**\*\*\*Port Security Advantages\*\*\***

**New Military Advantage Notes**

**Strategy note – consider making it just about land or sea power to avoid turns to the other (probably about sea power).**

**Impact work – there will be more cards about how the Navy is key to military stuff in the Mayport aff. There are lots of Navy impacts between the MOT aff and the title IX aff.**

**1AC Military Impact**

**Contention (\_) is the military:**

**Ports are vulnerable to a terrorist attack – it would shut down military and naval power**

**Watts 05** [CDR Bob Watts is a 1985 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and has served six tours at sea conducting drug/migrant operations, most recently commanding the USCGC STEADFAST (WMEC 623). He is currently assigned as the chief of drug and migrant interdiction at Coast Guard Headquarters, where his responsibilities include drafting migrant policy and strategy, including planning for mass migration. A 2006 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security, he has advanced degrees from the Naval War College, Old Dominion University, American Military University, and is a doctoral candidate at the Royal Military College of Canada.] Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multi-Agency Command and Control in an Asymmetric Environment http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.2.3

Throughout its history, the United States has been a global maritime nation, dependent upon the oceans for economy, welfare, and defense. In the modern era emphasis on globalization and the world economy has increased this dependence considerably. There are some 95,000 miles of United States’ coastline and 3.4 million square miles of territorial seas and exclusive economic zones in the U.S. maritime domain. 1 Connecting the continental United States to this zone are over 1,000 harbors and ports, 361 of which are cargo capable. Through these ports enter approximately 21,000 containers daily, representing ninety-five percent of the nation’s overseas cargo, including 100 percent of U.S. petroleum imports. 2 In addition to commerce, there are seventy-six million recreational boaters in the United States. Six million cruise ship passengers visit U.S. ports annually. In the strategic/military sense, a substantial portion of U.S. national power relies on the sea, both in the form of traditional Navy Carrier Strike groups that deploy from ports in the continental United States and the subsequent ability to reinforce deployed forces overseas. Without unimpeded access to the sea, the ability of the United States to project national power is extremely limited. Maritime infrastructure is crucial in maintaining this link to the sea. From naval bases to commercial ports, maritime infrastructure is well developed nationwide and is crucial to both the economic sector and military strategy. Maritime infrastructure is critical to the employment of national maritime power and as such is a logical (if not desirable) target for acts of terrorism by our enemies. A successful attack against a port could incur serious economic and military damage, present an enemy with the opportunity to inflict mass casualties, and have serious long-term detrimental effects on our national economy. Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection (MCIP) presents many challenges in an asymmetric environment. Previous models of maritime defense have focused on protecting ships from traditional naval attack; even when ports and supporting infrastructure have been considered targets, emphasis was on defense against a military threat. The Global War On Terror (GWOT) has created a number of heretofore unconsidered vulnerabilities in this traditional outlook. Many targets that would not be considered legitimate (economic, symbolic, etc.) in a conventional war must now be considered in strategic defensive planning. In conducting these attacks the unimpeded use of the sea is a force multiplier for an enemy dedicated to striking a wide range of potential targets. Possible threats from the sea are wide-ranging and diverse, relying on a combination of asymmetric offensive tactics while exploiting the variety of the littoral. This asymmetric nature of GWOT requires a multi-agency approach to devise effective command and control for modern port defense. The Coast Guard and Navy have made important strides in this area by devising experimental Joint Harbor Operations Centers (JHOCs) as a component of maritime anti-terrorist force protection. The expansion of this concept into multi-agency maritime homeland security is a logical next step in the evolving problem of port security and defense. This is made evident by examining likely terrorist threats to ports and studying the lessons of the past that apply in this environment which can be used to expand the current command and control system to meet the new threat NEW THREAT MATRIX: PORTS AS TARGETS The GWOT threat to ports is a relatively new element in the spectrum of naval warfare. This is largely due to the evolving nature of the shipping industry and the nation’s growing reliance on sea power. Historically, a nation’s maritime strength has been measured by the size and capability of its merchant fleet and Navy; attacks against a nation’s sea power meant the physical destruction of these ships. Ports, until quite recently, were composed of infrastructure that was relatively easy to replace or replicate, making them relatively low priority targets for an enemy dedicated to striking at maritime strength. This has changed in the modern era of containerization and the increased size and technical nature of ships. In modern times ports have become centers of highly technical, well-integrated infrastructure designed for the rapid loading and unloading of cargo, an evolution that has become highly complex in the era of containerization. Commercially efficient, port cargo operations are also highly dependent on networked operations, making the disruption of the process far simpler for a potential attacker. Additionally, the complexity of this evolution, combined with the increasing size of seagoing merchant vessels (and warships), has greatly reduced the number of commercial ports available for use by global shipping. This has the duel effect of making major ports more important economically and strategically while simultaneously making them more attractive targets for offensive action. The attractiveness of ports as targets for terrorists can be summarized as follows: A. Economic Impact: An unprecedented amount of trade — both imports and exports — relies on shipment by sea. A successful attack on maritime infrastructure would affect this trade in far greater proportion than the actual damage. It is likely that an attack on one port would have a cascade effect on others as increased security measures are applied nationwide. The recent impact of the London bombings can be seen as illustrative of this effect; although there was no indication of additional terrorist activity, security measures were increased at transportation hubs worldwide. Increasing security alerts at a train station is one thing; closing a huge economic entity such as a port is quite another. Delay of shipping in loading and offloading cargo is one of the most costly elements of the shipping process. We must also consider the impact to the shipping industry itself. During the Persian Gulf re-flagging operations of the late 1980s, for example, analysis showed the greatest impact to the shipping of oil was not the damage to tankers inflicted by the warring Iraqis and Iranians (which was, in fact, minimal), but the increased insurance costs of operating in that area. 3 An attack on a U.S. port could have a similar, if not larger, effect. B. High visibility/High Casualties: Ports are not isolated areas, but rather major centers of commerce, usually surrounded by large cities and economic centers. An attack on a port could be highly visible and potentially the scene of mass conflagration. As a result of urban development, most major ports are no longer confined to strictly industrial areas, but rather have become well-developed centers of commerce and entertainment, surrounded by built up waterside areas dedicated to tourism and recreation. Many of these facilities are located next to volatile maritime infrastructure (fuel tanks, docks, etc.) that could create mass conflagration if attacked through large explosive force. Sympathetic detonation, fires, and other catastrophic effects would certainly create mass casualties. C. Ease of attack: Commercial ports are not fortresses. The ocean itself presents a number of distinct advantages to a dedicated attacker, especially when employing maritime suicide terrorism or means to rapidly deliver large explosive force. Water is not only a tremendously efficient transport medium (allowing for rapid transit), but the large amount of legitimate commercial and recreational traffic in ports allows for an enemy to mask movements prior to an attack, making effective defense difficult. Given the importance of ports to our economy and military power, the potential for creating mass casualties, and the ease by which an enemy can attack, a strong case can be made that ports will become a target for future terrorist attacks. If this is the case, we can apply the military planning process to meeting this threat. The first step in this process is looking for lessons learned that could be used in the current scenario: have we faced this threat before, and if so, what can we learn from the experience?

**That would destroy naval power and military operations**

**Talor et al. 07** (Bruce Taylor director of research at the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) in Washington, D.C; Antony Pate Bruce Kubu;) Protecting America’s Ports: Promising Practices A Final Report Submitted https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221075.pdf

The U.S. Navy has considerable assets stationed in or near several American ports, most notably Norfolk, Virginia and San Diego, California. Although the Navy has primary responsibility for protecting these ships, other port interests also have concerns about the possibility of terrorists damaging or sinking one of these vessels, particularly those that are nuclear-powered. Finally, 17 ports have been designated “strategic” by the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation. 12 They are so designated because in the event of a large-scale military deployment, **DOD would transport more than ninety-five percent of all equipment and supplies needed for military operations by sea. These ports are therefore vital to national security.** If the strategic ports (or the ships carrying military supplies) were attacked, not only could massive civilian casualties result, but also valuable cargo and time could be lost, as military mobilization would be forced to rely on already overburdened airlift resources.

**Navy power solves war**

**Conway et al. 07** [James T., General, U.S. Marine Corps, Gary Roughead, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Thad W. Allen, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” October, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf]

Deter major power war**.** No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative **seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power war**. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces. Win our Nation’s wars.In times of war, our ability to impose local sea control, overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power ashore, **makes our maritime forces an indispensable element of the joint or combined force**. This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by a robust sealift capability that can concentrate and sustain forces, sea control and power projection enable extended campaigns ashore.

**Port security key to military mobilization**

**Hart 00** [Clyde J. Hart, Jr., Maritime Administrator, U.S. Department of Transportation] HEARING before the COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ OCTOBER 4, 2000 \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation http://ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/106s/86533.txt

MARAD recognizes that the movement of military cargoes through our commercial ports has and will continue to be standard practice. Because of our dual mission, MARAD works closely with both the maritime industry and the Department of Defense (DOD). As the seaport Commission's report noted, forward deployment of U.S. troops and equipment overseas in this post Cold War era is declining. Ongoing base closure and realignment initiatives have resulted in the closure of several military owned and operated ports. As a result, **U.S. commercial ports have become critical centers for military mobilizations. The security of commercial ports during times of military mobilization is therefore critical to national defense**. In developing port security standards MARAD has and will continue to work to bridge the gap between military requirements and industry concerns. A National Port Readiness Network was established by a memorandum of understanding between MARAD and various DOD Commands to ensure, in part, the readiness of commercial seaports in the event of a mobilization. MARAD, as the chair of the National Port Readiness Network (NPRN), can lead the effort to strengthen the NPRN in planning and coordination for military mobilization security at each of 13 commercial ports around the country designated as Strategic Ports.

**That solves a laundry list of global conflicts**

**Hickins 09** (COLONEL KENNETH, United States Army, March 30, 2009, “STRATEGIC MOBILITY: FORGOTTEN CRITICAL REQUIREMENT OF THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA494718///TS)

As I stated at the beginning of the paper, Strategic Mobility has not been fixed and is the weakest link in the strategic chain of getting the right forces, to the proper place in space and time in order to allow the Combatant Commander to either deter, deescalate, or decisively defeat an adversary. I believe I have shown that the 2006 QDR which stated, “Extensive investments in cargo transportability, strategic lift, and prepositioned stocks over the past decade have yielded military forces capable of responding to a broad spectrum of security challenges worldwide”,41 is at best misleading and at worst wishful thinking of the highest order. Eighty percent of all countries border on the coast, 80 percent of the world’s capitals lie within 350 miles of the coast, and 95 percent of all the world’s population lives within 500 miles of the coast.42 Currently, the United States cannot move significant ground forces to a crisis area in a timely manner. The recent National Security Strategy states that either Host Nation or an Allied Nation APODs and SPODs will be used to quickly move forces into the crisis area. An examination of past and potential crisis areas reveal most border the world’s oceans and are in remote, unimproved areas of the world: Somalia, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Yemen, Myanmar, Pakistan, India, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, China, Korea, Taiwan, Georgia, Sudan, East Timor, Venezuela, and Cuba. Half of these countries sit astride strategic waterways that would impact the United States and our Allies. If the United States would have to engage any of these countries militarily, the Combatant Commander would need all the assets that the Mobility Triad has in order to respond to any and all contingencies. **If the United States wants to continue to provide the world with political, economic, informational, and military leadership it will need to have the ability to flow military forces into the numerous trouble spots throughout the world**. The United States cannot afford to rely on possible Host Nation or Allied Nation support. Nor can it rely on limited air transport and slow sealift to get our forces quickly to the crisis area. The United States must quit paying lip service to the shortfalls in our Strategic Mobility Triad and leverage the available technology and create a truly interdependent and complimentary Mobility Triad that is a critical requirement for any operational and strategic success

**Ports are key to overall military power**

**AAPA Seaports 03** U.S. ports essential to war cargo efforts Rail infrastructure demands funding <http://www.aapaseaports.com/pdf_issues/AAPASeaports_Fall2003.pdf>

Vital national efforts such as military cargo moves for Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom would not be possible without U.S. seaports and the people who keep them working. As important as they are in times of peace, ports take on an added significance in wartime, when they provide the conduits for everything from armored vehicles to ammunition to get to battlefield locations on the other side of the planet. Military and civilian leaders agree that a network of multiple ports – each with sufficient rail capabilities and other intermodal infrastructure – is essential to war efforts. But, without proper funding for improvements to rail capacity and other facilities, ports are not able to maximize their ability to handle influxes of thousands of railcars loaded with military cargoes. “Ports are absolutely critical,” said Bill Lucas, the top civilian in the U.S. military transportation arena. “We couldn’t do it without them. “We are very, very dependent upon U.S. ports,” added Lucas, who for the past 13 years has served as deputy to the commander of the Alexandria, Va.-based Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). Lucas noted that ports played an essential role as military loadouts in support of this year’s Iraq conflict moved with much greater efficiency than those associated with Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Many ports play role With the Texas ports of Corpus Christi and Beaumont leading the way along the U.S. Gulf and Charleston, S.C., and Jacksonville, Fla., at the forefront on the South Atlantic, numerous seaports participated in the Iraq-bound loadouts, entailing close cooperation between port leadership, labor, inland and ocean transportation providers and the military. Nearly 200 ship voyages were carried out in what Major Gen. Ann E. Dunwoody, commander of MTMC, described as a “choreographed ballet,” while port officials sought to ensure that little or no impact would be felt upon ongoing commercial operations. By summer, vessels returning to U.S. ports from the Middle East were generating still more activity. Lt. Col.Arthur Hedgepeth, deputy commander of the 1192nd Transportation Terminal Brigade, who oversaw moves from Fort Hood through Corpus Christi, said of the port’s role, “They played an extremely important aspect in our operations. “The job done was tremendous,” Hedgepeth continued, adding, “The only drawback was in rail capacity coming into the port, which slowed us down a little bit.” Whereas the “power projection platform” (PPP) at Fort Hood was capable of dispatching between 200 and 300 loaded railcars per day, the rail facilities at and near the Port of Corpus Christi could only handle between 130 and 140 such cars during even the most productive 24hour periods of operation, according to Hedgepeth. More rail lines for bringing in cars for offloading plus additional capacity for return transport of empty cars are needed, he said. “**You’ve got to get through the port to get to the other end,”** Hedgepeth said. “The ports need more rail capacity, and I think that’s true at most strategic ports.” 14 ports designated The U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Maritime Administration (MARAD) has designated 14 such strategic commercial ports. In addition to Corpus Christi, Beaumont, Charleston and Jacksonville, they include Savannah, Ga.;Wilmington, N.C.; Morehead City, N.C.; Norfolk/Newport News, Va.; Philadelphia; New York/New Jersey; Tacoma and the California ports of Oakland, Long Beach and San Diego. Also, several other ports without such designation were sites for war-related moves. “Commercial ports provide the critical interface between the water and surface modes of transportation for handling both commercial and military cargoes,” explained William Aird, program director with MARAD’s Office of Ports and Domestic Shipping. “The Department of Defense (DoD) relies heavily on the use of the U.S. commercial ports to deploy its forces. “During military mobilizations, DoD must be able to move equipment and supplies through commercial port facilities quickly and securely to ensure optimal logistics flow to meet the mission requirements with minimum disruption to commercial port operations,” Aird continued, noting that DOT, through MARAD, is responsible for the readiness of designated commercial ports and establishing DoD's prioritized use of ports and related intermodal facilities during mobilizations. This includes, through the MTMC, designation of strategic commercial ports that may be used during a deployment, with a port executive serving as federal port controller (FPC) at each port to facilitate deployment planning and execution.

**That maintains the liberal order – comparatively better than the alternative**

**Kagan 12** [Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, B.A., Yale University, M.P.P., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Ph.D., American University, March 14, 2012, “America Has Made the World Freer, Safer and Wealthier”, Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/03/14-us-power-kagan>, DMintz]

We take a lot for granted about the way the world looks today -- the widespread freedom, the unprecedented global prosperity (even despite the current economic crisis), and the absence of war among great powers. In 1941 there were only a dozen democracies in the world. Today there are more than 100. For four centuries prior to 1950, global GDP rose by less than 1 percent a year. Since 1950 it has risen by an average of 4 percent a year, and billions of people have been lifted out of poverty. The first half of the 20th century saw the two most destructive wars in the history of mankind, and in prior centuries war among great powers was almost constant. But for the past 60 years no great powers have gone to war. This is the world America made when it assumed global leadership after World War II. Would this world order survive if America declined as a great power? Some American intellectuals insist that a "Post-American" world need not look very different from the American world and that all we need to do is "manage" American decline. But that is wishful thinking. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other powers, the world order will inevitably change to suit their interests and preferences. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great power autocracies. Both China and Russia already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. What about the free market, free trade economic order? People assume China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. But China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal being preservation of the ruling party. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power it brings. They might kill the goose because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Many people imagine that American predominance will be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been neither stable nor peaceful. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated, however, by major wars among great powers and culminating in World War I, the most destructive and deadly war mankind had known up to that point. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand. Many people view the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior, and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government -- forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. But there was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others -- in America's case, the domination of liberal free market principles of economics, democratic principles of politics, and a peaceful international system that supports these, over other visions that other nations and peoples may have. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms American power has supported will decline, too. Or they may collapse altogether as we transition into another kind of world order, or into disorder. We may discover then that the United States was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe -- which was what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

**2AC Ext. Military Impact**

**Port security key to military mobilization**

**Carlton 01** Bruce j. Carlton acting deputy maritime administrator before the committee on commerce, science and transportation united states senate on port and maritime security Department of transportation maritime administration statement of July 24, 2001 <http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/pasttest/01test/Carlton2.htm>

The movement of military cargoes through our commercial ports is standard practice. Because of our dual mission, MARAD works closely with both the maritime industry and the Department of Defense (DOD). As the Commission's report noted, forward deployment of U.S. troops and equipment overseas in this post Cold War era is declining. Ongoing base closure and realignment initiatives have resulted in the closure of several military owned and operated ports. As a result**, U.S. commercial ports have become critical centers for military mobilizations. The security of commercial ports during times of military mobilization is therefore critical to national defense**.

**2AC Ext. Trade/Economy Impacts**

**Terrorist attack collapses the economy and trade**

**Flynn 03** Written Testimony before a hearing of the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D. Commander, U.S. Coast Guard (ret.) Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies and Director, Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Homeland Security Imperatives March 20, 2003 <http://www.cfr.org/defensehomeland-security/fragile-state-container-security/p5730>

On October 12, 2001, I had the opportunity to testify before this committee at its first post 9-11 hearing on homeland security. At that time, I asserted that “the economic and societal disruption created by the September 11 attacks has opened Pandora’s box. Future terrorists bent on challenging U.S. power will draw inspiration from the seeming ease at which America could be attacked and they will be encouraged by the mounting costs to the U.S. economy and the public psyche associated with the ad-hoc efforts to restore security following that attack.” A year later I joined with former senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart in preparing our report, “America: Still Unprepared—Still In Danger.” We observed that “nineteen men wielding box-cutters forced the United States to do to itself what no adversary could ever accomplish: a successful blockade of the U.S. economy. If a surprise terrorist attack were to happen tomorrow involving the sea, rail, or truck transportation systems that carry millions of tons of trade to the United States each day, the response would likely be the same—a self-imposed global embargo.” Based on that analysis, we identified as second of the six critical mandates that deserve the nation’s immediate attention: “Make trade security a global priority; the system for moving goods affordably and reliably around the world is ripe for exploitation and vulnerable to mass disruption by terrorists.” This is why the topic of today’s hearing is so important. The stakes are enormous. U.S. prosperity—and much of its power—relies on its ready access to global markets. Both the scale and pace at which goods move between markets has exploded in recent years thanks in no small part to the invention and proliferation of the intermodal container. These ubiquitous boxes—most come in the 40’x8’x8’ size—have transformed the transfer of cargo from a truck, train, and ship into the transportation equivalent of connecting Lego blocks. The result has been to increasingly diminish the role of distance for a supplier or a consumer as a constraint in the world marketplace. Ninety percent of the world’s freight now moves in a container. Companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors move up to 30 tons of merchandise or parts across the vast Pacific Ocean from Asia to the West Coast for about $1600. The transatlantic trip runs just over a $1000—which makes the postage stamp seem a bit overpriced. But the system that underpins the incredibly efficient, reliable, and affordable movement of global freight has one glaring shortcoming in the post-9-11 world—it was built without credible safeguards to prevent it from being exploited or targeted by terrorists and criminals. Prior to September 11, 2001, virtually anyone in the world could arrange with an international shipper or carrier to have an empty intermodal container delivered to their home or workplace. They then could load it with tons of material, declare in only the most general terms what the contents were, “seal” it with a 50-cent lead tag, and send it on its way to any city and town in the United States. The job of transportation providers was to move the box as expeditiously as possible. Exercising any care to ensure that the integrity of a container’s contents was not compromised may have been a commercial practice, but it was not a requirement. The responsibility for making sure that goods loaded in a box were legitimate and authorized was shouldered almost exclusively by the importing jurisdiction. But as the volume of containerized cargo grew exponentially, the number of agents assigned to police that cargo stayed flat or even declined among most trading nations. The rule of thumb in the inspection business is that it takes five agents three hours to conduct a thorough physical examination of a single full intermodal container. Last year nearly 20 million containers washed across America’s borders via a ship, train, and truck. Frontline agencies had only enough inspectors and equipment to examine between 1-2 percent of that cargo. Thus, for would-be terrorists, the global intermodal container system that is responsible for moving the overwhelming majority of the world’s freight satisfies the age-old criteria of opportunity and motive. “Opportunity” flows from (1) the almost complete absence of any security oversight in the loading and transporting of a box from its point of origin to its final destination, and (2) the fact that growing volume and velocity at which containers move around the planet create a daunting “needle-in-the-haystack” problem for inspectors. “Motive” is derived from the role that the container now plays in underpinning global supply chains and the likely response by the U.S. government to an attack involving a container. Based on statements by the key officials at U.S. Customs, the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Transportation, should a container be used as a “poor man’s missile,” the shipment of all containerized cargo into our ports and across our borders would be halted. As a consequence, a modest investment by a terrorist could yield billions of dollars in losses to the U.S. economy by shutting down—even temporarily—the system that moves “just-in-time” shipments of parts and goods. Given the current state of container security, it is hard to imagine how a post-event lock-down on container shipments could be either prevented or short-lived. One thing we should have learned from the 9-11 attacks involving passenger airliners, the follow-on anthrax attacks, and even last fall Washington sniper spree is that terrorist incidents pose a special challenge for public officials. In the case of most disasters, the reaction by the general public is almost always to assume the event is an isolated one. Even if the post-mortem provides evidence of a systemic vulnerability, it often takes a good deal of effort to mobilize a public policy response to redress it. But just the opposite happens in the event of a terrorist attack—especially one involving catastrophic consequences. When these attacks take place, the assumption by the general public is almost always to presume a general vulnerability unless there is proof to the contrary. Government officials have to confront head-on this loss of public confidence by marshalling evidence that they have a credible means to manage the risk highlighted by the terrorist incident. In the interim as recent events have shown, people will refuse to fly, open their mail, or even leave their homes. If a terrorist were to use a container as a weapon-delivery devise, the easiest choice would be high-explosives such as those used in the attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Some form of chemical weapon, perhaps even involving hazardous materials, is another likely scenario. A bio-weapon is a less attractive choice for a terrorist because of the challenge of dispersing the agent in a sufficiently concentrated form beyond the area where the explosive devise goes off. A “dirty bomb” is the more likely threat vs. a nuclear weapon, but all these scenarios are conceivable since the choice of a weapon would not be constrained by any security measures currently in place in our seaports or within the intermodal transportation industry. This is why a terrorist attack involving a cargo container could cause such profound economic disruption. An incident triggered by even a conventional weapon going off in a box could result in a substantial loss of life. In the immediate aftermath, the general public will want reassurance that one of the many other thousands of containers arriving on any given day will not pose a similar risk. The President of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other keys officials responsible for the security of the nation would have to stand before a traumatized and likely skeptical American people and outline the measures they have in place to prevent another such attack. In the absence of a convincing security framework to manage the risk of another incident, the public would likely insist that all containerized cargo be stopped until adequate safeguards are in place. Even with the most focused effort, constructing that framework from scratch could take months—even years**. Yet, within three weeks, the entire worldwide intermodal transportation industry would effectively be brought to its knees—as would much of the freight movements that make up international trade.**

**Terrorist attack destroys the economy and trade**

**Talor et al. 07** (Bruce Taylor director of research at the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) in Washington, D.C; Antony Pate Bruce Kubu;) Protecting America’s Ports: Promising Practices A Final Report Submitted https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221075.pdf

Consequences. A number of studies have estimated that a nuclear bomb, a “dirty bomb,” or a radiological and biological device could cause considerable damage and could kill and/or contaminate thousands of citizens within several miles of a port (Loveless, et al., 2003). Ironically, however, “the cost of our response could be far more economically damaging than the attack itself” (Loveless, 2003, p.2). Absent appropriate security measures, the Hart-Rudman report points to the considerable risk that: Should the maritime or surface elements of America’s global transportation system be used as a weapon delivery device, the response right now would almost certainly be to shut the system down at an enormous cost to the economies of the United States and its trade partners....**bringing the global container industry to its knees**. Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner (2002) made the same point: If terrorists used a sea container to conceal a weapon of mass destruction and detonated it on arrival at a port, the impact on global trade and the global economy could be immediate and devastating—all nations would be affected. No container ships would be allowed to unload at U.S. ports after such an incident.

**1AC Trafficking Impact**

**Contention (\_) is the trafficking:**

**PSGP is key to solve human and drug trafficking but it must be a top priority**

**AAPA 11** SOURCE American Association of Port Authorities “10 Years After 9/11, Security Still a Top Priority of U.S. Ports” http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/10-years-after-911-security-still-a-top-priority-of-us-ports-128888213.html

Since 9/11, the Port Security Grant Program has received about $2.6 billion in funding for 11 rounds of grant awards. AAPA commends Congress and the Administration for these allocations and will continue to recommend the federal government commit $400 million a year for a separate and dedicated program to help port facilities enhance their physical security. The association supports a risk-based evaluation process that allows all facilities that are required to meet MTSA regulations to apply. "Clearly, America's ports have become much more secure since 9/11. In addition to guarding against cargo theft, drug smuggling, human trafficking and stowaways, ports and their law enforcement partners have added the protection of people and facilities from terrorism to their security plate," remarked Mr. Nagle. "**There's no question that more investments in security equipment, infrastructure, technology, personnel and training will be needed**. All parties—the ports, terminal operators, the various government agencies, and the Administration and Congress—must do their part in undertaking and funding these enhancements. **Only by continuing to make port security a top priority will America's seaports be able to continue serving their vital functions** as trade gateways, catalysts for job creation and economic prosperity, and important partners in our national defense."

**Human trafficking is modern day slavery – it destroys liberty and freedom which are necessary for peace**

**Crouse 07** Janice Shaw Crouse, Ph.D., Senior Fellow at the Beverly LaHaye Institute <http://townhall.com/columnists/janiceshawcrouse/2007/07/11/sex_trafficking_victims_disposable_or_human/page/full/>

It was gratifying to hear the ambassador directly address the problems of American popular culture in glamorizing the “ho” and “pimp.” He said, “It’s high time we treat pimps as exploiters rather than hip urban rebels. When a pimp insists his name or symbol be tattooed on his ‘girls’ he is branding them like cattle –– dehumanizing them, treating them like property.” There are those who would argue that human trafficking is the inevitable outcome of poverty and that some poverty-stricken people choose willingly to be involved. But, as Ambassador Lagon pointed out, “There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. Corruption is typically poverty’s handmaiden in cases of human trafficking.” CWA is pleased to be among those that Ambassador Lagon called an “indomitable force.” We and other evangelical Christians are at the forefront of this battle as modern-day abolitionists who work for the human rights of women and for the dignity of all of God’s people. We agree with Ambassador Lagon that trafficking in persons “shouldn’t be regulated or merely mitigated; it must be abolished.” The victims of this crime are among the “most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world.” We join the ambassador in declaring, “Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence.” Those who treat people as commercial commodities –– pimps, madams and johns –– are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods for their brothels, factories or fields. We must work for good laws and good law enforcement that will treat human trafficking as a criminal offense that will be investigated and the perpetrators prosecuted, convicted and punished to the fullest extent of the law. Otherwise, such crimes undermine everyone’s liberty and freedom; only corruption-free democratic processes create a society where peace and prosperity are possible for all citizens.

**Independently, human trafficking weakens the Balkans**

**Kaldor 08** Mary Kaldor is Professor of Global Governance and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit at the London School of Economics. The Balkans-Caucasus tangle: states and citizens MARY KALDOR , 9 January 2008 http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/democracy\_power/balkans\_caucasus\_tangle

There is a real risk of spreading destabilisation in the Balkans and the Caucasus. The criminal/nationalist entrepreneurs who profited from the wars in the 1990s were never properly dealt with. On the contrary, they have been nurtured by the combination of nationalist governments, high unemployment and lawlessness. Governments in the region - in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania or Georgia, for example - are not simply (as the jargon has it) "weak states"; their weakness is sustained by what some have described as shadow networks of transnational crime and extremist ideologies. There has been an expansion of human-trafficking, money-laundering, and the smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol, drugs, and weapons over the last decade - **much of it to satisfy** European and **American markets** - and all in the face of international agreements, aid programmes and the presence of foreign troops and agencies.

**And the instability caused by trafficking risks Balkan conflict and instability**

**The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 08** CRIME AND ITS IMPACT ON THE BALKANS and affected countries http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CFQQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rcc.int%2Fdownload%2Fpubs%2FBalkan\_study.pdf%2F88ac72aabc4af267910da4f02ca3f7c0&ei=Zm4NUPH-BYaQ9gSSuPy9Cg&usg=AFQjCNH30Rl21c6HtHKFuwICdp\_Y2wvNHQ&sig2=W3O3vHRAs7maQ\_Q5Qp7Y1g

The World Bank defines instability as “the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.”440 Many factors contribute to instability besides organised crime and corruption, but especially in new states, the credibility of the government may be closely related to its longevity. In states with small economies, organised crime groups may have the financial strength to pose a genuine threat, especially if they have historical linkages to political groups. Great fortunes were made off the previous era of instability. There are those who would benefit economically from further political conflict, and some of these may be in a position to generate further disruption. In terms of the World Bank governance indicators, the region shows quite a lot of variation in political stability rankings. On the one hand, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina were all ranked lower than the average for sub- Saharan Africa in 2006. On the other, Romania, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Croatia seem to exhibit far less likelihood of such conflict emerging, but these countries would still be greatly affected by regional instability. Serbia’s low ranking is propably due to the question of the final status of Kosovo (Serbia) and related problems in the south, which have the potential to trigger conflicts in several other parts of the region. It has been argued that, due to the importance of smuggling during the conflict, many of the leaders in the province have a criminal background, and may still be involved in trafficking, or at least providing protection to traffickers. According to one senior UNMIK official, “When we talk of organised crime in Kosovo, we are very much dealing with politicians, [and] ministers.”441 These alleged inter-linkages and the incentives they create are complex, so it is difficult to say how this might affect stability. But the case of the ethnic-Albanian National Liberation Army, which sparked off conflict in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001, is instructive. These rebels/criminals were also tied to the KLA, and it has been alleged that the struggle was as much about protecting trafficking routes as it was about advancing an ethnic agenda. As the International Crisis Group wrote at the time: The vision of a “Greater Kosovo” only partly explains the motivation of the NLA. Few ethnic Albanians in Macedonia – as distinct from the diaspora – would want to be part of Kosovo or Albania. Yet, a borderless criminal network already operates freely in Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo. Keeping Macedonia at risk allows the contraband trade in drugs, weapons, cigarettes, and humans to flourish unchecked. A destabilised Macedonia is profitable both for criminals and for those who dream of a pure Albanian section of western Macedonia.443 In the end, the two objectives – the political and the criminal – were probably intertwined in the minds of the rebels, as they were during the time of the Kosovo war. But do criminal groups really have the capacity to take on the states of the region? A recent seizure in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia provides some indication. In November 2007, a major arms cache, sufficient to equip 650 soldiers, was discovered, including anti-aircraft weaponry. It was found in the possession of what was initially described as an “organised crime group” but was later labeled a terrorist cell, a shift in perspective that is telling in itself. The group had been sheltering two escapees from Kosovo prisons.444 In Albania, the new Deputy Minister of the Interior Gent Strazmiri speaks of criminals, particularly in the border areas, who don a “patriotic disguise” and give “political excuses” for their illicit activity.445 All this suggests that the overlap between the political and the criminal that was manifest during open hostilities still prevails along the borders of Kosovo, and that these forces have the armament to engage militaries if it proves in their interest to do so. The risks are not just tied to the regions around Kosovo. The stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also at issue. There are elements within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fragmented political landscape that would profit from a further dissolution of the country, and again, political and criminal motives are difficult to disentangle. In the end, it is impossible to statistically demonstrate a correlation between the presence of organised crime and instability because neither issue can be satisfactorily quantified. But **there appears to be good reason to treat organised crime as a stability threat in South East Europe, due to the role it has played in past conflicts.**

**World war three**

**Paris 02** ROLAND PARIS University Research Chair in International Security and Governance University of Ottawa Kosovo and the Metaphor War <http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/UOTTAWA_Kosovo_metaphorwar.pdf>

The meaning of the powderkeg metaphor is straightforward: the Balkans can explode at any time, and the resulting conﬂagration can spread to the rest of Europe; preventing such an explosion is vital to the continent’s, and perhaps even to American, security. When Clinton described Kosovo as a powderkeg, he warned that the Kosovo conﬂict might spill over not only to surrounding Balkan states, but to Europe as a whole; and he insinuated that the United States could be compelled to ﬁght in such a pan-European conﬂict, just as it did in World Wars I and II. “As we approach the next century,” he stated on 12 October, during a discussion of the Kosovo situation, “we must never forget one of the most indelible lessons of this one we’re about to leave—that America has a direct stake in keeping the peace in Europe before isolated acts of violence turn into large-scale wars.” 53 Translation: if you want to make sure American boys will not have to ﬁght another world war, then support me in my efforts to extinguish the smoldering ﬁre in the Balkan powderkeg, before it is too late.

**AND, drug trafficking comes through maritime vessels – causes influx of cocaine**

**Department of Justice 10** National Drug Threat Assessment 2010 <http://www.scribd.com/doc/55871115/USDOJ-Drug-Assessment-2010>

Commercial maritime vessels, especially maritime containers, remain a viable conveyance for smuggling drugs directly into the United States, but seizure data and law enforcement reporting indicate that this smuggling method continues to account for a relatively small portion of the nation’s illicit drug supply. Traffickers use commercial maritime vessels to smuggle sizable quantities of drugs into the United States, but data suggest that other conveyance methods are preferred by smugglers. **Traffickers often hide drugs among** legitimate **cargo in maritime containers**, a fraction of which are inspected. Analysis of commercial maritime seizure data for 2004 through 2009 indicates that **cocaine** and marijuana **are most often smuggled in commercial maritime vessels** from Caribbean locations, such as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica, into East Coast ports in Florida and New Jersey. Traffickers also use commercial vessels to smuggle cocaine from the Dominican Re-public into Puerto Rico. Smaller amounts of heroin, typically 2 kilograms or less are occasionally smuggled by cruise ship passengers working for Caribbean trafficking organizations into East Coast ports; however, this smuggling technique appears to have declined since 2006. Seizure data indicate that methamphetamine is rarely smuggled into the United States on commercial maritime vessels.

**That destroys the Amazon**

**Mongabay 08** Mongabay.com is one of the world's most popular environmental science and conservation news sites. Cocaine use is destroying the Amazon mongabay.com May 26, 2008 http://news.mongabay.com/2008/0526-cocaine.html

A new campaign has linked cocaine consumption in Europe and the United States to destruction of the Amazon rainforest in Colombia. The "Shared Responsibility" drive, a joint initiative by the British and Colombian governments, features a collection of photographs showing the destruction of rainforest for coca plantations, the raw ingredient used for cocaine production. Cocaine production destroys rainforest In a speech in London marketing the launch of the initiative, Francisco Santos, Colombia's Vice President, said that every gram of cocaine consumed "destroys four square meters of rainforest." The campaign estimates that 2.2 million hectares of forest have been cleared for cocaine production in Colombia. Pollution from production — kerosene, sulfuric acid, acetone, and carbide are used to process the leaves — has fouled waterways while armed groups operating in forests areas have decimated wildlife.

**That causes extinction – turns soil erosion, climate, atmosphere, water, disease, food, energy, species, and nuclear war**

**Takacs 96**, David, 1996 Philosophies of Paradise, The Johns Hopkins Univ. Pr., Baltimore. ISBN 0-8018-5400-8 http://www.dhushara.com/book/diversit/restor/takacs.htm

"In every sense, in the sense of communities that will preserve soil, promote local climate, keep the atmosphere, preserve water, and everything else, the first rule of being able to put together communities well or have the world go on functioning well, or to keep climates as they are, or to retard disease, to produce products we want sustainably, because, after all, plants, algae, and photosynthetic bacteria are the only device we have to capture energy from the sun effectively-in all those senses, and in the sense that we're losing the parts so rapidly, I consider the loss of biological diversity to be the most serious problem that we have-far more serious than global climate change or stratospheric ozone depletion, or anything else." "Habitat destruction and conversion are eliminating species at such a frightening pace that extinction of many contemporary species and the systems they live in and support ... may lead to ecological disaster and severe alteration of the evolutionary process," Terry Erwin writes." And E. 0. Wilson notes: "The question I am asked most frequently about the diversity of life: if enough species are extinguished, will the ecosystem collapse, and will the extinction of most other species follow soon afterward? The only answer anyone can give is: possibly. **By the time we find out**, however, **it might be too late**. One planet, one experiment."" So **biodiversity keeps the world running**. It has value in and for itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: "It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, **the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war**, which could extinguish civilization."" Elsewhere, Ehrlich uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion, loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's well stocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where cancer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant**. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter**. Barring a nuclear conflict, **it appears that civilization will disappear some time before the end of the next century not with a bang but a whimper**. 14

**US key – most profitable**

**DEA 04** U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency Added May, 2004 Drug Trafficking in the United States http://www.policyalmanac.org/crime/archive/drug\_trafficking.shtml

The illegal drug market in the United States is one of the most profitable in the world. As such, **it attracts the most ruthless, sophisticated, and aggressive drug traffickers.** Drug law enforcement agencies face an enormous challenge in protecting the country's borders. Each year, according to the U.S. Customs Service, 60 million people enter the United States on more than 675,000 commercial and private flights. Another 6 million come by sea and 370 million by land. In addition, 116 million vehicles cross the land borders with Canada and Mexico. More than 90,000 merchant and passenger ships dock at U.S. ports. These ships carry more than 9 million shipping containers and 400 million tons of cargo. Another 157,000 smaller vessels visit our many coastal towns. Amid this voluminous trade, drug traffickers conceal cocaine, heroin, marijuana, MDMA, and methamphetamine shipments for distribution in U.S. neighborhoods.

**Anti-terrorist measures solve trafficking**

**Slosson 10** Mary is an Annenberg Fellow at the USC Annenberg Graduate School for Journalism. She also works as Executive Producer for Neon Tommy, the Annenberg Digital News website. Mary previously reported on international diplomacy, global health, and the environment at the United Nations. Fighting Illegal Trade in Humans, Guns, Drugs Helps Curb Terrorist ThreatsPosted on October 18, 2010 by Mary Slosson http://ascportfolios.org/laflash/?p=1219

“The methods that are used to smuggle narcotics and people are the same methods that a terrorist would use to smuggle in either arms or people or terrorists into our country, thereby making the whole port – and the whole nation – vulnerable,” said Farrell. Therefore, “if we seek to secure the entire supply chain, then necessarily we lessen the number of humans who are being illegally brought into the country or trafficked into the country. We reduce the amount of narcotics that are coming into the country.” “If we’re stopping the human trafficking and smuggling, and the corruption of ports, then one of the benefits of that is that necessarily you’ll be reducing the terrorist risk in your ports,” Farrell said. While the threat of terrorism demands the lion’s share of attention in the post-9/11 world, human trafficking and the smuggling of goods across international borders are happening “at a much higher rate,” according to Farrell.

**2AC Ext. Balkan Instability Bad**

**Balkan instability spreads**

**Roungas 99** THE ROLE OF GREECE IN THE BALKANS DURING THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS BY Colonel George Roungas Hellenic Army DISTRIBUTION STATEMEM A; Apprwed for Public Release. Distribution ls Unlimited. USAWC CLASS OF 1999 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a364539.pdf

The Balkan's future, to a large extent, is uncertain. It isn't clear which of the two tendencies will prevail in the end. For the time being, the spreading of ethnic intolerance has been restricted only to Kosovo territories. On the other hand, there is a great danger, that Balkan instability could spread fast with the extension of the political collapse and the fighting’s in areas where, up to now, there has been no war. KOSOVO <<TBI POWDER KEG>>O! EUROPE The main threat for Greek leadership and economic suzerainty in the Balkans is a possible generalization of Balkan instability and conflict. Kosovo is, for the present, the Balkans' powder keg and Europe's as well. Open war in this special and sensitive area would cause a serious wound to Greek ambitions. As the main power in the region, Greece can influence the evolution and help prevent this catastrophic possibility.

**Balkan instability is dangerous**

**New York Times 01** Balkan Instability Could Create a Terrorist Haven By Misha Glenny Published: October 16, 2001 Misha Glenny is author of ''The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999.''

BRIGHTON, England— For 10 years, the Balkans have presented Europe and America with one of their greatest foreign policy challenges. The aftermath of four violent conflicts has consumed billions of taxpayers' dollars in aid. In March 1999, the Balkans triggered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's first war, almost 50 years to the day after the alliance was founded. And bitter disputes over Balkan policy occasionally threatened the foundations of America's relations with Europe and, indeed, harmony within Europe. That is quite a record for a single decade. After Sept. 11, however, nobody can afford the luxury of a fractious Balkans. The United States and Europe feel compelled to divert political, military and financial resources away from the region and into their struggle against terrorism. The Balkan countries have a simple choice. All aspire to membership in the European Union, but unless they cooperate among themselves to stabilize the region, they will be moving in the opposite direction. Just wishing for concord among the Balkan nations will not make it happen. **The problems they face are very real and very dangerous**. The former Yugoslavia is a jumble of chronically weak states and quasi-protectorates run by the international community's ill-disciplined army of acronyms -- SFOR, KFOR and the rest. The greatest beneficiaries of this disorganization are criminal mafias, that have constructed huge networks based on the trade in illegal immigrants, prostitutes, weapons, drugs and, above all, cigarettes. These mafias do not recognize national boundaries. The Serbian underworld cooperates as happily with Albanian gangsters as it does with Bosnian or Croat tough guys. So influential has this web of crime become that the Sicilian mafia has retreated from its operations in central and northern Italy, which are now dominated by Balkan gangs. The NATO secretary general, Lord Robertson, hit the nail on the head earlier this week when he said that the Balkans must not become another ''black hole'' of terrorism like Afghanistan.

**Balkan instability is a security threat to the US**

**Global Security Studies 10** Global Security Studies, Fall 2010, Volume l, Issue 3 Instability and Desperation: The Balkan Link to Terrorism Sheila Rom Peace, War and Defense Program University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Chapel Hill, NC 27514 http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Rom%20Balkans.pdf

Non-state actors such as corrupt NGOs, terrorist groups and organized criminal networks pose the greatest security concern for the Western world for several crucial reasons. These groups are composed of a list of frequently changing, disposable individuals and are actively engaged in efforts to develop new areas for recruitment, transit and recovery. (Blair 2010) Areas that are non-traditional hot beds can quickly develop a terrorist problem. Regions prone to developing terrorists generally share several common factors, most importantly strife and poverty (Woehrel, 2005). One such region with a lengthy history of conflict and poor economic development is the Balkan Peninsula in Eastern Europe 2 . The prolonged instability in the Balkans has created a unique culture of desperation, which has enabled the rise of systemic corruption (pervasive organized crime) and left the region susceptible to terrorist activity and influence**. This development poses a** potentially **major security threat to the Western World, especially, the United States** (Kolhmann, 2004). 3 Continued international attention is needed in this area to prevent this region from transforming from a minor terrorist threat to major operating or breeding ground.

**2AC Ext. Cocaine Bad**

**Cocaine trade causes extinction**

**BBC 02** By Tim Hirsch BBC environment correspondent Thursday, 31 October, 2002, 23:51 GMT Cocaine industry 'killing rainforest <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2384303.stm>

Cocaine-users across the world are helping to destroy the Amazon rainforest, Colombian Environment Minister Cecilia Rodriguez has warned. Speaking in London, she appealed to the international community to help fund a scheme to pay poor farmers to protect trees instead of cutting them down to grow drug crops. The comments were made at a conference looking at the threats to the Amazon and the impact of deforestation on the world's climate. The problems of logging and cattle ranching are well known - much less widely recognised is the influence of the cocaine trade. Eighty per cent of the world's supply of the drug comes from Colombia, and Dr Rodriguez said 70% of this was now grown in the Amazon region. The area of former forest under cultivation has quadrupled in the last decade - coca farmers have to keep cutting down more trees as the soil is starved of nutrients within two years. 'Dramatic damage' Dr Rodriguez said the message to the world's drug users was clear: "I should call the attention of all consumers of cocaine that they're are harming dramatically the tropical rainforest of the world, because this is what the world needs for its oxygen."

**2AC Ext. Human Trafficking Is Slavery**

**Human trafficking should be rejected – it is modern day slavery**

**Goodwin 11** Human Trafficking: Slavery is Alive in the South http://blogcritics.org/culture/article/human-trafficking-slavery-is-alive-in/

Unfortunately I recently discovered something about my state that made me sick. Oklahoma is one of the highest “trade routes” for human trafficking. Human trafficking is modern-day slavery. It is forcing someone to work for you against their will, including jobs such as prostitution. Human trafficking isn’t a completely new concept to me. I had seen specials on TV about the issue, but they always focused on less developed countries. My heart broke when I first learned that in some countries most orphans would be forced into prostitution. It broke more to see five-year-olds offering to perform sex acts for the undercover reporters. Unfortunately the broken pieces of my heart were shattered even more when I found out human trafficking was so prevalent in the U.S. I kept asking myself how a civilized country could allow this to happen. We fought a war to end slavery, yet it is very much alive inside our borders. Because this problem has only recently begun being investigated, it is impossible to say exactly how much human trafficking takes place in Oklahoma, but we do know that nearly every county has at least one human trafficking case being investigated. We also know five of the top 10 cities for child sex trafficking are easily accessible through the major interstates going through Oklahoma. There are several truck stops and cheap motels at the I-35/I-44 junction in Oklahoma City, where human trafficking can be seen much of the day. The first time I saw it I assumed it was just prostitution…just prostitution…okay, I guess that shouldn’t be a “just,” but forced prostitution seems so much worse than voluntarily selling your body. I often stop in this area when I travel to see my family, but this was the first time I saw a prostitute walking through a parking lot. She was not trying to hide her intentions, but no one would give her any attention; of course the middle of the day doesn’t seem like the smartest time to solicit illegal services. After a few minutes of walking through the parking lots nearby she walked up to a semi driver she seemed to know, got in the cab of the truck looking quite disappointed, and they drove off. I asked my husband if he assumed the truck driver was her pimp, thinking it odd that he would be in a semi, and he agreed. Later that night I couldn’t get it off of my mind, so I googled prostitution in Oklahoma City to see what I could find out. After sifting through many sites directing me where I didn’t want to go, I came across an article in a local newspaper talking about the new epidemic of our state, human trafficking. I remembered human trafficking as the horrible crime that happened in third-world countries, but this article said it was happening here, in the middle of the Bible belt. I changed my search to human trafficking in Oklahoma and pulled up more information than I wanted to know. I learned that most of the human trafficking victims in the U.S. are actually U.S. citizens. I learned that human trafficking cases have been prosecuted in every state, and that most convicted traffickers receive less than 20 years in prison! There isn’t much I can personally do to stop human trafficking. I can raise awareness about it, and I can join abolitionist groups such as Oklahomans Against the Trafficking of Humans (OATH) or the Home Foundation, but it just doesn’t seem like enough. About 1/3 of the human trafficking instances involve child sex trafficking. This includes the child pornography industry. I am sick of it. I want to protect our children. I want to protect our adults. Child molestation has been high-profile lately as an assistant coach of a large university’s historic football team has been accused of molesting and raping young boys. This is sick. I am glad the media jumped on this case, but why don’t they cover cases involving human trafficking? Why does it have to be a high-profile perpetrator to be considered newsworthy? Maybe if the news would gave these children and adults in bondage faces, it would stop. At least Americans could know there is an evil to be fought! Maybe it’s time a politician issues another emancipation proclamation, and not just to win votes. It’s time for someone to stand up and say we will not tolerate slavery within our borders. It’s time we spend as much energy fighting human traffickers, these modern slave traders, as we spend fighting foreign dictators. Slavery has always existed, but I’m not willing to believe that it always has to exist. It will take something large to stop it. The media has to be involved, but maybe it doesn’t have to start with television. Maybe this could be a battle of the writers. Maybe if enough of us will write about it and get it out there, other forms of media will pick it up. Wouldn’t it be nice to know the writers began the war on human trafficking?

**1AC Vulnerability/Inherency**

**Contention one is inherency:**

**Lack of port security is a major threat – we have the technology to upgrade and we should**

**Washington Post 7/15/12** Port security: U.S. fails to meet deadline for scanning of cargo containers By Douglas Frantz, Published: July 15 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/port-security-us-fails-to-meet-deadline-for-scanning-of-cargo-containers/2012/07/15/gJQAmgW8mW_print.html>

The Obama administration has failed to meet a legal deadline for scanning all shipping containers for radioactive material before they reach the United States, a requirement aimed at strengthening maritime security and preventing terrorists from smuggling a nuclear device into any of the nation’s 300 sea and river ports. The Department of Homeland Security was given until this month to ensure that 100 percent of inbound shipping containers are screened at foreign ports. But the department’s secretary, Janet Napolitano, informed Congress in May that she was extending a two-year blanket exemption to foreign ports because the screening is proving too costly and cumbersome. She said it would cost $16 billion to implement scanning measures at the nearly 700 ports worldwide that ship to the United States. Instead, the DHS relies on intelligence-gathering and analysis to identify “high-risk” containers, which are checked before being loaded onto ships. Under this system, fewer than half a percent of the roughly 10 million containers arriving at U.S. ports last year were scanned before departure. The DHS says that those checks turned up narcotics and other contraband but that there have been no public reports of smuggled nuclear material. In response to the 9/11 Commission, Congress passed a law in 2007 specifying that no cargo container may enter the United States before being scanned with imaging equipment and a radiation-detection device. The administration’s failure to meet the deadline has left some members of Congress and outside experts concerned about whether the threat is being taken seriously enough. “I personally do not believe they intend to comply with the law,” Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), co-author of the 2007 law, said in an interview. “**This is a real terrorist threat, and it has a solution. We can’t afford to wait until a catastrophic attack**.” The DHS says monitors scan 99 percent of the containers for radiation after they arrive at U.S. ports. But experts say the monitors at U.S. ports are not sophisticated enough to detect nuclear devices or highly enriched uranium, which emit low levels of radiation. The Government Accountability Office has warned that a nuclear device could be detonated while at a port — containers often sit for days awaiting radiation checks — causing billions of dollars in damage in addition to the loss of life. Estimates of damage caused by a nuclear detonation at a major port range from tens of billions of dollars to $1 trillion. Shipping containers are potentially ideal for smuggling weapons, people and other illicit cargo; ensuring the integrity of the contents is difficult and costly. The standard container is 40 feet long and 8 feet high and holds more than 30 tons of cargo. A large vessel carries 3,000 or more containers from hundreds of different shippers and many ports. And a single container can hold cargo from many customers. Counterterrorism experts have worried about port vulnerability since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the self-described mastermind of the attacks, reportedly told interrogators he had considered sending explosives to the United States hidden inside a shipment of personal computers from Japan. Graham Allison, a Harvard University political scientist and author of a best-selling book on nuclear terrorism, said that a nuclear device is more likely to arrive in a shipping container than on a missile. But he acknowledged that preventing such an attack is expensive and that there is no guarantee prevention measures will work. “The game between hiders and seekers is dynamic, and there is no 100 percent solution,” Allison said in an e-mail interview. “The cost-benefit trade-off is the toughest issue.” Markey and some counterterrorism experts say that the costs of checking every U.S.-bound container could be substantially lower than the DHS estimate and that the necessary measures could be easier to implement than the agency has suggested. Research by scholars at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School indicate that 100 percent of containers could be screened much more inexpensively with existing methods. A number of companies also are developing cheaper new screening technology. Peter Boogaard, a DHS spokesman, said the department is committed to using a variety of measures, including screening, scanning and working with foreign authorities, to ensure that all goods are secure. Pilot programs established to scan all containers were abandoned in 2009 after the agency said costs were too high and the effort led to cargo delays and logistical problems. The current screening system relies heavily on the Customs and Border Protection agency and focuses on a small percentage of goods identified as high-risk through intelligence and analytical software. The program operates at 58 overseas ports that account for 80 percent of the cargo shipped to the United States. “Our layered and risk-based approach provides that, at a minimum, 100 percent of high risk containers are examined through a number of measures, including screening, scanning, physical inspection, or resolution by foreign authorities,” Napolitano told Congress in her May 2 letter invoking the two-year exemption. Kevin McAleenan, a senior CBP official, told Congress this year that the program led to inspections of 45,500 suspect containers overseas in 2011 — roughly two containers a day at each of the 58 ports in the program. Stephen Flynn, a terrorism expert at Northeastern University and a former Coast Guard commander who has studied container security, said, “The current system is woefully inadequate for stopping any determined adversary who wants to get a weapon of mass destruction into the United States.”

**Obama administration will miss the deadline for port security – risks huge attacks – tech is available, all that is missing is urgency.**

**NYT 6/26/12** OP-ED CONTRIBUTORS Cargo, the Terrorists’ Trojan Horse By JERROLD L. NADLER, EDWARD J. MARKEY and BENNIE G. THOMPSON Published: June 26, 2012

MILLIONS of cargo containers are unloaded from ships each year at American seaports, providing countless opportunities for terrorists to smuggle and unleash a nuclear bomb or weapon of mass destruction on our shores. To counter this threat, Congress passed a law five years ago mandating that by July 2012, all maritime cargo bound for the United States must be scanned before it is loaded on ships. But **the Obama administration will miss this deadline**, and it is not clear to us, as the authors of the law, whether it ever plans to comply with the law. Over the years, terrorists have shown themselves to be frighteningly inventive. They have hidden explosives in printer cartridges transported by air and embedded explosives in the shoes and underwear of airline passengers. The cargo containers arriving on ships from foreign ports offer terrorists a Trojan horse for a devastating attack on the United States. As the Harvard political scientist Graham T. Allison has put it, **a nuclear attack is “far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile.”** But for the past five years, the Department of Homeland Security has done little to counter this threat and instead has wasted precious time arguing that it would be too expensive and too difficult, logistically and diplomatically, to comply with the law. This is unacceptable. An attack on an American port could cause tens of thousands of deaths and cripple global trade, with losses ranging from $45 billion to more than $1 trillion, according to estimates by the RAND Corporation and the Congressional Research Service. Anyone who doubts these estimates should recall the labor strike that shut down the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach for 11 days in 2002. Economic losses were put at $6.3 billion or more. Homeland Security says it would cost $16 billion or more to meet the mandate, but that projection assumes that the department would pay to acquire, maintain and operate scanning equipment and related operations, without any offsetting fees from companies in the global supply chain. In contrast, Stephen E. Flynn, an expert in terrorism and port security at Northeastern University, has said a scanning system could be implemented in every major container port in the world at a cost of $1.5 billion, and that the costs could largely be absorbed by companies doing business at the ports. Homeland Security says it uses a “layered, risk-based approach” to cargo scanning, which, instead of comprehensive scanning, targets specific cargo thought to be high-risk. But this approach is inadequate. Recent advances in screening technologies have undermined Homeland Security’s contention that the technology is not available to scan all cargo containers without disrupting commerce. An effective high-volume container screening system was installed in the Port of Hong Kong in 2005. Trials of new, American-made technology have demonstrated that scanning all containers would be feasible at many ports. The world’s largest marine terminal operators have offered to work with the department to put the law into effect. Cost and technology have never been the primary obstacles to meeting this mandate. **What is missing is a sense of urgency and determination**.

**2AC Ext. Vulnerability**

**Terrorist attack on ports is the biggest threat**

**Konkel 05** Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe Todd Konkel Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Leslie Comstock Editor http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. government passed a significant number of measures to improve aviation security – an area with a high level of public visibility. This nation faces a potentially greater threat, however, from a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) making its way into the U.S. in one of the thousands of cargo containers that enter this country every day. In June 2004, the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation issued a memo reflecting this view: “Despite the importance of seaport security, perhaps **no other mode of transportation is currently more vulnerable** to future attacks than our Nation’s Marine Transportation System.” 1 Although a future attack involving a chemical or biological WMD could have tragic consequences, a nuclear weapon, which could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths in an instant, presents the most concerning threat. In Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Harvard professor Graham Allison shares a brief but revealing excerpt from a private conversation that took place with former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge in February 2004. When asked what worried him most, Secretary Ridge replied with a single word: “nuclear.” 2 Later in his book, Allison states that **a nuclear weapon used by terrorists in an attack on the United States “is far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile.”** 3

**Ports are vulnerable**

**Konkel 05** Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe Todd Konkel Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Leslie Comstock Editor http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf

Although shipping containers enter American ports at a rate of roughly twenty thousand per day, fewer than 5 percent are opened for inspection. 25 In the findings outlined in the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, the U.S. Congress acknowledged this problem: “Current inspection levels of containerized cargo are insufficient to counter potential security risks. Technology is currently not adequately deployed to allow for the nonintrusive inspection of containerized cargo . . . Security related and detection-related equipment, such as small boats, cameras, large-scale x-ray machines, and vessel tracking devices, are lacking at many ports.” 26 **This has created a situation where terrorists seeking to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the U.S. via a cargo container face highly favorable odds of escaping detection**. According to one study, in fact, the probability that inspectors will detect a shielded nuclear weapon in a shipping container using the current screening system is only about 10 percent. 27 In order to decrease the likelihood of a nuclear weapon entering the U.S. in a container, the odds of detection must be significantly improved. Otherwise, terrorists will eventually attempt to exploit this system, given the relatively low risk that a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb would be detected. Although the U.S. government made significant investments in national security during the first term of the Bush Administration, there is evidence to suggest that the dollars have not been allocated in proportion to the threat. According to Stephen Flynn, a Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, the CIA has concluded that the most likely way that a WMD would enter the U.S. is by sea. 28 Despite this assessment, as of September 2004, the U.S. government was spending more every three days to finance the war in Iraq than it had provided over the previous three years to improve security at all 361 U.S. seaports. 29

**Ports are vulnerable – attack destroys trade**

**Zegart et al. 05** PORT SECURITY: IMPROVING EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES AT THE PORTS OF LOS ANGELES AND LONG BEACH Amy B. Zegart, Assistant Professor, School of Public Affairs, UCLA Matthew C. Hipp, J.D. Candidate, UCLA School of Law Seth K. Jacobson, M.B.A. Candidate, Anderson School, UCLA http://www.spa.ucla.edu/calpolicy/files05/zegartcpotextorigedit.pdf

California’s seaports are vital to the global economy and highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. Today, over 95 percent of the volume of all U.S. foreign trade moves through America’s ports, but less than five percent of all shipping containers entering the United States are inspected. The relatively free flow of goods and services across America’s borders creates inherent risks. At the same time, the concentration of shipping among a handful of international megaports and innovations in inventory management—such as “just-in-time” delivery systems that minimize warehouse inventories—have increased the potential economic disruption of a terrorist attack dramatically in recent years. As Stephen Flynn, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and retired U.S. Coast Guard commander, recently noted, an attack on any single U.S. port would likely cause the entire global trading system to “go into gridlock.” 1

**\*\*\*Port Security Add-Ons\*\*\***

**2AC Honduras Relations Add-On**

**Port security boosts Honduras-US cooperation**

**Meyer 10** Honduran-U.S. Relations Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs February 1, 2010 http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/19919\_Previous\_Version\_2010-02-01.pdf

Honduras and the United States have cooperated extensively on port security. For the United States, port security emerged as an important element of homeland security in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. **Honduras views such cooperation as important** in order to ensure the speedy export of its products to the United States, which in turn could increase U.S. investment in the country. In March 2006, U.S. officials announced the inclusion of the largest port in Honduras, Puerto Cortés, in the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI). CSI is operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of the Department of Homeland Security, and uses a security regime to ensure that all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United States. Honduras also participates in the Department of Energy’s Megaports Initiative, which supplies ports with equipment capable of detecting nuclear or radioactive materials, and the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), which deploys equipment capable of scanning containers for radiation and information risk factors before they are allowed to depart for the United States. Puerto Cortés was one of six ports around the world chosen to be part of the first phase of the SFI. 99

**Key to troop presents in Central America**

**Sullivan 05** Mark P. Sullivan Specialist in Latin American Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Order Code RS21103 Updated May 3, 2005 Honduras: Political and Economic Situation and U.S. Relations http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/47138.pdf

The United States has had close relations with Honduras over the years, characterized by significant foreign assistance, an important trade relationship, a military presence in the country, and cooperation on a range of transnational issues, including counternarcotics efforts, environmental protection, and most recently the fight against terrorism. The bilateral relationship became especially close in the 1980s when **Honduras** returned to democratic rule and **became the lynchpin for U.S. policy in Central America**. At that time, the country became a staging area for U.S.-supported excursions into Nicaragua by anti-Sandinista opponents known as the contras. Today, overall U.S. policy goals for Honduras include a strengthened democracy with an effective justice system that protects human rights and promotes the rule of law, and the promotion of sustainable economic growth with a more open economy and improved living conditions. If approved, DR-CAFTA would lead to increased U.S.-Honduran economic linkages. The Bush Administration views DR-CAFTA as a means of solidifying democracy in Honduras and promoting safeguards for environmental protection and labor rights in the country, although critics fear that a CAFTA without enforceable environmental and labor provisions would do nothing to spur reforms. U.S. Foreign Aid. The United States has provided considerable foreign assistance to Honduras over the past two decades. In the 1980s, the United States provided about $1.6 billion in economic and military aid to Honduras as the country struggled amid the region’s civil conflicts. In the 1990s, U.S. assistance to Honduras began to wane as regional conflicts subsided and competing foreign assistance needs grew in other parts of the world. Hurricane Mitch changed that trend as the United States provided almost $300 million in assistance to help the country recover from the devastation of the storm. As a result of the new influx of aid, U.S. assistance to Honduras for the 1990s amounted to around $1 billion. With Hurricane Mitch funds expended by the end of 2001, U.S. foreign aid levels to Honduras declined. Foreign aid funding amounted to $41 million for FY2002, $53 million for FY2003, $43 million for FY2004, and an estimated $41 million for FY2005. The Bush Administration requested almost $37 million for FY2006. These amounts include support for a variety of development assistance projects, HIV/AIDS assistance, food aid, and the largest Peace Corps presence in the world, with over 250 volunteers. Honduras also could receive substantial U.S. foreign assistance under the Bush Administration’s Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a performance and resultsbased assistance program intended to focus exclusively on development goals without regard for other U.S. foreign policy objectives. In early May 2004, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) deemed Honduras eligible to compete for grants under the new program. Honduras and the MCC are currently negotiating an agreement for such assistance. Military Issues. The United States maintains a troop presence of about 550 military personnel known as Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo at Soto Cano Air Base. JTF Bravo was first established in 1983 with about 1,200 troops, who were involved in military training exercises and in supporting U.S. counterinsurgency and intelligence operations in the region. Today, U.S. troops in Honduras support such activities as disaster relief, medical and humanitarian assistance, counternarcotics exercises, and search and rescue operations that benefit Honduras and other Central American countries. Regional exercises and deployments involving active and reserve components provide training opportunities for thousands of U.S. troops. In the aftermath of the Hurricane Mitch in 1998, U.S. troops provided extensive assistance in the relief and reconstruction effort and were involved in delivering relief supplies, repairing bridges and roads, rebuilding schools, and operating medical clinics. Honduras was among the coalition of the willing supporting U.S. military operations in Iraq, and in July 2003, Honduras began providing a military contingent of 370 troops to Iraq, joining other contingents from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. The Maduro government’s proposal to send the troops was approved by the Honduran Congress, but the narrow margin of 66-62 reflected strong opposition by some sectors, including the opposition Liberty Party. 6 The Honduran troops served under a brigade commanded by Spain, but when Spain decided to bring home its troops, Honduras followed suit and removed all its troops by June 1, 2004.

**That causes global instability and war**

**Rochlin 94** James Francis Rochlin Professor of Political Science Okanagan University College, “Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America”http://books.google.com/books?id=TMmfUN\_CfhgC&q=%22While+there+were%22#v=snippet&q=%22While%20there%20were%22&f=false

While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere**. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region**. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. **It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war.** This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

**\*\*\*Port Security AT:\*\*\***

**AT: Airport/Borders Alt Cause**

**Airports and borders are secure – ports are key**

**Carlton 01** Bruce j. Carlton acting deputy maritime administrator before the committee on commerce, science and transportation united states senate on port and maritime security Department of transportation maritime administration statement of July 24, 2001 <http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/pasttest/01test/Carlton2.htm>

Terrorism is also a concern for seaport security. The threat of such activity and the vulnerability of seaports are the reasons for concern. While U.S. **airports and land border crossings have well structured security measures**, our ports do not enjoy the same level of security even though they offer unparalleled intermodal access to our nation’s interior. Addressing port vulnerabilities is key to ensuring that our ports are not targeted for terrorist and criminal activities. Moreover, most of the serious crimes that take place in our seaports are in fact violations of Federal law. For this reason, it makes good sense for the Federal Government to achieve coordination among the various agencies concerned with port and maritime security and to work with the ports to explore ways to minimize criminal activity.

**AT: Can’t Deter Terrorists**

**Terrorists can be deterred**

**RAND 09** Understanding the Role of Deterrence in Counterterrorism Security Andrew R. Morral, Brian A. Jackson http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP281.pdf

Despite occasional uncertainty and periodic controversy on the point, it is by now conventional to assume that terrorists pursue their objectives rationally. Although determined **terrorists**—both as individuals and organizations—may be willing to risk everything to achieve their objectives, they **do not wish to waste their own lives or other resources on missions that are doomed** to fail or unlikely to achieve their intended results. This insight has led to a growing game-theory literature examining how to optimize security investments given the assumption that terrorists are guided by principles of expected utility theory (e.g., Bier, 2005; Golany et al., 2009; Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2005; Major, 2002; Phillips, 2009; Zhuang and Bier, 2007, 2009; Zhuang, Bier, and Alagoz, 2009). The distinction between terrorists as individuals and terrorist groups as organizations is important for understanding the deterrent effects of security measures. The example of individual suicide terrorists is often invoked to illustrate why security measures that threaten the safety of operatives may have less of a deterrent effect than those aimed against criminals or other attackers who want to live to see another day. Even if an individual suicide terrorist is prepared to die for a minor victory, however, this may not be true for the organization that dispatches the operative. Both may be sensitive to measures that affect the successful outcome of the operation, but the group might also be sensitive to measures that both threaten the life of the operative and provide security forces with information that could compromise the group. In our discussion, we chiefly focus on deterring organizations. **From this perspective, individuals are deterred when their actions would produce unacceptable harm to their organizations**. See Radlauer (2006) for a discussion of the two different targets of deterrence.

**AT: Inherency**

**New systems have been delayed and PSGP funding has been cut**

**Holdeman 6/23/12** Eric Holdeman Director of Security, Port of Tacoma REAL ID and TWIC: Two Systems-Both In Trouble June 23, 2012 <http://www.emergencymgmt.com/emergency-blogs/disaster-zone/port-security/REAL-ID-and-TWIC-Two-systems-both-in-trouble-062312.html>

The final rule making by the Coast Guard on biometric readers for TWIC has been delayed several times. Now it is due out in early 2013 (after the elections are over) and who knows what it will say. Ports and terminal operators are leery of investing funding in these systems given the lack of implementation over the years. Then there is the fact that the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) has been cut to around 25% of what it was during the early years of the grant program.

**Cuts hurt port security**

**Kimery 03/09/12** By: Anthony Kimery received the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Director’s Award for Excellence, and was a Fund for Investigative Journalism grant recipient. Counternarcotics, Terrorism & Intelligence Security, Port Authorities Associations Urge DHS To Reconsider Port Allocations

“Even though Congress reduced the budget for preparedness grants by 40 percent, we are concerned with the allocation decisions made by the department,” SIA and AAPA said in their letter to Napolitano. “The recently announced cuts result in a 59 percent reduction in funding for the Port Security Grant Program and are 75 percent less than authorized by Congress in the SAFE Port Act.” Continuing, the two organizations stated that “this allocation will not come close to meeting local needs. It will result in continued struggles to bring port security into the 21st century and hamper meeting government mandates, such as the Transportation Worker Identity Card.” The two groups said that, “while we understand that Congress initiated this cut because of what it saw as a backlog of unspent funds, we believe such a drastic reduction of funds will have negative consequences on port security. In addition, we believe that one of the best ways to utilize existing funding is to categorically waive all cost-share requirements for grants that have already been awarded. Requiring short, individual waivers diverts the efforts of those involved from the goal of getting these projects done quickly. Grantees often put projects on hold until they receive a waiver.”

**AT: Terrorist Can’t Get Bomb**

**Terrorist can easily get nuclear materials**

**Konkel 05** Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe Todd Konkel Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Leslie Comstock Editor http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf

A fundamental factor contributing to the threat of a container-based terrorist attack is the disturbing availability of nuclear materials, which include unsecured nuclear weapons, fissile nuclear material and other sources of radioactivity. As previously stated, given a choice, a terrorist would opt for a nuclear device over a dirty bomb in order to maximize casualties and damage to physical infrastructure. The first obstacle a potential nuclear terrorist faces is the acquisition of a functional nuclear weapon. **There are more than two hundred locations worldwide where a would-be terrorist could acquire a nuclear weapon or the fissile material to make one.** 14 The area of greatest concern is Russia, which may still possess as many as twelve thousand low-yield tactical nuclear weapons that are often kept in less secure conditions than the weapons in the nation’s strategic arsenal. 15 Fortunately, a nuclear bomb in a terrorist’s hands has thus far been only the subject of spy thrillers and Hollywood productions rather than a live CNN newscast. If the theft of a complete nuclear weapon proved too difficult, terrorists could attempt to steal or purchase the necessary fissile material and construct a bomb on their own. The minimum amount of weapons-grade fissile material required for a nuclear detonation varies with bomb design but can be as little as twelve kilograms of uranium235 or four kilograms of plutonium-239. Terrorists seeking this path might look to one of the 130 research reactors in more than 40 countries worldwide that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) as fuel. 16 Attempted thefts of materials from such facilities occur with disturbing frequency. In the first three years after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 for example, the German government reported more than seven hundred incidents of attempted nuclear sales, including sixty cases that involved seizure of nuclear materials. 17 Furthermore, the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO), compiled by researchers at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, has documented twenty-five “highly-credible” incidents involving the trafficking of weapons-grade plutonium or HEU since 1992. 18 Fortunately, in all but one of these cases, the stolen nuclear material was recovered by law enforcement officials. Although open-source literature may offer little evidence of successful thefts involving significant amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material, the potential existence of unreported or as yet undiscovered thefts is sufficient cause for concern. Whereas obtaining enough fissile material for a working nuclear bomb could prove logistically challenging, there is no shortage of radioactive material that a terrorist could use to construct a dirty bomb. Sources of radioisotopes can be found in a diverse array of medical and industrial technologies. For example, cesium-137 and cobalt-60 are commonly used in nuclear medicine, and americium-241 can be found in certain oil exploration equipment. According to a 2003 study by the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, between October 1996 and September 2001, an average of three hundred commercial radioactive sources were lost or unaccounted for (or “orphaned”) each year. Of these orphaned sources, 56 percent were not recovered. 19 Figures published by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in 1998 are even more pessimistic, estimating that there were as many as thirty thousand orphaned radioactive sources in the U.S. at that time. 20 Given the availability and relative insecurity of nuclear materials, policymakers must address the very real risk that sophisticated terrorists might succeed in obtaining such materials. The story of David Hahn, a nuclear-savvy Michigan teenager, should serve as ample warning. Over the course of three years beginning in 1991, Hahn collected and purified enough radioactive material in his mother’s potting shed to put forty thousand nearby residents at risk due to the dangers posed by the release of radioactive dust and radiation. 21 A terrorist organization with sufficient determination and financial resources would no doubt pose a much greater threat.

**AT: Politics – Popular**

**Plan bipartisan**

**Security Director News 11** New Congressional group to support port security Share on email Share on twitter Share on facebook Share on digg | More Sharing ServicesMore by: SDN Staff - Monday, October 31, 2011 http://www.securitydirectornews.com/public-sector/new-congressional-group-support-port-security

WASHINGTON—Two members of Congress last week created a new bipartisan caucus to promote the growth and security of the United States' 350 commercial sea and river ports. Rep. Janice Hahn (D-CA) and Rep. Ted Poe (R-TX) announced on Oct. 25 the formation of the bipartisan House Ports Opportunity, Renewal, Trade, and Security (PORTS) Caucus, according to a press release. U.S. ports support 13.3 million jobs and account for $3.15 trillion in business activity to the economy.

**AT: States CP**

**CP fails**

**AAPA 3/7/12** Testimony of Captain John M. Holmes Deputy Executive Director of Operations Port of Los Angeles Before The United States House of Representatives Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Homeland Security 2358-A Rayburn “Budget Hearing - Federal Emergency Management Agency – Director and State & Local Witnesses” March 7, 2012

**Moving the funding to the states is** also **a big concern** for AAPA. Port security is focused on protecting international borders. This is a federal responsibility, not a state responsibility. Many States don’t have the personnel or expertise to evaluate maritime risks or determine how ports should be prioritized against other homeland security priorities in the state. **The risk evaluations for ports are made at the federal** level by the U.S. Coast Guard and other federal agencies. We are also concerned that this would increase the complexity in grant management and slow a process that is already recognized as cumbersome. Not only does a second or potentially third pass-through layer (the State or municipal government, respectively) mandate its own sets of compliance requirements on top of Code of Federal Regulations and Office of Management and Budget Circulars, it also creates **unnecessary cogs in the administration that slows down our ability to spend, execute, and deliver. Moving funds to the states would compromise program efficiency and effectiveness.** If, however, a decision is made to consolidate the program and move it to the states, AAPA strongly urges your Committee to allocate a set amount of funding for the program to ensure that funding for port security is not diluted further.

**AT: T – TI**

**PSGP is transportation infrastructure**

**FEMA 12** FEMA GRANT PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE FY 2012 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) Grant Guidance Outreach FEMA Grant Programs Directorate and United States Coast Guard February 22-23, 2012 <http://www.vamaritime.com/resource/resmgr/Files/FY12_PSGP_Outreach_Briefing.pdf>

The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) is one of three funded grant programs within the Transportation Infrastructure Security Branch (TISB) for FYFY 2012 2012