### \*\*\* Topicality\*\*\*

### 2AC T-Substantial

#### We meet; the plan text says “substantial” – and we will defend a substantial increase – means that they operationally define our plan text

#### Their Definition is Arbitrary

#### Substantial has no exact meaning

Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A, p. 483)

The word “substantial” is susceptible to different meanings according to the circumstances, and is variously defined as actual, essential, material, fundamental, although no rule of thumb can be laid down fixing its exact meaning

Prefer our interpretation:

Logical – the resolution demands a substantial increase of investment in transportation infrastructure. Nowhere in that does it specify a number

Predictability – we can’t know their interpretation before writing our plan text. Arbitrary limits shouldn’t govern the way we write our aff.

Default to Reasonability- C/I creates a race to the bottom

"Substantial" means of real worth or considerable value --- this is the USUAL and CUSTOMARY meaning of the term

Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A, p. 458)

D.S.C. 1966. The word “substantial” within Civil Rights Act providing that a place is a public accommodation if a “substantial” portion of food which is served has moved in commerce must be construed in light of its usual and customary meaning, that is, something of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable, something worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely nominal

“Substantial” means considerable or to a large degree --- this common meaning is preferable because the word is not a term of art

Arkush 2 (David, JD Candidate – Harvard University, “Preserving "Catalyst" Attorneys' Fees Under the Freedom of Information Act in the Wake of Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources”, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Winter,   
37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 131)

Plaintiffs should argue that the term "substantially prevail" is not a term of art because if considered a term of art, resort to Black's 7th produces a definition of "prevail" that could be interpreted adversely to plaintiffs. [99](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1421887dc00d6c0b78bddb20857a69fa&docnum=16&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAz&_md5=3f3ffe65eadff46b38ea49c40cb1037e&focBudTerms=definition%20of%20the%20term%21%20substantial%21%20or%20definition%20of%20the%20word%20substantial%21&focBudSel=all#n99) It is commonly accepted that words that are not legal terms of art should be accorded their ordinary, not their legal, meaning, [100](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1421887dc00d6c0b78bddb20857a69fa&docnum=16&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAz&_md5=3f3ffe65eadff46b38ea49c40cb1037e&focBudTerms=definition%20of%20the%20term%21%20substantial%21%20or%20definition%20of%20the%20word%20substantial%21&focBudSel=all#n100) and ordinary-usage dictionaries provide FOIA fee claimants with helpful arguments. The Supreme Court has already found favorable, temporally relevant definitions of the word "substantially" in ordinary dictionaries: "Substantially" suggests "considerable" or "specified to a large degree." See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining "substantially" as "in a substantial manner" and "substantial" as "considerable in amount, value, or worth" and "being that specified to a large degree or in the main"); see also 17 Oxford English Dictionary 66-67 (2d ed. 1989) ("substantial": "relating to or proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential"; "of ample or considerable amount, quantity or dimensions"). [101](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1421887dc00d6c0b78bddb20857a69fa&docnum=16&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkAz&_md5=3f3ffe65eadff46b38ea49c40cb1037e&focBudTerms=definition%20of%20the%20term%21%20substantial%21%20or%20definition%20of%20the%20word%20substantial%21&focBudSel=all#n101)

Substantial means “of considerable amount” – not some contrived percentage

Prost 4 (Judge – United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, “Committee For Fairly Traded Venezuelan Cement v. United States”, 6-18, http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/04opinions/04-1016.html)

The URAA and the SAA neither amend nor refine the language of § 1677(4)(C).  In fact, they merely suggest, without disqualifying other alternatives, a “clearly higher/substantial proportion” approach.  Indeed, the SAA specifically mentions that no “precise mathematical formula” or “‘benchmark’ proportion” is to be used for a dumping concentration analysis.  SAA at 860 (citations omitted); see also Venez. Cement, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1329-30.  Furthermore, as the Court of International Trade noted, the SAA emphasizes that the Commission retains the discretion to determine concentration of imports on a “case-by-case basis.”  SAA at 860.  Finally, the definition of the word “substantial” undercuts the CFTVC’s argument.  The word “substantial” generally means “considerable in amount, value or worth.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1993).  It does not imply a specific number or cut-off.  What may be substantial in one situation may not be in another situation.  The very breadth of the term “substantial” undercuts the CFTVC’s argument that Congress spoke clearly in establishing a standard for the Commission’s regional antidumping and countervailing duty analyses.  It therefore supports the conclusion that the Commission is owed deference in its interpretation of “substantial proportion.”  The Commission clearly embarked on its analysis having been given considerable leeway to interpret a particularly broad term.

### 2AC T–Not TI

#### 1. We meet – Port Security Grant Program directly invests in Transportation Infrastructure

CFDA, No Date Given (Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, “Port Security Grant Program”, https://www.cfda.gov/?s=program&mode=form&tab=step1&id=6f8d5141a3f6455eb4236957a2d860b2)

The FY 2012 **PSGP plays an important role** in the implementation of Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) **by supporting the development and sustainment of core capabilities.** **Core capabilities are essential fo**r the execution of each of the five mission areas outlined in the **National Preparedness** Goal (NPG). The development and sustainment of these core capabilities are not exclusive to any single level of government or organization, but rather require the combined effort of the whole community. The FY 2012 **PSGP supports** all core capabilities in the **Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery mission areas** based on allowable costs. **Grantees under** FY 2012 **PSGP are encouraged to** build and sustain core capabilities through activities such as: • **Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness** (MDA) • **Enhancing Improvised Explosive Device** (IED) **and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive** (CBRNE) **prevention, protection, response and supporting recovery capabilities** • **Port Resilience and Recovery Capabilities** • **Training and Exercises** • Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Implementation. Types of Assistance (060): Cooperative Agreements Uses and Use Restrictions (070): **The** **Port Security Grant Program** (PSGP) **is one of the Department of Homeland Security’s** (DHS) **FY 2012 grant programs which directly support transportation infrastructure security activities**. **The PSGP is one tool in the comprehensive set of measures authorized by Congress and implemented by the Administration to strengthen the Nation’s critical infrastructure against risks associated with potential terrorist attacks.** The vast majority of U.S. critical infrastructure is owned and/or operated by State, local, and private sector partners. The **PSGP funds available to these entities are intended to support increased port-wide risk management; enhanced domain awareness; training and exercises; expansion of port recovery and resiliency capabilities; and further capabilities to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from attacks involving improvised explosive devices** (IEDs) **and other non-conventional weapons**; and competitively award grant funding to assist ports in obtaining the resources required to support the NPG’s associated mission areas and core capabilities. **PSGP grant recipients and sub-recipients may only use PSGP grant funds for the purpose set forth in the grant, and must be consistent with the statutory authority for the award.** Grant funds may not be used for matching funds for other Federal grants/cooperative agreements, lobbying, or intervention in Federal regulatory or adjudicatory proceedings. In addition, Federal funds may not be used to sue the Federal government or any other government entity. Pre-award costs are allowable only with the written consent of DHS and if they are included in the award agreement. Federal employees are prohibited from serving in any capacity (paid or unpaid) on any proposal submitted under this program. Federal employees may not receive funds under this award. In FY 2012, the total amount of funds distributed under this grant program will be $97,500,000. The FY 2012 PSGP funds will be allocated based on the funding priorities outlined in FY 2012 PSGP Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA).

2. No link – we don’t invest in the military, ports are civilian transportation infrastructure

**3. Counter-interpretation Transportation infrastructure includes roads, bridges, waterways, ports, air and rail – water and energy infrastructure are separate**

**Chapman, 11** – attorney at law (Chapman and Cutler LLP, “The American Jobs Act and Its Impact on a National Infrastructure Bank” 9/29/11 http://www.chapman.com/media/news/media.1081.pdf)//dm

Eligibility for financial assistance must be demonstrated to the satisfaction of AIFAʼs Board of Directors. Generally, the applicantʼs request must meet the Actʼs definition of a transportation infrastructure project, water infrastructure project, or energy infrastructure project. To be eligible, the project must have costs that are reasonably anticipated to equal or exceed $100 million. However, rural infrastructure projects need only have costs that are reasonably anticipated to equal or exceed $25 million.

-- Transportation Infrastructure: includes the construction, alteration, or repair, including the facilitation of intermodal transit, of the following subsectors:

o Highways or roads

o Bridges

o Mass transit

o Inland waterways

o Commercial ports

o Airports

o Air traffic control systems

o Passenger rail, including high-speed rail

o Freight rail systems

-- Water Infrastructure: includes the construction, consolidation, alteration, or repair of the following subsectors:

o Wastewater treatment facilities

o Storm water management systems

o Dams

o Solid waste disposal facilities

o Drinking water treatment facilities

o Levees

o Open space management systems

-- Energy Infrastructure: includes the construction, consolidation, alteration, or repair of the following subsectors:

o Pollution reduced energy generation

o Transmission and distribution

o Storage

o Energy efficiency enhancements for public and commercial buildings

#### 4. We meet our counter-interpretation – we directly invest in the ports, which are transportation infrastructure

5. Education – directly investing in ports is core of the topic, ports are a massive sector of transportation and at the center of the literature base

#### Maritime transportation is a vital component of the topic

Corbett and Winebrake 8 (James J. Corbett and James Winebrake are Energy and¶ Environmental Research Associates; “The Impacts of Globalisation¶ on International Maritime¶ Transport Activity” http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/61/41380820.pdf)

**Marine transportation is an integral, if sometimes less publicly visible, part of the global economy.** The marine transportation system is a network of specialized vessels, the ports they visit, and transportation infrastructure from factories to terminals to distribution centers to markets**. Maritime transportation is a necessary complement to and occasional substitute for other modes of freight transportation.** **For many commodities and trade routes, there is no direct substitute for waterborne commerce. (Air transportation has replaced most ocean liner passenger transportation and transports significant cargo value,** but carries only a small volume fraction of the highest value and lightest cargoes; while a significant mode in trade value, aircraft move much less global freight by volume, and at significant energy per unit shipped.)On other routes, such as some coastwise or shortsea shipping or within inland river systems, **marine transportation may provide a substitute for roads and rail, depending upon cost, time, and infrastructure constraints. Other important marine transportation activities include passenger transportation** (ferries and cruise ships), **national defense** (Naval vessels), **fishing and resource extraction**, and **navigational service** (vessel-assist tugs, harbor maintenance vessels, etc.).

6. Limits – We don’t unlimit the topic, we only allow for affs that directly invest in transportation infrastructure, and even if we do underlimiting is better than extreme overlimiting because it forces neg strategic thinking

7. Ground – We increase neg ground because only allow for core of the topic affs, which gives the neg core generics and allows for neg innovation

8. Reasonability – if we meet a reasonable interpretation of the resolution you should vote aff because the neg’s interpretation is only forcing a race to the bottom in order to exclude the aff

9 Potential abuse isn’t a voter we shouldn’t be punished for affs other teams might run make them prove the abuse in this round

### \*\*\*ADV\*\*\*

### Inherency

#### The Port Security Grant Program is severely underfunded – the plan is key to fill critical infrastructure gaps and ensure effective port security

Eric Holdeman 7/14/2012- Director of Security for the Port of Tacoma (“SAFE Port Reauthorization Act,” <http://www.emergencymgmt.com/emergency-blogs/disaster-zone/port-security/SAFE-Port-Reauthorization-Act-071412.html>

The SAFE Port legislation needs to be reauthorized. In actuality the initial legislation has expired and the new authorization would cover 2012-2016. It looks like the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee will mark up the bill soon.¶ ¶ This is the legislation that provides port security funds for maritime security projects. As I noted recently, those funds have dwindled from a high of $400M a fiscal year to $97M for 2012. One bugaboo that has haunted this portion of homeland security grant programs has been the cash match, 50% for commercial organizations and 25% for governments. Everyone would like to see that requirement go away.¶ ¶ The other major challenge is that for 2012, and it is projected to be the same for future grant years, is the term of performance is being limited to two years. Previously it was five years. Any term beyond two would be helpful for those projects that require construction. There are always design, permitting and environmental hoops to jump through and those take time. Not to mention the fact that from the time the grant awards are announced to when you have a contract from FEMA can be six to nine months. ¶ ¶ Given the "frozen" nature of congressional politics I don't imagine this will go very far in achieving the passage of a bill out of both houses of congress, but getting the bill marked up in the senate would be a good start. Senator Patty Murray, (WA) has been a huge supporter of port security since its inception and her leadership will be critical to the passage of any legislation.

#### **The SMART Port Security Act** didn’t increase funding- the Aff is still inherent, but you don’t have any DAs.

Committee of Homeland Security 7/6/2012 “Homeland Security Committee Passes SMART Port Security Act,” http://homeland.house.gov/press-release/homeland-security-committee-passes-smart-port-security-act)

Washington, D.C. – Today, the House Committee on Homeland Security, chaired by Rep. Peter T. King (R-NY), passed, by voice vote, H.R. 4251, the SMART Port Security Act.¶ H.R. 4251, introduced by Rep. Candice Miller (R-MI), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, will enhance maritime security programs under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).¶ Subcommittee Chairman Miller said: “Securing our waterways is an essential component of a layered approach to security. A major disruption at one of the Nation’s ports, especially a terrorist attack, is a high-consequence event that has the potential to cripple the global supply chain and could severely damage our economy. This bill enhances risk-based security measures overseas before the threat reaches our shores, emphasizing a stronger collaborative environment between Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Coast Guard in sharing port security duties, and leveraging the maritime security work of our trusted allies.¶ “Maritime security is an important aspect of our efforts to secure the homeland, and smart, cost-effective choices have to be made that maximize our resources while ensuring the security of our ports – and by extension our way of life. The SMART Port Security Act is a step in the right direction that encourages all our homeland security assets to better coordinate and more effectively secure the maritime environment, recognizes the importance of partnerships with private industry and our international partners, and does so without an increase in spending.”

**More funding is needed- capabilities are reaching the service life mark**

Dr. Huban Gowadia 7/27/2012- Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Acting Director (“Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Does DHS have an Effective and Efficient Nuclear Detection Strategy,”

<http://www.defpro.com/news/details/37971/?SID=e4a3b7d85367ebc46f8a5a1f80ad31a8>)

We are looking ahead in anticipation of a future need for enhanced capabilities or new systems for scanning cargo at ports of entry. The RPM program began deployment of the current generation poly-vinyl toluene (PVT) RPMs in 2003 and many of these are approaching the 10 year service life mark. While recent DNDO-funded studies have shown that the service life of PVT RPMs may be significantly longer than was previously anticipated, the oldest RPMs will eventually need to be replaced or refurbished. Given the very significant DHS investment in the RPM program, DNDO has been studying the issue of how to extend the usefulness of this investment and develop the system to its full potential. DNDO’s PVT Improvement Program examines technical methods to improve the operations and capabilities of currently deployed PVT RPMs. DNDO plans to complete developmental testing and field validation testing of selected PVT improvement solutions in FY 2013.

### Low confidence now

**DHS has recently missed the deadline to scan all cargo for nuclear material**

**AllGov 7/17**/2012 “Shipping Containers from Abroad Remain Unscanned for Radioactivity Despite Government Deadline,” <http://www.allgov.com/US_and_the_World/ViewNews/Shipping_Containers_from_Abroad_Remain_Unscanned_for_Radioactivity_Despite_Government_Deadline_120717>

Five years after Congress ordered it, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) still cannot guarantee that all shipping containers arriving in U.S. ports have been scanned for radioactive material and nuclear bombs.¶ ¶ DHS was supposed to meet a deadline this month for ensuring all inbound cargo was first screened at foreign ports. But costs and lack of technology have stymied the agency.¶ ¶ DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano has said it would cost $16 billion to implement scanning measures at the nearly 700 ports worldwide that ship to the United States.¶ ¶ Until then, less than 1% of the 10 million containers arriving annually at U.S. ports are scanned before departure from abroad.¶ ¶ Some lawmakers think DHS is not taking the 2007 mandate that Congress adopted seriously.¶ ¶ “I personally do not believe they intend to comply with the law,” Representative Edward Markey (D-Massachusetts), co-author of the 2007 law, told The Washington Post. “This is a real terrorist threat, and it has a solution. We can’t afford to wait until a catastrophic attack.”

DHS’s failure to meet the deadline killed investor confidence

WSJ 7/15/2012 (“Port security: U.S. fails to meet deadline for scanning of cargo containers,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/port-security-us-fails-to-meet-deadline-for-scanning-of-cargo-containers/2012/07/15/gJQAmgW8mW_story.html>)

The Obama administration has failed to meet a legal deadline for scanning all shipping containers for radioactive material before they reach the United States, a requirement aimed at strengthening maritime security and preventing terrorists from smuggling a nuclear device into any of the nation’s 300 sea and river ports.¶ The Department of Homeland Security was given until this month to ensure that 100 percent of inbound shipping containers are screened at foreign ports.¶ But the department’s secretary, Janet Napolitano, informed Congress in May that she was extending a two-year blanket exemption to foreign ports because the screening is proving too costly and cumbersome. She said it would cost $16 billion to implement scanning measures at the nearly 700 ports worldwide that ship to the United States.¶ Instead, the DHS relies on intelligence-gathering and analysis to identify “high-risk” containers, which are checked before being loaded onto ships. Under this system, fewer than half a percent of the roughly 10 million containers arriving at U.S. ports last year were scanned before departure. The DHS says that those checks turned up narcotics and other contraband but that there have been no public reports of smuggled nuclear material.¶ In response to the 9/11 Commission, Congress passed a law in 2007 specifying that no cargo container may enter the United States before being scanned with imaging equipment and a radiation-detection device.¶ The administration’s failure to meet the deadline has left some members of Congress and outside experts concerned about whether the threat is being taken seriously enough.¶ “I personally do not believe they intend to comply with the law,” Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), co-author of the 2007 law, said in an interview. “This is a real terrorist threat, and it has a solution. We can’t afford to wait until a catastrophic attack.”¶ The DHS says monitors scan 99 percent of the containers for radiation after they arrive at U.S. ports. But experts say the monitors at U.S. ports are not sophisticated enough to detect nuclear devices or highly enriched uranium, which emit low levels of radiation.¶ The Government Accountability Office has warned that a nuclear device could be detonated while at a port — containers often sit for days awaiting radiation checks — causing billions of dollars in damage in addition to the loss of life. Estimates of damage caused by a nuclear detonation at a major port range from tens of billions of dollars to $1 trillion.¶ Shipping containers are potentially ideal for smuggling weapons, people and other illicit cargo; ensuring the integrity of the contents is difficult and costly. The standard container is 40 feet long and 8 feet high and holds more than 30 tons of cargo. A large vessel carries 3,000 or more containers from hundreds of different shippers and many ports. And a single container can hold cargo from many customers.¶ Counterterrorism experts have worried about port vulnerability since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

**Obama administration will miss the deadline for port security – risks huge attacks – tech is available, all that is missing is urgency.**

JERROLD L. NADLER, EDWARD J. MARKEY and BENNIE G. THOMPSON 6/28/2012- (“Cargo, the Terrorists’ Trojan Horse,” NYTimes, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/opinion/the-dangerous-delay-on-port-security.html)

MILLIONS of cargo containers are unloaded from ships each year at American seaports, providing countless opportunities for terrorists to smuggle and unleash a nuclear bomb or weapon of mass destruction on our shores.¶ To counter this threat, Congress passed a law five years ago mandating that by July 2012, all maritime cargo bound for the United States must be scanned before it is loaded on ships. But the Obama administration will miss this deadline, and it is not clear to us, as the authors of the law, whether it ever plans to comply with the law.¶ Over the years, terrorists have shown themselves to be frighteningly inventive. They have hidden explosives in printer cartridges transported by air and embedded explosives in the shoes and underwear of airline passengers. The cargo containers arriving on ships from foreign ports offer terrorists a Trojan horse for a devastating attack on the United States. As the Harvard political scientist Graham T. Allison has put it, a nuclear attack is “far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile.”¶ But for the past five years, the Department of Homeland Security has done little to counter this threat and instead has wasted precious time arguing that it would be too expensive and too difficult, logistically and diplomatically, to comply with the law. This is unacceptable.¶ An attack on an American port could cause tens of thousands of deaths and cripple global trade, with losses ranging from $45 billion to more than $1 trillion, according to estimates by the RAND Corporation and the Congressional Research Service. Anyone who doubts these estimates should recall the labor strike that shut down the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach for 11 days in 2002. Economic losses were put at $6.3 billion or more. Homeland Security says it would cost $16 billion or more to meet the mandate, but that projection assumes that the department would pay to acquire, maintain and operate scanning equipment and related operations, without any offsetting fees from companies in the global supply chain. In contrast, Stephen E. Flynn, an expert in terrorism and port security at Northeastern University, has said a scanning system could be implemented in every major container port in the world at a cost of $1.5 billion, and that the costs could largely be absorbed by companies doing business at the ports.¶ Homeland Security says it uses a “layered, risk-based approach” to cargo scanning, which, instead of comprehensive scanning, targets specific cargo thought to be high-risk. But this approach is inadequate.¶ Recent advances in screening technologies have undermined Homeland Security’s contention that the technology is not available to scan all cargo containers without disrupting commerce. An effective high-volume container screening system was installed in the Port of Hong Kong in 2005. Trials of new, American-made technology have demonstrated that scanning all containers would be feasible at many ports. The world’s largest marine terminal operators have offered to work with the department to put the law into effect.¶ Cost and technology have never been the primary obstacles to meeting this mandate. What is missing is a sense of urgency and determination.¶ We recognized that the scanning of 100 percent of all cargo containers in five years could be a challenging deadline to meet. That is why we included the authority to extend the deadline in cases in which Homeland Security certified that there are at least two major obstacles relating to the availability and accuracy of the technology, the logistics of its deployment and use, or impacts to trade.¶ Now Homeland Security is using this authority to simply exempt itself from any meaningful compliance with the law we wrote to close a dangerous loophole in United States security. We have urged the department over the last five years to make the law a reality, to no avail. Our nation can no longer risk such delays.

**Ports at risk for terror**

Dr. Evanor Palac-McMiken, 2005- Director of the Economic Analytical Unit at the Department of Foreign Trade and Affairs ( “Economic Costs and Benefits of Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x/asset/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x.pdf;jsessionid=04AE22510AFBB1EA4756D40DEA0CFA55.d03t03?v=1&t=h4ppdiht&s=3f469b88d024638a8733b4601e8cf7c32550c4c9>)

¶ Well before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, transport infrastructure and¶ equipment had been the target of terrorist action for a number of reasons, among them:¶ • relative accessibility¶ • potential to attract significant public attention and media coverage¶ • linkage with national symbols (eg. national airlines)¶ • impact on a large number of people in a single strike.¶ International maritime and aviation transport have a range of vulnerabilities.¶ • The maritime transport system is vulnerable to terrorism due to its diverse and large¶ international labour force, the large amount of goods transported whose provenance,¶ description and ownership are often vague, the involvement of thousands of¶ intermediaries, many vessels being registered in countries without stringent¶ requirements and the ability of vessel owners to hide their identities (EAU, 2003).

### 1AC – Econ

**Advantage two is the Economy, we’ll isolate 2 internal links.**

**First is investor confidence**

**Attacks don’t need to be successful-perception at port disruption alone will shock the economy and international confidence**

**Clark et al. 7.** CAPT Bruce G. Clark, USCGR (ret) Director of Maritime Security Projects, Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning -The California Maritime Academy. Dr. Donna J. Nincic , Associate Professor and Chair-Department of Global and Maritime Studies of The California Maritime Academy. CAPT Nevin Fidler, USCGR (ret) Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning-The California Maritime Academy-The California State University. “Protecting America’s Ports: Are We There Yet?” Oct 2007.

Why? Because, in this new world of unexpected and unplanned for terrorist activities, a miss is almost as good as a hit. How we react as everyday citizens to these nonoccurrences is as important as how we respond to a real event when it results in major changes in behavior and activities. The terrorists need not be successful in actually committing a terrorist act - the mere publicizing of plots, arrests and terrorist plans can have equally far reaching effects. The terrorist can create panic, chaos and economic impact simply by making a press release to the media of the intent to do something, without really needing to actually do it. While not as devastating as an actual attack with the incumbent level of mayhem, carnage, and destruction - fear is a completely effective and insidious weapon of the low cost/low capability variety; easy to deploy and very difficult to counter in an effective way. So fear becomes another of the terrorist's weapons - and it requires a managed solution as a part of any counter-terrorism plan.

**The perception of terrorism kills private investment- multiple reasons**

**1. Uncertainty increases the risk premium**

Dr. Evanor Palac-McMiken, 2005- Director of the Economic Analytical Unit at the Department of Foreign Trade and Affairs ( “Economic Costs and Benefits of Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x/asset/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x.pdf;jsessionid=04AE22510AFBB1EA4756D40DEA0CFA55.d03t03?v=1&t=h4ppdiht&s=3f469b88d024638a8733b4601e8cf7c32550c4c9>)

The ongoing threat of terrorism also affects world economic activity through its impact on¶ business and investment decisions. The possibility of future terrorist acts creates uncertainty¶ which increases perceived risk and the risk premium demanded by investors. A higher risk¶ premium could be imposed on investing in, and trading with, certain countries or regions. For¶ high risk countries, a higher rate of return may be required to attract international trade and¶ investment. Overall, investors would seek out lower risk and shorter term investments which¶ typically have lower rates of return. The cumulative effect is to reduce overall investment and¶ economic growth to rates lower than they would otherwise be. Higher risk premiums impact¶ mostly on economies with substantial external financing requirements, which must pay more¶ for their capital needs. One study suggested that from 1975 to 1991, heightened terrorism reduced average¶ annual FDI inflows to Spain by 13.5 per cent and to Greece by 11.9 per cent (Enders¶ and Sandler, 1996 cited in EAU, 2003). Another study estimated the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks to have reduced¶ stock market wealth by US$1.7 trillion (US Joint Economic Committee, 2002 citing¶ Navarro and Spencer, 2001).

**2. Consumer confidence**

Dr. Evanor Palac-McMiken, 2005- Director of the Economic Analytical Unit at the Department of Foreign Trade and Affairs ( “Economic Costs and Benefits of Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x/asset/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x.pdf;jsessionid=04AE22510AFBB1EA4756D40DEA0CFA55.d03t03?v=1&t=h4ppdiht&s=3f469b88d024638a8733b4601e8cf7c32550c4c9>)

Another important channel through which the ongoing threat of terrorism affects world¶ economic activity is through its impact on consumer confidence. The threat of terrorism¶ can result in lower spending especially in the airline, tourism and hospitality industries.¶ • Presumably due to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, tourist arrivals in the¶ Americas region plunged by 20.4 per cent in the last four months of 2001 and¶ 6 per cent for the year. The US bore the brunt of the downturn, with arrivals falling by¶ 10.7 per cent by the end of the year, its worst decline ever, with lodging occupancy¶ down by 5.7 per cent and revenue passenger miles on US carriers down by 7 per cent¶ (World Tourism Organisation, 2002). The incident also was estimated to have caused¶ an unprecedented 20 per cent decline in passengers and 200 000 job reductions¶ (APEC Transport Working Group, 2002).¶

**3. Equity risk causes investors to redistribute funds- decreasing total investment**

Dr. Evanor Palac-McMiken, 2005- Director of the Economic Analytical Unit at the Department of Foreign Trade and Affairs ( “Economic Costs and Benefits of Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x/asset/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x.pdf;jsessionid=04AE22510AFBB1EA4756D40DEA0CFA55.d03t03?v=1&t=h4ppdiht&s=3f469b88d024638a8733b4601e8cf7c32550c4c9>)

¶ In estimating the economic impact of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US,¶ McKibbin and Stoeckel (2001) simulated a scenario whereby terrorism concerns caused a¶ worldwide reappraisal of equity risk for five years. The initial shock was a rise in the equity risk¶ premia of 5 percentage points in 2001, declining to 4 percentage points in 2002 and so on to¶ 1 percentage point in 2005 (see Appendix B for more explanation of the modelling).¶ The effects¶ Worldwide reappraisal of equity risk causes investors to redistribute funds over other assets—¶ both internationally and at home. Investors move out of stocks into more secure investments¶ such as bonds, causing world wide investment to fall. Investment projects that were previously¶ viable become unviable as investors require a higher rate of return. Because the reappraisal¶ was assumed to be occurring everywhere, there was limited incentive for investors to¶ reallocate portfolios across countries.¶ Chart 2.2 shows the declines in real GDP from baseline. While the risk premium reappraisal¶ returns to normal after 5 years, real GDP does not fully recover in the US, Japan and the rest¶ of the OECD until 10 years later. Full recovery in Asia and Australia, does not occur until¶ 15 years later. This lingering effect stems from the worldwide fall in investment. In the US, investment falls to 6 per cent below baseline after 2 years before recovering. This¶ fall in investment leads to an initial decline in real GDP of 0.6 per cent below baseline. The¶ decline in US real GDP compounds and prolongs the adverse impact on Asian countries and¶ Australia.¶ This scenario suggests that the adverse economic impact of terrorism stemming from¶ increased risk perceptions could be greater than those emanating from declining productivity.¶ The economic effects of both declining productivity and increased risk perceptions arising¶ from terrorism (particularly if they last for a long time) would have an even greater adverse¶ effect on the world’s major economies. This is discussed in the succeeding section.

**That creates a negative feedback cycle annihilating the economy**

**Rubin, Orszag, and Sinai 04 – PhD Economics, Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institute** and Chief Global Economist at Decision Economics inc. (Robert E. Rubin, Chairman of Citigroup Financial, Peter R. Roszag, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute, and Allen Sinai, Decision Economics, “Sustained Budget Deficits: The Risks of Financial and Fiscal Disarray” Paper presented The Andrew Brimmer Policy Forum, “National Economic and Financial Policies for Growth and Stability,” Sunday, 1/4/04)

The loss of investor and creditor confidence, both at home and abroad, may cause investors and creditors to reallocate funds away from dollar-based investments, causing a depreciation of the exchange rate, and to demand sharply higher interest rates on U.S. government debt; The increase of interest rates, depreciation of the exchange rate, and decline in confidence can reduce stock prices and household wealth, raise the costs of financing to business, and reduce private-sector domestic spending; The disruptions to financial markets may impede the intermediation between lenders and borrowers that is vital to modern economies, as long-maturity credit markets witness potentially substantial increases in interest rates and become relatively illiquid, and the reduction in asset prices adversely affects the balance sheets of banks and other financial intermediaries; **These various effects can feed on each other to create a mutually reinforcing cycle**; for example, increased interest rates and diminished economic activity may further worsen the fiscal imbalance, which can then cause a further loss of confidence and potentially spark another round of **negative feedback effects**.

**2nd is Trade**

**1. Security technology increases trade efficiency- mutually reinforcing**

Dr. Evanor Palac-McMiken, 2005- Director of the Economic Analytical Unit at the Department of Foreign Trade and Affairs ( “Economic Costs and Benefits of Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x/asset/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x.pdf;jsessionid=04AE22510AFBB1EA4756D40DEA0CFA55.d03t03?v=1&t=h4ppdiht&s=3f469b88d024638a8733b4601e8cf7c32550c4c9>)

¶ Security objectives and trade facilitation can be mutually reinforcing. In addition to the benefits¶ of reducing exposure to terrorism, technological advances to increase security are likely to¶ increase the efficiency of cargo handling, cargo movement tracking and people movement.¶ These efficiency gains may lower the cost of international trade. The gains from these¶ improvements are likely to be greatest in developing countries that need to “catch-up” with the¶ more efficient systems in developed economies (Chart 5.2). Security-driven modernisation can bring about improvements in international¶ transport, which will benefit all parties in the trade supply chain. These savings could¶ partially offset the cost of investment in security measures:¶ • turnaround times would be shortened¶ • customs clearance would be accelerated and redundant data entry would be¶ avoided¶ • theft and fraud would be reduced—maritime theft and fraud is estimated to cost¶ between US$30 billion and US$50 billion a year. The prospect of reducing threats through technology-intensive customs inspections can be¶ viewed as an investment in greater trade efficiency. Automated technology—such as bar¶ codes, wireless communications, radio frequency ID tags, tamper-proof seals for containers¶ with global positioning technology and other electronic measures—could accelerate global¶ trade while improving security (Reddy, 2002 cited in World Bank, 2003).¶ • Advance passenger and goods information systems and other electronic¶ identification techniques at ports will speed up passenger and goods movements¶ (over time lowering business costs) and provide increased security at the border.¶ • By simplifying the detection of high risk consignments the advance electronic¶ transmission of customs data before the goods are shipped will facilitate trade¶ (WCO, 2003).¶

**2. Standardization and decreased cost**

Dr. Evanor Palac-McMiken, 2005- Director of the Economic Analytical Unit at the Department of Foreign Trade and Affairs ( “Economic Costs and Benefits of Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x/asset/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x.pdf;jsessionid=04AE22510AFBB1EA4756D40DEA0CFA55.d03t03?v=1&t=h4ppdiht&s=3f469b88d024638a8733b4601e8cf7c32550c4c9>)

Standardising and introducing compatible electronic manifests systems at all ports will save time and reduce costs through quicker processing of cargo, faster vessel turnaround, a more consistent approach to cargo and vessel data reporting, increased confidence in the reporting system and more timely responses for importers and exporters. All these benefits may lower freight and handling costs, reduce final prices of traded goods and increase demand. With international trade expanding rapidly and increasingly relying on just-in-time delivery, efficient global logistics systems are essential. Expenditure on new logistics systems represents an investment that will deliver considerable efficiency returns. Enhanced security, by bringing greater certainty and stability to the global economy, should encourage investor, business and consumer confidence. Using the above framework, the potential medium to long-term economic costs and benefits of counter-terrorism measures can be illustrated through a variety of general equilibrium model simulations. 1

**Maritime trade it accounts for 25% of US GDP and 20% of world trade- key to the economy**

**Fritelli ‘5 – Transportation Analyst** [John F. Fritelli, CRS Report for Congress Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress –May 27th 2005 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31733.pdf> Access Date - 6/22/2012]

Ships are the primary mode of transportation for world trade. **Ships carry approximately 80% of world trade by volume.12 The United States is the world’s leading maritime trading nation, accounting for nearly 20% (measured in tons) of the annual world ocean-borne overseas trade. Ships carry more than 95% of the nation’s non-North American trade by weight and 75% by value. Trade now accounts for 25% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), up from 11% in 1970.**

**Risk of a double-dip now due to expectations of austerity- increasing investment solves**

Nouriel **Roubini 7/23**/2012- Phd in international economics at Harvard University, professor at New York University's Stern School of Business and is the chairman of Roubini Global Economics, an economic consultancy firm. (US Economy Going from Bad to Worse: Roubini,” <http://www.cnbc.com/id/48281577>)

A robust and self-sustaining U.S. recovery is not on the cards, and we should now expect below trend growth for many years to come, according to Nouriel Roubini, the economist famed for his bearish views.¶ Roubini, best-known for calling the 2008 economic crisis, outlined five reasons the bulls have been wrong and argued that an American economic cold will lead the rest of the world to catch pneumonia in a post on the Project Syndicate website.¶ “Even this year, the consensus got it wrong, expecting a recovery to annual GDP growth of better than 3 percent,” the founder of Roubini Global Economics wrote.¶ “And now, after getting the first half of 2012 wrong, many are repeating the fairy tale that a combination of lower oil prices, rising auto sales, recovering house prices, and a resurgence of U.S. manufacturing will boost growth in the second half of the year and fuel above-potential growth by 2013.”¶ Roubini believes the U.S. economy will slow further this year and next as expectations of the “fiscal cliff” keep spending and growth lower — and uncertainty about the outcome of the presidential election dogs markets.¶ The fiscal cliff could knock 4.5 percent off 2013 growth if all tax cuts and transfer payments were allowed to expire and spending cuts where triggered, according to Roubini.¶ “Of course, the drag will be much smaller, as tax increases and spending cuts will be much milder. But, even if the fiscal cliff turns out to be a mild growth bump — a mere 0.5 percent of GDP — and annual growth at the end of the year is just 1.5 percent, as seems likely, the fiscal drag will suffice to slow the economy to stall speed: a growth rate of barely 1 percent,” he wrote.¶ The U.S. consumer, which drives plenty of the global economy as well as the U.S., will not be able to keep spending when $1.4 billion worth of tax cuts and extended transfer payments come to an end according to Roubini.¶ “In 2013, as transfer payments are phased out, however gradually, and as some tax cuts are allowed to expire, disposable income growth and consumption growth will slow. The U.S. will then face not only the direct effects of a fiscal drag, but also its indirect effect on private spending,” he wrote.¶ The problems in the euro zone, a slowdown in China and emerging markets, added to the chance that oil prices could be driven higher by tensions over Iran’s nuclear program, will also add to America’s economic woes, Roubini argued.¶ He warned the Fed will not be able to ride to the rescue this time.¶ “The U.S. Federal Reserve will carry out more quantitative easing this year, but it will be ineffective: long-term interest rates are already very low, and lowering them further would not boost spending,” he wrote.¶ “Indeed, the credit channel is frozen and velocity has collapsed, with banks hoarding increases in base money in the form of excess reserves. Moreover, the dollar is unlikely to weaken as other countries also carry out quantitative easing.”¶ Roubini also argued that earnings growth is now beginning to run out of steam, after buoying markets earlier in the economic cycle. The second-quarter earnings season has so far presented a mixed picture.¶ “A significant equity-price correction could, in fact, be the force that in 2013 tips the US economy into outright contraction. And if the U.S. starts to sneeze again, the rest of the world — its immunity already weakened by Europe’s malaise and emerging countries’ slowdown — will catch pneumonia,” he warned.

Economic collapse causes war

Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow.¶ First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.¶ Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4¶ Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write:¶ The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89)¶ Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions.¶ Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.¶ In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.¶ This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

### Solves investor perception

**Lack of investment causes ongoing shocks that tank the economy**

Dr. Evanor Palac-McMiken, 2005- Director of the Economic Analytical Unit at the Department of Foreign Trade and Affairs ( “Economic Costs and Benefits of Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x/asset/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x.pdf;jsessionid=04AE22510AFBB1EA4756D40DEA0CFA55.d03t03?v=1&t=h4ppdiht&s=3f469b88d024638a8733b4601e8cf7c32550c4c9>)

Both the Penm et al. (2003) and McKibbin and Stoeckel (2001) simulations assume that¶ terrorism causes ‘shocks’ (that is, a decline in productivity and a rise in equity risk) which are¶ temporary (that is, lasting for at most five years) which lead to lower output compared to¶ baseline. The ongoing threat of terrorism, however, presents a scenario where these¶ shocks could last for a very long time. We commissioned Professor Warwick McKibbin to¶ simulate a scenario where terrorism causes both a permanent 0.3 per cent decline in total¶ factor productivity and a 1 percentage point rise in global equity risk premia.¶ The assumed 0.3 per cent decline in total factor productivity is consistent with the US¶ Congressional Budget Office (2002) estimates of reduction in total factor productivity arising¶ from increased security spending. The assumed 1 percentage point rise in equity risk¶ premia attempts to capture the reverberating effects on the equity markets of the ongoing¶ threat of terrorism2¶ .¶ The effects¶ The combined shocks of a permanent decline in productivity and rise in equity risk are predicted¶ to cause a much stronger contraction of investment, fall in exports and decline in real GDP¶ (Chart 2.3) from baseline. After five years, US and Australian real GDP fall by around 2 per cent¶ (or around US$220 billion and US$9 billion, in 2002 dollars, respectively) from baseline.¶

**Investment in security good- empirics**

Dr. Evanor Palac-McMiken, 2005- Director of the Economic Analytical Unit at the Department of Foreign Trade and Affairs ( “Economic Costs and Benefits of Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x/asset/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x.pdf;jsessionid=04AE22510AFBB1EA4756D40DEA0CFA55.d03t03?v=1&t=h4ppdiht&s=3f469b88d024638a8733b4601e8cf7c32550c4c9>)

The cost of security measures should be viewed as an investment against future terrorist¶ attacks on the transport system. It is an investment which if successfully implemented could¶ help reduce risks and therefore minimise loss of lives and economic disruption.¶ ECONOMIC BENEFITS FROM REDUCING SECURITY RISKS¶ An analysis of economic security ratings of 53 developing countries from 1984 to¶ 1995 shows that economies can achieve significant benefits by reducing their security¶ risks. The study found that in the short to medium-term, measures that increased¶ economic security in relatively insecure developing countries to levels in ‘best practice’¶ regions raised private investment by 0.5 to 1 percentage point of GDP. In the long Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector – Economic Costs and Benefits¶ 31term, these measures boosted economic growth by 0.5 to 1.25 percentage points¶ per year. Politically motivated terrorism was found to be one of the most important¶ security factors undermining economic growth in the short to medium-term.

**Benefits o/w costs**

Dr. Evanor Palac-McMiken, 2005- Director of the Economic Analytical Unit at the Department of Foreign Trade and Affairs ( “Economic Costs and Benefits of Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x/asset/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x.pdf;jsessionid=04AE22510AFBB1EA4756D40DEA0CFA55.d03t03?v=1&t=h4ppdiht&s=3f469b88d024638a8733b4601e8cf7c32550c4c9>)

The main benefit of enhanced transport security stems from the fact that the costs of enhancing¶ transport security are of magnitudes most likely much smaller than those that might result¶ from the economic disruptions of a major terrorist attack.¶ The costs of terrorism as suggested by the model simulations discussed earlier, also illustrate¶ the potential benefit of counter-terrorism measures in the transport sector. Enhanced security¶ by engendering certainty and stability to the global economy should encourage investor,¶ business and consumer confidence.¶ Modelling indicates that declining productivity arising from increased security costs can be¶ more than offset by declining equity risk premia as risk perceptions improve due to enhanced¶ security (Chart 5.1). The net benefits would be even greater because some of the productivity¶ losses arising from counter-terrorism measures would also be offset by trade facilitation and¶ efficiency benefits that could arise from the same measures, as discussed in the succeeding¶ section.

**The perception of terrorism hurts the economy- 9/11 proves**

Dick K. Nanto 10/5/2004- Specialist in Industry and Trade¶ Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division (“9/11 Terrorism: Global Economic Costs,” http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs7725/m1/1/high\_res\_d/RS21937\_2004Oct05.pdf)

Another channel of effect from 9/11 is increased private sector costs arising from a¶ heightened perception of the threat from terrorism and the increased probability of and¶ costs of such attacks should they occur. Some of this is reflected in rising insurance costs,¶ enhanced measures to ensure security of shipments, and in reduced travel and tourism.¶ What cannot be measured is the decrease in productivity by individuals arising from lost¶ time, greater hassles, and general anxiety caused by the new security environment. In¶ Europe, 36% of companies recently surveyed expected terrorists to deliberately target¶ their organization or staff — 93% believed that the war in Iraq had increased that threat.¶ Yet the survey found that 77% of organizations spend less than two percent of their global¶ revenues on security.¶ 13¶ Following 9/11, in the United States, terrorism insurance for property virtually¶ disappeared or prices soared. In 2002, prices moderated, particularly after Congress¶ passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. With this federal backstopping of insurance claims in the United States through 2005, about 4.36% of premiums on property are to¶ cover terrorism risks.¶ 14¶ In Europe, following 9/11, commercial property and liability¶ insurance rates rose by about 30% on average, with “target” structures (e.g. chemical and¶ power plants, iconic office buildings) showing steeper increases. In response to rising¶ insurance rates for aviation insurance, the European Union took measures that allowed¶ Member States either to pay insurance premiums linked to the “risk of war and terrorism”¶ for their airline companies or to grant them a State guarantee against such risk. Industry¶ experts expect security-inspired measures to amount to between 1 and 3 % of the value¶ of shipments.¶ 15¶ The travel and tourism industry was hit particularly hard by 9/11 and subsequent¶ terrorism but also by the SARS outbreak and recession. Although most of the funds not¶ spent on travel and tourism is spent elsewhere, the adjustment costs for the industry and¶ economy can be significant. U.S. exports of travel services (foreign tourists visiting the¶ United States) dropped by 12% in 2001 and 4% in 2002. Employment in U.S. industries¶ related to travel and tourism in 2002 was down by 270,000 persons from 2001.¶ 16¶ Despite¶ government assistance ($15 billion emergency assistance package in 2001), several¶ airlines have declared bankruptcy. Colleges report that new security procedures are¶ reducing foreign student applications and lengthening wait times for visas.¶ 17

**Counter-terrorism increases stability in the global economy**

Mark **Vaile** 6/5/**2004**-FORMER MINISTER FOR TRADE and former Deputy Prime Minister of Australia (“Combating Terrorism in Transport Could Yield Economic Benefits,” <http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2004/mvt040_04.html>)

Universal adoption of counter-terrorism measures in the transport sector has the potential to deliver large efficiency gains for the traded goods sector, Trade Minister Mark Vaile said today at the APEC Trade Minister's meeting in Puc�n, Chile.¶ Mr Vaile launched Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector: Economic Costs and Benefits, a report from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's Economic Analytical Unit.¶ "The ongoing threat of terrorism imposes dispropotionately high costs on APEC developing countries because of their heavy reliance on trade and foreign direct investment," Mr Vaile said.¶ "International trade thrives on a secure and efficient transport system. Any interruption to or collapse of maritime or civil aviation transport systems would impose high costs on the world economy.¶ "Countering the risk of terrorism imposes enormous costs on the transport system and requires significant effort from both government and industry. While it is impossible to remove completely the risk of terrorist attacks, security measures in the transport sector designed to counter terrorism can add certainty and stability to the global economy, raise investor confidence and facilitate trade.¶ "Counter-terrorism measures can also present an opportunity to combine the imperative to fight terrorism with increased efficiencies in the system.¶ "It is in the interest of developed economies to ensure that there is a framework for practical cooperation with developing economies. APEC plays a critical role by providing a framework for collective action and strengthening the link between trade and economic stability, and increased security.¶ "As an open and highly competitive economy, enhanced security in the transport sector is of vital importance to Australia. It is in our interests to support and complement efforts to enhance transport security, particularly in the Asia Pacific region and through fora such as APEC."¶ APEC's Counter Terrorism Task Force, initiated in 2002 to oversight APEC's security agenda, is a key vehicle through which Australia engages in these efforts and contributes to capacity-building measures. This includes a Regional Trade and Financial Security (RTFS) fund, to which Australia announced at last year's APEC Leaders meeting it would contribute US$1 million, to be used to finance counter-terrorism capacity building in APEC developing economies with a focus on port security, combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

### Solves trade

**Security improvements increase trade efficiency**

Dr. Evanor Palac-McMiken, 2005- Director of the Economic Analytical Unit at the Department of Foreign Trade and Affairs ( “Economic Costs and Benefits of Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x/asset/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x.pdf;jsessionid=04AE22510AFBB1EA4756D40DEA0CFA55.d03t03?v=1&t=h4ppdiht&s=3f469b88d024638a8733b4601e8cf7c32550c4c9>)

International transport security measures, by reducing the risk of terrorism, will pay future¶ dividends through reduced risk premiums.¶ Many of the new security measures being introduced to combat the threat from terrorism have¶ trade facilitation benefits separate from, and additional to, their counter-terrorism task, that is¶ they enhance trade efficiency and thereby promote overall economic growth. With international¶ trade expanding rapidly and increasingly relying on just-in-time delivery, efficient global logistics¶ systems are essential. Expenditure on new logistics systems represents an investment¶ which will deliver considerable efficiency returns in the future.¶ The introduction of new security measures also creates an opportunity to review long-established¶ practices and regulations in the transport sector. Domestic policy reforms aimed at streamlining¶ regulations and removing anticompetitive practices in the international transport sector can¶ strengthen the competitive position of an economy by increasing efficiency and productivity.¶ Counter-terrorism measures, if properly managed, could result in a more efficient international¶ transport system.

**Decreases cost**

Dr. Evanor Palac-McMiken, 2005- Director of the Economic Analytical Unit at the Department of Foreign Trade and Affairs ( “Economic Costs and Benefits of Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x/asset/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x.pdf;jsessionid=04AE22510AFBB1EA4756D40DEA0CFA55.d03t03?v=1&t=h4ppdiht&s=3f469b88d024638a8733b4601e8cf7c32550c4c9>)

Introducing compatible electronic systems to handle trade also will reduce business costs.¶ For example, after introducing an electronic supply chain and logistics system, a US¶ manufacturer with an annual turnover of US$1.2 billion and imports of US$100 million now¶ takes only 20 minutes with half as many people to produce a manifest that formerly took two¶ to three days to prepare (Chabrow, 2003).¶ • USCS’ cost-benefit analysis of a new electronic customs manifest handling system it¶ was proposing before September 11 indicated direct savings to US importers alone¶ of US$22.2 billion over 20 years and savings to the US government of US$4.4 billion¶ over the same period (OECD, 2003).¶ The USCS’ ACE project is expected to increase security by enabling the USCS more readily to¶ identify and intercept high risk cargo, while at the same time reducing costs to business and¶ facilitating the faster processing of goods.¶ According to recent research, automated customs can lower direct costs of customs clearance¶ by the equivalent of 0.2 per cent of the value of traded goods. By accounting for the indirect¶ benefits of reduced delays, costs are reduced by 1 per cent of merchandise trade value¶ (Hertel, Walmsley, and Ikatura 2001, cited in World Bank, 2003). One study (Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki, 2003) estimated the potential increase in trade following¶ improvements in trade facilitation areas (ports efficiency, customs environment, regulatory¶ environment and service-sector infrastructure as proxied by the use of e-commerce in¶ businesses). The authors examine a scenario in which trade facilitation capacity in below average countries is raised halfway to the average of the entire set of countries. Their findings¶ suggest that better trade facilitation would increase trade among the 75 countries by¶ 9.7 per cent (or approximately US$377 billion dollars) (Chart 5.3). Improved customs regimes¶ would increase trade by 0.8 per cent (or US$33 billion dollars), more efficient ports would¶ increase trade by 2.8 per cent (or US$107 billion), while improved regulatory environment¶ would increase trade by 2.1 per cent (or US$83 billion). Enhanced use of e-commerce in¶ businesses would increase trade the most, by almost 4 per cent (or US$154 billion dollars).¶ This latter result is consistent with the estimated benefits arising from the adoption of paperless¶ trading among APEC economies, noted earlier. The APEC 2001 report suggested that paperless¶ trading could reduce landed costs of goods traded between APEC economies by 3 per cent¶ each year or an annual savings of around US$60 billion.

### Palac-McMiken Prodict

**Prefer Palac-McMiken- he cites independent models**

Dr. Evanor Palac-McMiken, 2005- Director of the Economic Analytical Unit at the Department of Foreign Trade and Affairs ( “Economic Costs and Benefits of Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x/asset/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x.pdf;jsessionid=04AE22510AFBB1EA4756D40DEA0CFA55.d03t03?v=1&t=h4ppdiht&s=3f469b88d024638a8733b4601e8cf7c32550c4c9>)

For this report, the Economic Analytical Unit has commissioned modelling work and also¶ used the results of other modelling to illustrate the potential medium to long-term economic¶ impact of terrorism on world economic activity. Using a general equilibrium framework, these¶ exercises simulated different scenarios using the various economic channels described¶ above.

### Nuclear detection works

**Nuclear detection capabilities work- new improvements**

Dr. Huban Gowadia 7/27/2012- Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Acting Director (“Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Does DHS have an Effective and Efficient Nuclear Detection Strategy,”

<http://www.defpro.com/news/details/37971/?SID=e4a3b7d85367ebc46f8a5a1f80ad31a8>)

Over the past decade, DHS has made considerable progress in deploying systems at our borders and seaports to scan cargo and vehicles for radiological and nuclear threats. Through the Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) program, detection equipment is procured and installed at domestic ports of entry to scan containerized cargo for radiological and nuclear threats, addressing the requirements of the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 (Pub. L. No. 109-347). Our ongoing work with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to facilitate container security has resulted in the scanning of over 99 percent of all incoming containerized cargo for radiological and nuclear threats entering via truck at our land borders and at our seaports, utilizing RPMs. RPMs, coupled with handheld radioisotope identification devices (RIIDs), are the workhorses of our on-going deployments.¶ Scanning of containerized cargo at seaports of entry will continue, in accordance with SAFE Port Act requirements. However, given the current fiscal environment, DNDO and CBP, working together, will continue to work to balance risk reduction, effectiveness of radiological and nuclear scanning, flow and volume of commerce, and life cycle costs when determining RPM deployment priorities.

**New technology solves**

Dr. Huban Gowadia 7/27/2012- Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Acting Director (“Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Does DHS have an Effective and Efficient Nuclear Detection Strategy,”

<http://www.defpro.com/news/details/37971/?SID=e4a3b7d85367ebc46f8a5a1f80ad31a8>)

Along with intelligence and law enforcement, technology is fundamental in our ability to detect nuclear threats. In recent years, there have been dramatic advancements in nuclear detection technology. Thirty years ago, identification of detected nuclear material required laboratory specialists and large, complicated equipment. Now, newer detection materials that can be integrated into mobile and human-portable devices, coupled with advanced algorithms, allow for significantly improved operations. As a result, frontline responders and law enforcement officials now regularly use detection equipment to search for, find, and identify nuclear materials in the field. Technological advances in computing, communications, software, and hardware have also contributed to this revolution in nuclear detection technology.

**Alternatives for RPMs allow for widespread deployment**

Dr. Huban Gowadia 7/27/2012- Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Acting Director (“Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Does DHS have an Effective and Efficient Nuclear Detection Strategy,”

<http://www.defpro.com/news/details/37971/?SID=e4a3b7d85367ebc46f8a5a1f80ad31a8>)

Helium-3 has been widely used as a neutron detection component for radiation detection devices, such as RPMs. However, in recent years, our country has faced a helium-3 shortage. Years before the recent helium-3 shortage, DNDO was already exploring options for better, more cost-effective, alternatives for neutron detection. DNDO’s transformational and applied research efforts included fourteen different technologies that could be used instead of helium-3 tubes, including those based on boron or lithium.¶ Once the shortage was identified, DNDO accelerated this progress and led an interagency working group to address the use of alternate neutron detection technologies. DNDO also queried the commercial marketplace for available systems. At a recently-completed test, present and next generation alternatives from DNDO’s research and development and the private sector were evaluated and multiple systems proved to have sufficient performance to replace helium-3 in RPMs. As a result of DNDO’s efforts, alternative neutron detection technologies are now commercially available and large quantities of helium-3 will no longer be necessary for use in RPMs. Importantly, due to a collaborative, USG-wide effort to address the shortfall, our U.S. strategic reserve of helium-3 has increased by 40 percent since 2009.

**ARMD solves nuclear detection problems**

Dr. Huban Gowadia 7/27/2012- Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Acting Director (“Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Does DHS have an Effective and Efficient Nuclear Detection Strategy,”

<http://www.defpro.com/news/details/37971/?SID=e4a3b7d85367ebc46f8a5a1f80ad31a8>)

Our Advanced Radiation Monitoring Device (ARMD) project focuses on enhancing our ability to distinguish benign radiological and nuclear materials, from those that potentially pose a threat. The ARMD project capitalizes on the efficiency and energy resolution of emerging detector crystals, such as strontium iodide (SrI2) and cesium lithium yttrium chloride, or “CLYC”, to develop smaller, more capable detection systems. Through DNDO’s efforts, the detector materials have sufficiently matured to the point where they are now commercially available. New handheld detector systems using these crystals are being designed, built, and will soon be ready for formal evaluation by DNDO.

**LRRD allows for wide-area searches**

Dr. Huban Gowadia 7/27/2012- Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Acting Director (“Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Does DHS have an Effective and Efficient Nuclear Detection Strategy,”

<http://www.defpro.com/news/details/37971/?SID=e4a3b7d85367ebc46f8a5a1f80ad31a8>)

Our Long Range Radiation Detection (LRRD) project has the potential to have broad operational impact by significantly improving the range of detectors. Through the LRRD project, DNDO has been developing advanced technologies to detect, identify, and precisely locate radiation sources at stand-off distances, through passive gamma-ray imaging technology. We have focused on two systems: Stand-Off Radiation Detection Systems, which uses a mobile system to locate stationary sources; and the Road Side Tracker, which is a rapidly re-locatable monitoring system capable of identifying and tracking threats in moving vehicles across multiple lanes of traffic. Recent LRRD demonstrations included interagency partners from the technical and law enforcement communities, utilizing a “technology push” to allow operators to use the prototype systems in simulated and operational environments. DNDO is assessing the potential for further development based upon operator feedback and evaluations obtained during the demonstrations. To address nuclear detection in challenging operational environments, DNDO is working on networked detectors. These detectors, being developed in the Intelligent Radiation Sensor System (IRSS) project, are intended to facilitate situational awareness and improve capabilities to detect, identify, locate, and track threats across distributed sensors. The IRSS integrates data from across multiple portable detectors with the goal of improving overall system performance compared to a non-networked system. This technology will support operations where scanning for nuclear threats by routing traffic through checkpoints is not tenable. These operations are conducted at some special security events, between ports of entry along the land border, and include scanning general aviation or small maritime vessels for illicit radiological or nuclear materials.

**SNAR solves shielding**

Dr. Huban Gowadia 7/27/2012- Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Acting Director (“Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Does DHS have an Effective and Efficient Nuclear Detection Strategy,”

<http://www.defpro.com/news/details/37971/?SID=e4a3b7d85367ebc46f8a5a1f80ad31a8>)

Nuclear threats may be shielded or masked, increasing the challenge for passive detection techniques. To address shielded nuclear threats, DNDO has several important projects. The Shielded Nuclear Alarm Resolution project seeks to develop and characterize advanced active interrogation systems with improved ability to uniquely detect special nuclear material and to resolve alarms with confidence, even in the presence of significant countermeasures (such as shielding). This technology may substantially reduce the number of manual inspections required to resolve alarms, while increasing the probability of nuclear threat detection even when heavily shielded. Technologies of interest include induced fission, high energy backscatter, and nuclear resonance fluorescence.¶ Recent advancements in the commercial sector have also resulted in technologies that combine the merits of passive and active technologies into a single system through either muon tomography or by integrating radiation detectors into x-ray radiography systems. In theory, these systems should be able to automatically detect nuclear threats, regardless of the shielding level, while providing an image for detecting other anomalies. In order to characterize the full performance capability of these technologies, DNDO recently solicited proposals for our Nuclear and Radiological Imaging Platform Advanced Technology Demonstration. This project will characterize imaging systems for scanning conveyances and identifying possible shielded threats. Results from this demonstration will be available in 2014.

### Navy power add-on

**Port security is key to US navy power projection**

**Watts 05** - the chief of drug and migrant interdiction at Coast Guard Headquarters, Phd from the Royal Military College of Canada (“Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multi-Agency Command and Control in an Asymmetric Environment,” Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 1 Issue 2, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.2.3)

Throughout its history, the United States has been a global maritime nation, dependent¶ upon the oceans for economy, welfare, and defense. In the modern era emphasis on¶ globalization and the world economy has increased this dependence considerably. There¶ are some 95,000 miles of United States’ coastline and 3.4 million square miles of¶ territorial seas and exclusive economic zones in the U.S. maritime domain.1 Connecting¶ the continental United States to this zone are over 1,000 harbors and ports, 361 of which¶ are cargo capable. Through these ports enter approximately 21,000 containers daily,¶ representing ninety-five percent of the nation’s overseas cargo, including 100 percent of¶ U.S. petroleum imports.2 In addition to commerce, there are seventy-six million¶ recreational boaters in the United States. Six million cruise ship passengers visit U.S.¶ ports annually. In the strategic/military sense, a substantial portion of U.S. national power¶ relies on the sea, both in the form of traditional Navy Carrier Strike groups that deploy¶ from ports in the continental United States and the subsequent ability to reinforce¶ deployed forces overseas. Without unimpeded access to the sea, the ability of the United¶ States to project national power is extremely limited.¶ Maritime infrastructure is crucial in maintaining this link to the sea. From naval bases¶ to commercial ports, maritime infrastructure is well developed nationwide and is crucial¶ to both the economic sector and military strategy. Maritime infrastructure is critical to¶ the employment of national maritime power and as such is a logical (if not desirable)¶ target for acts of terrorism by our enemies. A successful attack against a port could incur¶ serious economic and military damage, present an enemy with the opportunity to inflict¶ mass casualties, and have serious long-term detrimental effects on our national economy.¶ Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection (MCIP) presents many challenges in an¶ asymmetric environment. Previous models of maritime defense have focused on¶ protecting ships from traditional naval attack; even when ports and supporting¶ infrastructure have been considered targets, emphasis was on defense against a military¶ threat. The Global War On Terror (GWOT) has created a number of heretofore¶ unconsidered vulnerabilities in this traditional outlook. Many targets that would not be¶ considered legitimate (economic, symbolic, etc.) in a conventional war must now be¶ considered in strategic defensive planning. In conducting these attacks the unimpeded¶ use of the sea is a force multiplier for an enemy dedicated to striking a wide range of¶ potential targets. Possible threats from the sea are wide-ranging and diverse, relying on a¶ combination of asymmetric offensive tactics while exploiting the variety of the littoral.¶ This asymmetric nature of GWOT requires a multi-agency approach to devise¶ effective command and control for modern port defense. The Coast Guard and Navy¶ have made important strides in this area by devising experimental Joint Harbor¶ Operations Centers (JHOCs) as a component of maritime anti-terrorist force protection.¶ The expansion of this concept into multi-agency maritime homeland security is a logical¶ next step in the evolving problem of port security and defense. This is made evident by examining likely terrorist threats to ports and studying the lessons of the past that apply¶ in this environment which can be used to expand the current command and control¶ system to meet the new threat. The GWOT threat to ports is a relatively new element in the spectrum of naval warfare.¶ This is largely due to the evolving nature of the shipping industry and the nation’s¶ growing reliance on sea power. Historically, a nation’s maritime strength has been¶ measured by the size and capability of its merchant fleet and Navy; attacks against a¶ nation’s sea power meant the physical destruction of these ships. Ports, until quite¶ recently, were composed of infrastructure that was relatively easy to replace or replicate,¶ making them relatively low priority targets for an enemy dedicated to striking at maritime¶ strength.¶ This has changed in the modern era of containerization and the increased size and¶ technical nature of ships. In modern times ports have become centers of highly technical,¶ well-integrated infrastructure designed for the rapid loading and unloading of cargo, an¶ evolution that has become highly complex in the era of containerization. Commercially¶ efficient, port cargo operations are also highly dependent on networked operations,¶ making the disruption of the process far simpler for a potential attacker. Additionally, the¶ complexity of this evolution, combined with the increasing size of seagoing merchant¶ vessels (and warships), has greatly reduced the number of commercial ports available for¶ use by global shipping. This has the duel effect of making major ports more important¶ economically and strategically while simultaneously making them more attractive targets¶ for offensive action.

**A terrorist attack would destroy US naval power- only the federal government solves**

**Watts 05** - the chief of drug and migrant interdiction at Coast Guard Headquarters, Phd from the Royal Military College of Canada (“Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multi-Agency Command and Control in an Asymmetric Environment,” Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 1 Issue 2, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.2.3)

Access to the sea is vital for economic expansion and as a means to project national¶ power. Ports are essential in maintaining this link. But ports are not fortresses; as open¶ industrial and commercial centers, port infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to a¶ dedicated enemy. An effective attack against critical maritime infrastructure has the¶ potential to cause major economic disruption nationwide, create mass casualties, and¶ limit or halt deployment of naval power. As such, ports are logical targets for terrorists¶ bent on striking at vulnerabilities; the destruction of ports would have significant impact¶ on our nation.¶ Lessons from the past indicate that the key to effective defense is tactical coordination¶ through dedicated multi-agency command and control. During the Cold War, the Coast¶ Guard-Navy model for command and control was to deal with a military threat from the¶ sea, but this has changed with the new asymmetric threat of GWOT. The diversity of the¶ threat against our ports and the number of regulatory agencies that oversee critical¶ infrastructure requires an expanded comprehensive command and control system that¶ fuses multi-agency intelligence, has understanding of multi-agency capabilities, and can¶ provide direction to these forces in the field. The JHOC concept has proven to be¶ effective in multi-agency intelligence fusion and coordinated tactical port operations¶ essential for maritime critical infrastructure protection and should be considered a model¶ for coordinated port defense.

**Navy power solves war**

**Conway et al. 07** [James T., General, U.S. Marine Corps, Gary Roughead, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Thad W. Allen, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” October, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf]

Deter major power war**.** No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative **seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power war**. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces. Win our Nation’s wars.In times of war, our ability to impose local sea control, overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power ashore, **makes our maritime forces an indispensable element of the joint or combined force**. This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by a robust sealift capability that can concentrate and sustain forces, sea control and power projection enable extended campaigns ashore.

**Naval dominance is key to prevent the rise of any global challengers and the lynchpin of hegemony**

**Stratfor 2008** - the world’s leading private intelligence service. (“U.S.: Naval Dominance and the Importance of Oceans,” http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/u\_s\_naval\_dominance\_and\_importance\_oceans)

Our statement that control of the world’s oceans is a cornerstone of U.S. geopolitical security and keeps any potential adversary half a world away sparked extensive comment. This is a long-standing Stratfor position, not a casual assertion, and is crucial to the way we see the world. In his 1890 classic “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History,” U.S. Naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan examines the decisive role superior sea power played in geopolitical competition and conflict from 1660 to 1783. His work has made him perhaps the foremost theorist of naval power in the United States. At the risk of oversimplification, Mahan’s thesis is that control of the sea can be decisive in both peacetime and wartime, and has far-reaching military, economic and geopolitical ramifications. Mahan is required reading at Stratfor. The world has changed quite a bit since the time of Mahan, who wrote as sail was giving way to steam as the principal method of naval propulsion. Indeed, a common question from our readers has been about the applicability of the oceans to U.S. security in the 21st century, particularly in the context of globalization. In essence, readers have asked us whether oceans still matter after globalization has so reduced transit times and increased interconnectivity that transnational terrorism and cyberspace have come into existence. While aviation, the intercontinental ballistic missile, satellites and the Internet have all fundamentally altered the way the world interacts and how wars are fought, Mahan’s analysis holds true. Over the course of a century, but particularly during and after World War II, the United States honed and perfected expeditionary naval operations. Washington’s ability to function on the other side of the planet from home port is unparalleled and has surpassed the sea power of the British Empire that Mahan so admired. The importance of this cannot be overstated, and has broad applicability. Globalization has massively increased, not decreased seaborne commerce. As the dominant global naval power, Washington exercises a decisive influence over the principal avenue of both international trade and the flow of the world’s oil (and, increasingly, natural gas). In addition to wielding this as a lever over other countries, the U.S. Navy is the guarantor of America’s global supply lines. That Washington has claim to both the world’s foremost navy and the world’s foremost economy is no coincidence, and it is a key dynamic of the entire international system. From a military perspective, the last shooting war in the Western Hemisphere of any strategic significance for the United States was the Spanish-American War. That conflict resulted in the expulsion at the end of the 19th century of the last Eastern Hemispheric power from Washington’s periphery. For more than a century now, the United States has fought its wars abroad, with the only strategic threat to the homeland being Soviet (and to a much lesser extent, Chinese) nuclear weapons. Indeed, the fundamental value of naval dominance was demonstrated in 1962. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington was able to prevent the re-emergence of an outside power’s beachhead in Cuba because U.S. naval dominance made the situation untenable for the Kremlin. The Russian navy was not in a position to sustain forces there in the face of concerted U.S. naval opposition. And while the notion of “invasion” in the 21st century may seem anachronistic in the U.S. perspective, the rest of the world sees things very differently. That apparent anachronism is symptomatic of fundamental U.S. geopolitical security. Across the oceans, even much of Europe still looks east over the open Northern European plain and remembers columns of Soviet armor. Nations the world over continue to struggle day in and day out with their neighbors. Pakistan, India and China continue to squabble over Kashmir, which they each consider core to their geographic security. Russia’s foremost geopolitical struggle is the re-establishment of some semblance of a peripheral buffer in Europe and the Caucasus — necessary buffers, but a poor compensation for unfavorable geography. These issues — crucial geopolitical objectives — keep Eurasia divided and restrict (but obviously do not eliminate) other countries’ bandwidth to deal with global issues farther afield. The ultimate consequence of this division is the prevention of the emergence of a potential challenger to the United States. By this, we mean the emergence of a country so secure in its geopolitical position that the mustering of resources necessary to project military force across the Atlantic or Pacific to meaningfully challenge the strategic security of the North American continent becomes a possibility. More simply, U.S. naval dominance allows Washington to keep the costs of projecting hostile military force across the world’s oceans prohibitively high. The countries of the world are thus largely left confronting geopolitical challenges in their own backyards, unable to militarily challenge the United States in its backyard. All the while, the U.S. Navy conducts operations daily in Eurasia’s backyard. This is a secure and enviable geopolitical position.

### AT: ports resilient

**An attack on a SINGLE port would have a cascade effect- devastating the economy**

**Watts 05** - the chief of drug and migrant interdiction at Coast Guard Headquarters, Phd from the Royal Military College of Canada (“Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multi-Agency Command and Control in an Asymmetric Environment,” Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 1 Issue 2, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.2.3)

Economic Impact: An unprecedented amount of trade – both imports and exports –¶ relies on shipment by sea. A successful attack on maritime infrastructure would affect¶ this trade in far greater proportion than the actual damage. It is likely that an attack on¶ one port would have a cascade effect on others as increased security measures are applied¶ nationwide. The recent impact of the London bombings can be seen as illustrative of this¶ effect; although there was no indication of additional terrorist activity, security measures¶ were increased at transportation hubs worldwide. Increasing security alerts at a train¶ station is one thing; closing a huge economic entity such as a port is quite another. Delay¶ of shipping in loading and offloading cargo is one of the most costly elements of the¶ shipping process. We must also consider the impact to the shipping industry itself.¶ During the Persian Gulf re-flagging operations of the late 1980s, for example, analysis¶ showed the greatest impact to the shipping of oil was not the damage to tankers inflicted¶ by the warring Iraqis and Iranians (which was, in fact, minimal), but the increased¶ insurance costs of operating in that area.3 An attack on a U.S. port could have a similar,¶ if not larger, effect.

**An port attack would be highly visible- ports are centers of commerce and tourism**

**Watts 05** - the chief of drug and migrant interdiction at Coast Guard Headquarters, Phd from the Royal Military College of Canada (“Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multi-Agency Command and Control in an Asymmetric Environment,” Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 1 Issue 2, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.2.3)

High visibility/High Casualties: Ports are not isolated areas, but rather major centers¶ of commerce, usually surrounded by large cities and economic centers. An attack on a¶ port could be highly visible and potentially the scene of mass conflagration. As a result¶ of urban development, most major ports are no longer confined to strictly industrial areas, but rather have become well-developed centers of commerce and entertainment,¶ surrounded by built up waterside areas dedicated to tourism and recreation. Many of¶ these facilities are located next to volatile maritime infrastructure (fuel tanks, docks, etc.)¶ that could create mass conflagration if attacked through large explosive force.¶ Sympathetic detonation, fires, and other catastrophic effects would certainly create mass¶ casualties.¶

### \*\*\*Off-case\*\*\*

### AT: states

**States don’t solve- ports security needs a multi-agency approach**

**Watts 05** - the chief of drug and migrant interdiction at Coast Guard Headquarters, Phd from the Royal Military College of Canada (“Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multi-Agency Command and Control in an Asymmetric Environment,” Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 1 Issue 2, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.2.3)

This asymmetric nature of GWOT requires a multi-agency approach to devise¶ effective command and control for modern port defense. The Coast Guard and Navy¶ have made important strides in this area by devising experimental Joint Harbor¶ Operations Centers (JHOCs) as a component of maritime anti-terrorist force protection.¶ The expansion of this concept into multi-agency maritime homeland security is a logical¶ next step in the evolving problem of port security and defense. This is made evident by examining likely terrorist threats to ports and studying the lessons of the past that apply¶ in this environment which can be used to expand the current command and control¶ system to meet the new threat.

### AT: private cp

Private cp can’t solve

**1. Kills investment- increases operating costs of security for businesses**

Dr. Evanor Palac-McMiken, 2005- Director of the Economic Analytical Unit at the Department of Foreign Trade and Affairs ( “Economic Costs and Benefits of Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x/asset/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x.pdf;jsessionid=04AE22510AFBB1EA4756D40DEA0CFA55.d03t03?v=1&t=h4ppdiht&s=3f469b88d024638a8733b4601e8cf7c32550c4c9>)

In addition to the short-term disruptive economic effects of terrorist attacks, the ongoing threat¶ of terrorism will have a medium to long-term impact on the world economy.¶ One major channel through which terrorism impacts on world economic activity is through¶ operating costs as governments and businesses increase spending on security¶ measures to mitigate the risk of terrorist attacks. The need to hold larger inventories as a¶ precaution against possible disruptions in the supply chain and higher insurance premiums also are additional costs for business which are passed on to consumers. These additional¶ costs arising from the increased threat of terrorism are costs which do not increase output in¶ a sustained fashion. While they may provide a boost to some businesses, there is an overall¶ decline in productivity as more resources are now needed to produce the same unit of output.¶ • The threat of terrorist attacks is estimated to have wiped out around half of the¶ logistics productivity gains realised in the US over the past 10 years (OECD, 2003).¶ • An OECD (2002) study finds that a permanent increase in military and security¶ spending of around 1.5 per cent of GDP and in government employment of¶ 0.5 per cent in the US is estimated to lower the level of US productivity by around¶ 0.5 per cent over the medium-term compared with the reference case.¶ • Private sector estimates suggest that due to the ongoing threat of terrorism,¶ commercial insurance premiums could increase by around 20 per cent in the US,¶ which would increase business costs by around US$30 billion per year (UBS¶ Warburg, 2001 cited in Penm et al., 2003 and EAU, 2003).¶ • According to the IMF (2001), a 10 per cent rise in inventories in the US would impose¶ an additional carrying cost of around US$7.5 billion per year (cited in Penm et al.,¶ 2003).¶

**1. kills productivity**

Dr. Evanor Palac-McMiken, 2005- Director of the Economic Analytical Unit at the Department of Foreign Trade and Affairs ( “Economic Costs and Benefits of Combating Terrorism in the Transport Sector”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x/asset/j.1467-8411.2005.00158.x.pdf;jsessionid=04AE22510AFBB1EA4756D40DEA0CFA55.d03t03?v=1&t=h4ppdiht&s=3f469b88d024638a8733b4601e8cf7c32550c4c9>)

Using the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) global trade¶ and environment model (GTEM), Penm et al. (2003) simulated a scenario whereby the increasing¶ threat of terrorism is assumed to reduce the level of primary (including labour and capital)¶ factor productivity as resources are diverted from more productive activities to security. They¶ assume the level of primary factor productivity in the world economy to be 0.5 per cent lower¶ over the next five years compared to what would otherwise have been the case. Airline,¶ tourism and hospitality industries were assumed specifically to suffer significant declines in¶ output (see Appendix A for more explanation of the modelling).¶ The effects¶ The simulation results suggest world economic activity would be around 0.7 per cent¶ (or around US$310 billion in 2003 dollars) lower than the baseline over the medium-term¶ (ie. after 5 years) (Penm et al., 2003). By 2008, economic activity in the US would be around¶ 0.6 per cent (or US$80 billion, in 2003 dollars) lower than what would otherwise have been¶ the case. This compares with reductions from the reference case of around 0.4 per cent (or¶ US$20 billion, in 2003 dollars) in Japan and 0.5 per cent (or US$65 billion, in 2003 dollars) in¶ the European Union (Chart 2.1) The simulation results indicate that developing countries suffer more significant declines in¶ economic growth (in relative terms) than the OECD region over the medium-term, supporting¶ the findings of the earlier EAU report. For the ASEAN region, economic activity would be¶ around 1.4 per cent (or US$14 billion, in 2003 dollars) lower than the reference case by 2008,¶ compared with reductions from the reference case of 1.1 per cent (or US$35 billion, in 2003¶ dollars) in East Asia.

**Privatization can’t solve- needs a multi-agency approach**

**Watts 05** - the chief of drug and migrant interdiction at Coast Guard Headquarters, Phd from the Royal Military College of Canada (“Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multi-Agency Command and Control in an Asymmetric Environment,” Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 1 Issue 2, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.2.3)

While this relationship and division of responsibility made sense prior to 9/11, the¶ new asymmetric threat altered the equation considerably, requiring a merging of¶ traditional responsibilities across established lines of command. The expanded threat¶ spectrum now reached directly into the ports. Pure regulation, although still important¶ for security, no longer sufficed; a direct law enforcement response capability¶ (traditionally the role of Groups) was now required in the ports. Tracking and intercept¶ of large merchant vessels, traditionally an MSO function, took on a new meaning as these¶ vessels represent a potential threat to the security of the United States. Subsequently,¶ merchant vessel regulation focusing on maritime security was “pushed” far offshore with¶ the establishment of a layered defense.10 The new threat also affected other agencies¶ with maritime security concerns. Ports with a high Navy interest (including ports with¶ Navy bases, research facilities, critical infrastructure, and out load responsibilities) that¶ traditionally had some degree of Navy security immediately implemented extensive antiterrorist¶ force protection (ATFP) procedures to prevent, among other things, a “USS¶ COLE” style attack on potentially vulnerable warships. U.S. Customs immediately implemented increased forms of container and cargo security measures that were¶ completely lacking prior to 9/11. It is clear from these new multi-agency security¶ requirements that the somewhat laissez-faire command system exercised in the ports¶ prior to 9/11 would no longer suffice in light of the new threat.

### AT: 100% scanning cp

**Doesn’t solve terrorism- 100% scanning overstretches resources**

**Terreri 09—World Trade** [April, “The Current State of Port Security,” Web, 10/09, World Trade, Proquest, 6/20/12]

Donnelly at NAM believes the 100 percent scanning directive is heading in the wrong direction. "It treats all cargo the same, spreading our limited enforcement resources across all shipments, rather than targeting shipments from riskier shippers from dubious places. Major transnational companies with overseas plants shipping to their own companies here in the U.S. every two weeks should not be subjected to the same intensive security review as an unknown shipper. Established shippers and importers have invested in government programs like C-TPAT and are sharing information to assure their supply chains are secure. Security checks need to focus where the risks are the greatest."

**Turn- 100% scanning program would impede trade and hurt the economy**

Johnson, Writer for National Journal, 2012 (Fawn, may 9, “Post-9/11 at Ports: So Far, So Good”, National Journal, proquest)

There are still some outstanding issues. Cargo screening is nowhere near 100 percent and probably never will be, although the industry lingers under the threat that DHS will eventually mandate it and cause massive expenses and trade difficulties. DHS officials put the government costs of 100-percent screening at nearly $20 billion, and that's just to put the technology in place; those estimates don't take into account the private costs to the trade industry. Rep. Candice Miller, R-Mich., who chairs the House Homeland Security Committee's Border and Maritime Subcommittee, has acknowledged that those costs may be prohibitive. Port ID cards also are now in place, but the electronic readers that scan them are still being developed. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said earlier this year that the agency is close to issuing guidance on card readers that will allow the information to be read remotely by port-security professionals. If the readers work correctly, they will make it almost impossible for people who aren't cleared at ports to sneak through security. But early tests show they don't always work, and industry insiders worry that technological difficulties from weather or database viruses will cause the headaches that thus far have been avoided. "I think it's going to be a nightmare," Monteverde predicted. The ports' biggest government problem isn't so different from everyone else's troubles: They are squeezed by budget cuts. Federal grants for port security are slowly fading away. The administration sought a 59-percent cut in the program this year. The port industry counters that it is hanging on to grant money to purchase and install ID card readers but can't do so until DHS issues guidance. Unlike so many other conversations in Washington, these exchanges are friendly ones. DHS and Congress have shown a fair amount of patience with the transportation and security industries as they adapt to the post-9/11 era, mindful that trade relationships and the country's own fragile economy hang in the balance.

**100% scanning hurts the economy- tradeoffs with other security programs and slows down trade**

Paul **Rosenzweig 7/17**/2012- U.S. Homeland Security Consultant(“Port Security from Nuclear Device Smuggling: U.S. fails to meet deadline for 100% scanning cargo,” <http://thesantosrepublic.com/2012/07/port-security-from-nuclear-device-smuggling-u-s-fails-to-meet-deadline-for-100-scanning-cargo/>

First, a bit of background. Since 9/11 the US government, working mostly through Customs and Border Protection, has made a significant effort to extend our border outward. Today, DHS has a huge overseas presence and much of it is in sea ports where cargo bound for the United States is screened prior to loading. But, instead of scanning 100% of all cargo, CBP uses a sophisticated method of intelligence and analytics to designate “high-risk” cargo containers for active screening. This system, called the Container Security Initiative, is active in more than 50 ports worldwide and does analysis on 80% of the cargo bound for the United States.¶ The scope of the problem is really quite daunting. Between 10 and 11 million containers arrive in the US each year. Each container holds roughly 30 tons of goods. Using the targeting analytics, and with the current deployment of resources, DHS/CBP scan a little less than 1% of the containers bound for the US, or some 100,000 per year. Notionally, the mandatory 100% scanning law would require a 100-fold increase in the investment of resources. Even allowing for economies of scale, DHS says that the cost would be $16 billion per year. Critics say they could get away for less and possibly they could — but bear in mind that DHS’ entire budget request for the coming year is on the order of $50 billion.¶ The delay of the scanning requirement is, frankly, a good thing. It is another example of the inability of our system to effectively communicate and manage risk. The right answer to multiple threats has to be the risk based allocation of resources. We can’t protect against all things at all times — the costs, in resources and lost liberties would simply be too high. Instead, DHS allocates its inspection resources based on a judgment about risk. Dollars spent on 100% scanning are dollars NOT spent on some other threat (cyber? bio?).¶ Certainly one can ask whether our risk assessments are accurate and based on reasonable assumptions. But the 100% scanning law simply throws the idea of risk assessment overboard. Instead it relies on the anti-risk based rhetoric — “how can we possibly NOT scan everything coming to the United States?” And in our political system, where the legislators and citizenry don’t really understand concepts of risk management and mitigation, that sort of rhetoric is very powerful.¶ In addition to the mis-allocation of government resources, the scanning requirement will have a powerful, adverse impact on the economy. The vast majority of goods arriving in the US from overseas arrive by sea — it is the cheapest form of travel. We really have no idea how much time the 100% scanning requirement would add to the shipment of goods (I’ve seen estimates ranging from 1 day to 1 week for the average shipment) but whatever that is, the delay in shipping is an added cost — more inventory on hand, slower shipments, manufacturing delays, etc.¶

### Plan popular

**Port security is popular- recent backlash from the DHS Waiver Of Maritime Cargo Scanning Mandate proves**

**HSToday 7/26**/2012 (“Lawmakers Pan DHS Waiver Of Maritime Cargo Scanning Mandate,” <http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/today-s-news-analysis/single-article/lawmakers-pan-dhs-waiver-of-maritime-cargo-scanning-mandate/eae3e5c48c01f6571cfa80fb5de90ff5.html>)

In a congressional hearing Wednesday, frustrated Republicans and Democrats alike told Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano they were unhappy with the inability of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to scan 100 percent of cargo coming into US ports for nuclear or radiological materials. ¶ Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.), ranking member of the House Homeland Security Committee, led the questioning of Napolitano on why DHS could not meet the maritime cargo scanning mandate set by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53), a law that he introduced and shepherded through Congress.¶ In a letter dated May 2, Napolitano formally informed Congress that DHS would not meet a deadline of July 2012 to meet the maritime cargo scanning mandate and that she would extend that deadline for two years under the authority provided to her by the same law.¶ But Thompson protested that the direction of Congress could not be ignored indefinitely. Thompson summed up his view in a letter he sent to Napolitano after the hearing Wednesday.¶ "You, like your predecessor, refuse to implement the law, as evidenced most recently by your signing of a blanket two-year waiver of the requirement. Instead, you have stated that you support an alternative approach -- what you call a layered, risk-based approach to maritime cargo security -- targeting only those containers you believe to be 'high risk,'" Thompson wrote.

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### Nuclear detection fails

**Nuclear detection fails- multiple challenges**

Dr. Huban Gowadia 7/27/2012- Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Acting Director (“Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Does DHS have an Effective and Efficient Nuclear Detection Strategy,”

<http://www.defpro.com/news/details/37971/?SID=e4a3b7d85367ebc46f8a5a1f80ad31a8>)

Despite these advancements, however, developing nuclear detection technology for homeland security applications is an inherently difficult technical task. The fundamental technical challenge for nuclear detection is one of distinguishing signal from noise. Sensors can detect radiation, but detection is limited by several factors, including speed, distance, shielding, and source strength. Compounding these challenges is the difficulty in distinguishing ever-present background radiation from radiation that poses a threat. Additionally, to mitigate risk across all pathways in the GNDA, detection technologies must be capable of operations in challenging environments, such as on the water and in rugged terrain between ports of entry.¶ While DNDO’s work to develop, evaluate, and deploy systems supports the ongoing enhancement of the GNDA, significant technical challenges remain. These challenges include:¶ -- Cost effective equipment with sufficient technical performance to ensure widespread deployment;¶ -- Enhanced wide area search capabilities in a variety of scenarios to include urban and highly cluttered environments;¶ -- Monitoring along challenging GNDA pathways, to include scanning of general aviation and small maritime vessels, and searching for nuclear threats between ports of entry; and¶ -- Detection of nuclear threats even when heavily shielded.¶ Additionally, our programs must be able to reach out to operators for user requirements and to balance both “technology push” and “technology pull” efforts, as appropriate. For the former, the technology developer is pushing a new concept out for examination by the operator. These systems may be otherwise unknown to operators, and are often state-of-the-art with enhanced or improved threat detection capabilities and may further allow for simplified operational use. Technology pull refers to equipment and programs where operators have identified new concepts of operation and/or features that they need in order to achieve their missions. The operators are constantly pulling the technologies in directions that guide our development of detection systems.

### **100% scanning feasible**

100% scanning is feasible and has a low coast

JERROLD L. NADLER, EDWARD J. MARKEY and BENNIE G. THOMPSON 6/28/2012- (“Cargo, the Terrorists’ Trojan Horse,” NYTimes, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/opinion/the-dangerous-delay-on-port-security.html)

An attack on an American port could cause tens of thousands of deaths and cripple global trade, with losses ranging from $45 billion to more than $1 trillion, according to estimates by the RAND Corporation and the Congressional Research Service. Anyone who doubts these estimates should recall the labor strike that shut down the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach for 11 days in 2002. Economic losses were put at $6.3 billion or more. Homeland Security says it would cost $16 billion or more to meet the mandate, but that projection assumes that the department would pay to acquire, maintain and operate scanning equipment and related operations, without any offsetting fees from companies in the global supply chain. In contrast, Stephen E. Flynn, an expert in terrorism and port security at Northeastern University, has said a scanning system could be implemented in every major container port in the world at a cost of $1.5 billion, and that the costs could largely be absorbed by companies doing business at the ports.¶ Homeland Security says it uses a “layered, risk-based approach” to cargo scanning, which, instead of comprehensive scanning, targets specific cargo thought to be high-risk. But this approach is inadequate.¶ Recent advances in screening technologies have undermined Homeland Security’s contention that the technology is not available to scan all cargo containers without disrupting commerce. An effective high-volume container screening system was installed in the Port of Hong Kong in 2005. Trials of new, American-made technology have demonstrated that scanning all containers would be feasible at many ports. The world’s largest marine terminal operators have offered to work with the department to put the law into effect.¶ Cost and technology have never been the primary obstacles to meeting this mandate. What is missing is a sense of urgency and determination.¶ We recognized that the scanning of 100 percent of all cargo containers in five years could be a challenging deadline to meet. That is why we included the authority to extend the deadline in cases in which Homeland Security certified that there are at least two major obstacles relating to the availability and accuracy of the technology, the logistics of its deployment and use, or impacts to trade.¶ Now Homeland Security is using this authority to simply exempt itself from any meaningful compliance with the law we wrote to close a dangerous loophole in United States security. We have urged the department over the last five years to make the law a reality, to no avail. Our nation can no longer risk such delays.