# Port Security Negative

## Inherency

### 1NC Inherency

#### Status quo solves – House passed SMART Port Security Act to increase protection measures

Miller 12 (Candice Miller, U.S. Representative for the State of Michigan, 6/28/12, “House Passes SMART Port Security Act,” <http://candicemiller.house.gov/press-release/house-passes-smart-port-security-act>).

WASHINGTON – U.S. Representative Candice Miller (MI-10), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, made the following statement on her legislation, H.R.4251, the Securing Maritime Activities through Risk-based Targeting (SMART) for Port Security Act. Miller’s bipartisan legislation builds on the work of the 2006 SAFE Port Act to enhance risk-based security measures overseas before the threat reaches our shores, emphasizes a stronger collaborative environment between the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) in sharing port security duties, and leverages the maritime security work of our trusted allies, while requiring the Department of Homeland Security to find cost savings. The SMART Port Security Act passed the House by a vote of 402 to 21 and now heads to the U.S. Senate for consideration. Miller said:¶ “I’m absolutely convinced that the bill before the House today, the SMART Port Security Act, will tangibly enhance the nation’s maritime security. We spend a lot of times as a nation and as a Congress focusing on security threats at the southern and northern borders, but we also need to remember that we have a very long maritime border that also deserves our attention. A major disruption at one of the nation’s ports, especially a terrorist attack, is a high consequence event that has the potential to cripple the global supply chain and could severely damage our economy.¶ “We simply cannot afford to ignore threats to our nation’s maritime security. To that end, SMART Port Security Act builds on the work of the 2006 SAFE Port Act to enhance risk-based security measures overseas before the threat reaches our shores, emphasizes a stronger collaborative environment between CBP and the USCG in sharing port security duties, and it leverages the maritime security work of our trusted allies. If we learned anything after 9/11, is that we need to move from the need to know information to the need to share information.¶ “The Department components with shared jurisdiction must cooperate in maritime operations and form partnerships with state and local law enforcement agencies in order to improve the nation’s maritime security. What happens in our waterways and ports affects the entire nation, so it is incumbent on us to realize that maritime security is not the province simply of the government alone. Leveraging partnerships with private industry, as well as our international partners, is common sense and Trusted Shipper Programs, like the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-T PAT, where companies who make significant investments in their security reduces the amount of resources CBP needs to spend on looking at cargo shipments that we know the least about.¶ “Our trusted allies like Canada and the European Union have programs similar to C-T-PAT in place, and this bill supports the concept of mutual recognition where the Secretary can accept other countries trusted shipper programs, when they provide an equal level of security. Not only does this save CBP inspectors from the added burden of having to verify companies who participate in both programs, it also expedites commerce across our borders. And we really need to do this because of limited use of taxpayer dollars – it’s certainly makes fiscal sense as well. ¶ “The American port worker, truck driver, and others who make port operations run smoothly are another critical maritime security layer. They are all required to obtain a Transportation Worker Identification Credential’s, or TWICs. These individuals have complied with the law and done their part; they’ve purchased a TWIC, in many cases traveled long distances to go to the enrollment center, not once, but twice, and undergone the background check. But the problem is that the U.S. Government has not done their part. The Department has yet to release the TWIC reader rule meaning that the biometric information embedded on the card validating the worker’s identity just isn’t being confirmed. In reality, the TWIC has become little more than an expensive ‘flash pass.’ This bill will extend the validity of TWIC cards until the government upholds their end of the bargain and puts out a reader rule. The USCG and TSA must produce the TWIC reader rule which is necessary to give American workers and port facilities certainty after years of delay.¶ “As well, we should be cognizant of the fact that CBP and the USCG cannot intrusively scan every truck, cargo container, or bulk shipment that comes into American ports – it is not only cost prohibitive, but would cripple the just-in-time delivery system that industry relies on to keep American commerce running. Instead, I believe that the security of the supply chain is maximized through the use of a risk-based methodology – a key element of this bill. Smart, cost effective choices, have to be made that maximizes our resources while ensuring the security of our ports – and by extension our way of life. This bill is a step toward smarter security that encourages the Department to be more efficient, better integrated, and more closely coordinated amongst its components, industry and international partners.”¶

### 2NC Inherency

#### Smart act solves

Kimery 12 (Anthony Kimery, managing editor of SOURCES – a security based intelligence news service, 6/28/12, “House Passes SMART Port Security Act,” <http://www.hstoday.us/focused-topics/customs-immigration/single-article-page/house-passes-smart-port-security-act.html>).

In a 402 to 21 vote, the House passed H.R.4251, the Securing Maritime Activities through Risk-based Targeting (SMART) for Port Security Act introduced by Rep. Candice Miller (R-Mich.), chairwoman of the House Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security.¶ ¶ The legislation “builds on the work of the 2006 SAFE Port Act to enhance risk-based security measures overseas before the threat reaches our shores, emphasizes a stronger collaborative environment between Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and US Coast Guard (USCG) in sharing port security duties and leverages the maritime security work of our trusted allies, while requiring the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] to find cost savings,” Miller’s office said in a statement Thursday afternoon.¶ ¶ The SMART Port Security Act now goes to the Senate for consideration.¶ ¶ “I’m absolutely convinced that the bill before the House today … will tangibly enhance the nation’s maritime security,” Miller said in a statement, noting that, “we spend a lot of times as a nation and as a Congress focusing on security threats at the southern and northern borders, but we also need to remember that we have a very long maritime border that also deserves our attention.”¶ ¶ Miller explained, “A major disruption at one of the nation’s ports, especially a terrorist attack, is a high consequence event that has the potential to cripple the global supply chain and could severely damage our economy.”¶ ¶ “We simply cannot afford to ignore threats to our nation’s maritime security,” Miller emphasized, adding that “if we learned anything after 9/11, is that we need to move from the need to know information to the need to share information.”¶

#### Investment now solves but doesn’t link to politics – private sector

CBN 6/19/12 (Cargo Business Newswire, “Survey: $46 bill to be invested in U.S ports over 5 years” http://www.cargobusinessnews.com/news/061912/news1.html)

Public ports in the U.S. along with their partners in the private sector plan to invest $46 billion into capital improvements over the next five years, according to a survey conducted by the American Association of Port Authorities.¶ By comparison, the AAPA said in a statement that other countries have shown they’re up to the task of port infrastructure improvement as well, including India’s plan to invest $60 billion through public-private funds to develop new ports by 2020; Brazil’s mostly private sector funding level of $17 billion for port improvements by 2022; and global terminal operator DP World pumping $2.5 billion into London’s Deepwater Gateway project.¶ The AAPA produced the following chart from its survey findings on U.S. port infrastructure investment through 2016: The AAPA said it “continues to advocate for a national freight infrastructure strategy and for the U.S. Congress to quickly pass a reauthorized multi-year transportation bill that targets federal dollars toward economically strategic freight transportation infrastructure of national and regional significance.”¶ The $46 billion in infrastructure at U.S. ports would create more than 500,000 direct, indirect and induced domestic jobs, according to economist John C. Martin, Ph.D., president of Lancaster, Pa.-based Martin Associates, citing U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis formulas.¶ “Those are really significant job numbers,” Martin said. ¶ “From a dollars-and-cents perspective, it’s hard to over-emphasize the value of investing in ports, particularly when you factor in how much these investments help lower the cost of imports and make our exports more competitive overseas,” he said.¶ According to the World Economic Forum’s index on global infrastructure competitiveness, the U.S. dropped from number one in 2005 to its most recent ranking of 16, while northern neighbor Canada is five spots higher at 11 and the developing nation of China has risen to the 44th spot.

#### States funding now

Ron Barnett 6/18/12 (USA Today, “East Coast ports scramble to dig deep, for supersize ships” http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/story/2012-05-24/deepening-harbors/55653540/1)

The big ships are coming, and East Coast ports are scrambling to get ready for them.¶ East Coast ports are preparing to handle ships like the MSC Fabiola, here passing the San Francisco waterfront. The container ship, almost a quarter-mile long, is the largest to dock at any port in North America.¶ A growing number of supersize freighters, which up to now have relied mostly on West Coast ports to deliver goods from Asia to the USA because they couldn't fit through the Panama Canal, will be able to make the trip to the East Coast economically when an expansion of the canal is completed in 2014.¶ Ports on the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico, whose harbors have been too shallow to accommodate these behemoths, are gearing up to spend more than $40 billion over the next five years to deepen their shipping channels and make other upgrades, according to Aaron Ellis, director of communications for the American Association of Port Authorities.¶ The ports of Norfolk, Va., and Baltimore have completed projects that put them in position to be the first to receive the big ships, some of them 1,110 feet long with the capacity to haul up to 13,000 boxcar-size freight containers, Ellis said.¶ Elsewhere, the work is in varying stages:¶ •The Army Corps of Engineers is expected to finish dredging a 50-foot deep channel to three terminals in New York Harbor by the end of the year and to the main New York terminal by 2014, according to New York/New Jersey Port Authority spokesman Hunter Pendarvis. The authority has committed $1 billion to raise the Bayonne Bridge by 64 feet to allow the bigger ships to pass under, he said.¶ •Miami-Dade County reached an agreement in April with environmental groups that had raised concerns about the Port of Miami's Deep Dredge project. It is expected to be able to handle the big ships by 2014 or soon thereafter, according to Ellis.¶ •The Corps of Engineers completed a study in April finding that Savannah, Ga.'s proposed $652-million channel deepening project is viable.¶ •The Corps is in the midst of a study of Charleston harbor, said Jim Newsome, president and CEO of the South Carolina Ports Authority.¶ •Philadelphia and Corpus Christi are currently involved in dredging projects, according to Ellis. Boston, Jacksonville, Canaveral and Freeport, Texas, are among other ports pursuing deeper channels, he said.¶

#### Recent Bills solve security problems and improve efficiency of port security

Richardson 6/18 (Congresswoman, Richardson, member of the House Committees on Transportation & Infrastructure and Homeland Security and is chair of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness and Response, “Two Critically Important Port Security Measures Sponsored by Congresswoman Laura Richardson Included in New Homeland Security Bill”, <http://www.lasentinel.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=407:two-critically-important-port-security-measures&catid=44:news&Itemid=135>, 6/18/12, JNP)

Washington, D.C. - The House Homeland Security Committee today approved a bill that includes two critical measures sponsored by Congresswoman Laura Richardson to strengthen port security.¶ "I have met with many ports authorities and port security grant recipients who have expressed to me their frustration with current rules that hamper their ability to maximize port security," said Congresswoman Laura Richardson. "I agree with these port experts that it does not make sense to require grant recipients to fix security equipment when it may be cheaper to replace it with newer improved technology," said Congresswoman Richardson.¶ The Congresswoman's Port Security Equipment Improvement Act was accepted as an amendment to the SMART Port Security Act (H.R. 4251). By including this amendment Port Security Grant Program recipients will now be permitted the flexibility to determine whether it is more cost-effective to use funds to replace or maintain security equipment. Previously, Port Security Grant Program funds were to be used solely for maintenance of security equipment, but not for equipment replacement.¶ Congresswoman Richardson also successfully worked to include her Port Security Boots on the Ground Act (H.R. 5803) in Section 107 of the SMART Port Security Act. Because of this amendment security personnel costs will be permitted to be covered through grant funding. Currently, Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) funding cannot be used to fund statutorily-mandated security personnel costs yet this spending prohibition only exists for the ports.¶ "American ports should not have to bear the burden of protecting our most vital stream of commerce and source of American jobs on their own," said Congresswoman Richardson. "Instead, ports should be allowed to utilize PSGP grants to hire and pay current security personnel who are used to staff fusion centers, emergency operations, and counterterrorism posts," said Congresswoman Richardson.¶ The Congresswoman's proposal to amend the bill to include security personnel costs to be funded through grants passed with unanimous consent. To keep funding regulated, the amendment also places a cap on the amount of PSGP funding that can be used to pay security personnel costs. Payments will be limited to 50 percent of the total amount awarded to grant recipients in any fiscal year.¶ In the next 20 years, U.S. overseas trade, 95 percent of which enters or exits through the nation's ports, is expected to double. Because ports are the first line of defense at our sea borders, it is vital for maintenance and security enhancements to continue to take place at a swift and efficient speed.¶ "As the link between the land and the water, ports must continue to update and modernize their facilities, not only to accommodate this growth, but also to ensure congressionally mandated homeland security measures are in place and fully functioning, "said Congresswoman Richardson.¶ Congresswoman Richardson is a Democrat from California's 37th Congressional District. She is a member of the House Committees on Transportation & Infrastructure and Homeland Security and is chair of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness and Response. Her district includes Long Beach, Compton, Carson, Watts, Willowbrook and Signal Hill.

#### New bills are about to pass – say goodbye to any problems

The Hill 6/25 (“House to push port-security measures this week”, <http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/234511-house-to-push-port-security-measures-this-week>, 6/25/12, JNP)

The House this week plans to pass a handful of bills aimed at requiring improved coordination between the federal and state governments on port security, and an assessment of remaining security gaps at ports.¶ The Securing Maritime Activities Through Risk-based Targeting for Port Security Act, from Rep. Candice Miller (R-Mich.), would require the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Coast Guard to cooperate more in their efforts to ensure port security. It would also boost measures overseas to ensure safer cargo, and encourage more cooperation between the federal and local levels.¶ "In an era of tight budgetary times, we must ensure that we are making the best use of limited taxpayer dollars," Miller said earlier this year when she introduced her bill. "My legislation seeks to guard against these threats in a risk-based, coordinated way that enhances the programs in place to protect our maritime borders."¶ Her bill, H.R. 4251, would require DHS to submit a plan for improved coordination to Congress by July 1, 2014.¶ Another bill, from Rep. Janice Hahn (D-Calif.), would require DHS to submit another report that assesses gaps in port security, as well as a plan for addressing those gaps. Her bill, H.R. 4005, is the Gauging American Port Security (GAPS) Act.¶ Also up this week is H.R. 5889, the Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act. This bill from House Judiciary Committee Chairman Lamar Smith (R-Texas) would make it easier to capture suspected terrorists at sea, and increases penalties against anyone trying to use weapons of mass destruction from or against maritime vessels, or against fixed maritime platforms.¶ The House is also expected to pass a bill that would make it easier for workers in marine facilities or at sea to renew their Transportation Worker Identification Credentials (TWICs). Currently, these workers have to appear twice at an enrollment center to get this credential.¶ The bill — HR. 3173, from Rep. Steve Scalise (R-La.) — would reduce that to one visit.¶ While not related to maritime security, the House will also approve H.R. 1447, which would require DHS to establish an Aviation Security Advisory Committee to advise on security matters. That bill is from Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.).¶ These and other bills will be brought up under a suspension of House rules, usually reserved for non-controversial bills. Voting on them will start Tuesday night, but some might be considered later in the week.¶

## Terror Adv

### 1NC Terror Advantage

#### State sponsored terrorism has declined significantly due to globalization

Pillar 12 (Paul R. Pillar is director of graduate studies at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program and a former national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia. He is a contributing editor to The National Interest, 5/22/12, “The Decline of State-Sponsored Terrorism,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/05/the-decline-of-state-sponsored-terrorism/257515/>).

The death of Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi in Libya means the departure of a living link to an era of terrorism that was much different from what we see today. The 1980s was the peak of modern state-fomented international terrorism. The decade began with American diplomats being held hostage in Tehran. The next few years saw lethal terrorism carried out directly by several states. Iran conducted a sustained campaign of assassination of exiled Iranian dissidents. Syria attempted to blow up Israeli airliners. North Korea blew up a South Korean airliner and conducted a bombing in Burma intended to kill the visiting South Korean president. The Libyan regime of Muammar Qaddafi was active in terrorism on multiple fronts, including the bombing of a night club in Berlin frequented by U.S. servicemen. And it was Qaddafi's regime that killed 270 people by bombing Pan Am flight 103 in 1988--a crime for which Megrahi was the only person ever convicted.¶ State-sponsored international terrorism declined precipitously over the subsequent two decades. Some of the reasons were specific to particular states that had been leading practitioners, such as the survival of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the subsequent realization of rulers in Tehran that constant assassinations and subversion in neighboring states were not critical to keeping their regime alive. Two other factors had more general application. One was the end of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union, which had been an important source of aid to a state such as Syria--aid substantially greater than what Russia provides today. The other, related, factor was globalization and the escalation of opportunity costs of being a pariah state. Those costs, political as well as economic, provided the motivation for Qaddafi to get out of international terrorism (as well as out of the making of unconventional weapons) later in the 1990s, making this one of the most successful uses of international sanctions. The explicit demand associated with the sanctions was for Libya to surrender the two main Pan Am 103 suspects, Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah (who was tried along with Megrahi in a Scottish court but acquitted), which it did in 1999. This quickly led to secret talks with the United States that culminated four years later in a formal agreement between Libya and both the United States and United Kingdom.¶

#### Port attacks only constitute 2% of all international conflict – an increase in security is unnecessary

Chalk 08 (Peter Chalk, political scientist at the RAND corporation, 2008, “The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States,” page 19, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf>).

Historically, the world’s oceans have not been a major locus of terrorist¶ activity. Indeed, according to the RAND Terrorism Database, strikes¶ on maritime targets and assets have constituted only two percent of¶ all international incidents over the last 30 years. To be sure, part of¶ the reason for this relative paucity has to do with the fact that many¶ terrorist organizations have neither been located near coastal regions¶ nor possessed the means to extend their physical reach beyond purely¶ local theaters. There are also several problems associated with carrying¶ out waterborne strikes which have, at least historically, helped to¶ offset some of the tactical advantages associated with esoteric maritime¶ environments outlined in Chapter Two. Most intrinsically, operating¶ at sea requires terrorists to have mariner skills, access to appropriate¶ assault and transport vehicles, the ability to mount and sustain operations¶ from a non-land–based environment, and certain specialist capabilities¶ (for example, surface and underwater demolition techniques).1¶ Limited resources have traditionally prevented groups from accessing¶ options.

#### Anti-terrorism policies are creating more terrorism – US must change its policies first before increasing port security

Beat 12 (Matt Beat, history teacher and writer for Kansas City Underground Examiner, 3/24/12, “Our Government is Causing More Terrorism,” <http://trainwreckdsociety.com/2012/03/24/our-government-is-causing-more-terrororism-by-matt-beat-guest-wreckers/>).

The terrorists who attacked us on September 11, 2001, did not win on that horrible day. But they have won every day since then. They have created a fear not seen since the early days of the Cold War. They have turned our politicians into people who make every major decision based on fear. The “War on Terror” has, in fact, created more terror. That’s right, after the death of around 9,000 Americans, after the death of millions of people in other countries (but, really, who cares about them? ha!), and after $1.28 Trillion spent (keep raising that debt ceiling!), we are less safe now than before the War on Terror began.¶ But it’s not just the War on Terror. It’s also the War on Drugs. President Richard Nixon declared a war on drugs 40 years ago, and we now spend $42 billion a year fighting drugs (just illegal ones- alcohol, nicotine, oxycontin, morphine, those are fine) and more people use drugs now than ever before. The Global Commission on Drug Policy has recently affirmed what many of us already know. The war on drugs has failed.¶ Terror and Drugs have existed since the dawn of civilization, but recently our government decided to declare war on the two. Oh, and directly or indirectly kill millions and spend trillions of dollars since declaring both wars. It’s important to specifically look at how the two wars have created more terrorism.¶ The main reason why we are less safe now is simply because many people passionately hate us, and no, they don’t hate us for our freedom. They hate us for various reasons that I won’t get into, but the biggest reason of all is our foreign policy, and there is overwhelming evidence to support this. As a mostly Christian nation of people, our foreign policy blatantly contradicts the “golden rule.” Remember that one? That was the “treat others as you would want to be treated” rule that Jesus of Nazareth preached and popularized. For every military action we have made during the War on Terror, we have failed to ask ourselves, “what would we do if another country conducted such military action to us?” For example, if an unmanned aerial vehicle from Pakistan secretly dropped a bomb on a house where suspected enemy combatants lived (they’re innocent until proven dead!), killing an entire family except for an 8-year old, which country would that 8-year old grow up to hate? If Germany decided to build a permanent military base in Texas in the name of “national security,” how would Americans react?¶ You can distract yourselves with “So You Think You Can Dance” and “Celebrity Apprentice” every night, but the fact remains that while you watch those “reality” TV shows, the real reality is that civilians are accidentally killed everyday by the United States military and NATO. The real reality is that the United States has over 1000 permanent military bases outside of its borders. The real reality is that new terrorists are created because of the invasion and occupation of foreign countries by our military.¶

#### Even if terrorism declines, it’s still inevitable

Zakaria 12 (Fareed Zakaria, columnist for Newsweek, 5/6/2012, “Fareed’s Take: US Has Made War on Terror a War Without an End,” <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/06/national-security-state/>).

Whatever you thought of President Obama's recent speech on Afghanistan, it is now increasingly clear that the United States is winding down its massive military commitments to the two wars of the last decade.¶ We are out of Iraq and we will soon be largely out of Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden is dead, and al Qaeda is a shadow of its former self. Threats remain but these are being handled using special forces and intelligence. So, finally, after a decade, we seem to be right-sizing the threat from terrorist groups.¶ Or are we?¶ While we will leave the battlefields of the greater Middle East, we are firmly committed to the war on terror at home. What do I mean by that? Well, look at the expansion of federal bureaucracies to tackle this war.¶ Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has created or reconfigured at least 263 organizations to tackle some aspect of the war on terror. Thirty-three new building complexes have been built for the intelligence bureaucracies alone, occupying 17 million square feet – the equivalent of 22 U.S. Capitols or three Pentagons. The largest bureaucracy after the Pentagon and the Department of Veterans Affairs is now the Department of Homeland Security, which has a workforce of 230,000 people.¶ The rise of this national security state has entailed a vast expansion in the government's powers that now touch every aspect of American life, even when seemingly unrelated to terrorism. Some 30,000 people, for example, are now employed exclusively to listen in on phone conversations and other communications within the United States.¶ In the past, the U.S. government has built up for wars, assumed emergency authority and sometimes abused that power, yet always demobilized after the war. But this is, of course, a war without end.¶ So we continue to stand in absurd airport lines. We continue to turn down the visa applications of hundreds of thousands of tourists, businessmen, artists and performers who simply want to visit America and spend money here, and become ambassadors of good will for this country. We continue to treat even those visitors who arrive with visas as hostile aliens - checking, searching and deporting people at will. We continue to place new procedures and rules to monitor everything that comes in and out of the country, making doing business in America less attractive and more burdensome than in most Western countries.¶ We don't look like people who have won a war. We look like scared, fearful, losers.

#### Investment won’t solve terror – the problem is the system not the infrastructure

Bobby Calvin 6/13/12 (Boston globe staff writer, “tighter port security” maritime security review, http://www.marsecreview.com/2012/06/tighter-port-security/)

The Department of Homeland Security will miss an initial deadline of July 12 to comply with a sweeping federal law meant to thwart terrorist attacks arriving by sea, frustrating border security advocates who worry that the agency has not done enough to prevent dangerous cargo from coming through the country’s ocean gateways, including the Port of Boston.¶ Only a small fraction of all metal cargo containers have been scanned before arriving at US ports, and advocates for tighter port security say all maritime cargo needs to be scanned or manually inspected to prevent terrorists from using ships bound for the United States to deliver a nuclear bomb.¶ The scenario might be straight out of a Hollywood script, but the threat of terrorism is not limited to airplanes, according to Homeland Security critics, including Representative Edward Markey of Massachusetts. Markey accuses the agency of not making a good-faith effort to comply with a 2007 law he coauthored requiring all US-bound maritime shipments to be scanned before departing overseas docks.¶ “We’re not just missing the boat, we could be missing the bomb,’’ the Malden Democrat said. “The reality is that detonating a nuclear bomb in the United States is at the very top of Al Qaeda’s terrorist targets.’’¶ Only about 5 percent of all cargo containers headed to the United States are screened, according to the government’s own estimate, with some shipments getting only a cursory paperwork review.¶ Homeland Security officials argue that wider screening would be cost-prohibitive, logistically and technologically difficult, and diplomatically challenging. While acknowledging the threat as real, they are exercising their right under the 2007 law to postpone for two years the full implementation of the congressionally mandated scanning program. That would set the new deadline for July 2014.¶ Critics say the consequences of delay could be catastrophic. Terrorists have long sought to obtain uranium or plutonium to construct a nuclear bomb, global security analysts say. Government officials, including President Obama and his predecessor, George W. Bush, have worried that terrorist cells could be plotting further devastation in the United States, perhaps through radioactive explosives called “dirty bombs.’’¶ Homeland Security “has concluded that 100 percent scanning of incoming maritime cargo is neither the most efficient nor cost-effective approach to securing our global supply chain,’’ said Matt Chandler, an agency spokesman.¶ Homeland Security “continues to work collaboratively with industry, federal partners, and the international community to expand these programs and our capability to detect, analyze, and report on nuclear and radiological materials,’’ Chandler said, adding that “we are more secure than ever before.’’¶ The agency has used what it calls a “risk-based approach’’ to shipments. As a result, Homeland Security has focused on cargo originating from 58 of the world’s busiest seaports, from Hong Kong to Dubai. Last year, US agents stationed at those ports inspected 45,500 shipments determined to be high risk, according to joint testimony by Homeland Security, Coast Guard, and US Customs officials in February before the House Homeland Security Committee.¶ Republicans have been wary of forcing the agency to comply with the scanning mandate because of the presumed cost, perhaps at least $16 billion – a figure disputed by Markey and others who cite estimates that the program could cost a comparatively modest $200 million.¶ Representative Candice Miller, a Michigan Republican who chairs the House subcommittee on border and maritime security, was more inclined to accept the estimate from Homeland Security officials. In light of the country’s budget troubles, “we have to try and prioritize,’’ she said.¶ Scanning cargo “100 percent would be optimal,’’ she conceded, “but it’s not workable.’’¶ Still, she acknowledged the need to secure the country’s borders, whether by air, land, or sea.¶ There is no dispute that a terrorist attack at a major port could be catastrophic to the global economy. Much of the world’s products – T-shirts sewn in China, designer shoes from Italy, and other foreign-made products – arrives in the United States in large, metal cargo containers.¶ While some countries have voluntarily improved cargo screening, others have not. Large retailers have opposed measures that could increase their costs. Without full scanning compliance, it is often difficult to determine if shipments have been inspected because cargo is sometimes transferred from ship to ship offshore.¶ “The existing system has some real problems,’’ said Stephen Flynn, the founding codirector of the Kostas Research Institute for Homeland Security at Northeastern University.¶ “We should be focusing on how to improve the system,’’ he said, “and that’s really not happening.’’¶ November will mark a decade since Congress approved the sweeping maritime law that put in place standards and procedures for screening cargo. In 2007, Markey and other Democrats won approval of the 100-percent scanning program, opposed by Homeland Security officials but ultimately signed by President Bush.¶ “They don’t agree with the law. They think we should run the risk of nuclear devastation,’’ said Representative Jerrold Nadler, a New York Democrat.¶ “This is a huge threat to the country.’’

### ----Ext. Status Quo Solves

#### The fear of terrorism is low – removes incentive to do the affirmative plan

Saad 11 (Lydia Saad, senior editor of the Gallup Poll and holds a masters degree in political science from UConn, 9/2/11, “Americans’ Fear of Terrorism in US is Near Low Point,” <http://www.gallup.com/poll/149315/americans-fear-terrorism-near-low-point.aspx>).

PRINCETON, NJ -- Americans' fear that a terrorist attack in the U.S. could be imminent has retreated from the high level Gallup recorded shortly after al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was killed at his hiding place in Pakistan on May 1. It is now on the low end of the range seen over the past decade.¶ ¶ Thirty-eight percent of Americans currently believe terrorist acts are very or somewhat likely to occur in the coming weeks, down from 62% in Gallup's May 2 poll, but similar to the 39% recorded in November 2009.¶ ¶ The latest reading is from a USA Today/Gallup poll conducted Aug. 11-14, roughly a month prior to the 10th anniversary of 9/11, when nearly 3,000 were killed in hijacked plane attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center towers, as well as in a separate crash of a hijacked commercial jetliner in Pennsylvania.¶ ¶ The same poll finds 36% of Americans feeling very or somewhat worried that they or a family member could become a victim of terrorism. About a quarter of Americans held this concern in April 2000; it then registered highs of 58% and 59% in the first few weeks after 9/11, but has since varied between 28% and 48%.¶

### ----Ext. No Port Terror

#### Terrorist won’t attack US Ports anytime soon – they adhere to cheap and predictable methods that work on land **Chalk 08** (**Peter Chalk, political scientist at the RAND corporation, 2008, “The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States,” page 19,** <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf>).

Very much related to this is the fact that terrorists are inherently¶ conservative when it comes to choosing attack modalities. Precisely¶ because they are constrained by ceilings in operational finance and¶ skill sets, most groups have chosen to follow the path of least resistance.¶ They adhere to the tried and tested methods that are known to work,¶ that offer reasonably high chances of success, and whose consequences¶ can be relatively easily predicted. Stated more directly, in a world of¶ finite human and material assets, the costs and unpredictability associated¶ with expanding to the maritime realm have typically trumped any¶ potential benefits that might be garnered from initiating such a change¶ in operational direction.

#### Sea ports are less accessible to the media – terrorists won’t attack

Chalk 08 (Peter Chalk, political scientist at the RAND corporation, 2008, “The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States,” page 20, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf>).

A further consideration has to do with the nature of maritime targets themselves: Because they are out of sight, they are generally out of ¶ mind (this is particularly true of commercial vessels). Thus, an attack ¶ on a ship is less likely to elicit the same publicity—either in scope ¶ or immediacy—as a strike on land-based targets, which, because they ¶ are ﬁxed and typically located near urban areas, are far more media- ¶ accessible (although, as argued below, this point may not apply with ¶ respect to contingencies involving heavily-laden cruise liners and ferries).¶ This consideration is important because terrorism, at root, is a ¶ tactic that can only be eﬀective if it is able to visibly demonstrate its ¶ salience and relevance through the propaganda of the deed.¶ Rather ¶ like the philosopher’s tree silently falling in the forest, if no one observes ¶ the event, does it have any reason for being?

#### Terrorists won’t attack sea ports – they know of the high security already in place, ships can easily be diverted, and minimal damage occurs resulting from an attack

Chalk 08 (Peter Chalk, political scientist at the RAND corporation, 2008, “The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States,” page 23, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf>).

Although it is true that very little redundancy (in the form of ¶ surplus supply) is built into the contemporary international trading ¶ system, it would be extremely diﬃcult to decisively disrupt its operation through a campaign of terrorism. Major ports such as Rotterdam, ¶ Vancouver, Singapore, New York, and Los Angeles are both expansive and highly secure, making them extremely diﬃcult to fully close ¶ down. Even if an attack did result in the wholesale suspension of all ¶ loading/oﬄoading functions, ships could be fairly easily diverted (albeit ¶ at a cost) to alternative terminals, thus ensuring the continued integrity of the inter-modal transportation network. Successfully blocking ¶ a SLOC to all through traﬃc would be similarly diﬃcult, not least ¶ because it would require a group to scuttle several large vessels at the ¶ same time—a formidable and technically demanding undertaking.¶ Moreover, very few maritime choke points are truly nonsubstitutable ¶ for ocean-bound freight. Bypassing the Malacca Straits in Southeast ¶ Asia (one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors), for instance, would ¶ require only an extra three days of steaming, and other than oil and ¶ certain perishable goods, most commodities would not be unduly ¶ aﬀected by short delays in delivery.

### ----Ext. Terror Inevitable

#### And even if the port security measures the aff is deploying are successful, terrorist will continue to attack and negotiations are still inevitable – plan doesn’t solve

World News Daily 12 (World News Daily, independent conservative political website, 5/6/2012, “Obama Negotiating with Terrorists Inevitable?”, <http://www.wnd.com/2012/05/obama-negotiating-with-terrorists-inevitable/>).

U.S. talks with Hamas are “almost inevitable” if President Obama is reelected, John Bolton, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, declared in a radio interview today.¶ ¶ “I think that’s almost inevitable,” Bolton told Aaron Klein on his WABC Radio show in response to a question about whether the former diplomat thinks the U.S. will engage the U.S.-designated terrorist group Hamas during a second Obama term.¶ Continued Bolton: “I think if you look at the record of the Obama administration in its first three years and the unrelenting pressure that they put on Israel to make concessions to the Palestinian Authority, that once freed from the prospect of ever having to face the voters again … I think it’s going to be Katy bar the door!”¶ ¶ Bolton, now a member of Mitt Romney’s campaign, said that since “many Europeans” already believe that Israel should negotiate with Hamas, the Obama administration “would come to the same conclusion.”¶ ¶ “I don’t know why, once any fear of political consequence is removed, why [the Obama administration] would be any different in that context then they have been in so many others,” Bolton said.¶ ¶ He continued: “It used to be the American position that we don’t negotiate with terrorists. Well, we are doing that now with the Taliban. We are doing that with the government in Iran, which is not only terrorist, but [also] is pursuing nuclear weapons.”¶

### ----Ext. Investment Fails

#### Investment doesn’t solve terror

Joseph Bouchard 6/15/2005 (Dr. Bouchard is widely recognized as an expert on national defense and homeland security, and has received several awards for his leadership in port security, including the Secretary of Defense 2002 Annual Antiterrorism Award, Secretary of Transportation 2002 Partnering for Excellence Award, Virginia Port Authority Medal of Excellence, and the Virginia Maritime Association Port Champion Award, Center for American Progress, “new strategies to protect America: safer ports for a more secure economy”http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/port\_security.pdf)

¶ The implicit assumption underlying the current vulnerability-based¶ approach is that each and every port facility is equally likely to be attacked by¶ terrorists and would generate the same consequences in terms of loss of life and¶ loss to the American economy. This, of course, is nonsensical and demonstrates a¶ disturbing lack of understanding of the threat posed by global extremist terrorist¶ groups like al Qaeda. All facilities are vulnerable to some degree and there is no¶ end to the wildly imaginative threat scenarios that can be generated to justify¶ channeling scarce funds in one direction or another. This is the essence of the¶ political tension within Congressional oversight committees over funding for¶ urban vs. rural states, for example. All states are theoretically at risk, but ¶ terrorism risk does not apply to all states equally. Without such a strategic¶ approach based on the actual threat and the likely consequence of a terrorist¶ attack, strenuous efforts and extravagant expenditures will end up contributing¶ little to enhancing maritime transportation and more broadly our national ¶ security.

#### Port Security collapse inevitable-other countries lack adequate security standards

Interfor Inc. International investigation firm offering domestic and foreign intelligence services to the legal, corporate and financial communities. Interfor is staffed by highly skilled investigators and fraud examiners, many of whom have been associated with government, defense, and intelligence agencies worldwide, including the CIA, DEA and FBI agencies.no-date.[“Port and Maritime Security”. pg 2-8. Interfor Incorportation.]<http://www.interforinc.com/FileLib%5CPort_and_Maritime_Security.pdf>

With more than 80% of global trade dependent on maritime transport, disruption¶ within the maritime networks would have a devastating economic impact. According¶ to a 2006 report, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the closure of the¶ ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach alone would reduce the US Gross Domestic¶ Product by up to $150 million per day. In 2002 a labor dispute between port¶ terminal operators and the union representing dockworkers closed West Coast ports¶ for 10 days causing an estimated $15 billion in losses, including wages and¶ shipping delays. For this reason, Worldwide Port and Maritime operations and their¶ associated facilities and infrastructure collectively represent one of the single¶ greatest challenges to the security of nations and the global economy today.¶ Unfortunately, ports are unique and difficult environments to secure. Applying¶ adequate security procedures to the hive-like volume of activity that happens in a¶ busy port without bringing business to a crawl can seem impossible.¶ Another issue is size. Ports occupy hundreds of acres of land and water so they can¶ simultaneously accommodate ship, truck and rail traffic and container storage.¶ Securing the perimeter of such a large, open area bordered by water as well as the¶ people, vehicles and equipment within it is incredibly complex.¶ Globally there are few uniform standards for point-to-point control of security on¶ containers, cargoes, vessels or crews - a port’s security in one nation remains very¶ much at the mercy of a port’s security, or lack thereof, in another nation. Organized¶ crime is entrenched in many ports, and a large majority still do not require¶ background checks on dock workers, crane operators or warehouse employees.¶ While the government has spent $2.5 billion over the past decade on a security¶ overhaul at US seaports from Seattle to New Orleans and beyond, ports remain¶ critically vulnerable. Terrorists, in particular, are aware of this vulnerability and will¶ act to exploit the weaknesses in port facilities. This is, unfortunately, not a matter¶ of “if,” but “when.”

#### Spending on container security fails.

Kochems, 05. (Alane Kochem, Policy Analyst for National Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation, Taking a Global Approach to Maritime Security, Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/09/taking-a-global-approach-to-maritime-security)

Some security analysts argue that container security should receive special consideration because a container could possibly be used to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the country. To counter this threat, they propose spending billions of dollars on container and port security.¶This argument fails on four counts. First, the nuke-in-box is an unlikely terrorist tactic. If an enemy wanted to smuggle a bomb into the United States, a private watercraft would be a safer and more secure way to transport the weapon, either directly to the target (e.g., a port) or indirectly by landing it in Mexico and then driving it across the border. Second, while nuclear smuggling is possible, so are dozens of other attack scenarios. It is dangerously myopic to overinvest in countering one tactic when the terrorists could easily employ another tactic. Third, searching every container and hardening every port is extremely inefficient and expensive way to stop terrorists from using cargo containers. Fourth, there is no viable busi­ness case for many of the proposed solutions for "hardening" shipping containers. These measures would provide only minimal utility at the cost of billions of dollars in new duties or taxes.

#### Investing in port security won’t thwart terrorists, dangerous and false security

Kochems and Carafano 5-5-2006 (Alane Kochems, policy analyst for national security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation; James Jay Carafano, Deputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies; “One Hundred Percent Cargo Scanning and Cargo Seals: Wasteful and Unproductive Proposals”, The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/05/one-hundred-percent-cargo-scanning-and-cargo-seals-wasteful-and-unproductive-proposals>)

These approaches are efforts to thwart a nuke-in-a-box scenario, but the nuke-in-a-box is an unlikely terrorist tactic. If an enemy wanted to smuggle a bomb into the United States, an oil or chemical tanker, roll-on/roll-off car carrier, grain or other bulk vessel, or even private watercraft would be a more logical and secure way to transport it, either directly to the target (e.g., a port) or indirectly by landing it in Mexico, Canada, or the Caribbean and then moving it across a remote section of the U.S. border. Indeed, logic suggests, and most experts believe, that a port is more likely to be attacked from land than from sea, especially given the lack of visibility into the domestic trade network, the lack of protection on the landward side, and the ease of constructing explosive devices with domestic resources. Terrorists would likely construct smaller items (e.g., biological agents) domestically and then deliver them through FedEx or a similar carrier. While nuclear smuggling is possible, so are dozens of other attack scenarios. Overinvesting in countering one tactic when terrorists could easily employ another is dangerously myopic. Spending billions of dollars and deploying thousands of personnel to screen every container is an extremely inefficient and expensive way to stop terrorists from using cargo containers, especially since they would probably use other means. Choosing to screen every cargo container creates an easily bypassed bottleneck that gives people a false sense of security. Furthermore, even if these were good ideas, much of the technology, especially with regard to seals, is fairly immature. Admittedly, the Senate legislation asks for only three test sites, but why waste money on testing a bad idea?

### AT: Container Bomb

#### Terrorists won’t put bombs in containers

Carafano and Quartel 7-5-2006 (James Jay Carafano, Deputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies; and Robert Quartel, former Member of the US Federal Maritime Commission, and an internationally recognized expert in international maritime and US national transportation policy. He currently serves as Chairman and CEO of FreightDesk Technologies, a leading provider of internet-based applications for international cargo management to shippers and Third Party Logistics Suppliers (3PLs); “Contain yourself”, The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2006/07/contain-yourself>)

Some politicians want to require inspectors to look inside each container before it's shipped to U.S. ports. Supposedly, this would prevent terrorists from smuggling in a weapon of mass destruction or a "dirty" bomb (a large, conventional explosive laced with radiological material). But in reality, we'd be wasting our time and money. While it's true that a terrorist could put a bomb in a box, it's neither likely nor logical. In the case of all but a nuclear device, it would be easier and more certain to just build the weapon here. That's especially true for conventional explosives. Biological weapons can be produced with materials and equipment bought off the Internet or shipped here via any number of cargo delivery services. Potential chemical weapons surround us: chlorine tankers, gasoline trucks, pipelines and storage facilities. All a terrorist group needs for a dirty bomb is some low-grade radioactive material stolen from a hospital or a watch factory. Even the machines used to scan containers have radioactive material. Besides, if terrorists had a nuclear weapon, it's not at all clear why they would risk allowing it to leave their control. After all the time and trouble required to build a bomb, would they really wave good-bye and hope it gets to the right place? The terrorists would be far better off to hide their bomb in a private vessel (if they can afford a nuclear weapon, they can afford a boat to carry it in), a truck coming across from Canada, or a small tramp ship operating out of the Caribbean destined for, say, the Port of Richmond. If terrorists wanted to target a port, they would more likely use a truck, train or small boat. A McVeigh-style truck bomb, constructed domestically, would do the trick. And it would be much easier to approach a port from the land than from the sea. Finally, if foreign ports did attempt to screen every container of sneakers coming to America, they would likely fail. There aren't enough people and computers to scrutinize the millions of records that would be produced in real time before the containers reach their destination. It also isn't clear if any technology is fast, accurate and cheap enough to do the job with any degree of confidence.

## Econ Adv

### 1NC Economy Advantage

#### Link-Turn- Increased Port Security hurts efficiency of trade securitizing causes uneasiness to commercial traders

Jeremy Firestone and James Corbett. Firestone University of Delaware Associate Professor, Marine Policy Associate Professor of Legal Studies, University of Delaware¶ Professor of Marine Policy.2003.[“Maritime Transportation: A Third Way for Port and Environmental Security”. Widener Law Symposium Journal, 9:419-437] http://23parallel.com/CMS/jfirestone/CorbettFirestonePublication.pdf

Increased port security will not come without costs—and here we do not refer¶ to the money that the government must invest to increase security. Rather, we¶ refer to the trade-off between port security and economic efficiency in the¶ shipment of goods and the trade-off between security in the form of, for example,¶ background checks and security identification cards, and individual liberty of¶ those who work at or pass through ports.13 While port security is an “essential¶ part of the safe, secure, and competitive operation of the maritime transportation¶ system,” too much security can damper trade and lead to a loss of a sense of¶ freedom and to feelings of insecurity.14 If we assume that neither choking off all¶ trade nor living in a police state is an acceptable option, then the United States¶ must strive to devise port security policies that optimally balance security,¶ economic development and liberty and perhaps, as well as, other values such as¶ equality, sustainability, and environmental protection, subject to a budget

constraint.

#### Port Trade not internally key to econ- alts exists

Edward E. Leamer and Christopher Thornberg. Leamer UCLA Professor in Economics & Statistics and Chauncey J. Medberry Chair in Management / Director, UCLA Anderson Forecast, Thornburg Dr. Thornburg UCLA’s Anderson Forecast economist. Previously he has taught in the MBA program at UC San Diego’s Rady School of Business, at Thammasat University in Bangkok, Thailand, and has held a faculty position in the economics department at Clemson University.2006.[“Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost”. Pg 33-34¶ Public Policy Institutes of California.] <http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r_606jhr.pdf>¶

This is testimony partly to the great resilience of a modern economy.¶ Short interruptions to supply chains can be mitigated fully by drawing¶ down inventories, especially if they were built up in anticipation of the¶ event. When inventories are depleted and delivery essential, cargo can be¶ shifted to air or land through a neighboring economy. Somewhat longer¶ interruptions can be compensated for through a temporary shift to¶ domestic suppliers—an especially easy alternative if supply chains have¶ built-in redundancies that allow the needed flexibility. Some consumers¶ at the end of the supply chain may have to wait a while or pay higher¶ prices. The sale—and profits—may be postponed, but they are not¶ prevented.¶

#### Link-Turn Dredging Causes Economic Decline- Large Cargo Exported or Imported can’t be screened future tech costs $500 billion and producing delays vital to economic competitiveness- either they concede security not key and terrorists attack or increased trade over takes port capacity and econ decline-Impact take out

James Carafano and Jessica Zuckerman. Dr.Carafano Director of International Studies Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute, Zuckerman Heritage Foundation Foreign Policy Studies Research Assistant. 2/2/12. [“Maritime Cargo Scanning Folly: Bad for the Economy, Wrong for Security.Pg 1-2 The Heritage Foundation.]http://thf\_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/wm3481.pdf

While screening calls for cargo to be assessed¶ for risk on the basis of contents, origin, and¶ other attributes, scanning means that each of the¶ approximately 11.6 million maritime cargo security¶ containers entering U.S. ports each year must¶ be physically scanned. With many maritime cargo¶ increasingly containerized in recent decades, typical¶ maritime cargo containers often measure some¶ 40 feet in length. One key issue regarding maritime¶ cargo screening is, therefore, one of scale. While the¶ basic technology exists to effectively screen cargo¶ containers, the expanded technology necessary to¶ perform this function on large containerized cargo¶ largely does not.¶ Cost and infrastructure are also important factors.¶ A single x-ray scanner, the most common technology¶ used for cargo screening, can have a price¶ tag of $4.5 million, plus an estimated annual operating¶ cost of $200,000, not to mention the roughly¶ $600,000 per year for the personnel required to run¶ the equipment and examine the results.3 Likewise,¶ the mere placement of scanners can also prove to¶ cause logistical problems, as many ports were not¶ built with natural bottlenecks through which all¶ cargo passes. With today’s economy relying heavily¶ on the timely and efficient movement of goods,¶ and such logistical delays could amount to around¶ $500 billion in total profit loss. And once scanning¶ technology is installed, it may encounter multiple¶ problems, such as incompatibility with previous¶ technologies, frequent outages due to weather, and¶ insufficient communication infrastructure to transmit¶ electronic data to the U.S. National Targeting¶ Center-Cargo, where it is assessed¶

### -----Ext. Too Expensive

#### Increased Security Related costs kill the economy

Frittelli, Specialist in Transportation Resources, Science, and Industry Division, 5/27/2005(John F. “Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress” CRS Report to Congress http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA453735)

The container shipping system is designed for speed and efficiency. Transportation services are a critical component of the global, low-inventory (i.e., just-in-time) distribution model that many manufacturers have adopted. Most industries in the United States use some imported components from overseas suppliers. By bringing parts to a plant just before they are needed for assembly, manufacturers can save money on warehouse space and inventory carrying costs. Transport efficiencies permit warehouse requirements to be minimized. Lean inventories in turn have contributed to business productivity. From 1980 to 2000, according to one study, business logistics costs dropped from 16.1% of U.S. GDP to 10.1%. 15 Given the dependence of the United States and the global economy on a highly efficient maritime transportation system, many experts acknowledge that slowing the flow of trade to inspect all inbound containers, or at least a statistically significant random selection would be “economically intolerable.” 16 Supply chain analysts are concerned that increased security-related delay at seaports could threaten the efficiency gains achieved in inventory management over the past two decades by forcing companies to hold larger inventories.

#### Expanding port security undermines global trade

Keefer, J.D, 2008 (Wendy J. “Container Port Security: A Layered Defense Strategy to Protect The Homeland and The International Supply Chain” Campbell Law Review Vol. 30:139)

The only way wholly to ensure terrorists are unable to use containers to import weapons, other supplies or even would-be terrorists themselves is greater, indeed complete, physical inspection of incoming containers. Such inspections would need to be conducted prior to the carrying vessel’s entry into U.S. waters. Searches of all entering containers — or even inspection of any statistically significant number of containers — is extremely impractical. The impracticality of large scale inspections is clear when one considers that even now only about 5% 63 of containers entering United States ports are examined to identify their contents. Any large scale expansion of the number of containers examined — whether using non-intrusive imaging technology or involving an actual physical search — would be overly burdensome on global trade. Indeed, such security measures may themselves serve one of the potential terrorist goals by slowing maritime trade to an economically unacceptable level. 64

#### Link - Increasing port security is an economic burden.

Beltzer, 11. (Michael H. Beltzer, Associate Professor of Industrial Relations in the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Wayne State University. He also is a Research Scientist at the University of Michigan's Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, and is Associate Director of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation's Trucking Industry ProgramSupply Chain Security: Agency Theory and Port Drayage Drivers,

Economic Labor Relations Review, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/870060083/fulltext>)

Most solutions to date have been to increase surveillance and enforcement and to increase use of technology in this effort, and the economic burden is substantial. In addition, while the economic benefits flow to a narrow sector of the economy (the security and information technology sectors), the costs are borne by the public in the form of higher prices and distortions in allocative efficiency. Further, according the Secretary of DHS, 'guarding against every terror risk would bankrupt the US' (Lipton 2006). Martonosi, Ortiz, and Willis imply that the cost of 100 per cent inspection of inbound containers would be approximately $900 million annually (Martonosi et al. 2006). The cost of compliance with extremely high security standards would result in both increased cost to consumers and reduced economic activity (deadweight loss) and thus produce serious negative macroeconomic effects - all of which have much greater consequences since the global financial meltdown occurred in 2007-2010.

## Heg Adv

### 1NC Hegemony Advantage

#### Investment won’t solve terror – the problem is the system not the infrastructure

Bobby Calvin 6/13/12 (Boston globe staff writer, “tighter port security” maritime security review, http://www.marsecreview.com/2012/06/tighter-port-security/)

The Department of Homeland Security will miss an initial deadline of July 12 to comply with a sweeping federal law meant to thwart terrorist attacks arriving by sea, frustrating border security advocates who worry that the agency has not done enough to prevent dangerous cargo from coming through the country’s ocean gateways, including the Port of Boston.¶ Only a small fraction of all metal cargo containers have been scanned before arriving at US ports, and advocates for tighter port security say all maritime cargo needs to be scanned or manually inspected to prevent terrorists from using ships bound for the United States to deliver a nuclear bomb.¶ The scenario might be straight out of a Hollywood script, but the threat of terrorism is not limited to airplanes, according to Homeland Security critics, including Representative Edward Markey of Massachusetts. Markey accuses the agency of not making a good-faith effort to comply with a 2007 law he coauthored requiring all US-bound maritime shipments to be scanned before departing overseas docks.¶ “We’re not just missing the boat, we could be missing the bomb,’’ the Malden Democrat said. “The reality is that detonating a nuclear bomb in the United States is at the very top of Al Qaeda’s terrorist targets.’’¶ Only about 5 percent of all cargo containers headed to the United States are screened, according to the government’s own estimate, with some shipments getting only a cursory paperwork review.¶ Homeland Security officials argue that wider screening would be cost-prohibitive, logistically and technologically difficult, and diplomatically challenging. While acknowledging the threat as real, they are exercising their right under the 2007 law to postpone for two years the full implementation of the congressionally mandated scanning program. That would set the new deadline for July 2014.¶ Critics say the consequences of delay could be catastrophic. Terrorists have long sought to obtain uranium or plutonium to construct a nuclear bomb, global security analysts say. Government officials, including President Obama and his predecessor, George W. Bush, have worried that terrorist cells could be plotting further devastation in the United States, perhaps through radioactive explosives called “dirty bombs.’’¶ Homeland Security “has concluded that 100 percent scanning of incoming maritime cargo is neither the most efficient nor cost-effective approach to securing our global supply chain,’’ said Matt Chandler, an agency spokesman.¶ Homeland Security “continues to work collaboratively with industry, federal partners, and the international community to expand these programs and our capability to detect, analyze, and report on nuclear and radiological materials,’’ Chandler said, adding that “we are more secure than ever before.’’¶ The agency has used what it calls a “risk-based approach’’ to shipments. As a result, Homeland Security has focused on cargo originating from 58 of the world’s busiest seaports, from Hong Kong to Dubai. Last year, US agents stationed at those ports inspected 45,500 shipments determined to be high risk, according to joint testimony by Homeland Security, Coast Guard, and US Customs officials in February before the House Homeland Security Committee.¶ Republicans have been wary of forcing the agency to comply with the scanning mandate because of the presumed cost, perhaps at least $16 billion – a figure disputed by Markey and others who cite estimates that the program could cost a comparatively modest $200 million.¶ Representative Candice Miller, a Michigan Republican who chairs the House subcommittee on border and maritime security, was more inclined to accept the estimate from Homeland Security officials. In light of the country’s budget troubles, “we have to try and prioritize,’’ she said.¶ Scanning cargo “100 percent would be optimal,’’ she conceded, “but it’s not workable.’’¶ Still, she acknowledged the need to secure the country’s borders, whether by air, land, or sea.¶ There is no dispute that a terrorist attack at a major port could be catastrophic to the global economy. Much of the world’s products – T-shirts sewn in China, designer shoes from Italy, and other foreign-made products – arrives in the United States in large, metal cargo containers.¶ While some countries have voluntarily improved cargo screening, others have not. Large retailers have opposed measures that could increase their costs. Without full scanning compliance, it is often difficult to determine if shipments have been inspected because cargo is sometimes transferred from ship to ship offshore.¶ “The existing system has some real problems,’’ said Stephen Flynn, the founding codirector of the Kostas Research Institute for Homeland Security at Northeastern University.¶ “We should be focusing on how to improve the system,’’ he said, “and that’s really not happening.’’¶ November will mark a decade since Congress approved the sweeping maritime law that put in place standards and procedures for screening cargo. In 2007, Markey and other Democrats won approval of the 100-percent scanning program, opposed by Homeland Security officials but ultimately signed by President Bush.¶ “They don’t agree with the law. They think we should run the risk of nuclear devastation,’’ said Representative Jerrold Nadler, a New York Democrat.¶ “This is a huge threat to the country.’’

#### Alt cause – employee skills deficits

Fifth Third Bank 6/13 (United States Bank, “Greater Employee Training Is

Vital to Global Competitiveness”, <https://www.53.com/doc/cm/2Q12-employee-training-vital.pdf>, 6/13/12, JNP)

To gain a competitive edge, companies in the United States ¶ and around the world are increasingly specializing in their core ¶ competencies and outsourcing non-core functions. To succeed, ¶ this requires more knowledgeable workers with deeper skill sets ¶ and the means to manipulate sophisticated new technologies. ¶ Since skills cycles have been significantly shortened—from ¶ years to just months—the ability of employees to continually ¶ learn and welcome life-long educational programs is key. And the ¶ willingness of employers to frequently upgrade their employees’ ¶ skills and invest in corporate training programs is critical.¶ In light of the demands placed on today’s workers, it is not surprising that a skills deficit exists. In fact, this situation ¶ has occurred for years. For example, prior to the global financial crisis, in 2007, Manpower Group, a leader in the ¶ employment services industry, said 41 percent of U.S. companies surveyed indicated difficulties filling positions. ¶ Although current global unemployment levels remain high, the problem has not abated. ¶ According to the Washington, DC-based Manufacturing Institute, last year 67 percent of American survey respondents ¶ reported a moderate to severe shortage of qualified labor; they also anticipated the problem to worsen. And recently, ¶ the University of Michigan indicated that 600,000 American manufacturing jobs are unfilled due to a lack of employee ¶ qualifications. This shortage is further intensified due to U.S. labor mobility being at a 50-year low, McKinsey Global ¶ Institute said. This means fewer workers are able to relocate to seek or accept employment. This has a significant ¶ impact on competitiveness. Why?¶ For hundreds of years, nations with an abundance of natural resources were considered to have a competitive ¶ edge. Today, this is no longer the case. Human knowledge and skills have taken the front seat. In turn, a company’s ¶ only sustainable advantage is the ability of its employees to learn faster, apply new technologies better, and boost ¶ productivity more quickly than the competition.¶ This is not new. Several years ago Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said, “Education fundamentally supports ¶ advances in productivity, upon which our ability to generate continuing improvement in our standard of living depends.”

#### Alt Cause – U.S. regulatory system

NCF 7/28 (National Chamber Foundation, “SERIES: The Eight Factors of American Competitiveness - Chapter Three: The Cost of Doing Business”, <http://www.freeenterprise.com/economy-taxes/series-eight-factors-american-competitiveness-chapter-three-cost-doing-business>, 7/28/12, JNP)

Ruling out common sense. Besides our costly and complex tax code, job creators consistently view the severe inefficiencies of the U.S. regulatory system as a major competitive impediment. Like taxes, regulations are a vital part of providing for a well-functioning society; but when they are unnecessary, unduly burdensome, result in administrative delay, and costly paperwork they represent an enormous drag on economic growth and competitiveness. The European Commission summed up the formula succinctly in its campaign to reduce the excessive regulatory and administrative costs burdening the European Union: “Less Paperwork = More Jobs.”[x]¶ The World Economic Forum finds that 57 countries have less onerous regulatory systems than the United States. The OECD has found U.S. regulations to be among the most complex and costly of those in the developed economies, in many cases failing to produce the public benefits intended. [xi] MGI warns that precisely because of undue regulatory burden “the relative competitiveness of the U.S. business and regulatory environment is declining—at a time when many international jurisdictions are aggressively adjusting their regulatory environment and streamlining processes for working with business to attract new investment.”[xii]¶ The U.S. Small Business Administration reported that by 2008 the cost of regulations had reached more than $1.75 trillion per year, or the equivalent of over $10,500 per employee for small business—36 percent more than for large companies.[xiii] Each year the federal government issues some 4,000 new regulations.[xiv] The accretion of these rules issued by a multitude of federal agencies (sometimes pursuing conflicting missions), combined with the rules imposed by multiple layers of state and local jurisdictions, creates a complicated regulatory patchwork of administrative burden inhospitable to enterprise.[xv]¶ Despite the competitive damage the United States has no process for routinely reviewing regulations to determine which can be improved and which others should be eliminated. As the Brookings Institution observes in a Hamilton Project report, " [Regulations] . . . are rarely (if ever) evaluated or fine-tuned after they are issued. . . . A more effective regulatory system would continually evaluate regulation's impact and identify areas where reform would be beneficial."[xvi] This includes not only the regulations themselves but the procedures for administering them.¶ In a fast-moving global economy, bureaucratic inertia and timewasting procedural delays, particularly in permitting, are daggers in the heart of enterprise. As a recent OECD report stated, “Red tape is costly, not just in time and money spent filling out forms but also in terms of reduced productivity and innovation in business.” To make a start on remedying this competitive shortcoming, says McKinsey, “the United States could significantly reduce the complexity of regulations and streamline the process of resolving disputes.”[xvii]

#### No-Link Increased Global Competitiveness not key to heg,-desperate policy making fails

Robert Pape. University of Chicago professor of Political Science and founder of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism.2009. [“Empire Falls”. The National Interest.] http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2751/is\_99/ai\_n32148803/?tag=content;col1

The days when the United States could effectively solve the security problems of its allies in these regions almost on its own are coming to an end. True, spreading defense burdens more equally will not be easy and will be fraught with its own costs and risks. However, this is simply part of the price of America's declining relative power.¶ The key principle is for America to gain international support among regional powers like Russia and China for its vital national-security objectives by adjusting less important U.S. policies. For instance, Russia may well do more to discourage Iran's nuclear program in return for less U.S. pressure to expand NATO to its borders.¶ And of course America needs to develop a plan to reinvigorate the competitiveness of its economy. Recently, Harvard's Michael Porter issued an economic blueprint to renew America's environment for innovation. The heart of his plan is to remove the obstacles to increasing investment in science and technology. A combination of targeted tax, fiscal and education policies to stimulate more productive investment over the long haul is a sensible domestic component to America's new grand strategy. But it would be misguided to assume that the United States could easily regain its previously dominant economic position, since the world will likely remain globally competitive. To justify postponing this restructuring of its grand strategy, America would need a firm expectation of high rates of economic growth over the next several years. There is no sign of such a burst on the horizon. Misguided efforts to extract more security from a declining economic base only divert potential resources from investment in the economy, trapping the state in an ever-worsening strategic dilemma. This approach has done little for great powers in the past, and America will likely be no exception when it comes to the inevitable costs of desperate policy making

#### Alt Cause – lack of higher and equal education

NAICU 7/8 (National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, citing information from Economic Survey of the United States, written by the “Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development”, “Greater access, more equal higher education are key to U.S. competitiveness”, <http://www.naicu.edu/news_room/greater-access-more-equal-higher-education-are-key-to-us-competitiveness>, 7/8/12, JNP)

The United States is at risk of losing its competitive advantage in the global marketplace unless it ensures greater and more equal access to higher education, according to a survey released by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The Paris-based think-tank’s Economic Survey of the United States found that there is more demand for university-educated workers than meets supply. As a result, US companies are no longer more likely to innovate than companies in the other 33 OECD member countries.

#### Alt cause – export industries

Del Gatto et al 5/30 (Massimo, CRENOS - Centre for North South Economic Research; “Gabriele d’Annunzio” University of Chieti-Pescara - Faculty of Economics, also work by: Joseph W. Gruber,

Federal Reserve Board - Trade and Quantitative Studies Section, Benjamin R. Mandel

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Filippo Di Mauro

European Central Bank (ECB), “The Structural Determinants of the US Competitiveness in the Last Decades: A 'Trade-Revealing' Analysis”, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2070554##](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2070554), 5/30/12, JNP)

This paper analyzes the decline in U.S. export share. To tackle these issues, we begin¶ by decomposing the decline in share into detailed industry groups and find that only a¶ few of these industries contributed to the decline in any meaningful way. A large part¶ of the drop was driven by the changing size of U.S. export industries and¶ not the size of U.S. sales within those industries. In particular, U.S. exporters appear¶ to have specialized in industries that happen to have been growing relatively slowly as¶ a share of world trade. These observations offer our first suggestion that the fall in¶ aggregate U.S. share has little to do with the underlying productivity of U.S.¶ exporting firms.¶ To corroborate this argument, we estimate the effect of national income and¶ geography on export shares in a modified gravity equation, in which export flows to a¶ given country are divided through by the entire world export to that country. Such¶ preliminary analysis reveals that the majority of the decline in export shares is in fact¶ due to a declining share of world income.¶ This type of analysis offers potential for a better understanding of the drivers of the¶ U.S. export performance, as the residuals embody precious information on countrysector¶ underlying productivity. However, the latter is mixed with other unmeasured¶ components, such as relative trade costs and idiosyncratic shocks, making the residual¶ a poor measure of competitiveness.¶ We thus take a structural approach aimed at identifying relative cost competitiveness¶ across countries by modeling the micro-foundations of trade shares explicitly. The¶ model allows us to derive a measure of country-sector (relative) real marginal costs¶ which, insofar it is inferred from actual trade flows, we refer to as revealed marginal¶ costs (henceforth RMC). This (inverse) measure of competitiveness is endogenous to¶ the model, being the outcome of a process of firm selection driven by: (1) the degree¶ of 'accessibility' (i.e. trade costs) of the country and the size of the market, as well as¶ (2) the exogenous ability of the country to generate low cost firms (exogenous¶ marginal costs), which depends on structural and technological factors such as the¶ entry costs and the productivity distribution of firms.¶ When brought to the data, for the period 1980-2004, our measure suggests that,¶ notwithstanding significant heterogeneity across sectors, U.S. marginal costs have¶ generally kept decreasing, in absolute terms. However, relative to their main¶ competitors, U.S. manufacturing industries are also suffering from problems of¶ competitiveness, as we find that marginal costs have grown by more than 38\%, on¶ average, relative to the other G20 countries. At the sectoral level, the "Machinery"¶ industry is confirmed to be the most critical, followed by "Non-ferrous metals",¶ "Industrial chemicals", "Professional and scientific equipments". On the other hand, in¶ sectors like "Petroleum and coal", "Plastic products", "Printing and publishing",¶ reported RMCs decreased significantly, i.e. the respective competitiveness increased. With respect to the main trading partners of the US, two groups can be identified. For¶ the countries in which RMC decreased the most relative to the US (i.e. their relative¶ competitiveness increased) higher trade freeness (relative to the U.S.) appeared to be¶ an important factor, irrespective of the negative (India) or positive (China) variation¶ in market size. On the other hand, there was another group of countries in which the¶ degree of trade freeness decreased respect to the U.S. In all these countries, except for¶ Korea, trade freeness has been the main driver of a worse performance, in terms¶ of RMC, compared to the U.S. Korea, instead, compensated the decrease in trade¶ openness with a substantial increase in market size which, via increased competition,¶ produced a beneficial effect on competitiveness.¶ Overall, our analysis suggests that market share performance is not a sufficient¶ statistics for competitiveness, as witnessed by the very low correlation between our¶ RMC measure and the export shares. Market size is definitively the main responsible¶ for the dismal performance of the U.S. market share. On the other hand, trade freeness¶ increased substantially in the countries in which RMC decreased the most (India,¶ China, Germany) relative to the U.S.

#### Alt cause – tax system and internal tax revenue code

NCF 7/28 (National Chamber Foundation, “SERIES: The Eight Factors of American Competitiveness - Chapter Three: The Cost of Doing Business”, <http://www.freeenterprise.com/economy-taxes/series-eight-factors-american-competitiveness-chapter-three-cost-doing-business>, 7/28/12, JNP)

Taxing U.S. competitiveness. When comparing the cost structures of competing locales, job creators look especially at tax rates and trade policies.[ii] In this influential category, the United States does not stack up well. We now possess the highest corporate income tax rates in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). From 2000 to 2010, average national corporate tax rates worldwide dropped from 32.8 percent to 25.7 percent. The United States, however, has remained unchanged at 40 percent, when federal, state, and local taxes are taken into account.[iii] The World Bank, McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), World Economic Forum (WEF), and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) each have reported on the chilling effect America’s tax system has on the U.S. business environment.[iv]¶ As the National Small Business Association notes, “The corporate tax rate is just one small piece of the equation—the overwhelming majority of small businesses are pass-through entities and therefore pay business taxes through their individual income tax. America’s small businesses need broad, comprehensive and fair tax reform.” That’s why, according to the NSBA, “Small business consistently ranks reducing the tax burden among their top issues.”[v]¶ Moreover, America remains one of only five major economies that continue to tax the overseas earnings of domestic earnings when the proceeds are brought back home.[vi] According to Cisco Systems CEO John Chambers and Oracle Software President Safra Cayz, “This means that U.S. companies can, without significant consequence, use their foreign earnings to invest in any country in the world—except here.”[vii] And, to a large extent that is exactly what is happening.¶ Added to high, the complexity of the internal revenue code and the enormous cost of tax compliance damage the appeal of our business environment significantly. The U.S. tax code is among the most complicated in the world—a 71,500-page behemoth, twice as large now as it was in 1984, and growing by nearly 3.28 percent per year.[viii] National Small Business Association notes, “Although the actual out-of-pocket cost is a huge issue, the sheer complexity of the tax code has been an ever-increasing thorn in the sides of small-businesses.”[ix] The cost of compliance exceeds a staggering $168 billion per year (approximately 15 percent of annual income tax receipts). These outlays, of course, are passed through to consumers here and abroad, and every dollar that business must spend navigating an outsized tax code is one less dollar available for payroll, R&D, and other productive investments.

### ----Ext. Education Alt Cause

#### Without more education study, we will not gain competitiveness

Jones 2/9 (Elspeth, professor emerita of the internationalization of higher education at Leeds Metropolitan University, in Britain, and an international-education consultant, “In Praise of Languages for Internationalization”, <http://chronicle.com/blogs/worldwise/in-praise-of-languages-for-internationalization/29132>, 2/9/12, JNP)

Last month, The New York Times published a provocative essay by Larry H. Summers which argued, amongst other things, that American college students don’t necessarily need to learn a second language. The spread of English globally, the fragmentation of other languages, and the improvement in translation technology, he writes, “make it less clear that the substantial investment necessary to speak a foreign tongue is universally worthwhile.” I couldn’t disagree more.¶ Prompt responses from Nafsa: The Association of International Educators and others presented alternative viewpoints, but it is difficult to get across to those who speak only one language how greatly life is enriched through competence in another. There are many important reasons to study languages (the Centre for Languages, Linguistics, and Area Studies in the United Kingdom offers 700 of them) and those of us interested in the internationalization of higher education have special reason to argue the cause.¶ First, we cannot deny the economic importance of languages for global competitiveness, or indeed for national security and diplomacy. Sir Adam Roberts, president of the British Academy, argues that, “For the U.K. to thrive globally, it has to have a deep-rooted understanding of languages and cultures across the world.” Employers seem to agree, with a recent survey for the British Council demonstrating the varied requirements of different sectors. Overall, 39 percent of business leaders consider it important for potential employees to speak at least one language other than English, but this rises to 72 percent for those in the field of natural resources. So language graduates are highly employable in a range of fields and yet statistics indicate a substantial drop in U.K. university applications for language study (down by 11.2 percent for European and 21.5 percent for non-European languages). While there is criticism from some linguists of the so-called learn-to-earn approach of the U.K. government, there is no doubt that being able to function in another language enhances employability.¶

## Solvency

### 1NC Solvency Frontline

1NC

#### Port investment is ineffective – flawed application process

Joseph Bouchard 6/15/2005 (Dr. Bouchard is widely recognized as an expert on national defense and homeland security, and has received several awards for his leadership in port security, including the Secretary of Defense 2002 Annual Antiterrorism Award, Secretary of Transportation 2002 Partnering for Excellence Award, Virginia Port Authority Medal of Excellence, and the Virginia Maritime Association Port Champion Award, Center for American Progress, “new strategies to protect America: safer ports for a more secure economy”http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/port\_security.pdf)

Only this year has the department made an initial effort to implement a¶ “risk-based” approach in the current fiscal year 2005 (Round 5) program. This¶ effort to articulate risk-based priorities is laudable, but is seriously flawed.¶ Because of limited funds, only 66 of our largest ports are eligible for grants, with¶ emphasis placed on prevention and detection of improvised explosive devices,¶ particularly those delivered by small craft, underwater or in vehicles on ferries.¶ 22¶ Prioritizing entire ports for grant allocations misses the important point that not¶ all facilities within a port present the same level of risk: some may be seriously¶ threatened because an attack on them would cause catastrophic consequences, while other facilities in the same port would be of little interest to¶ terrorists. Although DHS recognizes that “the highest risk assets include oil,¶ chemical, gas terminals and passenger/ferry vessels/terminals,”¶ 23¶ this was not¶ incorporated into this year’s grant prioritization process. Thus, a low-risk facility¶ at a high-risk port can apply for a port security grant, while a high-risk facility in¶ an otherwise low-risk port cannot. The failure to distinguish priorities within¶ rather than between ports means that the allocation of scarce port security grant¶ funds will not accrue the greatest return on investment, leaving significant and¶ exploitable security gaps at U.S. ports.

#### Widely distributed funding fails – not enough money to make an impact or the wrong ports get invested in

Joseph Bouchard 6/15/2005 (Dr. Bouchard is widely recognized as an expert on national defense and homeland security, and has received several awards for his leadership in port security, including the Secretary of Defense 2002 Annual Antiterrorism Award, Secretary of Transportation 2002 Partnering for Excellence Award, Virginia Port Authority Medal of Excellence, and the Virginia Maritime Association Port Champion Award, Center for American Progress, “new strategies to protect America: safer ports for a more secure economy”http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/port\_security.pdf)

The Port Security Grant Program also has suffered from serious ¶ management issues, particularly relating to grant allocation decisions based on¶ politics and not on risk. The Transportation Security Administration, which ¶ managed the program before the advent of DHS, attempted to implement a¶ rational review and allocation process that included local and headquarters-level¶ review of applications by subject matter experts from the Coast Guard and¶ Maritime Administration, although the results were disappointing.¶ 21¶ Bowing to¶ Congressional pressure, when it took over, DHS distributed port security grants¶ as widely as possible, in some cases for projects of dubious value with little¶ regard to the risk or consequence of a terrorist attack.

#### Squo solves the aff but doesn’t trigger the link to politics

Global Trade 7/5/12 (the foreign policy of economics and trade, “U.S. PORTS PLAN MAJOR INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT” http://globaltrademag.com/2012/07/05/u-s-ports-plan-major-infrastructure-investment/)

¶ The country’s deep-water seaports and their private-sector partners plan to invest a combined $46 billion over the next five years in wide-ranging capital improvements to their marine operations and other port properties, according to a recently completed survey conducted by the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA).¶ According to the Alexandria, Virginia-based industry group, U.S. seaports support the employment of more than 13 million U.S. workers and create 15,000 domestic jobs for every $1 billion in manufactured goods that U.S. businesses export.¶ U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis formulas show that investing $46 billion in infrastructure at U.S. ports would create more than 500,000 direct, indirect and induced domestic jobs, accounting for more than 1 billion person-hours of work, said economist John C. Martin, president of Lancaster, Pa.-based Martin Associates.

#### New tech fails

Carafano and Zuckerman, 12 (James Jay Carafano and Jessica Zuckerman, Deputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies and Research Associate, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, “Maritime Cargo Scanning Folly: Bad for the Economy, Wrong for Security”, Heritage foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/02/maritime-cargo-port-security-and-the-100-percent-screening-mandate>)

Cost and infrastructure are also important factors. A single x-ray scanner, the most common technology used for cargo screening, can have a price tag of $4.5 million, plus an estimated annual operating cost of $200,000, not to mention the roughly $600,000 per year for the personnel required to run the equipment and examine the results.[3]

Likewise, the mere placement of scanners can also prove to cause logistical problems, as many ports were not built with natural bottlenecks through which all cargo passes. With today’s economy relying heavily on the timely and efficient

movement of goods, and such logistical delays could amount to around $500 billion in total profit loss. And once scanning technology is installed, it may encounter multiple problems, such as incompatibility with previous technologies, frequent outages due to weather, and insufficient communication infrastructure to transmit electronic data to the U.S. National Targeting Center-Cargo, where it is assessed.

#### Giving ports grants does not help national security

Carafano, ‘5 (James Jay Carafano, Deputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, “Homeland Security Dollars and Sense #2: Misplaced Maritime Priorities”, Heritage foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/02/homeland-security-dollars-and-sense-2-misplaced-maritime-priorities?renderforprint=1)

Appropriators must ensure that funding is directed toward programs that provide the greatest contribution to the most critical missions in homeland security. Getting the "biggest bang for the buck" is a worthwhile criterion to guide these spending decisions. Nowhere is this more important than in the area of maritime security. Maritime commerce is essential to America's economic vitality. Most goods that enter and leave our shores travel by sea. But this economic lifeline also offers terrorists vast opportunities to exploit or attack ships, ports, and waterways. Nowhere should the need for strategic spending be more apparent. Yet, nowhere is it more apparent that Congress has failed to target spending where it could provide the most security. Owners and operators of the nation's more than 350 ports have made shrill demands for increased federal grants in support of port security. Indeed, estimates for enhancing security at America's ports run into the billions of dollars. The Administration proposed limiting port grants in FY 2005 to $50 million. Lobbying efforts pushed for dramatic increases-as much as $400 million per year. In the end, Congress settled on tripling funding to $150 million. Is that a victory for enhancing maritime security? Not at all. The Administration was prudent to ask for more limited spending. The U.S. port infrastructure is so vast that providing resources for other than the most critical needs makes little sense. Spreading $150 million across the nation won't come close to plugging all the security gaps at ports. It is akin to locking the door in a house without windows. On the other hand, grant programs have proven far more effective when federal money has been used to fund vulnerability assessments and to encourage public-private partnerships that adopt sustainable and effective port-security programs. To address the considerable vulnerabilities of maritime infrastructure, the greater ¶ share of federal dollars might be more effectively used to invest in effective intelligence and early warning, domestic counterterrorism, and border and transportation security programs-efforts that would keep terrorists out of the ports to begin with. Congress should ensure that Coast Guard modernization is fully funded before it even thinks about dumping more federal dollars into port grants for state, local, and private sector projects that contribute marginally to the overall security of the maritime domain. The Administration and Congress should refrain from increasing port security grants in the FY 2006 budget

#### Investment fails in the short term – improvements take too long and maintenance overwhelms

Joseph Bouchard 6/15/2005 (Dr. Bouchard is widely recognized as an expert on national defense and homeland security, and has received several awards for his leadership in port security, including the Secretary of Defense 2002 Annual Antiterrorism Award, Secretary of Transportation 2002 Partnering for Excellence Award, Virginia Port Authority Medal of Excellence, and the Virginia Maritime Association Port Champion Award, Center for American Progress, “new strategies to protect America: safer ports for a more secure economy”http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/port\_security.pdf)

Existing grants come with inherent limitations that both inhibit MTSA¶ implementation and call into question whether security improvements that are¶ being made can be sustained over time. Grants can only be used to purchase and¶ install security equipment and systems, and not to pay salaries, maintenance and¶ other operational costs, which make up the bulk of the cost of implementing¶ MTSA.¶ 24¶ This means that, of the $5.4 billion that the Coast Guard estimated will¶ be required for enhanced facility security through 2013, about $4.9 billion cannot¶ be funded with port security grants under the current rules.¶ 25¶ This poses two ¶ problems for genuine compliance with the MTSA. Not only will security¶ improve at a slower rate, as security maintenance costs increase over time as¶ equipment ages, existing restrictions will force port authorities and private ¶ facilities to resort to the wasteful practice of applying for grants to replace ¶ equipment before the end of its expected service life – not because it is necessary¶ but because it is the only available route to grant support.

### ----Ext. No Adaptation

#### Port Security Investment fails-Efficent security requires interconnected and integrated maritime tech, Ports won’t upgrade

Jay Stowsky. Senior Assistant Dean for Instruction BA, with Highest Honors, Political Economy of Industrial Societies, UC Berkeley MPP, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University PhD, City and Regional Planning, UC Berkeley. 2006.[“Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost”. Pg. 135-136 Public Policy Institutes of California.] <http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r_606jhr.pdf>¶

As noted above, the initial reaction of commercial shippers,¶ suppliers, and port operators to the September 11 attacks was to expand¶ purchases of security products and services that were already on the¶ market or just coming to market before the terrorist attacks. These¶ products constitute a first generation of maritime and port security¶ technology and make up the majority of the sector’s current installed¶ technology base. First-generation security products include such things¶ as metal detectors and handheld radiation detectors, building or area¶ access control systems, and fingerprint recognition software.¶ As a consequence, a common desire among many commercial¶ shippers, importers, suppliers, and port operators contemplating new¶ security technology is for new products and services that will enable them¶ to integrate the disparate technologies in their installed, first-generation¶ product base. These represent a substantial sunk investment, and the¶ ports and shippers are not in any rush to replace or entirely upgrade it.¶ For companies and investors on the supply side of this market, first-generation¶ technologies are a low risk but still profitable investment,¶ offering a steady stream of revenue, although one that has passed its¶ peak. These products are starting to be replaced, albeit gradually, as¶ second-generation products and systems start to come to market.

# CP’s

## Risk Mitigation CP

### 1NC Shell

Text: The United States federal government should adopt a Portwide Risk Mitigation and Management Strategy

#### Risk mitigation solves port terror better – deterrence and response

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Risk mitigation. While deterrence may not work against an individual ¶ terrorist determined to die, plots against specific targets may be deterred by¶ reducing the risk of mass casualties or grave economic loss. For many high-risk¶ port facilities, we achieve a greater return on investment from risk mitigation¶ than from enhanced security measures. Even if an attack does occur, the response¶ will likely be easier and the recovery more rapid.¶ Risk mitigation focuses on safety, reliability and disaster prevention¶ measures already covered in laws and regulations addressing safety and ¶ environmental protection. In other words, the Environmental Protection Agency¶ (EPA) and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have an¶ important role to play in U.S. homeland security efforts. For example, ¶ double-hull tankers are required to reduce the likelihood of an oil spill in an ¶ accident, but they can also reduce the likelihood of an oil spill as a result of a ¶ terrorist attack. Similarly, oil pollution prevention and response regulations¶ enforced by EPA and the Coast Guard contribute to reducing the consequences ¶ of a terrorist attack on a waterfront petrochemical terminal. The weakness in ¶ current laws and policies is that they are designed to prevent or mitigate the ¶ consequences of accidents or natural disasters and in many cases may not be ¶ adequate for the magnitude of damage that can be caused by a terrorist attack.

#### Our current funding approach means the plan solves none of the aff – only holistic analysis of port security can develop effective solutions

Veronique de Rugy 2009 (Senior Research Fellow¶ Mercatus Center¶ George Mason University “Strategic Risk Management ¶ in Government: A Look ¶ at Homeland Security” <http://www.homelandcouncil.org/pdfs/digital_library_pdfs/ibmstrategicriskmanagementingovt.pdf>)

Central to strategic risk management is the requirement that policymakers think in terms of the risks to ¶ be addressed rather than locations to be protected. ¶ in the case of ports, strategic port security requires ¶ that policymakers think not of the ports themselves, ¶ but of what risks are related to ports. ¶ However, policymakers’ current approach to homeland security in general and port security in particular is very localized and discretionary as opposed to ¶ strategic and holistic. policy-makings now allocate ¶ security resources between critical security sectors, ¶ instead of allocating them to address overall risks.¶ 11¶ at the national level, for instance, congress allocates resources for port security, airline security, ¶ emergency preparedness, or transportation rather ¶ than allocating money to address different risks such ¶ as nuclear, bio-terrorism, and so on. within a given ¶ sector, congress does not now allocate resources ¶ based on the risk as it relates to specific sectors, but ¶ allocates resources to specific security tasks such as ¶ detection, prevention or protection. ¶ as a consequence, rather than designing a strategic ¶ solution to a given risk, policymakers ignore the ¶ holistic and interconnected nature of such risks and ¶ focus instead on a few particulars. for instance, ¶ instead of thinking strategically about the best way ¶ to prevent terrorists from smuggling a nuclear attack through one of our ports, a solution that might ¶ involve focusing most of our efforts beyond the borders of our ports, policymakers think about what’s ¶ the best way to engage in perfect detection in a ¶ port. thus, port security resources often spend a ¶ great deal of money to address one part of the risk it ¶ faces. as a result, we have developed a security system that may now overinvest on low priority threats ¶ and underinvest in high priority threats.¶ a strategic risk management approach to homeland ¶ security would:¶ • first, identify risks that a sector faces¶ • second, for each risk, identify the most cost ¶ effective solutions to address it¶ • third, assess who are the best players or agencies (federal (i.e, dod, dHs, or dot), state or ¶ local government) to put these solutions in ¶ place¶ • fourth, allocate scarce resources based on the ¶ priority and severity of the threat to agencies ¶ that would then implement appropriate security ¶ measures

### 2NC Solvency - Terrorism

#### Even if terrorists attack risk mitigation makes the impact irrelevant

Joseph Bouchard 6/15/2005 (Dr. Bouchard is widely recognized as an expert on national defense and homeland security, and has received several awards for his leadership in port security, including the Secretary of Defense 2002 Annual Antiterrorism Award, Secretary of Transportation 2002 Partnering for Excellence Award, Virginia Port Authority Medal of Excellence, and the Virginia Maritime Association Port Champion Award, Center for American Progress, “new strategies to protect America: safer ports for a more secure economy”http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/port\_security.pdf)

Private sector preparedness. Maritime transportation system resilience¶ and risk management means that private sector owners and operators of high-risk¶ maritime transportation facilities have robust emergency preparedness and ¶ continuity of business plans and capabilities. The 9/11 Commission ¶ recommended that private sector preparedness be mandatory:¶ “We endorse the American National Standards Institute’s recommended ¶ standard for private preparedness. We were encouraged by [then] Secretary ¶ Tom Ridge’s praise of the standard, and urge the Department of Homeland ¶ Security to promote its adoption. We also encourage the insurance and ¶ credit-rating industries to look closely at a company’s compliance with the ¶ ANSI standard in assessing its insurability and creditworthiness. We believe ¶ that compliance with the standard should define the standard of care owed by ¶ a company to its employees and the public for legal purposes. Private-sector ¶ preparedness is not a luxury; it is a cost of doing business in the port-9/11 ¶ world. It is ignored at a tremendous potential cost in lives, money and ¶ national security.”¶ 34¶ Wider implementation of emergency preparedness and continuity of ¶ business plans and capabilities by the private sector will help significantly reduce¶ the consequences of a terrorist attack, mitigating both individual losses and the¶ broader impact on the U.S. economy. As part of the MIRP effort, risk-based¶ assessments of maritime transportation facilities should address their emergency¶ preparedness and continuity of business as well as security programs.

#### Risk mitigation is comparatively a better option than the plan

Veronique de Rugy 2009 (Senior Research Fellow¶ Mercatus Center¶ George Mason University “Strategic Risk Management ¶ in Government: A Look ¶ at Homeland Security” <http://www.homelandcouncil.org/pdfs/digital_library_pdfs/ibmstrategicriskmanagementingovt.pdf>)

The defender’s most cost-effective solution is thwarting the attackers before they launch the attack or ¶ deploying personnel and equipment exactly where ¶ the attack will occur.¶ the defender’s second most cost-effective solution ¶ in the face of an attack is to mitigate an attack’s ¶ damage. even if the defender doesn’t know where ¶ or how an attack will occur, the defender can lower ¶ the expected damage by developing plans for the ¶ aftermath of an attack. for a port, such plans might ¶ include evacuating civilians and personnel, placing ¶ emergency equipment within easy reach, training ¶ personnel to handle emergencies and attacks, and ¶ developing business continuity strategies that would ¶ allow the port to get up and running quickly after ¶ an attack. the defender’s third most cost-effective solution ¶ against direct attack is direct prevention. the ¶ defender would employ measures such as physical ¶ barriers (e.g., fences), surveillance equipment (e.g., ¶ closed-circuit television), and access control systems ¶ for employees and visitors. However, such direct ¶ defenses are only as good as their weakest link. as a ¶ result, this solution tends not to be cost effective: ¶ one has to protect everything from every possible ¶ mode of attack. this gets expensive and is often ¶ counter-productive.¶ so, as with almost all counter-terrorism, an argument ¶ can be made to first devote greater focus on intelligence. second, greater focus could then be given to ¶ damage mitigation. direct prevention should then be ¶ only the last resort given this analysis.

#### The problem is not infrastructure but rather its existing function – the CP is the most efficient solution, blanket grants are ineffective and don’t target correct functions

GAO 4/6/12 (Government Accounting Office, “Maritime Security: Coast Guard Efforts to Address Port Recovery and Salvage Response” PDF http://gao.gov/assets/590/589946.pdf)

Each of the seven port areas we focused on have also supported the development of ¶ Portwide Risk Mitigation Plans—a requirement when applying for funding from FEMA’s Port ¶ Security Grant Program—that, in some cases, may facilitate the identification of recovery ¶ priorities within a port area.¶ 20¶ The primary goal of a Portwide Risk Mitigation Plan is to ¶ provide a mechanism to port stakeholders for considering an entire port system strategically ¶ as a whole, and to identify and execute a series of actions designed to effectively mitigate ¶ risks to the system’s maritime critical infrastructure.¶ 21¶ As one example, in April 2009, the ¶ AMS Committee in one port area issued a Strategic Risk Management / Mitigation and ¶ Trade Resumption / Resiliency Plan. This plan identified the key strategic functions provided ¶ by the port area’s maritime community, such as materials transportation and petroleum ¶ supply, among others. The plan also included an assessment of existing risk to those ¶ functions, ranked them by strategic priority, and identified initiatives intended to mitigate that ¶ risk.¶ 22¶ According to Coast Guard officials and port stakeholders, this process helped to ¶ inform the local maritime community of potential recovery priorities as well as risk mitigation ¶ opportunities.

### No link to politics

#### The cp is comparatively cheaper than the plan

Veronique de Rugy 2009 (Senior Research Fellow¶ Mercatus Center¶ George Mason University “Strategic Risk Management ¶ in Government: A Look ¶ at Homeland Security” <http://www.homelandcouncil.org/pdfs/digital_library_pdfs/ibmstrategicriskmanagementingovt.pdf>)

Another name for this process is strategic risk management. Strategic risk management is about assessing odds. It is figuring out which threats are most ¶ worth worrying about and spending money on and ¶ which threats are better left ignored or given fewer ¶ resources. strategic risk management is about devoting more resources against the threat of the most ¶ serious attacks—defined as being very likely or if ¶ successful, having devastating effects—and spending ¶ less on threats which are have potentially smaller consequence. it is taking a finite security budget and ¶ making the best use of it. ¶ a recurring recommendation from the government ¶ accountability office (gao) over the years has ¶ been the need to use risk management as an important element in developing a national strategy to ¶ fight terrorism and allocate counter terrorism ¶ resources.¶ 2