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# \*\*\*Affirmative Case\*\*\*

## 1ac-Port Security-Inherency

### Contention One: Inherency─

### Ports are extremely vulnerable to attacks-economic shock power and population density make them attractive targets─

Haveman & Shatz 6. Jon D. Haveman, research fellow @ Public Policy Institute of California. Ph.D in Economics-University of Michigan. Howard J. Shatz, senior economist at RAND corporation. 2006 “Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost.”[http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r\_606jhr.pdf]

The second concern is that ports themselves present attractive targets for terrorists. Ports are a significant potential choke point for an enormous amount of economic activity. The 361 U.S. seaports make an immense contribution to U.S. trade and the U.S. economy. They move about 80 percent of all U.S. international trade by weight, and about 95 percent of all U.S. overseas trade, excluding trade with Mexico and Canada. By value, $807 billion worth of goods flowed through the seaports in 2003, about 41 percent of all U.S. international goods trade. This value is higher than the value of trade moved by all modes in any single leading industrial country except Germany. Temporarily shutting down a major U.S. port could impose significant economic costs throughout not only the United States but also the world. Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden has labeled the destruction of the U.S. economy as one of his goals: “If their economy is finished, they will become too busy to enslave oppressed people. It is very important to concentrate on hitting the U.S. economy with every available means.”1 The potential for a port closure to disrupt economic activity has been made clear several times in recent years. In 2002, the closure of all West Coast ports was clearly responsible for some element of economic disruption, with estimates of lost activity ranging from the hundreds of millions of dollars per day to several billion. In September 2005, Hurricane Katrina further served to reinforce the fact that ports are an integral feature of our goods distribution system. The closure of the Port of New Orleans and many smaller ports along the Gulf Coast is likely to have adversely affected U.S. grain exports, although at the time of this writing, cost estimates were not available. Hurricane Katrina further illustrated the effects of disruptions to the flow of oil, gasoline, and natural gas to the nation’s economy. That a natural disaster can produce such a result implies that an attack on oil terminals at U.S. ports could be both desirable and effective for terrorists. Beyond their economic role, the largest seaports are also near major population centers, so the use of a weapon of mass destruction at a port could injure or kill thousands of people. In addition, a weapon such as a nuclear device could cause vast environmental and social disruption and destroy important non-port infrastructure in these urban areas such as airports and highway networks. How much risk is there for either of these concerns? U.S. law enforcement, academic, and business analysts believe that although the likelihood of an ocean container being used in a terrorist attack is low, the vulnerability of the maritime transportation system is extremely high, and the consequence of a security breach, such as the smuggling of a weapon of mass destruction into the country, would be disastrous.2 Others take issue with the notion that the likelihood of a container attack is low, believing that an increase in global maritime terrorism in 2004 and the reputed appointment late that year of a maritime specialist as head of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia portended a significant maritime attack.3

### Despite these risks, recent cuts in grant programs have been implemented-This *drastically* decreases efforts at maintaining port security nationally─

Kimery 3-9-12. “Counternarcotics, Terrorism & Intelligence Security, Port Authorities Associations Urge DHS To Reconsider Port Allocations.”[http://www.hstoday.us/focused-topics/counternarcotics-terrorism-intelligence/single-article-page/security-port-authorities-associations-urge-dhs-to-reconsider-port-allocations.html]

“Even though Congress reduced the budget for preparedness grants by 40 percent, we are concerned with the allocation decisions made by the department,” SIA and AAPA said in their letter to Napolitano. “The recently announced cuts result in a 59 percent reduction in funding for the Port Security Grant Program and are 75 percent less than authorized by Congress in the SAFE Port Act.” Continuing, the two organizations stated that “this allocation will not come close to meeting local needs. It will result in continued struggles to bring port security into the 21st century and hamper meeting government mandates, such as the Transportation Worker Identity Card.” The two groups said that, “while we understand that Congress initiated this cut because of what it saw as a backlog of unspent funds, we believe such a drastic reduction of funds will have negative consequences on port security. In addition, we believe that one of the best ways to utilize existing funding is to categorically waive all cost-share requirements for grants that have already been awarded. Requiring short, individual waivers diverts the efforts of those involved from the goal of getting these projects done quickly. Grantees often put projects on hold until they receive a waiver.” “We are certain there are other options available, and we would encourage your office to think through those options to help us as we help secure our ports,” the groups’ joint letter to Napolitano concluded. “Every agency has to do more with less; we understand that,” said Marcus Dunn, Director of Government Relations at SIA. “However, what is difficult to understand is the allocation made by DHS.” Many ports have applied for - and have been granted - funding for critical security components. Unfortunately, those grants have been tied to matching grants, the two organizations noted in a statement. They added that “given the state of the economy, some ports are unable to meet the matching amount, leaving those dollars unclaimed and leaving critical security projects unfinished.”

## 1ac-Port Security-Terrorism

### Scenario 1 – Nuclear Terrorism─

### Terrorist attacks involving weapons of massive destruction are inevitable by 2013.

Allison 10 – Prof @ Harvard, Graham, “A Failure to Imagine the Worst”, Foreign Policy, January, http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/node/5591

Thinking about risks we face today, we should reflect on the major conclusion of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission established to investigate that catastrophe. The U.S. national security establishment's principal failure prior to Sept. 11, 2001, was, the commission found, a “failure of imagination.” Summarized in a single sentence, the question now is: Are we at risk of an equivalent failure to imagine a nuclear 9/11? After the recent attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, this question is more urgent than ever. The thought that terrorists could successfully explode a nuclear bomb in an American city killing hundreds of thousands of people seems incomprehensible. This essential incredulity is rooted in three deeply ingrained presumptions. First, no one could seriously intend to kill hundreds of thousands of people in a single attack. Second, only states are capable of mass destruction; nonstate actors would be unable to build or use nuclear weapons. Third, terrorists would not be able to deliver a nuclear bomb to an American city. In a nutshell, these presumptions lead to the conclusion: inconceivable. Why then does Obama call nuclear terrorism “the single most important national security threat that we face” and "a threat that rises above all others in urgency?” Why the unanimity among those who have shouldered responsibility for U.S. national security in recent years that this is a grave and present danger? In former CIA Director George Tenet's assessment, “the main threat is the nuclear one. I am convinced that this is where [Osama bin Laden] and his operatives desperately want to go.” When asked recently what keeps him awake at night, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates answered: “It's the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.” Leaders who have reached this conclusion about the genuine urgency of the nuclear terrorist threat are not unaware of their skeptics' presumptions. Rather, they have examined the evidence, much of which has been painstakingly compiled here by Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former head of the CIA’s terrorism and weapons-of-mass-destruction efforts, and much of which remains classified. Specifically, who is seriously motivated to kill hundreds of thousands of Americans? Osama bin Laden, who has declared his intention to kill “4 million Americans—including 2 million children.” The deeply held belief that even if they wanted to, “men in caves can't do this” was then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's view when Tenet flew to Islamabad to see him after 9/11. As Tenet (assisted by Mowatt-Larssen) took him step by step through the evidence, he discovered that indeed they could. Terrorists’ opportunities to bring a bomb into the United States follow the same trails along which 275 tons of drugs and 3 million people crossed U.S. borders illegally last year. In 2007, Congress established a successor to the 9/11 Commission to focus on terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. This bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism issued its report to Congress and the Obama administration in December 2008. In the commission's unanimous judgment: “it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.”

### Ports represent the *most likely* target for WMD attacks─

Konkel ‘5. Todd Konkel, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe” [http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf]

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. government passed a significant number of measures to improve aviation security – an area with a high level of public visibility. This nation faces a potentially greater threat, however, from a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) making its way into the U.S. in one of the thousands of cargo containers that enter this country every day. In June 2004, the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation issued a memo reflecting this view: “Despite the importance of seaport security, perhaps no other mode of transportation is currently more vulnerable to future attacks than our Nation’s Marine Transportation System.” 1 Although a future attack involving a chemical or biological WMD could have tragic consequences, a nuclear weapon, which could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths in an instant, presents the most concerning threat. In Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Harvard professor Graham Allison shares a brief but revealing excerpt from a private conversation that took place with former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge in February 2004. When asked what worried him most, Secretary Ridge replied with a single word: “nuclear.” 2 Later in his book, Allison states that a nuclear weapon used by terrorists in an attack on the United States “is far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile.” 3

## 1ac-Port Security-Terrorism

### And, Terrorists have the ability and motivation to go nuclear.

Joyner 9 – Prof Govt @ Georgetown, Christopher, “Nuclear terrorism in a globalizing world: assessing the threat and the emerging management regime”, Stanford Journal of International Law, 6-22, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-216486733.html

The technologies and processes that make globalization beneficial to societies simultaneously empower sub-national actors and ideological extremists and thus render states more porous to external penetration and more vulnerable to violent disruption. (12) Terrorists, too, can use cell phones, computers, fax machines, e-mail, the internet, monetary transfers, and air transportation to plan, coordinate, and carry out violent attacks against Western societies. (13) This capability of terrorist groups was dramatically demonstrated by the tragic consequences of 9/11, and it was in the immediate aftermath of these events that the threat of nuclear terrorism became soberly evident. Indeed, the recovery of al-Qaeda documents in Afghanistan depicting the design of nuclear weapons and the interception of information regarding meetings between Osama bin Laden and nuclear specialists in August 2001 highlighted the undeniable determination of al-Qaeda to seek ways and means to commit acts of nuclear terrorism. (14) The study of nuclear terrorism's ramifications for international law and foreign relations is particularly critical given the reality of the threat it now poses. Since September 11, 2001, concern over the possibility that a nuclear terrorist attack could occur has increased significantly. (15) As a result of the expressed desire by terrorist groups to detonate a nuclear device--and the paucity of fissile materials needed to produce one--every effort must be made to counteract the possibility of such an attack occurring. (16) The international community is currently struggling to develop the legal, political and technological means necessary to combat this threat. However, through select modifications to international law and robust enforcement of current nuclear conventions by an empowered IAEA--as well as greater cooperation between governments in initiatives for strengthening nuclear safeguards and policing black market trafficking--threats associated with nuclear terrorism may be diminished. To address these issues, this study seeks to accomplish three main purposes. First, the study strives to analyze the nature of the threat of nuclear terrorism; second, an effort is made to assess various strategies adopted thus far by the international community to prevent nuclear terrorism from occurring; and third, the study seeks to evaluate and suggest possible recourses for new international actions aimed at deterring terrorist acts involving the use of nuclear materials. Toward these ends, Part II sets the stage by discussing the background relevant to the current threat of nuclear terrorism. Part III then analyzes the dimensions of the nuclear terrorist threat and the multifaceted impact of this threat. Recommendations for policy actions by governments and international institutions are treated in Part IV. Finally, Part V proffers some conclusions for critical reflection. II. BACKGROUND Three key factors portend the possibility that nuclear terrorism might actually occur. First, the porous security conditions for storing nuclear weapons and fissile materials in Russia and Pakistan, coupled with the weak safeguards for research reactors worldwide, provide inviting opportunities for terrorists to acquire nuclear materials. Second, a nuclear weapon can be made with relative ease. Third, a global nuclear market has emerged that enhances the prospects for increased proliferation of nuclear materials. These factors magnify the reality of the nuclear terrorism threat. Policymakers in Western states initially concluded that, because of the global nature of the threat, any strategy should focus on countering nuclear terrorism by securing nuclear materials, bolstering efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons programs, and criminalizing activities associated with such acts.

## 1ac-Port Security-Terrorism

### Acquisition of material needed for a container-based attack is feasible and highly likely─

Konkel ‘5. Todd Konkel, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe” [http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf]

A fundamental factor contributing to the threat of a container-based terrorist attack is the disturbing availability of nuclear materials, which include unsecured nuclear weapons, fissile nuclear material and other sources of radioactivity. As previously stated, given a choice, a terrorist would opt for a nuclear device over a dirty bomb in order to maximize casualties and damage to physical infrastructure. The first obstacle a potential nuclear terrorist faces is the acquisition of a functional nuclear weapon. There are more than two hundred locations worldwide where a would-be terrorist could acquire a nuclear weapon or the fissile material to make one. 14 The area of greatest concern is Russia, which may still possess as many as twelve thousand low-yield tactical nuclear weapons that are often kept in less secure conditions than the weapons in the nation’s strategic arsenal. 15 Fortunately, a nuclear bomb in a terrorist’s hands has thus far been only the subject of spy thrillers and Hollywood productions rather than a live CNN newscast. If the theft of a complete nuclear weapon proved too difficult, terrorists could attempt to steal or purchase the necessary fissile material and construct a bomb on their own. The minimum amount of weapons-grade fissile material required for a nuclear detonation varies with bomb design but can be as little as twelve kilograms of uranium235 or four kilograms of plutonium-239. Terrorists seeking this path might look to one of the 130 research reactors in more than 40 countries worldwide that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) as fuel. 16 Attempted thefts of materials from such facilities occur with disturbing frequency. In the first three years after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, for example, the German government reported more than seven hundred incidents of attempted nuclear sales, including sixty cases that involved seizure of nuclear materials. 17 Furthermore, the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO), compiled by researchers at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, has documented twenty-five “highly-credible” incidents involving the trafficking of weapons-grade plutonium or HEU since 1992. 18 Fortunately, in all but one of these cases, the stolen nuclear material was recovered by law enforcement officials. Although open-source literature may offer little evidence of successful thefts involving significant amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material, the potential existence of unreported or as yet undiscovered thefts is sufficient cause for concern. Whereas obtaining enough fissile material for a working nuclear bomb could prove logistically challenging, there is no shortage of radioactive material that a terrorist could use to construct a dirty bomb. Sources of radioisotopes can be found in a diverse array of medical and industrial technologies. For example, cesium-137 and cobalt-60 are commonly used in nuclear medicine, and americium-241 can be found in certain oil exploration equipment. According to a 2003 study by the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, between October 1996 and September 2001, an average of three hundred commercial radioactive sources were lost or unaccounted for (or “orphaned”) each year. Of these orphaned sources, 56 percent were not recovered. 19 Figures published by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in 1998 are even more pessimistic, estimating that there were as many as thirty thousand orphaned radioactive sources in the U.S. at that time. 20 Given the availability and relative insecurity of nuclear materials, policymakers must address the very real risk that sophisticated terrorists might succeed in obtaining such materials. The story of David Hahn, a nuclear-savvy Michigan teenager, should serve as ample warning. Over the course of three years beginning in 1991, Hahn collected and purified enough radioactive material in his mother’s potting shed to put forty thousand nearby residents at risk due to the dangers posed by the release of radioactive dust and radiation. 21 A terrorist organization with sufficient determination and financial resources would no doubt pose a much greater threat.

### Now the Impacts

### First, The U.S. will would retaliate ensuring superpower war with China and Russia─

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies, Director of Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Senior Research Associate with Oxford’s Centre for International Studies. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2010, pages 571-593)

Washington's early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents' … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that …might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

## 1ac-Port Security-Terrorism

### War with Russia is the only existential threat─

Bostrom 2002 (Nick, PhD of Philosophy at Oxford, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, <http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html>)

**A** much greater **existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war** was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that **might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal.** There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that **a nuclear Armageddon would occur and** that it might annihilate our species or permanently **destroy human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals** that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that **a smaller nuclear exchange**, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it **would not destroy** or thwart **humankind’s potential permanently.**

### Second, The attack alone risks climate disruption and total extinction─

Toon et al, 7 (O. B., Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics at the University of Colorado Boulder, R. P. Turco, A. Robock, C. Bardeen, L. Oman, and G. L. Stenchikov, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that **a single detonation** in the 15 kiloton range **can produce** **urban** **fatalities** approaching one million in some cases, and casualties **exceeding one million**. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, anorganized **attack** on the U.S. **by** a small **nuclear** state, or **terrorists** supported by such a state, **could generate casualties comparable to** those once predicted for a **full-scale** **nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict.** Remarkably, the estimated quantities of **smoke** generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives **could lead to** **significant global climate** **perturbations** (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes

## 1ac-Port Security-Economy

### Scenario Two is the Economy

### Port security is critical to maintain the stability of trade *internationally* and billions of dollars in contributions from port-employment annually─

**Clark et al. 7.** CAPT Bruce G. Clark, USCGR (ret) Director of Maritime Security Projects, Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning -The California Maritime Academy. Dr. Donna J. Nincic , Associate Professor and Chair-Department of Global and Maritime Studies of The California Maritime Academy. CAPT Nevin Fidler, USCGR (ret) Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning-The California Maritime Academy-The California State University. “Protecting America’s Ports: Are We There Yet?” Oct 2007.

The criticality of today's Maritime Transportation System (MTS) for the continued health and dynamism of the American economy can not be underestimated. Internationally, there are nearly 600 major container ports, over 7,000 container ships, and many millions of shipping containers in operation and use. The USCG and DOT recognizes 361 commercial ports in the United States of which 55 are considered major port operations. MARAD and DOD have co-designated 14 of these as Strategic Ports necessary for military logistic support operations. In addition to these designated major ports are hundreds of other small harbors that support commercial and sport fishing operations as well as private marinas that represent potential infiltration and operational support hubs for possible terrorist or other criminal activities. Under this possible scenario, there are 110,000 licensed commercial fishing vessels and more than 17 million private recreational watercraft in the United States that could be used as vessels of opportunity in support of terrorism. There are 13 million American citizens employed in domestic shipping related activities tied directly to the MTS and contributing at least $740 billion to the U.S. economy every year. More than 8,000 foreign flag vessels make more than 22,000 U.S. port calls annually, delivering 24,000,000 containers transporting everything from food stuffs to soccer balls. Over 95% of international trade and 25% of domestic trade shipments move by water through US ports and on the inland and Great Lakes waterways. In 2005, more than 134 million passengers transited U.S. waters by ferry, cruise ship, and floating casinos. These figures do not account for bulk liquid, bulk solid and break bulk cargoes which contribute significantly to the level of waterborne commerce.

### Any attack would collapse the global economy and U.S. leadership─

Flynn ‘3. Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D. Commander, U.S. Coast Guard (ret.) “The Fragile State of Container Security [http://www.cfr.org/defensehomeland-security/fragile-state-container-security/p5730]

A year later I joined with former senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart in preparing our report, “America: Still Unprepared—Still In Danger.” We observed that “nineteen men wielding box-cutters forced the United States to do to itself what no adversary could ever accomplish: a successful blockade of the U.S. economy. If a surprise terrorist attack were to happen tomorrow involving the sea, rail, or truck transportation systems that carry millions of tons of trade to the United States each day, the response would likely be the same—a self-imposed global embargo.” Based on that analysis, we identified as second of the six critical mandates that deserve the nation’s immediate attention: “Make trade security a global priority; the system for moving goods affordably and reliably around the world is ripe for exploitation and vulnerable to mass disruption by terrorists.” This is why the topic of today’s hearing is so important. The stakes are enormous. U.S. prosperity—and much of its power—relies on its ready access to global markets. Both the scale and pace at which goods move between markets has exploded in recent years thanks in no small part to the invention and proliferation of the intermodal container. These ubiquitous boxes—most come in the 40’x8’x8’ size—have transformed the transfer of cargo from a truck, train, and ship into the transportation equivalent of connecting Lego blocks. The result has been to increasingly diminish the role of distance for a supplier or a consumer as a constraint in the world marketplace. Ninety percent of the world’s freight now moves in a container. Companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors move up to 30 tons of merchandise or parts across the vast Pacific Ocean from Asia to the West Coast for about $1600. The transatlantic trip runs just over a $1000—which makes the postage stamp seem a bit overpriced. But the system that underpins the incredibly efficient, reliable, and affordable movement of global freight has one glaring shortcoming in the post-9-11 world—it was built without credible safeguards to prevent it from being exploited or targeted by terrorists and criminals. Prior to September 11, 2001, virtually anyone in the world could arrange with an international shipper or carrier to have an empty intermodal container delivered to their home or workplace. They then could load it with tons of material, declare in only the most general terms what the contents were, “seal” it with a 50-cent lead tag, and send it on its way to any city and town in the United States. The job of transportation providers was to move the box as expeditiously as possible. Exercising any care to ensure that the integrity of a container’s contents was not compromised may have been a commercial practice, but it was not a requirement. The responsibility for making sure that goods loaded in a box were legitimate and authorized was shouldered almost exclusively by the importing jurisdiction. But as the volume of containerized cargo grew exponentially, the number of agents assigned to police that cargo stayed flat or even declined among most trading nations. The rule of thumb in the inspection business is that it takes five agents three hours to conduct a thorough physical examination of a single full intermodal container. Last year nearly 20 million containers washed across America’s borders via a ship, train, and truck. Frontline agencies had only enough inspectors and equipment to examine between 1-2 percent of that cargo. Thus, for would-be terrorists, the global intermodal container system that is responsible for moving the overwhelming majority of the world’s freight satisfies the age-old criteria of opportunity and motive.

CONTINUES

## 1ac-Port Security-Economy

CONTINUES

“Opportunity” flows from (1) the almost complete absence of any security oversight in the loading and transporting of a box from its point of origin to its final destination, and (2) the fact that growing volume and velocity at which containers move around the planet create a daunting “needle-in-the-haystack” problem for inspectors. “Motive” is derived from the role that the container now plays in underpinning global supply chains and the likely response by the U.S. government to an attack involving a container. Based on statements by the key officials at U.S. Customs, the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Transportation, should a container be used as a “poor man’s missile,” the shipment of all containerized cargo into our ports and across our borders would be halted. As a consequence, a modest investment by a terrorist could yield billions of dollars in losses to the U.S. economy by shutting down—even temporarily—the system that moves “just-in-time” shipments of parts and goods. Given the current state of container security, it is hard to imagine how a post-event lock-down on container shipments could be either prevented or short-lived. One thing we should have learned from the 9-11 attacks involving passenger airliners, the follow-on anthrax attacks, and even last fall Washington sniper spree is that terrorist incidents pose a special challenge for public officials. In the case of most disasters, the reaction by the general public is almost always to assume the event is an isolated one. Even if the post-mortem provides evidence of a systemic vulnerability, it often takes a good deal of effort to mobilize a public policy response to redress it. But just the opposite happens in the event of a terrorist attack—especially one involving catastrophic consequences. When these attacks take place, the assumption by the general public is almost always to presume a general vulnerability unless there is proof to the contrary. Government officials have to confront head-on this loss of public confidence by marshalling evidence that they have a credible means to manage the risk highlighted by the terrorist incident. In the interim as recent events have shown, people will refuse to fly, open their mail, or even leave their homes. If a terrorist were to use a container as a weapon-delivery devise, the easiest choice would be high-explosives such as those used in the attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Some form of chemical weapon, perhaps even involving hazardous materials, is another likely scenario. A bio-weapon is a less attractive choice for a terrorist because of the challenge of dispersing the agent in a sufficiently concentrated form beyond the area where the explosive devise goes off. A “dirty bomb” is the more likely threat vs. a nuclear weapon, but all these scenarios are conceivable since the choice of a weapon would not be constrained by any security measures currently in place in our seaports or within the intermodal transportation industry. This is why a terrorist attack involving a cargo container could cause such profound economic disruption. An incident triggered by even a conventional weapon going off in a box could result in a substantial loss of life. In the immediate aftermath, the general public will want reassurance that one of the many other thousands of containers arriving on any given day will not pose a similar risk. The President of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other keys officials responsible for the security of the nation would have to stand before a traumatized and likely skeptical American people and outline the measures they have in place to prevent another such attack. In the absence of a convincing security framework to manage the risk of another incident, the public would likely insist that all containerized cargo be stopped until adequate safeguards are in place. Even with the most focused effort, constructing that framework from scratch could take months—even years. Yet, within three weeks, the entire worldwide intermodal transportation industry would effectively be brought to its knees—as would much of the freight movements that make up international trade.

### Attacks don’t need to be successful-attempts at port disruption alone will shock the economy and international confidence─

**Clark et al. 7.** CAPT Bruce G. Clark, USCGR (ret) Director of Maritime Security Projects, Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning -The California Maritime Academy. Dr. Donna J. Nincic , Associate Professor and Chair-Department of Global and Maritime Studies of The California Maritime Academy. CAPT Nevin Fidler, USCGR (ret) Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning-The California Maritime Academy-The California State University. “Protecting America’s Ports: Are We There Yet?” Oct 2007.

Why? Because, in this new world of unexpected and unplanned for terrorist activities, a miss is almost as good as a hit. How we react as everyday citizens to these nonoccurrences is as important as how we respond to a real event when it results in major changes in behavior and activities. The terrorists need not be successful in actually committing a terrorist act - the mere publicizing of plots, arrests and terrorist plans can have equally far reaching effects. The terrorist can create panic, chaos and economic impact simply by making a press release to the media of the intent to do something, without really needing to actually do it. While not as devastating as an actual attack with the incumbent level of mayhem, carnage, and destruction - fear is a completely effective and insidious weapon of the low cost/low capability variety; easy to deploy and very difficult to counter in an effective way. So fear becomes another of the terrorist's weapons - and it requires a managed solution as a part of any counter-terrorism plan.

## 1ac-Port Security-Economy

### Economic decline ensures great power war - trade disruptions will cause conflicts that collapse interdependence

Royal 10 – Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214

Less intuitive is how periods of **economic decline** may **increase** the likelihood of external **conflict**. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, **on the systemic level, Pollins** (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, **finding** that **rhythms in** **the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition** from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such. exogenous shocks such as **economic crises could usher in** a **redistribution of relative power** (see also Gilpin. 1981) **that leads to** **uncertainty about power balances, increasing** the **risk of miscalculation** (Fearon. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second. on a dyadic level, **Copeland**'s (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations **suggests** that 'future expectation of trade is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that **interdependent states are** likely to **gain pacific benefits** from trade **so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade** relations. However, **if** the **expectations** of future trade **decline**. particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the **likelihood for conflict increases**, as **states will be** **inclined to use force to gain access to** those **resources, Crises could** potentially he the **trigger** for **decreased trade expectations** either **on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves** by interdependent states.' Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. **Blomberg and Hess** (2002) **find** a **strong correlation between** **internal** conflict **and external conflict, particularly during** periods of **economic downturn**. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomber & Hess,. 2002. p. 84) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana. 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. **'Diversionary theory' suggests** that, **when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline,** sitting **governments** have increased incentives to **fabricate** external **military conflicts to create a** **'rally around the flag' effect**. Wang (1996). DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that **periods of weak** **economic performance in the U**nited **S**tates, and thus weak Presidential popularity, **are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force**. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic. dyadic and national level, This implied connection between integration. crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

## 1ac-Port Security-Economy

### New waves of protectionism risk continued terrorism, global instability, and extinction─

Panzner 8**,** faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase (Michael, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, Revised and Updated Edition, p. 136-138, googlebooks)

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster, But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify.   Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange, foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the (heap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly.  The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation.  In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level.  Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more healed sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an "intense confrontation" between the United States and China is "inevitable" at some point.  More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

## 1ac-Port Security-Plan

### The United States federal government should substantially increase its investment in the research, development, and implementation of in-port remote sensing technologies of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents in the United States.

## 1ac-Port Security Solvency

### Contention 2: Solvency─

### Only enhanced detection technologies guarantee effective port security.

Konkel ‘5. Todd Konkel, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe” [http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf]

In addition to making significant increases in appropriations to secure nuclear weapons and material around the globe, the U.S. must simultaneously strengthen efforts to enhance the security of containerized cargo. These efforts must include initiatives to ensure the integrity of shipping containers in transit and well as the development and deployment of technologies to detect radioactive material within containers. The first vital need is to protect container integrity throughout the entire global supply chain. Currently, no standard exists for a tamper-proof intermodal shipping container. Under existing port security regimes, terrorists might be able to break into and hide nuclear materials in a container from a “trusted shipper,” thus increasing their chances of escaping the scrutiny of inspectors. One possible solution is a multipurpose security device that would be required on every shipping container. Such a device would conform to internationally mandated standards and would enhance the security of a container in several ways. First, the device would have intrusion detection capability to protect the integrity of the container against unauthorized access. In addition, the device would contain basic radiation detection equipment to identify the presence of nuclear materials. Finally, the security device would also serve as a GPS-based tracking device to monitor the location of the container. The device would be assayed via radio frequency (RF) at various points during its journey, including loading, embarkation and disembarkation, to enable inspection officials to access the collected data and determine if a container posed a potential threat. According to one study, such devices could be produced at a cost of between $100 and $200 each, or roughly 2 percent of the cost of a single shipping container.49

### Government involvement is *critical*. Encouraging research and development is the only way to get the private sector on board and jumpstart new projects─

Haveman & Shatz 6. Jon D. Haveman, research fellow @ Public Policy Institute of California. Ph.D in Economics-University of Michigan. Howard J. Shatz, senior economist at RAND corporation. 2006 “Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost.”[http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r\_606jhr.pdf]

In the current wave of security technology development, the government can encourage beneficial effects by supporting, as much as possible, basic research and exploratory development, much as it did during the Cold War. This will attract more researchers from universities and businesses, especially if they can retain the rights to the intellectual property they develop. Government can adopt policies that encourage its own agencies to buy commercial technology and modify it for security purposes, rather than developing new technology specifically for security purposes. The security modifications can remain secret, but the expanded market for open, commercial technologies can encourage more research and development. More than ever, technology development is an international venture. Government can also rethink and reform export and publication controls so that collaborations with foreign researchers become easier. Cutting off U.S. technology development from the world could lead to less-promising technologies, as well as to technologies that do not respond to international needs, in turn allowing foreign competitors to outpace U.S. companies in global markets. Finally, government can focus its development efforts on those technologies that commercial sources are least likely to develop. Private businesses are keen to adopt and use tracking technology so that they know where goods are and whether they are being pilfered. However, private businesses are not so interested in producing technology that will detect threats to the entire maritime system or to the economy as a whole, that will help the entire supply chain operate through a terrorist attack, or that will allow it to be reconstituted quickly—the benefits are too diffuse for any single business to profit from them. However, the benefits are large for society, suggesting that government should pay special attention to technologies such as those that can remotely sense the presence of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents.

# \*\*\*Inherency Extensions\*\*\*

## Inherency-Funding Levels Decreasing

### New federal funding is critical-security goals have no chance of being met.

MAR 12. Maritime Activity Reports (online news filter for maritime activity “Ports Urge Congress to Support Port Security Grants” 3-7-12. <http://www.marinelink.com/news/congress-security-support342938.aspx>

At two separate Congressional hearings, representatives of the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) emphasized the need for federal support for seaport security and maintenance and improvements to federal navigation channels. Port industry leaders illustrated the challenges underfunding security and dredging pose for national security and U.S. international competitiveness. As the House Appropriations Committee begins work on the Fiscal Year 2013 budget, AAPA executives reminded Congressional leaders of the critical role ports play for the nation – serving as a front line of defense on international borders and facilitating overseas trade, 99 percent of which moves by water. Captain John Holmes, Deputy Executive Director of Operations at the Port of Los Angeles, testified before the Homeland Security Subcommittee regarding Port Security Grants within the Federal Emergency Management Agency. “The fiscal year 2012 funding level represents a 59 percent cut from the prior year and 75 percent less than the authorized level,” Holmes stated. “This will harm our ability to expand protection of our maritime assets, carry out Port-Wide Risk Management Plans, and fund federal mandates, such as installation of TWIC readers.”

### Fast actions is crucial-New reductions across coast guard and navy budgets make increased investment critical to maintaining secure maritime transportation─

The Maritime Executive 6-1-12. “Washington Insider - Money and Regulations Top Washington's Agenda.” [http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/washington-insider-money-and-regulations-top-washington-s-agenda]

In this year’s budget and appropriations processes, key maritime constituencies are vying for shrinking funding. There is no plainer illustration of this than the Administration’s proposal to dramatically cut the shipbuilding budgets of the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard. The Administration’s budget would cut the Navy’s program by approximately 30 percent over the next five years by foregoing the building of 16 ships previously planned. Likewise, the budget for the Coast Guard fails to include long-lead funding for the seventh and eighth national security cutters, and the service's five-year capital investment plan shows no money for these cutters beyond the sixth ship. The proposal cuts approximately $1.4 billion from the Coast Guard’s acquisition plans in the next few years. In 2013 alone it cuts the Coast Guard's acquisition funding by 20 percent, down $272 million from this year's level of $1.46 billion. The significance of the Administration’s decision to withhold funding for these national security cutters cannot be exaggerated. As a practical matter, the budget represents a cut of 25 percent in the Coast Guard’s long-range capability by reducing the cutter fleet from eight to only six ships. Coast Guard Commandant Robert Papp has emphasized the service’s need for “modern ships capable of independently operating on the high seas to perform missions like drug interdiction” because “these cutters enable us to stop multi-ton loads of pure cocaine before they reach our shores.” He further highlighted that smaller cutters simply cannot operate in the harsh Bering Sea. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano acknowledged the Administration’s elimination of the two cutters in congressional testimony and justified it because of a need to reduce federal spending and to see what the Navy does. According to the Secretary, “We need to look at what the Department of Defense is doing with respect to their own force ... to see what we need to be putting in the acquisition pipeline." But this explanation rings hollow when the same budget slashes the Navy’s shipbuilding program. The explanation, of course, appears to be nothing more than an artful dodge demonstrating that the Administration’s budget priorities do not include shipbuilding. Is the Secretary really suggesting that the many previous years of justifications of the need for the national security cutters has been summarily abandoned or that the Navy’s shrinking fleet of frigates will perform Coast Guard missions? Additionally, the President’s budget cuts operating expenses by four percent or $350 million, which means the service will lose 1,000 personnel and decommission five cutters (including two high-endurance cutters), three patrol boats and two air rescue facilities. Admiral Papp has explained he operates an aging fleet of ships and aircraft plagued with chronic breakdowns and skyrocketing maintenance costs, warranting further decommissioning. The Administration’s budget priorities clearly lie elsewhere. Obama himself acknowledged as much in a speech following the unveiling of his budget when he explained that he had proposed a massive $74 billion transportation infrastructure funding plan for roads, bridges and mass transit at the cost of other agencies’ budgets. Ports and MARAD Feel the Ax Too Other maritime programs are also falling on hard times. The President’s budget cuts port security grant funding by 59 percent, the Maritime Administration’s budget by $10 million, and eliminates funding for small shipyard grants. The longstanding, bipartisan-supported PL-480 food aid funding program, which fills the holds of many U.S.-flag ships and strengthens our national security, has come under increasing pressure from the Administration and long-time critics, who favor local purchase of foreign food rather than export of American agricultural products by American mariners to aid famine-stricken regions of the world.

annot be said for CBP inspectors at our ports of entry.

## Inherency-Enforcement Mechanisms Fail

### Current enforcement mechanisms have no chance of solving─ Investment in technology is critical─

Haveman & Shatz 6. Jon D. Haveman, research fellow @ Public Policy Institute of California. Ph.D in Economics-University of Michigan. Howard J. Shatz, senior economist at RAND corporation. 2006 “Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost.”[http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r\_606jhr.pdf]

Compliance is the weaker link. The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, for example, depends on U.S. Customs and Border Protection validation of security plans for thousands of companies. However, given a lack of enforcement mechanisms, there is no guarantee that firms, once validated, will continue to carry out their security plans and procedures. Likewise, the Container Security Initiative depends on the cooperation of foreign governments. In some cases, foreign governments decline to inspect containers that U.S. authorities deem high-risk. The United States can then order the containers not to be loaded onto the ship at the foreign port or can inspect the container in its U.S. port of arrival. However, even with these options, some high-risk containers go uninspected (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005b). Even full compliance will not guarantee success. As part of the Container Security Initiative, oceangoing ship operators must provide the manifest, or list of the contents of ship cargo, to U.S. officials in advance. However, the carrier has no way of knowing the accuracy of the manifest, since it gets the information from the individual companies shipping the goods.

Port security isn’t getting funding

# \*\*\*Solvency Extensions\*\*\*

## Solvency-R&D K2 Port Security/Solves

### Tech is already being developed-only continued support for R&D is needed.

Konkel ‘5. Todd Konkel, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe” [http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf]

Scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratory have developed one of the most promising new technologies with applications for detecting nuclear materials in shipping containers. This new active technique, called muon radiography, can detect uranium and plutonium, even when shielded with heavy materials such as lead and tungsten. Detectors employing muon radiography are far more sensitive than those using x-rays, and they present none of the radiation hazards of active systems utilizing x-ray or gamma-ray detectors. The Los Alamos team is currently working on a full-sized prototype, with completion expected for summer 2005. The new devices, which will be large enough to scan a standard intermodal container or a 50-foot trailer truck, would cost about $1 million each. 52 The researchers estimate that a system to scan every cargo container coming into the U.S. by ship or truck, in a timely manner that would not impede container traffic, would cost about $1 billion. 53 Continued research and development of new detection technologies will be necessary to ensure the security of the nation’s ports. The Bush Administration’s budget request for FY 2006 provides hope that the need for such efforts has been recognized. For example, the budget request for the Department of Homeland Security includes $227 million for the creation of a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), which will be charged with developing, acquiring and supporting systems to detect and report nuclear and radiological materials intended for criminal use. 54 Likewise, in 2004, the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) issued a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA 04-02) soliciting proposals for the development of an array of radiological and nuclear detection systems. 55 Such federal government appropriations will encourage private sector investment in the development of these critically important detection technologies.

### New funding allows ports to meet all security needs.

Haveman & Shatz 6. Jon D. Haveman, research fellow @ Public Policy Institute of California. Ph.D in Economics-University of Michigan. Howard J. Shatz, senior economist at RAND corporation. 2006 “Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost.”[http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r\_606jhr.pdf]

Finally, the U.S. government should reconsider the level of staffing and funding devoted to port security efforts. Under current programs, 12,000 facility and vessel security plans and more than 5,600 C-TPAT plans will need monitoring (with the number of C-TPAT plans steadily rising). The U.S. Coast Guard has gained a large set of new duties that need staffing. New technologies need developing. Customs officials must review large amounts of new information to target high-risk containers. Personnel from the Coast Guard and other parts of the government need training in tasks previously unknown to them. Finally, new security equipment will need maintenance, repair, and upgrading. Efficiency can go only so far. As Senator Olympia Snowe of Maine said at a recent hearing: The Coast Guard should no longer have to say we can do more with less. We’ve heard that consistently before this committee, time and again. Frankly, I think it’s a phrase that we ought to remove from the vocabulary. I well recall a past commandant saying that doing more with less will evolve into doing everything with nothing. Obviously we all refuse to accept that philosophy and that rationale.24 In port security, as in homeland security more generally, the issue is not only whether the government or the private sector will pay for increased staffing, inspections, and technologies. The issue is also whether—in the absence of renewed political will or an energizing event, such as an actual attack on the ports or a bomb found in a container— security will be implemented in a way that justifies all costs of the new security measures.

## Solvency-R&D K2 Port Security/Solves

### Research and implementation of critical technologies is already underway-continued development and government investment are critical─

Cohen ‘6. Stephen S. Cohen Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (BRIE) University of California, Berkeley. “Boom Boxes: Containers and Terrorism.”

The burden thus falls on technology—on the intelligent deployment of existing technologies and the rapid development of new and better technologies. Used in conjunction with one another, rather than as replacements for one another, they could provide an excellent, although regrettably still imperfect, security shield. There are several different kinds: • In-port radiography, or visualization machines: These machines peer into the box and see if the contents correspond with what the manifest states the box contains: Is there a cylindrical steel object where there should be toys and tools? Is there anything anomalous? This implies rapid checking against electronic manifests that list contents and provenance. These machines are being installed at major U.S. ports; they should also be installed at ports of embarkation; many have been. Obligatory, not voluntary, screening before sailing, backed by strong penalties—such as a red lane, green lane system—should be imposed. • In-port passive radiation detection devices: These devices detect radiation emitted by concealed radiation sources. They are now being deployed on a large scale. They are relatively cheap to purchase and operate; critically, they are fast and do not impose delays. But they are very far from satisfactory in their capabilities; they cannot detect well-shielded dirty bombs and yield false positives when tuned to a sensitivity that can discern some shielded nuclear devices. (There is more normal radiation out there than one might first expect.) They should be replaced by a new generation of active radiation detectors. These will be much more expensive to install and operate and slower, too. Unfortunately, they do not yet exist in tested, deployable models. Research and development programs are under way, with many laboratories and producers competing, and deployable models should (it is hoped) begin to appear in a year or so. • In-box sensors: These would operate all the time, in real time, and would be connected to receiving stations by radio frequency, to detect (passively) radioactivity, various chemicals, temperature, light, people, and, of course, tampering with the box and the sensor itself. They should be obligatory in all containers entering U.S. ports from abroad. Despite their vulnerabilities and shortcomings, if used in conjunction with the other layers of defense technology, they make penetration significantly more difficult.

# \*\*\*Terrorism Advantage\*\*\*

## Terrorism ADV-Ext. Motivation

### Rapid globalization and communication technologies will only increase incentives for port attacks─ attempts at disrupting maritime transportation are inevitable─

**Clark et al. 7.** CAPT Bruce G. Clark, USCGR (ret) Director of Maritime Security Projects, Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning -The California Maritime Academy. Dr. Donna J. Nincic , Associate Professor and Chair-Department of Global and Maritime Studies of The California Maritime Academy. CAPT Nevin Fidler, USCGR (ret) Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning-The California Maritime Academy-The California State University. “Protecting America’s Ports: Are We There Yet?” Oct 2007.

Remembering that terrorist seek to achieve the 'biggest bang for the buck" spectacular long term physical results; maximized death and injury rates; significant economic impact and - the ripple effects of chaos, terror and panic -- and the global MTS remains a "target rich environment. In the past, maritime targets -- specifically vessels -- were over the horizon, out of sight and largely not thought of at all by the general public. Lack of an instant audience has contributed to the low incidence rate of maritime terrorism. However, as the capability of instant communications grows - allowing anyone with a cell phone to capture video of an event and put it out onto the internet in a matter of minutes; and as it becomes cheaper, faster, and easier to move passengers, materials and finished goods through the MTS from any point on the globe - many of the traditional impediments holding back terrorism in the maritime mode will evaporate. It is inconceivable that additional maritime terrorist acts will not occur. Therefore, to completely understand current port security conditions, the nature of prevailing port security risks and ultimately the status of our port vulnerability -- basically, how we got to where we are today – we need to review the road we have traveled and poke around a bit in some of those potentially embarrassing “dark places” where history lies and where "inconvenient facts" sometimes intersect with our preferred understanding of “convenient truths”.

## Terrorism ADV-Attacks Inevitable

### Attacks are inevitable-Chances are only increasing for the detonation of a WMD

Allison 7 (Director – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Professor of Government, and Faculty Chair of the Dubai Initiative – Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, Graham, “Symposium: Apocalypse When?”, The National Interest, November / December, Lexis

MUELLER IS entitled to his opinion that the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is "exaggerated" and "overwrought." But **analysts** of various political persuasions, in and out of government, **are** virtually **unanimous** in their judgment to the contrary. As the national-security community learned during the Cold War, risk = likelihood x consequences. Thus, even when the likelihood of nuclear Armageddon was small, the consequences were so catastrophic that prudent policymakers felt a categorical imperative to do everything that feasibly could be done to prevent that war. Today, a single nuclear bomb exploding in just one city would change our world. Given such consequences, **differences between a 1** percent **and** a **20 percent likelihood** of such an attack **are** relatively **insignificant when considering how we should respond** to the threat. Richard Garwin, a designer of the hydrogen bomb who Enrico Fermi once called "the only true genius I had ever met", told Congress in March that he estimated a "20 percent per year probability [of a nuclear explosion-not just a contaminated, dirty bomb-a nuclear explosion] with American cities and European cities included." My Harvard colleague Matthew Bunn has created a model in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science that estimates the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack over a ten-year period to be 29 percent-identical to the average estimate from a poll of security experts commissioned by Senator Richard Lugar in 2005. My book, Nuclear Terrorism, states my own best judgment that, on the current trend line, the **chances of** a **nuclear terrorist** **attack in the next decade are greater than 50 percent**. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has expressed his own view that my work may even underestimate the risk. Warren Buffet, the world's most successful investor and legendary odds-maker in pricing insurance policies for unlikely but catastrophic events, concluded that **nuclear terrorism is "inevitable**." He stated, "I don't see any way that it won't happen." To assess the threat one must answer five core questions: who, what, where, when and how? Who could be planning a nuclear terrorist attack? Al-Qaeda remains the leading candidate. **According to the** most recent National Intelligence Estimate (**NIE**), **Al-Qaeda has been** substantially **reconstituted**-but with its leadership having moved from a medieval Afghanistan to Pakistan-a nation that actually has nuclear weapons. As former CIA Director George J. Tenet's memoir reports, **Al-Qaeda**'s **leadership** has **remained** "singularly **focused on** acquiring **WMD**s" and that "the main threat is the nuclear one." Tenet concluded, "I am convinced that this is where [Osama bin Laden] and his operatives want to go." **What nuclear weapons could terrorists use? A ready-made weapon from** the arsenal of one of the **nuclear**-weapons **states or** an elementary nuclear bomb **constructed from** **h**ighly **e**nriched **u**ranium made by a state remain most likely. As John Foster, a leading U.S. bomb-maker and former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, wrote a quarter of a century ago, "If the essential nuclear materials are at hand, it is possible to make an atomic bomb using information that is available in the open literature." Where could terrorists acquire a nuclear bomb? If a nuclear attack occurs, **Russia will be the most likely source** of the weapon or material. A **close second**, however, is **North Korea**, which now has ten bombs worth of plutonium, **or Pakistan** with sixty nuclear bombs. Finally, **research reactors** in forty developing and transitional countries still **hold the** **essential ingredient** for nuclear weapons. When could terrorists launch the first nuclear attack? **If terrorists bought or** **stole a** nuclear **weapon** in good working condition, **they could explode it today.** If terrorists acquired one hundred pounds of highly enriched uranium, they could make a working elementary nuclear bomb in less than a year. How could terrorists **deliver a nuclear weapon** to its target? **In the same way** that **illegal items come** to our cities **every day**. As one of my former colleagues has quipped, if you have any doubt about the ability of terrorists to deliver a weapon to an American target, remember: They could hide it in a bale of marijuana.

Delays only prove they are waiting for nukes.

Washington Post 10 – Report says Al-Qaeda still aims to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S., 1-26, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/25/AR2010012502598.html

When al-Qaeda's No. 2 leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, called off a planned chemical attack on New York's subway system in 2003, he offered a chilling explanation: The plot to unleash poison gas on New Yorkers was being dropped for "something better," Zawahiri said in a message intercepted by U.S. eavesdroppers. The meaning of Zawahiri's cryptic threat remains unclear more than six years later, but a new report warns that al-Qaeda has not abandoned its goal of attacking the United States with a chemical, biological or even nuclear weapon. The report, by a former **senior CIA official** who led the agency's hunt for weapons of mass destruction, **portrays al-Qaeda**'s leaders **as determined** and patient, **willing to wait** for years **to acquire the** kind of **weapons that could inflict widespread casualties**. The former official, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, draws on his knowledge of classified case files to argue that al-Qaeda has been far more sophisticated in its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction than is commonly believed, pursuing parallel paths to acquiring weapons and forging alliances with groups that can offer resources and expertise. "**If Osama** bin Laden and his lieutenants **had been interested in . . . small**-scale **attacks**, there is little doubt **they could have done so** now," Mowatt-Larssen writes in a report released Monday by the Harvard Kennedy School of Government's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

## Terrorism ADV-Ext. Expertise

### Terrorists have the expertise

Bunn and Wier 4 – Matthew Bunn is a Senior Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government From 1994–1996, Bunn served as an adviser to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, Anthony Wier is a Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom he was a Program Examiner in the International Affairs Division of the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget. He has a Master of Public Affairs from UT Austin and is a TRINITY ALUM, Securing the Bomb, PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT HARVARD UNIVERSITY COMMISSIONED BY THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, May, http://www.nti.org/e\_research/analysis\_cnwmupdate\_052404.pdf

Several weaknesses of al Qaeda have led some analysts to argue that it could not plausibly carry out an attack with an actual nuclear explosive. First, many of the organization’s recruits have little technical sophistication and expertise. For example, a 1999 **al Qaeda** progress **report** found in Afghanistan concludes that the attempt to make nerve gas weapons relying on the expertise the group could put together without recruiting specialists had “resulted in a waste of effort and money.” The report **recommended** **recruiting experts** as the “fastest, cheapest, and safest” way **to build** the capability to make such **weapons**. 54 Unfortunately, however, a number of **top al Qaeda personnel are technologically literate** (bin Laden deputy **al-Zawahiri is a medical doctor**, while reported 9/11 mastermind **Khalid Sheikh Muhammad**, now in U.S. custody, **is a U.S.-trained engineer**), 55 and **the group** has **repeatedly demonstrated** an **ability to carry out sophisticated research in the unclassiﬁed literature**. 56 The most detailed unclassiﬁed analysis of al Qaeda’s nuclear program concludes that it posed a serious threat while it was underway in the Afghanistan sanctuary, and could still succeed elsewhere. 57

### Small groups are all that’s needed.

Bunn and Wier 4 – Matthew Bunn is a Senior Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government From 1994–1996, Bunn served as an adviser to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, Anthony Wier is a Research Associate in the Project on Managing the Atom he was a Program Examiner in the International Affairs Division of the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget. He has a Master of Public Affairs from UT Austin and is a TRINITY ALUM, Securing the Bomb, PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT HARVARD UNIVERSITY COMMISSIONED BY THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, May, http://www.nti.org/e\_research/analysis\_cnwmupdate\_052404.pdf

Others argue that a group with al Qaeda’s structure of small cells would not be well-suited for what they argue would be a large, long-term project like making a nuclear bomb—particularly given the substantial disruptions al Qaeda has suffered from the international response to the 9/11 attacks. The deaths or arrests of a substantial number of senior al Qaeda leaders and operatives since 9/11, and the other disruptions of its operations, have undoubtedly reduced the probability of al Qaeda succeeding in pulling off a nuclear explosive attack. But the crucial question is: by how much? Unfortunately, as already noted, the **conclusion of repeated** **technical studies is that the group needed to** design and **fabricate a crude nuclear explosive**, once the needed materials were in hand, **might be** quite small—as **small as a single al Qaeda cell**. The ability of a cell-based organization like al Qaeda—**or even one of the** many **loosely afﬁliated regional groups** that now appear to be posing an increasing threat as the old central structure of al Qaeda is weakened—to make a crude nuclear explosive cannot be dismissed.

## Terrorism ADV-Impact Extension-O/W Nuke War

### Nuclear terrorism causes extinction.

Rhodes 9 – Richard, affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, Former visiting scholar at Harvard and MIT, and author of “The Making of the Atomic Bomb” which won the Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction, National Book Award, and National Book Critics Circle Award. “Reducing the nuclear threat: The argument for public safety” 12-14, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/reducing-the-nuclear-threat-the-argument-public-safety

The response was very different among nuclear and **national security experts** when Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar surveyed PDF them in 2005. This group of 85 experts **judged** that the **possibility of** a **WMD attack** against a city or other target somewhere in the world **is real** and increasing over time. The median estimate of the risk of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world by 2010 was 10 percent. The risk of an attack by 2015 doubled to 20 percent median. There was strong, though not universal, agreement that a nuclear attack is more likely to be carried out by a terrorist organization than by a government. The group was split 45 to 55 percent on whether **terrorists were** more **likely to obtain** **a**n intact **working** nuclear **weapon** **or manufacture one** after obtaining weapon-grade nuclear material. “The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem,” Lugar wrote in the report’s introduction. “It is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. **W**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction have **made it possible for a small** nation, or even a sub-national **group, to kill as many** innocent people **in a day as** national armies killed in months of fighting during **W**orld **W**ar **II**. “The bottom line is this,” Lugar concluded: “For the foreseeable future, the United States and other **nations** will **face an existential threat from** the intersection of **terrorism** and weapons of mass destruction.” It’s paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely: **A terrorist nuclear attack would** almost **certainly be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike on whatever country we believed to be sheltering** the **perpetrators. That** response **would** surely **initiate a new round of nuclear armament** and rearmament **in** the **name of deterrence**, however illogical. **Think of how much 9/11 frightened us;** think of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that **we** **invaded** and occupied a country, **Iraq, that had nothing to do with** those **attacks** in the name of sending a message.

### Nuclear terror outweighs nuclear war—probability.

Posner 5 – Prof Law and Econ @ U Chicago, Richard, Catastrophe, Skeptic, 11.3, Jan

The expected **costs of an atomic attack by terrorists may** well **be greater than** those of "**nuclear winter,"** if the **probability of the former is** as **much greater** as that of the latteras seems to be the case, even though the risks of nuclear terrorism that I have sketched, unlike the risk of nuclear winter, are subcatastrophic from the standpoint of this book. But that is small comfort. The expected costs of a subcatastrophic disaster may exceed those of a catastrophic one, since the probability of the lesser disaster may be higher and **expected cost is** the product of **probability and** **consequence** (subject to a possible adjustment for risk aversion). Anyway it is unclear what additional measures should be taken to prevent an accidental **war** involving thermonuclear weapons beyond those already being taken by the existing thermonuclear powers (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China) to ward off what **is** after all **a danger that has been** **recognized for half a century;** and so **the prospect of nuclear winter does not figure largely** in this book. A source of considerable worry, however, is that while only the five nations just mentioned are known to have hydrogen bombs, three other nations--Israel, India, and Pakistan--are believed either to have them or to have the capability of producing them. If they do not have them already, they probably will have them soon.

## Terrorism ADV-Impact Extension-Yes Retaliation

### Attacks ensures retaliation and nuclear war─

Beljac 8 – PhD at Monash University, Teaches at LaTrobe University and the University of Melbourne, Marko, The nuclear terror of Bush 'negligence' policy, Eureka Street, 18.12, http://www.eurekastreet.com.au/article.aspx?aeid=7585

But more may be at play here. **The** **U**nited **S**tates may actually have **developed a 'negligence doctrine'** for the deterrence of nuclear terrorism. As former Bush Administration official Elbridge Colby observed of the new policy, 'any and all thinking of participation, complicity, or negligence in the face of a catastrophic attack against the United States or its allies should have reason to worry about the retaliation that would follow'. **If** through nuclear forensics the **fissile material used in a** **nuclear terrorist attack were attributed to a Russian or Pakistani facility, the U**nited **S**tates **may** well **respond**, under the new policy, by striking Russia or Pakistan **using nuclear weapons**. This would be a proportionate attack, most likely employing low-yield B61-11 nuclear weapons. A negligence doctrine would involve striking **even if** the fissile **materials were stolen,** not just knowingly leaked, from one of their facilities on grounds that they were 'negligent' in their handling of fissile materials. Most analysts argue that should fissile material be stolen and used to fuel an improvised bomb it would most likely come from a Russian facility. The central aspect of any deterrence posture is credibility — advocates of a negligence doctrine argue that this type of deterrence would be credible because the United States has, or will soon have, a nuclear first strike capability against Russia. This is extremely wishful thinking. By no means can the US be said to have a first strike capability. In fact, a **negligence doctrine increases** the **chance of** what should properly be regarded as the leading security threat facing the world, namely inadvertent **nuclear war.** Imagine if a nuclear weapon was detonated in New York that employed fissile material attributed to a Russian nuclear facility, and that, immediately thereafter, the US decided to adhere to a negligence policy and strike back with a limited low yield nuclear strike. **Russia would** likely **respond in kind.** This would set off a chain reaction leading, at best, to limited and controlled exchanges or, at worst, to **an all out exchange**. Quite literally, **the** Bush **Administration** may have **handed al** **Qaeda the keys to Armageddon**.

### Obamas nuclear posture includes a negligence doctrine.

Beljac 10 – PhD at Monash University, Teaches at LaTrobe University and the University of Melbourne, Marko, National Research Council Report on Nuclear Forensics Exposes the Soft Underbelly of Deterrence Policy, Nuclear Resonances (Blog), 8-17, http://scisec.net/?p=435

Before looking at this issue it would pay to have a look at the Obama administration's policy on the deterrence of nuclear terrorism. The Obama policy, which essentially reaffirms Bush era policy, was articulated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. **The 2010 NPR states** that **the US will, ...hold** fully **accountable any state,** terrorist group, or other non-state actor **that** supports or **enables terrorist efforts to** obtain or **use w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts... The **use of nuclear** **weapons are not excluded**. In addition, contrary to the National Research Council report, the 2010 NPR states ...In addition, the United States and the international community have improving but currently insufficient capabilities to detect, interdict, and defeat efforts to covertly deliver nuclear materials or weapons—and if an attack occurs, to respond to minimize casualties and economic impact as well as to attribute the source of the attack and take strong action... The above statement encompasses nuclear forensics. The NPR recognises that nuclear forensics is “currently insufficient”, but nonetheless these capabilities are “improving.” That doesn't square with the National Research Council finding that “in some respects” forensic capabilities are “deteriorating.” Given current trends, furthermore, nuclear forensic capabilities will further “decline.” The US deterrence posture is robust, but the nuclear forensic capabilities needed to match declaratory policy are not sufficient and might well decline further, a point to which we return. It is not easy from the above to appreciate just how robust US nuclear deterrence policy is. It is not just that a deliberate transfer of nuclear materials by a state to a terrorist group is being deterred through the threat of nuclear attack. **The Bush-Obama policy adopts** what is called **a “negligence doctrine.” If a state is negligent in** its **oversight of nuclear materials**, and should a terrorist group acquire nuclear materials due to such negligence, then **a nuclear attack** upon the negligent state **falls within the** ambit ofthe **policy. This is what** that seemingly innocuous word, “**enables**”, **in the NPR** deterrence policy **refers to.** In the lexicon of US counter-terrorism policy “enables” has a pretty precise meaning. This meaning encompasses negligence. I will have more discussion of this in my book. A negligence doctrine is pretty extreme. Such a policy leaves open any state to nuclear attack if the US decides that that state was negligent in its oversight over nuclear materials.

# \*\*\*Economy Advantage\*\*\*

## Economy ADV-Port Security K2 Econ

### Our predictions are empirical─ disruptions to port activity are disastrous to economic activity internationally─

**Clark et al. 7.** CAPT Bruce G. Clark, USCGR (ret) Director of Maritime Security Projects, Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning -The California Maritime Academy. Dr. Donna J. Nincic , Associate Professor and Chair-Department of Global and Maritime Studies of The California Maritime Academy. CAPT Nevin Fidler, USCGR (ret) Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning-The California Maritime Academy-The California State University. “Protecting America’s Ports: Are We There Yet?” Oct 2007.

Although the long term significance and level of economic damage that would result from a terrorist attack varies from one risk model to another -- and from one group of experts to another; there can be no doubt that catastrophic results in varying degrees and at some level - local, regional, national and international -- are likely. One common baseline model often cited as a "conservative, real world approximation" is the economic impact of the October 2002 labor lock-out action that paralyzed west coast port operations. The physical impacts included a backlog of over 300 ships – carrying over 300,000 shipping containers - where many were required to anchor and or “hover” offshore for days until the situation slowly resolved itself. The effects of the closure were felt at all 29 seaports along the west coast of the United States. Direct lost cargo costs to the US economy via the Los Angeles/Long Beach port complex has been estimated at $467 million, while the ripple effects in the MTS is thought to have removed between 0.4 and 1.1 percent of the nominal gross domestic product from prominent Asian exporters to US west coast markets -- from Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. Actual estimates of total economic damage in the United States range from $1.7 billion to $20 Billion for the 10 day work stoppage, dependent upon whose calculation model is applied. According to Stephen Cohen (co-director of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, the first 5 days of the port closure cost the national economy $4.7 billion and he has projected that a 20 day closure - for any reason -- would result in losses of $48 billion.

### Only one attack is needed to halt international trade completely

Konkel ‘5. Todd Konkel, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe” [http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf]

What, then, is the potential impact of an attack on a major U.S. port involving a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb? Without question, the damage would be devastating. Gal Luft and Anne Korin at the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security describe a scenario where terrorists ram a cargo ship loaded with explosives, or possibly a WMD, into a major port or terminal. “Such an attack,” they state, “could bring international trade to a halt, inflicting multi-billion-dollar damage on the world economy.” 4 Robert Bonner, currently the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, painted a similarly bleak picture in August 2002: “There is virtually no security for what is the primary system to transport global trade. The consequences of a terrorist incident using a container would be profound . . . If terrorists used a sea container to conceal a weapon of mass destruction and detonated it on arrival at a port, the impact on global trade and the global economy could be immediate and devastating – all nations would be affected. No container ships would be permitted to unload at U.S. ports after such an event.”

## Economy ADV-Impact Extension

### Economic collapse causes nuclear war

Mead 9 (Walter Russell, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy – Council on Foreign Relations, “Only Makes You Stronger”, The New Republic, 2-4, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2)

If current market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years**. For billions** of people **in nuclear-armed countries** to emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their **distress could damage** U.S. **foreign policy** far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush. It's not just the great powers whose trajectories have been affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran also face new constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as falling oil prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms on U.S. protection. Success in Iraq--however late, however undeserved, however limited--had already improved the Obama administration's prospects for addressing regional crises. Now, the collapse in oil prices has put the Iranian regime on the defensive. The annual inflation rate rose above 29 percent last September, up from about 17 percent in 2007, according to Iran's Bank Markazi. Economists forecast that Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming months as stagnating oil revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the government to rein in its expansionary fiscal policy. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against domestic needs, while international sanctions and other diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like trade opportunities) have become more attractive. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other oil states have become more dependent on the United States for protection against Iran, and they have fewer resources to fund religious extremism as they use diminished oil revenues to support basic domestic spending and development goals. None of this makes the Middle East an easy target for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in part to the economic crisis, the incoming administration has the chance to try some new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and Syria) from a position of enhanced strength. Every crisis is different, but there seem to be reasons why, over time, financial crises on balance reinforce rather than undermine the world position of the leading capitalist countries. Since capitalism first emerged in early modern Europe, the ability to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key factor in international competition. Countries that can encourage--or at least allow and sustain--the change, dislocation, upheaval, and pain that capitalism often involves, while providing their tumultuous market societies with appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks, grow swiftly. They produce cutting-edge technologies that translate into military and economic power. They are able to invest in education, making their workforces ever more productive. They typically develop liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate, dissent and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate on a vast social project of modernization--and to maintain political stability in the face of accelerating social and economic change. The vast productive capacity of leading capitalist powers gives them the ability to project influence around the world and, to some degree, to remake the world to suit their own interests and preferences. This is what the United Kingdom and the United States have done in past centuries, and what other capitalist powers like France, Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser extent. In these countries, the social forces that support the idea of a competitive market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and political framework are relatively strong. But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin world is often drawn to anti-capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left. Russia, too, has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society--whether during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the post-cold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as many former Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly because, in much of the world, capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. **Bad economic times** can **breed wars**. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the **Depression** poisoned German public opinion and **helped** bring Adolf **Hitler** to power. **If the current crisis turns into a depression**, what rough **beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi** to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, **if we can't get the** world **economy** back **on track, we may** still **have to fight.**

### Economic collapse leads to great power war─

Friedberg and Schoenfeld ‘8 - Professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, Aaron, Visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J, Gabriel, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, The Wall Street Journal, 10/21, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html?mod=googlenews\_wsj

Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions. Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario **there are shades of the** **1930s, when global trade and finance ground** nearly **to a halt**, the peaceful **democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers** led by the remorseless fanatics who **rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions**. Today we run the risk that **rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys**, just **at our moment of maximum vulnerability**. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the **authoritarian leaders** of these countries **seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures**.

# \*\*\*Answers to Off-case Positions\*\*\*

## AT: States CP – Theory

### 50 State Fiat is bad and a voting issue:

**A) INTERPRETATION: NEGATIVE GETS ONE COUNTERPLAN WITH LITERATURE SUPPORTING THE COUNTERPLAN ACTION.**

**B) STATE UNIFROMITY HAS NEVER OCCURRED, DESTROYING AFF STRATEGY AND OFFENSE, WE DON’T GET THE BEST SOLVENCY TURNS TO THE COUNTERPLAN LIKE EXTERNALITIES AND RACE TO THE BOTTOM. THE COUNTEPRLAN IS IMPOSSIBLE TO RESEARCH.**

**C) RATIONAL ACTOR THEORY: THE JUDGE IS THE DECIDING VOTE IN THE US GOVERNMENT AND HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DECIDE IF AN ALTERNATE AGENT SHOULD DO THE PLAN: NOT REAL WORLD, DESTROYING RELEVANT EDUCATION.**

**D) DISADS TO US ACTION SOLVE ALL THEIR GROUND CONCERNS AND PRESERVES REICPROCAL OFFENSE.**

**E) VOTING ISSUE FOR FAIRNESS AND EDUCATION.**

## AT: States CP – Fed Key To Port Security

### Federal involvement is key to meeting security goals-the counter-plan makes this impossible

Hush, Rall, and Arguinzoni 12. National Conference of State Legislatures. “2011-2012 Policies for the Jurisdiction of the Transportation Committee” [http://www.ncsl.org/state-federal-committees.aspx?tabs=855,30,674]

Port security is a state-federal partnership that is critical to the nation’s homeland security strategy. The states need clear federal direction to ensure that resources are focused on the most needed security improvements. Ninety-five percent of overseas cargo and millions of cruise and ferry passengers transit through ports each year. Ports are spending enormous sums to harden these vulnerable targets and need federal assistance. NCSL supports the Department of Homeland Security’s Port Security Grant Program, which is vital to ports’ abilities to make improvements quickly and comply with the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. States have been directed to enhance the security of publicly operated ferries and provide for the inspection of vehicles and freight. In some cases, federal directives have preempted state laws and policies to the extent of superseding state constitutional provisions. Federal assistance should fund these requirements to avoid unfunded mandates.

## AT: States CP – Fed Key to Trade

### Federal involvement is key to port and waterway efficiency-States can’t sustain policies that are critical to maintaining competitiveness and trade.

Hush, Rall, and Arguinzoni 12. National Conference of State Legislatures. “2011-2012 Policies for the Jurisdiction of the Transportation Committee” [http://www.ncsl.org/state-federal-committees.aspx?tabs=855,30,674]

The U.S. system of waterways and ports provides substantial benefits to the nation by providing access to the world’s markets. The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) recognizes the combined efforts of all levels of government and users in sharing the cost of port and waterway development and maintenance. NCSL further acknowledges the distinctive roles played by the states and the federal government in financing waterways and ports. The increase of state and local financial support in recent years should be concomitant with an increased planning authority, which is particularly important for the integration and support of other transportation systems for enhanced waterway and port activity. Investment in the U.S. water transportation system is a partnership between state and local governments and the federal government. State and local authorities significantly invest resources to enhance marine terminal capacity and efficiency, dredge berths and approach channels, and share the cost of new dredging projects to widen and deepen navigation channels. The federal government traditionally had supported dredging expenses through the General Treasury. In 1986, Congress established the Harbor Maintenance Tax, which is paid on imports and the domestic coastwise movement of goods, to support increased federal operations, and to finance the maintenance dredging of navigable channels and harbors. These taxes are deposited into the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. In order to sustain U.S. leadership in global trade, the nation’s ports must receive adequate federal funds to improve and maintain federal navigational channels. NCSL supports the full use of the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund to maintain the nation’s harbors and calls on Congress to adequately fund deepening projects to modernize our ports. The accumulation of harbor tax receipts at the federal level is a break in faith from the purpose of the Harbor Maintenance Tax and results in the imposition of a competitive burden without providing needed improvements necessary to achieve efficiencies to offset added taxes.

## AT: States CP – No Funding

### Funding at the state level for transportation isn’t sustainable-This guarantees poor implementation.

Puentes ’11. Robert Puentes, Senior Fellow @ brookings, “State Transportation Reform: Cut to Invest in Transportation to Deliver the Next Economy.” [http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/2/22%20infrastructure%20puentes/0222\_infrastructure\_puentes.pdf]

First, state transportation funding sources are shrinking. Twenty-one states—including New York, Illinois, and Florida—saw transportation program area cuts in fiscal year 2010 and 11—like Michigan— expected cuts for the next fiscal year. 4 Part of the states’ funding problem is that they are still heavily reliant on the motor vehicle fuel tax (the gas tax) for the bulk of their transportation revenues. From 1995 to 2008, more than half of the funds states used for highways came directly or indirectly through state and federal gas taxes (Table 1). But slowdowns in fuel consumption overall and stagnant gas tax rates have squeezed this revenue source. 5 At the same time revenues are down, the demands for spending have increased. A litany of reports and analyses highlight the deteriorating condition of the nation’s transportation infrastructure. 6 Over a quarter of major roads’ rides in urbanized areas are not at acceptable levels. 7 According to the latest data, nearly 72,000 bridges (12 percent of the total) in the U.S. are considered to be “structurally deficient” meaning their condition had deteriorated to the point that rehabilitation or replacement is approaching or imminent. More than one-fifth of the bridges are deficient in states like Oklahoma, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. 8 In addition to its condition, U.S. infrastructure lags when it comes to the deployment of advanced information and telecommunications technology. 9

## AT: States CP - Not Strategic

### empirics prove they aren’t strategic with the funding they do have-innovations that are critical to the vitality of urban areas are never implemented

Puentes ’11. Robert Puentes, Senior Fellow @ brookings, “State Transportation Reform: Cut to Invest in Transportation to Deliver the Next Economy.” [http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/2/22%20infrastructure%20puentes/0222\_infrastructure\_puentes.pdf]

Second, state investments are not made in a sufficiently strategic, economy-enhancing way. States also face challenges because they spend their (now-declining) transportation dollars poorly. For example, many states have tended to allocate investments via logrolling rather than evidence. As a result, projects are spread around the state like peanut butter. 10 The metropolitan areas that will deliver the next economy—since they already concentrate the assets that matter to smart economic growth like transportation—are often undermined by spending and policy decisions that fail to recognize the economic engines they are and focus investments accordingly. Nor have states been deliberate about recognizing and supporting the particular needs and challenges of both metro and non-metro areas. State transportation policies also remain rigidly stovepiped and disconnected as states fail to take advantage of potential efficiencies gained through integrated systems. By failing to join up transportation up with other policy areas—such as housing, land use, energy—states are diminishing the power of their interventions and reducing the return on their investments. This is a very different approach from how the economy functions and is out-of-step with innovations to connect transportation investments to economic prosperity. The benefits of federal, state and private investments are amplified when metropolitan areas pursue deliberate strategies across city and suburban lines that build on the distinctive advantages of the broader metropolis.

## AT: States CP - Perm

### The perm is the best option-current security efforts aren’t integrated enough─

Clark et al. 7. CAPT Bruce G. Clark, USCGR (ret) Director of Maritime Security Projects, Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning -The California Maritime Academy. Dr. Donna J. Nincic , Associate Professor and Chair-Department of Global and Maritime Studies of The California Maritime Academy. CAPT Nevin Fidler, USCGR (ret) Maritime Security Directorate Dept. of Sponsored Projects & Extended Learning-The California Maritime Academy-The California State University. “Protecting America’s Ports: Are We There Yet?” Oct 2007.

FEDERAL and STATE LEVEL INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION AND

COOPERATION REMAINS SPORADIC AND INCOMPLETE. The DHS and the USCG, the DOD and the USN still are largely operating different and sometimes competing programs to address national and maritime security concerns. The Navy and USCG for example are both engaged in construction of similar littoral/brown water patrol and interdiction platforms that – while some of the systems are designed to be compatible, do not reasonably address overall program cost efficiency or other interoperability issues. At the state level, effective communication and integration of federal and state resources, response and planning assets remain largely disconnected or are only now being addressed to a significant degree.

## AT-Spending Disadvantage

### Non-Unique, the deficit will increase past a trillion inevitably─

USA Today 6-12-12. “Federal deficit totals $844.5B through 8 months”[http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-06-12/federal-budget-deficit/55551168/1]

WASHINGTON (AP) – The federal budget deficit is approaching $1 trillion for a fourth straight year even though the government is collecting more tax revenue than last year. The Treasury Department said Tuesday that the deficit grew by $124.6 billion in May. That put the deficit through the first eight months of the budget year at $844.5 billion, or 8.9% below last year's imbalance for the same period. Still, the Congressional Budget office forecasts that the deficit for the entire 2012 budget year, which ends Sept. 30, will total $1.17 trillion. That's only a slight improvement from the $1.3 trillion deficit recorded in fiscal 2011. And it is certain to keep the federal budget near the center of the presidential campaign.

### Fiscal restraint alone won’t solve the recovery─ Mulutple factors will determine the status of the economy─

Schulzke 5-23-12. 'Greecing' the wheels: U.S. financial collapse ahead if tax cuts expire, funding cuts kick in, Congressional Budget Office predicts. Compiled by Eric Schulzke, Deseret News. Published: Wednesday, May 23 2012 1:45 p.m. MDT

Federal debt continues to rise at an unprecedented rate, the CBO report added, and this "could not be sustained indefinitely, and policy changes would be required at some point. The more that debt increased before policies were changed, the greater would be the negative consequences — for the nation’s future output and income, for the burden imposed by interest payments on the federal debt, for policymakers’ ability to use tax and spending policies to respond to unexpected challenges, and for the likelihood of a sudden fiscal crisis. And the longer the necessary adjustments in policies were delayed, the more uncertain individuals and businesses would be about future government policies, and the more drastic the ultimate changes in policy would need to be." The CBO report is a little short on solutions. Reducing restraint now "would have substantial economic costs over the longer run," it says. But imposing restraint now "would have substantial economic costs in the short run." The solution the report seems to favor is to change tax and budget policies now, allowing the deficit to widen in 2013 but then "reduce deficits later in the decade relative to what would occur if current policies were extended for a prolonged period."

### Turn-Costs are in the billions for reconstruction post port attacks─

Haveman & Shatz 6. Jon D. Haveman, research fellow @ Public Policy Institute of California. Ph.D in Economics-University of Michigan. Howard J. Shatz, senior economist at RAND corporation. 2006 “Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost.”[http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r\_606jhr.pdf]

In Chapter 3, Peter Gordon, James E. Moore, II, Harry W. Richardson, and Qisheng Pan provide a quite different analysis, suggesting that an attack on the port complex could have severe economic consequences. About 55 percent of the twin ports’ trade goes through Terminal Island, which is connected to the mainland by three highway bridges and a rail bridge. One possible terrorism scenario is the successful destruction of all four of those bridges by conventional bombs, perhaps in a simultaneous attack of the type that al-Qaeda has become known for.11 The economic effects depend on reconstruction time, and estimates of these effects are derived for reconstruction times ranging between three months and two years. Costs would rise as the disruption lengthened. In the scenario of a one-year reconstruction, the U.S. economy could suffer losses of almost $45 billion, the authors argue. These include direct costs, indirect costs, and induced costs. Direct costs arise as a direct result of the halt in shipping. For example, if car parts are being imported, the car manufacturer can neither assemble nor sell more cars. Indirect costs result from the fact that other domestic firms supply parts to the same car manufacturer. These parts would no longer be needed, so these firms would sell fewer parts as an indirect result of the halt in trade. Induced costs result from the reduction of consumption spending by households whose members worked in the affected industries. About 64 percent of this loss would occur outside the five-county Los Angeles region; some would occur elsewhere in California, but most would occur outside the state. These are not trivial costs. For comparison, the new eastern span of the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge is expected to cost around $6 billion, and policymakers have gone to enormous pains finding money to pay for it. The estimated costs of a one-year closure of Terminal Island are more than seven times that large. Nevertheless, U.S. GDP is more than $11.7 trillion, next to which the economic costs of an attack do seem small.12

## AT-Spending Disadvantage

### No impact to deficit spending─

Wray 97 (L. Randall, a Professor of Economics at the University of Missouri-Kansas City, a Senior Research Associate at the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, as well as a visiting Senior Scholar at the Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. He is a past president of the Association for Institutionalist Thought (AFIT) and has served on the board of directors of the Association for Evolutionary Economics (AFEE), “Government as Employer of Last Resort: Full Employment Without Inflation”—November—online)

Here, we take the position that there is nothing inherently wrong with big deficits; these do not necessarily cause "crowding out", they do not "burden" future generations, and they cannot lead to "financial ruin" of the government.4 As we argue, all government spending is in the first instance financed by crediting a member bank's account at the central bank, that is, government spending is "financed" by money creation. Taxes are required onlyto generate a demand for this money; they are never required to "finance" the government spending (which has already occurred). Bond sales are then required to "drain" reserves (that is, bonds are sold as an alternative to non-interest-bearing excess reserves) in order to hit interest rate targets. Thus, government deficits are not "financed" by bond sales, deficits do not raise interest rates and "crowd out" private investment (since the government need sell only so many bonds as necessary to achieve its interest rate target--and can set that target more-or-less anywhere it likes), and deficits do not automatically set up a stream of interest payments (since bond sales are discretionary) and even when they do, these are always met through crediting bank reserves; thus, there is no "burden" of servicing government debt. There are necessary caveats to these conclusions for the case where the government has issued debt denominated in foreign currencies--but this action is almost never required.'

## AT-Spending Disadvantage-Hegemony Defense

### Hegemony can’t contain conflicts.

Layne 99 – Prof IR @ Texas A&M, Chris, “Adjusting to Nuclear Proliferation”, Cato Handbook for Congress, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb106/hb106-52.pdf

Notwithstanding its perceived difficulties and complexities, it appears that extended deterrence ‘‘worked’’ in Europe during the Cold War. One should not conclude, however, that extended deterrence will work equally well in the early 21st century. If extended deterrence indeed worked during the Cold War, it was because of a unique convergence of factors that are unlikely to be replicated in the future: (1) a bipolar international system, (2) a clearly defined geopolitical status quo recognized by both the potential challenger and the defender, (3) the intrinsic value of the protected region to the defender, and (4) the permanent forward deployment by the defender of sizeable military forces in the protected region. During the Cold War the bipolar nature of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Europe stabilized the superpower relationship by dividing the Continent into U.S. and Soviet spheres of influence that reflected the vital interests of both superpowers. Each knew it courted disaster if it challenged the other’s sphere. Also, during the Cold War the superpowers were able to exercise control over their major allies to minimize the risk of unwillingly being dragged into a conflict by them**. In the** early **21st century**, however, the international system will be multipolar. **Spheres of influence will not be delineated clearly**. In addition, because other **countries** will **have** more **latitude to pursue their own** foreign and **security policy** agendas than they did during the Cold War, there will be a greater risk that the United States could be dragged into a conflict because of a protected country’s irresponsible behavior. Moreover, a crucial factor in weighing the credibility of a defender’s commitment is the degree of its interest in the protected area. Had the Soviets seriously contemplated an attack on Western Europe, they almost certainly would have drawn back from the brink. In a bipolar setting, Western Europe’s security was a matter of considerable importance to the United States for both strategic and credibility reasons. In the early 21st century, however, the intrinsic value of many of the regions to which the United States may wish to extend deterrence will be doubtful. Indeed, as political scientist Robert Jervis observes, in the post–Cold War world, ‘‘few imaginable disputes will engage vital U.S. interests.’’ It thus will be difficult to convince a potential attacker that U.S. deterrence commitments are credible. **It is doubtful**, for example, that **the U**nited **S**tates **could deter a Russian invasion of the Baltic republics or** Ukraine or, several decades hence, a **Chinese assault on Taiwan**. To engage in such actions, **Moscow or Beijing would** have to **be highly motivated**; conversely, the **objects of** possible **attack are unimportant** strategically **to the U**nited **S**tates, **which would** cause the challenger to **discount U.S. credibility.** The spring 1996 crisis between China and Taiwan suggests the difficulties U.S. extended deterrence strategy will face in coming decades. During the crisis, **a Chinese official said** that **China could use force against Taiwan** without fear of U.S. intervention **because American decision makers ‘‘care more about L**os **A**ngeles **than** they do about **Taiwan**.’’ Although empty today, as China becomes more powerful militarily and economically in coming decades, threats of this nature from Beijing will be more potent. Extended deterrence is strengthened when the guarantor deploys its own military forces on the protected state’s territory. Thus, during the Cold War the presence of large numbers of U.S. combat forces and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe underscored its importance to the United States and bolstered the credibility of extended deterrence. But it is unlikely that the United States would ever bolster the credibility of explicit or implicit security guarantees to nations like Ukraine, the Baltic republics, or even Taiwan—each of which is threatened potentially by a nuclear rival—by deploying ground forces as tokens of its resolve. Indeed, even as NATO has expanded, Washington has taken an ambivalent stance with respect to whether the United States will ever deploy troops or tactical nuclear weapons in Poland (which, because of its proximity to Russia, is the expanded NATO’s most vulnerable member state). The bottom line is inescapable: in the early 21st century, U.S. extended deterrence guarantees will become increasingly tenuous. As that happens, countries currently under the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella will realize that they no longer can count on the United States to protect them from other nuclear states that could menace their security. Considerations of national interest and security inevitably will impel many of the states now protected by America’s extended deterrence strategy to acquire their own independent nuclear capabilities.

### Multipolarity doesn’t influence war—fighting is determined by the nature of individual great powers.

Gartzke 9 - Prof PoliSci @ UC San Diego, Erik, "Power Shuffle", Current History, Nov

Scholars have advanced almost every conceiv¬able relationship between the number of poles (centers of power) in the world and the risk of war. Some realists prefer bipolar systems, since fewer poles make it easier to identify balances of power. Others see multipolar systems as stabilizing, since the prospect of fighting a majority coalition deters aggression. Still other scholars see parity as the problem, arguing that war is more likely when nations are comparable in power. In all likelihood, **little** or no **relationship exists between the number of poles** in a system, or parity (or disparity for that mat¬ter), **and major war**. Careful scholarship by a number of researchers has shown that bipolar systems are no more (or less) peaceful than multipolar systems, and that **parity**, **while a bit more conflict-prone, is only marginally associated with additional conflict**. Realists are fond of pointing out that the United States and the Soviet Union never went to war (bipolar stability). Yet **no major-power war occurred in Europe in the 40 years before W**orld **W**ar **I**, either (**multipolar** **stability**). Most likely, **the reason** for peace in both periods **was** a **widespread consensus regarding** the **structure of international power.** It mattered much more that **nations all agreed on who was in charge**, than that they were confronted by a particular arrangement of powerful poles or persistent parities.

# \*\*\*Negative Case\*\*\*

## Terrorism Defense-No Nuke Terror

### No risk of nuclear terrorism.

Mueller 9 – Prof Political Science @ Ohio State University, John, “The Atomic Terrorist?”, Paper Prepared for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, April 30, http://www.icnnd.org/research/Mueller\_Terrorism.pdf

Thus far **terrorist groups** seem to have **exhibited only limited desire** and even less progress **in going atomic**. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists on the issue, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful.**It is** highly **improbable** that **a** would-be atomic **terrorist would be given** or sold **a bomb** by a generous like-minded nuclear state because **the donor could not control its use and** because **the** ultimate **source** of the weapon **might bediscovered**. Although there has been great worry about terrorists illicitly stealing or purchasing a nuclear weapon, it seems likely that **neither “loose nukes” nor a market in illicit** nuclear **materials exists**. Moreover, **finished bombs have** been outfitted with an array of **locks and safety devices**. There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were utterly to fail, collapsing in full disarray. However, even under those conditions, nuclear weapons would likely remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb would most likely end up going off in their own territory, would still have locks, and could probably be followed and hunted down by an alarmed international community. The most plausible route for terrorists would be to manufacture the device themselves from purloined materials. This task requires that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered in sequence, including the effective **recruitment of people who** at once **havegreat technical skills and** will remain completely **devoted to the cause.** In addition, a host of **corrupted** co-**conspirators**, many of them foreign, **must remain** utterly **reliable**, international and local **security servicesmust be kept** perpetually **in the dark**, and no curious outsider must get consequential wind of the project over the months or even years it takes to pull off. In addition, the **financial costs** of the operation **could** easily **become monumental**. Moreover, the **difficulties** are likely to **increase because of enhanced protective** and policing **efforts by** self-interested **governments** and because any foiled attempt would expose flaws in the defense system, holes the defenders would then plug. The evidence of al-Qaeda’s desire to go atomic, and about its progress in accomplishing this exceedingly difficult task, is remarkably skimpy, if not completely negligible. The scariest stuff—a decade’s worth of loose nuke rumor—seems to have no substance whatever. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan: “Make use of that which is available ... rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In part because of current policies—but also because of a wealth of other technical and organizational difficulties—the atomic terrorists’ task is already monumental, and their likelihood of success is vanishingly small. Efforts to further enhance this monumentality, if cost-effective and accompanied with only tolerable side effects, are generally desirable.

### Less than 1 in 3.5 billion risk of nuclear terrorism.

GSN 9 – Global Security Newswire, “Experts Debate Threat of Nuclear, Biological Terrorism”, 1/13, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20090113\_7105.php

**In** even **the most likely scenario of nuclear terrorism, there are 20 barriers between extremists and asuccessful** nuclear **strike** on a major city, **said** John **Mueller**, a political science professor at Ohio State University. The process itself is seemingly straightforward but exceedingly difficult -- **buy or steal** highly **enriched uranium**, **manufacture a weapon**, take the bomb to the target site and **blow it up.** Meanwhile, variables strewn across the path to an attack would increase the complexity of the effort, Mueller argued. **Terrorists would have tobribe officials** in a state nuclear program to acquire the material, **while avoiding a** stingby authorities or a **scam** by the sellers. **The material** itself **could** also turn out to **be bad.** "Once the purloined material is purloined, [police are] going to be chasing after you. They are also going to put on a high reward, extremely high reward, on getting the weapon back or getting the fissile material back," Mueller said during a panel discussion at a two-day Cato Institute conference on counterterrorism issues facing the incoming Obama administration. Smuggling the material out of a country would mean relying on criminals who "are very good at extortion" and might have to be killed to avoid a double-cross, Mueller said. The **terrorists would** then **have to find scientists** and engineers **willing to give up their** normal **lives** to manufacture a bomb, which would require an expensive and sophisticated machine shop. Finally, further technological expertise would be needed to sneak the weapon across national borders to its destination point and conduct a successful detonation, Mueller said. Every obstacle is "difficult but not impossible" to overcome, Mueller said, putting **thechance of success at** no less than **one in three for each**. The **likelihood** of successfully passing through each obstacle, in sequence, **would be** roughly **one in 3 1/2 billion,** he said, but for argument's sake dropped it to 3 1/2 million. "It's a total gamble. This is a very expensive and difficult thing to do," said Mueller, who addresses the issue at greater length in an upcoming book, Atomic Obsession. "So unlike buying a ticket to the lottery ... you're basically putting everything, including your life, at stake for a gamble that's maybe one in 3 1/2 million or 3 1/2 billion." Other scenarios are even less probable, Mueller said. A nuclear-armed state is "exceedingly unlikely" to hand a weapon to a terrorist group, he argued: "**States** just simply **won't give it to somebody they can't control." Terrorists are** also **not** likely to be**able to steal a wholeweapon**, Mueller asserted, dismissing the idea of "loose nukes." Even Pakistan, which today is perhaps the nation of greatest concern regarding nuclear security, keeps its bombs in two segments that are stored at different locations, he said (see GSN, Jan. 12).

## Terrorism Defense-Can’t buy Nukes

### States won’t ever sell nukes.

Mueller 9 – Prof Political Science @ Ohio State University, John, “The Atomic Terrorist?”, Paper Prepared for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, April 30, http://www.icnnd.org/research/Mueller\_Terrorism.pdf

One route a would-be atomic **terrorist** might take would be **to be given** or sold **a bomb by a** generous like-minded nuclear **state** for delivery abroad. This **is** highly **improbable**, however, because **there would be too much risk,** even for acountry led by extremists, that the ultimate source of the weapon would be discovered. As one prominent analyst, Matthew Bunn, puts it, “**A dictator** or oligarch **bent on maintaining power is** highly **unlikely to take the** immense **risk of transferring such a devastating capability to terrorists they cannot control, given the** ever-present **possibility** that **the material would be traced back** to its origin.” Important in this last consideration are deterrent safeguards afforded by “nuclear forensics,” the rapidly developing science (and art) of connecting nuclear materials to their sources even after a bomb has been exploded.6 Moreover, **there is a** very considerable **danger to the donorthatthe bomb** (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery, or that it **would be exploded in a manner** and on a target **the donor would not approve--**including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence.7

## Terrorism Defense-Can’t use loose nukes

### Loose nukes don’t exist and wouldn’t be usable.

Mueller 9 – Prof Political Science @ Ohio State University, John, “The Atomic Terrorist?”, Paper Prepared for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, April 30, http://www.icnnd.org/research/Mueller\_Terrorism.pdf

There has also been great worry about “loose nukes,” especially in post-Communist Russia—weapons, “suitcase bombs” in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, both Russian nuclear officials and experts on the Russian nuclear programs have adamantly denied that al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group could have bought such weapons. They further point out that the bombs, all built before 1991, are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years, after which they become “radioactive scrap metal.” Similarly, a careful assessment conducted by **the Center for Nonproliferation Studies** has **concluded** that **it is unlikely** that **any of these devices have** actually **been lost and** that, regardless, **their effectiveness would be** very low or even **non-existent becausethey** (like all nuclear weapons) **require continual maintenance**. Even some of those most alarmed by the prospect of atomic terrorism have concluded that “It is probably true that there are no ‘loose nukes’, transportable nuclear weapons missing from their proper storage locations and available for purchase in some way.”10 It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly Chechen ones of course, with whom it has been waging a vicious on-and- off war for well over a decade. The government of Pakistan, which has been repeatedly threatened by terrorists, has a similar very strong interest in controlling its nuclear weapons and material—and scientists. Notes Stephen Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos National Laboratory, “regardless of what is reported in the news, all nuclear nations takethesecurityof their weaponsvery seriously.”1 **Even if a** finished **bomb were** somehow **lifted** somewhere, **theloss would** soon **be noted and a** worldwide **pursuit launched.** And most **bombs** that could conceivably be stolen **use plutonium which emits** a great deal of **radiation that could** relatively **easily be detected** by sensors in the hands of pursuers.12 Moreover, as technology has developed, finished **bombs have** been outfitted with **devicesthat** will **trigger a nonnuclear explosion** that will destroy the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate highsecurity vaults, and things can be organized so that **two people and** multiple **codes are required** not only **to use** the bomb, but to **store**, to **maintain**, **and** to **deployit.** If the terrorists seek to enlist (or force) the services of someone who already knows how to set off the bomb, they would find, as Younger stresses, that “**only few people** in the world**have the knowledge to cause** an unauthorized **detonation** of anuclear weapon.” Weapons designers know how a weapon works, he explains, but not the multiple types of signals necessary to set it off, and maintenance personnel are trained only in a limited set of functions.1

## Terrorism Defense-No Retaliation

### No retaliation to terrorism.

Harvard Law Review 8 – No Author Given, “NOTE: THE INCENTIVE GAP: REASSESSING U.S. POLICIES TO SECURE NUCLEAR ARSENALS WORLDWIDE”, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1864, ln

A second major problem is that **fulfilling the commitment to retaliate would** likely **require the U**nited **S**tates **to incur major costsor endanger important interests. The most obvious scenario** here **involves** the case in which **Russia** is the negligent state responsible for an attack on the United States. **Fulfilling the** retaliatory **commitment** here **requires attacking a potential ally and risks provoking** substantial **counterattacks**, possibly leading to full-scale war between two nuclear powers. Given these circumstances, **it is difficult to believe that theU**nited **S**tates **would ever attack Russia.** More generally, the problem is that in many cases following through on the threat of retaliation might actually decrease American security or otherwise impose costs that outweigh  [\*1885]  the deterrence benefits. Thus, because retaliation may be strategically unwise for the United States, other states will question the credibility of the American threat.

No retaliation—public is rational.

Jenkins-Smith 4 /Hank C., PhD. Professor at the George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Kerry G. Herron, Ph.D. Research Scientist at George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, Fall, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=hjsmith

Our final contrasting set of expectations relate to the degree to which the public will support or demand retribution against terrorists and supporting states. Here our **data show** that **support for using** conventional U.S. **military force to retaliate againstterrorists** initially averaged above midscale, but **did not reach a high level** of emotional demand for military action. **Initial support declined significantly across all** demographic and belief **categories by** the time of our survey in **2002.** Furthermore, **panelists** both in 2001 and 2002 **preferred** that **high levels of certainty about culpability** (above 8.5 on a scale from zero to ten) be established **before taking military action**. Again, we find the weight of evidence supporting revisionist expectations of public opinion. Overall, these results are inconsistent with the contention that highly charged events will result in volatile and unstructured responses among mass publics that prove problematic for policy processes. The initial response to the terrorist strikes, in the immediate aftermath of the event, demonstrated a broad and consistent shift in public assessments toward a greater perceived threat from terrorism, and greater willingness to support policies to reduce that threat. But even in the highly charged context of such a serious attack on the American homeland, **the overall public response was** quite **measured** . On average, the public showed very little propensity to undermine speech protections, and initial willing-ness to engage in military retaliation moderated significantly over the following year.

### Obama won’t retaliate.

Brown 9 – Senior Fellow and Washington Director @ Institute for International Law and Human Rights, Former Deputy Executive Director for Action at Amnesty International USA; Former Chief of Staff and Director of the Office of Strategic Planning and External Affairs in the Bureau of Democracy, Former Human Rights and Labor in the U.S. Department of State, Charles, “Systems Theory and U.S. Foreign Policy: Obama’s Trip to Europe,” Undiplomatic, 4/9, http://www.undiplomatic.net/2009/04/09/systems-theory-and-us-foreign-policy-obamas-trip-to-europe/

With the obvious exception of the global economy, there are few systems bigger or more complex than the way governments interact with one another (and the way our government responds to those interactions). If a President wants to achieve his/her foreign policy goals, s/he must understand how his/her decisions have an impact on events over the horizon. The **Bush** Administration never quite understood this. Its **foreign policy tended to have a very limited horizon, and** it **failed** utterly **to think through the impact of its actions.** To cite the most obvious example**, it invaded Iraq** thinking it would send a message to state sponsors of terror and nuclear club wannabes that the United States would not tolerate their misbehavior. The Bush team never really thought through the unintended consequences of the invasion: the radicalization of Muslims around the world; the anger of allies heretofore willing to let the U.S. take the lead in the fight against terrorism; the implosion of America’s image; the costs (in terms of both human and financial resources) of fighting an insurgency after the success of the intitial invasion; the erosion of military capacity; and the impact of diverted resources and attention on the war in Afghanistan. In contrast, it looks like the**Obama Administration recognizes that its decisions can have consequences far beyond the immediate challenge at hand. Obama’s trip to Europe (and Iraq) demonstrated** the degree to which **he is trying to weave different challenges into** what Senge calls **a “fabric of interrelated actions.”** His bilaterals with Russia and China were crucial to success at the G-20. He had to balance humility and leadership if the G-20 and NATO summits were to demonstrate progress. He couldn’t have a bilateral with Medvedev without also visiting Prague to reassure America’s East European allies that they wouldn’t be forgotten. He couldn’t visit to Turkey to talk about better relations with the Islamic world without also recognizing Turkey’s desire to be part of the EU. He couldn’t ensure a shift in emphasis to Afghanistan without visiting Iraq and reassuring our troops there that a change in focus does not mean their efforts are not as important.

## Economy Advantage Front Line 1/2

### 1. No chance of trade of shut down-alternative methods will would replace port use in the short-term─

Leamer and Thornberg ‘6. Edward E. Leamer and Christopher Thornberg

UCLA Anderson Forecast. “Ports, Trade, and Terrorism: Balancing the Catastrophic and the Chronic.” [http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r\_606jhr.pdf]

Furthermore, it is our understanding from interviews with experts, that it is highly unlikely that the physical damage from an attack would be enough to close the combined ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach completely. The size of the port complex and the large amount of excess physical capacity would make it nearly impossible for a conventional attack to stop or even reduce substantially the amount of cargo that currently moves through the ports—as long as authorities intervened to allow displaced shippers to use other parts of the complex. The port might nonetheless be shut down if the dockworkers refused to work or were prevented from working by the government. Such a directive might affect all the ports on one or both coasts. Although the United States is considerably more trade-dependent today than in earlier periods, this potential vulnerability is offset by a number of factors. One is the shift from ship to aircraft for delivery of many high-value, time-sensitive goods, particularly on the export side. Second, countermeasures to a terrorist strike, such as increased inspections of containers, may be more onerous for imports coming from uncertain ports than for exports packaged in the United States. And although a widespread labor action would stop most maritime trade completely, a terrorist strike would only slow trade rather than stop it.

### 2. The economic impact of port disruption would be minimal and quickly mitigated─

Leamer and Thornberg ‘6. Edward E. Leamer and Christopher Thornberg

UCLA Anderson Forecast. “Ports, Trade, and Terrorism: Balancing the Catastrophic and the Chronic.” [http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r\_606jhr.pdf]

This is testimony partly to the great resilience of a modern economy. Short interruptions to supply chains can be mitigated fully by drawing down inventories, especially if they were built up in anticipation of the event. When inventories are depleted and delivery essential, cargo can be shifted to air or land through a neighboring economy. Somewhat longer interruptions can be compensated for through a temporary shift to domestic suppliers—an especially easy alternative if supply chains have built-in redundancies that allow the needed flexibility. Some consumers at the end of the supply chain may have to wait a while or pay higher prices. The sale—and profits—may be postponed, but they are not prevented. Our results do not say that no business was hurt by port labor actions or that profits were not adversely affected by the increase in transaction costs. Some industries, some firms, and some regions were surely adversely affected. Nor do we claim that a terrorist attack on the ports and the resultant disruption to the supply chain would not harm any region or company—certainly some firms and regions would be affected. However, as is often the case in a modern complex economy, when one industry or area suffers as a result of some economic disturbance, another prospers as a result of an offsetting shift in demand: There are winners and losers. Our main point here is that these past disruptions were insufficient to cause any noticeable change in the aggregate flow of the economy: Either the losses were small compared with the overall economy or they were largely offset by gains elsewhere. We believe that the same would be likely after a terrorist attack on a port: Its effects are not likely to show up other than in imports and exports.

## Economy Advantage Front Line 2/2

### 3. Consumer panic would NOT collapse the economy-their analysis is flawed

Leamer and Thornberg ‘6. Edward E. Leamer and Christopher Thornberg

UCLA Anderson Forecast. “Ports, Trade, and Terrorism: Balancing the Catastrophic and the Chronic.” [http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r\_606jhr.pdf]

There is a strong tendency to blame too many secondary effects on disasters. A good example of this phenomenon is found in the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. In the days after the attacks, the rhetoric regarding the potential effect on the national economy was both loud and wrong. The theory proposed by many analysts and journalists was that psychologically fragile consumers in the United States would suffer a crisis and stop spending, driving the economy into a deeper recession. Support for this theory came from the first Gulf War, which supposedly caused a similar consumer crisis of confidence that in turn drove us into a recession in 1990. For example, the Wall Street Journal reported on September 13, 2001: “Past shocks to America’s sense of security, such as the Oklahoma City bombing or the Gulf War, have prompted consumers to pull back temporarily on major purchases and other discretionary spending,” said Richard Curtin, director of surveys of consumers at the University of Michigan. He expects a similar reaction now, which could mean a rough time in the next several weeks for the economy, which was already struggling with rising jobless rates and high consumer debt burdens. “We were teetering on the edge, and this might well push us over,” said Mr. Curtin. This hypothesis ignores the facts and completely overstates the psychological fragility of American consumers. The 1990 recession was not caused by the first Gulf War at all. Residential investment and expenditures on consumer durables typically are leading indicators of the economy. When spending on these items begins to fall as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), this is a strong indication of an underlying weakness in the economy that will create a recession. Expenditures in these two sectors had dropped from 14 percent of GDP to below 12 percent of GDP in the three years preceding the 1990 downturn—and before the Gulf war. There has never been such a drop that did not eventually lead to a recession, with one exception—in 1967, when the economy was wobbling, appearing to be on the verge of recession, the sharp increase in spending for the Vietnam War propelled the economy forward. This was just the reverse of what Mr. Curtin suggested. Similarly, the U.S. economy did not slow down after the September 11 attacks; indeed, the economy was in the midst of accelerating its way out of the 2001 business-led downturn that had begun in the middle of 2000. And although consumer confidence fell sharply after the attacks, consumer spending in the fourth quarter grew at an unprecedented 7 percent seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR), one of the sharpest increases seen in the past decade (Figure 2.2). Unemployment did rise sharply after the event, but this seemed to be primarily an acceleration of the employment loss that would have been expected given the weak economic climate. This was especially true because labor markets were still overheated from the tech-fueled economic boom of the late nineties.

### 4. Economy is recovering now, US isn’t key to it and collapse won’t cause war

Barnet, 2009 (Thomas P.M., senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing , “the new rules: security remains stable amid financial crisis,” APN, August 25, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial **crisis struck** roughly a year ago, **the blogosphere was ablaze** **with** all sorts of scary **predictions of**, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and **wars** -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, **as** global **economic news brightens and recovery** -- surprisingly **led by** China and **emerging markets** -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how **globalization's first** truly **worldwide recession has had** virtually **no impact** whatsoever **on th**e international **security landscape**. **None of the** more than three-dozen **ongoing conflicts** listed by GlobalSecurity.org **can be** clearly **attributed to the global recession**. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, **the only two potential state-on-state wars** (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) **are both tied to one side acquiring** a **nuclear** weapon **capacity** -- a process wholly **unrelated to** global **economic trends.** And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, **to sum up:** No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); **Not a single** state-on-state **war directly caused** (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); **No great** improvement or **disruption in great-power cooperation regarding** the emergence of **new nuclear powers** (despite all that diplomacy); A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and **No** serious **efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan** or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.)

## Econ Impact Defense – XT: Collapse Won’t Cause War

### Economic collapse doesn’t cause war – only rich nations can fight and shocks don’t cause lash out

Miller 2k

(Morris, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” p. Proquest)

The financing required to engage in large-scale armed conflict is of an order of magnitude that compels a resort to exceptional sources such as drug dealing, diamond smuggling, and/or brigandry in general, and/or deal-making to gain the support of governments of neighboring countries and other countries whose leaders are motivated to help with money and/or soldiers on the basis of geo-political reasons and/or of religious, tribal or ethnic sympathy, and/or to secure a share of the loot. The reliance on illicit operations is well documented in a recent World Bank report that studied 47 civil wars that took place between 1960 and 1999, the main conclusion of which is that the degree of social inequality, the openness of the political system and even the extent of ethnic diversity are poor indicators in contrast to the availability of commodities to plunder. (That) is their single biggest common problem…The data suggests that whatever the original motivation, violent civil conflicts tended to be sustained by the pursuit of wealth. An illustration of this phenomenon is provided in a recent article in Toronto’s Globe & Mail of May 23, 2000 written by two "international peace scholars": In Central Africa right now, the continuation of bloodshed may be best understood as an instrument of enterprise, violence as a mode of accumulation….Warlords rely on access to global markets to peddle local resources in order to buy more guns and missiles…Companies (such as Shell operating in Nigeria and De Beers in Angola) want to get the resources out and will support whomever they have to in order to achieve this. Other cases in point could be cited as, for example, Columbia (with 12,000 paid fighters in control of a narcotic plant-growing region, the Revolutionary Armed Forces is estimated to be generating about $700 million in annual revenue from drug trafficking), Sierra Leone (control of diamond mines), and Nigeria (control of oil producing region). In most of such conflicts, the political and military leaders and their associated business elites have been reputed to have amassed huge personal fortunes. It is likely that the same observation led an anonymous author writing in The Encyclopedia Britannica on the theme of the causes of war to characterize the current type of intra-state war as "an instrument for gain or to maintain dominance, a weapon for greed and lust for power." The necessary condition for greed and power to become operative factors in the process leading to war is the opportunity to find the financial resources to make war. It could then be said that it is a condition of affluence - and/or an opportunity to gain affluence for the political leadership and associated elites - that provides the motivation and makes feasible the option to amass weaponry even when this diversion of funds to military purposes is inimical to the interests of the population-at-large. Thus, we find in the case of major inter-state wars that the antagonists were relatively wealthyin the sense that the leaders had at their command the very considerable resources necessary both to build up their armaments and their armies and to propagandize and repress to gain acceptance for policies that would lead to the use of those weapons. The role of the affluence factor is typified by the accounts in the Millennium edition of The Economist of the major wars that occurred over the span of the last millennium. Commenting on the war of 1914-18, The Economist wrote: the summer of 1914, the rulers of Europe, after a century of huge economic progress and a decade of rising tensions, marched their peoples…to the brink of collective suicide. In the same issue (on page 20) the commentary noted that almost three decades before, in 1887 on the occasion of Queen Victoria’s jubilee celebrations, The Economist had reported that there had been "fifty years of national progress and prosperity such as England has never known before." And they quoted a popular ditty that went like this: We don’t want to fight, but by jingo if we do, We’ve got the men, we’ve got the ships, We’ve got the money too. Perhaps one should ask, as some scholars do, whether it is not poverty as such but some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that is the factor that contributes in a significant way to the denouement of war. This calls for addressing the question: do wars spring from a popular reaction to an economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and/or from a heightened awareness of the poor of the wide and growing disparities in wealth and incomes that diminishes their tolerance to poverty? It seems reasonable to believe that a powerful "shock" factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership. The leadership, finding that this sudden adverse economic and social impact destabilizing, would possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. There would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis according to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded thatMuch of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong …..The severity of economic crisis- as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth **–** bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes**….(**or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence…In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another.)

### Economy Defense-No Diversionary War

No diversionary war

Boehmer, 2010 (Charles R., Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas El Paso, “Economic Growth and violent international conflict: 1875-1999,” Defence and Peace Economics, Volume 21, Issue 3, June)

Russett ([1990](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a922235442&fulltext=713240928#CIT0067)) argues that democracies, especially major powers, are more conflict prone during economic downturns. He alleges that diversionary behavior is the root of this problem. Other studies have sought to examine the effect of strategic interactions as affected by opportunities to divert and/or the behavior of potential targets. **Leeds and Davis** ([1997](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a922235442&fulltext=713240928#CIT0044)), working at the dyadic level, **find no evidence for diversionary behavior** and argue that potential **opponents shy away from confronting democracies when they** would **appear** most **prone to** attempt **diversionary tactics**. **Miller** ([1995](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a922235442&fulltext=713240928#CIT0054)) found no evidence that lower growth rates increase the risk of democratic diversion. His 1999 **study supports the logic of Leeds and Davis** ([1997](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a922235442&fulltext=713240928#CIT0044)), where he looks at individual states that are already involved in crises, and finds that **autocracies experiencing lower growth rates are more likely to opportunistically join on side A or B of a dispute (but not originate**) and use military force, **whereas democracies were neither likely to originate nor join disputes and use force**. Bennett and Nordstrom ([2000](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a922235442&fulltext=713240928#CIT0004)) find that deprivation increases diversionary behavior for states in enduring rivalries. Foster ([2006](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a922235442&fulltext=713240928#CIT0022)) finds evidence that opponents of the USA behave strategically depending on the vulnerability of US presidents.

## Econ Impact Defense – No Trade Collapse

### **Trade is resilient – depression won’t cause protectionism**

Beattie, 2010 (Alan, World Trade Editor for the Financial Times, “Pantomime villain fails to materialize,” June 25, Financial Times, http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001033254/en)

The analogies between the (still substantial) unemployment lines of today and the mass joblessness of the 1930s have become mercifully less frequent. And one area in which the drawing of parallels has dropped away almost completely is that of protectionism. In the months after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008, a precipitous collapse in the volume of world trade had observers reaching for their history books, noting that the drop-off in commerce was, if anything, faster than during the 1930s. With protectionist rhetoric becoming increasingly prevalent, there was real concern that the world could soon see a return to the out-and-out protectionism of the Great Depression. In particular, worrywarts kept repeating to each other, we could be on the brink of repeating the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff act of 1930. This raised trade barriers in the US and set off a flurry of tit-for-tat retaliation around the world. Just as the protectionism of the 1930s undid much of the liberalisation of trade during the “Golden Age” of globalisation from 1880 to 1914, the fear went, so the protectionism of the new Great Recession might reverse the rapid integration of markets in goods, services and capital since the end of the Cold War. But **despite** – or perhaps because of – all **the eyes trained on the wings, the pantomime villain of protectionism signally failed to appear. Monitoring projects were set up** by the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation and other bodies**. But they recorded only modest increases in** the use of traditional forms of trade **barriers** – import tariffs and emergency so-called “anti-dumping” measures and “countervailing duties” used against imports deemed to be unfairly priced or subsidised by the exporting country's government. A study by the World Trade Organisation and other official agencies commissioned by the G20 and published earlier this lyear was sanguine, saying that **at most 0.4 per cent of world trade had been affected by import barriers** imposed during the previous six months. “The trade and investment policy response to the global recession has so far been relatively muted,” the study said. “Most **G20 members continue to manage successfully the political process of keeping domestic protectionist pressures under control**, despite a difficult environment for some of them where employment levels and new job opportunities are shrinking.” Meanwhile, **trade itself rapidly recovered, and** on current trends **is likely to be back to pre-crisis levels** by the end of next year. Whether the lost years of growth will ever be made up is another matter, but policymakers in the dark days of late 2008 would have been mightily relieved if they had known today's outcome in advance.

## Solvency Answers-Not enough time

### Detection is useless-Too many entries and detonation would happen too soon to act.

de Rugy ‘7 Veronique de Rugy, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. “Is Port Security Funding Making Us Safer?” MIT Center for International Studies. [http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit\_11\_07\_derugy.pdf]

Besides, even if the system could detect every dangerous item, it is ineffective unless the nuclear material is brought through the fixed ports of entry where the monitors are located. With thousand of miles of unguarded borders—and no cost effective way to address the issue—smugglers can easily find positions to bring illicit goods inside the country. Consider the country’s long standing War on Drugs and the inability to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the country. This does not mean we should not make some effort to detect material inside U.S. ports. However, we should keep in mind how risky it is to rely on port security at home: if the system fails, the nuclear material ends up inside the country or will be used to blow up a port. If a nuclear bomb blows up at the port of New York, it would kill some of New York City’s eight million residents. It is a small comfort that a detector’s alarm might go off five minutes before so many people die.

### Increased security won’t make a difference in the case of an attack

de Rugy ‘7 Veronique de Rugy, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. “Is Port Security Funding Making Us Safer?” MIT Center for International Studies. [http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit\_11\_07\_derugy.pdf]

More telling is the fact that the $1.1 billion we spend on denying terrorists access to nuclear weapons and material pales in comparison with the amounts we spent each year on much less catastrophic threats. For example, in airline security, improved cockpit security has limited the worst-case scenario witnessed on 9/11 to the destruction of a plane and loss of approximately 300 passengers. Yet, we will spend $5.8 on baggage screening for airlines in FY 2008 and over $3 billion to help state and local government build their response capacity.22 First responder grant programs are predicated on the notion of cleaning up after terrorists have successfully attacked and hence are not making us more secure. Furthermore, nuclear experts predict that these investments will be irrelevant if we are actually attacked with a WMD weapon.23 In the end much of the money spent on port security goes to lower priority programs, as does much of our homeland security funding. It adds little value to the nation’s security. Thankfully, a successful nuclear attack remains a very low probability event. Yet, it only takes one success to create significant damages. Do we really need the deaths of 200,000 people to move the nuclear threat to the top of the priority list?

## Solvency Answers-Not Feasible

### It’s impossible to check every container-Doing so would collapse transportation stability.

Virginia Pilot 2-5-12. [ http://hamptonroads.com/2012/02/millions-containers-now-find-%E2%80%98boom-box%E2%80%99]

The technology isn’t fool-proof. Radiation can be masked, and conventional weapons – like the C-4 that blew a hole in the destroyer Cole in 2000 – won’t trip the detectors at all. Manually searching each container is out of the question; more than half of all goods sold in the United States come from other countries. “If we physically checked them all, commerce would grind to a halt,” Laria said. “We couldn’t hire enough people to do the job anyway, and even if we could, I don’t think taxpayers would want to foot that bill.”

# \*\*\*States CP

## 1NC-States CP

### The Fifty States, all relevant territories, and all relevant multi-state compacts should substantially increase its investment in the research, development, and implementation of in-port remote sensing technologies of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents in the United States.

### The counter-plan solves the case and avoids federal funding inefficiencies that keep infrastructure quality low-

Edwards ‘10. Chris Edwards, Director of Tax Policy, Cato Institute. June 2010 “Department of Transportation: Proposed Spending Cuts” [http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/transportation/spending-cuts]

Most Department of Transportation activities are properly the responsibility of state and local governments and the private sector. There are few advantages in funding infrastructure such as highways and airports from Washington, but there are many disadvantages. Federal involvement results in political misallocation of resources, bureaucratic mismanagement, and costly one-size-fits-all regulations imposed on the states. The Federal Highway Administration should be eliminated. Taxpayers and highway users would be better off if federal highway spending and gasoline taxes were ended. State governments could more efficiently plan their highway systems without federal intervention. The states should look to the private sector for help in funding and operating highways, and they ought to move forward with innovations such as expressways with electronic tolling. The Federal Transit Administration should be eliminated. Federal transit subsidies have caused local governments to make inefficient transportation choices. Federal aid favors rail systems, which are more expensive and less flexible than bus systems. The removal of federal subsidies and related regulations would spur local governments to discover more cost-effective transportation solutions, such as opening transit markets to private operators. Air traffic control should be removed from the federal budget, and the ATC system should be set up as a stand-alone and self-funded agency or private company. Many nations have moved towards such a commercialized ATC structure, and the results have been very positive with regard to efficiency and safety. Canada's reform in the 1990s to create a private nonprofit ATC corporation is a good model for the United States to follow. U.S. ATC is currently overseen by the Federal Aviation Administration, which has serious funding problems and a poor record on implementing new technologies. Moving to a Canadian-style ATC system would help solve these problems and allow our aviation infrastructure to meet rising aviation demand. Amtrak has provided second-rate rail service for decades, while consuming almost $40 billion in federal subsidies. It has a poor on-time record, and its infrastructure is in bad shape. As a government agency, it is hamstrung in its decisionmaking regarding routes, workforce polices, capital investment, and other aspects of business. Amtrak should be privatized to give it the management flexibility it needs to operate in a more efficient and competitive manner. The table shows that federal taxpayers would save about $85 billion annually by closing down the agencies and programs listed. The department would retain its current activities regarding highway safety, aviation safety, and some other regulatory functions. Those functions could be reformed as well, but the most important thing is to end federal subsidies for transportation activities that would be better handled by the states and private sector. America should take heed of the market-based reforms being implemented abroad, and pursue similar solutions to its transportation challenges.

## 2NC-Theory-Fifty State Fiat Good

### 1. Education—all our evidence is about transportation and devolution, the CP is an important and predictable topic issue. Ample lit exists for them to defend federal control, solves their offense.

### 2. Limits—forces the aff to read advantages with federal government key warrants. Prevents proliferation of bad affs that overburdens the neg decreasing depth of education.

### 3. Hard debate is good—we force good aff strategy and don’t make debate impossible.

### 4. Err neg—we need states as a generic to check affs infinite prep and ability to set terms of debate.

### 5. Defenses of the federal transportation role apply to all affs—we don’t destroy aff ground or force people into the margins of the topic.

### Reject the argument not the team

## 2NC-Solvency Ext.-Devolution K2 Transportation

### Devolution of transportation systems is key to successful transportation projects-federal involvement guarantees inefficiencies that undermine solvency-this alone turns case

Poole ’96. Robert W. Poole, Jr.“DEFEDERALIZING TRANSPORTATION FUNDING” Oct 1996.

[http://reason.org/files/4883e8bd01480c4d96ce788feb1f2e05.pdf]

Airports, highways, and mass transit systems are primarily state and local responsibilities. They are developed and operated by state and local governments (with increasing private-sector involvement) and funded primarily from state and local sources. Yet the federal government, by collecting transportation user taxes and using them to make grants for these systems, both raises the costs and exerts significant control over these state and local activities. Congress should devolve transportation infrastructure funding and responsibilities to cities and states, ending federal grant programs and their accompanying restrictions. Cities and states have been open to privatization, and most would welcome the flexibility and freedom from costly federal regulations which devolution would give them. Devolving transportation funding would lead to more-productive investment, greater intermodalism, more innovation, and new capital from the private sector. Conventional wisdom suggests that 21 states are net donors to the federal highway program and the rest are net recipients. But this paper's analysis, taking into account the real costs of federal funding and regulations, concludes that 33 states get back less than they contribute in highway taxes and would be better off if the funds were left in their states to begin with. By adding such major states as Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia to the donor-state category, this assessment could change the political dynamics in favor of devolution. Abundant evidence now exists that federal transit programs have stimulated investment in unviable rail systems and have needlessly boosted transit system operating costs. The flexibility created by repeal of federal transit regulations would permit changes (such as competitive contracting of transit operations) that could save enough to offset much of the loss of federal operating subsidies. It would be up to cities and states to decide whether to continue to invest in non-cost-effective rail transit.

## 2NC-Solvency Ext.-States Solve Private Investment

### Federal transportation funding has consistently failed-state governments are key to encourage private investment

Edwards ’11. Chris Edwards, Director of Tax Policy, Cato Institute.“Infrastructure Projects to Fix the Economy? Don't Bank on It.” 10-21-11.[http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/infrastructure-projects-fix-economy-dont-bank-it]

Increased infrastructure spending has bipartisan support in Washington these days. President Obama wants a new federal infrastructure bank, and members of both parties want to pass big highway and air-traffic-control funding bills. The politicians think these bills will create desperately needed jobs, but the cost of that perceived benefit is too high: Federal infrastructure spending has a long and painful history of pork-barrel politics and bureaucratic bungling, with money often going to wasteful and environmentally damaging projects. For plenty of examples of the downside of federal infrastructure, look at the two oldest infrastructure agencies — the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation. Their histories show that the federal government shouldn't be in the infrastructure business. Rather, state governments and the private sector are best equipped to provide it. The Corps of Engineers has been building levees, canals and other civilian water infrastructure for more than 200 years — and it has made missteps the entire time. In the post-Civil War era, for example, there were widespread complaints about the Corps' wastefulness and mismanagement. A 1971 book by Arthur Morgan, a distinguished engineer and former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, concluded: "There have been over the past 100 years consistent and disastrous failures by the Corps in public works areas ... resulting in enormous and unnecessary costs to ecology [and] the taxpayer." Some of the highest-profile failures include the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927. That disaster dramatically proved the shortcomings of the Corps' approach to flood control, which it had stubbornly defended despite outside criticism. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was like a dreadful repeat. The flooding was in large part a man-made disaster stemming from poor engineering by the Corps and misdirected funding by Congress. Meanwhile, the Bureau of Reclamation has been building economically dubious and environmentally harmful dams since 1902. Right from the start, "every Senator ... wanted a project in his state; every Congressman wanted one in his district; they didn't care whether they made economic sense or not," concluded Marc Reisner in his classic history of the agency, Cadillac Desert. The dam-building pork barrel went on for decades, until the agency ran out of rivers into which it could pour concrete. Looking at the Corps and Reclamation, the first lesson about federal infrastructure projects is that you can't trust the cost-benefit analyses. Both agencies have a history of fudging their studies to make proposed projects look better, understating the costs and overstating the benefits.

## 2NC-Solvency Ext.-States Solve Error Replication

### Only the counter-plan eliminates error replication-failures at the federal level effect the entire nation

Edwards ’11. Chris Edwards, Director of Tax Policy, Cato Institute.“Infrastructure Projects to Fix the Economy? Don't Bank on It.” 10-21-11.[http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/infrastructure-projects-fix-economy-dont-bank-it]

When the federal government "thinks big," it often makes big mistakes. And when Washington follows bad policies, such as destroying wetlands or overbuilding dams, it replicates the mistakes across the nation. Today, for instance, Reclamation's huge underpricing of irrigation water is contributing to a water crisis across much of the West. Similar distortions occur in other areas of infrastructure, such as transportation. The federal government subsidizes the construction of urban light-rail systems, for example, which has caused these systems to spring up across the country. But urban rail systems are generally less efficient and flexible than bus systems, and they saddle cities with higher operating and maintenance costs down the road. Similar misallocation of investment occurs with Amtrak; lawmakers make demands for their districts, and funding is sprinkled across the country, even to rural areas where passenger rail makes no economic sense because of low population densities. When the federal government is paying for infrastructure, state officials and members of Congress fight for their shares of the funding, without worrying too much about efficiency, environmental issues or other longer-term factors. The solution is to move as much infrastructure funding as we can to the state, local and private levels. That would limit the misallocation of projects by Congress, while encouraging states to experiment with lower-cost solutions. It's true that the states make infrastructure mistakes as well, as California appears to be doing by subsidizing high-speed rail. But at least state-level mistakes aren't automatically repeated across the country.

## 2NC Solvency Ext. – States Solve Water Infrastructure

### The counter-plan solves the case and maintains U.S. competitiveness ─ relationships between companies and local governments guarantee fast implementation of critical projects─ they can’t solve in the Long-Term.

Edwards ‘12. Chris Edwards, Director of Tax Policy, Cato Institute “Cutting the Army Corps of Engineers.” March 2012.[http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/usace]

The first step toward cutting the budget of the Army Corps is to end passage of new water resource authorization bills. It makes no sense for Congress to keep putting new civilian projects into the Corps' pipeline when the agency already has hundreds of projects previously authorized but not funded. Then Congress should go through the Corps' budget and cut out all those activities that could be financed and operated by state and local governments or the private sector. Given the agency's long-standing mismanagement and misallocation of spending, it should be removed from those activities where federal involvement is not essential. Many of the Corps' activities should be privatized. Activities such as harbor construction and maintenance, beach replenishment, and hydropower generation could be provided by private construction, engineering, and utility companies. Those companies could contract directly with customers, such as local governments, to provide those services. Consider the Corp's harbor maintenance activities on the seacoasts. These activities are funded by a Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) collected from shippers based on the value of cargo. The tax generates about $1.4 billion a year and is spent on projects chosen by Congress and the Corps. But the federal government is an unneeded middleman here—port authorities could simply impose their own charges on shippers to fund their own maintenance activities, such as dredging. By cutting out the middleman, ports could respond directly to market demands, rather than having to lobby Washington for funding. Groups representing shipping interests complain that Congress is not spending enough on harbors to keep America competitive in international trade. But the current federal system allocates funds inefficiently, creating large cross-subsidies between seaports. The Congressional Research Service notes that harbor maintenance funds are often "directed towards harbors which handle little or no cargo" and "there is no attempt to identify particular port usage and allocate funds accordingly."91 The Port of Los Angeles, for example, generates a large share of HMT revenues, but it receives very little maintenance spending in return. The Congressional Research Service further explains: Examining where trust fund monies have been spent indicates that little or no shipping is taking place at many of the harbors and waterways that shippers are paying to maintain. . . . Given the amount of HMT collections not spent on harbors, and the amount spent on harbors with little or no cargo, a rough estimate is that less than half and perhaps as little as a third of every HMT dollar collected is being spent to maintain harbors that shippers frequently use.92

### The counter-plan ensures **higher-value projects** aren’t neglected

Edwards ‘9. Chris Edwards, Director of Tax Policy, Cato Institute “Privatization.” February 2009 [http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/sites/default/files/privatization.pdf]

Congress has used the corps as a pork barrel spending machine for decades. Funds are earmarked for low-value projects in the districts of important members of Congress, while higher-value projects go unfunded. Further, the corps has a history of scandals, including the levee failures in New Orleans and bogus economic studies to justify expensive projects. To solve these problems, the civilian activities of the corps should be transferred to state, local, or private ownership.A rough framework for reform would be to privatize port dredging, hydroelectric dams, beach replenishment, and other activities that could be supported by user fees and charges. Levees, municipal water and sewer projects, recreational areas, locks, and other waterway infrastructure could be transferred to state governments.

# \*\*\*Fiscal Discipline DA\*\*\*

## 1nc-Spending DA 1/3

### US is moving toward fiscal discipline now-Decisions regarding maritime transportation are ongoing─

The Maritime Executive 6-1-12. “Washington Insider - Money and Regulations Top Washington's Agenda.” [http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/washington-insider-money-and-regulations-top-washington-s-agenda]

As the buildup to a full-fledged presidential campaign dominates the nation’s media, lawmakers and policymakers in the nation’s capitol returned to the nitty-gritty details of governing. Having achieved bipartisan agreement on the overall level of federal spending, the intricate decision-making of actually implementing fiscal restraint has begun in earnest. Meanwhile, debate also swirls around controversial regulatory initiatives advanced by the Obama Administration. President Obama launched the annual appropriations struggle by announcing that his budget proposal for 2013 freezes domestic spending for five years and thereby reduces the deficit by $400 billion. He emphasized that his proposal reduced domestic spending to its lowest level since the Eisenhower Administration. It was, nonetheless, immediately and roundly denounced by Republican congressional leaders. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) declared it was merely a “campaign document.” House Speaker John Boehner decried it as a “gloomy reflection of [President Obama’s] failed policies.” Putting aside the political rhetoric, the real process of setting national priorities is now underway. Hearings, debates and negotiations are proceeding on Capitol Hill, and decisions are being taken by the Administration on determining national funding priorities and establishing new regulatory requirements affecting the maritime industry. All of this pick-and-shovel work proceeds against the fiery backdrop of the 2012 presidential and congressional elections, wherein the competing parties principally seek to define themselves and their opposition with dramatic contrasts for political advantage.

### The plan is the perfect example of a lack of fiscal restraint-Funds will be misappropriated and nowhere near cost effective─

de Rugy ‘7 Veronique de Rugy, Mercatus Center, George Mason University. “Is Port Security Funding Making Us Safer?” MIT Center for International Studies. [http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit\_11\_07\_derugy.pdf]

In FY 2007, President Bush requested $2.3 billion for port security out of a $57 billion government-wide budget for homeland security.5 However, the important question is not how much money is spent but rather whether the money is allocated toward the most costeffective programs. In other words, is America getting the maximum level of protection in exchange for our tax dollars? A close look at port security allocation decisions indicates that spending occurs without regard for risk analysis let alone cost-benefit analysis, leading to a large array of misallocated spending. For instance, what should be the highest priorities—preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear devices and material—receive less money than much less cost-effective policies such as nuclear detection in the ports or post-disaster response activities. Because it rests mainly on domestic detection of WMD in ports—a task that is not clear could be achieved—the port security model offers almost no value to the nation.6

### Fiscal discipline is critical to maintain confidence in the economic recovery-The plan risks complete collapse─

Washington Post ‘11. [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/07/AR2011010701826.html]

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke laid out a dire scenario on Friday of what could happen to the U.S. economy if the government cannot develop a plan to bring down the budget deficit in the years ahead, even as he said that the economic recovery appears to be gaining momentum. Bernanke began his testimony before the Senate Budget Committee just an hour after the Labor Department reported that the unemployment rate fell to 9.4 percent in December - its lowest level since May 2009 - from the previous month's 9.8 percent. The surprising decrease was tempered by news from employers that showed weaker-than-expected job growth. Still, the sharp drop in unemployment revealed a growing confidence in the nation's economic outlook. "We have seen increased evidence that a self-sustaining recovery in consumer and business spending may be taking hold," Bernanke said, according to prepared testimony. "Overall, the pace of economic recovery seems likely to be moderately stronger in 2011 than it was in 2010." But Bernanke also offered his strongest warning yet over the nation's high deficit. If the United States does not set a fiscal course that is more sustainable, "the economic and financial effects would be severe," he said. If federal debt were to rise at the pace assumed in a plausible scenario analyzed by the Congressional Budget Office - such as extending most of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts as spending rises at a steady rate - "diminishing confidence on the part of investors that deficits will be brought under control would likely lead to sharply rising interest rates on government debt and, potentially, to broader financial turmoil," Bernanke said. He added that the high borrowing rate would limit private investment and push up the nation's foreign debt, hurting U.S. incomes and standards of living. "Prompt adoption" of a plan to bring deficits down in future years could improve the economic outlook today, Bernanke argued, by helping keep interest rates low and increasing business confidence.

## 1nc-Spending DA 2/3

### Continued deficit spending and lack of confidence will collapse dollar hegemony─

Caploe 8 [David, The Straits Times, “It's the fiscal deficit, stupid,” Sept 2 Lexis]

The result of dollar hegemony has been a 'win-win' situation for both the US and the rest of the world: The US can import goods and services far beyond its immediate ability to pay, and the rest of the world has been willing to take dollars, which they can use themselves. In this way, America serves as not just the global consumer of last resort - the place where countries know they are usually able to off-load their inventories - but also the global financier of last resort. That is, the supply of dollars moving around the world has, for the last half century, helped maintain the flow of not just trade, but international investment as well. Now, the key pre-condition for the successful operation of this system is the health of the US domestic economy. This is why the massive fiscal deficits are so worrisome - especially when combined with the indulgence and encouragement of all the high-tech financial manipulation and chicanery the inventive genius of Wall Street has devised over the past several years. The symbol of this, of course, is the collapse of the entire - not just 'sub-prime' - housing market in the US. These problems are compounded by the conventional response of private banks to a situation where a growing percentage of their loans are not being re-paid - tightening credit requirements and increasing interest rates. So no matter how much the Federal Reserve may cut interest rates at the top, interest rates for consumers on the ground are likely to continue to rise - which, in turn, will further slow an already weakened economy.

Dollar hegemony is key to primacy and power projection

Kirshner 8 [Jonathan Kirshner, Department of Government @ Cornell University, “Review of International Political Economy,” august 1, eview of International Political Economy,15:3,418 — 438 Informaworld]

Setting aside these red herrings, the US would, nevertheless, face real consequences from the contraction of the international role of the dollar. They are reduced international political inﬂuence, the loss of the beneﬁts it has become accustomed to enjoying (in particular, the ease with which it is able to ﬁnance its deﬁcits), and the risk of reduced macroeconomic policy autonomy during international political crises. These latter two effects, which would directly affect US power, would be more acute and salient if the change in the dollar ’s role comes about suddenly in the wake of an international ﬁnancial crisis, and less dramatic, though still signiﬁcant, if the dollar ’s relative primacy were to erode gradually. Either of these changes would take place in a domestic (American) political context that would likely magnify the extent to which dollar diminution contracts US power. It is hard to quantify the reduction of political inﬂuence that would result from diminished global use of the greenback, but that does not make it any less real. The loss of dollar primacy, even to a (most likely) ‘ﬁrst among equals’ status, would erode the Hischmanesque beneﬁts that the US garners as a result of the dollar ’s global role. In a world where fewer hold dollars, fewer would also have a stake on the dollar, and subtly, they would have less of a stake in the US economy and US policy preferences more generally. At the same time, the issuers of currencies that ﬁll in the gaps where the dollar once reigned would see their own inﬂuence enhanced, as holders of, say, euros, see their interests more enmeshed in the interests of the European Union. As the dollar is used less in some parts of the world (including most likely Europe, Asia, and parts of Africa and the Middle East), the US would lose twice, ﬁrst, from the reduction in its own inﬂuence, and second, from the enhanced political inﬂuence of other powers. More concretely, with the reduction in the dollar ’s prestige and thus its credibility, the US would lose some of the privileges of primacy that it takes for granted and routinely, if implicitly, invokes. Here the shift in status from ‘top’ to ‘negotiated’ currency is paramount.36 In a scenario where the dollar ’s role receded, and especially as complicated by an increasingly visible overhang problem (as more actors get out of dollars), American policies would no longer be given the beneﬁt of the doubt. Its macroeconomic management would be subject to intense scrutiny in international ﬁnancial markets and its deviations from ﬁnancial rectitude would start to come at a price. This would affect the US ability to borrow and to spend. Federal government spending would take place under the watchful eye of international bankers and investors, whose preferences will always be for cuts. Borrowing from abroad would also come at a higher price. In the past, periods of notable dollar weakness led to US borrowing via mechanisms that involved foreign currency payments and which were designed to insure creditors against the possibility of a decline in the value of the dollar. Each of these experimental mechanisms, the Roosa Bonds of the 1960s and the Carter Bonds of the 1970s, were only used on a modest scale; but they suggest the antecedents for future demands by creditors that would limit the ability of the US to borrow in dollars.37 It would also become more difﬁcult to reduce the value of US debts via devaluation and inﬂation, devices which have served the US well in the past, but which in the future would both work less well and further undermine the dollar ’s credibility. Increased (and more skeptical) market scrutiny of American macroeconomic policy choices would also affect the US during moments of international crisis, and during periods of wartime. Markets tend to react negatively to the prospects for a country’s currency as it enters crisis and war, anticipating increased prospects for government spending, borrowing, inﬂation, and hedging against general uncertainty.38 Under dollar hegemony, the US tended to beneﬁt from the ‘ﬂight to quality’ during moments of international distress; but in the context of dollar diminution, with markets much more nervous about the dollar, the US would ﬁnd itself uncharacteristically under ﬁnancial stress during crucial moments of international political confrontation. Here some analogy to Britain is illustrative – during World War II the international role of the pound was an important source of support; but after the war, with sterling in decline, the vulnerability of the pound left Britain exposed and forced it to abandon its military adventure over Suez in 1956.39 These new pressures on the dollar would take place in a distinct domestic political context. How would the US political system react to life under the watchful and newly jaundiced eye of international ﬁnancial markets, with reduced macroeconomic policy autonomy, greater demands that its economic choices meet the ‘approval’ of international ﬁnanciers and investors, and forced to ﬁnance its military adventures not by borrowing more dollars, but with hard cash on the barrelhead?

CONTINUES

## 1nc-Spending DA 3/3

CONTINUES

There is good reason to suspect that in response, the US will scale back its international power projection, to an even greater extent than necessarily implied by its underlying economic power. For the US seems to be at the political limits of its ﬁscal will, consistent with theories that anticipate great powers will become addled by consumerism and the corroding consequences of afﬂuence.40 This is particularly notable with regard to America’s recent wars. The 9/11 attacks revealed a real threat to the nation’s security, yet the subsequent war in Afghanistan has been undertaken with caution regarding risks taken and resources (both military and economic) expended; investments in homeland security have been relatively modest given the needs at hand, and appropriations for securing ‘loose nukes’ have been inadequate.41 The yawning divergence between the government’s rhetoric associated with the stakes of the Iraq war and the unwillingness of the administration to call for any national sacriﬁces on its behalf strongly suggest that America’s leaders are deeply skeptical of the nation’s ability to mobilize its vast wealth in support of foreign policy abroad. Indeed the Iraq war is the only large war in US history that has been accompanied by tax cuts. Major tax increases were associated with the War of 1812, the Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and even, if with great reluctance on the part of President Johnson, the Vietnam War.42 From one perspective, military spending in the US is not at historically high levels. As a percentage of gross domestic product, US defense spending (3.9% in 2004, 4.0% in 2005) is in fact near post-World War II lows, and well below the levels associated with other wartime periods (13% in 1953, 9.5% in 1968). However, that amount of spending is nevertheless extremely high in when considered in absolute dollars ($454.1 billion in 2004; 493.6 billion in 2005), and given that at these levels, the US comes close to spending as much on defense as the rest of the countries of the world combined.43 It is these ﬁgures that are more likely to be decisive in the future when the US is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending in the future. When borrowing becomes more difﬁcult, and adjustment more difﬁcult to postpone, choices will have to be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending. In sum, while dollar doomsayers have cried wolf repeatedly in the past, the currents of massive US debt, its unprecedented current account imbalances, the emergence of the euro, and, most important of all, a distinct geopolitical setting, have caused the dollar to drift towards uncharted waters. As a result, a reduced international role for the dollar plausible and perhaps even likely, and it would have signiﬁcant political consequences. A general downward recasting of US political inﬂuence would be accompanied by much more novel and acute inhibitors on the willingness and ability of the US to use force abroad – macroeconomic distress during international crises, and consistent pressure on federal budgets. The reduction in US power and inﬂuence would be less salient if dollar diminution occurs gradually rather than suddenly, and if the American public suddenly becomes willing to tolerate tax increases and cuts to other government spending. But even these circumstances would mitigate, not eliminate, the consequences of the erosion of dollar primacy for the US.

### Nuclear War

Kagan 12 – Senior Fellow @ the Brookings Institution, Robert, The importance of U.S. military might shouldn’t be underestimated, Washington Post, 2-2, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-importance-of-us-military-might-shouldnt-be-underestimated/2012/02/02/gIQAX5pVlQ\_story.html

These are sensible arguments. Power takes many forms, and it’s smart to make use of all of them. But there is a danger in taking this wisdom too far and forgetting just how important U.S. military power has been in building and sustaining the present **liberal** international **order**. That order has **rested** significantly **on the U.S.** ability **to provide security in** parts of the world, such as **Europe and Asia, that had** known **endless cycles of war**fare **before the** arrival of the **U**nited **S**tates. The world’s free-**trade**, free-market economy has **depended on America’s** **ability to keep trade** **routes open**, even during times of conflict. And the remarkably wide **spread of democracy** around the world **owes** something **to America’s ability to** provide support to democratic forces under siege and to **protect** peoples **from dictators such as** Moammar **Gaddafi** and Slobodan Milosevic. Some find it absurd that the United States should have a larger military than the next 10 nations combined. But that gap in military power has probably been the greatest factor in upholding an international system that, in historical terms, is unique — and uniquely beneficial to Americans. Nor should we forget that this power is part of what makes America attractive to many other nations. The world has not always loved America. During the era of Vietnam and Watergate and the ugly last stand of segregationists, America was often hated. But nations that relied on the United States for security from threatening neighbors tended to overlook the country’s flaws. In the 1960s, millions of young Europeans took to the streets to protest American “imperialism,” while their governments worked to ensure that the alliance with the United States held firm. Soft power, meanwhile, has its limits. No U.S. president has enjoyed more international popularity than Woodrow Wilson did when he traveled to Paris to negotiate the treaty ending World War I. He was a hero to the world, but he found his ability to shape the peace, and to establish the new League of Nations, severely limited, in no small part by his countrymen’s refusal to commit U.S. military power to the defense of the peace. John F. Kennedy, another globally admired president, found his popularity of no use in his confrontations with Nikita Khrushchev, who, by Kennedy’s own admission, “beat the hell out of me” and who may have been convinced by his perception of Kennedy’s weakness that the United States would tolerate his placing Soviet missiles in Cuba. The international system is not static. It responds quickly to fluctuations in power. **If the** **U**nited **S**tates were to **cut** too deeply into its **ability to project** military **power, other nations** could be counted on to respond accordingly. Those nations whose power rises in relative terms **would display expanding ambitions** commensurate with their new clout in the international system. They would, as in the past, **demand** particular **spheres of influence**. Those whose power declined in relative terms, like the United States, would have little choice but to cede some influence in those areas. Thus **China would lay claim to** its sphere of influence in **Asia, Russia** in **eastern Europe and** the **Caucasus**. And, as in the past, **these burgeoning great-power claims would** overlap and **conflict**: India and China claim the same sphere in the Indian Ocean; Russia and Europe have overlapping spheres in the region between the Black Sea and the Baltic. **Without the U**nited **S**tates **to** **suppress** and contain these **conflicting ambitions, there would** have to **be** complex adjustments to establish a new balance. Some of these adjustments could be made through diplomacy, as they were sometimes in the past. Other adjustments might be made through **war** or the threat of war, as also happened in the past. The biggest illusion is to imagine that as American power declines, the world stays the same. What has been true since the time of Rome remains true today: **There can be no world order without** power to preserve it, to shape its norms, uphold its institutions, defend the sinews of its economic system and keep the peace. Military power can be abused, wielded unwisely and ineffectively. It can be deployed to answer problems that it cannot answer or that have no answer. But it is also essential. No nation or group of nations that renounced power could expect to maintain any kind of world order. If **the U**nited **S**tates begins to look like a less reliable defender of the present order, that order will begin to unravel. People might indeed find Americans very attractive in this weaker state, but if the United States cannot help them when and where they need help the most, they will make other arrangements.

## DA-Uniqueness Extensions

### Fiscal restraint will increase. Bipartisan discussions are in the direction of maintain spending cuts and increasing revenue─

Tax News 6-21-12. US Senate Contemplates Year-End 'Fiscal Cliff' by Mike Godfrey, Tax-News.com, Washingtonhttp://www.tax-news.com/news/US\_Senate\_Contemplates\_YearEnd\_Fiscal\_Cliff\_\_\_\_56010.html]

At the hearing, the Committee’s Chairman Max Baucus (D - Montana) discussed plans for deficit reduction and the year-end fiscal crisis with Dr Alice Rivlin and Senator Pete Domenici (R - New Mexico) from the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Debt Reduction Task Force. He called on Congress to come together on a bipartisan agreement that reduces the deficit responsibly. While Baucus called on Congress to work to avoid the economic harm the fiscal crisis would cause, he warned that cancelling the automatic spending cuts and extending all the expiring tax cuts would demonstrate a dangerous inability to solve the deficit problem. A combination of additional revenues and spending cuts, he argued, is the only solution. “With the fiscal crisis we’re facing at the end of the year, Congress needs to come together and agree on a combination of revenues and spending cuts. It’s the only way forward,” he stated. “Alternatively, cancelling the sequester and extending all of the expiring tax cuts would tell the American people and the world that we are not serious about our deficit problem. This is an opportunity for us to come together to pass a balanced solution that puts us on a sustainable path for the future.” At the hearing, Baucus described his criteria for a deficit reduction plan that needs to be balanced, comprehensive and fair, and that brings in more revenue than current policy to pay for the country's needs. He added that the plan should start by stabilizing debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), and reduce it thereafter. Baucus also said that the plan should avoid deep, immediate cuts that would shock the economy in the short-term. Rivlin and Domenici agreed that, in addition to reining in spending, reducing US debt levels will require raising additional revenue. They pointed out that, under current policies, the Congressional Budget Office projects revenue to average only 18% of gross domestic product (GDP) over the next decade, but that the last time the US budget was balanced, from 1998-2001, revenues averaged 20% of GDP.

### Maritime spending is decreasing substantially. The plan would be a sharp shock in decisions that have already been made regarding funding levels.

The Maritime Executive 6-1-12. “Washington Insider - Money and Regulations Top Washington's Agenda.” [http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/washington-insider-money-and-regulations-top-washington-s-agenda]

In this year’s budget and appropriations processes, key maritime constituencies are vying for shrinking funding. There is no plainer illustration of this than the Administration’s proposal to dramatically cut the shipbuilding budgets of the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard. The Administration’s budget would cut the Navy’s program by approximately 30 percent over the next five years by foregoing the building of 16 ships previously planned. Likewise, the budget for the Coast Guard fails to include long-lead funding for the seventh and eighth national security cutters, and the service's five-year capital investment plan shows no money for these cutters beyond the sixth ship. The proposal cuts approximately $1.4 billion from the Coast Guard’s acquisition plans in the next few years. In 2013 alone it cuts the Coast Guard's acquisition funding by 20 percent, down $272 million from this year's level of $1.46 billion.

## DA-Link Extensions

### Implementation will require tens of millions per port and per year.

Hecker ‘2. Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, GAO “PORT SECURITY: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives Successful” August 5, 2002

Many of the planned security improvements at seaports will require costly outlays for infrastructure, technology, and personnel. Even before September 11, the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports 18 estimated the costs for upgrading security infrastructure at U.S. ports ranging from $10 million to $50 million per port. 19 Officials at the Port of Tampa estimated their cost for bringing the port’s security into compliance with state standards at $17 million—with an additional $5 million each year for security personnel and other recurring costs.

### Operation and training make implementation of technology extremely cost ineffective

James ‘7. Lt. Morgan James et all, Naval Postgraduate School. “Port Security Strategy 2012” 2007. [edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/TR/2007/NPS-97-07-003.pdf]

The by-products are the undesired outcomes due to the security measures implemented to enhance the security of the port. They are identified as slower commerce and higher operating cost. The installed security measures will inevitably reduce the movement rate of goods in and out of the port. Containers need to be scanned more thoroughly. Any legitimate goods that can be used for masquerading as WMDs need to be checked more frequently to err on the side of safety. All these measures will lengthen the time the container will remain in the port and therefore, slow down commerce. To enhance the security, more equipment has to be purchased and more security personnel have to be hired. Extensive training has to be provided to the port workers and more frequent patrols have to be allotted. All of these will definitely increase the operating cost for the port authority and port operators.

### No chance of a link-turn. The plan actively makes maritime transportation more expensive.

James ‘7. Lt. Morgan James et all, Naval Postgraduate School. “Port Security Strategy 2012” 2007. [edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/TR/2007/NPS-97-07-003.pdf]

The port operators are primarily concerned with continued operation with minimal cost while maintaining an efficient and continuous flow of cargo. Additional costs incurred in enhancing security will erode profit margin. Since the port operators are profit-conscious, it is desired that the terminals continue to operate with minimal cost. The second scenario considered was a large ship attack on ports. Ships laden with WMDs pose a potential threat. Another aspect to study is the use of the ship itself. Because of their large size and weight, the use of the ship as a kinetic weapon to port operations or to the military installations is a very viable threat. The large amount of momentum created by the large ship enables the infliction of severe damage to any vessel. If the large ship is laden with volatile cargo, the ship presents a major concern for port operations. Explosives from the ship can cause severe damage to the port, severely disrupting normal port operations.

## Fiscal Restraint K2 Economy

### Maintaining spending cuts is critical to preventing economic collapse

Washington Post, 11 [“Republican leaders say budget cuts would aid economic growth immediately”, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/republican-leaders-say-budget-cuts-would-aid-economic-growth-immediately/2011/05/24/AFLLIiAH_story_1.html>

Both sides agree that over the long term, yawning budget deficits put the country in danger, especially if investors fear that the federal government won’t be able to pay its debts and demand sharply higher interest rates in return for continuing to lend Washington money. But Republicans, in warning that federal deficits also pose an immediate hazard, are mustering two other arguments. The first turns on the question of business confidence, positing that companies are afraid they will pay the cost of the rapidly rising national debt through higher taxes. This fear makes them reluctant to hire and invest. So cutting government spending will make firms again confident enough to invest and expand, the argument goes. A second argument, which Republican politicians have embraced but many conservative economists shy away from, is that borrowing by the government is crowding out investment by firms. In effect, conservatives are now rejecting “root-canal economics,” which many embraced in the 1970s and ’80s. At the time, they argued that some immediate pain was necessary for a stronger growth in the long run. Today, conservative economists still acknowledge that lowering spending would reduce some economic activity. But they argue that budget cuts, by enhancing business confidence, would partly, if not fully, offset that drag. “Business spending is a long-run decision that requires an environment that will be beneficial going forward,” said Douglas Holtz-Eakin, president of the American Action Forum and an economic adviser to John McCain’s 2008 presidential campaign. “You have the administration signaling they’re going to solve our fiscal problems by taxing those who do that kind of investment. But if instead you signal your seriousness by doing it through spending cuts and doing it now, the business environment will be better.”

### Deficit spending collapses the economy

Bohn 10 [Henning, University of California Santa Barbara, “The Economic Consequences of Rising U.S. Government Debt: Privileges at Risk” Departmental Working Papers, Department of Economics, UCSB, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/7kz6v3zs]

The rapidly growing federal government debt has become a concern for policy makers and the public. Yet the U.S. government has seemingly unbounded access to credit at low interest rates. Historically, Treasury yields have been below the growth rate of the economy. The paper examines the ramifications of debt financing at low interest rates. Given the short maturity of U.S. public debt – over $2.5 trillion maturing in 2010 – investor expectations are critical. Excessive debts justify reasonable doubts about solvency and monetary stability and thus undermine a financing strategy built on the perception that U.S. debt is safe. The rapidly growing U.S. government debt has become a concern for policy makers and the public. The ratio of U.S. public debt to GDP has increased from 36.2% in 2007 to 53.0% in 2009. Under current policies, the debt-GDP ratio is likely to reach 70% by 2011 and 90% by 2020.1 What are the consequences of this rising U.S. government debt? The paper will argue that a proper analysis of U.S. debt must account for the U.S. government’s ability to issue debt at interest rates that are on average below the growth rate of the U.S. economy. Evidence suggests that the low interest rates are largely due to perceptions of safety, with a secondary role for liquidity effects. Given the short maturity of U.S. public debt – over $2.5 trillion maturing in 2010 – investor expectations are critical. To refinance its debt, the government must ensure that bond buyers remain firmly convinced of the government’s solvency. Excessive debts justify reasonable doubts about solvency and about inflation. Hence they undermine a financial strategy built on a perception of safety.

## Fiscal Restraint K2 Hegemony

### Sustaining a recovery is key to dollar hegemony and maintain primacy

Hamilton 8 [Lee, Director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University and Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars “U.S. can and must rebuild economic muscle,” Sept 22, http://www.centeroncongress.org/radio\_commentaries/ia\_us\_can\_and\_must\_rebuild\_economic\_muscle.php]

The notion that foreign and domestic policies are entirely separate is fanciful. America's domestic strength and dynamism is the foundation upon which its capacity to act on the world's stage rests. Our preeminence in world affairs is not sustainable without a strong economy here at home. Worryingly, we have witnessed the economy's vital signs take a turn for the worse. Budget deficits are spiraling upwards, our annual trade deficit is over $730 billion, the dollar's volatile, and collapses at Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG have brought government intervention. The U.S. is the world's leading debtor, has the world's largest current account deficit, and is the world's leading importer. How long can we continue down this road and remain the global economic leader? All of this, of course, can be overstated. The trend lines are unfavorable but not irreversible. Still, America's relative strength is not what it was. We are now the second–largest market in the world (the EU is first). The dollar's primacy is no longer assured. Our dominance in world capital markets has slipped.

## Impact Ext. Hege Turns Case-Econ Leadership

### Heg prevents economic collapse and solves the terminal impact.

Mandelbaum 5 – Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins, Michael, The Case for Goliath, p. 192-5

Although the spread of nuclear weapons, with the corresponding increase in the likelihood that a nuclear shot would be fired in anger somewhere in the world, counted as the most serious potential consequence of the abandonment by the United States of its role as the world's government, it was not the only one. **In the previous period of American** international **reticence**, **the** 19**20s** and 1930s, **the global economy suffered serious damage** that **a more active American role might have mitigated**. A twenty-first-century American retreat could have similarly adverse international economic consequences. The economic collapse of the 1930s caused extensive hardship throughout the world and led indirectly to World War II by paving the way for the people who started it to gain power in Germany and Japan. In retrospect, the Great Depression is widely believed to have been caused by a series of errors in public policy that made an economic downturn far worse than it would have been had governments responded to it in appropriate fashion. Since the 1930s, acting on the lessons drawn from that experience by professional economists, governments have taken steps that have helped to prevent a recurrence of the disasters of that decade.' In the face of reduced demand, for example, governments have increased rather than cut spending. Fiscal and monetary crises have evoked rescue efforts rather than a studied indifference based on the assumption that market forces will readily reestablish a desirable economic equilibrium. In contrast to the widespread practice of the 1930s, political authorities now understand that putting up barriers to imports in an attempt to revive domestic production will in fact worsen economic conditions everywhere. Still, a **serious**, prolonged **failure of the** international **economy, inflicting the** kind of **hardship** the world **experienced in the** 19**30s** (which some Asian countries also suffered as a result of their fiscal crises in the 1990s) **does not lie beyond** the realm of **possibility**. Market **economies remain** **subject to cyclical downturns**, which public policy can limit but has not found a way to eliminate entirely. Markets also have an inherent tendency to form **bubbles**, excessive values for particular assets, whether seventeenth century Dutch tulips or twentieth century Japanese real estate and Thai currency, **that cause economic harm** when the bubble bursts and prices plunge. In responding to these events, governments can make errors. They can act too slowly, or fail to implement the proper policies, or implement improper ones. Moreover, the global economy and the national economies that comprise it, like a living organism, change constantly and sometimes rapidly: Capital flows across sovereign borders, for instance, far more rapidly and in much greater volume in the early twenty-first century than ever before. This means that measures that successfully address economic malfunctions at one time may have less effect at another, just as medical science must cope with the appearance of new strains of influenza against which existing vaccines are not effective. Most importantly, since the Great Depression, an **active** **American international** economic **role has been crucial** both **in fortifying the conditions for** global **economic well-being and** in **coping with** the **problems** that have occurred, especially periodic recessions and currency crises, **by applying** the **lessons of the past**. The **absence of such a role could** **weaken** those conditions and **aggravate** those **problems**. The overall American role in the world since World War II therefore has something in common with the theme of the Frank Capra film It's a Wonderful Life, in which the angel Clarence, played by Henry Travers, shows James Stewart, playing the bank clerk George Bailey, who believes his existence to have been worthless, how life in his small town of Bedford Falls would have unfolded had he never been born. George Bailey learns that people he knows and loves turn out to be far worse off without him. So it is with the United States and its role as the world's government. Without that role, the world very likely would have been in the past, and would become in the future, a less secure and less prosperous place. The abdication by the **U**nited **S**tates of some or all of the **responsibilities for** international **security** that it had come to bear in the first decade of the twenty-first century would deprive the international system of one of its principal safety features, which **keep**s **countries from smashing into each other**, as they are historically prone to do. In this sense, a world without America would be the equivalent of a freeway full of cars without brakes. Similarly, should the American government abandon some or all of the ways in which it had, at the dawn of the new century, come to support global economic activity, the world economy would function less effectively and might even suffer a severe and costly breakdown. A world without the United States would in this way resemble a fleet of cars without gasoline.

## Impact Ext. Hege Turns Case-Terrorism

### Hege solves terrorism—decline emboldens them.

Walt 2 – Prof. IR @ Harvard, Stephen, “American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls”, Naval War College Review, Spring 2002, Vol. LV, No,2, http://usnwc.edu/press/Review/2002/spring/art1-sp2.htm

Perhaps the most obvious reason why states seek primacy—and why the United States benefits from its current position—is that international politics is a dangerous business. Being wealthier and stronger than other states does not guarantee that a state will survive, of course, and it cannot insulate a state from all outside pressures. But the strongest state is more likely to escape serious harm than weaker ones are, and it will be better equipped to resist the pressures that arise. **Because the** **U**nited **S**tates **is so powerful**, and because its society is so wealthy, **it has ample resources to devote to** whatever **problems** it may face in the future. At the beginning of the Cold War, for example, its power enabled the United States to help rebuild Europe and Japan, to assist them in developing stable democratic orders, and to subsidize the emergence of an open international economic order.7 The United States was also able to deploy powerful armed forces in Europe and Asia as effective deterrents to Soviet expansion.  When the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf increased in the late 1970s, the United States created its Rapid Deployment Force in order to deter threats to the West’s oil supplies; in 1990–91 it used these capabilities to liberate Kuwait. Also, when the United States was attacked by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network in September 2001, it had the wherewithal **to oust** the network’s **Taliban** **hosts and** to **compel** broad **international support** for its campaign to eradicate Al-Qaeda itself. It would have been much harder to do any of these things if the United States had been weaker. Today, U.S. **primacy helps deter** potential **challenges to American interests** in virtually every part of the world. **Few** countries or nonstate groups **want to invite the “focused enmity” of the U**nited **S**tates (to use William Wohlforth’s apt phrase), and countries and groups that have done so (such as Libya, Iraq, Serbia, or the Taliban) have paid a considerable price. As discussed below, U.S. dominance does provoke opposition in a number of places, but **anti-American elements are forced to rely on covert** or indirect **strategies** (such as terrorist bombings) **that do not** seriously **threaten America’s** dominant **position. Were American power to decline** significantly, however, **groups** opposed to U.S. interests **would** probably **be emboldened** and overt challenges would be more likely.

## Impact Ext. Hege Solves War

Collapse of hegemony causes great power wars.

Khalilzad 11 – Zalmay Khalilzad is a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. From 2007 to 2009, he served as U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations. He has also previously served as U.S. ambassador to Iraq, as well as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and also as special presidential envoy to Afghanistan, Follow the Leader, the National Interest, 2-2, http://nationalinterest.org/letters/follow-the-leader-4817

Mearsheimer ignores positive outcomes arising from American global leadership in Europe and Asia. Successive administrations since the Cold War have sought to preclude hostile regional hegemony and expand the zone of democracy. On both continents, **the** **U**nited **S**tates **maintained** a permanent military presence, upheld its security commitments, and supported the expansion of **alliances**—notably NATO and EU enlargement into Eastern Europe. **These policies** have **helped avoid resurgences of nationalism**, **proliferation, and arms races among major powers. They** have **enabled democracy and free markets** **to expand in Europe and Asia**. Rather Mearsheimer points to U.S. troubles in the greater Middle East to justify his more general criticism of post-Cold War U.S. grand strategy. Yet, before 9/11, America acted as an offshore balancer in the region. We carried out occasional strikes against al-Qaeda sanctuaries and Iraqi regime targets in response to specific provocations. We abandoned Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. And we pursued Arab-Israeli peace through energetic diplomatic engagement. Instead of empowering democratic reformers, American strategy relied on alliances with dictatorships to maintain stability. Even the policy of dual containment against Iran and Iraq—which Mearsheimer criticizes for being too interventionist—at a practical level reflected the logic of offshore balancing. The limited U.S. military presence in the region, flagging efforts to enforce the post-Gulf War ceasefire against Saddam, and minimal attempts to topple the regimes, meant in practice that regional players had to preserve the balance of power. When the George W. Bush administration entered office, it supported American global leadership, but did not believe that this strategy necessitated the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. The 9/11 attacks changed the strategic calculus. Addressing the region’s dysfunctionality and the extremism and terror that it produced now came front and center. The United States liberated Afghanistan out of fear that failing to confront the Taliban regime (considering its alliances with al-Qaeda and other terrorists) would lead to even more catastrophic outcomes. In the case of invading Iraq —the basic reason was that it was a festering issue that if left unattended would likely become a big strategic threat. A new set of objectives became priorities: counterterrorism, stability and democratization in Iraq and Afghanistan, containment of Iran, Israeli-Palestinian peace, and liberalization and reform of the region. Was it inevitable for the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan to become so expensive? The costs were certainly underestimated. But the interventions have been costly due in large part to specific tactical errors that were avoidable. The United States did not train enough indigenous security forces early on, deal with terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan, level the playing field between moderate and sectarian factions in Iraq, or pay sufficient attention to crafting political deals among local forces. Instead of dealing directly with these key decisions, Mearsheimer assumes that setbacks in the Middle East were inevitable consequences of post-Cold War U.S. grand strategy. On this faulty premise, he argues that America has overstated the threat of terrorism, that the risk of WMD terrorism or other potentially game-changing attacks are remote, and that, therefore, the United States should confront these threats via offshore balancing. He does not answer why the United States would be worse off dealing with these issues appropriately within the framework of American global leadership. U.S. grand strategy since the end of the Cold War has not fundamentally endangered American global primacy. Our current military budget as a percentage of GNP is consistent with past levels. The more serious threat to our position in the world is our continued economic problems and the rise of rival powers such as China. Whether we can address slow growth and mounting debt before they force us to retrench internationally is our test. Should we fail to get our economic house in order while others continue to grow at a rapid pace, a multipolar world may reemerge. In such a scenario, offshore balancing could be a sensible option. Shifting to **an offshore-balancer** role now is premature. Adopting such as **strategy would** accelerate the rise of multipolarity and **increase the risk of conflict among major powers.** Pursuing a global-leadership strategy remains the best option, albeit in a way that incorporates lessons of the past two decades. Looking ahead, future administrations should adjust specific policies to deal with changing domestic and global circumstances—the rise of China and threats resulting from globalization such as cyber attacks for example—while maintaining a grand strategy of American global leadership.