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Cross-X Notes

These CP’s function in a very nuanced way. You generate competition for them by reading one of the two T arguments for “reduced”. The affirmative’s obvious we-meets on these T violations will set up your CP.

To determine which CP to run, ask these questions in CX.

1. When are the troops removed? Is it immediately after plan passage?

If YES, then read the gradual drawdown CP

If NO, continue to ask.

1. Ok, so then how do we know when the troops will be removed? Are you specifying an end date? Will you use normal means like the Obama plans that have timetables for troop reductions?

Chances are, at this point, they will agree and say either normal means or specifying an end date, in which case you read the Conditional Withdrawal CP.

\*\*\*Solvency – Gradual Drawdown\*\*\*

Solvency – Pledge – 1NC\*\*

Obama’s pledge to reduce troops creates perception of action, even if he doesn’t outline the plan

Bennis 10 (TALKING POINTS, Phyllis Bennis, Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies http://www.ncpeaceaction.org/resources/obama-iraq-withdrawl-and-peace-movement.html)

While he laid out partial versions of some of these issues (withdrawal and oil), others (mercenaries and bases) were left out entirely. And at the end of the day, President Obama did not make a single real commitment to meeting our definition of ending the war. As the New York Times columnist Bob Herbert described Obama's plan for Iraq and Afghanistan, "we're committed to these two conflicts for a good while yet, and there is nothing like an etched-in-stone plan for concluding them." Understanding all the problems, limitations, and dangers of President Obama's speech is crucial. (For a fuller analysis of the dangers in Obama's speech, see my February 26th talking points - http://www.ips-dc.org/articles/1117.) But understanding those limitations does not tell us how to respond to this new moment, a moment when the president of the United States is telling Americans that he is ending the war, that he intends to withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq, telling Iraqis that the U.S. "pursues no claim on your territory or your resources," and telling the world that the U.S. plans to engage with everybody in the region including Iran and Syria. We may - we must - understand all the reasons that those words don't constitute a firm commitment. But the reality is that the vast majority of people hearing those words, who already believe in what those words should mean, will assume President Obama means the same thing they do. That perception provides a huge opportunity for the peace movement. And it is for that reason that the assertions in his speech remain contested terrain.

Solvency – Pledge – 2NC

Perception of Obama commitments are key to actual policymaking, it’s more than just words.

Bennis 9 (TALKING POINTS, Phyllis Bennis, Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies 9 March http://www.alterinter.org/article3054.html?lang=en)

The meaning of President Obama’s Iraq withdrawal speech, and its influence on real U.S. policy in Iraq, will not be determined solely by his actual words. The import of the speech - and whether its promises become real - will be determined by a fluid combination of what Obama says, his own definitions of what he says, AND the disparate ways his speech is heard, perceived, described and contested by others - the mainstream media, Congress, the military, other centers of elite power, and crucially, the peace movement. The words of the speech were quite amazing: "And under the Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government, I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. We will complete this transition to Iraqi responsibility, and we will bring our troops home." After eight years of reckless slaughter proudly justified in the name of a "global war on terror," it was stunning to hear the president of the United States announce what he called "a new strategy to end the war in Iraq." That moment was something we should celebrate. It was ours. The statement was a recognition of the powerful antiwar consensus in this country, a consensus that helped define the powerful constituency so key to Obama’s election. Obama may not acknowledge, even to himself, that it was the organized antiwar movement that helped create and build and strengthen that consensus - but still his speech reflected the new political reality that requires him to speak to the demands of that antiwar community.

Obama is positively received globally – he took unpopular Bush policies and made them popular.

Mead 9 (Walter Russell Mead, December 10th, 2009, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2009/12/10/a-prize-for-putting-lipstick-on-a-pig/)KM

Ironically, some of the Obama administration’s greatest successes are coming where, thanks in part to the charisma and sincerity of the President, it has been able to implement strategies that the Bush people only talked about. President Obama is as committed to Israel’s security as Bush was; he is fighting the same two wars in the Middle East that Bush fought. He is as determined to destroy Al-Qaeda as Bush was, and he is increasing the American commitment to a war that Bush was unable to win. Yet Obama can do all this and still reach out to the Islamic world. Bush gets shoes thrown in his face, Obama gets the Peace Prize while following Bush’s withdrawal plan in Iraq and escalating Bush’s war in Afghanistan. Some of this is due to changes in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Years of mindless violence have turned public opinion against Al-Qaeda and its offshoots in many countries. Yet even President Obama’s harshest critics should acknowledge that he has transformed the emotional tone of America’s relationship with much of the world. And he has done that while consistently making the policy choices that reflect American interests, rather than sacrificing the national interest in a quest for popularity abroad.

Solvency – Pledge – 2NC

Obama is a master of perception – his commitments are perceived globally and create action.

Mead 9 (Walter Russell Mead, December 10th, 2009, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2009/12/10/a-prize-for-putting-lipstick-on-a-pig/)KM

Obama’s success, limited but real, in rebooting the world’s image of the United States does not just serve as an effective critique of the Bush administration’s lousy diplomatic stance. It also refutes those who said that it was the substance of the Bush policies rather than the style that created the rift between the United States and so much of the world. It turns out that the United States can fight two wars in the Middle East while supporting Israel, nagging its NATO allies for more troops, and coordinating a global counterinsurgency and counterterrorism effort — and watch its global popularity ratings rise. Bush’s critics used to dismiss his efforts to improve the administration’s diplomatic efforts as ‘putting lipstick on a pig.’ The underlying policies were so ugly, the argument ran, that no effort could mitigate the catastrophic consequences for America’s global image. Obama, it turns out, is a masterly make-up artist. It wasn’t just the lipstick, of course. It was more of a makeover. The pig has been bathed and scrubbed and is taking a steady diet of prescription-strength breath mints. The new administration quickly and correctly identified certain features of American policy that had become so offensive that change was urgently needed. Guantanamo is being closed. The rhetoric has changed. But these represent more nips and tucks than radical surgery — botox for the pig, not a face transplant. The pig has been to charm school.

Perception influences foreign policy – international perception is directly connected to Obama’s commitments.

Erdoethan 8 (Ybrahim Erdoethan, Lecturer at Balykesir University, Turkish Daily News, December 29, 2008 THE FUTURE OF US FOREIGN POLICY)

More and more intellectuals attribute an increasing weight to the world view and perceptions of the U.S. leadership in forming the countrys foreign policy. The rationale is that states give meaning to the domestic and international constrains facing them through the perceptions of their leaders. Leaders in a way interpret the international environment for their constituencies and governments and form an image of what needs to be done, thus help frame governments orientation to international affairs. They are also the ones who manage domestic political pressures on foreign policy choices and who represent their country in the regional and international regimes which define the rules and norms of the international system. The perceptions of leaders, meanwhile, are influenced by their experiences, goals, belief about the world and sensitivity to the political context of their countries. In respect to that, Bushs perception of world politics may be defined mainly as neo-conservative which has envisaged a new global order where; the United States played a role of "global sheriff;" unilateral action as opposed to international cooperation was the preferred course of action; forcing regime change, holding permanent American military primacy and pre-emptive action were often applied as conventional policy choices, despite provoking anti-American sentiments. The Obama leadership seems comparatively more liberal suggesting that during his administration he would be more willing to consult and act in concert with allied nations in confronting to the threats posed to the United States and the international system; multilateralism in finding solutions to global problems, such as the environment and international economy, would be the preferred over unilateralism; resolve to protect the United States and its interest does not require disregard to the international law, diplomacy in the form of dialogue without preconditions would be given time to work out better outcomes; permanent military presence as a tool of imposing American supremacy on the world would be abandoned.

Solvency – Korea 3-Year 1NC

Phased withdrawal based on a three year deadline solves the Aff

Cato, ‘9. Think Tank. “Cato Handbook for Policymakers,” www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb111/hb111-54.pdf

Conversely, America’s risk exposure is largely discretionary. The principal reason Washington is obsessed with the North Korean problem is the presence of more than 27,000 U.S. troops in South Korea. Because of those forces, America has put itself, quite literally, on the frontlines of a potentially explosive crisis. That approach is precisely the opposite of the course Washington ought to adopt. The new administration should immediately begin to reduce America’s risk exposure by ordering a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. Washington should also indicate to the East Asian powers that they bear primary responsibility for dealing with the problem of North Korea’s nuclear program, since they have the most at stake. It is time, indeed it is long past time, to insist that South Korea manage its own security affairs. The United States has drawn down its military forces stationed in that country from approximately 37,000 to 27,000 over the past six years. Washington should implement a complete withdrawal within the next three years and terminate the misnamed mutual security treaty. That commitment was designed for an entirely different era. There is no need and very little benefit today for keeping South Korea as a security client.

Military pullouts from Korea are always slow and gradual – empirically proven.

Halloran 06 (July 28, 2006, Richard Halloran, RealClearPolitics, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/07/phasing\_out\_us\_forces\_in\_south.html) KM

The coming pullout of U.S. troops will be the culmination of a gradual slide that started after the end of the 1950-1953 Korean War. When the shooting stopped 53 years ago this month, the U.S. had 326,800 troops in Korea. By 1960, that had dropped to 55,800. It fell again, to 52,000, when more soldiers were needed in the Vietnam war. The late President Park Chung Hee said in 1975 that in five years South Korea would no longer need U.S. ground forces to help defend his country. President Jimmy Carter said in 1977 that U.S. ground forces would be withdrawn in five years but ran into so much opposition from the Pentagon, Congress, South Korea, and Japan that he dropped the plan. Even so, the decline continued. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wanted to bring the force down from 37,500 to 25,000 by the end of 2005 to make more units available for duty elsewhere. He was persuaded by South Korean military leaders, many of whom have been at odds with President Roh, to hold that off until 2008. Now, a combination of slipping U.S. Army readiness, U.S. distrust of the South Korean government, Korean attempts to veto U.S. deployments from Korea, disagreements over command structure, South Korean restrictions on U.S. training, and arguments over U.S. bases being returned to South Korean control seem to have added impetus to U.S. plans to withdraw.

Solvency – Korea Ground Forces 1NC

Immediately withdrawing ground forces without eliminating Air and Naval bases solves

Cato, ‘9. Think Tank. “Cato Handbook for Policymakers,” www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb111/hb111-54.pdf

We should especially move to terminate obsolete portions of that relationship. Most notably, that means withdrawing all U.S. ground forces from Japan. Most of those forces consist of Marine Corps units stationed in Okinawa. U.S. military bases occupy approximately 20 percent of the island’s land mass, including some prime real estate, and the presence has long been a source of extreme irritation to the inhabitants. Keeping the marines there makes sense only if the United States intends to intervene with ground forces in a new Korean war or to wage a land war somewhere else in East Asia. Neither mission makes sense from the standpoint of genuine American interests. Those forces should be withdrawn immediately, and the bases closed. The future disposition of U.S. air and naval forces is a more complex and difficult decision. Some forces should certainly be withdrawn, and many of them can be relocated to American possessions in the Central Pacific, especially Guam, without having a significant negative effect on U.S. military capabilities in that part of the world. But given the importance of East Asia, both strategically and economically, it is uncertain whether the United States should withdraw all its air and naval forces from Japan. That topic needs to be a crucial aspect of discussions about the future U.S.-Japan security relationship.

Solvency – Korea – Gradual Drawdown 2NC

**Military pullouts from Korea depend on being slow and gradual**

**Halloran** **06** (July 28, 2006, Richard Halloran, RealClearPolitics, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/07/phasing\_out\_us\_forces\_in\_south.html) KM

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Withdrawals should take the form of multi-year, multi-phase pullouts

Reuters, ‘3. “U.S. says discussing with S. Korea possible troop withdrawal,” 10-18, <http://www.haaretz.com/news/u-s-says-discussing-with-s-korea-possible-troop-withdrawal-1.103082>.

WASHINGTON - The United States is discussing with Seoul the possible withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops from South Korea while increasing American military strength and mobility there and around Asia, U.S. defense officials said on Saturday. The officials said the bilateral talks were being held in conjunction with Pentagon planning on changing the U.S. military "footprint" around the world after the Cold War, but stressed that it was far too soon to speculate on the touchy issue of how many of the 37,000 U.S. troops in the South might be withdrawn. "The final figure could could be high - I wouldn't argue with thousands. But that is speculation and far from decided," one of the officials, who asked not to be identified, told Reuters when asked about a report that as many as one-third could leave South Korea. Another official stressed that any withdrawal of thousands of troops would likely be accompanied by increases in U.S. air and naval power in the Asia-Pacific, including the possibility of placing additional strike aircraft on the island of Guam and even a second aircraft carrier in or near the region. "It is just premature to discuss numbers. Nothing has been decided on that (South Korea)," Defense Department spokesman Larry Di Rita said. "We have said we are working on restructuring our presence globally. But we always start with the premise that we will remain engaged in a way that reflects the current world." The United States and South Korea, close military allies on a still-tense peninsula 50 years after the end of the Korean War, agreed in June to move thousands of U.S. troops away from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates North and South Korea. North Korea has thousands of loaded artillery pieces aimed at Seoul and half of its army is deployed within 40 miles 64 km of the DMZ dividing the peninsula, the world's most heavily fortified border. The two-phase, multiyear pullback of ground troops from near the zone caused anxiety in South Korea because it was unveiled in the middle of a crisis over the North's nuclear ambitions that has escalated since late last year. Any outright large-scale removal of American forces from the South would be a controversial issue with the Seoul government despite growing unhappiness among many South Koreans over the decades-long, high-profile U.S. military presence.

Solvency – Korea – US-ROK Net Benefit 2NC

The CP saves the US-ROK alliance, the plan crushes it

NYT, ‘4. “U.S. will slow withdrawal of troops from S. Korea,” 10-7, <http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2004-10-07/news/0410070325_1_south-korean-korean-peninsula-defend-south>.

SEOUL, South Korea - In response to heavy South Korean pressure, the United States has agreed to stretch out over the next three years the withdrawal of one-third of American troops here, dropping an earlier deadline of next year, U.S. and South Korean officials said yesterday. Washington had announced the withdrawal in June, over objections from South Korea. This summer, 3,500 American soldiers left here for Iraq, the first of a total of 5,000 American troops to be withdrawn this year from South Korea. Under the new schedule, the next 5,000 are to leave by the end of 2006. The final 2,500 are to leave by the end of 2008, according to a new calendar announced yesterday by the U.S. Embassy and the South Korean Defense Ministry. In addition, the United States will leave in place many of its Apache ground-attack helicopters and its multiple-launch rocket systems, also known as counter-batteries, which are designed to locate and destroy North Korean artillery cannons that might fire on South Korea. Yesterday, South Korea's military praised the new timetable for "fully taking into consideration the concerns" of the Korean public. The drawdown was sparked by a series of motives: the need for combat-ready soldiers in Iraq, Washington's frustration with a perceived lack of appreciation here for the American military presence and a desire to shift U.S. troops here from serving as human "tripwires." Under the tripwire strategy, in vogue here and in Washington since the Korean War ended half a century ago, a North Korean invasion that causes American casualties would immediately galvanize the American public to defend South Korea. The new plan is to move U.S. troops south of the Han River, out of North Korean artillery range, to new bases. From there, they are to coordinate a counterattack from the south. In times of low tension on the Korean peninsula, the U.S. troops would deploy to regional trouble spots. The United States is also spending $11 billion to improve defense installations and equipment in South Korea in a three-year program. In Japan, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, a firm supporter of military cooperation with the United States, has suggested that some American units be moved off Okinawa, a small southern island that is base to about 22,000 of the 37,585 American troops assigned to Japan.

Solvency – Iraq – Gradual Drawdown

Delaying withdrawal by a year solves and ensures stability

Rand, ‘9 – Rand Press Release. “Timeline to Withdraw U.S. Troops from Iraq Is Feasible, but Combat Forces Are Needed for Elections,” 7-28, <http://www.rand.org/news/press/2009/07/28/>.

The first alternative described in the study would have all U.S. combat forces departing Iraq by May 2010, leaving approximately 44,000 American troops. The remaining force would include units to train Iraqi Security Forces as well as the associated support personnel. This force would depart no later than December 2011, consistent with the established Security Agreement between the United States and Iraq. There are three significant risks with this proposal, the study finds: it would affect the potential security of remaining U.S. military and civilian personnel; it would quickly end the ability to pair U.S. combat units with their Iraqi Security Forces counterparts for training; and it diminishes the ability of the residual force to deal with unforeseen contingencies. The second alternative is RAND's interpretation of President Obama's goal, announced in February 2009, to withdraw all combat units by August 2010. Approximately 12,000 combat forces would depart Iraq by November 2009, with all remaining personnel to stay through the national elections in January 2010. The drawdown would restart in February 2010. Once all combat units had withdrawn by August 2010, some 50,000 U.S. troops consisting of military trainers, support forces, combat brigades restructured as Advise and Assist Brigades, would remain in place. This transition force would be removed no later than the end of December 2011, in line with the Security Agreement. While U.S. commanders believe the installation of the new government will take three months after the elections, waiting that long to restart the withdrawal under this second alternative could put the August 2010 completion date in jeopardy. This approach would, however, provide the Obama administration a clearer picture of Iraq's security situation by the time combat forces depart, possibly precluding the need to position U.S. forces nearby, the study finds. The third alternative — maintaining some combat units until December 2011 — would entail a slower troop drawdown during 2010. This alternative leaves some 39,000 military personnel remaining in Iraq in March 2011. At this point, the remaining troops would be withdrawn over the next nine months. All three drawdown schedules include estimates for the number of non-combat forces — trainers, support troops and enablers — that remain. "Drawing down these forces is based on a complex combination of factors, some dealing with the need for continued support to the Iraqi forces, as well as the need to secure remaining U.S. forces," Perry said. "It's also understood that commanders will need to make schedule judgments based on the security situation and other conditions that could influence the withdrawal." The study cites three key dangers that threaten Iraq's internal security and stability during, and after, the drawdown of U.S. forces: Extremists who reject the merging political order and would use violence to generate chaos Main political and sectarian groups that currently participate in the political process, but have the ability to use force to gain political advantage and control resources A politicized Iraqi security force may stage a coup or may be used by the Iraqi government to crush political rivals. Of these, the study finds that the greatest danger arises from the tension between the Iraqi government and the quasi-independent Kurdish northern portion of the country. The report recommends that U.S. forces depart at a slower rate from the part of Iraq where the Arab and Kurdish populations meet and where the danger of clashes escalating to open conflict are most serious.

Solvency – Iraq – Gradual Drawdown

Calls for troop reductions are based on gradual reductions, not sudden changes in presence.

Rubin 05 (Barry Rubin director of the Global Research in International Affairs Spring 05, http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring\_rubin.pdf)KM

Leaders of Iraq’s most powerful political party have made their inten- tions clear. As Ahmad Chalabi, the exiled Iraqi politician whom the United States had once apparently designated as Iraq’s new leader, wrote in the Wall Street Journal on December 22, 2004, “The first task of the newly elected provisional parliament must be to reach agreement with the United States to determine the status of their forces in Iraq and agree on a timetable for a phased withdrawal.” 1 Chalabi was not calling for a sudden, irresponsible withdrawal, but rather a carefully planned, gradual one. The reality is that maintaining a large-scale U.S. presence to create a post-Saddam government is neither sustainable nor desirable. Despite U.S. assumptions, a protracted U.S.-led war in Iraq will not win over the people, assure stability, or defeat insurgents. On the contrary, it will have the oppo- site effect. The United States must therefore now shift gears and prepare to withdraw after an Iraqi government is initially established following the De- cember 2005 Iraqi elections. This stands in contrast to previous plans to stay for as long as it took to turn Iraq into an ideal democracy or even to maintain large bases there for the long-term future. Although withdrawing will undoubtedly leave many U.S. leaders and some members of the public somewhat dissatisfied, it will also provide an opportunity to declare victory in reasonable terms and bring the troops home. The alternative is to see the mission of U.S. forces held hostage by Iraq’s governmental instability or even to sustain a permanent presence, a scenario that will result in a disas- ter far greater than the problems confronted up to now.

Solvency – Afghanistan – Gradual Drawdown

Gradual military drawdowns solve – they transition responsibility while maintaining aid.

Feller 09 (BEN FELLER | 12/10/09, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/10/obama-afghanistan-troop-d\_n\_386938.html) km

President Barack Obama said Thursday that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, set to start in 19 months, will be gradual and U.S. aid to that nation will last for years. "We're not going to see some sharp cliff, some precipitous drawdown," Obama told reporters in Oslo, where he traveled to accept the Nobel Peace Prize. The president said he is sticking to his plan to start the drawdown in July 2011, but he signaled that the United States will help Afghanistan train its security forces and develop its economy for some time. "Several years after U.S. combat troops have been drastically reduced in the region," he said, "the Afghanistan government is still going to need support for those security forces. We are still going to have an interest in partnering with Afghans and Pakistanis and others in dealing with the remnants of terrorist activities there." Some critics have questioned Obama's timetable because the United States is about to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan. Many liberals in Congress and elsewhere oppose the buildup in the first place. Obama said there should be no confusion about his intentions. "Starting in July 2011 we will begin that transition, that transfer of responsibility," he said. "The pace at which that takes place, the slope of a drawdown, how it occurs tactically, those are all going to be conditions-based," he said, just as there has been "a constant monitoring of the situation" in Iraq. Obama seemed to place more emphasis on the eventual transfer of responsibilities to Afghans than on solid timetables for bringing U.S. troops home.

The CP solves Afghan stability and military blowback

Julian E. Barnes, 6-15-10. Los Angeles Times. “Debate grows over Afghanistan withdrawal plan,” <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-us-afghan-20100616,0,6174233.story>.

Reporting from Washington — Recent setbacks in Afghanistan have intensified debate over the wisdom of the Obama administration's plan to begin withdrawing U.S. military forces next summer and highlighted reservations among military commanders over a rigid timeline. At a Senate hearing Tuesday, Gen. David H. Petraeus, who oversees U.S. forces in the Mideast and Afghanistan, offered "qualified" support for President Obama's plan to begin withdrawing troops in July 2011. "In a perfect world, Mr. Chairman, we have to be very careful with timelines," Petraeus said under questioning by Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who wanted to know whether he supported the plan. Petraeus explained that the drawdown would be based on conditions in Afghanistan at the time. The reservation reflects longstanding uneasiness among military officials over the withdrawal timeline. In December, Obama announced plans for an increase in troop deployment to Afghanistan, which he said would begin to wind down in July 2011. Many military officials have downplayed the significance of the start of the withdrawal and have said the pace would be based on conditions. The U.S. will not leave Afghanistan precipitously, they say. But the timetable has put the military in uncomfortable positions, officials have said, forcing them to reassure skeptical Afghan leaders that the U.S. won't draw down quickly. Petraeus did not elaborate on his own reservations and left the hearing moments later after becoming ill. But Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) said he was worried that the timeline had undercut Afghan President Hamid Karzai's support for the U.S.-led war effort. Karzai recently fired two key advisors backed by Washington and, according to Afghans, has privately expressed doubts about the war. McCain said the announced drawdown made it harder for uncommitted Afghans to back the United States. The deadline makes it appear that the U.S. is more interested in "leaving than succeeding," he said. "I continue to worry a great deal about the message we are sending in the region," McCain said. The administration is planning a major assessment of the war in December — another key deadline. After the 2007 troop buildup in Iraq, the military used its first major assessment to buy time from Congress, showing that violence had begun to abate. With Afghanistan, however, some military officials worry that the December assessment deadline doesn't give them enough time to show their strategy is working. Earlier this year, military leaders hoped to have two successes to put before the White House in that review: Kandahar and Marja. But recent developments suggest that results of those offensives may not be clear. In Marja, the U.S. and its allies have had trouble setting up local governmental bodies since the major offensive launched there in February, and militants have renewed their attacks. Nonprofit organizations helping with civilian development efforts have been forced to withdraw, acknowledged Michele Flournoy, undersecretary of Defense for policy, who testified alongside Petraeus on Tuesday. In Kandahar, meanwhile, the beginning of a major campaign is underway, including raids by special operations forces that Defense officials say have weakened the Taliban. Faced with local Afghan leaders' skepticism over the offensive, military officials have delayed portions of it until later in the year. The December review is widely expected to touch off a debate between those favoring a sizable troop presence to train local security forces and stabilize Afghanistan and those pushing for a faster drawdown.

Solvency – Japan – Gradual Withdrawal 1NC

Withdrawal from Japan should occur over a two year period and delay removing air and naval units

Cato, ‘9. Think Tank. “Cato Handbook for Policymakers,” www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb111/hb111-54.pdf

Policymakers should ● terminate, within three years, all defense treaties with South Korea and the Philippines, and withdraw all American military units from those countries by that deadline; ● rescind, within three years, the informal commitment to defend Taiwan; ● continue the policy of being willing to sell Taiwan conventional weapon systems; ● withdraw all ground forces from Japan within two years; ● reassess whether to continue stationing any air and naval units in Japan; and ● immediately commence discussions with Japan about replacing the U.S.-Japan security treaty with a more informal cooperative security arrangement.

\*\*\*Solvency – Conditional Withdrawal\*\*\*

Solvency – Iraq – Vulnerable Groups 1NC

Drawdown needs to be slowest in areas with vulnerable groups – this is key to solving mass displacement

Olga Oliker, Audra K. Grant, and Dalia Dassa Kaye, ‘9 – Oliker, Grant and Kaye are all security analysts at the RAND Foundation. “The Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown in Iraq on Displaced and Other Vulnerable Populations,” 12-6, RAND, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP272.pdf>.

Although the displacement crisis will be long term, and vulnerable populations will face increased risk as U.S. forces draw down, the dangers emanating from both of these situations can be mitigated. Indeed, the drawdown of U.S. forces can potentially create opportunities for the United States to more effectively address this crisis and gain regional and international assistance to do so. A number of specific actions and general approaches can help ensure the protection of particularly endangered populations, mitigate the destabilizing effects of mass displacement, and prevent the chronic underdevelopment that may otherwise be its result. Lower Risk of Violence Where practicable and useful, adapt troop withdrawals to ensure the longest presence where violence is most likely, specifically in the regions of Baghdad, Diyala, and along the KRG border. Improve security for the vulnerable and those at risk of deportation in Iraq by working with Iraq, regional governments, and other key international actors.

Turns the case and hegemony is a net-benefit

Olga Oliker, Audra K. Grant, and Dalia Dassa Kaye, ‘9 – Oliker, Grant and Kaye are all security analysts at the RAND Foundation. “The Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown in Iraq on Displaced and Other Vulnerable Populations,” 12-6, RAND, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP272.pdf>.

As the United States draws down its forces in Iraq, it behooves decisionmakers to recognize that this drawdown, which started in June 2009 and continues at the time of this writing, will affect vulnerable and at-risk populations. The ways in which it does so have significant implications for the evolution of Iraq and U.S. policy interests in that country and the Middle East more broadly. Regardless of how the security situation evolves in the years to come, these issues will continue to create humanitarian challenges, and it is in U.S. interests to take steps to address them. A number of groups are at risk because of the U.S. drawdown and withdrawal, because they have depended on U.S. forces and force presence for their security over the last six years. In addition, the drawdown may exacerbate the already precarious circumstances of displaced Iraqis, both within the country and in neighboring states. That said, appropriate policies and actions can mitigate destabilizing regional scenarios and reduce the dangers faced by these populations in the years to come. Vulnerable Groups Groups at particular risk as U.S. forces depart Iraq include tens of thousands of Iraqis and their families who are affiliated with the United States in any of a variety of ways smaller minorities among Iraq’s permanent citizens who have relied on U.S. forces for protection1 Palestinians who took refuge in Iraq under the Saddam Hussein government other refugee groups from outside Iraq who have taken shelter in that country over the years2 the Mujeheddin e-Khalq (MEK), a cult-like dissident group from Iran that received sanctuary in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1991 and whose members have since lived in their own enclave, from 2003 to early 2009 under the protection of U.S. forces3 contractors from around the world who work for U.S., other coalition, a nd Iraqi companies in construction, food services, and myriad other jobs and who may lack documentation. Violence against these populations is a real danger as U.S. forces draw down. It would surely present a humanitarian tragedy to which the global community may not be able to respond in time. The United States would likely be held at least partially accountable, with detrimental results for U.S. image, credibility, and influence. It could also serve as a starting point for renewed violence in Iraq. Ongoing efforts to assist Iraqis with U.S. ties include the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program and the Refugee Resettlement Program, now available to Iraqis with U.S. ties. There has been significant improvement in the last year in the processing of refugees, especially, and the SIV program has been expanded. Instead of having to first leave Iraq, U.S.-affiliated Iraqis can now apply to come to the United States from Baghdad. Processing for both of these programs has remained slow and complicated, however, and no plan exists for rapid evacuation, which may be needed if the security situation deteriorates. For the other groups, the response thus far has been an effort by the U.S. government to engage Iraqi counterparts to ensure these groups’ safety and security, coupled with efforts by the UNHCR to resettle some of the refugees from elsewhere who cannot stay in Iraq. Success has been sporadic.

Solvency – Iraq – Vulnerable Groups 1NC

Also turns Middle East stability

Olga Oliker, Audra K. Grant, and Dalia Dassa Kaye, ‘9 – Oliker, Grant and Kaye are all security analysts at the RAND Foundation. “The Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown in Iraq on Displaced and Other Vulnerable Populations,” 12-6, RAND, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP272.pdf>.

The millions of Iraqis who have been displaced as a result of the war face increasing dangers as U.S. forces draw down. If violence in Iraq worsens as and after U.S. forces draw down, as it may well do in at least some disputed and multiethnic areas, displacement will increase yet again. Whether or not violence increases in the near term, however, this displacement crisis may well breed instability in its own right. Unless these problems are addressed as part of a broad development and integration agenda, displacement will not only be long term, but it may also lead to increased risk of violence in the future, as grievances over lost land combine with perceptions of social and economic inequities between the populations hosting the displaced and the newcomers, both in Iraq and in neighboring countries. This has the potential to undermine the stability of key regional states, such as Jordan, and a range of broader U.S. regional goals.

Solvency – Iraq – Politics NB

Phasing out the redeployment avoids politics

William D. Hartung, ‘5 – Hartung is the Director of the Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute. “Iraq: Withdrawal or Drawdown?” 12-15, <http://www.commondreams.org/views05/1215-20.htm>.

The relevant debate now is over how to pull out, not whether to do so. But the Bush administration's rhetoric on this score needs to be carefully scrutinized. In his "Victory in Iraq" speech on November 30th, the president talked about re-deploying U.S. Troops out of Iraqi cities and using them for more specialized anti-terror missions. It is widely believed that there will be some kind of troop reduction before the mid-term Congressional elections in November 2006, but the question is how large. If the administration were to reduce the U.S. troop presence in Iraq by 23,000, from 160,000 to 137,000, levels would simply be back before U.S. forces were bulked up in anticipation of the December 15th elections. Other numbers discussed have U.S. troop levels going to as low as 100,000 by next fall. But whatever the number ends up being, a "drawdown" or "redeployment" is not the same as a withdrawal. As David Sanger of the New York Times pointed out in a story that ran on December 1st, the day after the "victory" speech, "he [President Bush] said that while the strategy was intended to help Iraqis take the lead in the fight within their country, his hope was that they would do so without 'major' foreign assistance. That suggested some form of continuing American presence." Sanger further noted that while Bush didn't say how long that continuing presence might last, "some of his aides point to South Korea, the Balkans and other places where some American presence remains years after the conflict." Given these points, the article's title, "Bush Gives Plan for Iraq Victory and Withdrawal," is somewhat misleading. Congress is slowly -- very slowly -- coming around to the notion that U.S. troops should be withdrawn. In mid-November, the Senate passed a resolution calling for a "phased re-deployment of United States forces from Iraq." Senate Minority leader Harry Reid (D-NV) asserted that the vote meant that "Democrats and Republicans acknowledged that staying the course is not the way to go. Therefore, this is a vote of no confidence on the Bush administration policy in Iraq." This is certainly an exaggeration, given that the resolution suggested no timeline for withdrawal and represented only a "sense of the Senate," not a binding resolution. While noting that the vote fell "far short of laying the foundation for a successful exit strategy," analyst Erik Leaver of Foreign Policy in Focus noted that "For the first time since giving the Bush administration authorization to go to war three years ago, the Senate engaged in a debate over Iraq policy. And while the demands of the peace movement to bring the troops home now were not met, Democrats were united in setting forth an exit strategy that Republicans were forced to accept." Whether voters will get a clear choice on Iraq policy in the November 2006 Congressional elections remains to be seen. When House Minority leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) endorsed Rep. Murtha's withdrawal plan, there was considerable push back by some members of the Democratic Caucus arguing that the party would not be well-served by such a stance in the upcoming elections. At this point it appears that some Democrats (and some Republicans like Rep. Walter Jones (R-NC) will take a clear position on withdrawal, while others will limit themselves to criticizing the Bush administration's mishandling of the conflict.

Solvency – Iraq – Conditional Withdrawal

Conditional reduction policy is best – solves war weariness and damage control.

Packer 08 (George Packer JULY 7, 2008 http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2008/07/07/080707taco\_talk\_packer#ixzz0rRqbPce5)KM

A “conditional engagement” policy is a much better fit for the present situation in Iraq. It would keep the heat on Iraqi politicians, whose willingness to reach compromise on issues like oil revenues, provincial elections, de-Baathification, and power sharing still lags well behind the government’s recent military successes. It would allow for a phased withdrawal of most troops, depending on political progress and on the performance of the Iraqi Army. This, in turn, would ease the pressure on the American military and answer the rightful disenchantment in American public opinion. There will be no such thing as victory in Iraq, but the next President, if he remains nimble, may be able to keep the damage under control.

Solvency – Afghanistan – Conditional Withdrawal

Conditional withdrawal of specific forces solves Afghanistan violence – solves resentment, removes targets for terrorist acts and leaves troops for key functions.

Porter 09 (Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist, Oct 15, 2009 http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48875)KM

A veteran Army officer who has served in both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars warns in an analysis now circulating in Washington that the counterinsurgency strategy urged by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal is likely to strengthen the Afghan insurgency, and calls for withdrawal of the bulk of U.S. combat forces from the country over 18 months. In a 63-page paper representing his personal views, but reflecting conversations with other officers who have served in Afghanistan, Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis argues that it is already too late for U.S. forces to defeat the insurgency. "Many experts in and from Afghanistan warn that our presence over the past eight years has already hardened a meaningful percentage of the population into viewing the United States as an army of occupation which should be opposed and resisted," writes Davis. Providing the additional 40,000 troops that Gen. McChrystal has reportedly requested "is almost certain to further exacerbate" that problem, he warns. Davis was a liaison officer between the Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan (CFC-A) and the Central Command in 2005, just as the Afghan insurgency was becoming a significant problem for the U.S. military. In that assignment he both consulted with the top U.S. officers and staff of the CFC-A and traveled widely throughout Afghanistan visiting U.S. and NATO combat units. He also commanded a U.S. military transition team on the Iraqi border with Iran in 2008-09. In the paper, Davis suggests what he calls a "Go Deep" strategy as an alternative to the recommendation from McChrystal for a larger counterinsurgency effort, which he calls "Go Big". The "Go Deep" strategy proposed by Davis would establish an 18-month time frame during which the bulk of U.S. and NATO combat forces would be withdrawn from the country. It would leave U.S. Special Forces and their supporting units, and enough conventional forces in Kabul to train Afghan troops and police and provide protection for U.S. personnel. The forces that continue to operate in insurgent-dominated areas would wage "an aggressive counterterrorism effort" aimed in part at identifying Taliban and al Qaeda operatives. The strategy would also provide support for improved Afghan governance and training for security forces. Davis argues that a large and growing U.S. military presence would make it more difficult to achieve this counterterrorism objective. By withdrawing conventional forces from the countryside, he suggests, U.S. strategy would deprive the insurgents of "easily identifiable and lucrative targets against which to launch attacks". Typically insurgents attack U.S. positions not for any tactical military objective, Davis writes, but to gain a propaganda victory. The "Go Deep" strategy outlined in the paper appears to parallel the shift in strategy from counterinsurgency to counterterrorism being proposed by some officials in discussions in the White House in recent weeks.

Solvency – Afghanistan – Conditional Withdrawal

Withdrawal from Afghanistan must be based on conditions on the ground – timetables create perception of abandonment which creates instability and turns the advantage.

Rubin 10 (Trudy Rubin is a columnist for the Philadelphia Inquirer, June 20, 2010, http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2010/jun/20/us-must-clarify-withdrawal-plans/)

I understand why Obama set the deadline, in a speech at West Point on Dec. 1. At a time of economic recession, he wanted to avoid an open-ended commitment a la Vietnam. He also wanted to convey to President Hamid Karzai that, despite a temporary “surge” of 30,000 U.S. troops, Afghans urgently needed to assume more of the security burden. However, setting such a deadline in public has the perverse effect of undermining the prospects of meeting it. If, as McCain argues, the main actors think we are short-timers, they will hedge their bets and make different choices. For example, operations to secure the southern province of Kandahar, the Taliban heartland, are going more slowly than expected because of difficulty winning support from local tribal elders. They are less likely to help Americans push back against Taliban fighters if they think U.S. troops will be gone soon. Another example: Reports are rife that Karzai is angling for a deal with top Taliban, which would make sense if he believes our commitment is fleeting. Of course, he stands scant chance of achieving such a deal; if the top Taliban leaders think U.S. troops are leaving, they don’t need to compromise with him — or us. As for Pakistani military officials, if they think we’re short-timers, they won’t break their ties with Afghan Taliban leaders whom they will then expect to return to power. Of course, Obama didn’t say U.S. troops would stream home rapidly in July 2011; in his West Point speech, he said, “After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home.” (The emphasis is mine.) Secretary of Defense Robert Gates quickly insisted that any withdrawal would depend on conditions on the ground, and Petraeus gave similar assurances to Afghan and Pakistani officials. But that’s not the way the publics of those countries read Obama’s message: They think the Americans will be departing soon. So, it seems, do many of their leaders. Which brings me back to McCain’s question at the hearings. When pressed to say whether he supported the 2011 deadline, Petraeus stressed that the date would be the “beginning of a process” and that withdrawal would be “conditions-based.” When asked a similar question by committee chairman Carl Levin, D-Mich., Petraeus replied: “There was a nuance to what the president said that was very important, that did not imply ... a search for the light to turn off, or anything like that.”

\*\*\*Timetables/Fast Reductions Bad\*\*\*

Timetables Bad – Iraq

Timetables are bad – they fail to take into account security conditions on the ground – Iraq proves.

Phillips and Carafano 06 (Dec 6, 2006, James Phillips and James Carafano, Ph.D. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2006/12/The-Iraq-Study-Group-Report-The-Good-the-Bad-and-the-Ugly)KM

Reject a timetable for withdrawal. The ISG report wisely concluded that troop withdrawals should be based on security conditions on the ground in Iraq, not on political considerations in Washington. The ISG projects that most U.S. combat troops would be able to pull out by early 2008, based on the estimate by General Casey, the U.S. commander in Iraq, that Iraqi forces need 12 to 18 months to gain enough capacity to assume responsibility for security throughout the country. General John Abizaid, the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, warned against a timetable for troop withdrawals in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services committee on November 15: "At this stage in the campaign, we'll need flexibility to manage our force and help manage the Iraqi force. Force caps and specific timetables limit our flexibility." Advocates of a timetable for troop withdrawals argue that announcing withdrawals would force Iraqi leaders to do more to assume responsibility for security and reach a sustainable agreement on power sharing. But that policy could backfire if it is followed rigidly regardless of the security situation. If a drawdown of U.S. forces is accompanied by an increase in violence, it would be harder to build effective Iraqi security forces and make nervous Iraqi Shiite leaders less willing to take risks to strike a political deal with Sunni leaders.

Timetable reductions fail to take into account the vulnerability of the situation in Iraq. Attention to conditions on the ground is key.

Dreyfuss 08 (Robert Dreyfuss, a Nation contributing editor

December 11, 2008 http://www.thenation.com/blog/scowcroft-gates-jones-go-slow-iraq?page=0,0,0,1)KM

Let's start with Scowcroft. The ultimate Republican realist, who distinguished himself in 2002 by writing a Wall Street Journal op-ed saying bluntly that the United States should not attack Iraq, has had Obama's ear on national security matters for a while now. In a speech at the end of October, Scowcroft laid down a marker on Iraq, supporting limited troop withdrawals but urging caution -- exactly the sort of caution that will be urged on Obama from Gates and the generals: Progress is being made. But it's a very fragile process. ... And it's getting to that point now that I think it is reversible, and so I think while the U.S. can probably begin to reduce some troops as the security situation improves, we have to be very careful about pulling out before we have a situation there that is clearly able to be sustained by the local system. And therefore, I would caution against a withdrawal of the United States according to a calendar, rather than according to the situation on the ground. In today's Post, Gates is quoted by George Will along similar lines, suggesting that the United States will need to keep 40,000 troops in Iraq "for decades": Regarding Iraq, Gates is parsimonious with his confidence, noting that "the multisectarian democracy has not sunk very deep roots yet." He stresses, however, that there is bipartisan congressional support for "a long-term residual presence" of perhaps 40,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, and that the president-elect's recent statements have not precluded that. Such a presence "for decades" has, he says, followed major U.S. military operations since 1945, other than in Vietnam. And he says, "Look at how long Britain has had troops in Cyprus." General Jones, who will be Obama's national security adviser, is reportedly well in tune with Gates and General Petraeus, the Centcom commander. He' s been generally cautious on Iraq, where the one important thing he's done is to run a commission charged with examining the Iraqi security forces in 2007, and which made some news by calling for the disbanding of the corrupt and death squad-infiltrated Iraqi police. But as the Los Angeles Times reported, Jones hasn't been on the same page as Obama when it comes to Iraq: Jones has separated himself from the Obama playbook on a few issues. In 2007, he warned that setting an arbitrary deadline for removing U.S. troops from Iraq, which would presumably include Obama's campaign call to remove combat units in 16 months, would be "against our national interest." Appearing on "Meet the Press" with the late Tim Russert at the time of the commission's report, Jones suggested that the United States might be in Iraq for at least three to four years. Here's an excerpt: MR. RUSSERT: General Jones, you're known as a straight shooter. Just separate all the garbage away for the American people. What should they be thinking about Iraq? That we're going to need to be there for three, four, five years in order to secure the country? GEN. JONES: Well, I--it may be that it'll take that long a period of time in, in order to do that. But that doesn't mean that, that, that there'll be--the level of fighting will be, will be the same. MR. RUSSERT: Or the level of troops. GEN. JONES: Or the level of troops. We are still in the Balkans, for example. The Balkans are relatively peaceful. So we'll get to that point. Our point is that you can, you can accelerate that with political reconciliation. But the strategic interests of the United States in the region are very, very high.

Timetables Bad – Iraq

Timetable reductions from Iraq fail – changes in stability in the region demand flexibility.

Packer 08 (George Packer JULY 7, 2008 http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2008/07/07/080707taco\_talk\_packer#ixzz0rRqbPce5)KM

In February, 2007, when Barack Obama declared that he was running for President, violence in Iraq had reached apocalyptic levels, and he based his candidacy, in part, on a bold promise to begin a rapid withdrawal of American forces upon taking office. At the time, this pledge represented conventional thinking among Democrats and was guaranteed to play well with primary voters. But in the year and a half since then two improbable, though not unforeseeable, events have occurred: Obama has won the Democratic nomination, and Iraq, despite myriad crises, has begun to stabilize. With the general election four months away, Obama’s rhetoric on the topic now seems outdated and out of touch, and the nominee-apparent may have a political problem concerning the very issue that did so much to bring him this far. Obama’s plan, which was formally laid out last September, called for the remaining combat brigades to be pulled out at a brisk pace of about one per month, along with a strategic shift of resources and attention away from Iraq and toward Afghanistan. At that rate, all combat troops would be withdrawn in sixteen months. In hindsight, it was a mistake—an understandable one, given the nature of the media and of Presidential politics today—for Obama to offer such a specific timetable. In matters of foreign policy, flexibility is a President’s primary defense against surprise. At the start of 2007, no one in Baghdad would have predicted that blood-soaked neighborhoods would begin returning to life within a year. The improved conditions can be attributed, in increasing order of importance, to President Bush’s surge, the change in military strategy under General David Petraeus, the turning of Sunni tribes against Al Qaeda, the Sadr militia’s unilateral ceasefire, and the great historical luck that brought them all together at the same moment. With the level of violence down, the Iraqi government and Army have begun to show signs of functioning in less sectarian ways. These developments may be temporary or cyclical; predicting the future in Iraq has been a losing game. Indeed, it was President Bush’s folly to ignore for years the shifting realities on the ground. Obama, whatever the idealistic yearnings of his admirers, has turned out to be a cold-eyed, shrewd politician. The same pragmatism that prompted him last month to forgo public financing of his campaign will surely lead him, if he becomes President, to recalibrate his stance on Iraq. He doubtless realizes that his original plan, if implemented now, could revive the badly wounded Al Qaeda in Iraq, reënergize the Sunni insurgency, embolden Moqtada al-Sadr to recoup his militia’s recent losses to the Iraqi Army, and return the central government to a state of collapse. The question is whether Obama will publicly change course before November. So far, he has offered nothing more concrete than this: “We must be as careful getting out of Iraq as we were careless getting in.”

Timetables Bad – Afghanistan

Timetable troop withdrawals don’t solve – they fail to combat terrorism, become political tools and leave the host nation with a sense of betrayal.

Fisher 09 (MAX FISHER on December 02, 2009, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/opinions/view/opinion/Problems-With-the-Timetable-for-Withdrawal-1768)

Troops will begin to leave in July 2011, but the pace of draw-down and how long it takes to pull them all out remain open-ended. Will it work? Obama's Only Mistake The Washington Post's David Ignatius praises Obama's strategy, but takes exception to the timetable. "Obama thinks that setting deadlines will force the Afghans to get their act together at last. That strikes me as the most dubious premise of his strategy. He is telling his adversary that he will start leaving on a certain date, and telling his ally to be ready to take over then, or else. That's the weak link in an otherwise admirable decision -- the idea that we strengthen our hand by announcing in advance that we plan to fold it." Leverage on Karzai--And on Us Politico's Mike Allen explains the political use of timetables. "What everyone's missing about the time constraint (what we call the July 2011 target to begin withdrawing -- 'ahead of the 2012 elections,' as The Wall Street Journal snippily put it on the front page this morning) is that it's leverage on Karzai. And it's leverage, frankly, on ourselves and on the bureaucracy of the government," he writes. "The biggest worry is that this becomes a political football." I'll Believe It When I See It The Atlantic's Andrew Sullivan fears we'll be there far beyond July 2011. "I do not share his confidence in American military and civilian power to turn the roiling region of Afghanistan and Pakistan into something less threatening. I see no reason after the last eight years to see how this can happen, even with these new resources. But if you rule out withdrawal right away, then this seems to me to be about the smartest strategy ahead. But I see absolutely no reason to believe that it will mean withdrawal of any significant amount in Obama's first term." No One Buys It, Including Karzai Foreign Policy's Marc Lynch warns, "I believe that Obama and his team really want things to work out this way, and have carefully thought through how to work it. But when things don't go their way, will they really follow through on their promises to draw down? Few people believe that. And if they don't believe it, then the mechanism of pressure doesn't operate." Don't Set Firm Timeline Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf writes in the Wall Street Journal, "The exit strategy from Afghanistan must not and cannot be time related. It has to ask, 'What effect do we want to create on the ground?' We must eliminate al Qaeda, dominate the Taliban militarily, and establish a representative, legitimate government in Afghanistan," he writes. "Pakistan and Afghanistan were shortsightedly abandoned to their fate by the West in 1989, in spite of the fact that they were the ones who won a victory for the Free World against the Soviet Union. This abandonment lead to a sense of betrayal amongst the people of the region. For the sake of regional and world peace, let us not repeat the same mistake."

A timetable for pullout signals defeat to Al Qaeda and The Taliban, increasing terrorist threats.

Kuhnhenn 09 (Jim Kuhnhenn Associated Press / September 28, 2009 http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2009/09/28/gates\_rejects\_calls\_for\_withdrawal\_timetable\_in\_afghanistan/)KM

WASHINGTON - Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates is pushing back against liberal calls for withdrawal timetables from Afghanistan, saying it is a mistake to set a deadline to end US military action and a defeat would be disastrous for the United States. In a stern warning to critics of a continued troop presence in Afghanistan, Gates said the Islamic extremist Taliban and Al Qaeda would perceive an early pullout as a victory over the United States similar to the Soviet Union’s humiliating withdrawal in 1989 after a 10-year war. “The notion of timelines and exit strategies and so on, frankly, I think would all be a strategic mistake. The reality is, failure in Afghanistan would be a huge setback for the United States,’’ Gates said in an interview broadcast yesterday on CNN’s “State of the Union.’’ “Taliban and Al Qaeda, as far as they’re concerned, defeated one superpower. For them to be seen to defeat a second, I think, would have catastrophic consequences in terms of energizing the extremist movement, Al Qaeda recruitment, operations, fund-raising, and so on. I think it would be a huge setback for the United States.’’ Gates’s made his remarks as President Obama reexamines his administration’s strategy in Afghanistan and as the Pentagon sits on a request for additional troops from General Stanley McChrystal, the US and NATO commander in Afghanistan.

Timetables Bad – Afghanistan

Timetable drawdown promotes a wait-it-out mentality for adversaries and creates political instability.

Hager 10 (Emily Hager Best Defense Philadelphia deputy bureau chief, 02 Mar 2010, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/02/on\_the\_whole\_i\_d\_rather\_be\_in\_karachi\_ahmed\_rashid\_speaks\_in\_philadelphia)

Ahmed Rashid opened with a run down of the situation in Afghanistan. It was not encouraging. Taliban influence is expanding, he said, and it has come to control a wide swath of the country, including provinces near Kabul. Last year's election fraud undermined the credibility of President Karzai for taking part and of the West for not noticing sooner and fixing it. Afghanistan and Pakistan have become training grounds for other regional Taliban-type groups, mainly fighters from other Central Asian countries, China, Russia, and Europe. The Afghan economy is still primarily donor-driven, not a true national economy, and so it furnishes few lasting job opportunities for Afghan citizens. And though the Pakistani army has started to take on the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda still find refuge in that country. (Rashid said last week's arrests of top Taliban leaders by Pakistani forces were more due to chance than to a major shift in Pakistani policy). Still, he says the presence of Western forces offers at least the hope of rebuilding the country with continued international interest -- infinitely more appealing than the fear that he sees as still the main currency of the Taliban. How do Obama and his administration measure up? Rashid said that for the most part, they have the right ideas: building a regional strategy that includes key players from Pakistan to Iran to Saudi Arabia; investing in the Afghan economy, especially in agriculture; improving governance; and using troops to secure population centers. But because Indo-Pakistani relations fell apart after the Mumbai bombings in 2008 and the situation in Iran has deteriorated, the regional strategy piece is falling through. Rashid said the biggest mistake the administration has made, on a foreign policy level, was to set a timetable for withdrawal. Right now the draw down of American forces is set to start in July, 2011. That leaves very little time to build up the Afghan economy and promote good governance. Worse, Rashid argued, it will promote panic in the Afghan government, encourage a wait-it-out mentality among the Taliban, and prompt neighboring countries to send in the proxies and begin sorting out potential lines of influence in a post-war Afghanistan. Still, Rashid recognized that domestic politics in the West make ending the war as soon as possible a political imperative, citing the collapse of the Dutch government earlier this week.

Timetables are perceived as full withdrawals and hurt domestic forces in the host nation.

Rubin 10 (Michael Rubin, resident scholar at AEI, March 8, 2010, http://www.aei.org/article/101753)KM

It is true, as Schlesinger points out, that Obama did not set a date for the completion of the withdrawal, but he signaled its finite nature. And herein lays the problem. The reason Obama spoke of a deadline was not to pressure Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai but rather to assuage constituencies in the United States increasingly wary of open-ended U.S. involvement in the country. But in the Middle East and South Asia, perception matters far more than reality. Diplomatic affairs expert Omar Sharifi, speaking on Afghan television, declared, "Today the Afghans unfortunately lost the game and failed to get a long-term commitment from the international community." Likewise, Afghan political analyst Ahmad Sayedi observed, "When the USA sets a timeline of 18 months for troop withdraw, this by itself boosts the morale of the opponents and makes them less likely to take any step towards reconciliation." It is absolutely correct to say that Obama did not say that all--or even a significant fraction--of U.S. troops would withdraw in July 2011, but this is what was heard not only by U.S. allies and adversaries in Afghanistan but also by the governments and media in regional states such as Pakistan, Iran, and even Russia. Indeed, it appears Obama's advisors recognized their error and scrambled to clarify. Speaking on Meet the Press, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared, "We're not talking about an exit strategy or a drop-dead deadline." On December 3, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said the withdrawal would "probably" take two to three years but that "there are no deadlines in terms of when our troops will all be out." He made an unannounced visit to Kabul to underline his message. Sayed Masud, a lecturer at Kabul University, spoke of how Obama's announcement "was a big mistake" that had weakened the morale of Afghan forces, which until then had been on the upswing.

Fast Troop Reductions Bad – Iraq

Forced and rapid troop reductions will perpetuate instability, turning the aff.

Haas and Indyk 08 (“Executive Summaries from Restoring the Balance: A MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENT” Richard N. Haass • Martin In dyk December 2008 pg 1)

President Barack Obama will have to reprioritize and reorient U.S. policy toward the Middle East. For the past six years that policy has been dominated by Iraq. This need not, and should not, continue to be the case. The next president can gradually reduce the U.S. troop presence and combat role in Iraq, increasingly shifting responsibility to Iraqi forces. But because the situa- tion is still fragile there, the drawdown should be done carefully and not so quickly or arbitrarily that it risks contributing to the undoing of progress achieved at great cost over the past two years. All this would be consistent with the accord governing U.S. troop pres- ence being negotiated by U.S. and Iraqi officials. Instability generated by a too rapid withdrawal could distract the next president from the other priority ini- tiatives he will need to take and create opportunities in Iraq for Iran and al Qaeda to exploit. However, a too slow withdrawal would leave American forces tied down in Iraq and unavailable for other priority tasks, including backing his diplomacy visà-vis Iran in par- ticular with the credible threat of force. He will need to strike a balance. In no way should this call for retrenchment in Iraq be interpreted as a recommendation for a more general American pullback from the region. The greater Middle East will remain vital to the United States for decades to come given its geostrategic location, its energy and financial resources, the U.S. commitment to Israel, and the possibility both for terrorism to emanate from the region and for nuclear materials and weapons to spread there. Reduced American involvement will jeopardize all these interests.

Quick withdrawal is irresponsible – it creates more instability in Iraq.

Thomasson 07 (Dan K. Thomasson, former editor of the Scripps Howard News Service, April 3, 2007 http://www.globegazette.com/news/opinion/article\_2079de3b-0ff6-5320-bd70-fa1d79f25b58.html)KM

Washington, D.C., has always been full of bad ideas, but none worse than congressional Democrats’ determination to impose a firm date for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. Even if there were enough votes in both houses to override a presidential veto of the funding bill in which this nonsense is included — and there aren’t — such a mandate is ridiculously irresponsible. In the end, after the political charade has played out, the troops will get their funds because no lawmaker wants to be accused of denying them. But the inevitable delay has the potential of truly harming those carrying out our military mission. Telling the beleaguered Iraqi government and its enemies that there is a definite date when all support and security for it will end merely compounds the major mistakes already made in this war. Furthermore, it forces the Iraqi leaders to begin looking at political alliances that are not only threatening to American interests but also could result in a widening of the violence. For instance, the power vacuum in the entire region likely would be filled by Iran. All this has been argued along the way as lawmakers still friendly to President Bush have tried to convince Democratic leaders that there are other ways of sending an anti-war message to the White House. But the Democrats are increasingly in a confrontational mood. They firmly believe their tiny majority for the first time in 12 years resulted from voter angst over Iraq and Afghanistan and that their fragile control of the Congress would be fleeting if they ignored that. They clearly are determined to take advantage of a lame duck president whose approval rating is in the low 30s and who is so crippled that he is being openly defied by those who supported his re-election. There seems to be little hope, therefore, that when the lawmakers return from their Easter recess that constituents will have convinced many of them to take another course. In fact, a recent poll shows that 60 percent of Americans favor a deadline for withdrawal. The House and Senate versions of the military funding proposal include different 2008 withdrawal dates. The Senate bill sets March 28, 2008, as a goal for ending military support while the House establishes a firm deadline of Aug. 31 of next year for U.S. troops to be on the way home. It will take some time to hash out the differences. Meanwhile, the commanders in the field are apparently supposed to keep their fingers crossed that the men and materiel needed to accomplish their assignment will be forthcoming before the pinch is really felt by early summer. It is quite obvious to everyone that Iraq was itself a bad idea. In fact, it vies with Vietnam as the most ill-advised expedition in American history. But nearly every military and diplomatic expert on both sides of the political fence has warned that to force a precipitous withdrawal and to telegraph when that would occur would increase the magnitude of this disaster exponentially. The gap that would leave and the chaos that likely would ensue would make what has gone before look mild.

Fast Troop Reductions Bad – Iraq

Hasty retreat leads to instability, genocide, Syria-Israel war, terrorism, and perpetuates conflicts.

Kissinger 7 (Henry A. Kissinger The Washington Post - September 16, 2007, http://www.henryakissinger.com/articles/wp091607.html)

Two realities define the range of a meaningful debate on Iraq policy: The war cannot be ended by military means alone. But neither is it possible to “end” the war by ceding the battlefield. The radical jihadist challenge knows no frontiers; American decisions in the next few months will affect the confidence and morale of potential targets, potential allies and radical jihadists around the globe. Above all, they will define the U.S. capacity to contribute to a safer and better world. The imperative is for bipartisan cooperation in a coordinated political and military strategy, even while the political cycle tempts a debate geared to focus groups. The experience of Vietnam is often cited as the example for the potential debacle that awaits us in Iraq. But we will never learn from history if we keep telling ourselves myths about it. The passengers on American helicopters fleeing Saigon were not U.S. troops but Vietnamese civilians. American forces had left two years earlier. Vietnam collapsed because of the congressional decision to reduce aid by two-thirds to Vietnam and to cut it off altogether for Cambodia in the face of a massive North Vietnamese invasion that violated every provision of the Vietnam Peace Agreement. Should America repeat a self-inflicted wound? An abrupt withdrawal from Iraq would not end the war; it would only redirect it. Within Iraq, the sectarian conflict could assume genocidal proportions; terrorist base areas could reemerge. Lebanon may slip into domination by Iran’s ally, Hezbollah; a Syria-Israel war or an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities may become more likely as Israel attempted to break the radical encirclement; Turkey and Iran would probably squeeze Kurdish autonomy. The Taliban in Afghanistan would gain new impetus. Countries where the radical threat is as yet incipient, such as India, would face a mounting domestic challenge. Pakistan, in the process of a delicate political transformation, would encounter more radical pressures and might even turn into a radical challenge itself. That is what is meant by “precipitate” withdrawal — a withdrawal in which the United States loses the ability to shape events, either within Iraq, on the anti-jihadist battlefield or in the world at large. The proper troop level in Iraq will not be discovered by political compromise at home. To be sure, no “dispensable” forces should be retained there. Yet the definition of “dispensable” must be based on strategic and political criteria. If reducing troop levels turns into the litmus test of American politics, each withdrawal will generate demands for additional ones until the political, military and psychological framework collapses. An appropriate Iraq strategy requires political direction. But the political dimension must be the ally of military strategy, not a resignation from it. Symbolic withdrawals, urged by such wise elder statesmen as Sens. John Warner and Richard Lugar, might indeed assuage the immediate public concerns. They should be understood, however, as palliatives; their utility depends on a balance between their capacity to reassure the U.S. public and their propensity to encourage America’s adversaries to believe that they are the forerunners of complete retreat.

\*\*\*2NC Blocks – Conditional Withdrawal CP\*\*\*

2NC – Perm – Do Both

1. The permutation is severance – a topical aff has to immediately eliminate troop presence – this is the foundation of all negative ground and the only limit to a huge topic – that's on T. Additionally, severance makes the Aff a moving target which collapses clash and competitive equity.

2. Perm fails – even the announcement of a timetable for pullout will create political panic and instability – Afghanistan proves.

Hager 10 (Emily Hager Best Defense Philadelphia deputy bureau chief, 02 Mar 2010, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/02/on\_the\_whole\_i\_d\_rather\_be\_in\_karachi\_ahmed\_rashid\_speaks\_in\_philadelphia)

Ahmed Rashid opened with a run down of the situation in Afghanistan. It was not encouraging. Taliban influence is expanding, he said, and it has come to control a wide swath of the country, including provinces near Kabul. Last year's election fraud undermined the credibility of President Karzai for taking part and of the West for not noticing sooner and fixing it. Afghanistan and Pakistan have become training grounds for other regional Taliban-type groups, mainly fighters from other Central Asian countries, China, Russia, and Europe. The Afghan economy is still primarily donor-driven, not a true national economy, and so it furnishes few lasting job opportunities for Afghan citizens. And though the Pakistani army has started to take on the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda still find refuge in that country. (Rashid said last week's arrests of top Taliban leaders by Pakistani forces were more due to chance than to a major shift in Pakistani policy). Still, he says the presence of Western forces offers at least the hope of rebuilding the country with continued international interest -- infinitely more appealing than the fear that he sees as still the main currency of the Taliban. How do Obama and his administration measure up? Rashid said that for the most part, they have the right ideas: building a regional strategy that includes key players from Pakistan to Iran to Saudi Arabia; investing in the Afghan economy, especially in agriculture; improving governance; and using troops to secure population centers. But because Indo-Pakistani relations fell apart after the Mumbai bombings in 2008 and the situation in Iran has deteriorated, the regional strategy piece is falling through. Rashid said the biggest mistake the administration has made, on a foreign policy level, was to set a timetable for withdrawal. Right now the draw down of American forces is set to start in July, 2011. That leaves very little time to build up the Afghan economy and promote good governance. Worse, Rashid argued, it will promote panic in the Afghan government, encourage a wait-it-out mentality among the Taliban, and prompt neighboring countries to send in the proxies and begin sorting out potential lines of influence in a post-war Afghanistan. Still, Rashid recognized that domestic politics in the West make ending the war as soon as possible a political imperative, citing the collapse of the Dutch government earlier this week.

3. Perm still links – there’s still a perception of immediate troop drawbacks, only the CP solves by exclusively conditioning pullout based on conditions on the ground.

2NC – Perm – Do the CP

1. Extend their we-meets on T – if they meet our interpretation that topical affs must immediately reduce presence, then the CP competes because troop reduction is based on conditions on the ground and not immediate.

2. The permutation is severance and is a voter for fairness – a topical aff has to eliminate troop presence – this is the foundation of all negative ground and the only limit to a huge topic - that's on T.

3. They say in CX troop reductions are through a timetable, stick them to that.

<Read CX is Binding Theory>

4. Default neg – \*how\* to withdrawal is a crucial dispute in the literature

Lawrence J. Korb, Sean Duggan, and Peter Juul, ‘8 – the Authors are Analysts at the Center for American Progress, “How to Redeploy,” Center for American Progress, 6-11, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/08/how_to_redeploy.html>.

There is significant disagreement and confusion about the time necessary to withdraw all U.S. military forces from Iraq. Proponents of an indefinite U.S. military presence in Iraq have asserted that a withdrawal of over 140,000 American troops and equipment would be fraught with risk, uncertainty, and overwhelming logistical complications. According to a recent ABC News piece, several commanders in Iraq stated that there was “no way” a withdrawal of one to two brigades per month could work logistically—although none of them agreed to be quoted on the record. The debate over how to conduct an American withdrawal has gravitated back and forth between those arguing that there must be either a rapid, precipitous withdrawal, and those advocating for a long, drawn-out redeployment. Many who argue for an extended redeployment over several years do so simply in order to “stay the course” in Iraq, and cherry-pick logistical issues to make the case for an extended U.S. presence. Deciding between a swift or extended redeployment, however, is a false choice. Both options are logistically feasible, but this report will demonstrate that an orderly and safe withdrawal is best achieved over an 8 to 10 month period. This report, written in consultation with military planners and logistics experts, is not intended to serve as a playbook for our military planners; it is a guide to policymakers and the general public about what is realistically achievable. A massive, yet safe and orderly redeployment of U.S. forces, equipment, and support personnel is surely daunting—but it is well within the exceptional logistical capabilities of the U.S. military. It is necessary now more than ever for the United States to commit to a responsible phased withdrawal. This must be done because, as many analysts have noted, the American invasion and occupation of Iraq has produced several unintended consequences. A large and indefinite military presence in Iraq has allowed Al Qaeda and the Taliban to reconstitute itself, diverted U.S. attention from the war in Afghanistan, weakened the United States’ ability to project its hard and soft power around the world, and strengthened Iranian influence throughout the greater Middle East.

2NC – Theory – CX is Binding

Their reclarification of the aff in the 2AC after CX is abusive and is a voter:

1. Predictability – allowing them to change the aff kills the neg, we can’t guess which parts of their aff are lies.
2. Time Skew – 3 minutes of CX time are wasted in a world where the aff can shift to get out of arguments.
3. Strat Skew – CX is the only time for us to ask about the aff to get links. They uniquely hurt our strategy when they moot CX.
4. Reciprocity – the neg can’t change the status of an advocacy to dispositional after they read conditionality bad, they shouldn’t be able to reclarify their aff after CX to avoid our 1NC strat.

2NC – A2: Doesn’t Solve Perception

The net benefit turns this claim –

1. The perception of the aff is worse than the CP – the world of the aff creates a sense of abandonment and perpetuates instability, enemies will take advantage of set dates and remobilize.
2. The CP solves – conditioning reduction on the situation on the ground means it avoids risk of the NB while still providing a perception of troop reduction.
3. Conditional withdrawal of specific forces solves Afghanistan violence – solves resentment, removes targets for terrorist acts and leaves troops for key functions.

Porter 09 (Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist, Oct 15, 2009 http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=48875)KM

A veteran Army officer who has served in both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars warns in an analysis now circulating in Washington that the counterinsurgency strategy urged by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal is likely to strengthen the Afghan insurgency, and calls for withdrawal of the bulk of U.S. combat forces from the country over 18 months. In a 63-page paper representing his personal views, but reflecting conversations with other officers who have served in Afghanistan, Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis argues that it is already too late for U.S. forces to defeat the insurgency. "Many experts in and from Afghanistan warn that our presence over the past eight years has already hardened a meaningful percentage of the population into viewing the United States as an army of occupation which should be opposed and resisted," writes Davis. Providing the additional 40,000 troops that Gen. McChrystal has reportedly requested "is almost certain to further exacerbate" that problem, he warns. Davis was a liaison officer between the Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan (CFC-A) and the Central Command in 2005, just as the Afghan insurgency was becoming a significant problem for the U.S. military. In that assignment he both consulted with the top U.S. officers and staff of the CFC-A and traveled widely throughout Afghanistan visiting U.S. and NATO combat units. He also commanded a U.S. military transition team on the Iraqi border with Iran in 2008-09. In the paper, Davis suggests what he calls a "Go Deep" strategy as an alternative to the recommendation from McChrystal for a larger counterinsurgency effort, which he calls "Go Big". The "Go Deep" strategy proposed by Davis would establish an 18-month time frame during which the bulk of U.S. and NATO combat forces would be withdrawn from the country. It would leave U.S. Special Forces and their supporting units, and enough conventional forces in Kabul to train Afghan troops and police and provide protection for U.S. personnel. The forces that continue to operate in insurgent-dominated areas would wage "an aggressive counterterrorism effort" aimed in part at identifying Taliban and al Qaeda operatives. The strategy would also provide support for improved Afghan governance and training for security forces. Davis argues that a large and growing U.S. military presence would make it more difficult to achieve this counterterrorism objective. By withdrawing conventional forces from the countryside, he suggests, U.S. strategy would deprive the insurgents of "easily identifiable and lucrative targets against which to launch attacks". Typically insurgents attack U.S. positions not for any tactical military objective, Davis writes, but to gain a propaganda victory. The "Go Deep" strategy outlined in the paper appears to parallel the shift in strategy from counterinsurgency to counterterrorism being proposed by some officials in discussions in the White House in recent weeks.

2NC – A2: Doesn’t Solve Timeframe

The CP solves timeframe of the aff –

1. Withdrawal will be inevitable – maintaining troop presence guarantees stability to a point where pullout is possible, that’s 1NC solvency.
2. A static timeframe for withdrawal is worse – signals defeat to Al Qaeda and The Taliban, increasing terrorist threats.

Kuhnhenn 09 (Jim Kuhnhenn Associated Press / September 28, 2009 http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2009/09/28/gates\_rejects\_calls\_for\_withdrawal\_timetable\_in\_afghanistan/)KM

WASHINGTON - Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates is pushing back against liberal calls for withdrawal timetables from Afghanistan, saying it is a mistake to set a deadline to end US military action and a defeat would be disastrous for the United States. In a stern warning to critics of a continued troop presence in Afghanistan, Gates said the Islamic extremist Taliban and Al Qaeda would perceive an early pullout as a victory over the United States similar to the Soviet Union’s humiliating withdrawal in 1989 after a 10-year war. “The notion of timelines and exit strategies and so on, frankly, I think would all be a strategic mistake. The reality is, failure in Afghanistan would be a huge setback for the United States,’’ Gates said in an interview broadcast yesterday on CNN’s “State of the Union.’’ “Taliban and Al Qaeda, as far as they’re concerned, defeated one superpower. For them to be seen to defeat a second, I think, would have catastrophic consequences in terms of energizing the extremist movement, Al Qaeda recruitment, operations, fund-raising, and so on. I think it would be a huge setback for the United States.’’ Gates’s made his remarks as President Obama reexamines his administration’s strategy in Afghanistan and as the Pentagon sits on a request for additional troops from General Stanley McChrystal, the US and NATO commander in Afghanistan.

2NC – Theory – PIC’s Good

PIC’s are good –

1. Best policy option - if we win that the counterplan is competitive and better than the plan then it shouldn't matter how the CP works.

2. Competition checks abuse –the net benefit must have links to the plan with real impacts

3. Neg Ground – PICs are the only way the negative can generate offense against a racism bad aff. Without them, the negative would have to defend fundamentally untrue arguments like racism good.

4. Net benefits checks abuse – net benefits are a unique reason not to do the plan, and the Aff always has offense on the net benefit.

5. At worst, reject the argument, not the team, the NB is still a reason to vote neg.

\*\*\*2NC Blocks – Gradual Drawdown\*\*\*

2NC – Perm – Do Both

1. The perm still links – the CP only is a pledge to gradually remove troops, the aff removes the troops and destabilizes the region, that’s the NB.

2. The permutation is severance and is a voter for fairness – a topical aff has to remove troop presence – this is the foundation of all negative ground and the only limit to a huge topic - that's on T.

3. Perm fails - quick withdrawal creates more instability – Iraq proves.

Thomasson 07 (Dan K. Thomasson, former editor of the Scripps Howard News Service, April 3, 2007 http://www.globegazette.com/news/opinion/article\_2079de3b-0ff6-5320-bd70-fa1d79f25b58.html)KM

Washington, D.C., has always been full of bad ideas, but none worse than congressional Democrats’ determination to impose a firm date for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. Even if there were enough votes in both houses to override a presidential veto of the funding bill in which this nonsense is included — and there aren’t — such a mandate is ridiculously irresponsible. In the end, after the political charade has played out, the troops will get their funds because no lawmaker wants to be accused of denying them. But the inevitable delay has the potential of truly harming those carrying out our military mission. Telling the beleaguered Iraqi government and its enemies that there is a definite date when all support and security for it will end merely compounds the major mistakes already made in this war. Furthermore, it forces the Iraqi leaders to begin looking at political alliances that are not only threatening to American interests but also could result in a widening of the violence. For instance, the power vacuum in the entire region likely would be filled by Iran. All this has been argued along the way as lawmakers still friendly to President Bush have tried to convince Democratic leaders that there are other ways of sending an anti-war message to the White House. But the Democrats are increasingly in a confrontational mood. They firmly believe their tiny majority for the first time in 12 years resulted from voter angst over Iraq and Afghanistan and that their fragile control of the Congress would be fleeting if they ignored that. They clearly are determined to take advantage of a lame duck president whose approval rating is in the low 30s and who is so crippled that he is being openly defied by those who supported his re-election. There seems to be little hope, therefore, that when the lawmakers return from their Easter recess that constituents will have convinced many of them to take another course. In fact, a recent poll shows that 60 percent of Americans favor a deadline for withdrawal. The House and Senate versions of the military funding proposal include different 2008 withdrawal dates. The Senate bill sets March 28, 2008, as a goal for ending military support while the House establishes a firm deadline of Aug. 31 of next year for U.S. troops to be on the way home. It will take some time to hash out the differences. Meanwhile, the commanders in the field are apparently supposed to keep their fingers crossed that the men and materiel needed to accomplish their assignment will be forthcoming before the pinch is really felt by early summer. It is quite obvious to everyone that Iraq was itself a bad idea. In fact, it vies with Vietnam as the most ill-advised expedition in American history. But nearly every military and diplomatic expert on both sides of the political fence has warned that to force a precipitous withdrawal and to telegraph when that would occur would increase the magnitude of this disaster exponentially. The gap that would leave and the chaos that likely would ensue would make what has gone before look mild.

2NC – Perm – Do the CP

1. Extend their we-meets on T – if they meet our interpretation that topical affs must directly reduce presence, then the CP competes because we only pledge to reduce.

2. The permutation is severance and is a voter for fairness – a topical aff has to eliminate troop presence – this is the foundation of all negative ground and the only limit to a huge topic - that's on T.

3. They say in CX troops will be removed, stick them to that.

<Read CX is Binding Theory>

4. Default neg – \*how\* to withdrawal is a crucial dispute in the literature, particularly on the \*pledge\* to withdraw

Lawrence J. Korb, Sean Duggan, and Peter Juul, ‘8 – the Authors are Analysts at the Center for American Progress, “How to Redeploy,” Center for American Progress, 6-11, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/08/how_to_redeploy.html>.

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4. Reciprocity – the neg can’t change the status of an advocacy to dispositional after they read conditionality bad, they shouldn’t be able to reclarify their aff after CX to avoid our 1NC strat.

2NC – A2: Doesn’t Solve Perception

The net benefit turns this claim –

1. The perception of the aff is worse than the CP – the world of the aff creates a sense of abandonment and perpetuates instability, deployed regions are too fragile and dependent on the US to weather a sudden reduction in presence.
2. The CP solves – conditioning withdrawal on the situation on the ground still sends a perception of troop reduction while maintaining aid.

Feller 09 (BEN FELLER | 12/10/09, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/10/obama-afghanistan-troop-d\_n\_386938.html) km

President Barack Obama said Thursday that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, set to start in 19 months, will be gradual and U.S. aid to that nation will last for years. "We're not going to see some sharp cliff, some precipitous drawdown," Obama told reporters in Oslo, where he traveled to accept the Nobel Peace Prize. The president said he is sticking to his plan to start the drawdown in July 2011, but he signaled that the United States will help Afghanistan train its security forces and develop its economy for some time. "Several years after U.S. combat troops have been drastically reduced in the region," he said, "the Afghanistan government is still going to need support for those security forces. We are still going to have an interest in partnering with Afghans and Pakistanis and others in dealing with the remnants of terrorist activities there." Some critics have questioned Obama's timetable because the United States is about to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan. Many liberals in Congress and elsewhere oppose the buildup in the first place. Obama said there should be no confusion about his intentions. "Starting in July 2011 we will begin that transition, that transfer of responsibility," he said. "The pace at which that takes place, the slope of a drawdown, how it occurs tactically, those are all going to be conditions-based," he said, just as there has been "a constant monitoring of the situation" in Iraq. Obama seemed to place more emphasis on the eventual transfer of responsibilities to Afghans than on solid timetables for bringing U.S. troops home.

2NC – A2: Doesn’t Solve Timeframe

We solve their timeframe –

1. Perception is all that matters – we access their perception internal links, a pledge without eliminating all troops still accesses their impacts.
2. Removing some troops without total withdrawal still pushes us away from the brink of their advantage, even if it’s not 100% solvency.
3. The perception solves - calls for troop reductions are based on gradual reductions, not sudden changes in presence.

Rubin 05 (Barry Rubin director of the Global Research in International Affairs Spring 05, http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring\_rubin.pdf)KM

Leaders of Iraq’s most powerful political party have made their inten- tions clear. As Ahmad Chalabi, the exiled Iraqi politician whom the United States had once apparently designated as Iraq’s new leader, wrote in the Wall Street Journal on December 22, 2004, “The first task of the newly elected provisional parliament must be to reach agreement with the United States to determine the status of their forces in Iraq and agree on a timetable for a phased withdrawal.” 1 Chalabi was not calling for a sudden, irresponsible withdrawal, but rather a carefully planned, gradual one. The reality is that maintaining a large-scale U.S. presence to create a post-Saddam government is neither sustainable nor desirable. Despite U.S. assumptions, a protracted U.S.-led war in Iraq will not win over the people, assure stability, or defeat insurgents. On the contrary, it will have the oppo- site effect. The United States must therefore now shift gears and prepare to withdraw after an Iraqi government is initially established following the De- cember 2005 Iraqi elections. This stands in contrast to previous plans to stay for as long as it took to turn Iraq into an ideal democracy or even to maintain large bases there for the long-term future. Although withdrawing will undoubtedly leave many U.S. leaders and some members of the public somewhat dissatisfied, it will also provide an opportunity to declare victory in reasonable terms and bring the troops home. The alternative is to see the mission of U.S. forces held hostage by Iraq’s governmental instability or even to sustain a permanent presence, a scenario that will result in a disas- ter far greater than the problems confronted up to now.

2NC – Theory – PIC’s Good

PIC’s are good –

1. Best policy option - if we win that the counterplan is competitive and better than the plan then it shouldn't matter how the CP works.

2. Competition checks abuse –the net benefit must have links to the plan with real impacts

3. Neg Ground – PICs are the only way the negative can generate offense against a racism bad aff. Without them, the negative would have to defend fundamentally untrue arguments like racism good.

4. Net benefits checks abuse – net benefits are a unique reason not to do the plan, and the Aff always has offense on the net benefit.

5. At worst, reject the argument, not the team, the NB is still a reason to vote neg.

\*\*\*2AC Blocks – South Korea\*\*\*

2AC – Top Level

1. Doesn’t compete – PERM: do both AND Perm: do the CP.

1. Topicality doesn’t establish competition – the CP \*also\* initiates a reduction – even if interpret ‘reduce’ differently, the CP still isn’t textually competitive.
2. Textual competition is necessary to form competition – allowing CPs that only compete based on the function of the Aff creates a slippery slope that rewards Consult and QPQ CPs – this crushes Aff ground and topic education.
3. Their interp of normal means is backwards – if they’re right that troop reductions are usually conditional or gradual, that makes their solvency evidence another defense of the Aff
4. The plan is a rough draft, not a blueprint – their interpretation requires the Aff to specify thousands of details, making it impossible to debate – this flips their CP ground arguments because the Aff would constantly break new, lengthy plan texts to prevent the 1NC from having time to write CPs – we solve their offense DAs to withdrawal but not the MECHANISM of withdrawing

2. Doesn’t solve the Aff –

1. An immediate, complete withdrawal of troops is key – that’s the < > evidence
2. Doesn’t solve perception – quick topic FYI – NONE of the military bases are permanent – this is why the topic didn’t include European bases – the CP is perceived as \*tinkering\* with withdrawal rather than \*accelerating\* withdrawal

3. They’re cheating – the CP is just delay in drag – they’re in a DOUBLE BIND – EITHER

1. The CP doesn’t remove all troops and a built-in solvency deficit outweighs OR
2. The CP still removes all troops and just delays the date of transaction – this makes it impossible to be Aff because there are thousands of events like elections, key operations, etc. that we could never generate predictable offense to

4. No risk of offense the other way – we’ll defend immediacy for purposes of their DAs but not their CPs

2AC – Top Level

There are tons of interpretations of reduce – NONE of them are synonymous with eliminate, they’re all synonymous with reduce

Princeton Wordnet, ’10. wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

cut down on; make a reduction in; "reduce your daily fat intake"; "The employer wants to cut back health benefits"

make less complex; "reduce a problem to a single question"

bring to humbler or weaker state or condition; "He reduced the population to slavery"

simplify the form of a mathematical equation of expression by substituting one term for another

lower in grade or rank or force somebody into an undignified situation; "She reduced her niece to a servant"

be the essential element; "The proposal boils down to a compromise"

shrink: reduce in size; reduce physically; "Hot water will shrink the sweater"; "Can you shrink this image?"

lessen and make more modest; "reduce one's standard of living"

make smaller; "reduce an image"

SoKo – AFF Ans

Withdrawing as early as possible is key – this outweighs any risk of the net benefit

KIM JOHNG SOHN, ‘9 – Tongil Korea Net, “US Should Terminate Military Presence in S Korea As Early As Possible,” 9-8, <http://tongilkorea.net/2009/09/08/us-should-terminate-military-presence-in-s-korea-as-early-as-possible/>.

Pyongyang — It has passed 64 years since the U.S. imperialists’ occupation of south Korea. If the United States persistently enforces its policy of military presence in south Korea, lending a deaf ear to the voices of the peoples of Korea and other countries of the world demanding the earliest withdrawal of the U.S. forces from south Korea, it will face bitterer rebuff and denunciation at home and abroad. The U.S. forces’ landing in south Korea was aimed at keeping it under its occupation and turning it into its colony, dividing Korea into two parts and using its southern half as a military appendage for executing its policy of aggression. The U.S. moves to seek its forces’ permanent presence in south Korea and bolster up its combat capability are a challenge to the demand of the times for the withdrawal of foreign troops and their trend. The U.S. should pull its forces out of south Korea as early as possible as demanded by international law and the times. The termination of the U.S. forces’ presence in south Korea would remove the basic factor of threatening the peace in Korea and the biggest hurdle lying in the way of national reunification. The pullback of the U.S. forces from south Korea would result in eliminating the most dangerous hotbed of war in the world and thus help create environment favorable for ensuring peace and security on the Korean peninsula and the rest of Asia and the world. How to approach the issue of the U.S. forces’ withdrawal from south Korea serves as a barometer judging whether the U.S. has a will to rectify its hostile policy towards the DPRK or not and whether it wishes to see Korea’s reunification and peace or not. The world is waiting for the U.S. to make a switchover in its attitude.

SoKo – AFF Ans

Total withdrawal is crucial

PMAINDF, ‘4. “Totally withdraw the US military bases in south Korea,” Pyongyang Mission of the AINDF, News Report: No. 11

June, <http://ndfsk.dyndns.org/kuguk8/pym/nr0406-11/total.htm>.

There is a map of the facilities of the US Forces Korea on the USFK homepage (www.korea.army.mil.) The facilities cover south Korea as a net. The information officer of the US 8th Army said. “Now there are 90 facilities related to the US troops in south Korea. They involve 41 main bases, 38 military communication installations and 11 training camps. The land used by the USFK covers 6,770 thousand pyeongs. (One pyeong equals 3.3 square meters)” The US troops in south Korea number more than 35,000. This means that about 1,900 pyeongs of land is allotted to every GIs. It is equivalent to 61 apartment houses of 31 pyeongs. The Yongsan Garrison in central Seoul alone covers 780,000 pyeongs. The largest training camp of the USFK is “Bulls Eye”, the US 2nd Division training ground in Paju, Gyeonggi Province, which covers 28 million pyeongs of land. All the US military bases have inflicted disasters upon the Korean people for 60-odd years. The south Korean people have suffered from loss of lives and properties and human rights violation owing to the brigandish arbitrariness, atrocities and the war exercises of the US troops there for over half a century. In a word, they have suffered all kinds of misfortunes. Numerous are the damages caused by the US military bases including the case of “Cooney bombing firing range” in Maehyang-ri where several south Koreans were wounded by the wrong bombing by planes of the US 7th Air Force and the case of the US military base in Pyeongtaek where toxic oil was discharged due to damage of oil pipe. Keenly realizing that they cannot live comfortably leaving the US military bases intact, the south Korean people have turned out in the struggle to withdraw the military bases. Alarmed by the fierce anti-US resistance of the south Korean people, the United States schemes to calm down their anti-US sentiments by relocating some military bases. Its aim is not abandonment of the military bases in south Korea but transfer. And it is nothing but the relocation of its troops to the southern area of Han River in keeping with the new security strategy for preemptive attack against north Korea. The south Korean people do not want the US military presence in this land any longer. The Yankees must not relocate but totally withdraw the military bases and return home. The south Korean people will further intensify the struggle for the total withdrawal of the US troops under the banner of “by our nation itself.”

North Korea won’t trust the CP – they still view the remaining presence as a threat to national and regional security

Defense Talk, ‘6. “North Korea Demands US Troops Pull Out Of South,” Defense Talk, 8-14, <http://www.defencetalk.com/north-korea-demands-us-troops-pull-out-of-south-7104/>.

North Korea urged South Korea Sunday to push for the withdrawal of US troops and said the military presence could bring disaster. The communist state's Minju Joson newspaper said the South would "not be free from any misfortune and disasters" arising from the US military presence which dates back to the 1950-1953 Korean War. "The South Korean authorities should take a step to force the US troops to withdraw from South Korea as demanded by the people," Minju Joson said. The United States is reducing its forces in South Korea from 37,000 to 25,000, with 2008 set as the deadline for the troop cut, and wants to be able to redeploy them outside the country in time of need. South Korea is pushing to secure wartime control over its troops which are currently under a US-led combined command. US troops are stationed in the South to help its 650,000-strong army face up to North Korea's 1.2 million-strong army. Rodong Sinmun, newspaper of the North's communist party newspaper, repeated Sunday that US "imperialists" were preparing an invasion by stepping up propaganda and military drills. "They are engrossed in a vicious anti-DPRK (North Korea) smear campaign based on sheer lies. ... It is an operation to be carried out by them prior to invading it by force of arms," Rodong said. "These reckless moves against the DPRK have created such a tense situation on the Korean Peninsula that a war may break out there any moment." The United States has flatly denied planning to go to war against North Korea despite a long-running standoff over its nuclear and missile development programs.