# Pain at the Pump Aff

### Epistemology

#### Their arguments represent the opinions of military, economic, and cultural elites who systematically engage in asking the wrong questions while cynically addressing the wrong problems—it’s via their group think that we cannot imagine a world beyond cheap energy.  Only our epistemology is capable of undermining the logic of petrocapitalism

Bednarz 10

(Dan, president of Energy & Healthcare Consultants of Pittsburgh “Ethics, Epistemology, and Dirty Rotten Strategies” [http://healthafteroil.wordpress.com/2010/02/10/ethics-epistemology-and-%E2%80%9Cdirty-rotten-strategies%E2%80%9D/](http://healthafteroil.wordpress.com/2010/02/10/ethics-epistemology-and-%E2%80%9Cdirty-rotten-strategies%E2%80%9D/" \t "_blank))

Ian Mitroff and Abraham Silvers’ book, Dirty Rotten Strategies: How We Trick Ourselves and Others into Solving the Wrong Problems Precisely, addresses the inability, prevalent among political, economic and cultural elites and the highly educated who serve them, to think critically and properly formulate problems. This incapacity results in Type 3 Errors, which “is the unintentional error of solving the wrong problems precisely. In sharp contrast, the Type 4 Error is the intentional error of solving the wrong problems.” (Pg. 5) Their book offers insight to those who share my conviction that our society is arrantly unsustainable yet unable/unwilling to recognize the natural ecological and fiscal/economic sources of our predicament. Those of us who think we are not a dead species walking will be enlightened and challenged by the thought exercises in epistemology (how we know what we know) and ethics (what we ought to do) found in this book. The authors offer an integrated range of explanations for why political, corporate, military, medical, educational and cultural leaders end up honestly asking (Type 3 Error) or deceitfully devising (Type 4 Error) the wrong questions. Their framework is applicable to the economic contraction –and potential social collapse- now underway whose root or distal cause –in my view- is a decline in cheap net energy flows resulting from peak oil. For me, Mitroff and Silvers’ prominent observation is that, “Problems always require us to stand above them to better formulate them” (Pg. 177). They write: “One of the fundamental forms of Type Three and Type Four Errors occurs when … we elevate our preferred way of looking at the world [which no matter how “objective” and empirical remains a socially organized and sanctioned account] over all other ways of looking at it.” These errors are endemic because –despite all remonstrance to the contrary- Americans are not consistently socialized, educated and rewarded to value thinking in terms of systems and complexity. As a child I would naively ask adults, “What about…?” questions, and on occasion –usually by a teacher- I was rewarded for my inquisitiveness; but my vivid memory is of being told to “stop being a pest.” Everyone who has worked in a group knows the tacit bounds of discourse beyond which discussion is verboten. Indeed, organizations pursuing innovation consciously attempt to eliminate or attenuate this tendency towards what goes by various names such as, groupthink, institutional thinking, herd mentality, conformism, and so on. The authors conclude that in contemporary America, especially in politics, the facile solution –“kick the can down the road”- is the most likely option to be undertaken or propagated.

### Solvency

#### **Value is site for political transformation – value of gasoline is structured by a underlying economy of cultural meanings that motivate its consumption – our intervention re-directs outrage to produce social change**

Huber 9

(Matthew, Asst Professor, Syracuse University School of Public Affairs, The Use of Gasoline: Value, Oil,and the “American way of life”, Antipode 43:1, 465-486, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2009.00683.x)

Yet, it is very important politically to not theorize value as a totalizing force beyond human control (cf Gidwani and Chari 2004:477)—such a conception has much in common with neoliberal market orthodoxy. Gidwani and Chari (2004:476) suggest value is best understood as an open and porous “assemblage” replete with political spaces for opposition (see also, Gidwani 2008, especially ch 5). Thus, a valuetheoretical perspective seeks to understand both the relational webs that allow generalized commodity exchange to function on a world scale, but also how those relational webs get imperfectly represented and struggled over through the surface appearance of prices,wages, rents and profits. A start toward a more open theorization should consider value as a form of relationality that is not purely quantitative or purely about exchange. Indeed, the cultural politics of “outrage” over high gas prices are about much more than the seeming self-evidence of “price”. These discourses are about the concrete meanings of the commodity gasoline. The meanings surrounding value circulation correspond to what Mann (2007:26) calls “the politics of measure”. He suggests that those domains commonly considered purely quantitative and economic—for him the wage, for me the price of a particular commodity—are shot through with cultural political weight over the meanings and practices putatively measured through its quantitative indices. In his words: Measure . . . is precisely this node or knot that constitutes the space in which value is politicized, and the politics of measure consists in not only the struggles in that space but also the struggle to produce those spaces, to tie knots in the thread of value where there had previously only been slippery appearances (Mann 2007:52). Thus, the rise in price from $1.50 to 4.00/gallon does not merely indicate hardship for consumer budgets, but also qualitative concerns over the maintenance and reproduction of everyday geographies of home, work, leisure and, ultimately, national identity. Moreover, such claims end up politically intervening within the circuits of value production to force this commodity to trade at its “normal” (low) prices, for example, forcing OPEC to increase production, drilling off the coast of Florida, or, perhaps, invading an oil rich country. One theoretical conduit toward understanding the qualitatively open politics of value is through a focus upon its necessary and contradictory relation to use-value (see also Gidwani and Chari 2004; Joseph 2002; Spivak 1986). Contrary to many cursory readings of Marx, use-value is not a relic of pre-capitalist modes of production but is integral to the capitalist social relations dominated by the commodity form (Harvey 1982:7–9). As Marx states in the *Grundrisse* (1973[1857]:881) usevalue forms the “material basis in which a specific economic relation presents itself”. It becomes an important political economic concept, “as soon as it becomes modified by the relations of production, or as it, in turn, intervenes to modify them” (Marx 1973[1857]:881). In her critique of romantic notions of community, Joseph (2002:15) argues that value circulates with the *supplementary aid* of socially and historically specific use-values: “This reading of [Marx’s] theory of value suggests that the particularities of historically and socially determined use-values, which include particular social relations and ‘values’, supplement the discontinuous circuit of abstract value, enabling its circulation.” Thus, as the reproduction of the relations of production become ensconced within particular meanings around a commodity’s “use”, those meanings come to both supplement and intervene in the processes of value circulation. These socially negotiated meanings around use-value do not lie “outside” the circuits of value, but represent internal sites for opposing the operation of value itself. Political struggles over use-values represent concrete political spaces to question the ultimate definition of value as “socially necessary labor time”. If struggles over use-value are seen as struggles over precisely what is “socially necessary” to a system of production, value is positioned as less of a law-like and dominating force. In the next two sections, I will approach gasoline’s “use-value” from two particular vantage points7—the value of labor power and the particular use-value of gasoline. This will set up a reexamination of the politics of exchange-value in the final section.

#### **It’s try-or-die for changes in oil consumption – only confronting consumers with their energy demand in transportation can produce effective consciousness shift before peak oil arrives**

Foster 8 – professor of sociology at the University of Oregon

July/August 2008, John Bellamy Foster, “Peak Oil and Energy Imperialism”, http://www.cym.ie/documents/peak\_oil.pdf

Publicly of course the peak oil problem has often been characterised by establishment sources and the media as a “fringe issue.” Yet over the past decade the question has been pursued systematically with increasing concern within the highest echelons of capitalist society: within both states and corporations. 24 In February 2005 the U.S. Department of Energy released a major report that it had commissioned entitled Peaking of World Oil Production: Impacts, Mitigation, and Risk Management. The project leader was Robert L. Hirsch of Science Applications International Corporation. Hirsch had formerly occupied executive positions in the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Exxon, and ARCO. The Hirsch report concluded that peak oil was a little over two decades away or nearer. “Even the most optimistic forecasts,” it stated, “suggest that world oil peaking will occur in less than 25 years.” The main emphasis of the Hirsch report commissioned by the Department of Energy, however, was on the issue of the massive transformations that would be needed in the economy, and particularly transportation, in order to mitigate the harmful effects of the end of cheap oil. The enormous problem of converting virtually the entire stock of U.S. cars, trucks, and aircraft in just a quarter-century (at most) was viewed as presenting intractable difficulties. 25 In October 2005, Hirsch wrote an analysis for Bulletin of the Atlantic Council of the United States on “The Inevitable Peaking of World Oil Production.” He declared there that, “previous energy transitions (wood to coal, coal to oil, etc.) were gradual and evolutionary; oil peaking will be abrupt and revolutionary. The world has never faced a problem like this. Without massive mitigation at least a decade before the fact, the problem will be pervasive and long lasting.” 26 Similarly, the U.S. Army released a major report of its own in September 2005 stating: The doubling of oil prices from 2003–2005 is not an anomaly, but a picture of the future. Oil production is approaching its peak; low growth in availability can be expected for the next 5 to 10 years. As worldwide petroleum production peaks, geopolitics and market economics will cause even more significant price increases and security risks. One can only speculate at the outcome from this scenario as world petroleum production declines. 27 Indeed, by 2005 there was little doubt in ruling circles about the likelihood of serious oil shortages and that peak oil was on its way soon or sooner. In its 2005 World Energy Outlook the IEA raised the issue of Simmons’s claims in Twilight in the Desert that Saudi Arabia’s super-giant Ghawar oil field, the largest in the world, “could,” in the IEA’s words, “be close to reaching its peak if it has not already done so.” Likewise the U.S. Department of Energy, which had initially rejected Simmons’s assessment, backtracked between 2004 and 2006, degrading its projection of Saudi oil production in 2025 by 33 per cent. 28 In February 2007 the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a seventy-five-page report on Crude Oil pointedly subtitled: Uncertainty about Future Oil Supply Makes It Important to Develop a Strategy for Addressing a Peak and Decline in Oil Production. It argued that almost all studies had shown that a world oil peak would occur sometime before 2040 and that U.S. federal agencies had not yet begun to address the issue of the national preparedness necessary to face this impending emergency. For the GAO the threat of a major oil shortfall was worsened by the political risks primarily associated with four countries, accounting for almost one-third of world (conventional) reserves: Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela. The fact that Venezuela contained “almost 90 per cent of the world’s proven extra-heavy oil reserves” made it all the more noteworthy that it constituted a significant “political risk” from Washington’s standpoint. 29

#### Our affirmative is critical to create a shift away from exceptionalism – destroying American’s sense of entitlement to consume causes humility and integration of foreign perspectives

Bacevich ’8 [Andrew J., “The Limits of Power: The end of American Exceptionalism” http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ZnG-ZlzrA\_gC&oi=fnd&pg=PP7&dq=american+exceptionalism&ots=EPlU23PpnV&sig=\_l39-1Bk3pbRv9GJTDfheEkkKeA#v=onepage&q=american%20exceptionalism&f=false]

Realism in this sense implies an obligation to see the world as it actually is, not as we might like it to be. The enemy of realism is hubris, which in Niebuhr's day, and in our own, finds expression in an outsized confidence in the efficacy of American power as an instrument to reshape the global order. Humility imposes an obligation of a different sort. It summons Americans to see themselves without blinders. The enemy of humility is sanctimony, which gives rise to the conviction that American values and beliefs are universal and that the nation itself serves providentially assigned purposes. This conviction finds expression in a determination to remake the world in what we imagine to be America's image. In our own day, realism and humility have proven in short supply. What Niebuhr wrote after World War II proved truer still in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War: Good fortune and a position of apparent preeminence placed the United States "under the most grievous temptations to self- adulation." Americans have given themselves over to those temptations. Hubris and sanctimony have become the paramount expressions of American statecraft. After 9/11, they combined to produce the Bush administration's war of no exits and no deadlines. President Bush has likened today's war against what he calls "Islamofascism" to America's war with Nazi Germany — a great struggle waged on behalf of liberty. That President Bush is waging his global war on terror to preserve American freedom is no doubt the case. Yet that commitment, however well intentioned, begs several larger questions: As actually expressed and experienced, what is freedom today? What is its content? What costs does the exercise of freedom impose? Who pays? These are fundamental questions, which cannot be dismissed with a rhetorical wave of the hand. Great war time presidents of the past — one thinks especially of Abraham Lincoln speaking at Gettysburg — have not hesitated to confront such questions directly. That President Bush seems oblivious to their very existence offers one mea sure of his shortcomings as a statesman. Freedom is not static, nor is it necessarily benign. In practice, freedom constantly evolves and in doing so generates new requirements and abolishes old constraints. The common understanding of freedom that prevailed in December 1941 when the United States entered the war against Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany has long since become obsolete. In some respects, this must be cause for celebration. In others, it might be cause for regret. The changes have been both qualitative and quantitative. In many respects, Americans are freer today than ever before, with more citizens than ever before enjoying unencumbered access to the promise of American life. Yet especially since the 1960s, the reinterpretation of freedom has had a transformative impact on our society and culture. That transformation has produced a paradoxical legacy. As individuals, our appetites and expectations have grown exponentially. Niebuhr once wrote disapprovingly of Americans, their "culture soft and vulgar, equating joy with happiness and happiness with comfort." Were he alive today, Niebuhr might amend that judgment, with Americans increasingly equating comfort with self- indulgence. The collective capacity of our domestic political economy to satisfy those appetites has not kept pace with demand. As a result, sustaining our pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness at home requires increasingly that Americans look beyond our borders. Whether the issue at hand is oil, credit, or the availability of cheap consumer goods, we expect the world to accommodate the American way of life. The resulting sense of entitlement has great implications for foreign policy. Simply put, as the American appetite for freedom has grown, so too has our penchant for empire. The connection between these two tendencies is a causal one. In an earlier age, Americans saw empire as the antithesis of freedom. Today, as illustrated above all by the Bush administration's efforts to dominate the energy- rich Persian Gulf, empire has seemingly become a prerequisite of freedom. There is a further paradox: The actual exercise of American freedom is no longer conducive to generating the power required to establish and maintain an imperial order. If anything, the reverse is true: Centered on consumption and individual autonomy, the exercise of freedom is contributing to the gradual erosion of our national power. At precisely the moment when the ability to wield power — especially military power — has become the sine qua non for preserving American freedom, our reserves of power are being depleted.

### Cap K 2ac

#### **Perm do both**

#### The perm is a specific analysis that can be used to attack capitalism universally - transportation infrastructure is a critical nexus point because it links together development capital and labor mobility

Derickson 11

(Kate Driscoll, Neoliberalism and the Politics of Land Use in Post-Katrina Mississippi, PhD Dissertation, Penn State University, <https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/paper/11630/7208>)

Major reconfigurations of the built environment, as moments of creative destruction, can provide a particularly telling window into neoliberal capitalist social relations.1 Indeed, given Marxism‟s materialist lineage, it is quite surprising that geographers with roots in that tradition have paid so little attention to the built environment and its reconfiguration in the course of their many efforts to analyze neoliberalism. It is all the more surprising given the strong emphasis on private property that runs through the liberal philosophical tradition, neoliberalism, and contemporary struggles over the built environment alike. The politics, processes, and discourses associated with major reconfigurations of the built environment should be critical sites for the investigation and analysis of neoliberalism because they contain and represent the implementation of ideologically driven imaginations of the city, involve extensive justification and debate, and contain intricate land use decisions and political battles that play out as the larger project itself is debated. Moreover, whatever is eventually built inscribes current social relationships into the material environment in ways that often make them long-lasting, resistant to change, and distant from the social relations and process which created them. Thus, as I flesh out further below, major reconfigurations of the built environment and the associated politics and processes provide great promise for gaining a deeper understanding of the interconnection between large scale macroeconomic shifts, the ways in which capital, the state, and labor position themselves relative to those shifts, and the ways in which citizen subjectivities and cultural politics are articulated in and through the politics of the built environment. As Kathryne Mitchell (2004) has argued, “documenting in detail the transformation of space and consciousness in a particular urban environment makes it possible to understand the tightly interwoven relationship between socio-economic change, urban spatial transformation, and the narratives and practices of contemporary regimes of governance” (5). The term “built environment” refers to all human-made structures and their configuration. This includes infrastructure such as roads, bridges, highways, subdivisions, and public housing projects, as well as ports, wharves, and train yards. Examples are endless, of course. The built environment encapsulates sites of both production and reproduction, and its configuration is shaped largely by the interplay between the two. Workforce housing, road configuration, and public transportation – to name just a few – are designed to facilitate labor‟s access to work, commerce, and the transportation of goods. Each of these elements of the built environment exists in relation to the others – for example, sites of production and reproduction are in a particularly important relationship with one another and their relative location can be manipulated based on available transportation routes. Indeed, the tension between the needs and interests of labor and capital with respect to the built environment are often at the heart of struggles over land use.

#### Root cause args collapse resistance – they treat capitalism as too monolithic and ignore differences in everyday relations of power

Gibson-Graham 96

J.K,, feminist economist, 1996, End of Capitalism

One of our goals as Marxists has been to produce a knowledge of capitalism. Yet as “that which is known,” Capitalism has become the intimate enemy. We have uncloaked the ideologically-clothed, obscure monster, but we have installed a naked and visible monster in its place. In return for our labors of creation, the monster has robbed us of all force. We hear – and find it easy to believe – that the left is in disarray. Part of what produces the disarray of the left is the vision of what the left is arrayed against. When capitalism is represented as a unified system coextensive with the nation or even the world, when it is portrayed as crowding out all other economic forms, when it is allowed to define entire societies, it becomes something that can only be defeated and replaced by a mass collective movement (or by a process of systemic dissolution that such a movement might assist). The revolutionary task of replacing capitalism now seems outmoded and unrealistic, yet we do not seem to have an alternative conception of class transformation to take its place. The old political economic “systems” and “structures” that call forth a vision of revolution as systemic replacement still seem to be dominant in the Marxist political imagination. The New World Order is often represented as political fragmentation founded upon economic unification. In this vision the economy appears as the last stronghold of unity and singularity in a world of diversity and plurality. But why can’t the economy be fragmented too? If we theorized it as fragmented in the United States, we could being to see a huge state sector (incorporating a variety of forms of appropriation of surplus labor), a very large sector of self-employed and family-based producers (most noncapitalist), a huge household sector (again, quite various in terms of forms of exploitation, with some households moving towards communal or collective appropriation and others operating in a traditional mode in which one adult appropriates surplus labor from another). None of these things is easy to see. If capitalism takes up the available social space, there’s no room for anything else. If capitalism cannot coexist, there’s no possibility of anything else. If capitalism functions as a unity, it cannot be partially or locally replaced. My intent is to help create the discursive conception under which socialist or other noncapitalist construction becomes “realistic” present activity rather than a ludicrous or utopian goal. To achieve this I must smash Capitalism and see it in a thousand pieces. I must make its unity a fantasy, visible as a denial of diversity and change.

#### **The impact outweighs the K – everyday relations of violence prime people to accept and resort to macro-level violence**

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)

(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### **Revolutionary politics re-produce the relations of domination they aim to solve – they imagine class as a pure space of resistance outside of power**

Newman ‘00,

(Saul, Postdoctoral Fellow @ Macquarie University, Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment, muse)

What is the point of this distinction between power and domination? Does this not bring us back to original anarchist position that society and our everyday actions, although oppressed by power, are ontologically separated from it? In other words, why not merely call domination 'power' once again, and revert back to the original, Manichean distinction between social life and power? However the point of this distinction is to show that this essential separation is now impossible. Domination -- oppressive political institutions like the State -- now comes from the same world as power**.** In other words it disrupts the strict Manichean separation of society and power. Anarchism and indeed radical politics generally, cannot remain in this comfortable illusion that we as political subjects, are somehow not complicit in the very regime that oppresses us. According to the Foucauldian definition of power that I have employed, we are all potentially complicit, through our everyday actions, in relations of domination. Our everyday actions, which inevitably involve power, are unstable and can easily form into relations that dominate us. As political subjects we can never relax and hide behind essentialist identities and Manichean structures -- behind a strict separation from the world of power. Rather we must be constantly on our guard against the possibility of domination**.** Foucault says: "My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous...If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism."[[52]](http://208.34.222.250/bin/rdas.dll/RDAS_SVR=muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html#fn52) In order to resist domination we must be aware of its risks -- of the possibility that our own actions, even political action ostensibly against domination, can easily give rise to further domination. There is always the possibility, then, of contesting domination, and of minimizing its possibilities and effects. According to Foucault, domination itself is unstable and can give rise to reversals and resistance. Assemblages such as the State are based on unstable power relations that can just as easily turn against the institution they form the basis of. So there is always the possibility of resistance against domination. However resistance can never be in the form of revolution -- a grand dialectical overcoming of power, as the anarchists advocated. To abolish central institutions like the State with one stroke would be to neglect the multiform and diffuse relations of power they are based on, thus allowing new institutions and relations of domination to rise up. It would be to fall into the same reductionist trap as Marxism, and to court domination. Rather, resistance must take the form of what Foucault calls *agonism* -- an ongoing, strategic contestation with power -- based on mutual incitement and provocation -- without any final hope of being free from it.[[53]](http://208.34.222.250/bin/rdas.dll/RDAS_SVR=muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html#fn53) One can, as I have argued, never hope to overcome power completely -- because every overcoming is itself the imposition of another regime of power. The best that can be hoped for is a reorganization of power relations -- through struggle and resistance -- in ways that are less oppressive and dominating. Domination can therefore be minimized by acknowledging our inevitable involvement with power, not by attempting to place ourselves impossibly outside the world of power. The classical idea of revolution as a dialectical overthrowing of power -- the image that has haunted the radical political imaginary -- must be abandoned. We must recognize the fact that power can never be overcome entirely, and we must affirm this by working within this world, renegotiating our position to enhance our possibilities of freedom**.**

### Consumption K 2ac

#### **The alt fails – oil discourse is grounded in a discourse of entitlement that produces American exceptionalism, changing consumer behavior is a pre-requisite to collapsing nationalistic assumptions about cheap energy and avoiding future oil wars**

#### **They have no mechanism to resolve production-focused collapse of the environment – we control uniqueness, only a shift in perspective can establish ecological limits and avoid environmental collapse**

Princen 2

(Thomas Princen, Associate Professor of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy in the School of Natural Resources and Environment at the University of Michigan, where he also co-directs the Workshop on Consumption and Environment, Michael Maniates, Professor of Political Science and Environmental Science at Allegheny College, and Ken Conca, professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, 02, “Confronting Consumption,” *Confronting Consumption*, p. 14)

Given our dissatisfaction with prevailing, fragmentary approaches to consumption and its externalities, we seek an alternative perspective, a new angle on the consumption problem. We highlight here three critical themes as a provisional framework: emphasis on the social embedded-ness of consumption; attention to the linkages along commodity chains of resource use that shape consumption decisions; and stress on the hidden forms of consuming embedded in all stages of economic activity. These themes stand in contrast to the “production angle” and its underlying assumption of an economy with ever-expanding throughput of material and energy in the human system—an assumption that exists as if eco­logical, psychological, and social capacity were infinitely malleable and extendable. From our “consumption angle,” we assume just the oppo­site: that there are fundamental biophysical, psychological, and social limits that can be ignored or stretched or disguised only in the short term and only at increasing social, political, and economic cost. From the production angle, ever-increasing production is logical; displacement of costs onto others in time and space is normal competitive behavior. From the consumption angle, ever-increasing throughput and displacement of costs is ultimately destructive and self-defeating. In highlighting the dan­gers of exceeding social capacity and risking ecological overshoot, our intent is to question underlying assumptions, to stimulate thought, and to point to new forms of intervention.

#### Perm do both

#### **The permutation solves – we must combine institutional struggles and consumption analysis – creates green consciousness and allows individuals to internalize sustainability**

Connolly & Prothero 8

(John, Dublin City University, Andrea, University College Dublin, “Green Consumption: Life-politics, risk and contradictions”, *Journal of Consumer Culture* 2008 8: 117)

Of particular significance, within the context of this article, is the subject of individual responsibility. There is a view, put forward by some commen- tators (see Luke, 1997; Maniates, 2002) on environmental issues, that personal green consumption is in opposition to, or at least at the opposite end of the spectrum to, green collective political activism. For example, Maniates (2002) writes: ‘the individualization of responsibility, because it characterizes environmental problems as the consequence of destructive consumer choice, asks that individuals imagine themselves as consumers first and citizens second’ (p. 47). Furthermore, he goes on to argue that this has arisen as a result of the purposeful construction of an individualized politics. We argue that this belief is a misleading oversimplification and difficult to sustain. The data in this study suggest that such a clear demarcation may not exist. Clearly, as was illustrated previously in this study, the participants do attempt to address environmental concerns through a market-based mechanism, though not exclusively. These actions are the result of feeling a sense of moral responsibility to take individual action, often via the regulation of consuming, as the following examples further illustrate. I’ve stopped eating fish. Until our governments get to grips with the fact that fish inhabit the arena of global commons and start dealing with this, and stop grabbing all they can, and we find a way to fish without killing non-target species like dolphins and turtles, I’m not eating it. (Deirdre) You have got to take responsibility for the amount of waste you are taking out.You have got to take responsibility for the amount of waste you are taking in, in your food, in your lifestyle. If you buy a standard cleaning product, you are going to be flushing a load of chemicals down the drain. OK, it takes a lot of chemicals to cause damage to the environment, but say a freshwater river, if every person took responsibility for what they were getting rid of, the amount would be significantly reduced. I think it comes down to personal responsibility for the way you interact with your environment. Even if you are in a high-rise block or working in an office, you can still take responsibility for your impact on the environment. (Ciara) Such expressions can be viewed as positioning environmental degradation as a result of individual shortcomings that can be rectified by individual action. However, as we explained previously, the participants also experienced feelings of uncertainty and ambivalence in terms of what to do. For instance, Deirdre at one point actually gave up on attempting to live a green lifestyle. I just simply stopped thinking about environmental issues for quite a number of years, because it was too difficult to think about it; there was nothing that I could do, that I had no influences and nothing I could do, and it was too difficult to think about something like that without being able to do something about it. (Deirdre) Attempts at regulating personal consumption within particular practices must also be assessed alongside other practices in which the participants were engaged. These ranged from working (some on a voluntary basis) for environmental organizations affiliated to global environmental organiz- ations, working with local organizations concerned with planning and conservation in Ireland, and participating in anti-war protests14 as well as other localized activities. For example, Anne started a kids’ club in her local estate to introduce local children to environmental concepts and ideas. She is also involved in Global Action Plan (GAP)15 and hopes to help others to integrate green consumption activities into their lifestyles. While the environmental activism described in this study might be explained by our sample and the likelihood of very committed individuals taking part in the study, other studies have also found environmental activism interspersed with the regulation of personal consumption (see Dobscha and Ozanne, 2001; Shepherd, 2002; Horton, 2003). Green consumption is often criticized as a consumer activity detached from what are considered more politicized or citizen-based practices, essentially a substitute for action. Yet, as this study and others (see Shepherd, 2002; Horton, 2003) indicate, green consumption (a belief that green consumption is a means of addressing environmental concerns) takes place even amongst very committed environmental activists, who themselves are critical of aspects of green consumption as a strategy. Colin, for instance, who spent 20 years working in the motor industry and who now works for an environmental organization, feels that many in the green movement are middle class and there needs to be a concerted attempt to make it econ- omically attractive to less well-off people. However, he was also keen to articulate his attempts to consume in a green manner and how the organiz- ation he worked for was encouraging the greening of specific practices. Of course, the desire to consume green within the context of the practices of everyday life cannot be detached from the need to reflexively shape and develop a green subjectivity. As Horton (2003: 63) puts it: Material culture is a hugely significant constitutive component of this sphere of ‘the everyday’. Particular objects, and particular ways of living with the material world, are vital to the production and reproduction of both the everyday lives of environmental activists and environmentalism as a whole. Clearly, different levels of commitment exist amongst those who feel concern and responsibility for environmental issues. However, to view green consumption as an isolated activity detached from questions of distinction, subjectivity and indeed activism or citizenship is mistaken. While commercial organizations and market research enterprises are concerned with profiling those who purchase or may purchase green products and services, it should not be assumed that such acts of purchase are the only means by which green consumers engage and identify on an everyday level with environmental issues. Such a view also reduces consumption, as Miller (1995) puts it, to merely acts of purchase.

#### The alt can’t solve – environmentalism requires restrictions in final consumption to produce sustainability – only our method produces this shift

Boulanger 10

(Paul-Marie, Institute for Sustainable Development Belgium, “Three strategies for sustainable consumption”, S.A.P.I.EN.S [Online], 3.2 | 2010, http://sapiens.revues.org/1022#ftn6)

Besides its role in counteracting eco-efficiency rebound effects, there is another compelling environmental reason that favours a sufficiency strategy. Not all resources can benefit from eco-efficiency improvements. Some can be protected only by restricting harvesting, extraction or final consumption. For example, no eco-efficiency improvement in production processes (or in consumption practices) can ensure that fewer fishes are going to be harvested in the seas and oceans or fewer trees timbered in the forests. On the contrary, these are domains that are technological innovations that are run in the opposite direction, towards more and more harvesting. Only a restriction in consumption by way of rationing (harvesting quotas), such as heavy taxation on end-products (provided that the tax revenues will not find their way back into the overall consumption process) or voluntary abstinence can protect these kinds of resources. There are historical examples of such voluntary restrictions - at least at the collective level. Diamond (2005) reports the interesting case of Trobriand islanders who decided around 1600 to stop consuming (and, therefore, raising) pigs in order to protect the ecosystems of their island, which was severely hampered by their proliferation.

### Framework 2ac

#### Counter-interpretation – the affirmative may advocate an increase in investment either through an everyday life analysis, or from the perspective of the government

#### We meet – an increase in the gas tax advocates an increase in investment in transportation infrastructure

#### Our interpretation is predictable – allowing us to defend USFG action from the standpoint of everyday life is still a normative defense of government action – that limits us to discussing changes within the literature discussing increases in transportation infrastructure investment

#### Perspective is crucial – divorcing everyday life from the question of public policymaking is production-centered – this makes the central question of the debate the “efficiency” of the transportation infrastructure the USFG provides, ignoring the demand-side issue of why we need so much infrastructure

#### We have a couple DAs –

#### Entitlement discourse – ignoring everyday complicity in excessive oil consumption establishes it as a neutral background for transportation infrastructure – this embeds a sense of American entitlement to cheap oil in the topic research, infiltrating infrastructure with the exceptionalist belief that our way of life is sacred – the impact is oil wars and exn – Huber 9 says entitlement motivates oil resource wars and structures massive military-energy networks that use oil to finance arms sales – these relationships are the root cause of all major international conflicts

#### Externalization – focus on transportation infrastructure asks the question “how can we maintain our current standard of living?” – this question fails to confront the unsustainability of our current level of consumption and displaces the problem onto the USFG – the impact is extinction – Ehrenfield 5 says that excessive consumption causes runaway globalization and creates multiple feedback loops ensuring biosphere collapse – only focusing our world view on the everyday consumption relationships between individuals and nature can avoid inevitable eco-doom

#### They can’t win defense – making framework a voting issue fixes the history of oil consumption, and enframes transportation infrastructure within a limited set of questions about “efficiency” and “distribution” that are narrowly confined to problems of production – that ensures misrepresentation of the literature base and a gap between academic debate and reality – that’s Gunder and Hillier ‘9 – more evidence, intentionally focusing the debate on the wrong questions produces error replication and pedagogical failure

Bednarz 10

(Dan, president of Energy & Healthcare Consultants of Pittsburgh “Ethics, Epistemology, and Dirty Rotten Strategies” [http://healthafteroil.wordpress.com/2010/02/10/ethics-epistemology-and-%E2%80%9Cdirty-rotten-strategies%E2%80%9D/](http://healthafteroil.wordpress.com/2010/02/10/ethics-epistemology-and-%E2%80%9Cdirty-rotten-strategies%E2%80%9D/" \t "_blank))

Ian Mitroff and Abraham Silvers’ book, Dirty Rotten Strategies: How We Trick Ourselves and Others into Solving the Wrong Problems Precisely, addresses the inability, prevalent among political, economic and cultural elites and the highly educated who serve them, to think critically and properly formulate problems. This incapacity results in Type 3 Errors, which “is the unintentional error of solving the wrong problems precisely. In sharp contrast, the Type 4 Error is the intentional error of solving the wrong problems.” (Pg. 5) Their book offers insight to those who share my conviction that our society is arrantly unsustainable yet unable/unwilling to recognize the natural ecological and fiscal/economic sources of our predicament. Those of us who think we are not a dead species walking will be enlightened and challenged by the thought exercises in epistemology (how we know what we know) and ethics (what we ought to do) found in this book. The authors offer an integrated range of explanations for why political, corporate, military, medical, educational and cultural leaders end up honestly asking (Type 3 Error) or deceitfully devising (Type 4 Error) the wrong questions. Their framework is applicable to the economic contraction –and potential social collapse- now underway whose root or distal cause –in my view- is a decline in cheap net energy flows resulting from peak oil. For me, Mitroff and Silvers’ prominent observation is that, “Problems always require us to stand above them to better formulate them” (Pg. 177). They write: “One of the fundamental forms of Type Three and Type Four Errors occurs when … we elevate our preferred way of looking at the world [which no matter how “objective” and empirical remains a socially organized and sanctioned account] over all other ways of looking at it.” These errors are endemic because –despite all remonstrance to the contrary- Americans are not consistently socialized, educated and rewarded to value thinking in terms of systems and complexity. As a child I would naively ask adults, “What about…?” questions, and on occasion –usually by a teacher- I was rewarded for my inquisitiveness; but my vivid memory is of being told to “stop being a pest.” Everyone who has worked in a group knows the tacit bounds of discourse beyond which discussion is verboten. Indeed, organizations pursuing innovation consciously attempt to eliminate or attenuate this tendency towards what goes by various names such as, groupthink, institutional thinking, herd mentality, conformism, and so on. The authors conclude that in contemporary America, especially in politics, the facile solution –“kick the can down the road”- is the most likely option to be undertaken or propagated.

Their framework is heavily soaked with conservative ideology—the procedural “bracketing out” of our alternative of radical structural change is only meant to safeguard the status quo.

Meszaros, Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sussex, 89

(Istvan, Chair of philosophy @ U. of Sussex, The Power of Ideology, p. 232-234 GAL)

Nowhere is the myth of ideological neutrality – the self-proclaimed *Wertfeihert* or value neutrality of so-called ‘rigorous social science’ – stronger than in the field of methodology. Indeed, we are often presented with the claim that the adoption of the advocated methodological framework would automatically exempt one from all controversy about values, since they are systematically excluded (or suitably ‘bracketed out’) by the scientifically adequate method itself, thereby saving one from unnecessary complication and securing the desired objectivity and uncontestable outcome. Claims and procedures of this kind are, of course, extremely problematical. For they circularly *assume* that their enthusiasm for the virtues of ‘methodological neutrality’ is bound to yield ‘value neutral’ solutions with regard to highly contested issues, without first examining the all-important question as to the conditions of *possibility* – or otherwise – of the postulated systematic neutrality at the plane of methodology itself. The unchallengeable validity of the recommended procedure is supposed to be *self-evident* on account of its *purely methodological* character. In reality, of course, this approach to methodology is heavily loaded with a conservative ideological substance. Since, however, the plane of *methodology* (and ‘meta-theory’) is said to be *in principle* separated from that of the *substantive* issues, the methodological circle can be conveniently closed. Whereupon the mere insistence on the purely methodological character of the criteria laid down is supposed to establish the claim according to which the approach in question is neutral because everybody can adopt it as the common frame of reference of ‘rational discourse’. Yet, curiously enough, the proposed methodological tenets are so defined that vast areas of vital social concern are *a priori* excluded from this rational discourse as ‘metaphysical’, ‘ideological’, etc. The effect of circumscribing in this way the scope of the one and only admissible approach is that it automatically disqualifies, in the name of *methodology* itself, all those who do not fit into the stipulated framework of discourse. As a result, the propounders of the ‘right method’ are spared the difficulties that go with acknowledging the real divisions and incompatibilities as they necessarily arise from the contending social interests at the roots of alternative approaches and the rival sets of values associated with them**.** This is where we can seemore clearly the social orientation implicit in the whole procedure**.** For – far from offering an adequate scope for criticalenquiry – the advocated general adoption of the allegedly neutral methodological framework is equivalent, in fact, to consenting not even to raise the issues that really matter. Instead, the stipulated ‘common’ methodological procedure succeeds in transforming the enterprise of ‘rational discourse’ into the dubious practice of producing *methodology for the sake of methodology*: a tendency more pronounced in the twentieth century than ever before. This practice consists in sharpening the recommended methodological knife until nothing but the bare handle is left, at which point a new knife is adopted for the same purpose. For the ideal methodological knife is not meant for cutting, only for sharpening, thereby interposing itself between the critical intent and the real objects of criticism which it can obliterate for as long as the pseudo-critical activity of knife-sharpening for its own sake continues to be pursued. And that happens to be precisely its inherent ideological purpose. Naturally, to speak of a ‘common’ methodological framework in which one can resolve the problems of a society torn by irreconcilable social interest and ensuing antagonistic confrontations is delusory, at best, notwithstanding all talk about ‘ideal communication communities’. But todefine the methodological tenets of all rational discourse by way of transubstantiating into ‘ideal types’ (or by putting into methodological ‘brackets’) the discussion of contending social values reveals the ideological colour as well as the extreme fallaciousness of the claimed rationality. For such treatment of the major areas of conflict, under a great variety of forms – from the Viennes version of ‘logical positivism’ to Wittgenstein’s famous ladder that must be ‘thrown away’ at the point of confronting the question of values, and from the advocacy of the Popperian principle of ‘little by little’ to the ‘emotivist’ theory of value – inevitably always favours the established order. And it does so by declaring the fundamental structural parameters of the given society ‘out of bounds’ to the potential contestants, on the authority of the ideally ‘common’ methodology. However, even on a cursory inspection of the issues at stake it ought to be **fairly** obvious that to consent *not* to question the fundamental structural framework of the established order is *radically* different according to whether one does so as the beneficiary of that order or from the standpoint of those who find themselves at the receiving end, exploited and oppressed by the overall determinations (and not just by some limited and more or less easily corrigible detail)of that order**.** Consequently, to establish the ‘common’ identity of the two, opposed sides of a structurally safeguarded hierarchical order – by means of the reduction of the people who belong to the contending social forces into fictitious ‘rational interlocutors’, extracted from their divided real world and transplanted into a beneficially shared universe of ideal discourse – would be nothing short of a methodological miracle. Contrary to the wishful thinking hypostatized as a timeless and socially unspecified rational communality, the elementary condition of a truly rational discourse would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of contesting the given orderof societyin *substantive* terms**.** This would imply the articulation of the relevant problemsnot on the plan of self-referential theory and methodology, but as inherently *practical* issues whose conditions of solution point towards the necessity of radical structural changes.In other words, it would require the explicit rejection of all fiction of methodological and meta-theoretical neutrality. But, of course, this would be far too much to expect precisely because the society in which we live is a deeply divided society. This is why through the dichotomies of ‘fact and value’, ‘theory and practice’, ‘formal and substantive rationality’, etc., the conflict-transcending methodological miracle is constantly stipulated as the necessary regulative framework of ‘rational discourse’ in the humanities and social sciences, in the interest of the *ruling ideology*. What makes this approach particularly difficult to challenge is that its value-commitments are mediated by methodological precepts to such a degree that it is virtually impossible to bring them into the focus of the discussion without openly contesting the framework as a whole. For the conservative sets of values at the roots of such orientation remain several steps removed from the ostensible subject of dispute as defined in logico/methodological, formal/structural, and semantic/analytical terms. And who would suspect of ideological bias the impeccable – methodologically sanctioned – credentials of ‘procedural rules’, ‘models’ and ‘paradigms’?

### Framework 1ar

#### \*\*Not a must-read card but if the vast majority of the block is framework its probably helpful

#### Their interp depoliticizes debate and ensures the disciplinary cooption of all politics.

Holloway 2002

(Johnny, School of International Service American University, [www.isanet.org/noarchive/holloway.html](http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/holloway.html))

What separates critical theory most significantly from other modes of analysis is the value placed on cognition. While critical theory does encompass the positivist elements of reality like observable events and physical matter, its larger focus is on the non-observable elements of reality – thoughts, beliefs, values, language– that govern human interaction (Alway 1995, 105; Campbell 1992, 4-5; Guess 1981, 56). As is elegantly stated in the passage from Michel Foucault above, to be critical is not simply a matter of proffering criticism. Mere disparagement and other expressions of disapproval towards existing conditions are inadequate; true critical theory must address the dominant ideology – the basic thoughts and beliefs that form the bedrock of specific behaviors, policies, actions, etc that in turn formulate, reinforce, and perpetuate existing conditions. The basis of this address is reflection, the intellectual act of holding up a mirror to truly examine – and question – the world-view embraced by both the individual and the larger society of which he or she is a member (Leonard 1990, 4). By weighing the beliefs and assumptions held about (for example) society against the knowledge of the origins of those beliefs and assumptions combined with observable facts (e.g. consistently disproportionate allocation of resources, pervasive injustice, etc), real and rigorous reflection undermines and eventually shatters this world-view. By turning things on its head, the individual becomes enlightened; aware of those coercive elements (both self-imposed and produced and reproduced by the institutions of society) that have formed the ideology that had heretofore permitted the justification of a hypocrisy of incommensurate words and deeds. Moreover, this realization will not permit a simple acknowledgment; it compels actionand understandably so – the world (or some aspect of it) as one knew it to be is no more. “Although reflection alone can’t do away with real social oppression, it can free ... agents from unconscious complicity in thwarting their own legitimate desires” (Guess 1981, 75). At a minimum, reflection can bring about an intellectual freedom that compels advocacy for change through a basic rationality (i.e., one plus one is supposed to equal two; not six). After outlining these elements of critical theory – cognition, reflection, enlightenment – it becomes increasing evident as to the utility of this approach in regards to the question of the War on Drugs. Measurements of such things as total tons of cocaine seized or annual budgets for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in and of themselves can only offer a description of events – not an explanation for them or the policies that promulgate them. Consider the following assessment: Many Americans approach questions of drug ... policy with standard-issue drug war eyeglasses ... crafted from particular beliefs and values rooted in American political culture. When they hear the word narcotics, they hear danger and crime ... When they consider how the government should respond, they think “get tough”; and when the problem does not improve, they conclude that more force and more threats are needed (Bertram, et al: 57). In order to get to the why’s at the heart of the matter (e.g. Why view through this lens and not another? Why use the military metaphor?, etc), any meaningful analysis is going to have address the thoughts, beliefs, assumptions, and language that privileges certain responses over others. Confronted with a policy focused on eradication and interdiction that has been pursued for roughly twenty years, at a cost of billions of dollars, with advocates who claim that “victory” is imminent1[8] on one hand and wide scale evidence of an ever increasing supply of drugs at stable (and sometimes decreasing) prices essentially unaffected by that policy on the other, a “what is wrong with the is picture?” frame of analysis is imperative. Recognition of the wrongness of that picture and the reasons why is inherently emancipating– a freedom that may be limited to a personal refusal to accept the platitudes that shroud hypocrisy or may result in adding another voice to the call for greater introspection and larger understanding.

### AT Russia Oil DA

#### Current levels of oil consumption are unsustainable – the existing transportation infrastructure system organizes warfare and generates massive structural violence

Roberts 03 – professor of public health at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine

Ian Roberts, 18 January 2003, “The US Economy Needs Oil Like a Junkie Needs Heroin - And Iraq Will Supply Its Next Fix”, http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0118-01.htm

War in Iraq is inevitable. That there would be war was decided by North American planners in the mid-1920s. That it would be in Iraq was decided much more recently. The architects of this war were not military planners but town planners. War is inevitable not because of weapons of mass destruction, as claimed by the political right, nor because of western imperialism, as claimed by the left. The cause of this war, and probably the one that will follow, is car dependence. The US has paved itself into a corner. Its physical and economic infrastructure is so highly car dependent that the US is pathologically addicted to oil. Without billions of barrels of precious black sludge being pumped into the veins of its economy every year, the nation would experience painful and damaging withdrawal. The first Model T Ford rolled off the assembly line in 1908 and was a miracle of mass production. In the first decade of that century, car registrations in the US increased from 8,000 to almost 500,000. Within the cities, buses replaced trams, and then cars replaced buses. In 1932, General Motors bought up America's tramways and then closed them down. But it was the urban planners who really got America hooked. Car ownership offered the possibility of escape from dirty, crowded cities to leafy garden suburbs and the urban planners provided the escape routes. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, America "road built" itself into a nation of home-owning suburbanites. In the words of Joni Mitchell: "They paved paradise and put up a parking lot." Cities such as Los Angeles, Dallas and Phoenix were molded by the private passenger car into vast urban sprawls which are so widely spread that it is now almost impossible to service them economically with public transport. As the cities sprawled, the motor manufacturing industry consolidated. Car-making is now the main industrial employer in the world, dominated by five major groups of which General Motors is the largest. The livelihood and landscape of North Americans were forged by car-makers. Motor vehicles are responsible for about one-third of global oil use, but for nearly two-thirds of US oil use. In the rest of the world, heating and power generation account for most oil use. The increase in oil prices during the 1973 Arab oil embargo encouraged the substitution of other fuels in heating and power generation, but in the transport sector there is little scope for oil substitution in the short term. Due to artificially low oil and gasoline prices that did not reflect the true social costs of production and use, there was little incentive to seek alternative energy sources. The Arab oil embargo temporarily stimulated greater fuel efficiency with the introduction of gasoline consumption standards, but the increasing popularity of gas-guzzling sports utility vehicles over the past decade has substantially reduced the average fuel efficiency of the US car fleet. The US transportation sector is almost totally dependent on oil, and supplies are running out. It is estimated that the total amount of oil that can be pumped out of the earth is about 2,000 billion barrels and that world oil production will peak in the next 10 to 15 years. Since even modest reductions in oil production can result in major hikes in the cost of gasoline, the US administration is well aware of the importance of ensuring oil supplies. Every major oil price shock of the past 30 years was followed by a US recession and every major recession was preceded by an oil price shock. In 1997, the Carnegie commission on preventing deadly conflict identified factors that put states at risk. They include rapid population changes that outstrip the capacity of the state to provide essential services, and the control of valuable natural resources by a single group. Both factors are key motivators in the war with Iraq. Sprawling suburban America needs oil and Saddam Hussein is sitting on it. The US economy needs oil like a junkie needs heroin and Iraq has 112 billion barrels, the largest supply in the world outside Saudi Arabia. Even before the first shot has been fired, there have been discussions about how Iraq's oil reserves will be carved up. All five permanent members of the UN security council have international oil companies that have an interest in "regime change" in Baghdad. Car dependence is a global public health issue of which gasoline wars are only one facet. Every day about 3,000 people die and 30,000 people are seriously injured on the world's roads in traffic crashes. More than 85% of the deaths are in low and middle-income countries, with pedestrians, cyclists and bus passengers bearing most of the burden. Most of the victims will never own a car, and many are children. By 2020, road crashes will have moved from ninth to third place in the world ranking of the burden of disease and injury, and will be in second place in developing countries. That we accept this carnage as the collateral damage in a car-based transport system indicates the strength and pervasiveness of car dependency. Moreover, car travel has reduced our walking. One-quarter of all car journeys are less than two miles. A 3km walk uses up about half the energy in a small bar of chocolate. The same distance by car expends 10 times as much energy but from the wrong source. We can make chocolate but oil reserves are finite. Car use and the corresponding decline in physical activity is an important cause of the obesity epidemic in the US and UK, and physical inactivity increases the risks of heart disease, diabetes, osteoporosis and hypertension. Car-based shopping has turned many small towns into ghost towns and has severed the supportive social networks of community interaction. The first gasoline war was waged in Kuwait and the second will be waged in Iraq. The world must act now to prevent the third. On the brink of war with Iraq, Tony Blair is playing the role of tough world leader. But transport, not Iraq, is the truly tough issue. His deputy, John Prescott, tried and failed to deal with car dependency and now the government is in policy retreat. Ken Livingstone, who does not own a car and has leadership qualities that Blair lacks, may with congestion charging succeed where others have failed, but his enemies have the support of powerful lobby groups. Those who oppose war in Iraq must work together to prevent the conflicts that will follow if we fail to tackle car dependency. We must reclaim the streets, promote walking and cycling, strengthen public transport, oppose new road construction and pay the full social cost of car use. We must argue for land-use policies that reduce the need for car travel. We need "urban villages" clustered around public transport nodes, not sprawling car-dependent conurbations. We can all play our part and we must act now.

#### It’s try or die for changing oil consumption – all future wars will be fought because of excessive oil shortages

Roberts 04 – author of "The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World."

28 June 2004, Paul Roberts, “The Undeclared Oil War”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10714-2004Jun27.html

In the United States and Europe, new demand for electricity is outpacing the new supply of power and natural gas and raising the specter of more rolling blackouts. In the "emerging" economies, such as Brazil, India and especially China, energy demand is rising so fast it may double by 2020. And this only hints at the energy crisis facing the developing world, where nearly 2 billion people -- a third of the world's population -- have almost no access to electricity or liquid fuels and are thus condemned to a medieval existence that breeds despair, resentment and, ultimately, conflict. In other words, we are on the cusp of a new kind of war -- between those who have enough energy and those who do not but are increasingly willing to go out and get it. While nations have always competed for oil, it seems more and more likely that the race for a piece of the last big reserves of oil and natural gas will be the dominant geopolitical theme of the 21st century. Already we can see the outlines. China and Japan are scrapping over Siberia. In the Caspian Sea region, European, Russian, Chinese and American governments and oil companies are battling for a stake in the big oil fields of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. In Africa, the United States is building a network of military bases and diplomatic missions whose main goal is to protect American access to oilfields in volatile places such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and tiny Sao Tome -- and, as important, to deny that access to China and other thirsty superpowers. The diplomatic tussles only hint at what we'll see in the Middle East, where most of the world's remaining oil lies. For all the talk of big new oil discoveries in Russia and Africa -- and of how this gush of crude will "free" America and other big importers from the machinations of OPEC -- the geological facts speak otherwise. Even with the new Russian and African oil, worldwide oil production outside the Middle East is barely keeping pace with demand.

#### We have specific scenarios – oil dependence makes US-China conflict over African oil resources inevitable

Horn 11 – researcher and writer

Steve Horn, 8 November 2011, “Has Obama Just Kicked Off Another Oil War -- This Time in Africa?”, http://www.alternet.org/environment/152976/has\_obama\_just\_kicked\_off\_another\_oil\_war\_--\_this\_time\_in\_africa?page=entire

Though ExxonMobil and Tullow Oil lost out on the corrupt oil bid in late 2009, while exploration has been done, drilling has yet to occur in Uganda. In that vein, 100 U.S. JSOC troops, likely teaming up with Erik Prince, Salim Saleh and Yoweri Museveni-backed mercenaries, have swooped into the Lake Albert area to secure the prize, oil, before its rival does. The opponent? China. On October 24, Tullow sold $2.9 billion worth of its shares of oil to France's Total Oil and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), though it has yet to be approved by the Museveni government and requires his approval. Throughout all of this, it is vital to bear in mind the bigger picture, which is that the United States and China have been competing against one another in the new "African Scramble" for Africa's valuable oil resources. Serge Michel and Michel Beuret, in their 2009 book China Safari: On the Trail of Beijing's Expansion in Africa, write, "China's advances in Africa's oil-rich regions have been viewed with concern bordering on paranoia in the United States....[It] could...deteriorate into a a head-to-head clash between China and the United States, prompting the kind of open conflict that some see as inevitable by 2030." One has to wonder what will happen with regards to this recent oil deal, knowing the players involved, and seeing the geopolitical and resources maneuvering taking place in the Lake Albert region. If the United States and its well-connected guns-for-hire have any say, Tullow Oil, Heritage Oil, ExxonMobil will take home all the royalties, and CNOOC will be sent home packing.

#### Self-fulfilling prophecy – oil demands construction of enemies in order to protect US infrastructure – drives global geopolitical conflict

Priest 12 – Clinical Professor and Director of Global Studies at University of Houston

Tyler Priest, Journal of American History (June 2012) 99 (1): 236-251, “ the dilemmas of oil empire”, http://jah.oxfordjournals.org/content/99/1/236.full

Rather than paring back its global military presence, the United States enlarged it—a sign that U.S. global supremacy had been destabilized instead of strengthened by the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Concerns about access to oil, even in the low-price environment of the 1980s, and the escalation of competition for resources in the 1990s, transformed the U.S. military into what could arguably be called a “global oil-protection service.” The 1983 establishment of the U.S. Central Command for the Persian Gulf activated the Carter Doctrine, which pledged to use “any means necessary, including military force,” to keep the oil flowing from that increasingly unstable region. Successive U.S. administrations made sure that no nation in the Middle East would emerge as a dominant or independent regional power. Thus, the United States supported Iraq in its brutal war against postrevolutionary Iran. Then, after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991, U.S. and United Nations forces rolled back the Iraqi army in Operation Desert Storm. Following the liberation of Kuwait, the United States ratcheted up its commitment to the region through a decade-long effort to contain Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.31 U.S. “petro-imperialism” filled a post–Cold War power vacuum in the oil hot spots of the world. During the mid-1990s President Bill Clinton applied the Carter Doctrine to Latin America, West Africa, and Central Asia. Most notably, the U.S. injection of military forces into the Balkans, the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the cultivation of military alliances with post-Soviet “Pipelineistans” influenced transportation routes to the West for large oil and gas discoveries the Caspian basin. Upon taking office in 2000, President George W. Bush expanded military responsibilities and troops assigned to the Central Command to cover both the Persian Gulf and Caspian basin. After the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, which stemmed from grievances related to the stationing of the U.S. Army in Saudi Arabia during the 1990–1991 Gulf War, the 2003 U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq implemented a plan hatched by neoconservatives in the 1970s to extend formal U.S. control over the region. In 2007, as an additional twenty thousand U.S. troops “surged” into Iraq, the U.S. Department of Defense established a new unified Africa Command to safeguard growing oil production in West Africa and counter Chinese designs on African mineral resources.32

#### **Truth claims – oil geopolitics is racist – “stability” arguments are merely anxiety about a lack of US control over the oil system that generates a war of all against all to maintain existing prices**

Huber ‘11

(Matt, Department of Geography, Syracuse University, “Shocked: “Energy Crisis” and Neoliberal Transformation in the 1970s”, globetrotter.berkeley.edu/bwep/colloquium/papers/Huber\_Shocked.pdf)

Thus, in 1972 it appeared the US had reached its geological limits. Of course, it was during the same year, that the Club of Rome issued its now infamous The Limits to Growth which undergirded a decade fixated upon scarcity and the exhaustibility of nonrenewable resources (like fossil fuels) upon which modern industrial capitalism depends.42 A 1974 Op-Ed in the New York Times titled “An Age of Scarcity,” problematizing abundance as only a “modern idea.” More than other commodities, the scarcity of oil – with its pervasive embeddedness in all forms of everyday practice – signaled a larger crisis. While there were shortages of many commodities in the 1970s, one editorial states, “Not wheat, nor newsprint, nor beef came close to discommoding as many Americans as do gas and oil.”43 As early as 1972, an Editorial decaled, “the energy crisis...threatens the American way of life, at least that life that means color television, frostless freezer, self-cleaning ovens, and electric grills, knives, combs and toothbrushes.”44 The centrality of energy powering a whole set automatic machineries and social reproductive practices was suddenly problematized. The multiplicity of petroleum products provided the materiality underneath an individualized vision of control over the stuff of life – space, the home, the body – but, the 1970s witnessed innumerable events that put this control over life into question. The imaginary of finite fossil fuels was also rooted in a corresponding discourse of energy nationalism which produced anxiety over increasing reliance on energy not found within the territorial boundaries of the U.S. nation-state. Thus, alongside oil’s exhaustibility, the geopolitics of oil is also profoundly shaped by the uneven geography of deposits. Foreign Oil and the Territoriality of Dependence One of the most basic geographical problems with petroleum (and other mineral resources) is that deposits are unevenly distributed and materially fixed in space. During the postwar period, the scalar contradictions of petroleum governance in the United States were worked out to construct what could be called a Fordist national oil regime wherein mass oil consumption was largely provisioned by domestic production. It is fashionable to trace US dependence upon foreign oil to 1945 when Franklin Roosevelt had his famous meeting with Saudi King Saud on an American warship along the Suez Canal.45 But, this meeting was not about securing Saudi Arabian oil for American consumers, but rather for US oil capital. With its Americanized enclaves, US oil companies exploited domestic and migrant workers in the Saudi oil fields to mainly export oil to Europe and Japan; not the United States. 46 Foreign oil was seen as a problem long before the 1970s, but the concern was mainly articulated by a coalition of independent high-cost domestic oil producers.47 With clear memories of the crisis in East Texas, these producers feared that prices would collapse if cheap foreign oil was allowed to flood the domestic market. Precisely because of the actions by state prorationing agencies to restrict output and keep prices high, oil produced from Venezuela to the Middle East was considerably cheaper to produce. Although estimates varied, Prindle suggests that in 1960 an average barrel of crude in the Middle East cost $.20 to produce, while the US level averaged $1.75 (a number that may itself be reflective of proration policies).48 Thus, until the 1970s, “foreign oil” – especially the massive reserves in the Middle East – was constructed as a grave, but narrow and sectoral, threat to the domestic US oil petroleum industry. International Companies – and even independent refiners – always had a strong incentive to import this cheap oil and capture markets within the high priced markets of the United States. The contradictory tendencies of this arrangement revealed themselves very early on in the 1950s. Table 1 shows the level of imports and the percentage of imports quenching demand throughout much of the postwar period. The slow and steady increase in imports both in raw numbers and as a percentage of demand was considerable. The pace, however, could have been considerably greater had not the Eisenhower Administration installed the mandatory import quota program that remained in effect between 1959 and 1973. This program putatively attempted to fix the level of crude imports at 12.2 percent of domestic demand, but a complicated set of exemptions by refineries and geography ensured that the level was higher than that. Nevertheless, Bohi and Russell estimate that if the program were not instituted imports would have constituted 61% of domestic consumption in 1970.49 The program served to mollify the contradictory tendencies inherent within the entire system of prorationing – namely, the maintenance of national high cost producers in the face of a global geography of low-cost production.50 Only in the 1970s did the concept of “foreign oil” begin to become problematized not from the perspective of oil producers, but oil consumers. Americans were not worried about foreign sources of coffee, bananas, or, increasingly, manufactured consumer goods, but oil’s saturation of social reproduction and centrality to ideas of life, home, freedom, and mobility made dependence upon foreign oil seem unduly precarious. Ever since, leaders have continued to promise the territorial trap of an energy system contained within American borders in the name of “energy independence.” Richard Nixon’s first major speech after the OPEC embargo initiated a new “Project Independence” which unrealistically promised American independence from foreign oil by 1980. Moreover, oil’s fixity in space (and declining reserves within the US territory) created increasing geostrategic discourses where access to oil for the reproduction of American life was equated with national security, or what was eventually termed “energy security.”53 Amongst politicians and intellectuals, the oil crisis was represented as a great geopolitical confrontation between the United States and Europe and the rising power of OPEC and oil producing countries. The effective use by OPEC of what was called the “oil weapon” seemed to reverse the many centuries of Euro-American global domination.54 It was the mere assertion of power by non-Western countries that was seen as so shocking and unacceptable. On a more popular level, the politics of oil were shot through with a racialized politics of anti-Arab xenophobia. Countless political cartoons saturated American newspapers with highly caricatured images of obese Arab oil men (and they were always men) cynically plotting their next draconian imposition of pain on American consumers. This racialized politics circulated founds its purchase in popular culture through anger over US exports to these very nations. By the second oil shock of 1979, country music star, Bobby Butler, released “Cheaper crude or no more food” which echoed a longstanding sentiment that the US fed the world and thus could cut off food supplies as retribution. One letter to Nixon’s energy czar in 1973 presciently summed up the song’s message, “Tell the Arabs, ‘You drink your oil and we’ll eat our grain.”55 As I will detail later, the primary objection emerging from popular discourse was that Arab nations were unfairly intervening within the marketplace. Yet, for most Americans, the energy crisis was less about geopolitical confrontation and foreign policy, and more about the “shock” of gasoline lines and limits to everyday geographies of social reproduction combined with spiraling inflation, or what was called “the rising cost of living”. Freedom on Fumes: Gasoline Lines and the Geography of Limits During the winter of 1973-1974, and again in the summer of 1979, consumers witnessed winding lines at gasoline pumps in different parts of the country, limits on how much gasoline could be purchased, and outbursts of violence between and among consumers and gas station attendants. One attendant in Bradenton, FL was killed by being crushed between two cars when an eager driver propelled the car in front of him forward into the victim.56 In Pennsylvania, Bruce Hibbs obtained a 12-gauge shotgun joining “a number of operators who are toting guns to protect themselves.”57 Theft from gas stations and automobiles themselves was not uncommon. No longer taken for granted, access to gasoline appeared as a Hobbesian “war of all against all.” The geopolitical narrative of dependence and insecurity translated well to the everyday struggle for gasoline. Just as the OPEC embargo was represented as a lack of US control over distant spaces, the gasoline shortage was characterized by a sudden and dramatic limitation to the privatized command over space central the postwar vision of entrepreneurial life. For many short on gasoline, the most pressing concern was how to traverse the new suburban geography marked by vast spaces between home and work. This new geography made private automobile commuting the only option, and, therefore, the sudden lack of gasoline was framed as an unjust threat to livelihood. As one writer from the infamously suburban Southern California put it to President Nixon’s Energy Office, “Many thousands of us have no public transportation to get to our jobs and rely on our cars. I have to travel 70 miles a day round trip to work and no bus could get me there. I must drive, and soon I’ll be unable to buy gas or afford it. This isn’t right!”58

### Exceptionalism Bad Impacts

#### **Petro-exceptionalism is uniquely bad – combines environmental catastrophe and imperial foreign policy – ensures extinction**

Foster 8 – professor of sociology at the University of Oregon

July/August 2008, John Bellamy Foster, “Peak Oil and Energy Imperialism”, http://www.cym.ie/documents/peak\_oil.pdf

Yet, heavy levels of fossil fuel, and particularly petroleum, consumption are built into the structure of the present world capitalist economy. The immediate response of the system to the end of easy oil has been therefore to turn to a new energy imperialism—a strategy of maximum extraction by any means possible: with the object of placating what Rachel Carson once called “the gods of profit and production.” 44 This, however, presents the threat of multiple global conflagrations: global warming, peak oil, rapidly rising world hunger (resulting in part from growing biofuel production), and nuclear war—all in order to secure a system geared to growing inequality. In the face of the immense perils now facing life on the planet, the world desperately needs to take a new direction; toward communal well-being and global justice: a socialism for the planet. The immense danger now facing the human species, it should be understood, is not due principally to the constraints of the natural environment, whether geological or climatic, but arises from a deranged social system wheeling out of control, and more specifically, U.S. imperialism. This is the challenge of our time.

#### Structural violence – American exceptionalism has organized a network of global violence, while treating that destruction as historically pre-ordained – only ethical accountability for violence avoids future atrocities

Monkerud ‘10

(Don is a California-based writer who follows cultural, social and political issues. His articles have been published in a variety of magazines and newspapers, including Omni, *San Francisco Chronicle, Mac Week, New York Times, San Jose Mercury News, Humanities* and *Z Magazine*, “Demanding American ‘Exceptionalism’”, December 10th, 2010)

[http://www.consortiumnews.com/2010/121010a.html]

This latest super-patriotic call seeks to revive a concept dragged from the dustbin of history by George W. Bush. Bush resurrected American exceptionalism as an excuse for his destruction of Iraq, and the unilateral disregard for the rest of the world. Under Bush, the U.S. overturned international treaties, denounced the U.N. and international cooperation -- except when to America's advantage -- and rejected legal views routinely accepted around the world. Bush and his neocon cheerleaders claimed that the U.S. has its own set of rules, judgments, and solutions to every issue, based on national advantage. Many of today's politicians, urged on by Fox News, are replaying these old arguments. Exceptionalism reaches back to historic national decisions that were similar to the invasion of Iraq: dropping the atomic bomb on Japan; clearing out indigenous people to make room for white settlers; and enslaving Africans to build and run plantations. Those in favor of such moves claim God gave America a unique right to rule, and ignore the rest of the world, because we are special. In one way, exceptionalism is merely another weapon now being used to undermine President Obama and pave the way for the GOP to capture the presidency in 2012. The term also justifies conservative policies, such as unbridled capitalism, limited government, abolishing taxes, and imposing Christianity on the nation. Let's examine the concept. A 2008 Brookings Institute conference on American Exceptionalism outlined the ways Americans diverge from world opinion. Some 75 percent of Americans are proud of their country, while only a third of Germans and Japanese are. Half of Americans consider a public safety net important while 75 percent of Europeans do. Two-thirds of Americans believe success comes from individual effort, while the same proportion of Europeans believes success is the result of forces beyond their control. Above all, America is deeply rooted in religious belief. Half of Americans believe God is essential to morality, while only a third of Europeans do. Forty percent of Americans go to church once a week, while less than 10 percent attend in Europe. Do these characteristics justify America forcing its will on the rest of the world? The notion of exceptionalism includes the boast that America is the greatest nation on earth. Perhaps because few Americans read newspapers or travel abroad, they cannot adequately judge the truth of this claim. Corporate-controlled politicians claim America has "the greatest healthcare system in the world," only to reveal their ignorance. The World Health Organization ranked the U.S. 37th among nations in healthcare performance in 2000, although we pay more for less service. Numerous studies reveal that the U.S. is mediocre in treating illness. For example, compared to the G-8 countries, the U.S. has the highest infant mortality, the most mothers who die during childbirth, the most lives lost that could have been saved, and the worst in treatment of cancer. The U.N. rates the U.S. even worse: 74th in healthcare performance. And in 2009, the C.I.A. ranked the U.S. 49th in life expectancy in the world. Nor is the U.S. "the greatest" in essential categories. The U.S. is second after the European Union in GDP, 41st out of 130 in public debt, has the worst balance of trade of any country, and is 32nd in student math, reading and scientific performance. We do have the greatest wealth disparity in the world. In 2007, our top ten percent controlled 72 percent of the wealth, while the bottom 50 percent controlled 2.5 percent. The poverty rate increased from 12 to 14 percent since 2004, and the current recession has left over a quarter of the working population either under-or un-employed. The U.S. does have the most expensive military in the world because we spend almost as much as the rest of the world combined. We also spend more on our for-profit medical system-two and-a-half-times more than the world average. Pointing out an anomaly of historic development is one thing, but adopting "exceptionalism" as government policy ignores the disastrous failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, the meltdown of the world economy, huge national deficits, and the rise of Iran and China on the international scene. Flag-waving politicians like Mike Huckabee, Mitt Romney, Rick Santorum, Mike Pence, and Newt Gingrich use the concept of "exceptionalism" to prove how much they love America. Such hyper-nationalism, usually tied to a Christian God, denies our common humanity with the rest of the world, undercuts international cooperation, and promotes an arrogant disregard for world opinion. It remains to be seen how Americans will react when they realize their imperial ambitions in the New American Century -- a neocon dream of world dominance -- is a hollow myth. America lived beyond its means for too long and now must accept its place in a new world. China, the E.U. and even small countries increasingly challenge America's role in the world. Will the U.S. become isolationist, engage in more militaristic adventures, or join the nations of the world to push for world peace? We shall see.

### Exceptionalism Bad Solvency

#### Imperial overstretch makes the collapse of hegemony inevitable – our criticism is key to preventing the violent transitions they describe

Bacevich ’08 [Andrew J., “The Limits of Power: The end of American Exceptionalism” http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ZnG-ZlzrA\_gC&oi=fnd&pg=PP7&dq=american+exceptionalism&ots=EPlU23PpnV&sig=\_l39-1Bk3pbRv9GJTDfheEkkKeA#v=onepage&q=american%20exceptionalism&f=false]

One sees this, for example, in the way that heightened claims of individual autonomy have eviscerated the concept of citizenship. Yesterday's civic obligations have become today's civic options. What once rated as duties — rallying to the country's defense at times of great emergency, for example — are now matters of choice. As individuals, Americans never cease to expect more. As members of a community, especially as members of a national community, they choose to contribute less. Meanwhile, American political leaders — especially at the national level — have proven unable (or unwilling) to address the disparity between how much we want and what we can afford to pay. Successive administrations, abetted by Congress, have deepened a looming crisis of debt and dependency through unbridled spending. As Vice President Dick Cheney, a self- described conservative, announced when told that cutting taxes might be at odds with invading Iraq, "Deficits don't matter." Politicians of both parties certainly act as if they don't. Expectations that the world beyond our borders should accommodate the American way of life are hardly new. Since 9/11, however, our demands have become more insistent. In that regard, the neoconservative writer Robert Kagan is surely correct in observing that "America did not change on September 11. It only became more itself." In the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Washington's resolve that nothing interfere with the individual American's pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness only hardened. That resolve found expression in the Bush administration's with- us- or- against- us rhetoric, in its disdain for the United Nations and traditional American allies, in its contempt for international law, and above all in its embrace of preventive war. When President Bush declared in his second inaugural that the "survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands," he was in effect claiming for the United States as freedom's chief agent the prerogative of waging war when and where it sees fit, those wars by definition being fought on freedom's behalf. In this sense, the Long War genuinely qualifies as a war to preserve the American way of life (centered on a specific conception of liberty) and simultaneously as a war to extend the American imperium (centered on dreams of a world remade in America's image), the former widely assumed to require the latter. Yet, as events have made plain, the United States is ill prepared to wage a global war of no exits and no deadlines. The sole superpower lacks the resources — economic, political, and military — to support a large- scale, protracted conflict without, at the very least, inflicting severe economic and political damage on itself. American power has limits and is inadequate to the ambitions to which hubris and sanctimony have given rise. Here is the central paradox of our time: While the defense of American freedom seems to demand that U.S. troops fight in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, the exercise of that freedom at home undermines the nation's capacity to fight. A grand bazaar provides an inadequate basis upon which to erect a vast empire. Meanwhile, a stubborn insistence on staying the course militarily ends up jeopardizing freedom at home. With Americans, even in war time, refusing to curb their appetites, the Long War aggravates the economic contradictions that continue to produce debt and dependency. Moreover, a state of perpetual national security emergency aggravates the disorders afflicting our political system, allowing the executive branch to accrue ever more authority at the expense of the Congress and disfiguring the Constitution. In this sense, the Long War is both self-defeating and irrational.

#### Debate is key– citizen dissent produces effective resistance to US imperialism

Bacevich ’8 [Andrew J., “The Limits of Power: The end of American Exceptionalism” http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ZnG-ZlzrA\_gC&oi=fnd&pg=PP7&dq=american+exceptionalism&ots=EPlU23PpnV&sig=\_l39-1Bk3pbRv9GJTDfheEkkKeA#v=onepage&q=american%20exceptionalism&f=false]

Niebuhr once wrote, "One of the most pathetic aspects of human history is that every civilization expresses itself most pretentiously, compounds its partial and universal values most convincingly, and claims immortality for its finite existence at the very moment when the decay which leads to death has already begun." Future generations of historians may well cite Niebuhr's dictum as a concise explanation of the folly that propelled the United States into its Long War. In an immediate sense, it is the soldier who bears the burden of such folly. U.S. troops in battle dress and body armor, whom Americans profess to admire and support, pay the price for the nation's collective refusal to confront our domestic dysfunction. In many ways, the condition of the military today offers the most urgent expression of that dysfunction. Seven years into its confrontation with radical Islam, the United States finds itself with too much war for too few warriors — and with no prospect of producing the additional soldiers needed to close the gap. In effect, Americans now confront a looming military crisis to go along with the economic and political crises that they have labored so earnestly to ignore. The Iraq War deserves our attention as the clearest manifestation of these three crises, demonstrating the extent to which they are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. That war was always unnecessary. Except in the eyes of the deluded and the disingenuous, it has long since become a fool's errand. Of perhaps even greater significance, it is both counterproductive and unsustainable. Yet ironically Iraq may yet prove to be the source of our salvation. For the United States, the ongoing war makes plain the imperative of putting America's house in order. Iraq has revealed the futility of counting on military power to sustain our habits of profligacy. The day of reckoning approaches. Expending the lives of more American soldiers in hopes of deferring that day is profoundly wrong. History will not judge kindly a people who find nothing amiss in the prospect of endless armed conflict so long as they themselves are spared the effects. Nor will it view with favor an electorate that delivers political power into the hands of leaders unable to envision any alternative to perpetual war. Rather than insisting that the world accommodate the United States, Americans need to reassert control over their own destiny, ending their condition of dependency and abandoning their imperial delusions. Of perhaps even greater difficulty, the combination of economic, political, and military crisis summons Americans to reexamine exactly what freedom entails. Soldiers cannot accomplish these tasks, nor should we expect politicians to do so. The onus of responsibility falls squarely on citizens.

### AT Exceptionalism/Hege Good

#### Claims that hegemony promotes world peace are inherently wrong. Focus on power-projection creates endless wars and violence

Bacevich ’08 [Andrew J., “The Limits of Power: The end of American Exceptionalism” http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ZnG-ZlzrA\_gC&oi=fnd&pg=PP7&dq=american+exceptionalism&ots=EPlU23PpnV&sig=\_l39-1Bk3pbRv9GJTDfheEkkKeA#v=onepage&q=american%20exceptionalism&f=false]

Recalling how Washington saw the post-Cold War world and America's place in (or atop) it helps us understand why policy makers failed to anticipate, deter, or deflect the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. A political elite preoccupied with the governance of empire paid little attention to protecting the United States itself. In practical terms, prior to 9/11 the mission of homeland defense was unassigned. The institution nominally referred to as the Department Of Defense didn't actually do defense; it specialized in power projection. In 2001, the Pentagon was prepared for any number of contingencies in the Balkans or Northeast Asia or the Persian Gulf. It was just not prepared to address threats to the nation's eastern seaboard. Well- trained and equipped U.S. forces stood ready to defend Seoul or Riyadh; Manhattan was left to fend for itself. Odd as they may seem, these priorities reflected a core principle of national security policy: When it came to defending vital American interests, asserting control over the imperial periphery took precedence over guarding the nation's own perimeter. After 9/11, the Bush administration affirmed this core principle. Although it cobbled together a new agency to attend to "homeland security," the administration also redoubled its efforts to shore up the Pax Americana and charged the Department of Defense with focusing on this task. This meant using any means necessary — suasion where possible, force as required — to bring the Islamic world into conformity with prescribed American norms. Rather than soft and consensual, the approach to imperial governance became harder and more coercive. So, for the United States after 9/11, war became a seemingly permanent condition. President George W. Bush and members of his administration outlined a campaign against terror that they suggested might last decades, if not longer. On the national political scene, few questioned that prospect. In the Pentagon, senior military officers spoke in terms of "generational war," lasting up to a century. Just two weeks after 9/11, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was already instructing Americans to "forget about 'exit strategies'; we're looking at a sustained engagement that carries no deadlines." By and large, Americans were slow to grasp the implications of a global war with no exits and no deadlines. To earlier generations, place names like Iraq and Afghanistan had been synonymous with European rashness — the sort of obscure and unwelcoming jurisdictions to which overly ambitious kings and slightly mad adventurers might repair to squabble. For the present generation, it has already become part of the natural order of things that GIs should be exerting themselves at great cost to pacify such far- off domains. For the average American tuning in to the nightly news, reports of U.S. casualties incurred in distant lands now seem hardly more out of the ordinary than reports of partisan shenanigans on Capitol Hill or brush fires raging out of control in Southern California. How exactly did the end of the Long Peace so quickly yield the Long War? Seeing themselves as a peaceful people, Americans remain wedded to the conviction that the conflicts in which they find themselves embroiled are not of their own making. The global war on terror is no exception. Certain of our own benign intentions, we reflexively assign responsibility for war to others, typically malignant Hitler like figures inexplicably bent on denying us the peace that is our fondest wish.

#### You should be skeptical of their truth claims—At the heart of American exceptionalism is a politik of paranoiac fear of anything that might threaten American values or culture—makes violent and drawn-out wars inevitable

Vlisides ‘10

(James C. Vlisides, @ Grand Valley State University, “American Exceptionalism: Theocracy, Empire, and Capitalist Teleology”, April 18th, 2010)

[http://bgsu.academia.edu/JamesVlisides/Papers/1554806/American\_Exceptionalism\_Theocracy\_Empire\_and\_Capitalist\_Teleology]

Through the use of media fabricated, politically and economically oriented, and divinely legitimated fear tactics, the rest of the globalized world becomes subordinate to the American empire, and inevitably is demonized by and indebted to serving the exploitation that benefits the Capitalist consumer fetish.   ―Fear of crowds, fear of solitude, fear of what was and what could be, fear of Fear leads to polarization. Fear constructs a simpler world, a world that consists of the vulnerable yet all important *Us* and the dark, besieging  *Them* ‖ (Nussbaum , 42, 2004). The repercussions of the 9/11attacks in 2001 affirmed and legitimated this particular emotional and political sentiment in the U.S. According to Kevin Phillips:  After 9/11 the public’s apprehension and anxiety were molded into a new politics of good versus evil―if you’re not with us, you’re against us—rigidity, a crisis forged, red, white, and blue ideology of religion, patriotism, and respect for authority. Hence, the post 9/11 America claimed absolute truth and validity, and abused sacred texts to propagate their particular goals; seized upon an ideal time of a culture of fear and on the defense, with claims of imminent terrorist attacks and cataclysms or fast-approaching end-times, which in turn fostered fear-induced blind obedience, and legitimated a pseudo-modern crusade against all anti-American sentiments on a global scale (Phillips, 204, 2005).  Thus, American exceptionalism, the global exploitation of foreign nations for cheap labor and other raw materials, is legitimated because it is both a strike of vengeance upon the evil ―Other,‖ and because America is accepted as the  good and divine providence of God. Seeing America’s position in the world in this way justifies the extreme exploitation induced by the system, because the system is no longer refutable, rather it is objective and/or divine.

### AT Util

#### **Utilitarianism is bad and causes massive structural violence – their exceptionalist calculations exclude non-Americans from ethical consideration and should be rejected**

Rodriguez ‘11

(Roberto, Writer for NewAmericaMedia.org and US international policy journalist, “Iraq: The End of a War, and the Reaffermation of U.S. Exceptionalism, December 29th, 2011)

[http://newamericamedia.org/2011/12/iraq-war-the-end-or-reaffirmation-of-us-exceptionalism.php]

In the United States, the most significant event of 2011 hands down should have been the withdrawal of the last U.S. troops from Iraq. But for most Americans, the end of an illegal and immoral war and occupation that raged for nearly ten years, hardly registered a ripple. The reason? U.S. politicians and citizens continue to embrace the idea of American Exceptionalism. Case in point: In the United States, only U.S. casualties matter. According to the[Iraq Coalition Count](http://icasualties.org/), almost 4,500 U.S. soldiers perished during the Iraq War, while slightly more than 32,000 U.S. soldiers were officially identified as wounded. No U.S. agency, however, bothers to officially track Iraqi casualties. Not counting “enemy” casualties would seem to be the ultimate form of dehumanization. (The non-governmental group Iraq Body Count estimates between 104,308 and 113,962 Iraqi casualties.) After all, that’s the point of a war: dehumanize and demonize the enemy. No need to count their bodies, because they’re not worthy of being identified or even acknowledged. In Iraq, we were able to witness, from start to finish, the ushering in of a preemptive and unjustified illegal war, by the United States, sans legal consequences for those who engineered this massive crime against humanity. The U.S. government narrative – regurgitated ad nauseam by the mainstream media – told of a war being waged to prevent Iraq from terrorizing the world. Never mind that all the “evidence” was trumped up.  In mind-numbing fashion, we watched and listened to U.S. politicians invoke images of U.S. sacrifice and heroism, while simultaneously ordering U.S. troops to kill and maim untold tens of thousands of Iraqis and displace hundreds of thousands of others, all at the cost of a trillion dollars. This is how national myths are created. Since 2001, with the ascension and acceptance of the concept of a U.S. “homeland,” the United States now shares the ideological space of dictatorships. The government’s nurturing and selling of that idea was a deft psychological maneuver. Despite being the world’s sole superpower, the United States, with colonial and immigrant roots, could not previously lay claim to a “homeland.” Now, the Department of Homeland Security and the industry built up around it has become the mother’s milk of politicians. This in turn has led to the exponential growth of the U.S. military machine, for preemptive and never-ending wars to be fought overseas and at home. One could in fact say that via the use of drone technology, the entire world has now become a battlefield. The mantra now is that the homeland must be protected with militarized walls and fences, border patrols, and drone technology. This perceived need to protect the homeland against “evildoers” at all costs gave rise to the unquestioned post-2001 logic that we must willingly sacrifice our constitutional rights and freedoms, for the security of the nation. If truth was the first casualty, the U.S. Constitution was the second. But this is not logic; it is evidence that the entire nation appears to be suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. The impact of this frenzied effort to protect the homeland has not only been felt by our external “enemies.” Now, it is the fear and hate of brown men, women and children within our own borders that is driving this pathology. There is a direct connection between permanent war, “the homeland,” the expansion and privatization of the U.S. penal system, the criminalization of youths of color and the degradation of both the U.S. Constitution and human rights, world wide. In the largest penal system in the world (upwards of 2 million inmates), U.S. prisoners are primarily black and brown.

## Warming Mechanics

### Adaptation Mod

#### Green tech and infrastructure are key to adaptation – produce infrastructure resilient to climate effects

Oxfam ‘9

(Global Development NGO, “The new adaptation marketplace: Climate change and opportunities for green economic growth”, www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/the-new-adaptation-marketplace)

It is critical that we make investments in what are known as “climate change preparedness” or “adaptation” measures. These strategies can help reduce the risk of harm to vulnerable communities by building resilience to the impacts of climate change. For example, one adaptation approach enables people in coastal areas to construct or strengthen homes that can withstand stronger storms and increased flooding. Even with aggressive efforts to reduce emissions, the consequences of climate change will be severe; increased temperatures, rising sea levels, and more intense droughts, floods, and storms threaten the existence of many communi- ties—especially in developing countries. Adaptation efforts reflect the unavoidable fact that the situation is already bad enough. Not only must we dramatically reduce the green- house gas emissions that will cause warming in the future, but we must also work to save lives today. By investing in adaptation strategies, such as flood defenses and efficient irrigation systems, not only can we lessen the impact of future natural disasters, but we can drive economic growth by strengthening infrastructure and spurring the development of new technologies. Strong public policies that provide funding for adaptation have multiple benefits, both in the US and abroad. These include the following: • Encouraging companies to develop new, innovative technologies and to hire new workers, creating jobs and stimulating the economy; • Enabling long-term economic growth built around green technologies that are resilient to climate change; • HelpingvulnerablecommunitiesintheUSandaroundthe world prepare for and respond to the impacts of climate change; • Safeguarding global security, as climate change acts as a “threat multiplier” in some of the most volatile regions of the world; • Demonstrating US global leadership.

#### **Adaptation is key to check fast warming and extinction – failure causes massive nuclear proliferation, resource wars, and total environmental collapse**

Schwartz & Randall ‘3

Peter, Global Business Network, and Doug, Global Business Network, “An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security” October, <http://www.climate.org/PDF/clim_change_scenario.pdf>

However in the last three centuries, LeBlanc points out, advanced states have steadily lowered the body count even though individual wars and genocides have grown larger in scale. Instead of slaughtering all their enemies in the traditional way, for example, states merely kill enough to get a victory and then put the survivors to work in their newly expanded economy. States also use their own bureaucracies, advanced technology, and international rules of behavior to raise carrying capacity and bear a more careful relationship to it. All of that progressive behavior could collapse if carrying capacities everywhere were suddenly lowered drastically by abrupt climate change. Humanity would revert to its norm of constant battles for diminishing resources, which the battles themselves would further reduce even beyond the climatic effects. Once again warfare would define human life. The two most likely reactions to a sudden drop in carrying capacity due to climate change are defensive and offensive. The United States and Australia are likely to build defensive fortresses around their countries because they have the resources and reserves to achieve self-sufficiency. With diverse growing climates, wealth, technology, and abundant resources, the United States could likely survive shortened growing cycles and harsh weather conditions without catastrophic losses. Borders will be strengthened around the country to hold back unwanted starving immigrants from the Caribbean islands (an especially severe problem), Mexico, and South America. Energy supply will be shored up through expensive (economically, politically, and morally) alternatives such as nuclear, renewables, hydrogen, and Middle Eastern contracts. Pesky skirmishes over fishing rights, agricultural support, and disaster relief will be commonplace. Tension between the U.S. and Mexico rise as the U.S. reneges on the 1944 treaty that guarantees water flow from the Colorado River. Relief workers will be commissioned to respond to flooding along the southern part of the east coast and much drier conditions inland. Yet, even in this continuous state of emergency the U.S. will be positioned well compared to others. The intractable problem facing the nation will be calming the mounting military tension around the world. As famine, disease, and weather-related disasters strike due to the abrupt climate change, many countries’ needs will exceed their carrying capacity. This will create a sense of desperation, which is likely to lead to offensive aggression in order to reclaim balance. Imagine eastern European countries, struggling to feed their populations with a falling supply of food, water, and energy, eyeing Russia, whose population is already in decline, for access to its grain, minerals, and energy supply. Or, picture Japan, suffering from flooding along its coastal cities and contamination of its fresh water supply, eying Russia’s Sakhalin Island oil and gas reserves as an energy source to power desalination plants and energy-intensive agricultural processes. Envision Pakistan, India, and China – all armed with nuclear weapons – skirmishing at their borders over refugees, access to shared rivers, and arable land. Spanish and Portuguese fishermen might fight over fishing rights – leading to conflicts at sea. And, countries including the United States would be likely to better secure their borders. With over 200 river basins touching multiple nations, we can expect conflict over access to water for drinking, irrigation, and transportation. The Danube touches twelve nations, the Nile runs though nine, and the Amazon runs through seven. In this scenario, we can expect alliances of convenience. The United States and Canada may become one, simplifying border controls. Or, Canada might keep its hydropower—causing energy problems in the US. North and South Korea may align to create one technically savvy and nuclear-armed entity. Europe may act as a unified block – curbing immigration problems between European nations – and allowing for protection against aggressors. Russia, with its abundant minerals, oil, and natural gas may join Europe. In this world of warring states, nuclear arms proliferation is inevitable. As cooling drives up demand, existing hydrocarbon supplies are stretched thin. With a scarcity of energy supply – and a growing need for access -- nuclear energy will become a critical source of power, and this will accelerate nuclear proliferation as countries develop enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to ensure their national security. China, India, Pakistan, Japan, South Korea, Great Britain, France, and Germany will all have nuclear weapons capability, as will Israel, Iran, Egypt, and North Korea. Managing the military and political tension, occasional skirmishes, and threat of war will be a challenge. Countries such as Japan, that have a great deal of social cohesion (meaning the government is able to effectively engage its population in changing behavior) are most likely to fair well. Countries whose diversity already produces conflict, such as India, South Africa and Indonesia, will have trouble maintaining order. Adaptability and access to resources will be key. Perhaps the most frustrating challenge abrupt climate change will pose is that we’ll never know how far we are into the climate change scenario and how many more years – 10, 100, 1000 --- remain before some kind of return to warmer conditions as the thermohaline circulation starts up again. When carrying capacity drops suddenly, civilization is faced with new challenges that today seem unimaginable.

### AT Warming Inevitable

#### **Warming inevitable is our arg – only successful adaptation can solve the worst effects of the climate shift**

Gotlieb 12

(Yosef, Dr. Gotlieb is on the faculty of the David Yellin College of Education in Jerusalem, “Time to Adapt to Climate Change”, http://www.greenprophet.com/2012/04/adapt-climate-change/)

Scientists and policymakers are increasing concerned about extreme weather and climate events. These include extended waves of abnormally hot or cold weather, unseasonal temperatures, changes in precipitation and wind patterns, along with more dramatic occurrences like unprecedented blizzards, cyclones sudden downpours, sudden floods and extended droughts. Attempts to curtail climate-altering phenomena, which is known as mitigation, has been the focus of international protocols (Montreal, Kyoto) and gatherings (such as the failed Copenhagen Summit of late 2009). While the international community can claim modest achievements in some areas, for example, pacts that have led to a decrease in the use of ozone-reducing substances, reducing the emission of greenhouse gases has been far from encouraging. Accordingly, there is a second focus in the climate change literature, dealing with adaptation. It is sobering then, that the focus of a special report entitled Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation released last week, by The Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is not on how climate change can be forestalled. Rather, it deals with what societies will have to do to adapt to such change. Established in 1988 by the United Nations Environmental Program and the World Meteorological Organization, the IPCC’s mandate is to assess “the scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation.” At a time when significant progress is lacking in negotiations to reduce fossil fuel use and other causes of climate change, a shift in emphasis to adaptive strategies is a necessary one. Implicit to adaptive strategies is the recognition that climate change has already begun, that its impact will be increasingly felt, and that even if mitigation practices are enacted and succeed, planetary systems have been altered. As stated in the report, [a]nthropogenic climate change is projected to continue during this century and beyond. This conclusion is robust under a wide range of scenarios for future greenhouse gas emissions, including some that anticipate a reduction in emissions (p. 29). Societies, to survive, will have to adopt economic, social, institutional, technological and cultural practices that are adaptive to these realities. There is recognition that to varying extents, these adaptations will be socially and economically transformative. A Blueprint for Survival? The IPCC report deals planning the kinds of supports that will be needed to cope with slowly evolving trends, as well as risk and disaster management for climate events. For example, dramatic sea level rise due to polar or glacial melting is unlikely to take place overnight; flash flooding due to torrential, out-of-season rains already has. In planning for sea-level rise, delta regions and other low-lying areas should be protected with shore fortifications and drainage systems constructed over the medium-term. Concerning flooding, areas where adequate water runoff systems do not exist, for example shantytowns or spontaneous settlements, the provision of adequate sewage systems a short-run priority. Determining whether short-, medium- or long-term preparations are needed is a function of the level of vulnerability (defined in economic, social and institutional terms) characteristic of the people, places and property existing in an at-risk area. Exposure describes the extent of damage that could be foreseen in an area due to “people; livelihoods; environmental services and resources; infrastructure; or economic, social, or cultural assets in places that could be adversely affected.” The aim of adaptive strategies to climate change is to create infrastructures, technologies, economic instrumentalities, institutions and educational programs in place that will increase the resilience of peoples and their life-places. Current thinking largely equates resilience as being the product of sustainable development.