## Index

Table of Contents

[Index 1](#_Toc328768436)

[1AC 3](#_Toc328768437)

[Advantage 1: Terrorism 4](#_Toc328768438)

[Advantage 2: Wind 9](#_Toc328768439)

[Solvency 15](#_Toc328768440)

[Dredging Adv 17](#_Toc328768441)

[Dredging Adv/Add On 18](#_Toc328768442)

[Dredging L Ext 20](#_Toc328768443)

[Dredging Impx Ext 21](#_Toc328768444)

[Corals Impact Ext 23](#_Toc328768445)

[Economy Add on 24](#_Toc328768446)

[Jobs/Protectionism Add on 25](#_Toc328768447)

[Econ Add On 27](#_Toc328768448)

[Economy Ext 28](#_Toc328768449)

[Trade Links 33](#_Toc328768450)

[Harms Ext 37](#_Toc328768451)

[Harms: Current screening ineffective 38](#_Toc328768452)

[Non-Terrorist attack 41](#_Toc328768453)

[Drug Smuggling 42](#_Toc328768454)

[General Solvency Ext 44](#_Toc328768455)

[Solvency: Tech 45](#_Toc328768456)

[Solvency: 5 Ports 46](#_Toc328768457)

[International Modeling 47](#_Toc328768458)

[Terrorism Ext 48](#_Toc328768459)

[Heg Add on 49](#_Toc328768460)

[Terrorism Ext: Ports Targeted 50](#_Toc328768461)

[Terrorism Ext- Solvency 55](#_Toc328768462)

[Terrorism: Impx 62](#_Toc328768463)

[Terrorism: Econ IL 63](#_Toc328768464)

[Terrorism: Would be Nuclear/ Radiological 65](#_Toc328768465)

[Terrorism: Biological 66](#_Toc328768466)

[Terrorism: Funding doesn’t solve 67](#_Toc328768467)

[Nuclear Terrorism Impact – Global Nuclear War 1NC/1AC 68](#_Toc328768468)

[Nuclear Terror Impact – Global Nuclear War 70](#_Toc328768469)

[Nuclear Terror Impact – Economy 72](#_Toc328768470)

[Nuclear Terrorism – Terror Leaders Will Use Nuclear Weapons 75](#_Toc328768471)

[Nuclear Terrorism – AT/Objections to Nuclear Terrorism (Grab bag) 78](#_Toc328768472)

[Nuclear Terrorism – Can Acquire – Other Nations/Build It 79](#_Toc328768473)

[Key to Hegemony 83](#_Toc328768474)

[Wind Ext 84](#_Toc328768475)

[Wind Ext: Offshore Ports Key 85](#_Toc328768476)

[Wind Ext: Offshore Key 86](#_Toc328768477)

[Wind Ext: S Warming 89](#_Toc328768478)

[Wind Ext: Compared to onshore 92](#_Toc328768479)

[Wind Ext: A/T cost 93](#_Toc328768480)

[Wing Ext: Warming is Anthropogenic 94](#_Toc328768481)

[Wind: Warming Feedback loops 95](#_Toc328768482)

[Wind Ext: Warming OW NW 96](#_Toc328768483)

[Wind Ext: Environmental Justice 98](#_Toc328768484)

[Wind Ext: A/t Birds/Species 99](#_Toc328768485)

[Wind: A/T Causes warming 100](#_Toc328768486)

[A/T Neg Args, etc 101](#_Toc328768487)

[USFG Key 102](#_Toc328768488)

[A/T Federalism 104](#_Toc328768489)

[A/t Politics 105](#_Toc328768490)

[A/T Private CP 110](#_Toc328768491)

[A/T Spending 111](#_Toc328768492)

[N/U- Port Security Bills 112](#_Toc328768493)

[N/U Transportation Bill 113](#_Toc328768494)

[A/T Scan 100% Cp 114](#_Toc328768495)

[A/T Retrofit existing ports 115](#_Toc328768496)

[Offshore Military Bases 116](#_Toc328768497)

## 1AC

### Advantage 1: Terrorism

#### Risk of terrorist attacks on ports is increasing- 5 reasons

Peter Chalk, 2008, (Peter Chalk is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation), The maritime dimensions of international security: Terrorism, piracy and the challenges for the United States, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf>

**Over the past six years, there has been a modest yet highly discernible spike in high-profile terrorist attacks and plots at sea**. These various incidents have galvanized fears in the West that terrorists, especially militants connected with the international jihadist network, are moving to decisively extend operational mandates beyond purely territorially bounded theaters.

Five main factors explain the presumed shift in extremist focus to water-based environments. **First, many of the vulnerabilities** that have encouraged a higher rate of pirate attacks **also apply to terrorism.**

**Second, the growth of commercial enterprises specializing in maritime sports and equipment has arguably provided terrorists with a readily accessible conduit through which to gain the necessary training and resources for operating at sea**.

**Third, maritime attacks offer terrorists an alternate means of causing mass economic destabilization. Disrupting the mechanics of the contemporary “just enough, just in time” cargo freight trading system could potentially trigger vast and cascading fiscal effects, especially if the operations of a major commercial port were curtailed**.

**Fourth, sea-based terrorism constitutes a further means of inflicting**

**mass coercive punishment on enemy audiences**. Cruise ships and passenger ferries are especially relevant in this regard because they cater to large numbers of people who are confined in a single physical space.

**Finally, the expansive global container-shipping complex offers terrorists a viable logistical conduit for facilitating the covert movement of weapons and personnel in two critical respects. First, because much of the maritime trading system is designed to be as accessible and flexible as possibl**e (to keep costs low and turnover high), **there is no strong incentive to enact a stringent** (and disruptive) regime of security measures. **Second, the highly complex nature of the containerized supply chain,** combined with the ineffectiveness of point-of-origin inspections, **creates a plethora of openings for terrorist infiltration by providing extremists with numerous opportunities to “stuff” or otherwise tamper with boxed crates.**

#### Risk of attacks on ports is growing, but on shore ports ensure that WMD attacks will be successful and destroy the economy

Dr. Michael J. Hillyard, (April 2005), President, Rockwell University, The Atlantis Garrison: A Comprehensive, Cost Effective Cargo and Port Security Strategy, http://www.ciaonet.org.mutex.gmu.edu/olj/si/si\_4\_4/si\_4\_4\_him01.pdf

**The United States has a major cargo inspection problem of size, location, and time. Regarding size: 95 percent of all cargo entering the country passes through one of the nation’s 351 ports; 95 percent of that cargo goes unchecked;[2] and of the 8,000 foreign commercial vessels that make 60,000 annual port calls, the vast majority gain unabated access to U.S. soil.[3] The size of the problem increases dramatically over time: port cargo volume is expected to double by 2025**.[4] **The United States cannot securely handle the sheer volume of port calls, something not lost on enemies who have been unable to strike the U.S. homeland for almost four years now.**

**The location problem is twofold, and worse**. First, **the instant foreign vessels reach a port of call, they are potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD) shell casings for harbor-detonated nuclear weapons.** **There is currently no effective process to confirm that a ship is not a weapon. Second, even if all incoming ships and cargo were inspected, it would not matter because a WMD has already accomplished its mission. Currently, high risk cargo is either inspected at the port or, incredibly, driven to an inspection location one to fifteen miles inland. A potential weapon of mass destruction is thus unobstructed in its delivery inside the country, and even when identified as dangerous cargo, loses none of its destructive potential.**

**Time is the ultimate trade-off in the cargo and port security problem. Not acting quickly to fix the problem will result in devastating consequences. Maritime transportation experts warn that the current global ports system *can and will* be exploited by terrorists with ships or containers filled with explosive and/or nuclear devices—it is just a matter of when and where such attacks will occur.[5] The consequences of just one such attack are estimated to run as high as $1 trillion in economic costs and are immeasurable in human costs.**

#### Current security measures are bankrupting the country while leaving us vulnerable to WMD terrorism. Offshore ports solve security risks while reducing costs. We must act before it is too late.

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf

Terrorist activity has demonstrated the ability to disrupt the US economy and squander precious economic resources by elevating national security spending. The necessary strategy of providing a broad defense against an adversary that can attack anywhere in moderate scale is problematic and costly. We must avoid the mistakes the Soviets made in the Cold War, when the Soviet Union essentially bankrupted itself and ultimately collapsed. They believed they were under threat and to secure their safety, they got into an arms race they could not afford. The danger exists for the US to do the same with regards to the protection of US interests from terrorism. The economic models favor the terrorist who can place a bomb on target to deliver moderate damage at relatively low cost**.** Defense against, and response to such a threat has, and will continue to consume vast amounts of financial resources. The result of which will be a burden to our economic engine in order for us to achieve a reasonable and socially acceptable level of risk. This strategy is sub-optimal and unsustainable. The spending to secure our borders and citizenry could be just as damaging in the long-term as an attack. If we want to survive the next century, we will need to be a bit more thoughtful and creative. Fortunately, these traits are part of the American character.

I don’t believe there is debate that we are a target for terrorism. But how credible is it that a terrorist could obtain a nuclear weapon? “A terrorist group might obtain [material for] a bomb, perhaps with the yield of the Hiroshima bomb, by several plausible routes…”3 Controls for highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Russia, Pakistan and India are not certain. Emerging nuclear states like North Korea and Iran have demonstrated support for terrorist activities, with North Korea exporting technologies associated with production of HEU and Iran reportedly developing an inventory. Despite our best efforts, the technologies and materials for the development of nuclear weapons are proliferating. The sophistication needed to build a nuclear device is not that demanding once you have the raw materials. The Hiroshima bomb was so simple a design that scientists didn’t even need to test it. The impact of a radiological weapon detonated at a US port would affect the entire country. Other than the devastating direct damage such a weapon would cause, collateral impacts would include contamination, chronic illness, economic collapse, port shutdowns, border closures, suspended air traffic, fallout possibly effecting national agricultural production and exports, increased consumption of food and consumables like fuel, without the ability to replenish stores leaving shortages nationwide. We would also respond militarily and will need to re-open our ports and borders up quickly to sustain a war effort. Without a viable alternative, this action would result in opening ourselves up to the same vulnerability that was just exploited.

So where’s that leave us? Our ports are vulnerable, critical to our economy, and located in large population centers on our borders. The critical question is, “How realistic is the assumption that we can prevent the proliferation of WMD to terrorists indefinitely?” Efforts to date have provided protection, but there are still acknowledged gaps in our defense. When the threat is elevated due to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other WMD, our current protection scenario no longer can accept the present level of risk because the social and economic costs of a WMD attack are so severe. It will take time to develop a workable solution. The goal is to have such as solution in place before the terrorists can act on their WMD threats.

A Vision for Protection

To protect from the treats mentioned above we need to integrate a few emerging trends and technologies. A robust Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) integrates information from intelligence networks, maritime commerce databases, government sources and monitoring technologies to get an understanding of the vessels en route to the US. This system can track marine craft much like air traffic control systems, with the added component of providing a risk assessment for each vessel. Inbound craft will be monitored and directed to offshore platforms located in major sealanes for inspection.

The offshore platforms can be fitted out with technologies that can inspect bulk freighters and private craft quickly and efficiently. They can also provide a capability to significantly improve cargo handling times, making it more efficient for a shipping company to offload and onload all their cargo at the platform capitalizing on their investments in larger and larger containerships increasing the number of runs per year. US flagged Jones Act carriers can then move cargo directly to destination ports. Since the Jones Act carriers are generally smaller than the larger international freight haulers, ports will neither have to spend billions of dollars on infrastructure and civic improvements nor will they need to dredge, avoiding serious environmental concerns. The platforms will also house state-of-the-art screening technologies capable of keeping up with the high throughput of freight. In this way the US can achieve 100% screening of all inbound containers, small ships and bulk freighters before these vessels, their cargo or their crews can threaten the US. This system potentially has the benefit of improving US supply chain logistics, invigorating domestic industries, and improving environmental quality all while improving homeland security. The operational goal for this effort of unloading, inspection and reloading is to be able to unload and reload a 15,000 TEU ship in less than 24 hours. When containers have completed this process, they have completed US customs inspections and appropriate tariff assessments (which are more accurate based on the screening technology resulting in an expected initial increase in tariff collections of 10%). Receivers can be alerted automatically when cargo is loaded with expected delivery times at domestic ports of call or railheads so that pick-ups can be scheduled. They can also be informed of pending Custom’s holds. Items to be held in a bonded warehouse will be held at existing landbased facilities.

#### **A Terrorist Attack on a Port would be 100 times worse than a nuclear war**

**Rugy**, November **2007** [Veronique de, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, specifically researching homeland security, “Is Port Security Funding Making us Safer?” http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit\_11\_07\_derugy.pdf, PWS]

There are two types of threats related to ports: (1) direct attacks on the ports themselves and (2) transport of dangerous material through ports for use in terrorist plots elsewhere in the country. Like any terrorist attack, an attack on a port would cause injury, death, and have terrible economic and social consequences. Damage to infrastructure and the destruction of inventory in port could seriously disrupt trade not only in the U.S., but also around the world. The damage would be on the order of 100 times greater if a nuclear device were detonated in a major American city such as New York or Washington, D.C.7 In ports, as with all stationary targets, attackers have a natural advantage because they get to choose where to attack. The German thrust into Western Europe in the Second World War is an instructive example. The Wehrmacht simply side-stepped the impressive defenses built by the French in the Maginot Line. Similarly, terrorists will attack wherever the defenses are weakest. Because terrorists have this advantage, the best port security comes from a proactive strategy of keeping terrorists and their bombs as far as possible from U.S. shores.

#### Terrorists will use nuclear weapons triggering global nuclear war and extinction

Mohamed **Sid-Ahmed, 2004** ([**http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm**](http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm), 26 August - 1 September 2004)

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario **is if the attack succeeds**. This could **lead to a third world war**, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When **nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.**

### Advantage 2: Wind

#### Offshore ports are key to developing and maintaining offshore wind energy.

German Energy Agency, **11/11/2010, Ports - infrastructure for offshore wind farms. http://www.offshore-wind.de/page/index.php?id=10287&L=1**

**Ports play a central role in the value chain of offshore wind energy. For the construction of offshore wind farms, ports are required to function as hubs for each component which passes by**. Far more happens in ports than just loading components from trucks, inland navigation vessels or trains onto special ocean-going tugboats. Many components of the plants are produced, temporarily stored or partially assembled at the port. **Furthermore, offshore ports are bases for ships which are necessary for transport and assembly of plants at sea**. **They are also a point of departure for maintenance and repair works.**

#### Offshore wind is key the most feasible approach to solving warming and generates jobs

Dorothy W. Bisbee, Jan 1, 2004, NEPA Review of Offshore Wind Farms: Ensuring

Emission Reduction Benefits Outweigh Visual Impacts, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, (Visiting Assistant Professor, Southern New England School of Law) <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1140&context=ealr>

**Most people would prefer wind energy to other currently available power sources, if only it were invisible. Renewable energy does not involve environmentally disruptive fuel extraction from limited resources, reliance on foreign fuel imports, water flow disruptions, or nuclear waste generation. Wind power offers an increased jobs-to-power generation ratio5 and zero emissions to land, water, and air. Large-scale wind projects can reduce fossil fuel plants' running time, significantly decreasing emissions of air pollutants**. **Benefits from the reduced emissions include fewer air quality related illnesses and premature deaths, decreased global warming and acid rain, and reduced haze. Offshore wind projects are particularly promising because the ocean can satisfy wind turbines' need for broad, windy spaces, allow developers to use economies of scale, and meet the high energy demands of nearby densely populated areas that lack suitable land space.**

#### ANTHROPOGENIC WARMING IS HAPPENING -MODELS, STUDIES, SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS AND HISTORY ALL GO AFF.

Stefan **Rahmstorf**, Professor of **Physics @ Potsdam** University, Member of the German Advisory Council on Climate Change, **‘8**

(Global Warming: Looking Beyond Kyoto, ed. Ernesto Zedillo, Prof. IR @ Yale, p. 42-49)

It is time to turn to statement B: human activities are altering the climate. This can be broken into two parts. The first is as follows: global climate is warming. This is by now a generally **undisputed** point (except by novelist Michael Crichton), so we deal with it only briefly. The two leading compilations of data measured with thermometers are shown in figure 3-3, that of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and that of the British Hadley Centre for Climate Change. Although they differ in the details, due to the inclusion of different data sets and use of different spatial averaging and quality control procedures, they both show a consistent picture, with a global mean warming of 0.8°C since the late nineteenth century. Temperatures over the past ten years clearly were the warmest since measured records have been available. The year 1998 sticks out well above the longterm trend due to the occurrence of a major El Nino event that year (the last El Nino so far and one of the strongest on record). These events are examples of the largest natural climate variations on multiyear time scales and, by releasing heat from the ocean, generally cause positive anomalies in global mean temperature. It is remarkable that the year 2005 rivaled the heat of 1998 even though no El Nino event occurred that year. (A bizarre curiosity, perhaps worth mentioning, is that several prominent "climate skeptics" recently used the extreme year 1998 to claim in the media that global warming had ended. In Lindzen's words, "Indeed, the absence of any record breakers during the past seven years is statistical evidence that temperatures are not increasing.")33 In addition to the surface measurements, the more recent portion of the global warming trend (since 1979) is also documented by satellite data. It is not straightforward to derive a reliable surface temperature trend from satellites, as they measure radiation coming from throughout the atmosphere (not just near the surface), including the stratosphere, which has strongly cooled, and the records are not homogeneous' due to the short life span of individual satellites, the problem of orbital decay, observations at different times of day, and drifts in instrument calibration.' Current analyses of these satellite data show trends that are fully consistent with surface measurements and model simulations." If no reliable temperature measurements existed, could we be sure that the climate is warming? The "canaries in the coal mine" of climate change (as glaciologist Lonnie Thompson puts it) ~are mountain glaciers. We know, both from old photographs and from the position of the terminal moraines heaped up by the flowing ice, that mountain glaciers have been in retreat all over the world during the past century. There are precious few exceptions, and they are associated with a strong increase in precipitation or local cooling.36 I have inspected examples of shrinking glaciers myself in field trips to Switzerland, Norway, and New Zealand. As glaciers respond sensitively to temperature changes, data on the extent of glaciers have been used to reconstruct a history of Northern Hemisphere temperature over the past four centuries (see figure 3-4). Cores drilled in tropical glaciers show signs of recent melting that is unprecedented at least throughout the Holocene-the past 10,000 years. Another powerful sign of warming, visible clearly from satellites, is the shrinking Arctic sea ice cover (figure 3-5), which has declined 20 percent since satellite observations began in 1979. While climate clearly became warmer in the twentieth century, much discussion particularly in the popular media has focused on the question of how "unusual" this warming is in a longer-term context. While this is an interesting question, it has often been mixed incorrectly with the question of causation. Scientifically, how unusual recent warming is-say, compared to the past millennium-in itself contains little information about its cause. Even a highly unusual warming could have a natural cause (for example, an exceptional increase in solar activity). And even a warming within the bounds of past natural variations could have a predominantly anthropogenic cause. I come to the question of causation shortly, after briefly visiting the evidence for past natural climate variations. Records from the time before systematic temperature measurements were collected are based on "proxy data," coming from tree rings, ice cores, corals, and other sources. These proxy data are generally linked to local temperatures in some way, but they may be influenced by other parameters as well (for example, precipitation), they may have a seasonal bias (for example, the growth season for tree rings), and high-quality long records are difficult to obtain and therefore few in number and geographic coverage. Therefore, there is still substantial uncertainty in the evolution of past global or hemispheric temperatures. (Comparing only local or regional temperature; as in Europe, is of limited value for our purposes,' as regional variations can be much larger than global ones and can have many regional causes, unrelated to global-scale forcing and climate change.) The first quantitative reconstruction for the Northern Hemisphere temperature of the past millennium, including an error estimation, was presented by Mann, Bradley, and Hughes and rightly highlighted in the 2001 IPCC report as one of the major new findings since its 1995 report; it is shown in figure 3\_6.39 The analysis suggests that, despite the large error bars, twentieth-century warming is indeed highly unusual and probably was unprecedented during the past millennium. This result, presumably because of its symbolic power, has attracted much criticism, to some extent in scientific journals, but even more so in the popular media. The hockey stick-shaped curve became a symbol for the IPCC, .and criticizing this particular data analysis became an avenue for some to question the credibility of the IPCC. Three important things have been overlooked in much of the media coverage. First, even if the scientific critics had been right, this would not have called into question the very cautious conclusion drawn by the IPCC from the reconstruction by Mann, Bradley, and Hughes: "New analyses of proxy data for the Northern Hemisphere indicate that the increase in temperature in the twentieth century is likely to have been the largest of any century during the past 1,000 years." This conclusion has since been supported further by every single one of close to a dozen new reconstructions (two of which are shown in figure 3-6).Second, by far the most serious scientific criticism raised against Mann, Hughes, and Bradley was simply based on a mistake. 40 The prominent paper of von Storch and others, which claimed (based on a model test) that the method of Mann, Bradley, and Hughes systematically underestimated variability, "was [itself] based on incorrect implementation of the reconstruction procedure."41 With correct implementation, climate field reconstruction procedures such as the one used by Mann, Bradley, and Hughes have been shown to perform well in similar model tests. Third, whether their reconstruction is accurate or not has no bearing on policy. If their analysis underestimated past natural climate variability, this would certainly not argue for a smaller climate sensitivity and thus a lesser concern about the consequences of our emissions. Some have argued that, in contrast, it would point to a larger climate sensitivity. While this is a valid point in principle, it does not apply in practice to the climate sensitivity estimates discussed herein or to the range given by IPCC, since these did not use the reconstruction of Mann, Hughes, and Bradley or any other proxy records of the past millennium. Media claims that "a pillar of the Kyoto Protocol" had been called into question were therefore misinformed. As an aside, the protocol was agreed in 1997, before the reconstruction in question even existed. The overheated public debate on this topic has, at least, helped to attract more researchers and funding to this area of paleoclimatology; its methodology has advanced significantly, and a number of new reconstructions have been presented in recent years. While the science has moved forward, the first seminal reconstruction by Mann, Hughes, and Bradley has held up remarkably well, with its main features reproduced by more recent work. Further progress probably will require substantial amounts of new proxy data, rather than further refinement of the statistical techniques pioneered by Mann, Hughes, and Bradley.Developing these data sets will require time and substantial effort. It is time to address the final statement: most of the observed warming over the past fifty years is anthropogenic. A large number of studies exist that have taken different approaches to analyze this issue, which is generally called the "attribution problem." I do not discuss the exact share of the anthropogenic contribution (although this is an interesting question). By "most" I imply mean "more than 50 percent.” The first and crucial piece of evidence is, of course, that the magnitude of the warming is what is expected from the anthropogenic perturbation of the radiation balance, so anthropogenic forcing is able to explain all of the temperature rise. As discussed here, the rise in greenhouse gases alone corresponds to 2.6 W/tn2 of forcing. This by itself, after subtraction of the observed 0'.6 W/m2 of ocean heat uptake, would Cause 1.6°C of warming since preindustrial times for medium climate sensitivity (3"C). With a current "best guess'; aerosol forcing of 1 W/m2, the expected warming is O.8°c. The point here is not that it is possible to obtain the 'exact observed number-this is fortuitous because the amount of aerosol' forcing is still very' uncertain-but that the expected magnitude is roughly right. There can be little doubt that the anthropogenic forcing is large enough to explain most of the warming. Depending on aerosol forcing and climate sensitivity, it could explain a large fraction of the warming, or all of it, or even more warming than has been observed (leaving room for natural processes to counteract some of the warming). The second important piece of evidence is clear: there is no viable alternative explanation. In the scientific literature, no serious alternative hypothesis has been proposed to explain the observed global warming. Other possible causes, such as solar activity, volcanic activity, cosmic rays, or orbital cycles, are well observed, but they do not show trends capable of explaining the observed warming. Since 1978, solar irradiance has been measured directly from satellites and shows the well-known eleven-year solar cycle, but no trend. There are various estimates of solar variability before this time, based on sunspot numbers, solar cycle length, the geomagnetic AA index, neutron monitor data, and, carbon-14 data. These indicate that solar activity probably increased somewhat up to 1940. While there is disagreement about the variation in previous centuries, different authors agree that solar activity did not significantly increase during the last sixty-five years. Therefore, this cannot explain the warming, and neither can any of the other factors mentioned. Models driven by natural factors only, leaving the anthropogenic forcing aside, show a cooling in the second half of the twentieth century (for an example, See figure 2-2, panel a, in chapter 2 of this volume). The trend in the sum of natural forcings is downward.The only way out would be either some as yet undiscovered unknown forcing or a warming trend that arises by chance from an unforced internal variability in the climate system. The latter cannot be completely ruled out, but has to be considered highly unlikely. No evidence in the observed record, proxy data, or current models suggest that such internal variability could cause a sustained trend of global warming of the observed magnitude. As discussed, twentieth century warming is unprecedented over the past 1,000 years (or even 2,000 years, as the few longer reconstructions available now suggest), which does not 'support the idea of large internal fluctuations. Also, those past variations correlate well with past forcing (solar variability, volcanic activity) and thus appear to be largely forced rather than due to unforced internal variability." And indeed, it would be difficult for a large and sustained unforced variability to satisfy the fundamental physical law of energy conservation. Natural internal variability generally shifts heat around different parts of the climate system-for example, the large El Nino event of 1998, which warmed, the atmosphere by releasing heat stored in the ocean. This mechanism implies that the ocean heat content drops as the atmosphere warms. For past decades, as discussed, we observed the atmosphere warming and the ocean heat content increasing, which rules out heat release from the ocean as a cause of surface warming. The heat content of the whole climate system is increasing, and there is no plausible source of this heat other than the heat trapped by greenhouse gases. ' A completely different approach to attribution is to analyze the spatial patterns of climate change. This is done in so-called fingerprint studies, which associate particular patterns or "fingerprints" with different forcings. It is plausible that the pattern of a solar-forced climate change differs from the pattern of a change caused by greenhouse gases. For example, a characteristic of greenhouse gases is that heat is trapped closer to the Earth's surface and that, unlike solar variability, greenhouse gases tend to warm more in winter, and at night. Such studies have used different data sets and have been performed by different groups of researchers with different statistical methods. They consistently conclude that the observed spatial pattern of warming can only be explained by greenhouse gases.49 Overall, it has to be considered, highly likely' that the observed warming is indeed predominantly due to the human-caused increase in greenhouse gases. ' This paper discussed the evidence for the anthropogenic increase in atmospheric CO2 concentration and the effect of CO2 on climate, finding that this anthropogenic increase is proven beyond reasonable doubt and that a mass of evidence points to a CO2 effect on climate of 3C ± 1.59C global-warming for a doubling of concentration. (This is, the classic IPCC range; my personal assessment is that, in-the light of new studies since the IPCC Third Assessment Report, the uncertainty range can now be narrowed somewhat to 3°C ± 1.0C) This is based on consistent results from theory, models, and data analysis, and, even in the absence-of any computer models, the same result would still hold based on physics and on data from climate history alone. Considering the plethora of consistent evidence, the chance that these conclusions are wrong has to be considered minute. If the preceding is accepted, then it follows logically and incontrovertibly that a further increase in CO2 concentration will lead to further warming. The magnitude of our emissions depends on human behavior, but the climatic response to various emissions scenarios can be computed from the information presented here. The result is the famous range of future global temperature scenarios shown in figure 3\_6.50 Two additional steps are involved in these computations: the consideration of anthropogenic forcings other than CO2 (for example, other greenhouse gases and aerosols) and the computation of concentrations from the emissions. Other gases are not discussed here, although they are important to get quantitatively accurate results. CO2 is the largest and most important forcing. Concerning concentrations, the scenarios shown basically assume that ocean and biosphere take up a similar share of our emitted CO2 as in the past. This could turn out to be an optimistic assumption; some models indicate the possibility of a positive feedback, with the biosphere turning into a carbon source rather than a sink under growing climatic stress. It is clear that even in the more optimistic of the shown (non-mitigation) scenarios, global temperature would rise by 2-3°C above its preindustrial level by the end of this century. Even for a paleoclimatologist like myself, this is an extraordinarily high temperature, which is very likely unprecedented in at least the past 100,000 years. As far as the data show, we would have to go back about 3 million years, to the Pliocene, for comparable temperatures. The rate of this warming (which is important for the ability of ecosystems to cope) is also highly unusual and unprecedented probably for an even longer time. The last major global warming trend occurred when the last great Ice Age ended between 15,000 and 10,000 years ago: this was a warming of about 5°C over 5,000 years, that is, a rate of only 0.1 °C per century. 52 The expected magnitude and rate of planetary warming is highly likely to come with major risk and impacts in terms of sea level rise (Pliocene sea level was 25-35 meters higher than now due to smaller Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets), extreme events (for example, hurricane activity is expected to increase in a warmer climate), and ecosystem loss. The second part of this paper examined the evidence for the current warming of the planet and discussed what is known about its causes. This part showed that global warming is already a measured and-well-established fact, not a theory. Many different lines of evidence consistently show that most of the observed warming of the past fifty years was caused by human activity. Above all, this warming is exactly what would be expected given the anthropogenic rise in greenhouse gases, and no viable alternative explanation for this warming has been proposed in the scientific literature. Taken together., the very strong evidence accumulated from thousands of independent studies, has over the past decades convinced virtually every climatologist around the world (many of whom were initially quite skeptical, including myself) that anthropogenic global warming is a reality with which we need to deal.

#### Climate change leads to extinction

Mazo ‘10(PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA, Jeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, “Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,” pg. 122

The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above pre-industrial levels, depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1°C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still be expected to reach 1.2°C (O'9""1.5°C) above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." Without early and severe reductions in emissions,the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first century are likely to be catastrophic for the stability and security of countries in the developing world - not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change couldeven undermine the strength and stability of emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects on security of widespread state failure and collapse in developing countries.' And although they have been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond the end of the century could pose an existential threat to civilisation." What is certain is that there is no precedent in human experience for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political changes.

#### Plan:

The United States federal government should substantially increase its transportation infrastructure investment in the United States by building six offshore mega-ports.

### Solvency

#### Offshore ports reduce shipping costs, protect economies, enhance security, protect the environment, and cost less than other security programs.

Dr. Michael J. Hillyard, (April 2005), President, Rockwell University, The Atlantis Garrison: A Comprehensive, Cost Effective Cargo and Port Security Strategy, http://www.ciaonet.org.mutex.gmu.edu/olj/si/si\_4\_4/si\_4\_4\_him01.pdf

**Longer term cost-savings would be realized by strategically locating the offshore ports along the major sea lanes into the U.S., those entering the New England, Mid-Atlantic/Southeastern, Southern California, and Pacific Northwest regions** (see Diagram 5 for one possible layout for an offshore ports system). **Grouping the offshore ports as regional megaports would follow consolidation trends already sweeping smaller ports into larger hubs and smaller vessels into mega-container ships. A megaports system would reduce shipping transactions costs significantly, require fewer port calls, reduce nautical mileage at sea, and cut waiting and berthing times in port**. Similar costs savings have been realized in the Port of Singapore, the world’s Asian transshipment crossroads that transfers regionally-bound cargo to smaller vessels for eventual offload among a large network of local ports. A similar concept has also been proposed as a transshipment port between Halifax and Scapa Flow to feed all Western European and North American ports.[21]

**The cost of not adopting offshore ports should also be considered. First, there are the federal government’s post-9/11 security standards. When compared to an overhaul of all 351 U.S. ports to be fully compliant across the expanding list of federal security standards—a cost estimate for which has been estimated to be so large that it has not been quantified beyond a crude estimate of “many billions of dollars”—a system of offshore ports is a bargain**.[22] **Second, there is the issue of the existing ports system’s need to serve a changing maritime industry. Megaships that now dominate the industry will be served only by expensively retooling hundreds of existing ports to accommodate this new breed of ships’ deeper water berthing requirements.** For example, dredging operations to lower the New York Harbor by just 50 feet will require an outlay of $2.1 billion.[23] **If offshore ports are adopted, the land-based ports could receive cargo on shallow draft lighters or barges, so the expensive dredging upgrades would be significantly reduced or eliminated altogether. Dredging is also environmentally destructive, so cleanup and other costs could be realized through offshore ports’ construction as well.**

**Cost comparisons become even more favorable when foreign port compliance is considered.**

**Many nations have simply refused request to comply with U.S.-backed security standards due to**

**the impossible economic damage that would be inflicted on their smaller economies to do so**.[24]

**If foreign ports will not raise their standards, then the standards could be enforced at the offshore**

**ports. Offshore ports also provide the opportunity to concentrate the government’s Container**

**Security Initiative (CSI) people and resources in centralized locations, versus diluting their**

**effectiveness by dispersing them throughout the world’s many ports.**

#### Only USFG can solve- Key to common standards, equitable payments, intelligence coordination, enforcement, and is the only entity that can afford it.

Dr. Michael J. Hillyard, (April 2005), President, Rockwell University, The Atlantis Garrison: A Comprehensive, Cost Effective Cargo and Port Security Strategy, http://www.ciaonet.org.mutex.gmu.edu/olj/si/si\_4\_4/si\_4\_4\_him01.pdf

**Establishing the offshore ports as federal installations offers several advantages. First, it would guarantee their subsidization and regulation to a common standard. The current ports system is fraught with taxpayer inequities in which local residents assume a disproportionate tax burden for cargo destined to go well beyond their jurisdiction’s borders. The system is also plagued by tight local and state budgets that cannot support many of the newly imposed federal security standards.**

**Second, the federal government is the only entity that could both legally mandate and enforce the stopping of all ships bound for the U.S. and absorb the initial construction costs of an offshore ports system.** A comprehensive system that includes ports intersecting sea lanes off of both coasts would total as much as $15 billion, and **no single state, agency, company, or industry short of the federal government could absorb such an expenditure.**

**Third, no entity other than the federal government would be capable of seamlessly conjoining port operations among the existing 351-ports system and integrate critical federal functions such as foreign intelligence, inspection, customs, international law, and law enforcement. An essential federal coordination role—intelligence sharing in the cargo security information system—could be facilitated through the new National Director of Intelligence**, an office envisioned for just this type of task by President Bush who wants to ensure “that our intelligence agencies work as a single, unified enterprise.”[ 30]

#### Six offshore mega-ports should be built. Ports would get a return on investment and pay for themselves through increased economy and tariff benefits

[Stephen Wampler](mailto:wampler1@llnl.gov), JULY 2, 2010, (Staff Writer) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory News, Plan floated to ship cargo inspection offshore. https://newsline.llnl.gov/\_rev02/articles/2010/jul/07.02.10-ports.php

In their presentation, Northwestern’s Kellogg School of Business students **recommended building six off-shore megaports** — in **Seattle, Oakland, Los Angeles-Long Beach, the Gulf of Mexico, Georgia and New York.**

**It was estimated that the six ports would cost about $60 billion to build, with an annual economic and tariff benefit of about $5.3 billion per year and a payback period of 23 years**, according to the Kellogg School of Business team.

**The panel of government experts thought** the Kellogg team’s tariff income would be lower than expected, but added **that the value of WMD avoidance would be much higher than the team’s $730 million estimate, probably running into the hundreds of billions of dollars, significantly shortening the payback period.**

## Dredging Adv

### Dredging Adv/Add On

#### Current ports can’t accommodate new ships that will be online by 2014 without dredging. Offshore ports can service these ships without dredging.

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf

There are other factors outside of the national security driver for the development of offshore platforms that we need to consider. One of the most important factors is that the international shipping fleet is in transition. The containerization of freight and an **expansion in inventory of larger container vessels are underway**.

**This transition is highlighted by the deepening of the Suez Canal, the expansion of the Panama Canal (scheduled to be complete in 2014**), large investments in port infrastructure (over $4.78B in the last 5 years9), and ever increasing orders for larger containerships >12,000 TEU (twenty foot equivalent units).

The Maritime Professional reports in its February 21, 2011 issue, that Maersk placed an order recently with Daewoo Shipyards of South Korea for ten 18,000 TEU capacity containerships, the largest ever built. Each ship will cost approximately $190 million. These ships will produce 50% less CO2 per container moved than the industry average on the Asia-Europe trade lane. In addition, it will consume approximately 35% less fuel per container than the 13,000 TEU ships now being ordered for this route.

**The investment of $2B in new ships over the next 5 years is indicative of the scale of investment large shipping is making in new fleets. Access to domestic ports, by these larger ships requires increased dredging, port terminal infrastructure investments, and civic improvements. Placing floating ports in the major sea lanes inbound to US ports allows for these ships to offload and reload on one stop, transferring their cargo to smaller domestic carriers that go directly to one of the existing 361 US ports providing the most economical route to their cargo’s final destination.**

#### This dredging and construction will kill coral reefs and biodiversity

World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure (PIANC), 2010, DREDGING AND PORT CONSTRUCTION AROUND CORAL REEFS, http://www.unep-wcmc.org/medialibrary/2011/09/06/b45de64b/2010\_PIANC\_Dredging%20and%20port%20construction%20around%20coral%20reefs\_Report%20108-2010\_FINAL%20VERSION\_LowRes.pdf

**The risk and severity of impacts from dredging and port construction-related activities on corals are directly related to both the intensity and duration of impacts causing stress** (Figure 5.2). This graph shows the general relationship between the magnitude of an increase in turbidity or sedimentation above background levels (vertical axis), how long it lasts (horizontal axis) and the onset of (sub-)lethal effects on corals. Actual thresholds will vary by location based on typical ambient conditions and the sensitivity of the dominant coral species.**Frequent short-term exposures or chronic longterm exposure will result in mortality for many coral species. If moderate levels of impacts on a reef persist for particularly long periods of time, the coral reef may undergo changes in diversity, with more sensitive coral species gradually being replaced by more tolerant ones. This may result in an overall reduction in the biodiversity of the reef.**

**Responses not only include direct mortality of corals, but may also involve sub-lethal effects, such as: reduced growth, lower calcification rates and reduced productivity, bleaching, increased susceptibility to diseases**, physical damage to coral tissue and reef structures (breaking, abrasion), reduced regeneration from tissue damage, **as well as effects on other reef-dwelling (non-coral) organisms.**

#### Loss of Coral Reefs leads to extinction

Inter Press Service ‘6 (http://www.climateark.org/shared/reader/welcome.aspx?linkid=55070&keybold=coral%20reef%20dying%20Pacific)

Vast swaths of coral reefs in the Caribbean sea and South Pacific Ocean are dying, while the recently-discovered cold-water corals in northern waters will not survive the century -- all due to climate change.  The loss of reefs will have a catastrophic impact on all marine life.  One-third of the coral at official monitoring sites in the area of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands have recently perished in what scientists call an "unprecedented" die-off.  Extremely high sea temperatures in the summer and fall of 2005 that spawned a record hurricane season have also caused extensive coral bleaching extending from the Florida Keys to Tobago and Barbados in the south and Panama and Costa Rica, according to the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Coral Reef Watch.  High sea temperatures are also killing parts of Australia's 2,000-kilometre-long Great Barrier Reef, the world's largest living reef formation. As summer ends in the Southern Hemisphere, researchers are now investigating the extent of the coral bleaching. Up to 98 percent of the coral in one area has been affected, reported the Australian Institute of Marine Science last week.  "The Great Barrier Reef has been living on this planet for 18 million years and we've undermined its existence within our lifetimes," says Brian Huse, executive director of the Coral Reef Alliance, a U.S.-based NGO dedicated to protecting the health of coral reefs.  "Twenty percent of Earth's reefs have been lost and 50 percent face moderate to severe threats,"Huse told IPS.  The economic value of reefs globally is estimated at 375 billion dollars, he says.  Coral reefs are uncommon,found in less than one percent of the world's oceans. However, they are considered the tropical rainforests of the oceans because they provide home and habitat to 25 to 33 percent of all marine life. **The World Conservation Union (IUCN) considers coral reefs one of the life-support systems essential for human survival.**

### Dredging L Ext

#### Post Panamax ships will force onshore port dredging to accommodate their size by 2014

Larry Copeland, 10/2/2011 (Staff Writer) USA TODAY, U.S. ports racing to get ready for bigger ships, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/story/2011-09-30/ports-bigger-ships/50637090/1

Now, **this port — like others along the U.S. Atlantic Coast — is at a critical crossroads. Their fate is tied to the first major expansion of the** [**Panama Canal**](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Panama+Canal) in its nearly 100-year history. When that project is completed in 2014, **the canal's larger locks will be able to accommodate cargo ships with three times the current capacity. Those larger vessels, known as "post-Panamax" ships, will be calling at ports here and elsewhere on the** [**East Coast**](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Places,+Geography/Regions/East+Coast)**.**

**The problem: The port in Norfolk, Va., is the only one on the East Coast that has a channel deep enough to accommodate the larger vessels.**

**As a result, other ports along the** [**Atlantic Ocean**](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Places,+Geography/Bodies+of+water/Atlantic+Ocean) **are scrambling to dredge deeper channels so they can handle the bigger ships**. "Other countries throughout the world are looking at what is necessary in terms of their own (shipping) infrastructure to be competitive in world trade," says Kurt Nagle, president and CEO of the American Association of Port Authorities. "It's something the U.S. really needs to be doing. The general concern is **the U.S. is behind the curve and really at the stage of needing to play catch-up."**

### Dredging Impx Ext

#### Dredging kills biodiversity

Marine Insight, July 26, 2011, Effects of Dredging on the Marine Environment, <http://www.marineinsight.com/marine/environment/effects-of-dredging-on-the-marine-environment/#ixzz1yw0u7wuI>

**Dredging** is an activity that is required to be carried out to remove the unwanted deposits from water pathways. But even **though** the activity **aids regularity in marine traffic**, it **is not without its disadvantages. Dredging possess a huge threat to the marine environmen**t and is required to be carried out quite carefully aided only with the help of the right dredgers and dredges.

Since the main focus of dredging is to remove the deposits submerged under, the environmental effects of the process also revolve around this focal point. Some of the effects of dredging can be enumerated as follows:

**The soil deposits in any water-body have a certain pre-disposed composition. Through dredging this composition is altered**

**Because of the said alteration, the existing habitat of creatures and organisms that depends on the original composition of the soil dies out due to the unfavourableness of the changes caused**

**The turbidness of the soil under the water also changes because of this alteration in the underwater soil composition. This poses problems by way of creation of newer and harmful organisms, transferring of unwanted organisms to other parts in the water-body leading to a wider spread of contamination and organic processes by way of release of extra and unwanted nutrients. The turbidness also causes the already existing contaminations to spread further into the water-body which also affects the marine environment adversely**

However, all the points mentioned above pertain to dredging of water-bodies with clean soil deposits. But sometimes, dredgingis also carried out to weed out the contaminations present in the soil. **The effects and the biodiversity impacts of** contaminated deposit-**dredging are:**

* **The dredging of contaminated materials will cause the harmful particles to regroup and spread to a larger area in the water body**
* **Since dredging loosens up the soil, those substances which were previously held fast to the contaminated deposit will find their way into the water and the un-dredged soil. If these substances are harmful organisms then they will cause a substantial degradation to the environment even after dredging the area**
* **The water could get polluted because of the soil particles mixing with the water**. And while this does not have huge biodiversity impacts, it is indeed an unwanted side-effect of dredgingOffshore ports: Trade Adv

#### Dredging kills aquatic ecosystems, kills species, and disrupts food supplies.

US Environmental Protection Agency, December 08, 2010, Dredging, http://www.epa.gov/bioiweb1/aquatic/dredging.html

**In order to maintain safe navigation**, some channels and **harbors require periodic dredging**. Dredging is the process of excavating (or bringing up) material from an area (e.g., channel or harbor) with a dredge. Dredged material may include sediment, sand or silt carried as runoff from farms and forests or urban runoff and sewer overflows. While this process of dredging can be beneficial to aquatic ecosystems, it can also be detrimental.

**The alteration of habitat and water quality may result through the removal of sediments. As a result, growth and reproductive capability of certain organisms can be compromised as well as the destruction of important spawning grounds for benthic communities and fish species**, as documented by Rees (1980).

**Dredging can also lead to anoxic conditions, which would cause aerobic species die-offs. Throughout these modifications to aquatic ecosystems, the potential exists that dredging may contribute to already declining fisheries as well as impact food web interactions.**

### Corals Impact Ext

#### Coral reefs are critical to human survival.

Mccmichael 2003 (Anthony J, National Centre of Epidemiology and Population Health Director, Climate Change and Human Health: Risks and Responses, p. 254, http://books.google.com/books?id=tQFYJjDEwhIC&pg=PA254&lpg=PA254&dq=coral+reefs+critical+human+survival&source=web&ots=PpvyXNZ\_Ve&sig=HuTi0RaOUUfhEhs1\_zYoDQhJFz0&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book\_result&resnum=4&ct=result#PPP1,M1)

Coral reefs are one of the most threatened global ecosystems and also one of the most vital. They offer critical support to human survival, especially in developing countries, serving as barriers for coastal protection; major tourist attractions; and especially as a productive source of food for a large portion of the population (39, 40). Coral reefs supply a wide variety of valuable fisheries, including both fish and invertebrate species (41). Some fisheries are harvested for food, others are collected for the curio and aquarium trades.

## Economy Add on

There is a short jobs/protectionism add on and a straight up economy add on based on a terrorist attack written here. There are many more cards about the ability of offshore ports to improve the economy generally and also directly affect trade. You can use these cards to answer arguments against your case or to build other versions of this advantage.

### Jobs/Protectionism Add on

#### Offshore ports create jobs in shipping, agriculture, and manufacturing

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf

In addition to the cost avoidance strategies above, the adaptation of offshore inspection technologies may limit the legal liabilities of shipping companies should an attack occur.11 Offshore ports may be a more efficient delivery model for shipping, allowing the larger international carriers to spend less time in port and therefore more time shuttling cargo. New jobs will be created for longshoremen, shipyards, merchant marine, and coastal regions to construct and operate the platforms, and to provide Jones Act ships. Manufacturing and agriculture jobs will expand due to the increase in domestic manufacturing as a result of macroeconomic issues.

#### **High unemployment risks protectionism**

IMF Survey Online, 2010 Online. April 16, 2010. “Trade Protectionism Could Slow Global Recovery, says IMF.”

Accessed August 18, 2010 at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/new041610a.htm>

Restrictions on trade imposed by countries trying to protect their economies facing tough times could make it harder for them to recover from the global economic crisis, according to new findings by the IMF staff. While most countries have resisted a widespread effort to protect trade, an IMF staff paper said that trade has dropped on average up to 8 percent in products and services where new restrictions were imposed. If protectionist trade measures were allowed to balloon, it could harm global trade and stifle the global economic recovery, according to the research. The paper, “Trade and the Crisis: Protect or Recover,” released on April 16, argues that so far, the impact on global trade has been modest, at about 0.25 percent. The troubling news is what this means for countries as they struggle to emerge from the biggest recession in since the Second World War. Protectionism pressures may rise, given continued high unemployment, different growth rates across countries, and governments scaling back their spending, according to the paper.

#### Protectionism causes nuclear war

**Copley News Service**, 12/1/**99** (Lexis)

For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their own prosperity, but also to **forestall conflict with other nations**. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of **a worldwide nuclear war** for the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have **a major disincentive to wage war**. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.

### Econ Add On

#### An attack on a port would cause an economic depression.

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory <https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf>

From the CBP Strategic Plan, **experts have estimated that the cost to the U.S. economy resulting from port closures due to the discovery or detonation of a weapon of mass destruction or effect** (WMD/E) **would be enormous**. In October 2002, Booz, Allen and Hamilton reported that **a 12-day closure required to locate an undetonated terrorist weapon at one U.S. seaport would cost approximately $58 billion**. In May 2002, the Brookings Institution estimated that **costs associated with U.S. port closures resulting from a detonated WMD/E could be severe, assuming a prolonged economic slump due to an enduring change in our ability to trade.**

#### Economic decline causes World War III

O'Donnell **’09** [Sean, Baltimore Republican Examiner writer and Marine Corps Reserve squad leader,

"Will this recession lead to World War III?," 2-26-09, http://www.examiner.com/x- 3108-Baltimore-Republican- Examiner~y2009m2d26-Will-this- recession-lead-to-World-War- III]

Could the current economic crisis affecting this country and the world lead to another world war**?** The answer may be found by looking back in history. One of the causes of World War I was **the** economic rivalry that existed between the nations of Europe. In the 19th century France and Great Britain became wealthy through colonialism and the control of foreign resources. This forced other up-and-coming nations (such as Germany) to be more competitive in world trade which led to rivalries and ultimately, to war.After the Great Depression ruined **the** economies of Europe in the 1930s, fascist movements arose to seek economic and social control.From there fanatics like Hitler and Mussolini took over Germany and Italy and led them both into World War II. With most of North America and Western Europe currently experiencing a recession**,** will competition for resources and economic rivalries with the Middle East, Asia, or South American cause another world war**?** Add in nuclear weapons and Islamic fundamentalism and things look even worse**.** Hopefully the economy gets better before it gets worse and the terrifying possibility of World War III is averted. However sometimes history repeats itself.

### Economy Ext

#### Offshore Ports increase the US economy by improving supply chains

[Stephen Wampler](mailto:wampler1@llnl.gov), JULY 2, 2010, (Staff Writer) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory News, Plan floated to ship cargo inspection offshore. https://newsline.llnl.gov/\_rev02/articles/2010/jul/07.02.10-ports.php

“**Off-shore ports would not only achieve much more security, but they would also help provide an economy of shipping**,” Brown said. “**The port business is all about real estate. In some cases, containers are moved several times inside a port before they are loaded onto trains or trucks. None have enough real estate.”**

**With off-shore ports, there is a potential benefit to the U.S. economy because U.S. supply chain logistics can be improved**, Glauser said.

#### Offshore ports improve shipping expenses and efficiency

Float Inc, Sept 17, 2002, Implementing the Beyond the Horizon Strategy, (Corporation providing services that include research, design and development of marine oriented products and specializes in very large floating platforms)http://www.floatinc.org/BtHSep02.pdf

**There are additional advantages to the development of floating offshore ports. Among**

**these are the following:**

**• Streamlining the handling and directing the cargo to specific sites could lessen the**

**tremendous burden many ports are experiencing in handling such high volumes of**

**freight and help to defray the expense of double handling.**

• **For those ports served by inter-coastal waterways, shallower draft lighters could**

**navigate further inland with the potential of reducing the shipping costs.**

• With a clean sheet of paper to work from, **the floating port could be shaped and sized**

**to fit the most efficient way to handle and re-ship the cargo**.

• **A system that would identify containers to be sent directly to railheads or truck**

**terminals could be easily accommodated**.

• **By moving all cargo through these inspection stations, duplication of personnel and**

**security equipment at existing US ports is minimized**.

• Floating offshore ports could play a central role in drug interdiction programs.

• **The need for dredging ports to permit transit of the new post-canal-class container**

**vessels will disappear. Economically and environmentally, this will prove to be a plus.**

**• The offshore port can be strategically and optimally positioned for maximum security**

**and relocated if required by change of circumstances.**

**• The flexibility associated modularity and associated reconfiguration possibilities will**

**allow the stations to adapt to a changing role or mission**.

#### Seaport infrastructure is key to the economy

**Bridges, 10/26/11** [Jerry, <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/189829-seaport-infrastructure-improvements-are-critical-to-economic-recovery>, “Seaport infrastructure improvements are critical to economic recovery,” Jerry Bridges is Chairman of the Board of the American Association of Port Authorities,]

For centuries, seaports and waterways have served as a vital economic lifeline by bringing goods and services to people around the world. In 2010, America’s seaports supported an estimated 9.2 million jobs and handled 99 percent of our country’s overseas cargo – that’s more than $5.5 billion worth of goods each day, or a quarter of our country’s GDP. As the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee discusses the economic importance of seaports and policymakers look at creating jobs for the millions of Americans who are out of work, the need to make long-term investments that address future realities is critical. Seaports are one of our country’s oldest and largest economic drivers but they have been largely ignored.  The rapidly increasing size of cargo and cruise ships, new trade agreements with Panama, Colombia and South Korea and President Obama’s National Export Initiative that seeks to double U.S. exports by 2015, all will require the federal government to increase infrastructure spending to support these efforts. Seaports are essential to international trade and keeping our economy strong. If we’re serious about ensuring our country’s long-term prosperity, policymakers need to make America’s seaports a priority. Failure to improve our ports and related infrastructure will hinder our country’s global competiveness.

#### Ports increase jobs which benefits the economy

**Ellis 8/28/07** [Aaron, <http://www.aapa-ports.org/press/prdetail.cfm?itemnumber=3485>, American Association of Port Authorities. “New Study Details Economic Benefits of U.S. Seaports”]

Last year, United States deep-draft seaports and seaport-related businesses generated approximately 8.4 million American jobs and added nearly $2 trillion to the economy, according to a just-completed study by a Lancaster, Pa.-based business consulting service that specializes in port-sector economic impact studies. Based upon 2006 U.S. port cargo statistics and thousands of recent port-sector interviews, Martin Associates late this month completed an in-depth study into the economic impacts of coastal and Great Lakes ports, examining aspects ranging from jobs and wages to business and tax revenues. Of the 8,397,301 Americans working for ports and port-related industries in 2006, nearly 7 million were employed by firms involved in handling imports and exports, such as retailers, wholesalers, manufacturers, distributors and logistics companies. "The tremendous growth in overseas trade volumes moving through our ports in the past decade has been a huge boon to the American economy," said Kurt Nagle, president and chief executive officer for the American Association of Port Authorities.  "The jobs these imports and exports create are spread throughout the country, not just in port cities, making them a vital part of our nation's economic fabric." In addition to citing employment numbers, Martin Associates' new study also shows that businesses providing goods and services to U.S. seaports directly and indirectly paid $314.5 billion in total wages and salaries. Of this total, $207.4 billion came directly from businesses involved in handling international waterborne commerce. Moreover, the 2006 report shows that port-sector businesses generated a high rate of economic output, with business revenues and the value of the goods and services they provided totaled $1,976.4 billion, or nearly $2 trillion.

#### US lacks the port infrastructure to accommodate the biggest ships- this will destroy US competitiveness.

Larry Copeland, 10/2/2011 (Staff Writer) USA TODAY, U.S. ports racing to get ready for bigger ships, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/story/2011-09-30/ports-bigger-ships/50637090/1

In his 2010 State of the Union address, [President Obama](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/People/Politicians,+Government+Officials,+Strategists/Executive/Barack+Obama) announced the goal of doubling the nation's exports in the next five years. The nation cannot meet that goal — or compete successfully in an increasingly global economy — without modern ports capable of handling the biggest ships.

"Trade is going to grow significantly, and we need to be able to have the infrastructure to accommodate it," Nagle says. "To be able to do that, we really need an infrastructure to enable us to trade our goods, our coal, our grain."

#### High shipping costs kill economic growth.

Ximena Clark, David Dollar, Alejandro Micco, 2004. PORT EFFICIENCY, MARITIME TRANSPORT COSTS AND BILATERAL TRADE, National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/papers/w10353.pdf?new\_window=1

As a result, some immediate questions arise. **How much do these transport costs**

**affect trade and growth?** How much of these costs can be affected by government

policies? The broad literature that applies the gravity approach to the study of

international bilateral trade shows that geographical distance, which is used as proxy for

transport costs, is negatively related to trade.7 In a recent paper, Limao and Venables

(2000, henceforth LV) show that **raising transport costs by 10 percent reduces trade**

**volumes by more than 20 percent. They also show that poor infrastructure accounts for**

**more than 40% of predicted transport costs**. In a different analysis, Radelet and Sachs

(1998) show that shipping costs reduce the rate of growth of both manufactured exports

and GDP per capita. These authors claim that “*…* doubling the shipping cost (e.g. from an

8% to 16% CIF band) is associated with slower annual growth of slightly more than-half

of one percentage point.”

#### **US Port Security Key to US and World Economy**

Frittelli May 27, 2005 [John F, Specialist in Transportation Resources, Science, and Industry Division, “Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31733.pdf PWS]

Ships are the primary mode of transportation for world trade. Ships carry approximately 80% of world trade by volume. 12 The United States is the world’s leading maritime trading nation, accounting for nearly 20% (measured in tons) of the annual world ocean-borne overseas trade. Ships carry more than 95% of the nation’s non-North American trade by weight and 75% by value. Trade now accounts for 25% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), up from 11% in 1970. Over the next two decades, the total volume of domestic and international trade is expected to double. Given the importance of maritime trade to the U.S. and world economies, disruptions to that trade can have immediate and significant economic impacts. 13 By one estimate, the cost to the U.S. economy of port closures on the West Coast due to a labor- management dispute was approximately $1 billion per day for the first five days, rising sharply thereafter. 14 The container shipping system is designed for speed and efficiency. Transportation services are a critical component of the global, low-inventory (i.e., just-in-time) distribution model that many manufacturers have adopted. Most industries in the United States use some imported components from overseas suppliers. By bringing parts to a plant just before they are needed for assembly, manufacturers can save money on warehouse space and inventory carrying costs. Transport efficiencies permit warehouse requirements to be minimized. Lean inventories in turn have contributed to business productivity. From 1980 to 2000, according to one study, business logistics costs dropped from 16.1% of U.S. GDP to 10.1%. 15 Given the dependence of the United States and the global economy on a highly efficient maritime transportation system, many experts acknowledge that slowing the flow of trade to inspect all inbound containers, or at least a statistically significant random selection would be “economically intolerable.” 16 Supply chain analysts are concerned that increased security-related delay at seaports could threaten the efficiency gains achieved in inventory management over the past two decades by forcing companies to hold larger inventories.

#### Seaport infrastructure improvements are critical to economic recovery.

**Kurt Nagle10/26/11, president and CEO of the American Association of Port Authorities , “Seaport infrastructure improvements are critical to economic recovery.”** <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/189829-seaport-infrastructure-improvements-are-critical-to-economic-recovery>

For centuries**, seaports and waterways have served as a vital economic lifeline by bringing goods and services to people around the world.** In 2010, America’s seaports supported an estimated 9.2 million jobs and handled 99 percent of our country’s overseas cargo – that’s more than $5.5 billion worth of goods each day, or a quarter of our country’s GDP.**As the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee discusses the economic importance of seaports and policymakers look at creating jobs for the millions of Americans who are out of work, the need to make long-term investments that address future realities is critical. Seaports are one of our country’s oldest and largest economic drivers but they have been largely ignored. The rapidly increasing size of cargo and cruise ships,** new trade agreements with Panama, Colombia and South Korea and President Obama’s National Export Initiative that seeks to double U.S. exports by 2015, **all will require the federal government to increase infrastructure spending to support these efforts. Seaports are essential to international trade and keeping our economy strong**, but projects to improve them take years – if not decades – to plan and build. **If we’re serious about ensuring our country’s long-term prosperity, policymakers need to make America’s seaports a priority. Failure to improve our ports and related infrastructure will hinder our country’s global competiveness.** Earlier this month, President Obama’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness made an urgent plea for improvements in our nation’s transportation infrastructure, including landside and waterside access to ports. **Through increased investment in and connecting to seaports, we can create high-paying, sustainable jobs that will help put Americans back to work.**To accommodate larger ships, increased trade and a growing population, investments are critical to modernizing and maintaining federal navigation channels on the waterside and intermodal freight connectors and transportation corridors on the landside. Without them, the U.S. will continue to fall short among our global competitors. **It’s that simple. Our nation’s transportation infrastructure is at a tipping point. Individual seaports are making the necessary investments in their facilities so they can continue to support the U.S. economy, but they can’t do it alone. Our ports must be a federal priority to ensure that we can support future generations and be prepared for the many opportunities and challenges headed our way.**

### Trade Links

#### Trade is limited by lack of deep water sea ports- alternatives to offshore ports are too expensive.

SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORTATION SOLUTIONS, 2012, STS Offshore Loading Terminals, (company specializing in transportation optimization) http://stsplc.com/KeyCapabilities/STSOffshorePorts/Technologydescription.aspx

**Sea transport is the backbone of the world trade and globalization. More than 80 per cent of world trade goods and products are transported by sea. At the same time bulk cargo haulage accounts for about 40 per cent of the total volume of goods transported by sea**. Bulk cargo transshipment from other modes of transport (rail transport, road transport, etc.) to vessels is implemented at sea ports. Deadweight of bulkers, used in transportation of bulk cargoes (iron ore, coal) is constantly growing. First of all, it is explained by the fact that transportation costs of large vessels may be reduced by 20 per cent depending on the distance of transportation. It is very important in conditions of fierce competition on the global market of bulk haulage. **Constant increase of bulk carriers’ carrying capacity in the twentieth century created the problem of shortage in deep port facilities**. **It is common fact that hundreds of vessels with time-charter rate of USD100,000 per day are waiting to be loaded/unloaded at ports around the world.**

**Building of new ports and redevelopment of existing ports stand behind the growth of large vessels construction. First of all, it may be explained by large capital expenses for dredging. Secondly, there is a growing shortage of dredging equipment. Thirdly, the construction and expansion of sea ports require free vast areas at an acceptable cost**.

#### Port inefficiencies result in a 25% reduction in trade

Ximena Clark, David Dollar, Alejandro Micco, 2004. PORT EFFICIENCY, MARITIME TRANSPORT COSTS AND BILATERAL TRADE, Journal of Development Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w10353.pdf?new_window=1>

**By the 1990s many countries had adopted a development strategy emphasizing integration with the global economy and therefore had reduced their tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. This reduction in artificial trade barriers has raised the importance of transport costs as a remaining barrier to trade.** Therefore, **any strategy aimed at integrating a country into the trading system has to take into account transport costs seriously.**

Besides distance and other variables that governments can’t change, **an important determinant of maritime transport costs is seaport efficiency**. **An improvement in port efficiency** from 25th to 75th percentiles **reduces shipping costs by more than 12%,** or the equivalent of 5,000 miles in distance. This result is robust to different definition of port efficiency as well as to different years. Inefficient ports also increase handling costs.

Focusing on country specific maritime transport costs indexes, which are constructed independently of how far the country is from their trading partners, **a decrease in inefficiencies associated to transport costs** from the 25th to 75th percentiles **implies a reduction in bilateral trade of around 25 percent.**

#### Poor infrastructure is replacing protectionism as the primary barrier to trade.

Ximena Clark, David Dollar, Alejandro Micco, 2004. PORT EFFICIENCY, MARITIME TRANSPORT COSTS AND BILATERAL TRADE, Journal of Development Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/papers/w10353.pdf?new\_window=1

**As liberalization continues to reduce artificial barriers, the effective rate of**

**protection provided by transport costs is now in many cases higher than the one provided**

**by tariffs.** Figure 2 presents a comparison of average tariffs and a measure of transport

costs for various countries around the world, and Figure 3 presents an alternative

comparison of transport costs to the US and average tariffs faced in the US market by a

group of Latin American countries. From Figure 3, it is striking to realize that **for some**

**countries**, such as Chile and Ecuador, **transport costs exceed by more than twenty times**

**the average tariffs they face in the US market. Consequently, any additional effort to**

**integrate a country into the trading system should consider and analyze the effect of**

**transport costs and its determinants.**

#### Port Efficiency is key to trade.

Bruce A. Blonigen and Wesley W. Wilson, November 2006. (Professors of Economics of U of Oregon). PORT EFFICIENCY AND TRADE FLOWS, http://www.corpsnets.us/docs/PortDevInternalTransport/06-NETS-R-11.pdf

As the clearinghouses for a major portion of the world’s rapidly increasing international trade flows, ocean ports and the efficiency with which they process cargo have become an ever more important topic. Poorly-performing ports may reduce trade volumes, particularly for small, less-developed countries (Clark et al., 2004, and Wilson et al., 2003).1 Thus, port efficiency is an important issue in addressing trade facilitation practices, which has been a recent focus of the World Trade Organization and regional trade institutions, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization. Disruptions to U.S. ports, such as the recent congestion issues at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, quickly become national news because they can substantially impact supply chains throughout the country (MacHalaba, 2004).

#### Port Security is key to global trade

[**Jocelyn Redfern**](http://maritimeprofessional.com/Members/JRedfern.aspx/Jocelyn-Redfern), 12-1-2010[“GAO Weighs in on DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security”]<http://maritimeprofessional.com/Blogs/The-Final-Word-with-Joseph-Keefe/December-2010/Port-Security--Good-News,-Bad-News,-No-News-at-All.aspx>

According to GAO, “**Ports, waterways, and vessels handle more than $700 billion in merchandise annually, and an attack on this system could have a widespread impact on global trade and the economy.”** That much is obvious to all of us on the waterfront. GAO then goes on to tell us that, “within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), component agencies have responsibility for securing the maritime environment. The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for protecting, among other things, U.S. economic and security interests in any maritime region. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for keeping terrorists and their weapons out of the United States, securing and facilitating trade, and cargo container security.”

#### Seaport infrastructure investments lower costs and increase trade

**Tsuchiya, 2007** [Kayo, http://www.adbi.org/event/2237.infrastructure.reducing.trade.costs/, “The Role of Infrastructure in Reducing Trade Costs,” Asian Development Bank Institute]

At this 25-26 June conference, over 60 economists and researchers examined the impacts of hard infrastructure, such as air and sea ports, highways, and railways on reducing trade costs, but also emphasized the important role of soft infrastructure in reducing trade costs. Soft infrastructure may take the form of more efficient trade policies, procedures, and institutions, as well as deeper reforms that lead to more foreign direct investment. This conference demonstrated that variations in tariffs and changes in transport costs resulting from infrastructure facilities have significant influences on regional trade flows in Asia. It also illustrated how the growth and improvement of infrastructure can be a cost-effective means of lowering trade costs and thereby promoting trade growth. Meanwhile, it created a platform to discuss the role that infrastructure can play in enhancing trade facilitation and regional integration. Conference participants also identified the following future research areas for infrastructure’s role in reducing trade costs: Developing infrastructure investment strategies for national regions and infrastructure sectors in terms of priority and timing, in order to facilitate trade development, Determining the impacts of different forms of infrastructure on attracting FDI; and Examining the relative impacts of soft infrastructure improvements in reducing trade costs.

#### Trade is key to the US Economy

**Alden, 11/7/11** [Edward, <http://www.cfr.org/trade/can-trade-motor-us-economy/p26425>, “Can trade motor US economy?” Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow, specializing in U.S. economic competitiveness; Director of the Renewing America Publication Series]

There is no question that trade done well can boost U.S. economic growth at a time of sluggish domestic demand. It is also true that trade done poorly will do little to set the economy on a stronger recovery path. For too long, the political debate over trade has been mired in a "trade good/trade bad" food fight that has left the United States stuck while other countries are using trade strategically to lift living standards. It is time for this country to do the latter. As the CFR's new [Task Force Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy](http://www.cfr.org/trade/us-trade-investment-policy/p25737?co=C007302) lays out clearly, there are three pillars to a trade policy that will boost economic returns for more Americans: a trade-opening strategy that focuses on the biggest and fastest-growing markets in the developing world, especially Brazil, India, and China; a renewed commitment to enforcement of trade rules; and a comprehensive worker retraining strategy to help Americans retool for a hyper-competitive global economy.

#### Trade is a vital contributor to the United States economy

**Ward, 2009** [John, <http://trade.gov/press/publications/newsletters/ita_0509/wtw_0509.asp>, “Importance of Trade to U.S. Economy Highlighted in World Trade Week Events,” John Ward is a writer in the International Trade Administration’s Office of Public Affairs]

Just as it always has during previous cycles of growth and recession, exporting holds an important place in the U.S. economy. In 2008, U.S. exports of goods and services, on a balance of payments basis, totaled $1.84 trillion, an increase of 12 percent over 2007. During the past decade, the share of U.S. gross domestic product accounted for by exporting has been growing—from 10.9 percent in 1998 to 13.0 percent in 2008.

#### Trade has contributed to millions of jobs

**Ward, 2009** [John, <http://trade.gov/press/publications/newsletters/ita_0509/wtw_0509.asp>, “Importance of Trade to U.S. Economy Highlighted in World Trade Week Events,” John Ward is a writer in the International Trade Administration’s Office of Public Affairs]

In 2008, according to figures compiled by the Census Bureau, exports of manufactured goods totaled $1.12 trillion. Manufactured exports supported roughly 6 million U.S. jobs in 2006, the latest year for which figures are available. Of those export-supported jobs, 2.58 million were in manufacturing industries. Those jobs accounted for 19.9 percent of all U.S. manufacturing employment, nearly one out of every five jobs.

## Harms Ext

### Harms: Current screening ineffective

#### CSI inspection system is inadequate and has several loopholes

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf

Given current threat levels, the CSI and related programs provide an adequate defense. **Unfortunately, the threat level may not remain constant due to the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology and the increasing availability of materials. Therefore, our defensive posture should also increase over time as our risk increases.**

**For commercial maritime traffic, reliance on the Container Security Initiative is problematic. Fundamentally how certain are we in relying on everyone else for our survival? Additionally not all cargo bound for the US passes through the cooperative ports identified in the CSI, containers transferred between ships can bypass screening, manifests can be falsified, employees and port officials can be compromised. The strategy leaves us with a false sense of security**.

#### Current port security is ineffective

**Seaport Security News, 2/1/11 [**<http://www.seaportsecuritynews.com/?p=262>, “decade later, post-9/11 security measures still ineffective”]

But without significant change to security procedures, Public Law 110-53 was created, a 286-page act made to implement the 9/11 Act itself and actually put into action the security recommendations put forth by the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States. A step in the right direction resulted from PL 110-53: Requirements were set forth upon the TSA to screen all airborne cargo prior to when it is loaded for travel in U.S. territory, requirements of which finally went into effect on August 1, 2010. Now more than six months later, security experts begin to weigh in on the decade-long efforts put forth by the TSA and Congress, as it becomes possible to determine the results of screening requirements, and if the nation is any safer today than it was on September 11, 2001. And regrettably, the answer is—no. Even if the airborne cargo screening is effective, the monstrous majority of shipments roaming about the U.S. remain unchecked for explosives and radioactivity: Ninety-five percent of imports arrive via sea, and are not subject the TSA screening mandates. The 40-foot marine containers that have become the standard for maritime import are especially susceptible to terrorist exploitation due to their sheer volume and familiarity (i.e., each container is identical, despite what’s inside). Experts agree that explosives, weapons, and nuclear or radioactive materials could be smuggled into shipping containers—to be found on U.S. ships, trains, and winding down our highways on 18 wheelers—could be smuggled in containers free of screening.

#### Onshore port layout makes them the greatest threat to national security and the economy

Charles **Goslin , 11-12- 2008 -** Vice President of International Operations for Duos Technologies, Inc., “White paper maritime and port security “http://www.duostechnologies.com/DownloadCenter/WP-MaritimeAndPortSecurity.pdf

**Worldwide Port and Maritime operations and their associated facilities and infrastructure**

**collectively represent one of the single greatest unaddressed challenges to the security of nations**

**and the global economy today.** **The reason that ports and shipping activity are so difficult to**

**secure lies primarily in their topography. Ports are typically large, asymmetrical activities**

**dispersed over hundreds of acres of land and water so that they can simultaneously accommodate**

**ship, truck and rail traffic, petroleum product/liquid offload, storage or piping, and container**

**storage**. The movement of freight, cargo (solid or liquid), and transport through a port is generally

on a “queuing” system, meaning that any delay snarls all operations1. Whether or not delays are

related to security, security generally falls by the wayside in the interest of time management or

convenience.

#### Radiation scanners don’t solve- participation is too low.

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in December of 2009 that DHS has used technologies like mobile radiation scanners successfully at foreign ports, though the level of participation at test ports remains a problem. There are also troubling numbers. The GAO found that the 54-86% of U.S.-bound cargo containers that were scanned at three ports together account for less than 3% of container shipments to the U.S., and that CBP “has not been able to achieve sustained scanning rates above 5%” at two larger ports that handle much more U.S.-bound cargo.5

#### Screeners can’t detect nuclear or radiological weapons.

Stephen E. Flynn, January/February 2006, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Port Security Is Still a House of Cards, http://www.cfr.org/border-and-ports/port-security-still-house-cards/p9629

Moreover, the radiation-detection technology currently used in the world’s ports by the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection Agency is not adequately capable of detecting a nuclear weapon or a lightly shielded dirty bomb. This is because nuclear weapons are extremely well-shielded and give off very little radioactivity. If terrorists obtained a dirty bomb and put it in a box lined with lead, it’s unlikely radiation sensors would detect the bomb’s low levels of radioactivity.

#### Only low risk countries participate in CSI

Robert Pfriender, 03/11/2006, The day a nuke hit our port, (President, Allied International Development, Ltd. ) http://www.wnd.com/2006/03/35206/

Obviously, reading from this list it is apparent **that none of these ports would likely ever be considered as being at high-risk from terrorists**. **Not one** port in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Argentina, Colombia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Cuba, and Pakistan, or any other **potential enemies of America, has agreed to participate in CSI, nor are they likely to join in the future.**

**CBP is simply checking the lowest-risk cargo from countries that have the closest relations with America. It is unlikely that any terrorist organization, especially sophisticated ones like al-Qaida, would plan to ship a weapon of mass destruction into one of our extremely vulnerable cities from any CSI member port.**

#### CSI has failed tests of the system- Even boxes labeled as Depleted Uranium can get through

Robert Pfriender, 03/11/2006, The day a nuke hit our port, (President, Allied International Development, Ltd. ) http://www.wnd.com/2006/03/35206/

**For anyone who believes that CBP can find a nuclear weapon concealed in a cargo container, consider this. A while back, ABC News did an interesting experiment. They took 15 pounds of depleted uranium, shielded by a steel pipe with a lead lining, and placed it in a suitcase. The suitcase traveled from a European country and 25 days later it arrived in the United States.**

Although it was depleted uranium and not weapons-grade highly enriched uranium, or HEU, **it would be virtually indistinguishable from the weapons-grade material. Several well-regarded experts confirm that it would be a perfect fake. It traveled from Austria to Hungary, on to Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, a typical route that smuggled nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union would likely travel.**

**In Turkey, the suitcase was placed in a wooden chest clearly labeled “Depleted Uranium” and placed with other items being shipped in a cargo container**. **It arrived in New York at the port in Staten Island some 19 days thereafter. This port is equipped with “state of the art” radiological detection equipment**, according to CBP.

**Apparently, the container *was* targeted for screening by CSI. *However, it passed through without arousing any further suspicion* and the potentially destructive cargo sailed through undetected.** Later, it went to a warehouse area near the Brooklyn Bridge and again the “weapon” was not detected by customs officers on the site.

### Non-Terrorist attack

#### Iran, North Korea, or China could launch a nuclear attack on the U.S. via unsecured ports.

Robert Pfriender, 03/11/2006, The day a nuke hit our port, (President, Allied International Development, Ltd. ) http://www.wnd.com/2006/03/35206/

**Countries such as North Korea do not need to wait until they develop more sophisticated missiles with ranges sufficient to hit the United States. Taking into account the current very disturbing posture of North Korea, or Iran for that matter, it could easily place a 10-megaton** (a size many magnitudes greater than the bombs used against Japan) **nuclear warhead into a cargo container in an un-inspected port and ship it covertly into Manhattan without ever being detected until it kills millions of Americans. Many experts believe that such a pre-emptive strike against our country is likely under the current circumstances.**

**And, North Korea and Iran are not alone in this possible scenario; they are joined by several other countries that are known to be state supporters of terror and terrorists organizations.**

**Countries such as China may also have a motive to ship several nuclear warheads to our major cities for storage to be used against us later as a contingency, i.e., if we supported Taiwan militarily when China attempts to seize Taiwan by force. In fact, such a scenario is completely within the scope of China’s well-documented doctrine of “Unrestricted Warfare.”**

### Drug Smuggling

#### Current port layout contributes to drug smuggling

**COLONEL** DREFUS **LANE** SR**. 2009,** United States Army Colonel, “U.S. SEAPORT SECURITY: CRITICAL CHALLENGE FOR DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY”

**U.S. Seaports are naturally at risk to terrorist attacks due to their huge land masses. It is common for seaports to have many avenues of access, by water and land.** They are often located in metropolitan areas. **They transport large quantities of valuable goods, and provide effective transportation links and nodes to many destinations within U.S. borders. The perceived pre- 9/11 threats and vulnerabilities included internal conspiracies,** stowaways and smuggling illegal aliens, illegal export, **and drug smuggling. Defending against these vulnerabilities proved difficult due to the staggering numbers of U.S. ports and their structural designs.**

#### Offshore ports solve maritime drug smuggling and human trafficking.

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf

Environmental benefits include reduced dredging of harbors, alternative energy development and the elimination of invasive species threats. Law enforcement benefits include the virtual elimination of seaborne human trafficking and a capability to deter drug smuggling. The technology can also be applied as a platform for maritime domain awareness and remote ocean-based logistics platforms for the Department of Defense. Finally are the benefits achieved through the commercialization of the intellectual property.

#### Only 7% of cargo is screened for drugs

**Seaport security news,11-23- 2010 ”**Port Security Is A Global Issue” <http://www.seaportsecuritynews.com/?p=212>

**Only 7-10% of the cargo that enters U.S. ports is scanned for illegal drugs or chemical, nuclear or biological agents, Homeland Security Department officials say**. But they are quick to add that all cargo is “screened,” using a variety of cooperative programs and technologies, prior to reaching port.

#### Increased port monitoring is key to limiting drug smuggling and terrorism

Kongsberg Maritime, 8. May 2009, (a world leader in sonar diver detection systems and technologies) KONGSBERG releases White Paper on Military and Civilian Port Security, http://www.km.kongsberg.com/ks/web/nokbg0238.nsf/AllWeb/37DE0655571E668DC12575B0003139AA?OpenDocument

**Drug smuggling** **and the rise of terrorist threats over the last ten years have increased the need to monitor the underwater lanes of our ports using sonar and other technologies**. Fortunately, recent sophisticated innovations are helping to address this problem. This white paper explains how these advances can help improve port security."

#### Offshore ports free up resources for other border security projects

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf

Additionally, the US government and ports can avoid expenditures updating monitoring devices in 361 US ports and hundreds of international ports. Instead, it will be able to concentrate technological resources on a few offshore platforms where the screening would occur. Technology already deployed at existing ports can be diverted to land border crossings to enhance the security posture there, because of the incentive for an adversary to exploit land routes connecting the US from other ports in the Americas.

## General Solvency Ext

### Solvency: Tech

#### The tech exists for offshore ports- Just need investment and political will

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf

Other than economics, technology and political will are factors that need to be considered

when evaluating an offshore inspection strategy. While the technology exists to establish

permanent offshore platforms within the control of the US, the scale of an offshore

development needed to handle the throughput of commercial maritime traffic is

unprecedented.

### Solvency: 5 Ports

#### Our solvency advocate indicates 5 offshore ports should be built and could handle all incoming cargo

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf

The Portunus Project concept is to ultimately establish about five offshore ports that are commercially viable to provide the capability to screen all inbound cargo and transoceanic marine craft bound for the US in about 20 years. The project can be divided into three phases.

### International Modeling

#### Other countries will model US adoption of offshore ports

Float Inc, Sept 17, 2002, Implementing the Beyond the Horizon Strategy, (Corporation providing services that include research, design and development of marine oriented products and specializes in very large floating platforms)http://www.floatinc.org/BtHSep02.pdf

**Not unlike FedEx's efficient nationwide delivery system with its center in Memphis where all packages are sent, the ocean shipping industry may realize that a similar system could work as efficiently for sea borne deliveries as well. Indeed**, Grand Port, a proposal for just such an **offshore, floating, deep-water port** for New Orleans, **employ**s **the same technology**. Grand Port had already achieved prominence in the Millenium Port deliberations prior to 9/11 on logistical considerations alone. **If such a system of centralized distribution is successful, its adoption by other nations is assured. As time passes, all will grow accustomed to the necessity of shipping everything through these centers just as the airlines have gotten us use to flying from satellite cities to their hubs before flying on to another city.**

## Terrorism Ext

### Heg Add on

#### An attack on a port would destroy military transportation and readiness

Frittelli May 27, 2005 [John F, Specialist in Transportation Resources, Science, and Industry Division, “Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31733.pdf PWS]

In addition to its economic significance, the marine transportation system is vital for national security. The Departments of Defense and Transportation have designated 17 U.S. seaports as strategic because they are necessary for use by DOD in the event of a major military deployment. Thirteen of these ports are commercial seaports. During Desert Storm, 90% of all military equipment and supplies were shipped from U.S. strategic ports. The deployment required over 312 vessels from 18 commercial and military ports in the United States. As the GAO has reported, “If the strategic ports (or the ships carrying military supplies) were attacked, not only could massive civilian casualties be sustained, but DOD could also lose precious cargo and time and be forced to rely heavily on its overburdened airlift capabilities.” 18

#### \*\*\* ADD HEG IMPACT\*\*\*

### Terrorism Ext: Ports Targeted

#### WMD terrorist attack against US ports is inevitable in the next 10 years unless offshore ports are developed

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf

Over the next 10-20years, the probability of a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass

destruction (WMD) on the United States is projected to increase1. At some point over the next few decades, it may be inevitable that a terrorist group will have access to a WMD.

The economic and social impact of an attack using a WMD anywhere in the world would be catastrophic.

For weapons developed overseas, the routes of entry are air and sea with the maritime

vector as the most porous. Providing a system to track, perform a risk assessment and

inspect all inbound marine traffic before it reaches US coastal cities thereby mitigating

the threat has long been a goal for our government. The challenge is to do so effectively

without crippling the US economy.

The Portunus Project addresses only the maritime threat and builds on a robust maritime

domain awareness capability2. It is a process to develop the technologies, policies and

practices that will enable the US to establish a waypoint for the inspection of

international marine traffic, screen 100% of containerized and bulk cargo prior to entry

into the US if deemed necessary, provide a palatable economic model for transshipping,

grow the US economy, and improve US environmental quality. The implementation

strategy is based on security risk, and the political and economic constraints of

implementation. This article is meant to provide a basic understanding of how and why

this may be accomplished.

#### Ports are the greatest risk for terrorism- only 5% of shipping is inspected.

Council on Foreign Relations, Jan 2006, Targets for Terrorism: Ports. <http://www.cfr.org/port-security/targets-terrorism-ports/p10215>

Yes. CFR Senior Fellow [Stephen Flynn](http://www.cfr.org/bios/3301/) says “**maritime transportation is one of our nation’s most serious vulnerabilities.” At current staffing and funding levels, U.S. Coast Guard personnel and Customs agents can thoroughly inspect only about 5 percent of the 9 million shipping containers that arrive at U.S. ports every year**. Though the Customs Service is using increasingly sophisticated risk-assessment technology to choose which shipments to inspect, many outside experts are unsure about the system’s effectiveness.

#### **Risk of Terrorist Involvement in Ports is Very High**

Frittelli May 27, 2005 [John F, Specialist in Transportation Resources, Science, and Industry Division, “Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31733.pdf PWS]

Government leaders and security experts are worried that the maritime transportation system could be used by terrorists to smuggle personnel, weapons of mass destruction, or other dangerous materials into the United States. They are also concerned that ships in U.S. ports, particularly large commercial cargo ships or cruise ships, could be attacked by terrorists. Experts are concerned that a large-scale terrorist attack at a U.S. port could not only cause local death and damage, but also paralyze global maritime commerce. The 9/11 Commission reported that, “While commercial aviation remains a possible target, terrorists may turn their attention to other modes. Opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime and surface transportation. Initiatives to secure shipping containers have just begun.” 3

#### **Terrorists Have many Options when it comes to Disrupting Ports, many of which have happened elsewhere in the past**

Frittelli May 27, 2005 [John F, Specialist in Transportation Resources, Science, and Industry Division, “Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31733.pdf PWS]

Security experts are concerned about a variety of terrorist threat scenarios at U.S. ports. Among other things, they are concerned that terrorists could: ! use commercial cargo containers to smuggle terrorists, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, components thereof, or other dangerous materials into the United States; ! seize control of a large commercial cargo ship and use it as a collision weapon for destroying a bridge or refinery located on the waterfront; ! sink a large commercial cargo ship in a major shipping channel, thereby blocking all traffic to and from the port; ! attack a large ship carrying a volatile fuel (such as liquefied natural gas) and detonate the fuel so as to cause a massive in-port explosion; ! attack an oil tanker in a port or at an offshore discharge facility 19 so as to disrupt the world oil trade and cause large-scale environmental damage; ! seize control of a ferry (which can carry hundreds of passengers) or a cruise ship (which can carry more than 3,000 passengers, of whom about 90% are usually U.S. citizens) and threaten the deaths of the passengers if a demand is not met; ! attack U.S. Navy ships in an attempt to kill U.S. military personnel, damage or destroy a valuable U.S. military asset, and (in the case of nuclear-powered ships) cause a radiological release. ! use land around a port to stage attacks on bridges, refineries located on the waterfront, or other port facilities. Some of these scenarios (or similar ones) have already come to pass elsewhere. For example, in October 2002, the French oil tanker Limberg appears to have been attacked by a bomb-laden boat off the coast of Yemen, killing one crewman aboard the tanker, damaging the ship, and causing an oil spill. 20 In October 2001, Italian authorities arrested on terrorism charges an Egyptian-born Canadian citizen found with high-tech equipment (including a satellite phone and a computer) and other personal possessions in a cargo container in an Italian port. 21 In October 2000, the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole was attacked by a bomb-laden boat during a refueling stop in the harbor of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 sailors, injuring 39 others, and causing damage to the ship that cost about $250 million to repair. 22 In 1985, terrorists seized the cruise ship Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean and held its passengers hostage, killing one of them.

#### **Both Ports and Ships are extremely vulnerable to Terrorism and Piracy**

Frittelli May 27, 2005 [John F, Specialist in Transportation Resources, Science, and Industry Division, “Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31733.pdf PWS]

Port areas and ships in ports have many vulnerabilities to

potential terrorist attack. Port areas have very large landside perimeters to secure, giving terrorists many potential landside points of entry. Some ports are located immediately adjacent to built-up urban areas, giving terrorists places to hide while approaching or escaping from port areas. Large numbers of trucks move in and out of ports, making it possible for terrorists to use a truck to bring themselves and their weapons into a port. Many ports harbor fishing and recreational boats that terrorists could use to mask their approach to a target ship. Ships. Commercial cargo ships at pier or at anchorage in harbor are stationary, and those moving through port do so at slow speeds, making them easy to intercept by a fast-moving boat. Commercial cargo ships are generally unarmed and have very small crews, making them vulnerable to seizure by a small group of armed people, as proven by modern-day pirates. In the 1990s, the number of reported attacks on cargo ships by pirates tripled. 24 Most pirate attacks occur while the ship is in port. Although most attacks occur in Southeast Asian waters on foreign-flag freighters, U.S. shippers are likely to be among the owners of cargo onboard. It can also be noted that some experts believe there is a link between piracy and terrorism — that the goal of some acts of piracy may be to raise money to finance terrorist operations. The Financial Times has reported an incident where a chemical tanker in the south Pacific was boarded by pirates who practiced steering the vessel at varying speeds for several hours. 25 The lack of transparency in ship registration has been a longstanding concern. An Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study on the ownership and control of ships reports that: Not only does perfect transparency not exist, but in fact anonymity seems to be the rule rather than the exception, and not only is it permitted, but in many cases positively encouraged. This enables terrorists and would be terrorists to remain intimately involved in the operation of their vessels, while maintaining totally hidden, through the use of relatively simple mechanisms that are readily available and legally tolerated in almost all jurisdictions. 26 Unscrupulous ship owners are known to mask their identity by re-registering their vessels under fictitious corporate names and renaming and repainting their ships. Shipowners can register their vessels in “flag of convenience” countries which may have lax regulations and require little information from the applicants. According to press reports, U.S. intelligence officials believe they have identified 15 cargo ships that have links to al Qaeda. 27

#### Port security is key to terrorism prevention measures

**WENDY J. KEEFER 5-21-2008**[“Container Port Security: A Layered Defense Strategy to Protect the Homeland and the International Supply Chain”] <http://law.campbell.edu/lawreview/articles/30-1-139.pdf>

The events of September 11, 2001 aimed a spotlight on the true state of our national security. Though that particular terrorist attack utilized airlines, the lack of any real security measures at U.S. seaports raised perhaps even greater concerns. **Ports provide entry from all over the world into the United States. People and cargo arrive at U.S. ports with relatively little oversight. Once there, via road, rail or otherwise, they may travel throughout the country.** Recent government initiatives to tighten port security create numerous layers of protection from the entry of dangerous individuals and cargo. This layered defense seeks to prevent future attacks upon the country, as well as to protect the international supply chain. **Disruption of trade via attack on or at U.S. ports would be economically devastating.** **Port security**, however, is not a unilateral endeavor. It **involves all levels of government, private domestic and international businesses, and foreign governments**. Also, **it encompasses numerous issues— from the security of actual port facilities to passenger identity verification to threats posed by container cargo shipments.** Prior to post-9/11 initiatives, nowhere were the gaps in security more startling than in the importation of cargo packaged in shipping containers. Shipping containers travel the seas and enter ports with seeming anonymity and little verification of their contents.

#### Port security is key to prevent WMD terrorism

David M**. Stone, 3-06-2006 -**  Rear Admiral U.S. Navy (retired) “Port Security: Top Threats and Technology Trends” http://www.securityinfowatch.com/article/10558823/port-security-top-threats-and-technology-trends

**The terrorist threat of greatest concern to U.S. authorities today is a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), particularly nuclear, and the potential for the enormous damage it could create. To prevent a WMD from reaching the U.S., our country's security efforts encompass** air and ground transportation as well as **seaports**. With the current debate about the management of some U.S. port operations by Dubai Ports World, the maritime scenario has spiked on the "radar screen" of popular and political consciousness.

#### Terrorism via ports poses a greater risk than the Soviet Union did during the cold war.

Robert Pfriender, 03/11/2006, The day a nuke hit our port, (President, Allied International Development, Ltd. ) http://www.wnd.com/2006/03/35206/

**The scope of the problem we face is enormous. Over the next ten years, a total of more than 88 million of these potential stealth weapons will be facing our country with no legitimate defense being offered by any current program.**

**To put this in perspective, during the height of the Cold War, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Soviet Union had about 10,000** deployed **intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons** (missile warheads and bombs) **for potential use against the United States** in 1986. **And it cost them many billions of dollars to build them and maintain them. They now have a considerably lower number of warheads.**

**Terrorists can now accomplish the same destruction of our country for merely a few thousand dollars in shipping charges and know with certainty that their attack will be undetected and likely successful, even if sent from a CSI-participating port.**

### Terrorism Ext- Solvency

#### Offshore ports solve terrorism risk and provide efficient cargo transfers.

Dr. Michael J. Hillyard, (April 2005), President, Rockwell University, The Atlantis Garrison: A Comprehensive, Cost Effective Cargo and Port Security Strategy, http://www.ciaonet.org.mutex.gmu.edu/olj/si/si\_4\_4/si\_4\_4\_him01.pdf

**While government and commercial applications demonstrate the diversity of ocean real estate these new offshore technologies enable, the most significant application could be realized in a system of offshore ports to protect and defend the United States**. **Envisioning an ocean equivalent of the nation’s highway toll system, a series of cargo security screening ports could be strategically located as close as 2-3 miles or as far as 12-15 miles offshore**,[18] transecting the major U.S.-bound global sea lanes.

**These offshore ports would build on the government’s Container Security Initiative (CSI)—an initiative that places customs officials at foreign ports to prescreen and target high risk cargo—by providing the opportunity to scan and inspect a high percentage of all suspect cargo while it is at sea**. **The offshore ports would also prevent a ship-based dirty bomb attack from affecting the U.S. population by offloading, scanning, and reloading cargo on secured lighters or barges; provide the option to prevent any foreign vessel from reaching U.S. shores** (while still enabling foreign vessel cargo offloads at the offshore port); **and provide a more efficient intermodal system in which platform-supported air, sea, rail, and truck cargo transfers could occur at a single location**.

#### Even if attacks are not detected, offshore ports solve their impact

Dr. Michael J. Hillyard, (April 2005), President, Rockwell University, The Atlantis Garrison: A Comprehensive, Cost Effective Cargo and Port Security Strategy, http://www.ciaonet.org.mutex.gmu.edu/olj/si/si\_4\_4/si\_4\_4\_him01.pdf

Providing the conceptual underpinnings for a comprehensive cargo and port defense-in-depth

strategy, the **Department of Homeland Security**’s “A National Cargo Security Strategy White

Paper,” **envisions enhanced physical security of the global supply chain, recognition of nuclear,**

**chemical, biological, and radiological materials as the highest cargo security threat, and the**

**necessity to identify and inspect 100 percent of high risk cargo**.[25] In realizing such a strategy,

two essential elements must be considered: information systems and geography. The more

information that is available about every ship and container that moves around the globe, the less

likely that a dangerous shipment will leave one port or reach another. **The further away from U.S.**

**soil, or “pushing out our borders,” that such information enables, makes it much less likely that**

**any cargo that might slip through a secure information system will still be able do its intended**

**damage.**

#### Offshore ports create an extra line of defense that minimizes the effect of attacks and increases distribution efficiency.

Dr. Michael J. Hillyard, (April 2005), President, Rockwell University, The Atlantis Garrison: A Comprehensive, Cost Effective Cargo and Port Security Strategy, http://www.ciaonet.org.mutex.gmu.edu/olj/si/si\_4\_4/si\_4\_4\_him01.pdf

**The cargo inspection site at an offshore port would be the second line of the defense-in-depth. Offshore ports personnel and systems would screen all high risk cargo and up to 75% of all remaining cargo. They would also be responsible for separating containers to transfer them to truck, air, ship, or rail from foreign vessels onto U.S.-provided transportation that would take the cargo to its ultimate destination. Currently, most every port in the United States lacks the onsite capability to disseminate and transfer cargo to sea, air, rail, and truck operations**. Using the Port of Vancouver example, air operations commence only after a package is trucked 15 miles away to the airport. In the process of making the U.S. more secure, an offshore port would also enable an economically efficient hub and spoke transfer system into the country.

I**f the second line’s offshore port was physically attacked, the consequences would be dramatically less severe than one at a U.S.-based port. A USS Cole-equivalent attack would not sink a several hundred acre platform due to the interlocking support provided by thousands of individually buoyant and concrete reinforced cylinders.** **Unlike steel, concrete does not conduct heat, so a conventional weapon’s damage would be locally contained. Even if a weapon caused damage enough to ruin an entire section of a large platform, that section could be released, dropped to the ocean floor, and replaced with a newly constructed section**. **The platform would be repaired in its present location without having to be transported to a port. A more consequential WMD attack might destroy or make uninhabitable the port site, which would still result in the confined destruction of the port facility itself**, its docked ships, and its people, cargo, and supplies.

#### Offshore ports are safer, most cost effective, and better for the environment than traditional ports

SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORTATION SOLUTIONS, 2012, STS Offshore Loading Terminals, (company specializing in transportation optimization) http://stsplc.com/KeyCapabilities/STSOffshorePorts/Technologydescription.aspx

The construction of STS **Offshore Loading Terminals** integrated with STS Railway Freight Systems **provides certain benefits in solving the problem of lack of deep-water port facilities as compared with conventional facilities:**

* **possibility of 20m depth waterfront formation with minimum capital expenses for dredging and sea port area formation through the use of natural depth;**
* **minimizing of approach channels, which greatly simplifies entry of bulk carriers** to STS port **as compared with conventional sea ports;**
* minimization of pilot support;
* minimization of demurrage;
* **simultaneous loading of stored and delivered goods provides rapid loading of bulk carrier;**
* loading rate of bulk materials to the bulk carrier is not limited by the speed of bulk materials delivery by STS Railway Freight System trains to the port;
* possibility of mixing bulk materials with different characteristics while loading;
* **no need in vast onshore territories for stockpiles of ore, coal, etc.;**
* when there is no bulk carrier the bulk cargo may be stored at storage bins of STS Offshore Loading Terminal;
* **considerably lower environmental impact during construction and operation;**
* **offshore location of the terminal reduces the risk of terrorist attacks.**

#### Offshore ports improve security and the economy

[Stephen Wampler](mailto:wampler1@llnl.gov), JULY 2, 2010, (Staff Writer) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory News, Plan floated to ship cargo inspection offshore. https://newsline.llnl.gov/\_rev02/articles/2010/jul/07.02.10-ports.php

**The principal aim of the Portunus effort is to prevent ships entering a U.S. port with weapons of mass destruction and to do so in a way that benefits the nation’s economy**,” he said.

**With a large off-shore platform, the U.S. government would have the capability to inspect ships and cargo at sea prior to their arrival in U.S. ports near American cities**.

Three options have been identified by Glauser and his team — inspecting the ships and allowing them to proceed; off-loading the ships’ cargo, inspecting and then reloading the ships; and off-loading the ships’ cargo, inspecting and then reloading the cargo on different ships for economic reasons.

The June meeting was opened by Tomás Díaz de la Rubia, now the Laboratory’s deputy director for Science and Technology.

De la Rubia thanked the business school teams, the panel of government experts and the audience for taking the time to work with the Laboratory on the Portunus project.

“**I think the mission need is unassailable**,” de la Rubia said. “**There are people out there who want to do us harm.** This is a compelling national security challenge where the Laboratory’s capabilities could have an extraordinary impact.”

#### Expanded inspections alone can’t solve risk of terrorism

Float Inc, Sept 17, 2002, Implementing the Beyond the Horizon Strategy, (Corporation providing services that include research, design and development of marine oriented products and specializes in very large floating platforms)http://www.floatinc.org/BtHSep02.pdf

**Planning is also underway to increase the number of container inspections at all U.S. ports, although many do not have space for individual container inspection, nor for the storage of backed up containers caused by these inspections. This strategy**, as necessary as the various layers are, **does not provide the required protection against the basic threat from the in-port detonation of a ship, or cargo container borne weapon prior to its discovery and neutralization**. The satellite-based tracking system can provide needed intelligence on the track of a container ship, but tracking every container on that ship from its point of origin to its final destination is beyond today's technology.

#### Offshore ports reduce the risk of terrorism- they’re poor targets and are easily defended and repaired.

Float Inc, Sept 17, 2002, Implementing the Beyond the Horizon Strategy, (Corporation providing services that include research, design and development of marine oriented products and specializes in very large floating platforms)http://www.floatinc.org/BtHSep02.pdf

**The proposed offshore port would not compare to the World Trade Center in its attraction for a terrorist attack. The on-board population would be too sparse and the damage readily contained. Further, being surrounded by water, it would be much more defensible. Additionally, it can be designed with modularity such that modules damaged in an attack could be quickly replaced with prefabricated modules, thus avoiding a significant loss of operating time. The sheer size of each platform and the number of components and modules that comprise it provide such redundancy that its vulnerability would be limited and manageable.**

**With the water being part of the perimeter defense, the security of the floating port will be easier to achieve than for land-based ports. Sensors and systems developed for landbased ports that are presently in use by the US Navy and others should be more effective** considering the more homogeneous nature of the surrounding environment. **Using today's technology to provide a picture of the port and all surrounding activity, above and below the surface through linked command, control and communication systems will enable rapid response to a threat.**

#### Offshore ports solve WMD attacks against ports by closing all of the loopholes of traditional security measures and mitigating potential damage.

Float Inc, Sept 17, 2002, Implementing the Beyond the Horizon Strategy, (Corporation providing services that include research, design and development of marine oriented products and specializes in very large floating platforms)http://www.floatinc.org/BtHSep02.pdf

**The United States Government has made a compelling case of the threat our nation is facing from a weapon of mass destruction being delivered through our ports. If such a weapon were unleashed, even in a single strategic port, the loss of life, and economic disruption would be incalculable**. If the headline at the beginning of this paper were to be realized, the tip of the economic iceberg is found in the annual Department of Commerce, BEA statistics. **The loss in 2001 of both import and export business would have been approximately $6.5 billion per day.**

**To counter that threat, the U.S. has begun to plan and implement certain preventative and defensive measures**. Two of these, **increased standards of security in foreign ports and the tracking of all U.S. bound ships place one’s security in the hands of foreign governments and foreign nationals. This is a very unsettling thought**. **A third measure, to significantly reduce the threat by beefing up security in individual ports, is likely to be equally ineffective. First, the ports have little additional real estate for this added function. Second, the system would need individual tailoring to fit the over 300 U.S. ports. Third, simply detonating the ship or its cargo in the harbor before off loading its cargo could compromise even the best system of port security.**

**A floating offshore port embodies in a single concept a viable solution for all three deficiencies in the current strategy.** The U.S. would have total control and not be dependent on foreign governments for the security of our shores. Tracking of ships with or without foreign government permission would not be necessary if the ships were channeled through these inspection stations at sea. **Furthermore, and most important, terrorist incursions and attacks would be buffered from the mainland by its separation offshore.**

**Onshore ports are too late- Only offshore ports can prevent a WMD terrorism disaster**

David **Stone 3/6/06**, Rear Admiral U.S. Navy (retired), “Port Security: Top Threats and Technology Trends” <http://www.securityinfowatch.com/article/10558823/port-security-top-threats-and-technology-trends>

**The terrorist threat of greatest concern to U.S. authorities today is a weapon of mass destruction** (WMD), **particularly nuclear, and the potential for the enormous damage it could create. To prevent a WMD from reaching the U.S., our country's security efforts encompass air and ground transportation as well as seaports.** With the current debate about the management of some U.S. port operations by Dubai Ports World, the maritime scenario has spiked on the "radar screen" of popular and political consciousness. It is important to understand that while paying greater attention to port security is vital, the focus on the management of U.S. terminals is misplaced. **Once a ship arrives at a U.S. port, it is often too late to prevent disaster. A WMD can be detonated offshore or as the ship approaches the harbor, achieving its purpose before the ship ever puts its mooring lines over the pier.**

#### Offshore ports solve nuclear, chemical, and biological threats.

Robert Pfriender, 03/11/2006, The day a nuke hit our port, (President, Allied International Development, Ltd. ) http://www.wnd.com/2006/03/35206/

**One possible solution is** the development of the **Offshore Super-Security Inspection Ports** that has been proposed by a consortium that includes my company, Allied International Development, Ltd. **These offshore ports would provide the highest level of threat protection from weapons of mass-destruction concealed in cargo shipping containers by facilitating comprehensive** **robotic inspection of all containers before they arrive on the United States mainland.**

**The ports would enable true inspection (as compared to the mere virtual screening of CSI) of the containers for all types of weapons of mass destruction. The Offshore Super-Security Inspection Ports would even have capabilities to quarantine chemical and biological materials** detected. **Various technologies to neutralize and prevent the detonation of any nuclear weapons that may be encountered are being explored**.

**These new, high-technology security inspection ports will feature a safe, deepwater**, 25-mile **offshore location providing an effective distance barrier to any nuclear, biological or chemical weapons incident that may occur during the inspection of the containers**.

Most importantly, **the Super-Security Inspection Ports will preclude any weapon of mass destruction concealed within an inbound cargo container from ever arriving on the U.S. mainland and the possibility that it could be utilized within the territory of the United States**.

### Terrorism: Impx

#### A single WMD attack on a port will kill 1 million people and cost billions in property damage and trade disruption.

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf

The cost of a WMD attack on the US is estimated to be significant. By one estimate, a 10- to 20-kiliton weapon (a Hiroshima-sized nuclear bomb is about 15 kilotons) detonated in a major seaport would kill 50,000 to 1 million people and would result in direct property damage of $50 to $500 billion, losses due to trade disruption of $100 to $200 billion, and indirect costs in the hundreds of billions.4 Even a near miss event could cost the government tens of billions of dollars. Response scenarios when a device or attack is discovered at a port would likely include shutdowns at other ports, inspections of containerized cargo on road and rail systems, and significant constraints on international imports as ports are cleared to open after expanded inspection protocols.

### Terrorism: Econ IL

#### Secure ports are key to the global economy.

Joshua A. Lindenbaum, Summer, 2006, ASSURING THE FLOW: MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES AND TRADE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA, Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business, Lexis

The determination and ingenuity of terrorists in the 21st century require sophisticated, proactive security regimes to protect against attacks. **Perhaps no potential terrorist target is larger or more fragmented than the whole of the world's ports**, commercial shipping vessels, and key shipping lanes. **This creates an enormously far-flung and complex problem in securing maritime transport, and the fate of the world economy rests on its solution. Assuring the free flow of goods and materials is of vital importance to all nations, but arguably to none more than the United States and China. The continued growth of** **[\*111]  both countries' economies is contingent not just upon the ability to safely transport cargo to each other's ports, but confidence in the global marketplace in their ability to do so**.

#### Even threats against ports can trigger a recession.

Dr. Michael J. Hillyard, (April 2005), President, Rockwell University, The Atlantis Garrison: A Comprehensive, Cost Effective Cargo and Port Security Strategy, http://www.ciaonet.org.mutex.gmu.edu/olj/si/si\_4\_4/si\_4\_4\_him01.pdf

Asa Hutchinson, the Department of Homeland Security’s former undersecretary for border and

transportation security, summarizes the other side of the timeliness dilemma: “The waterways are

a concern; we’re not there in a perfect security environment...(but) do you shut down our

economic system…I think we learned that you can’t do that.”[7] **The economic consequences of**

**shutting down the Port of Long Beach/Los Angeles** (which receives over 40% of the nation’s total

container imports) **or the Mississippi Waterway and Houston Ship Channel** (which receive onehalf

of the nation’s tanker imports) for an extended period of time **due to security fears or**

**inefficient port inspection procedures could trigger a recession**.[8] And, **because** the inspection

process is fundamentally flawed, and **the country is so vulnerable to seaborne attack, even just**

**the threat of a bomb becomes a credible nightmare**. Time is also a major consideration when

trying to convince several hundred state- and locally- subsidized port authorities to comply with

increasingly onerous federal security standards.

#### Even a conventional attack on a US port would devastate the economy

Council on Foreign Relations, Jan 2006, Targets for Terrorism: Ports. <http://www.cfr.org/port-security/targets-terrorism-ports/p10215>

Yes. **Experts warn that U.S. seaports could be tempting targets for terrorists bent on killing large numbers of people, grabbing media attention, and disrupting the U.S. economy**. Port, ferry, and cruise-ship terminals are often located in highly congested areas where large numbers of people live and work. [Liquefied natural gas](http://www.cfr.org/publication/9810/) terminals and refineries that produce highly volatile petrochemicals and convert crude oil into gasoline and heating oil are also often nearby. **Given the importance of foreign trade to the U.S. economy, an attack that shut down a major American port for even a few days could devastate the** regional **economy served by that port.**

#### Ports are an attractive target for terrorists because of potential economic disruption

Linda Loyd, November 2, 2010, Inquirer Staff Writer, How safe and secure are seaports such as Philadelphia?, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Lexis

"Within the intelligence community, the consensus has largely been that al-Qaeda are not interested in going after freight or movement of cargo, but interested in passenger airplanes and killing people," Flynn said. "I have been pushing back on this view because economic disruption is an increasingly attractive tactic for terrorists, to go after the critical infrastructures that make our economy hum."

Flynn said he would like to see "automatic screening" of every container when it leaves a truck or train at maritime terminals or depots, before being loaded onto ships. "It's more cost effective, more comprehensive to do it there, than pick a few needles out of the haystack to inspect."

#### WMD attack on ports would devastate the economy.

Andrew Mener and Jessica Leval, 04.20.09, Pirates Attack! Protect Our Ports!, (f*ounding chief of the University of Pennsylvania's Emergency Medical Services. Jessica Leval is a research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute and assistant director of the AEI-Brookings Continuity of Government Commission.)* http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/17/homeland-security-ports-opinions-contributors-pirates.html

Emergency preparedness planners are concerned that terrorists might smuggle a chemical or even nuclear weapon into the U.S. inside a cargo-shipping container. But if terrorists were to succeed in smuggling a small, conventional weapon laced with radiological materials (a so-called "dirty bomb") into the U.S., they could kill dozens of people, damage infrastructure and precipitate widespread panic. Fear of secondary explosions could temporarily halt U.S. imports and devastate an already fragile economy.

### Terrorism: Would be Nuclear/ Radiological

#### Ports would be targeted for radiological attacks

Peter Chalk, 2008, The maritime dimensions of international security: Terrorism, piracy and the challenges for the United States, (Peter Chalk is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation) <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf>

Terrorist contingencies involving containerized freight have also been consistently highlighted as particularly relevant to U.S. national security. One scenario that has been repeatedly played out because of the volume of (unchecked) containers shipped to U.S. shores is the use of a boxed crate to hide a radiological dispersal device that is then detonated on land.5 Although the effects of such an attack would depend on the size and sophistication of the dirty bomb employed, it would cause at least localized contamination of the immediate surrounding area (often referred to as “ground shine”) and could reasonably be expected to elicit mass public panic of radiological fallout if deaths actually occurred.6

#### **Port Security Vital to prevent Nuclear Terrorism**

**Rugy**, November **2007** [Veronique de, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, specifically researching homeland security, “Is Port Security Funding Making us Safer?” http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit\_11\_07\_derugy.pdf, PWS]

The most terrifying security threat to security experts and the public alike is nuclear proliferation. Once the figment of Hollywood imagination, the ultimate nightmare scenario that is discussed by some as inevitable is the detonation of a nuclear device on American soil. The majority of experts believe that the most likely way weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would enter the United States is by sea, hence a focus on port security.1 Ports offer terrorists vast opportunities to inflict damages. As the primary mode of transportation for world trade goods, maritime commerce is essential to America’s economic vitality.2 Every year approximately nine million cargo containers—26,000 a day—arrive at U.S. ports from all over the world.3 The U.S. maritime system includes more than 361 sea and river ports with more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals and more than 1,000 harbor channels along thousands of miles of coastline.4

### Terrorism: Biological

#### Inadequate port security leads to biological weapons attacks

Barry Ritholtz, October 23, 2011, (chief executive of FusionIQ, a quantitative research firm) Washington Post, The public investment we need to make now, for our competitiveness, our jobs and our safety, Lexis

**Ports. We are checking too little of the cargo coming into the United States. Since 9/11, we simply have not upgraded our** **port security sufficiently, and we remain vulnerable to attack by a dirty bomb or biological weapon**. As long as we are discussing security, our chemical plants and petroleum processing centers could use a good security upgrade as well.

### Terrorism: Funding doesn’t solve

#### Although Port Security Recieves Funding, The money is allocated incorrectly

**Rugy**, November **2007** [Veronique de, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, specifically researching homeland security, “Is Port Security Funding Making us Safer?” http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit\_11\_07\_derugy.pdf, PWS]

In FY 2007, President Bush requested $2.3 billion for port security out of a $57 billion government-wide budget for homeland security.5 However, the important question is not how much money is spent but rather whether the money is allocated toward the most costeffective programs. In other words, is America getting the maximum level of protection in exchange for our tax dollars? A close look at port security allocation decisions indicates that spending occurs without regard for risk analysis let alone cost-benefit analysis, leading to a large array of misallocated spending. For instance, what should be the highest priorities—preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear devices and material—receive less money than much less cost-effective policies such as nuclear detection in the ports or post-disaster response activities.

### Nuclear Terrorism Impact – Global Nuclear War 1NC/1AC

#### Nuclear terrorism compels nations to assume the worst and retaliate against any perceived state sponsor of the attack – causes nuclear war between the US, Russia and China.

Robert **Ayson**, 2010, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington (NZ), “After a Nuclear Terrorist Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2010.483756

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael Mayetal. That while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important ... some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Clue do? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a back drop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and a betters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ ...long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

### Nuclear Terror Impact – Global Nuclear War

#### Nuclear terrorism prompts global nuclear retaliation.

Robert **Ayson,** 20**10**, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington (NZ), “After a Nuclear Terrorist Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2010.483756

The most important and challenging question regarding the scale of force that might be used after a terrorist nuclear attack is whether that response might itself include the use of nuclear weapons (by the victim and/or supporting states).Such a response would not break the long-standing taboo on nuclear use in general terms, because the terrorist group had just done exactly that. Even so a nuclear response would still be breaking a more specific form of the same taboo—the foreswearing of the use of nuclear weapons by states. As the discussion later in this article will demonstrate, any such nuclear use would be far from unproblematic. Even if the state deciding whether or not to respond with nuclear weapons realized that it had no chance of undoing the calamity it had already suffered, the nuclear temptation could still be strong. It might be thought, for example, that if a nuclear response was precluded, terrorist groups (and perhaps other actors) could expect that in the future they (and their supporters) would be immune from the risks of especially harmful retaliation. A non-nuclear response might embolden aspiring nuclear terrorists to repeat the dose. Other considerations could work in the other direction, reducing the prospect of a nuclear response to nuclear terrorism. If the identity and location of the responsible terrorist group was known with some precision, the use of a nuclear weapon against it could easily exceed the maximum damage required for its destruction or incapacitation. The same objective might well be achievable by the use of conventional weapons (although perhaps not if the group had hidden itself deep underground). But these operational considerations might still miss the point: there could be a strong groundswell of public and elite opinion favoring the use of the ultimate weapon against the group that was thought to have used it in the first place. Concerns about collateral damage—especially if the terrorist group was situated in a heavily populated area—might not be especially pressing in the aftermath of a terrorist attack that had already killed tens of thousands of innocent civilians. There might also be strong pressure for nuclear retaliation simply to be visited on the country that had been so malicious (or foolish or unlucky) to have hosted and/or supported the group. Of course, the terrorist group’s known leaders and operatives might well be dispersed, and it would seem especially disproportionate to use multiple nuclear weapons on multiple individual human targets in multiple countries (if of course multiple nuclear use was an option for the country making the response). But there might be situations in which rather than targeting the terrorist group itself with nuclear retaliation, with potential collateral effects for a wider population involving the slaughter of innocents, a deliberate decision might still be taken to launch an inter-state nuclear attack that might still bring with it very wide casualties and damage. If it was felt that the group was supported—and even directly assisted—in its attack by a state sponsor, the leadership, armed forces, and/or territory of that sponsor might be regarded as open to nuclear bombardment.39 (This is one reason why Iran’s future leaders might pause before passing any nuclear weapons they may acquire to Hezbollah.) The attacked state might decide it was more important (or practicable) to act coercively against the state sponsor rather than the terrorist group, or that double coercion could apply here if the terrorist group could be held responsible for the retaliation inflicted on its state sponsor. Most of the foregoing arguments for carefully deciding on the extent of the military response to a terrorist nuclear attack assume a fairly cool process of rational calculation where the long-term political consequences of any action are weighed up against the short-term need for something to be done. But it is not certain that the aftermath of a nuclear attack would encourage relatively cool and calm decision-making processes. It is not clear exactly how much public pressure would rise up demanding swift and dramatic action, but it might be wise to assume that this pressure would be very significant. The depth of anger could be considerable and so could a mood of vengeance. Political leaders might not even wait for this mood to emerge, but may anticipate it or be so aggrieved personally and collectively as to decide on decisive action even before the full facts were available. And it is quite likely that leaders could expect to find support for very extreme measures of response if they sought to implement them. That pressure could result in moves to lash-out against terrorist groups in particular or in general—in particular against the group (or groups) thought to be responsible for the nuclear attack, or in general against any group known to have threatened the attacked country in recent times or to have been at all sympathetic with the perpetrators. Ironically, because nuclear weapons can have wide-area effects, they might in fact be employed against general areas in which the terrorists were thought to exist (such as some Pakistan–Afghanistan border areas) but where their precise locations was uncertain. Some advantages might be seen in launching a somewhat indiscriminate response to an initially indiscriminate attack (an eye for an eye). State supporters of the terrorist groups might expect a similarly wrathful response to fall on them. Of course, if the sponsor was a known possessor of nuclear weapons a difficult decision would be presented to the retaliating country, although such a situation might also encourage a disarming nuclear attack to remove from the state sponsor the opportunity to use their own nuclear weapons (although the precision required to accomplish such disarmament by force is a rare commodity).

### Nuclear Terror Impact – Economy

#### Nuclear terrorism collapses the global economy – the spike in poverty will kill millions

Graham **Allison**, November/December 20**08**. Professor of Government at Harvard, Director @ Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Kennedy School of Government, former Dean at Kennedy School of Government. “Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Terrorism,” Technology Review, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/terrorism/PDFs/Allison,%20Graham.%20Nuclear%20Deterrence%20in%20the%20Age%20of%20Nuclear%20Terrorism.pdf.

Consider the consequences if just one nuclear bomb exploded in just one U.S. city. The immediate reaction would be to block all entry points to prevent another bomb from reaching its target, disrupting the global flow of raw materials and manufactured goods. Vital markets for international products would disappear, and financial markets would crash. Researchers at Rand, a think tank funded by the U.S. government, have estimated that a nuclear explosion at the Port of Long Beach, CA, would cause immediate indirect costs of more than $1 trillion worldwide and that shutting down U.S. ports would cut world trade by 7.5 percent. The total, long-term economic effects would be much worse, however, and would reverberate well beyond the developed world. As former U.N. secretary-general Kofi Annan has warned, a nuclear terrorist attack would not only “cause widespread death and destruction” but “thrust tens of millions of people into dire poverty.” This would, he observed, create “a second death toll throughout the developing world.”

#### Economic collapse triggers global war between the US, India and China.

Walter Russell **Mead**, 2/4/2009. Senior Fellow in US Foreign Policy Studies at CFR. “Only Makes You Stronger,” The New Republic, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=1.

The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes. (Think of Weimar Germany, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops. India's future is also a question. Support for global integration is a fairly recent development in India, and many serious Indians remain skeptical of it. While India's 60-year-old democratic system has resisted many shocks, a deep economic recession in a country where mass poverty and even hunger are still major concerns could undermine political order, long-term growth, and India's attitude toward the United States and global economic integration. The violent Naxalite insurrection plaguing a significant swath of the country could get worse; religious extremism among both Hindus and Muslims could further polarize Indian politics; and India's economic miracle could be nipped in the bud. If current market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years. For billions of people in nuclear-armed countries to emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush. It's not just the great powers whose trajectories have been affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran also face new constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as falling oil prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms on U.S. protection. Success in Iraq--however late, however undeserved, however limited--had already improved the Obama administration's prospects for addressing regional crises. Now, the collapse in oil prices has put the Iranian regime on the defensive. The annual inflation rate rose above 29 percent last September, up from about 17 percent in 2007, according to Iran's Bank Markazi. Economists forecast that Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming months as stagnating oil revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the government to rein in its expansionary fiscal policy. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against domestic needs, while international sanctions and other diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like trade opportunities) have become more attractive. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other oil states have become more dependent on the United States for protection against Iran, and they have fewer resources to fund religious extremism as they use diminished oil revenues to support basic domestic spending and development goals. None of this makes the Middle East an easy target for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in part to the economic crisis, the incoming administration has the chance to try some new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and Syria) from a position of enhanced strength. Every crisis is different, but there seem to be reasons why, over time, financial crises on balance reinforce rather than undermine the world position of the leading capitalist countries. Since capitalism first emerged in early modern Europe, the ability to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key factor in international competition. Countries that can encourage--or at least allow and sustain--the change, dislocation, upheaval, and pain that capitalism often involves, while providing their tumultuous market societies with appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks, grow swiftly. They produce cutting-edge technologies that translate into military and economic power. They are able to invest in education, making their workforces ever more productive. They typically develop liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate, dissent and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate on a vast social project of modernization--and to maintain political stability in the face of accelerating social and economic change. The vast productive capacity of leading capitalist powers gives them the ability to project influence around the world and, to some degree, to remake the world to suit their own interests and preferences. This is what the United Kingdom and the United States have done in past centuries, and what other capitalist powers like France, Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser extent. In these countries, the social forces that support the idea of a competitive market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and political framework are relatively strong. But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin world is often drawn to anti-capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left. Russia, too, has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society--whether during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the post-cold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as many former Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly because, in much of the world, capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

### Nuclear Terrorism – Terror Leaders Will Use Nuclear Weapons

#### The new Qaida leadership will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons against American targets.

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, 11/16/2010, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs @ Harvard, former director of intelligence and counterintelligence at Dept Energy, 23-year veteran of the CIA, recipient of many intelligence-related awards, “Al Qaeda’s Nuclear Ambitions,” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/16/al\_qaedas\_nuclear\_ambitions

The good news is that there's no need to wonder what the terrorists' strategic and tactical goals are -- one need only listen to what their leaders have already told us. The bad news is that we no doubt won't like what we hear. Al Qaeda's leaders yearn to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction against the United States; if they acquired a nuclear bomb, they would not hesitate to use it. Indeed, such an attack would be meant to serve as a sort of sequel to the 9/11 plot. The evidence for those intentions aren't hidden in encoded communications or classified intelligence. Quite the opposite: They're hidden in plain sight. Just as Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa to declare war on the United States in 1998, his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, issued a fatwa a decade later to herald a prospective next stage in the conflict. If we take him at his word, some day jihadists will use weapons of mass destruction to change history once and for all. Of course, al Qaeda leaders have spoken of acquiring weapons of mass destruction for well over a decade. They have had little observable success in achieving their goals of producing a nuclear bomb or biological weapon capable of producing mass casualties. Fortunately, it is extremely difficult, but not impossible, for a terrorist group to acquire a strategic weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Nonetheless, the al Qaeda core has kept at it over the years, in the hopes that time and opportunity will enable it to overcome the daunting challenges in this regard. What has changed recently is that the goal is no longer theoretical, but operational -- a change spurred by Zawahiri's intervention. Rather than follow bin Laden in issuing a religious edict, Zawahiri chose to release a book in 2008 titled Exoneration. In it, he resurrects a fatwa issued by senior Saudi cleric Nasir al-Fahd in May 2003 -- notoriously, the only such treatise that ever endorsed the use of WMD. Zawahiri adopts Fahd's ideas wholesale. He uses the same ideas, thoughts, examples, and scholarly citations to reach the same conclusion: The use of nuclear weapons would be justified as an act of equal retaliation, "repaying like for like." Zawahiri raises key Quranic themes to sweep away all potential objections to the use of WMD. He offers answers to questions about the legality of killing women, children, and the elderly; the justice of environmental destruction; the morality of harming noncombatants; the tactical prudence of attacking at night; and analyses of deterrence. Zawahiri adopts Fahd's examples verbatim: The Prophet Mohammed's attack on the village of al-Taif using a catapult, for instance, permits the use of weapons of "general destruction" incapable of distinguishing between innocent civilians and combatants. The take-away from Zawahiri's book is that the use of weapons of mass destruction should be judged on intent rather than on results; if the intent to use WMD is judged to be consistent with the Quran, then the results are justifiable, even if they clearly violate specific prohibitions under Islam. The same reasoning is applied in a detailed explanation of such matters as loyalty to the state, contracts, obligations, and treaties; the permissibility of espionage; and deception and trickery. For example, on the topic of Muslims killed in combat unintentionally in the fight against infidels: "When Muslims fight nonbelievers, any Muslim who is killed is a martyr." Aside from its general endorsement of WMDs, we should pay special attention to two operational messages embedded in Zawahiri's book. First, America is a special object of Zawahiri's attention when discussing a nuclear attack. Zawahiri explicitly ties U.S. crimes to the alleged need to use WMD, quoting Fahd: "There is no doubt that the greatest enemy of Islam and Muslims at this time is the Americans." Zawahiri further explains that he considers the United States to be a "single juridical entity" under Islam. It's a verdict with chilling implications: Zawahiri means to say that all Americans are valid targets, regardless of whether they are men, women, or children. This is not a mere aside; it is a careful choice of words that reflects a seriousness of purpose. Indeed, he is at pains to prove his judiciousness. He cites a variety of viewpoints from the Quran and hadiths (sayings of the Prophet Mohammed), some of which support his judgments, others which do not. At times, he dramatically prefaces his conclusion with the words "I say ..." to draw attention to the fact that his judgments digress from the views held by some Islamic scholars; it is also a way for Zawahiri -- a medical doctor, not a religious scholar by training -- to assume authority for himself as an arbiter of Islamic law. Second, al Qaeda has reckoned with the horrific scale of a nuclear attack; indeed, Zawahiri sees mass casualties as a point in WMDs' favor. Zawahiri's book explicitly justifies a potential attack that could kill 10 million Americans. Again, that enormous figure is not merely tossed off casually by Zawahiri. He believes that such a plan requires justification, and he is satisfied, at the conclusion of his book, that he has done so. It is notable that Zawahiri repeatedly uses the phrase "artillery bombardment" in the context of discussing the wide-scale destruction of a WMD attack. For al Qaeda, it seems, modern weapons of mass destruction are simply a form of weapon that cannot distinguish between civilians and combatants. Nuclear weapons, Zawahiri wants to argue, are no more morally significant than the catapult often cited in the Quran and hadiths. Here Zawahiri quotes Fahd once again: "If a bomb were dropped on them, destroying 10 million of them and burning as much of their land as they have burned of Muslim land, that would be permissible without any need to mention any other proof." Needless to say, Zawahiri's approach goes against all Western theories of just war. Zawahiri's dismissal of moral qualms in jihad echoes the words of his mentor, Islamist philosopher Sayyid Qutb: "The Islamic jihad has no relationship to modern warfare, either in its causes or in the way it is conducted." Zawahiri is a man of action, not contemplation, and his tone leaves little question that he believes the West has not yet been exonerated for its crimes. And like bin Laden in 1998, Zawahiri is not only a cleric but an operational planner -- we can be assured that he is planning al Qaeda's redemption by means of the terrible weapons he champions. Exoneration is a warning that the rules of engagement may be about to change. We would be foolish not to heed it.

#### AQ Leaders will acquire and use nuclear weapons – it’s been a long-term goal of the organization for decades.

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, March/April 2010, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs @ Harvard, former director of intelligence and counterintelligence at Dept Energy, 23-year veteran of the CIA, recipient of many intelligence-related awards, “Proliferation and Terrorism: Big Hype or Biggest Threeat?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 66 (2): 2010, DOI: 10.2968/066002005, URL: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20014/proliferation\_and\_terrorism.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F1961%2Frolf\_mowattlarssen

A further-and highly unsettling-explanation of Al Qaeda's extraordinary patience is that group members think time is on their side. They probably believe they have drawn the United States into a deepening commitment to fight a protracted insurgency in Afghanistan. Moreover, Saddam Hussein was deposed, opening up long-term possibilities for an Islamic theocracy in Iraq. Gen. Pervez Musharraf is out of power in Pakistan, and the domestic instability there is growing every day. These developments create opportunities to change the global status quo. In other words, Al Qaeda may be waiting for a perfect storm in the alignment of targets, opportunity, and timing to launch another game-changing attack. If they do so, it will certainly be based on a calculation that the moment is ripe to try to force Washington's hand in ways that favor Al Qaeda's long-term goals. In this light, the group's long-held intent and persistent efforts to acquire nuclear and biological weapons represent a unique means of potentially fulfilling its wildest hopes and aspirations. As bin Laden declared in 1998, it is his duty to obtain WMD. He apparently understood at this early juncture that using such weapons might become necessary at some stage of his confrontation with the United States and its allies. With this in mind, Al Qaeda feverishly pursued nuclear and biological weapons capabilities before 9/11. These efforts were managed by the group's most senior leadership, with a sense of purpose and urgency that suggests it was important to make progress on possessing WMD prior to its 2001 attack on the United States. Yet in spite of bin Laden's declaration and Al Qaeda's subsequent efforts to acquire nuclear and biological weapons, the threat is not widely being treated as a clear-and-present danger that requires an urgent response.

### Nuclear Terrorism – AT/Objections to Nuclear Terrorism (Grab bag)

#### Objections to the threat of nuclear terror make absurd assumption about how AQ operates.

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, March/April 2010, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs @ Harvard, former director of intelligence and counterintelligence at Dept Energy, 23-year veteran of the CIA, recipient of many intelligence-related awards, “Proliferation and Terrorism: Big Hype or Biggest Threeat?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 66 (2): 2010, DOI: 10.2968/066002005, URL: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20014/proliferation\_and\_terrorism.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F1961%2Frolf\_mowattlarssen

Nuclear terrorism detractors point out that the threat has been hyped. Unfortunately, it is true that some have used the WMD threat to incite fear and to justify extreme tactics to combat terrorism. Skeptics argue that there were no WMD in Iraq, so why should people believe intelligence that terrorists are seriously trying to acquire them? Plus, if terrorists have such a weapon, why haven't they used it? They also argue that it is impossible for men in caves to acquire and detonate a nuclear bomb. They acknowledge some nuclear material may be missing from global stocks, but they exude confidence that it is surely not available in sufficient enough quantities to constitute a real threat, and that in any case, it is preposterous to believe that primitive, unsophisticated terrorists might be able to construct a bomb capable of producing a nuclear yield. Let us hope the skeptics are right, because in terms of organizing the international community to confront the threat posed by large-scale WMD terrorism, not much has been accomplished. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies, in the United States and abroad, have been slow to dedicate resources and leadership to the problem. For example, there is a widespread assumption that terrorists will employ small-scale, crude forms of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons because they are easier to acquire and use. But the weight of the evidence suggests the opposite is true-i.e., terrorists choose weapons best suited for the targets they intend to strike. The history of Al Qaeda strikes against the United States bears this out. The group historically has utilized a remarkably diverse arsenal of weapons in its attacks against the United States: The embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were ground attacks; the U.S.S. Cole bombing was a sea attack; and the World Trade Center and Pentagon bombings were air attacks. It chose the desired weapons based on operational considerations, most notably a weapon's capacity to destroy the intended target. Another dangerous bias in assessing the threat is the belief that once terrorists obtain a nuclear bomb, they will use it. Thus, the following argument is proffered: Since Al Qaeda has yet to use a nuclear weapon, it does not possess one. This might comfort the doubters, but terrorists may not agree that it is difficult to stash a nuclear or biological weapon in a safe place for future use, without fear of discovery. After all, it has proved exceedingly difficult to find bin Laden and his lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri, and we have a pretty good idea of where they might be hiding. Plus, nothing in Al Qaeda's behavior suggests that its leaders follow predictable patterns concerning the means and timing of attacks.

### Nuclear Terrorism – Can Acquire – Other Nations/Build It

#### Many scenarios for AQ nuclear acquisition

(Pakistan, North Korea, homemade devices)

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, March/April 2010, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs @ Harvard, former director of intelligence and counterintelligence at Dept Energy, 23-year veteran of the CIA, recipient of many intelligence-related awards, “Proliferation and Terrorism: Big Hype or Biggest Threeat?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 66 (2): 2010, DOI: 10.2968/066002005, URL: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20014/proliferation\_and\_terrorism.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F1961%2Frolf\_mowattlarssen

Pakistan loses control of its Bomb. Allegations that the threat posed by Pakistani “loose nukes” has been hyped and that the Pakistani military has everything under control may sound soothing, but they obscure the fact that South Asia is replete with violent extremists. Mix in a rapidly expanding arsenal of nuclear weapons and growing domestic instability, and there is a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world. It is a good thing then that the Pakistani military approaches nuclear security with great professionalism, for Pakistan has fewer margins for error than any other nuclear state. For comparison’s sake, in the United States, it was widely recognized that significant nuclear security upgrades had to be made after 9/11. Specific attention was given to the possibility that terrorists could gain access to a nuclear weapons–related facility, particularly with the assistance of insiders working at the facility. Accordingly, large increases in funding were allocated to assure a much higher U.S. nuclear security standard, including an increased emphasis on intelligence and counterintelligence programs. Nonetheless, in recent years, there have been appalling lapses in controls over nuclear weapons and the compromise of nuclear weapons–related information—e.g., a U.S. Air Force B-52 mistakenly and unknowingly flew six nuclear- tipped cruise missiles across the country (from North Dakota to Louisiana) in August 2007. With this in mind, U.S. concerns about Pakistani vulnerabilities should not be interpreted as finger-pointing or meddling; it obviously can happen in the United States as well. Some broader trends in Pakistan, however, elevate the risks of compromised nuclear security. The burgeoning Pakistani nuclear arsenal. A growing domestic nuclear program means more nuclear activity taking place in more places—necessitating more materials, weapons, facilities, transportation, and storage. In short, there are now more places where something can go wrong. Increased extremism. Growing levels of extremism means higher numbers of potential insiders in the nuclear establishment willing to work with outsiders to provide access to facilities and exfiltrate nuclear-related materials and weapons. Recent warnings by the Taliban and Al Qaeda that Washington will seize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons amount to a clever recruiting pitch to insiders to collaborate with extremists. In an attempt to stoke such groundless fears, A. Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistani nuclear program, and Bashiruddin Mahmood, the radical CEO of Khan’s rogue nuclear supplier network, both recently called upon Pakistan to expand its arsenal of nuclear weapons, implying that they guarantee sovereignty and assure Islamabad’s standing as a leading Islamic nation.The perilous military-civilian relationship. Although Pakistan’s nuclear National Command Authority is controlled by the military, the Pakistani constitution delegates certain nuclear weapon responsibilities to the civilian government. This creates the potential for a military- civilian standoff over nuclear assets during a crisis, especially in the event that extremist elements assume power. Moreover, there are no guarantees of how the military and government would react to all contingencies they may encounter in a rapidly unfolding crisis. For instance, how would they respond to a breakdown in internal communication, or with the outside world? Unconfirmed news reports of a seizure of nuclear weapons in transit? A takeover of a facility by a rogue military unit? Taliban penetration of a nuclear weapons storage site? More importantly, how would India interpret and react to such developments? Along these lines: Are current communication mechanisms between Islamabad, New Delhi, and Washington robust enough to be reliable during a crisis? At least in Pakistan, the risks are well-known and extra precautions are being taken to avert nuclear compromise. That is not the case for the next scenario.North Korea sells the Bomb. The discovery of Syria’s Al Kibar reactor, believed to be built with North Korean assistance, was a wake-up call that Pyongyang does not possess strong self-imposed constraints on transferring nuclear technologies to other parties— a sobering, if unsurprising, reality. After all, North Korea routinely prints counterfeit U.S. currency, traffics narcotics, and starves its own people. So it is not unexpected that it would provide nuclear-related technologies for profit. If anything, North Korea’s erratic and irresponsible behavior makes it a leading potential source—on a witting or unwitting basis—for terrorist acquisition of nuclear-related technologies and materials. The extraordinary level of secrecy in handling intelligence concerning the North Korean-Syrian project at Al Kibar helped ensure that knowledge of its existence did not leak before Israel could effectively neutralize the reactor militarily in September 2007. Unfortunately, secrecy also restricted the international community’s ability to run down all leads on the reactor before the North Koreans discovered that it had been compromised. So an opportunity was lost to begin an early examination of active proliferation pathways flowing from Pyongyang. Nonetheless, there are three broad implications of North Korean-Syrian nuclear cooperation that should be assessed urgently. The viability of the nonproliferation regime. To date, the regimes of Kim Jong-il and Bashar al-Assad have suffered no consequences for conspiring to develop a nuclear weapons capability, casting doubts on the viability of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the credibility of the global nuclear order. In fact, U.S. dialogue with Syria improved after the Israeli raid. And the countries participating in the Six-Party Talks with North Korea (the United States, Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan) continue to cajole Pyongyang back to the negotiating table to make new concessions in exchange for more promises the North will not keep. Basically, Al Kibar obliterated all of the red lines thought to exist in terms of nuclear deterrence, accountability, and responsibility, setting a precedent that it is okay to clandestinely provide nuclear-related technologies to other states. An “A. Q. Kim” network? Since Kim Jong-il came close to providing Syria with the building blocks for a nuclear weapon, how confident can the international community be that there is not a long-running “A. Q. Kim” network in North Korea that is analogous to the Khan nuclear supplier network in Pakistan? Clearly, the chapter of proliferation history that suggests Khan was a historical anomaly may need to be rewritten. But what will it say? Today, there is fresh information and new leads that must be explored to determine the full extent of North Korea’s proliferation activity. Intelligence shortfalls. It is important to remember that the Al Kibar facility was uncovered thanks to a windfall of intelligence and expert analysis. Yet that windfall did not occur until the facility was nearly complete, exposing deficiencies in intelligence collection efforts specific to the nuclear arena. As such, it should create doubts in the international community’s ability to identify and neutralize clandestine nuclear sites and networks that might exist in other parts of the world. This inability to reliably assess state-related clandestine nuclear activity further reduces the prospects of uncovering clandestine nuclear trafficking and acquisition efforts of non-state actors, which would have a much smaller footprint than their state program counterparts. Al Qaeda acquires the Bomb. It is difficult to objectively assess the feasibility of nuclear terrorism without being suspected of hyping and overdramatizing the threat. It is also hard to set aside fear in contemplating nuclear catastrophe. That said, it is necessary to approach the task with an optimistic mind-set. Methodically sifting through all of the threat’s variables can systematically lower the risks—an approach that requires collection and analysis of each potential terrorist nuclear plot pathway, attack indicator, and choke point. Such a dynamic modus operandi can serve as the basis for undertaking anticipatory action that will identify actionable leads, compromise terrorist planning, and neutralize an impending attack. The chances of identifying indicators of a nuclear terrorism plot are highest in the earliest stages of planning. Over time, the likelihood of interdiction decreases. With this in mind, a premium must be paid to penetrate terrorist leadership, facilitation, and support networks during a plot’s most formative stages. Here is how it can be done: Finely tuned terrorist communication intercepts must be used to generate actionable leads. Satellite surveillance and state-of-the-art sensors also must be widely employed to enhance quick detection of nuclear material. And every tool of intelligence tradecraft needs to be focused on finding a logistical and support footprint no larger than that of Mohammed Atta’s limited 9/11 plot. Fortunately, the challenges faced by terrorists who want to acquire a nuclear weapon are no less formidable than for the global intelligence agencies that are trying to stop them. In fact, by my count, there are only three pathways to a terrorist nuclear attack. Sabotage. Terrorists could attack a nuclear facility in hopes of causing a large release of radioactivity—similar to how they used airplanes on 9/11 as an inscrutable weapon. There is evidence that Al Qaeda’s leadership considered such a possibility before 9/11, when their operatives reportedly conducted some light casing of U.S. nuclear reactor facilities. But thanks to enhanced security and reinforced defenses at U.S. nuclear sites, the available intelligence seems to indicate that Al Qaeda has concluded that it is too difficult to either (a) crash a plane into a nuclear facility or (b) use a team to penetrate a nuclear facility to gain access to nuclear weapons and materials. Purchase. After the Cold War ended, the former Soviet Union was an attractive place to shop for nuclear components. In fact, there are credible reports that Ayman al-Zawahiri visited Russia in the mid-1990s. However, al-Zawahiri’s announcement in 2001 that Al Qaeda had obtained nuclear devices in the former Soviet Union does not ring true. If the terrorist organization had purchased such weapons, why announce it to the world? Of course, there is a possibility that Al Qaeda’s nuclear materials are being held in storage or have not reached their final destination yet. But no credible reporting has surfaced that Russian/Soviet nuclear weapons have been lost, much less that they have found their way into terrorist hands. (Reports of Russian “loose nukes” appear to have been greatly exaggerated.) Construct. Counting assembled nuclear weapons is far easier than accounting for nuclear material in bulk form. Al Qaeda’s experience on the nuclear black market has taught its planners that their best chance at some sort of nuclear or radiological attack is to construct an improvised nuclear device comprised of illegally purchased weapons-usable material—i.e., the direct pathway of finding a “loose nuke” or “suitcase nuke” is riddled with scam artists and intelligence services dangling their wares to terrorists in hopes of landing big fish. So while building a bomb is surely not the preferred course of action, it might be the only realistic pathway for sub-state actors who cannot develop the infrastructure necessary to enrich fissile material. To realistically do so would involve recruiting malicious insiders at nuclear facilities who are in a position to smuggle fissile material from their workplace and patiently combing the nuclear black market for similar material. It also requires enlisting specialists to build a device, rig the explosives, and assemble the pieces, all in complete secrecy. Finally, a suicide bomber is needed to transport the bomb to the intended target. Even if they succeeded in avoiding discovery throughout the planning stages, a terrorist would never know for certain whether his device would reach a nuclear yield or whether he had a viable bomb until he tried to detonate it.

#### Many sources of proliferation, including Iran and North Korea

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, 1/12/2011, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs @ Harvard, former director of intelligence and counterintelligence at Dept Energy, 23-year veteran of the CIA, recipient of many intelligence-related awards, “Islam and the Bomb,” Report published by the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

The world has turned full circle. Paradoxically, in this age of the super enabled individual, the world may confront a greater likelihood of nuclear catastrophe than during the Cold War. In addition to the destabilizing prospect of new states that are secretly developing nuclear weapons, a growing number of states are developing nuclear technologies and materials for weapons or peaceful purposes.6This global expansion of nuclear-related activity is spawning new and unpredictable pathways to a bomb. Taking into account the increasing probability of dynamic, opportunistic interactions between states and sub-state actors, adequate foresight and early warning of nuclear threats cannot be assured. Indeed, it may be inherently impossible to assess and mitigate the nuclear threats of the 21st century with the same doctrine and approaches that served the world so well in the latter half of the 20th century. In this second nuclear age, nuclear actors straddle a single spectrum of risks, consisting of states possessing the most advanced nuclear arsenals on one end, to terrorist groups wielding a single crude improvised nuclear device on the other end. The complex transactions between states, states and groups, and groups with other groups must be identified and interpreted in order to identify any clandestine nuclear weapons-related activity that is taking place. Nuclear threats will emanate from non obvious relationships and non-linear combinations of actors. For example, a prospective nuclear weapons-armed Iran—with the witting or unwitting involvement of the government—could become a source of proliferation to surrogate groups such as Hezbollah or Hamas. A future nuclear crisis between Iran and Israel could be precipitated by the deliberate transfer or accidental loss of control of a single Iranian bomb into the arms of a terrorist group. Future rogue nuclear supplier networks, similar to the global network run by the father of the Pakistan nuclear weapons program, AQ Khan, might serve as a source of nuclear capabilities to a broader range of customers, including terrorist groups. In the aftermath of North Korea’s clandestine effort to provide a bomb-producing nuclear facility to Syria, for example, the world should question whether there are any limits in North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il’s willingness to provide nuclear weapons capabilities to other states, and even to terrorist groups.

### Key to Hegemony

#### Ports key to heg- deployments

Peter Chalk, 2008, The maritime dimensions of international security: Terrorism, piracy and the challenges for the United States, (Peter Chalk is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation) <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf>

**Besides economic considerations, the marine transportation system plays an important role in U.S. national security. The Departments Defense and Transportation have jointly designated 17 American ports**—13 of which also act as commercial trading hubs—**as strategic because they are necessary to expedite major military deployments**. 1 In the view of the Government Accountability Office, **if these terminals were decisively attacked, “not only could … civilian casualties be sustained, but DoD [Department of Defense] could also lose precious cargo and time and be forced to rely heavily on its [already] overburdened airlift capabilities.”2**

#### Even if attacked, offshore ports can continue to support military opperations

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf

If an attack targets a platform, maritime traffic can be diverted to the remaining platforms for inspection, maintaining the shield. This also allows the US maritime infrastructure to support sustained military operations in response. The key point is that coastal population centers and critical infrastructure are protected. The existence of the platform system itself provides a significant deterrent to a terrorist due to the potential of discovery and interdiction.

## Wind Ext

### Wind Ext: Offshore Ports Key

#### Offshore ports lead to offshore wind development

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf

Renewable energy like wind energy can also utilize floating offshore platforms to harness

energy in deeper ocean water close to the coast where the continental shelf drops off

rapidly. Thermal ocean flows at these locations, currents and wave action can all be

harnessed with a platform as a basis for emerging technologies.

### Wind Ext: Offshore Key

#### Offshore ports are the only feasible way to build offshore wind- OSW is key to economic growth

German Energy Agency, **11/11/2010, Ports - infrastructure for offshore wind farms. http://www.offshore-wind.de/page/index.php?id=10287&L=1**

**Large-scale wind farm components present a logistical challenge. If tower segments or rotor blades have to be transported, motorway bridges become obstacles**; with a general clearance of 4.5 meters they are impassable for rotor blades with a 6 meter width. **Not even inland navigation offers alternatives for this logistical challenge. That is why production of the components in the direct vicinity of the port is often the only solution. This local advantage is also used by companies which carry out maintenance and repair work on OWPP**. Based on the approved OWPPs and an operating time of 20 years, **one fact becomes clear: offshore wind energy plays a central role in the future development of coastal regions. It offers enormous opportunities for economic growth and future employment.**

Not all ports are suitable.

Important prerequisites for offshore ports are large manoeuvring and storage areas, e.g. for 60 meters long rotor blades. The load capacity of the docks shall be designed for the heavy load corresponding to wind park components. For example, a nacelle of an OWPP can weigh up to 280 tonnes – as much as 200 cars. Ports which are not dependent on the tide are particularly suited for the constant arrival and departure of transport, installation and supply boats.

**Offshore ports provide perspective**.

**Installation and operating of offshore wind farms brings a new dynamic into the port industry and stimulates the economic development of the port sites in a sustainable way. These ports benefit from the establishment of production locations and associated businesses from the wind power sector**. In addition to already created employment, **many jobs will be additionally created in the coming years** which, amongst others, shall be filled by qualified experts from e.g. former shipbuilding companies. An example for creation of new structures is the founding of the training centre in Emden, where experts are prepared for their offshore assignment. **Thus, the use of offshore wind energy with its constant opportunity for growth represents an economic development for coastal areas which is gaining momentum for the future.**

#### Offshore wind farms are the only viable renewable for providing energy for most of the country

Dorothy W. Bisbee, Jan 1, 2004, NEPA Review of Offshore Wind Farms: Ensuring

Emission Reduction Benefits Outweigh Visual Impacts, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, (Visiting Assistant Professor, Southern New England School of Law) <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1140&context=ealr>

**Wind energy**, whether onshore or offshore, **is arguably the only non-hydropower, clean renewable source currently capable of providing large-scale energy in densely populated coastal areas**.56 **Because the ocean offers undeveloped open space,57 strong winds,58 and close proximity to densely populated areas, offshore wind farms have significant advantages over terrestrial wind farms in many coastal regions.**59 55

#### Offshore wind is the only possible renewable for utilities

NRG Bluewater Wind, 2011, Overview, (Fortune 300 company focused on energy production) http://www.nrgenergy.com/nrgbluewaterwind/de\_overview.html

Studies done by the University of Delaware confirm that there is [**enormous wind energy potential off Delaware's shores**](http://www.ceoe.udel.edu/windpower/)**. That makes offshore wind the best - indeed, the only - utility-level renewable energy choice** for the state. Delaware has no natural resources capable of generating hydro-power and no feasible sites for an onshore wind park of the sizes needed to help meet Delaware's energy needs. **Solar power can't match offshore wind energy's productivity, or cost-effectiveness**

#### Building offshore allows use of new tech and reduces costs.

Jenny Fyall, June 14, 2012, Giant turbines could be key to reducing renewables costs, The Scotsman, Lexis

**BUILDING giant 8-megawatt turbines will be one way to reduce the cost of offshore wind farms** to make sure targets can be hit, according to research.

**Onshore turbines are usually a maximum of 3MW, but inventing offshore turbines more than twice the size will help slash costs**, the study by the Crown Estate concludes.

The report, based on evidence from more than 100 companies, argues that **offshore wind turbines will "radically change" between now and 2020, from those that have been altered from onshore turbines to those built for** **offshore purposes.**

**Whereas visual impact has limited the size of onshore turbines, this is not such a constraint** **offshore, the report argues, meaning "taller structures are more acceptable".**

**Due to noise constraints, onshore turbines have a blade tip speed limit of 80 metres per second,** **offshore turbines will be able to spin faster at 100 metres per second**, it suggests.

### Wind Ext: S Warming

#### Offshore Wind may hold the key to stopping Global Warming

**Masden and Heavner, 2010** [Travis, Staff Writer for Frontier Group, and Brad, Staff Writer for Environment Maryland Research & Policy Center, “The Power of Offshore Wind: A Source of Clean, Reliable, Affordable Electricity for Maryland's Future,” < http://www.frontiergroup.org/reports/fg/power-offshore-wind> PWS]

The wind blowing over the ocean along Maryland's coast is a vast, untapped energy resource. Capturing just a fraction of this resource can help to modernize Maryland's electricity system for the 21st century and give the state greater control over its energy destiny. Wind turbines deployed offshore could deliver large amounts of pollution-free electricity at a stable price – a bargain-rate insurance policy against unpredictable spikes in the cost of electricity and against the serious prospect of global warming. Offshore wind, as a local resource, can also reduce the need for Maryland to develop new power transmission lines to import electricity from coal-fired power plants in Pennsylvania or West Virginia. Accordingly, Maryland's Public Service Commission should take action to encourage development of the state's offshore wind energy resources, setting a goal of commercial operation of the first major offshore wind farm by 2014.

#### **Offshore Wind Key to solve Global Warming**

Janssen, 4/17/12 [Jennifer, Staff Writer for the National Wildlife Federation, “Marylanders Gather in Support of Offshore Wind”, < http://online.nwf.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=17891> PWS]

It is not every day that we have an opportunity to help make history, but on the evening of April 2nd wildlife advocates joined over 400 other advocates to form a "Circle of Support" for offshore wind around the Maryland State House. The event brought people together to show the widespread support and encourage lawmakers to vote in favor of clean, offshore wind--which is a critical step to reduce global warming pollution and protect the future of wildlife. Maryland's state house is the oldest state capitol in continuous use and over the last 240 years has been the site of countless policy debates and public demonstrations. Yet, not even long-time activists and lawmakers could recall people coming together to form a full ring around the state house ever happening before.

#### **Offshore Wind New way to solve Global Warming**

Anyanova 2011 [Ekaterina, Studied law at the State University of Kaliningrad; 2002- 2003: Master Program at the University of Hamburg; 2003 - present: PhD Studies at the University of Hamburg; 2003 - present: Lecturer in the law of the sea at the chair of International and European Law at Kaliningrad State University. Ekaterina Anyanova joined the Research School as an Associate in 2006., “Offshore wind energy and the rules of international law: phasing out nuclear power,” < http://www.inderscience.com/info/inarticle.php?artid=43857> PWS]

Climate change and global warming are serious problems that necessitate such solutions as for example alternative methods of energy production including wind energy. Offshore wind parks construction, which is considered to be more beneficial than construction of those on land, is a relatively young sphere in the alternative methods of energy production. Although the main basics for its regulation on the international level are contained in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, more detailed regulation on the international level still fail.

#### **Offshore Wind Helps Reduce Global Warming**

Catalyst 2010 [“Union of Concerned Scientists,” “How it Works: Offshore Wind Power” < http://www.ucsusa.org/publications/catalyst/fall10-how-it-works.html> PWS]

The United States has built wind power facilities on land at a record pace in recent years. Following in the footsteps of Europe and other regions, U.S. wind developers are now looking offshore, where the winds blow stronger and more consistently. Offshore wind could more directly deliver clean energy to major coastal cities, where demand for electricity is high, without the pollution and global warming emissions associated with extracting and burning fossil fuels.

#### **Wind Energy is the most cost effective way to address climate change.**

Evans, October 12, 2007, [Stephanie, Staff Writer for Green Living Ideas, “The Benefits of Wind Power,” <http://greenlivingideas.com/2007/10/12/the-benefits-of-wind-power/> PWS]

There are several major benefits to wind pow**er.** One of the most important is that wind power is the least expensive of all other forms of alternative energy.  Wind turbines generate electricity at around 5 cents per kWh (Kilowatt Hour), which is comparable to the new coal and/or oil burning power plants.  The costs are projected to decline even more as technology improves, and this is very important because most of the cost with wind power is in manufacturing.  Once the wind turbines are in place there is little cost to maintain and wind power is free. Another tremendous benefit of wind power is that it is a sustainable source of energy and a clean source of energy.  Wind power generation produces zero carbon dioxide emissions, which is important with our concern over climate change. Wind energy is also a renewable energy, meaning it does not deplete our natural resources like coal or petroleum based products.

#### **Wind Energy can solve Global Warming and the Economy**

Green World Investor, April 18, 2011 [News Site about Clean Energy, “Offshore Wind Energy vs Onshore Wind Power – Advantages and Disadvantages,” <http://www.greenworldinvestor.com/2011/04/18/offshore-wind-energy-vs-onshore-wind-power-advantages-and-disadvantages/> PWS]

1) No Pollution and Global Warming Effects – Wind Turbines does not lead to pollution which is one of the biggest advantages of Wind Energy. Note there are costs associated with the equipment used to build and transport Wind Equipment but the running of Wind Energy leads to no pollution 2) Low Costs – The Costs of Wind Energy has reached the level of Gas powered Energy and can be generated at extremely low rates of around 7-8c/KwH in favorable conditions 3) Big Industrial Base - Wind Energy has become a mainstream source of energy and a large industrial base already exists .This allows a rapid deployment of Wind Power in most places in the world. The number of Wind Turbine Producers is increasing with a number of Asian firms entering the industry. 4) No Fuel Cost - Wind Energy does not require any fuel like most other sources of renewable energy. is a huge advantage over other fossil fuels whose costs are increasing at a drastic  rate every year. Electricity prices are increasingly rapidly in most parts of  the world much faster than general inflation. Price shocks due to high fuel costs are a big risk with fossil fuel energy these days

#### **Offshore Wind provides benefits to the Economy, Jobs, and the Environment**

Deep Water Wind, 2012 [Deepwater Wind is the U.S. leader in offshore wind power, “Benefits of Offshore Wind Energy,” <http://dwwind.com/resources/benefits-of-offshore-wind> PWS]

A utility-scale offshore wind farm – of 350 megawatts – will generate enough clean, renewable energy to power about 125,000 homes every year. The fuel for these wind farms – the wind! – is free and thus you will never see a fuel adjustment charge on your electric bill associated with wind energy. This emission-free technology replaces fossil fuel-generated electricity, thereby avoiding 1.3 billion pounds of polluting carbon dioxide emissions a year and reducing the need to import 17 million barrels of oil a year. Offshore wind farms also create jobs for highly skilled workers, including fabrication of the turbine foundations, installation of the foundations and turbines themselves, laying of undersea cable, and operations and maintenance positions. Hundreds of workers will be required for each utility-scale wind farm and many hundreds more will be needed to manufacture the products associated with wind farms. There are now more than 85,000 workers employed in the land-based wind industry here in the United States. In Europe, it has been projected that more than 200,000 workers will be employed in the offshore wind sector by 2030. The U.S. has some catching up to do, and, with the support of the federal and state governments, we will: The U.S. offshore wind industry has the potential to employ tens of thousands of workers in the years to come. In a sentence: Offshore wind energy is a win-win-win. It’s good for the environment, it’s good for ratepayers since we provide a hedge against rising fuel costs, and it’s good for our country’s workforce.

### **Wind Ext: Compared to onshore**

#### **Offshore Wind solves the disadvantages to regular wind farms**

Green World Investor, April 18, 2011 [News Site about Clean Energy, “Offshore Wind Energy vs Onshore Wind Power – Advantages and Disadvantages,” <http://www.greenworldinvestor.com/2011/04/18/offshore-wind-energy-vs-onshore-wind-power-advantages-and-disadvantages/> PWS]

1) No Noise Pollution - Wind Turbines emit a slight whirring noise which has led to problems with people living nearby.Some farmers have also complained that the livestock like sheep get affected by the moving of the Wind Blades.Offshore Wind Farms are located far off the coast cause no such noise problems for humans or wildlife 2) No Injuries to Birds – Older Wind Farms on Land frequently cause deaths and injuries to birds though newer wind turbines don’t cause too much problems.Offshore Wind Farms do away with this problem entirely as they are located in the Ocean where birds don’t fly frequently if at all.There is research being conducted to see if there is an impact on sea life by Cowries. 3) No loss in scenery though near shore offshore wind farms have come into controversy because of this,the Cape Wind Project is attracting a lot of protests particularly from the Kennedy’s who say that it will destroy the view from their house near the ocean

### Wind Ext: A/T cost

#### Wind power prices will fall by 30% within a decade.

The Western Mail, June 14, 2012, Wind farm costs could be slashed, Lexis

THE costs of offshore wind farms could be cut by almost a third by the end of the decade, a report said yesterday.

Costs could be cut by 30% by measures including introducing bigger turbines, mass-producing the deep water foundations the turbines need, involving suppliers early and improving wind farm designs, the study published by the Crown Estate said.

### **Wing Ext: Warming is Anthropogenic**

#### Newest and most comprehensive ocean studies prove warming is anthropogenic

[Richard Chirgwin](http://forms.theregister.co.uk/mail_author/?story_url=/2012/06/11/humans_warming_the_oceans/), June 11, 2012, Study fingers humans for ocean heat, risehttp://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/06/11/humans\_warming\_the\_oceans/

**A study published last weekend on *Nature Climate Change* claims to give the lie to the notion that if the world is warming, it’s not our fault**.

With the kind of certainty that will send the Heartland Institute reaching for Plan C (“the world should focus on mitigation”), the study, **The study, *Human-induced global ocean warming on multidecadal timescales*, ends with the bald factual statement: “We have identified a human-induced fingerprint in observed estimates of upper-ocean warming on multidecadal timescales**”.

Alternatively, as oceanographer Professor Nathan Bindoff of the University of Tasmania put it [speaking](http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-06-11/research-taps-into-ocean-temperatures/4063886) to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation: “**No matter how you look at it, we did it”.**

**The study, with inputs from Australia, Japan, India and the United States, found that natural variability in ocean temperatures could only account for ten percent of the observed rise – at most.** Event the “noise” created by short-term variability would have to be twice as great as is observed to make any change to the study’s results.

“**Although we performed a series of tests to account for the impact of various uncertainties, we found no evidence that simultaneous warming of the upper layers of all seven seas can be explained by natural climate variability alone. Humans have played a dominant role**,” said Lawrence Livermore climate scientist Peter Gleckler.

The CSIRO’s Dr John Church, a co-author of the study, told the ABC **that the new study compared observed ocean temperature changes to “a dozen different models used to project climate change”, making it “the most comprehensive study of changes in ocean heat content to date.”**

Previous detection and attribution studies mostly focused on a single observational data set (for example, focusing on the Atlantic ocean alone), comparing that to “one or two” climate projection models.

**The new study draws on observational data from all the world’s major oceans and compares observations to a large number of models, projecting changes with and without the impact of greenhouse gases.**

### **Wind: Warming Feedback loops**

#### Warming creates positive feedback loops by releasing CO2 from soil

[FELICITY BARRINGER](http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/author/felicity-barringer/), June 29, 2012, Warming Will Unlock Carbon in Forests, Study Warns, New York Times, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/warming-will-unlock-carbon-in-forests-study-warns/

**Climate scientists have long been concerned about the possibility that warming temperatures will speed changes on the earth’s surface that will in turn accelerate global warming**. The best illustration of such a feedback loop involves the melting of sea ice in the Arctic. The ice reflects solar radiation back into space rather than absorbing it. When it melts, it leaves open water that absorbs the heat rather than reflecting it. The more warm water there is, the more ice melts, and so on.

**Now scientists have identified another feedback loop that may be accelerating the loss of carbon dioxide from the topsoil of forests in the United States, contributing to climate change**. In [a study](http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/06/07/1120603109.abstract) published online on Monday, researchers at the University of California, Irvine, and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory found **that as temperatures rise, activity increases among the microbes that eat the topsoil and exhale carbon dioxide afterward**.

While that finding is not surprising, said the lead author, [Francesca Hopkins](http://www.ess.uci.edu/celebrate20/reception/hopkins), a doctoral researcher in the Department of Earth System Science at Irvine, she and her collaborators also found that in **warmer temperatures the microbes were better able to digest decades-old carbon stored in the soils**. Scientists had previously believed that the old carbon was inaccessible because it had become fixed in the soil; that belief has become a magnet for [new studies](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1365-2486.2011.02496.x/abstract) and controversy.  
  
The new study was published online in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

### **Wind Ext: Warming OW NW**

#### Probability – warming only requires inaction, their impacts require action

Hanson **et al ‘7**Goddard institute for space studies, et al,2007 (LOOK HOW QUALIFIED THIS EVIDENCE IS – J. Hansen1,2, M. Sato2, R. Ruedy3, P. Kharecha2, A. Lacis1,4, R. Miller1,5, L. Nazarenko2, K. Lo3, G. A. Schmidt1,4, G. Russell1, I. Aleinov2, S. Bauer2, E. Baum6, B. Cairns5, V. Canuto1, M. Chandler2, Y. Cheng3, A. Cohen6, A. Del Genio1,4, G. Faluvegi2, E. Fleming7, A. Friend8, T. Hall1,5, C. Jackman7, J. Jonas2, M. Kelley8, N. Y. Kiang1, D. Koch2,9, G. Labow7, J. Lerner2, S. Menon10, T. Novakov10, V. Oinas3, Ja. Perlwitz5, Ju. Perlwitz2, D. Rind1,4, A. Romanou1,4, R. Schmunk3, D. Shindell1,4, P. Stone11, S. Sun1,11, D. Streets12, N. Tausnev3, D. Thresher4, N. Unger2, M. Yao3, and S. Zhang2 1NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, New York, NY, USA 2Columbia University Earth Institute, New York, NY, USA 3Sigma Space Partners LLC, New York, NY, USA 4Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA 5Department of Applied Physics and Applied Mathematics, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA 6Clean Air Task Force, Boston, MA, USA 7NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, USA 8Laboratoire des Sciences du Climat et de l’Environnement, Orme des Merisiers, Gif-sur-Yvette Cedex, France 9Department of Geology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA 10Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, USA 11Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, “Dangerous human-made interference with climate: a GISS modelE study,” <http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/2287/2007/acp-7-2287-2007.html>)

These stark conclusions about the threat posed by global climate change and implications for fossil fuel use are not yet appreciated by essential governing bodies, as evidenced by ongoing plans to build coal-fired power plants without CO2 capture and sequestration. In our view, there is an acute need for science to inform society about the costs of failure to address global warming, because of a fundamental difference between the threat posed by climate change and most prior global threats. In the nuclear standoff between the Soviet Union and United States, a crisis could be precipitated only by action of one of the parties. In contrast,the presentthreat to the planet and civilization, with the United States and China now the principal players (though, as Fig. 10 shows, Europe also has a large responsibility), requires only inaction in the face of clear scientific evidence of the danger.

#### Magnitude – arsenals aren’t built for mass destruction anymore

The New York End Times ‘6(The New York End Times is a non-partisan, non-religious, non-ideological, free news filter. We monitor world trends and events as they pertain to two vital threats - war and extinction. We use a proprietary methodology to quantify movements between the extremes of war and peace, harmony and extinction. http://newyorkendtimes.com/extinctionscale.asp)

We rate Global Climate Change as a greater threat for human extinction in this century. Most scientists forecast disruptions and dislocations, if current trends persist. The extinction danger is more likely if we alter an environmental process that causes harmful effects and leads to conditions that make the planet**uninhabitable** to humans. Considering that there is so much that is unknown about global systems, we consider climate change to be the **greatest danger to human extinction**. However, there is no evidence of imminent danger. Nuclear war at some point in this century might happen. **It is unlikely to cause human extinction though**. While several countries have nuclear weapons, there are few with the firepower to annihilate the world. For those nations it would be suicidal to exercise that option. The pattern is that the more destructive technology a nation has, the more it tends towards rational behavior. Sophisticated precision weapons then become better tactical options. The bigger danger comes from nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists with the help of a rogue state, such as North Korea. The size of such an explosion would not be sufficient to threaten humanity as a whole. Instead it could trigger a major war or even world war. Under this scenario human extinction would **only be possible** if other threats were present, such as disease and climate change. We monitor war separately. However we also need to incorporate the dangers here.

### Wind Ext: Environmental Justice

#### Offshore wind promotes environmental justice by replacing high polluting power plants in minority neighborhoods

Dorothy W. Bisbee, Jan 1, 2004, NEPA Review of Offshore Wind Farms: Ensuring

Emission Reduction Benefits Outweigh Visual Impacts, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, (Visiting Assistant Professor, Southern New England School of Law) <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1140&context=ealr>

**Environmental Justice (EJ) addresses disparate environmental impacts on people of color, low income, and foreign origin.83 Power plants and other locally unwanted land uses are more often sited in these communities than in wealthier areas that have more political clout**. **For example**, Geographic Information System **maps prepared by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts show minority and low income populations near most major sources of air emissions, including power plants**.84 A significant portion of the population subjected to the health risks caused by the Brayton Point coal plant fits the profile of an area of EJ concern.85 Minority and low-income populations exist on Cape Cod, Martha's Vineyard, and Nantucket, but these areas have lower populations overall than Fall River.86 **Persons with small fixed incomes tend to live and work close to power plants and other sources of air pollution, while oceanfront properties tend to have high real estate values and lower minority and low-income populations**. Arthur Pugsley, a Massachusetts Senior Environmental Analyst, recognized how the Cape Wind project relates to EJ concerns when he stated, "**I think environmental equity is an inescapable but unspoken thing .... You know that the alternative is an oil-fired plant in a minority neighborhood.** We don't put them on the Vineyard. "87 Furthermore, minority and low-income populations often have significantly greater dietary exposure to bioaccumulative toxins like mercury, found in fish and other aquatic organisms, than other groupS.88 Mercury from power plants can fall in a wide range, so that fish in a broad area, which could also include Cape Cod, Martha's Vineyard, and Nantucket, may be impacted. Thus, even minority and low-income populations near Nantucket Sound could be disparately impacted by emissions that turbines there would have offset.

### Wind Ext: A/t Birds/Species

#### New tech solves the risk that offshore wind could pose to birds

National Wildlife Federation, 2012, How Offshore Wind Development Affects Wildlife, http://www.nwf.org/Global-Warming/Policy-Solutions/Renewable-Energy/Offshore-Wind/Offshore-Wind-Wildlife-Impacts.aspx

National Wildlife Federation believes that offshore wind energy can and must be located, constructed, and operated in a way that does not threaten our sensitive coastal and marine wildlife such as birds, sea turtles, and whales. While conditions differ **in Europe, offshore wind energy has been developed extensively** there**, and studies found no significant or long-term impacts on wildlife in the area.**

**Technological advancements now allow offshore wind farms to be sited farther offshore, greatly reducing potential conflict with migratory birds and other species**. NWF supports using sound science to collect needed wildlife data, refine decision making tools and  best practices for offshore wind energy developers, and develop formal standards and guidance for wildlife protections.

#### Species are at greater risk from climate change than wind power

National Wildlife Federation, 2012, How Offshore Wind Development Affects Wildlife, http://www.nwf.org/Global-Warming/Policy-Solutions/Renewable-Energy/Offshore-Wind/Offshore-Wind-Wildlife-Impacts.aspx

**National Wildlife Federation supports the development of offshore wind energy as a critical part of the solution to** [**climate change, which threatens wildlife and habitat**](http://www.nwf.org/Global-Warming/Effects-on-Wildlife-and-Habitat.aspx) **across the globe. From sea level rise to the warming of mountain peaks, entire species and ecosystems are in jeopardy.**

According to the world’s leading scientists, **as many as 30% of species worldwide will face extinction this century if warming trends continue. If we are to protect wildlife from the dangers of a warming world, then we must take appropriate, responsible action to bring the offshore wind energy resources of the Atlantic Ocean ashore.**

### Wind: A/T Causes warming

#### “Warming” caused by wind mills doesn’t have an effect and offshore mills actually cause cooling.

[Tim Worstall](http://blogs.forbes.com/timworstall/), 4/30/2012, Wind Farms Cause Global Warming!, (Forbes Staff Writer for Business and Technology) http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/04/30/wind-farms-cause-global-warming/

However, amusing as this is, being able to point to one of the proposed solutions for climate change as being a cause of it, **it’s not actually anything that affects the larger picture.**

**We’re not changing the amount of heat that is disappearing off into space with this and thus not changing the basic energy balance of the planet. We’re just moving it around a bit, that’s all.**

**As with the earlier paper that showed that offshore windmills will lower the air temperature around them by 1 degree or so**: I assume from that same mixing increasing the evaporation rate of the sea water.

## A/T Neg Args, etc

### USFG Key

#### Only the federal government can create the necessary national approach to port security and evenly spread the burden of investment

Joseph F. Bouchard, June 15, 2005, New Strategies to Protect America: Safer Ports for a More Secure Economy, (PhD, Executive Director of the Center for Homeland Security and Defense) http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/port\_security.pdf

**Port security is a national imperative and requires a national approach. Since the benefits of maritime operations extend to 50 states, we should have a system where the costs of better security are shared across the country**. That is what a genuine partnership really does. The federal government, states, municipalities and private owners and operators are now all players in our global system of commerce and all have responsibilities to help secure it. But **only the federal government can set up appropriate mechanisms so that the burden is spread appropriately across the system and is thus sustainable over the long-term. The current approach fails to achieve that goal.** A new approach is necessary.

#### USFG Funds are key to local port security efforts

Kate Farrish, Sep 9, 2011, Port Security A Concern As Funds Shrink, http://c-hit.newhavenindependent.org/health/entry/port\_security\_a\_concern\_as\_funds\_shrink/

**From 2008 through this year, Bridgeport, New Haven and New London have been slated to receive a combined $12 million in federal Homeland Security port funding** since their harbors are ranked second in risk behind such large ports as New York City and Los Angeles.  **The funds have provided training, cameras, lights, radiation detectors, a hovercraft and boats for the police department, fire department and harbor master**, said Scott Appleby, Bridgeport’s director of emergency management and homeland security.

But as the 10th anniversary of 9/11 approaches, Appleby and Martocchio are worried about a new threat:  **federal funding for Connecticut’s three largest ports has been cut from $2.25 million in 2010 to $1.4 million this year**.

**A national pool of money that smaller coastal towns** such as Waterford and Greenwich **can compete for** - given their designation as lower-risk ports - **is also dropping, from $14.4 million in 2010 to $11.27 this year**, said Scott D. DeVico, spokesman for the state Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection.

**The cuts may force Appleby to cancel a $350,000 emergency drill. New Haven has already scaled back a fire boat purchase** from $900,000 to $800,000 and may not be able buy a dock for the new boat. **Greenwich may not be able to buy video cameras it had planned for its port.**

**“It’s a huge concern** for me,” Martocchio said. “**You can’t afford not to spend this money. You’re only one incident away from no one ever wanting to come back to your city**.”

#### The USFG needs to increase port security measures

Andrew Mener and Jessica Leval, 04.20.09, Pirates Attack! Protect Our Ports!, (f*ounding chief of the University of Pennsylvania's Emergency Medical Services. Jessica Leval is a research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute and assistant director of the AEI-Brookings Continuity of Government Commission.)* http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/17/homeland-security-ports-opinions-contributors-pirates.html

The threat is real; our response, despite repeated recommendations by the audit, oversight and investigative arms of congress, has been desultory at best. President Obama and Congress must make improving port security measures a high priority to protect our country from another potentially devastating attack. The time for decisive action is now.

#### Federal funding is key

**Nagle, 2012 [**Kurt, <http://www.industrytoday.com/article_view.asp?ArticleID=F370>, “Port-Related Infrastructure Investments Can Reap Dividends” Volume 14, Issue 3, President and chief executive officer of the American Association of Port Authorities

Seaports are the primary gateway for overseas trade. They’re essential to economic security. As such, **federal funding for infrastructure in and around ports pays dividends**. Deep-draft coastal and Great Lakes ports are the nexus of critical transportation infrastructure that connects America’s exporters with markets overseas, and they provide access for imports of raw materials, components and consumer goods that are a key part of US manufacturing and help define our standard of living. Investments in America’s port infrastructure and the intermodal connections that serve seaports – both land and waterside – foster prosperity and provide an opportunity to bolster the country’s economic and employment recovery.

### A/T Federalism

#### No link: Plan falls under federal admiralty and maritime authority

RACHAEL E. SALCIDO, 2010, The American Journal of Comparative Law, AIR AND MARITIME LAW: LAW APPLICABLE ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: Law Applicable on the Outer Continental Shelf and in the Exclusive Economic Zone (Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law), Lexis

Freedom of navigation remains a priority for economic development. **In the United States, a comprehensive body of admiralty and maritime law governs marine transportation, shipping, and navigation, together with related contract and tort matters**. The term "maritime" refers to "marine resources, ocean commerce, and navigation." [n68](http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1340987527182&returnToKey=20_T15030296117&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.978524.4292677676" \l "n68) Admiralty in turn refers to "private law of navigation and shipping." [n69](http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1340987527182&returnToKey=20_T15030296117&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.978524.4292677676" \l "n69) **One important aspect is the jurisdiction of federal courts to address admiralty and maritime disputes.**

**The United States has recently adopted provisions to address maritime security concerns. Namely, the Homeland Security Act of 2002** **[n70](http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1340987527182&returnToKey=20_T15030296117&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.978524.4292677676" \l "n70) addressed border and ports-of-entry measures, and the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002** **[n71](http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1340987527182&returnToKey=20_T15030296117&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.978524.4292677676" \l "n71) addressed port security at** **[\*417]  both domestic and foreign ports**. The U.S. Coast Guard is a federal agency with primary responsibility for defending the U.S. EEZ. [n72](http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1340987527182&returnToKey=20_T15030296117&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.978524.4292677676" \l "n72)

#### Port security is a federal responsibility

The Committee on International Trade, 2008, THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE PORT SECURITY LEGISLATION ON TRADE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, The Record of The Association of The Bar of the City of New York, Lexis

Port security remains the responsibility of the Coast Guard and the Customs and Border Patrol. It is important that these agencies have sufficient funding and personnel to maintain security standards at the port, such as being able to check any suspicious containers at random.

### A/t Politics

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*Note- Don’t read all of these at once. Pick the ones that apply to the DA you are debating\*\*\*\*\*\*

#### Port Security bills are bipartisan and non-controversial

Pete Kasperowicz, 06/25/12, (Staff writer) House to push port-security measures this week, http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/234511-house-to-push-port-security-measures-this-week

**The House this week plans to pass a handful of bills aimed at requiring improved coordination between the federal and state governments on port security**, and an assessment of remaining security gaps at ports.  
  
The Securing Maritime Activities Through Risk-based Targeting for Port Security Act, from Rep. Candice Miller (R-Mich.), would require the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Coast Guard to cooperate more in their efforts to ensure port security. It would also boost measures overseas to ensure safer cargo, and encourage more cooperation between the federal and local levels.

"In an era of tight budgetary times, we must ensure that we are making the best use of limited taxpayer dollars," Miller said earlier this year when she introduced her bill. "My legislation seeks to guard against these threats in a risk-based, coordinated way that enhances the programs in place to protect our maritime borders."

http://ads.undertone.com/l?bannerid=347269&campaignid=76566&zoneid=31236&UTLIA=1&cb=c8be5dea4eb14a20a90c0a43d0a595f4&bk=m66x3q&id=6c4uk0skvnfkne2aq0uzx8sf2

Her bill, H.R. 4251, would require DHS to submit a plan for improved coordination to Congress by July 1, 2014.  
  
Another bill, from Rep. Janice Hahn (D-Calif.), would require DHS to submit another report that assesses gaps in port security, as well as a plan for addressing those gaps. Her bill, H.R. 4005, is the Gauging American Port Security (GAPS) Act.

Also up this week is H.R. 5889, the Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act. This bill from House Judiciary Committee Chairman Lamar Smith (R-Texas) would make it easier to capture suspected terrorists at sea, and increases penalties against anyone trying to use weapons of mass destruction from or against maritime vessels, or against fixed maritime platforms.  
  
The House is also expected to pass a bill that would make it easier for workers in marine facilities or at sea to renew their Transportation Worker Identification Credentials (TWICs). Currently, these workers have to appear twice at an enrollment center to get this credential.  
  
The bill — HR. 3173, from Rep. Steve Scalise (R-La.) — would reduce that to one visit.  
  
While not related to maritime security, the House will also approve H.R. 1447, which would require DHS to establish an Aviation Security Advisory Committee to advise on security matters. That bill is from Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.).  
  
**These** and other **bills will be brought up under a suspension of House rules, usually reserved for non-controversial bills**. Voting on them will start Tuesday night, but some might be considered later in the week.

#### Plan will be spun as job creation- means there will be no opposition in an election year.

Roberta Rampton and Thomas Ferraro, 6/29/12, Congress poised to wrap up transport, loans, flood bill, (Reuters staff writer) http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/sns-rt-us-usa-transportation-housebre85s16k-20120629,0,7743359.story

**A bipartisan bill to fund a massive job-creating transportation bill,** retain low interest rates for millions of student loans, and maintain national flood insurance **won approval on Friday in the U.S. House of Representatives.  
  
On a vote of 373-52, the House sent the measure to the Senate** for anticipated concurrence later in the day, which would clear the way for President Barack Obama to sign it into law.

**Both Democrats and Republicans embraced the measure, largely because it would create or save about three million jobs, a key issue in the November 6 elections since voters' top concern is the struggling U.S. economy.**

#### Port Security bills generate overwhelming support, even in election years.

Associated Press, May 4, 2006, House Votes to Tighten Port Security, http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2006/5/4/180919.shtml

**The House overwhelmingly approved legislation Thursday to try and stop nuclear weapons from being smuggled into the country by screening** all **cargo** for radiological materials at seaports. **Yet the technology will not be available**, the Bush administration said.

**The 421-2 vote capped months of election-year debate in Congress** **over how to make the 140 U.S. seaports less vulnerable to terrorist threats without curbing commerce.**

#### Obama already pushing offshore wind

Brandi Colander, November 23, 2010, Natural Resources Defense Council Staff, Obama Administration Paves Way for Offshore Wind Power to Take Flight Off Atlantic Coast, http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/bcolander/obama\_administration\_paves\_way.html

On the heels of [yesterday’s good news](http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/bcolander/cape_wind_in_massachusetts_get.html) about progress for offshore wind energy in [Massachusetts](http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/kkennedy/massachusetts_oks_long_term_po.html), **today the Obama Administration announced a major new initiative to accelerate the development of clean, offshore wind power** along the Atlantic Coast.

The [Interior Department](http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Launches-Smart-from-the-Start-Initiative-to-Speed-Offshore-Wind-Energy-Development-off-the-Atlantic-Coast.cfm), (DOI), Governor O’Malley of Maryland and the President of the Offshore Wind Development Coalition, Jim Lanard, made this encouraging announcement for renewable energy in America today.

#### Obama wouldn’t push the plan- supports cuts in port security

Joel Griffin, May 11, 2009, (assistant editor) Obama to slash funding for port, transit security programshttp://www.securityinfowatch.com/news/10497242/obama-to-slash-funding-for-port-transit-security-programs

**The Security Industry Association has come out in opposition of President Obama’s proposed budget cuts that would reduce funding for** school, transit and **port security programs.**

In a statement in which it characterized the proposed cuts as “ill-advised” and “disappointing,” the SIA said that **the president wants to reduce funding for the** Transit Security Grant Program and the **Port Security Grant Program** from the current level of $388.6 million each to $250 million each for the 2010 fiscal year. Congress had previously authorized $900 million for the transit program and $400 for the port program.

#### Obama wouldn’t push the plan- he’s repeatedly slashed port security budgets

Homeland security today, 03/22/12, New Port Security Bill Would Help Prevent Threats From Reaching US Shores as White House Seeks to Cut Coast Guardhttp://www.hstoday.us/focused-topics/customs-immigration/single-article-page/new-port-security-bill-would-help-prevent-threats-from-reaching-us-shores-as-white-house-seeks-to-cut-coast-guard/fe7804eb4ce2457a7b4991e9db40e787.html

**Meanwhile, though, two lawmakers said the Obama administration's call to slash more than $600 million from the Coast Guard’s budget next year will seriously impair its ability to protect the nation's shorelines and ports.**

Reps. John Mica (R-FL), chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, and Frank LoBiondo (R-NJ), chairman of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee, Thursday wrote to the House Appropriations Committee to express their concern that “**President Obama’s reckless cuts to the service will leave it unable to successfully perform its critical missions.”**

**“We strongly oppose President Obama’s proposal to slash this account**,” Mica and LoBiondo wrote. “These cuts threaten the ability of the Coast Guard to protect lives and property, defend our borders, and secure our ports, waterways, and coasts.”

#### Industry lobby groups will push for the plan

Veronique de Rugy, April 1, 2005, American Enterprise Institute, What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy? <http://www.aei.org/files/2005/04/01/20050408_wp107.pdf>

Finally, **“homeland security” pressure groups**—e.g. first responders, **state officials and/or specific industries like the airline industry—may have an incentive to lobby lawmakers to try to grab a bigger share of the funding allocated to homeland security programs and /or to transfer their responsibilities to the federal government**. In a recent paper, Besley et al. (1999) look at the tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized provision of local public and private goods.36 They emphasize the importance of the politics of decision making for the move toward more centralization of local responsibilities and the inefficient allocation of resources resulting from this process.37 Federalization of airline screeners and the trend toward the federalization of law enforcement and first responder programs are recent examples that may be consistent with this evidence.

### A/T Private CP

#### Perm solves best: results in public private partnerships

Dr. Michael J. Hillyard, (April 2005), President, Rockwell University, The Atlantis Garrison: A Comprehensive, Cost Effective Cargo and Port Security Strategy, http://www.ciaonet.org.mutex.gmu.edu/olj/si/si\_4\_4/si\_4\_4\_him01.pdf

A federal oversight and private delivery model would well serve an offshore ports system. Such a public/private partnership would provide for the necessary federal law enforcement, accountability, security, and control of foreign cargo entering the U.S., while also allowing for the private sector to compete and contract for intermodal transfer, offload, and shipping operations. Both government and industry would be able to consolidate currently redundant inspection, onload/offload, transport, and other operations.

#### Perm Solves- Federal investment is necessary but private companies can do construction.

[Stephen Wampler](mailto:wampler1@llnl.gov), JULY 2, 2010, (Staff Writer) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory News, Plan floated to ship cargo inspection offshore. https://newsline.llnl.gov/\_rev02/articles/2010/jul/07.02.10-ports.ph

**The best operational model for Portunus, in the view of the Tuck School, would be to have a public-private partnership for constructing** the estimated $10 billion **off-shore ports. The federal government would raise the financing and private firms would do the construction.**

### A/T Spending

#### The alternative to spending on offshore ports is to wait for disaster to strike- Plan is the more frugal course and better for the economy

Float Inc, Sept 17, 2002, Implementing the Beyond the Horizon Strategy, (Corporation providing services that include research, design and development of marine oriented products and specializes in very large floating platforms)http://www.floatinc.org/BtHSep02.pdf

**We should proceed now to close the obvious hole in our current strategy with the planning and engineering of these offshore ports and distribution centers. Waiting until a disaster occurs will be costly in lives and dollars. It could take several years to reopen a port depending on the nature of the attack.** **In the interim, the economic impact of the closure of a major port(s) would be felt nationwide. Obviously, spending a modest amount of money now to** study, plan and **move this concept forward is not only the wisest, but also the most frugal course.** These beyond the horizon security ports can provide a solid core for our Homeland Defense.

#### The USFG already spends $3billion on ineffective port security programs

The Committee on International Trade, 2008, THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE PORT SECURITY LEGISLATION ON TRADE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, The Record of The Association of The Bar of the City of New York, Lexis

**While the Government currently spends $ 3 billion on** **port security, more needs to be budgeted for personnel, training and scanning equipment, given the yearly increases in container traffic**. [n46](http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1340995105750&returnToKey=20_T15030902748&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.979595.2649712804" \l "n46) Currently, a system called the Automated Targeting System ("ATS") is used to screen and assess cargo containers before the containers are loaded onto ships. [n47](http://www.lexisnexis.com.mutex.gmu.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1340995105750&returnToKey=20_T15030902748&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.979595.2649712804" \l "n47) If more detailed commercial data were submitted to the ATS, higher quality risk assessments of cargo would be facilitated before the containers even left the dock. In a related measure, security clearance procedures for port security officers could be enhanced by requiring officers to successfully complete a background check and qualify for a Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC).

### N/U- Port Security Bills

#### Non-Unique- USFG is increasing funding on port security now

**Congressional Budget Office, 6-11-2012** ” H.R. 4251, SMART Port Security Act” http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43318

**H.R. 4251 would require the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to carry out two pilot programs relating to border and port security and would direct DHS and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to prepare several reports on improving port security. In addition, the legislation would authorize the appropriation of $4 million for a security program jointly operated by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the Canadian government**. H.R. 4251 also would direct DHS to make changes to procedures for issuing Transportation Worker Identification Credentials (TWICs) to individuals who require unescorted access to secure areas of ports and certain other facilities.

#### The House just overwhelmingly passed a port security bill

GSN (Government Security News), 2012-06-29, Congresswoman Hahn’s port security bill passes the House, <http://www.gsnmagazine.com/node/26671?c=maritime_port_security>,

**Rep. Janice Hahn’s port security legislation passed the U.S. House of Representatives by a vote of 411 to 9.**  [**H.R. 4005 “Gauging American Port Security Act” or GAPS Act**](http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR4005:/) **directs DHS to conduct a comprehensive classified examination of remaining gaps in port security a**nd prepare a plan to address them.

### N/U Transportation Bill

#### Non-Unique- congress just passed a $105 billion transportation bill.

[Roberta Rampton](http://blogs.reuters.com/search/journalist.php?edition=us&n=roberta.rampton&) and [Thomas Ferraro](http://blogs.reuters.com/search/journalist.php?edition=us&n=thomas.ferraro&), Jun 29, 2012, Congress passes bill for transport jobs, student loans, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/29/us-usa-transportation-senate-idUSBRE85S19K20120629

**Congress gave final approval on Friday to a massive job-creating U.S. transportation bill that under a bipartisan deal** will also keep interest rates low for millions of federal student loans and maintain federal flood insurance.

**The Republican-led House of Representatives and Democratic-led Senate passed the measure on back-to-back votes,** clearing the way for President Barack Obama to sign it into law.

**In a rare display of bipartisanship, Democrats and Republicans embraced the measure largely because of $105 billion in transportation spending over the next 27 months that would create or save about 3 million jobs**, a key issue in the November 6 congressional and presidential elections.

#### Transportation bill just passed with overwhelming bipartisan support

**The US Congress overcame months of division to pass a massive transportation bill Friday that secures a two-year extension of highway funding**, and prevented a doubling of student loan interest rates.

The legislation, which now heads to the White House for President Barack Obama's signature, notably did not include the controversial Keystone XL oil pipeline long sought by congressional Republicans as well as the party's White House hopeful Mitt Romney.

But it averts a crisis that was looming for the country's highway construction projects, and provides as many as three million jobs in the sector, according to Senator Barbara Boxer.

**The bill sets aside more than $100 billion over 27 months to fund thousands of road, bridge and railway projects, including repairs to a steadily declining national infrastructure.**

Lawmakers were up against a rapidly approaching weekend deadline that would have seen funding evaporate had they not agreed to the money before a short-term extension expired.

They also needed to quickly resolve the student loan crisis, which led to the incorporation of that measure in the transport bill following months of bickering over details on the two issues.

The package sailed through the House with 373 votes to 52, and then passed the Senate 74-19, with one member voting present.

### A/T Scan 100% Cp

#### 100% scanning is unfeasible without offshore ports.

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf

There have been many concerns raised regarding the mandate to scan 100% of incoming containerized freight. Not the least of which is a concern over shipment delays and cost. I agree with these concerns in the context of handling freight with existing systems and technologies. However, providing a capability that improves handling rates significantly and improves the logistics of shipping while achieving the 100% goal is a different animal. An offshore port utilizing state of the art technologies has the potential of achieving this goal. Trying to achieve this goal at numerous foreign ports is unrealistic.

### A/T Retrofit existing ports

#### Retrofitting ports would take 15 years and is less cost efficient than the plan

Hank Glauser, April 4, 2011, Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/471897.pdf

Unfortunately, taking existing US ports and making the aforementioned technology upgrades would be improbable in the next 10-15 years due to operational, cost and process constraints. New ports are unlikely due to public opinion, environmental restrictions, permitting issues, and the limited supply of land adjacent to shipping access points. Retrofitting existing ports to provide the efficiencies identified in this report can also be hampered by operational disruptions, strong competition among adjacent ports, and labor unions (recall the west coast port shutdown). Efforts made to date and planned are not widespread but regionally targeted to address the most serious problem areas. Because of these constraints and the economies of scale achieved in developing offshore ports, a strategy to invest in existing port upgrades is not as efficient.

### Offshore Military Bases

#### **US Military Readiness Depends on Strong offshore Navy**

England, Jones, and Clark July 11, 2011 [Gordon, served as Deputy Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy; James L. Former National Security Advisor and retired Marine Corps General; Vern, previous Chief of Naval Operations; “The Necessity of U.S. Naval Power,” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303339904576406163019350934.html> PWS]

All our citizens, and especially our servicemen and women, expect and deserve a thorough review of critical security decisions. After all, decisions today will affect the nation's strategic position for future generations. The future security environment underscores two broad security trends. First, international political realities and the internationally agreed-to sovereign rights of nations will increasingly limit the sustained involvement of American permanent land-based, heavy forces to the more extreme crises. This will make offshore options for deterrence and power projection ever more paramount in support of our national interests. Second, the naval dimensions of American power will re-emerge as the primary means for assuring our allies and partners, ensuring prosperity in times of peace, and countering anti-access, area-denial efforts in times of crisis. We do not believe these trends will require the dismantling of land-based forces, as these forces will remain essential reservoirs of power. As the United States has learned time and again, once a crisis becomes a conflict, it is impossible to predict with certainty its depth, duration and cost.

#### The Future will hold increased Reliance on the US Navy and Offshore Bases for Military Superiority

England, Jones, and Clark July 11, 2011 [Gordon, served as Deputy Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy; James L. Former National Security Advisor and retired Marine Corps General; Vern, previous Chief of Naval Operations; “The Necessity of U.S. Naval Power,” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303339904576406163019350934.html> PWS]

That said, the U.S. has been shrinking its overseas land-based installations, so the ability to project power globally will make the forward presence of naval forces an even more essential dimension of American influence. What we do believe is that uniquely responsive Navy-Marine Corps capabilities provide the basis on which our most vital overseas interests are safeguarded. Forward presence and engagement is what allows the U.S. to maintain awareness, to deter aggression, and to quickly respond to threats as they arise. Though we clearly must be prepared for the high-end threats, such preparation should be made in balance with the means necessary to avoid escalation to the high end in the first place. The versatility of maritime forces provides a truly unmatched advantage. The sea remains a vast space that provides nearly unlimited freedom of maneuver. Command of the sea allows for the presence of our naval forces, supported from a network of shore facilities, to be adjusted and scaled with little external restraint. It permits reliance on proven capabilities such as prepositioned ships.

#### **Strong Naval Power and Offshore Ports key to solving Piracy, Trafficking, Proliferation, and Hegemony**

England, Jones, and Clark July 11, 2011 [Gordon, served as Deputy Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy; James L. Former National Security Advisor and retired Marine Corps General; Vern previous Chief of Naval Operations; “The Necessity of U.S. Naval Power,” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303339904576406163019350934.html> PWS]

Maritime capabilities encourage and enable cooperation with other nations to solve common sea-based problems such as piracy, illegal trafficking, proliferation of W.M.D., and a host of other ills, which if unchecked can harm our friends and interests abroad, and our own citizenry at home. The flexibility and responsiveness of naval forces provide our country with a general strategic deterrent in a potentially violent and unstable world. Most importantly, our naval forces project and sustain power at sea and ashore at the time, place, duration, and intensity of our choosing. Given these enduring qualities, tough choices must clearly be made, especially in light of expected tight defense budgets. The administration and the Congress need to balance the resources allocated to missions such as strategic deterrence, ballistic missile defense, and cyber warfare with the more traditional ones of sea control and power projection. The maritime capability and capacity vital to the flexible projection of U.S. power and influence around the globe must surely be preserved, especially in light of available technology. Capabilities such as the Joint Strike Fighter will provide strategic deterrence, in addition to tactical long-range strike, especially when operating from forward-deployed naval vessels.

#### **The Future of the Navy depends on Offshore Bases**

Slavin August 16, 2009 [Staff Writer and Reporter for “Stars and Stripes,” “Footprint of the future: Offshore sea bases,” < http://www.stripes.com/news/footprint-of-the-future-offshore-sea-bases-1.93988> PWS]

The solution heralded by the top brass at the Navy and Marine Corps — and even among a few in the Army — is to place most of that footprint in the ocean with “sea bases.” “When you have less boots on ground for logistic forces, you have less resentment for American forces,” said Robert Button, a Rand Corporation senior analyst, who has explored seabasing capabilities in Defense Department-backed studies. Seabasing isn’t a new idea. Aircraft carriers function like floating bases, and cargo ships have long positioned themselves offshore to support land operations. However, the Navy’s seabasing concept is on a grander yet more efficient scale, and the service says it’s critical to its 21st-century vision. The self-contained sea base squadron, a concept known as the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), could carry several dozen helicopters, thousands of trucks and all the armored vehicles found in a Marine or Army brigade. It also would carry millions of square feet in supplies and berthing for thousands of troops. The ships could then seamlessly transfer troops and supplies to amphibious landing craft, or send them to shore on helicopters. Most importantly, if less glamorous, the sea base’s ships could use recently developed technology to sort through tons of supplies at sea and deliver custom supply packages to shore in a fraction of the time it takes now. Officials say the full vision won’t be realized until at least sometime during the next decade, and some technological challenges remain. In the meantime, some of the required pieces are rolling off assembly lines and entering the fleet right now.

#### Put away your Kritiks, Offshore Bases decrease resentment of Americans

Slavin August 16, 2009 [Staff Writer and Reporter for “Stars and Stripes,” “Footprint of the future: Offshore sea bases,” < http://www.stripes.com/news/footprint-of-the-future-offshore-sea-bases-1.93988> PWS]

Today’s ships can get thousands of troops and supplies to shore for war pre-positioning and humanitarian aid efforts, but not without creating a giant footprint that could serve as a magnet for local opposition to the United States. The solution heralded by the top brass at the Navy and Marine Corps — and even among a few in the Army — is to place most of that footprint in the ocean with “sea bases.” “When you have less boots on ground for logistic forces, you have less resentment for American forces,” said Robert Button, a Rand Corporation senior analyst, who has explored seabasing capabilities in Defense Department-backed studies.

#### Sea Bases provide a future of Unstoppable Naval Dominance

Clark, October 2002 [Vern, Admiral in the US Navy, “Sea Power 21,” < http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/proceedings.html> PWS]

Sea-based operations use revolutionary information superiority and dispersed, networked force capabilities to deliver unprecedented offensive power, defensive assurance, and operational independence to Joint Force Commanders. The 21st century sets the stage for tremendous increases in naval precision, reach, and connectivity, ushering in a new era of joint operational effectiveness. Innovative concepts and technologies will integrate sea, land, air, space, and cyberspace to a greater extent than ever before. In this unified battlespace, the sea will provide a vast maneuver area from which to project direct and decisive power around the globe.  Future naval operations will use revolutionary information superiority and dispersed, networked force capabilities to deliver unprecedented offensive power, defensive assurance, and operational independence to Joint Force Commanders. Our Navy and its partners will dominate the continuum of warfare from the maritime domain—deterring forward in peacetime, responding to crises, and fighting and winning wars. By doing so, we will continue the evolution of U.S. naval power from the blue-water, war-at-sea focus of the "Maritime Strategy" (1986), through the littoral emphasis of ". . . From the Sea" (1992) and "Forward . . . from the Sea" (1994), to a broadened strategy in which naval forces are fully integrated into global joint operations against regional and transnational dangers.  To realize the opportunities and navigate the challenges ahead, we must have a clear vision of how our Navy will organize, integrate, and transform. "Sea Power 21" is that vision. It will align our efforts, accelerate our progress, and realize the potential of our people. "Sea Power 21" will guide our Navy as we defend our nation and defeat our enemies in the uncertain century before us.

#### **Sea Basing increase Naval Power and Response Time**

Barnard June 2004 [Richard C., Editor in Chief at the Navy League of the United States, “Sea Basing Concept Promises a Revolution in Power Projection” < http://www.navyleague.org/sea\_power/jun\_04\_10.php> PWS

Vice Adm. Charles W. Moore Jr., deputy chief of naval operations for fleet readiness and logistics, said, “There is probably nothing we are doing in the Navy today that excites us more than the potential and opportunity that sea basing presents to us.” Moore and others are excited because sea basing does much more than cut their deployment timelines. It allows them, working in concert with other U.S. military services, to overcome political barriers between their forces and a battle area, such as nearby nations denying access routes to U.S. forces. Sea basing, which officials view as a concept for joint operations, also rids military forces of one of their biggest handicaps, the iron mountain of weapons and materiel unloaded from the Navy’s transport ships and moved ashore where it must be guarded, allocated to staging areas and integrated with the force structure being constituted nearby. Sea basing enables the military to move troops tailored for specific missions globally and at high speed, Hanlon said. It fosters the use of maneuver warfare to create uncertainty, forcing the enemy into a reactive posture.

#### **Offshore Bases More Practical, More Effective, and Safer than Conventional Ports**

Hatfield 2005 [Major Stuart A. US Army Major, “Sea Basing: a Way to Project Land Combat Power,” < http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA457399> PWS]

The Unites States Navy maintains full spectrum domination of the world’s sea-lanes through unrivaled control of the surface, subsurface, and air. The Navy’s vulnerabilities still include mines, land based weapons, and asymmetric threats while in port, as with the USS Cole bombing. With the ocean covering 70% of the Earth’s surface, the exploitation of the sea-lanes as maneuver space is critical. International common areas include space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace. The Navy’s domination of the ocean means that the sea is maneuver space for the US, but an obstacle to its adversaries. The sea base exploits this freedom of maneuver by providing a platform for force projection unconstrained by alliances or political limitations. Furthermore, activities at the sea base can remain hidden from an adversary and safe from attack. Satellites have more difficulty locating and targeting a sea base than a land base. Therefore, land bases are more vulnerable to terrorist attacks, as well as land based conventional forces.

#### **Sea Bases Sustain Hegemony, checks China**

**Tangredi 2011** [Sam J, Director, San Diego Operations at Strategic Insight, Ltd. “Sea Basing: Concepts, Issues, and Recommendations” < http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/d49d4281-7790-435d-9b3f-c7df59fb1544/Sea-Basing--Concept,-Issues,-and-Recommendations> PWS]

Sea basing is a capability that depends on command of the sea, or sea control. In fact, it cannot exist without sea control. Since the collapse of the Soviet navy in 1991, U.S. sea control has been a given—unlike the situation in World War II, when the Allies had to fight to achieve sea control. Clearly the People’s Liberation Army intends to contest American sea control in the western Pacific. However, China’s maritime capabilities have not yet matched its aspirations and it is unclear whether Chinese efforts at sea denial would be as effective as the more alarmist reports would indicate. 11 American global sea control is not yet broken, presumably assuring the continued viability of sea basing. But the growing ambition among littoral states for regional denial capabilities—often referred to as “antiaccess” or “area denial” strategies—is itself undeniable.