http://www.examiner.com/x-16317-DC-Asia-Policy-Examiner~y2009m7d6-Obamas-nuclear-plan-could-prevent-Asian-arms-race] AD: 7/9/10)JM

One of the myriad fears associated with North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons is the potential for it to spark a nuclear arms race in Asia. The doomsday scenario plays out rather intuitively: 1) North Korea confirms unequivocally that it will be keeping its existing nuclear weapons or possibly adding to its stockpile; 2) Japan, which has repeatedly mentioned its belief that a nuclear North Korea is a threat to Japanese security, dramatically builds up its defensive and offensive military capability, possibly developing its own nuclear program while it pushes for greater involvement in transnational security issues such as terrorism; 3) China, continuing to see Japan as the only near-peer realistically capable of challenging its regional leadership, is threatened by Japan’s remilitarization and responds by increasing its own military spending; 4) Partly in response to China’s increased military expenditures and partly in response to nagging historically based concerns over Japan’s remilitarization, both South Korea and Taiwan build up their own conventional armaments, potentially engaging in secret nuclear programs as well. Under such circumstances, political risk indicators would shoot through the roof and foreign direct investment inflows of capital would quickly dry up as multinational corporations seek a safer, more stable region in which to do business. The region’s resulting economic contraction would place increasing pressure on national governments to pander to xenophobic and nationalistic sentiments, as has been done many times before, thus stoking the fire of conflict. The region, in sum, would become a powder keg. This is not overly pessimistic hyperbole but a realistic scenario according to the classic literature on security dilemmas. Just imagine a world where the most powerful countries in Asia all either possess nuclear weapons or are engaged in covert programs to develop a nuclear weapons capability, each in the name of its own security. Such a dreadful possibility is exactly what the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was designed to prevent.

Offshore Balancing Bad – China/Iran Heg

A. Offshore balancing facilitates the rise of an Iranian and Chinese global hegemon.

Schmitt 7 (Gary, dir of the Programon Advanced Strategic Studies and Ph.D from U of Chicago, June 3, [http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?contenidoID=7620] AD: 7/8/10)JM

If the latter, the passive "off-shore balancing" approach leads to the question of whether such a strategy results in the United States addressing a security problem at a time when it may be far more difficult to deal with. Layne's bet, at least in the case of Iran and China today, is that if the United States would only get out of the way, other powers would naturally begin to meet their challenge. Possibly. But doing so might create an even more destabilizing competition among neighbors, or lead those same neighbors to accept China or Iran's new hegemony, fueling their ambitions rather than lessening them. The history of international relations suggests that most great crises are the result of not addressing more minor ones initially. As Thayer argues, it is probably less costly to deal with these issues when one is in a better position to do so than to wait for them to become full-blown security problems.

B. Chinese hegemony leads to conflict with the U.S – draws in major powers.

Mearsheimer 6 (John, prof of international relations @ the U of Chicago, April, *Current History,* 105(690) p. 162)JM

It is clear from the historical record how American policy makers will react if China attempts to dominate Asia. The United States does not tolerate peer competitors. As it demonstrated in the twentieth century, it is determined to remain the world’s only regional hegemon. Therefore, the United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of ruling the roost in Asia. In essence, America is likely to behave toward China much the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the cold war. China’s neighbors are certain to fear its rise as well, and they too will do whatever they can to prevent the Chinese from achieving regional hegemony. Indeed, there is already substantial evidence that countries like India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, are worried about China’s ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it. In the end, they will join an American-led balancing coalition to check China’s rise, much they way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and even China joined forces with the United States to contain the Soviet Union during the cold war. Finally, given Taiwan’s strategic importance for controlling the sea lanes in East Asia, it is hard to imagine the United States, as well as Japan, allowing China to control that large island. In fact, Taiwan is likely to be an important player in the anti-China balancing coalition, which is certain to infuriate China and fuel the security competition between Beijing and Washington. The picture I have painted of what is likely to happen if China continues its rise is not a pretty one. I actually find it categorically depressing and wish that I could tell a more optimistic story about the future. But the fact is that international politics is a nasty and dangerous business, and no amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia. That is the tragedy of great power politics.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Forward Deployment

Off shore balancing fails – ground troops are key because we can’t project power over the sea.

Mearsheimer 1 (John, prof of international relations @ the U of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 83-85)JM

Power in international politics is largely a product of the military forces that a state possesses. Great powers, however, can acquire different kinds of fighting forces, and how much of each kind they buy has important implications for the balance of power. This chapter ana-lyzes the four types of military power among which states choose—inde-pendent sea power, strategic airpower, land power, and nuclear weapons—to determine how to weigh them against each other and come up with a useful measure of power. I make two main points in the discussion below. First, land power is the dominant form of military power in the modern world. A state's power is largely embedded in its army and the air and naval forces that support those ground forces. Simply put, the most powerful states possess the most formidable armies. Therefore, measuring the balance of land power by itself should provide a rough but sound indicator of the relative might of rival great powers. Second, large bodies of water profoundly limit the power-projection capabilities of land forces. When opposing armies must cross a large expanse of water such as the Atlantic Ocean or the English Channel to attack each other, neither army is likely to have much offensive capability against its rival regardless of the size and quality of the opposing armies. The stopping power of water is of great significance not just because it is a central aspect of land power, but also because it has important conse-quences for the concept of hegemony. Specifically, the presence of oceans on much of the earth's surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. Not even the world's most powerful state can conquer distant regions that can be reached only by ship. Thus, great powers can aspire to dominate only the region in which they are located, and possibly an adjacent region that can be reached over land. For more than a century strategists have debated which form of military power dominates the outcome of war. U.S. admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan famously proclaimed the supreme importance of independent sea power in The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 and his other writings., General Giulio Douhet of Italy later made the case for the primacy of strate- gic airpower in his 1921 classic, The Command of the Air.2 Their works are still widely read at staff colleges around the world. I argue that both are wrong: land power is the decisive military instrument. Wars are won by big battalions, not by armadas in the air or on the sea. The strongest power is the state with the strongest army. One might argue that nuclear weapons greatly diminish the importance of land power, either by rendering great-power war obsolete or by making the nuclear balance the essential component of military power in a com-petitive world. There is no question that great-power war is less likely in a nuclear world, but great powers still compete for security even under the nuclear shadow, sometimes intensely, and war between them remains a real possibility. The United States and the Soviet Union, for example, waged an unremitting security competition for forty-five years, despite the pres-ence of nuclear weapons on both sides. Moreover, save for the unlikely sce-nario in which one great power achieves nuclear superiority, the nuclear balance matters little for determining relative power. Even in a nuclear world, armies and the air and naval forces that support them are the core ingredient of military power. The alliance patterns that formed during the Cold War are evidence that land power is the principal component of military might. In a world domi-nated by two great powers, we would expect other key states to join forces with the weaker great power to contain the stronger one. Throughout the Cold War, not only was the United States much wealthier than the Soviet Union, but it also enjoyed a significant advantage in naval forces, strategic bombers, and nuclear warheads. Nevertheless, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and eventually China considered the Soviet Union, not the United States, to be the most powerful state in the system. Indeed, those states allied with the United States against the Soviet Union because they feared the Soviet army, not the American army.; Moreover, there is little concern about a Russian threat today—even though Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons—because the Russian army is weak and in no position to launch a major ground offensive. Should it recover and become a formidable fighting force again, the United States and its European allies would start worrying about a new Russian threat.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Forward Deployment

Offshore balancing means losing great power wars – navies and air forces can only play auxiliary roles.

Mearsheimer 1 (John, prof of international relations @ the U of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 86-87)JM

Land power is centered around armies, but it also includes the air and naval forces that support them. For example, navies transport armies across large bodies of water, and sometimes they attempt to project ground forces onto hostile beaches. Air forces also transport armies, but more important, they aid armies by delivering firepower from the skies. These air and naval missions, however, are directly assisting the army, not acting independently of it. Thus, these missions fit under the rubric of land power. Armies are of paramount importance in warfare because they are the main military instrument for conquering and controlling land, which is the supreme political objective in a world of territorial states. Naval and air forces are simply not suited for conquering territory.4 The famous British naval strategist Julian Corbett put the point well regarding the relationship between armies and navies: "Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided—except in the rarest cases—either by what your army can do against your enemy's territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do." Corbett's logic applies to airpower as well as sea power. Navies and air forces, however, need not act simply as force multipliers for the army. Each can also independently project power against rival states, as many navalists and airpower enthusiasts like to emphasize. Navies, for example, can ignore what is happening on the battlefield and blockade an opponent, while air forces can fly over the battlefield and bomb the enemy's homeland. Both blockades and strategic bombing seek to produce victory by coercing the adversary into surrendering before its army is defeated on the battlefield. Specifically, the aim is to cause the opponent to surrender either by wrecking its economy and thus under-mining its ability to prosecute the war, or by inflicting massive punish-ment on its civilian population. The claims of Douhet and Mahan notwithstanding, neither independent naval power nor strategic airpower has much utility for winning major wars. Neither of those coercive instruments can win a great-power war operating alone. Only land power has the potential to win a major war by itself. The main reason, as discussed below, is that it is difficult to coerce a great power. In particular, it is hard to destroy an enemy's economy solely by blockading or bombing it. Furthermore, the leaders as well as the people in modern states are rarely willing to surrender even after absorbing tremendous amounts of punishment. Although blockading navies and strategic bombers cannot produce victory by themselves, they sometimes can help armies gain victory by damaging the economy that underpins the adversary's military machine. But even in this more limited capacity, air and naval forces usually do not play more than an auxiliary role. Land power dominates the other kinds of military power for another reason: only armies can expeditiously defeat an opponent. Blockading navies and strategic bombing, as discussed below, cannot produce quick and decisive victories in wars between great powers. They are useful mainly for fighting lengthy wars of attrition. But states rarely go to war unless they think that rapid success is likely. In fact, the prospect of a pro-tracted conflict is usually an excellent deterrent to war.' Consequently, a great power's army is its main instrument for initiating aggression. A state's offensive potential, in other words, is embedded largely in its army. Let us now look more closely at the different missions that navies and air forces perform in wartime, paying special attention to how blockades and strategic bombing campaigns have affected the outcomes of past great-power conflicts.

Offshore balancing can’t solve – strategic bombing is ineffective.

Mearsheimer 1 (John, prof of international relations @ the U of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 108)JM

Strategic bombing is unlikely to work for the same reasons that blockades usually fail to coerce an opponent: civilian populations can absorb tremendous pain and deprivation without rising up against their govern-ment. Political scientist Robert Pape succinctly summarizes the historical evidence regarding aerial punishment and popular revolt: "Over more than seventy-five years, the record of air power is replete with efforts to alter the behavior of states by attacking or threatening to attack large numbers of civilians. The incontrovertible conclusion from these cam-paigns is that air attack does not cause citizens to turn against their government. . . . In fact, in the more than thirty major strategic air campaigns that have thus far been waged, air power has never driven the masses into the streets to demand anything."" Furthermore, modern industrial economies are not fragile structures that can be easily destroyed, even by massive bombing attacks. To paraphrase Adam Smith, there is a lot of room for ruin in a great power's economy. This targeting strategy makes even less sense against minor powers, because they invariably have small industrial bases.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Forward Deployment

History is conclusive on the question of how to achieve primacy; strategies based on air and sea power fail – ground presence is key.

Mearsheimer 1 (John, prof of international relations @ the U of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 110-113)JM

There have been ten wars between great powers over the past two cen- turies, three of which were central wars involving all of the great pow- ers: the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815), World War I (1914-18), and World War II (1939-45); the latter actually involved distinct conflicts in Asia and Europe. In the wake of the French Revolution, France fought a series of wars over twenty-three years against different coalitions of European great pow- ers, including Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom. The out-come of almost every campaign was determined by battles between rival armies, not battles at sea. Consider, for example, the impact of the famous naval Battle of Trafalgar on the course of the war. The British navy deci-sively defeated the French fleet in that engagement on October 21, 1805, one day after Napoleon had won a major victory against Austria in the Battle of Ulm. Britain's victory at sea, however, had little effect on Napoleon's fortunes. Indeed, over the course of the next two years, Napoleon's armies achieved their greatest triumphs, defeating the Austrians and the Russians at Austerlitz (1805), the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt (1806), and the Russians at Friedland (1807).7, Furthermore, the United Kingdom blockaded the European continent and Napoleon blockaded the United Kingdom. But neither blockade markedly influenced the war's outcome. In fact, the United Kingdom was eventually forced to send an army to the continent to fight against Napoleon's army in Spain. That British army and, even more important, the Russian army that decimated the French army in the depths of Russia in 1812 were largely responsible for putting Napoleon out of business. The balance of land power was also the principal determinant of victory in World War I. In particular, the outcome was decided by long and costly battles on the eastern front between German and Russian armies, and on the western front between German and Allied (British, French, and American) forces. The Germans scored a stunning victory in the east in October 1917, when the Russian army collapsed and Russia quit the war. The Germans almost duplicated that feat on the western front in the spring of 1918, but the British, French, and American armies held fast; shortly thereafter the German army fell apart, and with that the war ended on November 11, 1918. Strategic bombing played hardly any role in the final outcome. The Anglo-American blockade of Germany surely contributed to the victory, but it was a secondary factor. "The Great War," as it was later called, was settled main-ly by the millions of soldiers on both sides who fought and often died in bloody battles at places like Verdun, Tannenberg, Passchendaele, and the Somme. The outcome of World War II in Europe was determined largely by bat-tles fought between rival armies and their supporting air and naval forces. Nazi land power was almost exclusively responsible for the tidal wave of early German victories: against Poland in September 1939, France and the United Kingdom between May and June 1940, and the Soviet Union between June and December 1941. The tide turned against the Third Reich in early 1942, and by May 1945, Hitler was dead and his successors had surrendered unconditionally. The Germans were beaten decisively on the battlefield, mainly on the eastern front by the Red Army, which lost a stag-gering eight million soldiers in the process but managed to cause at least three out of every four German wartime casualties.72 British and American armies also helped wear down the Wehrmacht, but they played a consider-ably smaller role than the Soviet army, mainly because they did not land on French soil until June 1944, less than a year before the war ended. The Allies' strategic bombing campaign failed to cripple the German economy until early 1945, when the war's outcome had already been set-tled on the ground. Nevertheless, airpower alone did not wreck Germany's industrial base; the Allied armies closing in on the Third Reich also played a major role in that effort. The British and American navies imposed a blockade on the Third Reich, but it, too, had a minor impact on the war's outcome. In short, the only way to defeat a formidable continental power like Nazi Germany is to smash its army in bloody land battles and conquer it. Blockades and strategic bombing might help the cause somewhat, but they are likely to matter primarily on the margins. Americans tend to think that the Asian half of World War II began when Pearl Harbor was attacked on December 7, 1941. But Japan had been on the warpath in Asia since 1931 and had conquered Manchuria, much of northern China, and parts of Indochina before the United States entered the war. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese military conquered most of Southeast Asia, and virtually all of the islands in the western half of the Pacific Ocean. Japan's army was its principal instru-ment of conquest, although its navy often transported the army into com-bat. Japan conducted a strategic bombing campaign against China, but it was a clear-cut failure (as discussed earlier in this chapter). Also, starting in 1938, Japan tried to cut off China's access to the outside world with a blockade, which reduced the flow of arms and goods into China to a trick- le by 1942. Nevertheless, China's armies continued to hold their own on the battlefield, refusing to surrender to their Japanese foes.73 In short, land power was the key to Japan's military successes in World War II. The tide turned against Japan in June 1942, when the American navy scored a stunning victory over the Japanese navy at the Battle of Midway. Over the next three years, Japan was worn down in a protracted two-front war, finally surrendering unconditionally in August 1945. As noted earlier, land power played a critical role in defeating Japan. The U.S. navy's blockade of the Japanese homeland, however, was also a deciding factor in that conflict. The firebombing of Japan, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki, certainly caused tremendous suffering in the targeted cities, but it played only a minor role in causing Japan's defeat. This is the only great-power war in modern history in which land power alone was not principally responsible for determining the outcome, and in which one of the coercive instruments—airpower or sea power—played more than an auxiliary role.<CONTINUED>

Offshore Balancing Bad – Forward Deployment

<CONTINUED>

 Seven other great power vs. great power wars have been fought over the past two hundred years: the Crimean War (1853-56), the War of Italian Unification (1859), the Austro-Prussian War (1866), the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), the Russian Civil War (1918-21), and the Soviet-Japanese War (1939). None of these cases involved strategic bombing, and only the Russo-Japanese War had a significant naval dimension, although neither side blockaded the other. The rival navies mainly fought for command of the sea, which was impor-tant because whichever side dominated the water had an advantage in moving land forces about the theater of operations.74 All seven conflicts were settled between rival armies on the battlefield. Finally, the outcome of a major conventional conflict during the Cold War would have been determined in large part by events on the central front, where NATO and Warsaw Pact armies would have clashed head-on. For sure, the tactical air forces supporting those armies would have influ-enced developments on the ground. Still, the war would have been decid-ed largely by how well the rival armies performed against each other. Neither side would have mounted a strategic bombing campaign against the other, mainly because the advent of nuclear weapons rendered that mission moot. Furthermore, there was no serious possibility of the NATO allies using independent naval power to their advantage, mainly because the Soviet Union was not vulnerable to blockade as Japan was in World War II.75 Soviet submarines probably would have tried to cut the sea lines of communication between the United States and Europe, but they surely would have failed, just as the Germans had in both world wars. As was the case with Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Nazi Germany, a hegemonic war with the Soviet Union would have been settled on the ground by clashing armies.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Hegemony

Offshore can’t sustain hegemony – air power can only do so much.

 Mearsheimer 1 (John, prof of international relations @ the U of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 109-110)JM

The variant of the strategy that calls for isolating the political leadership from the broader population is also illusory. Leaders have multiple chan- nels for communicating with their people, and it is virtually impossible for an air force to knock all of them out at once and keep them shut down for a long period of time. For example, bombers might be well-suited for damaging an adversary's telecommunications, but they are ill-suited for knocking out newspapers. They are also ill-suited for destroying the secret police and other instruments of suppression. Finally, causing coups that produce friendly leaders in enemy states during wartime is an extremely difficult task. Isolating a political leader from his military forces is equally impractical. The key to success in this variant of the strategy is to sever the lines of communication between the battlefield and the political leadership. There are two reasons why this strategy is doomed to fail, however. Leaders have multiple channels for communicating with their military, as well as with their population, and bombers are not likely to shut them all down simultaneously, much less keep them all silent for a long time. Moreover, political leaders worried about this problem can delegate authority in advance to the appropriate military commanders, in the event that the lines of communication are cut. During the Cold War, for example, both superpowers planned for that contingency because of their fear of nuclear decapitation. It seems clear from the historical record that blockades and strategic bombing occasionally affect the outcome of great-power wars but rarely play a decisive role in shaping the final result. Armies and the air and naval forces that support them are mainly responsible for determining which side wins a great-power war. Land power is the most formidable kind of conventional military power available to states." In fact, it is a rare event when a war between great powers is not settled largely by rival armies fighting it out on the battlefield. Although some of the relevant history has been discussed in the preceding sections and chapters, a brief overview of the great-power wars since 1792 shows that wars are won on the ground.

Offshore balancing and hegemony are by definition mutually exclusive.

Brimley 8 (Shawn, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, June, [http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/FlournoyBrimley\_Finding%20Our%20Way\_June08.pdf] AD: 7/8/10)JM

First, isolationism holds that America’s only true vital interest is national defense—defined as securing the liberty, property, and security of the homeland. According to this school of thought, the United States should not attempt to maintain world order, and the promotion of democracy around the world only serves to generate additional enemies and risk strategic exhaustion.33 Isolationists are highly skeptical of the use of American power abroad and retain a deep animosity toward international institutions and international law. Contemporary arguments seldom use “isolationism,” but rather terms like “restraint” or “offshore balancing.” In The Peace of Illusions, Christopher Layne argues that, “offshore balancing is a multipolar—not unipolar— strategy, and therefore it would accommodate the rise of new great powers while simultaneously shifting, or devolving, to Eurasia’s major powers the primary responsibility for their own defense.” 34 In a November 2007 article in The American Interest, Barry Posen concluded that 16 years of post-Cold War strategy had failed, and that the United States should thus “conceive its security interests narrowly, use its military power stingily, pursue its enemies quietly but persistently, share responsibilities and costs more equitably, watch and wait more patiently. Let’s do this for 16 years and see if the outcomes aren’t better.” 35 In the context of the likely strategic inheritance in early 2009, a strategy of restraint will have some salience in America’s domestic politics.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Hegemony

States can’t power project offensively across an ocean.

Mearsheimer 1 (John, prof of international relations @ the U of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 114-115)JM

There is one especially important aspect of land power that merits further elaboration: how large bodies of water sharply limit an army's power-projection capability. Water is usually not a serious obstacle for a navy that is transporting ground forces across an ocean and landing them in a friendly state. But water is a forbidding barrier when a navy attempts to deliver an army onto territory controlled and well-defended by a rival great power. Navies are therefore at a significant disadvantage when attempting amphibious operations against powerful land-based forces, which are likely to throw the seaborne invaders back into the sea. Generally speaking, land assaults across a common border are a much easier undertaking. Armies that have to traverse a large body of water to attack a well-armed opponent invariably have little offensive capability. The basic problem that navies face when conducting seaborne invasions is that there are significant limits on the number of troops and the amount of firepower that a navy can bring to bear in an amphibious operation." Thus, it is difficult for navies to insert onto enemy shores assault forces that are powerful enough to overwhelm the defending troops. The specific nature of this problem varies from the age of sail to the industrial age.77

Offshore balancing sacrifices our army – we can’t wage wars relying on the sea.

Mearsheimer 1 (John, prof of international relations @ the U of Chicago, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 128)JM

In sum, neither of our insular great powers (the United Kingdom and the United States) has ever been invaded, whereas our continental great powers (France and Russia) have been invaded a total of twelve times since 1792. These continental states were assaulted across land eleven times, but only once from the sea. The apparent lesson is that large bodies of water make it extremely difficult for armies to invade territory defend-ed by a well-armed great power.

U.S global hegemony ensures international stability.

Brimley 8 (Shawn, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, June, [http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/FlournoyBrimley\_Finding%20Our%20Way\_June08.pdf] AD: 7/8/10)JM

Finally, advocates of primacy argue that only sustained American hegemony ensures continued global stability. From this perspective, the rise of a peer competitor in Eurasia would pose a dramatic threat to international order and significantly increase the risk of war. Most advocates of primacy argue that the United States is, on balance, perceived to be a benign hegemon, and thus significant balancing behavior that would undermine America’s strategic position is unlikely to occur.43 Moreover, even if there is growing resentment of continued American primacy, Michael Mandelbaum argues in The Case for Goliath that American abdication from its current role would “deprive the international system of one of its principal safety features, which keeps countries from smashing into each other, as they are historically prone to do. In this sense, a world without America would be the equivalent of a freeway full of cars with no brakes.” 44 Some in this school believe that the so-called unipolar moment must be sustained, and thus China and other rising powers should be viewed as strategic competitors rather than potential partners. 45 Critics of perpetual primacy often argue that an insistence on hegemony is a recipe for strategic overstretch, national exhaustion, and a decline of power and influence.46

Offshore Balancing Bad – Iranian Nuclearization Module

A. Offshore balancing leads to Iranian nuclearization.

Carlson 6 (Brian, masters in international relations, Summer-Fall, *SAIS Review*, 26(2), p. 210-211)JM

Second, for all his professed concern about ensuring that no dominant power gains control of the Persian Gulf, Walt is strangely complacent about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. He argues that the United States should offer to reduce its own nuclear arsenal, abandon current plans to build a new generation of nuclear weapons, and sign a non-aggression treaty with Iran in response to verifiable abandonment of its nuclear ambitions. (He advocates the same approach toward North Korea.) Such an approach might work, but this is far from certain. If it failed, this apparently would be of little concern to Walt. In “The Israel Lobby,” Mearsheimer and Walt argue that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose no threat to the United States.4 This is far too sanguine a view, given Iran’s record as the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s proclaimed desire to wipe Israel off the map. Furthermore, a nuclear-armed Iran could set off a dangerous arms race in the Gulf and would pose just the kind of regional threat that Walt claims he wants to prevent from arising.

B. Iran nuclearization means nuclear proliferation ending in extinction.

Presidential Task Force 9 (Presidential Task Force, Task Force on Iranian Proliferation, Regional Security, and U.S. Policy, March, [http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PTF-Iran.pdf] AD: 7/8/10)JM

In the hands of the Tehran regime, an actual nuclear weapon or the capacity to produce one quickly could profoundly destabilize the region. Given the past behavior of Iranian radicals, Iran on the nuclear brink could exacerbate fears among Gulf Arab states of sabotage and subversion, particularly across the Sunni-Shiite divide, and possible disruption in the flow of oil to world markets. Iran’s threats and actions could push oil prices up and intimidate its Gulf neighbors to bend to its will on issues ranging from border disputes to the presence of third-party military bases throughout the Gulf. Beyond the Gulf, radical groups in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza, all allies of Iran, would be emboldened by Iranian nuclear progress. A nuclear Iran might more actively portray itself as the voice of Islam by, for example, questioning the status quo on volatile issues like custodianship of key Muslim shrines or Jerusalem, or portraying itself as a champion of Muslim radicals standing up to pro-Western regimes. Shielded by a nuclear deterrent, Iran might be emboldened to step up its support to terrorist groups. In the worst case, Iran might share its technology and nuclear material with its radical friends. If Iran “gets away” at low cost with years of safeguards violations and defiance of UN Security Council resolutions, nonproliferation norms likely will further erode across the globe. Other countries may consider taking the same path, especially if Iran’s programs gain legitimacy. If the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is seen as fraying, it may be difficult to make progress on supplementary means to shore up the nonproliferation regime. The greater the number of countries with nuclear weapons, the higher the risk that misperception and miscalculation could lead to a nuclear confrontation, with horrible consequences. In the Middle East, those who see themselves as regional powers may want nuclear capabilities matching those in Iran—including enrichment or reprocessing facilities—for both strategic and prestige-related reasons. To be sure, Middle East states would need many years to build an indigenous nuclear infrastructure, but the pursuit of a broad range of nuclear capabilities could be destabilizing by creating the impression that the military nuclearization of the region is inevitable.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Iranian Nuclearization Link

We can’t balance with a small number of troops – it leads to Iranian And North Korean nuclearization.

Kagan 6 (Frederick, Ph.D in Russian and Soviet military history from Yale U, October, [http://www.aei.org/outlook/25010] AD: 7/8/10)JM

Above all, America’s conventional military strength remains critical, traditional power politics continue to control the world, and the lessons of thousands of years of human history still apply. In counterinsurgencies, the first requirement of success is the establishment of security throughout the country or region. This task is manpower-intensive and incompatible with a small footprint approach. Political, economic, and reconciliation tracks are not sustainable without security, as countless historical examples show. Success in Iraq--and Afghanistan--requires a heavier deployment of U.S. forces with orders not just to train indigenous soldiers, but also to bring peace to those troubled lands. Military strength and the visible will to use it is also essential to persuading regimes like those in Tehran and Pyongyang to abandon programs they wish to pursue. We have been trying the diplomatic approach, unsupported by meaningful military threat, for nearly fifteen years with North Korea, and the result has been utter failure. A similar approach in Iran will not be more successful. It may not be necessary to attack those two states to force them to give up their weapons of mass destruction programs, but there is no hope of convincing them to do so if they do not believe that we can and will defeat them. Nor is there any likelihood that a “small footprint” (almost a “no footprint”) approach in the Horn of Africa will contain the Islamist threat there. The United States is at war, and the enemy is the same one we have been fighting for sixty years. A totalitarian regime controls North Korea. Totalitarian ideologues hold power in Iran, have just seized power in southern Somalia, and seek power throughout the Middle East. Their goals are subtly different, but they share several key features: the destruction of democracy, which they hate; the elimination of liberalism and religious toleration; and the destruction of the United States. Victory will require a mobilization of America’s military might and the willingness to use it. Adaptive and unpredictable enemies like al Qaeda will require us to change part of our approach and some of our forces constantly. Winning throughout the Muslim world will require economic, political, and cultural initiatives alongside the use of military power. But nothing will be possible without adequate military force, which the United States is currently lacking. If we do not begin the necessary mobilization of our resources now, then our military power will become irrelevant, our strategies will fail, and our security will falter.

A large presence is needed to deter Iranian nuclearization.

Pollack 3 (Kenneth, dir for Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council, June 17, [http://www.iraqwararchive.org/data/jun24/US/nyt08.pdf] AD: 7/8/10)JM

A return to an over-the-horizon posture would also risk re-creating some of the same problems that made the strategy untenable the first time around. If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, a minimal American presence in the region might tempt it to new aggression. The GCC countries have often shown a willingness to accommodate powerful, aggressive neighbors, and a reduced American presence could increase their willingness to do so again -- giving Iran, say, an unhealthy degree of control over oil flows. Finally, a limited American presence might tempt other outside powers -- such as China -- to fish in the Gulf's troubled waters at some point down the road.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Iranian Nuclearization Impact

Iranian nuclearization causes NPT collapse, nuclear proliferation to terrorists, and nuclear hot wars.

Kurtz 6 (Stanley, fellow of the Hudson Institute and Ph.D. in social anthropology from Harvard U, August 28, [http://article.nationalreview.com/289370/our-fallout-shelter-future/stanley-kurtz] AD: 7/8/10)JM

Proliferation optimists, on the other hand, see reasons for hope in the record of nuclear peace during the Cold War. While granting the risks, proliferation optimists point out that the very horror of the nuclear option tends, in practice, to keep the peace. Without choosing between hawkish proliferation pessimists and dovish proliferation optimists, Rosen simply asks how we ought to act in a post-proliferation world. Rosen assumes (rightly I believe) that proliferation is unlikely to stop with Iran. Once Iran gets the bomb, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are likely to develop their own nuclear weapons, for self-protection, and so as not to allow Iran to take de facto cultural-political control of the Muslim world. (I think you’ve got to at least add Egypt to this list.) With three, four, or more nuclear states in the Muslim Middle East, what becomes of deterrence? A key to deterrence during the Cold War was our ability to know who had hit whom. With a small number of geographically separated nuclear states, and with the big opponents training satellites and specialized advance-guard radar emplacements on each other, it was relatively easy to know where a missile had come from. But what if a nuclear missile is launched at the United States from somewhere in a fully nuclearized Middle East, in the middle of a war in which, say, Saudi Arabia and Iran are already lobbing conventional missiles at one another? Would we know who had attacked us? Could we actually drop a retaliatory nuclear bomb on someone without being absolutely certain? And as Rosen asks, What if the nuclear blow was delivered against us by an airplane or a cruise missile? It might be almost impossible to trace the attack back to its source with certainty, especially in the midst of an ongoing conventional conflict. MORE TERROR We’re familiar with the horror scenario of a Muslim state passing a nuclear bomb to terrorists for use against an American city. But imagine the same scenario in a multi-polar Muslim nuclear world. With several Muslim countries in possession of the bomb, it would be extremely difficult to trace the state source of a nuclear terror strike. In fact, this very difficulty would encourage states (or ill-controlled elements within nuclear states — like Pakistan’s intelligence services or Iran’s Revolutionary Guards) to pass nukes to terrorists. The tougher it is to trace the source of a weapon, the easier it is to give the weapon away. In short, nuclear proliferation to multiple Muslim states greatly increases the chances of a nuclear terror strike. Right now, the Indians and Pakistanis “enjoy” an apparently stable nuclear stand-off. Both countries have established basic deterrence, channels of communication, and have also eschewed a potentially destabilizing nuclear arms race. Attacks by Kashmiri militants in 2001 may have pushed India and Pakistan close to the nuclear brink. Yet since then, precisely because of the danger, the two countries seem to have established a clear, deterrence-based understanding. The 2001 crisis gives fuel to proliferation pessimists, while the current stability encourages proliferation optimists. Rosen points out, however, that a multi-polar nuclear Middle East is unlikely to follow the South Asian model. Deep mutual suspicion between an expansionist, apocalyptic, Shiite Iran, secular Turkey, and the Sunni Saudis and Egyptians (not to mention Israel) is likely to fuel a dangerous multi-pronged nuclear arms race. Larger arsenals mean more chance of a weapon being slipped to terrorists. The collapse of the world’s non-proliferation regime also raises the chances that nuclearization will spread to Asian powers like Taiwan and Japan. And of course, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to embolden Iran, especially in the transitional period before the Saudis develop weapons of their own. Like Saddam, Iran may be tempted to take control of Kuwait’s oil wealth, on the assumption that the United States will not dare risk a nuclear confrontation by escalating the conflict. If the proliferation optimists are right, then once the Saudis get nukes, Iran would be far less likely to make a move on nearby Kuwait. On the other hand, to the extent that we do see conventional war in a nuclearized Middle East, the losers will be sorely tempted to cancel out their defeat with a nuclear strike. There may have been nuclear peace during the Cold War, but there were also many “hot” proxy wars. If conventional wars break out in a nuclearized Middle East, it may be very difficult to stop them from escalating into nuclear confrontations.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Iranian Nuclearization Impact

Iran nuclearization collapses NPT – that independently leads to Middle East nuclear exchange.

Ross 7 (Dennis, adviser for the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia to the Secretary of State, April 23, [https://www.tnr.com/article/politics/squeeze-play] AD: 7/8/10)JM

Consider this scenario: The Saudis have gone nuclear. So have the Egyptians. Both countries had been signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but that agreement is now dissolved. Riyadh and Cairo acquired their weapons from Pakistan, a Sunni ally, in response to the nuclear threat from Shia Iran. Meanwhile, Iraq continues to fester, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is far from settled, and Iranian proxies remain firmly entrenched within Lebanon's combustible sectarian mix--a mix that pits Sunni against Shia and just so happens to exist on Israel's northern border. In short, all the key players in the Middle East--Sunni, Shia, Israeli--now have nuclear weapons at a moment when the simmering and, in some cases, quite open conflicts between the region's states, sects, and ethnicities are almost too numerous to count. If that situation sounds terrifying, it should. And it may well come to pass if Iran is allowed to go nuclear. This past December, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, Saud Al Faisal, declared that Riyadh, in conjunction with surrounding Gulf states, might seek to develop nuclear power. He insisted the program would be used only for peaceful purposes, but, to many, Faisal's words sounded like a threat: Since Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, maybe we will, too. If that happens, Egypt probably won't be far behind. Senior Egyptian officials have told me that, if we cannot stop Iran from going nuclear, it will spell the end of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Needless to say, a nuclear arms race in the Middle East would greatly increase the chances of war--between Sunnis and Shia or between Israelis and Muslims--through mistake or miscalculation. For this reason alone, we must prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The question is: How?

The impact is extinction – Middle East war escalates globally.

Joshi 2K (Sharad, postdoctoral fellow at CNS and Ph.D from U of Pittsburgh, March, [http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa\_00jos01.html] AD: 7/8/10)JM

The introduction of nuclear weapons in an already hostile region could increase the possibility of actual use of nuclear weapons in a tense situation. The continuous hostility of varying levels over the past five decades, might lead to the inclusion of nuclear and other WMD in existing “war-fighting” doctrines. 18 If the states in the region see WMD simply as weapons to be used in a conflict, the probability of these weapons being used increases drastically. The Arabs have tried to counter Israel’s nuclear superiority, by developing a sizeable chemical and biological weapons arsenal. The greater the number of powers in a region possessing WMD, the greater the risk of escalation. Wars in history have more often than not been limited; but the main reason for this has been constraints due to resources and technological know-how. Instances are very rare of a war being limited due to considerations of the consequences of existing capabilities. 19 The indiscriminate effect of Weapons of Mass Destruction makes it very difficult to keep a war involving such weapons, limited.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Iran Nuclearization Impact

Iranian nuclearization ignites Middle Eastern war- 28 million dead in 21 days, 33 million to follow, global economy destroyed- extinction

Walker 7 (Martin, Senior Director of the Global Business Policy Council, November 22, [http://www.metimes.com/Opinion/2007/11/22/analysis\_a\_mideast\_nuclear\_war/4411/] KLS)

He has now turned his laser-like research and forensic intelligence skills to studying the real implication of the endless diplomatic minuet at the United Nations over Iran's nuclear ambitions. In the real world, this matters mainly because an Iranian nuclear capability would transform the power balance in the wider Middle East, and leave the region and the rest of us living under the constant prospect of a nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel. This would mean, Cordesman suggests, some 16 million to 28 million Iranians dead within 21 days, and between 200,000 and 800,000 Israelis dead within the same time frame. The total of deaths beyond 21 days could rise very much higher, depending on civil defense and public health facilities, where Israel has a major advantage. It is theoretically possible that the Israeli state, economy and organized society might just survive such an almost-mortal blow. Iran would not survive as an organized society. "Iranian recovery is not possible in the normal sense of the term," Cordesman notes. The difference in the death tolls is largely because Israel is believed to have more nuclear weapons of very much higher yield (some of 1 megaton), and Israel is deploying the Arrow advanced anti-missile system in addition to its Patriot batteries. Fewer Iranian weapons would get through. The difference in yield matters. The biggest bomb that Iran is expected to have is 100 kilotons, which can inflict third-degree burns on exposed flesh at 8 miles; Israel's 1-megaton bombs can inflict third-degree burns at 24 miles. Moreover, the radiation fallout from an airburst of such a 1-megaton bomb can kill unsheltered people at up to 80 miles within 18 hours as the radiation plume drifts. (Jordan, by the way, would suffer severe radiation damage from an Iranian strike on Tel Aviv.) Cordesman assumes that Iran, with less than 30 nuclear warheads in the period after 2010, would aim for the main population centers of Tel Aviv and Haifa, while Israel would have more than 200 warheads and far better delivery systems, including cruise missiles launched from its 3 Dolphin-class submarines. The assumption is that Israel would be going for Iran's nuclear development centers in Tehran, Natanz, Ardekan, Saghand, Gashin, Bushehr, Aral, Isfahan and Lashkar A'bad. Israel would also likely target the main population centers of Tehran, Tabriz, Qazvin, Isfahan, Shiraz, Yazd, Kerman, Qom, Ahwaz and Kermanshah. Cordesman points out that the city of Tehran, with a population of 15 million in its metropolitan area, is "a topographic basin with mountain reflector. Nearly ideal nuclear killing ground." But it does not end there. Cordesman points out that Israel would need to keep a "reserve strike capability to ensure no other power can capitalize on Iranian strike." This means Israel would have to target "key Arab neighbors" - in particular Syria and Egypt. Cordesman notes that Israel would have various options, including a limited nuclear strike on the region mainly inhabited by the Alawite minority from which come the ruling Assad dynasty. A full-scale Israeli attack on Syria would kill up to 18 million people within 21 days; Syrian recovery would not be possible. A Syrian attack with all its reputed chemical and biological warfare assets could kill up to 800,000 Israelis, but Israeli society would recover. An Israeli attack on Egypt would likely strike at the main population centers of Cairo, Alexandria, Damietta, Port Said, Suez, Luxor and Aswan. Cordesman does not give a death toll here, but it would certainly be in the tens of millions. It would also destroy the Suez Canal and almost certainly destroy the Aswan Dam, sending monstrous floods down the Nile to sweep away the glowing rubble. It would mean the end of Egypt as a functioning society. Cordesman also lists the oilwells, refineries and ports along the Gulf that could also be targets in the event of a mass nuclear response by an Israel convinced that it was being dealt a potentially mortal blow. Being contained within the region, such a nuclear exchange might not be Armageddon for the human race; it would certainly be Armageddon for the global economy. So in clear, concise and chillingly forensic style, Cordesman spells out that the real stakes in the crisis that is building over Iran's nuclear ambitions would certainly include the end of Persian civilization, quite probably the end of Egyptian civilization, and the end of the Oil Age. This would also mean the end of globalization and the extraordinary accretions in world trade and growth and prosperity that are hauling hundreds of millions of Chinese and Indians and others out of poverty.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Iranian Nuclearization – AT: No Use

Iran wouldn’t use nuclear weapons as a deterrent – they would fire them.

Chubin 6 (Shahram, dir of research at the Geneva Centre for Security Studies, *Iran's Nuclear Ambitions*, p. 53-55)JM

 Would possessing a nuclear weapons capability lead to greater restraint or more aggressive policies in Iran? How would the acquisition of nuclear weapons affect Iran's goals or behavior? Even a risk-averse state might be emboldened by a new capability. Analysts differ on whether nuclear weapons would have a sobering effect on all states, irrespective of orientation, and on the degree of risk-taking states would be willing to run given the heightened stakes.43 Broadly speaking, the threat coming from an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is multifaceted and could include the following elements: • Iran might be tempted to support terrorist groups such as Hezbollah more openly, perhaps by seeking to extend deterrence to them. At the least, new capabilities might stimulate more radical elements (especially in the Guards) to argue for a more ambitious set of policies. • A more activist belligerent Iran might seek to use its nuclear weapons to sanctuarize its homeland from reprisal. Iran has tended to be conscious of its own military weakness and has avoided running risks, but in light of its opportunism and given the uncertainties as to how a new major military capability might influence behavior, neither eventuality can be completely discounted." •Iran's strategic culture (its experience of Iraq's surprise attack in 1980, its decision-making culture, and its operating style) is likely to determine the command system it sets up for its nuclear capability. Given the likelihood that the Revolutionary Guards will be the custodians of this new capability and that they see WMD as offensive weapons rather than deterrents, there are grounds for concern.45 • Iran's track record, even without a nuclear capability, is not a model of restraint. Islamic Iran has made it a practice in crises to destabilize the region by threatening hor-izontal escalation, by widening the dispute by stirring regional instability, or by threatening states friendly to the United States." In the current impasse between Iran and the United States and the EU-3, Iranian officials have made some characteristically veiled threats: If the United States continued its (diplomatic) pressure, Iran would have "no choice but to agitate conditions for America and to endanger its interests." Iran has indicated that a refer- ral to the UNSC could result in regional repercussions: "The region needs stability and the smoke of any escala- tion in the region will hurt their own eyes."47 In light of current and past threats to hold the region hostage, there is room for doubt about what a nuclear-capable Iran would threaten. •Despite its far-flung borders and more than a dozen neighbors, Iran has invested heavily in missiles, domestic production of arms, and research and development of WMD, even though none of the regional threats it faces are likely to be unconventional. That Iran's conventional capabilities have remained limited and barely developed since 1988 therefore has dangerous implications." Emphasis on missiles and possibly nuclear weapons might give Iranian leaders the false impression that such weapons are somehow more elastic in their uses than is warranted by the experience so far. In looking for new and novel uses to compensate for their conventional inad- equacies, and in stretching their uses, Iran runs the risk of lowering the threshold of nuclear weapons use. Iran would thus leave itself with no other practical option except threat or actual use of such weapons. This threat would be reinforced domestically by a consideration of sunk costs: Of what use are these weapons if they cannot be applied practically in all contingencies? A balanced conventional force in Iran would be more reassuring to Iran's neighbors and the international community.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Israel/Palestine

Offshore balancing means we can’t exert influence – prolongs the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

Chazan 5 (Naomi, prof political science @ Hebrew U, February/March, [http://www.bostonreview.net/BR30.1/chazan.php] AD: 7/8/10)JM

The prescriptions generated by a strategy of offshore balancing falter in the face of two insurmountable obstructions. The first is obsessive U.S.-centrism. In his attempt to offer a corrective to Bush policy, Walt nurtures an internal discourse that effectively excludes the rest of the world. The second is a propensity to confuse objectives with outcomes. Policies aimed at fairly resolving festering conflicts elsewhere may ultimately fortify the standing of the United States; if they are undertaken with this goal in mind they may well fail. These weaknesses in Walt’s approach are best exemplified in his treatment of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Walt justifiably argues for an active American approach to the resolution of this century-old dispute, and he ties the achievement of regional security and progress in the fight against terror to its success. What he ignores is a long history of intense joint Israeli-Palestinian attempts, both formal and informal, to reach just such a goal. The Ayalon-Nusseibeh People’s Voice campaign and the detailed Geneva Initiative spell out the parameters of a just two-state solution and incorporate all the proposals raised by Walt and more. All call for concerted American involvement now. To stress, however, that such intervention be undertaken primarily to promote American interests minimizes existing bilateral and multilateral efforts and reduces the prospects for the renewal of negotiations. (It is useful to recall that the “road map” was originally drafted by the European Union and hardly modified when adopted by the Quartet.) The kind of direct engagement envisaged in Walt’s piece, entailing the formulation of a consistent policy and the allocation of military as well as economic resources, is at odds with his strategy of offshore balancing. The plea for an assertive American initiative contradicts the call for self-restraint and action by proxy. What has been lacking on the Israeli–Palestinian front is not the definition of substantive goals but a workable international plan with American participation to bring about their implementation. The only way Walt’s laudable specific proposals can have a constructive effect is to consciously separate them from his overall program to fortify American hegemony and carry them out in concert with European and Arab countries. American global leadership may be enhanced by an Israeli–Palestinian accord and the emergence of a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel. But it is not advanced by the adoption of Walt’s conceptual apparatus, which may prove more of a hindrance in a successful resolution and is definitely not needed for its attainment. The most creative aspects of Steven Walt’s analysis diverge from his rigid model. A modicum of modesty coupled with a serious review of American interests in a truly global context would yield far more satisfying results. If the United States could be less concerned with its reputation and more with its actions, less with its supremacy and more with its reliability, and less with amassing force and more with the worthy utilization of its power, then the global scene would look very different than it does today. As Walt argues, a mature American foreign policy may be the answer. But this would require that the United States acknowledge that the rest of the world has grown up. American policymakers would do well to ignore Walt’s advice to behave like parents who see other countries as children who need to be tamed either through force or compulsion. Instead, by nourishing independence and sustainability and by forfeiting control in return for ongoing respect, they should begin to treat them like adults.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Laundry List

Warming, geopolitical stability, and the world economy will be solved now – offshore balancing precludes that.

Art 8 (Robert, prof of International Relations @ Brandeis U, June, [http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/FlournoyBrimley\_Finding%20Our%20Way\_June08.pdf] AD: 7/8/10)JM

If properly implemented, selective engagement best protects America’s interests in the current and foreseeable international environment. It works actively to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella. It is more likely to avoid backlash and balancing against America’s use of military power, or at least minimize those two, than muscular Wilsonianism (the George W. Bush policy) because it eschews excessive unilateralism and ambition, and because it takes into account the interests of key regional allies in framing policy. It avoids the Lippmann gap by the judicious use of American military power. It better preserves America’s key alliances and their stabilizing role in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf—through the maintenance of a forward presence—than does the strategy of restraint.20 It assures the free flow of Persian Gulf oil through an onshore and offshore military presence there better than either the strategy of restraint or offshore balancing, and does not destabilize the region the way muscular Wilsonianism has.21 It helps to preserve an open international economic order by providing a stable political-military framework within which the international economy operates, something offshore balancing does not provide. It advances the spread of democracy through the generation of wealth and the expansion of the middle classes that an open international economic order facilitates and, in general, avoids getting bogged down in costly military interventions to fashion democracies. Finally, even if indirectly, it can help combat climate change by making the world more stable, and hence better able to muster the resources necessary to deal with climate change than if the world were more conflictual than is now the case.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Middle East Stability

A. Forward presence solves stability in every region.

Art 8 (Robert, prof of International Relations @ Brandeis U, June, [http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/FlournoyBrimley\_Finding%20Our%20Way\_June08.pdf] AD: 7/8/10)JM

Second, selective engagement is a forward defense strategy; hence it stresses the importance of bases abroad from which to exert power. If the projection of U.S. military power abroad is useful to advance U.S. interests, then this is done more easily from bases abroad than from the homeland. Forward operating bases make an in-theater presence possible on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. The assumption is that the United States can more easily influence events within a region if it has an in-theater military presence than if it does not. Such influence is exercised regionally through the deterrent, reassurance, and buffering roles that a U.S. military presence in a region can produce. Together, these three roles can help to produce stability among the main actors within a region and facilitate beneficial trends within states in the region.

B. Middle East instability causes genocide and terrorism

Forest 7 (James, director of terrorism studies at the U.S. Military Academy and the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, September 1, 2007, [http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices/5523341-1.html] AD: 6/24/10) JM

A regional war in the Middle East would bring a variety of negative consequences for the United States. First, and most obvious, the global security environment would shift in a most unfavorable direction. The death and destruction would transcend geopolitical boundaries and possibly spill over into neighboring regions. The humanitarian crisis would overwhelm the unprepared regimes throughout the Middle East. Calls for intervention and relief could result in allies of the United States becoming involved. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Meanwhile, the asymmetric nature of much of the fighting will offer new opportunities for many young, motivated men and women to acquire the skills of guerrilla warfare, making them attractive recruits for al-Qaeda and affiliate terrorist organizations. Wars bring an enabling environment for arms trafficking and other sorts of criminal activity, as well as human rights abuses--in some cases, even atrocities like genocide. It is also highly doubtful that, should such a war take place, the victors of the bloodshed will be inclined to establish the sort of liberal, open democratic societies that were fostered and nurtured in Europe and Asia following World War II.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Middle East Stability Impacts

Middle East instability leads to nuclear war.

Steinbach 2 (John, researcher for Centre for Research on Globalisation, March 2002 [http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html] AD: 6/24/10)JM

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

Middle East instability goes nuclear – it doesn’t take much

Gaffney, Jr. 97 (Frank, founder of the Center for Security Policy, September 1997, [http://www.meforum.org/360/china-arms-the-rogues] AD: 6/24/10)JM

The PRC's arms transfers will greatly intensify, if not precipitate, the next war in the Persian Gulf, the Levant, or North Africa. For example, the mere existence of chemical or biological weapons-to say nothing of nuclear ones-on medium-range ballistic missiles in the hands of people like the mullahs of Iran, Saddam Husayn, Hafiz al-Asad, and Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi could make the costs to Israel of "going second" appear intolerably high. Under such circumstances, even the tiniest provocative spark could be sufficient to set off a conflagration unlikely to remain confined to the Middle East. The proven Iranian, Syrian, and Pakistani willingness to collaborate with other potentially dangerous states-notably Libya, Algeria and, to varying degrees, Iraq-greatly complicates international efforts to combat proliferation. The Syrian-Iranian strategic partnership, one of the means by which Chinese technology reaches Hafiz al-Asad's regime, is particularly worrisome. For the People's Republic of China, these transactions may be more than simply a valuable means of generating hard currency, paying for oil imports, and gaining influence. Peking also appears to be encouraging weapons proliferation in the Middle East as part of its campaign to diminish America's presence and influence in Asia. 42 For violent conflict in the Middle East would preoccupy the United States, sapping its resources and tying it down far from Chinese borders. That the PRC's proliferation activities appear to be part of a larger and more ominous pattern of hostile behavior adds to the urgency of effective countermeasures. The United States must take the lead in forging efforts-multilateral where possible, unilateral where necessary-to resist and curb these perils.

Offshore Balancing Bad – New Hegemon

Disengaging our military from Asia leads to the rise of a regional hegemon – the impact is nuclear first strike.

Tellis 2K (Ashley, Ph.D, The U of Chicago, April 1, [http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6433] AD: 7/7/10)JM

The second critical interest consists of preventing the rise of a hegemonic state in Asia. Any hegemonic state capable of dominating the Asian land mass and the line of communications, both internal and external, represents an unacceptable challenge to the safety, prosperity, and relative power position of the United States. For reasons well understood by geopoliticians since Sir Halford Mackinder, Asia’s great wealth and resources would privilege its possessors considerably in the struggles endemic to international politics. If the region’s wealth and resources were to be secured by any single state (or some combination of states acting in unison), it would enable this entity to threaten American assets not only in Asia but in other areas as well — Europe and Africa, for example — and finally perhaps to challenge the United States itself at a global level. This entity, using the continent’s vast resources and economic capabilities, could then effectively interdict the links that currently connect the United States with Asia and the rest of the world and, in the limiting case, menace the U.S. territory itself through a combination of both wmd and conventional instruments. Besides being a threat to American safety, a hegemonic domination of Asia by one of the region’s powers would threaten American prosperity as well, if the consequence of such domination included denying the United States access to the continent’s markets, goods, capital, and technology. In combination, this threat to American safety and prosperity would have the inevitable effect of threatening the relative power position of the United States in international politics. This interest in preventing the rise of a hegemonic state inevitably involves paying close attention to the possible power transitions currently occurring in the region, especially those relating to China in the near to medium term and to Japan, Russia, and possibly India over the long run. It requires developing an appropriate set of policy responses — which may range from prevention at one end through containment in the middle to appeasement at the other — designed to prevent the rise of any hegemony that breaks American connections with Asia. Plainly, a strategy of disengagement would be unable to assure this objective, and may actually entice the larger Asian states to contemplate mounting just such a challenge. Even if such efforts were to arouse local balancing, there is no assurance that they could be checkmated without the assistance of the United States. And, if such balancing ultimately requires U.S. military presence and assistance for its success, it is still not clear what the benefits of a multipolar solution would be since the current division of labor already accepts not only American presence but also American preeminence. This is not to say that further adjustments in the U.S. regional posture ought to be ruled out, but that any adjustments that presage a true devolution towards multipolarity — the spread of wmd capabilities to American allies and acquiescing to their acquisition of power projection capabilities — have not yet been shown to be in the U.S. interest.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Readiness

Offshore balancing hurts military readiness.

Jowers 4 (Karen, Army Times staff writer, September 27, [http://www.armytimes.com/legacy/new/1-ARMYPAPER-354619.php] AD: 7/9/10)JM

If the U.S. military reduces its footprint overseas, there is no way around the fact that it will also lose some of its ability to quickly get equipment and troops to a conflict. “All things being equal, if you don’t have as many bases around the globe, you’re going to need more lift,” Lawrence Korb, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and an adviser to the Center for Defense Information, told the Overseas Basing Commission Sept. 2. “If you can’t get where you want to go, you won’t have the power you need.” Some defense analysts who testified before the commission had concerns about going too far with overseas reductions in some areas and about not going far enough in others. The commission, created by Congress, is assessing the current overseas basing structure. If taken too far, some of the Pentagon changes proposed for the Army could worsen an overdeployment problem that now poses the greatest challenge to the all-volunteer force in its 30-year history, said Michael O’Hanlon, a senior foreign policy and defense analyst at the Brookings Institution. The plan would take large numbers of troops out of Germany, where they can be assigned with their families, and deploy them on unaccompanied tours to Eastern Europe.

Offshore Balancing Bad – Realism

Offshore balancing fails – it’s premised upon an obsolete theory of international relations.

Falk 5 (Ricard, American professor emeritus of international law at Princeton University, February/March, [http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/falk.php] AD: 7/9/10)JM

But my bigger difficulty with Walt’s embrace of realism is that it appears to celebrate American-style regional hegemony of the sort that has existed for more than a century in the Western Hemisphere. It is here, among other places, that Walt’s disregard of the relevance of international law and morality is exhibited most blatantly, underscored by the absence of any criticism directed at the bloody legacy of interventionism and authoritarian rule that American diplomacy has facilitated, if not imposed upon the region until very recently, especially in Central America and the Caribbean. Walt writes as if American primacy is something to be cherished and preserved rather than feared and avoided. It would at least have been useful for Walt to include in his argument a principled defense of American primacy. But it is here that realists almost always come up empty, presuming what needs demonstration. It is also here that the American bias of Walt’s perspective is most evident. It is impossible to imagine a defense of American primacy being written in any other part of the world without some elaborate accompanying explanation. But my difficulties with Walt’s framing of foreign policy inquiry also extend to issues of historical circumstance and the challenge of globalization. He writes as if the Westphalian world order of sovereign states continues to be a viable basis for thought, policy, and action. There is no mention of globalizing developments covering a range of issues, including trade, money, economic regulation, environment, immigration, information technology, and crime, that can no longer be addressed by states acting on their own. Similarly, the rise of transnational social forces and non-state actors suggests that we have entered a post-Westphalian world whether the focus is placed on responding to global terrorism or promoting human rights and democracy. In this respect, realism is living in a historical bubble that is oblivious to the foundational changes that have been taking place for the last several decades. In this respect, my criticism of Walt’s approach to American foreign policy can be reduced to a rather simple assertion: if you fail to ask the right questions, it is impossible to find the right answers. At this stage of history, realism is incapable of asking some of the most important foreign-policy questions, and therefore realists inevitably avoid a multitude of issues that require resolution. This failure expresses itself, among other ways, in the realist tendency to overlook the need for the construction of a global architecture based on law, institutions, and a cooperative ethos, including a gradual shift in understanding from “national security” to “human security.” Walt gives us a narrow band view of foreign policy that is certainly preferable to the Bush administration’s narrow band foreign policy. Walt’s essay purports to advocate a “mature foreign policy,” but from my perspective it could be more accurately be called an “obsolescent foreign policy” because it is so deeply rooted in the statism of a bygone era. Not that states are obsolete or that supranationalism is about to reconstitute world order. States will remain significant players for a long, long time, but they must increasingly share the global stage with the likes of the European Union, the IMF/World Bank, al Qaeda, the World Social Forum, the World Economic Forum, Amnesty International, and the World Parliament of Religions. Unfortunately, realists remain content to analyze world politics and foreign policy as if the only political actors that matter are sovereign states.

Offshore Balancing Bad – AT: Offshore Balancing Now

Even if offshore balancing is good, the U.S isn’t capable of it and the international system would become unstable.

Schmitt 7 (Gary, dir of the Programon Advanced Strategic Studies and Ph.D from U of Chicago, June 3, [http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?contenidoID=7620] AD: 7/8/10)JM

If the former, a key problem with the strategy is that it requires a far more calculating style of statecraft than the United States has ever engaged in before. And even if we had Henry Kissinger upon Henry Kissinger to carry it out, would the American public really be willing to let its government play this version of international politics--shifting partners based on power relations--rather than the character of the states themselves? Surely, the disappearance of the United States as security guarantor is likely to lead to more competition among states and the creation of a more chaotic and fluid international environment. Britain had a hard enough time playing this role in its day, and found itself in numerous conflicts in any case.

Not only is offshore balancing unnecessary – the American public would never elect leaders who would abide by it.

Schmitt 7 (Gary, dir of the Programon Advanced Strategic Studies and Ph.D from U of Chicago, June 3, [http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?contenidoID=7620] AD: 7/8/10)JM

Obviously, that can lead to misjudgments about what really needs doing and what only appears to need doing. But that is less a problem--since it is no less a problem for those who want to engage in balance-of-power politics--than the fact that the American public is not especially willing to dedicate significant treasure or blood to deal with threats that are over the horizon. As someone who argued that there was a remarkable strategic opportunity available to the United States and its democratic allies in the wake of the Soviet empire's collapse, I can honestly say that, until the attacks of 9/11, the post-Cold War public was hardly seized with a determination to make the most of that opportunity. So, while Layne's preferred strategy of sitting above the world's fray is not likely to fit well with the universalistic character of American liberalism, Thayer's problem is sustaining his strategy in the face of the other side of American liberalism, with its decided focus on the pursuit of happiness. Contrary to what Layne imagines, the issue of sustainability is not one of material resources, or even the rise of great power competitors supposedly generated as a response to U.S. primacy. As Thayer notes, America has never been more powerful, and never has a country been able to call so many of the nations of the world friends or allies. No, the real issue is public will and the quality of leadership necessary to sustain that will in the face of both difficulties, and the enervating consequences of primacy's own success.

Offshore Balancing Bad – AT: Overstretch

No overstretch now – even if so, global leadership outweighs it.

Schmitt 7 (Gary, dir of the Programon Advanced Strategic Studies and Ph.D from U of Chicago, June 3, [http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?contenidoID=7620] AD: 7/8/10)JM

And speaking of money: Layne's argument about looming imperial overstretch is itself a stretch. Even with all the problems in Iraq, a war in Afghanistan, and an emerging hedging strategy vis-a-vis China, the defense burden is still barely over 4 percent of the country's gross domestic product. The United States has certainly had far higher defense burdens in the past, while still retaining its status as the world's economic juggernaut. There may be plenty of reasons to worry about the country's economy, but "guns over butter" is hardly one of them. Moreover, while pulling back from a forward-leaning defense strategy would undoubtedly save money, offshore balancing would still require the United States to have a major military establishment in reserve if it wanted to be capable of being a decisive player in a game of great power balancing. Is the $100 billion or so saved--or, rather, spent by Congress on "bridges to nowhere"--really worth the loss in global influence that comes from adopting Layne's strategy?

No overstretch – even if Iraq was a failure, the U.S still retains its primacy.

Schmitt 7 (Gary, dir of the Programon Advanced Strategic Studies and Ph.D from U of Chicago, June 3, [http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?contenidoID=7620] AD: 7/8/10)JM

First, in response to Layne's argument that Iraq has been an unmitigated disaster, Thayer tries too hard to put a happy face on the problem. The reality is, a strategy of primacy doesn't rest on success in Iraq. It may tell us how prepared or unprepared we are as a government for that role, but it doesn't necessarily vitiate the strategy's general validity. That said, having a strategy dedicated to maintaining primacy does, in fact, put a premium on preemption--not necessarily or even primarily military preemption, but certainly a strong impetus to use all the tools of statecraft to shape both the security environment and other states' behavior. As such, it is an inherently active and somewhat openended strategy that requires heading off challenges before they become threatening ones.

Offshore Balancing Bad – AT: Terrorism

Offshore balancing emboldens terrorism.

Carlson 6 (Brian, masters in international relations, Summer-Fall, *SAIS Review*, 26(2), p. 208)JM

This analysis misses the mark because it fails to grasp the murderous ideology of jihad that motivates radical Islamist terrorism. Rooted in a deep sense of humiliation over the Muslim world’s failings, and nurtured by this violent ideology, radical Islam will not be satisfied with adjustments in U.S. foreign policy. Walt acknowledges the obvious—that U.S. policies are not necessarily wrong just because al-Qaeda opposes them—but he questions whether those policies are worth the price America pays for them. Yet abandoning sound policies out of fear of an al-Qaeda attack merely rewards terrorism, emboldens terrorists, and makes further terrorist acts more likely.

\*\*\*Offshore Balancing Good\*\*\*

Offshore Balancing Good – China

China is rising now – offshore balancing solves that.

Walt 9 (Stephen, prof of international relations @ Harvard U, December 30, [http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/30/making\_the\_world\_safe\_for\_chinese\_investment] AD: 7/7/10)JM

I'm still swamped with grading papers and with preparations for our annual New Year's Eve potluck (about which more in a day or two), but I hope everyone takes a look at the Times piece on China's commercial activities in Afghanistan. While we've been running around playing whack-a-mole with the Taliban and "investing" billions each year in the corrupt Karzai government," China has been investing in things that might actually be of some value, like a big copper mine. As the article suggest, it's not like U.S. troops are "guarding" China's investments. Rather, there's a tacit division of labor going on, where "American troops have helped make Afghanistan safe for Chinese investment." The rest of the article makes depressing reading, however. Here's what one Afghan contractor had to say: "The Chinese are much wiser. When we went to talk to the local people, they wore civilian clothing, and they were very friendly," he said recently during a long chat in his Kabul apartment. "The Americans - not as good. When they come there, they have their uniforms, their rifles and such, and they are not as friendly." The result? According to the Times: "the Chinese have already positioned themselves as generous, eager partners of the Afghan government and long-term players in the country's future. All without firing a shot." The point is not that somehow those wily Chinese have fooled us into squandering a lot of money and lives and annoying lots of people in Central Asia, while they make profitable investments. Rather, the broader lesson is that the entire thrust of U.S. policy towards a large part of the world has been fundamentally misplaced for a long time. If we think we are somehow trapped in an endless cycle of intervention in the Muslim world-Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, now Yemen-it is because our policies towards the entire region have generated enormous animosity and to little good purpose. And when that animosity leads to direct attacks on the United States, we respond in ways that guarantee such attacks will be repeated. To be sure, some of this situation is due to America's position as the sole superpower, which means that it gets blamed for things that aren't always its fault. Plus, a dominant power does tend to end up with a disproportionate role in providing certain collective goods while others free-ride. (If China ever does supplant the U.S as the dominant world power, the same thing will undoubtedly happen to them.) But it also reflects specific decisions that we've been taking for a long time, in the mistaken belief that they would never blow back and affect us here at home. That's why we ought to thinking very strategically about our overseas involvements, and trying to shift those burdens onto locals whenever we can. Unfortunately, the predominant view in Washington still favors an "America First" approach to solving most global problems, even when it's not clear we have any idea how to do that. Don't forget: we are fighting in Afghanistan because a radical anti-American terrorist movement-Al Qaeda-located there in the 1990s and then attacked us on September 11. Al Qaeda attacked the United States for a number of different reasons, including its support for various Arab monarchies and dictatorships, its military presence in the Persian Gulf, and its "special relationship" with Israel (which is oppressing millions of Palestinians and consolidating control of Jerusalem). Al Qaeda also wanted to strike at the world's strongest power, in the vain hope that a dramatic act like that would win them lots of new supporters. They also hoped that they could goad us into doing a lot of stupid things in response, and that achievement may be their only real success to date. We are also bogged down in Central Asia because our earlier support for anti-Soviet mujaheddin there helped create a bunch of well-armed warlords and religious extremists who proved impossible to control later on. But the key lesson is that the current situation is not immutable. We don't have to keep implementing the same policies that led us to this situation; instead, we need to start working on strategic approaches that will minimize our involvement in these regions without sacrificing our vital interests (mostly oil) or endangering the security of key allies. One step would be to do what President Obama promised to do in his Cairo speech and then abandoned: namely, get serious about a two-state solution. A second step would be to stop trying to reorganize vast chunks of the Arab and Islamic world, and focus our efforts solely on helping local governments capture or neutralizing violent anti-American terrorists. A related step is to move back to an "offshore balancing" strategy in the region, and rely more on naval and air forces and less on on-shore intervention. And maybe a fourth element of a new approach would be to remember that the United States rose to its position of great power by letting other major powers do the heavy lifting, while Americans concentrated mostly on building the world's biggest and most advanced economy and building influence with lots of other countries. For the most part, we also kept our fiscal house in order, which gave us the resources to maintain and expand productive infrastructure here at home and made it possible to act overseas when we really had to. This isn't the 19th century and we can't just rewind the clock, but there's still a lot of wisdom in much more selective approach to the use of American power. You know, sorta the way that Beijing seems to doing it.

Offshore Balancing Good – China

China’s growing dominance will lead to war.

Mearsheimer 5 (John, prof of international relations @ the U of Chicago, January/February, [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16538] AD: 6/21/10)JM

China cannot rise peacefully, and if it continues its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China’s neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will likely join with the United States to contain China’s power.

The aftermath of the war is extinction.

Cheong 2k (Ching, senior journalist with the Strait Times, June 25, 2000, lexis, AD: 6/21/10)JM

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

Offshore Balancing Good – China/U.S War

Forward deployment will draw the U.S into war with China – offshore balancing is necessary.

Layne 8 (Christopher, Ph.D in Political Science @ U of California at Berkeley, January, *Global* Trends, 107(705), p. 17-18)JM

The final element of a us offshore balancing strategy would be the devolution from the United States to the major powers in Asia of the respon-sibility for containing China. An offshore balanc¬ing strategy would rely on the balance-of-power dynamics of a twenty-first century multipolar global order to prevent China from dominating East Asia. The other major powers in Asia-Japan, Russia, and India-have a much more immediate interest in stopping a rising China in their midst than does the United States. In a multipolar system, the question is not whether balancing will occur, but which state or states will do the heavy lifting. Because the United States is geographically distant from China-and protected both by the expanse of the Pacific Ocean and by its own formidable military (including nuclear) capabilities-the United States has the option of staying ou t of East Asian security rivalries (at least initially) and forcing Beijing's neighbors to assume the risks and costs of stopping China from Great powers that seek hegemony are always opposed-and defeated-by the counterbalancing efforts of other states. attaining regional hegemony. Because its air and naval power is based on long-range strike capabili-ties, the United States can keep its forces in an over-the-horizon posture with respect to East Asia and limit itself to a backstopping role in the unlikely event that the regional balance of power falters. It is hardly surprising-indeed, it parallels in many ways America's own emergence as a great power-that China, the largest and potentially most powerful state in Asia, is seeking a more assertive political, military, and economic role in the region, and even challenging America's pres¬ent dominance in East Asia. However, this poses no direct threat to us security. japan, India, and Russia, on the other hand, are worried about the implications of China's rapid ascendance for their security. They should bear the responsibility of bal¬ancing against Chinese power. An incipient drift toward multipolarity-which is the prerequisite for the United States to adopt an offshore balancing strat- egy-is already apparent in East Asia. Driven by fears of us abandonment in a future East Asian cri¬sis, japan has embarked on a buildup of its mili¬tary capabilities and has even hinted that it is thinking about acquir¬ing nuclear weapons. Moreover, the past several years have seen a significant escalation in tensions between China and japan, fueled both by nation¬alism and by disputes over control of the South China and East China seas (which may contain large energy deposits). From the standpoint of offshore balancing, japan's military buildup in response to its fear of China is a good thing if it leads to japan's reemer¬gence as an independent geopolitical actor. How¬ever,japan's military resurgence is not so good (for the United States) if it takes place under the aegis of the us-japan security alliance, and if the United States remains in the front lines of the forces con¬taining China. Under those conditions, the United States could find itself ensnared in an Asian con¬flict; its alliance with japan risks dragging it into a war with China in which American strategic inter¬ests would not be engaged. The idea of an offshore balancing strategy is to get the United States out of China's crosshairs, not to allow it to remain a target because of its present security commitments to allies in the region. The wisdom of risking war with China to main¬tain us hegemony in East Asia is all the more doubtful because America's predominance in the region is ebbing in any event. One indication of this is tha't us economic supremacy in East Asia is waning as China rises. China is emerging as the motor of the region's economic growth. While the United States has been preoccupied with Iraq, Iran, and the so-called war on terrorism, China has used its burgeoning economic power to extend its political influence throughout East and Southeast Asia. Indeed, most of the smaller states in Southeast Asia are gradually slipping into Beijing's political orbit because their own prosperity is ever more closely tied to their relations with China. America's strategy of trying to uphold the geo-political status quo in East Asia clashes with the ambitions of a rising China, which has its own ideas about how East Asia's political and security order should be organized. If the United States puts itself in the forefront of those trying to contain China, the potential for future tension-or worse-in Sino- American relations can only increase. By pull¬ing back from its hege¬monic role in East Asia and adopting an offshore balancing strategy, the United States could bet- ter preserve its relative power and strategic influence. It could stand on the sidelines while that region's great powers enervate themselves by engaging in security competitions.

Offshore Balancing Good – China/U.S War

U.S-Chinese war is coming now – offshore balancing solves by making China’s rise to power peaceful.

Layne 8 (Christopher, Ph.D in Political Science @ U of California at Berkeley, January, *Global* *Trends*, 107(705), p. 16-17)JM

Does this mean that the United States and China are on a collision course that will lead to a war in the next decade or two? Not necessarily. What happens in Sino-American relations largely depends on what strategy Washington chooses to adopt toward China. If the United States tries to maintain its current dominance in East Asia, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain, because us grand strategy has incorporated the logic of anticipatory violence as an instrument for maintaining American primacy. For a declining hegemon, "strangling the baby in the crib" by attacking a rising challenger preventively-that is, while the hegemon still holds the upper hand militarily-has always been a tempting strategic option. Washington, however, faces perhaps a last chance to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in ensuring that Chinese power is contained in East Asia but without running the risk of an armed clash with Beijing. This strategy is "offshore balancing," a concept that is finding increasing favor with a group of influential American scholars in the field of security studies. According to this strategy; the United States should deploy military power abroad only in the face of direct threats to vital American interests. The strategy recognizes that Washington need not (and in fact cannot) directly control vast parts of the globe, that it is better off setting priorities based on clear national interests and relying on local actors to uphold regional balances of power. The idea of offshore balancing is to husband national power for maximum effectiveness while minimizing perceptions that this power represents a threat. As an offshore balancer in East Asia, the United States would embrace a new set of policies regarding Sino-American economic relations, political liberalization in China, the defense of Tai-wan, and America's strategic posture in the region. An offshore balancing strategy would require the United States to approach economic relations with China based on a policy of strategic trade rather than free trade. A strategic trade policy would seek to curtail the flow of high technology and direct investment from the United States to China. It also would require a shift in current US trade policy to drastically reduce the bilateral trade deficit, which is a de facto American subsidy of the very economic growth that is fueling China's great power emergence. Second, the United States would abandon its efforts to effectuate political liberalization in China. This policy is a form of gratuitous eye-poking. Because the United States lacks sufficient leverage to transform China domestically; the primary effect of trying to force liberalization on China is to inflame Sino-American relations. An offshore balancing strategy also would require a new US stance on Taiwan, a powder-keg issue because China is committed to national reunification and would regard a Taiwanese declaration of independence as a casus belli. If us policy fails to prevent a showdown between China and Taiwan, the odds are that America will be drawn into the conflict because of its current East Asia strategy. There would be strong domestic political pressure in favor of us intervention. Beyond the arguments that Chinese military action against Taiwan would constitute aggression and undermine us interests in a stable world order, powerful incentives for inter-vention would also arise from ideological antipathy toward China, concerns for maintaining us "cred-ibility;" and support for a democratic Taiwan in a conflict with authoritarian China. Notwithstanding these arguments, which are underpinned by a national security discourse that favors American hegemony; the issues at stake in a possible showdown between China and Taiwan simply would not justify the risks and costs of us intervention. Regardless of the rationale invoked, the contention that the United States should go to war to prevent Bei¬jing from using force to achieve reunifica¬tion with Taiwan (or in response to a unilateral declaration of inde¬pendence by Taipei) amounts to nothing more than a veiled argument for fighting a "pre¬ventive" war against a rising China.

Offshore Balancing Good – Generic

Offshore balancing is inevitable – it leads to international cooperation and stability, but forestalling means terrorism, WMD use, and perpetual war.

Layne 9 (Christopher, Ph.D in Political Science @ U of California at Berkeley, *Review of International Studies*, 35, p. 7-9)JM

Primacy’s neorealist critics have outlined an alternative grand strategy that increasingly resonates with the American public: offshore balancing.3 Its proponents believe that offshore balancing can do a better job than primacy of enhancing American security and matching US foreign policy objectives with the resources available to support them. The driving factor behind offshore balancing is its proponents’ recognition that the US has a ‘hegemony’ problem. America’s strategy of primacy increases US vulnerability to a geopolitical backlash – whether in the guise of countervailing great power coalitions, or terrorist attacks – and alienates public opinion in large swaths of the globe, including Europe and the Middle East. Offshore balancing is based on the assumption that the most vital US interests are preventing the emergence of a dominant power in Europe and East Asia – a ‘Eurasian hegemon’ – and forestalling the emergence of a regional (‘oil’) hegemon in the Middle East. Only a Eurasian hegemon could pose an existential threat to the US. A regional hegemon in the Middle East could imperil the flow of oil upon which the US economy, and the economies of the advanced industrial states depend. As an offshore balancer, the US would rely on the tried and true dynamics of the balance of power to thwart any states with hegemonic ambitions. An offshore balancing strategy would permit the US to withdraw its ground forces from Eurasia (including the Middle East) and assume an over-the-horizon military posture. If – and only if – regional power balances look to be failing would the US re-insert its troops into Eurasia. Offshore balancing contrasts sharply with primacy because primacists fear a world with independent, multiple poles of power. Primacy is based on the belief that it is better for the US to defend its allies and clients than to have them defend themselves. Offshore balancers, on the other hand, believe for an insular great power like the US, the best strategy is to rely on a balance of power approach that devolves to other states the costs and risks of their defense. Offshore balancing is a realist strategy because it eschews the ideological crusading on behalf of democracy that is endemic to Wilsonianism, defines US interests in terms of what is vital rather than simply desirable, balances ends and means, and is based on prudence and self-restraint in the conduct of US strategy. Most of all it is a strategy that fits within the broad realist tradition because it recognises the difference between, on one hand, what the sociologist Max Weber called the ethic of conviction and, on the other hand, the ethic of responsibility. In foreign policymaking the road to hell is paved with good intentions, and policies must be judged on their consequences, not on the intentions that underlie them. The Bush administration’s disastrous policies in Iraq and the Middle East are a much needed reminder that this is a test Wilsonianism too often fails. Although there are some nuanced differences among offshore balancing’s proponents, they fundamentally agree on the strategy’s basic premises. First, offshore balancers recognise that one of the few ironclad rules in international politics is that when one great power becomes too powerful – when it bids to achieve hegemony – it is defeated by the counter-balancing efforts of the other major powers in the international system. The history of the modern international state system (which dates back to about 1500) is littered with the wreckage of great powers that tried and failed to achieve geopolitical primacy: the Hapsburg Empire under Charles V, Spain under Philip II, France under Louis XIV and Napoleon, and Germany under Hitler (and, some would argue, under Kaiser Wilhelm II). Failure is the fate of hegemons. The reason is simple: the basic motivation of all major states is to survive, and when one among them threatens to gain preponderant power, the security of the others is threatened. Some primacists believe that the US is immune to being counter-balanced because, as the only great power in a ‘unipolar’ system, it is so much more powerful than its nearest possible competitors.4 Yet, recent studies by the CIA offer compelling evidence that by 2020 the era of America’s unipolar ascendancy will be drawing to a close as new poles of power in the international system approach the US share of world power.5 And, of course, growing apprehensions about the military, as well as economic, implications of China’s rapid ascent are – at the very least – an implicit acknowledgment that the days of unchallenged US dominance in world affairs are numbered. Offshore balancers believe the US must adjust to incipient multipolarity because they understand that – unless the US is prepared to fight an unending series of preventive wars – new great powers inevitably will emerge in the next decade or two. A second point upon which offshore balancers agree is that in addition to the traditional kind of – ‘hard’, or military – counter-balancing that the US will face in coming years, there are new forms of balancing with which Washington already is contending, including so-called soft balancing.6 The most notable manifestation of soft balancing is the use by other major states of diplomacy and international institutions to try to restrain American actions. The attempt by France, Germany, Russia and China to forestall the US invasion of Iraq by withholding United Nation’s Security Council authorisation is one example of soft balancing. Another example is the effort of the same nations and Britain to promote a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that will avoid the imposition of UN sanctions on Teheran, and a possible armed confrontation between the US and Iran. Even if soft balancing efforts fail, they are important for two reasons. <CONTINUED>

Offshore Balancing Good – Generic

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First, they indicate that other major states regard US geopolitical dominance as a problem that needs to be addressed. Second, soft balancing efforts to rein-in American power may help the other major states learn to cooperate in ways that will the open the door to future hard balancing against the US.7 In addition to soft balancing, asymmetric strategies are another type of nontraditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. When employed by states, asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. Regional powers – especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant high-tech conventional forces. Because they are threatened by the US, however, these states seek other methods of offsetting American power, and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance.

Offshore Balancing Good – Generic

Offshore balancing solves terrorism and avoids conflicts with Iran and China.

Layne 9 (Christopher, Ph.D in Political Science @ U of California at Berkeley, *Review of International Studies*, 35, p. 24-25)JM

By lowering America’s politico-military profile in the region, an offshore balancing strategy would contribute importantly to lowering the terrorist threat to the US. As Robert Pape argues, offshore balancing ‘is America’s best strategy for the Persian Gulf’ because the ‘mere presence of tens of thousands of US troops in the region is likely to fuel continued fear of foreign occupation that will fuel anti-American terrorism in the future’.54 Similarly, Stephen Walt – who also favours a US offshore balancing strategy in the Middle East – observes, ‘The US does have important interests in the Middle East – including access to oil and the need to combat terrorism – but neither objective is well served by occupying the region with its own military forces’.55 The Bush administration’s policy of maintaining a dominating American military presence in the Persian Gulf and overthrowing nasty Middle Eastern regimes increased the terrorist threat to the US instead of reducing it. If the new administration wants to reduce US vulnerability, the best way to do so is to adopt an offshore balancing strategy and fight terrorists discreetly with good intelligence (including collaboration with US allies), covert operations, and by strengthening America’s homeland defences. In the Middle East, the pursuit of geopolitical and ideological dominance ‘over there’ has increased the terrorist threat over here. As Americans come to realise that the strategy of primacy makes the US less secure, they are becoming more receptive to the arguments for an offshore balancing strategy. Indeed, there are signs that Americans already accept offshore balancing’s key premises. For example, a recent public opinion survey by the Pew Charitable Trust found that ‘by a 45 per cent to 32 per cent margin, more Americans believe that the best way to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks on the US is to decrease, not increase, America’s military presence overseas’. This is a striking turnabout from summer 2002, when 48 per cent of those surveyed believed that the best defense against terrorism was to increase US military involvement abroad. The same Pew survey also found that: ‘An increasing number of Americans see nonmilitary approaches – such as decreasing US dependence on Middle East oil and avoiding involvement with the problems of other countries’ as effective strategies for reducing the terrorist threat to the US.56 The Pew survey’s results suggest that, unlike primacists, the American people are drawing the correct grand strategic lessons from the Iraq debacle. One huge disaster is enough – more than enough – for any grand strategy. And if the US continues to pursue a strategy of primacy, the strategic setbacks will not end with Iraq. A military collision between the US and Iran is still a possibility. And, outside of the Middle East, primacy means that the US is headed for a train wreck with China.57 It is time to begin a long overdue debate on future US strategy after Iraq. As this debate gathers steam, it will become apparent that a neorealist strategy of offshore balancing is the best candidate to become America’s next grand strategy – both in the Middle East, and globally.

Offshore Balancing Good – Hegemony

Offshore balancing retains hegemonic flexibility but avoids its negative aspects.

Walt 5 (Stephen, prof of international relations @ Harvard U, February/March, [http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.php] AD: 7/8/10)JM

The final option is offshore balancing, which has been America’s traditional grand strategy. In this strategy, the United States deploys its power abroad only when there are direct threats to vital American interests. Offshore balancing assumes that only a few areas of the globe are of strategic importance to the United States (that is, worth fighting and dying for). Specifically, the vital areas are the regions where there are substantial concentrations of power and wealth or critical natural resources: Europe, industrialized Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Offshore balancing further recognizes that the United States does not need to control these areas directly; it merely needs to ensure that they do not fall under the control of a hostile great power and especially not under the control of a so-called peer competitor. To prevent rival great powers from doing this, offshore balancing prefers to rely primarily on local actors to uphold the regional balance of power. Under this strategy, the United States would intervene with its own forces only when regional powers are unable to uphold the balance of power on their own. Most importantly, offshore balancing is not isolationist. The United States would still be actively engaged around the world, through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the WTO and through close ties with specific regional allies. But it would no longer keep large numbers of troops overseas solely for the purpose of “maintaining stability,” and it would not try to use American military power to impose democracy on other countries or disarm potential proliferators. Offshore balancing does not preclude using power for humanitarian ends—to halt or prevent genocide or mass murder—but the United States would do so only when it was confident it could prevent these horrors at an acceptable cost. (By limiting military commitments overseas, however, an offshore-balancing strategy would make it easier for the United States to intervene in cases of mass murder or genocide.) The United States would still be prepared to use force when it was directly threatened—as it was when the Taliban allowed al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan—and would be prepared to help other governments deal with terrorists that also threaten the United States. Over time, a strategy of offshore balancing would make it less likely that the United States would face the hatred of radicals like bin Laden, and would thus make it less likely that the United States would have to intervene in far-flung places where it is not welcome. Offshore balancing is the ideal grand strategy for an era of American primacy. It husbands the power upon which this primacy rests and minimizes the fear that this power provokes. By setting clear priorities and emphasizing reliance on regional allies, it reduces the danger of being drawn into unnecessary conflicts and encourages other states to do more for us. Equally important, it takes advantage of America’s favorable geopolitical position and exploits the tendency for regional powers to worry more about each other than about the United States. But it is not a passive strategy and does not preclude using the full range of America’s power to advance its core interests.

Offshore Balancing Good – Inevitable

Offshore balancing is inevitable – we will revert back as our alliances fail.

Snyder 2 (Glenn, prof of political science at the U of North Carolina, International Security, 27(1), p. 169)JM

In sum, the two gross variables in Mearsheimer's scheme—deployment of U.S. troops and changes in regional power structures—operate alternately as cause or consequence. The troops are likely to stay if a potential hegemon appears in either region; otherwise they will be withdrawn. But the withdrawal itself may cause changes in regional power structures, largely through the nuclearization of Germany or Japan and their reemergence as great powers. Obviously, a great deal of the causal weight in this logic rests on the deployment of U.S. forces. Mearsheimer seems certain that U.S. troops will come home from Europe before 2020, and only slightly less certain about the troops in Japan and Korea. In support, he cites evidence that the United States and its allies are "drifting apart" (p. 391), and that the allies are losing confidence in the reliability of the United States. Moreover, no potential hegemon is likely to arise in the near future, and even if one did appear, it would be containable by local powers. Hence the U.S. troops are likely to be brought home. The United States will revert to its traditional policy of offshore balancing—delaying intervention in Eurasian wars until absolutely necessary to restore a balance, thus minimizing war costs and being in position to dominate postwar arrangements.

Offshore Balancing Good – Israel/Palestine

Military presence makes Israel look like our proxy – this fuels terrorism.

Layne 9 (Christopher, Ph.D in Political Science @ U of California at Berkeley, *Review of International Studies*, 35, p. 23-24)JM

As an offshore balancer, the US would also seek to reduce the wide-spread anti-Americanism in the Islamic world by taking an even-handed stance on relations between Israel and Palestine. The US should support the creation of a viable Palestinian state, demand the removal of all Israeli settlements from the West Bank, and push for an international solution to the special problem of East Jerusalem. The US has a moral commitment to Israel’s existence that it must honour. At the same time, however, in its own interests, and as a good ally, Washington has an obligation to warn Jerusalem against pursuing self-defeating policies. The Bush administration’s decision to ‘tilt’ toward Israel – announced by President George W. Bush in early 2001 – serves neither US nor Israeli interests. The US has forfeited its position as an honest broker that can help negotiate a resolution of Israel’s conflicts with the Palestinians and Syria. By the same token, it does not benefit Israel to be perceived in the region as the proxy of the US. And, of course, for the US, the widespread perception in the Islamic world that it is indifferent to the fate of the Palestinians helps fuel the anti-American animus of radical Islamic groups like Al-Qaeda.

Offshore Balancing Good – Iranian Nuclearization

Offshore balancing solves nuclear proliferation and an Iran/U.S. nuclear exchange.

Layne 6 (Christopher, Ph.D in Political Science @ U of California at Berkeley, April 10, [http://www.amconmag.com/article/2006/apr/10/00007/] AD: 7/7/10)JM

For the same reason, Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons will not invest Tehran with options to attack or intimidate its neighbors. Just as it did during the Cold War, the U.S. can extend its own deterrence umbrella to protect its clients in the region like Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Turkey. American security guarantees will not only dissuade Iran from acting recklessly but also restrain proliferation by negating the incentives for states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to build their own nuclear weapons. Given the overwhelming U.S. advantage in both nuclear and conventional military capabilities, Iran is not going to risk national suicide by challenging America’s security commitments in the region. In this sense, dealing with the Iranian “nuclear threat” is actually one of the easier strategic challenges the United States faces. It is a threat that can be handled by an offshore balancing strategy that relies on missile, air, and naval power well away from the volatile Persian Gulf, thus reducing the American poltico-military footprint in the region. In short, while a nuclear-armed Iran is hardly desirable, neither is it “intolerable,” because it could be contained and deterred successfully by the United States.

Offshore balancing solves Iranian nuclearization – it gets rid of their incentive.

Mearsheimer 8 (John, prof of international relations @ the U of Chicago, November 29, [http://www.newsweek.com/2008/11/28/middle-east-know-the-limits-of-u-s-power.html] AD: 7/8/10)JM

Third, offshore balancing would reduce fears in Iran and Syria that the United States aims to attack them and remove their regimes—a key reason these states are currently seeking weapons of mass destruction. Persuading Tehran to abandon its nuclear program will require Washington to address Iran's legitimate security concerns and to refrain from overt threats.

Offshore Balancing Good – Iran Nuclearization – No Impact

No Iranian nuclear first strike.

Lind 7 (Michael, dir of New America's Economic Growth Program, May/June, [http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond\_american\_hegemony\_5381] AD: 7/8/10)JM

If Iran were to obtain nuclear weapons, its purpose almost certainly would be defensive -- to deter the United States, Israel or any other state from attacking it. The American public would not support a preventive war against Iran on the lunatic theory that it would cheaper to attack Iran before it gets nuclear weapons than to attack Iran after it gets them. Therefore, neoconservative hawks seek to persuade the public that Iran, like North Korea, might either bombard Kansas or give nuclear weapons to Islamist terrorists, or that Iran’s viciously anti-Semitic leadership might use nuclear weapons against Israel. (Annihilating Israeli Arabs and Palestinians alongside Israeli Jews would seem to be an odd way to promote the Palestinian cause -- but then, Iran’s leaders, like the leaders of any country that opposes the United States, are said to be "insane.")

Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East

Through military withdrawal, offshore balancing solves terrorism, Middle East instability, and U.S-Iran relations.

Layne 9 (Christopher, Ph.D in Political Science @ U of California at Berkeley, *Review of International Studies*, 35, p. 12-13)JM

The US has reached a watershed in Iraq and the Middle East. Washington needs to revamp its overall regional grand strategy because the current strategy is in shambles. Although the security situation in Iraq has improved since late 2006, the nation remains extremely fragile politically and its future is problematic. On the other hand, things are unravelling in Afghanistan, where the insurgency led by the revitalised Taliban is spreading. The US and Iran remain on a collision course over Tehran’s nuclear weapons programme – and its larger regional ambitions. Moreover, the summer 2006 fighting in Lebanon weakened US Middle Eastern policy in four ways. First, it enhanced Iran’s regional clout. Second, it intensified anti-American public opinion in the Middle East. Third, it fuelled a populist Islamic groundswell in the region that threatens to undermine America’s key Middle East allies: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Fourth, American policy in the Middle East has increased the terrorist threat to the US. The Bush administration’s Middle East policy was a classic example of an anti-wedge ‘strategy’. Rather than preventing the coalescence of forces hostile to the US, or deflecting their attention from the US, the Bush strategy has had the effect of unifying diverse groups against American interests. Instead of viewing them as discrete conflicts, the Bush administration regarded the conflict in Iraq, the ‘war on terror’, unrest in Gaza and the West Bank, turmoil in Lebanon, and the confrontation with Iran as part of a single enterprise. This tendency to aggregate opponents rather than to peel them off was first evidenced in January 2002 when President Bush linked Iran and Iraq – and North Korea – as part of an ‘axis of evil’. Similarly, although Syria and Iran long have had an ambivalent relationship, the administration grouped them together rather than trying to split them apart. Bush also lumped together Sunni Islamic radical groups like Al-Qaeda and Hamas and Shiite fundamentalists like Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Iraq, the Iranian regime, and Hezbollah – and regarded them as a single, unitary menace. As Bush put it, ‘The Shia and Sunni extremists are different faces of the same totalitarian threat. Whatever slogans they chant, when they slaughter the innocent they have the same wicked purposes. They want to kill Americans, kill democracy in the Middle East, and gain the weapons to kill on an even more horrific scale.’15 Bush’s comments manifested a vast ignorance of the cleavages in the Islamic world. Even worse, his policy of treating Sunni and Shiite radicals as a single threat may have acted as a self-fulfilling prophecy – a ‘glue strategy’ – that instead of dividing or neutralising opponents of the US, unified them and created threats that either would not otherwise exist, or would be much less potent. In the Middle East, an offshore balancing strategy would break sharply with the Bush administration’s approach to the Middle East. As an offshore balancer, the US would redefine its regional interests, reduce its military role, and adopt a new regional diplomatic posture. It would seek to dampen the terrorist threat by removing the on-the ground US military presence in the region, and to quell rampant anti- Americanism in the Islamic world by pushing hard for a resolution of the Israeli/ Palestinian conflict. The strategy would also avoid further destabilisation of the Middle East by abandoning the project of regional democratic transformation. Finally, as an offshore balancer, Washington would seek a diplomatic accommodation of its differences with Iran.

Offshore Balancing Good – Multipolarity Coming

Multipolarity is coming now and offshore balancing can make the transition stable.

Hadar 7/9 (Leon, Ph.D. in international relations from American U, [http://www.worldbulletin.net/news\_detail.php?id=61140] AD: 7/9/10)JM

In fact, notwithstanding McCain's neo-Cold War rhetoric, the U.S. government has lacked either the power or the will to use military power to help Georgia recover Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a geo-strategic reality recognized even by President Bush, who ended-up putting the efforts to bring Georgia (and Ukraine) into NATO on hold. Overextended militarily in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, and trying to re-adjust to the post-financial-meltdown erosion in its global economic power, the American people and their representatives are not in a mood to engage in a diplomatic and military confrontation with Russia over its territorial dispute with Georgia, an issue that has no major effect on core U.S. national interests. Moreover, 8 the context of the evolving international system under which America is gradually losing its post-Cold War unipolar status, trying to reset U.S. relationship with Russia as part of an overall policy to improve ties with other rising global players, like China, India, Brazil and Turkey makes a lot of sense. This is a cost-effective strategy that could help Washington win support from Russia for policies that actually strengthen U.S. national security and economic interests. At the same time, the fact that Georgia is also improving its ties with Iran and Turkey -- and Russia -- should not be considered a "loss" for Washington. By establishing close economic ties with Iran and Turkey, Georgia is helping facilitate economic cooperation in the region that could lead to diplomatic collaboration and provide for more stability in the Caucasus and the Middle East. Why should Washington be opposed to such a process that brings more economic prosperity and secure a regional stable balance of power? Georgia may or may not regain control of its lost territories, not unlike, say, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, etc., who seemed to have been able to cope with their territorial contraction. But the U.S. does not have the strategic interest or the moral obligation to change the new status quo, or for that matter, to invite Georgia to join NATO -- remind me again why that organization still exists? -- and commit American military power to provide that country with what would amount to disincentives for improving its relations with its close neighbors. In a way, the collapse of the American-controlled unipolar system -- and before that, the end of the bipolar system of the Cold War -- should help us recognize that international relations have ceased to be a zero-sum-game under which gains of other global powers become by definition a loss for America, and vice versa. It was inevitable that former members of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc like Ukraine, Poland, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia will try to stabilize their diplomatic and economic ties with Russia, while at the same time deterring powerful Russia by expanding cooperation with other players: Poland with Ukraine with Germany; Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia with Turkey and Iran, and all of these countries with the U.S and the European Union (EU). Similarly, Washington should welcome -- not discourage -- the growing diplomatic and economic role that Turkey is playing in the Middle East, which could help bring stability to Iraq (and allow for American military to start withdrawing from there), moderate the policies of Iran (and prevent a military conflict with the U.S.), encourage negotiations between Israel and Syria, and lead eventually to the creation of a more stable Middle East where Turkey, Iran, the Arabs states and Israel will be more secure and prosperous. It is not surprising those representatives of economic and bureaucratic interests in Washington, and some of America's client states that draw benefits from American interventionist policy, operate under the axiom that the U.S. should always be prepared to "do something" to "resolve" this or that conflict, here, there, and everywhere. That kind of never-ending American interventionism only discourages regional powers, counting on Washington to come to their aid, from actually taking steps to resolve those conflicts that end-up drawing-in other regional and global players, ensuring that America will never leave Japan and Korea (to help contain China), Iraq (to deter Iran), Afghanistan (to deal with Pakistan). And that is exactly what the pro-interventionists in Washington want when they suggested that America is the "indispensable power." In any case, the notion that American hegemony is a precondition for global peace and security and that Washington needs therefore to extend its military commitments in Europe, the Middle East, Caucus, East Asia and elsewhere is not very practical -- America does not have the resources in order to play that ambitious role -- and is not very helpful, considering the most recent U.S. experience in the Middle East. The U.S. should not retreat from the world. But by embracing a policy of "constructive disengagement" from some parts of the world, America could help itself and the rest of the world.

Offshore Balancing Good – Oil Hegemon

Military presence fails – offshore balancing stops oil shocks and empirically leads to Middle East stability.

Layne 9 (Christopher, Ph.D in Political Science @ U of California at Berkeley, *Review of International Studies*, 35, p. 13-15)JM

Advocates of both primacy, and of offshore balancing, agree that – under present conditions – the US has important interests in the Gulf that must be supported by American military power. However, they disagree on two key questions. First, how deeply does the US need be involved militarily and politically in the Gulf? Second, what is the likelihood of an oil stoppage severe enough to damage the US, and global, economies seriously? There are two main threats to US oil interests. First, there is the danger of a single power in the Gulf region consolidating its control over the majority of the world’s oil reserves. The fear that Iraq would control both Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian oil reserves, as well as its own, was the nightmare scenario invoked by US policymakers as one of the rationales for the 1991 Persian Gulf War. An ‘oil hegemon’ in the Gulf would be in a position to raise oil prices, and use oil as an instrument of political coercion. Yet, while the US does have an interest in preventing the emergence of a Persian Gulf oil hegemon, the risk of such a development is low, because the three largest states in the Gulf – Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran – lack the military capabilities to conquer each other. This was true even before the 1990–91 Gulf War, or the March 2003 Iraq War. Thus, when Iraq went to war with Iran in September 1980, the conflict ended in a prolonged, bloody stalemate. Similarly, from the end of the Gulf War in 1991 until the US invasion in March 2003, Iraq posed no military threat to Saudi Arabia (or Iran). On the other side of the coin, because of its overwhelming military capabilities compared to the big three Gulf powers, the US easily could deter any of them from launching a war of conquest. In 1990, for example, the US was able to dissuade Saddam Hussein from using Kuwait as a platform for conquering Saudi Arabia by inserting airpower, and a limited number of ground forces (as a tripwire) into Saudi Arabia, and by imposing an economic embargo on Iraq.16 This policy of containment, and deterrence worked in 1990 – and still was working in March 2003.17 To make sure no Gulf oil hegemon emerges in the future, Washington should make it clear that it would respond militarily to prevent a single power from gaining control over a majority of the region’s oil capacity. However, a deterrence strategy does not require an on-the-ground American military presence in the region, because the US today (in contrast to 1990), can back-up its deterrent threat with long-range airpower, and sea-based cruise missiles.18 Domestic instability in a major oil producing state is another threat to US interests in the Gulf. In the form of civil unrest, instability could temporarily reduce the flow of oil from an affected country, and drive up prices. However, because the oil industry is globally integrated, other oil producers would increase their own production to make-up for the lost capacity. Thus, any spike in oil prices would be temporary, and lost supplies would be replenished by other producers. In fact, past experience shows that this is precisely what happens when internal instability in an oil producing state causes a temporary disruption in oil supplies.19 Instability in any of the Gulf oil producers, of course, could bring a hostile regime to power. Here, there are two things to keep in mind. First, it is unlikely that US military intervention could forestall such an event. Indeed, it could make things even worse. Second, the economic consequences of such an event are exaggerated. In an integrated, global oil market it is immaterial whether a hostile regime would sell oil directly to the US. Because oil is fungible, all that matters is that such a regime makes its oil available to the market. The chances of an hostile regime self embargoing its oil are very low. The reason is simple: all the major oil producers in the Gulf are economically dependent on their oil revenues. Even if a hostile regime in the Gulf wanted to embargo oil shipments to the US or the West, it could not long do so without shooting itself in the foot economically. Moreover, if a hostile regime chose to behave in an economically irrational fashion by sacrificing income to achieve political or economic objectives, markets would adjust. Higher oil prices caused by an embargo would lead oil consuming states like the US both to switch to alternative energy sources, use energy more efficiently, and also provide an incentive for other oil producing states to increase the supply of oil in the market. Simply put, in relatively short order the supply/demand equilibrium would return to the marketplace, and oil prices would return to their natural marketplace level. There is a wild card, however: Saudi Arabia, which is the world’s largest oil producer, and also has the largest proven oil reserves. If, in the future, a hostile Saudi regime imposed an embargo, or cut back drastically on production, it would be difficult for the market to adjust because other oil producers do not have the capacity to replace lost Saudi Arabian oil. A major long-term interruption of oil exports from Saudi Arabia would cause real economic damage to the US and the other industrialised nations (although, over time, it would cause the US and the other industrialised nations to develop alternate energy sources that now are untapped because they cost more than oil). Given the political unrest percolating just below the surface in Saudi Arabia, it is a good bet that in coming years, the Saud Monarchy will lose its grip on power. However, America’s forward military presence in the Gulf does not offer a real solution to the possibility of a hostile regime coming to power in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the US military presence in the region serves to make things worse rather than better in this regard, because it is a lightening-rod for Islamic fundamentalists like Osama bin-Laden and Al-Qaeda. The American invasion of Iraq, and subsequent occupation, have exacerbated the problem. Access to oil is an important US interest, and in some respects American military power plays an important role in keeping the oil flowing from the Gulf. But there is no need for an on-the-ground American military presence in the Gulf and Middle East. Over-the-horizon deterrence can prevent the emergence of Gulf oil hegemon without triggering the kind of anti-American backlash that can occur when US forces visibly are present in the region.20 Similarly, although its closure is a low-probability event, the US has an important interest in making sure the Strait of Hormuz remains open. But this is a task that can be accomplished by American naval power. <CONTINUED>

Offshore Balancing Good – Oil Hegemon

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Finally, domestic instability in the Gulf oil producing states is a risk – especially in Saudi Arabia. However, as Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice recently acknowledged, the Gulf – and Middle East – are going to be unstable regardless of what the US does.21 Certainly, US military power, and America’s heavy-handed political influence, are not an antidote to domestic instability in the region. On the contrary, they contribute to it. This suggests that the wisest policies for the US are to reduce its footprint in the Gulf and Middle East, and formulate a viable long-term energy strategy that minimises its vulnerability to the vicissitudes of that endemically turbulent region.22

Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism

Offshore balancing would solve the Middle East terrorism.

Layne 9 (Christopher, Ph.D in Political Science @ U of California at Berkeley, *Review of International Studies*, 35, p. 17-18)JM

President George W. Bush repeatedly characterised Iraq as the ‘central front’ in the so-called war on terrorism, and argued that ‘if we fail there [Iraq], the enemy will follow us here’.26 In his view, the conflict in Iraq ‘is not civil war; it is pure evil’. Claiming that ‘we have an obligation to protect ourselves from that evil’, Bush said US policy in Iraq boiled down to one thing: ‘We’re after Al-Qaeda’.27 The administration’s claims, however, were disingenuous: American withdrawal from Iraq would not increase the terrorist threat to the American homeland. First, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has only tenuous links to Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organisation. Second, AQI has an extremely ambivalent relationship with the indigenous Sunni insurgents. The Sunni insurgents resent AQI because it uses foreign jihadists to conduct suicide bombings, and because it indiscriminately attacks civilian targets. To the extent AQI and the other Sunni insurgents groups collaborate, it is their common hostility to the American occupation that binds them. If US troops were to withdraw, it is likely that the other Sunni insurgents would try to drive AQI out of Iraq (while also contesting the Shiites for political supremacy). Indeed, the major reason violence in Iraq has subsided since late 2006 is not because of the ‘surge’ of US combat forces, but rather because large segments of the Sunni population (including former insurgents) turned against AQI.

Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism

U.S military presence exacerbates terrorism – there was no Al-Qaeda in Iraq before the invasion.

Layne 9 (Christopher, Ph.D in Political Science @ U of California at Berkeley, *Review of International Studies*, 35, p. 20-22)JM

Organisations like Al-Qaeda may be non-state actors, but their actions are of a kind frequently found in international politics: the use of violence against a state(s) to attain clearly defined political objectives. Indeed the use of violence for such purposes is the hallmark of terrorism. As Bruce Hoffman says, terrorism is ‘about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change’.38 Terrorism, moreover, is fundamentally an asymmetric form of conflict, because it is an instrument that the weak use against the strong. From this perspective, the 9/11 assault on the US was not a random, senseless, ‘irrational’ act of violence. In fact, the 9/11 attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the US by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. As German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz himself observed, ‘War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object’.40 Here, President Bush’s endlessly reiterated claim that the US was attacked because Islamic radicals ‘hate us because of our freedom’ betrayed a complete misunderstanding of the dynamics that underpin the clash between the US and Middle Eastern terrorists. For sure, there are Islamic radicals who, indeed, do hate the US for cultural, religious, and ideological reasons. But that is not why the US is a target for Islamic terrorists. 9/11 represented a violent counterreaction to America’s policies in the Middle East – especially its drive to dominate the region both geopolitically and culturally. As Michael Schuerer – who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda – says, it is dangerous for the US to base its strategy for combating terrorism on the belief ‘that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think rather than for what we do’.41 In a similar vein, Richard K. Betts observed following the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center that, ‘It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the US had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the Shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam’.42 It is the US’ attempt to impose its primacy and preferences on the Middle East that fuels groups like Al-Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamentalism. Terrorism is a form of ‘blowback’ against America’s preponderant role in international affairs. Despicable and brutal though it was, the 9/11 attack was undertaken with cool calculation to achieve well-defined geopolitical objectives. Underscoring this point, Scheurer observes that, ‘In the context of ideas bin Laden shares with his brethren, the military actions of Al-Qaeda and its allies are acts of war, not terrorism . . . meant to advance bin Laden’s clear, focused, limited, and widely popular foreign policy goals . . .’.43 Specifically, Al-Qaeda wants to compel the US to remove its military presence from the Persian Gulf, and force Washington to alter its stance on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.44 Al-Qaeda’s leaders also apparently hoped that the September 11 attacks would provoke a US overreaction, and thereby trigger an upsurge of popular discontent in the Islamic world that would lead to the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and other pro-American regimes in the Middle East (Egypt, Pakistan, and Jordan, for example) and their replacement by fundamentalist Islamic governments.45 In other words, Al-Qaeda seeks to undermine US primacy, and thereby compel changes in America’s Middle Eastern grand strategy. The US presence on the ground in the Middle East also incites terrorists to attack American interests. In his study of suicide terrorist groups, Pape has found that ‘what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland’.46 Al-Qaeda fits this pattern, and one of its principal objectives ‘is the expulsion of American troops from the Persian Gulf and the reduction of Washington’s power in the region’.47 Here, the Bush administration’s inflexible determination to maintain a long-term American military presence in Iraq is exactly the wrong policy to reduce terrorism.

Military presence paints a target on our back for terrorists – offshore balancing solves.

Layne 9 (Christopher, Ph.D in Political Science @ U of California at Berkeley, *Review of International Studies*, 35, p. 23)JM

Instead of reducing American vulnerability to terrorism, the presence of US troops in Iraq and the Middle East increases it by reinforcing the widespread perception in the Islamic world that the US is pursuing a neo-colonial policy in the Middle East in furtherance of its own imperial ambitions. The huge US politico-military footprint in the Middle East region – including Iraq – is, along with America’s policy on the Israel/Palestinian issue, the primary driver of Middle Eastern terrorism. The administration’s overall policy in the Middle East has inflamed anti-American sentiment, and turned the entire region into a source of recruits for various radical terrorist groups. Instead of solving this problem, staying in Iraq will exacerbate it.

Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism Impacts

Terrorism leads to extinction.

Sid-Ahmed 4 (Mohamed, political analyst for the 'Al-Ahram' newspaper, 26 August, [http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm] AD:6/23/10)JM

A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

Offshore Balancing Good – Wedge Strategy

Offshore balancing prevents great power wars and conflict.

Layne 9 (Christopher, Ph.D in Political Science @ U of California at Berkeley, *Review of International Studies*, 35, p. 10-11)JM

Heretofore, proponents of offshore balancing have seen the strategy primarily as a means of shifting the costs and risks of opposing rising Eurasian, or regional, hegemons from the US to other states. Offshore balancing seeks to capitalise on the inherent strategic advantages that insular great powers possess. First, they can rely on regional power balances to contain rising powers.8 Second, if it should become necessary for them to become involved, because they are protected by geography and their own military capabilities they can stand on the sidelines and wait for the most opportune moment to decide when, and on which side, to intervene. Moreover, by taking advantage of the freedom of action that allows them to enter conflicts later rather than sooner, they can extract the maximum concessions from their alliance partners as their price for entering a conflict. However, beyond these traditional advantages of insularity, offshore balancing does – or can – have a wedge strategy dimension. Wedge strategies are the grand strategic equivalent of what the great baseball executive Branch Rickey called ‘addition by subtraction’. A Timothy W. Crawford has pointed out, when discussing power relations among great powers, most security studies scholars focus on ‘addition’. Hence, they pay great attention to balancing behaviour – both internal and external – as a means by which great powers seek to increase their relative power. However, although often neglected, wedge strategies are way of accomplishing the same objective – increasing the state’s relative power – by a very different means: by subtracting potential opponents from the ranks of its adversaries.9 That is, wedge strategies are ‘a policy to increase a state’s relative power over external threats, by preventing the grouping or causing the dispersal of threatening alliances’.10 Great powers can improve their relative power position not only by forming coalitions and/or building up their own military capabilities, but also by preventing other states that might be inclined to align against them from doing so, or by persuading an actual or potential ally of an adversary to drop out of the alliance and assume a posture of neutrality.11 Another aspect of wedge strategies is that they can, if used successfully, prevent others from taking balancing actions directed at the state. While not generally conceived of as a wedge strategy, offshore balancing is a way that an insular great power can neutralise threats to its security. By acting as an offshore balancer, an insular great power can accomplish two vital grand strategic tasks. First, because its would-be adversaries invariably live in dangerous neighbourhoods, by truly being ‘offshore’ and non-threatening, an insular great power can deflect the focus of other states’ security policies away from itself. Simply put, if an offshore power stands on the sidelines, other great powers will compete against each other, not against it. It can thus enhance its security simply because the dynamics of balance-of-power politics invariably will draw would-be competitors in other regions into rivalries with each other. The fact that non-insular states must worry constantly about possible threats from nearby neighbours is a factor that historically has worked to increase the relative power position of insular states. Thus, as Paul Kennedy notes, after 1815 a major reason that Britain’s interests were not challenged by an overwhelming coalition was due to ‘the preoccupation of virtually all European statesman with continental power politics’ because it ‘was the moves of their neighbors, not the usually discreet workings of British sea power, which interested them’.12

Offshore Balancing Good – AT: New Hegemon Rises

Offshore balancing still allows curbing rising hegemons

Fouskas and Gokay 8 (Vassilis, prof of International Relations at the U of Piraeus, and Bulent, Senior Lecturer at Keele U, July 1, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 19(3), p. 112-113)JM

In order to do the above in the domestic sphere, the United States must reshape its grand strategy accordingly. Christopher Layne, in his latest contribution, The Peace of Illusions, argues in favor of a new US strategy based on “off-shore balancing.”12 So do John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt in their various contributions. It is not a bad idea. China, Europe, and Russia can be balanced by the “American Colossus” — the phrase belongs to Niall Ferguson — who, after all, needs time to recover from the global management of the world from 1941 to 2001. Balance Russia and China from the Pacific and Europe and Africa from the Atlantic and intervene only if or when a regional hegemon tends to rise, a hegemon who is threatening national security interests. This is not a return to isolationism, but a new challenge for managing the complexities of a multicentric and polyarchic world in the making. Washington can no longer act as the governing center of global capitalism, as Paul Nitze’s famous National Security Council – 68 document envisaged back in 1950. The famous hub-and-spoke system of US global governance built in the 1940s and 1950s is in tatters, and the country should stop going to war in order to restore it; it is counterproductive and dangerous. Instead, the United States needs to substantiate an offshore balancing strategy by way of launching a new dialogue with the other major global centers: Europe, China and Southeast Asia, and Bolivarian Latin America.

U.S forward presence is unnecessary.

Posen 7 (Barry, prof of Political Science at MIT, November - December, [http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=331] AD: 7/8/10)JM

We can well afford to think this way because extant threats to the United States are not threats to U.S. sovereignty. The country is in no danger of conquest or intimidation from those more powerful. U.S. territorial integrity is secure. The power position of the United States is excellent; any power position that allows a country to even think about running the world ought to provide ample capability for defense. Protecting this power position is an important goal, but direct action is the wrong way to go about it. If regional powers grow strong enough to threaten their neighbors—and perhaps ultimately threaten the United States—local actors will wish to balance that power. The United States should preserve an ability to help out if necessary, but it should be stingy in this regard. Others should get organized and dig into their own pockets before the United States shows up to help. U.S. command of the sea, air and space enables such assistance, but, coupled with a favorable geographic position, it also permits the United States to wait. This capability should cast a stabilizing shadow in any case.