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Inherency

Current screening systems are inadequate and offer little port security

Douglas Frantz, previously chief investigator for the [Senate Foreign Relations Committee](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Foreign_Relations_Committee), Managing Director of *Kroll’s Business Intelligence* Washington office, investigative reporter, 7/15/12, “Port security: U.S. fails to meet deadline for scanning of cargo containers”, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/port-security-us-fails-to-meet-deadline-for-scanning-of-cargo-containers/2012/07/15/gJQAmgW8mW_story.html>

The Obama administration has failed to meet a legal deadline for scanning all shipping containers for radioactive material before they reach the United States, a requirement aimed at strengthening maritime security and preventing terrorists from smuggling a nuclear device into any of the nation’s 300 sea and river ports. The Department of Homeland Security was given until this month to ensure that 100 percent of inbound shipping containers are screened at foreign ports. But [the department’s secretary, Janet Napolitano](http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/janet-napolitano/gIQAynPe9O_topic.html), informed Congress in May that she was extending a two-year blanket exemption to foreign ports because the screening is proving too costly and cumbersome. She said it would cost $16 billion to implement scanning measures at the nearly 700 ports worldwide that ship to the United States. Instead, the DHS relies on intelligence-gathering and analysis to identify “high-risk” containers, which are checked before being loaded onto ships. Under this system, fewer than half a percent of the roughly 10 million containers arriving at U.S. ports last year were scanned before departure. The DHS says that those checks turned up narcotics and other contraband but that there have been no public reports of smuggled nuclear material. In response to the [9/11 Commission,](http://www.9-11commission.gov/) Congress passed a law in 2007 specifying that no cargo container may enter the United States before being scanned with imaging equipment and a radiation-detection device. The administration’s failure to meet the deadline has left some members of Congress and outside experts concerned about whether the threat is being taken seriously enough. “I personally do not believe they intend to comply with the law,” [Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.)](http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/members/M000133), co-author of the 2007 law, said in an interview. “This is a real terrorist threat, and it has a solution. We can’t afford to wait until a catastrophic attack.” The DHS says monitors scan 99 percent of the containers for radiation after they arrive at U.S. ports. But experts say the monitors at U.S. ports are not sophisticated enough to detect nuclear devices or highly enriched uranium, which emit low levels of radiation. The Government Accountability Office has [warned that a nuclear device could be detonated while at a port](http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588253.pdf) — containers often sit for days awaiting radiation checks — causing billions of dollars in damage in addition to the loss of life. Estimates of damage caused by a nuclear detonation at a major port range from tens of billions of dollars to $1 trillion. Shipping containers are potentially ideal for smuggling weapons, people and other illicit cargo; ensuring the integrity of the contents is difficult and costly. The standard container is 40 feet long and 8 feet high and holds more than 30 tons of cargo. A large vessel carries 3,000 or more containers from hundreds of different shippers and many ports. And a single container can hold cargo from many customers. Counterterrorism experts have worried about port vulnerability since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the self-described mastermind of the attacks, reportedly told interrogators he had considered sending explosives to the United States hidden inside a shipment of personal computers from Japan.

New federal funding is key

**MAR 12** (Maritime Activity Reports, online news filter for maritime activity, “Ports Urge Congress to Support Port Security Grants” 3/7/12. <http://www.marinelink.com/news/congress-security-support342938.aspx>)

At two separate Congressional hearings, representatives of the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) emphasized the need for federal support for seaport security and maintenance and improvements to federal navigation channels. Port industry leaders illustrated the challenges underfunding security and dredging pose for national security and U.S. international competitiveness. As the House Appropriations Committee begins work on the Fiscal Year 2013 budget, AAPA executives reminded Congressional leaders of the critical role ports play for the nation – serving as a front line of defense on international borders and facilitating overseas trade, 99 percent of which moves by water. Captain John Holmes, Deputy Executive Director of Operations at the Port of Los Angeles, testified before the Homeland Security Subcommittee regarding Port Security Grants within the Federal Emergency Management Agency. “The fiscal year 2012 funding level represents a 59 percent cut from the prior year and 75 percent less than the authorized level,” Holmes stated. “This will harm our ability to expand protection of our maritime assets, carry out Port-Wide Risk Management Plans, and fund federal mandates, such as installation of TWIC readers.”

Plan

Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase port security in the United States.

Advantage 1: Deterrence

Terrorists have both opportunity and motive to attack our ports

Flynn 03 (Written Testimony before a hearing of the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D. a terrorism expert at Northeastern University and former Commander of the U.S. Coast Guard, and a Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies, and Director of the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Homeland Security Imperatives, 3/20/03, “The Fragile State of Container Security”, [www.cfr](http://www.cfr).org/defensehomeland-security/fragile-state-container-security/p5730)

The responsibility for making sure that goods loaded in a box were legitimate and authorized was shouldered almost exclusively by the importing jurisdiction. But as the volume of containerized cargo grew exponentially, the number of agents assigned to police that cargo stayed flat or even declined among most trading nations. The rule of thumb in the inspection business is that it takes five agents three hours to conduct a thorough physical examination of a single full intermodal container. Last year nearly 20 million containers washed across America’s borders via a ship, train, and truck. Frontline agencies had only enough inspectors and equipment to examine between 1-2 percent of that cargo.

Thus, for would-be terrorists, the global intermodal container system that is responsible for moving the overwhelming majority of the world’s freight satisfies the age-old criteria of opportunity and motive. “Opportunity” flows from (1) the almost complete absence of any security oversight in the loading and transporting of a box from its point of origin to its final destination, and (2) the fact that growing volume and velocity at which containers move around the planet create a daunting “needle-in-the-haystack” problem for inspectors. “Motive” is derived from the role that the container now plays in underpinning global supply chains and the likely response by the U.S. government to an attack involving a container. Based on statements by the key officials at U.S. Customs, the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Transportation, should a container be used as a “poor man’s missile,” the shipment of all containerized cargo into our ports and across our borders would be halted. As a consequence, a modest investment by a terrorist could yield billions of dollars in losses to the U.S. economy by shutting down—even temporarily—the system that moves “just-in-time” shipments of parts and goods. Given the current state of container security, it is hard to imagine how a post-event lock-down on container shipments could be either prevented or short-lived. One thing we should have learned from the 9-11 attacks involving passenger airliners, the follow-on anthrax attacks, and even last fall Washington sniper spree is that terrorist incidents pose a special challenge for public officials. In the case of most disasters, the reaction by the general public is almost always to assume the event is an isolated one. Even if the post-mortem provides evidence of a systemic vulnerability, it often takes a good deal of effort to mobilize a public policy response to redress it. But just the opposite happens in the event of a terrorist attack—especially one involving catastrophic consequences. When these attacks take place, the assumption by the general public is almost always to presume a general vulnerability unless there is proof to the contrary. Government officials have to confront head-on this loss of public confidence by ahnonng evidence that they have a credible means to manage the risk highlighted by the terrorist incident. In the interim as recent events have shown, people will refuse to fly, open their mail, or even leave their homes. If a terrorist were to use a container as a weapon-delivery devise, the easiest choice would be high-explosives such as those used in the attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Some form of chemical weapon, perhaps even involving hazardous materials, is another likely scenario. A bio-weapon is a less attractive choice for a terrorist because of the challenge of dispersing the agent in a sufficiently concentrated form beyond the area where the explosive devise goes off. A “dirty bomb” is the more likely threat vs. a nuclear weapon, but all these scenarios are conceivable since the choice of a weapon would not be constrained by any security measures currently in place in our seaports or within the intermodal transportation industry.

**Widespread increased security in ports deters terrorism and is cost effective—the plan is key**

**RAND**, The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world., 20**09,** a chapter in the series of New Ideas produced by rand found at, “Understanding the Role of Deterrence in Counterterrorism Security”, page 1 [www.rand](http://www.rand).org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP281.pdf

Deterrence is a central concept in counterterrorism security, yet it is not well understood or measured. Without effective deterrence, counterterrorism security may simply be impractical, as noted by the Transportation Research Board (2002, p. 34): “[T]he impracticality of elimi- nating all transportation vulnerabilities means that efforts to deter must be a key part of trans- portation security strategies.” Deterrence is also a major factor in the cost-effectiveness of many security programs. For instance, even if a radiation-detection system at ports never actually encounters weapon material, if it deters would-be attackers from trying to smuggle such mate- rial into the country, it could easily be cost-effective even if associated program costs are very high. On the other hand, if smugglers can merely shift their operations to smaller ports or land routes, then the benefits of the program may be slight in spite of its narrow deterrent effect. Indeed, a recent National Research Council (2009) review of one such port radiation-detection program, the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal program, recommended that development of the program be discontinued until questions about deterrent effects, deflection (or risk-shifting) effects, and related factors central to cost-effectiveness are better understood. This paper builds on a growing literature examining terrorist decisionmaking to examine the role of deterrence in counterterrorism strategy for homeland security. It discusses deter- rence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and considers adaptations that would-be attackers are likely to make in response to U.S. security efforts. It also discusses the related and nettlesome connection between deterrence and risk transfer, including the possibility that some successful deterrent actions can increase the level of danger. The paper then suggests a simple analytic framework for evaluating the relative value of deterrent actions. Such a framework is necessary for ensuring that counterterrorism security investments are efficient and effective. Prior studies and observation of terrorist-group behavior make it clear that terrorists respond dynamically to the security measures they encounter or suspect they will encoun- ter (Jackson et al., 2007). Therefore, to optimize security strategies, the United States needs to understand how such strategies are likely to affect terrorists’ decisions about whether and what to attack (Jackson, 2009a; 2009b). Ideally, deterrence and risk-displacement effects are “designed in” so that security measures manipulate terrorist decisionmaking in ways that pro- duce net security benefits. We explore this possibility by building on an economics literature that began with Becker’s 1968 analysis of crime and its management and has more recently been extended to investigate terrorist and security-manager decisionmaking, often in the con- text of economic game theory. In the next sections, we propose a general conceptual model for how security measures affect terrorists who plan attacks. We discuss this model’s implications for understanding both deterrence and the risk-displacement effects of security measures, as well as for counterterrorist security planning more generally. Finally, we propose a framework for evaluating alternative security measures that takes into account the possibility that deterrence merely results in risk displacement. Terrorist Decisions—The Targets of Deterrence Despite occasional uncertainty and periodic controversy on the point, it is by now conven- tional to assume that terrorists pursue their objectives rationally. Although determined terror- ists—both as individuals and organizations—may be willing to risk everything to achieve their objectives, they do not wish to waste their own lives or other resources on missions that are doomed to fail or unlikely to achieve their intended results. This insight has led to a growing game-theory literature examining how to optimize security investments given the assumption that terrorists are guided by principles of expected utility theory (e.g., Bier, 2005; Golany et al., 2009; Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2005; Major, 2002; Phillips, 2009; Zhuang and Bier, 2007, 2009; Zhuang, Bier, and Alagoz, 2009). The distinction between terrorists as individuals and terrorist groups as organizations is important for understanding the deterrent effects of security measures. The example of indi- vidual suicide terrorists is often invoked to illustrate why security measures that threaten the safety of operatives may have less of a deterrent effect than those aimed against criminals or other attackers who want to live to see another day. Even if an individual suicide terrorist is prepared to die for a minor victory, however, this may not be true for the organization that dispatches the operative. Both may be sensitive to measures that affect the successful outcome of the operation, but the group might also be sensitive to measures that both threaten the life of the operative and provide security forces with information that could compromise the group. In our discussion, we chiefly focus on deterring organizations. From this perspective, individuals are deterred when their actions would produce unacceptable harm to their organi- zations. See Radlauer (2006) for a discussion of the two different targets of deterrence. Examples of terrorists’ sensitivity to operational risks abound. Hoffman (1997), for instance, quotes George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine as saying, “The main point is to select targets where success is 100% assured.” Although hyperbolic, the quote illustrates sensitivity to risks. In the doctrine of groups like the Provisional Irish Repub- lican Army, requirements for operational planning include explicit consideration of how pre- attack surveillance can be used to manage and reduce operational risks. Similarly, in a docu- ment captured from the Islamic State of Iraq/al Qaeda in Iraq (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2008, p. 6), a group member laments the deleterious effects on potential suicide bombers when they suspect that poor planning may result in their lives being wasted on low- value targets: The brother . . . starts hearing stories and episodes of previous suicide bombers who carried out their attacks in the air or against walls. He hears also that the brothers will be sending him to an easy target that can be dealt with by a security or military operation. One of the brothers will inform the suicide bomber that the target will be against two police cars or one of the apostate leaders; as result [sic], his morale will deteriorate as he was hoping to cause huge damage to the apostate group, and devilish thoughts and depression crawls [sic] to his heart. The problem will increase when he hears about more suicide bombers who were captured while carrying out their operations, since the car did not explode or as a result of failure of the booby trapped vehicle. Rapid changes in terrorist tactics in response to effective security countermeasures—such as the decline in aircraft hijacking attempts after magnetometers were introduced as a routine part of passenger screening or a group’s decision to use indirect weapons, such as mortars and rockets, to attack targets protected by security barriers—also implicitly demonstrate terrorists’ sensitivity and rational adaptation to operational risks posed by security measures (Enders and Sandler, 2002; Jackson et al., 2007). Because terrorists are sensitive to the risk posed by their operations but also highly moti- vated to achieve operational objectives or the intended payoff, they must at least implicitly undertake a kind of cost-benefit analysis of the available alternative operations. Indeed, explicit prescriptions for this sort of rational decisionmaking can be found in contemporary writings by al Qaeda strategists. For example, in The Management of Savagery, Naji (2006, p. 107) directs planners to weigh the “benefit and harm” of different actions they might undertake, directly echoing this sort of cost-benefit thinking. Other groups have made similar statements, either with respect to individual acts or to violent action overall. The previously cited document captured from the Islamic State of Iraq/al Qaeda in Iraq parallels this argument while criti- cizing some of the group’s midlevel emirs for not performing such analyses appropriately and therefore wasting operatives and resources in attacks that failed to properly weigh operational risks against probability of success (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2008). In this case, risky actions are seen by the perpetrators themselves as taken not “irrationally” but out of incompetence.

Terrorists CAN be deterred – making one goal unattainable doesn’t cause a tradeoff but decreases the risk of terrorism overall

TTSRL 08 (Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law was a multi-faceted research project that aimed to help Europe better understand terrorism conducted between 2006 and 2009; December 2008; “Concepts of Terrorism” [www.transnationalterrorism](http://www.transnationalterrorism).eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%205.pdf)

Robert F. Traeger and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva argue, in Deterring Terrorism. It Can Be Done (2005), that deterrence as a way to counter and prevent terrorism is grossly overlooked. Moreover they contend that it has proven to have been both cost-effective as well as operationally effective in the Southern Philippines. They base this contention on a study of the cases of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group with regard to deterring them from supporting al-Qaida. Traeger and Zagorcheva initially argue that the three reasons why deterrence as a strategy is often discarded is based on various misunderstandings to do both with deterrence as well as the concept of terrorism in general. The first reason is that terrorists are assumed to be irrational and “therefore unresponsive to the cost-benefit calculations required for deterrence” (Traeger and Zagorcheva, 2005:87). This, according to Traeger and Zagorcheva, is “contradicted by a growing body of literature that shows that terrorist groups (though not necessarily every individual who engages in terrorist activities) usually have a set of hierarchically ordered goals and choose strategies that best advance them” (Traeger and Zagorcheva, 2005:93-94). The second reason why deterrence is often discarded is that terrorists are believed to be so highly motivated that they cannot be deterred. This, according to Traeger and Zagorcheva, is also a misconception. The strategy of deterrence, however, has to be designed according to the intensity of the motivation as well as the type of goals of the group in question. The third reason why deterrence is often discarded is that “even if terrorists were afraid of punishment, they cannot be deterred because they ‘lack a return address against which retaliation can be visited’” (Traeger and Zagorcheva, 2005:87-88) This assumption is likewise rejected by Traeger and Zagorcheva, because “when states devote sufficient resources, they can find members of terrorist organizations” (Traeger and Zagorcheva, 2005:108). And even without a “return address” the costs-benefit balance for the terrorist can be changed, if the costs cannot be increased then the rewards can be made even more unattainable. According to Traeger and Zagorcheva, the more motivated the group is the more effective this method will be; “[h]ighly motivated terrorists, because they hold their political goals so dearly, are loath to run even lower-level risks to these goals” (Traeger and Zagorcheva, 2005:110). Consequently, an elevation of the costs and the risks will result in a decline.

A port attack is the most likely risk of nuclear terrorism

Konkel 05 (Todd Konkel, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 2005, “Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe” <http://irps>.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf)

In one of his final interviews before leaving office, former Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that the greatest danger facing the United States in the war on terrorism is the possibility that al Qaeda or a sympathetic terrorist group could obtain a nuclear bomb.56 Security experts from the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard, and a multitude of think tanks have repeatedly identified the maritime cargo transportation system as the most likely means by which terrorists might bring a nuclear weapon into the United States. Despite these warnings, current measures to defend against a container-borne nuclear attack remain terribly inadequate.

Retaliation causes global nuclear war

Hellman 08 (Martin Hellman, Professor Engineering Stanford, Spring 2008, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” [www.nuclearrisk.org/ 1why\_now.php](http://www.nuclearrisk.org/%201why_now.php))

Nuclear proliferation and the specter of nuclear terrorism are creating additional possibilities for triggering a nuclear war. If an American (or Russian) city were devastated by an act of nuclear terrorism, the public outcry for immediate, decisive action would be even stronger than Kennedy had to deal with when the Cuban missiles first became known to the American public. While the action would likely not be directed against Russia, it might be threatening to Russia (e.g., on its borders) or one of its allies and precipitate a crisis that resulted in a full-scale nuclear war. Terrorists with an apocalyptic mindset might even attempt to catalyze a full-scale nuclear war by disguising their act to look like an attack by the U.S. or Russia.

Proliferation of biological weapons makes bioterrorism likely

Koblentz 04 (Gregory Koblentz, is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public and International Affairs and Deputy Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University, he is an Associate Faculty at the Center for Global Studies at George Mason University, and he is a Research Affiliate with the Security Studies Program at MIT, at the time he was a doctoral candidate in political science at MIT, Winter 2003/04 “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare” <http://belfercenter>.hks.harvard.edu/files/koblentz.pdf)

Preventing the spread of biological warfare capabilities to dis satisfied actors seeking a means to challenge the status quo is extremely difªcult. The proliferation of biological weapons is facilitated by the dual-use nature of biotechnology, which also complicates verification of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The BWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, and retention of biological weapons.41 It does not include provisions for veriªcation. In 2001, negotiations to develop a protocol to strengthen the BWC were halted after the United States announced that it would not accept the draft protocol. According to U.S. ofªcials, the proposed protocol was not intrusive enough to detect clandestine biological weapons activities, yet it was too invasive to adequately safeguard proprietary and classiªed information.42 Actors pursuing biological weapons are motivated by a variety of factors.43 The secrecy that shrouds biological weapons programs and the lack of reliable information regarding decisions to develop such programs, however, complicate efforts to study their motivations more thoroughly.44 Nevertheless, an examination of the characteristics of biological weapons strongly suggests that they are attractive primarily to dissatisfied actors—whether states or terrorists. Biological weapons have military utility across the spectrum of conflict, rely on surprise, and do not destroy property. These characteristics favor the use of such weapons in offensive operations and asymmetric strategies against stronger opponents. The outlaw status of biological weapons renders them undesirable to status quo states interested primarily in self-defense. In addition, the relative ease of accessibility, high levels of potency, and potentially huge psychological impact combine to make biological weapons attractive to extremist religious terrorist groups **i**nterested in maximizing casualties and fear. In sum, dis satisfied actors—both states and terrorists—have the opportunity and motivation to acquire these weapons.

Bioterror is the most likely risk for human extinction – even a minor risk means the plan is key

Matheny 07 **(**Jason Matheny research associate with the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University where his work focuses on technology forecasting and risk assessment – particularly of global catastrophic risks and existential risks, he is a Sommer Scholar and PhD candidate in Applied Economics at Johns Hopkins University, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction” <http://physics>.harvard.edu/~wilson/pmpmta/Mahoney\_extinction.pdf)

More recent predictions of human extinction are little more optimistic. In their catalogs of extinction risks, Britain’s Astronomer Royal, Sir Martin Rees (2003), gives humanity 50-50 odds on surviving the 21st century; philosopher Nick Bostrom argues that it would be “misguided” to assume that the probability of extinction is less than 25%; and philosopher John Leslie (1996) assigns a 30% probability to extinction during the next five centuries. The “Stern Review” for theU.K. Treasury (2006) assumes that the probability of human extinction during the next century is 10%. And some explanations of the “Fermi Paradox” imply Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction 1337 a high probability (close to100%)of extinctionamong technological civilizations (Pisani, 2006).4 Estimating the probabilities of unprecedented events is subjective, so we should treat these numbers skeptically. Still, even if the probability of extinction is several orders lower, because the stakes are high, it could be wise to invest in extinction countermeasures. We already invest in some extinction countermeasures. NASA spends $4 million per year monitoring near-Earth asteroids and comets (Leary, 2007) and there has been some research on how to deflect these objects using existing technologies (Gritzner&Kahle, 2004; NASA, 2007). $1.7 billion is spent researching climate change and there are many strategies to reduce carbon emissions (Posner, 2004, p. 181). There are policies to reduce nuclear threats, such as the Non- Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as well as efforts to secure expertise by employing former nuclear scientists. Of current extinction risks, the most severe may be bioterrorism. The knowledge needed to engineer a virus is modest compared to that needed to build a nuclear weapon; the necessary equipment and materials are increasingly accessible and because biological agents are self-replicating, a weapon can have an exponential effect on a population (Warrick, 2006; Williams, 2006). 5 Current U.S. biodefense efforts are funded at $5 billion per year to develop and stockpile new drugs and vaccines, monitor biological agents and emerging diseases, and strengthen the capacities of local health systems to respond to pandemics (Lam, Franco, & Shuler, 2006).

Advantage 2: Economy

Scenario 1:

A nuclear terrorist port attack would cause global recession within 3 weeks

Harrald 05 (Dr. John R. Harrald, Ph.D., he served as director of The George Washington University Institute of Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management, professor in the university’s Department of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering, School of Engineering and Applied Science, co founder of The George Washington University Aviation Institute, and program director, Crisis, Emergency and Risk Management graduate curriculum, School of Engineering and Applied Sciences at GW, Fall 2005 “Sea Trade and Security: an Assessment of the Post-9/11 Reaction”, [www.questia](http://www.questia).com/PM.qst?a=o&d=501223965)

The scenarios are indeed horrifying. Containers, for example, maybe used as a vector for an attack involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A nuclear device smuggled in one of millions of containers and remotely detonated could have catastrophic results. A study conducted by the Department of Transportation’s Volpe Center states that the detonation of a 10-to-20-kilotonweapon in a container would cause a disruption of trade valued at $100-$300billion, property damage of $50-$500 billion, and the loss of 50,000-1,000,000 lives.12 The report states that “global and long term effects, including the economic impacts of the pervasive national and international responses to the nuclear attack, though not calculated, are believed to be substantially greater.” According to Flynn, it would not take a WMD to wreak financial havoc: A dirty bomb smuggled in a container and set off in a seaport would likely kill only a few unfortunate longshoremen and contaminate several acres of valuable waterfront property. But if there is no credible security system to restore the public’s confidence that other containers are safe, mayors and governors throughout the country, as well as the President, will come under withering political pressure to order the shutdown of the inter-modal transportation system. Examining cargo in tens of thousands of trucks, trains and ships to ensure it poses no threat would have devastating economic consequences. When containers stop moving, assembly plants go idle, retail shelves are bare, and workers end up in unemployment lines. **A three-week shutdown could well spawn a global recession**.13

And, even a conventional port terrorism attack will kill the economy

Flynn 03 (Written Testimony before a hearing of the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D. a terrorism expert at Northeastern University and former Commander of the U.S. Coast Guard, and a Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies, and Director of the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Homeland Security Imperatives, 3/20/03, “The Fragile State of Container Security”, [www.cfr](http://www.cfr).org/defensehomeland-security/fragile-state-container-security/p5730)

Chairperson Collins, Senator Lieberman, and distinguished members of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. I am the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations where I recently directed the Independent Task Force on Homeland Security, co-chaired by former Senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart. In June 2002, I retired as a Commander in the U.S. Coast Guard after 20 years of active duty service. I am honored to be appearing before you this morning on the issue of container security. On October 12, 2001, I had the opportunity to testify before this committee at its first post 9-11 hearing on homeland security. At that time, I asserted that “the economic and societal disruption created by the September 11 attacks has opened Pandora’s box. Future terrorists bent on challenging U.S. power will draw inspiration from the seeming ease at which America could be attacked and they will be encouraged by the mounting costs to the U.S. economy and the public psyche associated with the ad-hoc efforts to restore security following that attack.” A year later I joined with former senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart in preparing our report, “America: Still Unprepared—Still In Danger.” We observed that “nineteen men wielding box-cutters forced the United States to do to itself what no adversary could ever accomplish: a successful blockade of the U.S. economy. If a surprise terrorist attack were to happen tomorrow involving the sea, rail, or truck transportation systems that carry millions of tons of trade to the United States each day, the response would likely be the same—a self-imposed global embargo.” Based on that analysis, we identified as second of the six critical mandates that deserve the nation’s immediate attention: “Make trade security a global priority; the system for moving goods affordably and reliably around the world is ripe for exploitation and vulnerable to mass disruption by terrorists.” This is why the topic of today’s hearing is so important. The stakes are enormous. U.S. prosperity—and much of its power—relies on its ready access to global markets. Both the scale and pace at which goods move between markets has exploded in recent years thanks in no small part to the invention and proliferation of the intermodal container. These ubiquitous boxes—most come in the 40’x8’x8’ size—have transformed the transfer of cargo from a truck, train, and ship into the transportation equivalent of connecting Lego blocks. The result has been to increasingly diminish the role of distance for a supplier or a consumer as a constraint in the world marketplace. Ninety percent of the world’s freight now moves in a container. Companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors move up to 30 tons of merchandise or parts across the vast Pacific Ocean from Asia to the West Coast for about $1600. The transatlantic trip runs just over a $1000—which makes the postage stamp seem a bit overpriced. But the system that underpins the incredibly efficient, reliable, and affordable movement of global freight has one glaring shortcoming in the post-9-11 world—it was built without credible safeguards to prevent it from being exploited or targeted by terrorists and criminals. Prior to September 11, 2001, virtually anyone in the world could arrange with an international shipper or carrier to have an empty intermodal container delivered to their home or workplace. They then could load it with tons of material, declare in only the most general terms what the contents were, “seal” it with a 50-cent lead tag, and send it on its way to any city and town in the United States. The job of transportation providers was to move the box as expeditiously as possible. Exercising any care to ensure that the integrity of a container’s contents was not compromised may have been a commercial practice, but it was not a requirement. The responsibility for making sure that goods loaded in a box were legitimate and authorized was shouldered almost exclusively by the importing jurisdiction. But as the volume of containerized cargo grew exponentially, the number of agents assigned to police that cargo stayed flat or even declined among most trading nations. The rule of thumb in the inspection business is that it takes five agents three hours to conduct a thorough physical examination of a single full intermodal container. Last year nearly 20 million containers washed across America’s borders via a ship, train, and truck. Frontline agencies had only enough inspectors and equipment to examine between 1-2 percent of that cargo. Thus, for would-be terrorists, the global intermodal container system that is responsible for moving the overwhelming majority of the world’s freight satisfies the age-old criteria of opportunity and motive. “Opportunity” flows from (1) the almost complete absence of any security oversight in the loading and transporting of a box from its point of origin to its final destination, and (2) the fact that growing volume and velocity at which containers move around the planet create a daunting “needle-in-the-haystack” problem for inspectors. “Motive” is derived from the role that the container now plays in underpinning global supply chains and the likely response by the U.S. government to an attack involving a container. Based on statements by the key officials at U.S. Customs, the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Transportation, should a container be used as a “poor man’s missile,” the shipment of all containerized cargo into our ports and across our borders would be halted. As a consequence, a modest investment by a terrorist could yield billions of dollars in losses to the U.S. economy by shutting down—even temporarily—the system that moves “just-in-time” shipments of parts and goods. Given the current state of container security, it is hard to imagine how a post-event lock-down on container shipments could be either prevented or short-lived. One thing we should have learned from the 9-11 attacks involving passenger airliners, the follow-on anthrax attacks, and even last fall Washington sniper spree is that terrorist incidents pose a special challenge for public officials. In the case of most disasters, the reaction by the general public is almost always to assume the event is an isolated one. Even if the post-mortem provides evidence of a systemic vulnerability, it often takes a good deal of effort to mobilize a public policy response to redress it. But just the opposite happens in the event of a terrorist attack—especially one involving catastrophic consequences. When these attacks take place, the assumption by the general public is almost always to presume a general vulnerability unless there is proof to the contrary. Government officials have to confront head-on this loss of public confidence by ahnonng evidence that they have a credible means to manage the risk highlighted by the terrorist incident. In the interim as recent events have shown, people will refuse to fly, open their mail, or even leave their homes. If a terrorist were to use a container as a weapon-delivery devise, the easiest choice would be high-explosives such as those used in the attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Some form of chemical weapon, perhaps even involving hazardous materials, is another likely scenario. A bio-weapon is a less attractive choice for a terrorist because of the challenge of dispersing the agent in a sufficiently concentrated form beyond the area where the explosive devise goes off. A “dirty bomb” is the more likely threat vs. a nuclear weapon, but all these scenarios are conceivable since the choice of a weapon would not be constrained by any security measures currently in place in our seaports or within the intermodal transportation industry. This is why a terrorist attack involving a cargo container could cause such profound economic disruption. An incident triggered by even a conventional weapon going off in a box could result in a substantial loss of life. In the immediate aftermath, the general public will want reassurance that one of the many other thousands of containers arriving on any given day will not pose a similar risk. The President of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other keys officials responsible for the security of the nation would have to stand before a traumatized and likely skeptical American people and outline the measures they have in place to prevent another such attack. In the absence of a convincing security framework to manage the risk of another incident, the public would likely insist that all containerized cargo be stopped until adequate safeguards are in place. Even with the most focused effort, constructing that framework from scratch could take months—even years. Yet, within three weeks, the entire worldwide intermodal transportation industry would effectively be brought to its knees—as would much of the freight movements that make up international trade.

Scenario 2:

Perception of vulnerability to a terrorist port threat halts economic growth and causes permanent long term damage

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Suppose for a moment that the New York Port Authority receives a threat of a radioactive “dirty bomb” to be detonated on a container ship in the Port of New York. Lower Manhattan is evacuated, and most of the other five boroughs’ residents also choose to leave. Business grinds to a halt as both consumers and workers take cover. Within thirty-six hours, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announces that the threat has passed. However, many residents wait several more days before returning, while others do not return at all. Business continues to wane as tourism stalls and factories and shops close down. It will be several months before the city fully recovers. This illustration demonstrates the importance of perceived risk regarding terrorism. The perception of risk – whether or not risk is actually present – is sufficient to cause real and long-term damages. Understanding how specific factors drive the perception of risk is essential to understanding how people will respond to threats of terrorism. There are many benefits to the empirical study of risk perception among the general populace. This research provides a better understanding of how risk perception influences political attitudes; it provides insight into how risk perception impacts various behaviors; it allows the mapping of social processes such as risk amplification and attenuation; it informs the development of effective communication and education programs; and it is useful for identifying which situational factors contribute to perceived risk. Each of these benefits will be discussed in turn, along with an examination of previous contributions in this field and explanations of how they inform homeland security research and policy. The concept of risk is a psychological one. Risk, as opposed to danger, is a socially constructed phenomenon. 1 Riskiness is based on perception rather than fact, and this perception is based on qualitative, not quantitative characteristics of the hazard being considered. 2 Paul Slovic argues that risks are made up of qualitative attributes like voluntariness or probability. He further posits that no single attribute defines the risk of a particular hazard; neither are specific attributes equally influential across different hazards. 3Even when the facts and probabilities of a particular hazard are well defined and well known, human judgment is required to determine which information is most important to defining the risk of that hazard. A study by Slovic and others found that participants’ ratings of risk did not match their own mortality estimates, indicating that factors other than death toll must be related to risk decisions. 4 Whether a risk is considered acceptable is also a matter of priorities and values, which are psychological by definition. 5 The subjective and perceptual nature of risk makes it an important area of study for the psychological sciences.

Scenario 3:

Maritime security is key to international trade

Joseph J. **Cox**, President, Chamber of Shipping of America, 10/2/**01**, “RAILROAD AND MARITIME SECURITY”, Senate Hearing 107-1033 From the U.S. Government Printing Office, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg89457/html/CHRG-107shrg89457.htm>

Chamber of Shipping of America–International and Domestic Responsibilities CSA traces its roots back to 1917 and the development of the first international treaty on maritime safety. Since that time, the U.S. has had extensive dealings with the international community on maritime matters. We mention this because it is critical to recognize two very important points: the maritime industry is the basic tool of international trade and the U.S. has been one of the leaders in the development of policies for this industry for decades. At the same time, we have an extensive trade in our waters among U.S. companies. The needs of the U.S. for a secure waterfront will have an impact on our ships and the ships of our trading partners. We should recognize that ships are the critical mechanism for the United States in its world trade leadership. Ships are the lifelines of trade from other nations to the U.S. and from the U.S. to the rest of the world. Types of Ships CSA represents all types of ships that carry cargo. These include container ships, tankers, both crude and product tankers, roll-on roll- off ships, integrated tug-barge units and large coastwise barges. Our members are involved in operating ships, chartering ships, arranging for crew and pilotage, government inspections, insurance surveys, complying with laws and regulations, responding to customer requests and generally keeping the maritime commerce of the country on the move.

The shipping industry is the cornerstone of the global economy—current solutions to port security lack enforcement and fail

Council on Foreign Relations, 6/22/12, “The Global Oceans Regime”, <http://www.cfr.org/energyenvironment/global-oceans-regime/p21035>

Securing commercial shipping:Global supply chains at risk Global shipping is incredibly lucrative, but its sheer scope and breadth presents an array of security and safety challenges. The collective fleet consists of approximately 50,000 ships registered in more than 150 nations. With more than one million employees, this armada transports over [eight billion tons](http://www.unctad.org/en/Docs/rmt2011_en.pdf) (PDF) of goods per year—roughly [90 percent](http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2011/04/06/prweb8271890.DTL) of global trade. And the melting Arctic is opening previously impassable trade routes; in 2009, two German merchant vessels [traversed](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8251914.stm) the Northeast Passage successfully for the first time in recent history. But despite impressive innovations in the shipping industry, maritime accidents and attacks on ships still occur frequently, resulting in the loss of billions of dollars of cargo. **Ensuring the safety and security of the global shipping fleet is essential to the stability of the world economy**. Internationally, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) provides security guidelines for ships through the [Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea](http://www.cfr.org/publication/20617/), which governs everything from construction to the number of fire extinguishers on board. The IMO also aims to prevent maritime accidents through international standards for navigation and navigation equipment, including satellite communications and locating devices. Although compliance with these conventions has been uneven, regional initiatives such as the [Paris Memorandum of Understanding](http://www.cfr.org/europerussia/paris-memorandum-understanding-port-state-control/p20615) have helped ensure the safety of international shipping. In addition, numerous IMO conventions govern the safety of container shipping, including the [International Convention on Safe Containers](http://www.cfr.org/publication/20620/), which creates uniform regulations for shipping containers, and the [International Convention on Load Lines](http://www.cfr.org/publication/20621/), which determines the volume of containers a ship can safely hold. However, these conventions do not provide comprehensive security solutions for maritime containers, and illegal cargo could be slipped into shipping containers during transit. Since 1992, the IMO has tried to prevent attacks on commercial shipping through the [Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation](http://www.cfr.org/publication/20645/), which provides a legal framework for interdicting, detaining, and prosecuting terrorists, pirates, and other criminals on the high seas. In reality, most enforcement efforts since the 9/11 attacks have focused on securing ports to prevent the use of a ship to attack, rather than to prevent attacks on the ships themselves. Reflecting this imperative, the IMO, with U.S. leadership, implemented the [International Ship and Port Facility Security Code](http://www.cfr.org/publication/20642) (ISPS) in 2004. This code helped set international standards for ship security, requiring ships to have security plans and officers. However, as with port security, the code is not obligatory and no clear process to audit or certify ISPS compliance has been established. Overall, a comprehensive regime for overseeing the safety of international shipping has not been created. The United States attempts to address this vulnerability through the [Container Security Initiative](http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/) (CSI), which aims to prescreen all containers destined for the United States, and to isolate those that pose a high-security risk before they are in transit. The initiative, which operates in [fifty-eight foreign ports](http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/trade_security/csi.xml), covers more than 86 percent of container cargo en route to the United States. Several international partners and organizations, including the European Union, the Group of Eight, and the World Customs Organization, have expressed interest in modeling security measures for containerized cargo based on the CSI model. Despite these efforts, experts [estimate](http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_162-565180.html) that only 2 percent of containers destined for U.S. ports are actually inspected.

The economy is in the brink now – if it worsens substantially it will cause a nuclear World War III

O’Donnell 09 (Sean O’Donnell, B.A. in History from the University of Maryland, Squad Leader in the Marine Corps Reserve, graduate student at the University of Baltimore studying law and ethics, 2/26/09, “Will this recession lead to World War III?” [www.examiner](http://www.examiner).com/republican-in-baltimore/will-this-recession-lead-to-world-war-iii)

Could the current economic crisis affecting this country and the world lead to another world war? The answer may be found by looking back in history. One of the causes of World War I was the economic rivalry that existed between the nations of Europe. In the 19th century France and Great Britain became wealthy through colonialism and the control of foreign resources. This forced other up-and-coming nations (such as Germany) to be more competitive in world trade which led to rivalries and ultimately, to war. After the Great Depression ruined the economies of Europe in the 1930s, fascist movements arose to seek economic and social control. From there fanatics like Hitler and Mussolini took over Germany and Italy and led them both into World War II. With most of North America and Western Europe currently experiencing a recession, will competition for resources and economic rivalries with the Middle East, Asia, or South American cause another world war? Add in nuclear weapons and Islamic fundamentalism and things look even worse. Hopefully the economy gets better before it gets worse and the terrifying possibility of World War III is averted. However sometimes history repeats itself.

Solvency

Chemical profiling can solve port security problems – it can quickly detect explosives, illicit drugs, hazardous chemicals, and biological substances

Staples 06 (Edward J. Staples has a Ph.D. in solid-state physics and electronics from Southern Methodist University and is a co-inventor of the zNose, 2/1/06, “Portable Chemical Profiling” [www.sensorsmag](http://www.sensorsmag).com/sensors/chemical-gas/portable-chemical-profiling-720?page\_id=3)

The U.S. now inspects 4% of the 6 million shipments arriving at more than 100 ports; before the September 11, 2001, attacks that figure was 2%. About 20% of the cargo passes through overseas ports such as Hong Kong, where U.S. inspectors are being stationed. Cargo worth $1.2 trillion, or half of U.S. imports, arrives by sea. The rest comes in from Canada and Mexico. Given the sheer volume of arriving merchandise, there is a good chance that some shipments will include unwelcome items. But how can they be discovered—and identified—without a lengthy inspection of every container? Current sensor capabilities are fairly limited; in many cases, the best “technology” for practical use continues to be trained “sniffer” dogs. Manufactured sensors are often designed for use in specific environments, and to be selective for only one or two chemicals. The spectrum of potential threats, however, argues for sensor systems capable of detecting a large variety of chemicals. In addition, sensor systems need a number of different subsystems, including sample collection and processing, presentation of the chemicals to the sensor, and sensor arrays with molecular recognition. In this article we present an electronic nose called the zNose that uses a single solid-state sensor to create an unlimited number of specific virtual chemical sensors for chemically profiling odors in cargo containers. Virtual sensor arrays and recognizable olfactory images for explosives, hazardous substances, illicit drugs, and even the cargo itself can provide a cost-effective screening tool for shippers and inspectors alike. In support of container security protocols, odor profiles can also be attached to an electronic manifest file and forwarded to authorities at the country of destination for comparison purposes. Chemical Profiling with High-Speed GC A portable chemical profiling system (Figure 1) incorporating an ultra-high-speed gas chromatography (GC) column, a solid-state sensor, a programmable gate array microprocessor, and an integrated vapor preconcentrator is able to speciate and quantify the vapor chemistry within a cargo container in 10 s. Vapors within the container are sampled by inserting a sampling tube attached to the inlet of the instrument through a small opening in the container door, or through the ventilation ducts of the container (Figure 2). The chromatograph system contains a minimum number of parts (Figure 3); temperature-programming a directly heated capillary column at rates up to 18°C/s produces 10 s chromatograms. A small capillary trap filled with Tenax (preconcentrates) samples the vapors and injects them into the capillary column. A key component of the system is a solid-state surface acoustic wave (SAW) detector that has zero dead volume and can detect quantities as small as 1 pg. The sensitivity of the 0.100 x 0.100 in. detector chip is dependent upon temperature, which is electronically controlled by a Peltier thermoelectric element. Olfactory Images and Virtual Chemical Sensors The SAW sensor is nonionic and nonspecific. It directly measures the total mass of each chemical compound as it exits the gas chromatography column and condenses on the crystal surface, thus causing a change in the fundamental acoustic frequency of the crystal. Odor concentration is directly measured with this integrating type of detector. Column flux is obtained from a microprocessor that continuously calculates the derivative of the SAW frequency. Plotting sensor frequency change (radial) vs. elution time (angle) produces a high-resolution 2D olfactory image called a VaporPrint (Figure 4). These images display the entire odor chemistry and enable the chemical profiling system to recognize complex odors and fragrances based upon their full chemical signatures. Because different chemicals have different retention times, hundreds of specific virtual chemical sensors and sensor arrays can be created for trace detection. Virtual chemical sensors (Figure 5), combined with odor profiles, are effective for recognizing the signature of known hazardous materials. Retention-time indices of known chemicals relative to n-alkanes allows the use of an instrument-independent chemical library and electronic odor profiles for quick distribution that can be shared by many users. Profiling Cargo Container Odors Explosives. The SAW sensor’s nonspecificity allows it to detect and quantify the vapor concentration of virtually any explosive, independent of its chemical makeup (e.g., nitro or non-nitro). The probability of detecting explosives from fugitive emissions (vapor phase) depends strongly on the temperature of the cargo container, the vapor pressure of the chemicals, and the way they are packaged. Explosives such as Semtex and C4 contain high-molecular-weight chemical explosives (e.g., PETN and RDX), which are rarely detectable by vapor phase measurements. However, by international accord all manufacturers of “plastic” explosives must now include a volatile taggant compound such as DMNB or MNT, which enables dogs and vapor detection systems like the zNose to detect these explosives (Figure 6). Not all explosives have a nitrogen base, preventing detection by conventional explosive trace detectors. One example is triacetone triperoxide (TATP), which has the explosive power of RDX and yet contains no nitrogen. This compound was used by the shoe-bomber Richard Reid and is also favored by Israeli “human bombs.” TATP is very volatile—as are NG, DNT, and TNT—and fugitive emissions from these explosives can now easily be detected in cargo containers. Contraband Drugs. Some contraband drugs such as methamphetamine and marijuana produce odiferous compounds such as terpenes that can easily be detected in the vapor phase by canines and the SAW-based chemical profiling system. Other drugs, including cocaine and heroin are much more difficult to trace because their vapor pressure is extremely low. An array of virtual sensors can be created using odors from samples of the target drugs or by selecting the specific, more volatile compounds from the system’s chemical library. For example, a natural by-product of cocaine is methyl benzoate, commonly called doggy-cocaine (Figure 7) because it is used to train canines to detect it. Whereas long sample preconcentration time and elevated temperatures were previously required, the presence of cocaine in a cargo container can now be detected using these more volatile compounds. Hazardous Chemicals. Many flammable organics, if properly sealed, may not be detected in a cargo shipment. But even a small leak can create a dangerous and even explosive vapor within the container. Vapors from gasoline and JP-8 aviation fuel are complex, containing many volatile organics, and are not easily separated by a single chemical sensor. They do, however, produce distinctly different olfactory images (Figure 8). Gasoline has more volatile compounds than JP-8. Creating virtual chemical sensors specific to both would be an important application for odor profiling in and around airports where JP-8 is a common background odor. Biological Substances. Virtually all living organisms produce detectable volatile organics. Human cargo smuggled inside cargo containers might be discernible from the odor of human waste, with its high percentage of E. coli bacteria. E. coli produces a very recognizable olfactory image dominated by the chemical indole. Various molds and fungi that can contaminate, and some types of cargo as well, produce distinctive olfactory images and unique chemicals called microbial volatile organic compounds that can also be detected. Security with Sensors Cargo and port security are key components of the nation’s homeland protection strategy. Helping in this effort is the zNose, a nonspecific sensor that, coupled with chromatographic separation, can produce high-resolution 2D olfactory images that can identify explosives, illicit drugs, hazardous chemicals, and biological nuisances such as molds and fungi. A single sensor can be used to create an unlimited number of specific virtual chemical sensors and can thus quickly adapt to changing threat vapors. Virtual sensor arrays and the olfactory images they produce provide a cost-effective screening tool for shippers and inspectors alike.

Port security is a federal responsibility

American Association of Port Authorities, represents over 150 [port authority](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_authority) organizations throughout the [Western Hemisphere](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Hemisphere), 3/7/12,“Testimony of Captain John M. Holmes”, <http://appropriations>.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ap15-jholmes-20120307.pdf

Moving the funding to the states is also a big concern for AAPA. Port security is focused on protecting international borders. This is a federal responsibility, not a state responsibility. Many States don’t have the personnel or expertise to evaluate maritime risks or determine how ports should be prioritized against other homeland security priorities in the state. The risk evaluations for ports are made at the federal level by the U.S. Coast Guard and other federal agencies. We are also concerned that this would increase the complexity in grant management and slow a process that is already recognized as cumbersome. Not only does a second or potentially third pass-through layer (the State or municipal government, respectively) mandate its own sets of compliance requirements on top of Code of Federal Regulations and Office of Management and Budget Circulars, it also creates unnecessary cogs in the administration that slows down our ability to spend, execute, and deliver. Moving funds to the states would compromise program efficiency and effectiveness. If, however, a decision is made to consolidate the program and move it to the states, AAPA strongly urges your Committee to allocate a set amount of funding for the program to ensure that funding for port security is not diluted further.

The Coast Guard has jurisdiction to protect US interests in ports

Kelepecz 05 (Betty P. Kelepecz, Chief of Police (Retired), San Diego Harbor Police Department, and Senior Vice President, Integrated Law Enforcement and Maritime Security Solutions, Crossflo Systems Inc., November 2005, “What Chiefs Need to Know About Port Security” The Police Chief, vol. 72, no. 11, [www.policechiefmagazine](http://www.policechiefmagazine).org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display\_arch&article\_id=742&issue\_id=112005)

Ports and waterways are regulated by a number of local, state, and federal agencies. The primary agency responsible for overall national maritime and port security is the U.S. Coast Guard, formerly within the Department of Transportation but now part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It is the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security and its mission is to protect the public, the environment, and U.S. economic interests in the nation’s ports and waterways, along the coast, on international waters, or in any maritime region as required to support national security. Today, maritime homeland security represents about 25 percent of the U. S. Coast Guard’s mission. The specific statutory authority for the U.S. Coast Guard’s law enforcement mission is given in 14 U.S.C. 2: “The Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”In addition, 14 U.S.C. 89 provides the authority for U.S. Coast Guard’s active duty commissioned, warrant, and petty officers to enforce applicable U.S. law. It authorizes Coast Guard personnel to enforce federal law on vessels subject to U.S. jurisdiction including U.S., foreign, and stateless vessels. The U.S. Coast Guard regulates maritime cargo, recreational, cruise, and transportation entities through the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) much as the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regulates airports and air carriers through the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA). Consequently, any law enforcement agency in a port environment shares jurisdiction with the U.S. Coast Guard and must follow its mandates. Although some believe that the U.S. Navy shares federal law enforcement jurisdiction in a strategic port, the U.S. Navy is not a law enforcement agency. The U.S. Navy has only military jurisdiction on its bases and around its vessels. However, other federal entities enforce federal laws in port environments, such as the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). But the primary federal regulator is the U.S. Coast Guard.

Cost is not a barrier to development of better detection technologies

Douglas Frantz, previously chief investigator for the [Senate Foreign Relations Committee](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Foreign_Relations_Committee), Managing Director of *Kroll’s Business Intelligence* Washington office, investigative reporter, 7/15/12, “Port security: U.S. fails to meet deadline for scanning of cargo containers”, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/port-security-us-fails-to-meet-deadline-for-scanning-of-cargo-containers/2012/07/15/gJQAmgW8mW_story.html>

Markey and some counterterrorism experts say that the costs of checking every U.S.-bound container could be substantially lower than the DHS estimate and that the necessary measures could be easier to implement than the agency has suggested. Research by scholars at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School indicate that 100 percent of containers could be screened much more inexpensively with existing methods. A number of companies also are developing cheaper new screening technology. Peter Boogaard, a DHS spokesman, said the department is committed to using a variety of measures, including screening, scanning and working with foreign authorities, to ensure that all goods are secure. Pilot programs established to scan all containers were abandoned in 2009 after the agency said costs were too high and the effort led to cargo delays and logistical problems. The current screening system relies heavily on the Customs and Border Protection agency and focuses on a small percentage of goods identified as high-risk through intelligence and analytical software. The program operates at 58 overseas ports that account for 80 percent of the cargo shipped to the United States. “Our layered and risk-based approach provides that, at a minimum, 100 percent of high risk containers are examined through a number of measures, including screening, scanning, physical inspection, or resolution by foreign authorities,” Napolitano told Congress in her May 2 letter invoking the two-year exemption. Kevin McAleenan, a senior CBP official, told Congress this year that the program led to inspections of 45,500 suspect containers overseas in 2011 — roughly two containers a day at each of the 58 ports in the program. Stephen Flynn, a terrorism expert at Northeastern University and a former Coast Guard commander who has studied container security, said, “The current system is woefully inadequate for stopping any determined adversary who wants to get a weapon of mass destruction into the United States.”

We don’t have to check every container to solve

Flynn 03 (Written Testimony before a hearing of the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D. a terrorism expert at Northeastern University and former Commander of the U.S. Coast Guard, and a Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies, and Director of the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Homeland Security Imperatives, 3/20/03, “The Fragile State of Container Security”, [www.cfr](http://www.cfr).org/defensehomeland-security/fragile-state-container-security/p5730)

Examining 100 percent of all containers is not only wasteful, but it violates an age-old axiom in the security field that if “you have to look at everything, you will see nothing.” Skilled inspectors look for anomalies and invest their finite time and attention on that which arouses their concern. This is because they know that capable criminals and terrorists often try to blend into the normal flow of commerce, but they invariably get some things wrong because they are not real market actors. But, an aggressive inspection regime that introduces substantial delays and causes serious disruption to the commercial environment can actually undermine an enforcement officer’s means to conduct anomaly detection. Accordingly, allowing low risk cargo to move as efficiently as possible through the intermodal transportation system has the salutary security effect of creating a more coherent backdrop against which aberrant behavior can be more readily identified.

\*\*\*Case Extensions\*\*\*

Inherency

Our current scanners are useless

Curry 11 (Andrew Curry, November 2011, “Mystery Box” Wired, volume 19, issue 11, Proquest)

So after 10 years and more than $1 billion spent on scanners, radiation detectors, and beefed-up intelligence, most US ports are still scanning containers onshore, after unloading. Unfortunately, the detectors are easily foiled. Lots of harmless things are slightly radioactive--kitty litter, ceramic tiles, even bananas. So most detectors are set to ignore low radiation levels. Basic shielding would be enough to mask all but the strongest sources. "The radiation portals that were deployed in the aftermath of 9/11 are essentially fine, except for three problems: They won't find a nuclear bomb, they won't find highly enriched uranium, and they won't find a shielded dirty bomb," says Stephen Flynn, a terrorism expert and president of the Center for National Policy. "Other than that, they're great pieces of equipment."

Advantage 1: Deterrence

EXT: Deterrence I/L

**Terrorists will pull back if confronted with greater risk of getting caught or failing**

**RAND**, The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world., 20**09,** a chapter in the series of New Ideas produced by rand found at, “Understanding the Role of Deterrence in Counterterrorism Security”, page 3-4 [www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP281.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP281.pdf)]MF

For a terrorist planning an attack, different types of costs and benefits need to be consid- ered. By thinking about how defensive measures might affect the decisions of terrorist organi- zations—potentially resulting in deterrence or risk displacement—we may be able to anticipate their cost-benefit calculation. To illustrate, consider a simple bombing attack. On the benefit side, the bomb will pro- duce immediate damage and casualties that the terrorist hopes will translate into media atten- tion, fear among or coercive power over its target populations or states, and some longer-term progress toward achieving his or her goals. Yet, even with meticulous planning and prepara- tion, a planner seeking to predict the magnitude of expected benefits for most operations will face considerable uncertainty. Even for something as tangible as the number of people his or her bomb will kill, the actual outcome of an operation can range from nothing (e.g., if the bomb fails or explodes at the wrong time) to the maximum number of casualities a device of its size and characteristics could produce (Phillips, 2009). On the cost side, there are predictable costs (e.g., the resources to build the bomb and stage the attack) and less-predictable ones (e.g., threats to operational security, dangers associated with handling explosives, and uncertainties in how counterterrorism response after the attack might affect the group). The uncertainties facing the terrorist decisionmaker are important to understanding the deterrent effect of security systems, but they are rarely treated explicitly in game-theoretic analyses of terrorist decisionmaking. For example, in many analyses, terrorists are presumed to have perfect information about their probabilities of succeeding against security measures of known effectiveness. Notable exceptions we identified were Dutter and Seliktar (2007), who address uncertainty in their theoretical discussion of terrorism deterrence; Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley (1983), who include outcome uncertainty for the terrorist as an element of a game- theoretic examination of the setting of demands in terrorist negotiation; and Anthony (2003), whose consideration of terrorist uncertainty about defensive measures—and steps attackers might take to reduce that uncertainty—is central to his discussion of the effectiveness of deter- rence. Recent work by Zhuang and colleagues (Zhuang and Bier, 2009; Zhuang, Bier, and Alagoz, 2009) has included the topics of uncertainty and incomplete information, but these treatments have focused on deception and secrecy—i.e., uncertainty intentionally created by security actors—rather than the inherent uncertainties faced by terrorist decisionmakers.

**Port Security forces terrorists to abandon attacks**

**RAND**, The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world., 20**09,** a chapter in the series of New Ideas produced by rand found at, “Understanding the Role of Deterrence in Counterterrorism Security”, page 10-11 [www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP281.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP281.pdf)]MF

Therefore, we can consider the possibility of reducing the attacker’s expected payoffs by either (1) reducing the probability of achieving any given level of payoff, thereby reducing the area under the curve describing the attacker’s probability of success (e.g., p1 in Figure 1), or (2) pushing the curve to the left, effectively reducing the expected payoff at any point on the curve. Although these are functionally equivalent, they correspond to different security approaches.

The expected payoff under the success curve is reduced when countermeasures ahno- tively diminish the terrorist’s perception of payoff for an operation. For instance, reducing the density of passengers at airline ticketing counters is intended to reduce the consequences of a suitcase-bomb attack (Stevens et al., 2004); this reduction could also reduce an attacker’s per- ahnon of the expected payoff from such an attack. Similarly, payoff may be diminished by improved response and recovery capabilities. Thus, to the extent that the Strategic National Stockpile of pharmaceuticals is viewed by attackers as an effective response capability that will be brought to bear in the event of, for example, an anthrax attack, any such attack must be scored by the terrorist as likely to achieve lower casualties and economic damage than had the Strategic National Stockpile not been present.

The perceived probabilities of success, p, are shifted downward when the attacker believes security measures make the operation more difficult or risky. Hardening targets with bol- lards, armed guards, or security-credentialing systems may increase the attacker’s sense that any given operation will be more difficult than had those security measures not been in place. With such measures in place, an attacker has two options—run the operation and accept the reduced probabilities of success or modify the operation either by raising the level of effort and resources sufficiently to overcome the security measure or by changing the target or tactic alto- gether (Zhuang and Bier, 2007).

EXT: Terrorists Coming Now

Ports are the most targeted areas for nuclear terrorist attacks

Konkel 05 (Todd Konkel, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 2005, “Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe” http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf)

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. government passed a significant number of measures to improve aviation security – an area with a high level of public visibility. This nation faces a potentially greater threat, however, from a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) making its way into the U.S. in one of the thousands of cargo containers that enter this country every day. In June 2004, the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation issued a memo reflecting this view: “Despite the importance of seaport security, perhaps no other mode of transportation is currently more vulnerable to future attacks than our Nation’s Marine Transportation System.”1 Although a future attack involving a chemical or biological WMD could have tragic consequences, a nuclear weapon, which could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths in an instant, presents the most concerning threat. In Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Harvard professor Graham Allison shares a brief but revealing excerpt from a private conversation that took place with former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge in February 2004. When asked what worried him most, Secretary Ridge replied with a single word: “nuclear.”2 Later in his book, Allison states that **a nuclear weapon used by terrorists in an attack on the United States “is far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile**.”3 The threat of a nuclear attack involving a seaborne container lies at the nexus of two critically important security issues: the availability of nuclear materials and the vulnerability of cargo containers. Although the U.S. government has taken a number of steps in the past few years to secure nuclear materials and improve the security of the country’s ports, the threat of a nuclear weapon entering the United States undetected in a shipping container remains very real. Much additional work, including international standards for container security and expanded international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials, is necessary to prevent a catastrophe that could dwarf the tragedy of 9/11.

Terrorist attacks on ports will only increase with increasing communication

**Clark et al.,** October **2007**

CAPT Bruce G. Clark, USCGR (ret) Director of Maritime Security Projects, Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning -The California Maritime Academy. Dr. Donna J. Nincic , Associate Professor and Chair-Department of Global and Maritime Studies of The California Maritime Academy. CAPT Nevin Fidler, USCGR (ret) Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning-The California Maritime Academy-The California State University. “Protecting America’s Ports: Are We There Yet?”

Remembering that terrorist seek to achieve the 'biggest bang for the buck" spectacular long term physical results; maximized death and injury rates; significant economic impact and - the ripple effects of chaos, terror and panic -- and the global MTS remains a "target rich environment. In the past, maritime targets -- specifically vessels -- were over the horizon, out of sight and largely not thought of at all by the general public. Lack of an instant audience has contributed to the low incidence rate of maritime terrorism. However, as the capability of instant communications grows - allowing anyone with a cell phone to capture video of an event and put it out onto the internet in a matter of minutes; and as it becomes cheaper, faster, and easier to move passengers, materials and finished goods through the MTS from any point on the globe - many of the traditional impediments holding back terrorism in the maritime mode will evaporate. It is inconceivable that additional maritime terrorist acts will not occur. Therefore, to completely understand current port security conditions, the nature of prevailing port security risks and ultimately the status of our port vulnerability -- basically, how we got to where we are today – we need to review the road we have traveled and poke around a bit in some of those potentially embarrassing “dark places” where history lies and where "inconvenient facts" sometimes intersect with our preferred understanding of “convenient truths”.

Advantage 2: Economy

EXT: Terrorist Attack Hurts Economy

Terrorist attack causes loss of damages and economic damage

Hahn, 5/9/12

Founder and co-chair of the 66 member bipartisan Congressional PORTS Caucus and member of the House Homeland Security Committee, “Rep. Hahn – Congressional Leader on Ports – Wins Passage of Port Security Amendment”, <http://hahn>.house.gov/press-release/rep-hahn-congressional-leader-ports-wins-passage-port-security-amendment

Congresswoman Janice Hahn’s bill, H.R. 4005 “Gauging American Port Security Act” or Gaps Act, today successfully passed by a unanimous vote in the Homeland Security Committee. H.R. 4005 directs the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a comprehensive classified examination of remaining gaps in port Security and prepare a plan to address them. “Pretending a threat doesn’t exist does not make it go away,” Rep. Hahn said. “The lesson of 9/11 is to be vigilant and proactive in seeking out and preventing our country’s most pressing threats. More than a decade after 9/11, our ports remain possible points of entry for terrorists and their weapons. Ports are also a key part of our economy. If an attack were ever to occur, it would cause a catastrophic loss of jobs and damage to our economic recovery. This situation requires a legislative solution and I hope that the resulting blueprint will guide Congress in creating effective legislation to help guard our ports.” Ships make 50,000 calls a year on U.S. ports, carrying two billion tons of freight and 134 million passengers. Each day our ports move both imports and exports totaling some $3.8 billion worth of goods through all 50 states. Additionally, ports move 99.4 percent of overseas cargo volume by weight and generate $3.95 trillion in international trade. Unfortunately less than 3% of cargo coming into the country is scanned, giving terrorist opportunities to smuggle themselves or their weapons into the United States with little risk of detection. An attack on the Port of Los Angeles complex, for example, would cost billions to the regional economy and put thousands of port employees out of work and cause the demise of hundreds of local businesses.

Terrorist attacks on ports are highly probable and will cause an economic disaster

Flynn 05 (from an article written by Betty P. Kelepecz, Chief of Police (Retired), San Diego Harbor Police Department, and Senior Vice President, Integrated Law Enforcement and Maritime Security Solutions, Crossflo Systems Inc., this section was written by Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D. Commander, U.S. Coast Guard (ret.), Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies, and Director of the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Homeland Security Imperatives, November 2005, “What Chiefs Need to Know About Port Security” The Police Chief, vol. 72, no. 11, www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display\_arch&article\_id=742&issue\_id=112005)

The next catastrophic terrorist attack on the United States may well be within or via one of our seaports. The attacks of September 11 involved domestic airliners. The Madrid attacks on March 11, 2004, and the London attacks in July 2005 targeted mass transit. On October 6, 2002, a small boat loaded with explosives rammed into the French oil tanker Limburg as it headed into a Yemeni port. The blast ripped through the two-year-old tanker's double hull, killing a crewmember and spilling 90,000 barrels of burning crude oil into the Gulf of Aden. Based on this track record, it is appropriate to conclude that al Qaeda and its imitator organizations view transportation systems as attractive targets. Those charged with protecting America's waterfront should find particularly worrisome a barely reported terrorist attack that took place just three days after the Madrid train bombings. On March 14, 2004, there were two suicide bomb explosions in the Israeli port of Ashdod. The bombers breached port security by hiding in an empty container with a false wall; the container had entered the port from Gaza. Fortunately, they were intercepted before they could reach the storage facilities that held hazardous and flammable materials. Ten people were killed including the bombers, and 15 were injured. U.S. ports, particularly our largest commercial seaports, make attractive targets because they satisfy the classic criteria of motive and opportunity. Most of our major urban centers, including heartland cities like Memphis and Chicago, sprang up from the American wilderness because they provided easy access to navigable waterways or to the sea. Today, we remain largely an island nation, dependent on waterways to move over 90 percent of all trade by volume. These goods include vast energy resources that are refined into fuels that we rapidly consume in facilities located in ports. Chemical plants import hazardous substances that they process into industrial products used throughout our economy. More than 9 million containers arrived in U.S. ports in 2004, carrying up to 32 tons of materials in each one. These boxes that are quickly transported to trucks and trains and find their way to every corner of the country support our just-in-time manufacturing and retail sectors. Despite our enormous dependency on ports, most remain very soft targets. Before September 11, 2001, they simply were not security priorities at the local, state, or federal levels. Few possessed the means to deter amateur thieves and thugs, never mind determined terrorists. Most ports are just at the earliest stages of putting in the kinds of protective measures these critical assets require. This translates into vulnerable ports where the consequences of a future attack would extend far beyond the confines of the city or state that bears most of the responsibility for safeguarding it. A radiation dispersal device, or dirty bomb, set off in a container while it is in a marine terminal. An explosive-laden small boat launched at the side of a moored cruise ship or an inbound oil tanker. These scenarios would produce much more than loss of life and destruction of property. Should a dirty bomb go off in a box, it would almost certainly produce a shutdown of all the container terminals in that port, and, given the uncertainty surrounding possible follow-on attacks, lead to the closure of other seaports as well. Just a few days of a national port shutdown to conduct an investigation would be an economic disaster. Just-in-time supply chains would collapse, retailer shelves would go bare, and manufacturing plants would be idled. The losses to our economy could quickly mount into the tens of billions of dollars. The destruction of a tanker in a harbor could create an environmental catastrophe on the scale of the Exxon Valdez spill in Prince William Sound in 1989. Should the ship sink and obstruct a navigable channel, petroleum refineries would have to cease operations, which would translate into gas pumps going dry in the surrounding region within days. Finally, a successful attack on a cruise ship could dry up the $26 billion cruise industry virtually over night, as jittery passengers would abandon their vacation plans. In short, the stakes associated with protecting our seaports are enormous. Since we are living on borrowed time before terrorists strike again on American soil, we need to treat the port security agenda with a far greater sense of urgency than we have demonstrated to date.1

Ports are super important to the economy

Frittelli 05 (John Frittelli, specialist in transportation policy for the Congressional Research Service, 5/27/05, “Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress” www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31733.pdf)

Economic Importance. Ships are the primary mode of transportation for world trade. Ships carry approximately 80% of world trade by volume.12 The United States is the world’s leading maritime trading nation, accounting for nearly 20% (measured in tons) of the annual world ocean-borne overseas trade. Ships carry more than 95% of the nation’s non-North American trade by weight and 75% by value. Trade now accounts for 25% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), up from 11% in 1970. Over the next two decades, the total volume of domestic and international trade is expected to double.

Given the importance of maritime trade to the U.S. and world economies, disruptions to that trade can have immediate and significant economic impacts.13 By one estimate, the cost to the U.S. economy of port closures on the West Coast due to a labor- management dispute was approximately $1 billion per day for the first five days, rising sharply thereafter.14

The container shipping system is designed for speed and efficiency. Transportation services are a critical component of the global, low-inventory (i.e., just-in-time) distribution model that many manufacturers have adopted. Most industries in the United States use some imported components from overseas suppliers. By bringing parts to a plant just before they are needed for assembly, manufacturers can save money on warehouse space and inventory carrying costs. Transport efficiencies permit warehouse requirements to be minimized. Lean inventories in turn have contributed to business productivity. From 1980 to 2000, according to one study, business logistics costs dropped from 16.1% of U.S. GDP to 10.1%.15

A dirty bomb set off in a port would cause a chain of port closures, bringing the economy to a stand still

Curry 11 (Andrew Curry, November 2011, “Mystery Box” Wired, volume 19, issue 11, Proquest)

But that's not true for the next danger on the list: a radiological dispersion device, also known as a dirty bomb. A payload of radioactive material--from inside a hospital's teletherapy machine or instrument sterilizer, for example--sits atop a pile of conventional explosives. When the bomb detonates, it blows a cloud of radioactive dust into the air. The wind does the rest: Under the right conditions, just 20 milligrams of cesium-137--roughly the amount found in gadgets that hospitals use to calibrate their radiation therapy equipment--could contaminate 40 city blocks. Compared to a nuclear explosion, a dirty bomb would be a hiccup in terms of destructive force. The real problem would be panic. A light coating of radioactive dust raining down on Manhattan might cause only a minor increase in cancer rates, but it would definitely result in a major national freak-out. Set off at a major port, a dirty bomb would cause a chain reaction of precautionary closures and painstaking inspections that could bring the entire US economy to a crawl within weeks. "The idea that dirty bombs could cause major destruction is complete bullshit. What they could do is cause billions and billions in economic damage," says James Acton, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Dirty bombs are weapons of mass disruption."

Even a single nuclear terrorist attack in a port would cause the economy to tank

Abt 03 (Clark C. Abt, Ph.D., 4/30/03, “The Economic Impact of Nuclear Terrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age of Seaport Vulnerability” www.abtassociates.com/reports/ES-Economic\_Impact\_of\_Nuclear\_Terrorist\_Attacks.pdf)

Assuming the main current nuclear terrorist threat of a cargo container-delivered 10-20 Kiloton fission weapon, several plausible scenarios created by the writer and other researchers were examined to estimate the economic impacts of a nuclear attack on two major seaport cities and the government center of Washington, DC. First the destructive radii from the probable aim points of the weapons were plotted on maps of three likely targets, New York, Washington DC, and Boston. (Boston was selected as fairly representative of an important seaport with city center adjacent to the container port, similar to Baltimore, Charleston, Miami, Oakland, and Seattle.) Loss of life and property estimates are based on the density of population and property value in the destroyed or severely damaged area. The losses attributable to trade disruption were estimated on the basis of the extent and duration of disruption of ocean, truck, and air cargo transport at the target and corresponding sites that might be shut down in response to such an attack (as they were for a week after 9/11 and some might be again.) Finally, indirect economic costs were estimated by a conservative multiplier of times the direct costs. One-year costs were estimated only for the United States, and did not include either global or longterm costs, which are believed to exceed substantially the immediate U.S. costs estimated. Major uncertainties in the determining variables are reflected by the estimates being given as ranges rather than the spurious exactitude of point values. The economic impact of even a single nuclear terrorist attack on a major U.S. seaport would be very great. In the three plausible scenarios examined, a successful attack would create disruption of U.S. trade valued at $100-200 billion, property damage of $50-500 billion, and 50,000 to 1,000,000 lives could be lost. Global and long-term effects, including the economic impacts of the pervasive national and international responses to the nuclear attack, though not calculated, are believed to be substantially greater.

Nuclear terrorism in a port would paralyze global trade

Frittelli 05 (John Frittelli, specialist in transportation policy for the Congressional Research Service, 5/27/05, “Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress” www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31733.pdf)

Much concern has focused on the threat that a sea container could be used to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the United States. Experts are concerned that if a nuclear weapon in a container aboard a ship in port is detonated, it could not only kill tens of thousands of people and cause massive destruction, but could also paralyze the movement of cargo containers globally, thereby shutting down world trade.23

Biological terrorism in a port would cause the global economy to freeze

Abt et. al. 03 (Clark C. Abt, Ph.D., William Rhodes, Ph.D., Rocco Casagrande, Ph.D., Gary Gaumer, Ph.D.5/9/03, “The Economic Impacts of Bioterrorist Attacks on Freight Transport Systems in an Age of Seaport Vulnerability” http://abtassociates.com/reports/ES-Economic\_Impacts\_of\_Bioterrorist\_Attacks.pdf)

Our investigation of the economic impacts of bioterrorist attacks on U.S. seaport-based container freight transportation systems yielded a disturbing finding: The freight transportation systems vital to the U.S. economy are vulnerable to attack by biological weapons. Indeed, bioterrorism presents an urgent danger not just to these systems and the seaport cities in which they are located, but to the entire population of the United States. In our view, the threat of bioterrorism today rivals the nuclear threat that has overshadowed this country for the last fifty years. Furthermore, we believe that the deterrent strategies that have held the nuclear threat at bay for half a century are unlikely to be as effective against the threat of bioterrorism. The events of September 11, 2001 dramatized the risk and demonstrated the consequences of the U.S. transportation system being recruited to serve terrorist aims. The U.S. government response to those events—to blockade its own sea- and airports for a week—may have incurred losses as great as the estimated $50 billion World Trade Center direct costs themselves. Airlines and airfreight companies lost billions of dollars. Container shipping fared worse, losing a billion dollars a day during months spent disentangling freight traffic. Imagine the even greater costs of a self-imposed shutdown of all forms of transportation—road and rail as well as sea and air—in response to a bioterrorist attack, especially one involving a deadly and highly contagious disease. We began to see our original research mandate in the context of a much larger, grimmer vision of the entire world economy held hostage by this emerging form of deadly global biological warfare.

Solvency

Chemical profiling is a fast, easy, and effective way of increasing port security

Staples and Watson 97 (Edward J. Staples has a Ph.D. in solid-state physics and electronics from Southern Methodist University and is a co-inventor of the zNose, and Gary W. Watson is the director of engineering at Electronic Sensor Technology and is a cofounder of zNose, January 1997, “A Portable SAW/GC Non-Intrusive Inspection System” www.estcal.com/tech\_papers/papers/Security/ONDCP97.pdf)

This paper describes research on a fast portable non-intrusive inspection system to identify and quantify the presence of contraband at ports of entry, on personnel, within vehicles, and aboard cargo in ships and aircraft. The system utilizes fast GC vapor analysis with a new type of Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW) detector technology. The objective of this research project1 is to develop a low cost, easy to use, mobile trace analysis system which can be used to detect currency, explosives, firearms & munitions, and hazardous chemicals. System Description Prototype inspection systems2, as shown in Figure 1, are currently being used in field trials and data gathering experiments. The SAW/GC portion of the system is contained within a handheld module as shown. Support for the system (He carrier gas and electrical power) as well as a laptop computer and Windows® user interface is contained within a small suitcase. The SAW/GC system requires no high voltages, utilizes essentially all solid state de-vices, and involves no radioactive or hazardous chemicals. The prototype SAW/GC system has demonstrated dynamic ranges greater than 100,000 and the ability to detect and analyze vapors from contraband at the part per billion level (picograms/liter). The SAW/GC inspection system is fast and accurate. It identifies and quantifies vapor or particulate trace materials collected from ambient environments in near real time (< 10 seconds). Typically only 10 cc of ambient air needs to be collected with a 100 ccm inlet flow prior to each analysis. Specificity and selectivity is based upon thermal management and material vapor pressure. The system is able to identify and alarm upon known vapor signatures and is non-intrusive because it does not require contact with the inspected object. At this time test methods and protocols have been developed for quantitative testing of vapor from drugs, currency, organophospate agents, and volatile organic compounds.

Chemical profiling is the most effective method for detecting hazardous materials

Staples 04 (Edward J. Staples has a Ph.D. in solid-state physics and electronics from Southern Methodist University and is a co-inventor of the zNose, April 2004, “Chemical Profiling Cargo with an Ultra-High Speed Gas Chromatograph, Olfactory Images, and Virtual Chemical Sensors” www.estcal.com/tech\_papers/papers/Security/Cargo\_Container\_Odors.pdf)

Ultra-high speed gas chromatography is a powerful analytical method for analysis of odors, fragrances, and chemical vapors produced by explosives, chemical and biological weapons, contraband, and hazardous industrial materials. A portable chemical profiling system incorporating an ultra-high speed chromatography column, a solid-state sensor, a programmable gate array microprocessor, and an integrated vapor preconcentrator is described. Using ultra-high speed chromatography, chemical vapors within containers can be speciated and their concentration measured in less than 10 seconds with picogram sensitivity using a SAW sensor with electronically variable sensitivity. Odor concentration and intensity are measured directly with an integrating GC sensor. The solid-state sensor produces high resolution 2-dimensional olfactory images unique to many complex odors. Examples involving odors from explosives, contraband drugs of abuse, hazardous chemicals, and even biological life forms are presented. An important requirement for a chemical profiling system is that it must recognize odors and fragrances based upon their full chemical signature. Unlike a trace detector, it must see everything and miss nothing. A library of retention time indices for chemicals allows for the creation of hundreds of specific virtual chemical sensors. Virtual chemical sensors combined with odor profiling can be an effective method for recognizing the presence of hazardous materials. Chemical libraries and electronic odor profiles allows users to quickly distribute signatures of hazardous materials or new threat vapors of any kind

Chemical profiling is a non-intrusive means of detecting innumerable hazardous items

Staples and Watson 97 (Edward J. Staples has a Ph.D. in solid-state physics and electronics from Southern Methodist University and is a co-inventor of the zNose, and Gary W. Watson is the director of engineering at Electronic Sensor Technology and is a cofounder of zNose, January 1997, “A Portable SAW/GC Non-Intrusive Inspection System” www.estcal.com/tech\_papers/papers/Security/ONDCP97.pdf)

A new type of fast chromatography system, the SAW/GC, has been developed for analyzing vapors associated with volatile and nonvolatile materials. Tests have shown that vapor detection is a viable non-intrusive method of detection. Portable non-intrusive inspection systems to identify and quantify the presence of contraband are now being field tested. Current research goals are to reduce the size and cost while improving the performance of the inspection system. Future SAW/GC inspection systems will contain a sunlite readable user display as well as a high flow front end preconcentrator for sampling larger volumes of ambient air. A low cost, easy to use, mobile trace analysis system which can be used to detect currency, explosives, firearms & munitions, hazardous chemicals, and general forensic screening will benefit many government and commercial fields.

Federal government funds are key to high-profile security and enforcement

Lake Houston News, 8/24/11, “[Sheriff Garcia: Federal support needed to keep port secure](http://www.yourhoustonnews.com/lake_houston/news/sheriff-garcia-federal-support-needed-to-keep-port-secure/article_f282d6ef-0c5b-5bde-8edb-272c554a5871.html?mode=story)”, <http://www.yourhoustonnews.com/lake_houston/news/sheriff-garcia-federal-support-needed-to-keep-port-secure/article_f282d6ef-0c5b-5bde-8edb-272c554a5871.html>

Harris County Sheriff Adrian Garcia on Wednesday, Aug. 24, told a U.S. House Homeland Security subcommittee that the county needs more federal law enforcement funds to provide personnel to go with the technology and organizational efforts that help protect the Port of Houston and the Houston Ship Channel from potential terrorist attacks. “We have a true ring of steel,” the sheriff said of surveillance equipment and other technologies used by the Sheriff’s Office to monitor the ship channel area. “We are light years ahead of other communities.” “But at the end of the day, we need blood, sweat and tears to be able to monitor those systems,” he said in response to questions from members of Congress. Sheriff Garcia was among witnesses who told a field hearing of the Oversight, Investigations and Management Subcommittee, chaired by Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Texas, that more personnel are needed to augment the Houston area’s homeland security “hardware” and the efforts of private industries and law enforcement agencies to work together on preventing attacks. Congress has provided funding for equipment but not for payroll. Subcommittee ranking Democrat William Keating of Massachusetts attended with McCaul, along with U.S. Reps. Gene Green and Sheila Jackson Lee of Houston. As the lead law enforcement agency of the Houston Ship Channel Security District, the sheriff’s office uses surveillance equipment at the ship channel on a 24-hours, 7-days-a-week basis and patrols the area by boat, car and airplane. But patrols are limited by a lack of funding for personnel amid a county government freeze on hiring by county agencies. Sheriff Garcia told committee members that their congressional colleagues need to realize that federal support of security in the ship channel area is crucial to protecting high-profile security assets such as the oil tankers, petrochemical plans and refineries and that supply much of the nation’s energy needs. Documents seized at the compound of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden’s compound discussed possible plans to attack oil tankers in the U.S. “We made a commitment” to protect against terrorist acts, Sheriff Garcia said. “I want to be able to honor that commitment.”

Add-On: Military Readiness

Port security key to military readiness

John Frittelli, 5/27/05

Specialist in Transportation Resources, Science, and Industry Division, “Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress”, <http://www>.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA453735

National Security Importance. In addition to its economic significance, the marine transportation system is vital for national security. The Departments of Defense and Transportation have designated 17 U.S. seaports as strategic because they are necessary for use by DOD in the event of a major military deployment. Thirteen of these ports are commercial seaports. During Desert Storm, 90% of all military equipment and supplies were shipped from U.S. strategic ports. The deployment required over 312 vessels from 18 commercial and military ports in the United States. As the GAO has reported, “If the strategic ports (or the ships carrying military supplies) were attacked, not only could massive civilian casualties be sustained, but DOD could also lose precious cargo and time and be forced to rely heavily on its overburdened airlift capabilities.”18

Readiness is critical to prevent rivals from lashing out and prevent war

Jack Spencer, 9/15/2000

Research Fellow at Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, “The Facts About Military Readiness”, Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2000/09/BG1394-The-Facts-About-Military-Readiness>

America’s national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries in a given war. America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America or its interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances. Therefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over any single nation has little saliency. The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America’s national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives,3 concludes that the United States “must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames.”4According to some of the military’s highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services’ ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy.5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America’s ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America’s military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

\*\*\*2AC Answers\*\*\*

T – Infrastructure

DHS includes port security as transportation infrastructure

FEMA, 7/3/12

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is an agency of the United States Department of Homeland Security, “FY 2012 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)”, <http://www>.fema.gov/government/grant/psgp/

Purpose: As appropriated by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012*, Division D* (Public Law 112-74), the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) is one of the Department ofHomeland Security’s (DHS) FY 2012 grant programs which directly supports transportation infrastructure security activities. The PSGP is one tool in the comprehensive set of measures authorized by Congress and implemented by the Administration to strengthen the Nation’s critical infrastructure against risks associated with potential terrorist attacks. The FY 2012 PSGP provides funds for transportation infrastructure security activities to implement Area Maritime Security Plans and facility security plans among port authorities, facility operators, and state and local government agencies required to provide port security services. The FY 2012 PSGP plays an important role in the implementation of Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) by supporting the development and sustainment of core capabilities to fulfill the *National Preparedness Goal* (NPG).

Port Development qualifies as infrastructure

Paul Scott Abbott, February 2007

Leading port industry trade journalist and communications consultant who has specialized in serving the maritime transportation sector since the late 1980s, among the most published writers in the industry in addition to serving as a public relations strategist, “Security or Infrastructure?”, American Journal of Transportation. February, 2007

<http://www>.secureportamericas.com/pdf/AJOT\_2007\_new.pdf

Security or Infrastructure? That‘s the tough decision US port leaders continue to face. ―Security costs have complicated port development,‖ Steve Cernak, the Port of Galveston‘s port director, said last week at the SecurePort 2007 Western Hemisphere Port Security Conference and Trade Exhibition in Houston. ―Ports often have to either divert funds away from important projects to pay for mandated security enhancements, or reduce the scope of their security enhancements,‖ Cernak continued. Kurt J. Nagle, president and chief executive officer of the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), echoed such concern at the SecurePort event held Jan 29-31. ―Prior to 9/11, the industry consistently rated the funding of needed infrastructure development as its No. 1 challenge,‖ Nagle told the gathering of 250 leaders from port management and security sectors. ―This dramatically increase level of resources being devoted to security enhancements has exacerbated the challenge of funding development of non-security infrastructure to handle the growing levels of international trade.‖

Transportation Infrastructure Committee includes the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation subcommittee

John L. Mica, no date

Chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, “The Transportation and Infrastructure Committee”, <http://transportation>.house.gov/singlepages.aspx/764

The Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, with 59 Members, is one of the largest committee in Congress. Its six subcommittees are:

-Aviation

-Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

-Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management

-Highways and Transit

-Railroads, Pipelines and Hazardous Materials

-Water Resources and Environment

That subcommittee includes port security

John L. Mica, no date

Chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, “The Transportation and Infrastructure Committee”, <http://transportation>.house.gov/singlepages.aspx/764

Issues and agencies under the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee include:

United States Coast Guard

Maritime transportation safety

Navigation, port and waterway safety

Maritime transportation regulatory activities, including the regulation of vessels and merchant seaman,

State boating safety programs

Marine environmental protection, generally as related to vessel operations (oil and plastics pollution, invasive/aquatic nuisance species transported by vessels, international agreements concerning transportation of oil and hazardous substances)

Port security

Federal Maritime Commission and the regulation of ocean shipping

The Jones Act (United States cabotage laws governing shipping of goods and passengers between any two points in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone)

Non-national security aspects of the merchant marine

Port security is investment in transportation infrastructure

Industry Today, 2012

Covers all sectors of manufacturing, in addition to shipping, transportation and distribution, Volume 14, Issue 3, “Association: American Association of Port Authorities”, <http://www>.industrytoday.com/article\_view.asp?ArticleID=F370

It seems the United States willingly allows infrastructure to crumble as other countries – particularly the BRICs – bolster the physical support systems that foster economic growth. The American Association of Port Authorities is concerned over the state of America’s aged transportation infrastructure so it’s urging investments in both landside and waterside connections with ports. The burning question on the mind of many US lawmakers, administration officials and others is how best to stimulate the economy and spur job creation. The answer lies in focusing scarce federal resources in areas that will have the greatest impact on economic growth, immediate and long-term job creation, national security, and our current and future competitiveness in the global economy. Enhancements in seaport-related infrastructure should be a high priority among the limited investment options. For centuries, US seaports – and the connecting waterways – have served as a vital economic lifeline, bringing goods and services to people around the world and delivering prosperity to our nation. They facilitate trade and commerce, create jobs, secure our borders, support our military and serve as stewards of valuable coastal environmental resources. Seaports are the primary gateway for overseas trade. They’re essential to economic security. As such, federal funding for infrastructure in and around ports pays dividends. Deep-draft coastal and Great Lakes ports are the nexus of critical transportation infrastructure that connects America’s exporters with markets overseas, and they provide access for imports of raw materials, components and consumer goods that are a key part of US manufacturing and help define our standard of living. Investments in America’s port infrastructure and the intermodal connections that serve seaports – both land and waterside – foster prosperity and provide an opportunity to bolster the country’s economic and employment recovery.

New Bills Solve

1. The recent bills have only passed the House, not the Senate – there’s no guarantee how long it’ll take or if they’ll be made into law

2. The proposed bills solve personnel problems and help cut costs, but they DON’T implement any new infrastructure

Richardson 12 (Whit Richardson, managing editor of Security Director News, 7/3/12, “House passes SMART Port Security Act, among others” [www.securitydirectornews](http://www.securitydirectornews).com/public-sector/house-passes-smart-port-security-act-among-others)

The largest piece of legislation is known as The SMART Port Security Act (H.R. 4251). This bill will direct components of the Department of Homeland Security with maritime security responsibilities to improve cooperation and coordination with other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, support and enhance risk-based supply chain programs, and find ways to save money. Specifically, the legislation would: 🡪 Reduce redundancies by allowing DHS to recognize other countries’ Trusted Shipper Programs, in addition to allowing the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to recognize other governments’ or organizations’ port security threat assessments; 🡪 Require DHS to update the Maritime Operations Coordination Plan to enhance interagency cooperation; 🡪Seek to improve efficiency and save taxpayer dollars by commissioning a report to study possible cost savings by having the USCG and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) share facilities, as well as require CBP to use standard practices and risk-based assessments when deploying assets; 🡪Institute changes to the TWIC program to prompt DHS to install readers, improve efficiency for enrollees, and prevent unauthorized use; 🡪Require DHS to develop a more in-depth strategic plan for global supply chain security with a focus on providing incentives for the private sector and measurable goals. The House also passed the following bills: H.R. 5843, which amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to allow state and local governments and emergency management officials to use funds from FEMA’s State Homeland Security Grant Program to contract with national laboratories to to assist in research and training purposes. The Aviation Security Stakeholder Participation Act of 2011 (H.R. 1447), which creates within the Transportation Security Administration an Aviation Security Advisory Committee, which will provide recommendations on the development and implementation of policies and programs related to aviation security. The Gauging American Port Security Act (H.R. 4005), which directs the DHS secretary to conduct a study and report to Congress on gaps in port security in the United States and a plan to address them. And H.R. 3173, which directs the DHS secretary to reform the process for the enrollment, activation, issuance, and renewal of a Transportation Worker Identification Credential to require not more than one in-person visit to a designated enrollment center.

Change to Other Targets

Both our RAND and TTSRL cards are excellent about why terrorists can be deterred. They are rational actors and when the cost outweighs the benefit they won’t attack – the more motivated the group is the more this is true. This means there isn’t a tradeoff between types of terrorism and decreasing the risk of port terrorism won’t make other types more probable. Our Flynn and Konkel evidence both describe how ports are the most likely target of terrorism.

Personnel Shortages Solvency Deficit

This is indicative of the status quo, not the plan because our increase in the ports infrastructure, specifically technology, compensates for a shortage of personnel by making them more productive

Hurt Trade

The plan won’t slow down trade significantly – our Staples evidence says they can do chemical profiling in 10 seconds and our Flynn evidence says we don’t have to check every container to solve.

Also, our economy advantage outweighs their impact – it’s more important to prevent a total economic collapse that would occur within three weeks of a terrorist attack than the minor delays that could be accommodated by shippers.

\*\*\*DAs\*\*\*

Politics – Elections

**The economy is the most important issue in the elections**

**Rasmussen 12** (Scott Rasmussen is the founder and president of Rasmussen Reports, 7/13/12, “Why Obama's Still in the Race Despite the Bad Economy” www.rasmussenreports.com/public\_content/political\_commentary/commentary\_by\_scott\_rasmussen/why\_obama\_s\_still\_in\_the\_race\_despite\_the\_bad\_economy)

There are plenty of reasons that the economy is the most important issue of Election 2012. Unemployment has remained high for a long time, and even 27 percent of those who have a job are worried about losing it. Only half of homeowners now believe their home is worth more than what they still owe on it. Just 16 percent believe that today's children will be better off than their parents.

**And, this means the plan won’t be perceived and even if it is, it’s key to save the economy so it’ll be popular – we have 5 pieces of evidence on this: Harrald, Flynn, Jenkin Cox, and CFR**

**Extend the Kelepecz evidence – the Coast Guard is the normal means actor**

**Independent agents are insulated from public pressure – Obama won’t get the blame**

**Barkow 10** (Rachel E Barkow, Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, NYU School of Law, 12-1-10, “Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design ” NELLCO Legal Scholarship Repository New York University Public Law and Legal, lhttp://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1241&context=nyu\_plltwp)

The obsessive focus on removal as the touchstone of independence is curious because insulation from the President is often not the dominant rea- son why policy makers seek to create independent agencies in the first place. Rather, the goal of insulation is frequently to allow an agency to protect the diffuse interest of the general public or a vulnerable segment of the public that, because of collective action problems or resource limitations, is often outgunned in the political process by well-financed and politically influential special interests. The insulated agency, its designers hope, will better resist short-term partisan pressures and instead place more emphasis on empirical facts that will serve the public interest in the long term. Put another way, the creation of an independent agency is often motivated by a concern with agency capture. 5

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**Obama will win – Nate Silver predicts**

**Silver 12** (Nate Silver, 7/20/12, “July 20: Little Change in Presidential Forecast” http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/20/july-20-little-change-in-presidential-forecast/)

\* In 2008 Nate Silver correctly predicted 49 out of 50 states (off by 1% in Indiana) and all 35 senate races

We’ll keep Friday’s presidential forecast update brief with the more pressing news in Colorado. National tracking polls moved toward President Obama, a set of state polls produced mixed but mostly unremarkable results, and the stock market was down on renewed investor concerns about Europe, lowering our economic index. Add it all up, and our model shows little change: Mr. Obama’s chances of winning the Electoral College are 67.2 percent, versus 66.7 percent on Thursday.

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**Romney will win – Obama is all in too early**

**Tracinski 12** (Robert Tracinski is the editor of The Intellectual Activist, 7/19/12, “How the Election Will Play Out (and Why Romney Will Win)” www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/07/19/how\_the\_election\_will\_play\_out\_and\_why\_romney\_will\_win\_114848.html)

I have been speculating for some time—and others have begun to say the same thing—that Romney's election strategy can be described as "rope-a-dope." This was a sports reporter's coinage for Muhammad Ali's strategy in the famous 1974 "Rumble in the Jungle" against George Foreman. Foreman was a large man known as a hard hitter, so Ali's strategy was to goad Foreman into throwing a frenzy of punches while Ali adopted a protective position and leaned against the ropes so they would help absorb the energy of the blows. Foreman fell for it and punched away in a fury, tiring himself out in the early rounds only to find himself fatigued while Ali was still fresh. Ali dominated the later rounds and knocked Foreman down long enough for the referee to call him out. The analogy here is that Romney is letting the Obama campaign punch itself out, spending like crazy on a blitz of negative advertising early on, before swing voters have made up their minds or even paid much attention to the race. Meanwhile, Romney has been holding his fire and money, saving it for when it will really count. Why is the Obama campaign falling for this? Because they have no other option. Here we have to refer back to the established rules of the horse-race analysis. When a president is running for re-election, it is inherently a referendum on the incumbent, so if his approval ratings are below 50%, he's in trouble. If a majority disapproves of his performance, that means they are going to be likely to cast their votes for the challenger. Obama is below 50% now. He's been around 47% in the RealClearPolitics average for a long time now, and since some of the polls tend to overestimate support for Democrats, the real number is probably a few points lower. But this just means that voters are willing to consider the challenger, and you can still convince them to stop considering him. Which means that an embattled incumbent has only one way to win: convince voters that the challenger is not an acceptable alternative. Hence the negative campaign against Romney. He needs to be made out as a corporate Snidely Whiplash who lays off workers, outsources their jobs to China, hides his profits in Swiss bank accounts, and lies about it to cover it all up. So that is exactly the story Obama's negative ads have been trying to tell. The attack ad in which Romney ties the girl to the railroad tracks is coming next. There is no evidence that these negative ads have worked so far—the variation in the candidates' RCP poll averages has been within the range of static for at least a month—so the Obama campaign is turning the volume up to eleven. They have poured $100 million into advertising in swing states over the past month, three-quarters of which has gone into negative ads. And they have increased the seriousness of the accusations, to the point of hinting that Romney might be a felon. But there is a big problem with dumping all these negative ads so early. If you bring up a charge in May or June, the Romney campaign and dozens of commentators and bloggers will have time to refute the attacks, or at least come up with convincing attempts to explain them away. You also run the risk of over-reaching—as in the Romney felony charge—and creating a story, not about Romney's wrongdoing, but about your campaign's unfair attacks. But most of all, these charges become "old news," so when the Obama campaign tries to bring them up again in October, once everyone is finally paying attention, the charges lose their impact because the press and the pundits have already heard it before. This business is called "news" for a reason, because it moves forward on things that are new. So why has the Obama campaign launched their attack on Romney so early and allowed it to become so vicious? I think they realize that they are running out of time. If they don't "define" Romney in hopelessly negative terms now—and by "now," I mean now—the game is over. While I've been using the rope-a-dope analogy, Washington Post blogger Jennifer Rubin has come up with a somewhat grander analogy. Here is her description of Obama's strategy. "Extend the Republican primary by running ads hitting Romney and encouraging Democrats to vote against Romney in Michigan and elsewhere. Then, before Romney could fully get his bearings, unload a barrage of negative attacks, scare-mongering, and thinly disguised oppo attacks through the mainstream media, taking advantage of many political reporters’ relative ignorance about the private equity field and their inclination to accept whole-hog President Obama’s version of 'facts.' "The extent of that effort is only now becoming clear. The Associated Press reports: 'President Barack Obama’s campaign has spent nearly $100 million on television commercials in selected battleground states so far, unleashing a sustained early barrage designed to create lasting, negative impressions of Republican Mitt Romney before he and his allies ramp up for the fall.' Think of it like the Confederacy’s artillery barrage on the third day of Gettysburg before Pickett’s Charge—you have to in essence disable the other side before the charge begins, or it's curtains." For those not versed in Civil War history, Pickett's Charge ends badly. I'll refer you to this scene from the magisterial 1993 film Gettysburg, which captures the point at which General Lee realizes the full scope of the debacle. It's worth looking at why specifically the Obama campaign is running out of time. It has to do with money and with the calendar. Obama started out with a distinct money advantage, since he could start raising money for the general election while Romney was still spending money on the primaries. But he is rapidly blowing his money advantage. In recent months, he has raised less than Romney and spent a lot more, particularly on his huge spree of negative ads. Jack Wakeland first pointed this pattern out to me and speculated that Obama is running his campaign finances about as well as he has been running the nation's finances. The result is that it now looks as if Romney and his supporters will be able to outspend Obama by a significant margin in the final months of the race. And if there's one thing we learned from the primaries, it is that Romney can win when he's able to outspend his rivals. Then there is the calendar. Outside of Washington and the media, most voters are not paying much attention to the race yet. And in exactly eight days, the Olympics begin. The Olympics are the crucial dividing point, because they will dominate the airwaves and the news, sucking away whatever attention anyone is now paying to the election. So Obama's negative campaign blitz has to have whatever effect it's going to have in those eight days. But what happens when the Olympics start? To begin with, the Olympics provide an opportunity for Mitt Romney to highlight the best part of his record, his successful turnaround of the 2002 Winter Olympics. And he can do so without having to do very much or spend much money. It will be natural, after all, for the sports reporters covering the Olympics to mention Romney's history with the movement. Obama can still be in the news during the Olympics just by showing up in London or doing something to root on the U.S. teams, but that's just a marginal bit of extra public exposure, not a message about his leadership. For Romney, by contrast, the Olympics are a leadership message. He can claim that his competence helped save a beloved institution whose appeal cuts across partisan lines. Remember that it was not his business success that launched Romney's political career. It was the Olympics: he ran for governor of Massachusetts in the afterglow of the 2002 games. Yet Romney's history with the Olympics has barely been mentioned yet, precisely because the Obama campaign can't find anything negative to say about it. Well, now it's going to be mentioned. And what happens after the Olympics? There are only two weeks between the end of the Olympics and the beginning of the Republican National Convention. It is logical that Romney would use those two weeks to announce his vice-presidential running mate. There is some speculation that he would do so earlier, but with so few days left to the Olympics, I'm not sure he would risk having the announcement be overshadowed. So it's slightly more likely he will make the announcement a few days after the Olympics, which will have the effect of dominating the news for the period between the games and the convention. Then the Republicans get to go first with their convention, giving them a chance to present all of the positive aspects of Romney's personal life and his professional achievements, just as most voters are beginning to tune in to the election. Which means that they have the opportunity to wipe out more than $100 million in Obama's negative advertising. So what this means is that the Obama campaign has only eight days left to have it all their way. After that they will be upstaged for more than a month, and probably outspent for the rest of the campaign. If they want to make Romney seem unacceptable to swing voters, the next eight days are the whole game. The big picture is that the Obama campaign is reaching its full tide. This is its moment of maximum impact, and everything after this is a pushback from the Romney campaign. So the fact that Obama is still just even in the polls, at the full extent of his effort, means that we can expect that everything from here on out will be a loss. From now on, the campaign will be about Romney making his own positive case, building back his image, setting his own message, firing back in the debates, and sending it all of home with giant advertising buys that Obama won't be able to match. Jennifer Rubin's reference to Pickett's Charge reminded me of another scene from Gettysburg. An actor who has been serving as a spy for the Confederacy asks General Longstreet for a musket so that he can, for once, fight honorably as a regular soldier. Longstreet then explains to him why he thinks Pickett's Charge—which he hasn't been able to talk Lee out of—will fail. It is, he explains, like a mathematical equation, as he ticks off the casualties Pickett's division will take at each stage of the assault. He briefly entertains hope that the artillery barrage will cause the Yankees to panic and break, then he concludes that they won't, so "it's mathematical after all." In much the same way, the numbers are against Obama. In political science, unemployment above 8%, economic growth below 2%, and approval ratings below 50%—all of it adds up to defeat. But the Obama campaign will entertain the hope that maybe, just maybe, they can vilify their opponent and create a negative impression of him in the minds of voters, or dredge up some scandal that knocks him out of the race before we even get to the conventions. They can hold on to that hope. And they're right: maybe it will happen. This has been a very unpredictable election from the beginning. But if something doesn't happen, and happen soon, the numbers kick in, and it's mathematical after all.

**! Economy**

**Ninety-three economic downturns since World War Two disprove the link between economy and war**

**Miller 2k** (Morris Miller, Adjunct Professor of Administration at the University of Ottawa, 2000, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol 24 No 4)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that: Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong…The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes…(or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence…In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

**! Russia War**

**Give a Russia war impact zero probability – politics, military superiority, economic concerns, and nuclear** **security all check war**

**Graham 07** (Thomas Graham, National Security Advisor,senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, 9/07, “The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness” Russia in Global Affairs, pg. 19)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threatto sweep across Europe,its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States **–** is undermorereliable controlthan it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

**Russia has ruled out any war with the US**

**NYT 08** (New York Times, Worldwide News cooperation, 10/1/08, “Russia rules out any war with the US-Europe” www.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/world/europe/01iht-georgia.4.16622086.html)

STRELNA, Russia — On the day European Union monitors began patrolling Georgian territory, President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia said there were no ideological grounds for a new Cold War, or any other kind of war, with the United States. Russia's relations with the United States were already at a post-Cold War low when they were further damaged by Russia's war with Georgia, a U.S. ally, in August. Russia has complained vehemently about what it says is a growing U.S. military presence near its borders. But Medvedev said Wednesday that the Cold War was based on ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. He said that no differences today were strong enough to bring about similar conflict with the United States. "We do not have such ideological differences around which a new cold or any other kind of war could start," Medvedev said at a news conference after talks with Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero of Spain outside St. Petersburg, Russia.

**! Russia Relations**

**Alt causes of poor relations – Magnitsky Bill, Syria, and missile-defense shield**

**Meyer 12** (Henry Meyer, 6/7/12, “U.S. Won’t Oppose Russia Sanctions That Risk Putin Reprisal” www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-07/u-dot-s-dot-won-t-oppose-russia-sanctions-that-risk-putin-reprisal)

The U.S. administration will no longer seek to prevent Congress from passing a bill targeting human-rights offenders in Russia, a step that President Vladimir Putin has warned would spark retaliation and damage ties. The House Foreign Affairs Committee today approved by voice vote legislation that would impose U.S. travel and financial curbs on any official abusing human rights in Russia, including 60 people suspected of involvement in the death of anti- corruption lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in a Moscow jail in 2009. Congress will vote on the measure at a later date. “You’d be hard pressed to find anyone who would bet against Congress expressing their concerns on the Magnitsky matter in some way,” U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk said today in Moscow. “It’s important to work with Congress on an appropriate mandatory response to that.” President Barack Obama’s administration is seeking to repeal trade restrictions with Russia to prevent U.S. companies from being penalized once Russian membership of the World Trade Organization takes effect later this year. A bipartisan group of senators has made a repeal of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment conditional on imposing sanctions on Russian officials for human-rights violations. ‘Adequate’ Response Any unilateral steps against Russian citizens would provoke an “adequate” response, Konstantin Dolgov, the Foreign Ministry’s human-rights representative, was cited as saying by Interfax today. Russia still sees a chance the bill won’t be adopted, according to the news service. Such a law would be “a gross interference in Russian internal affairs and, of course, it won’t have any positive effect on U.S.-Russian ties, to put it mildly,” Dolgov told reporters in Moscow on May 15. Russia warned in April it would retaliate with unspecified measures against the law. The U.S. is already at odds with Russia over its efforts to oust Russian ally Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and its plans to build a missile-defense shield in Europe on its former Cold War foe’s borders. Obama is counting on Russia to help push Iran toward a peaceful solution over its nuclear work and is seeking a deal with Putin over a managed transfer of power in Syria.

**US - Russian Relations are resilient – they’re based on mutual deterrence**

**Feneko 12** (Fenenko is a Leading Research Fellow at the Institute of International Security Studies of RAS, June 21, 2011, “The cyclical nature of Russian-American relations” http://en.rian.ru/valdai\_op/20110621/164739508.html)

There is nothing special or unusual about the current difficulties. Over the past twenty years, both Russia and the United States have experienced several cycles of convergence and divergence in their bilateral relations. It seems that Moscow and Washington are doomed to repeat these cycles time and again. Such changes in bilateral relations are no mere coincidence. Russia and the United States base their relations on mutual nuclear deterrence. The material and technical foundations for Russian-American relations differ little from those underpinning the Soviet-American relations of the 1980s. Thus, these cycles of Russian-American rapprochement are due to two factors. First comes the desire to consistently reduce aging nuclear systems so that during disarmament neither party risked destroying the military-strategic parity. Second, the reaction to a major military-political crisis after which the parties seek to reduce confrontation and update the rules of conduct in the military-political sphere. After confronting these tasks, Russia and the United States returned to a state of low intensity confrontation.

**! Japanese Relations**

**US – Japanese relations are high and resilient**

**Sang-ho 12** (Song Sang-ho, 7/8/12, “U.S.-Japan alliance grows for Asia-Pacific security balance” http://view.koreaherald.com/kh/view.php?ud=20120708000302&cpv=0)

As the U.S. has been shifting its military and diplomatic priorities toward the economically vibrant region, its alliance with Japan, along with its one with South Korea, will continue to be the core of its strategy to maintain primacy in the region. “Washington hopes to work with China’s neighbors to put together a balancing coalition that will contain China and prevent it from dominating Asia the way the U.S. dominates the Western Hemisphere,” said Mearsheimer. On the surface, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan appears to have worsened in recent years due to a long-standing controversy over the relocation of the Futenma airbase in Okinawa. But this would not undermine the core of the alliance between the two countries that share security interests and values of democracy, and take initiatives against global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, experts pointed out. “People should not misconstrue a long-running local dispute over how to close one Marine air base with the durability and capability of that vital alliance,” said Patrick M. Cronin, senior director of the Asia Program at the Center for a New American Security. After the Democratic Party of Japan took power in 2009, ending a half-century of almost unbroken conservative rule, the alliance appeared to have deteriorated with the Tokyo leadership pursuing a closer yet “equal” relationship. But it has apparently re-prioritized its relationship with Washington as it recognized growing security challenges from China and North Korea.

**! Heg**

**US heg is high with no decline in sight**

**Kagan 07** (Robert, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136)

These American traditions, together with historical events beyond Americans’ control, have catapulted the United States to a position of pre-eminence in the world. Since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of this “unipolar” world, there has been much anticipation of the end of unipolarity and the rise of a multipolar world in which the United States is no longer the predominant power. Not only realist theorists but others both inside and outside the United States have long argued the theoretical and practical unsustainability, not to mention undesirability, of a world with only one superpower. Mainstream realist theory has assumed that other powers must inevitably band together to balance against the superpower. Others expected the post-Cold War era to be characterized by the primacy of geoeconomics over geopolitics and foresaw a multipolar world with the economic giants of Europe, India, Japan, and China rivaling the United States. Finally, in the wake of the Iraq War and with hostility to the United States, as measured in public opinion polls, apparently at an all-time high, there has been a widespread assumption that the American position in the world must finally be eroding. Yet American predominance in the main categories of power persists as a key feature of the international system. The enormous and productive American economy remains at the center of the international economic system. American democratic principles are shared by over a hundred nations. The American military is not only the largest but the only one capable of projecting force into distant theaters. Chinese strategists, who spend a great deal of time thinking about these things, see the world not as multipolar but as characterized by “one superpower, many great powers,” and this configuration seems likely to persist into the future absent either a catastrophic blow to American power or a decision by the United States to diminish its power and international influence voluntarily. 11

**Hegemony is not key to stability – empirically proven**

**Fettweis 10** (Christopher, Assistant professor IR @ Tulane, Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival (00396338); Apr/May, Vol. 52 Issue 2, p59-82, 24p)

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible ‘peace dividend’ endangered both national and global security. ‘No serious analyst of American military capabilities’, argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, ‘doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace’.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilising presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

**! Warming**

**Cutting emissions can’t stop warming**

**Science Daily 09** (Science Daily, 1/27/09, "Climate Change Largely Irrerversible For Next 1,000 Years, NOAA Reports" www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/01/090127163403.htm)

A new scientific study led by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reaches a powerful conclusion about the climate change caused by future increases of carbon dioxide: to a large extent, there’s no going back. The pioneering study, led by NOAA senior scientist Susan Solomon, shows how changes in surface temperature, rainfall, and sea level are largely irreversible for more than 1,000 years after carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are completely stopped. The findings appear during the week of January 26 in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

**Alt causes - India and China coal production**

**The Economist 08** (The Economist, 6/5/08, “Melting Asia” www.economist.com/node/11488548)

Still, even if China meets this target, carbon emissions will continue growing rapidly too. The biggest concern among climate-change activists around the world is the impact of Chinese coal—and also Indian coal. China and India have the world's third and fourth biggest coal reserves; though much of India's is currently out-of-bounds, under protected forests and human settlements. Both countries are meanwhile trying to develop their renewables sectors. For example, India is the world's fourth-biggest producer of wind power. Its solar yield is also bigger than any country except America. Still, in the coming decades, both countries will remain heavily dependent on coal.

**No impact to warming**

**Solomon 11** (Lawrence Solomon, executive director of Energy Probe and Urban Renaissance Institute, 9/17/2011, "Warmed right over; The global-warming theory is nearing its end as evidence against it mounts" The National Post)

Some Canadians blame humans for global warming because they've been told that Antarctica is melting in unprecedented ways, the "proof" being spectacular film footage of huge chunks of ice breaking off into the Antarctic Ocean. They don't yet know that Antarctic ice has always broken off, that satellites show Antarctica to be gaining ice overall, and that Antarctica has been getting colder, not warmer, over the last half century. Other Canadians think the Arctic ice is in danger of disappearing, unaware that several times over the last century the Arctic Ocean was actually navigable - today's Arctic is no different from before. What about all the hurricanes predicted to ravage our shores because of global warming? They never happened, and for good reason: As the IPCC's own hurricane expert said in resigning from that organization, there is no evidence that global warming will cause an increase in hurricanes. The submerged islands in the Pacific? That, too, never happened. Yes, the oceans have been rising, as they have been for centuries, but not because of recent carbon dioxide emissions. In fact, the recent evidence shows the oceans' rate of rise has been slowing.

**! Middle East War**

**War in the Middle East won’t draw in outside powers**

**Ferguson 06** (Niall Ferguson, Professor of History at Harvard University, and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, LA Times, July 24)

Could today's quarrel between Israelis and Hezbollah over Lebanon produce World War III? That's what Republican Newt Gingrich, the former speaker of the House, called it last week, echoing earlier fighting talk by Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. Such language can — for now, at least — safely be dismissed as hyperbole. This crisis is not going to trigger another world war. Indeed, I do not expect it to produce even another Middle East war worthy of comparison with those of June 1967 or October 1973. In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbors — Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard to imagine today. Nor does it seem likely that Syria and Iran will escalate their involvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a position to risk a full-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this might precipitate an American military reaction. Crucially, Washington's consistent support for Israel is not matched by any great power support for Israel's neighbors. During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle East war could spill over into a superpower conflict. Henry Kissinger, secretary of State in the twilight of the Nixon presidency, first heard the news of an Arab-Israeli war at 6:15 a.m. on Oct. 6, 1973. Half an hour later, he was on the phone to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later, Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. The stakes were high indeed. At one point during the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the White House issued DEFCON 3, putting American strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anything like that today. In any case, this war may soon be over. Most wars Israel has fought have been short, lasting a matter of days or weeks (six days in '67, three weeks in '73). Some Israeli sources say this one could be finished in a matter of days. That, at any rate, is clearly the assumption being made in Washington.

**! China War**

**Four reasons for no war with China—economy, military, dependence, and internal focus**

**Newman 11** (Rick Newman, Chief Business Correspondent for U.S. News and a regular commentator on networks like MSNBC, CNN, Fox Business and NPR, 1/21/11, http://seekingalpha.com/article/247784-5-reasons-to-stop-fearing-china)

China still has a middling economy. China's population is four times that of the United States, yet its GDP is just two-thirds as large. That makes China an important economic power, but hardly the world's most dominant. China's per-capita GDP—which measures the productive capacity of the population as a whole—is just $7,400, which ranks 128th out of 230 nations, according to the CIA World Factbook. (The United States, with per-capita GDP of about $47,000, ranks 11th, after a handful of tiny nations like Qatar and Liechtenstein with concentrated wealth and a minimal underclass.) The number of poor people in China is probably greater than the entire population of the United States. And vast stretches of China's interior remain untouched by the impressive modern infrastructure that makes China's coastal region highly productive. Given China's size, ambition, and industrial capability, it's inevitable that China's economy will become the world's largest. But it's worth keeping in mind that 30 years ago, China was nearly as backward as North Korea is today, with little external trade, a population that was mostly poor, and a government that could barely prevent mass starvation. China's progress since then has been unprecedented, but it still has a long way to go before lifting the majority of its people out of poverty and raising overall living standards to anything near western levels. Paranoid Americans (or Europeans, or Japanese, or Koreans) may think China's goal is to somehow conquer them, but China's leaders are overwhelmingly focused on creating jobs and raising living standards for their own people. Failing to do that could provoke class warfare and open rebellion, one of the biggest fears of China's leaders. That's why China will continue to pursue aggressive economic policies meant to boost growth by 7 to 10 percent per year—for the next 10 or even 20 years. But at some point growth will slow and China will start to resemble a mature western economy—with a lot of economic power, but also the bureaucracy, special interests, and destructive speculative behavior that tends to bog capitalism down. China will be no more able to dominate America than America has been able to dominate China. It desperately needs the United States. China's rapid growth depends on a huge stream of consumers to keep buying the stuff it makes. And Americans are China's best customers. Worries about the U.S. government being too dependent on China to finance its debt are legitimate, since China is the top purchaser of U.S. government securities, with about 21 percent of all holdings. But the real problem is Washington's overdependence on debt, not the portion held by China. It's also true that Chinese officials sometimes overplay their hand, which may be the case with reported restrictions on the exports of rare-earth metals found largely in China, which are key components in many high-tech devices. Still, that kind of maneuvering is standard capitalist fare (commodity traders in New York and London try to corner markets all the time) and China is likely to exploit its own resources just as every other capitalist nation has done. Alarmists tend to worry that China's self-interested behavior could become a form of economic terrorism. That's a stretch. "The Chinese ideology has changed from Communism to GDPism," says Li. "Nothing matters except that the economy grows." Communist Party officials even earn perks and promotions based largely on their contributions to economic growth. So by that logic, China will carefully cultivate its relationship with the United States as long as it needs our business. Which is likely to be a long time. Long after China becomes the world's largest economy, it will still depend on heavily on trading partners, just as the United States does today. In fact, it's hard to imagine a scenario in which China could get wealthy, or stay wealthy, without the trade that has done far more to lift it toward world-power status than any other factor. The richer China gets, the more it will buy. During a recent visit to Spain, a key member of China's Politburo pointed out that if every person in China bought one bottle of Spanish wine and one container of Spanish olive oil per year, Spain would run out, with nothing left to offer the rest of the world. The rise of China's consumer class may be the most powerful economic force of the next 100 years, and China won't be the only beneficiary. As Chinese consumers earn more disposable income, they're beginning to covet the same cars, appliances, gizmos, and luxury items as everybody else in the world. Western business leaders are right to demand that China crack down on piracy and welcome foreign-made goods on the same terms that other nations import products made from China. But as China becomes wealthier and more dependent on trade, it has incentives to do just that. One reason Chinese consumers haven't made much of a mark yet is that they're still some of the thriftiest people on the planet, with a savings rate that's close to 50 percent. (The U.S. savings rate, by comparison, is about 5 percent, up from nearly zero a few years ago.) But Chinese consumers are nearly certain to spend more as credit becomes more commonplace, mass marketers work their black magic, and the first generation of affluent consumers begins to retire in a few years, which will force them to spend down their savings. Even if those consumers do buy mostly Chinese-made goods, that could divert some of China's exports to internal markets, creating new openings for exports from America and other nations. China's military might is overblown. If you're worried about a Chinese stealth fighter dropping bombs on your neighborhood, you can relax. The staged leak of recent photos showing a "secret" Chinese-made stealth aircraft generated terrific front-page drama and got the world's defense contractors excited about another arms race. But it was more of an exercise in national pride than in aeronautics. As China becomes richer in coming decades, it could well end up with the world's biggest military budget. But for a good long while, America's military technology will be generations ahead of China's. The stealth fighter is a good case study. If China did in fact build its own stealth aircraft—without simply reverse-engineering a Russian design—then it's a nice achievement. But the plane's first flight, reported a couple weeks ago, comes more than 30 years after America's stealth program began. During that time, the United States has developed numerous next-generation stealth technologies, established a detailed training regimen, built a global support infrastructure, and learned how to defeat stealth technology if an enemy should ever use it. Rather than sending a threatening message to the United States, China was probably showing off its advanced jet for more practical reasons—like advertising its wares to other countries that might want to buy Chinese-made weapons. And if China does decide to sink vast amounts of national wealth into the world's costliest weapon systems, it could end up diverting resources away from worthier projects that might have a much bigger economic impact, as some critics feel America has done. China is trying to modernize a military that not long ago was completely obsolete, and it does have modern missiles, submarines, and Russian-made aircraft that make it quite capable of defending itself. And there probably are still some Communist party hardliners who feel that waging a war to reclaim Taiwan would be worth the cost. Americans tend to think of China as a superpower wannabe always focused on Washington, but Michael Swaine of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace points out that China shares land borders with 14 other countries and has a long history of territorial disputes with truculent neighbors. That makes regional dominance its first national-security priority. Plus, any war would torpedo the economic gains China has spent the last 30 years making. Still, if you're really concerned about Chinese aggression, then worry about cyberwar, not bombs and bullets. Our biggest enemy isn't China. It's ourselves. Critics tend to describe China as "taking" American jobs, as if a whole variety of industries rightfully belongs in the United States, in perpetuity. That's not how capitalism works. Jobs always move from place to place, based on who can do the work most effectively at the lowest price. As low-paying jobs migrate away from the United States, it's up to us to replace them with higher-paying jobs that require more skill and generate more innovative products. But that requires a strong education system, effective government policies, the careful use of national resources, citizens willing to sacrifice and work as hard as necessary, and above all, enlightened leadership. If we can't muster that, it's not China's fault. It's our own. And if China or any nation can do better, then maybe they deserve to be No. 1 after all.

**China’s military is still inferior to America’s – their “grand strategy” questions any likelihood of war**

**Watts 11** (Barry Watts, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Testimony presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on May 11, 2011, “The Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs” www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/2011.05.11-China-Military-and-Civil-Space-Programs.pdf)

The second point to be made about prospective U.S.-PRC conflicts in 2012 or 2020 draws on the ongoing efforts of China scholars to understand how PRC leaders and strategists envision the future security environment. Michael Pillsbury, Jacqueline Newmyer and others argue that China’s leaders view international relations since the Cold War through the prisim of the strategy and statecraft that emerged from China’s Warring States Period (from around 400 BCE to China’s unification under the Qin Dynasty in 221 BCE). According to Newmyer, the Warring States period “was a militarized age when roughly seven small kingdoms vied for ascendancy over the territory now considered China’s Han core.” After some two centuries of struggle, the state of Qin emerged victorious, unified China, and launched the dynastic era that lasted into the twentieth century. Newmyer believes that in light of the Warring States literature, China’s grand strategy today seeks “to prevent the encirclement of China while encircling prospective enemies, with the aim of creating a disposition of power so favorable to the PRC that it will not actually have to use force to secure its interests.” However, because China is a rising power whose conventional military power remains substantially inferior to that of the United States, it is imperative for China to avoid a direct military conflict with the global hegemon for the time being. As Hu and Men concluded in 2004, militarily, China is still not strong enough “to cope with the military challenges by the forces advocating for Taiwan independence.” This reading of Chinese grand strategy provides, in my view, further grounds for questioning the likelihood of a U.S.-PRC conflict over Taiwan in 2012 or 2020.

Politics – Agenda

Port security enjoys wide bipartisan support

McCarter 12 (Mickey McCarter, 7/2/12, “Aviation, Port Security Bills Enjoy Bipartisan Support from House Lawmakers” [www.hstoday](http://www.hstoday).us/single-article/aviation-port-security-bills-enjoy-bipartisan-support-from-house-lawmakers/8774d00b80793d7b125324dc9dad3510.html)

Democrats applauded last week the passage by the House of several homeland security bills designed to strengthen aviation and port security. The bills, including the Aviation Security Stakeholder Participation Act (HR 1447), the Securing Maritime Activities through Risk–based Targeting (SMART) for Port Security Act (HR 4251) and the Gauging American Port Security (GAPS) Act (HR 4005) enjoyed bipartisan support.

Port security is overwhelmingly popular – empirically proven

Government Security News 12 (Government Security News, 6/29/12, “Congresswoman Hahn’s port security bill passes the House” [www.gsnmagazine](http://www.gsnmagazine).com/node/26671)

Rep. Janice Hahn’s port security legislation passed the U.S. House of Representatives by a vote of 411 to 9. H.R. 4005, Gauging American Port Security Act, or GAPS Act directs DHS to conduct a comprehensive classified examination of remaining gaps in port security and prepare a plan to address them.

Extend the Kelepecz evidence – the Coast Guard is the normal means actor

Independent agents are insulated from public pressure – Obama won’t get the blame

Barkow 10 (Rachel E Barkow, Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, NYU School of Law, 12-1-10, “Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design ” NELLCO Legal Scholarship Repository New York University Public Law and Legal, lhttp://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1241&context=nyu\_plltwp)

The obsessive focus on removal as the touchstone of independence is curious because insulation from the President is often not the dominant rea- son why policy makers seek to create independent agencies in the first place. Rather, the goal of insulation is frequently to allow an agency to protect the diffuse interest of the general public or a vulnerable segment of the public that, because of collective action problems or resource limitations, is often outgunned in the political process by well-financed and politically influential special interests. The insulated agency, its designers hope, will better resist short-term partisan pressures and instead place more emphasis on empirical facts that will serve the public interest in the long term. Put another way, the creation of an independent agency is often motivated by a concern with agency capture. 5

No internal link – their theory of political capital is wrong

Dickinson 09 **(**MatthewDickenson, professor of political science at Middlebury College, 5/26, “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power” http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/**)**

As for Sotomayor, from here the path toward almost certain confirmation goes as follows: the Senate Judiciary Committee is slated to hold hearings sometime this summer (this involves both written depositions and of course open hearings), which should lead to formal Senate approval before Congress adjourns for its summer recess in early August.  So Sotomayor will likely take her seat in time for the start of the new Court session on October 5.  (I talk briefly about the likely politics of the nomination process below). What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power.  Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress.  I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress.  That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences?  How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes?  These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power.  This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does.  Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence.  Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants.  (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying.  But this is not to say that presidents lack influence.  Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose.  That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting.   And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination.  Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox.  That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof).  His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee.

Spending

Even without 100% solvency, potential impact of terrorist attack justify spending on port security for mitigation

Veronique de Rugy, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, a former resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, policy analyst at the Cato Institute, and research fellow at theAtlas Economic Research Foundation, writes regularly for *Reason* magazine, the *Washington Examiner,*  November 2007, “Is Port Security Funding Making Us Safer?”, MIT Center for International Studies, <http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_11_07_derugy.pdf>

Economists think about security policies in terms of tradeoffs, formally comparing the costs and the benefits, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary. Common economic sense states that homeland security funds are best allocated where they are most likely to prevent successfully terrorist attacks and, in the event of failure, mitigate the consequences. This regimen should be maintained throughout the allocation process and should dictate how funds are dispersed within each sector. There are two types of threats related to ports: (1) direct attacks on the ports themselves and (2) transport of dangerous material through ports for use in terrorist plots elsewhere in the country. Like any terrorist attack, an attack on a port would cause injury, death, and have terrible economic and social consequences. Damage to infrastructure and the destruction of inventory in port could seriously disrupt trade not only in the U.S., but also around the world. The damage would be on the order of 100 times greater if a nuclear device were detonated in a major American city such as New York or Washington, D.C.7 In ports, , as with all stationary targets, attackers have a natural advantage because they get to choose where to attack. The German thrust into Western Europe in the Second World War is an instructive example. The Wehrmacht simply side-stepped the impressive defenses built by the French in the Maginot Line. Similarly, terrorists will attack wherever the defenses are weakest. Because terrorists have this advantage, the best port security comes from a proactive strategy of keeping terrorists and their bombs as far as possible from U.S. shores.

Ninety-three economic downturns since World War Two disprove the link between economy and war

Miller 2k (Morris Miller, Adjunct Professor of Administration at the University of Ottawa, 2000, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol 24 No 4)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that: Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong…The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes…(or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence…In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

Spending (fiscal discipline)

There’s no effect to credit downgrades – investors are confident in the dollar

van de Velde 12 (Antonia van de Velde, CNBC Associate Editor, 1/31/12 “S&P Warns of Cuts; Another US Downgrade Coming?” http://www.cnbc.com/id/46202656)

The August downgrade of the United States rating was an embarrassment to the country, but fears that the move would hurt investors’ confidence in the country proved unfounded. David Owen, Chief European Economist at Jefferies International believes the U.S. will face another downgrade, but that its impact will again be limited. “Is the U.S going to be downgraded again? We think so,” he told CNBC on Tuesday. “Our general perception is it won’t have a material impact. It could even lead to more money flowing to the U.S in the way we saw following the initial downgrade.” S&P's first downgrade has not driven up the United States’ borrowing costs and the dollar appreciated relative to other currencies in the months following the cut as investors sought out safe havens to escape the European debt crisis. “The U.S. [dollar] is a reserve currency. It’s able to retain all the confidence of international investors,” Owen said. He pointed out that most rating agencies take a short-term view about where the ratings should go. Aging, in increasing pension provisions and health care costs, will weigh on public finances for years to come, he said.

Downgrade inevitable, plan won’t hurt the economy

Detrixhe 12(John Detrixhe, Bloomberg Businessweek writer, 6-8-12,“S&P Sees Possible U.S. Downgrade by 2014” www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-08/u-dot-s-dot-political-risk-may-spur-another-downgrade-by-2014-s-and-p-says**)**

Political and fiscal risks may lead to another downgrade of the U.S.’s credit rating by 2014 by Standard & Poor’s, which affirmed its negative outlook on the nation’s debt. S&P stripped the U.S. of its top AAA ranking on Aug. 5, cutting it to AA+ while criticizing the nation’s political process and saying that spending cuts agreed on by lawmakers wouldn’t be enough to reduce record deficits. Treasuries surged after the move. While Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings have kept their top grades on the U.S., both have a negative outlook. “The credit strengths of the U.S. include its resilient economy, its monetary credibility and the U.S. dollar’s status as the world’s key reserve currency,” S&P said today in a report. Weaknesses “include its fiscal performance, its debt burden, and what we perceive as a recent decline in the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of its policymaking and political institutions, particularly regarding the direction of fiscal policy.”

Coast Guard DA / PIC

Perm: the coast guard is the leader of port security

Kelly Parker, 8/6/11

Coast Guard Compass, Official blog of the US Coast Guard, “Port Security Unit 313 welcomed home”, http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2011/08/port-security-unit-313-welcomed-home/

The Coast Guard is the recognized leader in port [security at home](http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2011/08/port-security-unit-313-welcomed-home/) and overseas. Overseas missions are performed primarily by Port Security Units, self-contained units staffed mostly by reservists. PSUs are just one way the Coast Guard adds measurable value to larger national security strategy goals, and their capabilities are an extraordinary force multiplier.

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States CP

Perm: Port security requires both federal and state control

John F. Frittelli, Specialist in Transportation Resources, Science, and Industry Division, 5/27/05, Congressional Research Service in The Library of Congress, “Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress”, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31733.pdf>

Some observers, while acknowledging the need for site-specific measures, argue that a certain amount of uniform measures are necessary to help ensure that no seaport remains excessively vulnerable to terrorist attack. Other observers argue that while standardized measures make sense up to a point, the effort to implement such measures must not come at the expense of efforts to devise and implement sites pecific security measures that respond to the unique characteristics of each port. Compared to commercial airports, seaports are generally more diverse in terms of their physical infrastructure and operations. As a result of this diversity in characteristics, each ship and port facility presents different risks and vulnerabilities. Port authorities are also very concerned with finding the right balance between standard and port specific security regulations. Ports seek a level of uniformity in security requirements because they are concerned that their customers will move their business to competing ports where their goods may be cleared more quickly. At the same time, ports do not want to be held to inflexible federal standards. They are concerned that setting security benchmarks may waste time and resources if those benchmarks are not applicable at their port given their particular commodity mix or other unique circumstances.

Perm: Port security is a state-federal partnership that requires federal direction

NCSL, National Conference of State Legislatures, 2012, “2011-2012 Policies for the Jurisdiction of the Transportation Committee”, <http://www>.ncsl.org/state-federal-committees.aspx?tabs=855,30,674#674

Port security is a state-federal partnership that is critical to the nation’s homeland security strategy. The states need clear federal direction to ensure that resources are focused on the most needed security improvements. Ninety-five percent of overseas cargo and millions of cruise and ferry passengers transit through ports each year. Ports are spending enormous sums to harden these vulnerable targets and need federal assistance.  NCSL supports the Department of Homeland Security’s Port Security Grant Program, which is vital to ports’ abilities to make improvements quickly and comply with the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. States have been directed to enhance the security of publicly operated ferries and provide for the inspection of vehicles and freight. In some cases, federal directives have preempted state laws and policies to the extent of superseding state constitutional provisions.  Federal assistance should fund these requirements to avoid unfunded mandates.

Solvency deficit - Only the federal government has jurisdiction in deepdraft channels and harbors and private ports

Sherman 02 (Rexford B. Sherman, Director of Research and Information Services at the American Association of Port Authorities, 2002, “Seaport Governance in the United States and Canada” www.aapa-ports.org/files/PDFs/governance\_uscan.pdf)

Introduction: To observers from abroad, even experienced port specialists, the seaport system of the United States might seem at first glance to be anything but a system. In other countries, port systems are typically small by comparison and commonly subject to direct control by national authority. The situation in the United States differs in several crucial respects. First is simply the size of the industry itself--183 commercial deepdraft ports dispersed along the U.S. Atlantic, Gulf, Pacific and Great Lake coasts. Included in that number, too, are the seaports of Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Saipan and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Here, unlike many countries, there is no national port authority. Rather authority is diffused throughout all three levels of government-federal, state and local. That stems from the federal character of the U.S. Constitution, which reserves certain powers for the national government and others strictly for the states. The Canadian system, by contrast, is subject to the general purview of the central government and more specifically to enactments of the national parliament. The enactment in June 1998 of the Canada Marine Act changed somewhat the character of the federal port system and permits the divestment of many ports previously administered by the Ministry of Transport to non-federal public and private entities. However, the nation’s major seaports are governed and managed by federal port authorities and ultimate statutory authority constitutionally remains with Parliament. Constitutional Parameters: The U.S. Constitution does grant the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over the navigable waters of the United States, including its deepdraft channels and harbors--authority delegated primarily to the Coast Guard and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. But federal jurisdiction over harbors stops at the water's edge. Port authorities in the United States are instrumentalities of state or local government established by enactment or grants of authority by the state legislature. Neither Congress nor any federal agency has the power, or even the right, to appoint or dismiss port commissioners or staff members, or to amend, alter or repeal a port authority charter. Certain port activities are, of course, subject to federal law and jurisdiction, particularly those pertaining to foreign and interstate commerce. Port vs Port Authority: It should be note that there are numerous commercial ports where no public seaport agency exists - ports in which facilities are all privately owned and frequently operate as adjuncts to large industrial enterprise such as iron ore company or an electrical utility. Industrial ports of this type are particularly common on the Great Lakes. However, there are also privately owned and operate ports that provide services to the shipping public that are in most ways similar to those offered by public seaport terminals. Examples include the Port of Searsport, Maine, which is owned by the Bangor & Aroostook Railroad, New Haven, Connecticut, where all general cargo facilities are owned by private companies, and Benicia, California, where the port is owned by a private share-holder owned corporation, Benicia Port Holdings which has raised funds from the sale of stock on the London Exchange. It should also be noted that some port authorities may own facilities in two or more ports. The South Carolina State Ports Authority, for example, owns and operates marine terminal facilities in the ports of Charleston, Georgetown, and Port Royal. The basic distinction is that a port is geo-economic entity whereas a port authority is a government entity.

Federal investment is key—states can’t maintain U.S. trade leadership—perm solves

NCSL, National Conference of State Legislatures, 2012, “2011-2012 Policies for the Jurisdiction of the Transportation Committee”, <http://www>.ncsl.org/state-federal-committees.aspx?tabs=855,30,674#674

The U.S. system of waterways and ports provides substantial benefits to the nation by providing access to the world’s markets. The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) recognizes the combined efforts of all levels of government and users in sharing the cost of port and waterway development and maintenance. NCSL further acknowledges the distinctive roles played by the states and the federal government in financing waterways and ports. The increase of state and local financial support in recent years should be concomitant with an increased planning authority, which is particularly important for the integration and support of other transportation systems for enhanced waterway and port activity.  Ports  Investment in the U.S. water transportation system is a partnership between state and local governments and the federal government. State and local authorities significantly invest resources to enhance marine terminal capacity and efficiency, dredge berths and approach channels, and share the cost of new dredging projects to widen and deepen navigation channels. The federal government traditionally had supported dredging expenses through the General Treasury. In 1986, Congress established the Harbor Maintenance Tax, which is paid on imports and the domestic coastwise movement of goods, to support increased federal operations, and to finance the maintenance dredging of navigable channels and harbors. These taxes are deposited into the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund.  In order to sustain U.S. leadership in global trade, the nation’s ports must receive adequate federal funds to improve and maintain federal navigational channels. NCSL supports the full use of the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund to maintain the nation’s harbors and calls on Congress to adequately fund deepening projects to modernize our ports. The accumulation of harbor tax receipts at the federal level is a break in faith from the purpose of the Harbor Maintenance Tax and results in the imposition of a competitive burden without providing needed improvements necessary to achieve efficiencies to offset added taxes.

**Perm Do Both - Bureaucracy ensures states are hesitant to flex funds from highways, only with federal pressure will they do so – the perms’ key to solve**

Robert J. **Dilger**, Director of West Virginia University’s Institute for Public Affairs and Professor in the Eberly College of Arts and Science’s Department of Political Science, 19**98**, Publius (1998) 28 (1): pg. 53-54, ‘TEA-21: Transportation Policy, Pork Barrel Politics, and American Federalism’, Oxford Journals, TB

One of ISTEA's implementation difficulties was Congress' failure to designate the highways within the National Highway System until 1995. Another difficulty was created by the U.S. DOT, which took nearly two years to issue its planning regulations.9 Worried that they could later become subject to federal sanctions, many state and local transportation officials were reluctant to implement new planning procedures in the absence of federal guidelines. Moreover, because most transportation projects typically take several years to go from conception to construction to use, many states already had a large number of projects "in the pipeline" when ISTEA went into effect and were not in a position to make radical changes in their funding patterns during ISTEA's initial two to three years. In addition, most MPOs were not accustomed to playing such a major role in transportation policymaking. Many of them lacked the staff, expertise, procedures, and political connections necessary to exercise their new responsibilities.10 As a result, it was not surprising that a major shift in transportation funding patterns did not take place during ISTEA's initial three years. In 1992, for example, state and local officials invested nearly all (about 97 percent) of their flexible highway funds in traditional highway projects, principally highway construction and repair.11 Since then, MPOs, particularly ones representing populations greater than 200,000, have strengthened their staff resources, though often by contracting out services to planners in the private sector rather than hiring their own permanent staff. The new planning procedures were also put into place.12 Nevertheless, most of ISTEA's funding continued to be spent on highway construction and repair. State and local officials "flexed" less than $3 billion of the more than $70 billion that could have been moved from highway construction to other transportation modes, and most of those flexed funds (55 percent) were concentrated in the $6 billion Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program (CMAQ) that specifically discouraged, with the exception of funding for High-Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes, funding for highway uses.13 The administration claimed that flexing nearly $3 billion in ISTEA's highway construction funds to other transportation modes was an indication that "state and local governments have responded enthusiastically to the increased flexibility in federal programs."14 Although the amount flexed under ISTEA increased from year to year, reaching nearly $800 million in 1996, flexing less than 4 percent of available funds, while noteworthy, does not represent a major policy shift. Moreover, most of the "flexing" occurred in just three states, New York, California, and Massachusetts.15

**Leaving funding to states makes plan impossible**

**Washington Post 12** [“Why can’t we just leave infrastructure spending to the states?” Brad Plumer at 02:46 PM ET, 03/21/2012 : http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/why-cant-we-just-leave-infrastructure-spending-to-the-states/2012/03/21/gIQAjpYBSS\_blog.html]

Yesterday, I pointed out that Rep. Paul Ryan’s GOP budget proposal would require the federal government to spend less and less on transportation over time. Reihan Salam asks whether this is really such a bad thing. Can’t state governments just pick up the slack? That’s possible, sure. But it hasn’t happened so far. As a recent report (pdf) from the Congressional Budget Office detailed, the federal government’s share of infrastructure spending has already been shrinking since the 1960s and 1970s. And the states, which still provide the vast majority of spending on roads and highways, haven’t made up the difference. The end result? There’s less infrastructure spending overall as a percent of GDP: Keep in mind that this is all happening at a time when infrastructure is getting increasingly expensive to build — the CBO notes that the cost of building highways has tripled since 1980, far faster than inflation. States are spending the same, but getting less and less. Now, maybe this would all be okay if we were keeping our roads and bridges and pipes in good shape. But various experts and groups like the American Civil Society of Engineers seem to think that we’re woefully under-investing in infrastructure of all sorts. One potential pitfall with handing over more and more infrastructure responsibilities to the states, meanwhile, is that states tend to cut way back on spending during recessions. And local funding can be pretty erratic, all told. Here’s a graph from New America’s Samuel Sherradan, based on CBO data: We’ve seen this in the current downturn. Sherraden observes that California’s transportation spending declined by 31 percent from 2007 to 2009 after the housing bubble burst and local tax revenue fell. The same goes for Texas, which saw an 8 percent drop. “[I]t is clear,” Sherraden writes, “that leaving a greater share of infrastructure spending to state and local governments makes infrastructure investment more vulnerable during downturns.” Now, this isn’t the last word on how best to divvy up responsibility on transportation between state and local governments. That’s a long-running, complicated debate — I’d recommend Robert Jay Dilger’s paper (pdf) for a history and overview. And, it’s true, some experts like Edward Glaeser argue that states would be less likely to build costly boondoggles if left to their own devices (although states are perfectly capable of building costly boondoggles of their own, see here and here for rebuttals to Glaeser). But that’s a separate discussion. For the purposes of the Ryan budget, there’s no guarantee that states will rush in to fill the infrastructure gap if the federal government pulls back sharply.

Privatization CP

CP is the squo—the private sector alone lacks ability to manage port security

Port and Maritime Security Working Group, October 2007

Part of the U.S. Maritime Administration Department of Transportation, in coordination with the California Maritime Academy, “Protecting America’s Ports: *Are We There Yet?”,* p. 10

Maritime Security Emphasis in the United States has Largely Shifted to the PRIVATE SECTOR Today’s domestic maritime security efforts in the local operational environment reside under a changed emphasis where the private sector carries a larger portion of the maritime security burden under both international and domestic regulation and doctrine – although they neither have the necessary understanding, practical intelligence information, education, training, motivation, desire or the willingness to effectively and fully engage in this critical role. The primary motivational role of business is “business” and to effect change in the allocation of funds and resources in the maritime business environment requires clear evidence that a) the threat, risk and vulnerability are all considerably too great to accept so that b) the potential for loss and liability warrants full assumption of the role and responsibility being thrust upon them by government. This case has yet to be effectively made and is more and more difficult as we move further and further away from the 9/11 events without the commission of a terrorist act along the waterfront. Leadership on the part of the federal and state governments establishing unambiguous standards, policies and expected implementation of Best Security Practices is required within the MTS – but is currently underemphasized and unevenly enforced.

The perm solves best

Frittelli 05 (John Frittelli, specialist in transportation policy for the Congressional Research Service, 5/27/05, “Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress” www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31733.pdf)

Private Industry’s Role. A broad policy question for Congress is how much of a role the private sector should have in enhancing maritime security. Many observers believe that businesses will worry more about near term profits than the remote possibility that their property will be attacked.63 At the same time, most experts acknowledge that there are just too many cargo movements for the government to monitor on its own. Security experts believe that tightening control over maritime commerce requires that security be “embedded” into everyday business processes. CBP’s C-TPAT program is intended to enlist the effort of the many companies involved in international container shipments. In its oversight responsibilities, Congress may evaluate the effectiveness of this program, particularly in ensuring the due diligence of maritime traders over the long term. Congress may consider how best to ensure sustained follow through on the part of C-TPAT participants. A “trust but verify” approach utilizing regular CBP security audits may be one strategy policymakers consider.

Perm solves best—federal-private partnership is normal means

Kelli Ann Walther, acting deputy assistant secretary, screening coordination office, office of policy, rear admiral Joseph Servidio, assistant commandant for prevention policy, U.S. coast guard, 6/28/12, U.S. department of homeland security delivered before the house committee on transportation and infrastructure, http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyCGMT/2012-06-28-WaltherServido.pdf

Coordination across DHS and intelligence organizations, domestic port security assessments, and critical infrastructure protection plans are all layers to protect U.S. ports and waterways. Along the coastal zone, Coast Guard has stations and response boats, and the National Vessel Movement Center and Deepwater Program. In the open ocean, the U.S. conducts long range vessel tracking and the Coast Guard continues joint efforts with NORTHCOM. Overseas we continue our Container Security Initiative and C-TPAT. In pursuit of security solutions, the Department has developed strong partnerships with the private sector, as these partnerships are critical to maritime security measures and to protecting our ports. In most cases, the Federal Government does not own or operate the many assets that comprise the maritime domain, including critical infrastructure and key resources. Therefore, we work closely with our partners to meet homeland security objectives in a manner consistent with their operational needs.

International Regime CP

Perm: CP is normal means—international port security collaboration is in place (\*uq to adv. proves solvency deficit—inspections from other countries are insufficient for port security)

Adam Shaw, Summer 2009

Has served in the U.S. Coast Guard for 20 years in multiple operational units, most notably as commanding officer of several aids to navigation cutters, currently assigned as the coordinator for the U.S. Coast Guard International Port Security program in Rotterdam, Netherlands, “Using Diplomacy to Promote Sustainable Port Security in Foreign Ports”, http://www.uscg.mil/proceedings/summer2009/articles/35\_Shaw\_Using%20Diplomacy%20to%20Promote%20Sustainable%20Port%20Security%20in%20Foreign%20Ports.pdf

Coast Guard International Port Security Liaison Officers There are approximately 60 U.S. Coast Guard personnel operating in only a few U.S. Coast Guard International Port Security offices throughout the world: Washington, D.C.; Portsmouth, Va.; Alameda, Calif.; U.S. Coast Guard Far East Activities, Japan; U.S. Coast Guard Far East Activities Detachment, Singapore; and U.S. Coast Guard Activities Europe (ACTEUR) in Rotterdam, Netherlands. The U.S. Coast Guard IPS program at ACTEUR is staffed by 11 active duty international port security liaison officers (IPSLOs) who operate in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, conducting visits to the port facilities of the 88 maritime trading partner nations within their area of responsibility. An IPSLO’s primary mission is to assess the anti-terrorism measures implemented at foreign ports. This is done through visits to evaluate compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code; engaging in bilateral information exchanges (including sharing of best practices); and participation in relevant conferences,meetings, seminars, and workshops in support of U.S. government strategic objectives.

CP is the squo—US port insecurity stems from too much focus on overseas ports and few domestic changes

Port and Maritime Security Working Group, October 2007

Part of the U.S. Maritime Administration Department of Transportation, in coordination with the california maritime academy, “Protecting America’s Ports: *Are We There Yet?”,* p. 10

As a country, the United States has faced and managed domestic port security issues many times during its history - the threat remains both INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL – but how we are addressing these concerns differs from the methods and approaches of the past. In prior circumstances, the federal government – usually through the U.S. Coast Guard -- has not only provided the regulatory leadership and standards of practice at the national level, but it has also taken a pre-eminent active role in the physical implementation and oversight of port security implementation at the local level in the port environment. This often was realized through dramatic increases in “boots on the ground” and assets in the water (and in the air) to regulate, inspect, and augment private sector security forces in a direct way. After 9/11, the national response to the terrorist threat has focused overseas, and the real possibilities of domestic terrorist cells, "jihadist" or otherwise, are largely unaddressed from a tactical security prospective. The security focus is largely offshore and those aspects of port security being implemented domestically pertain to the “hardening” of individual facilities and vessels regulated under the provisions of the ISPS Code and MTSA 2002. Worse, this focus largely still ignores the waterside and landside threats from surface and subsurface small craft and/or divers as well as the possibility of a landside infiltration via shipping container – both tactics that have been employed by terrorists in the recent past around the globe.

CP is plan-plus—The plan is to increase port security in the U.S. There’s no reason why cooperation is key to do that—We also don’t preclude cooperation to increase port security elsewhere.

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Terror Talk

Terrorism discourse is necessary to an effective response to terrorism

Jane Albrechtsen, 7/9/09

Writer for The Australian, “Language Police Terrorize Common Sense”

 http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/07/29/language\_police\_terrorize\_common\_sense.html

Would someone kindly lock up these language police for crimes against the English language? An attack is what happened in Jakarta when innocent hotel guests were murdered at the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels. And it is, quite literally, the bleeding obvious to point out that the perpetrators of the carnage are a group of Islamist militants who twist the tenets of Islam to suit their ideological purposes. They seek to bring down democracy in Indonesia and punish Western nations for fighting the Taliban and al-Qa'ida, with the ultimate aim of creating an Islamic caliphate. Yet while these terrorists go to great lengths to promote their Muslim identity and their militant Islamist ideology, it seems we are not allowed to mention that now. There is nothing wrong with crafting careful language when dealing with terrorism. For years political leaders have used terms such as Islamist terrorist or Islamo-fascist to carefully distinguish militants from the vast majority of peace-loving Muslims. But there is a difference between being careful and being cowardly. The kind of zealous language policing endorsed by the Victoria Police and the Multicultural Foundation encourages us to hide from the truth. Their new whitewash language is not just daft, it's dangerous. Clarity of language is a critical tool if we are serious about uncovering and understanding militant Islam. After so many attacks and the murder of so many innocent people, why would we cower from identifying the drivers of their Islamist extremism? Yet there was too much cowering and not enough clarity from Attorney-General Robert McClelland when he addressed the Australian Strategic Policy Institute last week. Endorsing the language police's Lexicon of Terrorism project, the A-G's speech was littered with references to "violent extremism", "violent extremists", "violent extremist messages", "extremist beliefs" and "extremist ideology". McClelland was too frightened to construct a sentence that included the word Islamism. Instead he quoted from Ed Husain, in his book The Islamist, who has no problem referring to "Islamist extremists". Apparently the A-G believes it is acceptable for a Muslim to speak with factual accuracy but the rest of us must resort to meaningless generalities for fear of radicalising Muslim youth.

**Terrorist threats are real – only by honing our fear of terror can we reduce the violence**

**Seymour 8** (JJ, writer @ Self Help Recordings, 10/10/8,

http://ezinearticles.com/?Fear-of-Terrorism---How-to-Overcome-Terrorism-Fear-For-Good&id=1574000)

Fear of terrorism is a serious matter in the post-9/11 world. As more and more political powers develop powerful nuclear weapons, and as large-scale war becomes more and more impracticable, military conflict**--**more and more often--takes the form of brief, violent attacks on civilians and infrastructure. Indeed, panic and fear are implied by the very word, "terrorism." The aim of a terrorist attack is to overwhelm a country's population with terror, and thus achieve one's organization's political aims. Thus, it is unsurprising that many people who live in countries that have suffered from recent terrorist attacks have developed a real phobia of being unexpectedly shot at, bombed, or taken hostage by various rogue military groups. Even people who live far from the major centers of terrorist activity have become paranoid, to the extent that their phobia interferes with their ability to lead normal lives.A Complex TerrorWhether you live near or far from previous terrorist activity, the fear of terrorist political acts entails many complicated emotions. That feeling of dread we experience when we hear the news of yet another attack is a potent cocktail of guilt, anger, confusion, and helplessness. When we listen to news of tragedy, we often regret how ignorant we are of what is going on elsewhere in the world**.** No matter how frequently we read the news, and from how many different sources (on the Internet and elsewhere), it's never frequently enough; our sources are never reliable enough.So Many QuestionsWe wonder, isn't there anything we can do? Would these attacks have been prevented if only we got involved in politics, if we knew more? Should we enter the world of politics or high finance, become major political players? Should we hide out in the desert, and live off canned food? Are we just so much sheep for the slaughter? Is it better to just bury our heads in the sand, to tune out these dire reports? The closer we live to the attacks, the more intense these feelings become.Take Control Of Your Fear Of Terrorism To be sure, terrorism poses a major world problem. The problem is at once political, economic, philosophical, and practical. So far, it's a problem without any obvious answers. However, perhaps the first step to grappling with this complex problem is to take control of your fear. Does the stuff you hear on the news put you into a state of unthinking panic? Well, how do you think those German citizens felt, when they voted a man named Adolf Hitler into power? To be an empowered citizen, you need to take control of your fear**-**-and the best way to do this is with hypnotherapy and NLP.

Identifying terrorist threats is key to responses

Jenkins, 98

Brian Michael, analyst @ RAND, “Countering the New Terrorism,” pp. vi-vii, 1998, , www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR989/index.html

Defining “international terrorism” was a necessary prerequisite for mobilizing international support against terrorism and could be viewed as a noble effort against piracy provided an historical precedent – and the conventions governing war. It also served U.S. national interests in that the principal terrorist threat to the United States came not from terrorist attacks inside the United States but rather from terrorist attacks on American citizens and facilities abroad. The chronology of international terrorism reinforced this concern by showing that U.S. citizens and facilities were the number one target in international incidents of terrorism. The United States had no mandate to intervene in the internal conflicts of other nations, but when that violence spilled over into the international community, it became a legitimate international concern

**Defining terrorism is key to solving it**

**TTSRL 8**

Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, policy Brif no. 2, 10/1/8,, www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%204.pdf

Yet the real business can be spoiled, some authors claim, by the lack of a universally agreed definition of terrorism. ‘An objective definition of terrorism is not only possible: it is also indispensable to any serious attempt to combat terrorism,’ holds Ganor (quoted in Schmid, 2004a: 375). He thus reiterated his earlier statement on the importance of this issue, in which he had declared that a common understanding of what constitutes terrorism is important, among other purposes, for 1) a development of common international strategies, 2) effective results of the international mobilization against terrorism, 3) enforcement of international agreements against terrorism, and 4) effective extradiction procedures (Ganor, 1998). Similarly, Schmid also points to a positive role of a universal definition in coordinating the states’ anti-terrorist strategies, quoting Dean and Alexander, who consider the absence of a universal definition of terrorism as the main factor likely to encourage future terrorism – more eminent than, e.g., disagreement as to the root causes, religionization of politics or exploitation of the media (Schmid, 2004a: 378). However, the focus is here shifted from the academia to the fields of strategic and legal discourse, and Ganor and Schmid’s statements therefore cannot be considered as proper arguments in favour of the universal academic definition of terrorism. Nonetheless, they pave the way to the conclusion that in fact, there is a search going on not for one universal definition of terrorism, but for manifold definitions of terrorism, which, in each of the fields listed above (academic, strategic and legal), are required to play a peculiar role and therefore focus on various issue areas in their quest. Whereas the **s**trategic discourse may be assumed to be primarily concerned with terrorism as a method of combat, in the legal discourse, the focus rests rather with those who can be punished for commiting terrorist acts, the perpetrators. In the absence of a universal legal definition, capabilities of prosecuting those who commit terrorist crimes are limited – nullum crimen sine lege – and the extradition channels are obstructed.