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**U.S. military bases in Okinawa operate under racialized and gendered norms**

**Ginoza 5** [Ayano, Professor of American/Women's studies @ Washington State University, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/0/4/0/7/1/pages40718/p40718-1.php, September, The American Village as a Space of Militarism and Tourism: U.S. Militarism, Gender Hierarchy, Class, and Race in Okinawa]

Thirty-three years after the official end of U.S. military colonization of Okinawa, thirty-eight U.S. military facilities remain and occupy 13% of the island. Memories of the Battle of Okinawa during WWII seem to have faded from the Okinawan people’s mind and, in turn, the landscape and powerful and popular cultural images of “America” have replaced the Okinawan natural and social landscape. With Seaport Park in San Diego (a U.S. military town) as a model, the American Village was built in 1992 on the central part of the island, Chatan Town, where 54% of the town is used for U.S. military facilities. Due to the course of U.S. militarization of Okinawa and the recent boom of the U.S. as a popular cultural edge, this miniaturized American space has been naturally incorporated into Okinawan landscape and enjoyed by the younger generation of Okinawans, tourists from mainland Japan, and U.S. GIs from nearby bases. In this essay, I will demonstrate that the cultural and natural landscape of the American Village is militarized by the nearby U.S. military bases, and the ways in which the American Village socio-politically subjugates Okinawan women. In an attempt to uncover the naturalized invisible power structures and the functionality of the invisible, this essay examines the ways in which the landscape of the 1 My understanding of landscape comes from Rebecca Solnit’s definition that landscape is not just “scenery,” but “the spaces and systems we inhabit, a system our own live depend upon” (47). Thus, I use landscape to indicate a space of direct political and cultural influence that constitutes our ideology. In this paper, I use italicized America or American to add a culturally constructed fantasized connotation to it. According to Enloe (2004), the loaded adjective natural is not self-consciously created. Instead, it keeps people uncurious about somebody’s political purpose or political power structure. Tourism is the most successful business next to the revenue generated from the U.S. military bases in contemporary Okinawa after the end of the formal U.S. military occupation in 1972. The index of Okinawan tourism for 2003 shows that 98% of 5,080,000 tourists in the year were from mainland Japan. The state’s financial dependency on tourism marked the highest amount of 16.1% in 2001, next to the revenue outside the prefecture (56.1%), and followed by the Base revenues (8.0%) (Tourism Survey by Okinawan Prefectural Government 2004). Among the Japanese tourists, 41.3% are in their twenties and thirties and 25% are under twenty. This statistic shows that the Okinawan tourism economy is highly dependent on those younger populations of Japanese and Okinawans. American Village is gendered, classed, and raced. By discussing media (mostly web sites 5 ) representation of the American Village, I will analyze the exploitation of the landscape from both Japanese and U.S. perspectives. This attempt also explicates the landscape as a reaffirmation of bilateral neocolonialism of Japan and the U.S. in Okinawa. However, this notion of neocolonialism disguised through popular media culture as natural, ignores any inheritance of the power structure of U.S. militarism as problematic, and blames the increasing number of sexual assaults against local women by U.S. GIs on the women themselves in the American Village as if there is no investigation necessary. Further, in order to garner a better understanding of the complexities of the gendered landscape and militarization of the space, I will examine a rape case that happened in the American Village in 2001. The Mihama Town Resort American Village’s theme is America, and it entertains 8.3 million people annually. The American Village was built “at the sites of the former [U.S. military’s] Hamby airfield and Maymosscolor firing range…after they were demolished and returned” to the town (Mihama Town Resort: American Village 7). The booklet Mihama Town Resort American Village (2003) states: “The objective for the American Village is to create a new Okinawan sightseeing area for Prefectural residents and tourists alike that is a distinctive town resort unlike any other in Okinawa” (13). Therefore, the theme of the American Village is to construct a space independent from the rest of the Okinawan environment. Choichi Hentona, the mayor, states that the American Village’s “pleasant…natural setting combines the fragrance of the sea and the attractiveness of the seashore, and the 5 Japanese internet diffusion rate in 2003 is 60.6%, 90% of which are the ages between thirteen and thirty- nine. most beautiful sunsets in Japan can be enjoyed here. This [Okinawan] natural setting is perfectly harmonized with the American-style buildings” (Mihama Town Resort American Village 7). This statement implies that, in the space of the American Village, signifiers of indigenous nature constitute only the background scenery. This incorporation of Okinawan nature into their commercial purposes disassociates homes and culture Okinawans inhabit. The commercialized landscape of the American Village produces a utilitarian notion of nature rather than nature as a part of Okinawans history and cultural practices. William Cronon, an environmental historian, points out that dichotomy of nature (or wilderness) and home disguises nature’s values as “an important vehicle for articulating deep moral values regarding our obligations and responsibilities to the nonhuman world” (87). Therefore, this commercialization of Okinawan nature also shapes how Okinawans interpret their indigenous nature. Very specific use of language in the American Village works to oppress Okinawan indigenous culture. Most of the “American-style buildings” have English names whose “guiding principle is to create an effect that gives the resort an American feel” (Mihama Town Resort American Village 13). This naming of amusement facilities, in particular, is not just for commercial purposes, but has a political effect as well because it means an erasure of Okinawan language to a degree. Thus, this facilitates the colonization of Okinawans’ mind, and leads to an agreement to the dominant ideology and oppressor’s language which has already accelerated decline of native Okinawan language. The landscape picture elucidates the subjugation of Okinawan nature—indigenous such as Mihama Sevenplex +1 (movie theater complex), Makeman Mihama Store, Beverly Palace (women’s apparel), American Depot (American fashion store), Seaside Square (amusement store), America Ya (American goods),

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Dragon Palace (3-D visual attraction), Carnival Park (shopping, amusement, and a Ferris Wheel), Gourmet-kan (Gourmet building), etc. trees, plants, roofing tile, sugar cane fields, etc.—as a background of the landscape of “the American-style buildings.” The American buildings ensure an effective hegemony over Okinawan nature and colonization of the minds of Okinawans. Suzan Davis, who studies the intersection of commercial forces and nature, also explains an impact of corporation constructed nature: “such a spectacular but limited way of seeing nature necessarily displaces or hides other kinds of connections and contacts that need to be made” (216). Even though the American Village occupies a tiny entertainment space on the island, since it has become the hottest space for the younger generation of Okinawans 7 , its images help them shape how they understand the indigenous natural environment. When their attentions are directed to the American buildings, their experience in the village associates culture with America and nature with Okinawa. An Okinawan Prefecture tourist web site, bankoku shinryokan, contextualizes the theme park as an American masculine landscape. This tourist promotion of the American Village submerges the “small tropical island” behind the imagined landscape of America by making U.S. bases both historically and politically invisible: The presence of the U.S. Military has had a great influence on Okinawa’s culture. In the Mihama area of Chatan, you’ll see first hand how this small tropical island developed a portion of its land into an American style village. Mihama has food, clothing, music, and entertainment that mostly resemble American taste. The design and architecture of the sidewalks and buildings will give you the feeling of being in America. If you get hungry, you can savor just about any type of American, Mexican, Chinese, French, and Korean food that you can think of. The American Village entertains about 8.3 million people annually, which is about seven times as the population of Okinawan., and nine tenth of it are Okinawans. See Mihama Town Resort American Village (2004). Grab a Grande size coffee at Starbucks and enjoy live outdoor entertainment by some of Okinawa’s rising young performers. There’s even a Dragon Palace that keeps the children entertained. It offers a 3-D virtual ride, tea cup ride, balloon corner, and a candy store that never ends! Other than the free parking, the best part of Mihama is the 150-foot Ferris Wheel that offers a view of the entire Mihama area. Ride it in the evening to enjoy a beautiful sunset or at night to enjoy the fluorescent lights. This landscape picture of the American Village with the above statement portrays a layer of bilateral power structures which camouflage the intersections of tourism and militarism. Teresia Teaiwa’s neologism “militourism,” is useful in discussing the American Village of the neocolonial landscape. According to Teaiwa, militourism “is a phenomenon by which military or paramilitary force ensures the smooth running of a tourist industry, and that same tourist industry masks the military force behind it” (251). This militourism signifies the Chatan Town’s use of the U.S. military history on Okinawa and describes the militarized and imagined American paradise as a profitable commercial tourist site. In the same web site, the Ferris wheel glares in the night landscape of the American Village as an indication of the power of America, and triumph of Western technology. It’s a sign that tells you that you are in America. In other words, this space provides an escape from the feeling of being in Okinawa, and a place where America is accepted as cultural hegemony over Okinawan indigenous landscape. The message is of America as the center of culture, rather than Okinawa. The rhetoric reveals a state- promoted reaffirmation of U.S. cultural imperialism over Okinawan landscape. Thus, the imperialism systematically operates to transform and redefine the militarized Okinawan society. Also on this web site, the Okinawan government strategically posits the U.S. military as “a great influence” on Okinawan culture, and uses it as a cultural resource for their development of the tourist economy. Thus, for them, the U.S. military bases in the town are politically and economically indispensable. The politically constructed, imagined American landscape and buildings provide tourists with “the feeling of being in America” (bankoku shinryokan). Here, the landscape offers an image of “America” as positive and powerful—powerful enough that this American space nurtures young Okinawans to be famous performers. According to Cynthia Enloe, this is a process of militarization which “managed to slip [the military bases] into the daily lives of the nearby community” to make the military bases “politically invisible” (Bananas 66). This political invisibility of the U.S. military bases further leads young Okinawans to easily associate America with a road to their dreams. The political is camouflaged as cultural and the domination of American culture as both political and economic enterprises. This is hidden behind notions of entertainment and allows Okinawans, especially younger generations of Okinawans, to become part of this entertainment and cultural landscape. By accepting and valuing the military bases as the economic and cultural developers for the American Village, the town at the same time embraces the ideology of militarism and militarizing young Okinawans’ view of America. According to Enloe in The Curious Feminist, the process of militarization is not “automatic,” but it is “a sociopolitical process” which rests on “entrenchment of ideas about ‘manly men’ and ‘real women’” (219). Thus, the militarization 9 is re-encouraged in 8 See 8militarism are given deep the space by privileging American masculinity and feminizing Okinawa. The idea of masculinist America is expressed fully in a landscape picture of night in a website called Another Japan. In the picture, while the colorful and glaring neon of the Ferris Wheels in the night sky symbolizes the power of America, the only signifier of Okinawa—the background subtropical landscape—visually disappears. The neon from the surrounding American buildings also helps romanticize American night life in the American Village as the darkness erases indigenous landscape of the ocean, sunset, and seashore and the rainbow color neon spotlights the landscape of America. At the same time, along with the landscape picture, the web site emphasizes that “the presence of Kadena Air Base” in town “has played a role in developing” the town’s society and culture. This naturalizes American militarism in Okinawa and Okinawa’s economic dependency on militarism and tourism. At night, when the Okinawan landscape disappears and highlights the American landscape, people who gather there take part in interpreting and consuming the power of America. In a larger sense, through tourist promotion, the Okinawan government seems to embrace U.S. colonization of Okinawa in the service of Japanese colonization through promoting Japanese tourism. The imagined American landscape is consumed and recreated by the younger generation of Okinawans, tourists, and GIs from the nearby bases. In this sense, tourism promoted this theme park constitutes appropriate participants demographics. The U.S. military’s web site, Stars and Stripes, 10 promotes the American

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Village as a new kind of R&R. A web site, Okinawa Marine, portrays the American Village as a space which “offers down into the soil of a society—or of a non-governmental organization, a governmental department, an ethnic group, or an international agency” (220). 10 see < http://www.stripes.com/about/aboutstripes.html>. Stars and Stripes is a Department of Defense- authorized daily newspaper distributed overseas for the U.S. military community. [U.S. military] service members a taste of home” where they can still enjoy “exotic Japanese sushi, Thai, Korean and Chinese…shopping, spend[ing] a few bucks and play some games…to spend the occasional weekend.” An issue of Time titled “Mihama Village Serves up Familiar Slice of Home in Okinawa” describes the American Village; “Surrounded by U.S. military bases on the north, east and south, the complex draws many servicemembers and their families and is more aptly referred to as ‘American Village.’” In this issue, “Raymond Rieczorek, a Vietnam veteran who was stationed on Okinawa in 1967” remembers Okinawa and the significant change that has happened since then. Rieczorek states that “Back when I was here [in Mihama area]…Okinawa was just a big R&R stop for Vietnam” (Time). Further he remembers the place consisted of ample bars and brothels outside the base, whereas the American Village now constitutes a healthy and friendly atmosphere. Another article, “Anxiety in the mix as cultures mingle at Okinawa’s American Village,” illustrates the American Village as a “busy scene on Friday nights for young Americans stationed on Okinawa.” Those “U.S. servicemembers with fresh military haircuts and baggy khaki trousers mingle with the young Japanese crowd.” For Okinawan women, the Village at night is “a date place” where GIs and Okinawan women meet. The visual celebration of American popular cultural landscape in the American Village invites Japanese women as the main participants in redefining and sustaining the meaning of the powerful American image. Thus, the view of the American Village is racialized and gendered at the same time. The ideology of racism legitimizes the marginalization of Okinawan indigenous culture by accepting the idea of cultural, economic, and political vulnerability of Okinawa where mass tourism engages in the commercialization of the power structure of Okinawa and America. As a result, many young Okinawans even consider the bases to be important Okinawan cultural and economic developers. Okinawan women who constantly receive those messages often consider GI’s as “romantic,” “like movie stars,” and “exciting,” whereas Japanese men aren’t (Keyso xiv). Moreover, women think that dating GIs elevates the women’s social status, and makes women “ultra-independent” and “independent thinkers” who are capable of freeing themselves from “the [Japanese] social system” (Keyso 109). All these ideas support the GIs’ masculinity, and participate in militarizing the space. The American Village for some Okinawan women is a space which fulfills their desires to raise their social status and class. It is a refuge in which they can escape from the old Japanese social system, while those women unconsciously participate in their own exploitation. In this sense, militourism is an undermining ideology and process of disguising political and cultural imperialism that directly, but most of the times unconsciously, influences Okinawan women’s sexuality. In the American Village, traditional Japanese gender roles seems to be less restrictive due to the absence of the Japanese and Okinawan cultural presence. However, once women are freed and alienated from the Japanese social gender norms in the American Village, their sexuality becomes subjugated to the militarization of GIs. As Teaiwa affirms: “This collaboration between militarism and tourism affects the complex process of displacement and social mobility for Islanders, affecting the physical, mental, and emotional health of island bodies” (252). Thus, the space of the American village negotiates and fluctuates with Japanese women’s social class, gender, and race relations. The carefully designed popular images of an American landscape entice younger GIs and Japanese women in particular. Suzuyo Takazato, a politician and feminist activist against military violence, also points out that, through media, “Japanese young girls” constantly receive images of “U.S. soldiers as friendly foreigners” and “images of movie heroes” which make them “dream of…the opportunity to court U.S. soldiers” (Takazato 263). The imagined American popular landscape exploits that dream and supposedly provides an opportunity to experience that dream. The idealization of the American landscape prevents Okinawan women and tourists from questioning, challenging, and explaining the militarization of Okinawan women’s sexualities. Further, Okinawan women in the American Village who enjoy the access to the American style commodities and entertainment in the space neutralize the tension between Okinawan conflicts with U.S. imperialism and mitigate the restlessness of the Okinawan- U.S. issue. Masahide Ota, the former Okinawan governor and a tireless critic of the U.S. military bases, laments that the younger generation of Okinawan women who “[have] no immediacy” to military violence “freely accept the bases” (148). Both Takazato and Ota lament Okinawan women’s incapability and lack of knowledge about militarization. However, they seem to dismiss the sociopolitical process of naturalizing the militarization of the Okinawan landscape. Most of the time, the militarization process is so naturally constructed in the landscape of Okinawa through media that people, even politicians, easily dismiss the process and end up blaming and lamenting the women’s behaviors. This shows the vulnerability of younger Okinawans who interpret the neocolonization of the space as urbanization. In this space, thus, Okinawan women are the ones most sexually visible and easily seen as a cause of the sexual assaults and militarization of their bodies although they are the ones most impacted and sexually and racially violated. While Okinawan women consume the positive image of America and romanticize the idea of dating GIs, GIs objectify and exploit the women’s sexuality. This often results in sexual abuse and rape of Okinawan women. An article in Time titled “Sex and Race in Okinawa: U.S. Servicemen and Local Women Can Be A Volatile Mix, A Rape Allegation Against An American Casts Harsh Light on The Island’s Race Relations” describes a

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rape case in the American Village. This article illustrates a militarized situation of the American Village with a hypersexualized image of female tourists from mainland Japan as “dream seekers” whose “biggest draws” are “the real live Americans” (August 27, 2001, p39). In the article, the American Village is depicted as “[r]eminders of Uncle Sam abound— America Mart, America Hotel and Club America”: A two-story emporium called American Depot stands in the shadow of a giant Ferris wheel emblazoned with a Coca-Cola logo. Even at traditional matsuri, or summer festivals, children wave cotton candy, shirtless skateboarders do stunts on open walkways and women in shorts and bikini tops lick jewel-colored snow cones. Tourists and dream seekers from the Japanese mainland flock [there]. The biggest draws, especially for Japanese women, are the real live Americans. (39) This not only provides the American journalists’ view of the American Village, but also stereotypes hypersexualized Asian women’s bodies which are available to desire “the real live American” males. The sexual objectification of women’s bodies—“lick[ing] jewel- colored snow cones”—is constructed to justify the rape against Japanese women. At the same time, Americans are on display and commodified as well. According to Lynn Lu, description of Asian women’s bodies by the Western media derives from “the Western (male) popular imagination” which constructed “the exotic mysteries of [Asian women’s] sex” (17). However, a crucial aspect to be noticed here is that in the American Village the young generations of Okinawans are able to perform and dress like younger generations of Americans, and GIs racialize this performance as exotic and sexual. As Enloe points out, popular media “can become the basis for crafting patriarchal and militarized public policies” (The Curious Feminist 228). This “public policy discourse,” she argues, “acknowledges a woman either as silently symbolic or silently victimized” and privileges masculinity (229). Thus, the hypersexualization of women’s bodies is a product of dynamic political and patriarchal ideas which valorize women’s sexuality. The women’s hypersexualized bodies are also racialized in the media. In an interview for the online Time Magazine, a “U.S. Air Force guy” arrogantly generalizes Okinawan women’s attitudes towards GIs: [Okinawan women] come out to bars. They know we’re there. What do you think they’re looking for? I mean, come on, they know what can happen, they’ve heard the stories, too. I mean, they live in Okinawa, and they still keep coming, looking for us. So what does that tell you? So they come in, have a good time, and the guy says, so you want to come home with me, and they say, sure, because that sounds like fun and you know we Americans treat them a helluva lot better than the Japanese guys do, right? (2 July 2001) This demonstrates the ways in which GIs conceive of Okinawan women’s sexuality as compared to “Japanese guys.” Those GIs not only sexualize Okinawan women’s bodies, but at the same time racialize them by generalizing all Okinawan women’s bodies as sexually available to GIs. Moreover, the implication is that GIs masculinize themselves by denigrating Japanese men. This also justifies GIs’ sexual abuse of Okinawan women in the American Village where they consider Okinawan women are GIs’ objects. That is, they are claiming the western masculine centrality against Okinawan women’s bodies. The hypersexualization and racialization of Okinawan women’s bodies by U.S. media and GIs demonstrate the dynamics of sociopolitical processes that militarize Okinawan women’s bodies and naturalize masculinized violence. The rape of a Japanese girl by Sergeant Woodland on June 29, 2001 in the American Village focused the media’s attention on the U.S. military issue in Okinawa. An article in Time on this incident issued a few months later sheds light on the night life in the American Village: On Thursday Night, June 28, the action in Okinawa is on the third floor of a building in a candy-colored open-air mall called the American Village. A pink- and-blue neon sign shows where everyone is going: 3F, a bar and restaurant with a Southeast Asian theme. A couple of hundred people are already there, drawn by $3 cocktails and reggae and hip-hop tunes. It’s so crowded that manager Jeff Short has abandoned his tikihut office to help behind the bar. The crowd is familiar, mostly female Japanese partyers and U.S. servicemen. Many of the girls dress alike—stiletto heels or sneakers, low-slung capris and halter tops, a spray of body glitter. (40) This article reveals some of the most important aspects of the hypersexualized and racialized American Village. First, the population in the night life in the American Village illustrates a large racial dichotomy of “mostly female Japanese partyers and U.S servicemen.” In the night life of the American Village, therefore, the population of male Japanese and female Americans are not recognized as participants. Second, this bar entertains the particular gender and racial groups (Asian females and U.S. GIs). Third, the women’s bodies are extremely sexualized with the description of “stiletto heels,” “low- slung capris and halter tops,” and “a spray of body glitter,” as if their bodies are available for GIs. The masculine bodies of the GIs and feminized Okinawan women’s bodies are fully displayed in the article. The article moves on to describe the scene of the rape victim drinking in the bar with Sgt. Woodland: For about an hour the woman [the rape victim] dances and drinks with a black American…. She tells him she moved to Okinawa a month ago and is working at a hospital. Her American boyfriend is in the U.S., she continues. When she and the ex-serviceman decide to leave together, the American says something to a friend about money—“13 cents,” to be exact. The woman misunderstands him and fumes, “I do not look 13.” She abruptly returns to the bar. Later, outside, the rejected former serviceman sees the women hand in hand with a tall black man with a buzz cut. They are heading into the parking lot. He calls to them: “She ain’t drunk, she’s acting.” The girl glares at him and says, “F\_\_\_ you.” One of the important implications the article generates is that the woman has just “moved to Okinawa.” That is, it is likely that she was a mainland Japanese who came to Okinawa for the opportunity to meet Americans/ GIs. A part of their conversation shows their shallow relationship. However, both seemed to enjoy the moments at night in the American Village together, and the scene illustrates a typical female Japanese and GI in the village night life. After they left the bar, Woodland raped her in the parking lot behind the bar at 2:32 am. Woodland’s attorney, Tsuyoshi Aragaki, commented that “American servicemen tend to hang out with and date Japanese ladies in places like this. I personally think that this was the background to this matter” (emphasis mine, The New York Times, Oct. 3, 2001). What is indicated by “places like this” is a gendered and racialized space like the American Village (Time. August 27, 2001). Places like this is, thus, used to describe a hypersexualized space and is interchangeable with a notion that all Asian women in the village are assumed to be sexual, and therefore rape could be expected. The American Village is conveniently portrayed for the media to justify that Okinawan women’s bodies are available for the GIs, and for the GIs to prove their masculinity on the women’s sexualized bodies. According to Woodland’s statement, the sexual intercourse was “consensual” (The New York Times Oct. 3, 2001). Woodland’s statement alludes to places like this, where one can expect sexual intercourse. Yumiko Mikanagi, a feminist political scientist, argues that this specific rape case is ascribed to “gendered power hierarchies in society and socially sanctioned masculinities based on violence against women” (98). In another word, places like this are spaces where violence against women is socially sanctioned, and where women paradoxically attain not only freedom from traditional Okinawan gender roles, but also freedom of sexual expressions that militarism relies on, exploits, and controls. Also, places like this is a militarizing term which

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trivializes the militarization process of the American Village and of how women’s bodies are sexualized by veiling power inequalities. Throughout the paper, I have tried to explore the problematic concept of natural and the process of naturalizing militarization in Okinawa with a case of the American Village. The space is a symbol for the anxieties and illusions of attaining higher class, and Japanese/ American life. This examination of the U.S. occupation of Okinawa helps us understand current imperialism. The imperialism is mediated through gender and race. It is also in pursuit of the natural, historical, and current practice of satisfying the military’s need for metaphorically subjugating sexually and racially, as though the military is the man acting naturally. The American Village exists as the most powerful cultural construction that reshapes contemporary Okinawan women’s sexualities toward Okinawan nature and culture. To naturalize is to trivialize the dynamic structure of sociopolitical maneuvers. The landscape of the American Village for younger generations of Okinawans is an escape from the old tragic war history, a place where they fulfill their desire for a higher social class and cross racial lines by dating and marrying GIs. On the other hand, some GIs manipulate the space as a testing ground for their masculinity on Okinawan women. This indicates the perpetuation of colonial dominance in the American Village. In a society where power is highly valued and embraced as the highest pleasure, we tend to understand the power structure and hierarchy as natural and women as sexual. In order to fight against the militarization of the Okinawan natural and social landscape, and the exploitation of women’s sexuality, it is indispensable to analyze the dynamics of naturalizing and trivializing processes.

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**U.S. Military presence in Okinawa has operated for the expansion of gendered security relations across the world--reduction is recognition of gendered violence and warfare**

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The power dynamics of militarism in the Asia-Pacific region rely on dominance and subordination. These hierarchical relationships, shaped by gender, can be seen in U.S. military exploitation of host communities, its abuse and contamination of land and water, and the exploitation of women and children through the sex industry, sexual violence, and rape. **Women’s bodies, the land, and indigenous communities are all feminized**, treated as dispensable and temporary. What is constructed as “civilized, white, male, western, and rational” is held superior to what is defined as “primitive, non-white, female, non-western, and irrational.” Nations and U.S. territories within the Asia-Pacific region are treated as inferiors with limited sovereignty or agency in relation to U.S. foreign policy interests that go hand-in-hand with this racist/sexist ideology. The imbalance of power in gender relations in and around bases is mirrored at the alliance level as well. The United States controls Hawai’i through statehood; Guam is a colonial territory; and the United States is the dominant partner in alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. The expansion and restructuring of U.S. bases and military operations in the region depend on these imbalances of power, which are rooted in histories of annexation, colonization, exploitation, and war. The Asia-Pacific region is a major part of the worldwide network of U.S. bases and facilities that support the global war on terror and enables the United States to extend its reach far beyond its own shores. The war on terror is only the latest justification for U.S. military presence in communities that have little say over the activities of armed outsiders. This network in turn depends on a set of interrelated phenomena – violence against women and girls, violation of local people’s self-determination, and abuse and contamination of the environment – that reinforce gender stereotypes. Military Violence against Women Violence against women is pervasive at U.S. bases in the region and in prevailing military culture and training. The case of Okinawa is especially shocking. In the past 62 years, there have been 400 reported cases of women who have been attacked, kidnapped, abused, gang-raped, or murdered by U.S. troops. Victims have included a nine-month old baby and girls between six and 15 years old. Most recently, in February 2008, Staff Sgt. Tyrone Luther Hadnott, aged 38, of Camp Courtney in Okinawa, was arrested and charged with raping a 14-year-old girl. In November 2005, several Marines stood trial for raping a Philippine woman, “Nicole” (a pseudonym) near Olongapo (Philippines). One man, Daniel Smith, a U.S. marine, was convicted of this crime and sentenced to 40 years imprisonment in the Philippines. However, he was transferred to U.S. custody immediately after conviction. Philippine and U.S. organizations contend that this case illuminates the negative impacts of the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which undermines Philippines national sovereignty. Violence against women recurs around U.S. bases in Asia. A particularly brutal rape and murder of a Korean woman in 1992 led to street demonstrations in Seoul and the formation of a new organization, the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea, to document crimes and help victims claim redress. Activists in Guam are justifiably concerned that such violence will rise in their communities with the proposed increase in U.S. Marines stationed there. Military personnel are trained to dehumanize “others” as part of their preparation for war. Their aggressiveness, frustration, and fear spill over into local communities, for example in acts of violence against girls and women. Although most U.S. troops do not commit such violations, these incidents happen far too often to be accepted as aberrations. Racist and sexist stereotypes about Asian women – as exotic, accommodating, and sexually compliant – are an integral part of such violence. These crimes inflame local hostility and resistance to U.S. military bases and operations, and have long-lasting effects on victims/survivors. Cases are seriously underreported due to women’s shame and fear or their belief that perpetrators will not be apprehended. This pattern of sexual violence reveals structural inequalities between Asian communities and the U.S. military, encoded in Status of Forces Agreements and Visiting Forces Agreements. The military sees each crime as an isolated act committed by individual soldiers. Local communities that protest these crimes see gendered violence as a structural issue that is perpetuated by legal, political, economic, and social structures.

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Military prostitution continues despite the military’s declared “zero tolerance” policy, affirmed in Department of Defense memoranda and Executive Order 13387 that President George W. Bush signed in October 2005. These days, most women working in clubs near U.S. bases in South Korea and Japan/Okinawa are from the Philippines due to low wages, high unemployment, and the absence of sustainable economic development at home. These governments admit Philippine women on short-term entertainer visas. Servicemen are still protected from prosecution for many infringements of local laws and customs. The sexual activity of foreign-based troops, including (but not exclusively) through prostitution, has had serious effects on women’s health, boosting rates of HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, drug and alcohol dependency, and mental illness. U.S. Navy ships visit the Philippines for R & R and make stops at Pattaya (Thailand) where the sex-tourism industry flourished during the Vietnam War. Violation of Local People’s Self-Determination The expansion of U.S. military bases and operations has had a huge adverse impact on local communities at social, economic, political, and environmental levels. Host governments and local business elites are complicit in this. They equate progress and economic development with U.S. corporate and military interests instead of addressing the effects of U.S. militarism on local communities. The United States uses political and economic control to exert military force in the Pacific region. Allied nations trade sovereignty for militarized “security.” Japan and South Korea both pay for upkeep of U.S. troops and the restructuring or expansion of U.S. bases in their countries. Guam has yet to attain full self-government through a UN-mandated political process that requires the full cooperation of the United States. The exploitation of Guam’s colonial status has allowed massive military expansion, slated to cost $10 billion, and without consent of the indigenous people. The expansion will transform the island into a forward base with the establishment of a Global Strike Force and ballistic missile defense system.

It will also significantly alter the population. The expected transfer of military personnel from Okinawa and other parts of Asia will boost the population by 21%. Although the local business elite welcomes this expansion, many people oppose it. They are also against the resulting economic dependency that is designed and imposed by U.S. foreign policy. Okinawa is only 0.6% of the land area of Japan, yet houses 75% of U.S. military facilities in that country. There are 37 U.S. bases and installations in Okinawa, with an estimated 23,842 troops and 21,512 family members. The U.S. military proposes to build a heliport in the ocean at Henoko, (northern Okinawa), despite a 10-year campaign against it by Okinawan people and international environmental groups. Similarly, Korean activists opposed major base expansion at Pyoungtaek, south of Seoul. However, U.S. military officials convinced the Korean government to invest millions of dollars to pay for this expansion as well as a new bombing training site. Hawai’i is a major tourist destination, but the U.S. military installations occupying 25% of the land area continue to be invisible to most visitors and even to local people. Current examples of the military camouflaging itself in the everyday are the Superferry and the University Affiliated Research Center, both "joint-use" operations for the military and civilians. Rendering the military a normal part of daily life serves U.S. dominance and superiority as truths that cannot be challenged. In tourist brochures Hawai’i is personified as an exotic woman, nearly naked, clad in a hula skirt and lei. Such images make women seem available for exploitation, much as the military treats the land as available for misuse. Another example of the extension of U.S. military domination is the greater involvement of local armies, such as joint exercises with the armed forces of the Philippines, the New Mexico Guard, and the Guam Army National Guard, as part of the National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program. This allows state National Guards to partner with foreign countries and is expected to expand in the coming years within the Pacific Rim and Southeast Asian countries. The Asia-Pacific region is part of the worldwide network of U.S. bases, facilities, refueling and R & R stops, and reserves of potential recruits that all support the global war on terror. Bases in Hawai’i, Guam, the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan/Okinawa serve as key training grounds for the Iraq War. Moreover, Guam, Diego Garcia, South Korea, and Okinawa are among the transit points for troops and military supplies for the war. Abuse and Contamination of Environment The military misuse of the land is part of its dominance over local communities. In many places, military training has caused fires, left the land littered with unexploded bullets and bombs, and pulverized bombing training targets. In Hawai’i, Guam, the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan, the U.S. military has taken no responsibility for cleaning up contamination caused by its operations. This includes heavy metals (mercury and lead), pesticides (dieldrin and malathion), solvents (including benzene and tuolene), PCBs, pesticides, and JP–4 jet fuel. The resulting toxic health effects on local communities are compounded as the years go on without remediation of contaminated land and water. In Korea, environmentalists are urging National Assembly members to secure U.S. commitment to clean up the pollution on the many bases slated for closure there, or this will be an expense borne by Korean taxpayers. The proposed heliport at Henoko (Okinawa), meanwhile, threatens the dugong, an endangered manatee, as well as the surrounding coral reefs. Kadena Air Base in Okinawa is a hub of U.S. airpower in the Pacific, with Air Force planes training overhead a daily reality. A 1996 Okinawa Prefecture report on babies born to women living near Kadena Air Force Base showed significantly lower birth weights than those born in any other part of Japan, due to severe noise generated by the base. Addressing Militarism Militarism is a system of institutions, investments, and values, which is **much wider and more deeply entrenched than any specific war.** To create alternate definitions of genuine peace and security, it is important to understand institutionalized gendered relations and other unequal power dynamics including those based on class, colonialism, and racism inherent in U.S. military policy and practice. Demilitarization requires a de-linking of masculinity and militarism, stopping the glorification of war and warriors, and defining adventure and heroism in nonmilitary terms. It also requires genuinely democratic processes and structures for political and economic decision-making at community, national and transnational levels. In addition, the United States must take responsibility for cleaning up all military contamination in the Asia-Pacific region. Instead of undermining indigenous control of lands and resources in Guam, for example, the United States and local government agencies should support the self-determination of the Chamorro people. The proposed Marines base for Henoko (Okinawa) should be scrapped and the Japanese government should redirect funds earmarked for it to economic development to benefit Okinawan

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people. Since military expansion is a partner in corporate capitalist expansion, economic, political, and social development based on self-sufficiency, self-determination, and ecological restoration of local resources must be encouraged. Communities adjoining U.S. bases in all parts of the region suffer from grossly distorted economies that are overly reliant on the services (legal and illegal) that U.S. soldiers support. This economic dependency affects local men as well as women. Locally directed projects, led by those who understand community concerns, should be supported, together with government reforms to redistribute resources for such initiatives. In addition, the United States and Asian governments need to revise their legal agreements to protect local communities. Local people need transparency in the implementation of these policies, in interagency involvement (Pentagon, State Department, Department of the Interior, Environmental Protection Agency) and in executive orders that affect U.S. military operations in the region. Such revisions should include the ability for host governments to prosecute perpetrators of military violence so that the U.S. military can be held accountable for the human consequences of its policies. U.S. military expansion and restructuring in the Asia-Pacific region serve patriarchal U.S. goals of “full spectrum dominance.” Allied governments are bribed, flattered, threatened, or coerced into participating in this project. Even the apparently willing governments are junior partners who must, in an unequal relationship, shoulder the costs of U.S. military policies. For the U.S. military, land and bodies are so much raw material to use and discard without responsibility or serious consequences to those in power. Regardless of gender, soldiers are trained to dehumanize others so that, if ordered, they can kill them. Sexual abuse and torture committed by U.S. military personnel and contractors against Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison illustrate a grim new twist on militarized violence, where race and nation “trumped” gender. White U.S. women were among the perpetrators, thereby appropriating the masculinized role. The violated Iraqi men, meanwhile, were forced into the feminized role. Gendered inequalities, which are fundamental to U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific region, affect men as well as women. Young men who live near U.S. bases see masculinity defined in military terms. They may work as cooks or bartenders who provide rest and relaxation to visiting servicemen. They may be forced to migrate for work to larger cities or overseas, seeking to fulfill their dreams of giving their families a better future. U.S. peace movements should not only address U.S. military involvement in the Middle East, but also in other parts of the world. Communities in the Asia-Pacific region have a long history of contesting U.S. militarism and offer eloquent testimonies to the negative impact of U.S. military operations there. These stories provide insights into the gendered dynamics of U.S. foreign and military policy, and the complicity of allied nations in this effort. Many individuals and organizations are crying out for justice, united by threads of hope and visions for a different future. Our job is to listen to them and to act accordingly.

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That causes extinction

Nhanenge 7 [Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, paper submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts in the subject Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT]

The androcentric premises also have political consequences. They protect the ideological basis of exploitative relationships. Militarism, colonialism, racism, sexism, capitalism and other pathological 'isms' of modernity get legitimacy from the assumption that power relations and hierarchy are inevitably a part of human society, due to man's inherent nature. Because when mankind by nature is autonomous, competitive and violent (i.e. masculine) then coercion and hierarchical structures are necessary to manage conflicts and maintain social order. In this way, the cooperative relationships such as those found among some women and tribal cultures, are by a dualised definition unrealistic and utopian. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This means that power relations are generated by universal scientific truths about human nature, rather than by political and social debate. The consequence is that people cannot challenge the basis of the power structure because they believe it is the scientific truth, so it cannot be otherwise. In this way, militarism is justified as being unavoidable, regardless of its patent irrationality. Likewise, if the scientific "truth" were that humans would always compete for a greater share of resources, then the rational response to the environmental crisis would seem to be "dog-eat-dog" survivalism. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which nature and community simply cannot survive. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This type of social and political power structure is kept in place by social policies. It is based on the assumption that if the scientific method is applied to public policy then social planning can be done free from normative values. However, according to Habermas (Reitzes 1993: 40) the scientific method only conceal pre-existing, unreflected social interests and pre-scientific decisions. Consequently, also social scientists apply the scientific characteristics of objectivity, value-freedom, rationality and quantifiability to social life. In this way, they assume they can unveil universal laws about social relations, which will lead to true knowledge. Based on this, correct social policies can be formulated. Thus, social processes are excluded, while scientific objective facts are included. Society is assumed a static entity, where no changes are possible. By promoting a permanent character, social science legitimizes the existing social order, while obscuring the relations of domination and subordination, which is keeping the existing power relations inaccessible to analysis. The frozen order also makes it impossible to develop alternative explanations about social reality. It prevents a historical and political understanding of reality and denies the possibility for social transformation by human agency. The prevailing condition is seen as an unavoidable fact. This implies that human beings are passive and that domination is a natural force, for which no one is responsible. This permits the state freely to implement laws and policies, which are controlling and coercive. These are seen as being correct, because they are based on scientific facts made by scientific experts. One result is that the state, without consulting the public, engages in a pathological pursuit of economic growth. Technology can be used to dominate societies or to enhance them. Thus both science and technology could have developed in a different direction. But due to patriarchal values infiltrated in science the type of technology developed is meant to dominate, oppress, exploit and kill. One reason is that patriarchal societies identify masculinity with conquest. Thus any technical innovation will continue to be a tool for more effective oppression and exploitation. The highest priority seems to be given to technology that destroys life. Modern societies are dominated by masculine institutions and patriarchal ideologies. Their technologies prevailed in Auschwitz, Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and in many other parts of the world. Patriarchal power has brought us acid rain, global warming, military states, poverty and countless cases of suffering. We have seen men whose power has caused them to lose all sense of reality, decency and imagination, and we must fear such power. The ultimate result of unchecked patriarchy will be ecological catastrophe and nuclear holocaust. Such actions are denial of wisdom. It is working against natural harmony and destroying the basis of existence. But as long as ordinary people leave questions of technology to the "experts" we will continue the forward stampede. As long as economics focus on technology and both are the focus of politics, we can leave none of them to experts. Ordinary people are often more capable of taking a wider and more humanistic view than these experts. (Kelly 1990: 112-114; Eisler 1990: 3233; Schumacher 1993: 20, 126, 128, 130).

\*\*\*Fem IR Solvency

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**Military presence in Okinawa is dehuminizing and serves to preserve false US security interests—reduction of troops would mark the end of gendered security in East Asia**

**Foreign Policy In Focus 99** [FPIF publishes commentaries, briefs, and reports on its website www.fpif.org and organizes briefings for the public, media, lawmakers, and legislative staff. Staff and other FPIF experts also write for newspapers, magazines, and other online publications and author books on foreign policy and international affairs. FPIF experts speak frequently on television and radio programs and are often quoted by print and online journalists, http://www.fpif.org/reports/women\_and\_the\_us\_military\_in\_east\_asia]

**Key Points** Negative effects of U.S. militarism on women and children in East Asia include sexual exploitation, physical and sexual violence, and the dire situation of many Amerasian children. Instead of seeing U.S. troops sent home and military bases closed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, East Asians have seen signs that the U.S. military is digging in deeper. The concept of security is too militarized and does not include the human rights of women and children and the protection of the physical environment. Despite reconciliation talks between North and South Korea, the U.S. has declared that it will maintain 100,000 troops in East Asia for the next 20 years even if the Koreas are reunited. Joint Vision 2020, a Pentagon planning document, concluded that Asia will replace Europe as the key focus of U.S. military strategy in the early 21st century and pointed to China as a potential adversary. Instead of seeing U.S. troops sent home and military bases closed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, East Asians have seen signs that the U.S. military is digging in deeper and that the cold war in the region continues, **despite the lack of credible threats** to the United States. The popular resentment—and especially the anger of many Asian women—at the U.S. military presence in East Asia was highlighted in a series of meetings and protests that occurred around the G8 Summit in Okinawa. Contributing to the focus of the U.S. military’s impact on women was another incident in Okinawa of sexual harassment a couple of weeks before the July 2000 Summit—this case involving a drunken Marine accused of molesting a 14-year-old schoolgirl while she slept in her home. Currently there are 37,000 U.S. military personnel in Korea and some 63,000 in Japan, including 13,000 on ships home-ported there. The islands of Okinawa, the southernmost prefecture of Japan, house 39 bases and installations (75% of all U.S. bases in Japan) although Okinawa is only 0.6% of the country’s land area. Stationed in Okinawa are 30,000 troops and another 22,500 family members. There were extensive U.S. bases in the Philippines until 1992. In 1991, the Philippine Senate voted against renewal of their leases. The U.S. subsequently proposed a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to cover situations when U.S. troops are in the Philippines for joint exercises or shore leave. The VFA gives access to Philippine ports and airports on all the main islands for refueling, supplies, repairs, and rest & recreation (R & R)—potentially far greater access than before, but under the guise of commercial arrangements and without the expense of maintaining permanent workforces and facilities. The VFA was ratified by the Philippine Senate in May 1999. Research conducted by a group called Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence shows that U.S. troops in Okinawa have committed more than 4,700 reported crimes since 1972, when Okinawa reverted to Japanese administration. Many of these were crimes of violence against women. In Korea, too, the number of crimes is high. A particularly brutal rape and murder of a barwoman, Yoon Kum Ee, in 1992 galvanized human rights advocates to establish the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea in order to document these crimes and help victims claim redress. Violence against women is seriously underreported, due to the victims’ shame and fear or their belief that perpetrators will not be apprehended. Women who work in the bars, massage parlors, and brothels near U.S. bases are particularly vulnerable to physical and sexual violence. The sexual activity of foreign-based U.S. military personnel, including (but not exclusively) through prostitution, has had very serious effects on women’s health, precipitating HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies and unsafe abortions, drug and alcohol dependency, and mental illness. In Korea, Japan, and the Phillipines, Amerasian children born to women impregnated by U.S. troops are a particularly stigmatized group. They are often abandoned by their military fathers and raised by single Asian mothers. They live with severe prejudice and suffer discrimination in education and employment due to their physical appearance and their mothers’ low status. Those with African-American fathers face even worse treatment than those having white fathers. Health effects linked to environmental contamination caused by military operations also need detailed investigation. In Okinawa, a 1996 report on babies born to women living near Kadena Air Force Base showed significantly lower birth weights than those born in any other part of Japan, attributable to severe noise generated by the base. At White Beach, a docking area for nuclear submarines, regional health statistics show comparatively high rates of leukemia in children and cancers in adults. In 1998, for example, two women from White Beach who were in the habit of gathering local shellfish and seaweed died of liver cancer. The drinking water from wells in the area of former Clark Air Force Base (Philippines) is contaminated with oil and grease. At 21 of the 24 locations where groundwater samples were taken, pollutants that exceeded drinking water standards were found, including mercury, nitrate, coliform bacteria, dieldrin, lead, and solvents. These contaminants persist in the environment for a long time and bioaccumulate as they move up the food chain. **Problems with Current U.S. Policy Key Problems**  Military personnel are trained to dehumanize “others” as part of their training for war. Their pent-up frustration, aggression, and fear are absorbed by East Asian communities, especially women and children, through reckless driving, assaults, and military prostitution. The Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) between the U.S. and host governments ensure legal protection for U.S. bases and military personnel but do not adequately protect local communities from crime by U.S. troops. The U.S. accepts no legal responsibility for environmental cleanup of bases. In the eyes of host communities, U.S. troops stationed overseas often seem arrogant and insensitive. They usually know little about the country’s history and culture. They speak only English, pay their way with dollars, and live in spacious, fenced-off enclaves at higher standards than most local citizens. Military

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personnel are trained to dehumanize “others” as part of their preparation for war. This process, and the experience of combat, can make them edgy, fearful, frustrated, alienated, or aggressive—negative feelings that are often vented on host communities, especially women. **Sexism is central to a militarized masculinity**, which involves physical strength, emotional detachment, the capacity for violence and killing, and an appearance of invulnerability. Male sexuality is assumed to be uncontrollable and in need of regular release, so prostitution is built into military operations, directly or indirectly, with the agreement of host governments. Suzuyo Takazato of Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, told the San Jose Mercury News, “These young troops go out into the field all day and are trained to be aggressive and to kill.... They may change out of uniform and into a T-shirt and jeans, but their attitude does not change.” Although the military has a policy of “zero tolerance” for sexual violence and harassment, and most military personnel do not violate women, this is an officially recognized problem in U.S. military families, for women in the military, and in communities near bases in this country and overseas. Military leaders often attribute it to a few “bad apples,” but these incidents happen far too often to be accepted as aberrations. Women organizers see them as systemic—an integral part of a system of military violence. Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) vary depending on host country laws and each government’s power and willingness to negotiate terms. For example, the SOFA between the U.S. and Germany includes more detailed procedures for jurisdiction over personnel who commit crimes than do SOFAs with Japan or Korea. It also commits the U.S. military to cooperating in finding fathers and advising them to pay child support to German women who have children by U.S. troops, a provision completely absent from the SOFAs with Japan or Korea, and from the VFA with the Philippiness. Host governments are in different power positions in relation to the U.S., though none of them come to SOFA negotiations as equal partners with the United States. SOFAs are based upon dysfunctional assumptions about national security. They ensure legal protection for U.S. bases and military personnel but do not provide genuine security for local communities, nor do they assure the security of the American people. Although U.S. officials claim to have implemented adequate procedures for dealing with crimes against people in host communities, U.S. troops are not always tried by local courts, even when cases involve serious injury or death. It took enormous public outcry before those responsible for abducting and raping a 12-year-old Okinawan girl in September 1995 were handed over to Japanese authorities, stood trial in a Japanese court, and began serving seven-year sentences in Japan. In other cases where local people know of punishment, it is often trivial. Sometimes perpetrators are moved beyond reach to another posting, perhaps back to the United States. SOFAs (including the VFA) make no reference to Amerasian children, who are often abandoned by their fathers. No government takes responsibility for the dire situation of these children, who have no legal standing in the United States. The 1982 Amerasian Immigration Act, which sought to address the situation of Vietnamese Amerasian children, does not cover people born in Japan or the Philippines. To qualify under this act, one must be born between 1951 and 1982. One must also have documentation that the father is a U.S. citizen, formal admission of paternity, and a financial sponsor in the United States. Environmental contamination affects whole communities but is most significant for women and children, because they tend to show signs of disease earlier than men. Militaries cause more pollution than any other institutions. Bases store fuel, oil, solvents, and other chemicals as well as weapons, including defoliants like Agent Orange, depleted uranium-tipped bullets, and nuclear weapons. The SOFAs with Japan and Korea do not hold the U.S. responsible for the cleanup of contamination. In the Philippines, records of environmental contamination were incomplete and unavailable to concerned nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for several years. Studies—both by the People’s Task Force for Bases Cleanup and by environmental consultants—show that the U.S. military did not follow its own guidelines on cleanup. In Okinawa, community leaders are trying to get information about contamination and assurances that the U.S. will take responsibility for cleanup, even though the SOFA with Japan explicitly excludes this. In both the Philippines and Okinawa, women are gathering information from local people who have worked on the bases or who live nearby. Host governments have downplayed contamination or denied its existence for fear of fueling antibase sentiment (Korea) or deterring prospective investors (Philippines). Environmentally induced illnesses may not be apparent for many years, and it is difficult to establish a clear cause-and-effect relationship. Determined efforts by NGOs, researchers, and some elected Philippine officials, as well as deaths of children born in contaminated areas have at last resulted in official recognition of the existence of military contamination in the Philippines. **Toward a New Foreign Policy Key Recommendations**  SOFAs should be revised to protect East Asian women from violence by U.S. troops and to safeguard the environment from military toxics. Congress should pass the Violence Against Women Act II, which includes provisions concerning U.S. military violence internationally (Title V). U.S. immigration law and policy should be revised to recognize U.S. responsibility to Amerasian children. The U.S. military presence in East Asia should be reduced, contamination caused by military operations should be cleaned up at U.S. expense, and bases should be redeveloped to benefit local communities. Grassroots movements for national sovereignty and self-determination in East Asian countries have gained momentum in recent years. Women’s organizations play a key role in these movements and bring a gender perspective to protests against U.S. bases. Organizations in East Asia and the United States as well as international networks are developing alternatives to militarized security that address the security of women, children, and the physical environment. These advocates recommend a series of policy changes: The U.S. military should adopt international standards regarding women’s human rights and must take responsibility for violations committed by U.S. troops in East Asia. Military training should include substantial prestationing and early stationing education to sensitize all personnel to local customs and laws, gender issues, and violence prevention. Specific personnel in each unit should be responsible for monitoring the situation, maintaining accountability, and counseling. Severe sanctions must be imposed for human rights violations, and legal investigations should be conducted by the victim’s lawyers, by independent investigative and prosecuting bodies, or by both. All military personnel must be required to pass rigorous local driving tests and provide adequate insurance coverage for full compensation of damages done to local people in East Asia. Until this requirement can be implemented, the U.S. government must fully compensate local victims when accidents occur. SOFAs should be revised to protect host communities against crimes committed by U.S. troops and against environmental contamination from U.S. military operations. This includes the Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines, which should be revised to protect the human rights of women and children. Congress should pass the Violence Against Women Act II (HR 357/S 51). Title V has provisions that address U.S. military violence overseas. The U.S. military should support the research, counseling, and rehabilitation work of NGOs dealing with the negative effects of U.S. military operations. It should also encourage efforts to create employment opportunities for women besides military

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prostitution. The U.S. should take responsibility for Amerasian children. Congress should pass the American Asian Justice Act (HR 1128), an amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act (HR 1128) to facilitate the immigration of Amerasians born in the Philippines, or Japan who were fathered by U.S. citizens. Immigration procedures will need flexibility in documentation requirements. The U.S. military should investigate contamination of land and water and should undertake cleanup to acceptable standards. It should conduct research into the health effects of military toxics and should publicize its findings widely in accessible languages. Policy debates should broadly consider the question: What is genuine security for women and children living near U.S. bases? The notion of security needs to be demilitarized. Women’s voices and a gender perspective should be included in U.S. foreign and security policy discussions as a matter of routine. The U.S. should work toward the progressive **reduction and eventual elimination of the U.S. military presence** in East Asia by seeking alternatives to an exclusive military approach to national, regional, and global security.

1AC Fem IR Solvency [4/5]

**Okinawa is not acting individually - it's protests and actions are linked to global struggles worldwide - giving into Okinawan demand would be a rallying cry against militarism and pave the way for a new order of genuine international security**

**Tanji 3** [Miyume, Ph.D, Research Fellow @ CAASP, Curtin University, Professor of Political Science and International Relations @ Sophia University, Australian National University, and Murdoch University, "THE ENDURING MYTH OF AN OKINAWAN STRUGGLE: THE HISTORY AND TRAJECTORY OF A DIVERSE COMMUNITY OF PROJECT", http://wwwlib.murdoch.edu.au/adt/pubfiles/adt-MU20040510.152840/02Whole.pdf, pgs. 19-20]

Chapter 8 focuses on the peak and the downturn period following the rise of the third wave of 'Okinawan Struggle'. The contemporary community of protest is characterized by the co-existence of plural social movements. Differences and internal divisions within the community of protest, I argue, indicate the co-existence of qualitatively different kinds of social movements, although they are all related in some way to the inequality and marginalization related to the continuing dominance of US military bases in Okinawa. A distinctive contribution of this thesis is to understand the Okinawan protest experiences in the world that are studied more widely and profoundly, for example, the civil rights movement, anti-nuclear movements and women at Greenham Common. It contributes to opening the black box of 'Okinawan protesters' represented as a collected victim of an invincible US international security policy, of Tokyo's political economy of compensation, and marginalization of a minority group in Japan. It attempts to look at who the protestors are, what they want, how they strive to get it, and why. Overall, it contends that the myth of an 'Okinawan struggle' has survived, and will surivve increasing diversification of protest actors and changing reform agendas in Okinawa because of its flexibility in being harnessed to a myriad of shapes and forms of campaigns against marginalization. This dissertation reveals that through the post-war period, the myth - described variously as an 'Okinawan struggle', the 'Okinawan Struggle', or the 'Okinawans' movement' - has become less rigid in the way it is incorporated into notions of collective identity or rationales for specific protests and organizations thereof. Yet it is precisely this capacity of the myth to speak to so many different interpretations of marginalization - involving different struggles and experiences at different periods in time - that means it is still a powerful and attractive one. It continues to be an effective source of inspiration and mobilization for divergent groups by providing strategies and ideas of protest derived from past experiences, and to be a source of self-expression. Another attraction of the idea of an 'Okinawan struggle' is its ability to provide a base for individual struggles, from which to connect with common experiences of marginalization taking place in other parts of the world, thus promoting developing networks with social movement actors in global civil society.

1AC Fem IR Solvency [5/5]

**The plan is the crucial blow against gendered US militarism**

**Okazawa-Rey 2K** [Margo—co-founder of the East Asia/U.S./Puerto Rico Women's Network against militarism, February 26, “Women’s Networks against US Militarism in East Asia”, http://www.cfd-ch.org/pdf/frieden/womanoeuvres/margo\_engWS.pdf]

During this fiscal year, the US is spending $1.26 billion per day on military expenditures for both US and overseas operations. Current direct military conflict is being waged in the Middle East, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan. Preparing and training for open conflict takes place in East Asia, the “second front” of the current war on Iraq. The presence and operations of US military in East Asia has its roots in unequal power and structural inequalities between race, class, gender, and nation defined and fueled by interrelated systems of globalization and militarism. U.S. bases in South Korea and Japan date from the end of World War II and currently house over 80,000 U.S. troops who are constantly preparing for war. South Korea is home to 95 US military facilities; 39 facilities are located in Okinawa, the largest facilities adjacent to urban centers where approximately one million people live. And in the Philippines, although its national Senate cancelled a 44-year-old base agreement with the United States in 1991, it ratified a new Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1999 allowing U.S. access to 22 ports on all main islands for refueling, repairs, and R&R – far greater access than before and without the expense of maintaining permanent bases. In their daily lives, women, children and their families in communities near these US bases are confronted by military violence and crimes committed by US servicemen, environmental toxics and threats to the public health, and economic development that privileges the US military at the expense the local well being of host communities and nations. Conditions facing women and children in East Asia are directly linked to women, children and the environment in low-income and communities of color in the US who also often live near military facilities and in the nation where military spending dominates public spending priorities on basic needs as housing, sustaining jobs, health care, and education. Building a Women’s Network Against US Militarism from the Ground Up. The East Asia-US Women’s Network Against Militarism (the Network) formed in May 1997 at our first meeting in Naha, Okinawa a gathering women from Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, South Korea and the US – survivors of US military violence, activists, academics, and religious leaders. Catalyzed by the 1995 rape of the 12-year old Okinawan girl by three US servicemen, the women came together to discuss shared challenges they face living with presence of US troops and facilities in the US and the strategies they use to transform their local communities from militarized communities into sustainable and safe communities This meeting was the first time that such a group had been convened to address the issue of long- term US military presence in the region. Although there is discussion about and notice paid to regions where there is active armed conflict, not enough consideration is given to areas where the military presence has fundamentally altered relations there. Here we speak of on-going violence against local women by military personnel; militarized prostitution; abandoned mixed-race children; environmental degradation; and so forth. In fact, at the recent East Asia Beijing +5 prep meeting, the US delegation blocked attempts by Asian women to include long-standing military presence as a problem needing to be addressed.(1) The goals of the EA-US-PRWN are to: 1. Challenge the principles of "military security" and "national security" on which the US and Asian governments base the massive presence of US military in East Asia through mass public education, lobbying, and community and transnational organizing; 2. Develop the leadership of women and communities directly affected by the actions of military personnel by supporting the work of local NGOs and survivors; 3. Contribute to and strengthen the international solidarity movement that challenges the dominance of the US military specifically and the US government more generally, and the global economic system they promote. 4. Build a movement that challenges all forms of militarism and creates models of women’s leadership, community service and development, policy development and planning that replace false notion of national security with genuine forms of human security. The Network is currently a volunteer-based organization and organized into country groups from Okinawa, mainland Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Puerto Rico/Vieques, and the U.S. Two women from each country group currently serve as the planning committee to play for bi-annual gatherings. The core group of the US country group is comprised of 8 women, the majority of whom are women of color and immigrants (Japanese-American, Filipino American, Japanese, British, Japanese/African American, Chinese American, Okinawan).

\*\*\*Add-Ons

2AC Democracy Add-On [1/2]

**Bases in Okinawa undermine democracy both domestically and abroad**

**Arudou 10** [Debito, coauthored the "Handbook for Newcomers, Migrants and Immigrants", June 1, "FUTENMA IS UNDERMINING JAPANESE DEMOCRACY", http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20100601ad.html]

Times are tough for the Hatoyama Cabinet. It's had to backtrack on several campaign promises. Its approval ratings have plummeted to around 20 percent. And that old bone of contention — what to do about American military bases on Japanese soil — has resurfaced again. The Okinawa Futenma base relocation issue is complicated, and Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has devoted too much time to a battle he simply cannot win. If the American troops stay as is, Okinawan protests will continue and rifts within the Cabinet will grow. If the troops are moved within Japan, excessive media attention will follow and generate more anti-Hatoyama and anti-American sentiment. If the troops leave Japan entirely, people will grumble about losing American money. So let's ask the essential question: Why are U.S. bases still in Japan? One reason is inertia. America invaded Okinawa in 1945, and the bases essentially remain as spoils of war. Even after Okinawa's return to Japan in 1972, one-sixth of Okinawa is technically still occupied, hosting 75 percent of America's military presence in Japan. We also have the knock-on effects of Okinawan dependency on the bases (I consider it a form of "economic alcoholism"), and generations of American entrenchment lending legitimacy to the status quo. Another reason is Cold War ideology. We hear arguments about an unsinkable aircraft carrier (as if Okinawa is someplace kept shipshape for American use), a bulwark against a pugilistic North Korea or a rising China (as if the DPRK has the means or China has the interest to invade, especially given other U.S. installations in, say, South Korea or Guam). But under Cold War logic including "deterrence" and "mutually assured destruction," the wolf is always at the door; woe betide anyone who lets their guard down and jeopardizes regional security. Then there's the American military's impressive job of preying on that insecurity. According to scholar Chalmers Johnson, as of 2005 there were 737 American military bases outside the U.S. (an actual increase since the Cold War ended) and 2.5 million U.S. military personnel serving worldwide. What happened to the "peace dividend" promised two decades ago after the fall of the Berlin Wall? Part of it sunk into places like Okinawa. But one more reason demonstrates an underlying arrogance within the American government: "keeping the genie in the bottle" — the argument that Japan also needs to be deterred, from remilitarizing. The U.S. military's attitude seems to be that they are here as a favor to us. Some favor. As history shows, once the Americans set up a base abroad, they don't leave. They generally have to lose a war (as in Vietnam), have no choice (as in the eruption of Pinatubo in the Philippines), or be booted out by a dictator (as in Uzbekistan). Arguments about regional balances of power are wool over the eyes. Never mind issues of national sovereignty — the demands of American empire require that military power be stationed abroad. Lump it, locals. But in this case there's a new complication: The Futenma issue is weakening Japan's government. Hatoyama has missed several deadlines for a resolution (while the American military has stalled negotiations for years without reprisal), enabling detractors to portray him as indecisive. He's had to visit Okinawa multiple times to listen to locals and explain. Meanwhile, the opposition Liberal Democratic Party claims Hatoyama is reneging on a promise (which is spoon-bitingly hypocritical, given the five decades the LDP completely ignored Okinawa, and the fact that Hatoyama has basically accepted an accord concluded by the LDP themselves in 2006). And now, with Mizuho Fukushima's resignation from the Cabinet, the coalition government is in jeopardy. Futenma is taking valuable time away from other policies that concern Japan, such as corruption and unaccountability, growing domestic economic inequality, crippling public debts, and our future in the world as an aging society. As the momentum ebbs from his administration, Hatoyama is in a no-win situation. But remember who put him there. If America really is the world's leading promoter of democracy, it should consider how it is undermining Japan's political development. After nearly 60 years of corrupt one-party rule, Japan finally has a fledgling two-party system. Yet that is withering on the vine thanks to American geopolitical manipulation. We keep hearing how Japan's noncooperation will weaken precious U.S.-Japan ties. But those ties have long been a leash — one the U.S., aware of how susceptible risk-averse Japan is to "separation anxiety," yanks at whim. The "threatened bilateral relationship" claim is disingenuous — the U.S. is more concerned with bolstering its military-industrial complex than with Asia's regional stability. In sum, it's less a matter of Japan wanting the U.S. bases to stay, more a matter of the U.S. bases not wanting to leave. Japan is a sovereign country, so the Japanese government has the final say. If that means U.S. forces relocating or even leaving completely, the U.S. should respectfully do so without complaint, not demand Japan find someplace else for them to go. That is not Japan's job. Yet our politicians have worked hard for decades to represent the U.S. government's interests to the Japanese public. Why? Because they always have. The time has come to stop being prisoners of history. World War II and the Cold War are long over. That's why this columnist says: Never mind Futenma. All U.S. bases should be withdrawn from Japanese soil, period. Anachronisms, the bases have not only created conflicts of interest and interfered with Japan's sovereignty, they are now incapacitating our government. Japan should slip the collar of U.S. encampments and consider a future under a less dependent, more equal relationship with the U.S.

2AC Democracy Add-On [2/2]

Extinction

Peter **Montague**, co-director Environmental Research Foundation and publisher of Rachael’s Environment and Health News, 14 October 19**98** http://www.greenleft.org.au/1998/337/20135

**The environmental movement is treading water and slowly drowning. There is abundant evidence that our efforts -- and they have been formidable, even heroic -- have largely failed. After 30 years of exceedingly hard work and tremendous sacrifice, we have failed to stem the tide of environmental deterioration.** Make no mistake: our efforts have had a beneficial effect. Things would be much worse today if our work of the past 30 years had never occurred. However, the question is, Have our efforts been adequate? Have we succeeded? Have we even come close to stemming the tide of destruction? Has our vision been commensurate with the scale and scope of the problems we set out to solve? To those questions, if we are honest with ourselves, we must answer No. What, then, are we to do? This article is intended to provoke thought and debate, and certainly is not offered as the last word on anything. Openness. Open, democratic decision-making will be

an **essential component** of any successful strategy. After the Berlin wall fell, we got a glimpse of what had happened to the environment and the people under the Soviet dictatorship. The Soviets had some of the world's strictest environmental laws on the books, but without the ability for citizens to participate in decisions, or blow the whistle on egregious violations, those laws meant nothing. For the same reason that science cannot find reliable answers without open peer review, bureaucracies (whether public or private) cannot achieve beneficial results without active citizen participation in decisions and strong protection for whistle-blowers. Errors remain uncorrected, narrow perspectives and selfish motives are rewarded, and the general welfare will not usually be promoted. The fundamental importance of democratic decision-making means that our strategies must not focus on legislative battles. Clearly, we must contend for the full power of government to be harnessed toward achieving our goals, but this is quite different from focusing our efforts on lobbying campaigns to convince legislators to do the right thing from time to time. Lobbying can mobilise people for the short term, but mobilising is not the same as organising. During the past 30 years, the environmental movement has had some notable successes mobilising people, but few successes building long-term organisations that people can live their lives around and within (the way many families in the '30s, '40s and '50s lived their lives around and within their unions' struggles). The focus of our strategies must be on building organisations that involve people and, in that process, finding new allies. The power to govern would naturally flow from those efforts. This question of democracy is not trivial. It is deep. And it deeply divides the environmental movement, or rather movements. Many members of the mainstream environmental movement tend to view ordinary people as the enemy (for example, they love to say, “We have met the enemy and he is us”.). They fundamentally don't trust people to make good decisions, so they prefer to leave ordinary people out of the equation. Instead, they scheme with lawyers and experts behind closed doors, then announce their “solution”. Then they lobby Congress in hopes that Congress will impose this latest “solution” on us all. Naturally, such people don't develop a big following, and their “solutions” -- even when Congress has been willing to impose them -- have often proven to be expensive, burdensome and ultimately unsuccessful. Experts. In the modern era, open democratic decision-making is **essential to survival**. Only by informing people, and trusting their decisions, can we **survive** as a human society. Our technologies are now too complex and too powerful to be left solely in the hands of a few experts. If they are allowed to make decisions behind closed doors, small groups of experts can make **fatal errors**. One thinks of the old Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) justifying above-ground nuclear weapons testing. In the early 1950s, their atomic fallout was showering the population with strontium-90, a highly radioactive element that masquerades as calcium when it is taken into the body. Once in the body, strontium-90 moves into the bones, where it irradiates the bone marrow, causing cancer. The AEC's best and brightest studied this problem in detail and argued in secret memos that the only way strontium-90 could get into humans would be through cattle grazing on contaminated grass. They calculated the strontium-90 intake of the cows, and the amount that would end up in the cows' bones. On that basis, the AEC reported to Congress in 1953, “The only potential hazard to human beings would be the ingestion of bone splinters which might be intermingled with muscle tissue in butchering and cutting of the meat. An insignificant amount would enter the body in this fashion.” Thus, they concluded, strontium-90 was not endangering people. The following year, Congress declassified many of the AEC's deliberations. As soon as these memos became public, scientists and citizens began asking, “What about the cows' milk?” The AEC scientists had no response. They had neglected to ask whether strontium-90, mimicking calcium, would contaminate cows' milk, which of course it did. Secrecy in government and corporate decision-making continues to **threaten the well-being of everyone on the planet** as new technologies are deployed at an accelerating pace after inadequate consideration of their effects. Open, democratic decision-making is no longer a luxury. In the modern world, it is a **necessity for human survival.**

2AC Environmental Justice Add-On [1/2]

**The Okinawan movement is more than a feminist one, but environmental justice as well**

**Yamakawa 9** [Ako, Masters candidate @ Portland State University, May 26, http://usmilitaryinokinawa.blogspot.com/2009/06/components-of-okinawas-movement.html]

Nonviolent environmental justice movements and struggles for indigenous rights, two important components of Okinawa’s movement to expunge the American military from their land, have historically been closely entwined (Hibbard et al., 2008). Indigenous people are often characterized by a status as a national minority with no centralized institutions and a worldview that “includes a custodial and nonmaterialist attitude to the land and natural resources” (Burrowes, 1996, p. 138). This relationship between indigenous people and their land frequently has a spiritual dimension, serves as a source of cultural identity, and allows the creation of sustainable management of complex ecological systems if left unimpeded (Zunes et al., 1999; Burrowes, 1996). Since the issue of the American military presence in Okinawa is commonly spearheaded by indigenous people and contains many elements of environmental degradation and species loss, understanding Okinawa’s nonviolent anti-military movement within the context of an environmental justice and indigenous rights movement is constructive. Another useful framework for understanding Okinawa’s anti-base movement is in relation to the feminist perspective of nonviolence, since many of the movement’s organizations are run by women and many of the issues, like sexual violence, disproportionately impact women in the community. There is some evidence that empowerment of women is associated with a “reduced tendency to engage in armed conflict” (Cortright, 2006, p. 186). Moreover, the collective leadership style of feminist organizations, in which “power begins in the private share of social relationships and thus is not conceptualized as zero-sum but as limitless and collective,” is in itself a form of alternative institution and a direct threat to the power system established by military rule (Stall & Stoecker, 2007, p. 203). Particularly in military conflicts, women are both relied on and unequally burdened with the violence and impact of conflict (Bunch, 2004). Military societies commonly subordinate women and legitimize the use of women as “sexual machinery in order to achieve the goals of the nation” (Takazato, 1996, p. 136). In Okinawa, this has resulted in hundreds of reported rapes (often of children) and a large prostitution industry.

**Environmental justice is a moral imperative—it is a strategy to break out of apathy and solve horrendous inequality.**

**De-Shalit 4** [Avner de-Shalit, Max Kampelman Professor of Democracy and Human Rights at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “*Environmental Justice: Creating Equality, Reclaiming Democracy,* by Kristin Shrader-Frechette. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 2002. Pp. 269 including index. ISBN: 0-19-515203-4.,” Ethics & the Environment 9.1 (2004) 140-144 Muse]

At the very last page of her book Kristin Shrader-Frechette writes: "We fail to recognize that unless we are the agents of democracy and social reform, there will be neither democracy nor social reform." This is such a short sentence, and yet it is so important. Shrader-Frechette writes this book in order for us the readers to be moved both philosophically and politically speaking. It is a Socratic way of shocking the student, and causing her to reflect upon the way she has conceived things, the way she has interpreted the world. This is not an easy book to read—it is more like watching a violent film: it tells us about greediness, cruelty, misery, cynicism, and the like. But just like watching a good film, after reading the book one cannot remain indifferent. This book, then, is not a typical neutral piece of philosophy or social science. Shrader-Frechette has an agenda on her mind, and she claims that not only is it wrong not to do something to stop environmental injustice, but in fact people have a duty to be active, politically speaking (see especially [End Page 140] pp. 195-7). Indeed, it is about time environmental philosophers realize that they have a social obligation not to remain unconcerned. Their first weapon is their philosophical tools, which they should employ to reveal and criticize what is going on. In this case, for example, Shrader-Frechette not only describes many cases of environmental injustice, but she also eloquently analyzes the arguments that are used by those opposing policies that are meant to rectify environmental disadvantages. Her position is unequivocal: environmental injustice is wrong because it is immoral, and because it discriminates against people, often the more vulnerable. Environmental injustice is defended by arguments which are philosophically flawed and morally repugnant. However, there are growing cases of environmental injustice because there are strong interests behind them, and because the more powerful can exploit the vulnerability of those marginalized by society. The reader can hear the echo of the French novelist Emile Zola's famous article, apropos of the Dreyfus affair: "J'accuse." What is 'environmental justice'? Often goods (e.g., cheaper electricity or faster cars) are manufactured with an environmental cost (pollution). Obviously, one relevant question is whether we need these goods. Let us assume that society decides we do. Sometimes this production ends up in severe injustice. Sometimes only the rich enjoy the benefits (e.g., faster cars) while the entire population pays the cost (more air pollution, more noise). Sometimes it is the case that society in general enjoys the benefits (e.g., cheaper electricity). Nevertheless, only a small group bears the cost. Why is the cost so unevenly distributed? First, pollution and hazardous waste must be treated by professionals so it is transferred to, and concentrated in several locations to be treated. This exposes the

2AC Environmental Justice Add-On [2/2]

populations that live there to very high levels of pollution. These people, then, face risks to their health and well-being, which other people do not have to face. Furthermore, when this happens house prices in the area usually fall, and these people are trapped there: so sharp is the fall in house pricing in their area that they cannot move to another, cleaner, or safer place, because whatever price they will get for their houses won't allow them to buy a decent house in cleaner areas. Once the process has started, even more pollution is attracted to this place. This is partly due to market forces: buying burial space for hazardous waste becomes very cheap in these locations, and therefore more and more firms use these locations for the burial [End Page 141] of hazardous waste. However, there is a second reason for this: it seems that the authorities and committees that decide where to send the waste to, are formed by middle class people who are less likely to live in those locations. It is an empirical fact, shown, for example by Robert Bullard and David Harvey, that the first ones to face environmental risks and be denied access to environmental goods are the poor and minorities. Whom does Shrader-Frechette accuse, and what for? Being a philosopher, her focus in this book is on the arguments employed to support such exploitative and discriminatory policies. Shrader-Frechette is very polemic. In Chapter 1 she asks why critics of the environmental justice movement reject solutions to environmental problems, and she dismisses their claims. But she also charges some environmentalists for being misanthropic. Indeed, her philosophical position is most interesting. On the one hand Shrader-Frechette's humanism is remarkable. At the same time, her attitude is not anti-ecology. On the contrary, she maintains that protecting the vulnerable and protecting nature tie in with each other. There is no need to find a balance between the interests of nature and a moral attitude towards the least advantaged among human beings. Protecting the latter advances the former and vice versa. If you wish, this position can be termed 'humanist ecology'. Therefore in Chapter 2 Shrader-Frechette guides us how to assess and dismiss several arguments that deny environmental injustice. The point, she claims, is to be able to point to cases of discrimination. Given the current lack of attention to issues of environmental injustice, her analysis of why popular arguments such as 'national security' are wrong, is crucial. In Chapters 3-8 Shrader Frechettes treats several arguments against environmental justice more profoundly. She begins with case studies, and then analyses the rhetoric used by those who prima face violate justice. This technique allows her to both study particular events and reflect upon the principles employed. Thus she discusses a rich variety of principles. To mention but a few: Treating people equally and what this principle implies, duties to future generations (see, for example, on pp. 106f, where she raises the question whether second party consent justifies exposing future generations to the greater risks of a permanent nuclear waste facility, and claims that there are several reasons why future persons cannot be said to have given consent to such arrangements), in what way can paternalism be exploitative, the duty to protect vulnerable people, treating people as citizens and not merely as consumers, and obligations people in the rich [End Page 142] world have to make it difficult for their governments and corporations to impose environmental risks on people in the poor world. All these are discussed within the context of cases and practical questions, such as should employees trade safety for money on the job market. Notice how widely Shrader-Frechette defines environmental injustice. For example, suppose some employees are notified about the unhealthy environment in which they work, about their exposure to various pollutions, and yet decide to take the job and work there. Many people would argue that since they take the risk voluntarily, and since they are given "better" salaries in return, this is no case of injustice. Shrader-Frechette insists that it is, and it seems to me that she is right. What does it mean that these workers take the jobs voluntarily? Obviously, if they could take similar but safer jobs, with comparable income, they would prefer the other job. The fact that they are likely to 'choose' this job is probably due to the fact that although the job is risky because of unhealthy environment, the other option—not having a job—is more risky, even in terms of health, because, for example, due to lack of income these people will not have any health insurance, or would become homeless. Moreover, one wonders whether the rise in salary really 'compensates' for anything. It might compensate for the sense of anxiety affiliated with having a risky job in a very technical sense, say, by paying the cost of a weekly visit to a psychologist. But it will never compensate for being mentally or physically ill, or for suffering from cancer. There is a limit to what economists can tell us about 'compensation'. The term just does not work when people have no other choice. Still, Shrader-Frechette argues, and quite rightly, if compensation is the used mechanism, then more of it is better than less. However, is all this environmental ethics? Perhaps some "purists" would answer negatively. The term 'intrinsic value' is rarely if ever mentioned in the book, apart form where Shrader-Frechette distinguishes her book from what used to be mainstream environmental philosophy (p. 5). She is sharp as a sword: those writing about 'intrinsic value' have been playing the violin while Rome burned. This book is therefore a great example for why the boundaries between mainstream environmental ethics and environmental political philosophy should be abolished. When it comes to environmental justice, at least, environmental ethics and political theory should be united, and they should both refer intimately to cases, and to taking action (see Chapter 9): to the way citizens should protect their environment and their fellow human beings. [End Page 143] This book is an academic book, but it is written in a jargon-free style. Because the author argues from cases she can discuss theories and arguments such as Rawls's theory of justice, or a Dworkinian principle of 'treating as equals' without having to assume that the readers are familiar with all the details of these philosophers' works. Moreover, each chapter opens with an 'overview' and ends with a 'conclusion'. This allows the readers to digest these chapters—and there is no doubt that what we read is not easy to digest since it is all about people being mean to each other, and about suffering. However, the book is also about how to fight these. It is about what arguments we can use to—hopefully—persuade the authorities, or at least the public in general, that environmental injustice is bad, morally and politically speaking. In that sense, although the book contains so many horrific stories, it is an optimistic book. But in order for it to be so, we—the readers, those interested in environmental ethics, and the environment in general—must realize that environmental justice is perhaps *the* key issue now in environmental activism. And we get the message: out of apathy.

\*\*\*2AC Fem IR Case Debate

AT: Essentialism [1/2]

The plans use of essentialism is necessary

Hook & Siddle 3 [Glenn D., Director of the National Institute of Japanese studies, Richard, Ph.D, director of the sheffield university doshisha center at doshisha university, "Japan and Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity", google books]



AT: Essentialism [2/2]

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AT: You Essentialize the Western Subject

**Our usage of the term Western is not essentializing; the term refers to an ontological system in which one is engendered in the historical image of the Western subject and opens up space for the dynamic shift of the subject in differential circumstances**

Yegenoglu 98

(Meyda [prof of sociology @ Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey], *Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism*, p. 2-4, 1998, Cambridge University Press)

The Western subject should not be thought of as an essence. There are many lines of fractures, rifts, discontinuities, and divisions that crisscross the Western subject. The use of such a term carries the risk of disregarding its diversity and the variety of class, gendered, national, ethnic, and other differences that permeate and impregnate it. It is true that there has never been one Western subject; it covers a great variety of differences. The process of becoming-a-Western-subject is not a process that simply homogenizes and makes uniform but that also differentiates. Hence **it implies neither an essential unity nor homogeneity**. This subject is working class, English, female, male, French, upper class and so on. The intricate processes at work that influence this differentiation require a sophisticated analysis beyond the scope and aim of this book. Although the word covers a great variety of other determinants, the traces and effects of the location I call "Western" nevertheless wait to be accounted for. Despite the difficulties in attributing unity to this subject (as the differentiations are great and there are contradictory, discordant, and disharmonious positions), it is nevertheless **not easy to claim that there is no validity** or justified ground **in the usage of such a term**. The task that awaits us is to affirm the validity of the term "Western subject" while at the same time complicating and revisiting the modernist, humanist, and metaphysical bind in which such a term is caught up; we should be wary of the risk of "re-introducing precisely what is in question.'' 1 Should I be using the term Western subject without problematizing this humanist bind, I would be betraying the whole mission upon which this book is based. The critique of the fundamental categories of humanism and metaphysics is of central importance for postcolonial criticism as these categories (especially the illusory self-certainty and the Western bind apparent in Enlightenment notions of the human and the individual) are constitutive of Western modernity and colonialism. Thus, **my use of the term does not imply returning to the humanist notion of subjectivity or assuming it is present to itself**. On the contrary, **a critique of the Western subject implies critiquing its self-certainty, authority, and value**. Such a critique, in other words, relies on deconstructing the very metaphysical gesture upon which it is based, yet it is far from indicating the dissolution or annihilation of the subject. The well-celebrated gesture of the "death of the subject" or the "decentring of the subject" does not imply its final annihilation. The presumptions that celebrate this dissolution are themselves part of the metaphysical gesture that such a celebration aims to criticize.2

Accordingly, in this work the category Western subject does not refer to an essence or uniformity nor to a metaphysical self-presence. The connotation is not essence but the process of constitution of identity; it thus refers to a position or positioning, to a place, or placing, that is, to a specific inhabiting of a place**. It refers to a process** of generation, to a process of coming into being, of invention and of fashioning of a place called "Western". The peculiarity of a colonial discourse such as Orientalism may be said to reside precisely in the Westernizing (as well as Orientalizing) operation itself. This is a process by which members are instituted as Western subjects. The operation I call "Westernizing" consists in the fashioning of a historically specific fantasy whereby members imagine themselves as Western. **This engendering and fashioning of the Western subject thus has a fictive character.** But the fictive character of this position does not mean that it is not real; on the contrary, it produces material effects by constituting the very bodies of the subjects that it subjects**. It refers to the historical inscription of a particular identity**. To put it in different terms, the process of "becoming" a Western subject refers to its members becoming ontologized. 3 **One is not a Western subject because there exists a pregiven structure called the Western culture** which imposes itself upon its members. The transformation of individuals into Western subjects is not accomplished by issuing Western identity cards.4 One "becomes" and is made Western by being subjected to a process called Westernizing and by imagining oneself in the fantasy frame of belonging to a specific culture called the "West." This imaginary, however, is not a private or an individual undertaking**. It is a process that exists externally and objectively.** The Lacanian formulation of fantasy and the desire that induces it is central to my discussion of the Orientalist discourse in the following pages, but my use of the psychoanalytic notion of ''fantasy" and the associated term "object petit a" should not be considered as an individual matter, but rather something conditioned by objective and structural processes.

However, the process that constitutes subjects as Western is not identical in each individual instance; it is subject to differential articulation at every specific historical moment and in different cases. Therefore, I do not claim that the analysis I offer here is valid for every specific instance of Orientalist discourse. What I do here is to chart the unconscious of Orientalism that needs to be rethought and reconfigured at every different instance. The specific instance I address in this book is veiling.

2AC: AT Patriarchy Inevitable

**Appeals to human nature are grounded in masculine bias, not reality—patriarchy guarantees extinction**

**Clark 4** [Mary E., PhD and professor of biological studies @ Berkeley, "RHETORIC, PATRIARCHY & WAR: EXPLAINING THE DANGERS OF "LEADERSHIP" IN MASS CULTURE", http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-4005307/Rhetoric-patriarchy-war-explaining-the.html]

I begin by questioning the notion that patriarchy is a "natural" or "inevitable" form of human society. By "patriarchy" I do not mean a community or society where males hold political positions as spokespersons for the whole and often are adjudicators of local disputes. This "male function" is common in tribal and indigenous societies. But men's power over others is severely limited and generally held only at the pleasure of the entire group, especially the elder women. (4) Patriarchies, rather, are those much larger societies where not only is there gender dominance; they also are highly class-structured, with a small, powerful elite controlling the rest of society, A short history of these entities is necessary to understand today's dilemma. Rigidly controlled patriarchies have evolved and disintegrated at many times and in many places in the past few millennia of human existence-which, being the era of written history, is the condition of humankind most familiar to us. But, as I have argued elsewhere (5) this was **an unknown political condition throughout earlier human existence**, when small, egalitarian, highly dialogic communities prevailed. Even today, **small remnants** of such societies **still exist** in comers of the planet that escaped the socially destructive impact of Western colonization. Modern Western "democracies" are, in fact, patriarchal in structure, evolving out of the old, male-dominated aristocracies of late-Medieval Europe. Those historic class/caste hierarchies were legitimized by embedded religious dogma and inherited royal authority. Together, church and monarch held a monopoly of physical and economic power, creating politically stable, albeit unjust, societies. During the gradual development of the religious Reformation, coupled with the Enlightenment's concept of the "individual citizen," emerging egalitarian ideas threatened to destabilize the social coherence of patriarchal regimes. At the same time, principalities and dukedoms were fusing into kingdoms; kingdoms, in turn, were joining together as giant nation states. The United Kingdom was formed of England, Wales and Scotland-each a fusion of local earlier dukedoms. City States of Italy fused rather later. Bismarck created the "Second Reich" out of diverse German-speaking princedoms in the 1870s. And, adding to this growth in the sheer size of patriarchies there was a doubling of populations every couple of generations. Nation-states emerged as "mass cultures," with literally millions of persons under the control of a single, powerful government. The centralized physical power possessed by most of these several industrializing European nations matched or exceeded that of ancient Rome. To achieve coherence of such societies demanded a new legitimating force to create a broad base of support among giant, diverse populations. The erosion of the belief that classes were a god-given, "natural" state of affairs was hastened by the introduction of low-cost printing and rapidly growing levels of literacy (both necessary to underpin the new Industrial Age). These politically equalizing forces unleashed a host of social discontents that had to be controlled. The old religious threats of damnation or excommunication were fast losing their force, and new legal systems circumscribed the absolute powers of monarchs to control social behavior. This very cacaphony of voices threatened the stability of the new giant states. The "solution," of course, was to take control of the public dialogue, to define the legitimate "topics of conversation." This is the primary role of political "leadership" in today's mass societies, and that leadership uses two major tools to wield its influence: rhetoric and the mass media. I suggest, then, that the high potential for internal instability in giant patriarchal states is a primary factor in setting the stage for today's global insecurity and the extreme militaristic rhetoric that exists both within and between nations. Before continuing this discussion of patriarchy's dangers, I would note that, although in modern Western patriarchies the domination of women by men is less evident as women have gained increasing political and economic status, women with such status tend to assume the "shoulder pads" and "language" of men when it comes to political and economic institutions. Women like Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, Golda Melt, Israeli Prime Minister; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Reagan's Ambassador to the United Nations; Madeleine Albright, Clinton's Secretary of State; Margaret Thatcher, Britain's Prime Minister; and Condoleezza Rice, George W. Bush's Security Advisor, come readily to mind. (Thatcher cites the following terms the media applied to her: Iron Lady, Battling Maggie, and Attila the Hen. (6)) The glass ceiling in the corporate world has proved harder to crack, however, so fewer well-known examples exist there of powerful females. (Katherine Graham, who became publisher of the Washington Post after the death of her husband, was one of the few powerful women who to her credit, did not adopt the patriarchal mode.) Hence, I regard the Western nations' politico-economic world view as very much in accordance with that of historical patriarchies, with perhaps one or two Scandinavian exceptions. I thus conclude that the language of international politics today is "gendered" by the political insecurity experienced by leaders of earlier patriarchies, and that the presence of women in such governments has little effect on the framework of public dialogue. (I recall hearing Geraldine Ferraro, when running for Vice-President in 1984, assure an interviewer that she would not hesitate to push the "nuclear button" if necessary.) Hence, **it is not our X and Y chromosomes that are at issue here; it is the gendered world view that underpins our institutions and frames our behaviors.** As long as those in power "think" in this patriarchal box, we will live in a globally-armed camp, where **war-leading even to the annihilation of our species-is a constant, real possibility.**

2AC: Challenging Gender Violence Key

**Military presence harms more than just Okinawan communities - the impact of masculine militarism is felt all around the globe - gender must be challenged to achieve de-militarization**

**Waller 1** [Marguerite R., Ph.D in Comparative Literature @ Yale University, Professor of English and Woman's studies @ UC Riverside, "Frontline Feminism: Women, Wars and Resistance, google books, pgs. 166-7]

The presence of U.S. bases predetermines national foreign policy in Korea, Japan. and the Philippines. Through treaties and agreements, the host governments are tied to U.S. foreign policy, its alliances and enmities. Ruling elites also share U.S. economic priorities. Much opposition to the U.S. military in East Asia is based on nationalism and self-determination. Women's analysis and organizing also focus on the sexism and racism involved in U.S. military violence in Asian host communities and the sexism of the East Asian governments who are complicit in letting such violence go on. They argue that eliminating gender inequalities and specifically ending violence against women must be **a fundamental element of a demilitarized future.** They challenge the conventional military notion of security: that the military protects ordinary people. On the contrary, they argue that the military harms many people, including women and children in East Asia who are victims of personal violence, hit-and-run accidents, or the severe noise and disruption of military training. The U.S. military system also harms women in the military. many of whom experience sexual harassment, and women and children in military families where domestic violence is much higher than in civilian families. The military disrupts local communities, damages local economies and contaminates the physical environment wherever it is located. Military security has devastated inner-city communities in the U.S. by starving them of resources-public funds to rebuild their economies and infrastructure, as well as the talents and hopes of their young people who are condemned lo long-term unemployment in neighborhoods destroyed by poverty, crime. and violence or forced to seek opportunities elsewhere (Childs 1993). Genuine security derives from the expectation that four fundamental conditions will be met: that the environment in which we live in can sustain life: that our basic survival needs for food, clothing and shelter will be met; that our fundamental human dignity and personal and cultural identities will be respected; and that we will be protected from avoidable harm. Women in the U.S. need to work with women from East Asia and many other countries to redefine security. We need to link foreign policy issues and U.S. domestic concerns, showing similarities and continuities in our experiences, the underlying causes of military violence and suggestions for activism-locally, nationally. and internationally.

2AC: AT Okinawa Not Key Site Of Resistance[1/2]

**Historical context makes Okinawa the key site of contestation - questioning gendered relations spills over to all of Japan**

**McCormack 8** [Gavan, meritus Professor and Visiting Fellow, Division of Pacific and Asian History @ Australian National University, "THE ALTERNATIVE TO JAPAN'S DEPENDENT MILITARISM, October 20, http://www.britannica.com/bps/additionalcontent/18/35010252/The-Okinawan-Alternative-to-Japans-Dependent-Militarism-Japanese-translation-available/fulltext]

This is a slightly abridged English version of a talk delivered in Japanese (see attached text) at the offices of the Ryukyu Shimpo in Naha, Okinawa, on the occasion of the award of the Ikemiyagi Shui Prize to Japan Focus on 18 September 2008. An abridged version of the Japanese text was published in Ryukyu shimpo on 22 September 2008. It was posted at Japan Focus on October 13, 2008. Okinawa is simultaneously Japan's periphery and its centre. It is peripheral for obvious geographical reasons, being much closer to the China coast and Taiwan than to Tokyo, but it is also peripheral in the historical sense that its links with the main Japanese islands, and eventually with the modern Japanese state, have been thin, fraught, and relatively recent. Only belatedly incorporated as a prefecture in the Japanese state in the late 19th century, it was then excised from it between 1945 and 1972, and only half restored to it in 1972, since the US bases remained intact. It has continued since then to be governed as if the US-Japan Security Treaty mattered more than the Japanese peace constitution, half-in and half-out of the country, so to speak. Though thus peripheral, Okinawa is also "central" in that it constitutes the fulcrum on which the key security relationship between the US and Japan rests. Okinawa's culture, with this "half in and half out" quality and the blend of the pre-modern, modern, and post-modern, reflects this ambiguity. With only relatively faint traces of Yamato, Tenno, samurai, imperialist/militarist, and salaryman cultures, and with strong elements of shamanism and sense of affinity with Asia and the Pacific, Okinawa appears as both "Japan" and "non-Japan." Because of its difference, mainland elites have tended to look on Okinawa as backward, but the same qualities may rather signify Okinawa's strength, offering the mainland a glimpse of what its multicultural future and bonds to Asia Pacific nations might look like. The contradictory forces that surround Okinawa are burdensome, but they generate a tension and openness, and a level of hope, civic responsibility and energy unequalled elsewhere in Japan. Without such qualities, Okinawa could never have become the byword for grassroots democratic struggle that it has become. In the post-Cold War world, the US has called for Japan to play a greatly stepped up military role (from the 1996 "Guidelines" to the 2005-6 "Beigun Saihen" or US military realignment), and governments in Tokyo have done their best to comply. My understanding of this is that these measures deepen and reinforce Japan's dependence and therefore its irresponsibility, transforming the long-term dependent and semi-sovereign Japanese state of the Cold War into a full "Client State." [1] Far from pursuing its own "values, traditions, and practices," (as other scholars have argued) 21st century Japan scraps them in order to follow American prescriptions, and the present political confusion stems at root from this identity crisis. US Officials such as Richard Armitage (former Deputy Secretary of State), Thomas Schieffer (ambassador) and Defense Robert Gates (Defense Secretary) offer Japan a steady stream of advice - pushing, pulling, and manipulating it in the desired direction, to "show the flag" and "put boots on the ground" in Iraq, to send the MSDF to the Indian Ocean (and keep it there), to revise Ampo de facto and the Constitution explicitly. Yet few ordinary Japanese people share these priorities. It is as much these days as most can manage to cope with livelihood problems - pensions, welfare, and jobs - and so governments, torn between their desire to serve Washington and their need to seem to be serving their own people, always incline to attach priority to the former. In the post Cold War decades, the contest in Japan between civil society and state power has nowhere been sharper than in Okinawa. Okinawa's modern history is commonly seen as a series of acts of shobun, or disposal, in which Okinawan people had no say and their interests were disregarded, first in 1879, when the Ryukyu kingdom was abolished and the islands incorporated, as Okinawa, in the Japanese state; second in 1952, when sovereignty was restored to the rest of Japan but Okinawa, its land and population having been devastated in the Battle of Okinawa, was turned into a US military colony, "Keystone of the Pacific," a center for the cultivation of "war potential," and preparation for "the threat or use of force" such as was forbidden under Article 9 of the Japanese constitution; third in 1972, when the islands were returned to Japan, but with bases and the island's military mission in the service of American power intact; and fourth in 1996, when the return of Futenma base was promised "within five to seven years" but with the catch that it would have to be replaced, the replacement facilities would also have to be located in Okinawa, and Japan would have to foot the bill. The Japanese state has struggled since 1996 to secure the compliance of the Okinawan people to an agenda whose core is priority to the US alliance over the constitution, priority to military over civil or democratic principle, and priority to the interests of the Japanese state over those of the Okinawan people. The cycle of shobun (disposition)and teiko (resistance) has been almost endless. The contest that has evolved especially since 1995 seems to me to be the defining, still unresolved, struggle of Japanese democracy. Priority to military over civil is what is known in neighboring North Korea by the term Sengun. Nobody, so far as I know, compares Okinawa with North Korea, but is the analogy not apt, at least in this respect? The state demands Sengun, and civil society attempts to articulate Senmin, the priority to citizen values and lives and to peace. For the US and Japanese government, the priority to Sengun is plain. The state's design was disguised first as a "Futenma return," that turned out to require the construction of a major new base. The base was disguised first as a "helipad," then as a removable, offshore pontoon with a runway, initially 1,500 meters but gradually stretching to 2,500 meters, before eventually assuming the current form of dual 1,800m runways stretching out from Cape Henoko into Oura Bay, plus a deep sea naval port and other facilities, and a chain of helipads scattered through the forest - a comprehensive air, land and sea base. The people of Nago rejected the designs in their plebiscite of 1997, only to be betrayed by their mayor. They persisted in rejecting the offshore Henoko design until in 2005 Prime Minister Koizumi announced that the state had given up because of "a lot of opposition," whereupon, however, the state drew up the current design. The helipad of 1996, has now evolved into a design for the comprehensive militarization of Yambaru, the northern reaches of the main island. The outcome remains uncertain. Governments and bureaucrats continually renew their strength and, backed by the resources of tbe state, often seem omnipotent. In 2007, even the MSDF was mobilized to take part in an almost certainly illegal survey and to intimidate

2AC: AT Okinawa Not Key Site of Resistance [2/2]

local protesters. The people, on the other hand, tire, age, and sometimes surrender. Yet, despite everything, for this struggle to be able to stall implementation of a project prioritized by the governments of the world's two most powerful countries for a decade indicates its profound historical significance. In July, the Prefectural Assembly took an unequivocal stance of opposition to the new base. [2] Yet Governor Nakaima Hirokazu now quietly abandons both the conditions on which his predecessor had insisted (joint civil-military use, a 15 year limit, and assurance of no harm to the environment) and those which he himself had demanded (a shifting of the base site offshore into Oura Bay), and argues that "realism" demands viewing the project as a fait accompli - a kind of "reluctant realist" pose - and so the construction at Cape Henoko should go ahead, under the subterfuge that what was to be constructed would not be really a "new" base because it would in part be constructed on the site of an existing one. [3] Mainland civil democracy is so enfeebled that the Beigun Saihen process of incorporation of Japan's Self Defense Forces under American command in the global "war on terror" passes with little debate or protest. For Okinawa, stepped up militarization is likely to lead, as it did 63 years ago, not to increased but to diminished security, and it is certain to increase conflicts between the US military and Okinawan people, so civil society is compelled to respond. Okinawa is a litmus test of Japan's constitutionalism. From 1945 to 1972, "Japan" was divided into the mainland "peace state" under the Constitution and its Article 9 on the one hand and the Okinawan "war state" on the other, both tied symbiotically within the US's Pacific and Asian Cold War system. Since the "reversion" of 1972, the reinforced Okinawan "war state" has begun to erode the fabric of the "peace state" mainland. As Article 9 is steadily emptied out, the "peace" and "war" functions merge, Ampo trumping Kempo. Although the Nagoya High Court held in April 2008 that the Japanese intervention in the Indian Ocean in the form of dispatch of MSDF to refuel US and allied ships was unconstitutional, the politicians who represent the Japanese state treated it as a kind of joke. The Foreign Minister said he would read the judgment if he had time and the head of the Air SDF dismissed it with a vulgar comic expression as something that had "nothing to do with us." Such contempt for the constitution is plainly in breach of Article 99, but it is an attitude that has permeated the higher echelons of state ever since the landmark US intervention of 1959, of which details have only recently come to light. [4] Outside the state bureaucracy, however, civil society strongly mobilizes at the grass-roots) to protect and demand adherence to Article 9. The "Article 9 Society," founded in 2004, has blossomed into a nationwide movement with over 7,000 branches. The power of such grassroots mobilization was evident in the Upper House election of 2007, when the revision-intent Prime Minister suffered a humiliating electoral rebuff. The Okinawan experience also raises large questions about other clauses, notably those on Local Self-Government, especially A 93 and A 94, since Okinawan self-government has repeatedly been subordinated to the requirements of the US alliance. Recently, instead of seeking the informed consent that a democratic society demands, governments have sought instead to gain formal consent, by fiscal manipulation that combines incentives and threats. It is a stratagem developed over the past decade by the bureaucrats at the helm of the nation state to impose their base project on Nago City. Since Nago opposition to the new Henoko Base was plain, and the formal consent of local self-governing bodies was necessary, money was poured in to secure it under the 10 year, 10 billion yen per year, "Northern Districts Development" policy adopted in 1999. That procedure, codified in May 2007 under the Special Measures Law on the Reorganization of US Forces in Japan (Beigun saihen tokubetsu sochiho) was then applied nationally, so that in that additional sense mainland Japan experienced "Okinawa-ization." The "Nago model" has proved singularly effective, as shown during 2008 by the defeat of Mayor Ihara Katsusuke in Iwakuni and the surrender of Mayor Hoshino Katsushi in Zama to plans for expanded US military presence in their cities. But even as the state seemed to triumph by using the new law to eliminate opposition to the Beigun Saihen at the local government level, the Okinawan prefectural assembly adopted its historic resolution, showing that that was far from being guaranteed. The employment of fiscal pressures to break popular will and buy consent encourages cynicism and corruption, blocks true development rooted in local needs, and is plainly contrary to the spirit, even if within the letter of democracy (cf. the regional self-government clauses, especially A93 and A94). It seems to me as a historian that the roots of the present "Okinawan problem" are embedded in a past that goes back long before the US-Japan Security Treaty. It is just 400 years since the Okinawan (Ryukyuan) king enunciated the principle of Nuchi du takara or non-resistance, in the face of the Satsuma samurai's Sengun, initiating the process of forceful incorporation by Japan. Sengun militarism has been the bane of Okinawa ever since - under Satsuma, the modern Japanese state, the US, and now the joint US-Japan regime. Article 9 was in 1946 a new and astounding reversal for mainland Japan, but for Okinawa it was a reversion to an ancient ideal, and to the centuries when the culture of these islands was a byword for sophistication, culture and peace. If it were indeed the case that Nuchi du Takara principle encapsulates some Okinawan essence, then it is up to present-day Okinawans to spell out ways, not just for Okinawa but for humanity, to come to terms with nature, finding a way beyond both war and rampant developmentalism with its environmental destruction. I have said enough about war. In the public works-centred economy that has prevailed in Okinawa for the three and a half decades since reversion, nature has come to be seen as something to be "fixed" (by seibi) in a process that has virtually no limit. [5] As a result, the natural environment, notably in the form of the coral, the dugong, the noguchigera, is under siege. Only a recovery of Nuchi du takara values (and within them, presumably, a reassertion of cooperative, non-market, yuimaru values) can hope to save it. Plainly the Yambaru can be either militarized or protected, can follow either "Sengun" or Nuchi du takara, not both.

2AC: Okinawa Key Site Of Resistance

**Okinawan militarism is a critical site of resistance – causes the gender socialization which upholds patriarchal militarism**

**Kirk and Francis 2k**

(Gwyn [member of the San Francisco Bay Area Okinawa Peace Network, founding member of the East Asia-U.S. Women's Network Against Militarism], Carolyn [member of Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, founding member of the East Asia-U.S. Women's Network Against Militarism], Redefining Security: Women Challenge U.S. Military Policy and Practice in East Asia, The Regents of the University of California on behalf of Berkeley Women's Law Journal, 2000, lexis)

Many of the problems created by U.S. military presence in East Asia stem from the **sexist attitudes and hyper-masculine culture that pervade** the military. Different branches of the U.S. Armed Forces have developed this hyper-masculine culture to varying degrees, with the Air Force at the lower end of the spectrum and the Marines at the higher end. [n74](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1276638849523&returnToKey=20_T9558503375&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.53739.27388583655#n74) **This phenomenon has had far reaching effects in** places such as  [\*240]  **Okinawa, where Marines account for sixty percent of the U.S. troop**s. [n75](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1276638849523&returnToKey=20_T9558503375&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.53739.27388583655#n75) Young boys in the United States, as in many parts of the world, develop their masculine identity during early childhood through a combination of adventure stories, comics, cartoons, competitive team sports, war toys, computer games, news reporting, ads, television shows, and films. [n76](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1276638849523&returnToKey=20_T9558503375&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.53739.27388583655#n76) **This routine gender socialization is taken further in basic military training where new recruits are pushed to the limits of their strength and stamina and are trained to follow orders without question**, no matter how nonsensical or humiliating. [n77](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1276638849523&returnToKey=20_T9558503375&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.53739.27388583655#n77) As part of military training, servicemen learn how to use highly sophisticated weaponry and equipment; they are socialized as warriors. A key aspect of this training and socialization process is the way **recruits are insulted and reviled by drill sergeants as "women" and "queers" as part of the military promise "to make a man" of them**. [n78](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1276638849523&returnToKey=20_T9558503375&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.53739.27388583655#n78)

According to feminist scholars of military systems and international relations, **militarism depends on a clearly gendered division of labor and the maintenance of hierarchy, including sexism and violence against women**. [n79](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1276638849523&returnToKey=20_T9558503375&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.53739.27388583655#n79) Military socialization involves the construction of a militarized masculinity that emphasizes heroism, physical strength, emotional detachment,  [\*241]  the capacity for violence and killing, and an appearance of invulnerability. [n80](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1276638849523&returnToKey=20_T9558503375&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.53739.27388583655#n80)

Intersection Key

**Addressing the intersection of race and gender is key to breaking down sexual domination of the Asian woman – this intersectional domination is inscribed by Western military involvement where predominantly White men “buy” the bodies of Asian women**

**Woan 8**

(Sunny [J.D., Public Interest and Social Justice Law, emphasis in Critical Race Theory], ARTICLE: WHITE SEXUAL IMPERIALISM: A THEORY OF ASIAN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, 14 Wash. & Lee J. Civil Rts. & Soc. Just. 275, Spring 2008, lexis)

The dominance approach to feminist theory frames the question of equality as "a question of the distribution of power." [n207](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277320029201&returnToKey=20_T9613159434&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.673938.4834940832" \l "n207) Thus, gender equality, as a question of power, scrutinizes "male supremacy and female subordination." [n208](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277320029201&returnToKey=20_T9613159434&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.673938.4834940832" \l "n208) Following this logic, racial equality scrutinizes White supremacy and non-White subordination**. For the Asian woman at the intersection of gender and race, achieving equality means overthrowing not only male supremacy or White supremacy, but specifically White male supremacy**. Since "sexuality appears as the interactive dynamic of gender as an inequality" [n209](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277320029201&returnToKey=20_T9613159434&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.673938.4834940832" \l "n209) and "aggression against those with less power is experienced as sexual pleasure, an entitlement of masculinity," [n210](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277320029201&returnToKey=20_T9613159434&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.673938.4834940832" \l "n210) **it is the White male's sexual dominance over the Asian female which emerges as the source of inequality that the Asian female suffers.**

Moreover, **for Asian feminist jurisprudence, "colonial and military domination are interwoven with sexual domination."** [n211](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277320029201&returnToKey=20_T9613159434&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.673938.4834940832" \l "n211) **The Western military's involvement in Asia, both in colonial and neo-colonial history, has led to Asia's sex tourism industry**. [n212](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277320029201&returnToKey=20_T9613159434&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.673938.4834940832" \l "n212) **This is an industry where the buyers of bodies for sexual pleasure are predominantly White men and the sellers of their bodies for sexual pleasure are predominantly Asian women. No other fact or condition confirms the imbalanced power relations between the East and the West. This imbalance** [\*300**]  of power came from White men imperializing Asia** [n213](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277320029201&returnToKey=20_T9613159434&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.673938.4834940832" \l "n213) **and,** in the course of conquest, the **taking of Asian women's bodies as their spoils.** [n214](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277320029201&returnToKey=20_T9613159434&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.673938.4834940832" \l "n214) The pervasiveness of sexual objectification establishes in the minds of Westerners a stereotype of Asian women as hyper-sexualized, since their only utility to Westerners for centuries come from their sexual submission. [n215](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277320029201&returnToKey=20_T9613159434&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.673938.4834940832" \l "n215)

AT: You Don’t Solve All Colonialism

The negative’s logic perpetuates colonialism – a unitary discourse of colonialism solves

Yegenoglu 98

(Meyda [prof of sociology @ Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey], *Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism*, 1998, Cambridge University Press)

It has been suggested that the prevalent perception of colonialism and of colonial discourse is characterized in unitary and essentialized terms. By evoking colonialism as a transhistorical and global phenomenon, such terms not only imply a homogenizing vision of colonialism but also suggest that colonialism was a coherent imposition, implying that it was all pervasively efficacious in dominating and assimilating the colonized,50 **Such a unitary understanding** of colonialism also **implies that the discourse of colonialism operated identically across the colonized space and throughout time**.51 In this respect, it is claimed that by employing the Manichaean division between self and other, colonizer and colonized, colonial discourse theory perpetuates the terms and dominance established by colonial history that it aims to scrutinize.52 Benita Parry criticizes colonial discourse theory for being complicit with the postulates of colonial discourse, because it retains colonialism's undifferentiated identity categories. In opposition to this, **she suggests that the range of possible subject positions can never be wholly determined by any system of coercion**.53

Each Instance of Rejecting Militarism Key

**Each instance of rejecting militarism is key – serve as a critical site of resistance and a starting point for dismantling the colonial militarism of the status quo**

**Ferguson and Mironesco 8**

(Kathy E [prof of polisci and gender studies at University of Hawai’i], Monique [prof of women’s studies at University of Hawaii – Manoa], Chapter 16: Environmental Effects of U.S. Military Security, in Gender and Globalization in Asia and the Pacific, ed. Kathy E. Ferguson and Monique Mironesco, © 2008 University of Hawai‘i Pres)

Militarism often seems to stand outside of globalization because wars and armies are generally activities of states (although nonstate terrorism complicates this understanding) and because violence seems to separate people and places, while global flows connect them. Yet global flows of violence, arms, soldiers, mercenar- ies, contractors, strategies, environmental destruction, and bellicose gendered imaginaries are part and parcel of globalization. Militarization, and by implica- tion demilitarization, is a complex process with a long history and many layers**. Militarization happens step by step**, through dense networks of microdecisions about how we live, work, and think as well as through obvious public policies, vi- olent colonial histories, and visible macrodecisions through which elites orga- nize the world and use its resources. **Militarization** also **marks sites of struggle, contests over not just how to militarize but whether to do so.**

Our Act of Resistance to Militarism Key

**Our act of resistance to the militarized work order is critical to reverse the tide of militarism – opens the door to a counter-discourse needed to create the possibility for global change**

**Ferguson and Mironesco 8**

(Kathy E [prof of polisci and gender studies at University of Hawai’i], Monique [prof of women’s studies at University of Hawaii – Manoa], Chapter 16: Environmental Effects of U.S. Military Security, in Gender and Globalization in Asia and the Pacific, ed. Kathy E. Ferguson and Monique Mironesco, © 2008 University of Hawai‘i Pres)

Lastly, hierarchical, bellicose cultural imaginaries are hot commodities in militarized global communications. Far from representing a breakdown of com- munications, militarization works through intensified communication flows that naturalize top-down authority and interpret differences in terms of absolute “otherness.” Militarized societies neglect the possibilities of diplomacy or other strategies to resolve conflict, and become accustomed to solving (or pretending to solve) problems with violence; violence becomes routine, ordinary, “just the way things are**.” Yet demilitarization struggles are also global, recruiting coun- terflows of language and material to imagine a different world.**

AT: Speaking for Others

**The feminist hermeneutic of the affirmative employs a discourse of speaking *with* others, not for them – feminist scholarship integrates the real perspectives and experiences of indigenous women in scholarly works – this is the only way to create a productive relationship between nonindigenous and indigenous women**

**Ferguson and Mironesco 8**

(Kathy E [prof of polisci and gender studies at University of Hawai’i], Monique [prof of women’s studies at University of Hawaii – Manoa], Chapter 16: Environmental Effects of U.S. Military Security, in Gender and Globalization in Asia and the Pacific, ed. Kathy E. Ferguson and Monique Mironesco, © 2008 University of Hawai‘i Pres)

Many of these essays develop a feminist hermeneutic: that is, they articulate and privilege a neglected and devalued point of view, pull it to the center of the analysis, and use it to generate a critique of the power relations that produced the neglect and devaluation in the first place. Feminist hermeneutics allow readers to enter the lifeworlds of the research subjects, imagine previously unknown worlds, and understand unfamiliar others as creatures of reason. Feminist hermeneutics allow us to articulate submerged discourses and tell neglected stories. Metaxas’s essay honors the subaltern discourse of Native Hawaiian healers, suppressed but not destroyed by missionary hegemonies. her hermeneutic is suspicious of the missionary’s accounts of Native Hawaiians because she locates the missionaries’ points of view within the structural context of colonial power inequalities. Raiskin uncovers indigenous stories hidden in or coopted by colonial accounts of Samoa. She takes readers into pacific Island stories in order to apprehend the gaze of colonized people back onto the anthropologists, missionaries, developers, and educators who are usually empowered to speak authoritatively about “na- tives.” **While both writers are in the complex position of nonindigenous scholars doing research on indigenous topics, they position themselves not as speaking for native people but as speaking with them and others about colonial encounters**.10 Ibarra and Price employ a similar tool of hermeneutics when they include lengthy quotations from the Mexican and Indian migrant women workers they inter- view. These writers frame extensive quotations within a context that recovers the sense of their interviewees’ words and renders their worlds intelligible. Yau Ching, Derné, riley, and Kirk exemplify a comparable hermeneutic tool—active, patient listening, over a considerable period of time, to bring the lifeworlds of de- linquent girls, film-viewing men, migrant women, and political activists into focus for readers residing outside those worlds. At the same time, readers may find overlap between their lives and the worlds these essays portray, since girls and women in all parts of the world, including college classrooms, may have ex- perience with laboring under extremely difficult conditions, or leaving their chil- dren to find work, or selling their sexuality, or injuring themselves. In some cases a powerful hermeneutic can create empathy for an unfamiliar life, while in other cases it can clarify shared struggles.

2AC: We Redefine Security

**Our redefinition of security is critical – current notions of security allow for the chronic insecurity of the local in the name of global security, a mythic notion that ultimately globally destructs communities**

**Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 98**

(Gwyn [has taught courses in women's studies and sociology at Antioch College, Colorado College, Hamilton College, Mills College, Rutgers, the University of Oregon, and the University of San Francisco. She received a Rockefeller Fellowship at the University of Hawaii (2002) and was a Visiting Scholar in the Women's Leadership Institute at Mills College (2002-2003)], and Margo [Professor of Social Work at San Francisco State University and a long-time community organizer focused on militarism, globalization, and women's rights], “Making Connections Building an East Asia-U.S. Women’s Network against U.S. Militarism,” 1998, published in *The Women and War Reader*, http://www.gwynkirk.com/pdf/making\_connections\_paper.pdf)

Throughout the meeting the question of what constitutes true security kept coming up. In Japan, for example, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty officially defines security**. But this treaty in no way protected the twelve-year-old Okinawan girl who was raped, or others who have been harmed and abused by U.S. military** personnel. Women’s lack of security is directly linked to this Security Treaty. Participants agreed that **the U.S. military presence does not protect local people but endangers them, and** that **we need to redefine security for our communities.** We do not need 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia. Implicit throughout our discussion is the realization that true security requires respect for land, air, water, and the oceans, and a very different economy with an emphasis on ecological and economic sustainability, not the pursuit of profit. The increasing globalization of the economy will create a world market where many countries cannot control their own resources or provide for their people. We recognized that environmental concerns and economic development are often currently in conflict. Thinking in terms of sustainability removes such conflicts.

Framework – Opposing Empire K2 Equality Struggles/Prioritize Our Impacts

We refuse to be complicit in the imperial project – our instance of resistance against the project of empire opens the space for transformative struggles of social justice, offering a praxis of resistance in which relations are reconstituted

Agathangelou, Bassichis, and Spira 8

(Anna M. [Dr. Agathangelou teaches in Political Science and Women’s Studies at York University, Toronto. She is also the co-director of Global Change Institute, Nicosia], M. Daniel, and Tamara L [PhD candidate in feminist studies at UC Santa Cruz],

In the place of this vision, we offer first and foremost a disruption of com-plicity, a refusal of empire’s promise project. The series of wars in which empire asks us to participate are utterly genocidal, rather than constituting processes that enable our security and healing. As members of different and overlapping communi-ties and struggles, the authors have each grappled personally with this process. As activists and intellectuals who are engaged in struggles around war, migration and trafficking, labor and homelessness, mass imprisonment, and state violence against queer and transgender communities, we are confronted with the seductive –yet ultimately murderous-promises that are described in this essay. Moreover, as members of the academy at different levels (undergraduate student, graduate stu-dent, and faculty member), we have witnessed how the strategies of promise and nonpromise projects have worked to fragment, divide, and conquer people of color, working-class people, queers, transgender people, postcolonial subjects, and others within powerful academic zones of knowledge production. Recognizing that we can never be outside empire’s seductive offerings, we engage these questions out of rage, hope, and the desire to form life-sustaining solidarities and intimacies. We strive with others toward a politics that enables intimacies as both means and ends, as a strategy of movement-building in which relationships are formed not to instantiate empire’s incessant production of internal and external enemies, but to disrupt it. This is a politics that would challenge histories that dichotomize and fragment our worlds, and instead offer praxes of erotic resistance in which we might be able to glimpse a breathing space for reconstituting connections and relations based in col-lectivity and healing.

With this analysis in mind, **all attempts to separate and make discrete strug- gles for social justice and transformation** — those working for prison abolition, sexual and gender freedom, decolonization, and the end to war, for example — **prove unsuc- cessful**. They are always already imbricated in one another. When one struggles to resist coercive sexual or gender regimes — heternormativization as well as homonor- mativization — one is already engaging in a politics deeply implicated in the wars on terror, poverty, and drugs, and in the (neo)slaveries of the prison industrial complex. This is true not only because of the devastating impacts these wars have had on queer communities and sexually aberrant (non)subjects locked away, and because of the ways in which a racializing “sodomotification” is drawn on to produce the crimi- nal and the terrorist. Indeed, the violence and death that we authorize and face operate through and within our libidinal, erotic, and affective investments, invest- ments that we must engage directly and rigorously if we are to disrupt the seductive workings of power in their most intimate dimensions.

2AC - Discourse Matters

**In the context of sexual violence - discourse is key - questioning those in power through discourse allows for sexual empowerment**

**Austin No Date Given** [Anastacia Mott, MD in english, Minor in Gender studies @ Sonoma State University, "HAVING DISCOURSE: TALK MATTERS IN SEX AND POWER, FOUCAULT SAYS", http://www.buzzle.com/articles/having-discourse-talk-matters-in-sex-power-says-foucault.html]

In "We Other Victorians," from volume one of author Michel Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, poses questions concerning the idea of sexual repression and the discourse that surrounds it, from the 17th century until today. He writes, "…repression operated as a sentence to disappear, but also as an injunction to silence, and affirmation of nonexistence, and, by implication that there was nothing to say about such things, nothing to see, and nothing to know" (p.293). The "other" Victorians he refers to are those who don’t fit within the normative society; the pimps, the mental patients, the prostitutes. Only they are permitted – in very limited, conscribed ways – to attach currency to words and gestures not afforded the general public. Foucault’s position is that if repression is an "injunction to silence," then by speaking of sex we are deliberately defying authority. We then briefly join those "others" and step for a moment outside of the supposed repressive reality that rules. We express our desire for change in the power structure by entertaining a discourse about sexuality; creating a "science of sexuality." But are we all talk and no action? Foucault emphasizes the fact that what is important is not necessarily that we are repressed, but what we say about it, and how we say it, that determine actual power. "The question I would like to pose is not: Why are we repressed? But rather: Why do we say, with so much passion and so much resentment against our most recent past, against our present, and against ourselves, that we are repressed? By what spiral did we come to affirm that sex is negated?" (p.297). When I first read this, I thought it meant that he was saying we are not repressed; we are just focused on saying that we are. After further study, I look at this statement now to mean that Foucault is not saying we are not repressed (he later states that we likely are), but that it’s more interesting to look at how and why we say so. Foucault also agrees that there is paradox in living in an age when there is sexual repression but an awful lot of superficial talk about sex; "The affirmation of a sexuality that has never been more rigorously subjugated than during the age of the hypocritical, bustling, and responsible bourgeoisie is coupled with the grandiloquence of a discourse purporting to reveal the truth about sex, modify its economy within reality, subvert the law that governs it, and change its future" (p. 296). He posits that the way in which the speakers hold power and how that power is disseminated can not only contribute to the further repressive nature of this "other Victorian" mentality, but paradoxically can also catalyze what he calls "incitement" to further discourse, an aspect of the "polymorphous techniques of power" (p. 299). One of Foucault’s primary rhetorical strategies is to first state what something is not, and then what he thinks it is. I am not saying "this," I am saying "that." In doing so, he effectively establishes his "ethos" by anticipating an opponent’s potential argument or possible misunderstanding, then clarifying his own position. Despite my instinctive loathing of what I call "theoretical language," I enjoyed this article by Foucault. As a side note, when initially reading the title I assumed this piece was about how we "other" Victorians, not how we are "the other Victorians!" I thought the parallel of the time of repression, post 16th century, with the advent of capitalism was interesting. It makes sense why sex would have to be pushed under the covers, so to speak, so that the most could be gotten out of workers, that they be productive (and reproductive) rather than gluttonous pleasure-seekers. It also makes sense in a more modern way that our capitalist social structure equates pleasure with shopping and buying and consuming products, rather than with sex. Why be having sex all afternoon when you could be out buying this product that will give you more satisfaction? This piece contains the key questions that Foucault is usually concerned with: who has the power and how did they get there? Who is doing the speaking, what are they saying and how is that represented? "What is at issue, briefly, is the overall ‘discursive fact,’ the way in which sex is ‘put into discourse" (p. 299).

2AC - AT: Realism Inevitable

**Realism isn't inevitable - their authors are wrong - the 1ACs attempt to question security is key**

**Mantle 6** [Lecturer in the College of International Relations @ Ritsumeikan University, “Defending the Dugong: Redefining ‘Security’ in Okinawa and Japan", pg. 90, http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/ir/college/bulletin/e-vol.5/MANTLE.pdf]

Although critical scholars, within IR generally and the study of security specifically, draw on a variety of theoretical traditions from within and beyond the disciplinary borders of IR, including the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory and Post-Modernism/Post-Structuralism, a common understanding is that the way things are is only one of many possibilities. As Berger and Luckmann state, ‘Social order exists only as a product of human activity’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1991: 70, emphasis in original). Humans construct their own realities, and within those realities their own identities. What is named as ‘male’, ‘female’, ‘art’ or ‘nature’ is given meaning and value particular to a time and culture. This specific meaning is constructed and then reconstructed daily through language and social custom. Once the temporal and cultural contingency of such concepts is recognised, what has been assumed to be real, inevitable and immutable can be challenged. Such critical thinking is a profound challenge for IR as a discipline and the study of security within the discipline. ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’ says Alexander Wendt (1992: 395). Booth takes this one step further, ‘security is what we make it’ (Booth, 1997: 106, emphasis added). Saying that thinking about politics and doing politics can be done differently opens up the space for change. Since power is integral to any social relation, ‘security’ can be seen as sociopolitical construct. As one concept of security becomes dominant others are ridiculed, suppressed or not even considered. Since such perceptions are often entrenched to the point of ‘naturalness’, problematizing them is potentially disturbing and even threatening. The status quo is the status quo because it suits those who have the power to define and keep it that way. Nevertheless, without such ‘dangerous’ critical questions little substantive change can occur.

2AC: AT Butler

**Okinawans have already performed gender - it doesn't work**

**Tanji 3** [Miyume, Ph.D, Research Fellow @ CAASP, Curtin University, Professor of Political Science and International Relations @ Sophia University, Australian National University, and Murdoch University, "THE ENDURING MYTH OF AN OKINAWAN STRUGGLE: THE HISTORY AND TRAJECTORY OF A DIVERSE COMMUNITY OF PROJECT", http://wwwlib.murdoch.edu.au/adt/pubfiles/adt-MU20040510.152840/02Whole.pdf, pg. 271]

In 1985, a female director of a local radio network, Minamoto Hiromi, was recommended by her boss to report on the Okinawan women’s attendance at the Nairobi Conference. Minamoto declined this recommendation and, in turn, asked him to give her a 12 hour slot of broadcasting and budget lo make a special program on women, produced by female-only staff. The radio network has since given a 12 hour-slot Ilo the UnniFesLiv:1l, each year, in which Minamoto’s colleagues and friends, including Takazato and women from all sectors of the community, produced forums on 'women's issues’ (Production Yui 1986). The issues they discussed were concrete life matters related to the political conditions of Okinawa. namely, food safety, pollution, clothing, health, childbirth, childcare, education, and discrimination. She named the event the ‘Unai Festival’ after the Ryukyuan word, unai, which stands for the 'female sibling gods' who. according to folk belief, protect male siblings from misfortunes and accidents, which embodies the traditional position given to Okinawan women in patriarchal family and society. Okinawan men joined and contributed to these events, however, women intentionally placed themselves in a privileged position in order to reverse and expose the 'normal' gender relations in which females are in underprivileged positions compared to males tn every aspect of the social order. Over the years, the participants called this strategy the 'Unai method' (Minamoto Interview May 1999). Furthermore, Okinawan women have developed a strategy of creating solidarity among different women who are facing varying kinds of gender Issues within ‘Okinawa’ through the Unai festivals. Similarly. they have linked with ‘global feminism': indeed, the strength of the Okinawan women is the ability to connect the local-centered approach to International action.

2AC AT: Bases Good/For The People

**Bases represent masculinized military violence - they drive up arms races, destroy the environment and create a culture of masculinity**

**Gibson 4** [Ian, Senior Lecturer @ College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, "HUMAN SECURITYY POST 9-11: GENDER PERSPECTIVES AND SECURITY EXCLUSION", http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/ir/college/bulletin/e-vol.3/gibson.pdf, pg. 14]

And not only in wartime, the incidences of rape from 1945 in areas surrounding U.S. military **bases in Okinawa in Japan have seriously undermined the idea that these bases are deployed for the security of the people.** In a recent case reported by Stars and Stripes a Marine Lance Cpl. was sentenced to three and a half years in a Japanese prison, “at hard labor, for raping a 19-year old Okinawa woman in May.” (Allen & Sumida, 2004). The Japanese prosecutor had asked for five years, “arguing that the May 25th attack in an alley in Kin, near Camp Hansen, was a ‘heinous and vicious crime’ that could not be forgiven” (Ibid. 2004). The marine it had been documented was “so drunk he could not think straight when he dragged the woman by her hair into the darkness, punched her in the face and raped her.” (Ibid., 2004). It is small wonder that women’s groups have insisted on their voice being heard and lobbied for legislation against such indiscriminate attacks. Out of these attacks came groups like The Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV) who “realized the necessity to consolidate and develop their newly emerged movement to continue the focus of action on military violence against women.” (Akiyabashi 2001:2) Their issues they address came from concerns such as “violence against women and children, promoting human rights of women and children, and environmental destruction.” (Ibid) Women’s gender roles have been construed by society as comforters in war, both for armed forces and for the mourning of the war slain. Their position has been one of service and now they are demanding political perspectives as “a resistance to the male dominance of politics some feminists see as responsible for militarizing security.” (Reardon after Birchenbach, 96:50). The emerging “feminine principle” attends on how to “achieve security so as to sustain and enhance the life chances of the most vulnerable” and “how to arrange relationships so that the vulnerability of one member or part of a system is not exploited to the advantage of another.” (Reardon, 1996:37). It is this vulnerability that women find crucial to the argument of security. The present system is where states try to attain invulnerability to other states, driving up arms production as in the arms race during the Cold War, exploiting much needed environmental resources for this production, and deluding its respective populaces into believing that such production is required for protection.

2AC: Now Is Key/Base Politics Suck [1/3]

**Now is the critical time - the recent protests against Okinawan bases means U.S. withdrawal would send a signal that base politics fail**

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For a country with a pacifist constitution, Japan is bristling with weaponry. Indeed, that Asian land has long functioned as a huge aircraft carrier and naval base for U.S. military power. We couldn’t have fought the Korean and Vietnam Wars without the nearly 90 military bases scattered around the islands of our major Pacific ally. Even today, Japan remains the anchor of what’s left of America’s Cold War containment policy when it comes to China and North Korea. From the Yokota and Kadena air bases, the United States can dispatch troops and bombers across Asia, while the Yokosuka base near Tokyo is the largest American naval installation outside the United States. You’d think that, with so many Japanese bases, the United States wouldn’t make a big fuss about closing one of them. Think again.  The current battle over the Marine Corps air base at Futenma on Okinawa -- an island prefecture almost 1,000 miles south of Tokyo that hosts about three dozen U.S. bases and 75% of American forces in Japan -- is just revving up.  In fact, Washington seems ready to stake its reputation and its relationship with a new Japanese government on the fate of that base alone, which reveals much about U.S. anxieties in the age of Obama. What makes this so strange, on the surface, is that Futenma is an obsolete base. Under an agreement the Bush administration reached with the previous Japanese government, the U.S. was already planning to move most of the Marines now at Futenma to the island of Guam. Nonetheless, the Obama administration is insisting, over the protests of Okinawans and the objections of Tokyo, on completing that agreement by building a new partial replacement base in a less heavily populated part of Okinawa. The current row between Tokyo and Washington is no mere “Pacific squall,” as Newsweek dismissively described it. After six decades of saying yes to everything the United States has demanded, Japan finally seems on the verge of saying no to something that matters greatly to Washington, and the relationship that Dwight D. Eisenhower once called an “indestructible alliance” is displaying ever more hairline fractures. Worse yet, from the Pentagon’s perspective, Japan’s resistance might prove infectious -- one major reason why the United States is putting its alliance on the line over the closing of a single antiquated military base and the building of another of dubious strategic value. During the Cold War, the Pentagon worried that countries would fall like dominoes before a relentless Communist advance. Today, the Pentagon worries about a different kind of domino effect. In Europe, NATO countries are refusing to throw their full support behind the U.S. war in Afghanistan. In Africa, no country has stepped forward to host the headquarters of the Pentagon’s new Africa Command. In Latin America, little Ecuador has kicked the U.S. out of its air base in Manta. All of these are undoubtedly symptoms of the decline in respect for American power that the U.S. military is experiencing globally.  But the current pushback in Japan is the surest sign yet that the American empire of overseas military bases has reached its high-water mark and will soon recede. Toady No More? Until recently, Japan was virtually a one-party state, and that suited Washington just fine. The long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had the coziest of bipartisan relations with that city’s policymakers and its “chrysanthemum club” of Japan-friendly pundits. A recent revelation that, in 1969, Japan buckled to President Richard Nixon’s demand that it secretly host U.S. ships carrying nuclear weapons -- despite Tokyo’s supposedly firm anti-nuclear principles -- has pulled back the curtain on only the tip of the toadyism. During and after the Cold War, Japanese governments bent over backwards to give Washington whatever it wanted. When government restrictions on military exports got in the way of the alliance, Tokyo simply made an exception for the United States. When cooperation on missile defense contradicted Japan’s ban on militarizing space, Tokyo again waved a magic wand and made the restriction disappear. Although Japan’s constitution renounces the “threat or the use of force as a means of settling international disputes,” Washington pushed Tokyo to offset the costs of the U.S. military adventure in the first Gulf War against Saddam Hussein in 1990-1991, and Tokyo did so. Then, from November 2001 until just recently, Washington persuaded the Japanese to provide refueling in the Indian Ocean for vessels and aircraft involved in the war in Afghanistan. In 2007, the Pentagon even tried to arm-twist Tokyo into raising its defense spending to pay for more of the costs of the alliance. Of course, the LDP complied with such demands because they intersected so nicely with its own plans to bend that country’s peace constitution and beef up its military. Over the last two decades, in fact, Japan has acquired remarkably sophisticated hardware, including fighter jets, in-air refueling capability, and assault ships that can function like aircraft carriers.  It also amended the 1954 Self-Defense Forces Law, which defines what the Japanese military can and cannot do, more than 50 times to give its forces the capacity to act with striking offensive strength. Despite its “peace constitution,” Japan now has one of the top militaries in the world. Enter the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). In August 2009, that upstart political party dethroned the LDP, after more than a half-century in power, and swept into office with a broad mandate to shake things up. Given the country’s nose-diving economy, the party’s focus has been on domestic issues and cost-cutting. Not surprisingly, however, the quest to cut pork from the Japanese budget has led the party to scrutinize the alliance with the U.S. Unlike most other countries that host U.S. military bases, Japan shoulders most of the cost of maintaining them: more than $4 billion per year in direct or indirect support. Under the circumstances, the new government of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama proposed something modest indeed -- putting the U.S.-Japan alliance on, in the phrase of the moment, a “more equal” footing. It inaugurated

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this new approach in a largely symbolic way by ending Japan’s resupply mission in the Indian Ocean (though Tokyo typically sweetened the pill by offering a five-year package of $5 billion in development assistance to the Afghan government). More substantively, the Hatoyama government also signaled that it wanted to reduce its base-support payments. Japan’s proposed belt-tightening comes at an inopportune moment for the Obama administration, as it tries to pay for two wars, its “overseas contingency operations,” and a worldwide network of more than 700 military bases. The burdens of U.S. overseas operations are increasing, and fewer countries are proving willing to share the costs. Of Dugongs and Democracy The immediate source of tension in the U.S.-Japanese relationship has been Tokyo’s desire to renegotiate that 2006 agreement to close Futenma, transfer those 8,000 Marines to Guam, and build a new base in Nago, a less densely populated area of the island. It’s a deal that threatens to make an already strapped government pay big. Back in 2006, Tokyo promised to shell out more than $6 billion just to help relocate the Marines to Guam. The political cost to the new government of going along with the LDP’s folly may be even higher. After all, the DPJ received a healthy chunk of voter support from Okinawans, dissatisfied with the 2006 agreement and eager to see the American occupation of their island end. Over the last several decades, with U.S. bases built cheek-by-jowl in the most heavily populated parts of the island, Okinawans have endured air, water, and noise pollution, accidents like a 2004 U.S. helicopter crash at Okinawa International University, and crimes that range from trivial speeding violations all the way up to the rape of a 12-year-old girl by three Marines in 1995. According to a June 2009 opinion poll, 68% of Okinawans opposed relocating Futenma within the prefecture, while only 18% favored the plan. Meanwhile, the Social Democratic Party, a junior member of the ruling coalition, has threatened to pull out if Hatoyama backs away from his campaign pledge not to build a new base in Okinawa. Then there’s the dugong, a sea mammal similar to the manatee that looks like a cross between a walrus and a dolphin and was the likely inspiration for the mermaid myth. Only 50 specimens of this endangered species are still living in the marine waters threatened by the proposed new base near less populated Nago. In a landmark case, Japanese lawyers and American environmentalists filed suit in U.S. federal court to block the base’s construction and save the dugong. Realistically speaking, even if the Pentagon were willing to appeal the case all the way up to the Supreme Court, lawyers and environmentalists could wrap the U.S. military in so much legal and bureaucratic red tape for so long that the new base might never leave the drawing board. For environmental, political, and economic reasons, ditching the 2006 agreement is a no-brainer for Tokyo. Given Washington’s insistence on retaining a base of little strategic importance, however, the challenge for the DPJ has been to find a site other than Nago. The Japanese government floated the idea of merging the Futenma facility with existing facilities at Kadena, another U.S. base on the island. But that plan -- as well as possible relocation to other parts of Japan -- has met with stiff local resistance. A proposal to further expand facilities in Guam was nixed by the governor there. The solution to all this is obvious: close down Futenma without opening another base. But so far, the United States is refusing to make it easy for the Japanese. In fact, Washington is doing all it can to box the new government in Tokyo into a corner. Ratcheting Up the Pressure The U.S. military presence in Okinawa is a residue of the Cold War and a U.S. commitment to containing the only military power on the horizon that could threaten American military supremacy. Back in the 1990s, the Clinton administration’s solution to a rising China was to “integrate, but hedge.” The hedge -- against the possibility of China developing a serious mean streak -- centered around a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance and a credible Japanese military deterrent. What the Clinton administration and its successors didn’t anticipate was how effectively and peacefully China would disarm this hedging strategy with careful statesmanship and a vigorous trade policy. A number of Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines and Indonesia, succumbed early to China’s version of checkbook diplomacy. Then, in the last decade, South Korea, like the Japanese today, started to talk about establishing “more equal” relations with the United States in an effort to avoid being drawn into any future military scrape between Washington and Beijing. Now, with its arch-conservatives gone from government, Japan is visibly warming to China’s charms. In 2007, China had already surpassed the United States as the country’s leading trade partner. On becoming prime minister, Hatoyama sensibly proposed the future establishment of an East Asian community patterned on the European Union.  As he saw it, that would leverage Japan’s position between a rising China and a United States in decline. In December, while Washington and Tokyo were haggling bitterly over the Okinawa base issue, DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa sent a signal to Washington as well as Beijing by shepherding a 143-member delegation of his party’s legislators on a four-day trip to China. Not surprisingly, China’s bedazzlement policy has set off warning bells in Washington, where the People’s Republic is still a focus of primary concern for a cadre of strategic planners inside the Pentagon. The Futenma base -- and its potential replacement -- would be well situated, should Washington ever decide to send rapid response units to the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, or the Korean peninsula. Strategic planners in Washington like to speak of the “tyranny of distance,” of the difficulty of getting “boots on the ground” from Guam or Hawaii in case of an East Asian emergency. Yet the actual strategic value of Futenma is, at best, questionable. The South Koreans are more than capable of dealing with any contingency on the peninsula. And the United States frankly has plenty of firepower by air (Kadena) and sea (Yokosuka) within hailing distance of China. A couple thousand Marines won’t make much of a difference (though the leathernecks strenuously disagree). However, in a political environment in which the Pentagon is finding itself making tough choices between funding counterinsurgency wars and old Cold War weapons systems, the “China threat” lobby doesn’t want to give an inch. Failure to relocate the Futenma base within Okinawa might be the first step down a slippery slope that could potentially put at risk billions of dollars in Cold War weapons still in the production line. It’s hard to justify buying all the fancy toys without a place to play with them. And that’s one reason the Obama administration has gone to the mat to pressure Tokyo to adhere to the 2006 agreement. It even dispatched Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the Japanese capital last October in advance of President Obama’s own Asian tour. Like an impatient father admonishing an obstreperous teenager, Gates lectured the Japanese “to move on” and abide by the agreement -- to the irritation of both the new government and the public. The punditocracy has predictably closed ranks behind a bipartisan Washington consensus that the new Japanese government should become as accustomed to its junior status as its

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predecessor and stop making a fuss. The Obama administration is frustrated with “Hatoyama's amateurish handling of the issue,” writes Washington Post editorial page editor Fred Hiatt. “What has resulted from Mr. Hatoyama's failure to enunciate a clear strategy or action plan is the biggest political vacuum in over 50 years,” adds Victor Cha, former director of Asian affairs at the National Security Council. Neither analyst acknowledges that Tokyo’s only “failure” or “amateurish” move was to stand up to Washington. “The dispute could undermine security in East Asia on the 50th anniversary of an alliance that has served the region well,” intoned The Economist more bluntly. “Tough as it is for Japan's new government, it needs to do most, though not all, of the caving in.” The Hatoyama government is by no means radical, nor is it anti-American. It isn’t preparing to demand that all, or even many, U.S. bases close. It isn’t even preparing to close any of the other three dozen (or so) bases on Okinawa.  Its modest pushback is confined to Futenma, where it finds itself between the rock of Japanese public opinion and the hard place of Pentagon pressure. Those who prefer to achieve Washington’s objectives with Japan in a more roundabout fashion counsel patience. “If America undercuts the new Japanese government and creates resentment among the Japanese public, then a victory on Futenma could prove Pyrrhic,” writes Joseph Nye, the architect of U.S. Asia policy during the Clinton years. Japan hands are urging the United States to wait until the summer, when the DPJ has a shot at picking up enough additional seats in the next parliamentary elections to jettison its coalition partners, if it deems such a move necessary. Even if the Social Democratic Party is no longer in the government constantly raising the Okinawa base issue, the DPJ still must deal with democracy on the ground. The Okinawans are dead set against a new base. The residents of Nago, where that base would be built, just elected a mayor who campaigned on a no-base platform. It won’t look good for the party that has finally brought real democracy to Tokyo to squelch it in Okinawa. Reverse Island Hop Wherever the U.S. military puts down its foot overseas, movements have sprung up to protest the military, social, and environmental consequences of its military bases. This anti-base movement has notched some successes, such as the shut-down of a U.S. navy facility in Vieques, Puerto Rico, in 2003. In the Pacific, too, the movement has made its mark. On the heels of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, democracy activists in the Philippines successfully closed down the ash-covered Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station in 1991-1992. Later, South Korean activists managed to win closure of the huge Yongsan facility in downtown Seoul. Of course, these were only partial victories. Washington subsequently negotiated a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines, whereby the U.S. military has redeployed troops and equipment to the island, and replaced Korea’s Yongsan base with a new one in nearby Pyeongtaek. But these not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) victories were significant enough to help edge the Pentagon toward the adoption of a military doctrine that emphasizes mobility over position. The U.S. military now relies on “strategic flexibility” and “rapid response” both to counter unexpected threats and to deal with allied fickleness. The Hatoyama government may indeed learn to say no to Washington over the Okinawa bases.  Evidently considering this a likelihood, former deputy secretary of state and former U.S. ambassador to Japan Richard Armitage has said that the United States “had better have a plan B.” But the victory for the anti-base movement will still be only partial. U.S. forces will remain in Japan, and especially Okinawa, and Tokyo will undoubtedly continue to pay for their maintenance. Buoyed by even this partial victory, however, NIMBY movements are likely to grow in Japan and across the region, focusing on other Okinawa bases, bases on the Japanese mainland, and elsewhere in the Pacific, including Guam. Indeed, protests are already building in Guam against the projected expansion of Andersen Air Force Base and Naval Base Guam to accommodate those Marines from Okinawa. And this strikes terror in the hearts of Pentagon planners. In World War II, the United States employed an island-hopping strategy to move ever closer to the Japanese mainland. Okinawa was the last island and last major battle of that campaign, and more people died during the fighting there than in the subsequent atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined: 12,000 U.S. troops, more than 100,000 Japanese soldiers, and perhaps 100,000 Okinawan civilians. This historical experience has stiffened the pacifist resolve of Okinawans. The current battle over Okinawa again pits the United States against Japan, again with the Okinawans as victims. But there is a good chance that the Okinawans, like the Na’vi in that great NIMBY film Avatar, will win this time. A victory in closing Futenma and preventing the construction of a new base might be the first step in a potential reverse island hop. NIMBY movements may someday finally push the U.S. military out of Japan and off Okinawa. It’s not likely to be a smooth process, nor is it likely to happen any time soon. But the kanji is on the wall. Even if the Yankees don’t know what the Japanese characters mean, they can at least tell in which direction the exit arrow is pointing.

\*\*\*AT DISADS

2AC: AT Defense DAs

**AND, defense spending is grounded in patriarchal thought**

**Clark 4** [Mary E., PhD and professor of biological studies @ Berkeley, "RHETORIC, PATRIARCHY & WAR: EXPLAINING THE DANGERS OF "LEADERSHIP" IN MASS CULTURE", http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-4005307/Rhetoric-patriarchy-war-explaining-the.html]

Abstract: Today's Western patriarchal world view now dominates globalwide dialogue among the "leaders" of Earth's nearly two hundred nation-states. Its Machiavellian/Realpolitik assumptions about the necessity of' military power to preserve order within and between groups of humans trumps--and stifles--other potential viewpoints. Founded on the belief that "evil" is innate, it dictates that human conflict must be "controlled": global "law" backed by coercive force. This view, when cross-culturally imposed, becomes a **self-fulfilling prophecy**, thus "legitimating" an escalating use of force. Western leaders (male and female) use a rhetoric couched in a "hegemonic masculinity" to justify their ready use of military force to coerce "those who are against us" into compliance. This translates globally as "national leaders must never lose facet!" Changing this dominant paradigm requires dismantling the hierarchic hegemony of masculine militarism and its related economic institutions, through global cross-cultural dialogues, thus replacing a hegemonic world view and institutions with new, more adaptive visions, woven out of the most useful remnants of multiple past cultural stories. The paper concludes with a few examples where people around the worm are doing just this--using their own small voices to insert their local "sacred social story" into the global dialogue. This global process--free from a hegemonic militaristic rhetoric--has the potential to initiate a planetary dialogue where "boundaries" are no longer borders to be defended, but sites of social ferment and creative adaptation. When the call came for papers on War, Language, and Gender, referring us to Carol Cohn's seminal paper "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," (1) I at first felt that little more could be added on the subject. But events in Washington in the ensuing weeks stimulated me to a broader "take" on this topic. Defense intellectuals, after all, are **embedded in a whole culture**, and the interaction is two-way. Not only does their strategic framework with its euphemistic language about war and killing have the outcome of forcing society to think in their terms; their framework and language developed in response to our deeply embedded, Western cultural image of a Machiavellian / neo-Darwinian universe. In other words, militarism and the necessity for organized physical force (2) emerge out of culturewide assumptions about human nature. Throughout historical times these assumptions have repeatedly proved to be self-fulfilling prophecies. The pervasive perception of enemy-competitors has generated violent conflicts that flared up and died back, only to flare up again through our failure to achieve deep resolution and, especially, to alter our basic beliefs about human nature and our consequent social institutions. Today our species, politically, comprises some 180190 "nations" of varying cultural homogeneity and moral legitimacy, not to mention size and physical power. Regardless of their indigenous, internal cultural preferences, their cross-national interactions are institutionalized to fit a framework long established by former Western colonial powers among themselves. In other words, the global "reality" constructed by Western patriarchies-a Realpolitik, ultimately grounded in military power-has come to define day-to-day cross-national politics. During the era of the Cold War, this resulted in small, powerless nations seeking alliances with one or other superpower, which offered not only development aid but military protection, and, for locally unpopular, but "cooperating" leaders, small arms to maintain order at home. The "end" of the Cold War brought little change in this pervasive global militarism (though it did strengthen the role of economic hegemony by the remaining superpower (3)). The enormous technological "improvements"-i.e. efficiency in killing power-in weaponry of all types over the past few decades has now resulted in a dangerously over-armed planet that simultaneously faces a desperate shortage of resources available for providing the world's people with water, **energy, health care, education, and the infrastructure for distributing them**. While our environmental and social overheads continue to mount, our species seems immobilized, trapped in an institutionalized militarism-an evolutionary cul-de-sac! We need new insights-as Cohn said, a new language, a new set of metaphors, a new mental framework-for thinking, dialoguing and visioning new patterns of intersocietal interaction.

2AC AT: Okinawa Deterrence [1/2]

**Okinawa no longer needs to be a critical site of military presence. Withdrawal should take place immediately to spur independence and genuine security**

**Bandow 10** [Doug*,* Senior fellow @ the Cato Institute, former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author and editor of several books, "JAPAN CAN DEFEND ITSELF", May 12, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11804]

World War II ended 65 years ago. The Cold War disappeared 21 years ago. Yet America's military deployments have little changed. Nowhere is that more evident than on the Japanese island of Okinawa. Okinawans are tired of the heavy U.S. military presence. Some 90,000 — nearly 10 percent of the island's population — gathered in protest at the end of April. It is time for Washington to lighten Okinawa's burden. An independent kingdom swallowed by imperial Japan, Okinawa was the site of a brutal battle as the United States closed in on Japan in early 1945. After Tokyo's surrender, Washington filled the main prefecture island with bases and didn't return it to Japan until 1972. America's military presence has only been modestly reduced since. The facilities grew out of the mutual defense treaty between America and Japan, by which the former promised to defend the latter, which was disarmed after its defeat. The island provided a convenient home for American units. Most Japanese people also preferred to keep the U.S. military presence on Japan's most distant and poorest province, forcing Okinawans to carry a disproportionate burden of the alliance. Whatever the justifications of this arrangement during the Cold War, the necessity of both U.S. ground forces in Japan and the larger mutual defense treaty between the two nations has disappeared. It's time to reconsider both Tokyo's and Washington's regional roles. The United States imposed the so-called "peace constitution" on Japan, Article 9 of which prohibits the use of force and even creation of a military. However, American officials soon realized that Washington could use military assistance. Today's "Self-Defense Force" is a widely accepted verbal evasion of a clear constitutional provision. Nevertheless, both domestic pacifism and regional opposition have discouraged reconsideration of Japan's military role. Washington's willingness to continue defending an increasingly wealthy Japan made a rethink unnecessary. Fears of a more dangerous North Korea and a more assertive People's Republic of China have recently increased support in Japan for a more robust security stance. The threat of piracy has even caused Tokyo to open its first overseas military facility in the African state of Djibouti. Nevertheless, Japan's activities remain minimal compared to its stake in East Asia's stability. Thus, Tokyo remains heavily dependent on Washington for its security. The then opposition Democratic Party of Japan promised to "do away with the dependent relationship in which Japan ultimately has no alternative but to act in accordance with U.S. wishes." The party later moderated its program, calling for a "close and equal Japan-U.S. alliance." However, the government promised to reconsider a previous agreement to relocate the Marines Corps Air Station at Futenma elsewhere on Okinawa. The majority of residents want to send the base elsewhere. The Obama administration responded badly, insisting that Tokyo fulfill its past promises. Only reluctantly did Washington indicate a willingness to consider alternatives — after imposing seemingly impossible conditions. Still, the primary problem is Japan. So long as Tokyo requests American military protection, it cannot easily reject Washington's request for bases. Thus, Okinawan residents must do more than demand fairness. They must advocate defense independence. Who should protect Japan? Japan. Tokyo's neighbors remain uneasy in varying degrees about the prospect of a more active Japan, but World War II is over. A revived Japanese empire is about as likely as a revived Mongol empire. Both Japan and India could play a much larger role in preserving regional security. Many Japanese citizens are equally opposed to a larger Japanese military and more expansive foreign policy. Their feelings are understandable, given the horrors of World War II. However, the most fundamental duty of any national government is defense. If the Japanese people want a minimal (or no) military, that is their right. But they should not expect other nations to fill the defense gap. Moreover, with an expected $1.6 trillion deficit this year alone, the United States can no longer afford to protect countries which are able to protect themselves. Washington has more than enough on its military plate elsewhere in the world. Raymond Greene, America's consul general in Okinawa, says: "Asia is going though a period of historic strategic change in the balance of power." True enough, which is why East Asian security and stability require greater national efforts from Japan and its neighbors. Regional defense also warrants improved multilateral cooperation — something which should minimize concerns over an increased Japanese role. The other important question is, defend Japan from what? Today Tokyo faces few obvious security threats. For this reason, many Japanese see little cause for an enlarged Japanese military. However, North Korea's uncertain future and China's ongoing growth should give the Japanese people pause for concern. East Asia might not look so friendly in coming decades. Richard Lawless, assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs in the Bush administration, claimed: "observers perceive a Japan that is seemingly content to marginalize itself, a Japan that appears to almost intentionally ignore the increasingly complex and dangerous neighborhood in which it is located." Nevertheless, only the Japanese can assess the threats which concern them rather than Washington. And only the Japanese can decide how best to respond to any perceived threats. Moreover, so long as Japan goes hat-in-hand to the United States for protection, Washington is entitled to request — or, more accurately, insist on — bases that serve its interests. And Tokyo cannot easily say no. Before the demonstration Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama said that "It must never happen that we accept the existing plan." Afterwards he visited Okinawa and indicated that he planned to renege on his government's earlier promises: "we must maintain the Japan-U.S. alliance as a deterrent force, and ... we must ask Okinawa to bear some of that burden." He added that "It has become clear from our negotiations with the Americans that we cannot ask them to relocate the base to too far-flung a location." Apparently his government intends to move some facilities elsewhere on Okinawa as well as to the small island of Tokunoshima. With Tokyo retreating from its commitment to chart a more independent course, it is up to the United States to reorder the relationship. Washington policy makers long have enjoyed America's quasi-

2AC AT: Okinawa Deterrence [2/2]

imperial role. But U.S. citizens are paying for and dying in Washington's quasi-imperial wars. An expansive American role made sense during the Cold War in the aftermath of World War II. That world disappeared two decades ago. Promiscuous intervention in today's world inflates the power of Washington policy makers but harms the interests of U.S. citizens. American forces and personnel are expected to be at perpetual risk guaranteeing the interests of other states, including Japan. Thus the U.S. reliance on Okinawa. Lieutenant General Keith Stalder, the Marine Corps Pacific commander, said the island deployment is "the perfect model" for the alliance's objectives of "deterring, defending and defeating potential adversaries." For years the most obvious target of the American forces was North Korea, with the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) expected to reinforce the Republic of Korea in the event of war. Yet the ROK is both financially and manpower rich. More recently some Americans have talked about deploying the MEF to seize Pyongyang's nuclear weapons in the event of a North Korean collapse. Alas, so far the North has proved to be surprisingly resilient, so the Marines might wait a long time to undertake this mission. Checking China is next on the potential Okinawa mission list. However, no one expects the United States to launch a ground invasion of the People's Republic of China irrespective of the future course of events. Thus, the MEF wouldn't be very useful in any conflict. In any case, a stronger Japanese military — which already possesses potent capabilities — would be a far better mechanism for encouraging responsible Chinese development. There's also the kitchen sink argument: the Marines are to maintain regional "stability." Pentagon officials draw expanding circles around Okinawa to illustrate potential areas of operation. The mind boggles, however. Should U.S. troops be sent to resolve, say, the long-running Burmese guerrilla war in that nation's east, a flare-up of secessionist sentiment in Indonesia, violent opposition to Fiji's military dictator, or border skirmishes between Cambodia and Thailand? It hard to imagine any reason for Washington to jump into any local conflict. America's presumption should be noninvolvement rather than intervention in other nations' wars. Making fewer promises to intervene would allow the United States to reduce the number of military personnel and overseas bases. A good place to start in cutting international installations would be Okinawa. America's post-Cold War dominance is coming to an end. Michael Schuman argued in Time: "Anyone who thinks the balance of power in Asia is not changing — and with it, the strength of the U.S., even among its old allies — hasn't been there lately." Many analysts nevertheless want the United States to attempt to maintain its unnatural dominance. Rather than accommodate a more powerful China, they want America to contain a wealthier and more influential Beijing. Rather than expect its allies to defend themselves and promote regional stability, they want Washington to keep its friends dependent. To coin a phrase, it's time for a change. U.S. intransigence over Okinawa has badly roiled the bilateral relationship. But even a more flexible basing policy would not be enough. Washington is risking the lives and wasting the money of the American people to defend other populous and prosperous states. Washington should close Futenma — as a start to refashioning the alliance with Japan. Rather than a unilateral promise by the United States to defend Japan, the relationship should become one of equals working together on issues of mutual interest. Responsibility for protecting Japan should become that of Japan. Both Okinawans and Americans deserve justice. It's time for Washington to deliver.

2AC AT: Okinawa Key Deterrence

**Presence in Okinawa is no longer needed. It hurts both countries more than helps**

**Bandow 10** [Doug*,* Senior fellow @ the Cato Institute, former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author and editor of several books, "NEEDED: A NEW U.S. DEFENSE POLICY FOR JAPAN", http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11804, June 2]

Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has resigned, just eight months after leading his party to a landslide victory.  The Democratic Party of Japan meets Friday to replace him.  The finance minister, Naoto Kan, is the favorite, though nothing is certain.  The party is an amalgam of factions and the party secretary general, Ichiro Ozawa, who did the most to bring the DPJ to power, also is stepping down. Prime Minister Hatoyama was hit by a campaign scandal—a regular of Japanese politics.  But the most important cause of his resignation was his botched handling of American bases on the island of Okinawa. In early 1945 Okinawa became the first part of the Japanese homeland to fall as the U.S. closed in on imperial Japan.  Washington held onto the island after the war and loaded it with military installations.  Only in 1972 was Okinawa returned to Japanese sovereignty.  Despite some reduction in U.S. forces, American military facilities still account for roughly one-fifth of the island’s territory. Okinawans long ago tired, understandably, of the burden and have been pressing for the removal of at least some bases.  The DPJ campaigned to create a more equal alliance with America and promised to revisit plans by the previous government to relocate America’s Futenma facility elsewhere on the island. However, under strong U.S. pressure Hatoyama reversed course.  He said the rising tensions on the Korean peninsula reminded him about the value of America’s military presence. Japan’s military dependency is precisely the problem.  American taxpayers have paid to defend Japan for 65 years.  Doing so made sense in the aftermath of World War II, when Japan was recovering from war and Tokyo’s neighbors feared a revived Japanese military.  But long ago it became ridiculous  for Americans to defend the world’s second-ranking power and its region. Of course, having turned its defense over to Washington, Tokyo could do no more than beg the U.S. to move its base.  After all, if Americans are going to do Japan’s dirty defense work, Americans are entitled to have convenient base access.  Irrespective of what  the Okinawans desire. Unfortunately, Hatoyama’s resignation isn’t likely to change anything.  The new prime minister won’t be much different from the old one.  Or the ones before him. If change is to come to the U.S.-Japan security relationship, **it will have to come from America.** And it should start with professed fiscal conservatives asking why the U.S. taxpayers, on the hook for a $1.6 trillion deficit this year alone, must forever subsidize the nation with the world’s second-largest economy? Cliches about living in a dangerous world and defending freedom are no answer.  America is made not only **poorer but less secure** when it discourages its friends from defending themselves and when it accepts their geopolitical conflicts as its own.  To coin a phrase, it is time for a change. And not just with Japan.  There’s also South Korea.  And especially the Europeans.  It’s not clear who they have to be defended from, but whoever their potential adversary or adversaries may be, the Europeans should defend themselves.  The Obama administration is impoverishing Americans to support a growing welfare state at home.  Americans shouldn’t have to help pay for the Europeans’ even bigger welfare state at the same time. The U.S. should maintain a strong defense.  Of America. Washington should stop subsidizing the defense of prosperous and populous allies.  When the Constitution speaks of “the common defense,” the Founders meant of Americans, not of the rest of the world.  **A good place to start ending foreign military welfare would be Japan.**

2AC AT: Regional Stability [1/1]

**Military presence in Okinawa hurts regional stability - countries don't learn to stem conflict**

**Bandow 99** [Doug*,* Senior fellow @ the Cato Institute, former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author and editor of several books, "FREEING OKINAWA", May 18th, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=5127]

Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi has visited Washington, offering the usual promises of economic reform and international cooperation. But neither Tokyo nor Washington seem interested in upgrading their relationship to reflect the post-Cold War world. Although the Diet recently passed legislation to implement the guidelines originally adopted in late 1997, the changes are largely cosmetic. Japan neither intends to do anything on its own nor use its military even in conjunction with that of the United States. Moreover, the latest Pentagon strategy report on East Asia, released late last year, makes clear that Washington intends to maintain its dominant role, apparently forever. And that presumably means keeping its forces and facilities in Japan, also apparently forever. Yet the Japanese consensus in favor of a protracted American protectorate may finally be cracking. The election of novelist Shintaro Ishihara as governor of Tokyo, running on a platform for the return of Yokota Air Base, brings the issue of Washington's presence to Japan's national stage. Which is where it should be. Only Tokyo can address the worst injustice stemming from the American-American alliance: Okinawa. Although Gov. Masahide Ota's defeat last year by Keiichi Inamine may have reduced attention to the island's plight, the issue remains no less pressing. It is hard to go anywhere on Okinawa without running into a U.S. base. Or being run into. Yuki Uema, an Okinawan high school student, died last October after being hit by a U.S. Marine in a hit-and-run accident. On April 1, 1945 the United States invaded the Ryukyu Islands, the last stepping-stone toward mainland Japan. Okinawa remained under U.S. occupation after the war; although Tokyo and Washington signed a peace treaty in 1952, the United States retained control of the island, leaving Japan with only "residual sovereignty." During the Korean War the United States began expanding its military operations, seizing land at bayonet point from farmers to make airfields. Many displaced residents were encouraged to emigrate. Washington acted like a colonial overlord. Only in 1972 did Okinawa revert to Japanese control. However, Washington and Tokyo continued to collude against the island. With three-quarters of U.S. facilities concentrated in the most distant and poorest 0.6 percent of its land area, Japan was largely unconcerned about Okinawa's plight. Tokyo enjoyed the benefit of defense by America, while Okinawans bore the burden. Okinawans have grown tired of the cost. Even Gov. Inamine, though a member of the ruling party, favors reducing America's presence. Over the last quarter century the United States returned just 15 percent of the land it occupied in Okinawa, compared to 60 percent of the property it used on the mainland. American facilities currently occupy one-fifth of the island, and are home to some 30,000 servicemen and nearly as many family members. Fences topped with barbed wire line major roads and cut through towns. U.S. facilities occupy more than half the land area of four communities. Roads, homes, schools, and businesses abut American bases. The United States controls 29 sea zones and 15 air zones and runs two of the island's three airports. It is not just the extraordinary incidents ? the 1995 rape of a 12-year-old school girl, for instance ? but the daily noise, congestion, crowding, and accidents that irritate Okinawans. However, the rape galvanized Japanese public opinion; in September 1996 89 percent of Okinawans voted in favor of reducing the American presence. The U.S. and Japanese governments created the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO) to ease the burden of America's military presence. But SACO proposed only modest land reversions, most of which remain stalled because of the difficulty in finding alternate facilities. For instance, Tokyo planned to replace Futenma Air Station with a floating heliport off the city of Nago, but in December 1997 municipal voters rejected the proposal. In any case, SACO does not reach the more fundamental issue: why should the United States continue to station a Marine Expeditionary Force and other units on Okinawa? Although Washington doesn't seem to have noticed, with the end of the Cold War the world has changed, and so, too, has East Asia. The threats have diminished ? the Soviet Union is no more, North Korea is crumbling, China has discarded Maoism. Moreover, the region no longer needs America's protection. Japan is the second-ranking economic power on earth, South Korea far outstrips its northern antagonist, and most of the ASEAN states have made dramatic economic progress. Indeed, so complacent are Tokyo and Seoul that both are cutting their defense budgets. What reasons do U.S. officials give for a policy that could be summarized as what has ever been must always be? China looms large on the horizon, but if Washington and Beijing eventually come to blows, the air force and navy would do the heavy lifting. Another favorite is the maintenance of regional stability, given widespread economic problems, political uncertainty in Indonesia, and so on. Yet it is time for East Asia to look after its own stability. If one wanted to catalog conflicts in which the United States should not intervene, it would be these. What if the Habibie regime in Indonesia totters? Let it fall. What if Filipino and Chinese ships exchange shots over the Spratly Islands? Stay out of the fight. What if Japan and South Korea rattle sabers over the Tokto/Takeshima Islands? Tell both countries to work together. These are East Asia's, not America's, problems. That doesn't mean Washington should be unconcerned about the region. But instead of being meddler of first resort, the United States should act as balancer of last resort, intervening only if a hegemonic threat develops that allied states are incapable of containing. America could then sharply reduce existing force levels and redeploy advanced units ? like the Third Marine division, currently stationed on Okinawa ? back to Guam and Hawaii. Japan, South Korea, and other countries could take on the military role dictated by their economic success. For a half century Okinawans have borne the brunt of U.S. military deployments in Japan. But the Cold War is over. It is time for Japan to defend itself. And America to give Okinawa back to the Okinawans.

2AC AT: Regional Stability [1/2]

**Military presence only endangers regional stability - withdrawal would spur East Asian cooperation**

**Bandow 10** [Doug*,* Senior fellow @ the Cato Institute, former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author and editor of several books, "OKINAWA AND THE PROBLEM OF EMPIRE", March 25, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11617]

A bloody military battlefield in 1945, Okinawa is the subject of an equally bitter political fight today. A majority of the prefecture's residents want the American military to go elsewhere. The U.S.-Japan alliance is almost 50 years old. Like most of Washington's military relationships, the security treaty really isn't an alliance. The treaty's terms are simple. The U.S. agrees to defend Japan. In return, Tokyo agrees to be defended. Japan long has enjoyed the benefits of the world's second largest economy while devoting a far smaller proportion of its resources than America to defense. Tokyo's international role has been circumscribed by Article 9 of the post-war Japanese constitution which formally bans creation of a military and use of force; domestic pacifism growing out of World War II; and regional fears of revived Japanese imperialism. Public concern over China's rising military expenditures and North Korea's ongoing nuclear program is growing, but the pace of policy change remains glacial. In elections last August the Democratic Party of Japan ousted the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Five years ago the DPJ promised to "do away with the dependent relationship in which Japan ultimately has no alternative but to act in accordance with U.S. wishes." But Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama quickly moderated his party's position; the most recent platform called for a "close and equal Japan-U.S. alliance." Nevertheless, the new government is proving less receptive to Washington's desires. For instance, the DPJ let expire authority to refuel U.S. and other allied ships in the Indian Ocean. Tokyo also has talked of renegotiating the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), cutting host nation support, and reconsidering the "don't ask, don't tell" policy as applied to U.S. nuclear weapons passing through Japanese territory. Finally, there is the prefecture of Okinawa (the largest island of which also is named Okinawa). Okinawa's saga is long and sad. Once independent, the territory was absorbed by Imperial Japan and treated like an untrustworthy stepchild. In April and May 1945 the island suffered through one of the most brutal battles of World War II, during which roughly 100,000 Japanese soldiers and perhaps even more civilians died (estimates vary wildly). After the war the occupying U.S. military loaded the main island with bases. Okinawa was not turned back to Japan until 1972, but with only a modest U.S. military drawdown. Today the prefecture, Japan's smallest with just .6 percent of the country's land area, hosts roughly three-quarters of American military facilities and two-thirds of American military personnel — some 27,000 personnel stationed on 14 major bases — located in Japan. U.S. operations take up about 18 percent of the main island's territory. Although some Okinawans benefit from land rent, construction contracts, and consumer spending, for most residents the inconvenience is monumental, the limits on development costly, and the environmental consequences substantial. No surprise, the vast majority of residents want to reduce or eliminate the American presence. The rape of a 12-year-old girl by three U.S. personnel in 1995 led to mass protests against both the SOFA (which left the accused in American custody) and the bases. A decade later the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to move the Marines Corps Air Station at Futenma out of Ginowan to a less heavily populated area on Okinawa, and relocate 8,000 Marines (plus dependents) to Guam. Tokyo pledged to cover about $6 billion of the relocation cost. However, Okinawa residents want to remove, not relocate the base, and Japanese taxpayers aren't thrilled about picking up part of the moving tab. The DPJ government announced plans to revisit the 2006 agreement. The Obama administration responded by demanding that Tokyo live up to its responsibilities. More recently, U.S. officials suggested that Washington would not agree to any change that lacked local approval — which would conveniently leave Futenma unmoved. Now the Hatoyama government is holding consultations, with a decision promised for May. Okinawa activists have brought their case to Washington and joined with interested Americans to set up a website and undertake educational activities. It's a worthwhile effort. But the primary problem remains in Tokyo. Today both U.S. and Japanese government officials cheerfully conspire against Okinawans. When the latter complain, Washington points to Tokyo. Tokyo points back at Washington. But, in fact, the ultimate decision lies in Tokyo. The American military is not organized to follow the will of Okinawa residents. That is the responsibility of their own national government. If Washington is going to both defend Japan and use Japanese territory as a launch pad for intervention elsewhere, troops must be stationed somewhere, and Okinawa is centrally located. In fact, there's no reason for the U.S. to do either. Allies are a means to an end; the defense of America, not allies, is America's vital interest. Sometimes protecting other nations is necessary for U.S. security, as during the Cold War. But that world disappeared long ago. Enemy threats are far fewer and allied capabilities are far greater. True, politicians and analysts alike routinely term America's alliances "cornerstones" and "linchpins" of U.S. security, regional stability, and world peace. In reality, today's alliance are unnecessary at best and dangerous transmission belts of conflict and war at worst. Consider Japan. President Barack Obama says that "America's commitment to Japan's security is unshakable," but does that mean the U.S. forever must defend that nation? The 1951 military treaty committed Japan to "increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression." In fact, Tokyo is capable of defending itself. Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada recently expressed doubt that "Japan on its own can face up to such risks" as China, but Tokyo needs a deterrent capability, not superiority. That is well within Japan's means. Certainly the U.S. would be far more secure if its allies and friends created forces to discourage aggression and worked together to encourage regional stability, rather than depended on Washington. If the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force located on Okinawa is not needed to defend Japan, then what is it for? South Korea vastly outranges the North on virtually every measure of power and can do whatever is necessary to deter North Korean adventurism. There also is much talk, offered unceasingly and uncritically, about maintaining regional stability. But what invasions, border fights, naval clashes, missile threats, and full-scale wars are the Marines preventing? And if conflict

2AC AT: Regional Stability [2/2]

broke out, what would the Marines do? Launch a surprise landing in Beijing's Tiananmen Square during a war over Taiwan? Aid Indonesia, really the Javan Empire, in suppressing one or another group of secessionists?

Help Thailand in a scrape with Burma triggered by the latter's guerrilla conflict spilling over the border? America has no reason to enter conflicts which threaten neither the U.S. nor a critical ally. Still, if the U.S. government desires to defend Japan and Japan wants to be defended, Washington inevitably must deal with the national government in Tokyo and ask for the best possible lodgings for its forces. Okinawa's travails will always be irrelevant from the U.S. government's standpoint. It's up to Japan to decide on where to place foreign bases and then to work with its prefectures and towns accordingly. Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated the brutal truth: "local conditions come to play, but these big decisions are at the level of our central governments." The Japanese government prefers to blame the U.S., since most Japanese don't want to change the status quo. Okinawans — from the smallest, poorest, and most distant prefecture — pay to host U.S. forces, leaving the rest of Japan free to enjoy the benefits while suffering little of the inconvenience. Okinawan opposition is undercut through subsidies from the central government and overridden by raw political power, since the prefecture has just a handful of seats in the national Diet. Explained Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano: "It's not necessary to have the understanding and agreement from the local people." Thus, the issue of fairness to Okinawa is tied to the more basic question of Japan's foreign policy and military posture. If Tokyo demands alliance equality, it must behave in a way that justifies being treated as an equal. Which means Japan must take over responsibility for its own defense, as well as contribute to regional and global security. The Japanese people may decide that the threats they face are small — as, indeed, they are today. However, the future might not be so safe. Brad Glosserman of the Pacific Forum CSIS argues that "Northeast Asia, from a Japanese perspective, is a scary place." A threatening North Korea and aggressive China are much bigger potential threats to Tokyo than to Washington. The Japanese government needs to assess future dangers and decide on appropriate responses — without assuming that the U.S. Marines will show up to the rescue. It is Japan's decision, but it should not be based on the presumption of American intervention. Having made its decision, then Tokyo should reconfigure its forces. Fairness suggests a major drawdown from Okinawa irrespective of whose military is protecting Japan. If the U.S. disengaged militarily, these decisions could be made without pressure from Washington. The two countries would still have much to cooperate about, including security. Leaving responsibility for Japan's defense with Tokyo would simply eliminate the unrealistic expectations engendered by the alliance on both sides. The governments could focus on issues of mutual interest, sharing intelligence, preparing emergency base access, and otherwise cooperating to meet international challenges. The best way for Americans to help residents of Okinawa is to press Washington to reshape U.S. foreign policy, making it more appropriate for a republic than a pseudo-empire. With the rise of numerous prosperous allied and friendly states — most notably Japan, but also South Korea, Australia, India, and others — the U.S. should step back, prepared to deal with an aggressive hegemon should one arise but determined to avoid being dragged into routine geopolitical squabbles. Then Tokyo could chart its own destiny, including deciding what forces to raise and where to base them. The Japanese government could no longer use American pressure as an excuse for inaction in Okinawa. Then Okinawans finally might gain justice — after 65 long years.

2AC: Kills Regional Stability, Econ, Deterrence [1/2]

**Presence in Okinawa kills regional stability, the economy and is no longer a useful deterrent**

**Bandow and Feffer 8** [Doug,Senior fellow @ the Cato Institute, former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author and editor of several books, John, author of several books and numerous articles. He has been a Writing Fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee. He has studied in England and Russia, lived in Poland and Japan, and traveled widely throughout Europe and Asia. He has taught a graduate level course on international conflict at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul in July 2001 and delivered lectures at a variety of academic institutions including New York University, Hofstra, Union College, Cornell University, and Sofia University, "BRING THEM HOME...FROM ASIA", September 19, http://www.fpif.org/articles/bring\_them\_homefrom\_asia]

Alliances, bases, and deployments should be a means, not an end. During the Cold War they helped preserve fragile allied states from potent enemies, but that world has disappeared. Instead of retiring the outmoded institutions, U.S. policymakers turned them into an end, to be preserved irrespective of changing circumstances. Officials have worked to come up with new justifications for old commitments. Now, Washington talks about using military alliances to address issues such as refugees, environment, and drug trafficking, as if Army divisions and Marine expeditionary forces have anything to do with solving such problems. Reason No. 1 to drop America's East Asian security commitments: they're expensive. The principle cost is not the overseas bases, since both South Korea and Japan provide varying levels of host nation support. The biggest expense is for the additional units necessary to back up America's promises to go to war. The worst policy would be to threaten action without possessing the means to act. The United States spends as much on the military as the rest of the world combined and more in real terms than at any point since World War II, but not to defend itself. It spends that much to defend everyone else. The United States has sprinkled nearly 800 military installations around the globe, improving Washington's ability to meddle in the affairs of other nations. But as the attacks of 9/11 demonstrated, despite all of its money and power the Department of Defense is ill-equipped to actually defend America. The only way to cut costs is to cut commitments. The deficit is $400 billion this year and will top half a trillion dollars next year. Total military outlays, including for Afghanistan and Iraq, will run an incredible $700 billion in 2009. The only way to reduce that figure is to start doing less. Another reason to tell Japan and South Korea that they are on their own is the risk of war. Admittedly, conflict doesn't look likely for either country, but the United States could rest much easier if it wasn't the ultimate guarantor of both countries' security. With security commitments to both governments and troops on the ground, America is stuck if war breaks out. And the mess in Georgia demonstrated how local politicians who expect U.S. support often behave in utterly irresponsible ways. It was one thing to risk conflict over distant allies during the Cold War, when everything seemed to be connected to everything else. But it makes far more sense today for the United States to sit back and play the role of off-shore balancer. That is, if a crisis develops that has global implications and that cannot be contained by America's friends, then Washington could consider intervening. Otherwise America should stay out. Self-SufficiencySouth Korea and Japan can defend themselves. North Korea is an international and diplomatic wreck. The South seeking American support against the North is like the United States requesting international assistance to deter an attack by Mexico. Indeed, though the latest ROK Defense White Paper declares that "the North Korean army is a clear and present threat," Seoul is busy subsidizing the DPRK. That's strange behavior if Pyongyang is poised to launch a new aggressive war. South Korea's increasingly close relationship with China, including expanded military exchanges, makes aggression ever less likely from that direction as well. Japan obviously has the wherewithal to construct whatever military force it believes to be necessary to deter Chinese and North Korean aggression. It isn't Washington's job to decide what that is. But it makes no sense for the United States to provide those forces instead. North Korea's nuclear program obviously remains a concern, but America's conventional deployments offer no help in that regard. And Washington's 26,000 troops on the peninsula provide the North with plenty of nuclear hostages. Bring them home and the United States could make Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions a regional rather than an American issue. Friendly nations will do a lot more to protect themselves if they can't rely on America to bail them out. For South Korea, with roughly 40 times the GDP and twice the population of the North, to remain vulnerable to a DPRK attack is frankly ludicrous. There is no principle of geography on the Korean peninsula that dictates the southern country will always have fewer tanks than the northern one. It's a matter of ROK policy. And that's fine — if Seoul isn't relying on the United States to make up the gap. The same with Japan: It could do a lot more to build up a defensive force, purchasing interceptors and frigates rather than building up a large army, which would unnerve Tokyo's neighbors. If Japan decided it didn't need to do any more, that would be fine too. But friendly states should take charge of their own security destinies and stop relying on Washington for aid. Real ChangeFinally, downplaying America's military role would improve overall U.S. relations with other countries. The continuing presence of bases and troops creates endless local grievances. Part of that reflects nationalist frustrations with the foreign control that

2AC: Kills Regional Stability, Econ, Deterrence [2/2]

inevitably accompanies foreign garrisons. There are also the inevitable problems that come from putting a large number of young American males in the middle of a foreign country and culture. The U.S. government has a particular image problem with young South Koreans, who tend for instance to view America as a greater threat than North Korea. But anger towards Washington extends well beyond universities; the recent protests against U.S. beef imports were directed at far more than the fear of consuming unsafe food. As a result, President George W. Bush received a less-than-friendly reception when he visited in early August. In Japan, the heavy concentration of U.S. bases in Okinawa has spawned strong opposition to America's presence in that province. Without the presence of U.S. military forces, which emphasize Washington's dominance, the bilateral relationships would be closer to ones of equals, with greater emphasis on private economic and cultural ties rather than on government-to-government geopolitical relations. Washington is filled with the mantra of "change," as both the Obama and the McCain campaigns vie for support. But both major political parties represent a status quo in which the United States must forever remain dominant everywhere, subsidizing prosperous and populous allies, occupying and transforming failed states, and micro-managing world affairs. Other than disagreeing over policy toward Iraq, Barack Obama and John McCain are marching in geopolitical lockstep. There are, of course, many foreign policy issues over which reasonable people can reasonably disagree. But the disappearance of any need to defend countries that have grown wealthy while their potential enemies have dissipated is not one of them. It's time to let America's Cold War commitments, especially those in Asia, just fade away.

2AC: Drive For Asian HEG Bad [1/3]

**The quest for Asian hegemony kills any hope of regional stability and emboldens the nuclear arms race - withdrawal solves**

**Gerson 97** [Dr. Joseph, Regional Program Coordinator of the American Friends Service Committee in New England, January 1, "ASIA/PACIFIC PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES", http://www.fpif.org/reports/asiapacific\_peace\_and\_security\_issues]

**Key Problems** The Asia/Pacific region is the geopolitical center of the struggle for world power. Competition for economic advantage and economic security fuel the region’s conflicts. The U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty remains the keystone of U.S.policy and hegemony in the Asian/Pacific region. The Asia/Pacific region is the geopolitical center of the struggle for world power. Producing 60 percent of the world’s manufactured and agricultural goods, it is the motor force of the global economy. Here U.S., Japanese, Chinese, and Russian ambitions, militaries, and insecurities contend. Compounding regional insecurity are 1) the nuclear weapons programs of Japan, North and South Korea, and Indonesia, and 2) the high-tech arms race among the newly industrializing Asian “tigers” and their imitators. Pursuit of economic advantage has largely replaced ideology as the driving force of foreign and military policies. In the Asia/Pacific, this means intensified economic and interstate competition is fueling military tensions and insecurity. The regional (dis)order is defined by complex balance of power struggles focusing on the U.S., Japan, and China but also involving Russia and the region’s lesser powers. The Clinton administration’s 1995 United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region is the most complete statement of U.S. Asian/Pacific policy. Noting that U.S. Asian/Pacific trade totals more than $374 billion and “account[s] for 2.8 million U.S. jobs.” the strategy reaffirms U.S. “permanent interest in the security of the Asia-Pacific region.” The U.S. will, therefore, continue “essential” forward deployments of 100,000 troops in the region, strengthen its alliance with Japan, maintain commitments to South Korea, implement the “Agreed Framework” to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons infrastructure, and “engage” China. President Clinton has repeated that multilateral security initiatives will “supplement our alliances and forward military presence, not supplant them.” In 1996 the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (AMPO in Japanese) was redefined to revitalize the strategic alliance, which the two countries have considered the keystone of U.S. Asian/Pacific hegemony since 1951. With its not-so-veiled nuclear threats against China and North Korea, the Clinton administration reminded the region that frontal assaults on the *status quo* will not be tolerated. Two potential nuclear flash points remain the focal points of strategic military and diplomatic activities: the armed confrontations on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. Elsewhere, against the possibility of future U.S. retreats from regional hegemony, Japan and China are competing to develop tacit alliances along the sea lanes linking East Asian economies with Persian Gulf and Indonesian oil. Competition for potentially oil-rich sea beds surrounding the Spratley and Parcel islands in the South China Sea has led to military confrontations and fueled an intense regional arms race involving China and five lesser powers. Adding to regional insecurity is the ever-present risk of nuclear proliferation. As the ratification provisions of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty attest, all major players in the Asian/Pacific strategic struggle are nuclear or potential nuclear powers. China is seen by Washington and Tokyo as the greatest challenge to their condominium. Whether the new Asian/Pacific (dis)order will be defined by a synthesis of engagement and militarized balance of power struggles, or if the U.S. will seek to contain China through a Manichean confrontation analogous to the cold war, will be determined as the regional powers test one another’s ambitions and strengths. For the time being, the Clinton administration has opted for engagement, while continuing military preparations for possible future confrontations. Although the U.S.-Japanese alliance is expanding, it could be undermined by continued economic rivalry or mounting U.S.-Chinese tensionsthat threaten Japanese involvement in a war with China. In such circumstances, Tokyo could opt to restructure the balance of power by pursuing an independent path or ally itself with China in pursuit of its economic interests. Japanese remilitarization under the Mutual Security Treaty (Japan now has the world’s third largest military budget) makes these options possible. There are also intimations of an alternative approach based on multilateral security structures and Common Security. **Problems with Current U.S. Policy Key Problems** The U.S. goal to maintain U.S. Asian/Pacific hegemony is the primary source of regional insecurity. The U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty is being redefined in ways that augment Japanese militarism, undermine the Japanese peace constitution, and excerbate tensions with China. China is seen as the primary threat to U.S. Asian/Pacific hegemony. A series of postwar bilateral treaties, which minimize collaboration among U.S. Asian-Pacific allies and clients and maximize their dependence on the U.S., established the structure for long-term U.S. hegemony in the Asian/Pacific. Fundamental was the Mutual Security Treaty, forced on Japan as the price for ending the formal U.S. military occupation. The Mutual Security Treaty legitimizes the presence of U.S. bases in Japan. These bases serve multiple functions: encirclement of the Soviet Union (and now Russia) and China; training and jumping off points for U.S. foreign military intervention; command and intelligence for U.S. forces; and a lever to influence Japanese politics and contain Japanese military ambitions. Fifty-nine thousand U.S. troops are still based or home-ported at more than one-hundred installations. The U.S.-Japan military partnership has been rife with tensions, most visibly during the 1960 AMPO revolt protesting the treaty’s extension, and more recently in Okinawa. Communities, political parties, and popular movements have protested land seizures, GI crime, military exercises, and loss of sovereignty. Diverging economic interests also undermine the alliance. Americans ask if they should make financial sacrifices for Japanese economic interests. Japanese ask why they must sacrifice for U.S. hegemony and militarism. The Clinton administration is concentrating on the modernization of the alliance and building popular support for it. Its 1995 Nye Initiative envisioned deepening personal relationships between senior U.S. and Japanese leaders and frequent meetings to identify common security interests and to develop new public rationales for the alliance. The April 1996 summit between Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto was used to pacify the Japanese anti-bases revolt, to redefine the AMPO, and to rebuild popular support for the alliance. Eleven bases are to be closed or consolidated over seven years, while respecting the commitment to “fully maintaining the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan.” No U.S. troops will be withdrawn. No bases will be closed until Japan provides and constructs acceptable alternate sites. Clinton and Hashimoto also announced the alliance’s new public rationales: Korean instability, China’s nuclear arsenal, and territorial disputes threatening war with China. Possibly more disturbing was Hashimoto’s ostensibly bureaucratic commitment to review the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. This will permit expansion of the Japanese military operations at the expense of the peace constitution. It also provides political cover for the transformation of Japan’s Self Defense Forces into a military prepared to fight with the U.S. on the Korean peninsula, along the region’s sea lanes, and in the Middle East. The two leaders also agreed to further integrate their militaries through increased Japanese logistical support and continued collaboration

2AC: Drive For Asian HEG Bad [2/3]

in technology and weapons development. The deepening of the U.S.-Japan alliance reinforces the hierarchy of Asian-Pacific power at the same time that region’s economies, technology, and cultures are beginning to integrate along somewhat more equitable and horizontal lines. The military pact is thus seen as an effort to preserve the privileges of the region’s two allied and modern imperial powers. China countered the Clinton-Hashimoto summit by welcoming Boris Yeltsin to Beijing to reconfirm the stability of the Russian-Chinese border. This allows Beijing to concentrate resources on anticipated U.S.-Japanese encroachments. Korea and Taiwan remain the region’s most likely flash points for catastrophic war. It is widely anticipated that North Korea will implode or will be more gradually absorbed by South Korea. The U.S. still deploys 36,000 troops in South Korea, with additional missiles and nuclear warheads at sea. Reunification will not guarantee the GIs’ return. The Security Strategy states: “Even after the North Korean threat passes, the U.S. intends to maintain its strong defense alliance with the Republic of Korea.” Regarding China, the debate in Washington and academia has been engagement versus containment. The meeting between Clinton and President Jiang in Manila and the commitment to exchange state visits indicate that engagement is now U.S. policy. However, China’s leaders see engagement as an attempt to infuse China with U.S. economic, cultural, and ideological influences. And, the formal identification of China as the Mutual Security Treaty’s enemy and loose talk by Pentagon officials about the necessity of containment maintains and legitimizes that prospect. China’s priority is managing its volatile economy and ensuring that economic tensions and disparities do not undermine either Communist rule or China’s unity. Beijing’s repression of human rights, its military modernization, foreign arms and dual-technology sales, and its militarized diplomacy in the South China Sea do need to be addressed diplomatically. On the historic margins of its empire, Beijing is brutally consolidating its control of Tibet and Xinjiang and has vowed to fight to prevent a formal Taiwanese declaration of independence. It has advanced new claims in the South China Sea and confronted Japan with its reaffirmation of sovereignty over the Daioyu/Senkaku isles. These problems are compounded by Taiwan’s Republican allies in Congress who, along with some human rights advocates, are building political support for a confrontational U.S. policy against China. Meanwhile, Samuel Huntington’s well advertised “Clash of Civilizations” dissertations provide the ideological framework for a new cold war. **Toward a New Foreign Policy Key Recommendations** The unjust, rigid, and archaic security order, based on the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and other bilateral military alliances, should be replaced by a multilateral framework based on Common Security. The withdrawal of all foreign military troops and bases, reductions of military forces throughout the region, and strict limits on arms sales and transfers are essential to Asian/Pacific security. Nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear war in the Asia/Pacific region can be prevented by fulfilling the Agreed Framework with North Korea and by the nuclear powers honoring their NPT commitments to complete nuclear disarmament. Security and economic imperatives dictate transformation of U.S. Asian/Pacific policy from militarized hegemony to the realpolitik of multilateral security structures based on Common Security. In the closing decade of the cold war, the Palme Commission brought together U.S., European, Soviet, and Asian political leaders and strategic analysts to build new strategic conceptions based on their collective experience. The commission’s most significant contribution was Common Security. The essence of this concept is that no nation can guarantee its security at the expense or detriment of another’s. Only by recognizing and addressing mutual security needs can meaningful security be achieved. As growing numbers of Asian/Pacific policy makers, scholars, and security analysts are advocating, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and the related hierarchical structure of bilateral military alliances should be replaced with a multilateral framework, possibly growing out of ASEAN’s Regional Forum (ARF). Such an alternative security framework, based on the principles of Common Security and respect for national sovereignty and self-determination, could facilitate disarmament negotiations essential to demilitarizing and denuclearizing the region. Within such a framework, reductions of military forces, strict limits on arms sales and transfers, sovereignty over contested islands and sea beds, withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign military bases and forces, and final decolonization of all Pacific island nations could be negotiated without resort to imperial dictate, new imbalances of power, or war. The continuing dangers of Asian/Pacific nuclear proliferation and war must be addressed. As Joseph Rotblat, Selig Harrison, and others have explained, discriminatory structures of power do not long endure. The only way to ensure that Asian/Pacific nations honor the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is for the declared nuclear powers to honor their Article 6 commitments to eliminate nuclear weapons. The negotiation of a Northeast Asian Nuclear Free Zone, facilitated by regional or multilateral security structures, would be an enormous contribution to Asian/Pacific security. Similarly, a multilateral security structure could facilitate negotiations prohibiting the storage and movement of all weapons of mass destruction and fissionable materials in the region. The armed and potentially nuclear confrontation in Korea must be addressed immediately. Regional security requires that Washington and its allies fulfill their commitments to Pyongyang under the 1994 agreement and not allow it to be derailed by North and South Korean incidents or diplomatic maneuvers. Ultimately, there will be no peace in Korea or in Northeast Asia until the root cause of the conflict is addressed. The four-party process proposed by the Clinton administration is but one means to this essential goal. Asian/Pacific security requires understanding much of Beijing’s military modernization as a defensive reaction. Confronted by the sophisticated fleets and arsenals of the U.S.-Japan alliance and sobered by the devastating consequences of the U.S. war against Iraq, Chinese military modernization is understandable, but dangerous. By pursuing a policy of Common Security engagement, not confrontation or containment with China, and by making multilateral security initiatives central, not supplementary, to its Asian/Pacific policies, Washington and other nations in the region can build from ARF and other multilateral initiatives to promote confidence-building initiatives with Beijing and construct an enduring multilateral Asian/Pacific security system.

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Such a system could mediate tensions across the Taiwan Strait and other focal points of tension, facilitate nuclear disarmament negotiations, and serve as the forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations. U.S. policy

makers should remember that China’s military modernization is, for the most part, a compensatory response to the lethal specter of U.S. and Japanese military capabilities. It should also be recalled that even in the electoral succession struggles of the U.S., the mantle of power does not fall to politicians who kowtow to foreign powers. Security is too important to wait for states to act. With the assistance of international NGO, corporate, and professional networks, citizen diplomacy is already weaving the web of regional ties, identities, and visions essential to an Asian/Pacific culture of peace. If people lead, governments will follow.

2AC: Plan Unpopular

**The plan sparks massive political backlash and debate**

**Feffer 10** [John, author of several books and numerous articles. He has been a Writing Fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee. He has studied in England and Russia, lived in Poland and Japan, and traveled widely throughout Europe and Asia. He has taught a graduate level course on international conflict at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul in July 2001 and delivered lectures at a variety of academic institutions including New York University, Hofstra, Union College, Cornell University, and Sofia University, June 14th, http://www.fpif.org/blog/right-wing\_loonies\_support\_okinawa\_base\_relocation"]

The Washington Post recently featured a full-page ad supporting U.S. military presence in Japan and Okinawa. The ad, sponsored by the Association for the Protection of Okinawa’s Freedom and the Happiness Realization Party, made the following claims: "There is a heated debate surrounding the relocation of the U.S. airbase in Okinawa. Some leftists are frantically attempting to expel the U.S. military from Japan. The Japanese media have been actively reporting on this campaign against the bases. This gives the impression that the majority of Japanese are opposed to these bases. This is not true." This was a curious string of half-truths and misrepresentations. Only the first sentence is correct. There is indeed a heated debate. But it’s not about expelling the U.S. military from Japan. It’s very specifically about the building of a new U.S. base in Okinawa to replace the Futenma facility. The campaign focused very narrowly on preventing this new base – not on closing other U.S. bases on Okinawa much less U.S. bases elsewhere in Japan. The Japanese media has actively reported on this narrow campaign, not on the imaginary campaign to expel the U.S. military from Japan. And how do the Japanese feel about the relocation of Futenma? Actually, a majority of Japanese are opposed to the new base: 52 percent compared to only 41 percent who support it. If you go to Okinawa, the opposition to the new base grows precipitously to 90 percent. Nearly 100,000 Okinawans – almost 10 percent of the population – gathered to protest the base back in April. What do the ad sponsors offer as counter-evidence? The Association for the Protection of Okinawa’s Freedom brought together 300 people in Nago in Okinawa to demonstrate support for the new base. Not exactly a groundswell of support compared to the nearly 100,000 who voiced opposition to the new base. And what about the other ad co-sponsor? The Happiness Realization Party is the political wing of a religious cult whose leader believes he is the incarnation of the Buddha. And what a strange incarnation he is, for he believes that Japan must renounce its peace constitution and rearm to the teeth. The wife of this reincarnated Buddha ran for office last year on a platform of attacking North Korea and preparing for an inevitable Chinese invasion. Right-wing militarists and religious fanatics are not exactly the alliance partners the United States should be seeking out. And if these are the only political forces in Japan that can be mustered to support the Okinawa base relocation plan, Washington is facing a long, long battle to get its way.

2AC: Plan Unpopular

**Plan sparks massive controversy - it's a divided issue and Obama hates the plan**

**Feffer 10** [John, John, author of several books and numerous articles. He has been a Writing Fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee. He has studied in England and Russia, lived in Poland and Japan, and traveled widely throughout Europe and Asia. He has taught a graduate level course on international conflict at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul in July 2001 and delivered lectures at a variety of academic institutions including New York University, Hofstra, Union College, Cornell University, and Sofia University, May 13, http://www.fpif.org/blog/okinawa\_and\_obamas\_base-based\_addiction]

Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has been going back and forth on the Okinawa base issue. As a candidate he pledged to close the Futenma air base and not relocate any of its personnel within Okinawa prefecture. But then, after Hatoyama’s Democratic Party of Japan won the elections last year, the U.S. pressure campaign began. And Hatoyama moved further and further toward Washington in a vain effort to curry favor with the Obama administration. In the latest episode, Hatoyama visited Okinawa last week to try to sell the island on his new idea: a modified base relocation plan that would put the replacement facility on a pier jutting into the waters off Henoko in the northern part of the island and also establish a new facility on Tokunoshima island (which is technically not part of Okinawa prefecture even though it has traditionally been part of larger Okinawan culture). Hatoyama’s proposal doesn’t please anyone. No one on Tokunoshima, which the United States occupied until 1953, wants a base. The people of Henoko – and Okinawa in general – reject the pier compromise, which would pose the same environmental risks to the marine ecosystem as the original plan. And the United States will probably not be thrilled about giving up on the full-blown Henoko base outlined in the 2006 agreement with Japan. Nearly 100,000 Okinawans protested the original base plan back on April 25. They are planning to form a human chain around the Futenma base on May 16. Organizers expect 30,000 people to form the 13-kilometer chain. Latest polls show that 90 percent of Okinawans oppose relocation of Futenma within the prefecture. So, what’s the likely outcome? The United States, which has pledged not to go forward with basing without local consent, will not get a new base any time soon. Hatoyama may well lose his position. And the Okinawans will have to put up with the dangerous Futenma base in the meantime. Of course, the Obama administration could just decide that, with the Cold War over for 20 years, it can close one of its 90 military facilities in Japan. But alas, it seems that like most of his recent predecessors in the office, Obama has an incorrigible addiction to bases.

2AC: Plan Unpopular

**The plan causes a massive political backlash - Washington hates it**

**Feffer 10** [John, author of several books and numerous articles. He has been a Writing Fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee. He has studied in England and Russia, lived in Poland and Japan, and traveled widely throughout Europe and Asia. He has taught a graduate level course on international conflict at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul in July 2001 and delivered lectures at a variety of academic institutions including New York University, Hofstra, Union College, Cornell University, and Sofia University, June 2, "WHO KILLED HOTAYAMA'S CAREER?", http://www.fpif.org/blog/who\_killed\_hatoyamas\_career]

Yukio Hatoyama’s political career is dead, and Washington’s fingerprints are all over the murder weapon. The Japanese prime minister announced yesterday that he’s resigning and taking his number 2, the head of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Ichiro Ozawa, with him. The press has made a big thing about Japan’s political instability, that Hatoyama is the fourth prime minister to step down in four years. But this was a resignation that could have been avoided. The Obama administration never warmed to Hatoyama. **Washington didn’t like his critique of American-led globalization.** His calls for a more equal partnership with the United States fell on deaf ears. But it was the Okinawa base issue that sealed the deal. The Japanese prime minister had the temerity to call for a renegotiation of the 2006 deal that would close the Futenma Marine Corps base in Okinawa, shift thousands of Marines to Guam, and build a new base elsewhere in Okinawa for the remainder. The Obama administration [went into overdrive](http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175214/tomgram%3A_john_feffer%2C_can_japan_say_no_to_washington/) in its efforts to persuade Hatoyama and his upstart DPJ to change their minds. It wasn’t just a matter of convincing the prime minister or his party. The DPJ’s ruling coalition partners were against the relocation plan. And the vast majority of Okinawans rejected the 2006 plan. Tens of thousands of protestors gathered in a mass demonstration in April. Another 17,000 formed a human chain around Futenma in May.  So, Hatoyama was in a quandary. He couldn’t afford to piss off Washington. And he couldn’t afford to alienate his own constituencies. So, he committed political suicide by accepting the fiat from Washington and then resigning. “Hatoyama's popularity collapsed, in large measure, because he could not make up his mind," writes Blaine Harden in The Washington Post. That’s not exactly true. The prime minister was flawed in many ways. He was inexperienced. There were some shady financial dealings in his political circles. But he couldn’t make up his mind because he was in an impossible position, a position that the United States forced him into. In my opinion, Washington used the Okinawa base as a weapon against a politician that it didn’t fundamentally trust. Japanese voters wanted a big change when they supported the Democratic Party of Japan last August. They didn’t realize that the U.S. government was not interested in big change in Japan, not if it challenged U.S. interests in the region. Japanese voters can still make new leaders. But the United States reserves the right to break them.

A2 Economy Turn – Unsustainable

Continued development results in their impact – unsustainable dependency on natural resources

McCormack 99

Gavan [Orientalist specialising in East Asia who is currently Emeritus Professor and Visiting Fellow, Division of Pacific and Asian History of the Australian National University, coordinator of an award-winning open access journal The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus)

Not only has the process of Okinawan development been unsustainable - as discussion of the coral, rivers, agriculture should have established - but **it has also been deeply flawed in purely economic terms. Dependence has deepened, and sustainability is more fragile.** Since reversion, the one great new industry successfully created has been public works, the archetypal "problem sector" of mainland Japan's economy. Without the transfusions of capital for bases, public works, and tourism, Okinawa as presently structured would collapse**, yet the blood-bank from which those transfusions come is itself in deep trouble.**

2AC Plan Unpopular

**Plan unpopular – policymakers avoid condemnations of military prostitution because it’s politically controversial**

**Enloe 2k**

(Cynthia [Professor of Government at Clark University and author of *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* among other books on feminism and militarism], from *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives*, published by University of California Press [Berkeley], 2000, p. 50)

The State Department officials’ initial response was positive. In this era of AIDS, as well as of U.S. overseas military base closures, taking a stand against military prostitution seemed a position that could be politically painless and attract widespread support. It would also make the Clinton administration look like a leader in making the post-Cold War world more friendly to women.2 But something happened. No mention of military prostitution appeared in the American government delegation’s final list of proposals to the UN conference in Beijing. It is not yet clear why. Whether or not prostitution should be seen as a violation of women’s human rights, in the same way that domestic violence has been increasingly understood to be, remains a question of controversy among women advocates, including those who attended the Beijing conference in 1995.3 But this intrafeminist debate does not seem to be what caused the disappearance of the antimilitary prostitution plank from the U.S. proposal. Maybe the topic was deemed an insignificant issue by the State Department civilians, and so it was pushed off an already crowded agenda by issues to which they assigned more weight. Or **perhaps people across the river in the Pentagon vetoes its inclusion.** Maybe Defense Department officials had to inform their State Department counterparts, whom they had long imagined naive about military affairs, that women’s relationships to militaries were far more “complicated” than their diplomatic colleagues presumed. Thus, **in the end, condemning the military’s involvement in prostitution at an international women’s conference might have been deemed too risky for this American administration. Military prostitution,** after all, has had a long entangled international political history.

a2 Readiness Impacts

**Concepts of readiness legitimize massive militarism and environmental destruction – provides an inexhaustible justification through which it is wrought**

**Kirk 8**

(Gwyn [has taught courses in women's studies and sociology at Antioch College, Colorado College, Hamilton College, Mills College, Rutgers, the University of Oregon, and the University of San Francisco. She received a Rockefeller Fellowship at the University of Hawaii (2002) and was a Visiting Scholar in the Women's Leadership Institute at Mills College (2002-2003)], Chapter 16: Environmental Effects of U.S. Military Security, in Gender and Globalization in Asia and the Pacific, ed. Kathy E. Ferguson and Monique Mironesco, © 2008 University of Hawai‘i Pres)

The military’s mission and absolute priority at all times is “readiness” for war, an imperative that takes on even greater urgency in wartime. Ret. Adm. Eugene Carroll described the pressure of the “intense pace of operations” at Subic Bay dur- ing the Vietnam War, for example, when environmental issues were completely ignored in the rush to meet operational commitments. . . . Cutting, welding, sand blasting, corrosion control, paint stripping, painting and tank flushing both of ship and aircraft, went on around the clock and the debris was simply flushed into the ground and the bay. (people’s task Force 1997: 18)

**Readiness is a slippery concept, much bigger than war, and an inexhaustible source of legitimation for expanding militarism**. Base commanders may allocate funds for on-base environmental clean-up, but these must come out of their operating bud- gets and thus compete with readiness.

2AC K of Politics

Conventional analysts in the political sphere ignore the voices of those who are silent, rendering them unable to affect the international sphere

Enloe 4

(Cynthia [Professor of Government at Clark University and author of *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* among other books on feminism and militarism], in *The Curious Feminist*, 2004)

By definition, people on the margins, those who are silenced, those perched on the bottom rung, are precisely those who, for whatever reason—and the reasons may be grossly unjust—lack what it takes to have a meaningful impact on the course of those particular events that together cause certain regional or world patterns to take the shape they do. Silenced marginalized people hovering on the lower rungs of any international hierarchy may be able to find the voice to sing while doing their laundry, may be able to affect the local patterns of intermarriage, may even be able to create micro-pyramids of inequality. Not everyone on the bottom rung has a zinc roof; some only have thatched. Not everyone at the bottom carries equal weight when the decision is made whether to use a condom in bed at night. Yet none of these distinctions is of a potency that can be decisive in determining flows of weapons trade, patterns of investment, rules for inter- state peace. Thus conventional analysts of international affairs feel justified in ignoring them.

Their political strategy entrenches societal marginalization and recreates existing power relations – they falsely simplify the political sphere, blinding it to sources of insecurity not seen in the mainstram

Enloe 4

(Cynthia [Professor of Government at Clark University and author of *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* among other books on feminism and militarism], in *The Curious Feminist*, 2004)

There is, I think, a serious flaw in this analytical economy, and in the common research strategy that flows from it. It presumes that margins, silences, and bottom rungs are so naturally mar- ginal, silent, and far from power that exactly how they are kept there could not possibly be of interest to the reasoning, reason- able explainer. A consequence of this presumption is that the ac- tual amount and the amazing variety of power that are required to keep the voices on the margins from having the right language and enough volume to be heard at the center in ways that might send shivers up and down the ladder are never fully tallied. Power, of course, only exists within a relationship. So omitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today’s conventional portrait of in- ternational politics thus too often ends up looking like a Super- man comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollock painting.

A2 Military Disads

Militarized approaches to policy result in the tightening of the grasp of patriarchy – justifications naturalize politics of masculinity and decrease women’s access to the political sphere

Enloe 4

(Cynthia [Professor of Government at Clark University and author of *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* among other books on feminism and militarism], in *The Curious Feminist*, 2004)

Consider what feminist analysis reveals about the conse- quences of militarizing anti-drug policy. In 2000 the American government’s billion-dollar-plus aid package to the Colombian military promised, as its critics noted,2 to further intensify the civil war and human rights abuses. But less discussed was the fact that this policy will serve to marginalize women of all classes in Colombia’s political life. This—the obsession of America’s elected officials and senior appointees with not appearing “soft” on drugs—militarizes drug prevention efforts and, in so doing, disempowers women both in the United States and in the drug- producing countries. Women—both as grassroots urban activists in American cities and as mobilizers of a broad, cross-class peace movement in Colombia—have offered alternative analyses and solutions to the problems of drug addiction and drug trade. Its own masculinized culture helped make the U.S. Congress remarkably passive in the face of the Bush administration’s post-9/11 militarized for- eign policy. Senator Patty Murray, pictured here among her male col- leagues, challenged this masculinized culture by joining a small group of congressional women to override the Bush administration’s 2003 decision to totally omit programming for women from the $87 billion appropria- tion it proposed for reconstructing Afghanistan and Iraq. (Photo: Melina Mara /AURORA)

However, their valuable ideas are being drowned out by the sounds of helicopter engines and M16 rifles.This example illustrates a more general phenomenon. **When any policy approach is militarized, one of the first things that happens is that women’s voices are silenced.** We find that when the United States **touts any military institution as the best hope for** stability, **security,** and development, **the result is deeply gen- dered: the politics of masculinity are made to seem “natural,” the male grasp on political influence is tightened, and** most **women’s access to real political influence shrinks dramatically.**

\*\*\*AT COUNTER PLANS

2AC Consult Japan: Say No

**Japan will say no - economic ties and client-state alliance**

**Asian Correspondent 9** ["JAPAN WANTS US MARINE BASE TO STAY ON OKINAWA", October 23, http://us.asiancorrespondent.com/breakingnews/japan-wants-us-marine-base-to-stay-.htm]

Japan's new government moved Friday to defuse a deepening rift with Washington over the future of a major US Marine airfield, saying it supports keeping the sprawling base on the southern island of Okinawa, although in a less populated area. Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, under intense pressure from top US military officials in Tokyo to push the matter this week, said that moving the base — now located in the crowded city of Futenma — off of tiny Okinawa "is not an option." It was his government's clearest statement to date that it will implement a sweeping pact negotiated with Washington years ago that would relocate the base and move some 8,000 Marines to the US territory of Guam in the Pacific. "Starting from scratch on other ideas would not serve the best interests of the people of Okinawa," Okada said. He said, however, that it will be difficult to completely resolve the issue in time for President Barack Obama's Nov. 12-13 visit to Japan. Okada's comments came after US Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, met with senior officials in Tokyo to urge Japan's new government, which took office last month, to act quickly on the Futenma issue. Earlier in the day, Mullen said Japan needed to commit to the relocation of the Futenma air station "as soon as possible" and added that the new Japanese government's decision to re-examine the existing realignment agreement could derail the overall timeline. Mullen's comments underscored increasing concern in Washington over whether Japan's government, under former opposition leader Yukio Hatoyama, was having second thoughts about key elements of the agreement, which took 15 years to negotiate with Japan's previous conservative administrations. Earlier this week, Gates told Hatoyama he wanted to see progress ahead of Obama's visit and warned the whole deal could collapse if the base relocation falls through. Adding to the frustrations, Hatoyama, who has vowed to put Tokyo's relations with Washington on a more even footing, had repeatedly said he did not intend to rush to a decision. Okada, however, acknowledged the issue needs to be addressed urgently. "We should not spend too much time on this," he said after meeting Mullen. "Our time is limited." Hatoyama on Friday also said that the matter should be resolved "sooner than later," but did not elaborate. In a package that includes relocating the Futenma facility, US and Japanese officials agreed three years ago to shift 8,000 Marines on Okinawa to Guam by 2014. While the existing plan would lighten Okinawa's share of hosting more than half of the 47,000 US troops in Japan, it has met with resistance from opponents who want the base closed completely and not replaced, or moved off Okinawa altogether. Such opposition has stalled efforts to settle on a final plan for where the base should be relocated, although the area around an existing base called Camp Schwab, which is in a less crowded part of Okinawa, remains the most likely candidate. Moving the operations to Kadena Air Base, which is also on Okinawa, has been proposed as well. Futenma is used by helicopters, transport planes and other aircraft as the primary air support base for the more than 10,000 US Marines based on Okinawa. US officials have argued that it must stay somewhere on Okinawa to be close to the Marines on the ground. Mullen on Friday said he understood Hatoyama's desire to review the pact, but was concerned further delays could put the whole plan behind its deadline. "We're barely on track with what was laid out in 2006," Mullen told reporters. "When you start falling behind, you don't fall behind by days, you start falling behind exponentially." Okada's statement appeared aimed at easing such concerns and stressing that Tokyo is not willing to sacrifice its relations with its most important ally and a key trading partner. "I don't think we have any disputes or serious problems between us," Okada said after meeting Mullen. "There is no need to overreact. I believe that the United States understands that we cannot simply accept everything just because an agreement is already made."

2AC Consult Japan: Say No

**Japan says no - they view Okinawa as the cornerstone of military defense**

**Fackler 6/6** [Martin, 2010, NYT correspondent, "JAPANESE LEADER TELLS OBAMA HE'LL WORK TO FULFILL BASE PACT", http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/world/asia/07japan.html]

Japan’s new prime minister, Naoto Kan, told President Obama on Sunday that he would work to fulfill an agreement to relocate an American air base, moving to get beyond a contentious issue that had confounded his predecessor. Making his diplomatic debut with a phone call to the White House, Mr. Kan also reaffirmed that his nation’s security alliance with the United States remained the “cornerstone” of Japanese foreign policy, Japan’s Foreign Ministry said. The ministry released few details of the 15-minute call, which it said Mr. Obama had requested. Mr. Kan, who succeeded Yukio Hatoyama on Friday, has promised to focus on pocketbook issues in an attempt to re-energize his governing Democratic Party, which has lost popularity since its election victory last summer. However, he also inherits difficult decisions on relocating the American base, Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on Okinawa, a politically toxic issue that drove Mr. Hatoyama to resign after he gave in to the Obama administration’s demands that the base stay on the island. It remains to be seen whether Mr. Kan can better balance Washington’s demands with those of Okinawans, who have opposed the base. Mr. Kan must also appease national public opinion, which turned against Mr. Hatoyama for appearing indecisive and causing mistrust with the United States, Japan’s longtime protector. Mr. Hatoyama stepped down a week after announcing an agreement with the Obama administration to move the base to a less populated part of Okinawa. In making the deal, he broke a prominent campaign pledge to move the base off the island. Under the new agreement, Tokyo has until August to announce the details of the new air field’s construction. That means Mr. Kan will likely have to make tough choices early in his government because any new construction could face mass opposition on Okinawa.

A2 SOFA CP – No Solvency

SOFA amendments are not enough to solve – political supremacy, maneuvering, and host country willingness mean the U.S. always gains jurisdictional control over cases of sexual violence

Caron 99

(Cathleen [J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law and a Staff Writer for The Human Rights Brief], ARTICLE: Whose Security Is It? Military Violence Against Women During Peacetime, 1999 Human Rights Brief, lexis)

When U.S. servicemen commit crimes of sexual violence abroad, serious questions need to be raised concerning the SOFA procedures that designate judicial forums, the adequacy of human rights protections, and the sovereign rights of the host nation. According to a recent U.S. **D**epartment **o**f **D**efense report, entitled "Statistics on the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction by Foreign Tribunals Over United States Personnel 1 December 1996-30 November 1997" (CJFT), U.S. military personnel committed 3,196 concurrent jurisdiction offenses that fell within primary foreign jurisdiction and 187 offenses within exclusive foreign jurisdiction. According to these statistics, one would assume that foreign courts processed the majority of crimes committed by U.S. military servicemen. This scenario, however, is not the case.

SOFAs mandate that the state with secondary concurrent jurisdiction request waivers only in cases of particular importance. The U.S. policy, however, is to automatically request a waiver for U.S. personnel implicated in any criminal activity. **In accordance with Army Regulation 27-50,** **military authorities should make efforts "that will maximize U**nited **S**tates **jurisdiction** to the extent permitted by applicable  [\*14]  agreements." Indeed, **the U.S.** **military seems to be quite successful in acquiring the transfer of cases back to its authority**. The CJFT notes that host countries granted 86.1% of U.S. military requests for waiver of primary foreign jurisdiction in 1997. The frequency and success of the requests for waiver of primary foreign jurisdiction ensure that large numbers of U.S. personnel remain under U.S. jurisdiction for crimes committed abroad.

In addition to requesting waivers, U.S. military authorities may secure jurisdiction over accused servicemen **by construing the circumstances of a crime** so that the offense lies within the U.S. military's primary concurrent jurisdiction. The manner by which an act is determined to be committed in the course of official duties (one of the categories for U.S. military primary concurrent jurisdiction) reveals how **the U.S.** **military has the possibility of manipulating the facts of a case to support its jurisdictional claims.** To illustrate, the United States-Japan SOFA vests full authority in the suspect's commanding officer to issue a certificate determining if an alleged act occurred while a serviceman was performing official duties. **Although a host country may rebut the classification presumption, seldom does such a challenge of the U.S.** **military occur.**

If the host country and U.S. military both claim that a crime falls within their respective primary concurrent jurisdictions, the conflict is settled through state negotiations. There is no third party authority to which complaints may be brought. If the issue is not resolved between the U.S. military authorities and host nation prosecutors, the issue moves from a legal to a political realm, with foreign affairs officials making the final jurisdiction determination. Usually **jurisdictional conflicts result in the U.S. gaining** **military jurisdiction.**

**Although SOFAs clearly dictate that a state has exclusive jurisdiction if an act violates the laws of only one state party,** the United States **nonetheless retains jurisdiction in a large number of these cases. Although no SOFA mandates this procedure, the U.S.** **military often requests a jurisdictional waiver from the host nation when a U.S. serviceman is accused of a foreign law violations**. Although the U.S. military can not criminally prosecute its own servicemen for violating a foreign law, it can initiate collateral criminal proceedings or take administrative measures internally. Typically, **when the U.S.** **military offers these alternative actions, host nations are amenable to waiving exclusive jurisdiction because it relieves them of the costs and responsibilities associated with crimes committed by foreigners**. Although SOFA arrangements establish the host nation's authority to assert jurisdiction over many instances of criminal conduct by U.S. servicemen, **the political and practical reality of these crimes often ensures that the U.S.** **military has control over its own. U.S. jurisdiction for crimes committed by servicemen abroad is pervasive;** therefore, it is essential that this juridical process is effective.

A2 U.S. Military Courts Solve

U.S. military prosecution fails – alienates victims and makes substantive punishment impossible – lack of transparency, officers’ discretionary authority, and option of military discharge

Caron 99

(Cathleen [J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law and a Staff Writer for The Human Rights Brief], ARTICLE: Whose Security Is It? Military Violence Against Women During Peacetime, 1999 Human Rights Brief, lexis)

There are many reports documenting violence by U.S. military personnel against women in a host country during times of peace, which often are resolved within the internal U.S. military adjudicatory process**. A successful U.S.** **military prosecution for crimes of sexual violence,** however, **is difficult for a victimized woman from a host country to obtain**. Foreign women with claims against U.S. military personnel not only are excluded from any participation in determining the adjudicatory forum, but then are limited to recourse within an unfamiliar U.S. military court system.

According to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which regulates behavior in the U.S. military, personnel guilty of crimes receive either non-judicial punishments or courts-martial. Non-judicial punishments are typically verbal admonishments, demotions in rank, or forfeitures in pay. Courts-martial are military courts divided into general, special, and summary courts-martial, each with a different function and authority to mete out punishments. These **military processes** **often anger women seeking redress in the halls of** **military justice because the results of non-judicial punishments and courts-martial are often unpredictable and do not guarantee disciplinary outcomes** for three primary reasons.

First, the status of U.S. military proceedings and the records of accused servicemen are not readily available, making transparency an additional hurdle that victims must overcome to raise a successful claim. Transparency refers to the clarity and accessibility of the procedures and outcomes of the system. **The lack of transparency in U.S.** **military proceedings undermines victims' confidence in the system.**

Second, the commanding officer, according to the UCMJ, has complete discretion when deciding to pursue either a non-judicial punishment or a court-martial when a serviceman under his command is accused of a crime. Although one would assume that the severity of the allegations would determine whether a non-judicial punishment or a court-martial is appropriate, the UCMJ does not mandate this result. In fact**, the UCMJ does not prescribe where categories of offenses fall within the** **military justice structure.** To the contrary, the UCMJ is arranged by the type of disciplinary action that may be ordered. Only if the commanding officer considers more than 30 days incarceration to be the appropriate punishment for the alleged crime will the case be referred to a court-martial. The amount of discretionary authority left to the accused's commanding officer, therefore, highlights **a judicial system where it is possible that servicemen guilty of serious crimes, such as** **rape, will receive non-judicial punishments.**

Third, U.S. servicemen facing a court-martial for certain crimes committed, including crimes of sexual violence, can request a discharge from the military in lieu of facing the stigma of a conviction. If U.S. military authorities accept the request, the serviceman walks free. As noted, once the U.S. military asserts its jurisdiction, a host country is often precluded from initiating its own criminal charges under the terms of the SOFA. As a consequence of these factors, women from host countries are regularly deprived of an open and fair adjudication process for crimes committed by U.S. servicemen.

A2 Consult NATO

NATO is a fundamentally masculinized body – it’s headed by a virtually all male-elite and their policies reify roles of masculinity

Enloe 4

(Cynthia [Professor of Government at Clark University and author of *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* among other books on feminism and militarism], in *The Curious Feminist*, 2004)

Feminist questioning also produces a more realistic account- ing of the consequences of “macho” policies. Despite slight increases in the number of women in policy positions, U.S. mil- itarized policies in the post–Cold War era have served to strengthen the privileged positions of men in decision-making, both in the United States and in other countries. For instance, **the U.S. government has promoted NATO as the central bastion of Western security**, at least when the United States can be sure of its position as the “first among equals” within NATO. Although it is true that there are now women soldiers in all NATO governments’ armed forces (the Italians were the most recent to enlist women), **NATO remains a masculinized political organization. The alliance’s policies are hammered out by a vir- tually all-male elite in which the roles of masculinity are silently accepted, when they should be openly questioned**. Thus, to the extent that the United States succeeds in pressing NATO to wield more political influence than the European Parliament (where women have won an increasing proportion of seats), not only American women but also European women will be shunted to the wings of the political stage.

\*\*\*Military Prostitution

Examining Military Prostitution Key

**Examining military prostitution is critical to break down patriarchy – it shapes the desires and experiences of men and provides a starting point for a broad feminist critique and resistance**

**Enloe 2k**

(Cynthia [Professor of Government at Clark University and author of *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* among other books on feminism and militarism], from *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives*, published by University of California Press [Berkeley], 2000, p. 51)

Exploring militarized prostitution is important first because the lives of so many women in so many countries have been directly and indirectly affected by this institution. Second, the subject should attract our attention because **so many men have had their expectations of**, and fantasies about, **women shaped by** their own **participation in militarized prostitution.** Third, military policy makers’ **attempts to construct** a type (or a particular array of types) of **masculinity** that best suits their military’s mission **are exposed by taking seriously their military prostitution policies.** Fourth, we need to think carefully about militarized prostitution because **calculations about it have shaped foreign policies on rape, recruitment, sexual harassment, moral, homosexuality, pornography, and marriage**. Finally, devoting analytical energy to unraveling the politics of military prostitution may help us explain why prostitution policies of a foreign military can often capture the attention of local male nationalists while those same protest leaders not only continue to ignore the prostitution policies of their own country’s military but also stubbornly resist local feminists’ efforts.

Sexual Violence is Connected with Colonialism

**The colonization of women’s bodies correlates with the conquest of Asia itself – women are rendered objects of an imperialistic male power-fantasy**

**Woan 8**

(Sunny [J.D., Public Interest and Social Justice Law, emphasis in Critical Race Theory], ARTICLE: WHITE SEXUAL IMPERIALISM: A THEORY OF ASIAN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, 14 Wash. & Lee J. Civil Rts. & Soc. Just. 275, Spring 2008, lexis)

In the late 1970s, Edward Said n47 described "Orientalism" n48 as a "Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient." n49 He noted the confluence of Orientalism and Sexism: "[Orientalism] view[s] itself and its subject matter with sexist blinders. . . . [**The local] women are usually the creatures of a male power-fantasy**. They express unlimited sensuality, they are more or less stupid, and above all they are willing." n50 Moreover, **"[w]hen women's sexuality is surrendered, the nation is more or less conquered."** n51 Thus**, the sexual conquest of Asia's women correlates with the conquest of Asia itself.**

**The U.S. now carries a colonial presence over Japan that justifies the colonization of Asian women, who are turned into hyper-sexual objects of sexual gratification**

**Woan 8**

(Sunny [J.D., Public Interest and Social Justice Law, emphasis in Critical Race Theory], ARTICLE: WHITE SEXUAL IMPERIALISM: A THEORY OF ASIAN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, 14 Wash. & Lee J. Civil Rts. & Soc. Just. 275, Spring 2008, lexis)

To filter an analysis of the Okinawa incident through the lenses of either sexual inequality or racial inequality exclusively, fails to convey fully why this twelve year old girl suffered. While many scholars see the convergence of sex and race stereotypes as the root cause of the incident, **examination of only these two components is insufficient.** [n94](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n94) To comprehend the gravity of harm caused by sexual-racial disparities between White men an d Asian women demands a tripartite inquest**. This inquest must conjoin colonial history along with that of sex and race related forces.**

First, the legacy of imperialism explains why the U.S. servicemen occupied Japan. After the Allies defeated the Axis powers in World War II, the United States decided to meddle in East Asian political affairs: Namely by regulating Japan to prevent it from engaging in imperialism. A sense of White supremacy meant the world could fall complacent to the idea that White imperialism was somehow "better" than Asian imperialism. Thus, while Japanese military presence in East Asia posed a world threat, American military presence would not.

Second, the prevailing attitude that Asian women occupy an inferior position to White women and more directly, to White men, in turn appeased the consciences of these three servicemen enough to rape and express belief that she enjoyed the sexual conquest. This underscores the idea that **in the eyes of White** [\*287] **men, Asian women seem to exist solely for their sexual gratification as hyper-sexed and unconditionally submissive creatures**. n95 **The stereotype of Asian women always consenting to sex allowed the three servicemen to deny the act as a rape**. It is this potent tripartite combination of imperialist thought, racial inequality, and sexual inequality that perpetuate violence against Asian women by White men. Had these components not come together under White sexual imperialism, the Okinawa incident probably would not have occurred.

Western Militarism Results in Objectification/Stereotyping/Pornographic Sexual Depiction of Asian Women

**Military prostitution occurs in a colonial context, creating a view of the Asian women as inferior – these denigrating stereotypes reaffirm a view of Asian women as sexual objects**

**Woan 8**

(Sunny [J.D., Public Interest and Social Justice Law, emphasis in Critical Race Theory], ARTICLE: WHITE SEXUAL IMPERIALISM: A THEORY OF ASIAN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, 14 Wash. & Lee J. Civil Rts. & Soc. Just. 275, Spring 2008, lexis)

Although prostitution around any U.S. military base is commonly seen, "military prostitution around Asian Pacific bases occurs in a colonial context, which largely distinguishes it from such prostitution in the U.S. and Western locations." [n85](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n85) Western societies often view Asian societies as less developed and sophisticated, and therefore inferior. [n86](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n86) These perceptions color the interactions of U.S. servicemen and Asian women, a problem "further exacerbated by the sexually denigrating stereotypes of Asian Pacific women." [n87](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n87) Filipina sex workers, for example, frequently report "being treated like a toy or a pig by the American [soldiers] and being required to do 'three holes'-- oral, vaginal and anal sex." [n88](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n88) **The systems of** **prostitution perpetuated around U.S. military bases** **[\*286]  in Asia reaffirm the West's perception of Asian women as sex objects.** [n89](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n89) In these contexts, **Asian sex workers are registered and tagged like domestic pets, further relegating them to a less-than-human status**. [n90](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n90)

**Despite significant improvements in racial and sexual equality over the last few decades, U.S. servicemen's treatment of women in Asia has failed to progress**. In the mid-80's, international controversy flared over a Japanese incident in Japan in which two U.S. Marines and a U.S. Navy seaman gang-raped a twelve year old Japanese girl in Okinawa, Japan. [n91](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n91) They ambushed the girl after watching her enter a stationery store. [n92](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n92) The two Marines bound the girl with tape, pulled her shorts and underwear down to her ankles, and after the three men raped her, remarked that the girl looked like she enjoyed it. [n93](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n93)

**The pornographic depiction of Asian women directly stems from this conquest – the prostitution of Asian women’s bodies results in their objectifications**

**Woan 8**

(Sunny [J.D., Public Interest and Social Justice Law, emphasis in Critical Race Theory], ARTICLE: WHITE SEXUAL IMPERIALISM: A THEORY OF ASIAN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, 14 Wash. & Lee J. Civil Rts. & Soc. Just. 275, Spring 2008, lexis)

White men's fascination with Asian women in pornography stems from early nineteenth century Western imperialism. n147 To colonize the Asian nations, countries such as the United States flooded Asia with military forces. n148 As an inevitable result of military presence, prostitution centers consisting of local civilian women sprung up to cater to the White servicemen. n149 With these sexual experiences as their main, if not only, encounters with Asian women, White servicemen returned home with the generalization that Asian women are hyper-sexualized and always willing to comply with White man's prurient demands. n150 **This germinated** even **more interest in Asian women as sexual objects**. n151 To sustain this increased interest, the Asian sex tour industry developed. n152 Asian sex tourism further perpetuates the stereotype of Asian women as hyper-sexualized and always willing. n153 If Asian women are perceived as hyper-sexual, it understandably follows that sexually explicit materials, pornography for example, would include a preponderance of Asian women. n154 The next two subsections on the Asian fetish syndrome and mail-order brides will discuss how depictions of Asian women in pornography have produced gravely detrimental consequences on the Asian and diasporic Asian woman's experience.

Pornographic Depiction of Asian Women Drives Sexual Violence

**Pornographic depiction drives a cycle of violence against Asian women – feature in violent porn and denied consent**

**Woan 8**

(Sunny [J.D., Public Interest and Social Justice Law, emphasis in Critical Race Theory], ARTICLE: WHITE SEXUAL IMPERIALISM: A THEORY OF ASIAN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, 14 Wash. & Lee J. Civil Rts. & Soc. Just. 275, Spring 2008, lexis)

Few mediums reveal the White sexual imperialistic exploitation of Asian women more so than pornography. [n137](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n137) In a 2002 study conducted by Jennifer Lynn Gossett and Sarah Byrne, out of thirty-one pornographic websites that depicted rape or torture of women, more than half showed Asian women as the rape victim and one-third showed White men as the perpetrator. [n138](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n138) The study further uncovered a strong correlation between race and pedophilia, advertising with titles such as "Japanese Schoolgirls" or "Asian Teens." [n139](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n139) Furthermore, images of Asian women in pornographic forms consistently came up through a keyword search for "torture." [n140](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n140)

Many scholars warn that race-specific pornography contributes to race-specific sexual violence. [n141](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n141) Since the overwhelming majority of violent pornography features Asian women in particular, it follows that Asian women are at even greater risk of sexual violence due to their role in violent pornography. [n142](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n142) Helen Zia, a noted social activist, suggests a direct connection between racial-sexual  [\*293]  stereotyped pornography and actual violence against Asian women. [n143](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n143) Additionally, Kandice Chuh argues that "**because Asian/American women are depicted as always consenting, they cannot be raped in the eyes of the law."** [n144](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277148488192&returnToKey=20_T9595726234&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.641444.1438327986" \l "n144)

Military Prostitution Causes Dehum

**Military prostitution causes men to view women as props, causing their dehumanization**

**Chang 1**

(Emily Nyen, J.D. Candidate, 2001, The Notre Dame Law School; Thomas J. White Scholar, 1999-2001, ENGAGEMENT ABROAD: ENLISTED MEN, U.S. MILITARY POLICY AND THE SEX INDUSTRY, lexis)

When describing the enlisted man's experience, Rita Brock and Susan Thistlethwaite identify life overseas as often lonely, depressing, or stressful, noting that many enlisted men are away from their families for the first time. n48 They speculate that this destabilization creates a vulnerability that can increase personal needs for nurturing physical contact, while also increasing susceptibility [\*630] to the peer pressure to prove "strength and dominance through sexual ... conquest." n49

The inexperience and youth of these men increases the likelihood that they will believe the sexist imagery and language that inundates military life. Beginning in boot camp, enlisted men are bombarded with polarized gender characterizations. They chant cadence counts that reduce their roles to fighting and sex: "This is my rifle ... this is my gun ... this is for fighting ... this is for fun." n50 During basic training, men are humiliated and taunted, called "ladies," "girls," and "women" until they properly conform to masculinized military norms. n51 Military policies regarding homosexuality reinforce the need for a hyper-masculine identity. n52 The current Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy n53 and past treatment of homosexuality as a punishable offense encourage enlisted men to exhibit hyper-masculine behavior in order to affirm the presumption that they are heterosexual.

**These experiences, when combined with the military practice of allowing enlisted men to purchase sex, encourage the viewing of women as props. This assists in the process of dehumanizing prostituted women**. Describing what it felt like to be nineteen in 1970 on a U.S. fighter base in northern Thailand, Gregory DeLaurier recalled "a young male soldier's mental map of femininities": n54

"There were two kinds of women in our world in Thailand: those who did our laundry, and prostitutes, and the latter far outnumbered the former ... . All I knew then was that for a few dollars, a radio, a couple of cases of food taken from the base, I could buy a woman." n55

Military Prostitution Equivalent to Rape

**Military prostitution is equivalent to rape – its logic justifies the objectification of women by teaching that they may be taken for a price**

**Chang 1**

(Emily Nyen, J.D. Candidate, 2001, The Notre Dame Law School; Thomas J. White Scholar, 1999-2001, ENGAGEMENT ABROAD: ENLISTED MEN, U.S. MILITARY POLICY AND THE SEX INDUSTRY, lexis)

Dan Rather, CBS News Anchor, did a one-year tour of Vietnam. [n10](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277391706855&returnToKey=20_T9619738399&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.275974.73098618165" \l "n10) When asked about occurrences of military rape, [n11](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277391706855&returnToKey=20_T9619738399&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.275974.73098618165" \l "n11) he denied ever reporting on that issue. He did, however, share his telling conclusion derived from observing men at war. "Everyone who was passing through a village did it - steal a chicken and grab a quick piece of ass, that sort of thing." [n12](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277391706855&returnToKey=20_T9619738399&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.275974.73098618165" \l "n12) He explained the context of these acts of aggression by stating, "Vietnam was a loosely organized gang war, and the women caught it from all sides." [n13](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277391706855&returnToKey=20_T9619738399&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.275974.73098618165" \l "n13) While there is a legal difference between sex with prostitutes and acts of rape, arguably **attitudes behind rape and prostitution inhabit the same continuum**. To some, "**the only distinction between rape and prostitution is the element of time.** With rape, the victim knows that there is a limited time during which she will be sexually brutalized. For the prostituted woman, there is no limit of time. The abuse can (and does) go on indefinitely ... ." [n14](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277391706855&returnToKey=20_T9619738399&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.275974.73098618165" \l "n14)

A more recent assessment of military rape pulls the two acts closer. In December of 1995, three U.S. servicemen were on trial for the rape of a twelve-year-old Japanese girl, committed while they were stationed in Okinawa earlier that year. One of the defendant's attorneys reported that the three men had discussed hiring prostitutes, but since Seaman Gill didn't have any money, he proposed a rape instead. [n15](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277391706855&returnToKey=20_T9619738399&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.275974.73098618165" \l "n15) Former Admiral Richard C. Macke voiced his opinion of the tragedy: "For the price they paid to rent the car, they could have had a girl." [n16](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277391706855&returnToKey=20_T9619738399&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.275974.73098618165" \l "n16)

 [\*625]  Admiral Macke's opinion lends credence to Susan Brownmiller's theories about the relationship between rape and prostitution. In her book Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape, Brownmiller observes, "When young men learn that females may be bought for a price, and that acts of sex command set prices, then **how should they not also conclude that that which may be bought may also be taken without the civility of a monetary exchange?**" [n17](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277391706855&returnToKey=20_T9619738399&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.275974.73098618165" \l "n17)

 Military Prostitution K2 Patriarchy

**Colonial military prostitution defines the military man – creates the juxtaposition of male and female that reifies male dominance**

**Ralston 98**

(Julie Yuki [J.D. from the University of Iowa College of Law], ESSAY: Geishas, Gays and Grunts: What the Exploitation of Asian Pacific Women Reveals About Military Culture and the Legal Ban on Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Service Members,
16 Law & Ineq. 661, Summer 1998, lexis)

Without myths of Asian women's compliant sexuality would many American men be able to sustain their own identities of themselves as manly enough to act as soldiers? Women who have come to work as prostitutes around American bases in Asia tell us how a **militarized masculinity is constructed and reconstructed** in smoky bars and in sparsely furnished boardinghouses. [n90](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277394275341&returnToKey=20_T9620220951&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.430779.24902517215#n90)
Asian Pacific women are, in essence, stereotyped to be everything the "Military Man" is not. If military men represent "ultra men," then Asian Pacific women represent "ultra women." Thus, **they are polar opposites, with one fundamental exception - both are highly heterosexualized.** This commonality, however, **is key to the military masculine identity because it allows a particular juxtaposition of "feminine" and "masculine" that exposes the core of militarism**. [n91](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277394275341&returnToKey=20_T9620220951&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.430779.24902517215#n91) At this core, **the military reveals itself to be an institution [that] has deliberately made itself addicted to a peculiar sort of heterosexual, male power**. This institutional addiction is fed by concrete decisions - honing sexist and anti-gay drill-sergeant training techniques, making foreign women available to male soldiers as prostitutes, defining "combat" as an exclusively masculine activity, converting hotel-corridor  [\*685]  gauntlets into "natural" bonding terrains for aircraft carrier pilots. [n92](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277394275341&returnToKey=20_T9620220951&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.430779.24902517215#n92)

The highly **heterosexualized components of these two identities realize this juxtaposition through a** **sexual connection, often occurring in a context of colonialistic prostitution**. [n93](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277394275341&returnToKey=20_T9620220951&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.430779.24902517215#n93) This connection is crucial to the identity of the "Military Man" because it links him to his strongest oppositional "other" - the archetypal Asian Pacific woman - in a way that reinforces and emphasizes his paramount dominance. This connection serves as a crucial conduit by which the "Military Man" enforces/proves his masculinity, literally within and against the context of the Asian Pacific woman's ultra-femininity. [n94](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277394275341&returnToKey=20_T9620220951&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.430779.24902517215#n94) Thus, **the act of prostituted sex is an act of both definition and domination for the "Military Man."** To understand how this definition is achieved, it is helpful to first examine the components of the Asian Pacific woman archetype.

Asian Military Prostitution Occurs at the Nexus of Patriarchy and Colonialism

Asian military prostitution occurs within a colonial context, at the nexus point of gender and race

**Ralston 98**

(Julie Yuki [J.D. from the University of Iowa College of Law], ESSAY: Geishas, Gays and Grunts: What the Exploitation of Asian Pacific Women Reveals About Military Culture and the Legal Ban on Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Service Members,
16 Law & Ineq. 661, Summer 1998, lexis)

Aside from the institutionalized nature of the military prostitution systems described above, which theoretically may be a characteristic of prostitution around any U.S. military base, [n193](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277664048288&returnToKey=20_T9632991542&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.44684.18217483605" \l "n193) **military prostitution around Asian Pacific bases occurs in a colonial context which largely distinguishes it** from such prostitution in U.S. and Western European locations. The Asian countries where such bases have been located (the Philippines, Korea, Japan, Thailand) are typically viewed as less developed or underdeveloped as compared to the United States, and thus inferior to the United States. [n194](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277664048288&returnToKey=20_T9632991542&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.44684.18217483605" \l "n194) In addition, Asian Pacific people are not only generally perceived to be foreign (even those born in the United States), [n195](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277664048288&returnToKey=20_T9632991542&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.44684.18217483605" \l "n195) but also as less sophisticated foreigners. [n196](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277664048288&returnToKey=20_T9632991542&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.44684.18217483605" \l "n196) These per [\*701]  ceptions taint the interactions between servicemen and Asian Pacific women, and are further exacerbated by the sexually denigrating stereotypes of Asian Pacific women in particular. According to some of these women's stories, this denigration clearly emerges in the way the Americans treat them, and even in the way other Asian Pacific men who have been exposed to American ways interact with them. [n197](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277664048288&returnToKey=20_T9632991542&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.44684.18217483605" \l "n197) The Filipina workers talk about being treated like a toy [n198](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277664048288&returnToKey=20_T9632991542&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.44684.18217483605" \l "n198) or a pig [n199](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277664048288&returnToKey=20_T9632991542&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.44684.18217483605" \l "n199) by the American "johns," and being required to do "three holes" - oral, vaginal and anal sex. [n200](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277664048288&returnToKey=20_T9632991542&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.44684.18217483605" \l "n200) Such labels - "three holes" and "three-holer" - reveal the extent to which these women are de-humanized by American soldiers. [n201](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277664048288&returnToKey=20_T9632991542&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.44684.18217483605" \l "n201)

 [\*702]  The T-shirt slogan quoted for the sub-heading of this section [n202](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277664048288&returnToKey=20_T9632991542&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.44684.18217483605" \l "n202) sums up the sentiments described here - succinctly racializing and colonizing ("little brown," "powered with rice"), sexualizing ("fucking") and de-humanizing ("machines") Asian Pacific women, in just seven words.

Prostitution of any sort is considered a "dirty racket," [n203](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.massart.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277664048288&returnToKey=20_T9632991542&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.44684.18217483605" \l "n203) but military prostitution in the Asian Pacific has a distinctly odious flavor to it. It is backed by government money and enforced by armed government power, lending itself particularly well to exploitative practices. When one throws in the factors of race and colonialism, the stink is undeniable.

\*\*\*Rape Advantage

Inherency: Rape ongoing now

Rape occurs frequently in Okinawa – February incident proves

Reuters 8

(“U.S. probes new sexual assault allegations in Japan,” Reuters, February 21, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUST1796320080221>)

In the latest incident, Kyodo news agency reported on Thursday that the U.S. military had taken a soldier into custody earlier this month over an alleged sexual assault on a Philippine woman in Okinawa, home to the bulk of U.S. forces in [Japan](http://www.reuters.com/places/japan). "We know about this allegation and are in full cooperation with host nation authorities," said U.S. Forces [Japan](http://www.reuters.com/places/japan) spokesman Colonel Eric Schnaible in an email. "We take this allegation very seriously and the Army does not tolerate sexual assault." Okinawa police declined to comment on Kyodo's report that they planned to seek an arrest warrant for the soldier soon. Last week, a 38-year-old Marine, Tyrone Hadnott, was arrested on suspicion of raping a 14-year-old girl on Okinawa, an incident that has rekindled memories of the 1995 rape of a 12-year-old girl on the island. That episode sparked huge protests against the U.S. bases on the island, where residents have long worried about crime associated with the American military presence. Hadnott has denied rape but admitted forcing her to kiss him. Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda has said he will raise the issue of slack military discipline with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during her visit to Tokyo next week. In the latest show of U.S. concern, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill met a senior[Japan](http://www.reuters.com/places/japan)ese diplomat and expressed "great regret" over the suspected schoolgirl rape. "I expressed my great regret of the situation that has developed in Okinawa, my great concern about the feelings of the people of Okinawa and the fact that this is a very difficult time," Hill told reporters after the meeting. The U.S. military on Wednesday slapped a 24-hour curfew on troops on the island and at another Marine base in Iwakuni, southwestern [Japan](http://www.reuters.com/places/japan), that bans them from leaving their homes or bases except to go to school, to worship or visit a doctor. The move followed the arrest of two Marines on Okinawa at the weekend, one accused of trespassing and the other of drink driving. Four Marines at Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station are also being investigated for allegedly raping a young woman last October and could face court martial for the crime.

US soldiers consistently rape Okinawan women – rape is used as an outlet for aggression

Takazato 00

(Suzuyo, “Report from Okinawa – Long Term U.S. Military Presence and Violence Against Women,” Canadian Woman Studies, Vol.19, No.4, Winter 2000, <http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/cws/article/viewFile/7929/7060>)

In general, the extent ofmilitaryviolence against women depends on a number of factors: the attitude of the host government and host country regarding the status of women and respect for their human rights; the legal v v system that is in place to protect their status; the treaties and agreements between the sending country and the receiving country regarding human rights, and the adequacy of the arrangements to prevent crimes. The larger the economic gap existing between the country deploying the military presence and the country receiving the military presence, the more military personnel look down on women in the host community, view women's sexuality as a commodity to be purchased, and contribute to the growth of military prostitution. The U.S. military system is ovenvhelmingly maledominated, despite the fact that ten per cent of military personnel are women (Enloe; Reardon). Troops engage in daily training exercises to hone their skills in killing and wounding to maintain a constant state of readiness that will enable them to be deployed to a conflict situation on - . a moment's notice. Military bases in Okinawa are located next to, orwithin, Okinawan residential areas. U.S. troops are allowed to move freely outside the base, and their violent training overflows into the Okinawa community. The U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa were deployed to the Korean War in the 1950s, the Vietnam War in the 1960s and '70s, and the Persian Gulf War in 1991. The warriors returned to Okinawa on each occasion carrying their pent-up battlefield aggression, which they released on women in the vicinity of military bases. To promote "morale," U.S. military operations include routine "Rest and Relaxation" sites in Asian countries (Sturdevant and Stoltzfus). Prostitution and rape are the military system's outlets for aggression, and its way of maintaining control and discipline-the target being local women, as well as women in the military or U.S. military families. Prostitution and rape is viewed as a reward-for example, in "R&R"- and serves to bolster a sense of masculinity. After the rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan girl by three U.S. military personnel in 1995 (discussed later in this article), Admiral Richard Macke, Commander ofthe Asia-Pacific Forces and aveteran ofthe Vietnam War, declared, "What fools! . . . for the price they paid to rent the car, they could have had a girl" (Schmitt 6Y). He was removed from his position for this remark, a revealing comment on military attitudes to prostitution. Today, former U.S. military women are denouncing military violence and sexual harassment. Both the U.S. Army and Navy admit the existence of sexual violence within those organizations, including violence in U.S. military families (Kelly).

Inherency: Rape Now

Rape is inevitable in a world with US bases – state-based military security system

Akibayashi and Takazato 9

(Kozue, Suzuyo, “Okinawa: Women’s Struggle for Demilitarization” in The bases of empire: the global struggle against U.S. military posts, edited by Catherine Lutz, New York University Press, pg. 260-261)

Military Violence Against Women and Children When OWAAMV women spoke out against the rape in 1995, one of the questions most commonly posed to them by the mainland Japanese media regarded the statistics of sexual crimes committed by U.S. soldiers in Okinawa. Although OWAAMV women often presented the offi cial statistics released by the local authority, they also emphasized the diffi culty in estimating the actual number. Furthermore, no offi cial statistics were available about the crimes committed by U.S. soldiers during the period of U.S. occupation. Few women victimized by U.S. soldiers revealed their experiences, even after the occupation had ended. This reluctance resulted in part from the stigma imposed on victims by societies ridden with different levels and forms of patriarchy. In addition, in the Japanese legal system, rape victims are required to report the crime in order for the police to start an investigation. Needless to say, numerous women and girls chose to remain silent. The offi cial statistics on sexual crimes by U.S. soldiers, therefore, refl ect only the tip of the iceberg. Having worked with many victims and survivors of sexual violence, OWAAMV women started to compile the cases which were brought to their attention or those which occurred in their own communities that were never reported to the police, including in the accounts and memoirs both documented cases and those recorded as oral histories. The most current, the seventh revision of the chronology, accounts for around 300 cases of different sorts of assaults against women and girls, including cases of gang rape, attempted rape, abduction, and murder. OWAAMV members’ efforts to collect cases from various sources including oral histories illustrate the realities of military violence against women. Women in Okinawa have been exposed to gender-based military violence for over 60 years. They have come to analyze their daily and historical experiences and have theorized that the violence against women committed by U.S. soldiers in Okinawa is an inevitable result of the state-based military security system. Cases listed in the chronology reveal the interplay between war preparation and the intensity of military violence. This chronology demonstrates that gender-based military violence in Okinawa began when the U.S. military landed on the island in 1945, during the last stage of World War II. Since then, women and children have been exposed to violence and have lived in fear. In the period between World War II and the Korean War, during which people in Okinawa lived on land that had been damaged by fi rce battle, struggling for survival, women experienced rampant and indiscriminate military violence that can be characterized as follows: 1. A group of between two and six soldiers would abduct one woman at gun- or knifepoint. 2. After being gang-raped, the victim would often be given to other groups of soldiers for more gang rape. 3. Soldiers did not hesitate to kill or severely injure those who tried to help victims. 4. Assaults might take place anywhere, including in fi elds, on streets, around wells, by the water, or in front of families. 5. Assaults often demonstrated brutality. Women with infants on their backs were raped and killed, and victims’ ages ranged from 9 months to the mid 60s. 6. Victims gave birth as a result of rapes. In the four years following World War II, 450 children were identifi ed as having been fathered by U.S. soldiers. 7. Perpetrators were mostly not apprehended, and were often left unpunished.

Inherency: No Reform Now

No priority being given to women’s rights in Okinawa now – women have been normalized

Tanji 6

(Miyume, research fellow at the CASAAP, Curtin University. in Perth, Australia, “The *Unai* Method: The Expansion of Women-only Groups in the Community of Protest Against Violence and Militarism in Okinawa,” Intersections: gender, History and Culture in the Asian Context, August 26, <http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue13/tanji.html>)

Feminist argument, however, inevitably entailed confrontation with the male-oriented order in Okinawan society, and in the community of protest. Following the 1995 rape, former Okinawa Taimusu editor Yui Akiko repeatedly heard male activists' criticisms directed at the women's protest: for 'reducing everything into the problem of men's violence'; 'confusing the real issue of the US military, bases and 'Okinawa'.[[26]](http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue13/tanji.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22n26) Takazato was also abused by a male activist at a march in front of the Kadena Air Base: 'Don't trivialize things by making this all into a “violation of women's human rights”; the important issue here is the Security Treaty!'[[27]](http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue13/tanji.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22n27) Takazato reflects: In the past, Okinawan reversion activists used to say, 'Okinawa is a pain in the little finger of the body of Japan' to describe how the suffering of Okinawans was ignored by the Japanese. But I have always wondered, in that 'pain in the little finger', how much of the women's pain has been represented? It is difficult for people to understand that women's human rights are a political issue, because there are always 'bigger' 'more important' issues. Prostitution has always been a social issue, but not presented to the public in the same way as the compulsory military occupation of land, or US plane crashes.[[28]](http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue13/tanji.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22n28) The male positions briefly identified above highlight the gendered order of the Okinawan struggle. They also point to a rather conservative culture that exists in the community of protest that tends to resist new ideas. Having said this, it is also interesting to note the type of criticism Yui and Takazato heard on 'reducing everything into women's issues' is rarely heard today. Male activists in political parties, unions or informal protest groups praise the public presence and commitment demonstrated by the Okinawan women after the rape incident. They express gratitude for ways in which women 'energize' the community of protest as well as building the international profile of the 'Okinawan'—not women's—problem. 'Women' have been normalized in the community of protest; they are now 'usual suspects' at protest scenes in Okinawa. Yet since the rape case, surprisingly low priority has been given to women's right to safety from sexual violence in Okinawan public policy. In 2001, REIKO, the first rape crisis centre ever in Okinawa – and a product of the lobbying of the Beijing Delegate's request – could only operate six hours a week due to insufficient funding from the Prefecture, which shrank by 650,000 yen between 1996 and 1999.[[29]](http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue13/tanji.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22n29) The OWAAMV members have continued protest activities against military violence and the patriarchal society that marginalizes gender issues.

Link: Bases 🡪 Rape

Bases cause sexual assaults to escalate – rapes in Okinawa started when the base was built and will continue – military accepts rape in its society

Wright 8

(Amy, US Army/Army Reserve veteran, “Rape Hobbles Bush Administration Policies,” Truthout, May 26, <http://www.truth-out.org/article/rape-hobbles-bush-administration-policies>)

One would hope that behavior that requires the "regrets" of the president of the United States and the secretary of state and the stand-down of United States military forces for "reflection" and retraining in ethics and leadership would be punished severely enough to send a clear signal that the behavior will not be tolerated.     Yet the history of sexual assault and rape of women around US military bases, particularly in Okinawa, reveals a military institutional acceptance of this criminal behavior and a lack of enforcement of military regulations against such behavior by senior military officers.     Many in Okinawa and in the United States are watching the US military's response to the latest rapes and sexual assaults to see if this pattern will change.    Since 1945, when the US military stormed onto the island of Okinawa to dislodge the Japanese military in World War II, Okinawan women and girls have been sexually assaulted and raped by US military personnel. Okinawans know the history of every assault. Thirty women were raped in 1945; 40 in 1946, 37 in 1947 and the count goes on year after year. The first conviction of a US military soldier for rape was in 1948.     During my recent trip to Japan, I met with members of the organization Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence. According to reports compiled from police records and other sources by that organization, hundreds of Okinawan and Japanese women have been sexually assaulted and raped by US military personnel since 1945.     In the latest series of incidents, in April 2008, the US military in Japan charged a Marine with rape and other violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in the alleged sexual assault of a 14-year old girl in Okinawa. US Marine Staff Sgt. Tyrone Hadnott, 38, who had been in the Marines 18 years, was charged with the February 10, 2008, rape of a child under 16, abusive sexual contact with a child, making a false official statement, adultery and kidnapping. In February, Japanese authorities had released Hadnott after the girl dropped the allegations against him, but the Marine Corps conducted its own investigation to see if Hadnott had violated codes of military justice.     The rape accusation against Hadnott stirred memories of a brutal rape more than a decade ago and triggered outrage across Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda said that Hadnott's actions were "unforgivable."     The February 11, 2008, arrest of Hadnott by Okinawan police on suspicion of raping a 14-year-old girl he picked up on a motorcycle outside an ice cream parlor in Okinawa City on February 10 triggered an international incident. The same day, February 11, Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima and Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura lodged protests with the United States government.     On February 12, Okinawa police recommended a charge of rape to the Naha District Public Prosecutors Office and hundreds of Okinawans staged protests at the headquarters gate to Camp Foster, Japan.     Japanese Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba expressed concern the alleged rape could affect the planned realignment of US troops in Japan.     On February 13, Lt. Gen. Bruce A. Wright, commander of all US military forces in Japan, US Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer and Lt. Gen. Richard Zilmer, commander of US Marines in Japan, met with Okinawa Governor Nakaima to express their concern. They promised steps would be taken to prevent future incidents.     On February 28, on an official visit to Japan, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also expressed her regrets to Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and Foreign Minister Mashiko Komura. "I earlier had had a chance to express the regret to the prime minister on behalf of President (George W.) Bush, on behalf of myself and the people of the United States for the terrible incident that happened in Okinawa," Rice said at a joint news conference held after she spoke with Komura. "We are concerned for the well-being of the young girl and her family."     In a press conference with Komura, Rice said the United States will try to prevent such incidents from recurring and said the US Forces in Japan and the US Embassy would be reinforcing military discipline. Rice also said that Okinawa is "extremely important" for the security of the Asia-Pacific region and it is important for the US and Japan to go ahead with the US forces reorganization. Rice did not mention publicly the Bush administration's push for Japanese participation in the Iraq war by providing more refueling ships and logistics aircraft, which has sparked outrage in the Japanese public as it violates renunciation of war Article 9 of their constitution.     Zilmer ordered a two-day stand-down for all Marines in Japan for "ethics and leadership" training. The incident also led to tight restrictions, for a time, for American troops and their families at the US base on Okinawa. The US military in Japan also formed a sexual assault prevention task force after the incident.     On May 15, 2008, a US military court-martial sentenced Hadnott to four years in prison, with one year suspended, after convicting him of abusive sexual conduct with a Japanese teenager in Okinawa. Four other charges, including rape of a child under 16, making a false official statement, adultery and "kidnapping through inveigling," or trickery, were dropped in a plea bargain. When asked

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Link: Bases 🡪 Rape

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specifically by a Japanese news reporter, a US Marines public affairs officer stated that Hadnott's name has been placed on the US National Sex Offenders list, yet the Stars and Stripes military newspaper reports that Hadnott will have to place himself on the sex offenders registry after he completes his 36-month jail sentence.     On May 16, 2008, charges were dropped against a soldier accused of raping a 21-year-old Filipino woman on February 18, 2008. The Naha, Okinawa, district public prosecutor said his office did not have sufficient evidence to indict Sgt. Ronald Edward Hopstock Jr., 25, of the 1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment, a US Army Patriot missile battery on the US Air Force's Kadena Air Base, Okinawa.     According to police, after the incident, the woman was hospitalized for more than a week and received outpatient treatment for two weeks. At the time of the incident, the woman had been in Japan only three days, police reports said. Hopstock remains restricted to Kadena Air Base and is closely supervised by officials.     However, like the US Marines in the Hadnott case, the US Army said it will conduct its own investigation, according to Maj. James Crawford, a US Army spokesman at Camp Zama, Japan.     On May 9, 2008, US Marine Lance Cpl. Larry Dean, 20, was convicted of "wrongful sexual contact and indecent acts" in the gang rape of a 19-year-old woman in Hiroshima, Japan, in October 2007, and sentenced to no more than one year in jail and a dishonorable discharge. He was also convicted of "fraternization and violating military orders about liberty and alcohol," but was cleared of rape and kidnapping charges. Three other Marines will be court-martialed this month on charges of gang-raping the young woman. In another incident, early this month, another 14-year-old Japanese girl reportedly was assaulted by a US military service member. The case is under investigation by both Japanese and US military police.     In the 1995 case that is referenced by virtually every Okinawan one speaks with, three American servicemen kidnapped and gang-raped a 12-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl. In August 2006, one of the perpetrators of the 1995 rape strangled and raped a 22-year-old female college student in Georgia, after which he killed himself.     In 2002, Marine Maj. Michael Brown was charged with attempting to rape a Filipina bartender at a club on a US military base. Following a 19-month trial, on July 8, 2004, Brown was convicted by the Japanese District Court of "attempting an indecent act" and "destruction of property" but was acquitted of the rape charge. The court gave Brown a one-year prison sentence, suspended for three years, and fined him $1,400. The Japanese judge said Brown was given a light sentence because the 21-year Marine veteran had no prior criminal record. Brown appealed the verdict to Japan's Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal in July 2004. Brown was transferred by the US military to the Marine Corps Base at Quantico, Virginia, in August 2004.     In October 2005, Brown was arrested and charged with kidnapping an 18-year-old girl from a flea market in Milton, West Virginia. Brown was indicted in January 2006 on felony kidnapping and grand larceny charges and, as of this month, awaits trial scheduled in Huntington, West Virginia. The US Marine Corps demoted Brown to captain and allowed him to retire at that rank on February 1, 2006.     In 2006, a US civilian employed by the US military was jailed for nine years for raping two women on Okinawa.     While the vast majority of US military personnel do not commit criminal acts while in Japan, the continued presence after 60 years of such a large number of US military, and the horrific crimes committed by a small minority of US military, mean that America's military presence in Japan and Okinawa is deeply resented and many Japanese call for the removal of US bases there.     Sexual assault and rape of women in countries where US military forces are stationed must be stopped, as must the rape of one in three women in the US military by their fellow military service members.

Link: Bases 🡪 Rape

Rapes of innocent women happen because of military bases – men want to gain power

Mikanagi 4

(Yumiko, Professor of Social Sciences at International Christian University, Tokyo “Okinawa: women, bases and US-Japan relations,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific, February 2004, Volume 4, Number 1)

As most feminist scholars now agree, rape is not a private issue. Rape occurs because of gendered power hierarchies in society and socially sanctioned masculinities based on violence against women. Thus all rapes have complex political and social causes. But cases of rape that involve military personnel and local women, as exemplified by the rape in Chatan, are even more complex because of the international circumstances surrounding the perpetrators and the survivors/victims.3 That is to say, **rapes conducted by American soldiers of local women would not have occurred if the Japanese government had not hosted US military bases in Okinawa in the first place**. Thus, all rapes committed by soldiers stationed overseas concern international affairs. The presence of military forces has often involved rape and/or sexual slavery. The best-known example of sexual abuse of foreign (as well as native) women by soldiers in the history of Japan is that of the ‘comfort women, who were induced or forced to serve as sexual slaves for the Japanese military during the Asia-Pacific War. Another well-known case of sexual violence by the Japanese military is the Rape of Nanjin. Needless to say, the abuse of women's bodies and sexuality by soldiers is not limited to the Japanese military. Brownmiller has chronicled sexual exploitation of local women by US soldiers during the Vietnam War (Brownmiller, 1975, pp. 86-113). In Korea, too, American soldiers are known to have extracted sexual services from local women since the Korean War, as Moon has demonstrated in her book *Sex Among Allies.* Therefore, the presence of the military, which is a function of international relations, often results in violation of women.

Impact: Health/Stigma

Rapes kill women’s health and cause stigmatization of children

Foreign Policy in Focus 99

(“Women and the U.S. Military in East Asia,” March 1, <http://www.fpif.org/reports/women_and_the_us_military_in_east_asia>)

Research conducted by a group called Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence shows that U.S. troops in Okinawa have committed more than 4,700 reported crimes since 1972, when Okinawa reverted to Japanese administration. Many of these were crimes of violence against women. In Korea, too, the number of crimes is high. A particularly brutal rape and murder of a barwoman, Yoon Kum Ee, in 1992 galvanized human rights advocates to establish the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea in order to document these crimes and help victims claim redress.

Violence against women is seriously underreported, due to the victims’ shame and fear or their belief that perpetrators will not be apprehended. Women who work in the bars, massage parlors, and brothels near U.S. bases are particularly vulnerable to physical and sexual violence. The sexual activity of foreign-based U.S. military personnel, including (but not exclusively) through prostitution, has had very serious effects on women’s health, precipitating HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies and unsafe abortions, drug and alcohol dependency, and mental illness.

In Korea, Japan, and the Phillipines, Amerasian children born to women impregnated by U.S. troops are a particularly stigmatized group. They are often abandoned by their military fathers and raised by single Asian mothers. They live with severe prejudice and suffer discrimination in education and employment due to their physical appearance and their mothers’ low status. Those with African-American fathers face even worse treatment than those having white fathers.

Impact: Dehumanization

Rape and prostitution cause dehumanization – associated with the “shame of Okinawa”

Tanji 6

(Miyume, research fellow at the CASAAP, Curtin University. in Perth, Australia, “The *Unai* Method: The Expansion of Women-only Groups in the Community of Protest Against Violence and Militarism in Okinawa,” Intersections: gender, History and Culture in the Asian Context, August 26, <http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue13/tanji.html>)

In the mid-1960s, Takazato Suzuyo investigated the burgeoning prostitution industry around the US bases and its effects on local women. In the war-torn island where everything has been destroyed, prostitution was often the only way to survive for many girls and women who had lost husbands or parents in the War. In fact, prostitution and the sex industry catering for US military personnel in Okinawa was a major industrial sector in the Okinawan economy.[[8]](http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue13/tanji.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22n8) Despite the circumstances that forced women into the industry and despite its economic importance, **Okinwan society treated women who sold sex to the foreign military for a living with contempt**. Many Okinawan men – who could live and go to school because of the incomes earned by women employed in the sex industry—associated the memory of local women flocking around American soldiers with the shame and misery of 'Okinawa' occupied by the US forces. Reversion and better economic times have reduced the relative size of the sex industry but they have not changed attitudes.[[9]](http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue13/tanji.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22n9) Takazato has eleven years of professional experience as a women's phone counsellor and has helped countless women suffering from ill health, economic hardship, mental distress, guilt, shame and low self-esteem caused by their experiences of rape, domestic violence and prostitution. Takazato and her like-minded colleagues have addressed the problems in 'a strange society intolerant to the prostitutes but tolerant to prostitution',[[10]](http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue13/tanji.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22n10) that is, discrimination, harassment and violence against women in the family, the workplace and the wider community.

\*\*\*Rape Advantage Solvency

Solvency: Accept Rape

Must stop using rape as a symbol for Okinawan nationalism – only by accepting rape for what it is can we solve women’s marginalized existance

Angst 3

(Linda Isako, Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Lewis and Clark College, “The Rape of a Schoolgirl: Discourses of Power and Gendered Identity in Okinawa,” in Islands of discontent: Okinawan responses to Japanese and American power by Laura Hein and Mark Selden, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, pg 135-154)

The 1995 rape provoked a broad reexamination of policies that had long permitted the U.S. military to dominate Okinawa. Many have justifiably used the rape as leverage against Tokyo for the removal of U.S. bases and the return of Okinawan lands. Feminist groups have challenged the focus on an agenda of economic development spearheaded by Japanese corpo­rate capital, as in the case of resort development, which fails to address the need to protect and improve women's lives. They interrogate the new development agenda: What efforts will be made to prevent the violent as­saults on women by GIs and others? And to what degree would small businesses owned and run by women be protected and encouraged under a new development regime? Much Okinawan development has centered on large Japanese corporations, and there has been scant effort to promote the needs of small business owners, women like Keiko and Kaa-chan, who ran a snack shop and bar in Kin or the proprietress of the Churasa Soap Factory in Onna Village. Indeed, the issue of how women will figure in the service economy of tourism is not addressed.47 While women have been called on to support men in their political protests demanding Okinawan rights, they have been expected to defer their goals to the aims of Okinawan identity poli­tics (read: economic development). Okinawan women with whom I have spoken fear that in this way, women will continue to be the base of a new tourist economy pyramid, mostly earning minimum wages and enjoying few if any employee benefits or protections.48 An economically and so­cially marginalized existence will continue for these women, with more and more of them coming from the Philippines and other poorer regions of Asia, within the sexual economy of tourism.49 The problem will remain invisible as long as officials insist on subordinating issues of women's hu­man rights to the cause of Okinawan nationalism and ignoring the in­creasingly Filipina profile of entertainment workers. In raising these issues, one of my goals has been to remind those of us who *so* readily appropriate the rape for our various purposes of the person at its core: the twelve-year-old Okinawan girl whose body was brutally violated and whose life was forever altered one night in 1995. Indeed, I began to write about this rape in order to understand and work through how to come to grips with this tragedy as a feminist scholar一that is, without losing sight of the girl herself. This is why it is necessary to revisit the rape. For it was initially from compassion for the victim that most of us became "involved" in our various ways with this rape. While the compassion may not have disappeared, many have shifted focus to the so-called larger political issues. A feminist politics calls on us to maintain and reaffirm the connection to the subjects of our study. In the end, we must remember that the victim is a child in an Okinawan family deprived of her youth and innocence. Whatever else we have had to say about the connection between her and Okinawa be- longs to the political world of adults, a world into which she was vio- lently and prematurely thrust.

Women are Excluded

Women in Okinawa are excluded – stigmatizing work causes marginalization and exclusion from the political arena

Angst 3

(Linda Isako, Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Lewis and Clark College, “The Rape of a Schoolgirl: Discourses of Power and Gendered Identity in Okinawa,” in Islands of discontent: Okinawan responses to Japanese and American power by Laura Hein and Mark Selden, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, pg 135-154)

**Women working in Okinawa s base-related and (now) resort tourism- related sex and entertainment industry have long borne the brunt of their socially stigmatizing, physically debilitating, dangerous work**. Protest leaders, who define an idea of collective cultural self through reference to a pristine, precolonial past, draw upon images of purity and chastity, such as the Himeyuri and the raped schoolgirl; in the process, the real prosti- tuted daughters of Okinawa are excluded. Indeed, in many ways, bar and brothel women are lingering and unwanted images of prewar era Oki- nawa as low ethnic other, while Filipina women, the new sex workers, are largely absent from the discussion.45 Despite their many sacrifices, these women are coded as less deserving of public concern by many groups because they are not "pure." The lack of sensitivity to the fact that women with little education have few work opportunities other than bar and sex work melds with the focus on the twelve-year-old raped girl as the primary symbol of sacrifice and victim- hood (just as the Himeyuri served in this capacity for wartime arid post- war Okinawa). Yet the raped girl differs fundamentally from other women in Okinawa: Precisely because she is a girl, her chastity places her within the protection of the patriarchal family. In the first decades after the war, the survival of many Okinawan families rested on the incomes of sex workerssisters, mothers, and other female relatives. Now that most Okinawans have put the hard- scrabble years behind them, the women who still bear the burden of such sacrifices—now mainly a few older Okinawan women and in­creasing numbers of Filipinas—have been forgotten or stigmatized.46 Ironically, the very women who have experienced the life of the prosti­tuted daughter are excluded from public recognition as that particular symbol of Okinawan victimhood. That is, Okinawan women (and still more Filipinas) working in the sex trade, around bases and in the tourist industry, are ineligible for inclusion within the protective embrace of the collective family, despite having sacrificed their own reputations as "de­cent women" in the service of families. A major challenge facing the fem­inist movement in Okinawa is inclusion of these marginalized and for­gotten women in contemporary human rights agendas.

Okinawa Key

Okinawa is key – it’s where most violence occurs

Gerson 96

(Joseph, regional program director of the American Friends Service Committee in New England, “I refuse,” in “Fort Okinawa,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July 1996, pg. 26)

Fumiko Maeda, another participant in the Beijing conference, cites specific incidents and crimes. When she was in elementary school, a military airplane crashed into another school, killing 17 students. Later, she recalls, a U.S. military vehicle killed a boy in a traffic accident, but the driver was not punished. ‘‘Since I was born," she says, “I have always been surrounded by U.S. bases, and I wondered why peo- ple were killed and criminals were not judged in court. Many Okinawan people remember similar cases. In 1955, six-year-old Yumiko-chan was raped, killed, and abandoned on a beach. I do not want my children sacrificed. **We can't coexist with military bases**. We need to protect our rights and to live in peace." Maeda and her neighbors have good reason to be concerned. Okinawan women have suffered at the hands of the Japanese and U.S. militaries. In 1944, as the Japanese Imperial Army prepared to defend Oki- nawa, between 400 and 500 Okinawan women and about 1,000 Korean women were forced into sexual slavery to serve as "comfort women" for the troops. After the war, 278 reported GI rapes were commit- ted during the first six years of the occupation. Re- cent years have not been much better. Between 1988 and 1995, according to one study, more "marines and navy sailors were tried for rapes, child molestations and other sexual assaults at bases in Japan than at any other U.S. military site in the world." The vast majority of these violations were in Okinawa. GI crime in Okinawa is not limited to rape and sex- ual assault. The governor's office reports “4,716 seri- ous crimes involving U.S. personnel, their depen- dents or civilian employees" between 1972 and 1995. Attorneys in Okinawa estimate that U.S. military personnel commit about 1,000 crimes and misde- meanors annually in Okinawa. Many Okinawan women are proud of Sugako Naka- mura, a student at Futenma High School, who spoke at a rally that mobilized 85,000 Okinawans in late Oc- tober. She said, in part: “When you trace back the history of the crimes committed by American military personnel, you will certainly be surprised at the abundance of very bru- tal crimes. The American military personnel have continued to commit these crimes since the end of the war, 50 years ago. Can the continuation of such a sit- uation be seen as acceptable? Why mainland Japan has been able to neglect the heavy burden of these crimes is something I do not understand— “I refuse to continue to live under the threat of ac- cidents, crimes, and the peril brought about by American military personnel. I refuse to make my fu- ture children live out their lives in this situation. Please stop sacrificing us, students, children, and women.”

Rape Comes First

Must look at rape first – Feminist approaches solve objectification of rape victims

Angst 3

(Linda Isako, Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Lewis and Clark College, “The Rape of a Schoolgirl: Discourses of Power and Gendered Identity in Okinawa,” in Islands of discontent: Okinawan responses to Japanese and American power by Laura Hein and Mark Selden, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, pg 135-154)

When various groups appropriate the incident and the victim for larger political purposes, they are participating in the complex field of identity politics in Okinawa. By engaging feminist and other critical ap­proaches, I wish to reframe and reposition questions of agency, determi-nation, human rights, and victimization.10 In explaining why (his partic­ular incident in the long history of abuses committed by U.S. servicemen against Okinawan people and property resonates so strongly throughout Okinawa and mainland Japan, I suggest that the answer has to do with more than the literal (political) on-the-ground conditions of the violation of a local child by soldiers of an occupying force at a particular moment in Okinawan history一though this cannot be minimized一and must in­clude a figurative (poetic) reading of the rape as the defilement and vic­timization of the idea of a pure and innocent Okinawa. Clearly, the rape of the schoolgirl is enmeshed in these complex discursive realms. I argue that a feminist politics can counteract the objectification of the twelve-year-old girl (and the rape event) and reclaim her subjectivity— indeed, her very humanity. We must return to the rape to understand it both concretely and symbolically as an act of violence between perpetra- tors and victim. It is also necessary to understand rhetorical strategies and agendas to politicize and thus transform the rape into a metaphor for contemporary\* Okinawa's condition of subjugation. I problematize the idea of a unified voice of Okinawan identity politics as presented in the media explosion surrounding the rape and promoted especially in the rhetoric of the prefecture's elected leaders at the time, who quickly assumed the position of main spokesmen after the rape. While a unified voice may help to build momentum for social change, I question to what degree this unified voice acts hegemonically in Okinawa to subsume and defer other voices and agendas. In examining the an- tibase protest movement's response to the rape, I highlight certain inter­nal Okinawan tensions—ideological regional, classist, and gender based—that are welded together into local antibase demands. Here, too, I work from a feminist critique. As Judith Butler and Joan Scott have shown, women's voices are of­ten lost in a generalized voice of identity politics,11 and as Cynthia Enloe has pointed out, feminist agendas are often subsumed under the rubric of the larger political good, their goals deferred, ostensibly for the short term but often indefinitely.12 The presumably more pressing needs of the "good of the political whole"—repatriation of land, politi­cal sovereignty; and base and military force reduction, in the Okinawa case—replace the "private" importance of the rape and the suffering of the young female victim. The focus on sovereignty displaced the issues of women's (and general human) rights, including the initial efforts of local women's groups to im­prove safety and work/living conditions for all Okinawan women.,; The rape victim and the rape have been absorbed into existing political ide­ologies and discourses, local and international, including feminist dis- courses. The rhetoric used by each group explains the rape as something else: as a catalyst in local political leaders' long-standing negotiations with the Japanese government over rights to land and Okinawan sover- eignty,14 as a consequence of post-Cold War military alignments involv­ing Japan and the United States, and as a stimulus to feminist campaigns to further women's rights. In each instance, groups draw upon and inter­pret particular aspects of the colonial and occupation eras to buttress their representations of the rape Such conscious remembering of the past gen­erates sometimes competing images of contemporary Okinawan identity, attesting to the heterogeneous and mutable character of a politics of iden­tity and ethnic identity formation. Not only has the rape been redeployed in a representational capacity, it has simultaneously been absorbed into and has redefined symbolic ex­pressions of Okinawan victimhood. Particularly in nationalist discourse, as Carol Delaney tells us, "Women do not represent, they are what is rep­resented. ...This observation opens theoretical space to think about the differences between symbolization and representation, often held to be the same/' In many countries, women symbolize the nation, but men rep­resent it, and often the nation is referred to as female and represented as a female statue. Most fundamentally, "because of their symbolic associa­tion with land, women are, in a sense, the ground over which national identity is played out."15 As symbol, the 1995 rape and the rape victim can serve in many capac­ities to many Okinawans, and as such, the event made it possible, beyond the immediate exigencies of political protest, for a variety of groups with competing agendas to come together as a unified Okinawan voice of dis­sent. Identity politics is implicitly one of resistance~in this case, simulta­neously against the Japanese state and the powerful myth of Japanese cul­tural homogeneity, and against U.S. military power with its repeated abuse of the Okinawan people whom it claims to defend. How, then, have Okinawan antiwar activists appropriated the rape as a symbol of Oki­nawan subjugation? This writing explores the nature and practice of hegemony within a politics of protest.

Rapes Represent Okinawa

Rapes of women near bases represent the subjugation of Okinawa

Angst 3

(Linda Isako, Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Lewis and Clark College, “The Rape of a Schoolgirl: Discourses of Power and Gendered Identity in Okinawa,” in Islands of discontent: Okinawan responses to Japanese and American power by Laura Hein and Mark Selden, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, pg 135-154)

Later media coverage of Okinawa spoke metaphorically of the rape in terms of the rapacious behavior of imperialist powers acting on a his­torically marginalized population. Commentators in the media and in the antibase movement shifted the public intellectual and ethical focus from the young female victim to the Okinawan body politic. While fem­inist groups protested the rape as the figuration and potential rape of all women in and around U.S. military installations in Asia, the Oki­nawan political establishment and international media moved from a particular sexual crime of violence against a young girl to a crisis of sovereignty. Okinawan prefectural officials and political activist lead­ers focused increasingly on the perpetrators' identity and agency, thus emphasizing the political/nationalist dimension of U.S. military domi­nation over the personal and gendered dimensions of the act. For polit-ical leaders, women and the body of the schoolgirl became significant mainly because they pointed to the crisis of sovereignty. Most stories situated the rape not only among the many heinous crimes perpetrated by U.S. soldiers against local Okinawans in the fifty years since the war but also within a broader historical context that included colonial and neocolonial oppression of Okinawa by Japan and the United States. The Okinawa Times, for example, editorialized that it took the "sacrifice of a schoolgirl" to make progress in the movement to scale back the Ameri­can military bases that occupy 20 percent of the land on this Japanese island.9 The female victim, a Kin schoolgirl, and the rape (her rape), were hid­den from view as they were appropriated by all sides, including the prefectural government, various women's groups, landowners, and other ac­tivist groups throughout Japan and Okinawa. Her pain was transformed into a symbol of national subjugation with its own narrative: Okinawa, as the feminized body politic, remains a site of contestation between con­tending political powers, local and international.

Although both political leaders and feminists appropriated the image of the rape for their own agendas, for feminists and women's rights ac­tivists the rape itself continues to inform a larger feminist politics as a vi­olent physical act against a female victim. But within the broader protest movement for Okinawan rights, the abstracted idea of the ravaged female body, victim of a grotesquely twisted sexual desire, has boon juxtaposed with Okinawan soil as the object of the nationalist imagination. In short, the rape of a child is transformed into the rape of the body politic. In this reading, **inflicting violence on a girl becomes a metonym for the perver-sion of U.S., or U.S. and Japanese, desire to maintain the bases in Oki­nawa**. Both woman (or her representation) and soil are of course critical symbolic elements within (emergent) nationalist discourses.

Rapes Represent Okinawa

Rape victims can be objectified easily – anonymity and youth symbolize innocence and purity

Angst 3

(Linda Isako, Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Lewis and Clark College, “The Rape of a Schoolgirl: Discourses of Power and Gendered Identity in Okinawa,” in Islands of discontent: Okinawan responses to Japanese and American power by Laura Hein and Mark Selden, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, pg 135-154)

The fervor with which Okinawans protested the rape—and by implication the ongoing policies under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty—cannot be ex- plained solely by a literal reading of the rape as an act of violence by mem- bers of a foreign occupation force against a local girl. A fuller consideration of Okinawan politics requires understanding how the image of a victimized schoolgirl resonates over time as a symbol of both wartime and postwar Okinawa, and thus of Okinawa as a victim of both Japanese and American violence and hegemony. The unity of the antibase movement in Okinawa rests on a shared symbolic understanding of Okinawa and Okinawan his- tory as a parable of the violated and sacrificed schoolgirl/daughter. Behind that unity, however, lies the "split" to which Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe refer—that is, the pluralistic and often competing nature of interest groups, with their "specific literal demands," within the totalized idea of Okinawan identity politics and the shared goals of greater autonomy and Okinawan rights to recover confiscated land.16 One possible way to focus attention on the actual experience of Oki- nawan women would be to highlight the direct experience of the raped girl herself. Yet direct attention to the personal experience of the victim of the 1995 rape is not possible. Her youth, as well as the crime itself, which traditionally stigmatizes its victims, require that she be protected through anonymity. It is precisely because she goes unnamed—and is thus anonymous—that the rape victim serves so well in a general sym- bolic capacity. Her youth also contributes to this symbolic power. As a child, she symbolizes innocence and purity; she does not yet know the world of work or women. Her position shifts from that of general female victim symbolizing (all) women to a more abstract, and therefore more generalizable, category of victimization: the symbol of an innocent, pure, and feminized Okinawa sacrificed to the interests of the dominant powers, the United States and Japan.

Rapes are used as a symbol of Okinawa against Japan and US militarization

Gerson 96

(Joseph, regional program director of the American Friends Service Committee in New England, “I refuse,” in “Fort Okinawa,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July 1996, pg. 26)

Why did the rape of a 12-year-old student ignite the largest Japanese protest against U.S. bases since the 1960s? Many women in Okinawa point to the September 1995 Women's Conference in Beijing, 71 Okinawan women attended. In Beijing, the women resolved to end rape and vi- olence against girls and women. Upon returning, they were greeted with the news of what was then the most recent outrage. “**Okinawa**," says Suzuyo Takazato, the leader of Okinawa’s delegation, **“is the prostituted daughter of Japan. Japan used her daughter as a breakwater to keep the battlefields from spreading over the main- land until the end of World War II. After the war, she enjoyed economic prosperity by selling the daughter to the United States."** With the dollar devalued, she adds, it is increasingly difficult for GIs to pay the drink fee required to talk with the Philippine "entertainers" who have replaced the more economically secure Okinawans. Some GIs frequent brothels or discos on payday. But, says Takazato, others search out Okinawan junior and se- nior high school girls with offers of English conversa- tion lessons. Sometimes, the “lessons" end in rape. After the September rape, Takazato played a lead- ing role in creating a broadbased coalition of women's groups, called Okinawan Women Act Against Mili- tary Violence. The work of the group is based on a section of the Platform of Action adopted in Beijing, which says: “Rape that takes place in a situation of armed conflict or long-term military presence consti- tutes both a war crime and crime against humanity."

 Prostitution = Rape

Military prostitution is equivalent to rape

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(Cynthia, Research Professor of International Development and Women’s Studies at Clark University. She received her Political Science PhD from the University of California, Berkeley, The Curious Feminist, University of California Press, pg. 119-121)

In September 1995, on the Japanese island of Okinawa, a twelve year- old girl was assaulted and raped. Three U.S. Marines were charged. In the wake of the rape, the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Richard Macke, told reporters: “I think it was absolutely stupid, as I’ve said several times. For the price they paid to rent the car, they could have had a girl.” While the comment forced the four-star admiral into early retirement, it also gave us a glimpse of the patriarchal assumptions that encourage U.S. men in uniform to see women as warriors’ booty. There is a widespread belief that soldiers’ sexuality is determined by uncontrollable “drives.” Any military’s fighting effectiveness, this theory holds, is jeopardized if those soldierly sex drives are not accommodated. U.S. base commanders have often worked closely with local and national officials to provide their male troops with “safe” commercialized sex—even, as in Japan, where prostitution is illegal. Rape causes public outrage and political embarrassment. But prostitution? It can be zoned and policed in a way that serves to release the male soldiers’ “natural” urges, while at the same time providing business opportunities for local entrepreneurs and allegedly protecting the “respectable” women living near the bases. The conventional wisdom is, therefore, that a woman who is raped by a U.S. soldier is deserving of headlines and, if necessary, official apologies. By contrast, the woman paid to dance nude at the bar outside the base or to have sex in a bar’s “dark corner” is considered unworthy, not only of our sympathy, but of our attention. There are two fallacies in this accepted military thinking. The first is that rape is discouraged, when in fact it is facilitated by an officially condoned industry that serves up women’s sexuality as if it were fast food. Such organized prostitution is often laced with racism, as it is around so many U.S. military bases, turning local women into exoticized game. The second fallacy is that women in prostitution and women outside prostitution are on opposite sides of the political chasm, when, in fact, feminists have long argued against pitting women in prostitution against so-called respectable women. Both are often working to support their children and both are often trying to develop nonviolent relationships with men. There’s a further danger: the 1995 Okinawa rape, like those committed by other military men, will be converted into mere fodder for a larger, “more serious” political contest. The soldiers and the girl will thereby be turned into mere symbols in a debate over the long-term consequences of Japan’s adherence to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Korean, Bosnian, and other feminists have warned us about this sort of political exploitation of militarized violence against women: left to their own devices, men will take seriously sexual assaults on women only when those assaults can be used to make some other point that those men hold dear—the need for nationalist mobilization, the opposition to an unequal bilateral treaty. Okinawan and other Japanese feminists, fresh from the UN Conference on Women, which was held in Beijing in fall 1995, drew links between this assault and Second World War and postwar prostitution politics. Then they chastised the Okinawan governor for not using the rape case as a lever for launching a wider investigation of violence against women in Okinawa at the hands of the U.S. military. Our current attention may have shifted to focus on U.S. soldiers in other war zones, but we need, most importantly, to continue to insist that the U.S. military’s entire policy regarding sexuality be subject to public scrutiny: military rape and military prostitution are not separate. They’re connected. In addition, we need to shoehorn feminists’ voices—Okinawan, Bosnian, and others—into the U.S. media. Reports about soldiers’ abuses of women are not enough. What these abuses mean for women is the real story.