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The aff's representations of Eastern instability rest on Eurocentric assumptions that proceed from an Orientalist perspective

SAID 3 (Edward, Prof. of English/Comparative Lit., Columbia U., “Preface.” Orientalism. P 3-4, date accessed: 7/9/2010) AJK

Related to this academic tradition,, whose fortunes, transmigrations, specializations and transmissions are in part the subject of this study is a more general meaning of Orientalism. Orientalism is a style of thought based upon ontological and epistemological distinction made between “the Orient” and (most of the time) “the Occident.” Thus a very large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, “mind,” destiny and so on. This Orientalism can accommodate Aeschylus, say and Victor Hugo, Dante, and Karl Marx. A little later in this introduction I shall deal with the methodological problems one encounters in so broadly construed a “field” as this. The interchange between, the academic and the more or less imaginative meanings of Orientalism is a constant one, and since the late eighteenth century there has been a considerable, quite disciplined, perhaps even regulated traffic between the two. Here I come to the third meaning of Orientalism, which is something more historically and materially defined than either of the other two. Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point Orientalism, can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. I have found it useful her to employ Michel Foucault’s notion of a discourse, as described by him in the *The Archaelogy of Knowledge and in Discipline and Punish* to identify Orientalism. My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period . Moreover, so authoritative a position did Orientalism have that I believe no one writing, thinking, or acting on the Orient could do, to without taking account of the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism. In brief, because of Orientalism, the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought or action. This is not to say that Orientalism unilaterally determines what can be said about the Orient, but that it is the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on (and therefore always involved in) any occasion when that peculiar entity “the Orient” is in question. How this happens is what this book tries to demonstrate. It also tries to show what European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self. Historically and culturally there is a quantitative as well as a qualitative difference between the Franco-British involvement in the Orient and until the period of American ascendancy after World War II the involvement of every other European and Atlantic power. To speak of Orientalism therefore is to speak mainly, although not exclusively of a British and French cultural enterprise, a project whose dimensions take in such desperate realms as the imagination itself, the whole of India and the Levant, the Biblical texts and Biblical land, the spice trade, colonial armies and a long tradition of colonial administrators, a formidable scholarly corpus, innumerable Oriental “experts” and “hands” in Oriental professorate, a complex array of “Oriental” ideas (Oriental despotism, Oriental splendor, cruelty, sensuality), many Eastern sects, philosophies, and wisdoms domesticated for local Europeans use, the list can be extended more or less indefinitely. My point is that Orientalism derives from a particular closeness experienced between Britain and France and the Orient, which until this early nineteenth century had really meant only India and Bible lands. From the beginning of the nineteenth century until the end of World War II France and Britain dominated the Orient and Orientalism; since World War II, America has dominated the Orient, and approaches it as France and Britain once did. Out of that closeness, whose dynamic is enormously productive even if it always demonstrated the comparatively greater strength of the Occident (British, French or American), comes the large body of texts I call Orientalist.

While the aff purports to create a kinder gentler US military presence, it in fact reentrenches the same mentality that is the root of policy failure in the Middle East.

SAID 3 (Edward, Prof. of English/Comparative Lit., Columbia U., “Preface.” Orientalism. p. xx-xxi. )

So from the very same directorate of paid professional scholars enlisted by the Dutch conquerors of Malaysia and Indonesia, the British armies of India, Mesopotamia, Egypt, West Africa, the French armies of Indochina and North Africa, came the American advisers to the Pentagon and the White House, using the same cliches, the same demeaning stereotypes, the same justification for power and violence (after all, runs the chorus, power is the only language they understand) in this case as in the earlier ones. These people have now been joined in Iraq by a whole army of private contractors and eager entrepreneurs to whom shall be confided everything from the writing of textbooks and the constitution to the refashioning of Iraqi political life and its oil industry.Every single empire in its official discourse has said that it is not like all the others, that its circumstances are special, that it has a mission to

1NC Shell (2/2)

<TEXT CONTD W/O INTERRUPTION FROM PREVIOUS PAGE> enlighten, civilize, bring order and democracy, and that it uses force only as a last resort. And, sadder still, there always is a chorus of willing intellectuals to say calming words about benign or altruistic empires, as if one shouldn't trust the evidence of one's eyes watching the destruction and the misery and death brought by the latest mission civ-ilizatrice.

Orientalist policy is inherently dehumanizing

SAID 3 (Edward, Prof. of English/Comparative Lit., Columbia U., “Preface.” Orientalism. p. xxvii)

Reflection, debate, rational argument, moral principle based on a secular notion that human beings must create their own history have been replaced by abstract ideas that celebrate American or Western exceptionalism, denigrate the relevance of context, and regard other cultures with derisive contempt. Perhaps you will say that I am making too many abrupt transitions between humanistic interpretation on the one hand and foreign policy on the other, and that a modern technological society that, along with unprecedented power, possesses the internet and F-16 fighter jets must in the end be commanded by formidable technical-policy experts like Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Perle. (Neither man will do any actual fighting since that will be left to less fortunate men and women.) But what has really been lost is a sense of the density and interdependence of human life, which can neither be reduced to a formula nor be brushed aside as irrelevant. Even the language of the war is dehumanizing in the extreme: "We'll go in there take out Saddam, destroy his army with clean surgical strikes, and everyone will think it's great," said a congresswoman on national television. It seems to me entirely symptomatic of the precarious moment in which we are living that when Vice President Cheney made his hard-line speech on August 26, 2002, about the imperative to attack Iraq, he quoted as his single Middle East "expert" in support of military intervention against Iraq an Arab academic who, as a paid consultant to the mass media on a nightly basis, keeps repeating his hatred of his own people and the renunciation of his background. Moreover, he is backed in his efforts by the military and Zionist lobbies in the United States. Such a trahison de clercs is a symptom of how genuine humanism can degenerate into jingoism and false patriotism.

Dehumanization is the root cause of violence and war

Katz 97 (Katheryn D. Katz, prof. of law - Albany Law School, 1997, Albany Law Journal

It is undeniable that throughout human history dominant and oppressive groups have committed unspeakable wrongs against those viewed as inferior. Once a person (or a people) has been characterized as sub-human, there appears to have been no limit to the cruelty that was or will be visited upon him. For example, in almost all wars, hatred towards the enemy was inspired to justify the killing and wounding by separating the enemy from the human race, by casting them as unworthy of human status. This same rationalization has supported: genocide, chattel slavery, racial segregation, economic exploitation, caste and class systems, coerced sterilization of social misfits and undesirables, unprincipled medical experimentation, the subjugation of women, and the social Darwinists' theory justifying indifference to the poverty and misery of others.

Alt: Reject the aff. Intellectual rejection and acknowledgement key

Bové 2000 (Paul A, “Edward Said and the work of the critic: speaking truth to power, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

Critics who take Said seriously recognize the central relation between history, narrative, and politics in his work, and they attempt to bring their own study into relation with Said’s efforts. In this collection, for example, Jonathan Arac presents us with some of his own arguments on *Huckleberry Finn*and shows us how Said’s work can and should matter in the context of American literature, culture, and politics. For just as Said meditates on the quizzical complexities that form the hypotheses of all critical work, so Arac’s deeply historical tracings and judgments of the ways cultures work in forming its own icons let us see exactly what the role of criticism should be. It is Said’s particular effect that those who write with him in mind must always confront this question: What should the critic do? In a unique and powerful essay on the problems of land mines and human rights, Barbara Harlow gives one exemplary answer to that question. She enacts in scholarly detail Said’s lifelong injunction: Speak truth to power. Like Said, Harlow casts aide “epistemological” worries over what we can know to show that, at the level of politics and history, we can know certain and often quite deadly things- massacres, cover-ups, and the suppression of human rights- and intellectuals must use their special training and knowledge to speak of these matters as they speak about race and stories.

\*\*\*Links\*\*\*

Links- Policy Experts

1AC impact cards are premised on an Orientalist literature base

Said 78 (Edward, “Orientalism”, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, p 35, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter or field .tat is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or institu¬tions; nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient; nor is it representative and expressive of some nefarious "Western" imperialist plot to hold down the "Oriental" world. It is rather a distribution of geopolitical awareness into .aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, andhiloiogical texts; it is an elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole series of "interests" which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by\_ no means in it corresponding relationshi the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with „— various kin s o powe aped to a degreel2y, the exchange with power Utica' as with a colonial or im rial establishment), power intellectual (as with reining sciences like coluparatiye linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern .lic sciences),sower u tura as with art oxies an carionLotiask\_teats—valuell, power moral (as with ideas about what "we" do and what "they" cannot do or understand as "we"slo). Indeed, my real argument is that Orientalism is—and does not simply represent—a con-siderable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has Less to do with the Orient than it does with "our" world. Introduction 13 Because Orientalism is a cultural and a political fact, then, it does not exist in some archival vacuum; quite the contrary, I think it can be shown that what is thought, said, or even done about the Orient follows (perhaps occurs within) certain distinct and in¬tellectually knowable lines. Here too a considerable degree of nuance and elaboration can be seen working as between the broad superstructural pressures and the details of composition, the facts of textuality. Most humanistic scholars are, I think, perfectly happy with the notion that texts exist in contexts, that there is such a thing as intertextuality, that the pressures of conventions, predecessors, and rhetorical styles limit what Walter Benjamin once called the "overtaxing of the productive person in the name of . . . the principle of 'creativity,' " in which the poet is believed on his own, and out of his pure mind, to have brought forth his worlc.7 Yet there is a reluctance to allow that political, institutional, and ideo¬logical constraints act in the same manner on the individual author. A humanist will believe it to be an interesting fact to any interpreter of Balzac that he was influenced in the Come'die humaine by the conflict between Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Cuvier, but the same sort of pressure on Balzac of deeply reactionary monarchism is felt in some vague way to demean his literary "genius" and therefore to be less worth serious study. Similarly—as Harry Bracken has been tirelessly showing—philosophers will conduct their discussions of Locke, Hume, and empiricism without ever taking into account that there is an explicit connection in these classic writers between their "philosophic" doctrines and racial theory, justifications of slavery, or arguments for colonial exploita¬tion.8 These are common enough ways by which contemporary scholarship, keeps itself pure.

Links- Media Sources

Media sources perpetuate Orientalism rather than the truth

Said 3 (Edward, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, “Orientalism once more”, p 876, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

What I do argue also is that there is a difference between knowledge of other peoples and other times that is the result of understanding, compassion, careful study and analysis for their own sakes, and on the other hand knowledge — if that is what it is — that is part of an overall campaign of self-affirmation, belligerency and outright war. There is, after all, a profound difference between the will to understand for purposes of co-existence and humanistic enlargement of horizons, and the will to dominate for the purposes of control and external dominion. It is surely one of the intellectual catastrophes of history that an imperialist war confected by a small group of unelected US officials (they’ve been called chickenhawks, since none of them ever served in the military) was waged against a devastated Third World dictatorship on thoroughly ideological grounds having to do with world dominance, security control, and scarce resources, but disguised for its true intent, hastened, and reasoned for by Orientalists who betrayed their calling as scholars. The major influences on George W. Bush’s Pentagon and National Security Council were men such as Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami, experts on the Arab and Islamic world who helped the American hawks to think about such preposterous phenomena as the Arab mind and centuries-old Islamic decline which only American power could reverse. Today bookstores in the US are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about Islam and terror, Islam exposed, the Arab threat and the Muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange Oriental peoples over there who have been such a terrible thorn in ‘our’ flesh. Accompanying such war-mongering expertise have been the omnipresent CNNs and Foxes of this world, plus myriad numbers of evangelical and right-wing radio hosts, plus innumerable tabloids and even middle-brow journals, all of them re-cycling the same unverifiable fictions and vast generalizations so as to stir up ‘America’ against the foreign devil.

Links- Policy Makers

Policy makers base their decisions on Orientalism and can’t be trusted

Said 3 (Edward, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, “Orientalism once more”, p 876, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

One specifically American contribution to the discourse of empire is the specialized jargon of policy expertise. You don’t need Arabic or Persian or even French to pontificate about how the democracy domino effect is just what the Arab world needs. Combative and woefully ignorant policy experts whose world experience is limited to the Beltway grind out books on ‘terrorism’ and liberalism, or about Islamic fundamentalism and American foreign policy, or about the end of history, all of it vying for attention and influence quite without regard for truthfulness or reflection or real knowledge. What matters is how efficient and resourceful it sounds, and who might go for it, as it were. The worst aspect of this essentializing stuff is that human suffering in all its density and pain is spirited away. Memory and with it the historical past are effaced as in the common, dismissively contemptuous American phrase, ‘you’re history’.

Links- Policy Makers

The West uses Orientalism to dominate other countries

Said 78 (Edward, “Orientalism”, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, p 35, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

If British success in Egypt was exceptional as Balfour said, it was by no means an inexplicable or irrational success. Egyptian affairs had been controlled according to a general theory expressed both by Balfour in his notions about Oriental civilization and by Cromer in his management of everyday business in Egypt. The most important thing about the theory during the first decade of the twentieth century was that it worked, and worked staggeringly well. The argument, when reduced to its simplest form, was clear, it was precise, it was easy to grasp. There are Westerners, and there are Orientals. The former dominate; the latter must be dominated, which usually means having their land occupied, their internal affairs rigidly controlled, their blood and treasure put at the disposal of one or another Western power. That Balfour and Cromer, as we shall soon see, could strip humanity down to such ruthless cultural and racial essences was not at all an indication of their particular viciousness. Rather it was an indication of how streamlined a general doctrine had become by the time they put it to use- how streamlined and effective.

Orientalist preconceptions lie behind every policy

Said 78 (Edward, “Orientalism”, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, p 108, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

These contemporary Orientalist attitudes flood the press and the popular mind. Arabs, for example, are thought of as camel- riding, terroristic, hook-nosed, venal lechers whose undeserved wealth is an affront to real civilization. Always there lurks the assumption that although the Western consumer belongs to a numerical minority, he is entitled either to own or to expend (or both) the majority of the world resources. Why? Because he, unlike the Oriental, is a true human being. No better instance exists today of what Anwar Abdel Malek calls "the hegemonism of possessing minorities" and anthropocentrism allied with Europocentrism: a white middle-class Westerner believes it his human prerogative not only to manage the nonwhite world but also to own it, just because by definition "it" is not quite as human as "we" are. There is no purer example than this of dehumanized thought. In a sense the limitations of Orientalism are, as I said earlier, the limitations that follow upon disregarding, essentializing, denuding the humanity of another culture, people, or geographical region. But Orientalism has taken a further step than that: it views the Orient as something whose existence is not only displayed but has remained fixed in time and place for the West. So impressive have the descriptive and textual successes of Orientalism been that entire periods of the Orient’s cultural, political and social history are considered mere responses to the West. The West is the actor, the Orient a passive reactor. The West is the spectator, the judge and jury, of every facet of Oriental behavior. Yet if history during the twentieth century has provoked intrinsic change in and for the Orient, the Orientalist is stunned: he cannot realize that to some extent the new [Oriental] leaders, intellectuals or policy- makers, have learned many lessons from the travail of their predecessors. They have also been aided by the structural and institutional transformations accomplished in the intervening period and by the fact that they are to a great extent more at liberty to fashion the future of their countries. They are also much more confident and perhaps slightly aggressive. No longer do they have to function hoping to obtain a favorable verdict from the invisible jury of the West. Their dialogue is not with the West, it is with their fellow citizens.

Orientalism shapes all Western policy

Sered 96 (Danielle, Rhodes Scholar at Emory, http://www.english.emory.edu/Bahri/Orientalism.html , date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

Said argues that Orientalism can be found in current Western depictions of "Arab" cultures. The depictions of "the Arab" as irrational, menacing, untrustworthy, anti-Western, dishonest, and--perhaps most importantly--prototypical, are ideas into which Orientalist scholarship has evolved. These notions are trusted as foundations for both ideologies and policies developed by the Occident. Said writes: "The hold these instruments have on the mind is increased by the institutions built around them. For every Orientalist, quite literally, there is a support system of staggering power, considering the ephemerality of the myths that Orientalism propagates. The system now culminates into the very institutions of the state. To write about the Arab Oriental world, therefore, is to write with the authority of a nation, and not with the affirmation of a strident ideology but with the unquestioning certainty of absolute truth backed by absolute force." He continues, "One would find this kind of procedure less objectionable as political propaganda--which is what it is, of course--were it not accompanied by sermons on the objectivity, the fairness, the impartiality of a real historian, the implication always being that Muslims and Arabs cannot be objective but that Orientalists. . .writing about Muslims are, by definition, by training, by the mere fact of their Westernness. This is the culmination of Orientalism as a dogma that not only degrades its subject matter but also blinds its practitioners."

Links- Policy Makers

Policy makers are Orientalist

SAID 3 (Edward, Prof. of English/Comparative Lit., Columbia U., “Preface.” Orientalism. p. xx-xxi. )

So from the very same directorate of paid professional scholars enlisted by the Dutch conquerors of Malaysia and Indonesia, the British armies of India, Mesopotamia, Egypt, West Africa, the French armies of Indochina and North Africa, came the American advisers to the Pentagon and the White House, using the same cliches, the same demeaning stereotypes, the same justification for power and violence (after all, runs the chorus, power is the only language they understand) in this case as in the earlier ones. These people have now been joined in Iraq by a whole army of private contractors and eager entrepreneurs to whom shall be confided everything from the writing of textbooks and the constitution to the refashioning of Iraqi political life and its oil industry. Every single empire in its official discourse has said that it is not like all the others, that its circumstances are special, that it has a mission to enlighten, civilize, bring order and democracy, and that it uses force only as a last resort. And, sadder still, there always is a chorus of willing intellectuals to say calming words about benign or altruistic empires, as if one shouldn't trust the evidence of one's eyes watching the destruction and the misery and death brought by the latest mission civ-ilizatrice.

Links- Policy Makers

Orientalism has become integral to policy interaction with the East

SAID 3 (Edward, Prof. of English/Comparative Lit., Columbia U., “Preface.” Orientalism. P 238-240 )

If I have concentrated so much on imperial agents and policy- makers instead of scholars in this section, it was to accentuate the major shift in Orientalism, knowledge about the Orient, inter¬course with it, from an academic to an instrumental attitude. What accompanies the shift is a change in the attitude as well of the individual Orientalist, who need no longer see himself—as Lane, Sacy, Renan, Caussin, MiiDer, and others did—as belonging to a sort of guild community with its own internal traditions and rituals. Now the Orientalist has become the representative man of his entire culture, a man who compresses within his own work a \_ major duality of which that work (regardless of its specific form) is the symbolic expussion: Occidental consciousness, knowledge, science taking hold of the furthest Oriental reaches as well as the most minute Oriental particulars. Formally the Orientalist sees him- self as accomplishing the union of Orient and Occident, but mainly by reasserting the technological, political, and cultural supremacy of the West. History, in such a union, is radically attentuated if not banished. Viewed as a current of development, as a narrative strand, or as a dynamic force unfolding systematically and ma¬terially in time and space, human history—of the East or the West —is subordinated to an essentialist, idealist conception of Occident and Orient. Because he feels himself to be standing at the very rim of the East-West divide, the Orientalist not only speaks in vast generalities; he also seeks to convert each aspect of Oriental or Orientalism Now 247 Occidental life into an unmediated sign of one or the other geo-graphical half. The interchange in the Orientalist's writing between his expert self and his testimonial, beholding self as Western representative is pre-eminently worked out in visual terms. Here is a typical passage (quoted by Gibb) from Duncan Macdonald's classic work The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam (1909): The Arabs show themselves not as especially easy of belief, but as hard-headed, materialistic, questioning, doubting, scoffing at their own superstitions and usages, fond of tests of the super¬natural—and all this in a curiously light-minded, almost childish fashion,52 The governing verb is show, which here gives us to understand that the Arabs display themselves (willingly or unwillingly) to and for expert scrutiny. The number of attributes ascribed to them, by its crowded set of sheer appositions, causes "the Arabs" to acquire a sort of existential weightlessness; thereby, "the Arabs" are made to rejoin the very broad designation, common to modern anthropo¬logical thought, of "the childish primitive." What Macdonald also implies is that for such descriptions there is a peculiarly privileged position occupied by the Western Orientalist, whose representative function is precisely to show what needs to be seen. All specific history is capable of being seen thus at the apex, or the sensitive frontier, of Orient and Occident together. The complex dynamics of human life—what I have been calling history as narrative— becomes either irrelevant or trivial in comparison with the circular vision by which the details of Oriental life serve merely to reassert the Orientalness of the subject and the Westernness of the observer. If such a vision in some ways recalls Dante's, we should by no means fail to notice what an enormous difference there is between this Orient and Dante's. Evidence here is meant to be (and probably is considered) scientific; its pedigree, genealogically speaking, is European intellectual and human science during the nineteenth century. Moreover, the Orient is no simple marvel, or an enemy, or a branch of exotica; it is a political actuality of great and significant moment. Like Lawrence, Macdonald cannot really detach his representative characteristics as a Westerner from his role as a scholar. Thus his vision of Islam, as much as Lawrence's of the Arabs, implicates definition of the object with the identity of the vision of an Oriental type as constructed by the Western scholar, as well as to a specific encounter with the Orient in which the Westerner regrasps the Orient's essence as a consequence of his intimate estrangement from it. For Lawrence as for Forster, this latter sensation produces the despondency as well of personal failure; for such scholars as Macdonald, it strengthens the Orientalist dis¬course itself. And it puts that discourse abroad in the world of culture, politics, and actuality. In the period between the wars, as we can easily judge from, say, Malraux's novels, the relations between East and West assumed a currency that was both widespread and anxious. The signs of Oriental claims for political independence were everywhere; certainly in the dismembered Ottoman Empire they were encouraged by the Allies and, as is perfectly evident in the whole Arab Revolt and its aftermath, quickly became problem¬atic. The Orient now appeared to constitute a challenge, not just to the West in general, but to the West's spirit, knowledge, and imperium. After a good century of constant intervention in (and study of) the Orient, the West's role in an East itself responding to the crises of modernity seemed considerably more delicate. There was the issue of outright occupation; there was the issue of the mandated territories; there was the issue of European competition in the Orient; there was the issue of dealing with native elites, native popular movements, and native demands for self-government and independence; there was the issue of civilizational contacts between Orient and Occident. Such issues forced reconsideration of Western knowledge of the Orient. No less a personage than Sylvain Levi, president of the Societe asiatique between.1928 and 1935, professor of Sanskrit at the ColThge de France, reflected seriously in 1925 on the urgency of the East-West problem:

Links- Generic

Modern academia is based on pervasive Orientalism

Said 78 (Edward, “Orientalism”, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, p 206, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

On several occasions I have alluded to the connections between Orientalism as a body of ideas, beliefs, clichés, or learning about the East, and other schools of thought at large in the culture. Now one of the important developments in nineteenth-century Oriental- ism was the distillation of essential ideas about the Orient—its sensuality, its tendency to despotism, its aberrant mentality, its habits of inaccuracy, its backwardness—into a separate and un¬challenged coherence; thus for a writer to use the word Oriental was a reference for the reader sufficient to identify a specific body of information about the Orient. This information seemed to be morally neutral and objectively valid; it seemed to have an epistemological status equal to that of historical chronology or geographical location. In its most basic form, then, Oriental material could not really be violated by anyone's discoveries, nor did it seem ever to be revaluated completely. Instead, the work of various nineteenth-century scholars and of imaginative writers made this essential body of knowledge more clear, more detailed, more sub¬stantial—and more distinct from "Occidentalism." Yet Orientalist ideas could enter into alliance with general philosophical theories (such as those about the history of mankind and civilization) and diffuse world-hypotheses, as philosophers sometimes call them; and in many ways the professional contributors to Oriental knowledge were anxious to couch their formulations and ideas, their scholarly work, their considered contemporary observations, in language and terminology whose cultural validity derived from other sciences and systems of thought.

The distinction I am making is realty between an almost uncon-scious (and certainly an untouchable) positivity, which I shall call latent Orientalism, and the various stated views about Oriental society, languages, literatures, history, sociology, and so forth, which I shall call manifest Orientalism. Whatever change occurs in knowledge of the Orient is found almost exclusively in manifest Orientalism; the unanimity, stability, and durability of latent Orientalism are more or less constant. In the nineteenth-century writers I analyzed in Chapter Two, the differences in their ideas about the Orient can be characterized as exclusively manifest differences, differences in form and personal style, rarely in basic content. Every one of them kept intact the separateness of the Orient, its eccentricity, its backwardness, its silent indifference, its feminine penetrability, its supine malleability; this is why every writer on the Orient, from Renan to Marx (ideologically speaking), or from the most rigorous scholars (Lane and Sacy) to the most powerful imaginations (Flaubert and Nerval), saw the Orient as a locale requiring Western attention, reconstruction, even redemp¬tion. The Orient existed as a place isolated from the mainstream of European progress in the sciences, arts, and commerce. Thus whatever good or bad values were imputed to the Orient appeared to be functions of some highly specialized Western interest in the Orient. This was the situation from about the 1870s on through the early part of the twentieth century—but let me give some examples that illustrate what I mean.

Links- Military

Military authors and officers are inherently Orientalist

Kbiri 8 (Hamid, Major in the Royal Moroccan Air Force, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/12070695/The-Influence-of-Orientalism-on-American-Perceptions-and-Policies-in-the-MiddleEast>, date accessed: 7/9/2010) AJK

More recently, Orientalist expertise has loomed large in the initiation and conduct of OIF. As Deputy Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, paid a glowing tribute to the veteran Orientalist Bernard Lewis, via video phone at a special ceremony held in Tel Aviv to honor Lewis in March 2002: “Bernard has taught [us] how to understand the complex and important history of the Middle-East and use it to guide us where we will go next to build a better world for generations”165 Even before the 9/11 tragedy occurred, Lewis actively lobbied for war in Iraq in a collective open letter addressed to President Clinton in 1998.166 Lewis is actually the father of what the Wall Street journal calls the “Lewis Doctrine”167 which consists of “making Iraq a Westernized polity, reconstituted and imposed from above like Kemal’s Turkey, which is to become a bulwark of security for America and a model for the region.”168 He also wrote an article for Newsweek International in early 2003, in which he made a case for American intervention in Iraq and argued that “worries about Iraqi civilians --fighting in the streets, popular resistance-- were overblown.”169 Other Orientalists whose expertise has turned out misplaced, if not misleading, are Fouad Ajami and Kanan Makiya, who along with Bernard Lewis advised the Bush administration in the run-up to the Iraq war.170 Downplaying the risks of insurgency in post-Saddam era, they argued that the Iraqis were going to meet American troops “with flowers and sweets.”171 The remarks of Vice President Dick Cheney to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention are very telling in this regard: As for the reaction of the Arab ‘street,’ the Middle-East expert Professor Fouad Ajami predicts that after liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are ‘sure to erupt in joy in the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans.’ Extremists in the region would have to rethink their strategy of Jihad. Moderates throughout the region would take heart.172 But most disturbing of all are the words of Bernard Lewis, hailed as the Dean of the Orientalists, as he counseled the Vice President and Secretary of Defense on the coming war in Iraq: “I believe that one of the things you’ve got to do to Arabs is hit them between the eyes with a big stick. They respect power.”173 Apart from the racist tones of these remarks, they reflect a long-standing Orientalist bias which consists of “underestimating the locals. ”174 Such remarks seem to highlight, at best, a lack of scientific neutrality and distance between the intellectual and his subject. They also somehow give credence to the reproaches made by Lewis’ detractors that although his work “purports to be liberal objective scholarship, it is in reality very close to being propaganda against his subject material”175 Last but not least, during the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War, Bernard Lewis went so far as to warn, in the Wall Street Journal, that Teheran might drop a nuclear bomb—a bomb that Iran by all accounts did not have—on Israel on August 22, 2006, coinciding with the day that the prophet Muhammad went to Jerusalem and then to heaven.176 In his own words: “this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and if necessary of the world. It is far from certain that Mr. Ahmadinajad plans any such cataclysmic events precisely for August 22. But it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.”177 Orientalists definitely seem to think that their stature as renowned scholars would lend unlimited authority to their pronouncements on contemporary conflicts in the Middle-East and the Muslim world, even when they clearly go against common sense.

Military decision makers and Middle Eastern experts are Orientalist

Kbiri 8 (Hamid, Major in the Royal Moroccan Air Force, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/12070695/The-Influence-of-Orientalism-on-American-Perceptions-and-Policies-in-the-MiddleEast>, date accessed: 7/9/2010) AJK

Orientalism as a scholarly tradition and a mode of thought looms large in the perceptions of the Middle-East both at the public and official spheres in America. This paper traces the formation of the Orientalist outlook back to the Middle-Ages. It argues that the Orientalist vision of the Middle-East has largely informed the interactions between the United-States and the Middle-East during much of the twentieth century up to the present day. In particular, the Orientalist expertise provided to civilian and military decision makers, under the guise of Area Studies, has time and again proven inaccurate or confusing with often disastrous long-term consequences. The on-going war in Iraq is the ultimate illustration of how Orientalist conventional wisdom had it wrong. The stark discrepancies between expert predictions and actual developments and the growing insistence on cultural awareness among the US military seem to underscore the limits of the prevailing Orientalist paradigm of perception. While Orientalist knowledge should not be rejected wholesale, there is a need to empanel other Middle- East experts, who are shorn of Orientalist bias, to achieve a balanced assessment of the developments in this critical region of the world. Likewise, military curricula and recommended reading lists should include other authoritative materials which present other perspectives on the Middle-East, relying more on empirical data than on philological conjectures.

Links- Democracy

Attempts to expand democracy to non- democratic nations are rooted in Orientalism

Sadowski 97 (Yahya, “Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report”, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

The “collapse of communism” in 1989 and the victory over Iraq in 1991 sparked a wave of triumphal declarations by Western pundits and analysts who believed that all “viable systemic alternatives to Western liberalism” had now been exhausted and discredited. Some then tried to sketch foreign policy appropriate to the “new world order.” A consistent theme of this “new thinking” was that the peoples of the developing countries must now acknowledge that liberal democracy is the only plausible form of governance in the modern world. Accordingly, support for democratization should henceforth be a central objective of US diplomacy and foreign assistance. This trend was not welcomed by all. Autocrats in the Arab world, particularly the rules of the Gulf states, were appalled t the thought that Washington might soon be fanning the flames of republican sentiment. “The prevailing democratic system in the world is not suitable for us in this region, for our peoples’ composition and traits are different from the traits of that world,” declared King Fahd of Saudi Arabia in March 1992. The king’s stance suits many US policy makers just fine. Former secretary of defense and CIA chief James Schlesinger spoke for more than himself recently when he asked whether we seriously desire to prescribe democracy as the proper form of government for other societies. Perhaps the issues is most clearly posed in the Islamic world. Do we seriously want to change the institutions in Saudi Arabia? The brief answer is no- over the years we have sought to preserve those institutions, sometimes in preference to more democratic forces coursing throughout the region.

The way policy makers represent Central Asia is Orientalist

Heathershaw 7 (John, Visiting Fellow, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies , http://eric.exeter.ac.uk/exeter/bitstream/10036/16812/1/Heathershaw%20Worlds%20Apart%20CAS%202007%20preprint.pdf, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

US analysts and policy-makers have continually mistook the nature of local geopolitical imaginaries, and reproduced an orientalist vision of Central Asia as a battleground of essentially similar great powers for essentially despotic places in desperate need of democratic reform. Writing after Andijon, Blank contends that such turbulent events are indeed proof of the geopolitical importance and instability of the region. ‘The overlay of ideological and strategic rivalry,’ he notes, ‘thus creates conditions in Central Asia not just of a great game but also of - 19 - a strategic bipolarity reminiscent of the Cold War in the Third World.’72 Such testimonies reproduce the Central Asian other, a region on the periphery, more akin to the colonial frontier of Afghanistan than related to the Slavic states of the Former Soviet Union. Revealingly, this has even been reflected in the re-organisation of the US state department. By late-2005, the department of European and Eurasian affairs had lost responsibility for the Central Asian region which had been incorporated into a South and Central Asian section. In itself this bureaucratic change reflects US thinking about Central Asia as a region apart from the Former Soviet Slavic states. The move is a particularly fascinating one which reveals much about how discourse shapes even the structure of foreign policy-making institutions. Such representations of geopolitical ‘reality’ reaffirm the status of the United States as an ‘outsider’ power which fails to perform sovereignty in a manner conducive to the imaginaries and interests of regional elites. Such orientalist representations of central Asia are vehemently opposed by regional elites who often see themselves as more European than Asian. Ironically, it is this elite representation of a ‘European’ Uzbekistan – for secularism, modernisation and closeness to Europe – which might have helped build the illusion of strategic partnership from 2001. For example, the long-term usage of the term ‘civil society’ in official discourse indicates an aspiration of a ‘European’ society, yet its articulation via formal, state-led processes exhibits decidedly neo-Soviet ethics.73 Thus, Uzbekistan’s European sympathies never meant that it accepted ‘European’ standards of human rights but rather that it wished to represent Uzbekistan as undergoing a ‘European’-style of development which could be represented in terms of neo-soviet maxims of ‘stability’ and ‘authority’. This illustrates the post-Soviet nature of the Uzbekistani elite: aspiring to capitalist, ‘European’ modernisation yet doing so via neo-Soviet registers of discourse and thought. This tension is important as its ambiguity can be either a constructive or deconstructive basis for ‘partnership’ with the US. US and European responses, post-Andijon forced an alternative representation of what it means to be both ‘European’ and sovereign onto an Uzbek elite. They effectively - 20 - ended constructive ambiguity and dispensed with the illusion that the US and Uzbekistan might actually be talking about the same kind of relationship that had kept the partnership going.

Links- Democracy

Central Asian policy and threats of conflict are created by self serving Orientalists

Heathershaw 7 (John,

 Visiting Fellow, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies , http://eric.exeter.ac.uk/exeter/bitstream/10036/16812/1/Heathershaw%20Worlds%20Apart%20CAS%202007%20preprint.pdf, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

The crisis with Uzbekistan has profound implications for US foreign policy. It illustrates the dire need for humility on the part of policy-makers about the limits of US power. Today, the US position in the region is precarious. Since the last flight by US military aircraft from Kharshi-Khanabad in November 2005, US policy-makers have begun to look, thus far unsuccessfully, at possibilities for a rapprochement with Uzbekistan. Yet the inquest prompted by the events of 2005 seems to have led to very little introspection. In August 2006, on the first official American visit to Tashkent since the Andijon massacre, the Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher, reasserted that the US would continue to ‘take necessary steps’ in defence of human rights in Uzbekistan.76 Moreover, he remarked in his 2006 testimony to congress: Central Asia faces numerous threats to its stability, including Islamic extremism, a population that remains poor and has little economic opportunity, the post-Soviet legacy of authoritarianism, public perceptions of injustice, and high levels of corruption.77 Discursively underwriting such outlooks is the assumption that ‘they’ ought to be more like ‘us’ – that is, more like who we imagine ourselves to be. Thus, Giragosian notes, ‘what is essential for Central Asia is a continued and even greater US commitment’, as opposed to regional cooperation through organisations such as the SCO.78 Furthermore, to suggest that Central Asian states ‘simply followed’ Putin in the SCO statement of 5 July 2005, as some have79, fails to acknowledge that they have political imaginaries of their own which might be closer to those of the Putin government. Where introspection has occurred it has been limited. So-called realists who had long argued that the democratisation agenda must be downplayed in order to maintain the strategic partnership argue that the US was not being ‘real’ enough. Starr notes, As U.S. and European pressure increased in the area of democratisation and human rights, both Russia and China were able to dangle before Tashkent alliances based on a less rigorous standard in these areas, yet promising greater rewards than were forthcoming from Washington. Both were pursuing long-term - 22 - strategic objectives, which they could present as less threatening to Tashkent than the U.S.’s preoccupations.80

Constructing scenarios to which democracy is the only answer is Orientalist

Said 3 (Edward, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, “Orientalism once more”, p 876, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

One specifically American contribution to the discourse of empire is the specialized jargon of policy expertise. You don’t need Arabic or Persian or even French to pontificate about how the democracy domino effect is just what the Arab world needs. Combative and woefully ignorant policy experts whose world experience is limited to the Beltway grind out books on ‘terrorism’ and liberalism, or about Islamic fundamentalism and American foreign policy, or about the end of history, all of it vying for attention and influence quite without regard for truthfulness or reflection or real knowledge. What matters is how efficient and resourceful it sounds, and who might go for it, as it were. The worst aspect of this essentializing stuff is that human suffering in all its density and pain is spirited away. Memory and with it the historical past are effaced as in the common, dismissively contemptuous American phrase, ‘you’re history’. Twenty-five years after Orientalism was published, questions remain about whether modern imperialism ever ended or whether it has continued in the Orient since Napoleon’s entry into Egypt two centuries ago. Arabs and Muslims have been told that victimology and dwelling on the depredations of empire is only a way of evading responsibility in the present. You have failed, you have gone wrong, says the modern Orientalist. This of course is also V. S. Naipaul’s contribution to literature, that the victims of empire wail on while their country goes to the dogs. But what a shallow calculation of the imperial intrusion that is, how summarily it scants the immense distortion introduced by the empire into the lives of ‘lesser’ peoples and ‘subject races’ generation after generation, how little it wishes to face the long succession of years through which empire continues to work its way in the lives say of Palestinians or Congolese or Algerians or Iraqis. We allow justly that the Holocaust has permanently altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in what imperialism has done, and what Orientalism continues to do? Think of the line that starts with Napoleon, continues with the rise of Oriental studies and the take over of North Africa, and goes on in similar undertakings in Orientalism Once More 873 Vietnam, in Egypt, in Palestine and, during the entire twentieth century in the struggle over oil and strategic control in the Gulf, in Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Afghanistan. Then think contrapuntally of the rise of anticolonial nationalism, through the short period of liberal independence, the era of military coups, of insurgency, civil war, religious fanaticism, irrational struggle and uncompromising brutality against the latest bunch of ‘natives’. Each of these phases and eras produces its own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious polemics.

Links- Discourse

Interaction with the East is fundamentally Orientalist

Said 78 (Edward, “Orientalism”, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, p2-4, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

Related to this academic tradition, whose fortunes, transmigra­tions, specializations, and transmissions are in part the subject of this study, is a more general meaning for Orientalism. Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and (most of the time) "the Occident." Thus a very large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and im­perial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, "mind," destiny, and so on. This Orien­talism can accommodate Aeschylus, say, and Victor Hugo, Dante and Karl Marx. A little later in this introduction I shall deal with the methodological problems one encounters in so broadly con­strued a "field" as this. The interchange between the academic and the more or less imaginative meanings of Orientalism is a constant one, and since the late eighteenth century there has been a considerable, quite disciplined—perhaps even regulated—traffic between the two. Here I come to the third meaning of Orientalism, which is something more historically and materially defined than either of the other two. Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing I it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having au­thority over the Orient. I have found it useful here to employ Michel Foucault's notion of a discourse, as described by him in The Archaeology of Knowledge and in Discipline and Punish, to identify Orientalism. My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, socio­logically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period. Moreover, so authoritative a position did Orientalism have that I believe no one writing, think­ing, or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and action imposed by Orientalism. In brief, because of Orientalism the Orient was not (and is not) a v free subject of thought or action. This is not to say that Orientalism unilaterally determines what can be said about the Orient, but that it is the whole network of interests inevitably brought to bear on (and therefore always involved in) any occasion when that peculiar entity "the Orient" is in question. How this happens is what this book tries to demonstrate. It also tries to show that European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against Ve" t\_he Orient as a sort of surroagAajid even underground self. Historically and culturally there is a quantitative as well as a qualitative difference between the Franco-British involvement in the Orient and—until the period of American ascendancy after the involvement of every other European and At­lantic power. To speak of Orientalism therefore is to speak mainly, although not exclusively, of a British and French cultural enter- Else, a project whose dimensions take in such disFi-rWe– realms as the imagination itself, the whole of India and the Levant, the Biblical texts and the Biblical lands, the spice trade, colonial armies and a long tradition of colonial administrators, a formidable schol­arly corpus, innumerable Oriental "experts" and "hands," an Orien­tal professorate, a complex array of "Oriental" ideas (Oriental despotism, Oriental splendor, cruelty, sensuality), many Eastern sects, philosophies, and wisdoms domesticated for local European use—the list can be extended more or less indefinitely. My point is that Orientalism derives from a particular closeness experienced between Britain and France and the Orient, which until the early nineteenth century had really meant only India and the Bible lands. From the beginning of the nineteenth century until the end of World War II France and Britain dominated the Orient and Orientalism; since World War II America has dominated the Orient, and approaches it as France and Britain once did. Out of that closeness, whose dynamic is enormously productive even if it t, always demonstrates the comparatively greater strength of the Occi­dent (British, French, or American), comes the large body of texts I call Orientalist.

Links- Discourse

Representations of “crazy” leaders in the East = Orientalism

Gusterson 99 (Hugh, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Stan-PS-314-2009-Q1\_PNP/Syllabus/EReadings/Gusterson1999Nuclear.pdf, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries. This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as ineradicably different from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said (1978). Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where "we" are modem and flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse. Following Anthony Giddens (1979), I define ideology as a way of constructing political ideas, institutions, and behavior which ( I ) makes the political structures and institutions created by dominant social groups, classes, and nations appear to be naturally given and inescapable rather than socially constructed; (2) presents the interests of elites as if they were universally shared; (3) obscures the connections between different social and political antagonisms so as to inhibit massive, binary confrontations (i.e., revolutionary situations); and (4) legitimates domination. The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation is ideological in all four of these senses: (1) it makes the simultaneous ownership of nuclear weapons by the major powers and the absence of nuclear weapons in Third World countries seem natural and reasonable while problematizing attempts by such countries as India, Pakistan, and Iraq to acquire these weapons; (2) it presents the security needs of the established nuclear powers as if they were everybody's; (3) it effaces the continuity between Third World countries' nuclear deprivation and other systematic patterns of deprivation in the underdeveloped world in order to inhibit a massive north-south confrontation; and (4) it legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognized nuclear powers.

Representations of the East perpetuate Orientalism

SAID 3 (Edward, Prof. of English/Comparative Lit., Columbia U., Orientalism. p. 273-274)

The representations of Orientalism in European culture amount to what we can call a discursive consistency, one that has not only history but material (and institutional) presence to show for itself. As I said in connection with Renan, such a consistency was a form of cultural praxis, a system of opportunities for making statements about the Orient. My whole point about this system is not that it is a misrepresentation of some Oriental essence—in which I do not for a moment believe—but that it operates as representations usually do, for a purpose, according to a tendency, in a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic setting. In other words, representations have purposes, they are effective much of the time, they accomplish one or many tasks. Representations are formations, or as Roland Barthes has said of all the operations of language, they are deformations. The Orient as a representation in Europe is formed—or deformed—out of a more and more specific sensitivity towards a geographical region called "the East." Specialists in this region do their work on it, so to speak, because in time their profession as Orientalists requires that they present their society with images of the Orient, knowledge about it, insight into it. And to a very large extent the Orientalist provides his own society with representations of the Orient (a) that bear his distinctive imprint, (b) that illustrate his conception of what the Orient can or ought to be, (c) that consciously contest someone else's view of the Orient, (d) that provide Orientalist discourse with what, at that moment, it seems most in need of, and (e) that respond to certain cultural, professional, national, political, and economic requirements of the epoch. It will be evident that even though it will never be absent, the role of positive knowledge is far from absolute. Rather, "knowledge"—never raw, unmediated, or simply objective—is what the five attributes of Orientalist representation listed above distribute, and redistribute

Links- Discourse

Orientalism is everywhere

Boer 3 (Inge, “After Orientalism: critical entanglements, productive looks”, p 12, date accessed: 7/7/2010)AJK

But one might still be intrigued by the book's success and the way in which it inspired academics of many different stripes to critique, nuance and elaborate Said's work. Ironically, Robert Young argues that the unresolved theoretical problematic in the book was precisely the basis for the mass of related writings that followed Its publication (2001: 385). This unresolved problem, that entailed the move from a concept of discourse to one of Ideological representation, left sufficient space for critics to extend Said s thesis to "colonial discourse" in a more general sense, or to studies of Orientalism In representations other than those analyzed in the book." Said analyzed literary materials, travel narratives, Oriental tales, historical, philosophical and theological texts, some at length, others more cursory, in a broad, at times generalizing gesture showing evidence of Orientalism's omnipresence. Vet many studies following up on Orientalism argued that it neglected entire disciplines, such as art history, or paid too little attention to gender, or to color - whiteness included - or passed on too quickly after pointing at a single example of a genre.1\* To take one example of an early study after Orientalism - after in the sense of "subsequent to\* and not "in Imitation of" - Linda Nochlin wrote a review of an 1982 exhibit: Orientalism: The Near East In French Painting, 1800-1880, in which she pushes issues further than Daniel Rosenthal, the exhibit's curator, wishes to go. In the catalogue of the exhibit. Rosenthal refers to the close association between the flowering of Orientalist painting in the nineteenth century and the culmination of European colonial expansion, as well as to Said's definition of Orientalism as a control mechanism for colonialism. But Rosenthal shies away from the consequences of this daring first step: "French Orientalist painting will be discussed in terms of its aesthetic quality and historical Interest, and no attempt will be made at a re-evaluation of its political uses" (Rosenthal 1982: 9 quoted in Nochlin 34). Nochlin takes up what Rosenthal wishes to neglect, the political angle implicating both art history as a discipline and the study of Orientalist painting. She argues the following: "Pictorial Orientalism, apparently, was taken by most art historians concerned with this genre to be an innocent and colorful representation of an exotic reality, now due for a salutary revisionist airing" (xlx). Nochlin implies that there can be no such thing as inno-cence in the face of Orientalist painting; art history must rethink its practices and presuppositions. For Nochlin. Said s crititwe of Orientalist representation offers parallels with the feminist critique of, and within, art history. In fact, the importance of Nochlin s argument resides in a fundamental critique ol both the procedures of a discipline and the lack of political awareness of. or insight into, the power structures regulating Oilentallst representations. The issues are further developed, partially in conjunction with gender issues, by critics like Griselda Pollock (1992.1994, 1999) and Rcina Lewis (1996) (see also Boer 1994).Orientalism has proven to be fruitful in its approach and scope in the context of various disciplines, partially due to its insistence on power inequality in cross-cultural encounters. As important. Young argues, is the idea of Orientalism as discourse: Saids use or\* the notion of a discourse to demonstrate the way in which forms of knowledge were constructed within o particular kind of language, which in turn was replete with all sorts of cultural assumptions, enabled Orientalism, and cotonlaHsm more generally, to be analysed as an ideological production across different kino's of texts produced historically from a wide range of different Institutions, disciplines and geographical areas. (2001: 385) Discourse, understood in this highly malleable form, is well suited to further research on texts and images, and on material, cultural productions as fashion or architecture.10 Moreover, Orientalism identified as discourse makes it possible, even Imperative, to transcend the boundaries between disciplines. As a form of knowledge. Orientalism surpasses text-Image divisions, for example, and hence distinctions between literature and art history as separate disciplines engaged in Orientalism. Multiple crossings and connections knit an intertextuality that calls forth more Interdisciplinary work on Orientalism (Boer forthcoming). In this way. the "after" of this books title may mean very different things at once. The critical aftermath of methodological and theoretical critiques runs parallel with a development toward colonial discourse analysis and postcotonka\* studies. Quite often, the dichotomy between the West and other parts of the world is termed Orientalist, after Salds book describing phenomena that fit in with (neo)cc4onlalist assumptions about other cultures. In consequence of Orientalism, however, we see how the book engages with critical entanglements with and within disciplines, and new interdisciplinary fields of study. In accordance with the book's project I want io briefly present the productive looks that the articles in this volume accommodate.

Links- Gender

Orientalism is directly linked to conceptions of gender and the way we represent gender

Khalid 9 (Maryam, PhD Candidate- University of South Wales, http://wocmes.iemed.org/en/new-panel-9128-rethinking-women , date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

In the aftermath of 9/11, images of the Middle Eastern or Islamic other have been highly visible in the West. These representations have played a role in publicly justifying the military interventions of the War on Terror. For example, in the lead-up to the October 2001 Afghanistan war, the image of the oppressed veiled Afghan woman was deployed in official discourses, to construct intervention as (at least partly) emancipatory. Drawing on Edward Said's concept of orientalism and informed by postcolonial and feminist international relations, my analysis explores how, using the examples of the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, gendered orientalist representations of the Middle Eastern or Islamic other have been deployed in official US discourse to facilitate intervention as part of the War on Terror. The basic tenets of Said's thesis on the power of Western representations of the East will be applied to the War on Terror context in a modified form, taking into account both the specificity of the historical context and the importance of gender as an analytical tool. I argue that a range of binaries situating the West in opposition to the East for example, good vs evil, civilised vs barbaric, rational vs irrational, progressive vs backward have been used in ways that are gendered and orientalist. By this I mean that gender roles and identities (femininities, masculinities, and their correlation with ideas of appropriate maleness and femaleness) inform and shape the repository of orientalist knowledge that is drawn upon in War on Terror discourse. Using a discourse-analytical approach, I explore the dynamics of this gendered orientalist power in terms of its operation in US security discourses through which certain Western entities (specifically the US George W. Bush) construct their others. To this end, I have undertaken research that locates and examines official texts (spoken, visual and written) regarding War on Terror policy created and distributed (by the Bush administration) for a public audience. Within these texts, I identify dominant representations of the Eastern other, how these might be orientalist, what kinds of gender roles and identities they reproduce, and how they have been used politically. This is an important task as critical engagement with such discourses and the representations that create and reproduce them serves to destabilise and unravel the orientalist and gendered justifications for military intervention.

Orientalism creates impacts to fulfill its own desires to be a hero

Hirji 1 (Faiza, “The War for Women’s Freedom: Orientalist Imaginaries of Rescue in Afghanistan”, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p14796\_index.html, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

Under such circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that the Orientalist stereotypes Edward Said identified in 1978 still abound in media coverage of Islam in the twenty-first century. The United States media have picked up on historical European representations of Muslims as backwards or uncivilized, and reproduce these in countless news stories. In the case of Afghanistan, the depiction of victimized Muslim women did not arise spontaneously. Rather, it represented the latest in a series of images that journalists, academics and politicians call upon when attempting to explain Islam and Muslims. These images belong to a group of simplified depictions of Muslims that can be modified and utilized in different ways. In this case, the idea of the Muslim man as violent terrorist that anchored post-September 11 reporting easily led to a notion of the Muslim woman as subjugated, a notion that evoked sympathy from Northern publics due to the familiarity of the idea of Muslim women as veiled, hidden and submissive. Such caricatures and stereotypes are frequent features of propaganda. There is nothing unusual about the use of propaganda in military campaigns, although the role of the media has 4 evolved in the United States over the course of several military conflicts. Following Vietnam, when journalists and photographers’ stories and pictures unmasked the brutality of that conflict for the American population and led to widespread opposition (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, pp. 169-170), a significant segment of the American population arguably remains averse to war, except when pressing humanitarian concerns present themselves (Payne, 1995). If this is true, then pacifist Americans were only persuaded to overcome a natural tendency towards isolationism through a sense that the war in Afghanistan was not only one of vengeance, but one that offered a solution to numerous wrongs throughout the Islamic world. The idea that gender inequity in Islam is one particular wrong that requires righting is not merely manufactured by the media, but can be located in historical and scholarly works. Coverage of Afghanistan drew upon a longstanding obsession with the Muslim woman as a silent, veiled figure patiently awaiting rescue from a heroic non-Muslim man (Kabbani, 1986, pp. 7, 26, 127-128; Karim, 1997, pp. 174-175). The renewed emphasis on depicting the Muslim man as a terrorist threat requires an oppressed Muslim woman in the background to complete what Ella Shohat terms a “rescue fantasy” for Western men (cited in Al-Solaylee, 2001, p. R3; also see Khan, 1995, p. 149). This fantasy of whisking the Muslim woman away from her repressive lifestyle is hardly new, reaching back to the early days of Orientalist scholarship and colonialism (see Fanon, 1959, 1963). It is not only colonizers who have attempted such ambitious rescues, as Ahmed (1982, 1999) notes; it is also feminist scholars, some of whom have critiqued Islam’s patriarchal domination of women without expressing any understanding of the importance Islam holds in many Muslim women’s lives, and without admitting to the repressive forces found in other religions or cultures.

Links- Masking

The US hides Orientalism with seemingly benevolent action

Trafton 3 (Scott, George Mason University, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/american\_quarterly/v056/56.2trafton.html, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

Klein argues that Cold War middlebrow Orientalism was directly tied to the U.S. federal government's political projects abroad. In negotiating the complicated political terrain of the Cold War, American foreign policy makers faced a difficult question: how to maintain a [End Page 461] continuing project of postwar imperial expansion while simultaneously projecting the image of America as nonimperial, nonexpansionist benevolent peacekeeper. "The political and cultural problem for Americans," as Klein presents it, was, "how can we define our nation as a nonimperial world power in the age of decolonization?" (9). Klein's great contribution to the understanding of Cold War foreign policy discourse is her argument that this internal conflict was managed in two major ways: first, in the construction of narratives in which America was seen as a land of pluralism, multiculturalism, and racial integration, and second, by the casting of these narratives in ways that relied overwhelmingly on the literary and cultural tropes of sentimentalism. The Asian political designs of an expansionist American government were engaged by various producers of American middlebrow culture, Klein argues, and this engagement resulted in a wide range of sentimental Orientalisms. By projecting an image of racial tolerance, narratives that featured America's role as an imperialist presence in Asia were radically softened, made into dramas of what Klein calls "mutual exchange and understanding": "Middlebrow intellectuals eagerly embraced these ideals of tolerance and inclusion, and largely framed their representations of noncommunist Asia within them. . . . They envisioned U.S. global expansion as taking place within a system of reciprocity. In their view, America did not pursue its naked self-interest through the coercion and subjugation of others, but engaged in exchanges that benefited all parties" (11-13). This language of mutuality and emotion, Klein argues, is Cold War Orientalism's most significant feature: it masks the military and economic exploitation of America's Cold War expansion, and it is radically sentimental. "Middlebrow texts are full of exchanges between Asians and Americans," Klein explains: "intellectual exchanges of conversation, economic exchanges of shopping, emotional exchanges of love, physical exchanges of tourism and immigration. . . . Cultural producers imaginatively mapped a network of sentimental pathways between the United States and Asia that paralleled and reinforced the more material pathways along which America's economic, political, and military power flowed" (13-17).

Links- China Impacts

Orientalism depicts China as a threat for self serving purposes

Gosset (David, Professor and Director of Academia Sinica Europaea, http://esia.asef.org/documents/eurochina.pdf date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

It is a paradox that despite a long obsession for an immutable order - unity under the Emperor mainly served by an ideology, orthodox Confucianism, and an obedient bureaucracy -, China could well be prepared to act as a co-architect of a multipolar world. Western "orientalism" reflects China 's imperial vision of itself : a timeless pyramidal socio-political construction occupying the center of the world. This "orientalism", vulgar or sophisticated, is still one of the sources of the "China threat" refrain; indeed, a reemerging "Middle Kingdom" - translation of the Chinese "zhong guo" where the notion of kingdom is not even obvious - would logically strive to gain a position of dominant centrality! In that sense, the fear is just a consequence of a biased initial assumption. One should stop to indulge in vague representation such as the one behind the alleged quotation attributed to Napoléon : " Quand la Chine s'éveillera, le monde tremblera" ("When China awakes the world will tremble"). Why should the world necessarily dread China 's awakening? China is, in fact, able for concrete universalism, which is already partly enveloped in her own internal "unity in diversity" and in her post-imperial socio-political transformations.

Links- Japan Impacts

The way Western authors represent Japan and Japanese conflict is a product of Orientalism

Rosen 2000 (Steven, Faculty of Intercultural Communication
Hiroshima Women's University, http://www.immi.se/intercultural/nr4/rosen.htm, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

A look at how metaphors comparing and evaluating the Chinese compared to the Japanese in America, bears testimony to how mythic paradigms inform understandings of others, such that we create artificial divisions between the people we may be trying to communicate with. In the 20th century at least, Chinese stereotypes have been far kinder than images of Japanese people and culture. Even though the Second World War clearly separated the Chinese and Japanese into friend and enemy respectively, earlier, pre-war stereotypes as well, evaluated Chinese people and culture in a far kinder light. (Johnson 1988:23) American ideological thinking about the East has generally found Chinese culture to be much more accessible than Japanese- the Chinese are seen to be "more like us": frank and direct, individualistic, rational, educated, pragmatic and practical. Even the cuisine is much more accessible/comprehensible to Western palates, it seems, than the Japanese fare such as raw fish and miso soup. Not only is Japan what Geertz has called, "the last other to be discovered," it seems to us to be the most attenuated of civilized cultures (aboriginal hunter-gather cultures being completely beyond the ken of Western commonsense understandings of reality). Japanese social institutions signify Japan to be a culture with a high level of sophistication in Western eyes, yet it also appears as highly feudal and totally anachronistic to the moral imperatives of the modern world; the culture as a whole tends to be quite opaque to us- Japanese cultural mores are exotic, quixotic and even absurd. The paradigmatic example of this is self-immolation, total self-sacrifice- whether it is killing oneself for one's feudal lord or for the company by overwork. Western images and metaphors for Japan are not all negative, of course- a romantic version of Orientalism paints a picture of Japan whose sophisticated culture with its indigenous traditions are in close harmony with nature (a myth popular in Japan, as well, it might be added); tiny bonsai trees, exotic geisha girls in kimono, manicured rock gardens, the unfathomable mysteries of Zen Buddhism, shiatsu and macrobiotic cooking, signify for us a people who are deeply intuitive and aesthetically attuned in a way that we are not. Nevertheless, this romantic Orientalism is less salient than its shadow side- we could say, is overshadowed by its shadow, which sees the Japanese as basically fanatical, deceitful, with a tendency to cruelty in their private lives and totalitarianism in their public practices. The image which predominates here is of the unquestioning company man/woman who sacrifices all their individuality and humanity for the organization- who submerges their entire identity in the group. To give one powerful example of this essentializing process of image formation which is entailed by Orientalism, we quote form a book entitled, When Culture's Collide, by Richard D. Lewis (1982), a kind of manual for those traveling and doing business around the world to help them understand the alien cultures they come in contact with. By no means the worst of its kind, Lewis’ book expresses very well the way we use metaphors to trivialize another culture in a totalistic way, so as to make it easier to capture it in the network of our own understandings. - Japanese children are encouraged to be completely dependent and keep a sense of interdependence throughout their lives. -Everything must be placed in context in Japan. -Japanese are constrained by their thought processes in a language very different from any other. - They do not like meeting newcomers. - They represent their group and can not therefore pronounce on any matters without consultation- cannot initiate an exchange of views. -Westerners are individuals, but the Japanese represent a company which represents Japan - As we all know, Japanese do not like to lose face. - The Japanese go to incredible lengths to be polite. (Lewis 1988:262) This kind of Orientalism carries with it the implication that Asian people are much more conformist than we are, and less respecting of the dignity of individual rights, i.e., inferior. Social and cognitive psychology tells us that stereotyping is a kind of mental schema making designed to help us grasp reality- to make things more understandable and less threatening; these mental schema such as stereotypes provide us with the illusion of understanding by dividing up and categorizing the flux of experience into easily manageable cognitive maps. (Augustinos 1995:33) Orientalism has been the prevalent mode by which this cognitive need to schematize has manifested itself in apprehending Asian peoples. In recent history, Japan bashing has been a reiteration of the ethnocentrism exhibited during the war, carrying with it negative consequences in terms of cross-cultural understanding/communication. America reacted to the economic defeats and recession of the 1980’s with patent hostility towards Japan, which included such things as Congressmen smashing Japanese radios on Capitol Hill, and the murder of an the Chinese man in Detroit, because he was thought to be Japanese. To some degree, we have witnessed the darkest sorts of racism which characterized our appraisals of Japan during the Second World War. The numerous corporate takeovers of Hollywood movie studios and famous real estate has, of course, exacerbated these fearful stereotypes which signify the Japanese has wholly other; they carry the implicit assumption that "they are not like us- they don’t play by the rules of decency; they don’t play fair."

Links- Afghan Instability

Orientalism manipulates threats to achieve further its own agenda

Fitzgibbon (Jacqueline, 3rd year history student, US Foreign Policy Seminar, http://www.ucc.ie/en/history/scrinium/AfghanFitzgibbon.pdf, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

The US sought to portray its enemies within Afghanistan as an ‘evil other’ by conflating the Taliban and al Qaeda. This was Orientalist and reductive and promoted an imperialist outlook. It sought to marginalise or ignore the historical reasons for the rise of the Taliban and regional influences on the situation in Afghanistan, rather than address them. It manipulated the issue of Afghan women’s rights to further demonise the Taliban. This provided justifications for the US’ war aims but left Afghanistan even more chaotic and impoverished than before. The US portrayed itself as a friend of the Afghan people while causing them to flee their homes in terror. It accepted no responsibility for creating any of the conditions in Afghanistan which led to the Taliban rise to power. The US delayed sending in peacekeepers following the setting up of an interim government in Bonn. This would have hindered their freedom to roam Afghanistan in search of bin Laden and the Taliban though it would have greatly helped to stabilise the country and relieve the humanitarian crisis so that recovery and reconstruction could begin. The Bush administration highlighted the fundamentalist, repressive nature of the Taliban as a justification for war though US foreign policy had fostered this culture in Afghanistan over two decades and had not meaningfully tried to assist Afghanistan to develop and restructure previous to 9/11. US military tactics privileged the safety of its personnel over innocent civilians leading to higher Afghan casualties. The American public would have not tolerated high US military casualties so this tactic enabled the Bush administration to continue with its military response to 9/11 to the detriment of the Afghan civilians. The decision to attack Afghanistan reflected an imperial agenda which favoured a strong military response to any threat to the US and furthered the expansion of the US’ military reach giving it ‘strategic depth’ in the region.97

Links- Afghan Instability

Orientalism is responsible for representations of Eastern insability

Stanksi 9 (Keith, U of Oxford, ‘So These Folks are Aggressive’: An Orientalist Reading of ‘Afghan Warlords’, Security Dialogue, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

The article draws this comparison by developing a discursive analysis of primary and secondary materials from the First Anglo-Afghan War and Operation Enduring Freedom. As exemplified in the later work of Michel Foucault (1977, 1978, 2004), discursive analysis can reveal not only how actors construct identities, concepts and labels in specific historical and social contexts, but also how these discursive patterns are essential to the way soci­ety is organized and functions. For example, particular discourses render appropriate certain policies or authorize specific individuals, and all the while marginalize others. It is the attention to what Jennifer Milliken (1999: 229) calls 'discourse productivity' that makes this type of discursive analysis most valuable to the study of politics. In the case of the present study, a care­ful reading of sources from each intervention stands to provide a fuller understanding of how longstanding assumptions about the 'Afghan people' continue to influence how the United States responds to 'Afghan warlords'. Particular attention is devoted to how Orientalist archetypes — that is, ontological and epistemological distinctions between the 'Occident' and the 'Orient' — have long informed how each Western power understands 'Afghans' and their expressions of force. As demonstrated below, theories of Orientalism provide a framework through which to interrogate longstanding cultural constructions about Afghanistan, the West and the purported differ­ences between the two.' This theoretical approach challenges observers to account for assumptions that underpin seemingly commonplace conclusions that Afghans are somehow starkly different from and utterly inferior to Westerners. Perhaps more importantly, the Orientalist framework also opens a larger discussion about how cultural constructions, in their various forms and contexts, have been an essential part of attempts by Britain and the United States to develop, maintain and enhance their authority in Afghanistan, particularly during times of war. It is argued here that 'Afghan warlords' are more than just evidence of Afghanistan's recent turmoil. Those labelled 'warlords' are heirs to a long­standing tendency in US and British political thought to construct a violent Afghan 'Other', a figure that contrasts with, yet also affirms, purportedly essential features of the West. This pattern of thought depends largely, but not exclusively, on a series of Orientalist archetypes about the decidedly violent and treacherous nature of the 'Afghan people' and the superiority of Western modes of warfare. Dating as far back as the 19th century, US and British officials and commentators have selectively employed these Orientalist archetypes to render both the complexities of Afghan politics and their own countries' involvement in the region in more palatable terms. This pattern of thought suggests that the stark and varied terms in which the 'Afghan people', and more recently 'Afghan warlords', are understood are inseparable from the West's often strained efforts to advance and justify its violent interventions in Afghan politics. In more theoretical terms, the longevity of the violent Afghan 'Other' con­struct underscores the lasting influence of Orientalist archetypes in Western attempts to claim greater political, economic and moral authority over the Global South. In different forms and intensity, these cultural assumptions continue to inform Western imperial efforts, most obviously in how the West justifies this project, portrays the magnitude of any successes and diverts attention away from the liabilities inherent in the use of force. These mutu­ally reinforcing functions confirm that Orientalist thought is more than just cultural relativism: it is a pattern that not only reflects but also helps sustain the inequality that has historically shaped relations between the West and the Global South. More than just diagnosing Orientalist thought and its evolu­tion over time, scholars are also left to assess its effects in the West's repeated violent interventions in the Global South. The argument about how imperial powers employ evocative labels to expand their influence in the Global South develops in four parts. The first section of the article explores the core Orientalist archetypes in US discus­sions about 'Afghan warlords' during Operation Enduring Freedom, begin­ning with the initial invasion in 2001 and continuing through the Afghan presidential election in late 2004. This period includes not only some of the United States' closest contact with warlord types, but also crucial decisions about the place of the latter in Afghanistan's political establishment. With this encounter in mind, the next section turns to the Orientalist themes that emerge from British accounts of the First Anglo-Afghan War. The third section draws some larger reflections about the legacy of Orientalist thought and the violent Afghan 'Other' construct in US and British military inter­ventions in Afghanistan. The article concludes with a brief review of the overarching argument.

Links- Middle East

Impact framing of the 1AC assumes inevitable conflict in the East b/c of Orientalism

Michael 3 (John, professor at University of Rochestor, South Atlantic Quarterly, “Beyond Us and Them: Identity and Terror from an Arab American's Perspective ,”date accessed: 7/7/2010)AJK

A quarter of a century ago, Edward Said taught many of us to see Western representations of the Arab as a continuing tradition of Orientalism. At bottom, Orientalism is a discourse about identity, one in which all Orientals and especially all Arabs are essentially the same Arab. The discourse continues today, not only as a prop of the Bush administration's pursuit of "Iraqi Freedom," but also, as it did then, as a determining factor in American attitudes toward the Middle East generally and the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories more specifically. The Arab mind and Islamic culture are different and therefore not to be understood according to Western habits of thought. This form of cultural relativism founds a reductive conceptual violence that legitimates even as it masks material and political injustices. In 1978 Said wrote that in practice this notion has meant that when Orientals struggle against colonial occupation, you must say . . . that Orientals have never understood the meaning of self-government the way "we" do. When some Orientals oppose racial discrimination while others practice it, you say "they're all Orientals at bottom" and class interest, political circumstances, economic factors are totally irrelevant. Or with Bernard Lewis, you say that if Arab Palestinians oppose Israeli settlement and occupation of their lands, then that is merely "the return of Islam," or, as a renowned contemporary Orientalist defines it, Islamic opposition to non-Islamic peoples, a principle of Islam enshrined in the seventh century. History, politics, and economics do not matter. Islam is Islam, the Orient is the Orient, and please take all your ideas about a left and a right wing, revolutions, and change back to Disneyland. 1 The war on terror, the war in Iraq, and the armed conflict between Israel and the Palestinians continue the divisive logic of Orientalist ideas and identities. Orientalist ideas underpin Samuel Huntington's noxious and influential thesis of a clash among cultures, especially between Islam and the West, an idea that is rapidly reshaping the world it pretended to describe. Orientalist ideas have legitimated denunciations of Islam by Jerry Falwell and Andrew Sullivan, each of whom has claimed that the key to our current crises may be found in the errors of Islam rather than in understandable perceptions of Western policies (and understanding a perception does not mean that one necessarily finds oneself in accord with it), or in the mistakes of Arab leaders (and all leaders can make mistakes without becoming personifications [End Page 707] of Satan), or in the pressures of modernization itself (which would make both Arabs and their leaders part of the world with which we are already familiar—a world in which the United States plays an enormous cultural, economic, and military part—rather than inhabitants of a locale out of time and space as we know it). The foundation of these professional and popular ideas is Orientalism, and Orientalism is a discourse of false identity. But, to paraphrase Nietzsche, identity may be an error without which we cannot live. So where does that leave us?

Links- Middle East

ME policy is entrenched in Orientalist ideas and re-creates a cycle of Orientalism

Said 78 (Edward, “Orientalism”, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, p 321, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

The system of ideological fictions I have been calling Orientalism has serious implications not only because it is intellectually discreditable. For the United States today is heavily invested in the Middle East, more heavily than anywhere else on earth: the Middle East experts who advise policy- makers are imbued with Orientalism almost to a person. Most of this investment, appropriately enough, is built on foundations of sand, since the experts instruct policy on the basis of such market¬able abstractions as, political elites,moderr\_thmtigm,and stability, mo old Orientalist stereotypesjire,ssed up in policy jaEgpn, and most of which have been completely inade¬quate to describe what took place recently in Lebanon or earlier in Palestinian popular resistance to Israel. The Orientalist now tries to see the Orient as an imitation West which, according to Bernard Lewis, can only improve itself when its nationalism "is prepared to come to terms with the West.' If in the meantime the Arabs, the Muslims, or the Third and Fourth Worlds go unexpected ways after all, we will not be surprised to have an Orientalist tell us that this testifies to the incorrigibility of Orientals and therefore proves that they are not to be trusted. The methodological failures of Orientalism cannot be accounted for either by saying that the real Orient is different from Orientalist portraits of it, or by saying that since Orientalists are Westerners for the most part, they cannot be expected to have an inner sense of what the Orient is all about. Both of these propositions are false. It is not the thesis of this book to suggest that there is such a thing as a real or true Orient (Islam, Arab, or whatever); nor is it to make an assertion about the necessary privilege of an "insider" perspec¬tive over an "outsider" one, to use Robert K. Merton's useful distinction.'" On the contrary, I have been arguing that "the Orient" is itself a constituted entity, and that the notion that there are geographical spaces with indigenous, radically "different" in-habitants who can be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that geographical space is equally a highly debatable idea. I certainly do not believe the limited proposi¬tion that only a black can write about blacks, a Muslim about Muslims, and so forth. And yet despite its failures, its lamentable jargon, its scarcely concealed racism, its paper-thin intellectual apparatus, Orientalism flourishes today in the forms I have tried to describe. Indeed. there is some reason for alarm in the fact that its influence hasspread\_to "the Orient" itself: the pages of books\_and\_j urnals\_inArabic (and doubtless in Japanese. various Incliandialem, \_and\_other\_Oriental lance-filled with second7oideL.analyses by Arabs of "the Arab mind,\_","Islamland other myths. Orientalism has also spread in the United States now that Arab money and resources have added considerable glamour to the traditional "concern" felt for the strategically important Orient. The fact is that Orientalism has been successfully accommodated to the new imperialism, where its ruling paradigms do not contest, and even confirm, the continuing imperial design to dominate Asia.

ME policy without Orientalism is impossible- four reasons

Said 78 (Edward, “Orientalism”, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, p 26, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

One aspect of the electronic, postmodern world is that there has been a reinforcement of the stereotypes by which the Orient is viewed. Television, the films, and all the media’s resources have forced information into more and more standardized molds. So far as the Orient is concerned, standardization and cultural stereotyping have intensified the hold of the nineteenth- century academic and imaginative demonology of “the mysterious Orient.” This is nowhere more true than in the ways by which the Near East is grasped. Three things have contributed to making even the simplest perception of the Arabs and Islam into a highly politicized, almost raucous matter: one, the history of popular anti-Arab and anti-Islamic prejudice in the West, which is immediately reflected in the history of Orientalism; two, the struggle between the Arabs and Israeli Zionism, and its effect upon American Jews as well as upon both the liberal culture and the population at large; three, the almost total absence of any cultural position making it possible either to identify with or dispassionately to discuss the Arabs or Islam. Furthermore, it hardly needs saying that because the Middle East is now so identified with Great Power politics, oil economics, and the simple minded dichotomy of freedom loving, democratic Israel and evil, totalitarian, and terroristic Arabs, the chances of anything like a clear view of what one talks about in talking about the Near East are depressingly small.

Links- Middle East

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Links- Iraq War

Justifications for the war in Iraq are based in Orientalism

Spencer 6 (Robert, NYT Bestselling author on Islam, http://media.web.britannica.com/ebsco/pdf/23/23648989.pdf, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

In the wake of the onslaught against Iraq and the cack-handed overhaul of that country, it is high time for us to admit that jitteiy compunctions 1983, pp226-47! about intellectual work will not advance what ought to be the calling of the postcolonial critic: to help humankind prevail over the manifestly undiniinished consequences of imperialism. The war in Iraq has made starkly visible an imperialist project that has not, as our field's moniker suggests, been drawing to a close but has on the contrary been expanding American hegemony, extending corporate power and hijacking international institutions of governance. Therefore, in addition to exposing those destructive dealings that are the result of cupidity and misapprehension, postcolonial criticism needs methods and principles that will allow it to elaborate positive visions of genuine fellowship and equality to set against the parochial, self-sei-ving universalism of the United States. It requires a critical vocabulary that fulminates against Iraqis' plight and arraigns their assailants in the name of universal principles and a vision of social transformation. Many postcolonial thinkers have, alas, been persuaded against performing these tasks by their reluctance (often brought about by what I think is a misreading of Edward Said's Orientalism) to acknowledge that thinkers can write about, for and in the name of a broad international constituency. The fallacious doctrines that underpin imperialism are too often put down to an irremediable entanglement of knowledge with power. But this scepticism about the possibility of knowledge then leads to an equally unavailing political philosophy; incomprehension is put down to the fact that the culture of the perceived and that of the percipient belong to terminally discrepant realms, discrete spheres without values or aspirations in common, a belief that in my view is as far from reality as it is from providing an appealing alternative to the fractured, inequitable world brought into being by imperialism. Not many will need reminding that the postcolonial field's governing idea is that much, indeed most, of what has been written in colonising societies about, for instance, the Arab world, though it pretends to be scholarly in intention and edifying in effect, is actually bound up with the misapprehension of such regions and the ill-treatment of their peoples. Orientalism traces a host of misrepresentations that portray 'Orientals' not as individuals and groups 52 Ni!w FORMATIONS that merit considerate analysis but as an easily digestible mass reducible to stereotypical Figures. Tbe term 'Orientalism' names tbe purportedly faitbful and dispassionate but actually erroneous and self-sen'ing set of ideas tbat bas come to stand in for an obscured region and its inbabitants. Orientalists peddle distortions tbat evoke images of a dependent and powerless place, an ageless canvas for tbe realisation of tbe west's economic objectives, strategic plans and cultural fantasies. In tbe mainstream media, in ortbodox political discussion and, alas, in mucb scbolarly work tbere is a flattening out of tbe intricacy and unevenness of tbe Arab world's bistories, cultures and societies (and even of tbe initiative and bumanity of its inbabitants) into lifeless figiaes of civilisational decline, religious zeal and despotic torpor. Orientalism gives rise not to knowledge but to pretexts for tbe exercise of power.^

Links- Iraq War

Justifications for military action in Iraq are based in Orientalism

Said 3 (Edward, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, “Orientalism once more”, p 876, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

Worse yet, education is threatened by nationalist and religious orthodoxies often disseminated by the mass media as they focus ahistorically and sensationally on the distant electronic wars that give viewers the sense of surgical precision, but in fact obscure the terrible suffering and destruction produced by modern ‘clean’ warfare. In the demonization of an unknown enemy for whom the label ‘terrorist’ serves the general purpose of keeping people stirred up and angry, media images command too much attention and can be exploited at times of crisis and insecurity of the kind that the post-9/11 period has produced. Speaking both as an American and as an Arab, I must ask my reader not to underestimate the kind of simplified view of the world that a relative handful of Pentagon civilian elites have formulated for US policy in the entire Arab and Islamic worlds, a view in which terror, pre-emptive war, and unilateral regime change — backed up by the most bloated military budget in history — are the main ideas debated endlessly and impoverishingly by a media that assigns itself the role of producing so-called ‘experts’ who validate the government’s general line. I should also note that it is far from a coincidence that General Sharon of Israel, who in 1982 led the invasion of Lebanon killing 17,000 civilians in the process, in order to change the Lebanese government, is now a partner in ‘peace’ with George W. Bush, and that in the US at least there has been not enough dissent from the dubious thesis that military power alone can change the map of the world. 876 Edward Said Reflection, debate, rational argument, moral principle based on a secular notion that human beings must create their own history have been replaced by abstract ideas that celebrate American or Western exceptionalism, denigrate the relevance of context, and regard other cultures with derisive contempt. Perhaps you will say that I am making too many abrupt transitions between humanistic interpretation on the one hand and foreign policy on the other, and that a modern technological society, which along with unprecedented power possesses the internet and F-16 fighter-jets, must in the end be commanded by formidable technical-policy experts like Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Perle. Neither man, once the war started in earnest, will do any actual fighting since that will be left to less fortunate men and women. But what has really been lost is a sense of the density and interdependence of human life, which can neither be reduced to a formula nor brushed aside as irrelevant. Even the language of the projected war is dehumanizing in the extreme: ‘we’ll go in there, take out Saddam, destroy his army with clean surgical strikes, and everyone will think it’s great’, said a congresswoman on national television. It seems to me entirely significant of the precarious moment we are living through that when Vice President Cheney made his hard-line speech on 26 August 2002 about the imperative to attack Iraq he quoted as his single Middle East ‘expert’ in support of military intervention against Iraq, an Arab academic who as a paid consultant to the mass media on a nightly basis keeps repeating his hatred of his own people and the renunciation of his background. Moreover he is backed in his efforts by the military and Zionist lobbies in the United States. Such a trahison des clercs is a symptom of how genuine humanism can degenerate into jingoism and false patriotism.

Links- Iraq War

Orientalism constructs scenarios to serve a selfish purpose

Baylis and Smith 3 (“The Globaliztion of World Politics”, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199271184/01student/zcases/03iraq/alternative.pdf, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

Orientalist representations of Iraq One idea central to postcolonial scholarship is the concept of Orientalism, and this was discussed in chapter 12. The term was used by theorist Edward Said to describe the way in which the ‘West’ has constructed an image of the ‘East’ as its Other, the opposite against which it defines itself. Representations of the ‘East’, including the Middle East, have been a central to the economic and political domination. Before Said’s untimely death in late 2003 he wrote that the concept of Orientalism revealed much about representations of Iraq in the West that were used to justify the war. In his words, ‘There's been so massive and calculatedly aggressive an attack on the contemporary societies of the Arab and Muslim for their backwardness, lack of democracy, and abrogation of women's rights that we simply forget that such notions as modernity, enlightenment, and democracy are by no means simple, and agreed-upon concepts…’ (Orientalism 25 years later). Mainstream Western assumptions about the identity of the insurgents in postwar Iraq are also problematic from the perspective of post-colonial scholarship. In the words of Tarak Barkawi, ‘The role of the Iraqi people is to want to be free, for only then can the United States understand itself as a liberator. Accordingly, the growing resistance to US occupation must be represented as somehow not emanating from ‘real’ Iraqis. It is very important that the fiction that the resistance in Iraq is mounted only by “Saddam loyalists” and “foreign terrorists” be maintained, for to admit otherwise is to switch from discourses of liberation to those of occupation’ (2004: 33).

Discourse used to construct impacts is entrenched in Orientalism

Baylis and Smith 3 (“The Globaliztion of World Politics”, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199271184/01student/zcases/03iraq/alternative.pdf, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

A major strength of post-modern research is its ability to reveal the way in which political action cannot be understood outside of discourse, language and speech. Moreover, the meaning of a particular discourse is always contested and, indeed, ‘truth’ does not exist outside of (historically constructed political) discourse. As suggested in ch.12 of Globalization, ‘various regimes of truth merely reflect the ways in which through history both power and truth develop together in a mutually sustaining relationship. The way to uncover the workings of power is to undertake a detailed historical analysis of how the practices and statements about the social world are only ‘true’ within specific discourses. Accordingly, post-modernism is concerned with how some discourses and therefore some truths dominate over others in very concrete ways’. From a post-modern perspective it therefore becomes necessary to investigate how the Bush administration tried to establish the ‘truth’ of its interpretation of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and the fictive weapons of mass destruction. It is necessary to investigate thoroughly the rhetorical devises used in public statements that tried to convince the world of the threat. How was the discourse about the war, when it started, controlled? Central to the way in which the battlefield narrative could be constructed was the runaway victory of the White House communications operation in the way the war was spun, especially to the American audience. Why was the administration propaganda machine so effective? Extremely important was the Pentagon’s decision to ‘embed’ more than 500 journalists with the US troops as the invasion began which meant that the first hand were highly Baylis and Smith: The Globalization of World Politics: 3e Case Study: The Iraq War, 2003 sympathetic to the United States. A content analysis from a post-modern perspective of the mainstream media would be necessary to show how the identities of the participants were partly constructed and represented thereby making certain actions possible.

Links- Prolif

Engaging in a discourse that problematizes Eastern possession of nuclear weapons is distinct Orientalism

Gusterson 99 (Hugh, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Stan-PS-314-2009-Q1\_PNP/Syllabus/EReadings/Gusterson1999Nuclear.pdf, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

The Non-Proliferation Treaty embodied a bargain between the five countries that had nuclear weapons in 1970 and those countries that did not. According to the bargain, the five official nuclear states (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China)3 promised to assist other signatories to the treaty in acquiring nuclear energy technology as long as they did not use that technology to produce nuclear weapons, submitting to international inspections when necessary to prove their compliance. Further, in Article 6 of the treaty, the five nuclear powers agreed to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (Blacker and Duffy 1976:395). One hundred eighty-seven countries have signed the treaty, but Israel, India, and Pakistan have refused, saying it enshrines a system of global "nuclear apartheid." Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nuclear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric4-designating only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers-the treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly legitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms. In view of recent 1 14 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY developments in global politics-the collapse of the Soviet threat and the recent war against Iraq, a nuclear-threshold nation in the Third World-the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing. It has become an increasingly important way of legitimating U.S. military programs in the post-Cold War world since the early 1990s, when U.S. military leaders introduced the term rogue states into the American lexicon of fear, identifying a new source of danger just as the Soviet threat was declining (Klare 1995). Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western discourse on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side.5 However, the United States and Russia have turned back appeals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basically formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998).

\*\*\*Impacts\*\*\*

Dehum Impact Module 1NC

Orientalist policy is inherently dehumanizing

SAID 3 (Edward, Prof. of English/Comparative Lit., Columbia U., “Preface.” Orientalism. p. xxvii)

Reflection, debate, rational argument, moral principle based on a secular notion that human beings must create their own history have been replaced by abstract ideas that celebrate American or Western exceptionalism, denigrate the relevance of context, and regard other cultures with derisive contempt. Perhaps you will say that I am making too many abrupt transitions between humanistic interpretation on the one hand and foreign policy on the other, and that a modern technological society that, along with unprecedented power, possesses the internet and F-16 fighter jets must in the end be commanded by formidable technical-policy experts like Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Perle. (Neither man will do any actual fighting since that will be left to less fortunate men and women.) But what has really been lost is a sense of the density and interdependence of human life, which can neither be reduced to a formula nor be brushed aside as irrelevant. Even the language of the war is dehumanizing in the extreme: "We'll go in there take out Saddam, destroy his army with clean surgical strikes, and everyone will think it's great," said a congresswoman on national television. It seems to me entirely symptomatic of the precarious moment in which we are living that when Vice President Cheney made his hard-line speech on August 26, 2002, about the imperative to attack Iraq, he quoted as his single Middle East "expert" in support of military intervention against Iraq an Arab academic who, as a paid consultant to the mass media on a nightly basis, keeps repeating his hatred of his own people and the renunciation of his background. Moreover, he is backed in his efforts by the military and Zionist lobbies in the United States. Such a trahison de clercs is a symptom of how genuine humanism can degenerate into jingoism and false patriotism.

Dehumanization is the root cause of violence and war

Katz 97 (Katheryn D. Katz, prof. of law - Albany Law School, 1997, Albany Law Journal

It is undeniable that throughout human history dominant and oppressive groups have committed unspeakable wrongs against those viewed as inferior. Once a person (or a people) has been characterized as sub-human, there appears to have been no limit to the cruelty that was or will be visited upon him. For example, in almost all wars, hatred towards the enemy was inspired to justify the killing and wounding by separating the enemy from the human race, by casting them as unworthy of human status. This same rationalization has supported: genocide, chattel slavery, racial segregation, economic exploitation, caste and class systems, coerced sterilization of social misfits and undesirables, unprincipled medical experimentation, the subjugation of women, and the social Darwinists' theory justifying indifference to the poverty and misery of others.

Dehum Impact Module: I/L EXT

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Orientalism is fundamentally dehumanizing

SAID 3 (Edward, Prof. of English/Comparative Lit., Columbia U. ] Orientalism. p. 108-109)

These contemporary Orientalist attitudes flood the press and the popular mind. Arabs, for example, are thought of as camel-riding, terroristic, hook-nosed, venal lechers whose undeserved wealth is an affront to real civilization. Always there lurks the assumption that although the Western consumer belongs to a numerical minority, he is entitled either to own or to expend (or both) the majority of the world resources. Why? Because he, unlike the Oriental, is a true human being. No better instance exists today of what Anwar Abdel Malek calls "the hegemonism of possessing minorities" and anthropocentrism allied with Europocentrism: a white middle-class Westerner believes it his human prerogative not only to manage the nonwhite world but also to own it, just because by definition "it" is not quite as human as "we" are. There is no purer example than this of dehumanized thought. In a sense the limitations of Orientalism are, as I said earlier, the limitations that follow upon disregarding, essentializing, denuding the humanity of another culture, people, or geographical region. But Orientalism has taken a further step than that: it views the Orient as something whose existence is not only displayed but has remained fixed in time and place for the West. So impressive have the descriptive and textual successes of Orientalism been that entire periods of the Orient's cultural, political, and social history are considered mere responses to the West. The West is the actor, the Orient a passive reactor. The West is the spectator, the judge and jury, of every facet of Oriental behavior. Yet if history during the twentieth century has provoked intrinsic change in and for the Orient, the Orientalist is stunned: he cannot realize that to some extent the new [Oriental] leaders, intellectuals or policy-makers, have learned many lessons from the travail of their predecessors. They have also been aided by the structural and institutional transformations accomplished in the intervening period and by the fact that they are to a great extent more at liberty to fashion the future of their countries. They are also much more confident and perhaps slightly aggressive. No longer do they have to function hoping to obtain a favorable verdict from the invisible jury of the West. Their dialogue is not with the West, it is with their fellow-citizens.

Dehum Impact Module: I/L EXT

Orientalism is dehumanizing- erases empathy between the Orient and the Occident

SAID 3 (Edward, Prof. of English/Comparative Lit., Columbia U. ] Orientalism. p. 154-155)

We are immediately brought back to the realization that Orientalists, like many other earlynineteenth-century thinkers, conceive of humanity either in large collective terms or in abstract generalities. Orientalists are neither interested in nor capable of discussing individuals; instead artificial entities, perhaps with their roots in Herderian populism, predominate. There are Orientals, Asiatics, Semites, Muslims, Arabs, Jews, races, mentalities, nations, and the like, some of them the product of learned operations of the type found in Renan's work. Similarly, the ageold distinction between "Europe" and "Asia" or "Occident" and "Orient" herds beneath very wide labels every possible variety of human plurality, reducing it in the process to one or two terminal, collective abstractions. Marx is no exception. The collective Orient was easier for him to use in illustration of a theory than existential human identities. For between Orient and Occident, as if in a self-fulfilling proclamation, only the vast anonymous collectivity mattered, or existed. No other type of exchange, severely constrained though it may have been, was at hand. That Marx was still able to sense some fellow feeling, to identify even a little with poor Asia, suggests that something happened before the labels took over, before he was dispatched to Goethe as a source of wisdom on the Orient. It is as if the individual mind (Marx's, in this case) could find a precollective, preofficial individuality in Asia—find and give in to its pressures upon his emotions, feelings, senses—only to give it up when he confronted a more formidable censor in the very vocabulary he found himself forced to employ. What that censor did was to stop and then chase away the sympathy, and this was accompanied by a lapidary definition: Those people, it said, don't suffer—they are Orientals and hence have to be treated in other ways than the ones you've just been using. A wash of sentiment therefore disappeared as it encountered the unshakable definitions built up by Orientalist science, supported by "Oriental" lore (e.g., the Diwan) supposed to be appropriate for it. The vocabulary of emotion dissipated as it submitted to the lexicographical police action of Orientalist science and even Orientalist art. An experience was dislodged by a dictionary definition: one can almost see that happen in Marx's Indian essays, where what finally occurs is that something forces him to scurry back to Goethe, there to stand in his protective Orientalized Orient.

Dehum Impact Module: Terminal Impacts

Dehumanization means no value to life

Dillon 99 (Michael, University of Lancaster, “Another Justice” Political Theory Vol. 27, No. 2, April 1999)

Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself." It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure. But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

Dehumanization means mass murder and no value to life

Fasching and deChant 1 (Darrell J., Prof. Religious Studies @ U of South Florida; and Dell, Assoc. Chair Religious Studies @ U of South Florida, “Comparative Religious Ethics,” p.64)

When Auschwitz and Hiroshima teach us is that the surrender to the myth of life through death in all its religious and even secular forms leads to "killing in order to heal" as a justification for mass death. The unconscious surrender to the sacral power of the ethnocentric techno-bureaucratic state has its training ground in the conscious surrender of one's will and one's whole being, advocated by the dominant forms of virtually all religions, East and West. After Auschwitz and Hiroshima, we can no longer afford the luxury of an unadulterated mythology of life through death, not even when it is sublimely transmuted, for instance, by Buddhist or Christian spirituality, into a language of self-transformation. We need not an ethic of secular holiness that sacralizes death but one that sanctifies life. We need not a sacral ethic but an ethic of secular holiness that champions human dignity, human rights, and human liberation against all mythologies of killing in order to heal with audacious tenacity.

Dehum Impact Module: Terminal Impacts

Their argument risks a slippery slope – once we decide that certain lives are not worth living- all killing is justified and we jeopardize all ethics

Hanger 92 (Lisa, B.A. at Miami University, Summer, 1992, Journal of Law-Medicine, 5 Health Matrix 347)

Considering anencephalic infants "dead" or "close enough to death" instills in the public a fear that other individuals very near death also will be declared dead and will be killed for the sake of procuring their organs. If the UAGA or state statutes are amended to require anencephalic infants to become organ donors, it is believed that other individuals with neural tube anomolies or debilitating cognitive deficiencies also may be forced to become organ donors before their natural deaths. n38 Specifically, the " slippery slope" would lead most directly to those infants born with hydroencephaly n39 and microencephaly n40 as becoming forced organ donors. This position could then extend to other groups of people similarly situated who possess only limited cognitive functioning or who arguably lack a "valid" interest in life, including death row inmates, adults in a permanently vegetative state, individuals with Alzheimer's disease, [\*357] or incompetent individuals with terminal illnesses. n41 To declare as dead many of these groups whom the general population perceive to be very much alive could jeopardize the ethical integrity of the medical profession and decrease public trust in medicine. n42 Many individuals also would become even more skeptical of organ donation. While some groups have tried to minimize the fear of a slippery slope by arguing that "safeguards" would prevent groups of individuals other than anencephalic infants from being affected by an amendment to the UDDA, n43 any "safeguard" would not be sufficient. Once "very fine distinctions [are made] regarding the dying," n44 the risk of descending down the slippery slope becomes significant.

Dehumanization outweighs nuclear war

Berube ’97 (David, Ph.D. in Communications, “Nanotechnological Prolongevity: The Down Side”, NanoTechnology Magazine, June/July 1997, p. 1-6, URL:http://www.cla.sc.edu/ENGL/faculty/berube/prolong.htm)

This means-ends dispute is at the core of Montagu and Matsou’s treatise on the dehumanization of humanity. They warn “its destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or natural calamity on record – and its potential danger to the quality of life and the fabric of civilized society is beyond calculation. For that reason this sickness of the soul might well be called the Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse… Behind the genocide of the Holocaust lay a dehumanized thought; beneath the menecide of deviants and dissidents… in the cuckoo’s next of America, lies a dehumanized image of man… (Montagu & Matsou, 1983, p. xi-xii). While it may never be possible to quantify the impacts dehumanizing ethics may have had on humanity, it is safe to conclude the foundations of humanness offer great opportunities which would be foregone. When we calculate the actual losses and the virtual benefits, we approach a nearly inestimable value greater than any tools which we can currently use to measure it. Dehumanization is nuclear war, environmental apocalypse, and international genocide. When people become things, they become dispensable. When people are dispensable, any and every atrocity can be justified. Once justified, they seem to be inevitable for every epoch has evil and dehumanization is evil’s most powerful weapon.

Dehumanization is the root cause of violence and war

Katz 97 (Katheryn D. Katz, prof. of law - Albany Law School, 1997, Albany Law Journal

It is undeniable that throughout human history dominant and oppressive groups have committed unspeakable wrongs against those viewed as inferior. Once a person (or a people) has been characterized as sub-human, there appears to have been no limit to the cruelty that was or will be visited upon him. For example, in almost all wars, hatred towards the enemy was inspired to justify the killing and wounding by separating the enemy from the human race, by casting them as unworthy of human status. This same rationalization has supported: genocide, chattel slavery, racial segregation, economic exploitation, caste and class systems, coerced sterilization of social misfits and undesirables, unprincipled medical experimentation, the subjugation of women, and the social Darwinists' theory justifying indifference to the poverty and misery of others.

Dehum Impact Module: Terminal Impacts

Dehumanization causes violence and genocide

Maiese 3 (Michelle. "Dehumanization." Beyond Intractability, Conflict Research Consortium, UC Boulder, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/dehumanization)
While deindividuation and the formation of enemy images are very common, they form a dangerous process that becomes especially damaging when it reaches the level of dehumanization. Once certain groups are stigmatized as evil, morally inferior, and not fully human, the persecution of those groups becomes more psychologically acceptable. Restraints against aggression and violence begin to disappear. Not surprisingly, dehumanization increases the likelihood of violence and may cause a conflict to escalate out of control. Once a violence break over has occurred, it may seem even more acceptable for people to do things that they would have regarded as morally unthinkable before. Parties may come to believe that destruction of the other side is necessary, and pursue an overwhelming victory that will cause one's opponent to simply disappear. This sort of into-the-sea framing can cause lasting damage to relationships between the conflicting parties, making it more difficult to solve their underlying problems and leading to the loss of more innocent lives. Indeed, dehumanization often paves the way for human rights violations, war crimes, and genocide. For example, in WWII, the dehumanization of the Jews ultimately led to the destruction of millions of people.[9] Similar atrocities have occurred in Rwanda, Cambodia, and the former Yugoslavia.

Dehum Impact Module-Root Cause

Continued Orientalism keeps the orient oppressed inevitably dehumanizing the other

Said 78(“Orientalism” Edward Said was a professor of comparative literature at Columbia University, November 1978 pg108-110)

In a sense the limitations of Orientalism are, as I said earlier, the limitations that follow upon disregarding, essentializing, denuding the humanity of another culture, people, or geographical region. But Orientalism has taken a further step than that: it views the Orient as something whose existence is not only displayed but has remained fixed in time and place for the West. So impressive have the descriptive and textual successes of Orientalism been that entire periods of the Orient's cultural, political, and social history are considered mere responses to the West. The West is the actor, the Orient a passive reactor. The West is the spectator, the judge and jury, of every facet of Oriental behavior. Yet if history during the twentieth century has provoked intrinsic change in and for the Orient, the Orientalist is stunned: he cannot realize that to some extent the new [Oriental] leaders, intellectuals or policy‑makers, have learned many lessons from the travail of their predecessors. They have also been aided by the structural and institutional transformations accomplished in the intervening period and by the fact that they are to a great extent more at liberty to fashion the future of their countries. They are also much more confident and perhaps slightly aggressive. No longer do they have to function hoping to obtain a favorable verdict from the invisible jury of the West. Their dialogue is not with the West, it is with their fellow citizens." Moreover, the Orientalist assumes that what his texts have not prepared him for is the result either of outside agitation in the Orient or of the Orient's misguided inanity. None of the innumerable Orientalist texts on Islam, including their summa, The Cambridge History of Islam, can prepare their reader for what has taken place since 1948 in Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or the Yemens. When the dogmas about Islam cannot serve, not even for the most Panglossian Orientalist, there is recourse to an Orientalized social‑science jargon, to such marketable abstractions as elites, political stability, modernization, and institutional development, all stamped with the cachet of Orientalist wisdom. In the meantime a growing, more and more dangerous rift separates Orient and Occident. The present crisis dramatizes the disparity between texts and reality. Yet in this study of Orientalism I wish not only to expose the sources of Orientalism's views but also to reflect on its importance, for the contemporary intellectual rightly feels that to ignore a part of the world now demonstrably encroaching upon him is to avoid reality. Humanists have too often confined their attention to departmentalized topics of research. They have neither watched nor learned from disciplines like Orientalism whose unremitting ambition was to master all of a world, not some easily delimited part of it such as an author or a collection of texts. However, along with such academic security‑blankets as "history," ,literature," or "the humanities," and despite its overreaching aspirations, Orientalism is involved in worldly, historical circumstances which it has tried to conceal behind an often pompous scientism and appeals to rationalism. The contemporary intellectual can learn from Orientalism how, on the one hand, either to limit or to enlarge realistically the scope of his discipline's claims, and on the other, to see the human ground (the foul‑rag‑and‑bone shop of the heart, Yeats called it) in which texts, visions, methods, and disciplines begin, grow, thrive, and degenerate. To investigate Orientalism is also to propose intellectual ways for handling the methodological problems that history has brought forward, so to speak, in its subject matter, the Orient.

Racism Impact Module (1/1)

Orientalism breeds racism

Salaita 6 (Steven, Assistant Professor of English at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg, Virginia, p. 265, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new\_centennial\_review/v006/6.2salaita.html, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

Years ago, Amilcar Cabral noted that "culture is the vigorous manifestation on the ideological or idealist plane of the physical and historical reality of the society that is dominated or to be dominated" (1994, 54). Cabral's conﬂation of political desire and cultural manifestation is no less true today, even across space and time, which indicates that a moral paradigm of enlightenment indeed creates the reality of American domination of the Arab World, and, to a lesser degree, its marginalization of Arab Americans. For this reason, if no other, Orientalism and Islamophobia matter and demand continued interrogation. But if we are to contextualize Orientalism and Islamophobia within a more dynamic methodology, then racism must become part of our vocabulary. Even if the word is not part of the discourse in the United States vis-à-vis Arabs, it is, tacitly but pervasively, part of the culture of discursive authority in the United States vis-à-vis both Arabs and those who are otherwise oppressed as a result of legislation rationalized by the fear of terrorism (a phenomenon now exclusive to the Arab World in corporate American media). In sum, then, anti-Arab racism in the United States is simultaneously overused and underdiscussed. It is extrinsic, intrinsic, and, most importantly, ubiquitous. In order to challenge it with any success, we are compelled to analyze notions of patriotism and national pride, which inevitably give anti-Arab racism meaning. Conversely, anti-Arab racism mystiﬁes patriotism and national pride. It is in this spirit that I announce openly that I am unpatriotic, a sentiment that should not in any way be confused with disdain. Rather, it speaks to my rejection of anti-Arab racism. I similarly reject the various origins of anti-Arab racism and, in so doing, reject the American metanarrative of manifest manners. I do so with a sad but necessary acknowledgment: Ridding the United States of anti-Arab racism requires nothing less than a rejection of all that is now considered fundamentally American.

Racism is a d-rule

Barndt 91 (Joseph. NYC pastor and author, “Crossroads; Dismantling Racism” p. 219, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK
To study racism is to study walls. We have looked at barriers and fences, restraints and limitations, ghettos and prisons. The prison of racism confines us all, people of color and white people alike. It shackles the victimizer as well as the victim. The walls forcibly keep people of color and white people seperate from each other in our seperate prisons. We are all prevented from achieving human potential that God intends for us. The limitations imposed on people of color by poverty, subservience, and powerlessness are cruel, inhumane and unjust; the effects of uncontrolled power, privilege, and greed, which are the marks of our white prison, will inevitably destroy us as well. But we have also seen that the walls of racism can be dismantled. We are not condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the vision and possibility of freedom. Brick by brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual, institutional, and cultural racism can be destroyed. You and I are urgently called to join the efforts of those who know it is time to dear down once and for all, the walls of racism.

Racism Impact Module: I/L EXT

Orientalism suppresses entire populations and perpetuates prejudice

Warraq 6 (Ibn, founded the Institute for the Secularization of Islamic Society, http://www.islam-watch.org/IbnWarraq/EdwardSaid.htm, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

Said not only attacks the entire discipline of Orientalism, which is devoted to the academic study of the Orient, but which Said accuses of perpetuating negative racial stereotypes, anti-Arab and anti-Islamic prejudice, and the myth of an unchanging, essential "Orient," but he also accuses Orientalists as a group of complicity with imperial power, and holds them responsible for creating the distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority, which they achieve by suppressing the voice of the "oriental," and by their anti-human tendency to make huge, but vague generalizations about entire populations, which in reality consist of millions of individuals. In other words, much of what was written about the Orient in general, and Islam and Islamic civilisation in particular, was false. The Orientalists also stand accused of creating the "Other" - the non-European, always characterised in a negative way, as for example, passive, weak, in need of civilizing (western strength and eastern weakness).

Orientalism causes anti-Arab violence

McCarus 94 (Ernest Nasseph, “The development of Arab-American identity”, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

Dr. Abraham deals with the vitally important topic of "Anti-Arab Racism and Violence in the United States." The curious thing about anti-Arab violence is that it is largely unreported in this country and generally ignored by the mass media and by governmental au¬thorities. Dr. Abraham states that violence committed against Arab-Americans stems from three main sources: (I) ideologically motivated violence, such as that by the Jewish Defense League, a Jewish terrorist group that attacks "the enemies of Israel" and is the FBI's prime suspect in the murder of Alex Odeh; (2) anti-Arab xenophobia, which has nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict but is based on perceived differences of race, culture, ethnicity, or religion; and (3) jingoist racism, a blend of knee-jerk patriotism and homegrown white racism toward the Other; it usually occurs during heightened inter¬national tensions (hijackings, hostage takings, or military conflict). Abraham also deals with the impact of the Gulf war on anti-Arab racism and violence, detailing the role of individuals, groups, and the federal government.

Racism Impact Module: I/L EXT

Orientalism encourages blanket generalizations

Kbiri 8 (Hamid, Major in the Royal Moroccan Air Force, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/12070695/The-Influence-of-Orientalism-on-American-Perceptions-and-Policies-in-the-MiddleEast>, date accessed: 7/9/2010) AJK

The main shortcoming of the Orientalist tradition remains its overarching generalizations based on “philological methods, unexamined premises and meager empirical data.”181 Orientalists usually represent the Middle-East as a monolithic and benighted region whose inhabitants are somewhat uniformly mesmerized by the teachings of an enraged Islam.182 Therefore Middle-Easterners stances’ are not to be taken seriously, because “they are at bottom merely irrational expressions of a Muslim collective psyche which had been gravely damaged by its encounter with Western modernity.”183 Orientalists hold that the universality and centrality of Islam in the lives of Muslims are beyond question.184 Such depictions overlook the diversity of a region comprised of a multitude of ethnies, tribes and nationalities with different historical trajectories and cultural backgrounds. They lump together all and sunder: Muslim terrorists (a very marginal minority), extremists, moderates, seculars, agnostics, Sunnis and Shiites. Such generalizations can prove misleading, complicating rather than facilitating the task of even the lowest ranking soldiers. For example, “Marines who were instructed that Muslims were highly pious and prayed five times a day, lost respect for Iraqis when they found a brewery in Baghdad and men with mistresses.”185 Likewise, despite widespread Western images of Islamists as uniformly violent and radical, Islamism represents a large spectrum extending from die hard 25 terrorists to co-opted activists willingly engaging in non-violent politics. Islamism is indeed a “modern phenomenon, the product of complex social, economic and cultural forces operating in specific historical contexts and conjunctures.”186 In Turkey and Morocco, for instance, Islamist parties have been incorporated into the political process and they are evolving in a rather democratic and moderate direction. At the same time, die-hard extremists like Osama Bin Laden have no religious or scholarly legitimacy. Their fatwas (opinions) are not binding on anyone187 and they do not represent any form of orthodoxy. If Bin Laden has any forerunners, they would be, among many others, the Russian anarchists of 1881, the Oklahoma City bombers, the Zionist terrorist groups Irgun and Stern Gang,188 or Guy Fawkes the “Catholic jihadist” who plotted to blow up (by gunpowder) British Houses of Parliament as early as 1605.189 The condition of women is another example where broad generalizations fail to take into account the diversity of Middle-Eastern societies. For instance, Tunisian women have had the right to vote and to run for election since 1957,190 just one year after Tunisia’s independence. Moroccan women, as well, gained the right to vote as early as 1963. In contrast, Switzerland, situated at the heart of Europe, did not grant this right to its women until 1971. Moreover, there are and there were many prominent Muslim women leaders in the course of history,191 such as Queen Shagrat al-Durr of the Mamluk dynasty in Egypt (AD 1250-57) Tansu Çiller (Turkey), Benazir Bhutto (Pakistan), Khaleda Zia (Bangladesh)

Racism Impact Module: Root Cause

Orientalist dipections of the struggling world culminates in a racist specificity world.

Malek 04(“A Major Inspiration for Said's Conception of Orientalism” Anwar Abdel Malek, Political Discourse- Theories of Colonialism and Postcolonialism 3/12, http://www.postcolonialweb.org/poldiscourse/said/orient9.html)

b) On the level of the thematic, [the Orientalists] adopt an essentialist conception of the countries, nations and peoples of the Orient under study, a conception which expresses itself through a characterized ethnist typology . . . and will soon proceed with it towards racism.

According to the traditional orientalists, an essence should exist -- sometimes even clearly described in metaphysical terms -- which constitutes the inalienable and common basis of all the beings considered; this essence is both "historical," since it goes back to the dawn of history, and fundamentally a-historical, since it transfixes the being, "the object" of study, within its inalienable and nonevolutive specificity, instead of defining it as all other beings, states, nations, peoples, and cultures-as a product, a resultant of the vection of the forces operating in the field of historical evolution.

Thus one ends with a typology-based on a real specificity, but detached from history, and, consequently, conceived as being intangible, essential-which makes of the studied "object" another being with regard to whom the studying subject is transcendent; we will have a homo Sinicus, a homo Arabicus (and why not a homo Aegypticus, etc.), a homo Africanus, the man-the "normal man," it is understood-being the European man of the historical period, that is, since Greek antiquity. One sees how much, from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, the hegemonism of possessing minorities, unveiled by Marx and Engels, and the anthropocentrism dismantled by Freud are accompanied by europocentrism in the area of human and social sciences, and more particularly in those in direct relationship with non-European peoples. [Anwar Abdel Malek, "Orientalism in C risis," Diogenes 44 (1963): 107-8]

Colonialism Impact Module (1/2)

Orientalism causes widespread colonialism

Said 78 (Edward, “Orientalism”, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, p 120, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

But if these interconnected elements represent a secularizing tendency, this is not to say that the old religious patterns of human history and destiny and "the existential paradigms" were simply  removed. Far from it: they were reconstituted, redeployed, re-distributed in the secular frameworks just enumerated. For anyone who studied the Orient a secular vocabulary in keeping with these frameworks was required. Yet if Orientalism provided the vocab¬ulary, the conceptual repertoire, the techniques—for this is what, from the end of the eighteenth century on, Orientalism did and what Orientalism was—it also retained, as an undislodged current in its discourse, a reconstructed religious impulse, a naturalized supernaturalism. What 1 shall try to show is that this impulse in Orientalism resided in the Orientalist's conception of himself, of the Orient, and of his discipline. The modern Orientalist was. in his view, a hero rescuing the Orient from the obscurity, alienation, and strangeness which he himself had properly distinguished. His research reconstructed the Orient's lost languages, mores, even mentalities, as Champ°Ilion reconstructed Egyptian hieroglyphics out of the Rosetta Stone. The specific Orientalist techniques—Lexicography, grammar, translation, cultural decoding—restored, fleshed out, reasserted the values both of an ancient, classical Orient and of the traditional disciplines of philology, history, rhetoric, and doctrinal polemic. But in the process, the Orient and Orientalist disciplines changed dialectically, for they could not survive in their original form. The Orient, even in the "classic" form which the Orientalist usually studied, was modernized, restored to the present; the traditional disciplines too were brought into contemporary culture. Yet both bore the traces of power— power to have resurrected, indeed created, the Orient, power that dwelt in the new, scientifically advanced techniques of philology and of anthropological generalization. In short, having transported the Orient into modernity, the Orientalist could celebrate his method, and his position, as that of a secular creator, a man who made new worlds as God had once made the old. As for carrying on such methods and such positions beyond the life-span of any individ¬ual Orientalist, there would be a secular tradition of continuity, a lay order of disciplined methodologists, whose brotherhood would be based, not on blood lineage, but upon a common discourse, a praxis, a library, a set of received ideas, in short, a doxology, common to everyone who entered the ranks. Flaubert was prescient enough to see that in time the modern Orientalist would become a copyist, like Bouvard and Pecuchet; but during the early days, in the careers of Silvestre de Sacy and Ernest Renan, no such danger was apparent. My thesis is that the essential aspects of modern Orientalist theory and praxis (from which present-day Orientalism derives) can be understood, not as a sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient, but as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and re-formed by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were naturalized, modernized, and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) Christian supernaturalism. In the form of new texts and ideas, the East was accommodated to these structures. Linguists and explorers like Jones and Anquetil were contributors to modern Orientalism, certainly, but what distin¬guishes modern Orientalism as a field, a group of ideas, a discourse, is the work of a later generation than theirs. If we use the Napoleonic expedition (1798-1801) as a sort of first enabling experience for modern Orientalism, we can consider its inaugural heroes—in Islamic studies, Sacy and Renan and Lane—to be builders of the field, creators of a tradition, progenitors of the Orientalist brother¬hood. What Sacy, Renan, and Lane did was to place Orientalism on a scientific and rational basis. This entailed not only their own exemplary work but also the creation of a vocabulary and ideas that could be used impersonally by anyone who wished to become an Orientalist. Their inauguration of Orientalism was a considerable feat. It made possible a scientific terminology; it banished obscurity and instated a special form of illumination for the Orient; it estab-lished the figure of the Orientalist as central authority for the Orient; it legitimized a special kind of specifically coherent Orientalist work; it put into cultural circulation a form of discursive currency by whose presence the Orient henceforth would be spoken for; above all, the work of the inaugurators carved out a field of study and a family of ideas which in turn could form a community of scholars whose lineage, traditions, and ambitions were at once internal to the field and external enough for general prestige. The more Europe encroached upon the Orient during the nineteenth century, the more Orientalism gained in public confidence. Yet if this gain coincided with a loss in originality, we should not be entirely surprised, since its mode, from the beginning, was reconstruction and repetition. One final observation: The late-eighteenth-century and nine-teenth-century ideas, institutions, and figures I shall deal with in this chapter are an important part, a crucial elaboration, of the first phase of the greatest age of territorial acquisition ever known. By. the end of World War I Europe had colonized 85 percent of the earth. To say simply that modern Orientalism has been an aspect of both imperialism and colonialism is not to say anything very disputable. Yet it is not enough to say it; it needs to be worked through analytically and historically. I am interested in showing how modern Orientalism, unlike the precolonial awareness of Dante and d'Herbelot, embodies a systematic discipline of accum¬ulation. And far from this being exclusively an intellectual or theoretical feature, it made Orientalism fatally tend towards the systematic accumulation of human beings and territories. To recon¬struct a dead or lost Oriental language meant ultimately to recon¬struct a dead or neglected Orient; it also meant that reconstructive precision, science, even imagination could prepare the way for what armies, administrations, and bureaucracies would later do on the ground, in the Orient. In a sense, the vindication of Orientalism was not only its intellectual or artistic successes but its tater effec¬tiveness, its usefulness, its authority. Surely it deserves serious atten¬tion on all those counts.

Colonialism Impact Module (2/2)

Biopower wages war on entire populations and as conflict grows nuclear war becomes the only possible outcome.

Foucault 78 (Michel, Professor of Philosophy at the College de France, The History Of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume 1, 136-137)

Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. “Deduction” has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, mak­ing them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-adminis­tering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death—and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits—now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to adminis­ter, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s con­tinued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of bat­tle—that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living—has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

Continued colonialist oppression will compound the genocidal effects ending in extinction

Porter 98(Robert B. Porter, Seneca and Professor of Law and Director of the Tribal Law and Government Center, University of Kansas, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Sac and Fox Nation, 21 University of Michigan Journal of Law and Reform, 1998)

Nonetheless, this otherwise natural process was dramatically altered by colonization. These colonizing efforts were accomplished by force and often with great speed, producing dramatic changes within Indigenous societies and interfering with the natural process of adaptation and change. This disruption has had a genocidal effect; groups of Indigenous peoples that existed 500 years ago no longer exist. There should be no doubt that their extinction was not an accident – it was the product of a concerted effort to subjugate and eliminate the native human population in order to allow for the pursuit of wealth and manifest destiny. As a result, extinction is the most dramatic effect of colonization. Allowed to run its full course, colonization will disrupt and destroy the natural evolutionary process of the people being colonized to the point of extinction.

Colonialism Impact Module: I/L EXT

Orientalism gives the West full control over the East and allows unchecked domination

Stanksi 9 (Keith, U of Oxford, ‘So These Folks are Aggressive’: An Orientalist Reading of ‘Afghan Warlords’, Security Dialogue, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

At first glance, Orientalist accounts of cultural difference appear anti-quated. Its idealized patterns seemingly reveal less about contemporary politics than about colonial times, when these types of stark assumptions about culture, race and gender were more explicit in popular discourse. However, to dismiss theories of Orientalism on these grounds risks over-looking its inherent mutability, its capacity to assume various forms depend¬ing on specific contexts. `Orientalism', maintains Said, `depends for its strategy on this flexible positional superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand' (1978: 7; emphasis in original). These archetypes appear in various forms, contexts and intensities across history; but, regard¬less of the context, the Orient is described as fundamentally different from and inferior to the West. Although it is important not to overstate the coherence of Orientalist thought, as it contains a number of inconsistencies, omissions and discrepancies, the longevity of this broad ideology of differ¬ence is inseparable from its capacity to preserve the West's presumed superi¬ority over the Global South, regardless of the historical context. More is at stake in Orientalism's persistence than just how one culture comes to understand another. As suggested above, this discursive tradition has long informed how the West has attempted to expand its imperial influ¬ence over the Global South. Orientalist logic shapes many of the core ideolo¬gies, identities and arguments that comprise this longstanding project. As Said (1978: 6) concludes, 'Orientalism . . . is not an airy European fantasy about the Orient, but a created body of theory and practice in which, for many generations, there has been a considerable material investment.' Orientalism is not just a way of thinking about the Global South, but also a way of conceptualizing its political landscape in a way that makes it suscep¬tible to certain kinds of management. Three of the patterns identified in this article are demonstrative of Oriental¬ism's lasting influence in how the West attempts to manage the Global South. First, imperial powers return to Orientalist patterns to justify their expanding influence across the Global South. This strategy can be seen in how the stark contrasts that distinguish Orientalist thought can be manipulated to create urgent challenges that seemingly warrant greater Western involvement. For example, in the months preceding the 2004 Afghan presidential election, US officials began to draw an especially crude caricature of 'Afghan warlords', casting many of their former allies and other militia leaders as endangering the ongoing state-building process. This portrayal of Afghan politics helped justify the United States' increasing intervention in all facets of national poli¬tics, whether in government appointments or the use of force against intran¬sigent leaders. Orientalism validates the West's capacity to resolve many of the supposed challenges of politics in the Global South. Second, Orientalist thought has a tendency to accentuate the West's imperial victories, no matter their significance. Although Orientalist thought is rooted in an idealized vision of the West, this tradition inflates a seemingly minor success into confirmation of the West's inherent righteousness. This pattern was illustrated after the defeat of the Taliban. Neoconservatives in the Bush administration heralded the US military for combining its 'sophisti¬cated' technology with the 'rudimentary' Northern Alliance to defeat noth¬ing less than the 'cause of evil in the world' (Rumsfeld, 2002: 3). This aggrandizing effect helps Westerns leaders sustain their imperial missions, even in the most dubious of circumstances. Finally, Orientalism defuses some of the inherent liabilities posed by the West's use of force. Amid the uncertainty, confusion and chaos of war, Western observers often turn to Orientalism's flexible narrative to help pre¬serve Western supremacy. The utility of this pattern was evident at the Battle of Mazar-e-Sharif. US officials deflected the risks of the Northern Alliance's brutality by stressing before US voters and international observers the unfamiliar and exotic qualities of their Afghan allies. Romantic accounts of ill-equipped horseback warriors distracted observers from the complete story of the battlefield and suggested that their form of warfare was too foreign to be controlled. Orientalism helps the West try to claim greater influ¬ence over how the battlefield is understood.

Colonialism Impact Module: Root Cause

Orientalism maintains the systemic harms of domination- turns case

Said 78(“Orientalism” Edward Said was a professor of comparative literature at Columbia University, November 1978 pg39-41)

We would be wrong, I think, to underestimate the reservoir of accredited knowledge, the codes of Orientalist orthodoxy, to which Cromer and Balfour refer everywhere in their writing and in their public policy. To say simply that Orientalism was a rationalization of colonial rule is to ignore the extent to which colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism, rather than after the fact. Men have always divided the world up into regions having either real or imagined distinction from each other. The absolute demarcation between East and West, which Balfour and Cromer accept with such complacency, had been years, even centuries, in the making. There were of course innumerable voyages of discovery; there were contacts through trade and war. But more than this, since the middle of the eighteenth century there had been two principal elements in the relation between East and West. One was a growing systematic knowledge in Europe about the Orient, knowledge reinforced by the colonial encounter as well as by the widespread interest in the alien and unusual, exploited by the developing sciences of ethnology, comparative anatomy, philology, and history; furthermore, to this systematic knowledge was added a sizable body of literature produced by novelists, poets, translators, and gifted travelers. The other feature of Oriental‑European relations was that Europe was always in a position of strength, not to say domination. There is no way of putting this euphemistically. True, the relationship of strong to weak could be disguised or mitigated, as when Balfour acknowledged the "greatness" of Oriental civilizations. But the essential relationship, on political, cultural, and even religious grounds, was seen‑in the West, which is what concerns us here to be one between a strong and a weak partner. Many terms were used to express the relation: Balfour and Cromer, typically, used several. The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, "different"; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, "normal." But the way of enlivening the relationship was everywhere to stress the fact that the Oriental lived in a different but thoroughly organized world of his own, a world with its own national, cultural, and epistemological boundaries and principles of internal coherence. Yet what gave the Oriental's world its intelligibility and identity was not the result of his own efforts but rather the whole complex series of knowledgeable manipulations by which the Orient was identified by the West. Thus the two features of cultural relationship I have been discussing come together. Knowledge of the Orient, because generated out of strength, in a sense creates the Orient, the Oriental, and his world. In Cromer's and Balfour's language the Oriental is depicted as something one judges (as in a court of law), something one studies and depicts (as in a curriculum), something one disciplines (as in a school or prison), something one illustrates (as in a zoological manual). The point is that in each of these cases the Oriental is contained and represented by dominating frameworks. Where do these come from? Cultural strength is not something we can discuss very easily and one of the purposes of the present work is to illustrate, analyze, and reflect upon Orientalism as an exercise of cultural strength. In other words, it is better not to risk generalizations about so vague and yet so important a notion as cultural strength until a good deal of material has been analyzed first. But at the outset one can say that so far as the West was concerned during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an assumption had been made that the Orient and everything in it was, if not patently inferior to, then in need of corrective study by the West. The Orient was viewed as if framed by the classroom, the criminal court, the prison, the illustrated manual. Orientalism, then, is knowledge of the Orient that places things Oriental in class, court, prison, or manual for scrutiny, study, judgment, discipline, or governing.

Terrorism Impact Module

Orientalism breeds terrorism and culture loss

Said 3 (Edward, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, “Orientalism once more”, p 876, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

That is one side of the global debate. In the Arab and Muslim countries the situation is scarcely better. As Roula Khalaf in an excellent Financial Times essay (4 September 2002) argues, the region has slipped into an easy anti-Americanism that shows little understanding of what the US is really like as a society. Because the governments are relatively powerless to affect US policy toward them, they turn their energies to repressing and keeping down their own populations, which results in resentment, anger and helpless imprecations that do nothing to open up societies where secular ideas about human history and development have been overtaken by failure and frustration, as well as by an Islamism built out of rote learning, the obliteration of what are perceived to be other, competitive forms of secular knowledge, and an inability to analyse and exchange ideas within the generally discordant world of modern discourse. The gradual disappearance of the extraordinary tradition of Islamic ijtihad has been one of the major cultural disasters of our time, with the result that critical thinking and individual wrestling with the problems of the modern world have simply dropped out of sight. Orthodoxy and dogma rule instead. This is not to say that the cultural world has simply regressed on one side to a belligerent neo-Orientalism and on the other to blanket rejectionism. Orientalism Once More 877 The 2002 United Nations World Summit in Johannesburg, for all its limitations, did in fact reveal a vast area of common global concern whose detailed workings on matters having to do with the environment, famine, the gap between advanced and developing countries, health, human rights, suggest the welcome emergence of a new collective constituency that gives the often facile notion of ‘one world’ a new urgency. In all this, however, we must admit that no one can possibly know the extraordinarily complex unity of our globalized world, despite the reality that, as I said at the outset, the world does have a real interdependence of parts that leaves no genuine opportunity for isolation.

Terrorism causes extinction

Sid-Ahmed 4 (Mohamed, political analyst, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, “Extinction!” August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

\*\*\*Impact Construction\*\*\*

No Impact- USFG

The USFG’s Orientalist attitude creates their own threats

Abrahamian 4 (Ervand, Ph. D., History Department, Baruch College., “Empire Strikes Back: Iran in U.S. Sights.” Inventing the Axis of Evil. p. 139)

The "axis of evil" speech, now compounded by the nuclear issue, has further complicated the conflict between reformers and conservatives in Iran. Of course, both have serious concerns about national security. Both know that they live in a "dangerous neighborhood"; that Pakistan, their strategic rival in Central Asia, has nuclear bombs; that Saudi Arabia has been talking about buying such bombs from Pakistan; that others, namely Russia, China, India, and Israel have large stockpiles; that for years influential voices in Washington and Tel Aviv have been calling for "regime change" in Iran; that they are now surrounded with American bases in Turkey, Georgia, Iraq, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan; that atomic weapons provide national prestige and presumably entry into the "nuclear club"; that Iraq, a country without such weapons was invaded, but North Korea, a country with them, has not been; and that the ongoing instability in Iraq could easily overflow into Iran—they may remember Rumsfeld's motto "When you have a problem you can't solve, expand it." In the words of the Guardian, "Iran's fears are real": "Iran does have one deeply persuasive reason for acquiring nuclear weapons: national security. . . . Barely a week goes by without US officials making threatening noises towards Iran, decrying its alleged support of international terrorism, encouraging internal civil insurrection, or reminding it that like Iraq, the US deems it to be a rogue state."101 Surprisingly, George Tenet, the CIA director, came to a similar conclusion when presenting his 2003 annual report to the Senate: "No Iranian government, regardless of its ideological leanings, is likely to abandon weapons of mass destruction seen as guaranteeing Iran's security."

No Impact- Generic

Orientalist policy re-creates the problems we try to solve

Little 2000 (Donald P., Scholar at the Institute of Islamic Studies in Canada, “Orientalism: A Reader”, p 124, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

Professor A. L.Tibawi,a distinguished educator and scholar on subjects Islamic and Arab who has recently reached the end of his teaching career, is the first critic whom we shall consider/ through his article, 'English-Speaking Orien-talists: A Critique of their Approaches to Islam and Arab Nationalism.'6 It is Tibawi's complaint that almost all Orientalists, both past and present, if not actually hostile to Islam and the Arabs, lack an elementary sympathy for the Islamic religion and the nationalistic aspirations of the Arab people. In the religious sphere this negative attitude impedes, Tibawi claims, a true under¬standing of what Islam really means, that is, what Islam means to Muslims, and results, inevitably, in errors and distortions, or even downright blasphemy, that is bound to offend Muslim sensibilities. In a secular context, if indeed it is possible from Tibawi's point of view to make a distinction between Islam and the Arabs, this negativism is manifest in thinly disguised contempt for the Arabs and their struggle to free themselves from imperialist, including Zionist, interference and control. These two dimensions of Orientalism are discussed separately. Western interest in Islam as a religion has been tainted from the beginning, Tibawi believes, by hostility to Islam as a rival religion to Judaism and Christianity. This hostility was first displayed openly, in the form of polemics, holy war and missionary activities aimed at converting or destroying Muslims. Later, how¬ever, commercial and political considerations led Westerners to study Islam and Muslim peoples in order to subject them to imperialist control. Those few figures in the West who studied the Islamic East for its own sake were far outnumbered by those who were inspired by missionary or colonialist motives, which, in the last analysis, were one and the same. Eventually, however, thanks to the development of a 'scientific' approach to the humanities, a detached and truly academic approach to Islam appeared in the West, but this approach has not been mastered, much less adopted, by many scholars. Indeed, much to Tibawi's dismay, religious prejudice against Islam has by no means disappeared and is still being propagated in the works of Orientalists of the most seemingly impeccable credentials, marring to a greater or lesser degree the pronounce¬ments of such eminent Orientalists as A. Guillaume, Montgomery Watt, G. E. von Grunebaum, Bernard Lewis, Wilfred Cantwcll Smith, J. N. D. Anderson, and Kenneth Cragg, to name only a few. Prejudice emerges most clearly in scholarship on the Prophet Muhammad and the origins of Islam. Tibawi objects vehemently to Orientalists\* implicit assumption or explicit assertion that the Qur'an was composed by Muhammad rather than revealed to him by Allah. Tin's he regards as denial of the 'cardinal Muslim belief that Islam is of divine origin\* and therefore suggests that it is 'more conducive to human understanding, and more scholarly, to leave matters of faith alone... .'7 Or, failing that, and it is doubtful that he seriously expects non-Muslim scholars 'to leave matters of faith alone/ Tibawi insists that they should at least state 'the traditional Muslim view' on such matters before stating contrary views of their own. In the same vein he decries the perennial attempts of Orientalists to seek the origins of Islam in Christianity and Judaism. Not only do such attempts presuppose ideas that are unacceptable to Muslims and thus 'tend to create ill-feeling among Muslims, and in consequence place serious obstacles in the way of intellectual traffic between the two sides'; these attempts are also futile since they arc speculative and are incapable of historical proof. Also doomed to failure are attempts even to compare Islam with Christianity since most who have applied the methods of comparative religion to Islam have tried to fit it into a Christian mold, to make Islam compatible with Christianity, with the ultimate object of persuading Muslims to abandon or soften their beliefs in order to embrace Christianity. Of the same stripe are those Orientalists who advocate the reform or reformation of Islam as the prerequi¬site for its survival in modem times. For Tibawi Islamic beliefs are immutable; Islamic lau . on the other hand, has its own instrumentalities by which change can be, and has been, effected and has no need of alien guidance.

No Impact- Media

Media creates a world of violence

Patel 5 (Tejas, U of Queensland-IR-Thesis, http://www.scribd.com/doc/191254/Tejass-M-Phil-Thesis-MEDIA-AND-CONFLICT-RESOLUTION-2005.)

According to Galtung, the way media operate while reporting on war and violence, they not only serve as catalysts to unleash violence, but are violent in and by themselves. Researchers (McNair 1988; Young 1991; Wolfsfeld 1997; Galtung 1998; Kellow and Steeves 1998; Futehally and Shaheen 2001; Fischer and Galtung 2002; Kellner 2002; Tehranian 2004) agree to the fact that media has the potential to escalate conflict by highlighting violence. Botes states that there is a consensus among media scholars that conflict is news and new is normally presented within some kind of conflict framework. According to him, Conflict being such a major part of news; it has become a commodity for which all forms of media compete. Since conflict news is source of such rivalry, it is not only often dramatized or exaggerated, but frequently abused for commercial purposes (Botes 1998: 4-6). Galtung (1998), while criticizing contemporary media coverage of conflicts, claims that the media generally follows the 'low road' in reporting conflict - chasing wars, the elites that run them and a 'win-lose' outcome. He says that in present scenario media legitimizes violence by constantly giving coverage to it and mostly ignores peaceful outcomes of a conflict. Given Galtung’s stature in the field of peace research and his extensive writings on the role of media in conflicts, I decided to empirically test his critique of conventional news coverage of conflicts. In contemporary times, media coverage of conflict is more inclined to highlight violence. The constant coverage of violence and over simplification of the conflict leads to more violence and less possibility of achieving peace. Galtung (2000: 3-15) has argued that media coverage in conflict largely, • • • • Focuses largely on violence, Reduces the number of combatants to two, Demonizes one party against another, Predicts Armageddon as the only possibility; ignoring peace measures and proposals. 4 In order to empirically test Galtung’s claims regarding news coverage of conflict, an ongoing conflict had to be selected. The India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir was selected as a case study to test Galtung’s claims. The long running Indian Subcontinental conflict merits attention because of several reasons. The primary motive behind selecting India-Pakistan conflict was the fact that there is not much direct contact between people of both the countries and the images are heavily media dependent. Given Galtung’s claim regarding media’s role in conflict, it can play a constructive or destructive role in case of India-Pakistan conflict. Other factors such as the time span of the conflict and its dangerous potential to turn itself in to a nuclear confrontation were also considered while selecting this conflict to test Galtung’s claims.

Media has incentive to report conflict and escalation when there is none

Patel 5 (Tejas, U of Queensland-IR-Thesis, http://www.scribd.com/doc/191254/Tejass-M-Phil-Thesis-MEDIA-AND-CONFLICT-RESOLUTION-2005.)

Young (1991) agrees that media contributes to conflict escalation, either directly or indirectly. He observes that media focus in many cases is selective. Many journalists observed that in the age of video, visually dramatic events such as battles or bombings receive more coverage. Botes concurs with this view when he says, There is consensus among media scholars that conflict is news, and that news is normally presented within some kind of conflict framework. Because conflict is such a major part of news, it has become a commodity for which all forms of media compete. Since conflict news is source of such rivalry, it is not only often dramatized or exaggerated, but frequently abused for commercial purposes (Botes 1998: 4-6). The Malaysian Information Minister in an international seminar on “Violence, Media and challenges of modern societies” stated, Through the media, violence finds a mass audience.

Media profits most from reporting wars conflict escalation

Patel 5 (Tejas, U of Queensland-IR-Thesis, http://www.scribd.com/doc/191254/Tejass-M-Phil-Thesis-MEDIA-AND-CONFLICT-RESOLUTION-2005.)

Gadi Wolfsfeld has explained the media behaviour in the coverage of conflicts and peace processes. Wolfsfeld (Wolfsfeld 2004) says that it is lot easier to promote conflict to the media than peace. According to him, conflict can be considered the sine qua non of news, while peace and news make strange bedfellows. As a successful peace process requires patience, the news media demand immediacy. He argues that peace is more likely to develop within calm environment whereas the media have an obsessive interest in threats and violence.

No Impact- Conflict Frame Bad

Media depictions of conflict reduce it to a game

Patel 5 (Tejas, U of Queensland-IR-Thesis, http://www.scribd.com/doc/191254/Tejass-M-Phil-Thesis-MEDIA-AND-CONFLICT-RESOLUTION-2005.)

Scholars (Aubrey 1982; Chadha 1996; Wolfsfeld 1997; Carruthers 2000; Galtung 2000; Tehranian 2004) have long understood that media reports of conflicts; can magnify violence, sustain ethnic violence or propagate messages of intolerance. Galtung (2000: 3-15) terms such coverage as violence oriented coverage. He argues that the dominant theme in contemporary news coverage of conflict sees a conflict as a battle and reduces the parties of a conflict to two, struggling to impose their goals. According to Galtung (1998: 7-10), the reporting model used by media in such conflict situations focus on, “who advances, who capitulates short of their goals; losses are counted in terms of numbers killed or wounded and material damage.”

Violent media depictions de-prioritize and undermine conflict resolution

Patel 5 (Tejas, U of Queensland-IR-Thesis, http://www.scribd.com/doc/191254/Tejass-M-Phil-Thesis-MEDIA-AND-CONFLICT-RESOLUTION-2005.)

But while explaining the journalism practiced in contemporary times, Galtung (1998: 7-10) states that the media generally follows the 'low road' in reporting conflict chasing wars, the elites that run them and a 'win-lose' outcome. Galtung argues that in the present circumstances, “Journalism not only legitimizes violence but is violent in and of itself” by its continuing failure to pay attention to people’s grievances or strategies for peaceful outcomes. Galtung (2000: 3-15) argues that violence oriented journalism tends to focus on violence as its own cause and ignores the deeper structural origins of the conflict. The war journalists focus on the day's events, on who advances and who capitulates, the numbers killed and wounded, and material damage. The same perspective is applied to negotiations, which are treated as verbal battles: who outsmarts the other, who comes out closest to his original position. Galtung (1998: 7-10) further points out that violence oriented journalism focuses only on the conflict arena and after the episode of violence it concentrates on visible effects like number of people killed, wounded and visible material damage. But there is no mention of damage to the psychology, structure and culture of the people suffering violence. In other words, media totally ignores the long term and subtle effects of violence and the underlying and unresolved factors that influence the conflict or violence. This type of journalism also reduces the parties in a conflict to two when more parties are involved; in a way it draws us/them polarity. It totally ignores other parties who exercise considerable influence on the conflict or violence (Galtung 1998: 7-10).

Media coverage of conflict is biased and self serving- 5 reasons

 Patel 5 (Tejas, U of Queensland-IR-Thesis, http://www.scribd.com/doc/191254/Tejass-M-Phil-Thesis-MEDIA-AND-CONFLICT-RESOLUTION-2005.)

Media coverage also fails to explore the underlying 35 causes of conflict and violence and the impact of their coverage on the conflict (Galtung 2000: 3-15). It focuses on individual acts of violence while avoiding structural causes, like poverty, government neglect and military or police repression. Galtung (1998: 7-10) states that violence oriented journalism require clear winners and losers. The zero-sum characteristic is similar to sports reporting where winning is the only thing. Galtung claims that media ignores peaceful initiatives undertaken by the other side or the third parties most of the times. It ignores all the non-violent options which do not give total victory to ‘our’ side. The violence oriented journalism also fails to explore the causes of escalation and the impact of media coverage on the conflict itself. Galtung (2002) also points out at the fact that such coverage presents conflict and violence as inevitable and omits alternatives like peace proposals and steps taken to resolve or prevent the conflict. It is victory-oriented and leaves for another war as soon as the violence ends. Another important characteristic of violence oriented journalism is that it confuses cease-fires and negotiations with actual peace and looks for instant solutions to a conflict. This type of journalism also omits reconciliation between the parties to the conflict (Galtung 2000: 3-15). Schechter (2001), quotes Galtung as saying that conflicts tend to re-emerge if attention is not paid to efforts to heal fractured societies. When news about attempts to resolve conflicts is absent, fatalism is reinforced. That can help provoke even more violence, when people have no images or information about possible peaceful outcomes and the promise of healing.

\*\*\*Alts\*\*\*

Alt Solvency

The kritik is key to reshaping our understanding of Orientalism

Ucelli and O’Neil 92 (Juliet and Dennis, http://www.wengewang.org/read.php?tid=19345, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

In the United States, the developing critique of eurocentrism emphasizes conscious ness, i.e. ways of thinking, values, works of art and theories, and does not yet address social institutions and structures.  This orientation toward consciousness is doubtless influenced by the greater mainstream recognition, over the past few years, of the contributions to cultural production by people of African, Asian and Native descent.  While people of color were always the unacknowledged creators of much U.S. popular music, art and fashion styles, filmmakers like Spike Lee, fashion designers like the late Willi Smith, culture critics and trendsetters like bell hooks, Cornel West, Henry Louis Gates Jr., novelists like Alice Walker and Toni Morrison, and multi-genre musical masterminds like Quincy Jones demand a new level of recognition.  These cultural producers get authorship credits, have their names above the title, or even own the company.  It is not accidental that most of these figures are African American, because of the historical and structural primacy of racial slavery in constituting the U.S. social formation and its ideology, and the historically key role of African Americans in shaping the culture which never could completely subjugate them.     On the one side, the prominence of African Americans in the cultural sphere forces masses of white people, whose consciousness about racism is contradictory and fragmentary, to recognize that people of color produce culture, even some of the culture which white people like best and try to imitate.  A white person can wear Air Jordans and admire individual Blacks and that admiration is an opening for identifying with people of color and questioning their oppression.  But lacking a coherent critique of racism, that white person might still be quite racist.     On the other side, since any overt political opposition by Black, Latino, Asian and Native peoples in the United States has been subject to such murderous repression by the state, their opposition gets pushed into - and sometimes contained by - a cultural form.  Kinte cloth, dreadlocks and “40 Acres and a Mule” warmup jackets don’t constitute a program for liberation, but they are a less dangerous way for a Black person to assert collective identity and pride than joining an overtly political, radical group.     If you’re still wondering what’s the point of reexamining history and social theories (including our own left-wing ones) once we acknowledge that Europeans didn’t invent everything good, well, there are several reasons.  Our theory of imperialism certainly needs to develop its cultural dimension to better understand the ideological framework that legitimizes white supremacy.  Further, if we want to create a world where no nation or region dominates another, it would help to understand how this domination arose and is perpetuated.  If Europe didn’t subdue the world just because it was eternally culturally superior and rational as we learned in school, then why did it?  How can we explain why cultures and economic systems which had many valuable features were destroyed?  What can we learn from non-European cultures that can help us conceptualize and bring into being a truly egalitarian society?  As educators and parents, how do we provide children of all backgrounds with an authentic (non-superior) pride in their own people, an appreciation for diversity, a coherent story of human evolution and a moral philosophy of history that enables them to situate themselves as responsible global actors?

Only the kritik can solve

Said 9 (Edward, “Orientalism Updated”, Journal of Developing Areas, p 878, date accessed: 7/9/2010) AJK

Lastly, most important, humanism is the only and I would go so far as saying the final resistance we have against the inhuman practices and injustices that disfigure human history. We are today abetted by the enormously encouraging democratic field of cyberspace, open to all users in ways undreamt of by earlier generations either of tyrants or of orthodoxies. The world-wide protests before the war began in Iraq would not have been possible were it not for the existence of alternative communities all across the world, informed by alternative information, and keenly aware of the 878 Edward Said environmental, human rights, and libertarian impulses that bind us together in this tiny planet. The human, and humanistic, desire for enlightenment and emancipation is not easily deferred, despite the incredible strength of the opposition to it that comes from the Rumsfelds, Bin Ladens, Sharons and Bushes of this world. I would like to believe that my work has had a place in the long and often interrupted road to human freedom.

Alt Solvency- Specific Intellectual

Role of the scholar key- must examine the discourse of the 1AC

Edwards 2010 (Brian, American Literary History, http://alh.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/22/2/360, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

In addressing the popular fascination with Private Jessica Lynch, taken captive by Iraqi forces shortly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Sayre notes the captivation sentimentalism holds over the American media public, particularly as it is filtered through an account of a white woman in the hands of putatively dark men and forces. He juxtaposes the published comments of an American literature professor in Iowa, then teaching Susanna Rowson's Slaves in Algiers (1794), to point both to the renewed interest and the resulting perils of misreading two apparently linked accounts as suggestive of a transhistorical American call for liberty within captivity. Though Sayre does not pursue this question, or rather does so only suggestively, such analogues feed the powerful pull that the exceptionalist thesis has long held over Americanist work and, in turn, justify military invasion retroactively via a logic by which captive subjects must always already be seeking their liberty.1 While we may note a vastly different occasion for the presence of an American woman in Iraq in 2003, attached to the largest military apparatus on the planet and an immediate media celebrity, from that of the case of the late eighteenth century, when a young nation without such might would be forced to pay a full one-sixth of its annual federal budget as ransom for the release of Americans in captivity, the persistence of the trope in popular American discourse suggests that there is a strand linking disparate geopolitical situations in the popular imaginary. Thus the work of the scholar is todisaggregate this Orientalist strand—after identifying its American particularities, which is not to say its exceptionalism—and to recognize how it functions to divert attention from less legible or palatable attention to American aggression or depravity, both at home and abroad (e.g., Abu Ghraib, the federal government's handing of the crisis in New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina).

Intellectual rejection and acknowledgement key

Bové 2000 (Paul A, “Edward Said and the work of the critic: speaking truth to power, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

Critics who take Said seriously recognize the central relation between history, narrative, and politics in his work, and they attempt to bring their own study into relation with Said’s efforts. In this collection, for example, Jonathan Arac presents us with some of his own arguments on *Huckleberry Finn*and shows us how Said’s work can and should matter in the context of American literature, culture, and politics. For just as Said meditates on the quizzical complexities that form the hypotheses of all critical work, so Arac’s deeply historical tracings and judgments of the ways cultures work in forming its own icons let us see exactly what the role of criticism should be. It is Said’s particular effect that those who write with him in mind must always confront this question: What should the critic do? In a unique and powerful essay on the problems of land mines and human rights, Barbara Harlow gives one exemplary answer to that question. She enacts in scholarly detail Said’s lifelong injunction: Speak truth to power. Like Said, Harlow casts aide “epistemological” worries over what we can know to show that, at the level of politics and history, we can know certain and often quite deadly things- massacres, cover-ups, and the suppression of human rights- and intellectuals must use their special training and knowledge to speak of these matters as they speak about race and stories.

Criticism is k2 solve

Said 78 (Edward, “Orientalism”, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, p 326 & 327, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

On the other hand, scholars and critics who are trained in the traditional Orientalist disciplines are perfectly capable of freeing themselves from the old ideological straitjacket. Jacques Berque's and Maxime Rodinson's training ranks with the most rigorous avail-able, but what invigorates their investigations even of traditional problems is their methodological self-consciousness. For if Oriental- ism has historically been too smug, too insulated, too positivistically confident in its ways and its premises, then one way of opening oneself to what one studies in or about the Orient is reflexively to submit one's method to critical scrutiny. This is what characterizes Berque and Rodinson, each in his own way. What one finds in their work is always, first of all, a direct sensitivity to the material before them, and then a continual self-examination of their methodology and practice, a constant attempt to keep their work responsive to the material and not to a doctrinal preconception. Certainly Berque and Rodinson, as well as Abdel Malek and Roger Owen, are aware too that the study of man and society—whether Oriental or not—is best conducted in the broad field of all the human sciences; therefore these scholars are critical readers, and students of what goes on in other fields. Berque's attention to recent discoveries in structural anthropology, Rodinson's to sociol¬ogy and political theory, Owen's to economic history: all these are instructive correctives brought from the contemporary human sciences to the study of so-called Oriental problems.

Alt Solvency- Spillover

Specific intellectualism key to solve- spills over

Said 3 (Edward, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, “Orientalism once more”, p 876, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

My intellectual approach has been to use humanistic critique to open up the fields of struggle, to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange. I have called what I try to do ‘humanism’, a word I continue to use stubbornly despite the scornful dismissal of the term by sophisticated post-modern critics. By humanism I mean first of all attempting to dissolve Blake’s mind-forged manacles so as to be able to use one’s mind historically and rationally for the purposes of reflective understanding and genuine disclosure. Moreover humanism is sustained by a sense of community with other interpreters and other societies and periods: strictly speaking therefore, there is no such thing as an isolated humanist. This is to say that every domain is linked to every other one, and that nothing that goes on in our world has ever been isolated and pure of any outside influence. The disheartening part is that the more the critical study of culture shows us that that is the case, the less influence such a view seems to have, and the more territory reductive polarizations like ‘Islam vs. the West’ seem to conquer. For those of us who by force of circumstance actually live the pluricultural life as it entails Islam and the West, I have long felt that a special intellectual and moral responsibility attaches to what we do as scholars and intellectuals. Certainly I think it is incumbent upon us to complicate and/or dismantle the reductive formulae and the abstract but potent kind of thought that leads the mind away from concrete human history and experience and into the realms of ideological fiction, metaphysical confrontation, and collective passion. This is not to say that we cannot speak about issues of injustice and suffering, but that we need to do so always within a context that is amply situated in history, culture, and socio-economic reality. Our role is to widen the field of discussion, not to set limits in accord with the prevailing authority. I have spent a great deal of my life during the past thirty-five years advocating the rights of the Palestinian people to national self-determination, but I have always tried to do that with full attention paid to the reality of the Jewish people and what they suffered by way of persecution and genocide. The paramount thing is that the struggle for equality in Palestine/Israel should be directed toward a humane goal, that 874 Edward Said is, co-existence, and not further suppression and denial. Not accidentally, I indicate that Orientalism and modern anti-Semitism have common roots. Therefore it would seem to be a vital necessity for independent intellectuals always to provide alternative models to the reductively simplifying and confining ones based on mutual hostility that have prevailed in the Middle East and elsewhere for so long.

Intellectual refusal spills over to the rest of the world

Abraham 7 (Matthew, assistant professor of English at DePaul University http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cultural\_critique/v067/67.1abraham.html, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

H.R. bill 3077, introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives to ensure the "balanced" presentation of views within area studies curricula in U.S. universities, represents an attempt to counteract the influence of political mavericks such as Said and Noam Chomsky, who—while establishing themselves as relatively conservative figures within their respective areas of disciplinary expertise—have continually posed a formidable political challenge to state functionaries and apologists such as Daniel Pipes, Martin Kramer, and Alan Dershowitz.5 It seems, then, that H.R. 3077—which has not been passed by the Senate into law—seeks to limit the influence of Said's and Chomsky's political work by insisting that it be read alongside steady doses of Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and Richard Perle. How is it that Said's Orientalism, for instance, could pose such a threat to the policymakers in Washington?6 That it has, in its persistent documentation of how Western knowledge of non-Western cultures and peoples cannot be separated from the very colonial structures of perception that produced that knowledge, stands as the ultimate testament to Said's brilliant legacy; and that his commitment to blurring the boundary between academic and public discourse will continue through the work of his friends, colleagues, as well as those he never met, confirms that any New Humanism he would have endorsed brings with it an obligation to speak out in defense of others at the very moment when speaking out has become so difficult.7 A New Humanism renounces the types of silence that have contributed to the continued frontal assault on academic freedom and also all the evasions that prevent us from defending those who are engaging in the kinds of scholarship so desperately needed in this political moment.

Alt Solvency- Gender

Alt key to solve constructed gender impacts

Hirji 1 (Faiza, “The War for Women’s Freedom: Orientalist Imaginaries of Rescue in Afghanistan”, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p14796\_index.html, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

Unfortunately, the inability of some feminists to address both gender and culture in a meaningful, contextualized way often contributes to a belief that there is only one valid way to practise feminism, and this way does not include a commitment to religions such as Islam. Even more unfortunately, it is this belief that is frequently reproduced in news stories about Muslim women. News coverage often endorses a secular, specific brand of feminism, propagating the notion that feminism is a Western construct entirely foreign to Muslims. So-called rescue missions for Muslim women are therefore problematized by a failure to consider cultural or historical context. The latter is particularly important in the case of Afghanistan, which has been so substantially affected by interventions from the former Soviet Union and the United States. Sherene Razack notes that Western feminists wishing to help their Third World sisters must be honest about the role that the First World has played in oppressing women in other countries (1998, p. 91). A globally responsible feminism would acknowledge that Afghan women have been victimized in many ways, not simply by a repressive Taliban. Turning the media spotlight on them in an effort to justify war trivializes their struggles, offering assistance years too late after the United States’ support vaulted the Taliban into power.

\*\*\*AT: Aff Answers\*\*\*

AT: Perm

1. Orientalism will overpower the alt-people will choose orientalism

SAID 3 (Edward, Prof. of English/Comparative Lit., Columbia U., Orientalism. p. 307)

Of itself, in itself, as a set of beliefs, as a method of analysis, orientalism cannot develop. Indeed, it is the doctrinal antithesis of development. Its central argument is the myth of the arrested development of the Semites. From this matrix other myths pour forth, each of them showing the Semite to be the opposite of the Westerner and irremediably the victim of his own weaknesses. By a concatenation of events and circumstances the Semitic myth bifurcated in the Zionist movement; one Semite went the way of orientalism, the other, the Arab, was forced to go the way of the (Oriental. Each time tent and tribe are solicited, the myth is being employed; each time the concept of Arab national character is evoked, the myth is being employed. The hold these instruments have on the mind is increased by the institutions built around them. For every Orientalist, quite literally, there is a support system of staggering power, considering the ephemerality of the myths that orientalism propagates. This system now culminates in the very institutions of the state. To write about the Arab Oriental world, therefore, is to write with the authority of a nation, and not with the affirmation of a strident ideology but with the unquestioning certainty of absolute truth backed by absolute force.

1. Perm is severance-severs out of the Orientalist assumptions that are the foundation of 1AC impact evidence. Voting issue- makes the aff a moving target and means the aff will always lose because the aff can sever out of a link to a DA or K.

AT: Perm

Orientalism is too pervasive for the perm to be effective

Said 93 (Edward, Culture and Imperialism, professor of comparative literature at Columbia, p 287, date accessed:7/7/2010) AJK

Dissenting literature has always survived in the United States alongside authorized public space, this literature can be described as oppositional to the overall national and official performance. There are visionists, historians, such as William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko and Howard Zion, powerful public critics like Noam Chomsky, Richard Barnet, Richard Falk, and many others, all of them prominent not only as individual voices but as members of a fairly substantial alternative and anti-imperial current within the country. With them go such Left-liberal, journals as *The Nation, The Progressive,* and, when its author was alive; *IF Stone Weekly.* How much of the following there is for such views as represented by the opposition is very difficult to say; there has always been an opposition – one thinks of anti-imperialists like Mark Twain, William James and Randolph Bourne – but the depressing truth is that its deterrent power had not been effective. Such news as opposing the United States attack on Iraq did nothing at all to stop, postpone, or lessen its horrendous force. What prevailed was an extraordinary mainstream consensus in which the rhetoric of the government , the policymakers, the military, think thanks media, and academic centers converged on the necessity of the United States force and the ultimate justice of its projection, for which a long history of theorists and apologists from Andrew Jackson through Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Kissinger and Robert Tucker furnished the preparation.

People will choose Orientalism because of its elite status

Sered 96 (Danielle, http://www.english.emory.edu/Bahri/Orientalism.html , date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

One of the most significant constructions of Orientalist scholars is that of the Orient itself. What is considered the Orient is a vast region, one that spreads across a myriad of cultures and countries. It includes most of Asia as well as the Middle East. The depiction of this single 'Orient' which can be studied as a cohesive whole is one of the most powerful accomplishments of Orientalist scholars. It essentializes an image of a prototypical Oriental--a biological inferior that is culturally backward, peculiar, and unchanging--to be depicted in dominating and sexual terms. The discourse and visual imagery of Orientalism is laced with notions of power and superiority, formulated initially to facilitate a colonizing mission on the part of the West and perpetuated through a wide variety of discourses and policies. The language is critical to the construction. The feminine and weak Orient awaits the dominance of the West; it is a defenseless and unintelligent whole that exists for, and in terms of, its Western counterpart. The importance of such a construction is that it creates a single subject matter where none existed, a compilation of previously unspoken notions of the Other. Since the notion of the Orient is created by the Orientalist, it exists solely for him or her. Its identity is defined by the scholar who gives it life.

Orientalism will subsume the alternative and only further entrench the system

Marrouchi 98 (Mustapha, professor postcolonial literature LSU, Counternarratives, Recoveries, Refusals, boundary 2, Vol. 25, No. 2, Edward W. Said. (Summer, 1998), pp. 205-257)

Origins are also implicated in narrative and representation, in the novelistic model of successive continuity, which gives formal reassurance of a beginning, middle, and end. This chain of begetting and fatherhood, mixing memory and desire, constitutes a patrimony that, in relation to the ideological operation of colonialism, becomes a celebration of the law of the empire, disguised so successfully as to be invisible. "This is all the more true in the case of the Arab world," Said writes, "which for several cen- turies had been dominated by Ottoman or European colonialism. National independence for countries like Egypt and Morocco, say, meant that young people at last could be educated fully in the traditions, histories, languages, and cultures of their own particular Arab countries." In my own case, for instance, I was educated entirely in French colonial schools in Tunisia and France, where all study focused on the history of French society, literature, and values. Much the same was true in the main French colonies, where it was assumed that native elites would be taught the rudiments of intellectual culture in the idioms and methods designed, in effect, to keep those native elites subservient to colonial rule, the superiority of European learning, and so forth. Until I was about sixteen, I knew a great deal more about Albert Camus's L'Etranger and Andre Gide than I did about Ibn Khaldun's Mu- qaddi'mah or the Tunisian poet Abu-al-Kacem aCChabbi, and to me-irony of ironies-colonial consuls such as Jules Ferry and missionaries such as Charles de Foucauld were more familiar than emira al- Qahina and emir Abdel-Kader.

AT: We Withdraw troops

Troop withdrawal = redeploying them somewhere else

PDA 8 (Project on Defense Alternatives, http://www.comw.org/pda/0512exitplans.html, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

When Carl Conetta of the Project on Defense Alternatives wrote his first Iraq War exit plan in July 2004 he was the second defense policy analyst who offered such a plan. In January 2005 Massachusetts Congressman Marty Meehan was the first elected political leader to call for an exit plan. During 2005 the politics of the Iraq War in the U.S. began to shift reaching a turning point in November when conservative Democratic Congressman John P. Murtha ended his support for White House policy. Since that time most political leaders have had to address the question of how and when they will withdraw troops from Iraq. It has become clear that many such plans for "exiting" or "withdrawing" troops from Iraq do not mean that all troops will leave in the foreseeable future. Some refer to "redeploying" troops. Others allow for residual troops to stay in Iraq for certain missions, but don't specify how many (almost certainly many thousands.) For more on withdrawal meaning creep, see Tom Engelhardt's "The Withdrawal Follies" (28 July 2007) and Charles Knight's "Like a Mirage in the Desert: full withdrawal may recede into the time horizon"(25 July 2008). All this suggests that readers should exercise caution when attributing meaning to the phrases "troop withdrawals" and "exit plans." Readers are advised to attend to details; there may be devils lurking.

Troops aren’t really “withdrawn”- they’re sent to neighboring areas

White 6 (Keith, U of Virginia, http://www.campusprogress.org/tools/1184/crib-sheet-iraq-redeployment, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

While some troops would be sent back to home bases, troops would also be stationed near Iraq. Korb and Katulis offer some specifics: calling for 10,000 troops to join current American forces in Kuwait and an “over the horizon force” consisting of an aircraft carrier battle group and Marine expeditionary force. Korb and Katulis also recommend continuing America’s military presence in Bahrain and Qatar (Strategic Redeployment 2.0, page 15). There are several different redeployment plans being circulated in policymaking circles, but all agree on a common strategy: Leave a credible force in nearby countries that could serve as an emergency security force while training the Iraqi security forces in the meantime. If intensive fighting breaks out in Iraq’s region, coalition forces would restore order. But if properly executed, the phased withdrawal of American troops could push Iraq to revolve its internal conflicts. Phased withdrawal puts greater accountability on Iraqi leaders, allowing Iraq to secure itself—instead of biding time with the security blanket of American troops. And as Nir Rosen, a fellow at the New American Foundation who spent more than a year in Iraq after the war began, contends in a December 2005 article for The Atlantic Monthly, the presence of collation troops “fuels Sunni hostility toward ‘Shiite collaborators.” He goes on claim “the mere announcement of an intended U.S. withdrawal would allow Sunnis to come to the table and participate in defining the new Iraq.”

Troops aren’t withdrawn, they’re simply re-deployed

Korb and Katulis 6 (Lawrence and Brian, http://www.afji.com/2006/01/1410750/, date accessed: 7/8/2010

The United States should immediately begin a slow and irreversible drawdown of military forces to make us safer by preserving our all-volunteer Army and refocusing all elements of American power on the real threats our country faces. The redeployment of U.S. forces should be conducted in two phases. Phase one would take place in 2006, with the drawdown of 80,000 troops by the end of the year. In phase two, the remaining 60,000 would withdraw by the end of 2007. United States troops would immediately and completely redeploy from urban areas, with Iraqi police, troops and militias, such as the Kurdish pesh merga, taking responsibility for security in those areas. This redeployment from urban areas — which has already begun in places such as Najaf and Tikrit — will decrease the number of insurgents motivated by the U.S. occupation. It also will free remaining U.S. forces in Iraq to dedicate their efforts in 2007 to high-priority tasks related to our core mission.

AT: We Withdraw troops

Post Cold War, the US redeploys troops when they leave a target country

Gerson 8 (Joseph, writer for Foreign Policy in Focus, http://www.fpif.org/articles/resisting\_the\_empire, “Resisting the Empire”, date accessed: 7/9/2010) AJK

Since the Cold War ended, U.S. presidents and the Pentagon have worked to “reconfigure” the architecture of this military infrastructure to address changing geopolitical realities, technological “advances,” and growing resistance to the presence of foreign bases. With agility, flexibility and speed being given priority in U.S. military operations, bases are being transformed into hubs, forward operating bases, and “lily pads” for invasions and foreign military interventions. The other axis of reconfiguration is geographic. As U.S. forces have been forced out of Saudi Arabia, and with U.S. geostrategic priorities turning away from Europe and toward China, Washington has concentrated its military build up elsewhere in the Persian Gulf nations, Asia and the Pacific.

AT: Said Indicts

1. All we have to win is that Said is correct in this specific instance- even if his method is generally bad, that doesn’t preclude a correctly inferred conclusion
2. Criticisms of Said and Orientalism are spawned from fear and ignorance

Marrouchi 98 (Mustapha, professor postcolonial literature LSU, Counternarratives, Recoveries, Refusals, boundary 2, Vol. 25, No. 2, Edward W. Said. (Summer, 1998), pp. 205-257)

Marshaling the facts of Said's Western critique, one cannot help but notice that at the center of these remarkably confident statements is a somewhat recalcitrant reality that Gellner and critics like him deftly incorporate yet also dismiss: that Western scholarship is beyond any reproach. This is not to say that they have explored Said with a miraculous, zany lightness of touch. On the contrary, they have called him names, have denounced his ideas, and have condemned what he has written. To them, Said is a "professor of terror," "an anti-Semite," "an accomplice to murder," "a liar," "a deranged demagogue." The tirade is not only mean-spirited and perverse but disquieting. Their condemnation of him brings to mind Gustave Flaubert's defense of Louis Bouilhet, who was awarded the Belles-Lettres et Arts de Rouen medal of honor in 1862: The life of the man of letters is . . . a painful business for those who have a higher regard for Art than for vaunting their own names or swelling their fortunes. Innumerable obstacles impede this career in which one is assailed by calumny and slandered by stupidity as one is obliged to trample one's way over those Lilliputian vanities that writhe in the dust! Even after all the anguish of giving birth and the disappointments of the ideal, once the task is completed, nothing is achieved. Then one is subject to indifference, to rejection, to disdain, to insult, to the promiscuity of banal applause or to the sarcasm of the malicious; obliged to avoid the plots of the jealous and to stay forever silent in the face of triumphant mediocrity. And yet there are men who, by force of talent and energy, soon grasp the prize for which so many are striving.

Framework- Reps First

Representations come first. Language is not neutral territory –the affirmative’s representations produce the preconditions for all types of violence

Zizek 06(Slavoj, Dimmed Tide is Loosed, The Symptom Volume 7, spring, http://www.lacan.com/zizantinomies.htm[gjm])
What we should always bear in mind is the fact that the protests (and the very real violence accompanying them) were triggered by means of representation, by words and images (caricatures, which a large majority of those protesting did not see, but just read or heard about). The Muslim crowds did not react to caricatures as such; they reacted to the complex figure/image of the “West” that was perceived as the attitude behind the caricatures. Those who proposed the term “Occidentalism” as the counterpart to Edward Said’s “Orientalism” were up to a point right: what we get in Muslim countries is a certain ideological image of the West which distorts Western reality no less (although in a different way) than the Orientalist image of the Orient. What exploded in violence was a complex cobweb of symbols, images and attitudes (Western imperialism, godless materialism and hedonism, the suffering of Palestinians, etc.etc.) that became attached to Danish caricatures, which is why the hatred expanded from caricatures to Denmark as a country, to Scandinavian countries, to Europe, to the West – it was as if all these humiliations and frustrations got condensed in the caricatures. And, again, one should bear in mind that this condensation is a fact of language, of constructing and imposing a certain symbolic field.\_\_ This simple and all too obvious fact should compel us to render problematic the idea (propagated lately by Habermas, but also not strange to a certain Lacan) of language, symbolic order, as the medium of reconciliation/mediation, of peaceful co-existence, as opposed to the violence of immediate raw confrontation: in language, instead of exerting direct violence on each other, we debate, we exchange words, and such an exchange, even when it is aggressive, presupposes a minimum of recognition of the other. The idea is thus that, insofar as language gets infected by violence, this occurs under the influence of contingent empirical “pathological” circumstances which distort the inherent logic of symbolic communication. What if, however, humans exceed animals in their capacity to violence precisely because they speak? [7] As already Hegel was well aware, there is something violent in the very symbolization of a thing, which equals its mortification; this violence operates at multiple levels. Language simplifies the designated thing, reducing it to a “unary feature”; it dismembers the thing, destroying its organic unity, treating its parts and properties as autonomous; it inserts the thing into a field of meaning which is ultimately external to it.\_ Lacan condensed this aspect of language in his notion of the Master-Signifier which “quilts” and thus holds together a symbolic field. That is to say, for Lacan (at least for his theory of four discourses elaborated in late 1960s), human communication in its most basic, constitutive, dimension does not involve a space of egalitarian intersubjectivity, it is not “balanced,” it does not put the participants in symmetric mutually responsible positions where they all have to follow the same rules and justify their claims with reasons. On the contrary, what Lacan indicates with his notion of the discourse of the Master as the first, inaugural, constitutive, form of discourse, is that every concrete, “really existing,” space of discourse is ultimately grounded in a violent imposition of a Master-Signifier which is stricto sensu “irrational”: it cannot be further grounded in reasons, it is the point at which one can only say that “the buck stops here,” a point at which, in order to stop the endless regress, somebody has to say “It is so because I say it is so!”.\_\_ Perhaps, the fact that reason (ratio) and race have the same root tells us something: language, not primitive egotistic interests, is the first and greatest divider, it is because of language that we and our neighbors (can) “live in different worlds” even when we live on the same street. What this means is that verbal violence is not a secondary distortion, but the ultimate resort of every specifically human violence. Let us take anti- Semitic pogroms (or, more generally, racist violence). They do not react to (i.e., what they find intolerable and rage-provoking is not) the immediate reality of Jews, but (to) the image/figure of the “Jew” constructed ands circulating in their tradition. The catch, of course, is that one cannot simply distinguish between real Jews and their anti-Semitic image: this image overdetermines the way I experience real Jews themselves (and, furthermore, it affects the way Jews experience themselves). What makes a real Jew that an anti-Semite encounters on the street “intolerable,” what the anti-Semite tries to destroy when he attacks the Jew, the true target of his fury, is this fantasmatic dimension. And the same goes for every political protest: when workers protest their exploitation, they do not protest a simple reality, but a certain meaningful experience of their real predicament. Reality in itself, in its stupid facticity, is never intolerable: it is language, its symbolization, which makes it such. So precisely when we are dealing with the scene of a furious crowd, attacking and burning buildings and cars, lynching people, etc., we should never forget the placards they are carrying, the words sustaining and justifying their acts. [8]

Framework- Reps First

Framework is discourse and discourse is framework: discourse is the medium through which we comprehend and constitute the world around us.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague,(Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

While appreciating these basic assumptions about contemporary global politics, my conceptualisation of transversal dissent embarks on a different path, and this not only because of the problematic statecentric nature around which the structure—agency debate has developed. Instead of articulating issues of agency in relation to structures, my approach relies on what could be called a discourse—agency axis. Discourses are, in their broadest meaning, frameworks of knowledge and power through which we comprehend (and constitute) the world around us. Because the conceptual range of a discursive approach is broader than that of a structural one, it is better suited to scrutinise transversal struggles. The notion of structure, especially as applied in international theory, is intrinsically linked to neorealist, statist and spatial perceptions of world politics. But even outside the realist paradigm, structures often remain too closely identified with institutional practices and the type of societal order they sustain. The notion of discourse, by contrast, encapsulates not only the structural terrains of rules and norms, but also a variety of other aspects, such as language and culture, that interfere with the mutually constituted and transversal production of power and knowledge. 29 But posing questions of transversal dissent and human agency in relation to discourses breaks theoretical taboos. It creates various forms of anxieties. There are possible objections from those who employ the concept of discourse in their work. Neither Heidegger nor Foucault, for instance, nor many of their subsequent interpreters, have dealt with questions of agency in an explicit and systematic way. This omission has often been equated with an image of the world in which human beings are engulfed by discursive webs to the point that action becomes no more than a reflection of externally imposed circumstances. Towards such interpretations my challenge will consist in demonstrating that it is feasible as well as worthwhile to conceptualise the notion of human agency. In fact, my analysis will seek to show how this alleged inability or unwillingness to speak of agency is more often than not a reflection of anti-postmodern polemic, rather than a position that is inherent to or advocated by most authors who have sought to apply a discursive approach to the study of global politics.

We must recognize the inherent political value of language to challenges to the ‘objectivity’ and ‘rationality’ of policymaking can be heard convincingly.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague,(Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Language is one of the most fundamental aspects of human life. It is omnipresent. It penetrates every aspect of transversal politics, from the local to the global. We speak, Heidegger stresses, when we are awake and when we are asleep, even when we do not utter a single word. We speak when we listen, read or silently pursue an occupation. We are always speaking because we cannot think without language, because 'language is the house of Being', the home within which we dwell. 2

But languages are never neutral. They embody particular values and ideas. They are an integral part of transversal power relations and of global politics in general. Languages impose sets of assumptions on us, frame our thoughts so subtly that we are mostly unaware of the systems of exclusion that are being entrenched through this process. And yet, a language is not just a form of domination that engulfs the speaker in a web of discursive constraints, it is also a terrain of dissent, one that is not bound by the political logic of national boundaries. Language is itself a form of action — the place where possibilities for social change emerge, where values are slowly transformed, where individuals carve out thinking space and engage in everyday forms of resistance. In short, language epitomises the potential and limits of discursive forms of transversal dissent.

Framework- Reps First

How we imagine others is critical to how we treat them

Asen 2 (Robert Asen, University of Wisconsin, Communications Professor, 2002, Visions of Poverty: welfare policy and political imagination, p. 6)

However difficult, seeing others in this way is especially important for social and political action.  As Elaine Scarry explains, “the way we act toward ‘others’ is shaped by the way we imagine them.” Imagining entails individual and collective effort, as Scarry’s use of the plural pronoun implies.  Collective imaginings is intrinsic to social orders; it bears directly on a society’s self understanding.  Benedict Anderson has traced how imagining lies at the heart of the idea of nationhood.  He explains that the nation “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”   Imagining one’s relationship to others also occurs in face-to-face interactions among members of a political community: the physical presence of another does not displace images.  Moreover, just as members of a political community may imagine their shared belonging with one another, they may imagine others in their midst as internal exiles—people who have abdicated conditions of membership. Citizens and their elected representatives often imagine this relationship when they consider the residents of the other America.

\*\*\*AFF\*\*\*

Perm Solvency

Only the perm solves- it’s impossible to exclude the state

Foucault 88 (Michel, French Sociologist, “On Criticism” in Michel Foucault: Politics Philosophy Culture Interviews and other writings 1977-  1984)

D.E. You mean it will be possible to work with this government? FOUCAULT: We must escape from the dilemma of being either for or against. After all, it is possible to face up to a government and remain standing. To work with a govern ment implies neither subjection nor total acceptance. One may work with it and yet be restive. I even believe that the two things go together.D.E. After Michel Foucault the critic, are we now going to see Michel Foucault the reformist? After all, the reproach was often made that the criticism made by intellectuals leads to nothing. FOUCAULT First I’ll answer the point about “that leads to nothing.” There are hundreds and thousands of people who have worked for the emergence of a number of problems that are now on the agenda. To say that this work produced nothing is quite wrong. Do you think that twenty years ago people were considering the problems of the relationship between mental illness and psychological normality, the problem of prison, the problem of medical power, the problem of the relationship between the sexes, and so on, as they are doing today? Furthermore, there are no reforms as such. Reforms are not produced in the air, independently of those who carry them out. One cannot not take account of those who will have the job of carrying out this transformation. And, then, above all, I believe that an opposition can be made between critique and transformation, “ideal” critique and “real” transformation. A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncon sidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest. We must free ourselves from the sacrilization of the social as the only reality and stop regarding as superfluous something so essential in human life and in human relations as thought. Thought exists independently of systems and structures of discourse. It is something that is often hidden, but which always animates everyday behavior. There is always a little thought even in the most stupid institutions; there is always thought even in silent habits. Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult. In these circumstances, criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation. A transformation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation. On the other hand, as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible. It is not therefore a question of there being a time for criticism and a time for transformation, nor people who do the criticism and others who do the transforming, those who are enclosed in an inaccessible radicalism and those who are forced to make the necessary concessions to reality. In fact I think the work of deep transformation can only be carried out in a free atmosphere, one constantly agitated by a permanent criticism. D.E. But do you think the intellectual must have a programmatic role in this transformation? FOUCAULT A reform is never only the result of a process in which there is conflict, confrontation, struggle, resistance. To say to oneself at the outset: what reform will I be able to carry out? That is not, I believe, an aim for the intellectual to pursue. His role, since he works specifically in the realm of thought, is to see how far the liberation of thought can make those transformations urgent enough for people to want to carry them out and difficult enough to carry out for them to be profoundly rooted in reality. It is a question of making conflicts more visible, of making them more essential than mere confrontations of interests or mere institutional immobility. Out of these conflicts, these confrontations, a new power relation must emerge, whose first, temporary expression will be a reform. If at the base there has not been the work of thought upon itself and if, in fact, modes of thought, that is to say modes of action, have not been altered, whatever the project for reform, we know that it will be swamped, digested by modes of behavior and institutions that will always be the same.

Perm Solvency

Blanket rejection can’t solve

SAID 3 (Edward, Prof. of English/Comparative Lit., Columbia U., “Preface.” Orientalism. p. xxviii)

This is not to say that the cultural world has simply regressed on one side to a belligerent neoOrientalism and on the other to blanket rejectionism. The recent United Nations World Summit in Johannesburg, for all its limitations, did in fact reveal a vast area of common global concert whose detailed workings on matters having to do with the environment, famine, the gap between advanced and developing countries, health, and human rights, suggest the welcome emergence of a new collective constituency that give the often facile notion of "one world" a new urgency. In all this, however, we must admit that no one can possibly know the' extraordinarily complex unity of our globalized world, despite the reality that, as I said at the outset, the world does have a real interdependence of parts that leaves no genuine opportunity for isolation.

Compromise key to solve

Spencer 6 (Robert, NYT Bestselling author on Islam, http://media.web.britannica.com/ebsco/pdf/23/23648989.pdf, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

We postcolonial critics should have the courage to heed Said's proposition that the problem with American imperialism is not that it is too universalist, but on the contrary, that it is not universalist enough. Our opponent is not universalism, in other word, but a provincial, two-faced caricature of it. The apparent universalism of the Bush administration is in fact nothing of the sort. Insofar as its talk of freedom, democracy and human rights is not merely a smokescreen sent up to conceal more unseemly motivations, America's missionaiy universalism represents a circumscribed view of the world that propagates systems, priorities and courses of action that further only the special interests of American elites.'" Hymning the virtues of unregulated business activity, privatised public sen'ices and cursory forms of democracy betrays a worldview far too parochial to be described accurately as universalist. So narcissistic is this particular vision ofthe world that, far from being characterised by the global sympathies and self-conscious mindset of humanism, it actually has more in common with the cast iron certainties of religious belief. Of great relevance, therefore, to the humanist as he or she operates in the public sphere is not just the idea of humanistic or democratic criticism but also Said's earlier notion of secular criticism, which was set out in *Beginnings* and, most persuasively, in *The World, the Text, and the Critic,* and which reverberates in these late essays. Said's secularism is a powerful antidote to the selfrighteous, double-dealing piety of orthodox humanism. He proclaims the need to resist abstract doctrines that claim all the incontestability of God-given truth and he attests the veiy urgent requirement to apply oneself instead to a perspicacious and watchfully self-conscious engagement with the world. In the present context secularism involves rejecting the sort of fanatical selfcertainty hrought into relief by Gregoiy Thielmann, director ofthe US State Department's bureau of intelligence until his 'retirement' in 2002, when he remarked that '[the Bush] administration has had a faith-based intelligence attitude ,,, "We know the answers, give us the intelligence to support those answers'"," The disciples of that 'faith-based' worldview credit it with the impregnable, fact-proof authority of divine scripture. Gathered about the maundering president and his blowhard lieutenants, therefore, are the most garrulous but unselfconscious votaries. Theirs is a clueless executive, 'advised' (or al; least sweet-talked) by corrupted intellectuals like Fawaz Gerges, Richard Perle and Norman Podhoretz as well as the usual minstrels like Francis Fukuyama, Fouad Ajami and Bernard Lewis, an unctuous crowd assembled at court to admire the emperor's new humanitarian clothes and deliver their wrong-headed waffle about a clash of civilisations. Seemingly devoid of conscience and evidently without accountability, these thinkers (if thinking is what they are doing) issue jeremiads against the evildoers and declaim from their pulpits the merits of America's divinely sanctioned power.

Said Defense- Ontology

Said’s theory of Orientalism isn’t fully developed- unanswered questions of current ontological conditions

Spanos 96 (William, Professor of comparative literature at Binghampton,

 Culture and Colonization: The Imperial Imperatives of the Centered Circle, p. 172, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

Given the political sterility of the studied localism of much of our criticism, especially as represented by New Historicists, such as Stephen Greenblatt, and by the odd parochialism of even some of our best critics, such as Raymond Williams, Edward Said's globalization of cultural criticism is uniquely powerful and enabling. Insofar as the ontology informing the in-dissoluble relay between culture and imperialism has been left unthought, there is still work to be done. Even the power of Said's visionary critical humanism leaves unthought the ontological conditions of global power re-lations precipitated by the end of the cold war. The failure of postcolonial critics to think the ontological site not only thins out its critique of the iden-tity (nationalist) politics of the various colonial and postcolonial discourses but, equally important, renders even Said's recommendation for "an emer-gent non-coercive culture" (Cl, 334) a kind of despairing lyrical yearning of a "damaged life," a yearning that, however suggestive, lacks the fully persuasive force of an ontologically grounded theory.

Said’s theory of Orientalism isn’t fully developed- ontological representations aren’t addressed

Spanos 96 (William, Professor of comparative literature at Binghampton,

 Culture and Colonization: The Imperial Imperatives of the Centered Circle, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

Nevertheless, I believe that Said's valuable meditation on the cul-ture/imperialism nexus betrays a fundamental limitation, one that may be the inadvertent consequence of his quite justified effort to extricate criticism (especially American) from the rarefied web of academic professionalism in order to put it to work in the world. I mean his resistance to "travelling theory"-an institutionalized discursive practice separated from the origi-nal occasion of crisis and thus devoid of historical specificity and practical effectivity--especially to his reluctance to theorize his commitment to the decentered subject.5 As a result, Said fails to adequately articulate the absolute continuity--however uneven in any particular historical occasion, including the present--between ontological representation (metaphysics: the perception and ordering of the being of Being, the differences that tem-porality always already disseminates, from above or after the process), cultural production (the re-presentation of individual and social experience as narrative), and imperialism (the "conquest" and incorporation of extra-territorial constituencies--the provincial "others"--within the self-identical framework of the "conquering" metropolis). To put this knowledge/power relay between metaphysics, culture, and imperialism in the metaphorics en-demic to the hegemonic discourse and practice of Western imperialism, Said is blinded by his enabling insight into the "worldliness"o f the cultural text to the indissoluble relation between the circle, culture, and coloniza-tion in etymological and historical usage and practice.6 This blindness is not a disabling limitation of Said's momentous critical genealogical project. But insofar as it leaves vague that which would allow an oppositional dis-course to intervene precisely where the "end-of-history"d iscourse is both strongest and most vulnerable, Said's project needs to be supplemented by putting ontological representation back into play in the process of thinking the imperial depth and scope of the New World Order.

Said Defense- Ontology

Said’s analysis on Orientalism is useless without an interrogation of ontology

Spanos 96 (William, Professor of comparative literature at Binghampton,

 Culture and Colonization: The Imperial Imperatives of the Centered Circle, date accessed: 7/7/2010) AJK

Edward Said's rethinking of colonization in texts from Orientalism to Culture and Imperialism sets out with a deep recognition of the ambivalence of humanist culture's Eurocentrism—even if not of its ontological "ground.'9In his work throughout this part of his career, in which he shows that the alleged universality of humanist cultural p roductionis historically specific and its globalr each paradoxically provincial, Said achieves an es- 9. See EdwardW .Said, "Secular Criticism,"in The World, the Text,a nd the Critic, 21-22. This text offers an excellent example of Said's well-knownli ne of argumentv is-6-vis the Eurocentrismo f humanists tudies. 142 boundary2 / Spring1 996 trangement effect of persuasive force. In overdetermining Western human-ist scholarship and cultural production, he overlooks and renders practically invisible, however, the inextricably connected and more fundamental ques-tion of the specifically colonized "Others" all along the continuum of being-a continuum we have seen Dussel to acknowledge as well. Said too often minimizes, if he does not entirely efface, the role that ontology-the anthro-pologos and its centering, accommodational force-plays in the ideologi-cal relay he thematizes. I want to recall that the anthropological phase of the ontotheological tradition, significantly called "the Enlightenment,"is the phase that witnesses the (re)emergence of a Eurocentric imperialism that represents itself (as in the case of Hegel) as being founded on the "truth" of being or (as in the case of the United States's intervention in Vietnam) as a project of "winning the hearts and minds" of extraterritorial others to the essential principles informing its "way of life." Said claims that humanist culture is complicitous with imperialism; if this claim is to have any validity, it behooves the genealogist of imperialism to look deeper into the historical and ideological origins of humanist culture than Said has done thus far.10 Agenealogy of imperialism must con-front not simply humanist culture but humanism as such. It must view with suspicion the assumption of virtually all modern theoreticians and practitioners of humanism that this discourse derives a putatively disinterested and free inquiry from classical Greece.1 Reading the history of humanism against the grain will show how crucial ontological representation-and its figuration-is in the relay of dominations that Said and others who follow him delimit to Western cultural production and the imperial project.

Said Defense- Useless Theory

Said’s analysis is hypocritical and illogical

Warraq 6 (Ibn, founded the Institute for the Secularization of Islamic Society, http://www.islam-watch.org/IbnWarraq/EdwardSaid.htm, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

There are, as I shall show, several contradictory theses buried in Said’s impenetrable prose, decked with post-modern jargon ("a universe of representative discourse", "Orientalist discourse") (and some kind editor really ought to explain to Said the meaning of "literally" and the difference between scatological and eschatological), and pretentious language which often conceals some banal observation, as when Said talks of "textual attitude", when all he means is "bookish" or "bookishness". Tautologies abound, as in "the freedom of licentious sex ". Or take the comments here: "Thus out of the Napoleonic expedition there issued a whole series of textual children, from Chateaubriand’s Itinéraire to Lamartine’s Voyage en Orient to Flaubert’s Salammbô, and in the same tradition, Lane’s Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians and Richard Burton’s Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah. What binds them together is not only their common background in Oriental legend and experience but also their learned reliance on the Orient as a kind of womb out of which they were brought forth. If paradoxically these creations turned out to be highly stylized simulacra, elaborately wrought imitations of what a live Orient might be thought to look like, that by no means detracts from the strength of their imaginative conception or from the strength of European mastery of the Orient, whose prototypes respectively were Cagliostro, the great European impersonator of the Orient, and Napoleon, its first modern conqueror." What does Said mean by "out of the Napoleonic expedition there issued a whole series of textual children" except that these five very varied works were written after 1798? The pretentious language of textual children issuing from the Napeolonic expedition covers up this crushingly obvious fact. Perhaps there is a profound thesis hidden in the jargon, that these works were somehow influenced by the Napoleonic expedition, inspired by it, and could not have been written without it. But no such thesis is offered. This arbitrary group consists of three Frenchmen, two Englishmen, one work of romantic historical fiction, three travel books, one detailed study of modern Egyptians. Chateaubriand’s Itinéraire (1811) describes superbly his visit to the Near East; Voyage en Orient (1835) is Lamartine’s impressions of Palestine, Syria, and Greece; Salammbô (1862) is Flaubert’s novel of ancient Carthage; Lane’s Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians (1836) is a fascinating first-hand account of life in Egypt, particularly Cairo and Luxor, written after several years of residence there, Burton’s account of his audacious visit to Mecca was first published in three volumes between 1855-6. Lane and Burton both had perfect command of Arabic, Classical and Colloquial, while the others did not, and Lane and Burton can be said to have made contributions to Islamic Studies, particularly Lane, but not the three Frenchmen. What on earth do they have in common? Said tells us that what binds them together is "their common background in Oriental legend and experience but also their learned reliance on the Orient as a kind of womb out of which they were brought forth ". What is the background of Oriental legend that inspired Burton or Lane? Was Flaubert’s vivid imagination stimulated by "Oriental legend", and was this the same legendary material that inspired Burton, Lane and Lamartine? "Learned reliance on the Orient as a kind of womb..." is yet another example of Said’s pretentious way of saying the obvious, namely that they were writing about the Orient about which they had some experience and intellectual knowledge.. Orientalism is peppered with meaningless sentences. Take, for example, "Truth, in short, becomes a function of learned judgment, not of the material itself, which in time seems to owe its existence to the Orientalist". Said seems to be saying :‘Truth’ is created by the experts or Orientalists, and does not correspond to reality, to what is actually out there. So far so good. But then "what is out there" is also said to owe its existence to the Orientalist. If that is the case, then the first part of Said’s sentence makes no sense, and if the first part is true then the second part makes no sense. Is Said relying on that weasel word "seems" to get him out of the mess? That ruse will not work either; for what would it mean to say that an external reality independent of the Orientalist’s judgment also seems to be a creation of the Orientalist? That would be a simple contradiction. Here is another example: "The Orientalist can imitate the Orient without the opposite being true." Throughout his book, Said is at pains to point out that there is no such thing as "the Orient", which, for him, is merely a meaningless abstraction concocted by Orientalists in the service of imperialists and racists. In which case, what on earth could "The Orient cannot imitate the Orientalist" possibly mean? If we replace "the Orient" by the individual countries, say between Egypt and India, do we get anything more coherent? No, obviously not : "India, Egypt, and Iran cannot imitate the Orientalists like Renan, Bernard Lewis, Burton, et al.". We get nonsense whichever way we try to gloss Said’s sentence.  Contradictions At times, Said seems to allow that the Orientalists did achieve genuine positive knowledge of the Orient, its history, culture, languages, as when he calls Lane’s work Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians "a classic of historical and anthropological observation because of its style, its enormously intelligent and brilliant details"; or when he talks of "a growing systematic knowledge in Europe about the Orient", since Said does not have sarcastic quotation marks around the word knowledge, I presume he means there was a growth in genuine knowledge. Further on, Said talks of Orientalism producing "a fair amount of exact positive knowledge about the Orient". Again I take it Said is not being ironical when he talks of "philological discoveries in comparative grammar made by Jones,...". To give one final example, Said mentions Orientalism’s "objective discoveries". Yet, these acknowledgements of the real discoveries made by Orientalists are contradicted by Said’s insistence that there is no such thing as "truth"; or when he characterizes Orientalism as "a form of paranoia, knowledge of another kind, say, from ordinary historical knowledge". Or again, "it is finally Western ignorance which becomes more refined and complex, not some body of positive Western knowledge which increases in size and accuracy". At one point Said seems to deny that the Orientalist had acquired any objective knowledge at all, and a little later he also writes, "the advances made by a ‘science’ like Orientalism in its academic form are less objectively true than we often like to think". It is true that the last phrase does leave open the possibility that some of the science may be true though less than we had hitherto thought. Said also of course wholeheartedly endorses Abdel Malek’s strictures against Orientalism, and its putatively false "knowledge" of the Orient. In his 1994 Afterword, Said insists that he has "no interest in, much less capacity for, showing what the true Orient and Islam really are". And yet he contradicts this outburst of humility and modesty, when he claims that, "[The Orientalist’s] Orient is not the Orient as it is, but the Orient as it has been Orientalized", for such a formulation assumes Said knows what the real Orient is. Such an assumption is also apparent in his statement that "the present crisis dramatizes the disparity between texts and reality". In order to be able to tell the difference between the two, Said must know what the reality is. This is equally true when Said complains that "To look into Orientalism for a lively sense of an Oriental’s human or even social reality...is to look in vain".

Said Defense- Useless Theory

Said’s analysis of Orientalism is severely lacking- four reasons

McLeod (John, University of Leeds, “Beginning postcolonialism”, p. 47-50, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

1.*Orientalism* is ahistorical. The major criticism of Orientalism from which several of the others stem, concerns its capacity to make totalizing assumptions about a vast, varied expanse of representations over a very long period of history. As Dennis Porter describes it in his essay of 1983, ‘*Orientalism* and its Problems’ (in Colonial Discourse and Post- Colonial Theory, ed. Williams and Chrisman, pp. 150-61), Said posits the ‘unified character of Western discourse on the Orient over some two millennia, a unity derived from a common and continuing experience of fascination with and threat from the East, of its irreducible otherness’ (p. 152). Said’s examples of Orientalist writing range from the Italian poet Dante writing in the early fourteenth century up to twentieth-century writers. Can it be true that they all hold essentially the same latent assumptions? Can such a massive archive of materials be so readily homogenized? Has nothing changed? Said’s view takes in a broad, generalizing sweep of history but attends little to individual historical moments, their anomalies and specifics. As John MacKenzie points out in his book *Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts* (Manchester University Press, 1995), Said’s history of Orientalism is perhaps ‘in itself essentially ahistorical because it glosses over the variable factors that make historical moments unique, such as the ‘contrasting economic and social circumstances of different territories’ (p. 11). In these terms, we could say that Said privileges latent Orientalism over manifest Orientalism by neglecting to think whether the representations of the Orient made by those in the West at particular moments might modify or challenge the enduring assumptions of the Orient. MacKenzie argues that Western artists have approached the Orient at various moments with perfectly honourable intentions and ‘genuine respect’ (p. 60) for other peoples, in order to learn from and value their cultures. Not everybody looked down upon the Orient so crudely. This was no doubt true in some cases. However, in fairness to Said, MacKenzie is too trusting of the examples of ‘benign’ Orientalist art he reproduces and fails to grasp the point that even the most gracious and respectful artist may unwittingly reproduce Orientalist assumptions. If Said’s work privileges the latent aspect of Orientalism, MacKenzie pays it too scant attention and forgets that the road to hell is often paved with good intentions. It does not necessarily follow that a sympathetic representation of the Orient or the Oriental will automatically be free from the latent assumptions of Orientalism. 2. Said ignores resistance by the colonized. This is another major criticism of Orientalism. If Said is to be believed, Orientalism moves in one direction from the active West to the passive East. But he rarely stops to examine how Oriental peoples received these representations, nor how these representations circulated in the colonies themselves. In what ways did the colonized peoples respond to Orientalist representations? Did they readily submit to the colonisers’ view of themselves? How might they have contested Orientalism and brought it to crisis? As Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman have argued in their introduction to *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory,* there is little notion of the colonized subject as a *constitutive* agent (p. 16) with the capacity for political resistance. And in the words of Aijaz Ahmad, one of Said’s fiercest critics, Said never thinks about how Western representations ‘might have been received, accepted, modified, challenged, overthrown or reproduced by the intelligentsias of the colonized countries’ (In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures, Verso, 1992, p. 172). In these terms, Said stands accused of writing out the agency and the voice of colonized peoples from history as he never stops to consider the challenges made to dominant discourses. In so doing, his work is in danger of being just as ‘Orientalist’ as the field he is describing by not considering alternative representations made by those subject to colonialism. 3. Said ignores resistance within the West. According to Said, ‘every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric’ (*Orientalism*, p. 204). This is certainly a sweeping statement. What about those within the West who opposed colonialism and were horrified by the treatment of colonized peoples? As Dennis Porter argues, Orientalism leaves no room to accommodate what he calls, adapting a term from Antonio Gramsci, ‘counter hegemonic thought’ (‘*Orientalism* and its Problems’, p. 152); that is, opinions contrary to the dominant views within the West which contest the authority of Orientalist representations. 4. Said ignores gender differences. As we noted previously, Said argues that Orientalist representations were made in the main by men. This explains why the Orient is a specifically male fantasy and is often represented in feminine terms. Said maintains that in Orientalist writing ‘women are usually the creatures of a male power-fantasy. They express unlimited sensuality, they are more or less stupid, and above all they are willing’ (*Orientalism,* p. 207). But did Western women write about the Orient? And if they did, did they also resort to the same stereotypes? As Sara Mills has argued importantly in

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Said Defense- Useless Theory

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*Discourses of Difference: An Analysis of Women’s Travel Writing and Colonialism* (Routledge, 1992), many women travelled to the colonies and made their own observations in a variety of writings, but Said rarely looks at women’s writing in *Orientalism.* However, it is not just a case of ‘adding in’ women’s writings to Said’s theory in order to fill the gaps in his more male-centered study. Mills points out that the position of women in relation to Orientalism is often different to that of men because of the tensions between the discourses of colonialism and the discourses of gender. Looking at late Victorian and early twentieth century travel writing by Western women, Mills maintains that these women were, at one level, *empowerered*  by colonialism due to the superior position they perceived themselves to hold in relation to colonized peoples. Yet, not unlike colonized peoples, women were *disempowered* due to the inferior position they were placed in in relation to Western men. This might make available, if only fleetingly, a partial and problematic accord between the Western woman traveler and the colonized peoples she encountered. Her position in relation to the colonized is not the same as the Western male. Hence, the intersection of colonial and patriarchal discourses often places Western women in a contradictory position. They occupy a dominant position due to colonialism, but a subordinate place in patriarchy. Women ‘cannot be said to speak from outside colonial discourse, but their relation to it is problematic because of its conflict with the discourses of “femininity”, which were operating on them in an equal, and sometimes stronger, measure. Because of these discursive pressures, their work exhibits contradictory elements which may act as a critique of some of the components of other colonial writings’ (*Discourses of Difference*, p. 63). Women’s writing about the colonies may not be so readily explained with recourse to Said’s theory of Orientalism due to its particular contradictions borne out of the contrary positions frequently held by women. (We will consider these issues again in Chapter 6.) As Sara Mills’s argument above suggests, the various criticisms of Said’s work collectively give the impression that colonial discourses are multiple, precarious and more ambivalent than Said presumes in Orientalism. They do not function with the smoothness or the complete success that he awards the totalizing concept of Orientalism. Colonial discourses, then, are by no means homogenous or unitary. Said is certainly right to identify a series of representations about the Orient which functioned to justify and perpetuate the propriety of colonial rule, but these representations were not monolithic, static and uncontested.

Said Defense- Flawed Theory

Said’s analysis of “Orientalism” is flawed and inconsistent

Roosa 95 (John, “Literary Approach to a Complex Relationship”, Social Scientist Vol. 23 No 1/3, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

The questions concerning the relationship between culture and imperialism that Said has posed in his most recent book are important and complex. They are ones that many of us have faced in thinking about imperialism. Said's own attempt to answer these questions is , I think, deeply flawed, but it is rich with ideas. As a beginning, his writing may help us think through the problems in an alternative way. In this very brief review, I'll indicate what I see to be a few of the fundamental problems with his analysis. Said's basic approach into the vast topic of culture and imperialism is to review British and French novels of the nineteenth to mid-twentieth century. Said considers novels to be 'immensely important in the formation of imperial attitudes, references and experiences' (p. xii). Novels may indeed be 'particularly interesting to study' (p. xii) but the reader is not given any evidence that novels were important at a mass level in Britain and France. How many people actually read lengthy novels in the largely illiterate European countries of the nineteenth century? Novels should certainly be studied but their significance as determinants or representations of empire should not be inflated. In following Said through his literary approach to imperialism, the reader may well forget what is missing: a study of popular culture and everyday practice, whether in Europe or in the colonies. Said has made an advance over his book Orientalism (1978) by intertwining a reading of European writers with writers of the colonies. He is now willing to admit that he made a serious error in omitting the voices of the colonised in his previous book. In C&I, Said places the European texts side by side with those from colonies. For example, Camus's novels, in which France's possessions in North Africa play a significant part, are discussed in conjunction with Fanon's writings on the Algerian struggle for independence. This methodology produces much of what is valuable in the book and is a clear departure from the often vindictive and vague readings of European writers presented in Orientalism. It is strange, however, that most of Said's non-European texts are by activists or historians, and not novelists. In discussing European imperialism, he adopts an almost exclusively literary approach but when discussing the resistance to imperialism, he moves into a more political and historical account. In so doing, he omits even mentioning the truly great anti-imperialist novelists from the British and French colonies, e.g. Prem Chand in India and Osmane Sembene in Senegal. Most of the non-European novelists he does mention are modern day 'cosmopolitan' novelists whose writing is more for consumption in Europe than in the countries of their origin. e.g. Salman Rushdie, a particular favorite of Said. It is encouraging to read Said's discussions of C.L.R. James and Fanon, two great anti-imperialist activists who are routinely ignored or vilified in European and American writings. But when the book's focus is on level, almost 200 pages to Dickens, Conrad, Austen, Kipling, and Camus, it is disheartening to see virtually no discussion of non-European novelists. The study of British and French novels is actually the core of the book and the section concerning the non-European 'resistance' to empire-a confused rambling and repetitive section covering only ninety pagesappears to be tacked on as an afterthought. Thus, after reducing the study of culture to the novel, Said is not even consistent enough to study the non-European novel and compare it with the European.

Said Defense- Out of Context

Said builds portions of his theory on a faulty and out of context Marx quote

Richardson 90 (Michael, “Reflections on Orientalism”, Anthropology Today Vol. 6 No. 4, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

At this point, a consideration of the relation of reci-procity to representation is called for. We have already noted the use made by Said of Marx's phrase 'they can-not represent themselves; they must be represented'. This phrase is also used as an epigraph to the book and is clearly one of its central themes. Yet if we refer to the context in which Marx himself made this comment, we find that the implications for Marx are radically different from those that Said seeks to establish. Given the importance this phrase has for Said it is perhaps useful here to give the context of Marx's own argu-ment. Marx was considering not the Orient but the peasantry.H e was concerned with understandinga con-crete historical context: the failure of the revolution of 1848 and in this specific quotation he was looking at the relation of the peasantry to the Bonapartist party. He wrote: 'Insofar as these small peasant proprietors are merely connected on a local basis, and the identity of their interests fails to produce a feeling of commu-nity, national links, or a political organization, they do not form a class. They are therefore incapable of assert-ing their class interests in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented. Their representative must appear simultaneously as their master, as an authority over them, an unrestricted government power that protects them from the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine from , 12above'. If there are implications in this for the Orien-talist debate, they are certainly not the ones that Said himself takes up. What will be immediately apparent here is that for Marx this relation is dynamic: the peasantry are not acted upon but rather actively seek such representation and use it for their own purposes. The relation between the Bonapartist party and the con-servative peasantry is thus reciprocal: they need each other. It goes without saying that the idealist conclusion that Said draws here 'if the Orient could represent it-self, it would; since it cannot, the representation does the job...' would be wholly foreign to Marx. Indeed it reveals a curious naivety on the part of Said as to how people actually perceive images. Does he really believe that anyone actually thinks that images of the Orient are commensurate with what the Orient is actually like? Indeed it is arguable that it is only academic literary critics (whose work is by definition concerned pri-marily with representation)w ho would mistake a repre-sentation for the thing it represented. Said would, however, wish to extend such a critique further to dissolve the subject/object relation altogether, something that is not unique to him but is rather a post-modernist stance. It certainly cuts to the heart of the anthropological project, since a relation of self to other is fundamental in anthropology and it is difficult to see how anthropology can possibly take form unless it en-gages with the complex dialectical relation between dis-tanciation and familiarity that the subject/object relation implies. If at its root this relation is unable to entertain the possibility of reciprocity, then anthropology must resign itself to producing images that bear no relation to the object of study. Worse, such images could only function ideologically and involve falsification in a power context. However, in this context Said fails to justify, or even argue, the presupposition that enables him to establish the monolithic nature of the object of his study: the European subject that has created Orientalism. What is the nature of this subject: Where did it originate? And how and why? Such 'willed, human work' as he calls it can hardly be born from empty space. Given the nature of his critique, it would seem incumbent upon him to at least address these issues. The fact that he does not do so emphasizes even more the 'Orientalist' nature of his own project: Orientalism is a given to be analysed; as such it becomes Said's own 'Other'. Thus, within his own work, the self/other relation remains intact. Even if we allow for the possibility of the dissolving of the self/other relation, it must still be asked whether this can be done except by means of a tautological sleight of hand. He has certainly not taken on board the philosophical underpinning of this relation, which is contained in Hegel's anthropology and most notably in his treatment of the relation of master and slave13, for in Hegel's terms what is fundamental is reciprocity. In fact, it is more than reciprocal, it is symbiotic: the real-ity of the slave is the master; the reality of the master is the slave. Nleither are free agents: each needs the other to complete his relation to the world. But this separa-tion is also necessary for any sort of lucidity; without it undifferentiation and entropy take over. But in Hegel's terms, the differentiation between master and slave is, at root, illusory: it is the interplay of the relation, not its fixity, that is of importance. In Hegel's terms, then, Orientalism could be changed only by the Orient itself acting upon the relation. The Orient would have to rec-ognize itself, something that Said refuses to accept. However, if the relation remains static then Orientalism will not, indeed cannot, change its ideological charac-ter. In this respect a critique such as Said's, acting solely on the form by which the subject master asserts its ascendancy, can change only the form and not the substance of such domination. Indeed it must become subsumed within the dominant subject; it must of ne-cessity become part of the dominating ideology. In this respect Simon Leys was not merely being malicious when he wrote acidly: 'Orientalism could obviously have been written by no one but a Palestinian scholar with a huge chip on his shoulder and a very dim under- ,1 4 standingo f the Europeana cademic tradition.

Said Defense- Out of Context

Said’s theory manipulates quotes and theories out of context to arrive at a flawed conclusion

Richardson 90 (Michael, “Reflections on Orientalism”, Anthropology Today Vol. 6 No. 4, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

Both Said and Fabian are, of course, part of the groundswell of contemporary criticism that takes refuge in the so-called 'post-modem condition', founded in a dubious Nietzschean subjectivism. Said dutifully quotes Nietzsche in defining truth as a 'mobile army of meta-phors', but refuses to recognize the problematic that Nietzsche himself recognized in such a definition. How rarely do we hear Nietzsche's own corollary to this statement: 'The falseness of a judgement is to us not an objection to a judgement; it is here perhaps that our language sounds strangest. The question is to what ex-tent it is life-advancing, life-preserving, species-preserv-ing, perhaps even species-breeding.. 17. Furthermore, Nietzsche recognized that truth and falsehood existed in dialogic relation to each other. If one accepts that truth is nothing but a 'mobile army of metaphors' then one must, as Nietzsche recognized, establish a centring position that enables the relative value of a particular 'lie' to be qualitativized. Both Said and Fabian, in com-mon with post-modernism in general, fall into the trap of all subjectivism and conflate general and specific cri-tiques in a way thaf de-legitimizes both. The direction of the 'deconstructive' impulse in contemporary criti-cism is not negation but rather its subversion, to the extent that genuine negation becomes impossible. In his La Conquete de 1'Am&rique, Tzvetan Todorov has attempted a critique that has some similarities with Said's, but in the opposite direction. He has considered the conquest of Mexico not in the terms we know so well, in which the double violence (Aztec and Spani-ard) still has power to shock, but in terms of human sympathy: "'To ignore history", as the adage goes, is to risk repeating it, but it is not through knowing history that we know what to do. We are both like and not like the Conquistadores;t heir example is instructive,b ut we can never be sure that we would not behave like them, or that we are not in the process of imitating them as we adapt to new circumstances. But their history can be exemplary for us because it allows us to reflect on our-selves, to discover resemblances: once more the knowl-edge of self passes through that of the other'18. It is surely in this affirmation that anthropology ought to base itself. In considering one of the Conquistadores, Cabeza de Vaca, Todorov notes that he had 'reached equally a neutral point, not because he was indifferent to the two cultures, but because he was able to ex-perience both internally; for him there was no longer a "they" around him. Without becoming an Indian, he had ceased to be completely Spanish' . This flow of an individual between cultures constitutes the am-bivalence of the anthropological experience, a relation that is never simple and never easy. But within this re-lation a dialogue is possible between cultures in which, as Todorov suggests, 'no-one has the last word, where none of the voices reduces the other to a simple object and in which neither takes advantage of his exteriority 2 0in relation to the other'. But it is also the reality of the Western conquest that has established the possi-bility for such dialogue and communication. It is in the recognition of this fact that anthropological knowledge needs to be founded. For anthropology, the critiques of Said and Fabian bring attention to our need to remain alert to our own social context. In addition to the usually assigned moral requirements towards the society one is studying, one also needs to be aware both of the institutional frame-work in which one is working and also of one's subser-vience to one's own culture. This is so no matter how strong the affinity anthropologists may feel with the people studied: if it weren't they would not return to write up their ethnographies. While we need to be aware also of the danger of turning the 'Other' into an ill-defined universal, we need at the same time to be conscious of the contrary danger of relativizing the 'Other' to the extent that the context of the ethno-graphic encounter in time and space is lost, and both observer and observed are reduced to a common de-nominator in which it becomes increasingly difficult to extricate one from the other. In this context the very real problems of repre-sentation that undoubtedly need to be addressed are in danger of being subsumed by following the spurious direction in which Said has led the debate. Perception is not determined by Orientalism, or by anything else. It is of course true that our perceptions of the part of the world we have named as the Orient are conditioned by the representations that scholars and artists have estab-lished of that part of the world. We need to understand how such representations have functioned in practice and in this respect Said has provided some valuable raw material for a genuine consideration of what he convinces is a specific ideological construction that can be called 'Orientalism'. Such an ideology has deter-mined nothing, however, and it is surely a dangerous illusion to believe that it ever has done.

Said Defense- Out of Context

Lack of context results in a confused and confusing theory of Orientalism

Roosa 95 (John, “Literary Approach to a Complex Relationship”, Social Scientist Vol. 23 No 1/3, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

Said repeatedly insists on the need to place British and French novels in an earthly, global context' and, more specifically, in the context of empire. As a criticism of old-school literary studies which wished to see art as a purely aesthetic object, in a world apart, Said's argument is valid. But it is also platitudinous. The difficult question is the method in which the connection is made between literature and the 'real world.' So let us consider 'imperialism', the phenomenon to which Said says European literature should be affiliated. Said defines the term 'imperialism' as the practice of 'dominating a distant territory'. If Said was studying imperialism from ancient Egypt to the present then perhaps this would have been a sufficient definition. But he is studying nineteenth century imperialism of that century's two leading capitalist powers. That imperialism was not just about 'dominating distant territories'; it was about exploiting them within a capitalist economy. European imperialism of the nineteenth century obviously had something to do with capitalism. Said does mention a list of writers on the political economy of imperialism, Lenin, A.G. Frank, Samir Amin, Walter Rodney, Harry Magdoff, among others, writers whose works precisely turned upon the question of the relationship between capitalism and imperialism. Said avoids taking any position in their debate upon the excuse of studying culture, not political economy. But Said, by ignoring the debate entirely, is left seeing imperialism as divorced from capitalism. His terms of discussion are 'nations' and 'national cultures', without a word on class. In fact, Said thinks imperialism may have emerged out of, was caused by, the will to dominate behind the 'national cultures' of Europe (cf. pp. 8, 15, 61). Said is so confused on the causes and functioning of imperialism that he fears his argument that imperialism was 'integrative' may represent a 'vast system building or totalistic theory' (p. 4). He need not worry, the argument is merely a platitude; it is not even a theory. Said is unable to see the relationship between exploitation within Europe, (which in the nineteenth century was more brutal than many people recognise now,) and imperial exploitation. If literature should be connected to its political context then this would apply to Said's own text. What are his own worldly affiliations? Said would like to position himself in the middle, reading both European and non-European writers with a mixture of admiration and criticism. In the 'loud antagonisms of the polarized debate of pro- and anti-imperialists, 'he would like to be the sober-headed individual calling for tolerance, peaceful interchange and calm dialogue (p. 29). Said's general principle is to denounce cultural and national chauvinisms, whether they arise in Europe or in the mid- East, and to demand that we be self-critical and vigilant against our own self-pride turning into chauvinism. While Said's generous attitude is admirable, it is also ethereal. Said wants to speak in the name of all humanity and avoid taking any sides. In a particularly bizarre passage he argues that 'the organization of political passions . . . lead[s] inevitably to mass slaughter, and if not to literal mass slaughter then certainly to rhetorical slaughter.' (p. 28). Said says political organization leads inevitably to mass murder, then contradicts himself that the process may not be inevitable and then invents a perfectly meaningless concept 'rhetorical slaughter'. Such confusing passages litter the entire book. Said, as a literary critic, is preoccupied with books and intellectuals and has great difficulty presenting a clear political position. By the end of the book he is posing 'homeless wanderers, nomads, vagrants' (p. 403), those living on the margins of the world's nation-state system, as the basis of a new politics of liberation. And he is posing a new breed of intellectuals, deconstructivists, post-modernists, as those 'distilling then articulating the predicaments . . . [of] mass deportation, imprisonment, population transfer, collective dispossession, and forced immigrations.' (p. 403) Said sees all of these problems as stemming from nationalism and imperialism. I would certainly agree with Said that we need to find a new internationalist politics but the liberation of which Said speaks is simply the liberation from nationalism, not from capitalism. Capitalists themselves, through all the free trade agreements now underway, are in the business now of dissolving many aspects of the national and forcing a worldwide trend of economic expropriations. And they would be quite happy to read Said's injunctions to study and understand other cultures (p. 21,408). But their internationalism is completely different from the internationalism of the working class and the poor. Said is incapable of distinguishing between the two. As for nationalism, Said fails to see that, as protection from the exploitation of capital, the nation-state may still play a positive role. In the book's typical trivial style, Said speaks of the world as 'one global environment' incapable of bearing any longer' 'selfish and narrow interests-patriotism, chauvinism, ethnic, religious, and racial hatreds.' (p. 21) Perhaps one will soon find Said's writing being quoted by multinational corporations.

Said Offense- Conclusions bad

Said’s research and analytic methods are flawed- means his conclusions are faulty

Ning 97 (Wang, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Peking University, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new\_literary\_history/v028/28.1wang\_n.html, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

As quite a few Eastern and Western scholars have already noticed, however, the "Orient" and "Orientalism" constructed by Said have their inevitable limitations, which lie chiefly in their geographical, cultural, and literary aspects. It is these limitations that provide us Third World scholars and critics with a theoretical basis on which to question and reconsider his Orientalism. First, we should point out its geographical limitation, which is restricted by his family background, as well as his scope of knowledge and learning. As is well known, the "Orient," geographically speaking, covers at least the wide areas of Asia, Africa, and Australia, but in Said's book, the boundary line stops at the Near East and Middle East. Such regions as Southeast Asia and such important Oriental countries as China, India, and Japan are seldom touched upon; they pose a serious limitation to his theory although he has added certain corrective analyses in his new book Culture and Imperialism. Second, his "Orient" or "Orientalism" also has its ideological and cultural limitations. As far as its ideological and cultural significance is concerned, the "Western" idea or culture that we usually deal with in effect refers to the ideology or cultural concepts based on the bourgeois value standard prevailing in Western Europe and North America, while those contrary to them are normally regarded as the "Oriental" concepts. It is on the basis of this striking difference in ideology and culture that the East and the West were in a state of opposition during the cold-war period after World War II; with the end of the cold war, East-West relations have entered a post-cold war period, during which, according to Samuel Huntington, "The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics." 6 Among Oriental cultures, the "most prominent form of this cooperation is the Confucian-Islamic connection that has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and power" (45). Huntington has here correctly grasped the two origins of Oriental cultures, the Arab countries and China, which have, especially the latter, been overlooked by Said. Moreover, due to the limitations of other geographical and ideological factors, Said's Orientalism, in the sense of Oriental studies, naturally leads to his limitation in comparative literature studies: the texts he discusses are mostly from the English or english -speaking world rather than from the non-English-speaking or other Third-World countries, while comparative literature is not only cross-national and interdisciplinary but also cross-cultural and cross-linguistic. In this way, the limitations of his research as well as that of all the postcolonial academic [End Page 61] studies are obviously discernible. It is true that to conduct comparative literature studies from the postcolonial perspective could break through the boundary line of geography and disciplines, but cannot break through the boundary line of languages, which is the very problem that we Oriental scholars of comparative literature and cultural studies must solve in our research.

Said Offense- Conclusions bad

Said’s conclusions perpetuate misconceptions

Habib 5 (Irfan, a former Chairman of the Indian Council of Historical Research, http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=141&issue=108 , date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

I would not take more space to press the point that Said’s concept of ‘Orientalism’ is both far too general and far too restricted, and the limits of his definition are so set and the actual selection so executed that his conclusions are thereby simply predetermined. I would also not go into the other fundamental questions that Aijaz Ahmad has raised about Said’s method in his essay, ‘Orientalism and After’ (In Theory, Delhi, 1994, pp159-220). But one further problem with Said that needs certainly to be taken up is his notable lack of rigour in terms of documentation and logic; and I illustrate this by the treatment he metes out to Karl Marx. On a preliminary page of his Orientalism, Said puts two short quotations, the first of which is from Marx: ‘They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.’ An innocent reader will surely assume that Marx is here implying that Oriental peoples are incapable of representing themselves, and so Europeans (better still, European Orientalists) must speak for them. And, indeed, on p21, quoting Marx’s words in original German, Said explicitly furnishes this precise context for his words. There is a double sense in which this use of the quotation is unethical and irresponsible. The quoted words are taken from a passage in Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, where he speaks not of the position of Eastern peoples, but of the poverty-stricken smallholding peasants of France at a particular juncture in the mid-19th century. Since these peasants could not unite, they were ‘incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master…’ (K Marx and F Engels, Selected Works, Moscow, 1950, vol I, p303). Not only does Said thus coolly substitute eastern peoples for French peasants; by a sleight of hand he also converts Marx’s word ‘representation’, meaning political representation, into ‘depiction’ (The Oriental people cannot depict themselves, and so the Orientalists’ ‘representation does the job’—p21). The exploitation of Marx’s quotation does not even end with this double misuse. On p293, Said makes the still more audacious statement that Marx had used the quoted phrase ‘for Louis Napoleon’, as if Louis Napoleon had made any claims to represent or depict Orientals. Further on, quite forgetting what context he had given to Marx’s quotation on p21, Said alleges in the ‘Afterword’ to the 1995 edition (p335), that by putting the quotation as one of the book’s epigraphs, he, on his part, meant to refer to ‘the subjective truth insinuated by Marx…which is that if you feel you have been denied the chance to speak your truth, you will try extremely hard to get that chance!’ One fears to voice the suspicion that Said had never cared to read the original passage of the Eighteenth Brumaire, and had just picked up the quotation from some secondary source. Even so, the range of manifestly wrong meanings so confidently ascribed to the same words, on different spurs of the moment, is incredible. So much for the short ‘epigraph’. Marx as a subject of Said’s study (pp153-156) also offers further examples of the cavalier way in which Said can stuff anyone he dislikes or wishes to belittle into his nasty basket of ‘Orientalists’. Much has already been said on this matter by Aijaz Ahmad in his essay, ‘Marx on India: a Clarification’ (In Theory, as above, pp221-242). He shows that Said builds his interpretation on just two passages taken from Marx’s two articles published in the New York Tribune in 1853, and seems to be unacquainted with what Marx wrote elsewhere on India. Here it must be added that while Marx necessarily relied on (the quite extensive) European reports on India, the picture that he drew out of it, of the social and economic devastation that British rule caused in India, was largely his own—and this was hardly an ‘Orientalist’ enterprise under Said’s definition. Moreover even in Marx’s second essay, apparently consulted by Said, there is a passage looking forward to the Indians overthrowing ‘the English yoke’ (K Marx and F Engels, Collected Works, vol 12, Moscow, 1979, p221). Marx also writes in the very same article of ‘the profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilisation [which] lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies where it goes naked.’ And yet, again and again in his book, Said sneers at Marx as being, at the end of the day, a pro-colonial ‘Orientalist’. So we are told, ‘This Orientalism can accommodate Aeschylus, say, and Victor Hugo, Dante and Karl Marx’ (p3). The view that ‘Indians were civilisationally, if not racially, inferior’ is indirectly ascribed to Marx on page 14. On page 102 Said goes so far as to put Marx among those writers who could use all the following ‘generalities unquestioningly’: ‘An Oriental lives in the Orient, he lives a life of Oriental ease, in a state of Oriental despotism, and sensuality, imbued with a feeling of Oriental fatalism.’ The italicised words constitute a fantastic misrepresentation of Karl Marx’s writings on Asia. But Said does not still stop here. On p231 he puts Marx among those who held that ‘an Oriental man was first an Oriental and only second a man’—a meaningless formula seemingly coined simply to belittle Marx. III Such reckless rhetoric cannot but create grave suspicions about Said’s general credibility. Here it must be made clear that it cannot be any serious critic’s case that colonialism and imperialism have not promoted a particular kind of

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Said Offense- Conclusions bad

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writing about the East; the real point of criticism is that not only does Said unreasonably use the term ‘Orientalism’ to represent only this particular class of writing, but he also goes on to tar with the same brush the entire corpus of learned writing on the Orient, which in common parlance constitutes the product of Orientalism. This is a clever device, and verve and verbosity tend to conceal the resort to a verbal confusion pure and simple. Said himself tells us (‘Afterword’, pp341-342) that the late Professor Albert Hourani, while agreeing with much of his criticism of a part of the writing on the Orient, protested that the criticism was not applicable to a large part of Orientalist writing, and yet now after Said’s Orientalism, the very word Orientalism has ‘become a term of abuse’. How much Said has been successful here was borne upon me while reading a recent article by a western ‘Orientalist’, Carl W Ernst. This author claims credit, without any sense of embarrassment, for ‘foreign scholars who alone had the resources and the motivation’ to analyse an Islamicised Yogic text. The claim has all the marks of a self-satisfied sense of western superiority that Said treats as the trademark of ‘Orientalism’. Yet Ernst himself dubs early theories of a possible Indian origin of Sufism as ‘early Orientalist theories’ (‘The Islamicisation of Yoga in the Amrtakunda Translations’, Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, 3rd series, vol 13, part 2, London, 2003, p226, italics mine). ‘Orientalist’ here just does duty for what one thinks is wrong: otherwise, how can there be any indication of western superiority in an ‘Orientalist’ theory that places the source of Islamic sufism in early Indian beliefs rather than, say, Christian mysticism? ‘Orientalism’ as a word has thus been so degraded that anyone can use it for anything one disapproves of, even when the disapprover may himself be a dyed in the wool ‘Orientalist’! Despite Said’s denials that it was not his intention to protect chauvinistic or conservative beliefs in Asia, especially in relation to Islam, one can see that any critical or historical view of any aspect of Islam by any western scholar is yet taken by him as reflective of a sense of western superiority and so a kind of ‘Orientalist’, colonial discourse. The hypersensitivity goes to such an extent that the word ‘Mohammedan’, used in place of ‘Islamic’, as in ‘Mohammedan Law’, is held to be an ‘insulting’ designation (p66): Said obviously forgets that innumerable Muslim scholars down the centuries have also spoken (in Persian) of Din-i Muhammadi (Muhammedan faith), or Shari‘at-i Muhammadi (Muhammedan law), without at all being conscious of any insult implied in such use of the Prophet’s name. But with the aggressive stance of modern Islamic ‘orthodoxy’, the word ‘Mohammedan’ is quickly disappearing from books, and even from titles of works by authors long dead: thus Goldziher’s Mohammedanische Studien and H A R Gibb’s Mohammedanism now reappear in print respectively as Muslim Studies (English translation) and Islam in editions by established academic publishers. An innocent designation becomes disreputable the moment it is found to be tainted through association with that pernicious weed, ‘Orientalism’.

Said’s writing is unsubstantiated and erroneous

Lippman 81 (Thomas, Middle East Journal, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

The cogency of Said's argument, however, is undermined by the narrowness of his focus, his arroganta nd hectoringt one, unsubstantiateda s-sertions and numerous inaccuracies. Most of his conclusions are based on the per-formance of the American media during the Iranian revolution and the captivity of the hos-tages.Certainly that performance was flawed,but Said fails to demonstrate that it was, as he claims, characteristic of Western coverage of crises in the Islamic world. It would have been instructive to make a brief comparison with how the French media covered the war in Algeria, say, or what the British reported about Egypt during the Suez affair, neither of which he mentions. Said thinks that the errors he finds in press and diplomatic analysis of events in Iran reflect a collective American antipathy to Islam. There may be such antipathy, but Said ought to ac-knowledge that the same criticisms were rightly made of coverage of events in Vietnam, Chile and Africa, where "fear of 'Mohammedanism'"(p . 5) was not involved. Finding the American press to be a handmaiden of American government policy and asserting that "never before has an international trouble spot like Iran been covered so instantaneously and so regularly as it has by the media" (p. 25), Said seems to have slept through the Vietnam war. Said's choice of facts and incidents to support his argument is selective and duplicitous. It is not true, as he asserts, that President Sadat offered to "give the United States bases on his territory" and that therefore "most of what is reported out of Egypt by the media effectively makes his point of view on matters Egyptian, Arab and regional seem like the correct one" (p. 112). (In fact, it is hard to think of any political opposition so tooth-less as that of Egypt that is so successful in having its views disseminated by the Western press.)I t is not true that "only recently have there been overt references to Israeli religious fanaticism, and all of these have been to the zealots of Gush Emunim" (p. 31). It is not true that the press ascribed Saudi Arabia's refusal to endorse the Camp David accords to some "peculiarly Islamic logic" (p. 30). There is no credible evidence for Said's statement that the Christian factions in Lebanon have been "armed and supported" by the United States (p. 138). And it is preposterous to assert that "assiduous research has shown that there is hardly a primetime television show with-out several episodes of patently racist and insult-ing caricatures of Muslims" (p. 69). Said appears to have written this denunciation of American correspondents without interview-ing any, and he knows little about the decision-making processes of the media. He complains that "anything falling outside the consensus defi-nition of what is important is considered irrele-vant to United States interests and to the media's definition of a good story" (p. 142). If the charge against them is that their coverage emphasizes American interests and "good stories," most edi-tors and writers would happily plead guilty.

Said Offense- Orientalist

Said’s analysis is largely irrelevant, save when it actually furthers Orientalism

Richardson 90 (Michael, “Reflections on Orientalism”, Anthropology Today Vol. 6 No. 4, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK

That Said feels under no compunction to justify his change of opinion here is indicative of his methodological approach. As he felt no necessity to explain what it was specifically that made the work of Geertz ad-mirable in the first place so, it appears, he is not called upon to explain a radical change of opinion. In 1978 he had been seeking to place himself within 'Western' dis-course, almost in the role of a radical reformer. By 1983, he is clearly seeking to orient his critique differ-ently, seeking to find a place within a 'space' of anti-imperialist studies, in which the work of Geertz does not fit. This much is apparent in his article 'Orientalism Revisited?' in which he plays down the originality of his own study, to place it in a line of anti-colonialist writers who seem to have nothing but this, and the fact that Said approves them, in common10. What he is keen to establish is a catch-all critique providing the means to dispose of what he finds objectionable and to praise whatever he approves. This is exactly the power rela-tion that he accuses the Orientalists of constructing in relation to the Orient. Unlike the Orient itself, however, contemporary Orientalists have the power to answer back, and not surprisingly they have not hesitated to do so. Said's pathetic response to some of these counter-blasts indicates the weakness of his position, which he is incapable of defending, except by constantly shifting his ground. The more substantial question raised (or, one could equally argue, hidden) by Said's critique is the nature of reciprocity between subject and object. In this re-spect the extent that Said has adequately represented what the Orientalists themselves have said is largely ir-relevant. His argument rather stands or falls on his denial of such a reciprocal relationship. Orientalism was imposed upon the Orient: it was a European pro-ject, more or less consciously elaborated, in which Orientalists were nothing but passive pawns. Whether or not Orientalist representations were accurate or not thereby becomes somewhat irrelevant. The problem here is that if reciprocity between sub-ject and object is impossible then, by the same token, the object cannot challenge the subject by developing alternative models. In fact, since the object has no real existence, being only a conceptualization of the sub-ject's mind, it can never be a question of the former acting upon the latter. However, this just will not do, as Said has to recognize in the conclusion to his book, since to leave the matter there would be to freeze the relation in empty space. There could be no way of ever changing it. The only way out of the impasse is for the subject to develop representations of the object that would represent the object more faithfully. Given the extent of Said's critique, however, it is difficult to see how this can ever possibly occur. The best that can be achieved is that the representation should concur with Said's own understanding. But then by what right can Said stand as a representative of the Orient? He is con-sequently forced into a position that relies on precisely the same discourse that he is criticizing. Whether or not the 'Orientalists' are guilty of the central charge that Said makes against them, of believing that the Orient 'cannot represent itself, it must be represented' (and it cannot be said that he proves his case on this point) it would certainly appear that Said himself believes it; indeed such a belief is inscribed at the heart of his pro-ject. Furthermore, his own critique relies on just as much mis-representation of Orientalists as he accuses them of making in their representations of the Orient. In Said's terms, in fact, his own conceptualization of 'Orientalists' is as pure an example of 'Orientalism' as one could wish for!

Said Offense- Orientalist

Said’s concept of Orientalism recreates Orientalism

Landow 02(“Edward W. Said's Orientalism” George P. Landow, Professor of English and Art History, Brown University 18 March, 2002, Political Discourse- Theories of Colonialism and Post-Colonialism http://www.postcolonialweb.org/poldiscourse/said/orient14.html)

Drawing upon the methods of feminist criticism of the 1970s, Said's Orientalism did much to create the field of postcolonial studies by teaching us to "read for the gap," placing texts in broad political contexts. Despite its obviously valid points about weaknesses of Euro-American thought, its appeal for Western intellectuals, and its liberating effect on intellectuals from former countries that were colonized, this seminal book has some major flaws: Though enormously effective as a polemic, Orientalism is very shoddy as scholarship, and yet it presents itself as a corrective to flawed scholarship. The book completely neglects China, Japan, and South East Asia, and it has very little to say about India. Although purporting to be a study of how the West treats all of the East, the book focuses almost entirely upon the Middle East. Its generalizations about "the Orient" therefore repeat the very Orientalism it attacks in other texts! It is bizarrely forgiving of French Orientalist writers like Nerval and Flaubert. Orientalism is an orientalist text several times over, and in two ways commits the major errors involved with the idea of the Other: First, it assumes that such projection and its harmful political consequences are something that only the West does to the East rather than something all societies do to one another. (I am surely not the only teacher who has had heard Asian-American students returning from their parent's country of origin exclaim, "Everything Said says the West does to the East, the East does to the West!") Because Orientalism is apparently based on very little knowledge of the history of European and Non-European imperialism, it treats Western colonialism as unique. This point, like the previous one, makes perfect sense if one takes Said's pioneering book largely as a political polemic, for in that case such omissions might be forgivable. One expects more from criticism and scholarship, particularly politically motivated criticism and scholarship.

Said Offense- Advocates Violence

Said encouraged violence in a text littered with misrepresentations and contradictions

Pryce-Jones 8 (David, staff writer for The New Criterion, <http://www.newcriterion.com/articles.cfm/enough-said-3743>, date accessed: 7/9/2010) AJK

Edward Said was an outstanding example of an intellectual who condemned the West root and branch while taking every advantage of the privileges and rewards it has to offer. In its dishonesty and exercise of double standards, his was truly a cautionary tale of our times. Born in Jerusalem in 1935, he laid claims to be a Palestinian, dispossessed by Zionist Jews, and therefore an archetypal Third World victim. In sober fact, he was the son of an American father, a member of a prosperous Christian family with extensive business interests in Egypt. Undoubtedly an intelligent and civilized man with one side of his personality, he became a professor of comparative literature at Columbia University. Yet with his other side, he wrote speeches for Yasser Arafat in the 1970s, and was far and away the most vociferous advocate for the Palestine Liberation Organization. Although he knew the history of persecution that lay behind Zionism, he could not accept Israel as anything but an injustice that had to be put right in bloodshed. On the pretext of victimhood, but from the safety of New York, he urged others to kill and be killed. When Arafat professed (falsely as it turned out) to be willing to make peace with Israel, Said broke with him, insisting on armed struggle. At the end of his life, this professor of a subject within the humanities was photographed throwing a stone from Lebanese soil against the boundary with Israel. The contradictory aspects of the man came together in Orientalism, a book Said published in 1978. The thesis was that every Westerner who had ever studied or written about the Middle East had done so in bad faith. From ancient Greece through the medieval era to the present, the work of historians, grammarians, linguists, and even epigraphists had been “a rationalization of colonial rule.” There was no colonial rule in the lifetimes of the majority of these scholars, so they must have been “projecting” what was to come. For Said, these highly eclectic individuals were all engaged in a long-drawn conspiracy, international but invisible, to establish the supremacy of the West by depicting an East not only inferior but static and incapable of change. At bottom, here was the vulgar Marxist concept that knowledge serves only the interest of the ruling class. Said had also latched on to Michel Foucault, with his proposition—modishly avant-garde at the time—that there is no such thing as truth, but only “narratives” whose inventor is putting across his point of view. This reduces facts to whatever anyone wishes to make of them. Omitting whatever did not fit, misrepresenting evidence, and making unwarranted generalizations, Said committed the very sin for which he was accusing Westerners—of concocting a “narrative” to serve his purposes. As he summed up: “Every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist.” The “narrative” shaped a conclusion particularly crucial to Said. Europeans included Jews and later Israelis, and they were therefore integral to the conspiracy to do down Orientals and ensure that Palestinians were prime victims of racism and imperialism. Palestinian violence and terror was therefore natural and legitimate.

Said Offense- Flawed Theory

Said’s theory of Orientalism is based on lies and misrepresentations

Pryce-Jones 8 (David, staff writer for The New Criterion, <http://www.newcriterion.com/articles.cfm/enough-said-3743>, date accessed: 7/9/2010) AJK

Discussion of inconvenient facts soon began to expose piecemeal Said’s “narrative.” An Israeli scholar, Justus Reid Weiner, uncovered the extent to which Said had been romancing his own victimhood. Leaving Jerusalem as a young boy before Israel became independent, he had grown up in Cairo and been educated at its most prestigious British-run college. His credentials as a Palestinian refugee and a spokesman demanded more than a stretch of the imagination. It was not the Zionists who had dispossessed the Said family, it turned out, but Nasser when he expropriated the property of all foreigners including theirs. The victim of Arab nationalism, Said was nevertheless its most ardent defender, and this psychological inversion is the most mystifying thing about him. Perversity of the sort may perhaps illuminate the psychological process whereby so many kindred intellectuals misplace hatred and guilt, admiring those who injure them and condemning those who might protect them. Said did not live long enough to read Robert Irwin’s book For Lust of Knowing, published early in 2006. This thorough rebuttal of Said is a monument of genuine scholarship, examining who the Orientalists were, how historically they advanced their disciplines all over Europe, and what their achievements have been. At the outset, Irwin calls Said’s book “a work of malignant charlatanry,” and he demonstrates the point calmly; in contrast to Said, he is free from either spite or arrogance. (Stephen Schwartz, another informed critic, also deploys the words “malignant charlatan” to describe Said.) Irwin’s account of the founding of chairs in European universities for the sake of studying and translating Eastern languages and literary texts is particularly strong. Dedicated scholars handed down to their successors a tradition of learning and research. Even Christian churchmen and apologists among them were prepared to pursue knowledge objectively. Some of Said’s critics have had Arab or Muslim origins, for instance Sadiq al-Azm, Fouad Ajami, and Kanan Makiya, and Said treated them all as though they were traitors. He would surely have issued another personal fatwa in his usual style of bluster and insult against Ibn Warraq, whoseDefending the West further demolishes in close detail the Saidian “narrative.” Originally from the Indian subcontinent, Ibn Warraq is the author of a previous book, Why I Am Not A Muslim. This is a scrupulously documented examination of the life and teaching of the Prophet Muhammad, of the Qur’an and its sources, and the resulting culture. As he sees it, intolerance and ignorance, and all manner of taboos, have been deliberately preserved and cultivated down the centuries, doing the faithful no service, and creating what he openly calls the totalitarian nature of Islam. Like the earlier book, Defending the West rests on very wide reading in several languages; there are almost a hundred pages of footnotes. The impact is all the more solid because the tone expresses neither ridicule nor anger but only determination to get at the truth. The book mounts its demolition of Said from several angles. To begin with, Said’s pseudo-Foucault style often descends into meaningless verbiage and contradiction. Said’s selectivity and failure to take historical context into consideration also lead him astray wildly. Out of laziness or carelessness, he makes egregious historical blunders. For instance, at the time when Said is accusing the British of imperialism in the Middle East, the actual overlords were the Ottoman Turks. And if British and French Orientalists were imperial agents by definition, how come Germany had no Middle East empire when its Orientalists were the most distinguished and original of all? And what about Ignaz Goldziher, the founding father of modern Orientalism and ready to consider converting to Islam, but Hungarian, therefore from a country with no imperialist aims in the Middle East?

Said Offense- Flawed Theory

*Orientalism* is full of faulty assumptions, manipulations, and misrepresentations

Berkowitz 8 (Peter, Tad and Dianne Taube Senior Fellow at Stanford, “Answering Edward Said”, Policy Review, date accessed: 7/9/2010) AJK

Like the book it introduces, the preface exhibits a master propagandist at work, as he weaves together moderate and reasonable pronouncements with obscurantist rhetoric and sophisticated invective. But Said puts even his moderate and reasonable pronouncements in the service of immoderate and unreasonable conclusions. For instance, he couples an elegant defense of humane studies with a vehement condemnation of the Bush administration and Ariel Sharon's government. It is one thing to condemn Bush and Sharon. But he insists that the condemnation is intimately connected to the defense of serious scholarship in the humanities. Indeed, in the guise of presenting to a new generation his critique of the decisive contribution that the West's scholarly study of the East allegedly made to the West's subjugation of the East, Said insinuates that literary cultivation itself issues in an implacable opposition to American and Israeli Middle East foreign policy. I say "insinuates" because such arguments for the link as Said puts forward in the preface crumble upon inspection. Said begins by contending that since its first publication, Orientalism has been subject to "increasing misrepresentation and misinterpretation." But he never bothers to identify the misrepresentations and misinterpretations--or, for that matter, to acknowledge a single flaw that might have been brought to his attention in the 25 years since his book's publication, wide dissemination and discussion in the West, and translation into 36 languages including Hebrew and Vietnamese. Said leaves it to the reader to conjecture where his critics might have gone astray. Perhaps he had in mind those who charge that Orientalism exploits the ignorance, panders to the passions, and plays to the prejudices of credulous American intellectuals only too ready to believe the worst about their intellectual forbears and their nation. Such critics contend that the book seduced a generation of historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and political theorists into believing falsely that for two centuries Western scholarship devoted to understanding the languages, history, art, and ideas of the Arab and Muslim Middle East distorted and degraded the peoples under examination and provided inspiration and justification for their intellectual and political conquest. If Said had such critics in mind, his preface does nothing to allay their charges and, in the space of 16 pages, much to prove their point. On the one hand, Said stresses the importance of "continuing to have faith in the ongoing and literally unending process of emancipation and enlightenment that, in my opinion, frames and gives direction to the intellectual vocation." He emphasizes that while he has "never taught anything about the Middle East" (his emphasis), his "training and practice" as "a teacher of the mainly European humanities" fits him for "the kind of deliberately meditated and analyzed study that this book contains, which for all its urgent worldly references is still a book about culture, ideas, history, and power, rather than Middle East politics tout court." He deplores that "Reflection, debate, rational argument, moral principle based on a secular notion that human beings must create their own history have been replaced by abstract ideas that celebrate American or Western exceptionalism, denigrate the relevance of context, and regard other cultures with derisive contempt." On the other hand, Said descends into incoherent theorizing and rank vilification to deride the history of U.S. and Israeli conduct in the Middle East. To illustrate the trendy notion that "neither the term Orient nor the concept of the West has any ontological stability," he declares, without a shred of supporting evidence or the slightest effort to make explicit the connection, that following the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000, "Israeli F-16s and Apache helicopters [were] used routinely on defenseless civilians as part of their collective punishment." Along the same lines, to demonstrate that the Orient and the West are "supreme fictions," Said cavalierly effaces the vital distinction between terrorist attacks on civilians and wars by liberal democracies against terrorist organizations and ruthless dictators: "The suicide bombing phenomenon has appeared with all its hideous damage, none more lurid and apocalyptic of course than the events of September 11 and their aftermath in the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq." Furthermore, notwithstanding his call for intellectual civility, he accuses the Bush administration of coming under the influence of "intellectual lackeys," chief among them Princeton University professor emeritus Bernard Lewis and Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies scholar Fouad Ajami. Despite their diverse and worldly backgrounds--Lewis is a British-born Jew and Ajami is of Lebanese Shiite origins--both these eminent scholars are, in Said's judgment, hopelessly naive and incurably racist. What they "seem incapable of understanding," he declares, "is that history cannot be swept clean like a blackboard, clean so that 'we' might inscribe our own future there and impose our own forms of life for these lesser people to follow." Of course, contrary to Said, the premise that informs Lewis's and Ajami's writings on American foreign policy and undergirds Bush administration democracy promotion efforts is that Arabs and Muslims are not lesser peoples but full members of the human family, equal in rights and as deserving as any other people of living in freedom and dignity. In the preface's closing lines, Said contrives an obscene moral equivalence by declaring that "the human, and humanistic, desire or enlightenment and emancipation" are menaced by "the incredible strength of the opposition to it that comes from the Rumsfelds, Bin Ladens, Sharons, and Bushes of this world." Said's brand of propaganda is particularly insidious. Although he presents himself as a heroic defender of liberal learning and systematic scholarship, he conjures egregious misrepresentations and promulgates toxic misunderstandings, thereby undermining the separation between scholarly vocation and partisan pleading in defense of which he purports to write. Nor is such an outcome incidental to Orientalism's larger project. Said aims to persuade that for hundreds of years Western scholars of the East, like U.S. and Israeli political leaders today, have been blinded to the realities of Arab life and the wider Muslim world by the very principles that lie at the heart of the West. Furthermore, he wants readers to believe that these principles compel the West to vanquish and oppress Arabs and Muslims. To succeed, Said must anesthetize his readers' critical faculties and incite their resentment of Western power and preeminence.