# Port Security Neg

## 1NC Options/Cards

### T – Substantial - TBF

**A. Interpretation Substantial increase is 3.7 billion**

**Oldershaw, ’08** [Mark Oldershaw, 2008,“NATIONAL’S INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN: BUILDING FOR A BRIGHTER FUTURE”, <http://www.national.org.nz/files/2008/infrastructure_policy.pdf>]

National’s fiscal policy includes a substantial increase in infrastructure investment over the next six years, totalling $3.7 billion. This takes the form of an increase in the capital allowance in each of the next six Budgets, adding to the capital allowances that Labour has already planned.

The Port Security Grant Program only costs $1.7 billion over 4 years.

GAO 11 (Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened,

GAO-12-47, Nov 17, 2011, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-47)

From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has awarded nearly $1.7 billion dollars to port areas through its Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) to protect critical maritime infrastructure and the public from terrorist attacks. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--a DHS component agency--is the agency responsible for distributing grant funds. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which DHS has (1) allocated PSGP funds in accordance with risk; (2) encountered challenges in administering the grant program and what actions, if any, DHS has taken to overcome these challenges; and (3) evaluated the effectiveness of the PSGP. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the PSGP risk model, funding allocation methodology, grant distribution data, and program documents, such as PSGP guidance. Additionally, GAO interviewed DHS and port officials about grant processes, funding distribution, and program challenges, among other things.

C. standards:

1. Ground: we lose potential ground to specific spending links because are below the substantial requirements.

2. Limits: alternative interp allow for tons of tiny affs that create minor modifications to US transportation infrastructure making this already huge topic impossible for the negative. Filling a pothole one highway would be an aff as long as they spend money

3. Topic specific education: We don’t learn about substantial projects such as HSR, Climate Adaptation, or any other affs that cost a lot of money. Substantial aff’s ensures in depth topics b/c if a project cost $20, there would be nothing to learn

### T – T.I.

A. Interpretation: transportation infrastructure excludes port security

AJA, ’11 [“American Jobs Act”, 9/12/11, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/reports/american-jobs-act.pdf>

(9) INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT-

(A) IN GENERAL- The term `eligible infrastructure project' means any non-Federal transportation, water, or energy infrastructure project, or an aggregation of such infrastructure projects, as provided in this Act.

(B) TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT- The term `transportation infrastructure project' means the construction, alteration, or repair, including the facilitation of intermodal transit, of the following subsectors:

(i) Highway or road.

(ii) Bridge.

(iii) Mass transit.

(iv) Inland waterways.

(v) Commercial ports.

(vi) Airports.

(vii) Air traffic control systems.

(viii) Passenger rail, including high-speed rail.

(ix) Freight rail systems.

(C) WATER INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT- The term `water infrastructure project' means the construction, consolidation, alteration, or repair of the following subsectors:

(i) Waterwaste treatment facility.

(ii) Storm water management system.

(iii) Dam.

(iv) Solid waste disposal facility.

(v) Drinking water treatment facility.

(vi) Levee.

(vii) Open space management system

(D) ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT- The term `energy infrastructure project' means the construction, alteration, or repair of the following subsectors:

(i) Pollution reduced energy generation.

(ii) Transmission and distribution.

(iii) Storage.

(iv) Energy efficiency enhancements for buildings, including public and commercial buildings.

(E) BOARD AUTHORITY TO MODIFY SUBSECTORS- The Board of Directors may make modifications, at the discretion of the Board, to the subsectors described in this paragraph by a vote of not fewer than 5 of the voting members of the Board of Directors.

B. Violation: funding port security is not the construction, alteration, or repair of commercial ports

C. Vote Negative

a. Topic Shift – their interpretation moves the topic to other areas of infrastructure and renders the word “transportation” meaningless – kills the core of the topic education

b. Limits – Water and energy infrastructure are their own topics – each specific infrastructure with different mechanisms for investment collapses any stable limit on the topic

c. Fairness- we came prepared with links to specific transportation infrastructure. They are able to spike out of core neg generics by claiming that the links don’t apply to them. Kills neg ground

### States

Text: The fifty states and all relevant territories, through a performance payment regime public private partnership program, should substantially increase their investment in port security, and the states where this is applicable should amend their constitution to allow for deficit spending. The local port authorities will request data from the relevant federal agencies for properly assessing vulnerabilities in ports to mitigate risks.

State authority solves best- local autonomy is important to effectively respond to pressures.

Allen 11 Craig H. [Professor of Law at the University of Washington], Future Ports Scenarios for 21st Century Port Strategic Planning (December 3, 2011). 79 J. Transp. L. Logist. & Pol’y 89-137 (2012)

The current structures and arrangements governing port development and management are adequate to accommodate economic development, environmental protection and security concerns. A more active role by the federal government to respond to future trends in trade or other areas of the MTS is not required or desired. State and local port authorities should continue to decide what is in their own ports’ best interest. The market will and should determine what and how future port development will take place. Local autonomy is paramount in deciding on how to respond to challenges facing today’s ports. Ports on the seacoasts, rivers and the Great Lakes have shaped our country’s history. From the mid-17th century, the sheltered harbors provided safe refuge for early explorers and settlers of North America. Cities depended on docks and shipping terminals as their communications and commerce lifeline to the rest of the world. Port cities prospered and grew as a result of local decision-making, responding to the requirements of the port’s hinterland and international trading partners. Today, according to the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), “almost 16 million Americans work in port-related jobs -- jobs that mean $515 billion in annual income and $210 billion in federal, state and local taxes. Port activity also contributes more than $780 billion to the Gross Domestic Product.” Ports have always been gateways to domestic and international trade, connecting the United States to the world. The nation’s ports have always been and will continue to be, the reception and embarkation points at which the vast majority of consumer products and valueadded goods are shipped affordably. With the exceptions of duties collection, interstate commerce issues and defense mobility, the federal government shied away from interfering in what was held to be a responsibility of the several states. In sum, the country’s locally administered port system has inherent in its structure the necessary flexibility to adapt to pressures that the supposedly “new” global system may create. If one could point to major inhibitors of a streamlined and prosperous localized port system, it would be excessive federal regulation, coupled with a lack federal financial support. Although most can agree that federal involvement in other transportation sectors has improved the relative position of those affected sectors (highways and rail), it seems clear that little positive effect has resulted from federal involvement in the maritime sector.

States solve PPP’s – lack of federal funding forces innovation to make them better

Miller et al 12 [Jonathan D. Miller, Deborah Myerson, Rachel MacCleery, Urban Land Institute,

“Infrastructure 2012: Spotlight on Leadership”, [http://www.uli.org/~/media/ResearchAndPublications/Priorities/Infrastructure/Infrastructure2012]](http://www.uli.org/~/media/ResearchAndPublications/Priorities/Infrastructure/Infrastructure2012%5d)

Everybody realizes most governments lack the necessary financial wherewithal to invest and borrow for backlogged infrastructure projects. Even China appears to decelerate recent over-the-top spending. “The big question is where will all the money come from” to deal with funding gaps in the umpteen trillions of dollars worldwide and at least $2 trillion in the United States alone. For officials and planners, the challenge simply boils down to doing more with less—concentrating funds on essential repairs, executing projects that can most affect future economic growth, and stoking sputtering employment engines. States and cities must figure out how to raise more revenues, in part through greater reliance on user fees and creative tax mechanisms and by taking the case to the voters. PPPs can help with efficiencies, building in life cycle cost considerations, and financing. Not surprisingly, financial distress—both government indebtedness and diminution in personal wealth—helps focus all of us on what really matters for our social and economic well-being. Infrastructure starts to matter more when every dollar, euro, or Yuan counts. Ironically, fiscal constraints finally may compel some better results—figuring out what matters most, and what will get the best bang for the buck, becomes even more urgent. From a land use perspective, critics of subsidized sprawl finally gain serious traction after years of pointing out how the infrastructure cost equation never added up in extending suburban subdivisions toward exurban fringes. “When money is so tight, it becomes too difficult to rationalize building miles of roads and sewers into empty cow pastures.” Countries with national infrastructure strategies, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, probably have an advantage in parceling out limited funding to projects identified as top priorities serving the greatest good for economic growth and productivity. These game-changing initiatives could include building out multimodal transport systems from gateway cities; linking augmented freight-rail distribution between population centers, major ports, and international airports; constructing high-speed passenger-rail lines between key metropolitan areas; or implementing new energy systems and broadband technologies. Unfortunately, the United States is one of the few major economic powers lacking a national infrastructure policy direction: initiatives are left to percolate from local and state levels, often competing for resources. But in the current environment, at least, bottom-up “self-help” efforts will more likely attract funding from federal and private sources, especially when they help meet clearly defined economic and strategic objectives.

### Privatization CP

Text: The relevant local port authorities will issue a request for private investors to lease and operate their ports with the requirement that they increase port security.

Privatized infrastructure would be massively cheaper than public investment- competitiveness.

Plumer 4/01 (Brad Plumer, former associate editor at The New Republic, now reporter for Washing Post More states privatizing their infrastructure. Are they making a mistake? Washington Post 04/01/2012 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/more-states-privatizing-their-infrastructure-are-they-making-a-mistake/2012/03/31/gIQARtAhnS\_blog.html)

The other way to privatize infrastructure is to have a private firm take charge of building a road, bridge, or transit system from the start. From a global perspective, this isn’t a radical idea. Countries like France, Spain, and Australia have long harnessed these public-private partnerships to build their highways and rail lines. “Compared to other countries, we’re way behind on this,” says Schank. (Indeed, that’s why the large firms that handle these public-private contracts are often European — foreign companies have all the expertise.) Here’s how this setup would work. Say a state wants to build or upgrade a highway. Various private companies will bid for the project, and the winning bidder has to raise enough money from outside investors to design, operate, build, and maintain the highway for a fixed number of years. The firm is allowed to recoup its costs through tolls and the like over that span. Because the private company is on the hook for the whole thing, it has an incentive to keep costs as low as possible and finish the road on time. “The idea here,” says Robert Poole of the Reason Foundation, “is that the government is only commissioning projects where the private sector is willing to put its skin in the game.” There’s some evidence that privately operated infrastructure projects can get built more quickly — and for less money — than projects wholly overseen by the government. One 2007 [study](http://www.irfnet.ch/files-upload/knowledges/IPA_Performance%20of%20PPPs_2007.pdf) (pdf) from Allen Consulting and the University of Melbourne looked at 54 large infrastructure projects in Australia and found that the privately financed ones had smaller cost overruns and were more likely to be finished on schedule than those financed through traditional public-sector methods.

### Elections

**Recent optimism in the economy signals Obama’s lead in the election**

**Page, ’12** (Susan, USA Today staff, 5/16/12, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-05-14/poll-economy-obama-romney/54958250/1>, JD)

WASHINGTON – Americans may be downbeat about today's economy, a USA TODAY/Gallup Poll finds, but they are increasingly optimistic that things are about to get better for the nation and themselves. A new USA TODAY/Gallup poll finds 56% of respondents, regardless of which candidate they support, predict President Obama will win in November. Though an overwhelming 71% rate economic conditions as poor, a 58% majority predict they will be good a year from now. While those surveyed are inclined to say they are worse off financially than a year ago, nearly two-thirds say they think they'll be better off this time next year. The assessment of personal finances already is on the upswing. More than a third report they are better off than they were a year ago — the highest number since before the economic meltdown in 2008. (They're still outnumbered by the four in 10 who say they're worse off, though.) The sense that the recession's impact finally is lifting should be good news for President Obama, since an improving economy typically boosts the prospects for a White House incumbent running for re-election. Indeed, regardless of which candidate they support, those surveyed predict by 56%-36% that the president will win in November over Republican Mitt Romney. That's a bigger edge than Obama had at this point four years ago; then, by 52%-41%, Americans said he would defeat Republican John McCain.

**More deficit spending would swing the election to Romney**

**Kraushaar, ’12** (Josh, National Journal writer, 5/14/12, <http://decoded.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/romneys-targeted-deficit-messa.php>, JD)

If unemployment was the only factor driving this presidential election, Mitt Romney would not be spending much time campaigning in Iowa, where the state's agricultural economy is relatively healthy, and the state boasts a 5.2 percent unemployment rate, the lowest for any battleground state. But **spending and debt are big issues in the American heartland**, too. **And that's why Romney spent time on the trail in Des Moines** Tuesday, with a speech **decrying excessive government spending.** Concern over federal spending is what drove the tea party movement into existence in 2009, and it's an issue that hasn't gone away in 2012. It's what's driving Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker's momentum in next month's gubernatorial recall, **with a deficit-conscious GOP base showing high levels of enthusiasm. (It's also an effective message with independents:** Check out this new ad from Republican New Mexico Senate candidate Heather Wilson that's focused squarely on the debt, deficit and spending -- in a Democratic-leaning state.) When pollsters ask voters what their most important issue is, the catch-all "jobs and the economy" comes first. But the number of voters naming the deficit rose in 2010 and has remained largely constant, and it's an issue that's **driving conservatives to the polls. It's also a way for Romney to criticize the president on the economy** in states that haven't suffered the brunt of the downturn. New Hampshire is another state with a solid economy, but one receptive to Romney's small-government messaging. Indeed, the RNC held a conference call today, featuring former New Hampshire Gov. John Sununu and former New Hampshire Rep. Jeb Bradley, decrying Obama's record on debt and deficits. Obama may be leading in early Granite State polls, but **the Romney campaign is optimistic about their chances there, hoping to take advantage** of the state's "live free or die" sentiment. If Obama needs high levels of youth and minority turnout to win a second term, Romney needs a restive base anxious about the fiscal future of the country to show up in big numbers. **That's the ticket to a Romney victory in states like Iowa, New Hampshire, and Virginia -- where the economy is pretty good but voter dissatisfaction still runs high.**

Impact: Russia doesn’t like Romney, election leads to full scale crisis, turns case

**Morrissey 7/3** [JULY 3, 2012, ED MORRISSEY, Hot air “Bad News, Russia Not Terribly Fond of Romney” http://hotair.com/archives/2012/07/03/bad-news-russia-not-terribly-fond-of-romney/]

Okay, okay, I admit it: I led with the bad news. The good news? Alexey Pushkov, a key ally of Vladimir Putin and chair of the Duma’s foreign-policy committee, pronounces Barack Obama to be an “acceptable” partner for Russia. Admit it … this makes you feel better about Mitt Romney: **Alexey Pushkov, chairman of the international affairs committee of the State Duma, said in a recent interview that Russian leaders have noted Romney’s comments with concern**, and are watching with interest as neoconservative and “realist” advisers maneuver for influence within the campaign. “**We don’t think that for us Romney will be an easy partner**,” said Pushkov, an ally of President Vladimir Putin. “We think that **Romney will be**, on the rhetorical side, **a replay of the Bush administration.” He also noted Romney’s statements that the U**nited **S**tates **should assert its dominance** in the 21st century. “If he is serious about this, I’m afraid he may choose the neocon-type people…In the first year of his presidency, **we may have a full-scale crisis,**” he said. The catalyst for this attitude was **Romney’s statement that Russia is the “number one geopolitical foe” of the U**S, which I believe is incorrect — but not because the Russians are great friends of the US, either. **Our primary geopolitical foe at the moment is Iran**, and it has been for some time. Russia ranges from economic competitor to diffident anti-proliferation partner, occasionally flipping to antagonist in central Asia and far-eastern Europe. But Iran clearly wants to damage if not destroy the US along with Israel, and has conducted a low-level hot war against us since the 1979 sacking of our embassy in Tehran. The problem here is that Russia has been an obstacle rather than a friend in dealing with the mullahs. Putin has fallen back into the Great Game, when the stakes now are no longer empire but nuclear terrorism. China is equally a problem in the same regard, and **Romney hasn’t had kind words to say about Beijing either in this campaign**, although usually in the form of trade issues. Even Obama doesn’t get terribly high marks from Pushkov. He’s not been impressed with the “reset” pronounced by Hillary Clinton and Sergei Lavrov, and insists “it needs another reset.” Don’t worry, Alexey; Obama will have “more flexibility” after the election. Didn’t Dmitri Medvedev transmit that to you?

US Russia crisis leads to extinction

**Philips 2012** [Alan Philips 2012 “Consequences of a Large Nuclear War” http://www.nucleardarkness.org/warconsequences/hundredfiftytonessmoke/]

2600 U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons on high-alert are launched (in 2 to 3 minutes) at targets in the U.S., Europe and Russia (and perhaps at other targets which are considered to have strategic value). Some fraction of the remaining 7600 deployed and operational U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads/weapons are also launched and detonated in retaliation for the initial attacks. **Hundreds of large cities in the U.S., Europe and Russia are engulfed in massive firestorms** which burn urban areas of tens or hundreds of thousands of square miles/kilometers. **150 million tons of smoke from nuclear fires rises above cloud level, into the stratosphere, where** it quickly spreads around the world and **forms a dense stratospheric cloud layer.** The smoke will remain there for many years to block and absorb sunlight. The smoke blocks up to 70% of the sunlight from reaching the Earth's surface in the Northern Hemisphere, and up to 35% of the sunlight is also blocked in the Southern Hemisphere. **In the absence of warming sunlight, surface temperatures on Earth become as cold or colder than they were 18,000 years ago** at the height of the last Ice Age There would be rapid cooling of more than 20°C over large areas of North America and of more than 30°C over much of Eurasia, including all agricultural regions **150 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere would cause minimum daily temperatures in the largest agricultural regions of the Northern Hemisphere to drop below freezing for 1 to 3 years. Nightly killing frosts would occur and prevent food from being grown**. Average global precipitation would be reduced by 45% due to the prolonged cold. Growing seasons would be virtually eliminated for many years. Massive destruction of the protective ozone layer would also occur, allowing intense levels of dangerous UV light to penetrate the atmosphere and reach the surface of the Earth. Massive amounts of radioactive fallout would be generated and spread both locally and globally. The targeting of nuclear reactors would significantly increase fallout of long-lived isotopes. Gigantic ground-hugging clouds of toxic smoke would be released from the fires; enormous quantities of industrial chemicals would also enter the environment. **It would be impossible for many living things to survive the extreme rapidity and degree of changes in temperature** and precipitation, combined with drastic increases in UV light, massive radioactive fallout, and massive releases of toxins and industrial chemicals. Already stressed land and marine ecosystems would collapse. Unable to grow food, **most humans would starve to death. A mass extinction event would occur**, similar to what happened 65 million years ago, when the dinosaurs were wiped out following a large asteroid impact with Earth (70% of species became extinct, including all animals greater than 25 kilograms in weight). Even humans living in shelters equipped with many years worth of food, water, energy, and medical supplies would probably not survive in the hostile post-war environment.

### K

Federal infrastructure projects are historically motivated to allow capitalism to globally flourish – imperialist expansion still occurs with the transportation the affirmative promotes

**Smith 8** (Jason Scott, assistant professor of history at the University of New Mexico, "The New Deal Order," Enterprise and Society Vol. 9 Num 3 2008, Muse)

By using the **lens** of political economy to focus on the New Deal's public works spending, we can begin to see the outlines of a different interpretation. The huge amount of funds devoted to public construction, the far-reaching federal efforts invested in directing this money, and the long-run impact of the **infrastructure** itself form the components of the story of a public works revolution.[9](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/enterprise_and_society/v009/9.3.smith.html#f9) This revolution helped **justify** the new role of the federal government in American life, **legitimizing**—intellectually and physically—what has come to be known as **Keynesian management of the economy**. By sponsoring this infrastructure, New Dealers remade the built environment that managed the movement of people, goods, electricity, water, and [End Page 524] waste. Among the New Deal's projects were some of the largest and most significant structures ever built in human history.[10](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/enterprise_and_society/v009/9.3.smith.html#f10) These programs not only anticipated the national highways and the military-industrial complex; in the postwar period government-sponsored economic development also looked abroad. For example, Harry Truman's Point IV program was conceived of as an international PWA, building roads and airports in countries like Afghanistan and Vietnam. Similarly, Lyndon Johnson's vision of **exporting Keynesian style economic development** to Southeast Asia by replicating the Tennessee Valley Authority on the Mekong Delta reflected the powerful example set by the New Deal. After World War II, construction firms like Bechtel and Brown & Root (today a subsidiary of Halliburton) took their expertise overseas as well. The New Deal's public works programs employed millions of unemployed workers, both urban and rural, while building the infrastructure that helped **integrate** the disparate regions of the country into a **national market.** From the beginning, then, New Dealers built a state that was both far more powerful and substantially less liberal than historians have realized: more powerful, in the scale and scope of the federal government's commitment to economic development, and less liberal, in the sense that the New Deal state was focused on state-sponsored economic development, and not, in contrast, centrally occupied with tasks like implementing its social security program (which began making payments only in 1942), or with more radical goals, such as the direct redistribution of wealth through tax policy. By reinterpreting the New Deal in this way through a political economic lens, we gain a new history of just how the New Deal's public works programs contributed to American economic development. Public works also had important ramifications for state building and political party building at the federal, state, and local levels. Harry Hopkins, the head of the WPA, once claimed that the New Deal was a political project that could "tax and tax, spend and spend, and elect and elect." We now know this phrase's descendant, the derisive expression "tax and spend liberalism," but at the time Hopkins made his statement it was pure genius—he succinctly identified the qualities that made New Deal liberalism so powerful and controversial: The taxing and spending functions of government could—and [End Page 525] did—remake the physical landscape of the nation. Even more striking, though, was that through using the taxing and spending powers of the state, New Dealers were able to remake a society's politics.[11](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/enterprise_and_society/v009/9.3.smith.html#f11) These accomplishments raise a central question: how do we evaluate New Deal liberalism when we attend to its political economy and place its public works programs at its core? The New Deal's public works programs reflect a number of achievements and shortcomings. These programs built the infrastructure that made a national market more efficient, spurred dramatic advances in economic productivity, created a network of roads and airports, planned for national highways, improved military bases, foreshadowed the rise of the Sunbelt, and gave the New Dealers a policy tool that could be **used to shape overseas development,** from the ColdWar through the Vietnam War. Faced with the Great Depression, the New Deal and its public works projects **helped save capitalism**, an achievement subsequently consolidated by enormous public spending during World War II and the ensuing postwar economic boom.[12](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/enterprise_and_society/v009/9.3.smith.html#f12) Bound up with these triumphs, however, were many limitations. Most notable, of course, was the **failure** of the public works programs to bring an end to mass unemployment during the Great Depression. Those that the New Deal did manage to employ were white men, for the most part. This was hardly surprising, given their disproportionate presence in the building trades and construction industry, generally. Surely, the New Deal had a remarkable chance to address the crisis of unemployment among African-Americans and women. Yet, in basing so much of their public policy on the building of public works projects, New Dealers largely reinforced the gender and racial boundaries already evident in the labor market, bypassing the maternalist legacies of Progressive Era social policy.[13](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/enterprise_and_society/v009/9.3.smith.html#f13) When we turn to the environment, the New Deal's shortcomings are likewise apparent. While architectural historians have generally [End Page 526] praised the New Deal for creating a more democratic landscape, environmental historians have strongly disagreed. From their perspective, the New Deal spent far too much money on roads and not enough on developing alternative mass transportation technologies. They charge that the New Deal's large hydroelectric projects promoted an **imperialist** view of resources, leaving nature to be **exploited** by a **coercive**, undemocratic power **elite** composed of technically minded engineers and **narrow-minded** bureaucrats. Developments such as the TVA displaced thousands of people, while the affordable electrical power generated by dams led only to increased pollution. The main achievement of the New Deal, in this view, is its role in creating an "asphalt nation." To be sure, the environmental damage caused by the New Deal's public works projects was real, if difficult to measure. But to blame New Dealers such as Harry Hopkins for not being mindful of the environment is to fail to recognize the historical impact of the New Deal's public works projects.[14](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/enterprise_and_society/v009/9.3.smith.html#f14)

**The impact is extinction**

**Brown 05** (Charles, Professor of Economics and Research Scientist at the University of Michigan, 05/13/2005, <http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/pen-l/2005w15/msg00062.htm>)

The capitalist class owns the factories, the banks, and transportation-the means of production and distribution. Workers sell their ability to work in order to acquire the necessities of life. Capitalists buy the workers' labor, but only pay them back a portion of the wealth they create. Because the capitalists own the means of production, they are able to keep the surplus wealth created by workers above and beyond the cost of paying worker's wages and other costs of production. This surplus is called "profit" and consists of unpaid labor that the capitalists appropriate and use to achieve ever-greater profits. These profits are turned into capital which capitalists use to further exploit the producers of all wealth-the working class. Capitalists are compelled by competition to seek to maximize profits. The capitalist class as a whole can do that only by extracting a greater surplus from the unpaid labor of workers by increasing exploitation. Under capitalism, economic development happens only if it is profitable to the individual capitalists, not for any social need or good. The profit drive is inherent in capitalism, and underlies or **exacerbates all major social ills of our times**. With the rapid advance of technology and productivity, new forms of capitalist ownership have developed to maximize profit. The working people of our country confront serious, chronic problems because of capitalism. These chronic problems become part of the objective conditions that confront each new generation of working people. **The threat of nuclear war, which can destroy all humanity, grows** with the spread of nuclear weapons, space-based weaponry, and a military doctrine that justifies their use in preemptive wars and wars without end. Ever since the end of World War II, the U.S. has been constantly involved in aggressive military actions big and small. These wars have cost millions of lives and casualties, huge material losses, as well as trillions of U.S. taxpayer dollars. Threats to the environment continue to **spiral**, threatening all life on our planet. Millions of workers are unemployed or insecure in their jobs, even during economic upswings and periods of "recovery" from recessions. Most workers experience long years of **stagnant real wages,** while health and education costs **soar**. Many workers are forced to work second and third jobs to make ends meet. Most workers now average four different occupations during their lifetime, being involuntarily moved from job to job and career to career. Often, retirement-age workers are forced to continue working just to provide health care for themselves. With capitalist globalization, jobs move as capitalists export factories and even entire industries to other countries. Millions of people continuously live below the poverty level; many suffer homelessness and hunger. Public and private programs to alleviate poverty and hunger do not reach everyone, and are inadequate even for those they do reach. Racism remains the most potent weapon to divide working people. Institutionalized racism provides billions in extra profits for the capitalists every year due to the unequal pay racially oppressed workers receive for work of comparable value. All workers receive lower wages when racism succeeds in dividing and disorganizing them. In every aspect of economic and social life, African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, Asian a nd Pacific Islanders, Arabs and Middle Eastern peoples, and other nationally and racially oppressed people experience conditions inferior to that of whites. **Racist violence** and the poison of racist ideas **victimize** all people of color no matter which economic class they belong to. The attempts to suppress and undercount the vote of the African American and other racially oppressed people are part of racism in the electoral process. Racism permeates the police, judicial and prison systems, perpetuating unequal sentencing, racial profiling, discriminatory enforcement, and police brutality. The democratic, civil and human rights of all working people are continually under attack. These attacks range from increasingly difficult procedures for union recognition and attempts to prevent full union participation in elections, to the absence of the right to strike for many public workers. They range from undercounting minority communities in the census to making it difficult for working people to run for office because of the domination of corporate campaign funding and the high cost of advertising. These attacks also include growing censorship and domination of the media by the ultra-right; growing restrictions and surveillance of activist social movements and the Left; open denial of basic rights to immigrants; and, violations of the Geneva Conventions up to and including torture for prisoners. These abuses all serve to maintain the grip of the capitalists on government power. They use this power to ensure the economic and political dominance of their class. Women still face a considerable differential in wages for work of equal or comparable value. They also confront barriers to promotion, physical and sexual abuse, continuing unequal workload in home and family life, and **male supremacist ideology** perpetuating unequal and often unsafe conditions. The constant attacks on social welfare programs severely impact single women, single mothers, nationally and racially oppressed women, and all working class women. The reproductive rights of all women are continually under attack ideologically and politically. Violence against women in the home and in society at large remains a shameful fact of life in the U.S.

**The purpose of the debate should be envisioning a different relationship toward the knowledge capital produces – only by acting as intellectual advocates can this occur**

**Meszaros 8** (Istvan, Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sussex, The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time, p323-328)

The unreality of postulation the sustainable solution of the grave problems of our social order within the formal and legal framework and corresponding constraints of parliamentary politics arises from the **fundamental misconception** of the structural determinations of capital’s rule, as represented in all varieties that assert the dualism of civil society and the political state. The difficulty, insurmountable within the parliamentary framework is this that since capital is actually in **control** of all vital aspects of the social metabolism, it can afford to define the separately constituted sphere of political legitimation as a strictly formal and legal matter, thereby necessarily **excluding the possibility of being legitimately challenged** in its substantive sphere of socioeconomic reproductive operation. Directly or indirectly, capital controls everything, including the parliamentary legislative process, even in the latter is supposed to be fully independent from capital in many theories that fictitiously hypostatize the “democratic equality” of all political forces participating in the legislative process. TO envisage a very **different relationship** to the powers of decision making in our societies, now completely dominated by the forces of capital in every domain, it is necessary to radically challenge capital itself as the overall controller of social metabolic reproduction. What makes this problem worse for all those who are looking for significant change on the margins of the established political system is that the later can claim for itself genuine constitutional legitimacy in its present mode of functioning, based on the historically constituted inversion of the actual state of the material reproductive affairs. For inasmuch as the capital is not only the “personification of capital” but simultaneously functions also “as the personification of the social character of labor, of the total workshop as such,” the system can claim to represent the vitally necessary productive power of society vis-à-vis the individuals as the basis of their continued existence, incorporating the interest of all. In this way capital asserts itself not only as the de facto but also the de jure power of society, in its capacity as the objectively given necessary condition of societal reproduction, and thereby as the constitutional foundation to its own political order. The fact that the constitutional legitimacy of capital is historically founded on the ruthless expropriation of the conditions of social metabolic reproduction- the means and material of labor-from the producers, and therefore capital’s claimed “constitutionality” (like the origin of all constitutions) is unconstitutional, is an unpalatable truth which fades away in the mist of a remote past. The “social productive powers of labor, or productive power or social labor, first develop historically with the specifically capitalist mode of production, hence appear as something immanent in the capital-relation and inseparable from it. **This is how capital’s mode of social metabolic reproduction becomes eternalized and legitimated as a lawfully unchallengeable system**. Legitimate contest is admissible only in relation to some minor aspects of the unalterable overall structure. The real state of affairs on thee plane of socioeconomic reproduction-i.e., the actually exercised productive power of labor and its absolute necessity for securing capital’s own reproduction- disappears from sight. Partly because of the ignorance of the very far from legitimate historical origin of capital’s “primitive accumulation” and the concomitant, frequently violent, expropriation of property as the precondition of the system’s present mode of functioning; and partly because of the mystifying nature of the established productive and distributive relations. As Marx notes: The objective conditions of labor do not appear as subsumed under the worker; rather, he appears as subsumed under them. Capital employs Labor. Even this relation is in its simplicity is a personification of things and a reification of persons. None of this can be challenged and remedied within the framework of parliamentary political reform. It would be quite absurd to expect the abolition of the “personification of things and the reification of persons” by political decree, and just as absurd to expect the proclamation of such an intended reform within the framework of capital’s political institutions. For the capital system cannot function without the perverse overturning of the relationship between persons and things: capital’s alienated and reified powers dominate the masses of the people. Similarly it would be a miracle if the workers who confront capital in the labor process as “isolated workers” could reacquire mastery over the social productive powers of their labor by some political decree, or even by a whole series of parliamentary reforms enacted under capital’s order of social metabolic control. For in these matters there can be no way of avoiding the irreconcilable conflict over the material stakes of “either/or” Capital can neither abdicate its-usurped-social productive powers in favor of labor, nor can I share them with labor, thanks to some wishful but utterly fictitious “political compromise.” For they constitute the overall controlling power of societal reproduction in the form of “the rule of wealth over society.” Thus it is impossible to escape, in the domain of the fundamental social metabolism, the severe logic of either/or. For either wealth, in the shape of capital, continues to rule over human society, taking it to the brink of self-destruction, or the society of associated producers learns to rule over alienated and reified wealth, with productive powers arising from the self-determinated social labor of its individual-but not longer isolated-members. Capital is the extra-parliamentary force par excellence. It cannot possibly be politically constrained by parliament in its power of social metabolic control. This is why the only mode of political representation compatible with capital’s mode of functioning is one that effectively denies the possibility of contesting its material power. And precisely because capital is the extra-parliamentary force par excellence, it has nothing to fear from the reforms that can be enacted within its parliamentary political framework. Since the vital issue on which everything else hinges is that “the objective conditions of labor do not appear as subsumed under the worker” buy, on the contrary, “he appears as subsumed under them,” no meaningful change is feasible without addressing the issue both in a form of politics capable of matching capital’s extra-parliamentary powers and modes of action, and in the domain of material reproduction. Thus the only challenge that could affect the power of capital, in a sustainable manner, is one which would simultaneously aim at assuming the system’s key productive functions, and at acquiring control over the corresponding political decision making processes in all spheres, instead of being **hopelessly constrained** by the circular confinement of institutionally legitimated political action to parliamentary legislation. There is a great deal of critique of formerly leftwing political figures and of their now fully accommodating parties in the political debates of the last decades. However, what is problematic about such debates is that by overemphasizing the role of personal ambition and failure, they often continue to envisage remedying the situation with in the same political institutional framework that, in fact, greatly favors the criticized “personal betrayals” and the painful “party derailments.” Unfortunately, though the advocated and hoped for personal and government changes tend to reproduce the same deplorable results. All this could not be very surprising. The reason why the now established political institutions successfully resist significant change for the better is because they are themselves part of the problem and not of the solution. For in their immanent nature they are the embodiment of the underlying structural determinations and contradictions through which the modern capitalist state- with its ubiquitous network of bureaucratic constituents- has been articulated and stabilized in the course of the last four hundred years. Naturally, the state was formed not as a one-sided mechanical result but through its necessary reciprocal interrelationship to the material ground of capital’s historical unfolding, as not only being shaped by the latter but also actively shaping it as much as historically feasible under the prevailing- and precisely through the interrelationship also changing- circumstances. Given the insuperably centrifugal determination of capital’s productive microcosms, even at the level of the giant quasi-monopolistic transnational corporations, only the modern state could assume and fulfill the required function of being the overall command structure of the capital system. Inevitably, that meant the complete alienation of the power of overall decision making from the producers. Even the “particular personifications of capital” were strictly mandated to act in accord with the structural imperatives of their system. Indeed the modern state, as constituted on the material ground of the capital system, is the paradigm of alienation as regards the power of comprehensive decision making. It would be therefore extremely naïve to imagine that the capitalist state could willingly hand over the alienated power of systemic decision making to any rival actor who operates within the legislative framework of parliament. Thus, in order to envisage a meaningful and historically sustainable societal change, it is necessary to submit to a radical critique both the material reproductive and the political inter-determinations of the entire system, and not simply some of the contingent and limited political practices. The combined totality of the material reproductive determinations and the all-embracing political command structure of the state together constitutes the overpowering reality of the capital system. In this sense, in view of the unavoidable question arising from the challenge of systemic determinations, with regard to both socioeconomic reproduction and the state, the need for a comprehensive political transformation-in close conjunction to the meaningful exercise of society’s vital productive functions without which far-reaching and lasting political change is inconceivable-becomes inseparable from the problem characterized as the wither away of the state. Accordingly, in the historic task of accomplishing “the withering away of the state,” self-management through full participation, and the permanently sustainable overcoming of parliamentarism by a positive form of substantive decision-making are inseparable. This is a vital concern and not “romantic faithfulness to Marx’s unrealizable dream,” as some people try to discredit and dismiss it. In truth, the “withering away of the state” refers to nothing mysterious or remote but to a perfectly **tangible process** that must be initiated right in our own historical time. It means, in plain language, the progressive reacquisition of the alienated power of political decision making by the individuals in their enterprise of moving toward a genuine socialist society. Without the reacquisition of this power- to which not only the capitalist state but also the paralyzing inertia of the structurally well-entrenched material reproductive practices are fundamentally opposed- neither the new mode of political control of society as a whole by its individuals is conceivable, nor indeed the nonadversarial and thereby cohesive and plannable everyday operation of the particular productive and distributive units by the self-managing freely associated producers. Radically superseding adversariality, and thereby securing the material and political ground of globally viable planning- an absolute must for the very survival of humanity, not to mention the potentially enriched self realization- of its individual members- its synonymous with the withering away of the state as an ongoing historical enterprise.

### Solvency

The Port Security Grant Program fails- they don’t allocate fund to the most vulnerable ports.

de Rugy 05 (Veronique, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, “Is Port Security Spending Making Us Safer?,”

http://cip.management.dal.ca/publications/Is%20Port%20Security%20Spending%20Making%20Us%20Safer.pdf)

III. 3. a. The Port Security Grant Program As explained in section II, the most cost effective measures to protect ports from direct attacks are those aimed at preventing bad things from happening inside our ports. The Port Security Grant Program, however, is predicated on the notion of turning each port into a little Maginot line instead of preventing the next terrorist attack. In that sense, the program is not making us safer. To be sure, because not every attack can be prevented, some level of direct defense, such as physical barriers (e.g., fences), surveillance equipment (e.g., closedcircuit television), and access control systems for employees and visitors, is wise. But if funds are going to be spent to upgrade security in ports, it should be done in a cost efficient way. It means that the money should go to critical national ports and terminals, the areas of highest consequence with the greatest vulnerability to terrorist attack. 22 As already mentioned, 95 percent of non-North-American trade enters the United States through the nation’s 361 public and private ports and about 42 percent of that trade moves through just 10 ports, with the biggest loads passing though Houston, New York, and South Louisiana. 97 In addition, over 40 percent of cargo and 25 percent of refined energy coming into the country goes through the twin ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Severely damaging one of these critical ports could not only cause injuries, death, and property damage, but could also disrupt the flow of basic goods into and out of the country. For this reason, the nation’s biggest ports are regarded as high-risk areas. However, they often receive relatively less grant money than smaller and lower-risk ports.

**And, spending on the Port Security Grant program is worse for security- it diverts funds from other more important terrorism prevention measures.**

de Rugy 05 (Veronique, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, “Is Port Security Spending Making Us Safer?,”

http://cip.management.dal.ca/publications/Is%20Port%20Security%20Spending%20Making%20Us%20Safer.pdf)

Considering the scope of maritime opportunities for terrorists and the dramatic consequences of a successful nuclear or radioactive attack nowhere is the need for strategic spending more apparent than in the area of maritime security. 3 In FY2006, President Bush requested a budget of $2.03 billion for port security out of a $50 billion budget for homeland security activities government wide. However, on homeland security issue, the important question is not how much money is spent but rather whether the money is allocated toward the most cost-effective programs. In other words, is America getting the maximum level of benefit in exchange for the spending? This paper reviews some homeland security port programs. First, it takes a look at the economics of port security spending. Second, it examines how the federal government, mainly through DHS, responds to the two main terrorist threats faced by ports: (1) direct threats on the ports themselves and (2) indirect threats via the transport of dangerous material through ports for use in terrorist plots elsewhere in the country. Third, it analyzes whether DHS is achieving its port security objectives and then whether this spending is conducive to improving port security and security in the United States. Finally, this paper will look whether this allocation demonstrates good prioritizing within homeland security This paper will show that port security spending appears to occur without risk and cost-benefit analysis, leading to large array of misallocated of spending. For instance, a close look reveals that within port security spending per se possibly less money is appropriated to the highest priorities such as preventing nuclear devices from blowing up in our ports than to nuclear detection on site (when it would already be too late). Also, much of the appropriated money is allocated to ineffective programs or low priority goals such as the Port Security Grant Program or Radiation Portal Monitors. But this prioritizing seems also to be lacking within Department of Homeland Security’s budget. Allocating money efficiently means that the money appropriated must be spent based on risk analysis. To be most effective, the money should first go to programs preventing devastating terrorist attacks, i.e., intelligence programs. And if experts are correct about the probability of a nuclear attack in our country then the federal government should make protection of stockpiles of fissile materials a priority. Within maritime security, funds should also fund the highest priorities first, like keeping nuclear weapons and terrorists outside of our ports. Finally, if funds are spent on ports to upgrade security then the money should go first and foremost to critical national ports and terminals—the areas of highest consequence with the greatest vulnerability to terrorist attack—rather than spending a little money in every port. Severely damaging one of these critical ports could not only cause injuries, death, and property damage, but could also disrupt the flow of basic goods into and out of the country. Spending a little money everywhere ensures that we protect nowhere adequately.

PSGP fails- outdated vulnerability equation, low draw down, cost share requirement

GAO 2011 (“PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM: Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened” United States Government Accountability Office, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587153.txt>)

In 2010 and 2011, PSGP allocations were based largely on port risk and determined through a combination of a risk analysis model and DHS implementation decisions. DHS uses a risk analysis model to allocate PSGP funding to port areas that includes all three elements of risk—- threat, vulnerability, and consequence-—and DHS made modifications to enhance the model’s vulnerability element for fiscal year 2011. For example, DHS modified the vulnerability equation to recognize that different ports can have different vulnerability levels. However, the vulnerability equation is not responsive to changes in port security— such as the implementation of PSGP-funded security projects. Additionally, the vulnerability equation does not utilize the most precise data available in all cases. DHS addressed prior GAO recommendations for strengthening the vulnerability element of grant risk models, but the PSGP model’s vulnerability measure could be further strengthened by incorporating the results of past security investments and by refining other data inputs. FEMA has faced several challenges in distributing PSGP grant funds, and FEMA has implemented specific steps to overcome these challenges. Only about one-quarter of awarded grant funding has been drawn down by grantees, and an additional one-quarter remains unavailable (see table below). Funding is unavailable-—meaning that grantees cannot begin using the funds to work on projects—-for two main reasons: federal requirements have not been met (such as environmental reviews), or the port area has not yet identified projects to fund with the grant monies. Several challenges contributed to funds being unavailable. For example, DHS was slow to review cost-share waiver requests—requests from grantees to forego the cost-share requirement. Without a more expedited waiver review process, grant applicants that cannot afford the cost-share may not apply for important security projects. Other challenges included managing multiple open grant rounds, complying with program requirements, and using an antiquated grants management system. FEMA has taken steps to address these challenges. For example FEMA and DHS have, among other things, increased staffing levels, introduced project submission time frames, implemented new procedures for environmental reviews, and implemented phase one of a new grants management system. However, it is too soon to determine how successful these efforts will be in improving the distribution of grant funds. FEMA is developing performance measures to assess its administration of the PSGP but it has not implemented measures to assess PSGP grant effectiveness. Although FEMA has taken initial steps to develop measures to assess the effectiveness of its grant programs, it does not have a plan and related milestones for implementing measures specifically for the PSGP. Without such a plan, it may be difficult for FEMA to effectively manage the process of implementing measures to assess whether the PSGP is achieving its stated purpose of strengthening critical maritime infrastructure against risks associated with potential terrorist attacks.

Current term of performance is too short

John M. Holmes 3/7/2012- Deputy Executive Director of Operations¶ Port of Los Angeles (Testimony Before¶ The United States House of Representatives¶ Appropriations Committee¶ Subcommittee on Homeland Security, ““Budget Hearing - Federal Emergency Management Agency –¶ Director and State & Local Witnesses” <http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ap15-jholmes-20120307.pdf>)

¶ There were other adverse changes to the FY 2012 grants as well. First, the term of ¶ performance has been changed from three years to two years in an effort to get money¶ spent more quickly. Although we appreciate the need to move projects along, we are ¶ concerned that such a move will shift the focus to buying “stuff,” rather than developing ¶ technological solutions, most of which are part of Port-Wide Risk Management Plans,¶ which have been well vetted to address current and future vulnerabilities. This will result in ¶ a repeat of early grant funding effo**r**ts where ports bought hardware because it was fast ¶ and easy to procure. Ports, in working closely with each other and the Department of ¶ Homeland Security, have spent a great deal of time to identify system-wide vulnerabilities ¶ and develop holistic solutions. The past period of performance made it difficult to execute ¶ many of these solutions; the current period may make it nearly impossible.¶

EHP review and antiquated data management system leads to ineffective grant distribution

GAO 2011 (“PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM: Risk Model, Grant Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened” United States Government Accountability Office, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587153.txt>)

In addition to funding that is unavailable because it is unused, some funding is also unavailable because it is on-hold due to delays in achieving compliance with postaward requirements and challenges with FEMA’s grant management system. After FEMA approves the use of grant funds for a specific project, stakeholders reported that additional delays in making funds available resulted from compliance with postaward requirements. FEMA cannot make grant funds available to grantees to begin work on approved projects until all postaward requirements, including budgetary and environmental reviews, are met. One cause of delay was inefficiency in the reviews conducted pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, which requires a review of the impacts of proposed actions as well as reasonable alternatives to those actions.46¶ Fiduciary agents we interviewed in 5 of 11 port areas reported that slow EHP reviews caused delays. Grantees submit Environmental and Historical Preservation (EHP) information to the Grant Program Directorate––Environmental and Historical Preservation (GPD-EHP) office for review. If the project does not require a detailed EHP analysis, it can be reviewed and approved by a GPD analyst. However, projects that require a more detailed analysis are reviewed either by the GPD-EHP team or passed to a FEMA regional environmental officer depending on the scope of the review.¶ During a July 2009 FEMA-sponsored stakeholder conference, participating port areas stated that the EHP submission and review process associated with the PSGP was causing delays, which increased project costs and limited what grantees could accomplish with grant funds. The group requested the establishment of a more structured postaward time line, including deadlines for EHP reviews, so that grantees would be better able to plan their projects. A senior FEMA official reported that delays in EHP reviews were due to the fact that prior to 2008, GPD had not historically conducted EHP reviews on preparedness projects and thus, had no established program for doing so. This official further reported that creating an “EHP Team” within GPD with the assistance of subject matter specialists via technical support contract and standardizing the format for project submittals has helped expedite EHP reviews.¶ According to FEMA officials, the delays caused by inefficient review processes have been amplified by FEMA’s reliance on an antiquated data management system. As we reported in our June 2009 report on the Transit Security Grant Program, FEMA did not have a mechanism for systematically collecting data on the status of individual grant projects through the review process.48 For example, although FEMA has systems to track the financial information related to its grants programs, these systems did not allow FEMA to track the status of grant reviews, such as EHP reviews. According to FEMA, the data management system used to manage the Transit Security Grant Program is also used to manage the PSGP and no changes have been made to the system since our 2009 report. As such, GPD officials reported that each PSGP program analyst maintained separate spreadsheets that tracked the grants for which they were responsible. Using numerous data systems and spreadsheets resulted in inefficiencies and, in some cases, lost data, as program analysts had to search across systems for information or were reliant on systems––such as the Homeland Security Information Network––that lost application information.49 The overall result was a data system that did not provide information in a timely manner and that could not be used effectively to manage the grant lifecycle

### Terrorism

Better detection fails- terrorists can hide their HEU from radiation detectors.

de Rugy 05 (Veronique, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, “Is Port Security Spending Making Us Safer?,”

http://cip.management.dal.ca/publications/Is%20Port%20Security%20Spending%20Making%20Us%20Safer.pdf)

Considering the extreme difficulty of interdicting drug smugglers, it seems that determined smugglers with a nuclear device would have little trouble circumventing the nation’s border protection and control, particularly because they would be able to leverage the techniques used successfully by drug smugglers. Further lowering their probability of being caught is the fact that, according to a series of experts testifying 11 before Congress in July 2005, terrorists could easily shield the highly enriched uranium and avoid detection from radiation detectors. 34

**Port security fails to solve terrorism**

a. Other targets besides ports

Shie 04, Tamara Renee Shie, [former visiting fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, research assistant at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, D.C. ], “Ships and Terrorists – Thinking Beyond Port Security”, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0445a.pdf

Unfortunately, relying on these initiatives alone creates a false sense of security. They are inadequate to deter terrorists from pursuing many maritime targets. The principal limitation of these two initiatives is their specific focus on the security of major transshipment ports. Though these are essential to international trade, securing only these ports will not protect them or a region from terrorist attacks. First, the emphasis on upgrading the security of major ports neglects the fact that these represent only a single link in the transportation chain. A shipping container may pass through some 15 physical locations and some two dozen individuals and/or companies while traveling from departure point to destination. Because containers are only searched at the major port, there is no guarantee they cannot be waylaid in route after that point. Second, the CSI conducts security checks only on U.S. bound containers. Therefore even if a tampered container arrives at a major port, if it is destined for a port other than the U.S., it is more likely to escape notice. Containers between the major ports of Singapore and Shenzhen or Pusan and Hong Kong are not subject to CSI requirements. Yet terrorist assaults on U.S. ships or interests can occur outside the U.S. Third, as major ports increase security, terrorists will look for other maritime targets or other means to target those ports. Terrorists are increasingly aiming at soft targets. Attacking maritime targets has never been particularly easy, often requiring a greater sophistication in planning, training, and coordination than those aimed at many land-based facilities. This is why maritime terrorism is rather rare, and why terrorists are less likely to attack a more secure major port. Yet in considering maritime terrorist threat scenarios – using a ship to smuggle goods or weapons, sinking a vessel in a major shipping thoroughfare, using a ship as a weapon, or even targeting maritime vessels – none require access to a major port or a shipping container to carry out a strike. There remain numerous small ports and small vessels not covered under the new security initiatives. The ISPS Code for instance only covers ships of 500 tons or more and port facilities that serve large international-bound vessels. The Code would not have protected the USS Cole.

b. Effective nuclear detection is impossible

Rugy 07, Veronique de Rugy, [senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University],“Is Port Security Funding Making Us Safer?”, MIT Center for International Studies, November 2007, <http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_11_07_derugy.pdf>.

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) received $535 million in 2007.14 DNDO’s mission addresses a broad spectrum of radiological and nuclear protective measures, but is focused exclusively on domestic nuclear detection.15 The fundamental problem is that DNDO relies on radiation portal monitors that have been proven unable to detect shielded nuclear material essentially rendering them useless.16 Besides, even if the system could detect every dangerous item, it is ineffective unless the nuclear material is brought through the fixed ports of entry where the monitors are located. With thousand of miles of unguarded borders—and no cost effective way to address the issue—smugglers can easily find positions to bring illicit goods inside the country. Consider the country’s long standing War on Drugs and the inability to stop the flow of illegal drugs into the country.

c. Least cost-effective way

Rugy 07, Veronique de Rugy, [senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University],“Is Port Security Funding Making Us Safer?”, MIT Center for International Studies, November 2007, <http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_11_07_derugy.pdf>.

A close look at port security allocation decisions indicates that spending occurs without regard for risk analysis let alone cost-benefit analysis, leading to a large array of misallocated spending. For instance, why should the highest priorities—preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear devices and material—receive less money than much less cost-effective policies such as nuclear detection in the ports or post-disaster response activities. Because it rests mainly on domestic detection of WMD in ports—a task that is not clear could be achieved—the port security model offers almost no value to the nation.6 Even if we could seal our ports, America wouldn’t be safe. The only effective way to prevent nuclear attacks is to deny terrorists access to weapons and material. Without nuclear materials there can be no nuclear bombs.

d. Vulnerability between stops

Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz 2006- Director of the Economy Program at the Public Policy Institute of  California and Senior Economist; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School (*Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost,* Pg 30-31, http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r\_606jhr.pdf)

In Chapter 4, Stephen S. Cohen considers the security threat that¶ the container creates for the maritime transportation system. Each day,¶ tens of thousands of containers flow through U.S. ports, largely¶ undisturbed in their trip from one part of the world to another. In¶ general, containers are loaded and sealed, or perhaps only closed and not¶ sealed, well inland of a port. They are then transferred by truck, or truck¶ and train, to a seaport, where they are loaded onto a ship. Following the¶ sea journey, they are transferred to another truck, and perhaps another¶ train, for a further journey over land to the ultimate destination.¶ Each container trip to the United States has, on average, 17 different¶ stops, or points at which the container’s journey temporarily halts.14¶ The adage “goods at rest are goods at risk” readily applies to the terrorist¶ threat. The container will be at rest at any point in the journey that¶ involves a change in mode of transportation. While at rest, the container¶ is vulnerable to thieves and terrorists alike. Providing port security¶ therefore involves closely scrutinizing activities not only at the port but at¶ points all along the shipping chain. The truck driver picking up the¶ container at the U.S. port, often poorly paid and possibly an illegal¶ immigrant not well integrated into U.S. society, may himself represent a¶ vulnerability in the system.¶ The issue is not merely that something could be put in a container¶ illicitly for an attack on the port where it is unloaded but that nuclear weapons or radiological material could be inserted, shipped to the¶ United States, moved inland without inspection, and then unloaded into¶ the hands of terrorists. These objects could then be transported for use¶ in major population centers—perhaps better targets than a port complex.¶ Likewise, explosive material could be put in several containers and then¶ detonated at or near port complexes around the same time, leading to a¶ security reaction that could shut down the entire maritime transportation¶ system until officials, and port workers and management, were certain¶ the threat had passed.¶ There is no way to completely inspect all of the millions of¶ containers entering the United States. They are about as large as a fullsize¶ moving van and are often tightly packed. Inspecting each¶ thoroughly would bring commerce to a halt, exactly the kind of reaction¶ that terrorists hope to generate.

The risk of nuclear terrorism is vanishingly small -- terrorists must succeed at each of twenty plus stages -- failing at one means zero risk

Mueller, ‘10 [John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and a Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University, A.B. from the University of Chicago, M.A. and Ph.D. -- UCLA, “Atomic Obsession – Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda,” Oxford University Press]

.Even those who decidedly disagree with such scary-sounding, if somewhat elusive, prognostications about nuclear terrorism often come out seeming like they more or less agree. In his Atomic Bazaar, William Langewiesche spends a great deal of time and effort assessing the process by means of which a terrorist group could come up with a bomb. Unlike Allison—and, for that matter, the considerable bulk of accepted opinion—he concludes that it "remains very, very unlikely. It's a possibility, but unlikely." Also: The best information is that no one has gotten anywhere near this. I mean, if you look carefully and practically at this process, you see that it is an enormous undertaking full of risks for the would-be terrorists. And so far there is no public case, at least known, of any appreciable amount of weapons-grade HEU [highly enriched uranium] disappearing. And that's the first step. If you don't have that, you don't have anything. The first of these bold and unconventional declarations comes from a book discussion telecast in June 2007 on C-SPAN and the second from an inter-view on National Public Radio. Judgments in the book itself, however, while consistent with such conclusions, are expressed more ambiguously, even coyly: "at the extreme is the possibility, entirely real, that one or two nuclear weapons will pass into the hands of the new stateless guerrillas, the jihad-ists, who offer none of the retaliatory targets that have so far underlain the nuclear peace" or "if a would-be nuclear terrorist calculated the odds, he would have to admit that they are stacked against^ffen," but they are "not impossible."5 The previous chapter arrayed a lengthy set of obstacles confront-: v ,„ ing the would-be atomic terrorist—often making use in the process of Langewlesche's excellent reporting. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if often with great difficulty, surmount each obstacle—that doing so in each case is, in Langewiesche's phrase, "not impossible."6 But it is vital to point out that, while it may be "not impossible" to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them could quickly approach impossibility. If the odds are "stacked against" the terrorists, what are they? Lange-wiesche's discussion, as well as other material, helps us evaluate the many ways such a quest—in his words, "an enormous undertaking full of risks"— could fail. The odds, indeed, are stacked against the terrorists, perhaps massively so. In fact, the likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small. ARRAYING THE BARRIERS Assuming terrorists have some desire for the bomb (an assumption ques-tioned in the next chapter), fulfillment of that desire is obviously another matter. Even the very alarmed Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier contend that the atomic terrorists' task "would clearly be among the most difficult types of attack to carry out" or "one of the most difficult missions a terrorist group could hope to try" But, stresses the CIA's George Tenet, a terrorist atomic bomb is "possible" or "not beyond the realm of possibility." In his excellent discussion of the issue, Michael Levi ably catalogues a wide array of difficulties confronting the would-be atomic terrorist, adroitly points out that "terrorists must succeed at every stage, but the defense needs to succeed only once," sensibly warns against preoccupation with worst-case scenarios, and pointedly formulates "Murphy's Law of Nuclear Terrorism: What can go wrong might go wrong." Nevertheless, he holds nuclear terrorism to be a "genuine possibility," and concludes that a good defensive strategy can merely "tilt the odds in our favor."7 Accordingly, it might be useful to take a stab at estimating just how "difficult" or "not impossible" the atomic terrorists' task, in aggregate, is— that is, how far from the fringe of the "realm of possibility" it might be, how "genuine" the possibilities are, how tilted the odds actually are. After all, lots of things are "not impossible." It is "not impossible" that those legendary monkeys with typewriters could eventually output Shakespeare.8 Or it is "not impossible"—that is, there is a "genuine possibility"—that a colliding meteor or comet could destroy the earth, that Vladimir Putin or the British could decide one morning to launch a few nuclear weapons at Ohio, that an underwater volcano could erupt to cause a civilization-ending tidal wave, or that Osama bin Laden could convert to Judaism, declare himself to be the Messiah, and fly in a gaggle of mafioso hit men from Rome to have himself publicly crucified.9 As suggested, most discussions of atomic terrorism deal in a rather piecemeal fashion with the subject—focusing separately on individual tasks such as procuring HEU or assembling a device or transporting it. However, as the Gilmore Commission, a special advisory panel to the president and Congress, stresses, setting off a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents "Herculean challenges," requiring that a whole series of steps be accomplished: obtaining enough fissile material, designing a weapon "that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a second" and figuring out some way to deliver the thing. And it emphasizes that these merely constitute "the minimum requirements." If each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less powerful weapon, but one that can't produce any significant nuclear yield at all or can't be delivered.10 Following this perspective, an approach that seems appropriate is to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome by a terrorist group in order to carry out the task of producing, transporting, and then successfully detonating an improvised nuclear device, an explosive that, as Allison acknowledges, would be "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient." Table 13.1 attempts to do this, and it arrays some 20 of these— all of which must be surmounted by the atomic aspirant. Actually, it would be quite possible to come up with a longer list: in the interests of keeping the catalogue of hurdles down to a reasonable number, some of the entries are actually collections of tasks and could be divided into two or three or more. For example, number 5 on the list requires that heisted highly enriched uranium be neither a scam nor part of a sting nor of inadequate quality due to insider incompetence, but this hurdle could as readily be rendered as three separate ones. In contemplating the task before them, woixftlsbe atomic terrorists effectively must go through an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do so, they are likely to find the prospects daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. "

### Economy

Terrorist attacks have a minimal effect on the economy

a. Ports aren’t key and empirics disprove

Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz 2006- Director of the Economy Program at the Public Policy Institute of  California and Senior Economist; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School (*Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost,* Pg 30-31, http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r\_606jhr.pdf)

In Chapter 2, Edward E. Leamer and Christopher Thornberg argue¶ that the actual costs of an attack on the Los Angeles–Long Beach port¶ complex may not be as high as many fear. For example, if a port is¶ closed, many shippers will reroute their shipments through other ports.¶ In addition, displaced workers will seek alternative employment. As a result, the economy will adjust. Some output will be lost, but it may be¶ so small in magnitude that it will not reveal itself in data that track¶ national or even regional macroeconomic trends.¶ The authors provide examples of other disruptions that might have¶ caused severe economic damage but did not, such as the terrorist attacks¶ of September 11, 2001. Consumer spending fell immediately after the¶ attacks but then rebounded sharply at the end of 2001, growing at an¶ unprecedented, seasonally adjusted annual rate of 7 percent. Likewise,¶ although retail sales fell immediately after the attacks, they returned to¶ trend in November, only two months later. Some sectors did suffer,¶ most notably the airline industry, which had already been in deep¶ trouble before the end of the technology boom in early 2001. But¶ consumer spending actually increased, suggesting that people reallocated¶ the money that they would have spent on airline travel to other forms of¶ consumption. Similarly, the authors argue that other disruptions such as¶ hurricanes, earthquakes, and even labor disputes at seaports did have¶ immediate negative economic effects but that these effects dissipated¶ quickly as the economy adjusted. The message in this is that most such¶ disruptions lead to business being delayed rather than business being¶ cancelled, which in turn results in much less economic harm than would¶ be expected.

b. The economy’s resilience and excess physical capacity checks back

Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz 2006- Director of the Economy Program at the Public Policy Institute of  California and Senior Economist; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School (*Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost,* Pg 67-69, http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r\_606jhr.pdf)

A cursory look would seem to portend a dramatic, dangerous¶ scenario, but a closer look at the facts suggests otherwise. From an¶ input-output perspective, a wide variety of holes would be quickly¶ created in the flow of production that would seem to lead to a very sharp¶ downturn in economic activity. But our economy is not a mechanical¶ system; it is an organic self-healing system, much like that of a human¶ being: Large injuries take time to heal, but for the most part they do¶ eventually heal. To continue the analogy, a port attack is only a cut on the arm—quickly healed with little noticeable effect on the day-to-day¶ functioning of the person.¶ Although the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach certainly¶ represent a primary infrastructure target in the United States, a complete¶ shutdown of the ports is highly unlikely as a direct result of some¶ physical attack. There are two reasons for this: the sheer physical scale of¶ the facilities and the large amount of excess physical capacity (as opposed¶ to human capital capacity) currently in place. As shown in the port map¶ on p. xxiii, the two facilities take up approximately 12 square miles of¶ space in a six-by-four-mile area. The complex is broken into a number¶ of separate yards, each completely controlled by a number of¶ independent, competing major shipping lines, each of which have¶ substantial investment in the physical cranes and equipment on their¶ property. Some of these yards are on Terminal Island, connected to the¶ mainland by three road bridges and a railroad; others are on the¶ mainland itself. There are multiple access points into the area as the map¶ shows, including two highways. Even if these roads were shut down, it¶ would be relatively simple to construct a temporary bridge to the island,¶ and although it might have some implications for the movement of¶ ships, no yard would be effectively isolated.3¶ Conventional weapons would be able to damage, at best, only a¶ small portion of the complex, and would be unable to isolate a¶ substantial portion of the port given the multiple access routes into and¶ out of the area. Even a so-called “dirty bomb” could cover only one or¶ two square miles of area with radioactivity. Given the location on the¶ water, winds would quickly blow most of the radioactive materials away,¶ leaving even most of the initially affected area quickly reusable. The only¶ known weapon that could take out an area of this size for an extended¶ period of time would be a nuclear weapon. It seems more likely that the¶ target of such a horrific device would be a densely populated area, not a¶ port.

Terrorism doesn’t affect growth

Haveman and Shatz 06 (Jon and Howard, Public Policy Institute of California, “Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost” http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R\_606JHR.pdf)

September 11 Did Not Cause the 2001 Recession **There is a strong tendency to blame too many secondary effects on****disasters**.A good example of this phenomenon is found in theSeptember 11 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.**In the days****after the attacks, the rhetoric regarding the potential effect on the****national economy was both loud and wrong.****The theory proposed by****many analysts and journalists was that psychologically fragile consumers****in the U**nited **S**tates **would suffer a crisis and stop spending, driving the****economy into a deeper recession.****Support for this theory came from the****first Gulf War,** which supposedly caused a similar consumer crisis ofconfidence that in turn drove us into a recession in 1990.For example,the Wall Street Journal reported on September 13, 2001: “Past shocks to America’s sense of security, such as the Oklahoma Citybombing or the Gulf War, have prompted consumers to pull back temporarilyon major purchases and other discretionary spending,” said Richard Curtin,director of surveys of consumers at the University of Michigan.He expects asimilar reaction now, which could mean a rough time in the next several weeksfor the economy, which was already struggling with rising jobless rates andhigh consumer debt burdens.“We were teetering on the edge, and this mightwell push us over,” said Mr. Curtin. **This hypothesis ignores the facts and completely overstates the****psychological fragility of American consumers.****The 1990 recession was****not caused by the first Gulf War at all**.**Residential investment and****expenditures on consumer durables typically are leading indicators of the****economy.**When spending on these items begins to fall as a percentageof gross domestic product (GDP), this is a strong indication of anunderlying weakness in the economy that will create a recession.**Expenditures in these two sectors had dropped from 14 percent of GDP****to below 12 percent of GDP in the three years preceding the 1990****downturn**—and before the Gulf war.**There has never been such a drop****that did not eventually lead to a recession**, with one exception—in 1967,when the economy was wobbling, appearing to be on the verge of recession, the sharp increase in spending for the Vietnam War propelledthe economy forward.This was just the reverse of what Mr. Curtinsuggested.

Economic growth causes extinction – we should allow the collapse to occur

Barry 08 [Dr. Glen Barry – PhD in Land Resources from Wisconsin-Madison University, January 14, 2008, “Economic Collapse and Global Ecology”, http://www.countercurrents.org/barry140108.htm]

Bright greens take the continued existence of a habitable Earth with viable, sustainable populations of all species including humans as the ultimate truth and the meaning of life. Whether this is possible in a time of economic collapse is crucially dependent upon whether enough ecosystems and resources remain post collapse to allow humanity to recover and reconstitute sustainable, relocalized societies.It may be better for the Earth and humanity's future that economic collapse comes sooner rather than later, while more ecosystems and opportunities to return to nature's fold exist. Economic collapse will be deeply wrenching -- part Great Depression, part African famine. There will be starvation and civil strife, and a long period of suffering and turmoil.Many will be killed as balance returns to the Earth. Most people have forgotten how to grow food and that their identity is more than what they own. Yet there is some justice, in that those who have lived most lightly upon the land will have an easier time of it, even as those super-consumers living in massive cities finally learn where their food comes from and that ecology is the meaning of life. Economic collapse now means humanity and the Earth ultimately survive to prosper again.¶ Human suffering -- already the norm for many, but hitting the currently materially affluent -- is inevitable given the degree to which the planet's carrying capacity has been exceeded. We are a couple decades at most away from societal strife of a much greater magnitude as the Earth's biosphere fails. Humanity can take the bitter medicine now, and recover while emerging better for it; or our total collapse can be a final, fatal death swoon.

Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Tir 10 [Jaroslav Tir - Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of Politics, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425]

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

No impact to economic decline

D. Scott Bennett and Timothy Nordstrom, February 2k. Department of Political Science Professors at Pennsylvania State. “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Ebsco.

In this analysis, **we focus on using economic conditions to understand when rivalries are likely to escalate or end.** Rivalries are an appropriate set of cases to use when examining substitutability both because leaders in rival states have clearly substitutable choices and because rivalries are a set of cases in which externalization is a particularly plausible policy option.7 In particular, **when confronted with domestic problems, leaders in a rivalry have the clear alternatives of escalating the conflict** with the rival to divert attention **or to** work to **settle** the rivalry as a means of freeing up a substantial amount of resources that can be directed toward solving internal problems. In the case of the diversion option, rivals provide logical, believable actors for leaders to target; the presence of a clear rival may offer unstable elites a particularly inviting target for hostile statements or actual conflict as necessary. The public and relevant elites already consider the rival a threat or else the rivalry would not have continued for an extended period; the presence of disputed issues also provides a casus belli with the rival that is always present. Rivals also may provide a target where the possible costs and risks of externalization are relatively controlled. If the goal is diversion, leaders willwant to divert attention without provoking an actual (and expensive)war. Over the course of many confrontations, rival states may learn to anticipate response patterns, leading to safer disputes or at least to leaders believing that they can control the risks of conflict when they initiate a new confrontation. In sum, rivals provide good targets for domestically challenged political leaders. This leads to our first hypothesis, which is as follows: *Hypothesis 1*: Poor economic conditions lead to diversionary actions against the rival. **Conflict settlement is also a distinct route to dealing with internal problems that leaders in rivalries may pursue when faced with internal problems. Military competition** between states **requires large amounts of resources, and rivals require even more attention. Leaders may choose to negotiate a settlement that ends a rivalry to free up important resources that may be reallocated to the domestic economy. In a “guns versus butter” world of economic trade-offs, when a state can no longer afford to pay the expenses associated with competition in a rivalry, it is quite rational for leaders to reduce costs by ending a rivalry. This** gain (a peace dividend) could be achieved at any time by ending a rivalry. However, such a gain **is likely to be most** important and **attractive to leaders when internal conditions are bad and the leader is seeking ways to alleviate active problems. Support for policy change away from continued rivalry is more likely to develop when the economic situation sours and elites and masses are looking for ways to improve a worsening situation. It is at these times that the pressure to cut military investment will be greatest and that state leaders will be forced to recognize the difficulty of continuing to pay for a rivalry**. Among other things, this argument also encompasses the view that the cold war ended because the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could no longer compete economically with the United States. *Hypothesis 2*: **Poor economic conditions increase the probability of rivalry termination.** Hypotheses 1 and 2 posit opposite behaviors in response to a single cause (internal economic problems). As such, they demand a research design that can account for substitutability between them.

## 2NC

### Solvency

### ---Funds Misspent

Port Security Grants are misspent- the DHS allocates money to unimportant projects.

de Rugy 05 (Veronique, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, “Is Port Security Spending Making Us Safer?,”

http://cip.management.dal.ca/publications/Is%20Port%20Security%20Spending%20Making%20Us%20Safer.pdf)

Again, the DHS Inspector General’s audit of the Port Security Grant Program confirms this vast problem of misplaced priorities. It explains that the Department has put too much emphasis on spreading money around broadly, instead of directing it toward the most vulnerable and important targets or toward cost effective security measures. According to the audit, “Grant award decisions are made with the intent of expending all available funding and spreading funds to as many applicants as possible.” 99 During the third round, selection officials even capped funding per entity and per award in order to reach more applicants and projects. 100 Consequently, hundred of thousands of dollars were spent on low-traffic ports defined as low-risk areas by DHS’s own standards. Major ports such as New York, Los Angeles, Houston, and South Louisiana received large allocations, but DHS also awarded smaller grants to ports such as Christiansted in the Virgin Islands, Martha’s Vineyard in Massachusetts, Tulsa Port of Catoosa in Oklahoma, and six ports in Alaska, none of which appeared to meet the grant eligibility requirements. 101 For example, $180,000 was awarded to a port that the field review team described as a “small remote facility that receives less than 20 ships a year.” 102

### ---Detection Fails

Nuclear detection fails- its too easy to spoof.

de Rugy 05 (Veronique, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, “Is Port Security Spending Making Us Safer?,”

http://cip.management.dal.ca/publications/Is%20Port%20Security%20Spending%20Making%20Us%20Safer.pdf)

Finally, the fourth best solution is direct onsite detection at local ports. This is the least cost effective measure because, according to experts, it is hard to detect highly enriched uranium and almost impossible to detect anything if it is shielded. As such, the effectiveness of the detection devices we have now is dubious. However, even if the detection devices were capable of detecting dangerous material, it would still be riskier than the three other solutions because the stakes are so high: if the system fails, the illicit material ends up inside the country.

# 2NC

## States

## Overview

The fifty states can solve the affirmative – that’s 1NC Allen – local autonomy allows for efficient and more knowledgeable construction of port security – prefer comparative evidence as to how empirically the states have been more successful

And no solvency deficits – not ONE of their cards says specifically what is necessary other than “security” – all this requires is funding by the states which the counterplan ensures

The states are superior to the federal government in port security

Beisecker 06 [Randall Beisecker - Research Assistant, Monterey Institute of International Studies, March 01, 2006, “DP World and U.S. Port Security”, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/dp-world-and-us-port-security/]

Despite DP World's attempt to diffuse, or at least delay the controversy, lawmakers remain indignant that they were left out of the loop on such a hot-button issue as national security, and are seizing this opportunity to introduce legislation prohibiting state-controlled companies from operating in U.S. ports. In addition, Congress wants greater legislative oversight over the workings and decisions of CFIUS. The danger is that Congress may overstep its bounds in its zealous desire to react. Instead, Congress should listen to the states and port employees and focus on how it can improve communications with other levels of government, improve the capacity of programs and legislation already in place, and work with the CFIUS process to reflect current concerns over national security.

### AT: Coordination

The program that the affirmative fund already exists and requires federal-state coordination – therefore all that is required in order for the counterplan to solve is funding, and we do so – it’s not an intrastate project like high-speed rail

### AT: Training/Equipment

The federal government already offers training to state governments and security officers – however the plan cannot increase training as a solvency deficit

Haveman and Shatz 06 [Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz 2006- Director of the Economy Program at the Public Policy Institute of  California and Senior Economist; Professor at Pardee RAND Graduate School (Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, Pg 212, http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r\_606jhr.pdf]

The grants program and the handling of labor both illustrate the question of allocations within security categories. Grants cannot be used for the operation of equipment or for training of personnel and must be spent within one year. Port officials consider these terms too rigid. Any new security equipment must be maintained and, often, security enhancing projects can take more than a year to complete. The choice between the purchase of equipment and the maintenance of that equipment is an allocation decision that fits within the framework described above.44 Properly targeting grants has been an issue throughout the development of the U.S. homeland security response. In an evaluation of the federal grant system for first responders, the GAO reported that any effective grant system should target states and localities at greatest risk. “A proclivity to spread money around, unfortunately, may provide less additional net protection while actually placing additional burdens on state and local governments. Given the significant needs and limited federal resources, it will be important to target to areas of greatest need.”

### AT: Risk Assessment

The counterplan mandates cooperation with the Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security over port security – here’s a quote from their 1AC evidence as to how this solves all problems with risk assessment –

“The U.S. Coast Guard has the training, expertise and systems in place to assess risk, threat and vulnerability - most states do not possess this capability” – fortunately, the CP allows this capability

### AT: No Coast Guard/DHS

The Coast Guard and DHS cooperates with states

Lane 2009 [Drefus Lane - Colonel in the US Army, “U.S. Seaport Security: Critical Challenge for Department of Homeland Security”, 2/4/2009, US Army War College, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA499287>]

Achieving U.S. seaport security requires several joint endeavors. As this analysis¶ has shown, securing the U.S. seaports is not a single integrated mission, but a¶ multifaceted set of assorted missions and functions that must be performed jointly by¶ federal, state, local, and a host of other organizations. DHS has expanded its area¶ borders outward so that ports can identify, interdict, and prevent suspicious cargo from¶ directly threaten our country. DHS requires information and intelligence on every single¶ U.S. bound shipping container before it has been loaded onto a foreign ship. CBP¶ officers are “stationed at 58 overseas ports [that account] for 86 percent of the container¶ traffic that comes to the United States. [DHS has] deployed equipment overseas to scan¶ cargo for radiation before it leaves for our country [and has] proposed new regulations¶ to collect more commercial data from the private sector [to] better track international¶ shipments.”¶ 36¶ DHS is currently developing a comprehensive national strategy that will¶ provide a roadmap for joint, integrated action and for realizing the leverage and synergy¶ that is attainable only through joint operations with international, federal, state, and local¶ participants to include the DOD. This master plan plays a critical role in securing the¶ homeland.¶ U.S. port security requires joint operational concepts. Despite the large number¶ of federal homeland security strategies disseminated in the wake of 9/11, none provide¶ “clear joint or interagency operating concepts. These policy documents provide general¶ guidance regarding the goals of homeland security and the need to share information15¶ and coordinate, but none recommend the formulation of a joint operations concept.”¶ 37¶ This is an incredible strategic gap, considering the widespread “perception that DHS¶ was created in order to ‘consolidate’ federal homeland security efforts.”¶ 38¶ Port security efforts must be adequately resourced. This means more than just¶ providing funding to agencies at the federal and state levels, such as funding the Coast Guard for port security operations and deployments, or hardening physical assets and infrastructures, or adding personnel and improving equipment. Port security requires a paradigm shift. The immediate national response must focus on creating U.S. concepts¶ for joint or interagency operations and on processes in place to sustain and maintain¶ nation-wide capabilities for port security. The need to ensure and enable a safer¶ America and its seaports is evident from the studies and commissions conducted after¶ 9/11. There are many common-sense measures being implemented to protect our¶ ports. New restrictions and regulations are implemented for seaports and maritime¶ facilities throughout the nation. Companies are required to file security plans with the¶ Coast Guard that identifies its vulnerabilities along with a feasible, suitable, and¶ acceptable plan to mitigate risk. Nearly 80,000 maritime employees are enrolled into the Transportation Identification Credential (TIC) program by the Coast Guard. There are considerable improvements in container management at the ports; virtually all¶ containers are scanned for radiation upon their arrival to prevent the entry of potential¶ weapons of mass destruction. Prior to 9/11, no cargo was scanned.”¶ 39¶ Securing the¶ homeland is not a single integrated mission but a complex set of diverse missions and¶ functions performed jointly by a number of organizations facing potential threats which¶ could occur in locations nationwide. The success of homeland security hinges on16¶ cooperation and coordination of multiple independent elements acting at different levels.¶ DHS and its security partners face the challenge of devising a comprehensive national¶ strategy that is a roadmap for joint, integrated action and for realizing the leverage and¶ synergy that is attainable only through joint operations of federal, state and local parties.¶ DOD is a significant participant in this endeavor; its enormous capabilities can be¶ skillfully incorporated in the overall security strategy.

## Privitization

### Overview

The counterplan solves the entirety of the affirmative – that’s 1NC Plumer – prefer comparative evidence as to how private investors have incentives to fund things with economic motives – empirically proven

### Solvency

Local port authorities can offer to deals to lease and operate their ports with specific conditions for new improvements attached to the offer—private investors will say yes, there is a huge chance to profit from ports.

Ybarra, senior transportation policy analyst-Reason Foundation, 09 (Shirley, “Port Privatization Trend Growing,” April 23, 2009, http://reason.org/news/show/port-privatization-trend-growi)

Efficient trade depends on the capacity of our nation's transportation infrastructure, making ongoing infrastructure maintenance and modernization projects crucial to the long-term success of the economy. With the economy in recession and the nearly every state facing budget deficits, legislators and local officials are being forced to consider better ways to pay for infrastructure improvements. Like America's highways and railroads, ports are an integral part of the nation's transportation system. Today, many ports must update their facilities to accommodate for changing vessel sizes, fluctuating trends in world trade, and escalating global port security standards. According to the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), United States ports invested more than $31.2 billion to improve their facilities between 1946 and 2006, nearly a quarter of which was invested after 2001. Between 2007 and 2011, 35 of the 85 ports surveyed by the AAPA are committed to investing approximately $9.4 billion in infrastructure improvements. Unlike highways and the highway trust fund, ports do not have a dedicated source of federal funds. Historically, ports have relied on the revenues generated from operations, bonds supported by those revenues and a few government grants to keep their facilities up to date. Some state and local governments appropriate money from their budgets to support port improvements. Generally, however, ports are left to fund themselves. Recently, more and more ports have been turning to third-party investors to finance infrastructure modernization projects through public-private partnerships (PPPs). This change is due to both a lack of overall funding available given the demand for facility improvements and a growing number of private investors who see great potential for future returns on their investments in the nation's ports. As managing partner of the private infrastructure investment firm Highstar Capital, Christopher Lee puts it: "Ports are going to be one of the first lines of the economy to turn when the environment improves. We want to be ahead of the competition." In my previous commentary, I noted that the Virginia Port Authority received an unsolicited public-private partnership proposal from the investment firm, CenterPoint Properties Trust. Although the proposal was initially met with skepticism from legislators and members of the media, it is now posted on the Port Authority's website and is undergoing review for approval according to the process prescribed by Virginia's Public Private Partnership Act of 1995. This time-tested process has previously been used to bring successful PPPs to fruition in Virginia, such as the High-Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes now under construction on the Beltway in Northern Virginia and the completed Pocahontas Parkway. Competing proposals for operating Virginia's ports are due in July, and as I previously advised, authorities in the Commonwealth of Virginia should carefully consider the PPP proposals, given Virginia's past success with public-private partnership infrastructure projects. And the trend is continuing. In recent weeks, public-private partnership proposals for ports have appeared in two other states, Maryland and Alabama. Maryland On April 15, 2009, the Maryland Port Authority (MPA) issued a request for a private investor to lease and operate the Port of Baltimore's Seagirt Marine Terminal. The MPA would like to partner with a private investor to fund a new 50-foot berth and increase the capacity of Seagirt Marine Terminal's waterborne containers. According to the terms of the proposed deal, the MPA would lease the 200-acre Seagirt Marine Terminal exclusively to the private investor. The private investor would be required to invest in a new berth, cranes and other necessary infrastructure, while providing a revenue stream to the MPA and meeting a minimum annual cargo guarantee. The government would continue to own the port, but would award the private investor with the port's business that is currently under contract with the MPA/Maryland International Terminals. The full request is available here. The MPA hopes to close a deal on the public-private partnership in 2010. Alabama The Alabama State Port Authority recently solicited a request for a private partner to invest in the development and operation of the 74-acre Garrows Bend Intermodal Container Traffic Facility (ICTF) in Mobile, Alabama. The ICTF would handle both domestic and international traffic for multiple rail carriers and steamship lines and would finance its own operations. According to the ASPA, the facility would benefit the local economy by creating jobs, improving the ASPA's competitive position, and reducing highway congestion in the region. According to Jimmy Lyons, director and CEO of the ASPA, "This is the first step in the process by the Port Authority to initiate efforts to identify a private sector partner for development of the intermodal facility and is a continuation of the Choctaw Point project that started in early 2000. From the beginning, we have envisioned this project as a true public private partnership." Potential private investors must submit a formal expression of interest by May 22, 2009 (more information is available here). Public-private partnerships are becoming increasingly popular because port authorities can no longer rely on just their own revenues and the limited amount of funding available from state and local governments to fill in funding gaps, and because private investors are confident that ports will be at the forefront of the economy when global economic conditions begin to improve. One of the forces driving investor confidence in ports is the opening of the expanded Panama Canal, which is scheduled for 2014 or 2015. Once the Panama Canal is expanded, mega-ships, which cannot fit through the Canal in its current condition, will be able to reduce their transit times by cutting through the canal en route from China to East and Gulf Coast ports in the United States. Private investors that put their money down now are likely to receive generous returns from the lucrative container trade from China, which will be able to arrive on the East Coast faster through the Panama Canal than it could moving inland by cargo or rail from West Coast ports in the U.S. Public-private partnerships are a natural extension of the business model for ports, and we are sure to see more port authorities following the examples of Virginia, Maryland, and Alabama in the future. This is because, unlike traditional highway transportation departments, port authorities have always had to compete with other ports to maintain a customer base. Port authorities that capitalize on the port's natural ability to operate in a business climate by seeking capital from public-private partnerships will be well positioned when the expanded Panama Canal ushers in a new and improved world of shipping.

Private investment in port security is comparatively better than the federal Port Grant Security Program\*\*

de Rugy 05 (Veronique, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, “Is Port Security Spending Making Us Safer?,”

http://cip.management.dal.ca/publications/Is%20Port%20Security%20Spending%20Making%20Us%20Safer.pdf)

Despite this policy improvement, a more fundamental issue still needs to be addressed: whether the federal government should even be involved in upgrading port security. Public seaports are generally owned and operated by local governments through a port authority; however, large portions of seaport real estate are leased to the private sector with the local government operating as a landlord. In addition, there are many privately owned and operated terminals within seaports that exist independently of the local port authority. Where do the private, state, and local sectors’ responsibilities for preventing terrorism end and where does the federal government’s begin? As mentioned earlier, none of the prevention techniques used in ports is a public good: the cost to the port would be the same as the cost to the government. And as with other government spending, the local or private decision-maker is in a better position to determine local needs and the most effective way to meet them. Accordingly, all such spending should be local, e.g., paid for from taxes and fees charged by the port in question. Having port authorities and the private sector responsible for the direct defense of ports would guarantee a more responsible use of the money. When port security is federalized, a given port authority official and the state’s Congressmen have no incentive to admit that the port is not a likely target or that if it ever were a target, damages would be limited. By contrast, when port security programs are the responsibility of states and port authorities, officials have an incentive to assess risk and potential damages accurately. Moreover, once port security is the responsibility of port authorities, they have an incentive to identify the most cost effective measures. They are also the best suited to identify how much should be spent on each measure. If, for instance, they measure that the biggest expected cost from an attack is not the loss of the inventory stored in the port but the number of days that the port is unable to operate, port authorities will lower the expected damage by developing plans for the aftermath of an attack. They will focus on evacuating civilians and personnel, placing emergency equipment within easy reach, training personnel to handle emergencies and attacks, and planning for business continuity to allow the port to get up and running quickly after an attack. Given these factors, the PSGP is probably a misuse of our federal dollars. The good news is that it remains rather small. The even better news is that the administration and DHS are trying to reform the PSGP. In his FY2006 budget, President Bush proposes consolidating multiple narrowly-focused programs (PSGP, Transit/Rail Security, Intercity Bus, Trucking Industry Security, and Buffer Zone Protection) into a Target Infrastructure Protection Program (TIPP).

Privatizing ports solves investment in them.

Edwards, Director of Tax Policy-CATO, 05 (Chris, Privatize the Army Corps of Engineers, Cato Institute, October, http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb-0510-27.pdf)

Reform Options To solve these problems, the civilian activities of the Corps should be transferred to state, local, or private ownership. A rough framework for reform might be: • Privatize: port dredging, hydroelectric dams, beach replenishment, and other activities that could be supported by user fees and revenues. • Transfer to lower governments: levees, municipal water and sewer projects, recreational areas, locks, channels, and other waterway infrastructure. Such reforms could accompany broader reforms to U.S. ports and waterways. For example, U.S. ports are owned by state and local governments and are dredged by the Army Corps. But ports could be privatized, and they could purchase dredging services in the marketplace. The harbor maintenance tax could be repealed, and ports could recover dredging costs from port users. For example, if the $286 million Delaware River dredging project made sense, it could be funded by the refineries and other industries along the river that would be the beneficiaries. In Britain, 19 ports were privatized in 1983 to form Associated British Ports. ABP and a subsidiary UK Dredging sell port and dredging services in the marketplace. They earn a profit, pay taxes, and return dividends to shareholders. 11 Two-thirds of British cargo goes through privatized ports, which are highly efficient. In the United States, there are complaints that governments are not investing enough in port facilities and dredging to the detriment of U.S. international trade. If ports were privatized, they could invest and expand as needed to relieve congestion and accommodate larger ships.

Private sector competition in ports avoids government monopolies

Hakim et al 96 (Simon Hakim, Paul Seidenstat, & Gary W. Bowman; Greenwood Publishing Group, an educational and academic publisher; Privatizing Transportation Systems, pg. 5; 1996, accessed 7/18/12)

Water ports are similar in nature to airports where the infrastructure is very costly and therefore may require long-term government financing and ownership; however, ports can be operated by private enterprises. Privatization of operations is an efficient policy when sufficient competition exists so that private monopoly cannot simply replace government monopoly and enjoy monopolistic profits. The competitive environment dictates whether privatization of operations is feasible and what form the private involvement should take. Privatization of operations under government ownership of facilities is the most common framework. Direct competition exists when two or more terminals in the same port compete for the same service, such as the container trade. Clearly, where large ports that serve large markets exist, privatization is possible. It is usually believed that the port authority should not restrict its operators to specific types of cargo, such as containers, but should allow competition of noncontainerized cargo during periods of low demand for the basic service.

## Elections

### 2NC Link Wall

**Extend Kraushaar – deficit spending is a death wish for Obama – the public would GREATLY oppose it and cause them to change their decisions – our economy based uniqueness evidence proves the sensitivity of the link**

**Obama is hinging the election on REDUCING spending – the plan causes independents to vote Republican**

Kirchgaessner, ’11 (Stephanie, “Obama looks to independent voters,” April 15 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7dd54d5c-678c-11e0-9138-00144feab49a.html#axzz1T844vB9m

Barack Obama is betting that his attack on the Republican deficit reduction plan, which he has derided as un-American, will resonate with independent voters as he prepares to hit the campaign trail next week. The president will hold town hall meetings in California and two swing states: Nevada and Virginia. The political winds seemed to shift in favour of Democrats this week, with Mr Obama looking – for the first time in months – as if he is primed to lead his party into the difficult fiscal battles that lie ahead. It was, at the same time, a tumultuous week for the increasingly divided Republican majority in the House of Representatives. Party lawmakers called for their leaders to be more aggressive in demanding spending cuts and almost unanimously endorsed a 2012 budget plan that could have dire political consequences in the next election.

The proposal by Republican Paul Ryan to cut $5,800bn in the next decade and transform Medicare, the insurance programme for the elderly, passed 235 to 193 in the House without a single Democratic vote. House passes 2012 budget Republicans in the House of Representatives united on Friday behind a 2012 budget plan slashing trillions of dollars in government spending while cutting taxes. The vote effectively serves as the Republicans’ opening gambit in what are likely to be contentious negotiations with President Barack Obama and his Democrats over debt and deficits in the coming months. The U.S. Congress must decide within weeks on raising the $14,300bn US debt ceiling. By a vote of 235-193, the House passed the plan written by House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan for the 2012 fiscal year beginning October 1. Democrats rejected the measure, which proposes slashing spending by nearly $6 trillion over a decade and reducing benefits for the elderly and poor. All but four Republicans supported it. There is almost no chance of the Senate approving the measure in its current form. The White House swiftly condemned the measure but said it was committed to working with Republicans to bring down record deficits that all sides acknowledged imperil the country’s economic future. Reuters “I think Obama has had his best week in a while,” said Democratic strategist James Carville. “His speech really has got Democrats excited again. Also, they feel they are on the right side of public opinion here.” Mr Obama’s address on Wednesday satisfied the liberal base by reaffirming his support of tax increases for the wealthy to pay for entitlement programmes for the poor and elderly. It also spoke to independent voters who abandoned Democrats in last year’s congressional election by reassuring them that he believed the deficit required immediate action."

No link turns:

1. No uniqueness for it - Obama already has the vote for national security – Bin Laden

The Hub 7/7/12 [“Why Obama Can't Lose in 2012” http://robephiles.hubpages.com/hub/Why-Obama-Cant-Lose-in-2012]

IN OBAMA’s FAVOR 1. National Security: While he may seem vulnerable on the economy one place he isn’t is on national security. Republicans can’t appeal to the voters who think that Obama is too much of a hawk because they have a base full of hawks. Their only option is to try to appear tougher than he is which will be pretty hard since he got Bin Laden and hasn’t wavered much on the foreign policies of the Bush administration.

2. The public doesn’t think the plan solves terrorism- just because they are concerned about the issue does not mean they think the plan is effective in stopping an attack.

Peters, senior researcher at RAND, no date (John E., “Understanding Homeland Security- Congressional Action, Public Attitudes and Task Areas,” http://www.fathom.com/course/21701714/session3.html)

Public attitudes Although there has of course heightened public awareness of terrorism after the September 11 attacks, even well before the attacks opinion polls showed that the American people seem to have gotten the message on the danger of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Public opinion data reveal a differentiated set of attitudes that indicate a reasonable level of concern and a strong desire to see action taken against the threats but no expectation that the measures taken can ever eliminate the possibility of attacks: Although fewer than 1 percent of Americans think of terrorism when asked to identify the most important problem facing the country, more than half of those polled in September 1996 indicated that terrorism was one of the most important problems for the nation today, and about one in three polled in April 1997 identified terrorism as the greatest threat facing the United States in coming years, and the greatest threat to world peace. Nearly three out of four believe that there is a chance that terrorists could attack with WMD, but fewer than one in six said they worried a great deal about this. Similarly, nearly six in ten believe that a foreign country could launch a nuclear attack against the United States, although fewer than one in ten said they worried a great deal about it. When asked whether they perceive the greater threat of terrorism to come from inside or outside the country, nearly half (47 percent) indicated inside while four in ten said outside, and 11 percent volunteered "both." There also were indications at the time of the Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995 that a slight majority of the public believed that bombings like that may become common in the future. Regarding the government's response to the emerging threat: In July 1996, the public was evenly split between those who believed that the US government was doing enough to prevent terrorism in this country (48 percent) and those who did not think so (48 percent). More than half of those polled in April 1995 and March 1996 felt that antiterrorism laws were too weak. In August 1998, large majorities indicated they were following news reports on government activities to prevent terrorism. A total of 71 percent said that they had followed such reports very closely (33 percent) or fairly closely (38 percent). In August 1998, majorities indicated that they had a sober view of the difficulties in preventing terrorist incidents; when asked how many terrorist incidents officials would be able to prevent if they were given the tools they needed, more than half indicated that they would be able to prevent few or none, and fewer than 1 in 20 thought that all such attacks could be prevented. In 1999, substantial majorities indicated that reducing the threat of international terrorism should be a "top priority" of the US government. The impression one gets from the public opinion data is that the public are concerned about homeland security issues and expect intelligence, law enforcement and defense officials to engage in the necessary planning and preparations, wherever possible, to prevent terrorist acts against the United States. Nevertheless, majorities also have a fairly realistic appraisal of the difficulties of preventing terrorist incidents--fewer than 1 in 20 believe that all future terrorist attacks could be prevented if law enforcement officials (and, presumably others) were given the tools they need.

Americans don’t care about port security

Nossel 06 [Suzanne Nossel - Executive Director of Amnesty International USA, February 28, 2006, “Na Na Na Na, Hey Hey Hey, Dubai”, http://warisacrime.org/node/8402]

But there could be one positive spillover from what otherwise looks like just another political foul-up for the Bush Administration. The Dubai deal has finally gotten politicians - both nationally and in key coastal cities - to start talking seriously about port security. Port security has been a watchword since right after 9/11, but while great plans have been laid on paper, and Bush has outlined a[thorough maritime security agenda](http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html), virtually nothing has been implemented. Most Americans simply don't spend a lot of time thinking about boats, and its been tough to get political leaders to focus on unsexy imperatives like rigorous container inspection. Lorelei looks at some of the key steps that need to be taken (and why they haven't been)

## Politics

### Link

Funding for the Port Security Grant Program causes a huge fight in Congress.

de Rugy 05 (Veronique, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, “Is Port Security Spending Making Us Safer?,”

http://cip.management.dal.ca/publications/Is%20Port%20Security%20Spending%20Making%20Us%20Safer.pdf)

The total amount allocated to port security grants over four years is $706 million. In addition, the Transit Grant Program for ferry security received an additional $5 million in FY2005. 44 Interestingly, the Port Security Grant Program represents a small portion of port security money—les than a percent—and is only 0.3 percent of homeland security spending government wide. Yet, each year, the House and the Senate fight over the amount this program will receive. This year was no exception. In other words, the Port Security Grant Programs is a very political program because it is a very visible program that Congress~~men~~ like to use to show their commitment to homeland security and to their constituents.