TO DO:

Finish DA/CP blocks – JL?

Organize terror/radar – KF

Cites for Katie’s cards:

* Under AT: Don’t need upgrades
* Under “Okinawa relocation”
* Under AT: Disads

\*\*\*1AC

Contention \_ is China

China is gearing up for military conflict in the South China Sea

Westhead 7/14/12

(Rick Westhead, Foreign affairs writer, former South Asia bureau chief with The Toronto Star of Canada, “Battle for the Pacific; A perilous arms race is unfolding as regional rivals vie for control of trade routes, fish stocks - and oil and gas deposits,” The Toronto Star, 14 July 2012, p. WD4, <http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1225396--battle-for-the-pacific-naval-arms-race-in-the-china-sea> | JS)

ABOARD THE USS CARL VINSON-U.S. navy Capt. Rick Labranche streaks across the horizon at 1,000 kilometres an hour in his F-18 Hornet strike fighter. It has been 12 minutes since a catapult slung Labranche's plane from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and Labranche is preparing to drop a pair of 225-kilogram bombs into the Indian Ocean's two-metre swells. Labranche checks his radar and scans the blur of blue below. Before he can release his payload on this practice run, he needs to make sure no one is within 16 kilometres. There's no telling whose fishing trawlers, research vessels or submarines are plying these waters. A 21st-century Great Game is unfolding in the Asia Pacific, a region that accounts for more than half the world's population and many emerging powers. Some, such as China, India, Pakistan and North Korea, are nuclear-armed competitors who have battled before. As these regional rivals vie for control of trade routes, fishing stocks and rich, untapped oil and gas deposits, they are expanding and modernizing their maritime forces, conducting war games and opening naval bases in what has become **the most perilous arms race in the world**. At the same time, the U.S. is trying to re-establish a dominant presence in the region, strengthening ties to some countries, including the Philippines and Australia, and trying to warm relations with others, such as Burma. With the U.S. pledging to send more troops and ships to the Asia Pacific, regional neighbours want to coax China to be more open at the negotiating table. Ten Southeast Asian nations this week agreed on a code of conduct to prevent disputes over the South China Sea from escalating into open conflict. China has so far refused to sign the pact. "The more militarized the region becomes, the harder it is to resolve conflicts," says Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbradt, a China analyst with the International Crisis Group, which works to defuse conflicts. "You have increasing harassment of fishermen in disputed waters, which becomes a proxy for bigger issues of claimed territory," she says. "It can easily spiral into a security dilemma, especially when nationalist sentiments in the region are increasing. There's a real pressure in these countries not to cave in on disputes, and when you've been telling people for 50 years that you have a claim, it's hard to agree to go to an international tribunal and live with its decisions." China is the pacesetter. It is said to be spending $106 billion this year alone on its military, up from $14 billion in 2000. It recently began sea trials on its first aircraft carrier, the Shi Lang, and is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile that can penetrate the defences of U.S. aircraft carriers, according to its military. India - whose first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, once wrote, "to be secure on land we must be supreme at sea" - bought a Russian-built attack submarine, the Chakra, in January. It's the first nuclear-powered sub India has operated in 20 years. India's first locally built aircraft carriers, the Vikramaditya and Vikrant, are scheduled to join the navy in 2013 and 2014. South Korea last year began construction on a $970-million naval base for 20 warships, including submarines. Australia, which has signalled it will build a sub fleet after construction is finished on three destroyers, recently agreed to allow the U.S. navy to station 2,500 marines in Darwin, while the Philippines is in talks with the U.S. about expanding an American military presence there. Half a world away, the U.S. looms over the islands, straits and channels of the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, a region U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has called a "national interest." In January, President Barack Obama said the U.S. would "pivot" and "rebalance" its global military forces toward the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. is concerned about China's sweeping claims of sovereignty, such as its directive to foreign oil companies not to help Vietnam develop oilfields in the South China Sea. While the U.S. Defence Department has been ordered to pare spending by $487 billion over the next 10 years, Obama has mostly spared the navy from cuts. In June, Defence Secretary Leon Panetta told a conference in Singapore that by 2020, 60 per cent of U.S. warships, including six aircraft-carrier groups, would be stationed in the Asia-Pacific. Mitt Romney, the Republican nominee in November's presidential election, has pledged to increase the naval fleet from 285 warships to 346. "In many respects, the broader Pacific will be the most dynamic and significant part of the world for American interests for many decades to come," U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns said in November. The U.S. announced last year it would develop long-range nuclear-capable bombers and better electronic jammers for the navy. The military contractors General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman are also building a new stealth destroyer. The ship, known as the DDG-1000, will cost as much as $3.3 billion and feature a new type of radar that offers improved scanning in shallow coastlines, a wave-piercing hull that leaves a minimal wake, and an electromagnetic rail gun, which employs a magnetic field and electric current to shoot a projectile at several times the speed of sound. While the navy originally wanted 32 of the DDG-1000s, its order has been trimmed to three. But Chinese Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong, a professor at China's National Defence University, said the DDG-1000's high-tech design wouldn't protect it from a group of fishing boats packed with explosives. If enough fishing boats could be mobilized, the DDG-1000 "would be a goner," Zhaozhong said recently on China's public broadcaster. History would seem to support Zhaozhong. During the Falklands War in 1982, Argentina used a single $200,000 air-to-surface missile to sink a $50-million destroyer, HMS Sheffield. And in 1967, an Egyptian vessel used several guided missiles to sink an Israeli destroyer. Meanwhile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam and Bangladesh have either acquired submarines or plan to buy them. Japan is increasing its 18-sub fleet to 24. And China has more than 68 subs, three nuclear-powered, according to The Military Balance in Asia, a May 2011 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "For most countries, it's not about a fight, it's about the ability to dispatch to preserve your quarter," says Mike Hennessy, a professor of naval history at the Royal Military College of Canada. "It's about being able to intimidate so your claims go unchallenged." Throughout the sprawling Asia- Pacific region, there is no shortage of maritime claims. The biggest dispute is over the Spratly islands, a barren patch of 750 islets, coral reefs and outcroppings in the South China Sea about 350 kilometres southeast of Vietnam and 900 kilometres southeast of China. For more than 50 years, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei have fought for control of the archipelago. In 1956, a Filipino businessman named Tomas Clomas arrived at the islands and declared an independent country, Freedomland. Manila rejected the suggestion but claimed the islands, occupying some with armed troops since 1968. Last year, Vietnam announced that six monks who belong to the government-sanctioned wing of the Buddhist church would set up temples and live on several islands in the Spratlys chain, presumably to establish Vietnam's claim. In April, the Philippines and Vietnam said they would hold soccer and basketball matches in the Spratlys, the same day a Chinese cruise ship completed a voyage to the disputed territory. At first glance, the Spratlys seem to hold scarce value. Some of the islands actually disappear below the water at high tide. But, the Spratlys offer a prime location to monitor the shipping lanes of the South China Sea. More important, the seabed is believed to contain as much as 225 billion barrels worth of oil and natural gas - enough to fuel Canada for 280 years, based on current consumption of about 2.2 million barrels a day. (The Athabasca oilsands formation, by contrast, is estimated to contain 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil.) It's no wonder China covets the Spratlys. The world's fastest-growing economy, China uses five times as much oil and gas as Canada, but its supply of hydroelectricity declined by 40 per cent last year because of a prolonged drought. When the Philippines announced recently that it would work with a U.K. company to search for deposits near the Spratlys, China's government-owned Global Times newspaper wrote an editorial that China should strike first. "Everything will be burned to the ground should a military conflict break out," the paper argued. "We shouldn't waste the opportunity to launch some tiny-scale battles that could deter provocateurs from going further." Oil and gas are only one reason for the naval buildup. The Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca off Indonesia combine to form a crucial trade route. At least 40 per cent of the world's oil is carried aboard tankers that travel these waters. An estimated 700 million people live near the South China Sea and depend on the rich fishing stocks for their livelihoods, as well as 80 per cent of their diets. Vietnam, for instance, estimates its population of 87 million will surge by 25 per cent by 2050 and it will need additional food and fish. This spring, on April 8, China and the Philippines quarrelled in a stretch known as the Scarborough Shoal after the Philippine Navy discovered coral, giant clams and live sharks on a Chinese boat. The Philippines announced the Chinese fishermen would be arrested for poaching. The showdown, some 200 kilometres west of the Philippine island of Luzon, simmered for more than two months. Then, on June 17, the Philippines ordered its two ships to withdraw. The day before they left, China had seven large ships and as many as 26 fishing boats stationed at the shoal, the Philippine Daily Inquirer reported. China has alienated and antagonized its regional neighbours during the past few years over a string of incidents, pushing them "into a coalition and toward the Americans," says M. Taylor Fravel, a political scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who has written a book about China's territorial issues. Last year, a boat owned by PetroVietnam was surveying the ocean floor about 120 kilometres south of Vietnam and 600 kilometres from China's Hainan Island. Three Chinese patrol vessels intercepted the Vietnamese ship and cut its cables to the seabed. China's foreign ministry blamed Vietnam for the clash, claiming its oil and gas operations "undermined China's interests and jurisdictional rights." That incident came 10 months after the U.S. and Vietnam began joint naval exercises in the South China Sea. "I think China has realized the open hostility has been a mistake and you're seeing it take a more moderate approach now," Fravel says. "It's unarmed or lightly armed vessels - the Chinese version of the coast guard - who are responding to conflicts, not its navy." Fravel says China is also becoming better at international diplomacy, using civilian maritime law agencies to press its claims in conjunction with its navy, which is becoming formidable. In 1990, China's navy amounted to two Soviet-era destroyers. By 2011, China had 71 frigates and destroyers and 71 submarines, as well as its first aircraft carrier.

US-China conflict coming now over Philippines – defusing tensions over the South China Sea is the only way to prevent

Alunan 7/3/12

(Rafael M. Alunan III, President of the First Philippine Infrastructure Development Corp, served in the cabinets of President Fidel Ramos and President Corazon Aquino as Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Tourism, “To Take A Stand: China’s War Drums,” July 3 2012, Business World Online, <http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Opinion&title=China%E2%80%99s-war-drums&id=54448> // Lexis | JS)

There is a serious advocacy in China by influential persons, institutions and publications to wage war against the Philippines. China resents our standing up to it in defense of our South China Sea (SCS) claims, which it says it owns, as this emboldens other claimants to follow suit. The tension stems from its "nine-dash line map" that violates the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of claimant countries. In September 2011, the Communist Party's newspaper, Global Times, headlined "The Time to Use Force Has Arrived in the South China Sea; Let's Wage Wars on the Philippines and Vietnam to Prevent More Wars." It was a call to arms against Vietnam and Philippines for loudly protesting China's sweeping maritime sovereignty claims over the SCS. In a follow-up op-ed in the Global Times, Liu Rui, a strategic analyst of the China Energy Fund Committee, echoed Long Tao's "use of force." President Hu Jintao himself exhorted the PLA (People's Liberation Army) Navy in early December 2011 to "accelerate its transformation and modernization...and make extended preparations for warfare to safeguard national security". His comments were believed aimed at the US, the Philippines and Vietnam. How his successor, Xi Jinping, the current vice- president, will deal with this remains to be seen, although moderation would come as a surprise since he heads the powerful Military Commission. Vice-Foreign Minister Fu Ying (a former ambassador to Manila) delivered a warning early this year at the height of the Panatag standoff that China is fully prepared to respond to any escalation of the situation by the Philippine side. The Global Times elaborated in an editorial that China was sending a clear signal - military force is a live option. It said we needed to be taught a lesson for our aggressive nationalism, and should it trigger a military clash, the international community should not be surprised. Xiamen University Professor Shen Hong-Fang spoke recently in Manila of "a new upsurge" in Chinese nationalism. The SCS, she said, is a core interest like Tibet and Taiwan. China rejects UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and refers to its own Law of the Sea that places the Sea of Vietnam and the West Philippine Sea within its territorial jurisdiction. Hardliners in the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) are raring to teach China's neighbors "a lesson" for their intrusions. AMS is the highest-level research institute and center of military sciences of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Professor Zhang Zhongzhao of the PLA's National Defense University holds the view that "China should have the courage to use the sword to uphold its sovereignty. The government is under pressure to stand firm on the SCS as a matter of national honor; perceived weakness would have severe political consequences." Reports have it that the PLA is aggressively pushing the Central Committee to play the war card to unite its divided society wracked by political, social, economic and cultural fissures. Last week, Beijing divulged its plans to establish a "military presence" in Sansha, a prefecture-level city of Hainan province, to administer "Chinese territories" in the SCS. It also announced the deployment of "combat-ready" naval and aerial patrols to protect its interest. Defense ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng said China will resolutely oppose any military provocation in its territorial waters, adding that the PLA's determination to safeguard its territorial claims is "unwavering." The PLA is playing hero and the SCS has, thus, become the first genuine test of America's new Asia policy. Underlying all that is its goal to establish undisputed presence on the disputed claims throughout the SCS to control, or deny access, to sea lanes and resource-rich areas. This directly collides with America's declared national interest that all sea lanes must remain open to all nations, and the national interests of claimant countries as well. Panatag is a convenient target for China to test America's will at a time when it is wobbly from long and costly wars, compounded by the consequences of exploitative capitalism. America's pivot to the Asia-Pacific region has clearly pricked China's sensibilities. Encouraging Asian states to unite, resist and contain China's expansionism has incurred its ire; hence, the war drums. Yet, I don't think the US will allow itself to fight a friendly country's battles with China, especially if the former mishandles the situation or rushes recklessly into a brawl, then cries running to Uncle Sam. However, the US needs to publicly reassure allies, who pursue a thoughtful and moderate course, of its full support should China's assertiveness cross the line. Waging war on the Philippines presents the path of least resistance. It will also test America's resolve to uphold its Mutual Defense Treaty obligations. China has already shown aspects of the asymmetric warfare that it intends to fully wage against the country should it come to that. It temporarily halted tourism, tightened banana inspections and warned its citizens to look after their safety; a dangerous dynamic that could further escalate given China's aggressive moves. All it needs now is an excuse to trigger a small-scale war (a false flag incident is likely) to suit its strategic aims. Is a US-China conflict inevitable? From what's been said and done so far, I believe China wants America's beau geste as it carries out its own manifest destiny and version of the Monroe Doctrine. China, however, hasn't been saying and doing the things expected of a nascent superpower committed to peaceful rise, so the two giants are talking past each other. Sooner or later they will collide because as Deng Xiao Ping once said, "There can't be two tigers on the same hill." And we will be caught in the middle because we also believe our claims to be legitimate; we're allied with the US; and defending our sovereignty is a matter of duty, honor and country. The Philippines is not a vassal state and treating it as a subordinate is insulting. Unless all sides find the right diplomatic recipe for a win-win, there will be war.

Risk of losing credibility forces US to respond to China-Philippines conflict

Glaser 12

(Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea: Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14,” April 2012, Council on Foreign Relations Press, <http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883> | JS)

A second contingency involves conflict between China and the Philippines over natural gas deposits, especially in the disputed area of Reed Bank, located eighty nautical miles from Palawan. Oil survey ships operating in Reed Bank under contract have increasingly been harassed by Chinese vessels. Reportedly, the United Kingdom-based Forum Energy plans to start drilling for gas in Reed Bank this year, which could provoke an aggressive Chinese response. Forum Energy is only one of fifteen exploration contracts that Manila intends to offer over the next few years for offshore exploration near Palawan Island. Reed Bank is a red line for the Philippines, so this contingency could quickly escalate to violence if China intervened to halt the drilling. The United States could be drawn into a China-Philippines conflict because of its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines. The treaty states, "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes." American officials insist that Washington does not take sides in the territorial dispute in the South China Sea and refuse to comment on how the United States might respond to Chinese aggression in contested waters. Nevertheless, an apparent gap exists between American views of U.S. obligations and Manila's expectations. In mid-June 2011, a Filipino presidential spokesperson stated that in the event of armed conflict with China, Manila expected the United States would come to its aid. Statements by senior U.S. officials may have inadvertently led Manila to conclude that the United States would provide military assistance if China attacked Filipino forces in the disputed Spratly Islands. With improving political and military ties between Manila and Washington, including a pending agreement to expand U.S. access to Filipino ports and airfields to refuel and service its warships and planes, the United States would have a great deal at stake in a China-Philippines contingency. Failure to respond would not only set back U.S. relations with the Philippines but would also potentially undermine U.S. credibility in the region with its allies and partners more broadly. A U.S. decision to dispatch naval ships to the area, however, would risk a U.S.-China naval confrontation.

US-China conflict coming in next 20 years – maintaining deterrence essential to prevent escalation

Dobbins et al 11

(Ambassador James Dobbins is the director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, David C. Gompert, , David A. Shlapak, Senior International Policy Analyst @ RAND Corporation, Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist at RAND's Washington, DC office, “Conﬂict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence,” 2011, RAND Corporation, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP344.pdf>)

Over the next twenty years, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) and defense budget could grow to exceed those of the United States, allowing it to become a true peer competitor. Despite this potential, we believe China’s security interests and military capabilities will remain focused on its immediate periphery. Possible conlicts might arise there involving Korea, Taiwan, one or more countries of Southeast Asia, or India, more or less in that descending order of probability. A U.S.-China conlict might also start in—and perhaps be entirely conined to—cyberspace. We do not assess armed conlict between the United States and China as probable in any of these instances, but that judgment is based on an assessment that the United States will retain the capacity to deter behavior that would lead to such a clash. American ground forces will be essential for the most likely East Asia contingency, that arising from a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) collapse, but less so for the others. While China’s overall military capabilities will not equal those of the United States anytime soon, it will more quickly achieve local superiority in its immediate neighborhood, first in and around Taiwan and then at somewhat greater distances. In consequence, the direct defense of contested assets in that region will become progressively more difficult, eventually approaching impossible. he United States will therefore become increasingly dependent on escalatory options for defense and retaliatory capabilities for deterrence. American nuclear superiority is not likely to be much help in this regard, both because China will retain a second-strike capability and because the issues at stake in most potential crises are not of vital consequence to the United States. Conlict is likely to escalate into the cyber and economic realms. In both cases, U.S. vulnerabilities are such as to make this unattractively costly. Conventional strikes on mainland Chinese military targets may be the best escalatory option, but there is little reason to be confident that conflict could be so confined. One means of improving the prospects for direct defense and reducing the risk of escalation is for the United States to enable the capabilities and buttress the resolve of China’s neighbors. Such a strategy should not be—or be seen—as a U.S. attempt to encircle or align the region against China, lest it produce greater Chinese hostility. Indeed, a parallel efort should be made to draw China into cooperative security endeavors, not only to avoid the appearance of an anti-China coalition but also to obtain greater contributions to international security from the world’s second-strongest power. The economic consequences of a Sino-American conlict could be historically unparalleled, even if both sides avoid economic warfare. his is a powerful mutual deterrent, one marginally in the American favor at present. Strengthening the U.S. economy is the best way of ensuring that the balance of interdependence and of the associated deterrence does not shift dangerously against the United States over the next several decades.

Successful regional realignment vital to preserve regional stability and deter China

Richardson 5/12/12 [Michael Richardson, visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore, “US and Allies move to Counter Chinese Deployments” <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20120405mr.html#.UAXyvNmsOSo>] Jack

SINGAPORE — The pieces of a new strategic kaleidoscope in the Asia-Pacific region are starting to fall into place as allies and security partners of the United States seek to deter China from using or threatening force to achieve its expansive aims, particularly in the South China Sea, which forms the maritime heart of Southeast Asia.¶ A contingent of about 200 U.S. Marines will soon arrive in Darwin, northern Australia. They are the forerunners of a bigger force of up to 2,500 marines agreed in November by leaders of the two allies.¶ Singapore has offered basing facilities to several high-speed Littoral Combat Ships being brought into service with the U.S. Navy, while U.S. ally the Philippines is negotiating with Washington to hold more military training exercises with the U.S. in the Philippines and increase U.S. Navy access to Philippine ports.¶ Vietnam is in the midst of a major military buildup to protect its interests in the South China Sea, following similar moves by Malaysia.¶ The U.S. Marines will rotate through bases in northern Australia for training and exercises, underscoring what President Barack Obama said was U.S. determination to play a larger and long-term role in shaping the region and its future, despite looming hefty cuts in America's defense budget.¶ Obama reaffirmed in South Korea recently that reductions in defense spending would not come at the expense of the Asia-Pacific. "America's armed forces are going to stay ready for the full range of contingencies and threats," he said.¶ Japan and the U.S. are expected to finalize an agreement later this month to relocate 4,700 U.S. Marines from the Japanese island of Okinawa to Guam, a U.S. territory and major military base in the western Pacific.¶ The Yomiuri Shimbun reported that the new force layout would divide the Marine Corps command, ground force, air and logistic units into an arc of bases forming a flank along the eastern seaboard of China.¶ Marines are the spearhead of U.S. forces deployed in the Asia-Pacific region. The Yomiuri said that spreading them more widely across the region was designed to make any foreign attack on their bases more difficult, counter the growing military strength of China, and better prepare for any future disaster relief and humanitarian aid efforts.¶ The U.S. is also realigning its forces in the western Pacific to focus more of them on maintaining stability in Southeast Asia and protecting the shipping and energy supply lines that run through the Indian Ocean to East Asian economies that are key drivers of global growth.¶ China has also indicated that it wants to restrict foreign military operations in large areas of the South China Sea, alarming the U.S., Japan and many other regional countries that depend on freedom of navigation. Much of Australia's trade, including vital energy imports, pass through the South China Sea and, like the U.S., Japan can only give full support its security partners in Asia if it has unrestricted access to international waters in the area for its naval and air self-defense forces.¶ In addition to the new U.S. Marine presence, Australia will increase U.S. access to military airfields in northern Australia and to its main Indian Ocean naval base near Perth. In the longer term, it may allow the U.S. to use an upgraded airfield on its Cocos and Keeling Island territory in the Indian Ocean south of Indonesia for long-range maritime reconnaissance flights by unmanned aircraft.¶ Although both the U.S. and Australia have been careful not to cast their strengthening security cooperation in anti-China terms, Beijing sees it as part of a regional containment strategy. The China Daily said on March 29 that "the prospective new base (on Cocos island) will allow U.S. spy flights over the South China Sea."¶ China evidently aims to dominate its "near seas" — the Yellow, East, and South China seas — turning them into an extended security buffer protecting the Chinese mainland and enabling China to exploit valuable fisheries and seabed resources, including oil, gas and minerals.¶ The three seas contain the vast majority of China's outstanding territorial claims against its neighbors, as well as all its disputed maritime claims.¶ Beijing's claims in the 3.5 million square km South China Sea are by far the most extensive. Beijing asserts sovereignty over the main contested archipelagos and their surrounding waters and seabed. It also asserts other forms of jurisdiction in its claimed zone of control, which covers about 80 percent of the sea.¶ Chinese mapping authorities said recently that they would clarify Chinese claims in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, the state-owned company that leads the search for oil and gas in the area said that deepwater resources there would boost the firm's growth in the medium and long-term.¶ "The majority of the disputed waters used to be beyond our reach because we seldom put our claims into action," Zhang Yunling, director of the Institute for International Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times. "By drawing a (more precise) map, the country can reinforce its jurisdiction claim in the South China Sea, and further actions may follow, such as exploiting resources near the Nansha Islands."¶ These widely scattered islands, known in the English-speaking world as the Spratlys, are also claimed in full by Taiwan and Vietnam, and in part by the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. All but Brunei have garrisoned the main atolls, creating a powder keg should China try to forcibly evict any rival claimants.

Increased US presence near South China Sea crucial to deter Beijing from territorial conflict

Grunstein 5/11/12

(Judah Grunstein is World Politics Review's editor-in-chief. His coverage of French politics, foreign policy and national security has appeared in World Politics Review, the American Prospect online, French Politics, the Small Wars Journal and Foreign Policy online. “Global Insider: Philippines Needs Major Military Upgrade to Balance Encroaching China,” World Politics Review, 11 May 2012, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/11945/global-insider-philippines-needs-major-military-upgrade-to-balance-encroaching-china> | JS)

The announcement last week that the U.S. is doubling its foreign aid to the Philippines came as the U.S. ally remains locked in a maritime standoff with China over a territorial dispute in the South China Sea. In an email interview, Richard D. Fisher, Jr., a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, discussed U.S.-Philippines military cooperation. WPR: In what concrete ways is U.S.-Philippines military cooperation being expanded in response to the Philippines' territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea? Richard D. Fisher, Jr.: After nearly 20 years of U.S. and mainly Philippine indifference following the rancorous exit of U.S. forces from Philippine bases in 1991, there is now an active bilateral dialogue about expanding conventional military cooperation. The change is due in no small part to China’s belligerence and the new pragmatic attitude of Philippine President Benigno Aquino. Though concrete agreements have not been announced, there has been discussion of Washington easing Philippine acquisition of new defense equipment and a more frequent “rotation” of some U.S. forces through Philippine bases that does not constitute “basing.” WPR: What are some of the critical areas where the Philippines' military needs support, in terms of weapons systems and training? Fisher: Manila basically needs a navy and air force with credible defense capabilities, having lacked both since the 1970s, and now needs to prove that it is willing to sustain financially what for it will be a major military buildup. Washington should lean forward to ease their acquisition of excess U.S. weapons that would handily meet Manila’s needs. The U.S. will have transferred three 3,200-ton ex-U.S. Coast Guard frigates by the end of 2013, which, though they lack anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, are nonetheless the most capable ships ever in the Philippine navy. The Philippines should get more frigates and the weapons they need. Furthermore, the U.S. should offer a low-cost transfer of excess F-16 multirole fighters, an initial network of long-range air defense radar and a number of excess turboprop-powered transports for maritime patrol missions. The Philippines understands that it must invest in better training capabilities, especially for its air force, but the U.S. can also configure its rotations to ease Manila’s training requirements. WPR: How do U.S.-Philippines military relations fit into Washington's shifting regional defense strategy? Fisher: The Philippines has been and remains on Asia’s geostrategic fulcrum; plus, it is now a raucous democracy, albeit with some hefty political, economic and social challenges. Despite the resentments of the 1990s, there is more than ample justification for both countries to revive substantive cooperation under their 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. Manila realizes it needs credible defenses to deter Chinese encroachments, and Washington realizes it requires a Philippine contribution to make its new “pivot” or “rebalancing” strategy toward East Asia credible. **China’s maximalist territorial claims over the entire South China Sea region combined with its expanding military capabilities -- notably its intention to base much of its new expeditionary navy and its new nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet in this region -- threaten the freedom of navigation in sea lanes vital to all of the economies of the region, making this a key economic and security interest for the United States. By helping Manila, Washington can do a better job of deterring Beijing and defending the freedom of navigation that underpins the region’s commerce**.

Permanent US base in Philippines would counterbalance Chinese aggressiveness against Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines

Fillingham 12

(Zachary Fillingham, BA in IR from York University and MA in Chinese Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, “Philippines: The Next US Military Base?”, 4-18-12, Geopolitical Monitor, [http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/philippines-the-next-us-military-base-4664](http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/philippines-the-next-us-military-base-4664/) | JS)

The standoff playing out between China and the Philippines over the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea may one day be looked back on as the harbinger of a renewed American military presence in the Philippines. Analysis The current standoff began on April 10th when Chinese ships intervened to prevent a Philippine Navy vessel from detaining Chinese fishermen who were caught fishing in Philippine territorial waters. What followed were several days of posturing on both sides, as Chinese patrol boats were sent in and then recalled, and the Philippine Navy boat was pulled out and replaced with a coast guard vessel. As of April 16th, both sides are keeping ships in the disputed area. Of the many points of conflict that currently exist throughout the South China Sea, this one is particularly important because of the geopolitical fallout it might entail. The Scarborough Shoal is well within the Philippines’ 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), making China’s current military excursion to protect its fisherman stand as a rather stark breach of sovereignty, or at least sovereignty as it’s defined under the UN Law of the Sea. For the government of the Philippines, this breach couldn’t come at a worse time. A month hasn’t even passed since the last ASEAN summit came to a close in Cambodia without an agreement on how to resolve overlapping claims in the South China Sea. Essentially, Manila has been left with no diplomatic recourse in dealing with an increasingly assertive Chinese government; one that now seems willing to deploy its military assets in Philippine territorial waters. With diplomacy off the table and a Chinese government that isn’t shy to put its $114 billion advantage in military spending to work for it, Manila is in need of allies that can help it redress this military imbalance. And of course, there’s no better ally for this than the United States. Ever since the Philippines Senate voted to shut down Clark Air Force Base and the Subic Naval Base in 1991, the United States has been quietly deepening its indirect military links with the government of the Philippines. In 1999, the Philippines-US Visiting Forces Agreement came into effect, allowing for the deployment of US troops under a very loose pretense of ‘training missions.’ And this was followed by another agreement in 2002 that allowed for the storage and pre-positioning of US military equipment in Philippines territory. This legislative build-up towards a renewed permanent deployment will intensify now that popular opinion within the Philippines is sure to swing back in favor of leveraging the United States military against an increasingly threatening PLA Navy. In fact, the idea of US military bases in the Philippines wasn’t even terribly unpopular back in 1991, and most of the anti-base sentiment grew out of urban elites who believed, somewhat ironically given present circumstances, that the bases infringed on national sovereignty. On the American side, new permanent bases in the Philippines would be a masterstroke for Obama’s Asia-Pacific pivot policy. The United States has been expanded its Pacific footprint into Australia and it is now upgrading airstrips on the Cocos Islands between Australia and Sri Lanka. A new base in the Philippines would provide several benefits: it would help to frustrate the PLA Navy’s attempts to expand its defense perimeter, it would allow for a quicker and multi-pronged military response in the event of a conflict over Taiwan, and it would establish the US military as a counterbalance against Chinese assertiveness when dealing with other South China Sea claimants, including Washington’s other new friend- Vietnam. With so much to lose from a possible re-establishment of permanent US military bases in the Philippines, it seems a little strange for Beijing to want to back Manila into a corner like this. It’s possible this hyper-aggressive stance on the South China Sea might be a little domestic political posturing in the lead-up to the rollover in Chinese leadership later this year. The next generation of Chinese leaders could very well wise up to the risks of new American bases and go hard on the diplomatic track; it’s just a question of whether or not it will already be too late.

Contention \_ is Terror

Phillipine terrorism can’t be solved in the squo

Niksch 7 (Larry Niksch Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, January 24, 2007, “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S.

Anti-Terrorism Cooperation,” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31265.pdf>

The U.S. military undoubtedly will be influenced by the increasingly complex Muslim terrorist and insurgency situation that has developed since 2002. As stated previously, Abu Sayyaf’s armed strength has dwindled to an estimated 200-400. The cease-fire between the MILF and the Philippine government has held, and negotiations for a settlement are ongoing in Malaysia. However, there are other developments of a negative nature that could worsen the overall situation in the southern Philippines and even the Philippines as a whole. One is the growing cooperation among Abu Sayyaf, several major MILF commands, and elements of Jeemah Islamiah on Mindanao. JI appears to use Mindanao as a primary base for building up its cadre of terrorists. This cooperation among the three groups appears to be transforming Mindanao into a significant base of operations rather than just a site for training; and these operations appear to target increasingly the Philippines for terrorist attacks rather than just neighboring countries. This, too, is related to the emergence of the Rajah Solaiman Movement and its cooperation with Abu Sayyaf and JI. The result has been an increase in terrorist bombings since 2002 both in number and destructiveness and an increase in the number of bombings and bomb plots in the northern Philippines, including Manila. The Bush Administration has expressed growing concern over MILF links with JI and Abu Sayyaf and JI’s use of the Mindanao-Sulawesi corridor to move terrorists and bombing materials between the Philippines and Indonesia. In April 2005, the U.S. Charge d’Affaires in Manila, Joseph Mussomeli, caused an uproar among Filipino officials when he stated that parts of Muslim Mindanao, with its poverty, lawlessness, porous borders, and links to JI could development into an “Afghanistanstyle” situation. In May 2005, U.S. Ambassador Francis Ricciardone announced the cancellation of a U.S.-aided road project in Cotabato province in southern Mindanao, describing Cotabato as a “doormat” for Muslim terrorists.51 These statements indicated U.S. dissatisfaction with the situation on Mindanao and doubts about the Philippine government’s ability to end Muslim terrorism.

A base in the Philippines could be used to target terrorists in the Philippines

WND 2 (WND news, 4/26/2002, “New US Base in the Phillipines?” <http://www.wnd.com/2002/04/13700/>)

As U.S. engineers reconstruct roads and airstrips on rebel-infested Basilan Island in the Philippines, the United States may be preparing a forward base there for future regional counterterrorism strikes. Move to the Philippines. Military engineers from the U.S. Naval Construction Task Group – commonly referred to as Seabees – have begun reconstructing the Sumisip Highway, a road connecting six towns and the capital city of the southern Philippine island of Basilan. The construction is part of the joint U.S.-Philippine counterterrorism training exercise in the south known as Balikatan 02-1. More than 1,000 U.S. troops are participating in the exercise directed against the militant Muslim group Abu Sayyaf, which is linked to al-Qaida and blamed for several kidnappings and bombings in the Philippines. U.S. participation in Balikatan has been dubbed the opening of the second front in the war against terrorism. Yet the Abu Sayyaf represents only a limited threat to the United States. The real reason for the exercises may be evidenced by the U.S. infrastructure development in Basilan, where factions of the rebel group maintain their base of operations. Although the U.S. government is characterizing the development work as an effort to reduce poverty in the region and thus eliminate one of the root causes of terrorism, Washington may be literally paving the way for a forward logistics and operations base to conduct regional counterterrorism strikes. The U.S. presence in the Philippines, which began when American troops were deployed in January to provide assistance and training to Filipino forces, has stirred controversy in the country. Politicians debated the constitutionality of the deployment and especially whether U.S. soldiers would engage in combat operations. It was only after being carefully constrained in size and scope that the Balikatan exercise cleared the legal and political hurdles in Manila. U.S. participation was initially limited to 660 personnel, of which just 160 – organized into 12-man Special Forces teams – would be with Philippine troops in the field on Basilan. The remaining support and training staff would be relegated to operating around the southern city of Zamboanga on nearby Mindanao and to a support base on Mactan Island near Cebu. Through extensions and modifications to the initial terms, the total U.S. deployment now exceeds 1,000, comprising 160 Special Forces and 340 Seabees and Marine guards on Basilan, 440 support and training staff near Zamboanga and as many as 300 aviation, logistics and intelligence personnel on Mactan. The U.S. forces are joined by nearly 4,000 Philippine troops who are engaged in tracking down and destroying the Abu Sayyaf and freeing three hostages – including two Americans – the group still holds. The initial U.S. participation was likely triggered by the numerous reports of links between the Abu Sayyaf and al-Qaeda. Several key Abu Sayyaf members allegedly trained in Afghanistan and participated in planning sessions to assassinate the Pope and crash hijacked airliners into the ocean. Abu Sayyaf also demanded the release of convicted World Trade Center bomber Ramsi Youseff in return for the release of several hostages.

A base in the Philippines could be used to target alqueda

WND 2 (WND news, 4/26/2002, “New US Base in the Phillipines?” <http://www.wnd.com/2002/04/13700/>)

Basilan is far from Manila, and if it weren’t for the Abu Sayyaf, it would be an island of little note. Yet its location is strategic if the United States wants to establish a forward logistics and operations base in Southeast Asia. Despite the political bickering in Manila, the Philippines is a focal point for U.S. operations in the region due to Washington’s close relationship with the government and the country’s proximity to Malaysia and, more importantly, Indonesia. Indonesia, like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, would be a very attractive location for al-Qaida to regroup, due to the massive Muslim population, limited central control and the underlying sympathies of some influential political and military figures. These same features also make U.S. cooperation and anti-terrorism operations in Indonesia extremely difficult. That is why it is important for the United States to set up an operations facility outside Indonesia but close enough for action.

A US base in the Philippines is essential for combating Al Qaeda

Bhattacharji 9 (Preeti Bhattacharji, Assistant Director at Heilbrunn Center at Columbia Business School, “Terrorism Havens: Philippines,” June 1, 2009, Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/philippines/terrorism-havens-philippines/p9365>)

The southern Philippines have long been a breeding ground for terrorist activity. Militant organizations like the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) operate in the Sulu archipelago and easternmost island of Mindanao, where a rugged terrain, weak rule of law, sense of grievance among the country's Muslim minority, and poverty make it difficult for the government to root them out. In recent years, the Philippine government has made significant progress in combating terrorism, due in part to counterterrorism aid provided by the United States. But experts are concerned by what appears to be increasing cooperation among the Abu Sayyaf Group, several major MILF commands, and elements of the Southeast Asian terror group Jemaah Islamiyah. Counterterrorism progress in the region remains difficult, and the Philippines remains vulnerable to penetration by extremist networks like al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaida’s stronghold is now in Southeast Asia

FP 3 (Free Press citing Maria Ressa, CNN’s lead investigative reporter for Asia, 2003, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia*,

<http://books.google.com/books?id=55S4AAAAIAAJ&q=al+qaeda+asia&dq=al+qaeda+asia&source=bl&ots=SsnFOhBiCZ&sig=7NX2TaggjtO7xO_NB13oTdqNNGI&hl=en&sa=X&ei=dKcIUOzlNaXX0QHr-JCTBA&ved=0CDQQ6AEwAA> )

For anyone wishing to understand the next, post-9/11 generation of al-Qaeda planning, leadership, and tactics, there is only one place to begin: Southeast Asia. In fact, such countries as the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia have been crucial nodes in the al-Qaeda network since long before the strikes on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, but when the allies overran Afghanistan, the new camps in Southeast Asia became the key training grounds for the future. It is in the Muslim strongholds in the Philippines and Indonesia that the next generation of al-Qaeda can be found. In this powerful, eye-opening work, Maria Ressa casts the most illuminating light ever on this fascinating but little-known "terrorist HQ."<p>Every major al-Qaeda attack since 1993 has had a connection to the Philippines, and Maria Ressa, CNN's lead investigative reporter for Asia and a Filipino-American who has lived in the region since 1986, has broken story after story about them. From the early, failed attempts to assassinate Pope John Paul II and Bill Clinton to the planning of the 9/11 strikes and the "48 Hours of Terror," in which eleven American jetliners were to be blown up over the Pacific, she has interviewed the terrorists, their neighbors and families, and the investigators from six different countries who have tracked them down. After the Bali bombing, al-Qaeda's worst strike since 9/11, which killed more than two hundred, Ressa broke major revelations about how it was planned, why it was a Plan B substitute for an even more ambitious scheme aimed at Singapore, and why the suicide bomber recruited to deliver the explosives almost caused the whole plan to fall apart when he admitted he could barely drive a car.<p>Above all, Ressa has seen how al-Qaeda's tactics are shifting under the pressures of the war on terror. Rather than depending upon its own core membership (estimated at three to four thousand at its peak), the network is now enmeshing itself in local conflicts, co-opting Muslim independence movements wherever they can be found, and helping local "revolutionaries" to fund, plan, and execute sinister attacks against their neighbors and the West.<p> If history is any guide, al-Qaeda revisits its plans over and over until they can succeed -- and many of those plans have already been discovered and are here revealed, thanks to classified investigative documents uncovered by Ressa.

Terrorists can get nuclear weapons

Hashmi 12 ([Muhammad Jawad Hashmi](http://www.eurasiareview.com/author/muhammad-jawad-hashmi/), author and scholar in the field of Defence and Strategic Studies, Eurasia Review News, January 29, 2012, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/29012012-al-qaeda-in-pursuit-of-nuclear-weaponsradiological-material-analysis/>)

The pursuit of nuclear weapons and material by sub national groups has been an alarming challenge to deal with. This article will examine groups like al Qaeda that are said to have the ability and motivation to pursue nuclear capabilities. This study simultaneously provides an insight into the issues related to the demand for these weapons capabilities and their supply. According to Daniel Metraux, on the demand side of the nuclear market there are small national groups working with political or religious belief structures that may be stirred to pursue massive devastation. Some of these groups have large financial and organizational resources, together with the physical assets. Some of these groups also enjoye sanctuary either in a lawless grey zone or as guests of the local rulers where they can pursue their plans. On the other hand, in Japan, extensive legal protections for religious organizations operate in a very permissive environment without much state interference. The supply side of the nuclear market indicates that such opportunities to acquire nuclear material and expertise are potentially numerous for such groups or such terrorist organizations. The A.Q. Khan network revealed that people from inside a state weapons program in certain circumstances, take advantage of their expertise, access, and control over equipment and material for considerable profit and personal benefits. There is also the huge nuclear weapons inventory and production complex of the former Soviet Union (FSU) possessing a vast potential source of supply. The Russian inventory of nuclear weapons, particularly tactical weapons, remains larger than any other in the world. In its report, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) indicated that Russian nuclear weapons storage facilities are facing vulnerabilities to an extent that an insider can attempt unauthorized actions. The low funding, lack of trained security personnel, and insufficient equipment for security storing of such material brings Russian facilities housing weapons-usable nuclear material under the constant threat for leakages. It is therefore recognized by the Moscow that there must be a need for increased security and assistance from other countries that have robust nuclear command and control systems. The interest of some terrorists in nuclear weapons, the potential opportunities for acquiring nuclear weapons or material, and a number of non-traditional weapon designs, some of which may use previously uncontrolled strategic nuclear materials, all highlight the potential for terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons in an unprecedented fashion.

Alqueda will use nukes to attack the US even if some of its leaders disagree

 Tad Daley, Writing Fellow with International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the 1985 Nobel Peace Laureate organization and spent several years at the International Policy Department at RAND, 2010, *Apocalypse Never: Forging the Path to a Nuclear Weapon-Free World*,

<http://books.google.com/books?id=jgS1zsY1K3cC&pg=PA50&lpg=PA50&dq=al+qaeda+%22nuclear+terror%22&source=bl&ots=Pw7QnbRort&sig=T_kd0bDp5VIN5suEV24T-ajbb8Q&hl=en&sa=X&ei=t6gIUMvMGcnf0QHgga2DBA&ved=0CDQQ6AEwAA#v=snippet&q=alqueda&f=false> )

Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank explored similar themes in the June 11, 2008 issue of the New Republic. They emphasized that several individuals with impeccable jihadist credentials now argue both that the innocent citizens of western states are blameless and should not be attacked, and that such attacks cause far more harm than good for the Muslim world as a whole and especially to Al Qaeda itself. And Noah Feldman, writing in the October 2008 issue of Esquire, maintained that Al Qaeda began a long, steep slide toward its own oblivion when it started, in its attacks in the middle of the decade, to kill far more Muslims than infidels. Nevertheless, internal unity and ideological unanimity are hardly essential to pulling off a successful nuclear terror attack. Even if almost all Muslim clerics opposed direct attacks on the United States, the opinion would not necessarily stop those who were determined to launch them. As this chapter will elaborate, some experts believe that a very small group of focused and committed individuals could successfully carry out a nuclear terror attack. Few things could be more fatuous than to read the reports of these investigative journalists, and then conclude that, because some within the jihadist world have foresworn the terrorist road, no one else remains on the march.

Solvency

Expanded US military presence in Philippines key to defuse tensions between China and the Philippines

Esguerra 7/3/12

(Christian V. Esguerra, staff writer @ Philippine Daily Inquirer, “Honasan: Spy planes not enough, bring US military to West Philippine Sea, July 3 2012, <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/42749/honasan-spy-planes-not-enough-bring-us-military-to-west-philippine-sea> | JS)

MANILA, Philippines—Spy planes are OK, but then what? Senator Gregorio Honasan called, on Tuesday, for an actual military presence by the United States in the Scarborough Shoal and other disputed areas in the West Philippine Sea to help protect Philippine interests there. Honasan, a former Army colonel, welcomed President Benigno Aquino’s move to tap US spy planes to monitor activities in the area and relay information to the Philippine government. “But the question really is: What do we do with that information?” he told the Inquirer in a phone interview. “If they just feed us information that there’s an intrusion but the Americans would do nothing, useless.” Honasan said the US could send a “carrier task group” composed of an aircraft carrier and destroyers to police the area where the Philippines has accused China of harassing its vessels. The senator said the US could also redeploy to Scarborough some of its troops currently in Mindanao as part of the Visiting Forces Agreement. He said the US military presence would help “level” the field between the Philippines and China, which boasted of a much stronger military. “In a bilateral situation, there should be a parity of forces, of leverage. But in our case with China, there’s none. That’s why I need to underscore the need for a third party, an observer,” he said. Honasan added: “They’ll be the ‘barangay tanod.’ They’ll be the police. They will monitor everything. Any movement of naval and air assets in the area will be monitored by the US.” In case a Philippine vessel is blocked by China, for instance, he said the US could serve as a third party to ensure that any agreement between the two claimant countries would be observed. “If there’s a violation of the initial agreement, of ground rules, there would be a disinterested party that would call the attention (of both countries), and I think the US fits that role,” he said. But before getting the US on board, the Philippine government should clarify where the US stood when it came to the dispute with China, said Honasan. “We have to ask the US: Do they believe that the Scarborough Shoal belongs to us? I think we should get a categorical answer from them,” he said. “If they say it belongs to China, it’s over. Let’s go home,” he added. “Now if they believe that it belongs to the Philippines, help us put up structures there and deploy your troops there. Establish a naval component there as a monitoring device for your deployed air and naval asset.” Honasan said the Scarborough dispute would allow the Aquino administration to “test” whether the US put more value on its historical ties with the Philippines than its relationship with China. “Now is the time to test it,” he said. While trying to get the US more involved, the Philippines should also conduct backdoor negotiations with China over the possibility of a joint exploration of the disputed territory, the senator said. “There should be backdoor diplomacy. This is not a simple issue,” he said.

Material and financial assistance of Philippines fails to deter China - physical US presence key

De Castro 7/3/12

(Renato Cruz De Castro, Senior Professor of International Studies at De La Salle University, Manila, “Future Challenges in the US-Philippines Alliance,” ISN, 3 Jul 2012, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Security-Watch/Articles/Detail/?id=144535>)

The first US-Philippines bilateral strategic dialogue was held in January 2011, and discussions centered on new areas of cooperation. Kurt Campbell, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, reassured his Filipino counterparts by promising "provision of equipment through excess defense sales, training of elements of their coast guard and navy, and deeper consultations at a strategic, political, and military level." US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton later reiterated US support for Filipino maritime defense development at a signing ceremony commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Philippines-US alliance, where she promised "greater support for external defense, particularly maritime domain awareness." Beyond the Summit Meeting No amount of US material and technical assistance will enable the Philippines to confront an assertive China. The development of Filipino defense capabilities for early warning, surveillance, communication, command and control are designed for "joint operations capabilities" in maritime defense and interdiction operations in line with US capabilities throughout the region. Thus, Filipino capabilities merely complement the deterrence provided by US forward deployment and its other bilateral alliances in the region. In the final analysis, Filipino territorial defense is predicated on the US assertion as the dominant naval and military power in the Pacific Ocean.

\*\*\*Add-ons

Cyberwar

US-China conflict incites cyber attack, crippling US infrastructure

Tkacik 12

(John J. Tkacik, Jr. - Senior Fellow, Director Future Asia Project International Assessment and Strategy Center, “CHINESE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES,” Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, Committee on House Foreign Affairs, March 28 2012 // Lexis | JS)

The answer in large part is found in China's predatory and kleptomaniacal trade practices, and the single most versatile tool in China's kit of unfair practices is cyber espionage. In fact, these practices are so pervasive that most European and North American government counterintelligence agencies have issued formal warnings to their parliaments, congresses and to business communities that Chinese industrial espionage is the single greatest threat to their businesses. In January of this year, three of the most cyber-spy savvy men in America delivered a powerful warning on China's cyber threat. Former Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff and former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn spelled it out as clearly as they could: China's economic and industrial espionage and cyber warfare capacities are able "to cripple our critical infrastructure, including financial networks and the power grid. Now the threat of economic cyber espionage looms even more ominously." While the United States has only in the last six months officially - on the record - named China as the primary adversary in global economic warfare, other countries have been less reticent. In late 2007, the Director General of Britain's domestic security service, MI-5, Jonathan Evans, sent a confidential letter to 300 chief executives and security chiefs at banks, accountants and legal firms which, according to the London Times, underscored the "damage to UK business resulting from electronic attack sponsored by Chinese state organisations, and the fact that the attacks are designed to defeat best- practice IT security systems."31 The letter was remarkable because it warned "Chinese state organizations" were the perpetrators. At about the same time, a top German intelligence official told the press that computer hacking by China against German companies and its government "was occurring on an almost daily basis." German intelligence officers briefed reporters that computer hackers linked to the Chinese military had hacked into German ministries -- including the office of Chancellor Angela Merkel -- and infected them with spying programs.32 French and Canadian counterintelligence agencies have expressed similar anxieties. But it was not just European politicians that the Chinese targeted. In November, 2008, the FBI notified both the McCain and Obama presidential campaigns that both their computer networks had been penetrated, and that "China was the place of origin."34 This should have surprised nobody: By June 2008, Congressman Frank Wolf had been aware that his congressional computer database had been attacked repeatedly by Chinese hackers for two years, and despite his demands, congressional networks were not secured. Wolf charged that "despite everything we read in the press, our intelligence, law enforcement, national security and diplomatic corps remain hesitant to speak out about this problem. Perhaps they are afraid that talking about this problem will reveal our vulnerability. In fact, I have been urged not to speak out about this threat."35 It still took the U.S government another three years to admit that China was the main cyberthreat to the country. In August, 2011, white-hat hackers in U.S. software security firm McAfee managed to access a server in China which had been a jump-off for cyber attacks and discovered a cyber-espionage operation that had lasted many years, had penetrated 72 governments and other organizations, most of them in the U.S., and had downloaded vast amounts of data from military secrets to industrial designs. Dmitri Alperovich, McAfee vice president said, "I am convinced that every company in every conceivable industry with significant size and valuable intellectual property and trade secrets may have been compromised, with the great majority of the victims rarely discovering the intrusion or its impact."36 One Washington official "with a clearance" said in an email, "the story is understated...it's actually much worse than reported!" The Scale of the Cyber Problem That "giant sucking sound" you often hear from your PC? It's China's indiscriminate cosmic-scale cyber-vacuum cleaner. It suggests that China's intelligence services have established Google-like server farms all across China into which downloaded data can be stored, organized, prioritized, cached and - of course - searched. It also suggests that China doesn't care whether anyone knows about the ubiquity of their cyberpenetrations -perhaps because they cannot be stopped. In October 2011, the United States Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) issued a startling report "Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets In Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2009-2011" warning that Foreign economic intelligence collection and industrial espionage are "significant and growing threats to the nation's prosperity and security" and cautioned that "Chinese actors are the world's most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage. US private sector firms and cybersecurity specialists have reported an onslaught of computer network intrusions that have originated in China." The report went on: "the governments of China and Russia will remain aggressive and capable collectors of sensitive US economic information and technologies, particularly in cyberspace." On the first page of the report, the NCIX indicated that, by far, the major sources of industrial espionage and theft of trade secrets was China. The megaindustrial-scale theft of intellectual property and proprietary business information both by Chinese employees of foreign firms and by professional state cyberpenetrations of foreign commercial, academic, financial government computer networks is standard operating procedure for all Chinese companies and state entities. Most recently, the top information security officer of Northern Telecom (Nortel) revealed that his company's networks had been under the control of Chinese hackers for over a decade, the precise decade when Nortel found itself unable to compete with Chinese telecoms firms in international bidding. During that decade, the man said, "they had access to everything . . .They had plenty of time. All they had to do was figure out what they wanted."40 Even America's most advanced IT firms have admitted breaches. Intel said in November 2011 that hackers had penetrated Intel's networks and warned that "the theft or unauthorized use or publication of our trade secrets and other confidential business information as a result of such an incident could adversely affect our competitive position and reduce marketplace acceptance of our products." Sikorsky, Lockheed, Mantech, CACI International, Northrop-Grumman, Juniper Networks, VeriSign, are among the top U.S. companies whose computer networks have been penetrated by Chinese hackers.41 It is no longer a secret that Chinese cyber penetrations of the most sensitive U.S. databases and information systems - including U.S. space databases - are state-sponsored. On February 29, 2012, NASA admitted in a formal submission to Congress that it had virtually no defense against cyber attacks. The NASA report is the most self-damning report I have ever seen from an agency of the US Government. One quote: ". . .Our ongoing investigation of another such attack at JPL involving Chinese-based Internet protocol (IP) addresses has confirmed that the intruders gained full access to key JPL systems and sensitive user accounts. With full system access the intruders could: (1) modify, copy, or delete sensitive files; (2) add, modify, or delete user accounts for mission-critical JPL systems; (3) upload hacking tools to steal user credentials and compromise other NASA systems; and (4) modify system logs to conceal their actions. In other words, the attackers had full functional control over these networks."42 The attackers had full functional control over these networks! Verily, it takes the breath away. These penetrations demonstrate that NASA in particular (but civilian space contractors, and other defense agencies as well) are virtually defenseless against them. Most alarming are the almost total vulnerability of U.S. space assets to hostile information operations (IOs) from China and the inability of U.S. agencies to construct effective patches when they actually discover the penetrations. Increasingly, U.S. government sources are confirming the details of these vulnerabilities to the press, and the scale of the danger must draw Congressional action. All evidence available to both the U.S. government as well as to cyber security experts across the world leaves no doubt about the attribution of the espionage and aggressive computer network operations: it is the Chinese state. It has been only in the last several months, however, that the United States government has begun openly to warn that the Chinese government itself condones, if not directs, the wholesale cyberpenetration of global government, business, academic, nongovernmental organization and personal computer networks. On September 23, 2011, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said "they [China] have made possible systematic stealing of intellectual property of American companies and have not been very aggressive to put in place the basic protections for property rights that every serious economy needs over time." Geithner added, "We're seeing China continue to be very, very aggressive in a strategy they started several decades ago, which goes like this: you want to sell to our country, we want you to come produce here ... if you want to come produce here, you need to transfer your technology to us."43 Geithner was right, of course. China has never been cooperative in reining in IPR violations, and one is left with the inescapable impression that the Chinese government itself directs, condones and even sponsors the practice of driving foreign rivals into bankruptcy - non-payment of bills is a favorite tool in this regard.

US-China conflict coming in next 20 years – maintaining deterrence essential to prevent escalation

Dobbins et al 11

(Ambassador James Dobbins is the director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, David C. Gompert, , David A. Shlapak, Senior International Policy Analyst @ RAND Corporation, Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist at RAND's Washington, DC office, “Conﬂict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence,” 2011, RAND Corporation, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP344.pdf>)

Cyber-Space Sino-U.S. cyber-war could be an aspect of—or prelude to—armed hostilities. Or it could begin and stay in cyber-space. his case is confined to that domain, though with some danger of triggering armed conflict. Having conducted repeated intrusions into U.S. networks to exfiltrate sensitive data without U.S. reprisal, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might seek and receive authority to interfere with U.S. intelligence collection and dissemination on Chinese strategic-nuclear programs. Chinese civilian leaders might not grasp that such operations would be defined as cyber-attack by the United States and thus lead to retaliation. he attack could disrupt systems the United States relies on for critical intelligence, including warning. If confident that the PLA was the attacker, the United States might decide to retaliate. Given that corresponding PLA intelligence networks are not easily accessed, and choosing to signal dangers of escalation, the United States might retaliate against networks that support Chinese transport systems, including commercial shipping as well as military logistics. he impact on Chinese trade could be immediate. In addition, because the U.S. ability to observe Chinese forces had been impaired, Pacific Command (PACOM) might be told to increase the readiness of its forces. While China does not want armed conflict, it could respond by conducting “soft-kill” attacks (e.g., link interference) on U.S. satellites that serve the Pacific command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) grid, to which the United States responds in kind. Because both Chinese and U.S. network defenses are of limited value against such large and sophisticated attacks, both sides might resort to counterattacks in hopes of restoring deterrence. In the ensuing escalation, both China and the United States could suffer temporary but major disruptions of critical networks, precipitating shocks in stock, currency, credit, and trade markets. Although both sides avoid escalation to armed force, economic damage would be considerable. Sino-U.S. cooperation on Iran would likely come to a halt, and the situation in Korea could heat up. here are no lives lost—just extensive harm, heightened antagonism, and loss of confidence in network security. here would be no “winner.”

China-US cyber war would have huge impacts on economy and trade

Dobbins et al 11

(Ambassador James Dobbins is the director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, David C. Gompert, , David A. Shlapak, Senior International Policy Analyst @ RAND Corporation, Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist at RAND's Washington, DC office, “Conﬂict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence,” 2011, RAND Corporation, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP344.pdf>)

The difficulties of direct defense could be greatly accelerated by Chinese development and use of cyber-attack and ASAT weapons, given the dependence of U.S. forces and operating concepts on computer-networked and space-based C4ISR. For this reason, the PLA appears to think that hostilities in space and cyber-space would favor China, and so might initiate them. At the same time, as China extends the reach of its own forces and C4ISR into the Pacific, 6 Conﬂict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence they will become vulnerable to U.S. cyber-attack and ASAT. In any case, any Sino-U.S. armed conflict will be increasingly affected if not decided by warfare in these new domains. he erosion of capabilities for direct defense will push the United States toward enhanced weapons, ranges, geography, and targets both to regain survivability and to strike Chinese forces, launchers, sensors, and other capabilities on the mainland (or elsewhere in the region outside of the immediate theater). In addition, as the PLA develops cyber and ASAT capabilities but also comes to rely more on advanced C4ISR, the United States will have to consider striking Chinese satellites and computer networks. These trends will thus lead both sides to widen their choice of targets in order to achieve dominance over any particular geographic objective, however limited. he increasing difficulty in ensuring direct defense can be consequential even if Sino-U.S. hostilities are unlikely, for they could stimulate Chinese risk-taking, increase U.S. inhibitions, and weaken the resolve of U.S. allies and China’s neighbors in facing a China more insistent on settling disputes on its terms. These trends are the result of underlying general technological progress, sustainable growth in military spending, PLA reform and doctrinal adaptation, and geographic distances for China and the United States. On the other hand, most of China’s neighbors are growing economically and in technological sophistication, and some may choose to keep pace in quality if not quantity with Chinese advances in the military field. Barring unforeseen technological developments that assure survivability for U.S. forces and C4ISR, it will not be possible or affordable for the United States to buck these trends. As the defense of Taiwan is already becoming problematic for U.S. forces (e.g., carriers and nearby air bases), so will U.S. operational options in the event of a confrontation with China over North Korea’s collapse and a crisis in Southeast Asia. Over time, the United States will feel the need to rely increasingly on its more distant and less vulnerable capabilities. As U.S. forward operating survivability declines, strike range must increase. U.S. military-operational emphasis in the Western Paciic will thus shift from geographically limited direct defense to more escalatory responses and eventually, when even these will not suffice, from deterrence based on denial to deterrence based on the threat of punishment, with the speed of the shift varying from, first of all, Taiwan, then Northeast Asia, then Southeast Asia at a somewhat later date. his will move the United States toward a choice between escalation—and deterrence based on Chinese fear of escalation—and noninvolvement in hostilities near China that could bring about direct armed conflict. Escalation can take several paths. Starting with the most severe, the United States can make more explicit what has been only faintly implicit in its strategy toward China: the threat to use nuclear weapons if conventional defense fails, if U.S. forces face defeat, and/or if vital U.S. interests in the region could be harmed. Yet in none of the above cases are U.S. vital interests at stake. Moreover, however low the credibility of a U.S. nuclear threat may be today, it will be lower in the future because of China’s clear determination and sufficient capacity to have a survivable second-strike deterrent force able to defeat U.S. missile defense (e.g., through mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), multiple re-entry vehicles/multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MRV/MIRVs), and penetration aids). Two more plausible and proportional escalation paths for the United States are to disable Chinese satellites and computer networks, starting with those that enable Chinese forces to operate. In both ASAT and cyber-war, it is easier to imagine how hostilities would start than how they would end—very likely with attacks by both sides on critical civilian and economic space systems and networks. he main reason for this is the dual-use nature of much of the Conﬂict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence 7 space and cyber infrastructure on which the U.S. military, and in due course the PLA, rely. Compounding the problem is that both escalatory domains are offense-dominant, in that both satellites and computer networks are exceedingly hard and costly to protect against very capable attackers. Even with superior ASAT and cyber-war capabilities, the United States stands to suffer as at least as much as China in space and cyber escalation, given its greater reliance on these domains for military and intelligence missions and for its economic health.

Radar

The phillipines needs radar now

Whitlock 6/8/12

(Craig, covers the Pentagon and national security for The Post, where he has worked as a staff writer since 1998, “Philippine President Aquino seeks U.S. military aid,” June 8 2012, Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/philippine-president-aquino-seeks-us-military-aid/2012/06/08/gJQAUEwtOV_story.html>)

The president of the Philippines made a direct pitch to the White House Friday to help bolster his country’s relatively weak defenses as the island nation increasingly finds itself tangled in territorial conflicts with China. The Philippines, a former colony and longtime ally of the United States, has been seeking reassurances that Washington would come to its defense in a confrontation with China. The two Asian countries assert overlapping claims in the mineral-rich South China Sea and have been engaged in a two-month standoff over a rocky outcropping there. China claims sovereignty over much of the South China Sea, alarming countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia, whose coastlines are much closer to some of the disputed territories. That has led to a rapid souring of relations between Beijing and Manila, with Philippine leaders expressing concern about China’s strategic ambitions in the region. “If you’re asking me to discern their intentions, frankly we’re still analyzing what their intentions are,” Philippine President Benigno Aquino III said in an interview with editors and reporters of The Washington Post on Friday prior to his visit to the White House, where he met with President Obama. China has the most powerful military in Asia and is boosting its spending on defense. The Philippines, in contrast, lacks a single fighter jet. Its navy is so weak that its biggest warship is an aging former U.S. Coast Guard cutter it acquired as surplus from the Pentagon last year. Aquino’s government has intensified talks this year with the Obama administration about expanding the U.S. military presence in the Philippines. Among the options under consideration are operating Navy ships from the Philippines, deploying troops on a rotational basis and staging more frequent joint exercises. The welcome mat from Manila represents a turnaround. In 1992, the Philippines evicted the U.S. military from its sprawling naval base at Subic Bay, a year after the Pentagon had abandoned nearby Clark Air Base. Together, the two bases had served as a cornerstone of the U.S. military presence in Asia for nearly a century. In the interview with The Post, Aquino said his government wanted the Pentagon’s help to upgrade its maritime surveillance capabilities so the Philippines — which has 7,107 islands — can better patrol its extensive coastlines.

He said the U.S. deployment of surveillance aircraft, such as Navy P-3C Orion planes and Global Hawk drones, would be “a welcome development.” But he said the Philippines was particularly interested in acquiring a land-based radar that could enable it to monitor the wide expanses of the South China Sea. Felix K. Chang, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, called a radar “a significant step in improving the Philippines’ situational awareness off its coasts.” He said Manila’s defenses are so poor that often it has “only learned about foreign activities after the fact.” Rick Fisher, an Asian security expert at the International Assessment and Strategy Center in Alexandria, said a powerful land-based radar could be used jointly by the Philippines, the United States and other allies to quickly detect Chinese military movements in the region. That would fill a void that has existed since the U.S. military was evicted from Subic Bay and Clark two decades ago. Such a radar could provide “an almost instant way of keeping the Chinese honest,” Fisher said.

The Philippines needs radar now

Castro 12 (Erik De Castro, staff writer for reuters news, June 13, 2012, The Telegraph News, “US military to help Philippines monitor coastal waters,” http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/philippines/9328427/US-military-to-help-Philippines-monitor-coastal-waters.html)

 The Pentagon revised earlier comments and said there was no firm plan to deliver a land-based radar to the Philippines, but that a radar could be part of future assistance. "We are in the initial planning stages of assisting the Philippines with a National Coast Watch Center," Major Catherine Wilkinson told AFP. The centre is designed "to create an overall picture of what is going on in the Philippines' territorial waters," she said. "Right now we are discussing a range of options and no details have been finalised. Radars may be an eventual part of the package but it hasn't been determined yet." The cost and the time line for the project were still being worked out, she said.

Radar is key to deter China, stop poaching, human trafficking, piracy, and drug trafficking

Yap 12 (DJ Yap, staff writer for the Philippine daily inquirer, June 14, 2012, Military elated by US promise of radar system,” <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/39971/military-elated-by-us-promise-of-radar-system>)

The Armed Forces of the Philippines said the announcement of the US government to assist the Philippines in monitoring coastal waters would help the latter form a “minimum credible defense posture” against potential threats. “This significant development comes at a very opportune time as we try to beef up our defense capability particularly in bolstering our maritime surveillance and monitoring capabilities,” said AFP public affairs chief Colonel Arnulfo Marcelo Burgos Jr. He added that “this effort will not only help us prevent foreign intrusion but will also aid us in addressing transnational crimes like poaching, human trafficking, piracy and drug trafficking.” On Tuesday, a Pentagon spokesperson announced plans by the US military to provide the Philippines a powerful land-based radar system to form part of a “watch center” that would be able to track ships off the archipelago’s coastline. “This center will improve the Philippine maritime domain awareness of a breadth of security issues including countering the proliferation of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) to countering illegal smuggling,” Major Catherine Wilkinson told a news agency. The Philippines has sought military assistance from the United States to boost its position in its long-running standoff with China over Panatag Shoal, internationally known as Scarborough. In April tensions rose between the two countries over disputed fishing grounds in Scarborough Shoal when Philippine authorities tried to arrest alleged Chinese poachers, driving Chinese maritime vessels to step in. The standoff continued well into May with maritime ships from both sides coming and going into the area as a show of force, while the Department of Foreign Affairs and its Chinese counterpart sought a diplomatic resolution.

US Infrastructure and Radar is key to deter China

Castro 12 (Erik De Castro, staff writer for reuters news, June 13, 2012, The Telegraph News, “US military to help Philippines monitor coastal waters,” http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/philippines/9328427/US-military-to-help-Philippines-monitor-coastal-waters.html)

The Philippines has requested radar, patrol aircraft and naval vessels as it seeks to bolster its position in a row with China over the Scarborough Shoal, which lies near the main Philippine island of Luzon. China claims the area along with virtually all of the South China Sea up to the shores of other Southeast Asian nations, including Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines. The Pentagon's comments came after President Benigno Aquino paid a visit last week to the White House, where he was offered a robust show of support. Plans to help Manila reflect Washington's strategic shift towards Asia amid a growing rivalry with Beijing, with the South China Sea at the centre of the contest, analysts said. "Land-based radar is one of the practical ways the United States can simultaneously boost Philippine defence capabilities and signal Washington's long-term commitment to Asia," said Patrick Cronin, senior adviser for Asia at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington think tank. China may choose to defuse tensions with the Philippines just before a gathering of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations next month, Cronin said. "But it is also possible that China is determined to humiliate the Philippines and, indirectly, the United States," he told AFP. Manila's request for US military help marks a reversal after the Philippines evicted the American military from its vast naval base at Subic Bay in 1992. It was unlikely the United States would look at providing military aircraft at a time when China may be preparing a conciliatory gesture, Cronin said. "If China persists with embarrassing the Philippines, then I have no doubt aircraft sales will follow," he said. Tensions between Beijing and Manila escalated in April when Chinese and Philippine vessels approached the Scarborough Shoal, which lies near the main Philippine island of Luzon. Manila says the rock formation falls within its exclusive economic zone.

Radar is Key to Deterring China

Defense News 12 (Defense News, June 12, 2012, “Pentagon: U.S. To Help Philippines with Radar,” <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120612/DEFREG03/306120009>)

WASHINGTON — The U.S. military said June 12 it plans to provide a land-based radar to the Philippines, as the country faces an escalating dispute with China over territorial rights off its shore. The radar would form part of a “watch center” to help track ships off the island nation’s coast line, a Pentagon spokeswoman said. “We are in the initial planning stages of assisting the Philippines with a National Coast Watch Center,” Major Catherine Wilkinson told AFP. “This center will improve their maritime domain awareness of a breadth of security issues, including counter-proliferation of (weapons of mass destruction) to countering illegal smuggling,” she said. The cost and the timeline for the project were still being worked out, she said. Plans to provide a powerful radar to the Philippines came after Philippine President Benigno Aquino paid a visit last week to the White House, where he was offered a robust show of support. Manila has asked for the radar system and other military assistance to bolster its position in a row with Beijing over the Scarborough Shoal, which lies near the main Philippine island of Luzon. China claims the area along with virtually all of the South China Sea up to the shores of other Southeast Asian nations, including Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines. The move reflects Washington’s strategic shift towards Asia amid a growing rivalry with Beijing, with the South China Sea at the center of the contest, analysts said. “Land-based radar is one of the practical ways the United States can simultaneously boost Philippine defense capabilities and signal Washington’s long-term commitment to Asia,” said Patrick Cronin, senior adviser for Asia at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington think tank.

Radar is key to deter China, especially in conflicts over oil

Katigbak 12 (Jose Katigbak, staff writer for Philippine star, June 11, 2012, “Noy seeks US aid for radar to monitor Phl waters,” <http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=816046>)

WASHINGTON -- The Philippines has asked the Pentagon for help in upgrading its maritime surveillance capabilities and is particularly interested in acquiring a land-based radar to monitor the wide expanses of the West Philippine Sea, President Aquino said. In an interview with The Washington Post during his three-day official visit here Aquino said the deployment of surveillance aircraft such as Navy PO-3C Orion planes and Global Hawk drones would be “a welcome development.” The newspaper quoted Rich Fisher, an Asian security expert at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, as saying a powerful land-based radar could be used by the Philippines, the US and other allies to quickly detect Chinese military movements in the region. “Such a radar could provide an almost instant way of keeping the Chinese honest,” Fisher said. In a separate interview with The Wall Street Journal Aquino said a potentially dangerous confrontation between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough (Panatag) Shoal area has eased after two tense months but opined other brewing conflicts may not be easily defused. A permanent solution to the standoff in Panatag, if one is achieved, won’t easily transfer to other looming conflicts, including access to energy resources, Aquino said in the interview. “This is a very small portion of the entire dispute,” he said. Panatag is closer to the coastline of the Philippines than it is to China. The Philippines is in the process of building a “credible defense force” and looks to the United States to supply many of its needs. Aquino has made a direct pitch to the White House to help bolster his country‘s weak defenses. The weeks leading to the Aquino-Obama talks here produced much rhetoric about China on both sides of the Pacific and fueled Bejing’s suspicions the two allies may be ganging up on it. Surprisingly at the end of their talks Aquino and Obama in statements to the press never mentioned China at all. Their joint statement was equally cautious. Obama assured Aquino of the US government’s support for Philippine efforts to build a minimum credible defense posture and both leaders reaffirmed their mutual commitment to the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region and to the Phl-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). What form this support would take was not specified.

Monitoring is necessary to resolve disputes and continue American Economic Activity in Asia

Katigbak 12 (Jose Katigbak, staff writer for Philippine star, June 11, 2012, “Noy seeks US aid for radar to monitor Phl waters,” <http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=816046>)

Aquino assured Americans he would not drag the US in any military intervention in the crisis and expressed his commitment to diffusing the tension. US officials have repeatedly made clear America’s pivot to the Asia Pacific is not directed at China. “What we have are very significant US interests in the continued positive economic development of the region and increasing our trade and investment and exports within the region,” said a senior administration official. “We want to empower international rules of the road on maritime security, not to isolate any one nation or to take a position on a claim, for instance in the South China Sea, but rather to make sure that claims can be resolve peacefully,” he added.

No Radar now – radar is key to deterring China

MSN 12 (MSN news, June 12, 2012, “US military to help Philippines monitor coastal waters,” <http://news.ph.msn.com/regional/us-military-to-help-philippines-monitor-coastal-waters-2>)

The Pentagon revised earlier comments and said there was no firm plan to deliver a land-based radar to the Philippines, but that a radar could be part of future assistance. "We are in the initial planning stages of assisting the Philippines with a National Coast Watch Center," Major Catherine Wilkinson told AFP. The center is designed "to create an overall picture of what is going on in the Philippines' territorial waters," she said. "Right now we are discussing a range of options and no details have been finalized. Radars may be an eventual part of the package but it hasn't been determined yet." The cost and the time line for the project were still being worked out, she said. The Philippines has requested radar, patrol aircraft and naval vessels as it seeks to bolster its position in a row with China over the Scarborough Shoal, which lies near the main Philippine island of Luzon. China claims the area along with virtually all of the South China Sea up to the shores of other Southeast Asian nations, including Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines. The Pentagon's comments came after President Benigno Aquino paid a visit last week to the White House, where he was offered a robust show of support. Plans to help Manila reflect Washington's strategic shift towards Asia amid a growing rivalry with Beijing, with the South China Sea at the center of the contest, analysts said. "Land-based radar is one of the practical ways the United States can simultaneously boost Philippine defense capabilities and signal Washington's long-term commitment to Asia," said Patrick Cronin, senior adviser for Asia at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington think tank.

Radar is Key to solve disputes with China, poaching, human trafficking, piracy, drug trafficking, and preserve oil and minerals

MBI 12 (Malaysa Business Insight, June 15, 2012, [US plans to give land-based radars](http://www.malaya.com.ph/~malayaco/index.php/news/nation/6393-us-plans-to-give-land-based-radars), <http://www.malaya.com.ph/~malayaco/index.php/news/nation/6393-us-plans-to-give-land-based-radars>)

FOREIGN intrusion into Philippine territory will be prevented if the United States pushes through with a plan to provide the Philippines with powerful land-based radars, AFP spokesman Col. Arnulfo Marcelo Burgos said yesterday. The radars, Burgos also said, will not only beef up the military’s capability in monitoring and protecting resources but will also aid in the fight against “transnational crimes like poaching, human trafficking, piracy, and drug trafficking.” The military last year reported a number of intrusions by China into Philippine territory in the West Philippines Sea (South China Sea) where the disputed Spratly Islands are. The Spratlys, a chain of islands and islets believed to be rich in oil and minerals deposits, is being claimed by the Philippines, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei. Last April, a standoff broke out at the Scarborough Shoal or Panatag Shoal off Zambales when Chinese ships prevented a Philippine Navy ship from arresting Chinese fishermen caught gathering corals, live sharks and giant clams.

Disaster Relief

Troops KT disaster relief

Tow 12 (William Tow, professor of IR at ANU college in Asia, Feburary 3, 2012, “The eagle returns: resurgent US strategy in Southeast Asia and its policy implications,” <http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&q=In+November%2C+President+Obama+visited+Australia+on+his+way+to+the+sixth+East+Asia+Summit+%28EAS%29+in+Bali&btnG=&as_sdt=1%2C30&as_sdtp>=)

In November, President Obama visited Australia on his way to the sixth East Asia Summit (EAS) in Bali. While in Canberra, he announced that US Marines would begin six-month rotations near Darwin in 2012. Although relatively small numbers of US forces would be involved (250 in 2012 and up to 2,500 by 2016), this initiative—along with a commensurate announcement that US military aircraft rotations would increase in northern Australia—sent a powerful signal to other Asia–Pacific countries that Washington would sustain its strategic commitments in the region even as the overall US defence budget is to be reduced due to the ongoing global economic crisis. The Marines The eagle returns: resurgent US strategy in Southeast Asia and its policy implications 2 deployment and increased US air presence would strengthen US capability to intervene quickly in future regional crises and to contribute to increasingly common non-combat missions, such as disaster relief. Obama’s announcement of the US force posture initiative was balanced, however, by the White House characterising his attendance at the EAS as symbolising ‘the Administration’s commitment to deepening engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and playing a leadership role in its emerging institutions’.3 This dual track approach reflects the balancing requirement between strategic commitment and regional engagement inherent in current US strategy in Southeast Asia. It was specifically designed to modify the apprehensions of some regional powers, such as China and Indonesia, that the US may be pursuing a containment strategy by stealth directed against Beijing.

[Insert Disaster Impact]

\*\*\*2AC Case Blocks

AT: China Won’t Attack

Tensions over South China Sea grow with China’s military aggression

Glaser 12

(Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea: Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14,” April 2012, Council on Foreign Relations Press, [http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883](http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883%20//) | JS)

The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region's possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China's two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping—and being shaped by—rising apprehensions about the growth of China's military power and its regional intentions. China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily.

Territorial disputes will escalate to armed conflict if unchecked

Reuters 7/14/12

(“Summit in chaos over waters; China asserts role in South China Sea,” The Star Phoenix, p. C9, July 14, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/13/us-asean-summit-idUSBRE86C0BD20120713?feedType=RSS&feedName=everything&virtualBrandChannel=11563> | JS)

A southeast Asian regional summit ended in acrimony on Friday over China's assertive role in the strategic South China Sea, failing to agree on a concluding joint statement for the first time in its 45-year history. Divisions between the 10 countries in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) follow a rise in incidents of naval brinkmanship involving Chinese vessels in the oil-rich waters that has sparked fears of a military clash. The Philippines said it "deplores" ASEAN's failure to address the worsening row, and criticized Cambodia - a close ally of China - for its handling of the issue during the foreign ministers' meeting. Without mentioning China, Philippine Foreign Minister Albert del Rosario told a news conference in Manila that one "member state's" intrusions into Philippine territory were part of a "creeping imposition" of its claim over the entire South China Sea and were raising the risk of a conflict. The South China Sea has become Asia's biggest potential military flashpoint as Beijing's sovereignty claim over a huge, looping area has set it against Vietnam and the Philippines as the three countries race to tap possibly huge oil reserves. The stakes have risen as the U.S. military shifts its attention and resources back to Asia, emboldening its longtime ally the Philippines and former foe Vietnam to take a bolder stance against Beijing. ASEAN's divisions are an ominous sign for a bloc that wants to create a regional economic community by 2015 that would bring down barriers in trade, labour and financial markets - partly to compete with China for investment. China is a member of the East Asian Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum which also held meetings in Cambodia. "The increasing assertion by this member state over the disputed and nondisputed areas poses a threat to the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region," del Rosario said. "If left unchecked, the increasing tension that is being generated in the process could further escalate into physical hostilities which no one wants." China has been accused of using its heavy influence over summit chair Cambodia and several other ASEAN members to block regional-level discussions on the issue and attempts to agree a binding maritime Code of Conduct to manage the dispute. The Philippines said it took "strong exception" to Cambodia's statement that the non-issuance of a communique was due to "bilateral conflict between some ASEAN member states and a neighbouring country". It said it had only requested that the communique mention the recent standoff between Chinese and Philippine ships at the Scarborough Shoal, a horseshoeshaped reef in waters that both countries claim. Indonesia, the biggest economy in Southeast Asia, played down the rift. "No doubt the South China Sea at the moment is a difficult issue but I'm sure ASEAN will find ways and means to be able to address that problem," Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa told Reuters. But the rising tensions were underlined on Friday when the Chinese navy said that one of its frigates had run aground on Half Moon Shoal, about 90 nautical miles (170 km) off the western Philippine island of Palawan. China said it was conducting a rescue mission and the Philippines said it was sending "assets" to the area to investigate and provide assistance if needed. "That's a very strategic location to strengthen their claim over the Reed Bank, they are getting closer to our territory, putting one foot inside our fence," one military official told Reuters

Sino-US-Filipino tensions rising in SCS

Mallari 6/28/12

(Mario J., with AFP – staff writer for The Daily Tribune, “China vows to oppose military provocation,” June 28 2012, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jPFDJW7A6LF2eNV0F3DhfdPzV-yA?docId=CNG.8ce61e811a998e6ec041f250a9f4356c.7f1> | JS)

China said Thursday it would resolutely oppose any military provocation in its territorial waters, remarks which appeared to be directed at the United States, Vietnam and the Philippines. China's military has established routine naval patrols in the South China Sea, "indisputable territory" of the nation and a matter of "national sovereignty," defence ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng said. "We will resolutely oppose any military provocations," Geng said in statements posted on his ministry's website. "The determination and will of China's military to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity is unwavering." Geng's remarks came as the United States launched the largest-ever "Rim of the Pacific" naval exercises in Hawaii, involving 22 nations, including the US, India, Russia, Australia and the Philippines. China was not invited to participate or observe the exercises. Tensions in the South China Sea have intensified recently with Vietnam and the Philippines both accusing China of increasingly flexing its military muscle in the region, despite a pledge from all claimants to avoid actions that could further stoke tensions. Both the Philippines and Vietnam have also sought to shore up relations with the United States to counter China's increasingly vocal assertions over the region that also includes key international shipping routes.

Tension now over South China Sea – Manila won’t back down from military conflict

Spross 12

(Hans, staff writer @ Deutsche Welle, “Tension is expected to remain in the South China Sea,” Deutsche Welle World, April 19 2012, [http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,15895671,00.html](http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0%2C%2C15895671%2C00.html) | JS)

The United States and Philippines have started joint naval manoeuvres as the diplomatic row between Manila and Beijing continues over territorial claims in the South China Sea. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea go way back. The riparian states - Malaysia, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Brunei - lay claim to some of the same islands and reefs there. China lays claim to almost all of the territories in the South China Sea. That led in 1974 to a military conflict between China and Vietnam over the Paracel Islands. Now the Islands, which are called Xisha in Chinese and Hoang Sa in Vietnamese, are administered by China, although Vietnam still claims the islands as part of its territory. The most recent territorial dispute has been between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Reef, which the Chinese call Huangyan Island and the Filipinos call Panatag Shoal. At the beginning of April, it came to a standoff between Chinese fish trawlers and Philippine navy. Though the ships involved in the conflict have left the area - including the Chinese fisher boats along with their illegal catches, as Manila termed it -the situation remains tense. Two Chinese reconnaissance ships, a Philippine coastguard ship, and a Philippine vessel searching for sunken ships were still in the area on Wednesday, April 18, when both governments summoned each other's ambassadors. Beijing demanded Manila remove its ships immediately, so that "peace and stability could be restored to the Huangyan Island," said a spokesperson for the Chinese foreign ministry. Historical tug-of-war Beijing maintains the reef has been part of its territory since it was discovered in the 13th century and named. Manila rejects the claim and points out that the area is within the Philippines' internationally recognized 200 sea mile economic zone. The reef is around 124 nautical miles (230 kilometers) away from the northern Filipino island Luzon. The nearest part of the Chinese mainland is over four times that distance. Manila offered to resolve the issue at the International Maritime Court. But according to Stefan Talmon, an international law expert, Beijing does not have to accept. He believes the question over who has rights to the contested area will have to be negotiated. With regards to its military inferiority to Beijing, Manila, however, is not keen on finding a solution to the dispute by means of negotiation. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reaffirmed last November while on board the USS Fitzgerald in Manila Bay the strong military ties between Washington and Manila and promised support in "deterring provocation from the full spectrum of state and nonstate actors." In a conference with her Filipino counterpart Albert del Rosario, she said: "Any nation with a claim has the right to exert it, but they do not have a right to pursue it through intimidation or coercion." Coveted natural resources On Monday, April 16, joint maneuvers began off the coast of Palawan Island, near the hotly contested Spratly Islands - to which China, Vietnam and the Philippines lay claim. The area is rich in natural resources. Various estimates put the amount of crude oil under the South China Sea at up to 230 billion barrels - 60 times China's annual consumption. Last March, Chinese ships dispelled the ship of a British energy company, which had been commissioned by the Philippines to search for gas resources. And recently, Beijing issued a warning to Russian and Indian oil exploration companies which had been invited by Vietnam that they would do well to stay out of the South China Sea.

Sino-Filipino tension rising over South China Sea

BusinessWorld 7/17/12

(Business World Online, “Manila warns Beijing against intruding into economic zone,” p. S1/12, July 17 2012, <http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Nation&title=Manila-warns-Beijing-against-intruding-into-economic-zone&id=55247> // Lexis | JS)

THE PHILIPPINES has warned China against the possible intrusion of a fleet of Chinese fishing vessels into the country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). "The Chinese fishing vessels must not intrude in the EEZ of the Philippines," said Foreign Affairs spokesman and Assistant Secretary Raul S. Hernandez in a statement yesterday. "We require China to respect the sovereign rights of the Philippines over the resources within our EEZ," he added. Prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the EEZ stretches out 200 nautical miles from a country's coast, giving the state special rights over the exploration and use of marine resources. On Sunday, Chinese state-run news agency Xinhua reported that a fleet comprising 30 fishing vessels, which came from the Hainan island-province of China, arrived at the waters of Nansha Islands at the southern end of the West Philippine Sea (WPS). The fleet - reportedly the largest from Hainan - went to the area for a five- to 10-day fishing expedition near the Yongshu Reef. A government patrol ship, China Yuzheng 310, also reportedly arrived in the area to protect the fishing activities. Mr. Hernandez said the department is "asking the Philippine Coast Guard to identify the location of the Chinese fishing vessels so that we can ascertain whether they are in our maritime domain." The two countries just came out of a standoff at the Scarborough Shoal, also within the disputed area which lasted for over a month. The shoal - called Panatag Island and Bajo de Masinloc by the Philippines, and Huangyan Island by China - is 124 nautical miles away from the shores of Zambales and 450 nautical miles from the closest island of China. The shoal is part of the resource-rich Spratlys or Kalayaan Group of Islands in the WPS, claimed in part or wholly by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. The fleet's arrival came after China earlier Sunday extricated a naval frigate that got stranded four days earlier on a shoal in the Spratlys, near the western Philippine island of Palawan. However, the Philippines did not lodge a diplomatic protest over the matter, saying the stranding of the vessel in its exclusive economic zone was likely an accident. Meanwhile, a group of Taiwanese academics has visited the contested Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, defense officials said Monday, amid continued tensions over rival claims to the area. A 12-member delegation from the Institute of Ocean Technology and Marine Affairs at National Cheng Kung University completed the week-long trip on Sunday, the defense ministry said in a statement. "The group was able to use the fact-finding mission to collect firsthand information on issues such as transportation to and from the area, maintaining national security, and protecting the South China Sea's ecosystem," the defense ministry said. "The visit inspired their patriotism and also renewed our territorial claim." The move came as local media said Taiwanese authorities were considering extending the runway on Taiping Island, the largest in the disputed waters and 1,376 kilometers from Taiwan. Calls for an increase in Taiwan's defense capability in the Spratlys have been on the rise, with rival claimants deploying more troops and adding military facilities in the area. In May, Taiwanese coast guards said the number of intruding Vietnamese boats last year surged to 106, up from 42 the year before. All claimants except Brunei have troops based on the archipelago of more than 100 islets, reefs and atolls, which have a total land mass of less than five square kilometers. The Spratlys are one of the biggest island chains in the area. The rival claims have long made the South China Sea one of Asia's potential military flash points, and tensions have escalated over the past year. The Philippines and Vietnam have complained that China is becoming increasingly aggressive in its actions in the area - such as harassing fishermen - and also through bullying diplomatic tactics. The Philippines said the latest example of this was at annual Southeast Asian talks in Cambodia that ended on Friday in failure because of the South China Sea issue. The Philippines had wanted its fellow Association of Southeast Asian Nations to refer in a communique a standoff last month with China over a rocky outcrop known as the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. But Cambodia, the summit's host and China's ally, blocked the move.

Chinese claims over SCS risk conflict with surrounding nations

Tkacik 12

(John J. Tkacik, Jr. - Senior Fellow, Director Future Asia Project International Assessment and Strategy Center, “CHINESE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES,” Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, Committee on House Foreign Affairs, March 28 2012 // Lexis | JS)

China is not content with a culture of strong-arm commercial and financial aggressiveness. As a unitary state actor in the international arena, China has a coherent multidimensional approach to global competition which also includes the domination of sealanes and civil airspace in East Asia. This is one of Beijing's top strategic goals, not just for economic and military advantage, but also for domestic political legitimacy and regional diplomatic propaganda. In this context, the most visible geostrategic flashpoint between China and the rest Asia - and the United States as well - is China's growing belligerence in the seas it shares with its Asian neighbors. China's increasingly adamantine territorial sea claims in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea are certain to be resolved only one of two ways: either China gets what it wants or it will use armed conflict to enforce its so-called "core interests." Let me review the bidding on China's maritime claims:

South China Sea

Combined, the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea are the globe's single busiest maritime route through which roughly half of the world's seaborne traffic transits each year.66 China claims them all, and Chinese law, on its face, restricts "freedom of navigation and overflight" in China's EEZ and continental shelf only to states that observe "the laws and regulations of the People's Republic of China." 7 As recently as two weeks ago, U.S. experts noted that China's so-called "Nine- Dash Line" (which encompasses the bulk of the South China Sea) now demarcates absolute right over all the fishing resources of the entire sea.68 While in public Chinese diplomats play down territorial sea claims to foreign audiences,69 China's absolute sovereignty is nowhere demurred. China views its claims to the South China Sea are not covered by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) because China's claims antecede the Convention and because the Convention "does not deny historical claims."

In June 2010, at his headquarters in Pearl Harbor Naval Base, Hawaii, Admiral Patrick Walsh gave an interview to a reporter from Japan's major newspaper, Asahi Shimbun. Walsh was stressed by a new intensity in Chinese naval harassment in the South China Sea, especially its unseemly reef-grabbing and physical force against non-Chinese fishermen from the Sea's other littoral states. Mimicking the "core interest" terminology of the Chinese themselves, Walsh told the Japanese correspondent, "This is an issue that has us very, very concerned because, on principle, the interference with freedom of navigation in international water is a core interest for those who use the global commons." Walsh referred to "this economic 'carotid artery' that runs through the South China Sea ... they [the Chinese] are willing to put at risk over rocks, reefs and disputed claims."71

Beijing persists in its broad "Nine Dash Line" territorial sea claim around the full periphery of the South China Sea - a claim which The Economist magazine calls "a great lolling tongue of Chinese sovereignty" encompassing about 1.5 million square kilometers of water. There are promising seabed oil and gas structures within whatever EEZs are carved from the Sea's continental shelf and the islets occupied by China, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Since 1992, China has warned its south sea neighbors against exploring the Sea's oil and gas resources. Since 1974, China has inexorably tightened its claims to the Sea and it islets, claims that were first articulated in 1947 by the Chinese Nationalist Government under Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking, and which the regime in Taipei had staked in the maritime vacuum as Japan gave up claim to the islands at the end of World War II. Taipei's nationalists occupied some of the largest of the islands, Itu Aba in the Sea's southern Spratly chain and Pratas in the Sea's far northern edge amidst Taiwan, Hong Kong and Luzon. As early as 1974, Taipei reportedly opened up the Taiwan Strait to the transit of People's Liberation Army Naval (PLAN) warships in support a Chinese attack on South Vietnamese forces in the Paracel islands then occupied by tottering South Vietnamese Saigon regime. Saigon had inherited the islands from France at independence in 1954 -France had reclaimed them from Japan in 1945, and Japan had claimed them from the teettering French government as it collapsed before the Nazis in 1940.

In March 1988, Chinese troops destroyed Vietnamese forces then occupying Johnson South Reef in the Spratlys. And since then, Chinese naval, civilian maritime administration and fisheries forces have occupied a succession of minor reefs to enforce their claims. In recent years, China's military has systematically garrisoned several chains of submerged coral shoals in the Spratlys west of the southern Philippine island of Palawan, secretly emplacing huge caissons of concrete in their shallow water and constructing massive platforms and anchorages. The Chinese forcefully ejected Philippines troops from Mischief Reef in 1995, and the Philippines has been complaining about it ever since. In 2002, ASEAN induced China to accept the 2002 ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea which includes a commitment by all parties to "resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force." China's subsequent behavior, however, reflects that Beijing saw the move as pure propaganda and never intended to abide by the code of conduct in the first place.

In May 2011, the Philippines air force spotted several new structures in the Spratly island group, all complete with satellite communications, air defense cannons, and 300 meter-long cargo docks. The discovery coincided with the visit to Manila of China's defense minister, General Liang Guanglie who, without a hint of irony, proceeded to sign a communique with his Philippines counterpart which urged that "unilateral actions which could cause alarm should be avoided."74 China gradually is tightening its strategic presence in the South China Sea. By 2008, the deputy commander of the Chinese navy's East Fleet, Admiral Zhang Huachen, explained that "with the expansion of the country's economic interests, the navy wants to better protect the country's transportation routes and the safety of our major sea lanes." A retired PLA general was a bit more candid: "We kept silent about territory disputes with our neighbors in the past because our navy was incapable of defending our economic zones, but now the navy is able to carry out its task."75 Indeed, incidents at sea between U.S. Navy and Chinese forces have always been a fact of life (the most violent was an incident in April 2001 when a Chinese jet fighter collided with an American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft 60 miles off Hainan Island). They have intensified since March 2009 when the U.S. naval ocean surveillance ship USNS Impeccable engaged in submarine detection operations in international waters about 75 miles south of Hainan Island was surrounded by several Chinese fishing boats which closed to within 25 feet of the American ship. The confrontation was preceded by a close approach incident when a Chinese naval frigate crossed the Impeccable's bow at a range of 100 yards. When the U.S. lodged an official complaint about the Chinese behavior, China's foreign ministry countered that the U.S. vessel had broken "international and Chinese law" and besides, the U.S. complaint was "totally inaccurate and confuses right and wrong and is unacceptable to China."76

A senior Chinese strategic analyst at People's University in Beijing, Professor Shi Yinhong, observed that "the United States is present everywhere on the world's seas, but these kinds of incidents may grow as China's naval activities expand." China now picks fights in the South China Sea with alarming frequency. On June 11, 2009, a Chinese submarine deliberately cut the cable of a sonar array being towed by the USS John McCain in international waters about 140 miles northwest of Subic Bay, Philippines. Shortly after the contretemps with the Impeccable, China's fisheries department announced it would increase its fisheries patrols in South China Sea and by June had deployed eight new patrol vessels which had seized several Vietnamese fishing boats. In 2009 alone, Chinese had seized 433 Vietnamese fishermen in the South China Sea.79

In August 2011, Chinese naval vessels confronted an Indian Navy ship that was transiting between two Vietnamese ports, and India promptly asserted freedom of navigation on the high seas. In October 2011, India announced its intentions to explore for subseabed oil in Vietnamese waters, drawing Chinese protests, with the Chinese government officially declaring "challenging the core interests of a large, rising country for unknown oil at the bottom of the sea will not only lead to a crushing defeat for the Indian oil company, but will most likely seriously harm India's whole energy security and interrupt its economic development." In February 2012, armed Chinese vessels prevented Vietnamese fishing boats from seeking storm refu8g1e in the Chinese-occupied Paracels - and reportedly tried to rob the Viet crewmembers.81 At the southern end of the South China Sea where China's maritime claims abut Indonesia's, Indonesian authorities detained eight Chinese fishing boats and arrested 75 illegal Chinese fishermen. A year later, in the summer of 2010, Indonesian patrol vessels again confronted a fleet of ten Chinese fishing boats, but this time, a Chinese "fishery management vessel" (described as a "repurposed heavy gunboat") threatened to fire on the Indonesian coast guard ships. Moreover, the Chinese boats were not even in waters claimed by China, but in Indonesia's EEZ near Natuna Island. One analyst believes that massive overfishing in Chinese waters have left coastal fisheries in "a state of near collapse," and this has prompted the Beijing government to encourage its fleet of 300,000 fishing boats to go farther asea - a migration that now brings re8g3 ular clashes in neighboring fishing grounds that China now claims as its own.83

As if to rationalize its new belligerence, China also set about declaiming that it had "core interests" in the South China Sea. In March, 2010, according to The Washington Post, Chinese assistant foreign minister Cui Tiankai explained to two senior U.S. officials that his country viewed its claims to the South China Sea on par with its claims to Tibet and Taiwan. This was reportedly the first time China had defined the South China Sea to be as central to China's security as Taiwan. Thereafter, Chinese diplomats proclaimed a "core interest" in the South China Sea to progressively more senior Americans - and Southeast Asians as well. In tandem, Chinese security scholars declared in the official media that "by adding the South China Sea to its core interests, China has shown its determination to secure its maritime resources and strategic waters."85

By June 2010, China's proprietary posture in the South China Sea had become unbearable not just to the major South China Sea littoral states, but to the United States as well. Addressing the annual Asian Security Summit in Singapore (also known as the "Shangri-La Dialogue") on June 5, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates countered China's "core interest" rhetoric with his own declaration of "the longstanding belief of the U.S. government that a peaceful and non-coerced resolution to the Taiwan issue is an abiding national interest - and vital for the overall security of Asia."86

In response, senior American officials began explicating America's "national interests" in the South China Sea. Speaking at the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi on July 23, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for a binding international code of conduct for the states claiming disputed islands in the South China Sea, including China, as well as a formal international process for resolving those claims. "The United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea," Clinton asserted. China's foreign minister immediately characterized the U.S. stance as an "attack" on China, adding ingenuously that "nobody believes there's anything that is threatening the region's peace and stability."87 There ensued several months of Chinese complaints about American interference in the Sea, beginning with the banner headline on the front page of the July 26, 2010, Huanqiu Shibao (the international news mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party) which charged "Hillary's ignorant rhetoric is cause of South Sea furor, Yang Jiechi refutes U.S. distortions, China Slams American interference in South Sea." An English commentary in Global Times (the English language edition of Huanqiu) warned darkly of the "American Shadow over South China Sea" and cautioned that "Southeast Asian countries need to understand any attempt to maximize gains by playing a balancing game between China and the US is risky." The commentary continued. "China's tolerance was sometimes taken advantage of by neighboring countries to seize unoccupied islands and grab natural resources under China's sovereignty. . . China will never waive its right to protect its core interest with military means."89

China kept up the pressure until it became clear that it was simply making things worse for its Southeast Asian diplomacy. By the spring of 2011, the "core interest" formula had faded for a time from China's official South China Sea rhetoric. But it resurfaces regularly in pseudo-unofficial commentaries in English on Chinese media websites. Chinese media still indulgently post commentaries calling for "economic punishment" of Southeast Asian neighbor which have the temerity to challenge new Chinese assertions of territorial sovereignty in South China Sea waters.90 The U.S. Navy's Pacific Commander, Admiral Patrick Walsh fretted on the record to the Associated Press on January 17, 2012 that South China Sea disputes "have all the ingredients of an escalatory situation," 2012 has seen a recrudescence of China's belligerence at Sea. Earlier this month, People's Liberation Army Major General Luo Yuan, executive director of the China Military Science Society, proposed that China establish a new "administrative zone" encompassing much of the South China Sea, and the enforcement of territorial claims in the Sea by stationing troops on more disputed islands and encouraging its fishermen and oil companies to start commercial operations around them.91 Is China's expanding security footprint in the South China Sea a problem for the U.S. as well as Southeast Asia? As former Asia policy aide to President George W. Bush, Michael Green, put it: "The Chinese are elbowing, seeing how far they can go before the referee blows the whistle on them and they get a yellow card . . . This is also a [Chinese] signal to Vietnam, the Philippines, and the smaller countries in the region, that 'look, if we can do this to the Americans, what chance do you think you have?"'

AT: US Won’t Intervene

Brinkmanship in the South China Sea could easily erupt into armed conflicts, forcing US intervention

Westhead 7/14/12

(Rick Westhead, Foreign affairs writer, former South Asia bureau chief with The Toronto Star of Canada, “Battle for the Pacific; A perilous arms race is unfolding as regional rivals vie for control of trade routes, fish stocks - and oil and gas deposits,” The Toronto Star, 14 July 2012, p. WD4, [http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1225396--battle-for-the-pacific-naval-arms-race-in-the-china-sea |](http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1225396--battle-for-the-pacific-naval-arms-race-in-the-china-sea%20%7C) JS)

"It's not like you're going to see China strangling world trade," Le Miere says. "Everyone wants open and free shipping lanes." Still, good relations can quickly sour and become games of brinksmanship. In 2010, a South Korean corvette called the Cheonan was on a routine patrol in the Yellow Sea when it was sunk near Baengnyeong, 22 kilometres from the North Korean coast. Forty-six South Korean sailors died. An investigation concluded the warship had been crippled by a torpedo from a mini-submarine. "No one can predict what North Korea will do, and no one can say what China will do if the U.S. rushes in to help South Korea," says David Zimmerman, a professor of military history at British Columbia's University of Victoria. Tensions are already raw between South Korea and China. Last December, a South Korean coast guard commando was stabbed and another injured after they arrested nine Chinese fishermen who had been illegally fishing in the Yellow Sea. After the commandos boarded one fishing vessel, another rammed it, prompting fishermen on board to start attacking the commandos. The captain of the Chinese fishing boat smashed a window and used broken glass to kill the commando. "One of the reasons for worry is that there is no code of conduct when there are incidents at sea," says Kleine-Ahlbradt of the International Crisis Group. "During the Cold War between the U.S. and Soviet Union, there would be at least one confrontation between vessels each year, but we never heard about it because there was an agreement known as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement to settle those disputes. China hasn't wanted to negotiate that kind of agreement." While the U.S. argues its interests in the region are based on ensuring ships receive free passage in international waters and regional countries enjoy fair access to mineral deposits, China contends the U.S. is a cunning meddler. To monitor shipping routes, the U.S. says it's necessary to patrol waters within a 321-kilometre exclusive economic zone of China's shores. "They're actually just spying on Chinese subs as they leave port," says a former United Nations official. "The U.S. would say that they would respect China's right to do the same off the coast of Florida, but it's not a fair comparison. It would take years before China's in a position to have subs there, if they are able to do it at all." The U.S. has discussed deploying P3C Orion spy planes to the Philippines to monitor disputed areas in the South China Sea. Even though the U.S. holds an advantage both in technology and the number of vessels, military strategists and security hawks note the U.S. now has 285 ships, its smallest naval fleet since 1916 and down from a 600-ship fleet during the Reagan years. The average age of its ships is approaching 20 years. Still, the U.S. remains far ahead of its rivals. Of the 22 operational aircraft carriers in the world, according to the trade journal Jane's Guide to Fighting Ships, the U.S. has 11. They form the backbone of the American fleet. "If the U.S. doesn't have a base in a country, it's irrelevant," says Zimmerman. "They can just bring their carriers around and they have a major airbase right there. They're powerful enough that one carrier group could defeat the entire Iranian air force." The power and size of a carrier battle group is difficult to overstate. Carriers like the Carl Vinson are home to as many as 85 aircraft, as well as vast stores of ammunition and fuel. A carrier's protective escorts usually include two guided missile cruisers, two destroyers, a frigate, two submarines and a supply ship. In 1981, after Libya claimed the Gulf of Sidra was within its territorial waters, threatening to punish anyone who crossed a "line of death," the aircraft carrier Nimitz was dispatched. Two Libyan fighters were subsequently shot down and Libya backed down. Twenty years later, with China conducting a series of naval war games, the U.S. sent two carriers, the Constellation and Carl Vinson, to participate in a drill off the coast of Taiwan. "The fact is, as long as carriers are in a region, they represent pressure," Zimmerman says. "The message is, 'We can, if we decide we have to, strike at you and there's little you can do about it.'" As Labranche waitS in his office aboard the Carl Vinson for the last of his pilots to touch down on deck following their daily missions, he says technology and decades of experience give the U.S. an advantage over its rivals. Labranche, 51, says he recently met a Russian pilot who was his country's most experienced at landing on a carrier at sea. That pilot had 100 landings. Labranche has 1,300. "So what do I have, a factor of 13? That's huge and in this game, experience is gold." He says it would take China years to catch up. "All the lessons you learn on a ship like a carrier are written in blood. This takes time and we've had a 60-year head start." It's almost 10 p.m. aboard the Carl Vinson, which is now about 500 kilometres off the western coast of Australia. The last few planes are landing for the day. Though his ship is only two days away from docking in Perth, the Carl Vinson could, in five days, easily make its way through the South China Sea to within sight of Hong Kong. Labranche would have no reservation about going, even if it meant conflict with nuclear-armed China. "You pick a fight with one of us, you pick a fight with all of us," he says "If you're not hostile with us, we don't want to be kinetic, but we will if we have to. It's all in the name of global peace." THE DISPUTES: SENKAKU ISLANDS The uninhabited islands are controlled by Japan but China calls them the Diaoyu Islands and claims them as Chinese territory. In September 2010, Japan arrested a Chinese fishing trawler captain near the disputed islands in the East China Sea, launching a diplomatic dispute. The islands, which are comprised of five islets, were allegedly discovered by Japan in 1884 and claimed by Japan a year later. PARACEL ISLANDS The Paracels are a disputed island group occupied by China, but claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. In the Paracels, the Chinese have built a 350-metre pier and an airstrip. In 2010, China said it would develop tourism in the Paracels, which the Chinese military has controlled since 1974. SCARBOROUGH SHOAL The shoal is a rock formation in the South China Sea discovered by the British East India Company ship The Scarborough in 1784. The rock outcropping has been claimed by both China and the Philippines because of its rich fishing beds and the possibility of drilling for oil. The shoal is only 225 kilometres west of Luzon, the main Philippine island, well within Manila's "exclusive economic zone" as recognized under international law. It is 1,200 kilometres from China. SPRATLY ISLANDS These islands represent less than four square kilometres of land spread out over 420,000 square kilometres of sea. While the islands are a group of 750-plus reefs and spits of land, only about 45 islands are occupied, mostly by military forces from Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Malaysia and the Philippines. Besides being rich in fish, the Spratlys are said to have as much oil and gas reserves under their sea floor as Kuwait. What's at stake FISH The South China Sea is rich in fishing stocks with 3,000 marine species, of which more than 150 are fished commercially. The region provides about 10 per cent of the world's catch, but growing demand means fish stocks are more quickly depleted. OIL AND GAS The South China Sea is believed to contain as many as 225 billion barrels worth of untapped oil and natural gas reserves - enough to meet Canada's fuel needs for 280 years, based on our current consumption of about 2.2 million barrels per day. CONTROL OF COMMERCE The South China Sea also has some of the world's most congested shipping lanes. Control of shipping routes could be used to restrict another country's trade and potentially stop or slow the transport of goods such as plutonium.

US will be drawn in if China attacks the Philippines

Amurao 5/5/12 (George Amurao, a former journalist in Manila, until recently worked for the Southeast Asian Press Alliance. He is now with Mahidol University International College in Bangkok, Thailand, “Mixed US messages in China-Philippine spat,” May 5, 2012, Asia Times Online, [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast\_Asia/NE05Ae02.html |](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NE05Ae02.html%20%7C) JS)

As the maritime standoff between China and the Philippines enters a fourth week, attention has shifted to what role the United States may play in the escalating territorial conflict over a shoal in the South China Sea. During an unprecedented "2+2" meeting held earlier this week between US State Secretary Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto del Rosario and Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, the US said it will remain neutral in the sovereignty dispute, but reaffirmed its commitment to the 1951 Philippine-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), which provides for each country to come to the other's defense in the event of a third country attack. Clinton clarified that the US will defend freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, areas of which Manila refers to as the West Philippine Sea. "While we do not take sides on the competing sovereignty claims to land features in the South China Sea, as a Pacific power we have a national interest in freedom of navigation, the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, and the unimpeded, lawful commerce across our sea lanes," she said. Del Rosario called on the US to help bolster its naval capabilities and for greater assistance towards developing a "minimum credible defense posture". Over the years, successive Philippine governments have relied on the MDT with the US for matters of external defense, often to the detriment of developing domestic military capabilities. However, the current standoff with China has put the bilateral treaty and the US's stated strategic "pivot" towards Asia to an unprecedented test.

AT: Philippines Block US Base

US troops will be allowed to be stationed at Clark and Subic

Johnson 6/8/12

(Robert Johnson is the Military & Defense Editor and features writer for the main page at Business Insider, “The US Will Open Massive Philippine Bases Not Occupied Since The Cold War,” June 8 2012, Business Insider, <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-is-reopening-massive-philippine-military-bases-not-used-since-the-cold-war-2012-6#ixzz20vU5LGil> | JS)

With the U.S. moving the majority of its naval fleet to the Pacific, commanders are eagerly looking for invitations to park the planes and ships that will be pouring into the region. Travis Tritten at Stars and Stripes reports that the Pentagon has apparently been fanning the old flame of friendship with the Philippines and will be re-opening two bases it left in 1991 — Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. The U.S. had a falling out with the island nation in the early nineties and pulled out of the bases, which were then built-up by a series of private developers and builders. How useful what's left is a matter of debate, but the locations used to be major centers of operation for American forces in the Pacific. Clark Air Base and its military reservation are 244 square miles of land that played a vital role for the U.S. during the Vietnam war and is capable of hosting the largest of America's military aircraft. Subic Bay played an even greater role in U.S. operations and until the withdrawal in 1991 it was the largest American overseas military base in the world. The waters at Subic Bay should have no problem hosting U.S. submarines and the largest of naval ships. The Philippines has been embroiled in a major dispute with China in the nearby Spratley Islands and Beijing is unlikely to be happy with this news.

Clark and Subic opened to US troops but are unusable in present state

Tritten 6/7/12

(Travis J. Tritten, Reporter for Stars and Stripes, currently based in Okinawa, “Philippine government gives OK for US to use old bases, newspaper reports,” June 7 2012, Stars and Stripes, [http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/philippines/philippine-government-gives-ok-for-us-to-use-old-bases-newspaper-reports-1.179790 |](http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/philippines/philippine-government-gives-ok-for-us-to-use-old-bases-newspaper-reports-1.179790%20%7C) JS)

CAMP FOSTER, Okinawa — The Philippine government said this week that the United States military is again welcome to use Subic Bay and the sprawling Clark Air Base, two decades after the installations were abandoned due to political friction with Manila, according to media reports. Philippine Defense Undersecretary Honorio Azcueta said U.S. troops, ships and aircraft can make use of the old bases, as long as prior approval is granted by the government. Azcueta made the comments following a meeting with Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey, who traveled to the country as part of a regional trip to generate support for a military pivot toward Asia, according to the Philippine Star newspaper. The United States had key bases in the Philippines for decades after World War II, but relations broke down in the early 1990s, and the facilities were returned. The announcement of an expanded military relationship this week comes after months of talks between Washington and Manila, and appears to be another step forward in the U.S. plan to bolster forces in the Asia-Pacific region. “They can come here provided they have prior coordination from the government,” Azcueta said following the meeting at the Philippine military headquarters of Camp Aguinaldo in Manila, according to the Philippine Star newspaper. “That’s what we want … increase in exercises and interoperability.” The United States has a 60-year-old mutual defense treaty with the Philippines and participates in annual exercises with its military. There are also roughly 500 U.S. Special Forces troops that have been advising the Philippine military in its fight against Islamic terrorist groups in the southern portion of the county since 2001. However, it was unclear Thursday how useful the Clark and Subic bases might now be to the United States because much of the land has been privately developed over the past 20 years. The former Navy base at Subic Bay still has an airfield that can accommodate military aircraft and also can provide a safe haven for ships during cyclones, according to the Philippine Star.

The Philippines wants our base

Munoz 6/6/12

(Carlo Munoz, staff writer for The Hill newspaper, covering Defense and National Security, “The Philippines re-opens military bases to US forces,” June 6 2012, The Hill, <http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/operations/231257-philippines-re-opens-military-bases-to-us-forces->)

American warships and fighter plans can once again call Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base home after Manila approved limited U.S. deployments to the former American military outposts. “They can come here provided they have prior coordination from the government,” Filipino Under Secretary for Defense Affairs Honorio Azcueta announced shortly after his meeting with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey on Monday. “That’s what [the Philippines] want ... increase in exercises and interoperability” with U.S. forces, Azcueta said, according to reports by the Philippine Star. Azcueta's announcement opens the door for the first American military deployments to Clark Air Force Base and the naval base in Subic Bay since DOD officially shuttered the facilities in 1991 and 1992, respectively.

Base is popular in the Philippines

Munoz 6/6/12

(Carlo Munoz, staff writer for The Hill newspaper, covering Defense and National Security, “The Philippines re-opens military bases to US forces,” June 6 2012, The Hill, <http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/operations/231257-philippines-re-opens-military-bases-to-us-forces->)

The deal to reopen Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base was struck during Dempsey's visit to the Asia-Pacific region to attend the Shangri-La defense talks held in Singapore last Saturday. Dempsey and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta used the three-day conference among top U.S. and international defense officials to sell the White House's new Pacific-focused national security strategy to its regional allies. That said, the Philippines is poised to take on a large part of that emerging U.S. strategy in the region. In March, the Obama administration opted to triple the amount of military funding to the Philippines as U.S. forces look to expand their foothold in the country. Manila will receive $30 million in foreign military funding from the the United States this year, according to news reports — nearly three times the $11.9 million in military funds Washington pledged to the Philippines in 2011. That money will likely help support the hundreds of Marines expected to flood into the Philippines in the coming years.

AT: Current Military Support Enough

Expanded US presence in the region crucial to maintain peace and stability

Mogato 12

(Manuel Mogato, Political and General News Correspondent at Thomson Reuters, “Exclusive: U.S. military seeks more access in Philippines,” Feb 9, 2012, [http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/us-philippines-usa-idUSTRE8180Q020120209 |](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/us-philippines-usa-idUSTRE8180Q020120209%20%7C) JS)

Last month, Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin told reporters Manila is also considering a proposal from the United States Pacific Command to deploy P3C-Orion spy planes in the country to help monitor movements and activities in the South China Sea. The disputed ownership of oil-rich reefs and islands in the South China Sea, through which $5 trillion in trade sails annually, is one of the biggest security threats in Asia. Beijing says it has historical sovereignty over the South China Sea, superseding claims of other countries. Tension over the region and the U.S. plans to expand its military operations in the Asia-Pacific, long an issue with China, could well come up in talks when China's leader-in-waiting Xi Jingping visits Washington next week. China has expressed misgivings about the Obama administration's shift to raise its security role in the region at a time when Beijing is expanding its own military reach. The Hawaii-based Pacific Command's proposal to deploy spy planes came two months after State and Pentagon officials offered to share surveillance data on the South China Sea during talks with Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario in June 2011. Last year, Del Rosario repeatedly protested against China's activities and intrusions into Philippine maritime territories, including an attempt to ram a survey ship exploring oil and gas in the South China Sea. Manila had accused China's ships of crossing into its maritime borders nearly a dozen times in 2011. The Philippines has welcomed plans by the United States to shift more attention in the Asia and Pacific region and senior officials said an expanded U.S. military presence could enhance peace and stability. "For us, it would boost our deterrent capability to stop intrusions into our territories," said the diplomat.

US stance in South China Sea weak now – stepped-up commitment to Philippines necessary

Boot 6/24/12

(Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, “China Starts to Claim the Seas,” 24 June 2012, WSJ, [http://www.cfr.org/china/china-starts-claim-seas/p28597 |](http://www.cfr.org/china/china-starts-claim-seas/p28597%20%7C) JS)

The hardheaded case for President Obama's foreign policy rests on twin pillars: He is a tough commander in chief who does not hesitate to slay the nation's enemies, and he is "pivoting" from the Middle East to East Asia to confront the No. 1 threat to American power—China. There is some truth to both claims, but their essential hollowness has been revealed by a little-noticed defeat the U.S. has just suffered in a place few Americans have ever heard of. Scarborough Shoal is a minuscule rock formation in the South China Sea that was discovered by an unlucky British East India Company ship, the Scarborough, which grounded there in 1784. This outcropping has been claimed by both China and the Philippines because of the rich fishing beds that surround it and the possibility of drilling for oil. You would think that the Philippines would have the better claim, having built a lighthouse and planted its flag there in the 1960s. The shoal is only 140 miles west of Luzon, the main Philippine island, well within Manila's 200-mile "exclusive economic zone" as recognized under international law. It is 750 miles from the Chinese landmass. Nevertheless, China is trying to assert its sovereignty over nine-tenths of the South China Sea based on tendentious historical "evidence" ranging from purported trips by Chinese explorers 2,000 years ago to a 1947 map issued by China's Nationalist government and recognized by no other state. However unconvincing its claims, China is attempting to make good on them by sending fishing vessels and paramilitary patrol boats into disputed waters. In early April, a Philippine navy ship tried to prevent Chinese fishermen from poaching seafood from the area. Two armed boats from the Chinese Marine Surveillance Agency intervened and a standoff ensued. Over the past two months, China sent more than 20 ships to the shoal, including as many as seven paramilitary vessels. The Philippines' interests were protected by two Coast Guard cutters. The standoff finally ended, at least for the time being, when the Philippines withdrew its vessels rather than risk losing them in an approaching typhoon. The U.S. is bound to protect the Philippines under the terms of a 1951 treaty. Yet even as our ally was being bullied by China, the Obama administration adopted a pose of studied neutrality. The Philippines has offered to submit the Scarborough Shoal dispute to an international tribunal under the Law of the Sea Treaty, which both Beijing and Manila have signed. But China refuses, no doubt knowing it would lose. The Chinese leadership must figure they have a better chance to assert their claim by force majeure because there is no way a weak state like the Philippines can stand up to them. The Obama administration did not orchestrate an international campaign to rally support for the Philippines. And it failed to take the most dramatic step of all by not sending an American destroyer or other warship to Scarborough Shoal. Would doing so have risked war with China? Hardly. In fact China is the classic bully with a glass jaw. For evidence, look no further than the tiny Pacific Island of Palau. In late March, at virtually the same time that the Scarborough Shoal standoff was beginning, a Chinese fishing vessel illegally entered Palau's waters. When the poachers ignored repeated demands that they leave an area designated as a shark sanctuary, police from Palau's Fish and Wildlife Division opened fire, trying to sink the offending vessel. The result: one fisherman dead and 25 captured. A couple of weeks later, under the terms of a deal with China, the poachers were fined $1,000 each and flown back home. The Chinese must have been furious, but their diplomat on the scene had nothing to say except "it is a good outcome." No one is suggesting that either the Philippine or U.S. navies should have opened fire over the Scarborough Shoal dispute. But it is a sad day when Palau (population 20,000) is more assertive in standing up to Chinese aggression than the United States of America. The nations of Asia are watching carefully and making their calculations accordingly. In their eyes, the U.S. just became a less reliable friend.

AT: Base Won’t Deter China

Increased US presence in South China Sea would act as deterrent in territorial conflicts

Alexander & Mogato 12

(David Alexander, Washington Correspondent, and Manuel Mogato, Political and General News Correspondent, at Reuters, “U.S. and Philippines eye stronger defense ties,” Jan 26, 2012, Reuters, [http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/us-philippines-us-idUSTRE80P22320120126 |](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/us-philippines-us-idUSTRE80P22320120126%20%7C) JS)

The Philippines used to host major U.S. military bases with tens of thousands of airmen and sailors until 1992, but they pulled out after a 1991 vote in the Philippine Senate. Since 2002, U.S. army special forces have trained Filipino troops fighting al Qaeda-linked Islamist militants in the southern Philippines. More recently, the Philippines' relations with China have been strained by conflicting claims to islands in the South China Sea -- an issue which has also tested China's ties with other countries in the region. After Manila complained about Chinese intrusions into its maritime territory last year, the Pentagon promised the Philippines more access to surveillance data from the South China Sea, a Philippines official told Reuters. That offer, which resulted in Manila publishing photos of intruding Chinese vessels in an area called Reed Bank, came with a U.S. proposal to deploy to the Philippines several spy planes, the official added. A commander in the western Philippine naval forces said a greater U.S. presence in the region, especially in the disputed waters of South China, would boost security. "**The presence of U.S. Navy in Philippine waters could be an effective deterrent** and increase our domain awareness **in the disputed areas**," he said. China claims the entire South China Sea, while the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan also have conflicting claims over the disputed area believed to have rich deposits of oil and gas. The United States has backed the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) call for a multilateral solution to the dispute, which Washington warns could threaten freedom of navigation in the strategically and commercially important waterway. A research note published by the Eurasia Group political risk consultancy warned that efforts to hedge against the rise of China by the Philippines and Vietnam, which is also moving closer to the United States, could kindle tensions in 2012. "While a direct confrontation remains unlikely, tensions over territorial disputes increase the risk of a miscalculation by Hanoi or Manila and of an overreaction by Beijing," said the note, published on Thursday.

Expanded US presence in the region would enhance peace and stability

Mogato 12

(Manuel Mogato, Political and General News Correspondent at Thomson Reuters, “Exclusive: U.S. military seeks more access in Philippines,” Feb 9, 2012, [http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/us-philippines-usa-idUSTRE8180Q020120209 |](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/us-philippines-usa-idUSTRE8180Q020120209%20%7C) JS)

Last month, Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin told reporters Manila is also considering a proposal from the United States Pacific Command to deploy P3C-Orion spy planes in the country to help monitor movements and activities in the South China Sea. The disputed ownership of oil-rich reefs and islands in the South China Sea, through which $5 trillion in trade sails annually, is one of the biggest security threats in Asia. Beijing says it has historical sovereignty over the South China Sea, superseding claims of other countries. Tension over the region and the U.S. plans to expand its military operations in the Asia-Pacific, long an issue with China, could well come up in talks when China's leader-in-waiting Xi Jingping visits Washington next week. China has expressed misgivings about the Obama administration's shift to raise its security role in the region at a time when Beijing is expanding its own military reach. The Hawaii-based Pacific Command's proposal to deploy spy planes came two months after State and Pentagon officials offered to share surveillance data on the South China Sea during talks with Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario in June 2011. Last year, Del Rosario repeatedly protested against China's activities and intrusions into Philippine maritime territories, including an attempt to ram a survey ship exploring oil and gas in the South China Sea. Manila had accused China's ships of crossing into its maritime borders nearly a dozen times in 2011. The Philippines has welcomed plans by the United States to shift more attention in the Asia and Pacific region and senior officials said an expanded U.S. military presence could enhance peace and stability. "For us, it would boost our deterrent capability to stop intrusions into our territories," said the diplomat.

US presence in South China Sea key to prevent Chinese attack on the Philippines

Casayuran 7/14/12

(Mario B. Casayuran, staff writer @ Manila Bulletin, “Miriam: US Bases’ Closure Short-Sighted,” July 14, 2012, Manila Bulletin, <http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/365982/miriam-us-bases-closure-shortsighted> | JS)

MANILA, Philippines — The rejection of the proposed extension of the Philippines-United States (PH-US) Military Base Agreement (MBA) in 1991 that saw the closure of the sprawling US military bases – Clark Air Force Base and the Subic naval base – was a short-sighted decision by the Philippine Senate. Because of this closure, the Philippines is now in a bind in protecting its territorial waters, particularly the Scarborough (Panatag) Shoal, and the Spratlys, from the alleged illegal incursions of vessels from the People’s Republic of China (PROC) in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea). This is the assessment of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago who said that the expulsion by the Philippines of the US military might in the Pacific has resulted in a “conflicted relationship” between the two countries. In the voting on the proposed extension of the PH-US MBA, 13 senators voted to reject the proposed treaty. In a treaty, a vote of 16 is needed to ratify it. Senator Jovito R. Salonga was then the Senate President. “I was against it but nationalistic feeling was very high at that time (that) it had been inflated beyond reason,” she said. “It was so short-sighted hindi nila inisip ang maging kinabukasan because of the rise of China as a world power. O tignan mo ngayon. Wala na tayong Subic, Eh ‘di wala na tayong panlaban but in any event, we are just out of the contest. We have no funds, we have no arms. We can’t even try and qualify in the arms build-up contest here. So our only choice is to depend on our western allies,’’ she said. (It was so short-sighted that they did not think of the eventual rise in the future of China. Look at us now, no Subic naval base. We are not militarily able to contest China.) Santiago told Senate reporters in last Thursday’s regular press forum that the Philippines has to rely on its western allies and members of the Southeast Asian nations. But the annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers’ meeting held in Cambodia that ended yesterday only showed discord among the member nations when several countries refused to include in their communiqué the intrusions of a foreign power in the maritime territories of the Philippines, particularly Spratlys and the Scarborough. This led Santiago to forecast that the “next five years in Philippines-China relations will be the flashpoint of the world, particularly in view of the statement by President Obama that the US will pivot to Asia, meaning to say they will not pay as much attention as before to Iraq or Afghanistan and instead they will pay more attention to the Southeast Asian region.” “In the next five years, this is going to be the flashpoint the Chinese dispute with all the ASEAN neighbors led by the Philippines with Vietnam. We are the Big Three – the Philippines, Vietnam, and China in the South China Sea dispute or the West Philippine Sea dispute,” she explained. Santiago, who awaits her posting as judge at the International Criminal Court at The Hague, said the 1951 PH-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) is “irrelevant to our present row with China.” She pointed out that under the MDT, there is a proviso that America will come to the Philippine defense if there is an attack in the Pacific area and so the question is “does Scarborough and Spratlys belong to the Pacific area?” Both the Spratlys and the Scarborough are in the West Philippine Sea. Scarborough is 125 nautical miles west of Zambales or is more than 500 nautical miles west of the nearest Chinese land mass. “Next, the treaty says the US will come to our defense in accordance with its constitutional processes. What means that the US Congress will make a decision first on how to defend the Philippines. Maybe they will say ‘we’ll send them all our used junks that we don’t need anymore. That will be in accordance with constitutional processes,” she said. But what will save the Philippines from Chinese incursions is not the PH-US MDT but “it is the outright scare that China will not allow ships of any other nations to pass the South China Sea without its consent. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had hinted that the Chinese claim over Scarborough meant the freedom of navigation by other countries crisscrossing the South China Sea would be curtailed because its territorial claim extends at the doorsteps of the Philippines.

Stronger US support for Philippine military deters China

Glaser 12

(Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea: Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14,” April 2012, Council on Foreign Relations Press, <http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883> | JS)

Bolster Capabilities of Regional Actors

Steps could be taken to further enhance the capability of the Philippines military to defend its territorial and maritime claims and improve its indigenous domain awareness, which might deter China from taking aggressive action. Similarly, the United States could boost the maritime surveillance capabilities of Vietnam, enabling its military to more effectively pursue an anti-access and area-denial strategy. Such measures run the risk of emboldening the Philippines and Vietnam to more assertively challenge China and could raise those countries' expectations of U.S. assistance in a crisis.

AT: No US-China War

South China Sea is highest risk area for US-China conflict

Dobbins et al 11

(Ambassador James Dobbins is the director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, David C. Gompert, , David A. Shlapak, Senior International Policy Analyst @ RAND Corporation, Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist at RAND's Washington, DC office, “Conﬂict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence,” 2011, RAND Corporation, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP344.pdf>)

There are numerous potential flash points in the South China Sea region. China’s assertion of some degree of sovereignty over virtually the entire area rubs up against the rival claims of numerous other states, and the areas around the Paracel and Spratly islands in particular have witnessed limited clashes since the mid-1970s. A confrontation at sea could lead to a broader conflict if, for example, an oceanic dispute between Vietnam and China escalated into a land war between the two. he presence of a U.S. treaty ally, the Philippines, may elevate the stakes 4 Conﬂict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence for Washington if some deep crisis arises in or around the South China Sea. China’s recent claims that the region is part of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and therefore subject to Chinese control, represent a test to global norms of free navigation and are a direct challenge to U.S. interests in East Asia. Depending on the nature and severity of a conflict, U.S. objectives could range from enforcing freedom of navigation against a Chinese effort to control maritime activities in the South China Sea, to helping the Philippines defend itself from an air and maritime attack, to supporting Vietnam and shielding Thailand—another treaty ally—in the event of a land war in Southeast Asia. Any likely contingency in the South China Sea or Southeast Asia will make demands on U.S. air and naval power to assure friendly dominance of the battlespace. A war on land could create a demand for U.S. land forces—especially SOF and forced-entry capabilities. China’s current ability to project substantial power into the South China Sea region is limited; in particular, the PLA’s land-based combat aircraft lack adequate range to operate efficiently so far from home. his assessment will change if China builds aircraft carrier and air-refueling capabilities in the coming years. Direct defense in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia should remain a viable strategy for the next twenty years.

Econ impact

Dobbins et al 11

(Ambassador James Dobbins is the director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, David C. Gompert, , David A. Shlapak, Senior International Policy Analyst @ RAND Corporation, Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist at RAND's Washington, DC office, “Conﬂict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence,” 2011, RAND Corporation, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP344.pdf>)

Short of a nuclear exchange, the greatest damage from any conflict with China is likely to come in the economic realm. Massive and mutual economic harm would indeed result from any significant Sino-U.S. armed conflict, even if the two sides eschewed employment of economic weapons. The two economies are linked with each other and with the rest of the world in a manner unparalleled in history. his mutual dependency can be an immensely powerful deterrent, in effect a form of mutually assured economic destruction. At the moment the balance of advantage rests with the United States, but even the winner in such a contest will wish it had been avoided.

AT: Don’t Need Upgrades

The Clark base needs to be rebuilt to house large scale forces – Volcano eruption in ’91 destroyed it

http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1372&context=elr

Good morning. The US naval base at Subic Bay was formally " . handed over to the Philippine government today.... Today is Wednesday, September 30th, and this is NPR's 'Morning Edition.' "I The American flag was lowered at Subic Bay Naval Station on November 24, 1992, with the last remaining forces withdrawing in December 1992, ending ninety-four years of American military presence in the Philippines.2 In November 1991, the U.S. Air Force pulled out of Clark Air Force Base, three months after it was buried in ashes, rocks and mud from the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.3 The military withdrawal from the Philippines resulted from the September 1991 rejection by the Philippine Senate, under the administration of President Corazon Aquino, of a base treaty which would have renewed the military bases agreement for another ten years, in exchange for more than $2 billion in aid.4

A base in the Philippines is necessary – other bases aren’t enough

<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Security-Watch/Articles/Detail/?id=144535>

Furthermore, the US-Philippines defense treaty does not provide for an automatic response from either party in the event of an armed attack. It only requires consultations to determine what military action, if any, both would take. More importantly, it has no mention whatsoever of a response in the event of conflict in the South China Sea over disputed islands and territories. Whether the United States will be able to respond to a contingency in the South China Sea depends upon whether US forces are physically prepositioned to provide immediate and timely assistance. The United States can only effectively guarantee Filipino external defense if it has access to facilities near the South China Sea from which it can rapidly deploy in the event of an armed confrontation. Thus, in August 2011, the United States and the Philippines agreed to focus their efforts on the development of a framework for increased bilateral and multilateral security and maritime domain awareness. Among the measures that were considered are: 1) a US rotational presence in the Philippines to assist the AFP in developing its own capability for territorial defense; 2) to increase bilateral maritime security activities; 3) development of joint-use maritime security support facilities; 4) improved bilateral information sharing; 5) coordinated and integrated maritime security initiatives between US Pacific Command and the AFP.

Clark and Subic opened to US troops but are unusable in present state

Tritten 6/7/12

(Travis J. Tritten, Reporter for Stars and Stripes, currently based in Okinawa, “Philippine government gives OK for US to use old bases, newspaper reports,” June 7 2012, Stars and Stripes, <http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/philippines/philippine-government-gives-ok-for-us-to-use-old-bases-newspaper-reports-1.179790> | JS)

CAMP FOSTER, Okinawa — The Philippine government said this week that the United States military is again welcome to use Subic Bay and the sprawling Clark Air Base, two decades after the installations were abandoned due to political friction with Manila, according to media reports. Philippine Defense Undersecretary Honorio Azcueta said U.S. troops, ships and aircraft can make use of the old bases, as long as prior approval is granted by the government. Azcueta made the comments following a meeting with Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey, who traveled to the country as part of a regional trip to generate support for a military pivot toward Asia, according to the Philippine Star newspaper. The United States had key bases in the Philippines for decades after World War II, but relations broke down in the early 1990s, and the facilities were returned. The announcement of an expanded military relationship this week comes after months of talks between Washington and Manila, and appears to be another step forward in the U.S. plan to bolster forces in the Asia-Pacific region. “They can come here provided they have prior coordination from the government,” Azcueta said following the meeting at the Philippine military headquarters of Camp Aguinaldo in Manila, according to the Philippine Star newspaper. “That’s what we want … increase in exercises and interoperability.” The United States has a 60-year-old mutual defense treaty with the Philippines and participates in annual exercises with its military. There are also roughly 500 U.S. Special Forces troops that have been advising the Philippine military in its fight against Islamic terrorist groups in the southern portion of the county since 2001. However, it was unclear Thursday how useful the Clark and Subic bases might now be to the United States because much of the land has been privately developed over the past 20 years. The former Navy base at Subic Bay still has an airfield that can accommodate military aircraft and also can provide a safe haven for ships during cyclones, according to the Philippine Star.

US military base needs updates

Johnson 12 (Robert Johnson, Military & Defense Editor for the business insider and A former U.S. Army non-commissioned officer, Business Insider,June 8, 2012, “The US Will Open Massive Philippine Bases Not Occupied Since The Cold War,” <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-is-reopening-massive-philippine-military-bases-not-used-since-the-cold-war-2012-6>

With the U.S. moving the majority of its naval fleet to the Pacific, commanders are eagerly looking for invitations to park the planes and ships that will be pouring into the region. Travis Tritten at Stars and Stripes reports that the Pentagon has apparently been fanning the old flame of friendship with the Philippines and will be re-opening two bases it left in 1991 — Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. The U.S. had a falling out with the island nation in the early nineties and pulled out of the bases, which were then built-up by a series of private developers and builders. How useful what's left is a matter of debate, but the locations used to be major centers of operation for American forces in the Pacific.

US airfields around SCS need refurbishment in order to house air forces

Reed et al 12

(John Reed is the Washington, DC-based editor of Military.com’s Defense Tech blog and the associate editor of DoDBuzz. Christian Lowe was a senior writer for The Politico covering defense and national security issues after spending five years with the Military Times newspapers in Springfield Va. Kevin G. Coleman is a Certified Management Consultant and Strategic Advisor with the Technolytics Institute. He is the former Chief Strategist of Netscape and a veteran of the consulting and technology industries. Ward Carroll is the editor of Military​.com. Colin Clark is editor of DoDBuzz and Pentagon correspondent for Military​.com. Colin joined the Military​.com team from Space News, where he covered Congress, intelligence and regulatory affairs. Bryant Jordan is an associate editor for Military​.com. “Air-Sea Battle and Our Buildup in the Pacific,” June 4 2012, Defense.org, <http://defensetech.org/about-defense-tech/#ixzz21C0jrqwE>)

It’s begun. A couple of years ago we began hearing quiet discussions on how, as part of the Air-Sea Battle concept, the United States might look to disperse its air forces (lowercase af, not USAF) stationed at its handful of major bases in the western Pacific in the event of a major conflict with China. Doing so would make it more difficult for China to wipe out entire squadrons sitting on the ground with surprise attacks from its long range ballistic missiles (think the DF-21D carrier killers but designed to hit ground targets instead of ships). A key component of this plan is the refurbishment of long-abandoned World War II airfields scattered across the Pacific. These fields would serve as pretty bare bones facilities that American aircraft could disperse to if a conflict seemed imminent (similar to the way Strategic Air Command’s Cold War dispersal base concept worked). It looks like the Marine Corps has begun practicing how to put such a plan into action. Last month, Marines refurbished the 8,000-foot “Baker” runway at the abandoned — and historic — North Field air base on the island of Tinian, and installed aircraft carrier-like arresting gear on the runway of the island’s lightly-used West Field. Naturally, this was followed up by Marine Corps F/A-18D Hornets from nearby Guam performing arrested landings on West Field, as shown in the picture above. The exercise, called Geiger Fury ’12, was designed to put the theory of operating from bare bones Pacific bases into practice. Or, as one of the official Marine Corps press release on the events says, “the purpose of Exercise Geiger Fury is to execute and assess combined expeditionary operations in the Pacific.” You’re welcome for the translation. Keep in mind that North Field at Tinian — with its four parallel runways, Able, Baker, Charlie and Dog — was one of the most important U.S. airfields in the Pacific during World War II. It’s the base where the B-29s Enola Gay and Bocks Car took off from to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, effectively ending the war.

tag

Fuentes 12

(Gidget, staff writer @ The Marine Corps Times, “Few details on expanded presence in Philippines,” Marine Corps Times, July 17 2012, <http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2012/07/marine-details-on-expanded-philippines-presence-072312> | JS)

U.S. and Philippine officials have agreed to expand joint military training in the Philippines, raising the prospect that former U.S. bases there could be reopened to accommodate the Marines, sailors and other troops who may swing through the region. The United States maintained more than a dozen bases, airfields and training areas in the Philippines until 1991 when, amid souring relations, the Philippine senate voted to close them. Now, with the U.S. planning to move more forces to the Asia-Pacific region, the Philippines, a hotly contested collection of islands and atolls, is once again in the spotlight. And although officials have not detailed what these moves will entail, deployments are likely to be short visits for exercises rather than lengthy stays like the new six-month unit rotations to Australia that began earlier this year. “The Philippines is in a strategically important location. It’s an ally. It’s smack in the middle of the South China Sea,” said Denny Roy, a senior fellow with the East-West Center in Hawaii. “Greater access to the Philippines would, no question, make some operations easier … and enable [the U.S.] to bring more forces to bear.” Defense Department officials have not indicated they intend to reopen closed bases, but that hasn’t stopped speculation that Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station, the two largest former U.S. facilities in the Philippines, would reopen to accommodate more U.S. forces. A Philippine defense official, Honorio Azcueta, told reporters in June that U.S. forces “can come here provided they have prior coordination from the government.” In its heyday during the Vietnam War, Subic, located on the northern island of Luzon, housed more than 4,000 troops and thousands of civilian workers. It provided a key naval ship repair facility and a popular “rest and recreation” spot for troops. Nearby Cubi Point, a naval air station at the edge of Subic Bay, housed the Marine barracks, but today it’s home to an international airport and, like Subic, houses a commercial freeport zone. East of Subic, on the other side of the Bataan Peninsula, is Manila Bay. The former Clark Air Base, outside Angeles City north of the capital, was used by the U.S. military since the early 1900s. Today, it is shared as an international airport, a Philippine air force base and a commercial zone. U.S. troops haven’t been gone entirely from these places. In recent years, Marines have joined the Navy and their Filipino counterparts at various Philippine military bases and training ranges for the annual naval Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training, or CARAT, exercises. Subic Bay served as a key CARAT site in 2011. Capt. Staci Reidinger, a public affairs officer, deployed for that training and recalled the once-busy military bases were open to the public, with shops and businesses and without military security manning any of the entry gates. “You could definitely tell that it was at one time a Navy base,” said Reidinger, assigned at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Ariz., who returned to the Philippines earlier this year for a new round of CARAT exercises on the island of Palawan. The city of Puerto Princesa served as a training hub for Marines on Palawan, which stretches along the South China Sea and is nearest to the Spratly Islands, a group of atolls rich in natural resources and claimed by the Philippines, China, Vietnam and Malaysia. But having a short-term presence may be less important to the United States than improving ties with the Philippines, Roy said, considering the hot-bed issues in the region, which includes balancing military forces to counter the perceived rising threat from China. Shorter deployments, he said, also could ease the pressure off Okinawa, where the United States is pressed to reduce its footprint even as it plans to shift 5,000 Marines to other places, including Hawaii and Guam, in the coming years. “It’s more a matter that the United States would make do with the best situation it can get,” he said, adding, “It’s a matter of taking an advantage to improve their positioning” in the region.

AT: No Terror In Philippines

#### South East Asia is the newhot spot for terrorism

Keo’ 11 (August 24, 2011, Peter Tan Keo is the Secretary General of the Asia Economic Forum, a policy think tank that focuses on the Asia-Pacific region. He is also Vice President of the University of Cambodia, and is earning a doctorate from Columbia University, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia” <http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/08/24/terrorism-in-southeast-asia/>) Ivan

But the wider conflict is far from over. Indeed, in Southeast Asia, it has likely just begun.¶ The so-called war on terror exists in a dark, blurry bubble that few people, especially many Americans, fully understand. It’s probably better that way: to live in fear equates to the acceptance of defeat, which most of us can live without. Still, such a mindset also risks inadvertently creating a culture of apathy.¶ Mainstream US political, military, and media attention has disproportionately fallen on the Middle East and the fight against terrorism in that region. One need not look beyond Western media coverage of Patek’s arrest to this – an event that failed to make the front page of most major newspapers. While the media is only one source of information, this example still highlights a growing global disconnect from the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia.¶ As attention has been fixed on the Middle East, terrorist networks in Southeast Asia have been quickly evolving and expanding. If terrorism is to be fought effectively, greater attention needs to paid toward Southeast Asia, and how to address the concerns that have too often allowed fundamentalism to spread like wildfire in this region.¶ What cases such as those of Patek, [Dulmatin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dulmatin), Abu Bakar Bashir and others in Southeast Asia have revealed is that Islamic fundamentalism is deeply rooted in certain parts of Southeast Asia. Places like Aceh, Indonesia and Jolo Island in the southern Philippines have been converted into training camps, where followers have been lured largely from the middle class and universities. Indeed, this is one of the interesting differences between militants in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, where the poor and rural populations have been targeted. Terrorist networks such as the Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf have a strong foothold in the region, recruiting disgruntled young men and women to join a network whose main goal is to destroy the ‘infidels.’

AT: Base Won’t Deter Terror

A base in the Philippines would be a safe base to target terrorists in Indonesia

WND 2

(WND news, 4/26/2002, “New US Base in the Phillipines?” <http://www.wnd.com/2002/04/13700/>)

In many respects, Basilan has several benefits over General Santos, most notably its small size. An opposing force would find it difficult to mass for an attack on the facilities, so the defending U.S. and Philippine troop numbers could be smaller. Furthermore, General Santos has a very busy port, offering cover to potential terrorists or other aggressors. And Basilan’s built-in insurgency provides a convenient political cover for the establishment of a more permanent U.S. presence on the island. Although the political debate in Manila has yet to be quieted, the United States is well on its way to creating a conducive environment in Basilan for a forward operations base. The Seabees are repairing the main road around the island, upgrading other roads and improving two airstrips and pier facilities – all changes that will make the island much more useful for U.S. troops to operate from. U.S. forces involved in the separate but simultaneous Balikatan 02-2 exercises on the main northern island of Luzon are training in jungle warfare and survival techniques, useful for other places in Southeast Asia. The Abu Sayyaf problem offers a rhetorical cover for U.S. activity in the Philippines, avoiding or at least postponing the politically volatile issue of a more permanent U.S. base in its former colony. Ultimately, U.S. operations in the southern Philippines are directed less at defeating the Abu Sayyaf and more at establishing a forward operation base in Southeast Asia – with an eye on Indonesia as a likely first target.

The US base can be used to root out Al Qaeda terrorists

Bhattacharji 9

(Preeti Bhattacharji, Assistant Director at Heilbrunn Center at Columbia Business School, “Terrorism Havens: Philippines,” June 1, 2009, Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/philippines/terrorism-havens-philippines/p9365>)

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Macapagal-Arroyo pledged to help the United States in its counterterrorism efforts and offered to give the United States access to its former military bases. Once it became clear that some of the September 11 planners had held meeting in the Philippines, the United States reestablished a military presence in the country under Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOPAC). Since then, U.S. forces have engaged in dozens of counterterrorism exercises with the Philippine military. In 2006 alone, the United States and the Philippines scheduled up to thirty-seven joint exercises, including as many as six thousand U.S. troops (AsiaTimes). Most notable is the annual Balikatan (shoulder-to-shoulder) bilateral military exercises, which the State Department says "contribute directly to the Philippine armed forces' efforts to root out Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists."

Okinawa Relocation

An upgraded base in the Philippines would be ideal for relocation of marines from Okinawa

Munoz 6/6/12

(Carlo Munoz, staff writer for The Hill newspaper, covering Defense and National Security, “The Philippines re-opens military bases to US forces,” June 6 2012, The Hill, <http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/operations/231257-philippines-re-opens-military-bases-to-us-forces->)

The deal to reopen Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base was struck during Dempsey's visit to the Asia-Pacific region to attend the Shangri-La defense talks held in Singapore last Saturday. Dempsey and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta used the three-day conference among top U.S. and international defense officials to sell the White House's new Pacific-focused national security strategy to its regional allies. That said, the Philippines is poised to take on a large part of that emerging U.S. strategy in the region. In March, the Obama administration opted to triple the amount of military funding to the Philippines as U.S. forces look to expand their foothold in the country. Manila will receive $30 million in foreign military funding from the the United States this year, according to news reports — nearly three times the $11.9 million in military funds Washington pledged to the Philippines in 2011. That money will likely help support the hundreds of Marines expected to flood into the Philippines in the coming years. In April, DOD officials agreed to relocate 9,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam and other outposts in the Pacific. It remains unclear whether those displaced Marines will end up on Filipino soil.

Troops from Guam will go to the Phillipines

<http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2012/07/marine-details-on-expanded-philippines-presense-072312/>

But having a short-term presence may be less important to the United States than improving ties with the Philippines, Roy said, considering the hot-bed issues in the region, which includes balancing military forces to counter the perceived rising threat from China. Shorter deployments, he said, also could ease the pressure off Okinawa, where the United States is pressed to reduce its footprint even as it plans to shift 5,000 Marines to other places, including Hawaii and Guam, in the coming years. “It’s more a matter that the United States would make do with the best situation it can get,” he said, adding, “It’s a matter of taking an advantage to improve their positioning” in the region.

Heg Good

1. Their concept of hegemony is much to general – OUR 1AC NEVER MAKES A CLAIM THAT HEG OVERALL IS GOOD – WE ONLY NEED TO DEFEND DETERRANCE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

2. Military, economic, and diplomatic strengths render US hegemony sustainable.

Thayer 06(Bradley A., associate professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, *National Interest*, “In Defense of Primacy,” 11/06, Proquest)

There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this.

3. Even if hegemony is unsustaible, we should still preserve it as long as possible to avoid transition wars

Prefer the specificity of our internal link chain to China war:

1. Westhead evidence indicates that in the status quo China war is inevitable because of tensions over the South China Sea – the Scarsborough Shoal proves -- China is gearing up for military conflict in the South China Sea
2. Glaser indicates that the US will respond to conflict now to preserve their credibility
3. Alunan says that ONLY deterrence can prevent China war because China will do whatever it can to rise
4. Prefer our evidence because its from less than a week ago and only it assumes recent tensions in the South China Sea

Declining US hegemony provokes great power wars.

Khalilzad 11 (Zalmay Khalilzad, counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, 2/8/11, The National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad)

If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in **frequent crises and major wars** among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars.

US heg is key to preventing Chinese hostility.

Khalilzad 11 (Zalmay Khalilzad, former United States Ambassador for the United Nations and counselor at the Center for Strategic and International studies, 2/8/11, The National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad)

American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.

\*\*AT: T

2AC – T Military

#### 1. We meet – upgrade of bases includes upgrade in facilities used by civilians – civilians have to work at the bases and use shuttles roads etc. too

#### 2. “Transportation” includes the military

Kim 9

(Brian, Wyle Laboratories, Inc., et al., “Guidebook on Preparing Airport Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventories”, Airport Cooperative Research Program – Report 11, http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/acrp/acrp\_rpt\_011.pdf)

Transportation Sector: Consists of private and public passenger and freight transportation, as well as government transportation, including military operations.

3. Prefer our interpretation –

a. Limits – neg overlimits – all tech is dual use, especially transportation infrastructure – rails and roads were initially developed for transport of troops and ammunition

b. Ground – if anything we allow greater disad ground off of military action – they can still CP military infrastructure that isn’t used for transportation

c. Education – allowing a slightly broader topic doesn’t spread teams out so much that they won’t learn about other parts of the topic – no reason to preclude researching the military

4. Neg side bias means you err aff on T – they get issue choice and infinite ground for disads, barely competitive counterplan, and cheating critique alts – reading affs at the edges of the topic is the only way to keep debate fair

5. Default to reasonability – limits are arbitrary, the neg will just find a new definition to limit out any case they don’t want to answer – that decreases research skills and clash which gives us two crucial internals to education – force them to prove that our interpretation causes specific abuse in this round or else we don’t deserve to lose.

1AR Cards – “infrastructure”

#### ( ) Military structures are an instance of capital infrastructure

Snieska and Simkunaite 9

(Professors at Kaunas University of Technology,“Socio-Economic Impact of Infrastructure Investments”, <http://www.ktu.edu/lt/mokslas/zurnalai/inzeko/63/1392-2758-2009-3-63-16.pdf>, 2009)

Economists and urban planners distinguish two types of infrastructure: economic infrastructure and social infrastructure. Economic infrastructure is defined as the infrastructure that promotes economic activity, such as roads, highways, railroads, airports, sea ports, electricity, telecommunications, water supply and sanitation. Social infrastructure (such as schools, libraries, universities, clinics, hospitals, courts, museums, theatres, playgrounds, parks, fountains and statues) is defined as the infrastructure that promotes the health, education and cultural standards of the population – activities that have both direct and indirect impact on the welfare. All of these institutions entail capital goods that have some public use (Fourie, 2006). The author also argues that infrastructure consists of two elements – “capitalness” and “publicness”. According to this specification, infrastructure would include goods that have a capital character, but are not necessarily public. Thus, a common feature of infrastructure seems to be that infrastructure goods are strongly used by public. Economists label such goods physical infrastructure, or infrastructure capital.

#### ( ) Infrastructure includes the military

The Free Online Dictionary 2000

(The Free Online Dictionary, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/infrastructure>, 2000)

The term infrastructure has been used since 1927 to refer collectively to the roads, bridges, rail lines, and similar public works that are required for an industrial economy, or a portion of it, to function. The term also has had specific application to the permanent military installations necessary for the defense of a country.

2AC – T In the US

#### 1. We meet, US bases are in the US – the US has jurisdiction over its military holdings.

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 5 (Dictionary of Military, [http://www.thefreedictionary.com/United+States](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/United%2BStates), 2005)

Includes the land area, internal waters, territorial sea, and airspace of the United States, including the following: a. US territories, possessions, and commonwealths; and b. Other areas over which the US Government has complete jurisdiction and control or has exclusive authority or defense responsibility.

2. Investment is spending money.

Lynton ‘95

**(**Jonathon S. Lynton, , Ballentine’s Legal Dictionary and Thesaurus, 1995, “investment”, pg. 339 (2))

n. 2. A property or a deal into which money is put for the purpose of producing income or revenue

Res only mandates that investment occur in the US – the actual check is written within the continental U.S.

3. “In” means “under the law”

Gardner ‘99

(Bryan A. Gardner, J.D., Editor in Chief of Black’s Law Dictionary, Black’s Law Dictionary Deluxe Seventh Edition, “in”, pg.782, 1999)

Prep. Under or based on the law of <to bring an action in contract>.

4. Prefer it – lit checks their predictability args, it’s not like we’re building a base in France – they should be prepared to debate all aspects of the topic

5. Overlimiting is worse than underlimiting: guts in-round education – debating the same rounds all year means neg just has to learn the best argument against a couple affs – also minimizes out-of-round education – limiting the topic to a few cases means we never learn about smaller policies or marginalized voices

6. Neg side bias means you err aff on T – they get issue choice and infinite ground for disads, barely competitive counterplan, and cheating critique alts – reading affs at the edges of the topic is the only way to keep debate fair

7. Default to reasonability – limits are arbitrary, the neg will just find a new definition to limit out any case they don’t want to answer – that decreases research skills and clash which gives us two crucial internals to education – force them to prove that our interpretation causes specific abuse in this round or else we don’t deserve to lose.

1AR Cards – “United States”

“United States” is anywhere that the US exercises sovereign power

Lynton ‘95

(Jonathon S. Lynton, , Ballentine’s Legal Dictionary and Thesaurus, 1995, “investment”, pg. 689 (3))

n. 3. The territory over which this sovereign nation called the “United States” exercises sovereign power

2AC – T Investment

1. We meet – new structures will have to be built, just because the base structure is in place doesn’t mean it’s not new spending

2. “Investment” is spending government resources to develop infrastructure

LMPI ‘10

(Laos Ministry of Planning and Investment, “Manual For Public Investment Program (PIP) Program Management”, August, <http://www.jica.go.jp/project/laos/0700667/materials/pdf/ProgramManual/ProgramMa> nual\_eng.pdf)

Public investment is defined as investment from government resources, domestic or foreign, with the objective of development in the sector and/or region. Domestic PIP projects, ODA in forms of grant, technical assistance and loan are main components. Provision of public infrastructure (ex. roads, bridges, irrigation systems, public hospitals and schools, rural electrification etc.) and technical promotion (ex. training) is generally done using public investment.

3. Prefer it –

a) ours is the only definition in the context of infrastructure – theirs is only in the context of finance

b) 90% of affs are maintenance or upgrades of some kind – neg overlimits

4. Overlimiting worse – first, guts in-round education: debating the same rounds all year means neg just has to learn the best argument against a couple affs. Also minimizes out-of-round education – limiting the topic to a few cases means we never research smaller policies or marginalized voices

5. Neg side bias means you err aff on T – they get issue choice and infinite ground for disads, barely competitive counterplan, and cheating critique alts – reading affs at the edges of the topic is the only way to keep debate fair

6. Default to reasonability – limits are arbitrary, the neg will just find a new definition to limit out any case they don’t want to answer – that decreases research skills and clash which gives us two crucial internals to education – force them to prove that our interpretation causes specific abuse in this round or else we don’t deserve to lose.

1AR Cards – “investment”

( ) “Infrastructure Investment” is not a limiting term – only has to entice investors

MCO Financial 05

(March, Respected Australian Financial Group “Infrastructure Investments” www.mcofinancial.com/​Dictionary/​Infrastructure%​20Investments.pdf)

In addition to the regular revenue stream, some infrastructure assets can generate long-term capital growth. This comes from revenue growth built into the management contract, added value as the asset moves through its life cycle and away from the upfront risks, and also from strategic management of the asset by the managers through improvements such as the introduction of electronic tollbooths or more airport retail space. Infrastructure investments do not have a long history in Australia, but like many listed managed investments, such as listed property trusts, they are generally characterized as behaving like a hybrid of an equity and a bond. The correlations between infrastructure and other asset classes are also hard to assess, so at present most asset consultants usually include infrastructure investments within the equity allocation of a portfolio. Early stage projects usually have a greater level of risk, higher growth potential and lower yield, so they may be more suitable for younger or more risk-tolerant investors, while mature projects with lower growth and higher yields may be more suitable for investors seeking a stable income stream. What about tax? The income streams or distributions from infrastructure investments are usually tax advantaged and often provide investors with attractive after-tax returns. Like property trusts, these funds usually pay regular distributions that can include a tax-deferred component, so investors do not pay tax on a portion of their income until the investment is sold. What are listed infrastructure funds? Most listed infrastructure funds are managed by specialist fund managers. They generally seek to diversify across different assets, industries or geographic regions. Many listed funds are structured as stapled securities, so that the investor owns two or more securities related and bound together through one vehicle. Typically these are a unit in a trust that holds the portfolio of assets, together with a share in a funds management company that carries out the asset management or development activities. The two components cannot be traded separately. The tax impact of stapling depends on the specific terms of each stapling arrangement, but generally, each individual security retains its own legal character and is treated separately for tax purposes. This means that dividends from each security are included separately in an income tax return and each security is listed as an individual capital gains tax asset. How do unlisted funds work? Investors can also access infrastructure through unlisted investment funds. While traditionally these have been the province of institutional investors, these assets are now being marketed to retail investors. Several of the current offerings include infrastructure assets outside Australia and they are often diversified across a number of infrastructure asset sectors and different industries. Unlisted investments are often heavily marketed on their lack of correlation with equity markets and their potential for good returns during periods of low inflation and bearish markets. They are often based on green field projects that fact high initial construction and operational risks in return for better returns. As these assets mature, they usually have a declining risk profile and substantial capital appreciation. An important consideration in investing in unlisted infrastructure vehicles is that they are usually relatively illiquid with no secondary market for the units, and investors cannot redeem funds. While some funds offer a small liquidation facility to buy back units, many do not. Investors usually receive an illiquidity premium to compensate them for this characteristic. According to Macquarie Investment Management, this illiquidity premium can be worth an additional 0.5 per cent to 2 per cent return a year. ￼￼￼Benefits of infrastructure funds ￼￼￼￼￼￼￼￼According to the Australian Stock Exchange, the key benefits of investing in infrastructure assets are: ??Low correlation to price fluctuations in other asset classes ??Diversification of the portfolio ??Earnings stability from essential good and services ??Access to unique assets ??Returns from capital appreciation and income ??Tax-effective income streams with tax deferred components. ￼￼￼“Many investors may still remember what happened back in the late 1680s/early 1990s when a lot of unlisted property trusts got frozen because the funds could not sell the underlying property quickly enough to fund investor redemptions.”

( )“Investment” is disbursement of public funds

Perez 10

(Perez, Bustamonte, and Ponce (Law Firm), “Executive Summary of the Organic Code on Public Planning and Finance”, Legal Newsletter, 11-4, http://www.pbplaw.com/boletines/2010/20101104\_boletinPBP\_bl\_en.pdf)

Public investment is defined as “… a set of disbursements and/or transactions made out of public funds to maintain or increase social and State wealth and capacities for the purpose of achieving the planned objectives”. And Article 77 of the Code referred to herein provides that the State General Budget is an instrument used “to determine and manage income and disbursements of all the entities comprised in the different State branches.”

\*\*AT: DAs

AT: Ptix

Support for Action in the Phillipines is bipartisan

<http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=817087&publicationSubCategoryId>=

WASHINGTON – Republicans and Democrats don’t agree on much these days, but on the issue of deepening relations with the Philippines and strengthening the Philippine-US alliance “we stand together,” Sen. John McCain said at a Philippine Independence Day reception. “Republicans are with you,” particularly on the controversy over Panatag Shoal in the West Philippine Sea, he said, using the name designated by the Aquino administration for the South China Sea. McCain got the biggest applause when he said the decision that went against Manny Pacquiao in his fight versus Timothy Bradley was a travesty of justice. If the US presidential election of 2008 was decided the way the Pacquiao-Bradley fight was, “I would be the president today,” he said to much laughter. About 250 guests attended the reception at the Four Seasons Hotel hosted by Ambassador Jose Cuisia. Among senior US officials in addition to McCain in attendance were Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and John Negroponte, former US ambassador to the Philippines who later served as deputy secretary of state and as the first ever Director of National Intelligence. In his comments, Campbell spoke of the remarkable economic recovery of the Philippines in the two years since President Aquino took office and said Aquino was responsible for a renaissance in Philippine-US relations. Cuisia spoke about the exceptional year in Philippine-US relations capped by last week’s official visit to Washington by Aquino.

AT: China Relations DA

China won’t resolve disputes by peaceful measures – they refused to cooperate through United Nations

<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120502/DEFREG03/305020004/Philippines-Asks-U-S-Radars-Patrol-Boats-Aircraft>

“For the Philippines, the tension in the West Philippines Sea are particularly challenging,” he said. The Philippines and China have been embroiled in a dispute over a shoal in the South China Sea, or the West Philippines Sea, with both nations stationing vessels there for nearly three weeks to assert their sovereignty. The Philippines says Scarborough Shoal is its territory because it falls well within its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, as recognized by international law. The Philippines has called for arbitration through the United Nations to end the dispute, but China has refused.

\*\*AT: CPs

\*\*AT: Ks

2AC – Security K

#### Evolutionary biology proves realism is inevitable

Thayer, ‘4(Bradley, Associate Professor for the Department of Defense & Strategic Studies and a former Fellow @ the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict)

Evolutionary theory allows realists to advance offensive realist arguments without seeking an ultimate cause in either the anarchic international state system or in theological or metaphysical ideas. Realism based on evolutionary theory reaches the same conclusions, but the ultimate causal mechanism is different: human evolution in the anarchic and perilous conditions of the late-Pliocene, Pleistocene, and most of the Holocene epochs. Specially, evolutionary theory explains why humans are egoistic, strive to dominate others, and make in-group/out-group distinctions. These adaptations in turn serve as a foundation for offensive realism**.**The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior. The fact that there is no world government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security, such as striving to have a powerful military, aggressing when forced to do so, and forging and maintaining alliances. This is what neorealists call a self-help system: leaders of states are forced to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that evolutionary theory also offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment were great-so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet high-without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift-survived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions. The environment produced the behaviors examined here: egoism, domination, and the in-group/out-group distinction. These specific traits are sufficient to explain why leaders will behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to behave. That is, even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, defined as either control over others (for example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their family’s or tribe’s need for food, shelter, or other resources). Evolutionary theory explains why people seek control over environmental circumstances-humans are egoistic and concerned about food-and why some, particularly males, will seek to dominate others by maintaining a privileged position in a dominance hierarchy. Clearly, as the leaders of states are human, they too will be influenced by evolutionary theory as they respond to the actions of other states and as they make their own decisions.

#### No other theory explains the world accurately

Mearsheimer, ‘1 (John J., Professor of Political Science @ the University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Pg. 1-3)

The optimists’ claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. In fact, all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves for the foreseeable future**.**Consequently, realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other’s expense, because international anarchy-the driving force behind great-power behavior-did not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon. States remain the principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a major shift in the global distribution of power. But it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries. Indeed, considerable evidence from the 1990s indicates that power politics has not disappeared from Europe and Northeast Asia, the regions in which there are two or more great powers, as well as possible great powers such as Germany and Japan. There is no question, however, that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. Still, there is potential for intense security competition among the great powers that might lead to a major war. Probably the best evidence of that possibility is the fact that the United States maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Europe and in Northeast Asia for the explicit purpose of keeping the major states in each region at peace.

#### Strategic political action is key – the alt causes insecurity that re-creates the most violent aspects of your impact claims

P. H. Liotta (Professor of Humanities at Salve Regina University, Newport, RI, and Executive Director of the PellCenter for International Relations and Public Policy) 2005 “Through the Looking Glass” Sage Publications

Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization, privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more than social constructions (Grayson, 2003), all these concepts work in theory but fail in practice. While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and applications. With regard to environmental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago: National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to watersheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian transformation’. Granted, we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global communitytoday also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises. We are nowhere closer toaddressing how best to solve these challenges, even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even ‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. Yet, the creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come – is perhaps the only appropriate first response. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be decades and decades of economic and political frustration – and, potentially, military engagement. Rather than justifying intervention (especially military), we ought to be justifying investment. Simply addressing the immensities of these challenges is not enough. Radical improvements in public infrastructure and support for better governance, particularly in states and municipalities (especially along the Lagos–Cairo–Karachi–Jakarta arc), will both improve security and create the conditions for shrinking the gap between expectations and opportunity. A real debate ought to be taking place today. Rather than dismissing ‘alternative’ security foci outright, a larger examination of what forms of security are relevant and right among communities, states, and regions, and which even might apply to a global rule-set – as well as what types of security are not relevant – seems appropriate and necessary. If this occurs, a truly remarkable tectonic shift might take place in the conduct of international relations and human affairs. Perhaps, in the failure of states and the international community to respond to such approaches, what is needed is the equivalent of the 1972 Stockholm conference that launched the global environmental movement and established the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), designed to be the environmental conscience of the United Nations. Similarly, the UN Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996 focused on the themes of finding adequate shelter for all and sustaining human development in an increasingly urbanized world. Whether or not these programs have the ability to influence the future’s direction (or receive wide international support) is a matter of some debate. Yet, given that the most powerful states in the world are not currently focusing on these issues to a degree sufficient to produce viable implementation plans or development strategies, there may well need to be a ‘groundswell’ of bottom-up pressure, perhaps in the form of a global citizenry petition to push the elusive world community toward collective action.Recent history suggests that military intervention as the first line of response to human security conditions underscores a seriously flawed approach. Moreover, those who advocate that a state’s disconnectedness from globalization is inversely proportional to the likelihood of military (read: US) intervention fail to recognize unfolding realities (Barnett, 2003, 2004). Both middle-power and major-power states, as well as the international community, must increasingly focus on long-term creeping vulnerabilities in order to avoid crisis responses to conditions of extreme vulnerability. Admittedly, some human security proponents have recently soured on the viability of the concept in the face of recent ‘either with us or against us’ power politics (Suhrke, 2004). At the same time, and in a bit more positive light, some have clearly recognized the sheer impossibility of international power politics continuing to feign indifference in the face of moral categories. As Burgess (2004: 278) notes, ‘for all its evils, one of the promises of globalization is the unmasking of the intertwined nature of ethics and politics in the complex landscape of social, economic, political and environmental security’. While it is still not feasible to establish a threshold definition for human security that neatly fits all concerns and arguments (as suggested by Owen, 2004: 383), it would be a tragic mistake to assume that national, human, and environmental security are mutually harmonious constructs rather than more often locked in conflictual and contested opposition with each other. Moreover, aspects of security resident in each concept are indeed themselves embedded with extraordinary contradictions. Human security, in particular, is not now, nor should likely ever be, the mirror image of national security. Yet, these contradictions are not the crucial recognition here. On the contrary, rather than focusing on the security issues themselves, we should be focusing on the best multi-dimensional approaches to confronting and solving them. One approach, which might avoid the massive tidal impact of creeping vulnerabilities, is to sharply make a rudder shift from constant crisis intervention toward strategic planning, strategic investment, and strategic attention. Clearly, the time is now to reorder our entire approach to how we address – or fail to address – security.

#### Alt doesn’t do anything to change material structures – cedes the discussion to elites

Darryl Jarvis (Director of the Research Institute for International Risk and Lecturer in International Relations, The University of Sydney) 2000 “International relations and the challenge of postmodernism” p. X

Just because we acknowledge that the state is a socially fabricated entity, or that the division between domestic and international society is arbitrary inscribed does not make the reality of the state disappear or render invisible international politics. Whether socially constructed or objectively given, the argument over the ontological status of the state is no particular moment. Does this change our experience of the state or somehow diminish the political-economic-juridical-military functions of the state? To recognize that states are not naturally inscribed but dynamic entities continually in the process of being made and reimposed and are therefore culturally dissimilar, economically different, and politically atypical, while perspicacious to our historical and theoretical understanding of the state, in no way detracts form its reality, practices, and consequences. Similarly, few would object to Ashley’s hermeneutic interpretivist understanding of the international sphere as an artificially inscribed demarcation. But, to paraphrase Holsti again, so what? This does not make its effects any less real, diminish its importance in our lives, or excuse us form paying serious attention to it. That international politics and states would not exist without subjectivities is a banal tautology. The point, surely, is to move beyond this and study these processes. Thus while intellectually interesting, constructivist theory is not an end point as Ashley seems to think, where we all throw up our hands and announce that there are no foundations and all reality is an arbitrary social construction. Rather, it should be a means of recognizing the structurated nature of our being and the reciprocity between subjects and structures through history. Ashley, however, seems not to want to do this, but only to deconstruct the state, international politics, and international theory on the basis that none of the is objectively given fictitious entities that arise out of modernist practices of representation. While an interesting theoretical enterprise, it is of no great consequence to the study of international politics. Indeed, structuration theory has long taken care of these ontological dilemmas that otherwise seem to preoccupy Ashley

#### Threats are real – not all politicians would make the same mistake and their evidence is based on out-dated Cold War theories

Knudsen, ‘1 (Olav F., Sodertorn University College, Security Dialogue, 32.3, “Desecuritizing Securitization”)

This argument is convincing as far as its description of the military establishment and decisionmakers goes, but its heyday is gone. It was a Cold War phenomenon, and things just aren’t so anymore. In the post-Cold War period, agenda-setting has been much easier to influence than the securitization approach assumes. That change cannot be credited to the concept; the change in security politics was already taking place in defense ministries and parliaments before the concept was first launched. Indeed, securitization in my view is more appropriate to the security politics of the Cold War years than to the post-Cold War period. Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states ‘really’ face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors’ own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for whatever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats – in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger – referred to ‘real’ phenomena, and they refer to ‘real’ phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening.

#### Empirically - responses to threats don’t create self-fulfilling prophesies—conveying weakness is more likely to spur aggression

Jervis, 76 (Robert, professor of political science at Columbia University, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 84)

Spiral and deterrence theories thus contradict each other at every point. They seem to be totally different conceptions of international relations claiming to be unconditionally applicable. If this were true, it would be important to gather evidence that would disconfirm at least one of them. 53 A look at the basic question of the effects of the application of negative sanctions makes it clear that neither theory is confirmed all the time. There are lots of cases in which arms have been increased, aggressors deterred, significant gains made, without setting off spirals. And there are also many instances in which the use of power and force has not only failed or even left the state worse off than it was originally (both of these outcomes can be explained by deterrence theory), but has led to mutual insecurity and misunderstanding that harmed both sides. Evidence Against the Spiral Model The most obvious embarrassment to the spiral model is posed when an aggressive power will not respond in kind to conciliation. Minor concessions, the willingness to treat individual issues as separate from the basic conflict, and even an offer to negotiate can convince an aggressor that the status quo power is weak. Thus in 1903 Russia responded to British ex-pressions of interest in negotiating the range of issues that divided them by stiffening her position in the Far East, thus increasing the friction that soon led to the Russo-Japanese War. 54 Whatever the underlying causes of Anglo-German differences before World War I, once the naval race was under way the kaiser interpreted any hesitancy in the British build-ing as indicating that, as he had predicted, the British economy could not stand the strain. As he read a dispatch describing a debate on naval esti- mates in Parliament in which more attention was paid to the costs of the program than to the two-power standard, the kaiser scribbled in the mar-gin: “They respect our firm will, and must bow before the accomplished fact [of the Gennan naval program]! Now further quiet building.” 55 And, as events of the 1930s show, once an aggressor thinks the defenders are weak, it may be impossible to change this image short of war. Unambig-uous indicators of resolve are infrequent, and the aggressor is apt to think that the defender will back down at the last minute. Concessions, made in the incorrect belief that the other is a status quo power are especially apt to be misinterpreted if the other does not under- stand that the state's policy is based on a false image. The spiral theorists have made an important contribution by stressing the serious conse-quences that flow from the common situation when a status quo power does not realize that others see it as aggressive, but they have ignored the other side of this coin. Aggressors often think that their intentions are obvious to others and therefore conclude that any concessions made to them must be the result of fear and weakness. Thus, by the time of Mu-nich, Hitler seems to have believed that the British realized his ambitions were not limited to areas inhabited by Germans and concluded that Chamberlain was conciliatory not because he felt Germany would be sated but because he lacked the resolve to wage a war to oppose Ger-man domination of the Continent. Since Hitler did not see that British policy rested on analysis of German intentions that was altered by the seizure of the non-German parts of Czechoslovakia he could not under-stand why British policy would be different in September 1939 than it had been a year earlier. 56 Even when the adversary aims for less than domination, concessions granted in the context of high conflict will lead to new demands if the adversary concludes that the state's desire for better relations can be ex-ploited. Thus Germany increased her pressure on France in the first Moroccan crisis after the latter assumed a more conciliatory posture and fired the strongly anti-German foreign minister. Similar dynamics pre-ceded the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war. More recently. the United States responded to Japanese concessions in the fall of 1941 not by making counter-concessions, but by issuing more extreme demands. Less frequently, even a status quo power may interpret conciliation as indicating that the other side is so weak that expansion is possible at little risk. As Herman Kahn notes, prophecies can be self-denying. To trust a person and place him in a position where he can make gains at your expense can awaken his acquisitiveness and lead him to behave in an untrustworthy manner.57 Similarly, a state’s lowered level of arms can tempt the other to raise, rather than lower, its forces. For example, the United States probably would not have tried to increase NATO's canven-tional forces in the 1960s were it not for the discovery that the Soviet Union had fewer troops than had been previously believed, thereby bringing within grasp the possibility of defending West Europe without a resort to nuclear weapons. It is also possible that the Soviets drastically increased their misslle forces in the late 1960s and early 1970s not only because of the costs of remaining in an inferior position but also because they thought the United States would allow them to attain parity.

#### Rejection of securitization causes the state to become more interventionist—turns the K

Tara McCormack, ’10, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

2AC – Pan K

#### China become more and more of a threat everyday- confrontation is the only way to solve

Dan Blumenthal, resident fellow at AEI AND Gary Schmitt, executive director of the Project for the New American Century, AEI, 8-8-2005, “Wishful Thinking in Our Time: The Pentagon Looks at China and Blinks”

But rather than face the facts presented in the report about the character and scope of China's military buildup, the tendency in the senior ranks of the administration is to wash over them with sound bites about our relationship with China being "good but complex." Or worse. The day after the report was issued, in response to a question about the cross-strait military balance, Marine general Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said, "There's lots of countries in the world that have the capacity to wage war," but "very few have the intent to do so. . . . There's absolutely no reason for us to believe there is any intent on [China's] part." Absolutely? For one thing, as these annual Pentagon reports have repeatedly pointed out, China shrouds its military plans and senior decision-making in secrecy. But what we can observe could hardly lead anyone to think that we should be so confident about China's intentions. After all, this is the country that now ranks third in the world in overall defense spending, and the one that has increased its military budget fastest over the past decade, with growth in military expenditures outpacing even China's own remarkable growth in GDP. General Pace had better hope his statement doesn't go down in history alongside George Tenet's now infamous, "It's a slam dunk, Mr. President." One theme that was added to this year's report is that China is at a "strategic crossroads." It faces one path leading to peaceful integration with its region and the world, the other to competition with the other significant powers in the region and with the United States. In one respect, this is a truism: Theoretically, any power, at any time, can choose to alter its relationships with the outside world. But the data at the heart of the Pentagon's report suggest that China is not at any crossroads; rather, it is already headed down a path previously taken by other autocratic, rapidly rising great powers. And until China undertakes major political reforms, it will probably stay on that path. In reality, it is more accurate to say that the United States is at a strategic crossroads when it comes to China. With our plate full around the globe, we are understandably reluctant to raise publicly the prospect of a new great power competition. Nevertheless, the administration is doing quite a bit to contain Chinese military power--our upgraded relations with Japan, India, Vietnam, Singapore, and Australia are cases in point. But our reluctance to admit this publicly to ourselves or to our allies, and our rosy rhetoric about our "constructive" relationship with Beijing, leave us at a disadvantage as China ratchets up the competition. As a practical matter, this attitude often leaves us a day late and a dollar short when it comes to matching new Chinese initiatives. Nor is our position sustainable. Beijing is not blind to our reaching out to the powers in the region. For it, the competition has already begun. The Pentagon's report provides ample evidence that this is the case, but then ducks the obvious conclusion. Preparing the Congress and the public for that competition should be a priority of the administration. Unfortunately, this year's report, for all its substantive merit, fails the test.

#### China wants to kill us…no seriously. – This is from China’s Minister of Defense

Haotian 5 (Chi Haotian, Former Minister of Defense and vice-chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, 8/8/05 War is not far from US and is the midwife of the Chinese century; http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-8/31055.html)

I sometimes think how cruel it is for China and the United States to be enemies that are bound to meet on a narrow road! Do you remember a movie about Liberation Army troops led by Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping? The title is something like “Decisive Battle on the Central Plains.” There is a famous remark in the movie that is full of power and grandeur: “The enemies are bound to meet on a narrow road, only the brave will win!” It is this kind of fighting to win or die spirit that enabled us to seize power in Mainland China. It is historical destiny that China and United States will come into unavoidable confrontation on a narrow path and fight each other! The United States, unlike Russia and Japan, has never occupied and hurt China, and also assisted China in its battle against the Japanese. But, it will certainly be an obstruction, and the biggest obstruction! In the long run, the relationship of China and the United States is one of a life-and-death struggle. One time, some Americans came to visit and tried to convince us that the relationship between China and United States is one of interdependence. Comrade Xiaoping replied in a polite manner: “Go tell your government, China and the United States do not have such a relationship that is interdependent and mutually reliant.” Actually, Comrade Xiaoping was being too polite, he could have been more frank, “The relationship between China and United States is one of a life-and-death still rely on their capital and technology, we still need America. Therefore, we must do everything we can to promote our relationship with America, learn from America in all aspects and use America as an example to reconstruct our country. How have we managed our foreign affairs in these years? Even if we had to put on a smiling face in order to please them, even if we had to give them the right cheek after they had hit our left cheek, we still must endure in order to further our relationship with the United States. Do you remember the character of Wuxun in the movie the “Story of Wuxun”? In order to accomplish his mission, he endured so much pain and suffered so much beating and kicking! The United States is the most successful country in the world today. Only after we have learned all of its useful experiences can we replace it in the future. Even though we are presently imitating the American tone “China and United States rely on each other and share honor and disgrace,” we must not forget that the history of our civilization repeatedly has taught us that one mountain does not allow two tigers to live together. We also must never forget what Comrade Xiaoping emphasized “refrain from revealing the ambitions and put others off the track.” The hidden message is: we must put up with America; we must conceal our ultimate goals, hide our capabilities and await the opportunity. In this way, our mind is clear. Why have we not updated our national anthem with something peaceful? Why did we not change the anthem’s theme of war? Instead, when revising the Constitution this time, for the first time we clearly specified “March of the Volunteers” is our national anthem. Thus we will understand why we constantly talk loudly about the “Taiwan issue” but not the “American issue.” We all know the principle of “doing one thing under the cover of another.” If ordinary people can only see the small island of Taiwan in their eyes, then you as the elite of our country should be able to see the whole picture of our cause. Over these years, according to Comrade Xiaoping’s arrangement, a large piece of our territory in the North has been given up to Russia; do you really think our Party Central Committee is a fool? To resolve the issue of America we must be able to transcend conventions and restrictions. In history, when a country defeated another country or occupied another country, it could not kill all the people in the conquered land, because back then you could not kill people effectively with sabers or long spears, or even with rifles or machine guns. Therefore, it was impossible to gain a stretch of land without keeping the people on that land. However, if we conquered America in this fashion, we would not be able to make many people migrate there. Only by using special means to “clean up” America will we be able to lead the Chinese people there. This is the only choice left for us. This is not a matter of whether we are willing to do it or not. What kind of special means is there available for us to “clean up” America? Conventional weapons such as fighters, canons, missiles and battleships won’t do; neither will highly destructive weapons such as nuclear weapons. We are not as foolish as to want to perish together with America by using nuclear weapons, despite the fact that we have been exclaiming that we will have the Taiwan issue resolved at whatever cost. Only by using non-destructive weapons that can kill many people will we be able to reserve America for ourselves. There has been rapid development of modern biological technology, and new bio weapons have been invented one after another. Of course we have not been idle; in the past years we have seized the opportunity to master weapons of this kind. We are capable of achieving our purpose of “cleaning up” America all of a sudden. When Comrade Xiaoping was still with us, the Party Central Committee had the perspicacity to make the right decision not to develop aircraft carrier groups and focus instead on developing lethal weapons that can eliminate mass populations of the enemy country. From a humanitarian perspective, we should issue a warning to the American people and persuade them to leave America and leave the land they have lived in to the Chinese people. Or at least they should leave half of the United States to be China’s colony, because America was first discovered by the Chinese. But would this work? If this strategy does not work, then there is only one choice left to us. That is, use decisive means to “clean up” America, and reserve America for our use in a moment. Our historical experience has proven that as long as we make it happen, nobody in the world can do anything about us. Furthermore, if the United States as the leader is gone, then other enemies have to surrender to us. Biological weapons are unprecedented in their ruthlessness, but if the Americans do not die then the Chinese have to die… It is indeed brutal to kill one or two hundred million Americans. But that is the only path that will secure a Chinese century, a century in which the CCP leads the world. We, as revolutionary humanitarians, do not want deaths. But if history confronts us with a choice between deaths of Chinese and those of Americans, we’d have to pick the latter, as, for us, it is more important to safeguard the lives of the Chinese people and the life of our Party. That is because, after all, we are Chinese and members of the CCP. Since the day we joined the CCP, the Party’s life has always been above all else! History will prove that we made the right choice. Now, when I am about to finish my speech, you probably understand why we conducted this online survey. Simply put, through conducting this online survey we wanted to know whether the people would rise against us if one day we secretly adopt resolute means to “clean up” America. Would more people support us or oppose us? This is our basic judgment: if our people approve of shooting at prisoners of war, women and children, then they would approve our “cleaning up” America. For over twenty years, China has been enjoying peace, and a whole generation has not been tested by war. In particular, since the end of World War II, there have been many changes in the formats of war, the concept of war and the ethics of war. Especially since the collapse of the former Soviet Union and Eastern European Communist states, the ideology of the West has come to dominate the world as a whole, and the Western theory of human nature and Western view of human rights have increasingly disseminated among the young people in China. Therefore, we were not very sure about the people’s attitude. If our people are fundamentally opposed to “cleaning up” America, we will, of course, have to adopt corresponding measures. Why didn’t we conduct the survey through administrative means instead of through the web? We did what we did for a good reason. First of all, we did it to reduce artificial inference and to make sure that we got the true thoughts of the people. In addition, it is more confidential and won’t reveal the true purpose of our survey. But what is most important is the fact that most of the people who are able to respond to the questions online are from social groups that are relatively well-educated and intelligent. They are the hard-core and leading groups that play a decisive role among our people. If they support us, then the people as a whole will follow us; if they oppose us, they will play the dangerous role of inciting people and creating social disturbance. What turned out to be very comforting is they did not turn in a blank test paper. In fact, they turned in a test paper with a score of over 80. This is the excellent fruition of our Party’s work in propaganda and education over the past few decades. Of course, a few people under the Western influence have objected to shooting at prisoners of war and women and children. Some of them said, “It is shocking and scary to witness so many people approving of shooting at women and children. Is everybody crazy?” Some others said, “The Chinese love to label themselves as a peace-loving people, but actually they are the most ruthless people. The comments are resonant of killing and murdering, sending chills to my heart.” Although there are not too many people holding this kind of viewpoint and they will not affect the overall situation in any significant way, but we still need to strengthen the propaganda to respond to this kind of argument. That is to vigorously propagate Comrade He Xin's latest article, which has already been reported to the central government. You may look it up on the website. If you get on the website using key words to search, you will find out that a while ago, comrade He Xin pointed out to the Hong Kong Business News during an interview that: "The US has a shocking conspiracy." According to what he had in hand, from September 27 to October 1, 1995, the Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachëv Foundation, funded by the United States, gathered 500 of the world’s most important statesmen, economic leaders and scientists, including George W. Bush (he was not the US president at the time), the Baroness Thatcher, Tony Blair, Zbigniew Brzezinski, as well as George Soros, Bill Gates, futurist John Naisbitt, etc., all of the world’s most popular characters, in the San Francisco Fairmont hotel for a high-level round table conference, discussing problems about globalization and how to guide humanity to move forward into the 21st century. According to what He Xin had in hand, the outstanding people of the world in attendance thought that in the 21st century a mere 20% of the world’s population will be sufficient to maintain the world’s economy and prosperity, the other 80% or 4/5 of the world’s population will be human garbage unable to produce new values. The people in attendance thought that this excess 80% population would be a trash population and "high-tech" means should be used to eliminate them gradually. Since the enemies are secretly planning to eliminate our population, we certainly cannot be infinitely merciful and compassionate to them. Comrade He Xin's article came out at the right time, it has proven the correctness of our tit for tat battle approach, has proven Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s great foresight to deploy against the United States military strategy. Certainly, in spreading Comrade He Xin’s views, we cannot publish the article in the party newspapers, in order to avoid raising the enemy’s vigilance. He Xin's conversation may remind the enemy that we have grasped the modern science and technology, including "clean" nuclear technology, gene weapons technology as well as biological weapons technology, and we can use powerful measures to eliminate their population on a large-scale. The last problem I want to talk about is of firmly seizing the preparations for military battle. …. The central committee believes, as long as we resolve the United States problem at one blow, our domestic problems will all be readily solved. Therefore, our military battle preparation appears to aim at Taiwan, but in fact is aimed at the United States, and the preparation is far beyond the scope of attacking aircraft carriers or satellites. Marxism pointed out that violence is the midwife for the birth of the new society. Therefore war is the midwife for the birth of China’s century. As war approaches, I am full of hope for our next generation.

#### Extinction via bioweapons

Ochs 02, (Richard, Chemical Weapons Working Group Member “Biological Weapons must be Abolished Immediately,” June 9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html)

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

#### Constructing china as a threat is necessary to prevent war

Friedberg ‘1 (Aaron L. Professor of Politics and International Affairs. Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Commentary, Vol. 111, No. 2, February, p. https://lists.lsit.ucsb.edu/archives/gordon-newspost/2001-May/001274.html)

Is it possible, finally, that merely by talking and perhaps even by thinking about a full-blown SinoAmerican rivalry we may increase the probability of its actually coming to pass? This is the clear implication of Michael Swaine ’s letter. Mr. Swaine worries that “ordinary observers,” unable to distinguish between descriptions of present reality and “hair-raising scenarios” of the future, will conclude that “an intense geostrategic rivalry is virtually inevitable, and . . . respond accordingly.” While I am flattered by the thought that my article could somehow change the course of history, I very much doubt that it, or a hundred more like it, will have any such effect. On the other hand, I am disturbed by the suggestion that we ought to avoid discussing unpleasant possibilities for fear that someone (presumably our political representatives and “ordinary” fellow citizens) might get the wrong idea. Acknowledging real dangers is a necessary first step to avoiding them, as well as to preparing to cope with them if they should nevertheless come to pass. Refusing or neglecting to do so, it seems to me, is a far more likely formula for disaster.

2AC – Militarism K

#### Hardline militarism is the best alignment – The affirmative’s pacifism emboldens enemies and causes wars that escalate globally

Alex Epstein, Graduate of Duke University, BA Philosophy, Junior fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute, “Peacenik Warmongers,” Ayn Rand Institute, December 9, 2002, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=7458, UK: Fisher

We do not need to predict or deduce the consequences of pacifism with regard to terrorism and the nations that sponsor it, because we experienced those consequences on September 11. Pacifism practically dictated the American response to terrorism for more than 23 years, beginning with our government's response to the first major act of Islamic terrorism against this country: when Iranian mobs held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days at the American embassy in Tehran. In response to that and later terrorist atrocities, American Presidents sought to avoid military action at all costs--by treating terrorists as isolated criminals and thereby ignoring the role of the governments that support them, or by offering diplomatic handouts to terrorist states in hopes that they would want to be our friends. With each pacifist response it became clearer that the most powerful nation on Earth was a paper tiger--and our enemies made the most of it. After years of American politicians acting like peaceniks, Islamic terrorism had proliferated from a few gangs of thugs to a worldwide scourge--making possible the attacks of September 11. It is an obvious evasion of history and logic for the advocates of pacifism to label themselves "anti-war," since the policies they advocate necessarily invite escalating acts of war against anyone who practices them.Military inaction sends the message to an aggressor--and to other, potential aggressors--that it will benefit by attacking the United States. To whatever extent "anti-war" protesters influence policy, they are not helping to prevent war; they are acting to make war more frequent and deadly, by making our enemies more aggressive, more plentiful, and more powerful. The only way to deal with militant enemies is to show them unequivocally that aggression against the United States will lead to their destruction. The only means of imparting this lesson is overwhelming military force--enough to defeat and incapacitate the enemy. Had we annihilated the Iranian regime 23 years ago, we could have thwarted Islamic terrorism at the beginning, with far less cost than will be required to defeat terrorism today. And if we fail to use our military against state sponsors of terrorism today, imagine the challenge we will face five years from now when Iraq and Iran possess nuclear weapons and are ready to disseminate them to their terrorist minions. Yet such a world is the goal of the "anti-war" movement. The suicidal stance of peaceniks is no innocent error or mere overflow of youthful idealism. It is the product of a fundamentally immoral commitment: the commitment to ignore reality--from the historical evidence of the consequences of pacifism to the very existence of the violent threats that confront us today--in favor of the wish that laying down our arms will achieve peace somehow. Those of us who are committed to facing the facts should condemn these peaceniks for what they really are: warmongers for our enemies.

#### Militarism is inevitable – human nature

Ann Scales (Associate Professor, University of Denver College of Law) 2005 “Symposium: Soft on Defense: The Failure To Confront Militarism,” 20 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 369, 2005, Lexis)

Fourth, relatedly but far more broadly, perhaps no one wants to face militarism because it is the single most important indication that Thomas Hobbes was right. You remember poor old Hobbes. He was one of the most influential social contract theorists, a philosophical founding father of the American republic. But he was a pretty grim guy, John Locke without the Prozac. Born on the day that the Spanish Armada arrived in England in 1588, Hobbes said that his mother gave birth to twins, himself and fear. 114 Hobbes believed that our species is inherently, permanently, and lethally aggressive. Thus, we all live in a state of chronic anxiety, expecting violent death at any moment. We form governments to protect us from insecurity, but inter-governmental warfare is a big source of that insecurity. Governments wage war, at least they say, to protect us from our inherent insecurity. Hobbes saw the irrational and suicidal vicious cycle in this. It is this tendency toward war-making that, more than anything else, led Hobbes to his famous conclusion that life is "solitary, [\*392] poor, nasty, brutish, and short. n115"

#### Militarism is inevitable – too deeply ingrained in American society

McKay, 2006 (Iain, Former Editor of Black Flag Magazine and Author, “An Anarchist FAQ”, Version 11.6, Section D, 8.1, <http://egemonia.blogspot.com/2006_06_01_archive.html>)

Although there may appear to be no urgent need for huge military budgets now that the Soviet threat is gone, the US has found it impossible to kick its forty-year addiction to militarism. As Noam Chomsky points out in many of his works, the "Pentagon System," in which the public is forced to subsidise research and development of high tech industry through subsidies to defence contractors, is a covert substitute in the US for the overt industrial planning policies of other "advanced" capitalist nations, like Germany and Japan. US defence businesses, which are among the biggest lobbyists, cannot afford to lose this "corporate welfare." Moreover, continued corporate downsizing and high levels of unemployment will produce strong pressure to maintain defence industries simply in order to keep people working.

2AC – Anthro K

#### Human-centered ethics necessitate protecting the environment—change is possible without adopting a bio-centric ethic.

Kyung-sig Hwang, 2003. Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University. “Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism,” Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century, http://eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm.

The third view, which will be defended here, is that there is no need for a specifically ecological ethic to explain our obligations toward nature, that our moral rights and duties can satisfactorily be explained in terms of traditional, human-centered ethical theory.[4] In terms of this view, ecology bears on ethics and morality in that it brings out the far-reaching, extremely important effects of man's actions, that much that seemed simply to happen-extinction of species, depletion of resources, pollution, over rapid growth of population, undesirable, harmful, dangerous, and damaging uses of technology and science - is due to human actions that are controllable, preventable, by men and hence such that men can be held accountable for what occurs. Ecology brings out that, often acting from the best motives, however, simply from short-sighted self-interest without regard for others living today and for those yet to be born, brings about very damaging and often irreversible changes in the environment, changes such as the extinction of plant and animal species, destruction of wilderness and valuable natural phenomena such as forests, lakes, rivers, seas. Many reproduce at a rate with which their environment cannot cope, so that damage is done, to and at the same time, those who are born are ill-fed, ill-clad, ill-sheltered, ill-educated. Moralists concerned with the environment have pressed the need for a basic rethinking of the nature of our moral obligations in the light of the knowledge provided by ecology on the basis of personal, social, and species prudence, as well as on general moral grounds in terms of hitherto unrecognized and neglected duties in respect of other people, people now living and persons yet to be born, those of the third world, and those of future generation, and also in respect of preservation of natural species, wilderness, and valuable natural phenomena. Hence we find ecological moralists who adopt this third approach, writing to the effect that concern for our duties entail concern for our environment and the ecosystems it contains. Environmental ethics is concerned with the moral relation that holds between humans and the natural world, the ethical principles governing those relations determine our duties, obligations, and responsibilities with regard to the earth's natural environment and all the animals and plants inhabit it. A human-centered theory of environmental ethics holds that our moral duties with respect to the natural world are all ultimately derived from the duties we owe to one another as human beings. It is because we should respect the human rights, or should protect and promote the well being of humans, that we must place certain constraints on our treatment of the earth's environment and its non-human habitants.[5]

#### Anthropocentrism key to survival—understanding the importance of ecosystems to future generations solves environmental destruction but radical biocentrism causes extinction.

Kyung-sig Hwang, 2003. Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University. “Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism,” Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century, http://eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm.

While our ability to affect the future is immense, our ability to foresee the results of our environmental interventions is not. I think that our moral responsibility grows with foresight. And yet, paradoxically in some cases grave moral responsibility is entailed by the fact of one's ignorance. If the planetary life-support system appears to be complex and mysterious, humble ignorance should indicate respect and restraint. However, as many life scientists have complained, these virtues have not been apparent in these generations. Instead they point out, we have boldly marched ahead, shredding delicate ecosystems and obliterating countless species, and with them the unique genetic codes that evolved through millions of years; we have altered the climate and even the chemistry of the atmosphere, and as a result of all this-what?[18] A few results are immediately to our benefit; more energy, more mineral resources, more cropland, convenient waste disposal. Indeed, these short-term payoffs motivated us to alter our natural environment. But by far the larger and more significant results, the permanent results, are unknown and perhaps unknowable. Nature, says poet, Nancy Newhall, "holds answers to more questions than we know how to ask." And we have scarcely bothered to ask.[19] Year and year, the natural habitants diminish and the species disappear, and thus our planetary ecosystem (our household) is forever impoverished. It is awareness of ecological crisis that has led to the now common claim that we need transvaluation of value, new values, a new ethic, and an ethic that is essentially and not simply contingently new and ecological. Closer inspection usually reveals that the writer who states this does not really mean to advance such a radical thesis, that all he is arguing for is the application of old, recognized, ethical values of the kind noted under the characterization of respect for persons, justice, honesty, promotion of good, where pleasure and happiness are seen as goods. Thus, although W. T. Blackstone writes; "we do not need the kind of transvaluation that Nietzsche wanted, but we do need that for which ecologists are calling, that is, basic changes in man's attitude toward nature and man's place in nature, toward population growth, toward the use of technology, and toward the production and distribution of goods and services." We need to develop what I call the ecological attitude. The transvaluation of values, which is needed, will require fundamental changes in the social, legal, political and economic institutions that embody our values. He concludes his article by explicitly noting that he does not really demand a new ethic, or a transvaluation of values. A human being is a hierarchical system and a component of super-individual, hierarchical system of sets. What is needed is not the denial of anthropocentrism, the placing of the highest value on humans and their ends and the conceiving of the rest of the nature as an instrument for those ends. Rather what is needed is the explicit recognition of these hierarchical systems and an ecological approach to science and the accumulation of scientific knowledge in which the myriad casual relationships between different hierarchical systems are recognized and put to the use of humanity. The freedom to use the environment must be restricted to rational and human use. If there is irrational use - pollution, overpopulation, crowding, a growth in poverty, and so on - people may wipe out hierarchies of life related to their own survival and to the quality of their own lives. This sort of anthropocentrism is essential even to human survival and a radical biotic egalitarianism would undermine conditions for that survival.[20] Rational anthropocentrism, one that recognizes the value of human life "transcends our individual life" and one in which we form a collective bond of identity with the future generations is essential is the process of human evolution.

#### Anthropocentrism is critical to human survival but still forces environmental protection in order to preserve future generations.

David Watson, 2007. Professor at the Department of Psychology in the University of Iowa. "Conservative anthropocentrism provides the best basis and framework for an environmental ethic," http://philosophy.cnu.edu/thesis\_papers/DavidWatsonSpring07HTML.htm.

The most important consideration in an environmental ethic should be the survival of humanity. Survival is the most important function of humans instinctively and biologically. G.G. Simpson held this view and stated it concisely: ….even if he were the lowest animal, the anthropocentric point of view would still be manifestly the only one to adopt for consideration of his place in the scheme of things and when seeking a guide on which to base his actions and evaluations of them. (Norton 144) Science considers self-interest to be a driving force in nature. Simpson explains that humans can only evaluate their actions as they relate to themselves, and that anthropocentrism is natural. G.H. Murdy simplifies the concept by saying, “it is proper for men to be anthropocentric and for spiders to be arachnocentric” (Norton 144). All living things are physiologically constructed for survival and procreation. All issues related to environmental ethics cannot be discussed without consideration of humans. There is one common trait held by all living things, and that is reproduction. All living things have the ability to procreate. Scientists believe that individual survival is not the only goal of living things, but also the reproduction of their DNA. This importance placed on the future of the DNA is analogous to the importance of the future of humanity. As much as individuals function to ensure their survival, they also function to ensure the chances of survival of their species. Likewise, an environmental ethic should function to ensure survival in the present, as well as functioning to increase the chances for future survival and humanity’s longevity. The theory of natural selection revolutionized biological discussions. This theory holds that the members of each species “must and should act to increase the survival chances of their species” (Norton 145). Similar to other species included in this theory, humans should act to increase the chances of the survival of their species. According to the laws of nature we should and must act to increase the chances of present human survival as well as the future of humanity. One of the main issues of environmental treatment is that of the earth’s condition when inherited by future generations. Gillespie asserts: ….there is the ethical argument that the future is barely represented in most contemporary decision making. Yet, by the time future generations are living with the environmental problems that this generation has left them, this generation will have gone, having taken the benefits of such decisions, but leaving the costs behind. (Gillespie 111-112) Making decisions that are fair to future generations of humanity may require sacrifice. Such sacrifice might be significant, but would pale in comparison to the misery future generations may face on an exhausted and devastated earth. Though acting in the interests of the present may be easier, humanity as a whole should act to increase the chances for future humans. One of the most basic needs of future generations is to have a healthy biosphere in which to live, and this must be addressed before time runs out.

#### Anthropocentrism is not the root cause of environmental crisis

Guha, 89 (ramachandra – phd, center for ecological services in india, environmenal ethics, spring, p. 74)

The proximate causes of the ecologically wasteful characteristics of industrial society and of militarization are far more mundane: at an aggregate level, the dialectic of economic and political structures, and at a micro-level, the life style choices of individuals. These causes cannot be reduced, whatever the level of analysis, to a deeper anthropocentric attitude toward nature; on the contrary, by constituting a grave threat to human survival, the ecological degradation they cause does not even serve the best interests of human beings! If my identification of the major dangers to the integrity of the natural world is correct, invoking the bogy of anthropocentrism is at best irrelevant and at worst a dangerous obfuscation.

#### Anthro is inevitable – no point in rejecting it and they can't solve it

Luke, 99 (timothy – prof of pol sci @ virginia polytechnic institute, capitalism. Democracy, and ecology. P. 155-156)

This maneuver is not clever, but it is the honest option inasmuch as one can only wonder how humans could ever move beyond anthropocentrism. As long as humans are humans, they will be, and can only be, anthropocentric. The notion of ecocentrism tacitly acknowledges this inevitability, even though McLaughlin does not face this necessity. Ecocentrism simply says humans are nature, humans must coexist with all other life forms in the diversity of nature, and nonhuman life should be accepted as equally important as human beings. Although it is not clear that ecocentrism is really a radical break with most current practices, this rhetorical move merely broadens the notion of humanity to include nonhuman nature as a vital aspect of identity for human beings. So becoming radically ecocentric may mean only becoming softly anthropocentric, because humans could then correctly merge with nature to recenter their human being. Since the humanly defined ecology underpinning ecocentrism would then also be the center of human being, recentering social ontologies and axiologies on this humanly delimited ecology simply slips the anthropos into a stealth mode by embedding human beings more forthrightly into the being of nature.

Generics

#### Our ways of knowing aren’t perfect, but they’re still best

Miller in 02 (Katherine Miller, Prof. of Communication at Texas A&M, Communication theories: Perspectives, processes, and contexts, 2002, p 35-36)

Epistemology and Axiology Post-positivist assumptions about the grounds of social knowledge and the role of values in the production of social knowledge are also based largely on the objectivist tenets we discussed in Chapter 2. These assumptions include the three interlinked notions that (a) knowledge can best be gained through a search for regularities and causal relationships among components of the social world, (b) regularities and causal relationships can best be discovered if there is a complete separation between the investigator and the subject of the investigation, and (c) this separation can be guaranteed through the use of the scientific method. As they have done with ontological assumptions of realism, however, most post-positivist scholars in communication today have tempered these epistemological and axiological bases to what Guba (1990a) has termed modified objecttvist. Post-positivist theorists generally hold to the first assumption mentioned in the preceding paragraph. That is, the search for knowledge remains centered on causal explanations for regularities observed in the physical and social world. This is clearly consistent with the ontological position outlined previously. It should be noted, though, that the regularities and causal relationships studied by post-positivist scholars today are rarely simplistic and often involve a multiplicity of factors and over-time relationships (see K. I. Miller, 2001, for examples in organizational communication). Beyond this first assumption, however, post-positivists have largely rejected the second assumption, regarding the necessary distinction between knower and known. Instead, many post-positivists have concluded that "the hope for a formal method, capable of being isolated from actual human judgment about the content of science (that is, about the nature of the world), and from human values seems to have evaporated" (H. Putnam, 1981, p. 192). Because this assumption of value-free inquiry is rejected, post-positivists have similarly rejected blind obedience to the scientific method. Instead, objectivity is seen as a regulatory ideal. In other words, a post-positivist will use methods that strive to be as unbiased as possible and will attempt to be aware of any values that might compromise neutrality However, because the possible fallabilities of the scientific method are recognized, the post-positivist will also rely on the critical scrutiny of a community of scholars in order to safeguard objectivity and maximize the growth of social scientific knowledge. Thus, though no claims to absolute truth and value-free inquiry are made, the belief exists that progress can be made if researchers exercise care in their theorizing and research and are critical of theoretical assertions and empirical justifications. As Phillips (1990) summarizes, The ideal that is embraced seems to be this: Seekers after enlightenment in any field do the best that they can; they honestly seek evidence, they critically scrutinize it, they are (relatively) open to alternative viewpoints, they take criticism (fairly) seriously and try to profit from it, they play their hunches, they stick to their guns, but they also have a sense of when it is time to quit. It may be a dirty and hard and uncertain game, but with no fixed algorithms to determine progress, it is the only game in town.

#### All life has value

L Schwartz, medical ethicist, 2002, Medical ethics: a case based approach, [www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf](http://www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf)

Supporters of the sanctity of life ethic dismiss considerations about quality and quantity because, they assert: • all life is worth living under any condition because of • the inherent value of life. The upshot of the theory is that quality of life, although desirable, is irrelevant to assessing the value of a life because all life is inherently valuable. Many supporters of the sanctity of life criterion say this is true only of human life, but there are religious groups who claim sanctity extends to all life. Either way, the sanctity of life principle states that all human life is worthy of preservation and hence eliminates the justifiability of abortion, euthanasia and rational suicide and, at extremes, withdrawal of futile treatment: The sanctity of life ethic holds that every human life is intrinsically good, that no life is more valuable than another, that lives not fully developed (embryonic and fetal stages) and lives with no great potential (the suffering lives of the terminally ill or the pathetic lives of the severely handicapped) are still sacred. The condition of a life does not reduce its value or justify its termination.6 So, whereas to determine the value of a life on its quality asserts that there is a relevant difference between the type of life and the fact of life, this distinction is rejected by sanctity arguments as irrelevant. The sanctity criterion tends to be associated with religious beliefs. The Judeo-Christian rationale is usually that lives are inherently valuable because they are gifts from God and not ours to end as we wish. In a sense, our lives are on loan to us and, as such, must be treated with respect. In Islam, the suffering associated with reduced quality of life is also considered a divine endowment and therefore ought to The value of life: who decides and how? 115 be borne without assistance, as the suffering is said to lead to enlightenment and divine reward. However, religious arguments are not required to defend sanctity beliefs. It is enough simply to say that all human lives are deserving of equal respect not because of what they have to offer or have offered or potentially will offer, but because they exist. The notion of inalienable human rights attributes force to the value of human life with the assertion that it needs no justification. This is the primary merit of the sanctity of life ethic – that a life requires no justification – but justification is required for the premature termination of that life. In this sense, the principle acts as a forceful bulwark against devaluing human life. Article 3 of the United Nations Declaration of Human rights asserts simply that: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.7 No argument is made to justify this claim because no argument is necessary. However, it will be necessary to justify any violation of this right.

#### Consequentialism is the best framework to avoid their impacts.

Robert E. Goodin, professor of social sciences and philosopher at the Research School of Social Sciences at Australian National University, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, 1995, p. 39

The rather more grand way of phrasing the point here might be couched in terms of undermining moral agency. Failure to discharge isolated, individual responsibilities may well result in other people's being harmed. That is wrong, but it is, at least in principle, a remediable wrong. People can, at least in principle, always be compensated for harms to their interests (or so the libertarian would claim, anyway). Failure to discharge shared, collective responsibilities has more grievous consequences, undermining in certain crucial respects other people's moral agency itself. For that, compensation is in principle impossible. There must be a moral agent to be compensated, and it is that very moral agency that is being undermined."

#### Severing ethics from consequentialism is self-defeating and is blind complicity with injustice.

Isaac, prof of political science @ indiana univ, 02 (jeffrey c., ends, means, and politics, dissent, vol. 49, issue 2, p. 32-38)

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics— as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

\*\*Other Resources

Chinese interests in SCS incite aggressive push outward

<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/paradox-chinas-naval-strategy?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120717&utm_term=gweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=86eadcd3f7984c6ea03a4aa869921422>

More on Chinese expansionism

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438711000846>

Increased US presence in SCS will deter nations from territorial conflict

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2012.690984>

Scenarios for SCS conflict

<http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4417&Itemid=188>

Sea turtles.

Manila Bulletin 7/14/12

(“Philippines rescues sea turtles from poachers' net,” July 14 2012, [http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/365962/14-turtles-rescued-from-poachers](http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/365962/14-turtles-rescued-from-poachers%20//))

Philippine authorities rescued 14 protected sea turtles that were caught in a net laid down by Chinese poachers, a navy commander said Saturday. However one sea turtle was already dead when a joint team from the navy and the environment department arrived Friday in the remote area off the western island of Palawan, said Major Ferdinand Atos. Atos, commander of naval forces in the area, said informants had told them that Chinese poachers planted the net a week ago in the coastal district of Balabac. "They enter the waters of Balabac, riding in a speedboat and they plant their nets, using their contacts among the locals," he told AFP. The 200-metre (660-foot) net left by the poachers was removed and the 14 surviving sea turtles were set free, Atos said. He said informants had told them that Chinese fishermen used their contacts to enter the area frequently and would bring their catch to Half-Moon Shoal, an outcrop in the Spratly islands claimed by both the Philippines and China. The shoal has come under closer scrutiny after China announced that one of its naval frigates had run aground there. Sea turtles are protected under Philippine law and catching them is punishable by at least 12 years in jail. Chinese fishermen poaching in Philippine waters have become an issue in recent months. In April, Philippine authorities tried to arrest Chinese fishermen taking sea turtles and other protected species from Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. They were blocked by Chinese government ships, triggering a continuing standoff over the area which is claimed by both countries.

Neg

Alt causes to US-China conflict – actual war highly unlikely – economic MAD is a stronger deterrent than US presence

RAND 11

(The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. “U.S. War with China Not Likely But Steps Needed to Keep the Peace,” October 10, 2011, <http://www.rand.org/news/press/2011/10/10/index1.html> | JS)

To avoid direct military conflict with China, the United States should adopt a parallel strategy that strengthens the defense capabilities of China's neighbors while inviting China into cooperative security endeavors that benefit the interests of both nations, according to a new RAND Corporation study. Researchers find that any military conflict between the United States and China would be disastrous for both sides. Fortunately, a Chinese-American military conflict is not likely to happen so long as the United States retains the capacity to deter behavior that could lead to a clash. The study examines six scenarios involving North Korea, Taiwan, cyberspace, the South China Sea, Japan and India that could result in a conflict between the United States and China. While researchers emphasize a China-U.S. military conflict is improbable as long as the United States continues to take appropriate measures for defense and deterrence, they find that China will gradually achieve local military superiority. "If it chose to do so, China could become a more capable opponent than either the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany at their peak," said James Dobbins, the study's lead author and a senior fellow at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. "However, China is not seeking to expand its territory or hold ideological sway over its neighbors. Nor is it seeking to match U.S. defense spending." The study finds that North Korea poses the greatest source for conflict in the region. Whether by a failed economy, a contested power transition or a defeat in a war with South Korea, the situation in North Korea would quickly become chaotic and confusing. The immediate operational concerns for the United States and South Korea would be to secure ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, as well as to neutralize North Korean artillery within range of Seoul. "For these missions, special operations forces, forced entry and airlift capabilities would be at a premium," Dobbins said. South Korea would provide sizable forces for these missions, but they would not be adequate to deal with the situation by themselves. A North Korean collapse could require a very large multinational stabilization force. China would likely respond by mobilizing the Shenyang Military Region forces and could send forces into North Korea to control refugee flow. "The likelihood of confrontations, whether intentional or accidental, between United States and Chinese forces would be high, with a significant potential for escalation," Dobbins said. On the other hand, it is equally possible that a North Korean collapse could engender a cooperative U.S. and Chinese response, with both countries joining others in seeking to stabilize the situation. While relations between Taiwan and China are improving, the chance of conflict across the Taiwan Strait will remain so long as the fundamental disagreement about the island's status as an independent nation or as part of a "reunified" China remains. The authors find that should a cross-Strait conflict erupt--such as a Chinese blockade of Taiwanese ports or an outright invasion--the U.S. would aim to prevent Chinese coercion or conquest of Taiwan and limit the damage to Taiwan's military, economy and society. To do so would require preventing China from gaining air and sea dominance, and limiting the impact of Beijing's land-attack missiles. This could include the possibility of U.S. strikes on mainland targets associated with the offensive against Taiwan, but such strikes would carry with them the risk of further escalation. China may preempt such actions with attacks of its own against U.S. assets in the region. "As China's military modernization progresses, the United States' ability to confidently accomplish these missions is eroding," Dobbins said. China already has demonstrated the capacity for cyberwarfare by conducting repeated intrusions into U.S. networks to steal sensitive data, without U.S. reprisal. Cyberwar between the two nations, researchers say, would not produce a "winner" as both countries would experience substantial economic harm. Such a conflict also would create tension that could negatively influence cooperative efforts involving Iran and the Korean peninsula. With additional potential conflicts in the South China Sea, Japan and India, researchers say the United States needs a wide range of advanced military capabilities to deter a conflict or prevail should one erupt. As Chinese power grows, the direct defense of American interests in East Asia will become progressively more difficult, beginning with Taiwan and spreading outward. Defense and deterrence will increasingly depend upon strengthened indigenous capabilities and the threat of escalation. Such escalation could be either geographic or into other domains such as space, cyber or economic, all areas of considerable American vulnerability. The study says any military conflict with China would have serious economic consequences for both sides. This interdependence is a powerful source of deterrence, operating in effect as a form of "mutual assured economic destruction." The United States needs to maintain the strength of its economy, lest it find itself even more deterred than is China by the prospect of such economic damage. The study, "Conflict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence," can be found at www.rand.org. Other authors are David C. Gompert, David A. Shlapak and Andrew Scobell. The study was prepared by the RAND Arroyo Center, which provides objective analytic research on major policy concerns to leadership of the U.S. Army, with an emphasis on mid- to long-term policy issues intended to improve effectiveness and efficiency. The center also provides the Army with short-term assistance on urgent problems and acts as a catalyst for needed change.

US occupation has devastating environmental consequences

Branigin 92 (William Branigin writes and edits breaking news. He previously was a reporter on the Post’s national and local staffs and spent 19 years overseas, reporting in Southeast Asia, Central America, the Middle East and Europe. Before joining the Post in 1979, he was a wire service reporter in Paris and a freelancer in Tehran and Beirut. He later served as the Post’s bureau chief in Bangkok, Mexico City and Manila. “PHILIPPINES: U.S. LEAVES TOXIC LEGACY AT MILITARY BASES,” 11-23-92, IPS // Lexis | JS)

The United States will leave behind a frightening legacy of environmental damage when it ends nearly a century of military presence in the Philippines this week. The last U.S. troops will leave Subic Naval Base tomorrow, more than a month before the Dec. 31 deadline for the U.S. pullout. The Philippine Senate last year rejected a new 10-year lease on U.S. military bases in the country. The United States abandoned Clark Air Base in November 1991, a few months after nearby Mt. Pinatubo spewed tons of ash, mud and rocks, causing severe damage to base facilities. But U.S. government documents and on-site investigation by Filipino scientists and the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) revealed that the bases have been exposed to danger other than last year's natural disaster. For more than 40 years, the U.S. Navy and Air Force stored and improperly disposed of tons of military and industrial wastes in and around Clark and Subic, according to a PCIJ report. "We found enough evidence for people to be concerned," said Dr Jorge Emmanuel, a Filipino-American environmental scientist who led the scientific probe. The report said U.S. forces had stored and used hazardous materials banned at home, such as asbestos and polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB), a cancer-causing chemical used in transformers. A decrepit 11-mile underground pipeline linking Subic and Clark was found to contain huge volumes of highly-corrosive aviation fuel, and live bombs and ammunition were left behind in firing ranges at the two bases. The findings raise questions on the U.S. military's policy on environmental protection at overseas bases and threaten to shake up an already troubled relationship with Manila, triggered by the Philippine Senate's rejection of a new bases treaty. The U.S. Embassy in Manila has denied the reports, including studies done by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), the investigative arm of the U.S. Congress. "All they're doing is reporting hearsay evidence," said U.S. Embassy spokesman Morton Smith. "We know what our standards are. We know what our actions are. We are fully in keeping with the requirements laid down by the U.S. government and the U.S. navy practice." But U.S. military practice generates a lot of pollution. The U.S. Armed Forces produce 500,000 tons of toxic waste every year, said a study by U.S. journalist Seth Shulman. A 1991 GAO report said most U.S. bases overseas had poor hazardous waste management facilities and programs. U.S. Navy reports said Subic produced 500 tons of toxic waste a year in 1990 and 1991, but disposed of less than 20 percent each year. "We were endlessly producing industrial toxic chemicals and discarding them without due regard for the pollution," recalled former Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, who is now deputy director of the Center for Defense Information in Washington. Ed Pugay, 33, a former worker at Subic's Ship Repair Facility, said it was only in the months leading to Subic's closure that base officials warned them of the dangers of asbestos and other toxic wastes they inhaled while repairing or cleaning Navy ships. Whenever PCB-contaminated fuel was spilled, the soiled ground was dug up and isolated by workers wearing full protective clothing and respirators. "This worried many of us because they only started doing this last year," said former Subic worker Edgar Magalang. "What about those other years?" Children have also been killed or wounded when unexploded bombs and ammunition left behind in firing ranges blew up. Fernando Velonza, whose eight-year-old son died when live ammunition exploded at a Subic firing range, said: "I couldn't do anything . . .The people I was up against were armed, so I just had to think of it as an accident. That's all I could think of." The full extent of the environmental damage is unknown, but some U.S. officials say they will neither conduct a study nor do a clean-up if serious damage is proven at Subic and Clark. U.S. estimates show a comprehensive study at one facility could cost as much as $1.5 million, and clean-up at each base could cost as much as $25 million. U.S. officials claim the United States is not legally liable for environmental damage at the bases, and argue they are leaving behind valuable property estimated at two billion dollars. Prof. Raphael Lotilla of the University of the Philippines College of Law says Manila should raise the issue of damage at the bases, if only to educate Filipinos on future dealings with the United States. "It would make them aware of the political considerations to be taken into account in dealing with a superpower," he said. Lotilla added: "Perhaps more people will realize that when we deal with any country, we must look out for our own interests -- nobody else will."