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## 1AC – Inherency

Despite a massive budget, the Department of Homeland Security’s investment in research and technology for port security is failing

Berrick 3-8-12 – Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office (Cathleen, House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management Hearing; "Eliminating Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and Duplication in the Department of Homeland Security," Congressional Documents and Publications, Lexis)

DHS management of acquisitions could be strengthened to reduce cost overruns and schedule and performance shortfalls. As DHS's acquisition spending has increased to over $14 billion and its portfolio of complex acquisitions continues to expand, most DHS acquisition programs we reviewed have not met cost, schedule, and performance expectations. For example, CBP's program to modernize its computer application for disseminating data to support port-of-entry inspections did not have a component- or department-approved baseline after more than 6 years. Action 1: DHS should ensure requirements and cost estimates are well defined upfront. . February 2012 Update: DHS partially addressed our recommendation to ensure that requirements and cost estimates are well defined up front by developing plans to address management of acquisitions. For example, DHS reported that it planned to implement an integrated investment life-cycle model to establish a decision-making process for investments' life cycles and that, as of December 2011, the department had chosen three portfolios to pilot this process. DHS also partially addressed our recommendation to establish and measure performance against department-approved baselines and indicators for major acquisition programs by working to develop a decision support tool to track programs' cost, schedule, and performance indicators. Further, DHS partially addressed our recommendation to ensure that its investment decisions are transparent and documented by planning to have its Investment Review Board, once established, meet regularly to approve major program decisions. These actions are positive steps that should help strengthen DHS's acquisition management processes. However, DHS is in the early stages of implementing these actions, thus it is too soon to assess their impact on reducing acquisition cost overruns and schedule and performance shortfalls at this time. Action 3: DHS should ensure investment decisions are transparent and documented, among other things. Improvements in managing research and development (RandD) could help reduce inefficiencies and costs for homeland security. DHS has experienced challenges in managing its multibillion dollar RandD efforts, and we have identified problems with its testing and cost-benefit analyses efforts in this area. For example, DHS spent more than $200 million on advanced spectroscopic portals, used to detect smuggled nuclear or radiological materials, without issuing an accurate analysis of both the benefits and the costs--which we later estimated at over $2 billion--and a determination of whether additional detection capabilities was worth the additional costs. DHS subsequently announced that it was cancelling the advanced spectroscopic portals program as originally conceived.

## Plan

The United States Department of Homeland Security should fund the implementation of Multi-Mode Passive Detection Systems at seaports in the United States.

## 1AC – Terrorism

Contention 1: Terrorism

DHS failure makes nuclear terrorism via seaports inevitable in the status quo

Nadler, Markey and Thompson 6-26-12 – Jerrold L. Nadler, Edward J. Markey and Bennie G. Thompson are Democratic representatives from New York, Massachusetts and Mississippi, respectively (New York Times, Cargo, the Terrorists’ Trojan Horse, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/opinion/the-dangerous-delay-on-port-security.html)

Millions of cargo containers are unloaded from ships each year at American seaports, providing countless opportunities for terrorists to smuggle and unleash a nuclear bomb or weapon of mass destruction on our shores. To counter this threat, Congress passed a law five years ago mandating that by July 2012, all maritime cargo bound for the United States must be scanned before it is loaded on ships. But the Obama administration will miss this deadline, and it is not clear to us, as the authors of the law, whether it ever plans to comply with the law. Over the years, terrorists have shown themselves to be frighteningly inventive. They have hidden explosives in printer cartridges transported by air and embedded explosives in the shoes and underwear of airline passengers. The cargo containers arriving on ships from foreign ports offer terrorists a Trojan horse for a devastating attack on the United States. As the Harvard political scientist Graham T. Allison has put it, a nuclear attack is “far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile.” But for the past five years, the Department of Homeland Security has done little to counter this threat and instead has wasted precious time arguing that it would be too expensive and too difficult, logistically and diplomatically, to comply with the law. This is unacceptable.

Lack of universal DHS oversight increases the likelihood of nuclear smuggling through ports

Boston Globe 6-12-12 (US to miss target for tighter port security, http://articles.boston.com/2012-06-12/nation/32176427\_1\_homeland-security-cargo-containers-nuclear-bomb)

The Department of Homeland Security will miss an initial deadline of July 12 to comply with a sweeping federal law meant to thwart terrorist attacks arriving by sea, frustrating border security advocates who worry that the agency has not done enough to prevent dangerous cargo from coming through the country’s ocean gateways, including the Port of Boston. Only a small fraction of all metal cargo containers have been scanned before arriving at US ports, and advocates for tighter port security say all maritime cargo needs to be scanned or manually inspected to prevent terrorists from using ships bound for the United States to deliver a nuclear bomb. The scenario might be straight out of a Hollywood script, but the threat of terrorism is not limited to airplanes, according to Homeland Security critics, including Representative Edward Markey of Massachusetts. Markey accuses the agency of not making a good-faith effort to comply with a 2007 law he coauthored requiring all US-bound maritime shipments to be scanned before departing overseas docks. “We’re not just missing the boat, we could be missing the bomb,’’ the Malden Democrat said. “The reality is that detonating a nuclear bomb in the United States is at the very top of Al Qaeda’s terrorist targets.’’

Impact One: Nuclear Retaliation

Nuclear terrorism causes nuclear retaliation- extinction

**Ayson 10,** Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (Robert,“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a **massive exchange** of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks **of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers** started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) **suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors.** Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and **confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack,** the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, **on a higher stage of alert.** In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

Impact Two: Protectionism

Regardless of whether the attack is nuclear, a terrorist attack from shipping cargo will immediately shut down international trade and sweep in a new era of protectionism

Flynn 2003 – Ph.D., Professor at the Kostas Institute for Security Studies @ Northeastern (Stephen, The Fragile State of Container Security, http://www.cfr.org/defensehomeland-security/fragile-state-container-security/p5730)

A year later I joined with former senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart in preparing our report, “America: Still Unprepared—Still In Danger.” We observed that “nineteen men wielding box-cutters forced the United States to do to itself what no adversary could ever accomplish: a successful blockade of the U.S. economy. If a surprise terrorist attack were to happen tomorrow involving the sea, rail, or truck transportation systems that carry millions of tons of trade to the United States each day, the response would likely be the same—a self-imposed global embargo.” Based on that analysis, we identified as second of the six critical mandates that deserve the nation’s immediate attention: “Make trade security a global priority; the system for moving goods affordably and reliably around the world is ripe for exploitation and vulnerable to mass disruption by terrorists.” This is why the topic of today’s hearing is so important. The stakes are enormous. U.S. prosperity—and much of its power—relies on its ready access to global markets. Both the scale and pace at which goods move between markets has exploded in recent years thanks in no small part to the invention and proliferation of the intermodal container. These ubiquitous boxes—most come in the 40’x8’x8’ size—have transformed the transfer of cargo from a truck, train, and ship into the transportation equivalent of connecting Lego blocks. The result has been to increasingly diminish the role of distance for a supplier or a consumer as a constraint in the world marketplace. Ninety percent of the world’s freight now moves in a container. Companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors move up to 30 tons of merchandise or parts across the vast Pacific Ocean from Asia to the West Coast for about $1600. The transatlantic trip runs just over a $1000—which makes the postage stamp seem a bit overpriced. But the system that underpins the incredibly efficient, reliable, and affordable movement of global freight has one glaring shortcoming in the post-9-11 world—it was built without credible safeguards to prevent it from being exploited or targeted by terrorists and criminals. Prior to September 11, 2001, virtually anyone in the world could arrange with an international shipper or carrier to have an empty intermodal container delivered to their home or workplace. They then could load it with tons of material, declare in only the most general terms what the contents were, “seal” it with a 50-cent lead tag, and send it on its way to any city and town in the United States. The job of transportation providers was to move the box as expeditiously as possible. Exercising any care to ensure that the integrity of a container’s contents was not compromised may have been a commercial practice, but it was not a requirement. The responsibility for making sure that goods loaded in a box were legitimate and authorized was shouldered almost exclusively by the importing jurisdiction. But as the volume of containerized cargo grew exponentially, the number of agents assigned to police that cargo stayed flat or even declined among most trading nations. The rule of thumb in the inspection business is that it takes five agents three hours to conduct a thorough physical examination of a single full intermodal container. Last year nearly 20 million containers washed across America’s borders via a ship, train, and truck. Frontline agencies had only enough inspectors and equipment to examine between 1-2 percent of that cargo. Thus, for would-be terrorists, the global intermodal container system that is responsible for moving the overwhelming majority of the world’s freight satisfies the age-old criteria of opportunity and motive. “Opportunity” flows from (1) the almost complete absence of any security oversight in the loading and transporting of a box from its point of origin to its final destination, and (2) the fact that growing volume and velocity at which containers move around the planet create a daunting “needle-in-the-haystack” problem for inspectors. “Motive” is derived from the role that the container now plays in underpinning global supply chains and the likely response by the U.S. government to an attack involving a container. Based on statements by the key officials at U.S. Customs, the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Transportation, should a container be used as a “poor man’s missile,” the shipment of all containerized cargo into our ports and across our borders would be halted. As a consequence, a modest investment by a terrorist could yield billions of dollars in losses to the U.S. economy by shutting down—even temporarily—the system that moves “just-in-time” shipments of parts and goods. Given the current state of container security, it is hard to imagine how a post-event lock-down on container shipments could be either prevented or short-lived. One thing we should have learned from the 9-11 attacks involving passenger airliners, the follow-on anthrax attacks, and even last fall Washington sniper spree is that terrorist incidents pose a special challenge for public officials. In the case of most disasters, the reaction by the general public is almost always to assume the event is an isolated one. Even if the post-mortem provides evidence of a systemic vulnerability, it often takes a good deal of effort to mobilize a public policy response to redress it. But just the opposite happens in the event of a terrorist attack—especially one involving catastrophic consequences. When these attacks take place, the assumption by the general public is almost always to presume a general vulnerability unless there is proof to the contrary. Government officials have to confront head-on this loss of public confidence by marshalling evidence that they have a credible means to manage the risk highlighted by the terrorist incident. In the interim as recent events have shown, people will refuse to fly, open their mail, or even leave their homes. If a terrorist were to use a container as a weapon-delivery devise, the easiest choice would be high-explosives such as those used in the attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Some form of chemical weapon, perhaps even involving hazardous materials, is another likely scenario. A bio-weapon is a less attractive choice for a terrorist because of the challenge of dispersing the agent in a sufficiently concentrated form beyond the area where the explosive devise goes off. A “dirty bomb” is the more likely threat vs. a nuclear weapon, but all these scenarios are conceivable since the choice of a weapon would not be constrained by any security measures currently in place in our seaports or within the intermodal transportation industry. This is why a terrorist attack involving a cargo container could cause such profound economic disruption. An incident triggered by even a conventional weapon going off in a box could result in a substantial loss of life. In the immediate aftermath, the general public will want reassurance that one of the many other thousands of containers arriving on any given day will not pose a similar risk. The President of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other keys officials responsible for the security of the nation would have to stand before a traumatized and likely skeptical American people and outline the measures they have in place to prevent another such attack. In the absence of a convincing security framework to manage the risk of another incident, the public would likely insist that all containerized cargo be stopped until adequate safeguards are in place. Even with the most focused effort, constructing that framework from scratch could take months—even years. Yet, within three weeks, the entire worldwide intermodal transportation industry would effectively be brought to its knees—as would much of the freight movements that make up international trade.

Rampant protectionism spurs economic collapse and great power war

Panzer in ‘8

Micheal Panzner, faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase. Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, Revised and Updated Edition, p. 136-138.

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster, But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange, foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the (heap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more healed sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an "intense confrontation" between the United States and China is "inevitable" at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

Prefer our studies—our authors use a testable empirical method

Weede ‘4

Erich Weede, professor of sociology at the University of Bonn, Germany, In Winter 1986-87, he was Visiting Professor of International Relations at the Bologna Center of The Johns Hopkins University. . “BALANCE OF POWER, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE CAPITALIST PEACE,” http://www.fnf.org.ph/downloadables/Balance%20of%20Power,%20Globalization%20and%20Capitalist%20Peace.pdf

If one does research or summarize the research of others – of course, most of the ideas, theories, and evidence discussed below have been produced by others – one cannot avoid some epistemological commitments. In the social sciences the fundamental choice is whether to pursue an ideographic or a nomothetic approach. Almost all historians choose the ideographic approach and focus on the description of structures or events, whereas most economists and psychologists choose the nomothetic approach and focus on the search for law-like general statements. Sociologists and political scientists are still divided – sometimes even by the Atlantic Ocean. In American political science the nomothetic approach dominates the flagship journal of the profession, the American Political Science Review, as well as more specialized journals, such as International Studies Quarterly, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, or World Politics. In German political science, however, the nomothetic approach has advanced little beyond electoral studies. My own approach is definitely nomothetic. This is related to my training in psychology at one of the first German universities focusing on quantitative research methods in the early 1960s, the University of Hamburg. This epistemological orientation has been reinforced by graduate training in international politics at one of the first American universities emphasizing quantitative research in the late 1960s, Northwestern University, which is located in a suburb of Chicago. Nomothetic research focuses on hypothesizing, testing and establishing law-like general statements or nomological propositions. Examples of such propositions are: The higher average incomes in a nation are, the more likely is democratic government. Or, the more economic freedom in a nation prevails, the less frequently it is involved in war. One characteristic of such propositions is that they say something about observable reality. Whenever you say something about reality, you risk that others find out that you are wrong. If we observed that most poor countries were democracies, but most rich countries were autocracies, then we should reject or, at least, modify the proposition about prosperity and democracy mentioned above.1 Nomothetic researchers look for refutations. They try to falsify their propositions or theories (Popper 1934/1959). If the empirical evidence is compatible with one's theory, then one keeps the hypothetical propositions and regards them as supported – until negative evidence turns up. Although certitude about possession of the truth is beyond the capabilities of human inquiry, growth of knowledge is conceivable by the successive elimination of errors. This epistemological approach borrowed from Popper were easily applicable, if most of our propositions were deterministic, if they claimed to be valid without exceptions. Then, finding a single exception to a general statement – say, about prosperity and democracy – would suffice to falsify the proposition. Looking at poor India nevertheless being democratic, or at fairly rich Kuwait nevertheless being autocratic, would suffice to reject the theory.2 Unfortunately, almost no theory in macroeconomics, macrosociology, or international relations delivers deterministic propositions. Instead we have only probabilistic statements of the type that more prosperous countries are more likely to be democratic than others, or that economically freer countries are more likely to avoid war involvement than others. Probabilistic assertions never can be falsified by pointing to single events which do not fit with theoretical expectations. Instead we have to look at relative frequencies, at correlations or regression coefficients. We need statistical tools to evaluate such propositions. We typically ask the question whether a hypothesized relationship is so strong that it could only rarely occur because of random measurement or sampling error. Probabilistic propositions are regarded as supported only if they jump certain thresholds of significance which are ultimately defined by mere conventions. Researchers are interested in causal propositions, that is, in statements about causes and effects, or determinants and consequences. Such statements can be used for explanation, forecasting, or policy interventions. We need to know more than the mere existence of some association or correlation between, say, prosperity and democracy, or economic freedom and the avoidance of military conflict. We need to know whether prosperity promotes democracy, or whether democracy promotes growth, or whether, possibly, both statements might be defensible or, for the time being, taken for 'true'. While a correlation between two variables, like prosperity and democracy, is equally compatible with the simple alternative causal propositions that prosperity causes democracy, and that democracy causes prosperity, this ambiguity no longer necessarily applies in more complex theoretical models. There, we tend to explain a single effect by a number of causes. For example, one may contend that democracy is promoted by prosperity as well as by a capitalist economic order (or economic freedom). We can take such a theoretical contention – which may be true or false, compatible with the data or not – as a starting point for specifying a regression equation.3 If both theoretical statements – about the democratizing effects of prosperity and capitalism – were true, then the regression coefficients of both variables should be positive and significant. If this is what we find in empirical research, then we regard the two propositions as provisionally supported. But final proofs remain impossible in empirical research. It is conceivable that some nonbeliever in the two propositions suggests a third measurable determinant of democracy. Before it actually is included in the regression equation, one never knows what its inclusion results in. Possibly, the previously significant and positive regression coefficients of prosperity and capitalism might be reduced to insignificance or even change signs. Then a previously supported causal proposition would have to be overturned and rejected. The claim of causality implies more than observable association or correlation. It also implies temporal precedence of causes before effects. If one wants to test the causal proposition that prosperity contributes to democratic government, or that economic freedom contributes to the avoidance of military conflict, then one should measure prosperity or economic freedom before their hypothesized effects occur – certainly not later. If there is doubt about the direction of causality, as there frequently is, one might also look at the relationships between, say, earlier prosperity and later democracy as well as between earlier democracy and later prosperity. Although such investigations may become technically complicated, it might suffice here to keep the general principles in mind. From causal propositions we derive expectations about correlation or regression coefficients. But conclusions from correlations to causal propositions are not justified. One simply can never 'verify' causal statements by correlations. From causal propositions we also derive expectations about temporal precedence. As long as empirical evidence fits one's theoretical expectations, one regards the propositions or theory as provisionally supported and works with them. There is another complication. As illustrated by the debate about the effects of trade and economic interdependence on the avoidance of military conflict below, full accordance of empirical studies and verdicts with theories is the exception rather than the rule – if it ever happens at all. That is why some philosophers of science (for example, Kuhn 1962; Lakatos 1968-69) have been critical of the idea of falsification and warned against premature rejection of propositions. If 'anomalies' or 'falsification' are more or less ubiquitous, then our task is no longer so easy as to choose between theories which have been falsified and therefore deserve rejection and those which are compatible with the facts and therefore deserve to be accepted until negative evidence turns up. Then our task becomes to choose between competing theories, for example about the conflict reinforcing or pacifying impact of trade, and to pick those which fit the data relatively better than others. So, the claim advanced in this review of the literature cannot be that the empirical evidence fits the capitalist peace idea perfectly, but merely that the evidence fits it much better than competing explanations of military conflict and notions about the negative impact of capitalism on the avoidance of conflict and war or the irrelevance of democracy do. The epistemological discussion above could provide no more than a crude 'feel' for empirical research in the social sciences and its pitfalls. Although certitude is beyond reach, it is better to rely on testable, tested and so far supported propositions than on a hodgepodge of ambiguous hunches, contradictory thinking, and unsystematically evaluated empirical evidence.

## 1AC – Economy

Port infrastructure is insufficient to meet demand now

Port Technology International ‘12

“US port infrastructure ranked behind Iceland and Estonia” January 12, 2012 http://www.porttechnology.org/news/us\_port\_infrastructure\_ranked\_behind\_iceland\_and\_estonia/

The condition of port infrastructure in the United States was further realized this week with claims that its port development is falling behind countries including Iceland and Estonia. The subject was at the forefront of a recent policy forum attended by a coalition of elected officials from the Building America’s Future Educational Fund (BAF) and [Jacksonville](http://www.porttechnology.org/search/results/search%26keywords%3D%22Jacksonville%22)’s Chamber of Commerce, the JAX Chamber, to highlight the need for continued investment in the country’s port infrastructure. “Other countries understand that port innovation and capacity is key to competitiveness in an export-driven economy,” former Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell, and BAF co-chair, told the IFW. “The World Economic Forum now ranks US port infrastructure 22nd in the world, behind such countries as Iceland and Estonia.” During his keynote speech, Rendell noted how the 59 busiest ports in America were only operable 35 percent of the time. As a result US ports have experienced notable delays and backlogs, which have increased the cost of goods going in and out of the country considerably. “Policy-makers in Washington need to make smart infrastructure investments a priority, because if we don’t, we will only fall further behind the rest of the world.”

Scenario 1: Competitiveness

Efficient port infrastructure is key to US competitiveness

Barnes and Oloruntoba 2004 – Queensland University of Technology, School of International Business (Paul and Richard, Assurance of security in maritime supply chains: Conceptual issues of vulnerability and crisis management, http://www.sciencedirect.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/science/article/pii/S1075425305000694)

Effective and efficient systems of transportation are critical to domestic and international business. Along with trade liberalization, the adoption of international standards, advanced telecommunications and the capacity to transport goods and commodities are critical factors in globalized and interdependent economies (Kumar and Hoffmann, 2002). In addition, effective and efficient systems of transportation are critical to optimizing transport and transaction costs and global competitiveness generally. A study by the World Bank found that increased port efficiency has a significant and positive impact on the expansion of trade, as are improvements in the customs regulatory environment. Wilson et al. (2003) argue that burdensome customs and regulatory/security measures may hinder port and maritime supply chain efficiency, which in turn leads to a contraction in trade and overall efficiency. While the notion of a competitive company is clear, the notion of a competitive nation is not. Ultimately, the source of competitive advantage rests at the industry level and regional level. Studies examining the factors that confer advantage to particular industry sectors have sought ideal policy positions that governments might pursue to generate a competitive edge for domestic industries ( [Garelli, 2001] and [Farrugia, 2002]). The International Institute for Management Development considers aspects of structural factors affecting long term economic performance as encapsulated in the concept of competitiveness with respect to productivity, skills and innovation in an economy (Fagerberg, 1996). Not-with-standing notions of global competitiveness, the focus of this article is on regional competitiveness. This makes considerable sense in that any loss of competitiveness in trade will impact directly on regional economies especially those with a higher than average density of trade-related infrastructure that would normally be found adjacent to ports and surrounding hinterlands. An economic impact study carried out by the St Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (SLSDC) in 2001 highlights how the presence of an efficient maritime trading system can enhance regional competitiveness. The study included the St. Lawrence Seaway and related waterways, ports and their inter-modal connections, as well as vessels, vehicles and other system users. The SLSDC report indicated a total of 152,508 jobs are in some way related to the 192 million tonnes of cargo moving on the US side of the great lakes seaway system in 2000 (U.S. Dept. of Transportation, 2002). In addition firms providing transportation services and cargo handling services made USD$ 1.3 billion in purchases across the great lakes region and supported 26,757 indirect jobs. Maritime activity on the U.S. side of the great lakes seaway system generated USD$ 3.4 billion in business revenues for firms providing transportation and cargo handling services. This amount excludes the value of the commodities moved on the great lakes seaway system. Governments also benefit from such localized commercial activity. Maritime movements on the U.S. side of the great lakes seaway system created USD$ 1.3 billion in federal, state and local tax revenue in 2000. Firms providing the cargo handling and transportation services within the study area in-turn spent USD$ 1.3 billion on purchases for a range of service-related deliverables: for example diesel fuel, utilities, maintenance and repair services (U.S. Dept. of Transportation, 2002).

Scenario 2: Modernization Crunch

Coast Guard security inspections trades off from other obligations – prevents them from enforcing fishing vessel regulations

Larsen and Salerno 4-26-12 – Rep. Rick Larsen, D-Wash. Ranking Member and Coast Guard Vice Admiral (REP. FRANK A. LOBIONDO HOLDS A HEARING ON MARITIME INDUSTRY REGULATION, CQ Transcriptions, Lexis)

LARSEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and he asked the many of questions I had on 41 certification -- so for instance, the coordination and cooperation between the EPA and the Coast Guard's vessel general permit -- so I won't repile (sic) that ground, perhaps only for further clarification but I want to move to a few other issues if I may. This is for Admiral Salerno with regard to fishing vessel examinations. How has the Coast Guard hired a full complement of examiners in order to conduct the examinations? SALERNO: Well, we have a number of qualified examiners already in our workforce. We have 62 full-time examiners plus other marine inspectors, which have the qualification to conduct fishing vessel exams -- about 198 in total. The additional, they're coming on this year, in fiscal '12 -- an additional 23 examiners will be coming on. Now, in addition to our full-time cadre, we make use of our volunteer force, the Coast Guard Auxiliary, many of them who are qualified, plus there is provision for third-party examinations of these vessels as well. So we're watching this very closely. The full population, quite honestly, Sir, is a little bit hard to nail down. There are a number of state registered vessels that we don't have complete visibility on. So we're watching this closely and it may very well be that, you know, we come back with the need for more resources in this regard, but we're not at the point where we're ready to ask for that. LARSEN: So, you have not yet made a decision on whether you intend ship funds from other accounts in order to maintain this examination program. SALERNO: No, Sir. We -- our inspection force can shift very easily from one inspection type to another as I mentioned we have quite a few marine inspectors in our active workforce, which have this qualification. They can be moved around as needed based on the needs of the day to accommodate this need. Now, we anticipate a surge in fishing vessel examinations. We are preparing for that. We're confident that we can get through this initial tranche but again, with the caveat that, you know, we may find that we need additional resources in the future.

CG enforcement key to incentivize ship modernization – delay will collapse the shipping industry

Larsen and Salerno 4-26-12 – Rep. Rick Larsen, D-Wash. Ranking Member and Coast Guard Vice Admiral (REP. FRANK A. LOBIONDO HOLDS A HEARING ON MARITIME INDUSTRY REGULATION, CQ Transcriptions, Lexis)

LOBIONDO: OK. Thank you. Mr. Gutowski, can you talk a little bit about what you believe or how, the Coast Guard has been proactive in informing the fishing industry of the new vessel safety exam requirement? Have they been coming to you? Have they been -- readily -- has this information been -- they've been proactive in talking about the need to do this? GUTOWSKI: To be candid, I'm not sure. I can tell you that from my perspective, the fishing industry has a whole -- is not really prepared for this. We have our boats inspected every two year voluntarily, because we are mandated to carry observers. And if we do not have that sticker on our vessel, we will not be able to leave the dock. But all vessels are not, so those that are not required to carry observers, I do not think that the majority of those would understand that this is coming. LOBIONDO: OK. I next want to ask you about -- on the classing of vessels, the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2001 -- of 2010 mandated that all fishing vessels greater than 50 feet in length be designed, built and maintained to specifications outlined by the classification society. Can you talk a little bit about why this requirement is gonna increase the cost? I think we were talking about something by 25 percent construction cost. What's behind that? GUTOWSKI: Well, depending on what that class is, Mr. Chairman. And I sure not -- I don't have the answer to that. I would like to try to get to that, that's ABS or what type of class this is, but we consider that those cost increase to be in certain types of steel, (inaudible) shafts, piping, a large range of upgrades to a normal commercial fishing vessel that will add those cost. But more disturbing to me is a boat owner that has a vessel that's been taken care of pretty well over a 15, 20 year period. This ultimate compliance program that would begin in 2020 would make all vessels over 50 feet come up to the same standard on a refit by that time, which would be, I would think equally as costly. And with some vessels in our industry not doing well, I think that will really cripple some of the larger fisheries and coastal communities. Not to mention the infrastructure, I'm not sure that our shipyards in the United States will be able to achieve all that work within that period of time.

Competitiveness to hegemony

Khalilzad 95

Zalmay, director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program @ RAND & current US Ambassador to Afghanistan] "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Spring, p. proquest

The United States is unlikely to preserve its military and technological dominance if the U.S. economy declines seriously. In such an environment, the domestic economic and political base for global leadership would diminish and the United States would probably incrementally withdraw from the world, become inward-looking, and abandon more and more of its external interests. As the United States weakened, others would try to fill the vacuum. To sustain and improve its economic strength, the United States must maintain its technological lead in the economic realm. Its success will depend on the choices it makes. In the past, developments such as the agricultural and industrial revolutions produced fundamental changes positively affecting the relative position of those who were able to take advantage of them and negatively affecting those who did not. Some argue that the world may be at the beginning of another such transformation, which will shift the sources of wealth and the relative position of classes and nations. If the United States fails to recognize the change and adapt its institutions, its relative position will necessarily worsen. To remain the preponderant world power, U.S. economic strength must be enhanced by further improvements in productivity, thus increasing real per capita income; by strengthening education and training; and by generating and using superior science and technology. In the long run the economic future of the United States will also be affected by two other factors. One is the imbalance between government revenues and government expenditure. As a society the United States has to decide what part of the GNP it wishes the government to control and adjust expenditures and taxation accordingly. The second, which is even more important to U.S. economic well-being over the long run, may be the overall rate of investment. Although their government cannot endow Americans with a Japanese-style propensity to save, it can use tax policy to raise the savings rate. Another key factor affecting the global standing of the United States is its current social crisis: the high rate of violence in cities, the unsatisfactory state of race relations, and the breakdown of families. Although it faces no global ideological rival, and although movements such as Islamic fundamentalism and East Asian neo-Confucian authoritarianism are limited in their appeal, the social problems of the United States are limiting its attractiveness as a model. If the social crisis worsens, it is likely that, over the long term, a new organizing principle with greater universal appeal will emerge and be adopted by states with the power and the desire to challenge the erstwhile leader.

Leads to Nuclear War

Khalilzad 95

Zalmay, Washington Quarterly, Spring, LN

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

## 1AC – Solvency

Implementing the MMPDS is key to DHS success

Goure 7-2-12 – Ph.D. Early Warning Blog, Lexington Institute (Daniel, DHS Failing in Its Duty to Screen Cargo Containers, http://www.defpro.com/news/details/37023/?SID=20d92eb405b246619bea5d87f902dbbe)

Even as the Transportation Security Administration improves its techniques for patting down airline passengers and ferreting out blue-haired, little old lady terrorists the danger to the United States, its citizens and its international commerce as a result of unscreened cargo containers grows. Cargo containers are employed by criminals and smugglers to move all kinds of contraband around the world. A terrorist organization could use one, just a single container among hundreds aboard a large ship, to slip a nuclear or biological weapon into a U.S. port. Five years ago, Congress passed a law requiring the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to screen 100 percent of maritime cargo heading for the United States no later than July 2012. DHS recently announced that it would miss this deadline. Actually, the problem is worse than simply a delay in meeting the law’s requirements. DHS has utterly failed at the task assigned to it. Most cargo containers proceed on their way to U.S. destinations unscreened. What passes for screening involves old and inadequate systems that are easy to spoof. Even as the technology to remotely screen cargo containers undergoes revolutionary improvements, DHS continues to dither. In part this reflects the department’s utter failure to create the internal procedures and methods needed to develop advanced technologies and security systems. But it also reflects a lackadaisical approach to many critical tasks. For example, DHS is just beginning to invest in unmanned aerial systems to patrol our borders and sea approaches, even though the U.S. military has demonstrated the value of these capabilities during ten years of conflict. This situation is tragic because there is technology available that would allow for rapid, highly accurate cargo screening. An operational test of a new system, the privately-developed Multi-Mode Passive Detection System (MMPDS) is about to begin at Freeport, the Bahamas. The MMPDS uses naturally-occurring high energy particles as its source. The vehicle or container carrying the nuclear material passes between two detector arrays which measure the change in the path of the particles caused by their interactions with the material inside the container. Denser materials such as uranium or plutonium cause greater changes in the paths compared to less dense materials. The MMPDS can detect nuclear material even if it is hidden within a lead and steel shielded container placed in a cargo bin with other naturally radiating materials. The MMPDS is fast, relatively cheap, extremely accurate and easy to operate.

MMPDS is crucial – successfully penetrates radiation shielding and operates at low cost

Goure 3-7-12 – Ph.D. Early Warning Blog, Lexington Institute (Daniel, The Next Generation in Nuclear Material Detection Technology, http://www.defpro.com/news/details/33126/?SID=d399a219da6571672330a4a674769a0f)

Possibly the hardest problem in homeland security is detecting the presence of radioactive material -- the essential component in a nuclear device -- hidden in a vehicle, train car, cargo container, ship or airplane. The problem is even more challenging if the material is shielded or hidden amidst a cargo of naturally radiating material such as kitty litter. Scientists have been working on the nuclear material detection problem for decades with only limited success. The current generation of passive detectors is extremely short range and active detectors require large amounts of power. Neither kind does very well in finding shielded materials. A breakthrough in nuclear material detection technology is in the offing. The Multi-Mode Passive Detection System (MMPDS) has the potential to solve the challenge of finding shielded nuclear material and to do so in a manner that is fast, relatively cheap, extremely accurate and easy to operate. The MMPDS uses the universe’s constant background of naturally occurring cosmic radiation in the form of high energy particles as its source. For you Big Bang Theory aficionados, the primary particle employed is the muon. The system also exploits gamma rays as a second source. The vehicle or container carrying the nuclear material passes between two detector arrays which measure the change in the path of the muons. Denser materials cause greater changes in the paths compared to less dense materials. The MMPDS can identify the location of nuclear material within a lead and steel shielded container placed in a cargo bin with other naturally radiating materials. The MMPDS can be deployed at ports, border crossings, package sorting centers and airfields. This technology has tremendous applications in combating nuclear proliferation and arms control verification. Because it is entirely passive, the MMPDS is relatively cheap to build and operate. What makes the MMPDS all the more impressive is that it was developed virtually without government money. Venture capital provided all the funds and most of the intellectual property (IP) was privately developed. The company behind MMPDS, Decision Sciences, did some collaborative work with the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the two share some of the IP. The MMPDS has successfully completed its initial testing. The first system is being deployed at the port of Nassau in the Bahamas as a demonstration. The Department of Homeland Security, specifically Customs and Border Patrol, and the Department of Defense need to look into this revolutionary capability.

# **INHERENCY**

### Obama Cut Nuclear Detection

Obama slashed funding for nuclear testing

Long Beach Post 7-2-12 (Ports to Receive $155 Million in Security Grants, http://www.lbpost.com/business/2000000587-ports-to-receive-155-million-in-security-grants)

However, some of those initiatives have been criticized or all together halted, such as the enormously expensive radiation scanners, or Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASP), that the Obama administration quietly dismissed as ineffective following confirmation that the devices did not work in picking out radioactive material or nuclear weapons attempting to be snuck into ports. Former President George W. Bush's held only praise for the now-defunct program, in which the government had planned to spend some $1 billion to install the devices in every port in the U.S., following the first ever installment right here in Long Beach's port.

Obama does not have nuclear detection in his budget

**Washington Post,** May 7 **‘09**

“Obama’s Budget Eliminates New Funding for Nuclear Detection” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/07/AR2009050703518.html

**President Obama would eliminate new funding for advanced-generation equipment to detect nuclear weapons and radiological materials at** U.S. borders and **ports** and around New York City **in his** 2010 **budget**, homeland security officials said.

### DHS Port Funding Decreasing Now

DHS funding for port security is decreasing in the status quo

Bonney 7-2-12 – Senior Editor @ The Journal of Commerce Online (Joseph, DHS Awards $97 Million in Port Security Grants, http://www.joc.com/portsterminals/dhs-awards-97-million-port-security-grants)

Fiscal 2012 grants are much less than those of the past three years

The Department of Homeland Security announced more than $97 million in port security grants for the 2012 fiscal year. The largest grants went to the Port of Long Beach, $6.9 million; the New York City Police Department, $5.457 million; the Lower Mississippi River Port-Wide Strategic Security Council, $4.975 million; the Hawaii Department of Defense, $3.891 million; and PPG Industries in Lake Charles, La., $2.35 million. The $97 million in grants pales in comparison with $235 million in the 2011 fiscal year, $288 million in 2010 and $388 million in 2009.

# TERRORISM ADV

## UNIQUENESS

### DHS Failing Now

DHS not meeting its obligations on port security – universal screening key

NTI 6-27-12 – Global Security Newswire: Daily News on Nuclear, Biological & Chemical Weapons, Terrorism and Related Issues (“Authors of Cargo Screening Mandate Upset Over Lack of DHS Action,” http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/authors-cargo-screening-law-upset-over-dhs-implementation/)

In a Tuesday New York Times column, three Democratic lawmakers took the Homeland Security Department to task for failing to carry out a 2007 congressional mandate that all U.S.-bound cargo be scanned for weapon-usable radioactive materials and other threats prior to leaving foreign seaports (see GSN, June 12). The Sept. 11, 2001, attacks heightened fears that extremists might attempt to smuggle into the United States via its port system a nuclear weapon or another form of weapon of mass destruction. To respond to this danger, lawmakers directed the Homeland Security Department to by July of this year ensure that all U.S.-bound shipping containers are prescanned for nuclear or radioactive materials. "But the Obama administration will miss this deadline, and it is not clear to us, as the authors of the law, whether it ever plans to comply with the law," according to Representatives Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.), Edward Markey (D-Mass.) and Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.) The department has taken advantage of the option provided by Congress to delay full implementation of the mandate until July 2014, the lawmakers asserted. "For the past five years, the Department of Homeland Security has done little to counter this threat and instead has wasted precious time arguing that it would be too expensive and too difficult, logistically and diplomatically, to comply with the law. This is unacceptable," they wrote in the Times. They criticized as inflated DHS projections that it would take a minimum of $16 billion to fully implement the law, arguing the estimate is based on the assumption the U.S. government would have to shoulder all costs of purchasing, utilizing, and sustaining the necessary resources. "In contrast, Stephen E. Flynn, an expert in terrorism and port security at Stanford, has said a scanning system could be implemented in every major container port in the world at a cost of $1.5 billion, and that the costs could largely be absorbed by companies doing business at the ports," the representatives wrote. The Homeland Security Department's current practice of employing a "layered, risk-based approach" to check those shipping containers judged to pose the greatest threat is insufficient, they stated. "Recent advances in screening technologies have undermined Homeland Security’s contention that the technology is not available to scan all cargo containers without disrupting commerce. An effective high-volume container screening system was installed in the Port of Hong Kong in 2005. Trials of new, American-made technology have demonstrated that scanning all containers would be feasible at many ports. The world’s largest marine terminal operators have offered to work with the department to put the law into effect," Markey, Thompson and Nadler noted. The legislators accused the department of misusing the deadline extension in order to "exempt itself from any meaningful compliance with the law" and not, as it was intended by Congress, to overcome serious operational or technical hurdles related to implementation (New York Times, June 26).

Not enough security in the status quo

McCarter 7/2 (Mickey McCarter, homeland security reporter for more than 10 years, “Aviation, Port Security Bills Enjoy Bipartisan Support From House Lawmakers” [http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/today-s-news-analysis/single-article/aviation-port-security-bills-enjoy-bipartisan-support-from-house-lawmakers/8774d00b80793d7b125324dc9dad3510.html DOA 7/2/12](http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/today-s-news-analysis/single-article/aviation-port-security-bills-enjoy-bipartisan-support-from-house-lawmakers/8774d00b80793d7b125324dc9dad3510.html%20DOA%207/2/12))

Rep. Janice Hahn (D-Calif.), who sponsored the bill, hailed its passage, 411-9, Thursday. In a statement, Hahn said, "The loopholes that continue to exist in port security keep me up at night. My first question as a member of the Homeland Security Committee was to Lee Hamilton, vice chair of the 9/11 Commission, on what Congress should be doing to protect our ports. Mr. Hamilton's response that Congress wasn't focused enough on our ports meant we needed to act." US ports receive roughly 50,000 calls from ships annually, with 2 billion tons of freight and 134 million passengers, Hahn reported. The contribution of this cargo to the US economy is staggeringly significant, but only 3 percent or less of cargo undergoes scanning. That low amount opens up opportunities for terrorists to smuggle people or weapons into the United States, she argued. A terrorist attack on the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach would cost billions to the economy of California and displace thousands of port workers, Hahn warned. Geraldine Knatz, executive director of the Port of Los Angeles, praised the GAPS Act as an effort to prevent such a catastrophe. "It's a tribute to both the importance of the issue and Representative Hahn's tenacity that Congress passed her legislation a mere four months after she introduced the bill," Knatz said in a statement. "Trade gateways, like the Port of Los Angeles, are critical pieces of our nation's economic infrastructure. Keeping these gateways safe is a national priority."

### Terrorist Attack Coming – Ports Key

Greater incentive for nuclear terrorism at a port – creates greater economic disruption

Flynn 2008 – Ph.D., Professor at the Kostas Institute for Security Studies @ Northeastern (“Overcoming the Flaws in the U.S. Government Efforts to Improve Container, Cargo, and Supply Chain Security” CFR Testimony to Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives)

There is third important reason why terrorists would be more willing than criminals to exploit the supply chains of well-established companies. By doing so, they can count on generating far greater economic disruption. This is because once a dirty bomb arrives in the United States via a known and trusted shipper, the risk management system that customs authorities are relying on will come under withering scrutiny. In the interim, it will become politically impossible to treat cross-border shipments by other trusted shippers as low risk. When every container is assumed to be potentially high risk, everything must be examined which translates into putting the intermodal transportation system into gridlock.

WMD’s will enter the US from sea ports

**MIT, ‘07**

“Is Port Security Funding Making Us Safer?” November 2007 http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit\_11\_07\_derugy.pdf

The most terrifying security threat to security experts and the public alike is nuclear proliferation. Once the figment of Hollywood imagination, the ultimate nightmare scenario that is discussed by some as inevitable is the detonation of a nuclear device on American soil. **The majority of experts believe that** the most likely way weapons of mass destruction (**WMD**) **would enter the United States is by sea,** hence a focus on port security.1 **Ports offer terrorists vast opportunities to inflict damages**. As the primary mode of transportation for world trade goods, maritime commerce is essential to America’s economic vitality.2 Every year approximately nine million cargo containers—26,000 a day—arrive at U.S. ports from all over the world.3 The U.S. maritime system includes more than 361 sea and river ports with more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals and more than 1,000 harbor channels along thousands of miles of coastline

Lax security makes ports the most likely site for smuggling

Ames 2007 [Ames, Morgan, ETAL. Port Security Strategy 2012. Rep. Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, 2007. Print.]

The Global presence of U.S. Navy and Commercial Ships has always presented lucrative terrorist targets. U.S. Navy and Commercial ships are the most vulnerable while pier-side. Incidents such as the USS Cole (DDG 67) bombing in 2000 and the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attack in 2005 confirmed that even the mightiest warships are vulnerable to terrorist attack while in-port. Another lesson learned from these incidents is effectively attacking an in-port ship does not require advanced tactics or hardware. The USS Cole was almost sunk by a slow, explosive laden surface vessel. The USS Kearsarge was missed by terrorists shooting RPGs from a rooftop in close vicinity to the port. Defending a pier-side ship presents many challenges. There are several avenues from which a terrorist threat may originate. If the threats are allowed port entry via water or land, protecting an in-port ship presents a difficult challenge. The identification and neutralization of terrorist threats before port infiltration will provide the best results. The task of protecting an in-port ship is best accomplished by defending the hosting port from potential terrorist threats or incursions, but measures to accomplish this might cause unacceptable impediments to port operations. Commercial ports and naval bases are high profile terrorist targets. Commercial and Naval Ports are often located near major metropolitan areas with high population densities. A successful terrorist attack on one of these facilities could endanger the local populace. The geographic locations of the top ten U.S. Container ports are shown in Figure 1.

## ADV SOLVENCY

### **Radiological Detection at Ports Key**

Consensus of experts agree maritime terrorism is most likely – detection capabilities are key

Konkel 2005 – Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University (Todd, Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe, Journal of International Policy Solutions)

In one of his final interviews before leaving office, former Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that the greatest danger facing the United States in the war on terrorism is the possibility that al Qaeda or a sympathetic terrorist group could obtain a nuclear bomb. 56 Security experts from the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard, and a multitude of think tanks have repeatedly identified the maritime cargo transportation system as the most likely means by which terrorists might bring a nuclear weapon into the United States. Despite these warnings, current measures to defend against a container-borne nuclear attack remain terribly inadequate. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. government moved swiftly to improve the security of aviation transportation. In light of the potentially devastating costs of a nuclear attack, this nation cannot afford to take a similarly reactive approach to container security. Programs such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the Container Security Initiative must be given adequate funding and must be augmented by mandatory international standards for container integrity and the deployment of cost-effective radiological detection systems. Although the U.S. government has taken a number of steps toward preventing a nuclear catastrophe, there are still miles to go before we can all sleep comfortably knowing that our nation’s ports are secure against a nuclear attack.

### **MMPDS Key – Penetrates Radiation Shielding**

MMPDS is necessary to penetrate radiation shielding

Homeland Security Newswire 3-20-12 (Breakthrough in next gen nuclear detectors, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20120320-breakthrough-in-next-gen-nuclear-detectors)

Researchers have long struggled to develop radiation detectors that can spot a nuclear device hidden away in a shielded case, but a recent breakthrough could change all that. Existing passive detectors have limited ranges, while active detectors require large amounts of power and both have difficulty sensing shielded materials. To overcome these challenges, researchers have created the Multi-Mode Passive Detection System (MMPDS) which uses the universe’s constant stream of naturally occurring cosmic radiation. When a vehicle or container with nuclear material passes between the MMPDS’ sensor arrays, the device will measure the change in the path of muons, high energy particles that have been a constant in the universe since the Big Bang. Denser materials cause greater changes in the paths of muons thereby allowing the sensors to identify the location of nuclear material even if it is shielded by lead and steel.

## IMPACT

### Terrorism – Ports Comparatively Larger

Terrorist attack at a port is unique – 100 times worse than attacking New York City

De Rugy 2007 – Mercatus Center, George Mason University (Veronique, Is Port Security Funding

Making Us Safer?, MIT Center for International Studies)

There are two types of threats related to ports: (1) direct attacks on the ports themselves and (2) transport of dangerous material through ports for use in terrorist plots elsewhere in the country. Like any terrorist attack, an attack on a port would cause injury, death, and have terrible economic and social consequences. Damage to infrastructure and the destruction of inventory in port could seriously disrupt trade not only in the U.S., but also around the world. The damage would be on the order of 100 times greater if a nuclear device were detonated in a major American city such as New York or Washington, D.C.7

### Terrorism – Yes Retaliation

Attack during a recession ensures lash-out and retaliation.

Morgan 1

Nicole Schwartz-Morgan, Assistant Professor of Politics and Economics at Royal Military College of Canada, 10-10-2001, “Wild Globalization and Terrorism,” http://www.wfs.org/mmmorgan.htm

The terrorist act can reactivate atavistic defense mechanisms which drive us to gather around clan chieftans. Nationalistic sentiment re-awakens, setting up an implacable frontier which divides "us" from "them," each group solidifying its cohesion in a rising hate/fear of the other group. (Remember Yugoslavia?) To be sure, the allies are trying for the moment to avoid the language of polarization, insisting that "this is not a war," that it is "not against Islam," "civilians will not be targeted." But the word "war" was pronounced, a word heavy with significance which forces the issue of partisanship. And it must be understood that the sentiment of partisanship, of belonging to the group, is one of the strongest of human emotions. Because the enemy has been named in the media (Islam), the situation has become emotionally volatile. Another spectacular attack, coming on top of an economic recession could easily radicalize the latent attitudes of the United States, and also of Europe, where racial prejudices are especially close to the surface and ask no more than a pretext to burst out. This is the Sarajevo syndrome: an isolated act of madness becomes the pretext for a war that is just as mad, made of ancestral rancor, measureless ambitions, and armies in search of a war. We should not be fooled by our expressions of good will and charity toward the innocent victims of this or other distant wars. It is our own comfortable circumstances which permit us these benevolent sentiments. If conditions change so that poverty and famine put the fear of starvation in our guts, the human beast will reappear. And if epidemic becomes a clear and present danger, fear will unleash hatred in the land of the free, flinging missiles indiscriminately toward any supposed havens of the unseen enemy. And on the other side, no matter how profoundly complex and differentiated Islamic nations and tribes may be, they will be forced to behave as one clan by those who see advantage in radicalizing the conflict, whether they be themselves merchants or terrorists.

And attacks will snowball

Ferguson and Potter ‘5

Charles D. Ferguson, Science and Technology Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and an Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, William C. Potter is Institute Professor and Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005, pg. 29-30

The lack of a precedent stands out as a major deterrent to nuclear terrorism by suggesting that other groups have found this option too difficult or too dangerous in view of the scale of likely retaliation. Once that precedent has been set, however, the playing field will change dra-matically. Two factors in particular will determine the actions of other would-be nuclear terrorists. First, the effectiveness of an attack will ei-ther encourage or discourage its perpetrators. Due to a make-shift means of delivery, Aum’s chemical attack was able to cause only a small frac-tion of the fatalities generally associated with WMD. 33 The low number of casualties highlights the limitations of terrorism involving chemical weapons. The difficult task of effectively dispersing a chemical agent has arguably acted as a significant deterrent to other terrorist groups. On the other hand, any nuclear attack—including one by a state—that appeared successful at causing panic, destruction, the breakdown of governmental authority, and substantial human casualties raises the pos-sibility of copycat events, as the impact of a nuclear attack will have been visibly demonstrated. Second, the consequences for the perpetra-tors of a nuclear or radiological attack will have sizeable influence on the plans of other terrorists. Should the detonation of a nuclear weapon, an attack on a nuclear facility, or use of an RDD be met with only a moderate response, the perceived taboo against such terrorist methods might erode considerably.

### Terrorism – AT: No Access

Terrorists can get WMD and are motivated enough to use them

Intriligator and Toukan ‘6

Michael Intriligator, Professor of Economics, Political Science, and Public Policy at UCLA and Abdullah Toukan, PhD from MIT in Theoretical Nuclear Physics and former Science Advisor to King Hussein of Jordan, Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network, Ed. Peter Kotana, Michael Intriligator, and John P. Sullivan, 2006, pg. 74-5

Overall, while there has been remarkably little historical use of WMD by terrorists and very few fatalities resulting from their use, one cannot rule out terrorist groups gaining such weapons and using them in the future. Sooner or later they could be available to terrorists. As former Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated concerning WMD terrorism: “The question is no longer if this will happen, but when.” In addition, other groups have sought to gain access and use nuclear weapons and other WMD, which compounds the problem as new nations and subnational groups seek these weapons. Some terrorist groups may feel that, in order to attract worldwide attention, they should escalate from conventional to biological or nuclear weapons. The likely users of these and other WMD are probably fundamentalist terrorist groups, given both their motivation and their access to funding and expertise. 9 It should be noted that nuclear weapons are “self-protecting”—they are difficult to acquire, to use and to take care of properly. This has the effect of keeping such weapons out of the reach of most national and subnational groups, including terrorists, and Table 4.3 summarizes some of the technical hurdles for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs. Neverthe-less, a well-financed terrorist group could have the resources need to hire the experts who could build and take care of such weapons, as was the case with Aum Shinrikyo. The CIA had predicted copycat phenomena in that case, but they did not in fact materialize, probably due to the difficulties of building and maintaining such a weapon. Also, each weapon is different and, while there are some weapons that can be developed easily, such as ricin, others are extremely difficult to build, including nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, with demand rising and marginal cost falling, as is also the case with other WMD technologies, it is only a matter of time before such weapons, including nuclear weapons, become available to terrorist groups.

### Terrorism – AT: No Motivation

Al Qeada would face use it or lose it pressures that would force their hand.

Velde ‘10

James R. Van De Velde, Booz Allen Hamilton, Washington, DC. “The Impossible Challenge of Deterring “Nuclear Terrorism” by Al Qaeda”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 8 August 2010 , pages 682 – 699. InformaWorld.

Worse, even if Al Qaeda leadership adopted a deterrent policy for its acquired nuclear weapon, would the West enter into such a frozen state of mutual threat? More likely, the U.S. chief executive would command all U.S. forces to seek out and destroy the Al Qaeda-acquired weapon, no matter how many pronouncements bin Laden or al-Zawahiri may make, pledging not to use it. Western pressure, therefore, would create what is known as “crisis instability”— also known as “use it or lose it.” Al Qaeda leadership would be faced with worldwide U.S. pressure, airstrikes, troop movements, alliances, and alike to find the weapon, forcing, perhaps, Al Qaeda leadership to use the weapon they pledged not to use, thus making any Al Qaeda employment doctrine even more moot and irrelevant.

Given new restriction on unconventional tactics by Al Qaeda – it will push them towards use of WMDs.

Matthews ‘10

Colonel Patrick S. Matthews, United States Air Force. “Nuclear Deterrence of Terrorist WMD Attacks”. March 30, 2010. US Army War College. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA520082&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Motivation to Attack the US. Motivation to strike at the US or her allies is a necessary ingredient in any enemy. Al-Qaeda has already proven its willingness to attack the US. Al-Qaeda's overall objective, the creation of a global caliphate ruled by shar'ia law, puts it in opposition to US interests and actions globally. To further its objective, Al-Qaeda also has intermediate ends such as removing Western influence from Muslim lands. Such objectives clearly provide a continued motivation for further attacks against the US. Capability to Attack the US. The attacks of 9/11 proved the US could be attacked by a non-state enemy. Although these attacks caused significant casualties and used unconventional weapons in an unconventional manner, they did not use WMDs10. The security measures instituted since 9/11 are intended to make another attack using 9/11 tactics a more remote possibility. Given this, but retaining a continued motivation to attack, terrorists must find another means to inflict significant casualties. This makes it likely terrorists will continue to attempt procurement of some sort of WMD. Terrorists can obtain these weapons in three ways; develop and build WMD themselves, obtain WMD from a state supporter, or steal the desired WMD. The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism concluded the possibility of terrorists designing and building their own nuclear device is slight.11 The Commission concluded "terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon." Given the consequences of a successful nuclear terror event in the US, however, the possibility of terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons cannot be ignored from a deterrence stand point. Furthermore, irrespective of the type of WMD, the manner in which terrorists attempt to get these weapons is important when determining the appropriate deterrent approach.

**Modern terror groups are likely to use WMD**

Goodin 06 (Robert E. Goodin is Distinguished Professor of Social and Political Theory at the Australian National University, What’s Wrong with Terrorism?, pg. 138-9)

It was once thought that larger strategic considerations would inhibit terrorists from using weapons of mass destruction. It would simply not be prudent for terrorists who are in pursuit of specific objectives that required broad public sympathy to engage in the radically indiscriminate destruction, such as that entailed by the use of nuclear weapons or the uncontrolled spreading of an epidemic. 74 Recent decades, however, have seen the emergence of ‘new terrorism’ of a sort that is more Messianically motivated or millenarian-oriented. Being less concerned with external support among non-believers, such groups might be less reluctant to employ indiscriminately weapons of mass destruction. 75 On the contrary, ‘inflicting a scourge on the heretics or infidels may be seen as performing a sacramental act, manifesting divine retribution that morally justifies mass murder.’ 76 Once upon a time it was further thought ‘that a biological attack is unlikely precisely because the devastation from such an attack cannot be limited’, and would spread to the attackers’ own people as well as among those they meant to attack. But again, that may no longer be such a compelling argument, insofar as contemporary terrorists are infused with a spirit of martyrdom that extends that exalted status even to unknowing or unwilling victims of the epidemics that they initiate. 77

### Terrorism – AT: Impact Exaggerated

Even if the risk of a terror attack is improbable – still risk large scale nuclear war.

Ayson ‘10

Robert Ayson, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7 July 2010 , pages 571 – 593. InformaWorld.

It is just possible that a terrorist nuclear attack could catalyze an inter-state nuclear war. The likelihood of a terrorist group gaining access to nuclear weapons is lower than some fear, and terrorists might not use a nuclear weapon as soon as they had acquired one. But if a terrorist group was to explode a nuclear device in a country that was itself armed with nuclear weapons, and especially if that country was in a conflict-prone relationship with another nuclear-armed state, the broader consequences of even a single terrorist nuclear detonation could be much more serious than some assume. To consider what might follow the terrorist use of a nuclear weapon upon an industrialized country, and especially on a country that is itself armed with nuclear weapons, is to engage a whole cosmos of uncertainties and assumptions. Moreover, in order to acquire a nuclear weapon in the first place, the terrorist group in question would need to surmount considerable hurdles. Having done so, the successful delivery and detonation of the nuclear device is no automatic process. And even once past this second set of obstacles, there remains a battery of questions, likelihoods, and interactions regarding what might happen once the world's first dramatic act of nuclear terrorism has occurred. It is all too easy, as Mueller has explained, for the discussion of catastrophic terrorism to descend into exaggeration and alarmism.1 But the strategic consequences of nuclear terrorism deserve attention for at least two reasons. First, no matter how improbable, the terrorist use of a nuclear weapon could have even wider and more harmful implications than some might suppose. The detonation of a single weapon by a terrorist group could certainly be locally catastrophic in and of itself. But it is also important to consider whether that initial explosion might just spark a general nuclear exchange between states with much larger arsenals than the terrorists could ever hope to acquire and use. Either by accident or design is it possible that a terrorist nuclear detonation could ultimately result in a catastrophe of truly intercontinental proportions? Second, even though it is unclear whether these much graver developments have any real likelihood of occurring, the analytical consideration of this possibility presents an intellectual challenge that tests strategic imaginations, and that indicates that, at least in theory, even terrorists cannot escape the logic of the nuclear age.

### Terrorism – AT: Deterrence Checks Terror

Can’t deter nuclear terrorism.

Velde ‘10

James R. Van De Velde, Booz Allen Hamilton, Washington, DC. “The Impossible Challenge of Deterring “Nuclear Terrorism” by Al Qaeda”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 8 August 2010 , pages 682 – 699. InformaWorld.

Deterring Al Qaeda from using a nuclear weapon, should it acquire one, is a harder challenge than analysts have argued. Suggestions for “deterrence based on punishment” have severe limitations. Al Qaeda is not a state, has no clear command authority, and has no clear nuclear weapons-employment doctrine. Most analysts also ignore the dynamic of “crisis instability” (“use it or lose it”): should the West believe Al Qaeda has an improvised nuclear devise, it is unlikely (regardless of whether Al Qaeda leadership claimed the weapon would be held as a deterrent only) that the West would accept a mutually-assured-destruction relationship with the group. The West would hunt the weapon down, forcing Al Qaeda's hand. The best counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction-Nuclear Terrorism defense, therefore, is good counterinsurgency policy to starve it of recruits until the group dies. Arguably the most important strategic objective of any president's strategy to protect the United States is to prevent terrorist acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction. A critical (and intellectually hard) sub-element of such an objective is to devise means to deter specifically “nuclear terrorism”—assuming, despite U.S. efforts, a terrorist group (or individual) somehow acquires a nuclear weapon.1 The idea sounds particularly challenging, given that such terrorism may be the goal of many such terrorists. Therefore, when addressing a terrorist group like Al Qaeda, deterrence policies may need to be devised from the ground up; Cold War deterrence concepts, based on weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-enabled states facing each other, may not serve well.2 States often have the means to develop WMD (defined as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons designed to effect multiple personnel casualties and/or significant political/economic/psychological damage) but do not have the intent to develop or acquire them. The U.S. Code (18 USC SS 2332a) defines a nuclear “WMD” as any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.3 Terrorist groups have the intent to acquire WMD but not the means. Given such interest, including presumably an interest in using them, not just acquiring them for deterrence purposes, an approach to deter nuclear weapons-enabled terrorists may require a more disaggregated approach (i.e., deterring elements of the network or group attempting to acquire and use an improvised nuclear device or stolen weapon).4 The problem, however, is that the ideas most widely proposed as “punishments” against Al Qaeda are limited and indirect at best. One may have to accept the reality that although there may be some concepts to be considered, there may not any punishment that will certainly affect Al Qaeda's decision making regarding use of a nuclear device, if one is so acquired.

### Protectionism – Attack Causes Immediately

Attack via maritime freight causes immediate protectionism

Carafano 2006 – PhD, Senior Research Fellow @ Heritage (James, Port Security and Foreign-Owned Maritime Infrastructure, http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/port-security-and-foreign-owned-maritime-infrastructure)
Maritime trade is vital to the U.S. economy. Almost one-third of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) is derived from trade. As you know, 95 percent of American overseas trade traffics the maritime domain. According to the American Association of Port Authorities, $1.3 billion worth of U.S. goods move in and out of U.S. ports every day. In addition, many major urban centers (more than half of the U.S. population) and significant critical infrastructure are in proximity to U.S. ports or are accessible by waterways.[2] Ports can also be tempting for terrorists. As points of entry and exit, they are critical nodes that affect terrorist travel and transiting of material support or weapons. They might also be prime targets for terrorist strikes. The economic, physical, and psychological damage that would result from a significant terrorist attack targeting maritime commerce or exploiting America's vulnerability to sea strikes is difficult to estimate, but the stakes are high. A significant breakdown in the maritime transport system would send shockwaves throughout the world economy. In fact, in a worst-case scenario, a large attack could cause the entire global trading system to halt as governments scramble to recover. Drastic and inefficient solutions could also be put in place, such as the complete closure of some ports and duplicative and lengthy cargo checks in both originating and receiving ports.[3]

### Protectionism Impact Extensions

Deglobalization increases poverty, decreases growth, increases political instability, and increases the liklihood of interstate conflict.

Hillebrand ‘10

Evan E. Hillebrand, Visiting Professor in the Patterson School of Diplomacy at the University of Kentucky and a Senior Economist for the Central Intelligence Agency. “Deglobalization Scenarios: Who Wins? Who Loses?”. Global Economy Journal. Volume 10, Issue 2 2010 Article 3. Online.

Simulations with the International Futures Model give us a starting point for considering such a future. Compared to the assumptions in the globalization scenario, the primary deglobalization scenario assumes that a) tariff levels rise 33 percent, in all countries, over 5 years and remain at this elevated level, b) net foreign direct investment (FDI) and official foreign aid flows to the non-OECD countries fall to zero over five years and remain zero, and c) migration flows fall to zero between the OECD countries and the non-OECD countries.3 Over a thirty-year period, the model calculates that the total effect of these deglobalization shifts reduces world economic growth by almost a percentage point a year, more in the non-OECD countries than in the OECD. The global rise in tariff rates alone reduces world trade growth by about 2 percentage points per year and world economic growth by about 0.6 percentage points per year. The reduction in net FDI and foreign aid alone cuts non-OECD GDP per capita growth about 0.2 percent per year. The assumed migration cuts affect mainly the United States and Mexico on the one hand, and the European Union and its near neighbors on the other. In the US, reduced migration and then fewer births results in a US population of about 30 million fewer by 2035, and a reduction of about 3% in GDP from this change alone. The EU’s 2035 population is about 17 million fewer than it is in the globalization scenario. The model estimates these large falls in GDP growth because trade flows are linked to efficiency gains in production as posited in neoclassical trade theory literature (Krugman, and Obstfeld, 2006) and demonstrated in empirical research such as Estavadeordal and Taylor (2008). Capital and labor changes also affect production and productivity by the straightforward mechanics of the simple neoclassical growth model (Hubbard and O’Brian, 2006) which is embedded in the IFs model.4 While the basic functional relationships between trade and growth are the same for each country, the actual impact of the deglobalization assumptions varies a great deal by country depending on each country’s initial level of development and degree of globalization, its dependence on foreign capital and labor, and its industrial and wage structure. The model projections tell us a great deal about relative gains and losses within countries and between countries, about change in inequality and poverty, and even about political stability, democratization, and peace and war. In short, deglobalization results in rising poverty headcounts and inequality increases in most but not all countries, a slight increase in average political instability, and a substantial increase in the risk of interstate war.

Prefer our ev – it has the best model.

Hillebrand ‘10

Evan E. Hillebrand, Visiting Professor in the Patterson School of Diplomacy at the University of Kentucky and a Senior Economist for the Central Intelligence Agency. “Deglobalization Scenarios: Who Wins? Who Loses?”. Global Economy Journal. Volume 10, Issue 2 2010 Article 3. Online.

This paper relies on the International Futures Model (Hughes and others, 2003, 2004, and 2006) to estimate a general equilibrium analysis of the impact of a potential reversal of the globalization process. The International Futures Model (IFs) is a global model representing hundreds of relationships within and among 183 countries. It has complex sub-models focusing on demographic change, economic growth, income distribution, agriculture, industrial structure, the environment, energy, trade, social stability, and interstate war. The behavioral relationships are based on theoretical and empirical specifications derived from the literature as well as empirical work by Hughes and his colleagues. The model has a long history of use by multiple institutions in assessing long-range global futures2.

## AT: DEFENSE

### AT: Foreign Attacks Trigger MPX

Other countries will model the US

Obama 2010 (Barack, Obama's Closing Remarks, Press Conference at Nuclear Summit;

He thanks leaders, says world will be more secure after historic gathering, Lexis)

But as I said, today was about taking tangible steps to protect our people. So we've also agreed to a detailed work plan to guide our efforts going forward -- the specific actions we will take. I want to commend my partners for the very important commitments that they made in conjunction with this summit. Let me give some examples. Canada agreed to give up a significant quantity of highly enriched uranium. Chile has given up its entire stockpile. Ukraine and Mexico announced that they will do the same. Other nations -- such as Argentina and Pakistan -- announced new steps to strengthen port security and prevent nuclear smuggling. More nations -- including Argentina, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam -- agreed to join, and thus strengthen, the treaties and international partnerships that are at the core of our global efforts. A number of countries -' including Italy, Japan, India and China -' will create new centers to promote nuclear security technologies and training. Nations pledged new resources to help the IAEA meet its responsibilities. In a major and welcomed development, Russia announced that it will close its last weapons-grade plutonium production reactor. After many years of effort, I'm pleased that the United States and Russia agreed today to eliminate 68 tons of plutonium for our weapons programs -' plutonium that would have been enough for about 17,000 nuclear weapons. Instead, we will use this material to help generate electricity for our people. These are exactly the kind of commitments called for in the work plan that we adopted today, so we've made real progress in building a safer world. I would also note that the United States has made its own commitments. We are strengthening security at our own nuclear facilities, and will invite the IAEA to review the security at our neutron research center. This reflects our commitment to sharing the best practices that are needed in our global efforts. We're seeking significant funding increases for programs to prevent nuclear proliferation and trafficking. And today, the United States is joining with our Canadian partners and calling on nations to commit $10 billion to extending our highly successful Global Partnership to strengthen nuclear security around the world. So this has been a day of great progress. But as I said this morning, this can't be a fleeting moment. Securing nuclear materials must be a serious and sustained global effort. We agreed to have our experts meet on a regular basis '- to measure progress, to ensure that we're meeting our commitments and to plan our next steps. And I again want to thank President Lee and the Republic of Korea for agreeing to host the next Nuclear Security Summit in two years. Finally, let me say while this summit is focused on securing nuclear materials, this is part of a larger effort -' the comprehensive agenda that I outlined in Prague last year to pursue the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. Indeed, in recent days we've made progress on every element of this agenda. To reduce nuclear arsenals, President Medvedev and I signed the historic new START treaty '- not only committing our two nations to significant reductions in deployed nuclear weapons, but also setting the stage for further cuts and cooperation between our countries. To move beyond outdated Cold War thinking and to focus on the nuclear dangers of the 21st century, our new Nuclear Posture Review reduces the role and number of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. And for the first time, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is at the top of America's nuclear agenda, which reaffirms the central importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And next month in New York, we will join with nations from around the world to strengthen the NPT as the cornerstone of our global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons even as we pursue greater civil nuclear cooperation. Because for nations that uphold their responsibilities, peaceful nuclear energy can unlock new advances in medicine, in agriculture, and economic development. All of these efforts are connected. Leadership and progress in one area reinforces progress in another. When the United States improves our own nuclear security and transparency, it encourages others to do the same, as we've seen today. When the United States fulfills our responsibilities as a nuclear power committed to the NPT, we strengthen our global efforts to ensure that other nations fulfill their responsibilities.

# ECONOMY

## UNIQUENESS

### Port Infrastructure Failing Now

Port efficiency lagging now – threatens competetiveness

JaxDailyRecord ‘12

“U.S. Mayors discuss national port infrastructure plans” Feb. 27, 2012 http://www.jaxdailyrecord.com/showstory.php?Story\_id=535764

“Investing in our infrastructure is so critical for our country. Ports play a major role in putting America back to work all around the globe,” Brown said. “We want to remain competitive in the marketplace and the only way to do that is to invest in our ports,” he said. The U.S. Conference of Mayors released a report during the weekend outlining the economic impact of exports on metro cities’ economies. It also projects that exports will outpace imports by 2020. “The U.S. Conference of Mayors has one message — cities are where the action is,” said Scott Smith, mayor of Mesa, Ariz. “Cities are where economic activity happens. Cities are where economic growth will happen. The great opportunity we have right now is in exports. We believe 40 percent of real growth in our GDP will come through exports,” he said. Smith said cities operate in a world economy that needs to be connected. “The challenges we face in America is that we have fallen behind in our ability to connect with the world. Our problem is that we have lagged in infrastructure investment. We have redirected resources and we all know how challenged we are with resources in Washington,” he said. Smith explained that policy changes are needed to correct operations. “We are looking for smart investment. We are looking for smart cuts, not dumb cuts, in Washington. We think it’s dumb to cut the investment in our ports, in our highways and in those things that connect the world and create real economic opportunity,” said Smith.

## ADV SOLVENCY

### MMPDS Key – Increases Efficiency of Ports

Effective MMPDS implementation is key to streamline shipping inspections

PR Newswire 2011 (Homeland Security Award Recognizes Columbus Scholar Dr. Michael Sossong's Innovations in "Cutting Edge" Nuclear Detection Technology, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/homeland-security-award-recognizes-columbus-scholar-dr-michael-sossongs-innovations-in-cutting-edge-nuclear-detection-technology-131534758.html)

Dr. Sossong has revolutionized the state of the art for passive nuclear threat detection using cosmic ray muon tomography (MT). He has led the development of Decision Sciences' Multi-Mode Passive Detection System (MMPDS), a commercial multi-mode passive detection system that facilitates the flow of commerce by rapidly and accurately identifying nuclear and radiological threats in shipping containers and vehicles of all types, without compromising the safety of cargo, passengers or inspection personnel. Under Dr. Sossong the MMPDS has evolved from its laboratory origins into a robust, deployable commercial system. Muon tomography is the only technology available that can accomplish the original U.S. congressional mandate of 100% screening of cargo for nuclear materials. Given its effectiveness, scalability and passive nature, the technology is also appropriate for scanning occupied passenger vehicles, private aircraft, trains, air-cargo containers, and more.

### Ports Key to Growth

Ports key to trade, job creation and economic growth

Nagel ‘12

Kurt Nagle, President, American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), Virginia, US Master’s degree in Economics and over 30 years experience in Washington, DC, related to seaports and international trade. Former Director of International Trade for the National Coal Association and Assistant Secretary for the Coal Exporters Association “US port-related infrastructure investments reap dividends” Industry Today October 17, 2011 <http://www.porttechnology.org/images/uploads/technical_papers/PTI-4.pdf> Acessed 7/3/11 Online at Port Technology International

For centuries, US seaports and the waterways that connect them have served as a vital economic lifeline by bringing goods and services to people around the world, facilitating trade and commerce, creating jobs, helping to secure US borders, supporting the military and serving as stewards of valuable coastal environmental resources. As the primary gateway for overseas trade, seaports are essential for economic prosperity, and federal funding for infrastructure in and around ports pays dividends for the country. Deep- draft coastal and Great Lakes ports are the nexus of critical transportation infrastructure that connects America’s exporters with markets overseas. They also provide access for imports of raw materials, components, and consumer goods that are a key part of US manufacturing and standards of living. Investments in port infrastructure and the intermodal connections that serve seaports – both land and waterside – help the nation prosper and provide an opportunity to bolster the employment and economic recovery. Economic impacts: Today, international trade accounts for more than a quarter of America’s gross domestic product, while ocean-going vessels that load and unload cargo at US seaports move 99.4 percent of the nation’s overseas trade by volume and 65.5 percent by value. Furthermore, customs collections from seaport cargo provide tens of billions of dollars a year to the US federal government, including $23.2 billion in financial year 2007, $24.1 billion in financial year 2008, $20.3 billion in financial year 2009 and $22.5 billion in financial year 2010. In the latest economic impacts analysis conducted in 2007, US seaport activities generated $3.15 trillion in annual economic output, with $3.8 billion worth of goods moving in and out of seaports every day. The impacts go far beyond the communities in which seaports are located. On average, any given US state uses the services of 15 different ports around the country to handle its imports and exports. From a jobs standpoint, America’s seaports support the employment of 13.3 million US workers, and seaport-related jobs account for $649 billion in annual personal income. For every $1 billion in exports shipped though US seaports, 15,000 domestic jobs are created. With ambitious greening initiatives nationwide, seaports have begun generating jobs outside of their traditional sectors, such as opportunities in the environmental sciences.

## IMPACT

### Econ Decline Bad

Economic decline risks great power conflict and increase nation’s belligerance.

Green and Schrage in ‘9

Michael J Green, Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Associate Professor at Georgetown University. Steven P Schrage, the CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business and a former senior official with the US Trade Representative's Office, State Department and Ways & Means Committee. Asia Times. March 26 2009. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Asian\_Economy/KC26Dk01.html

However, the Great Depression taught us that a downward global economic spiral can even have jarring impacts on great powers. It is no mere coincidence that the last great global economic downturn was followed by the most destructive war in human history. In the 1930s, economic desperation helped fuel autocratic regimes and protectionism in a downward economic-security death spiral that engulfed the world in conflict. This spiral was aided by the preoccupation of the United States and other leading nations with economic troubles at home and insufficient attention to working with other powers to maintain stability abroad. Today's challenges are different, yet 1933's London Economic Conference, which failed to stop the drift toward deeper depression and world war, should be a cautionary tale for leaders heading to next month's London Group of 20 (G-20) meeting. There is no question the US must urgently act to address banking issues and to restart its economy. But the lessons of the past suggest that we will also have to keep an eye on those fragile threads in the international system that could begin to unravel if the financial crisis is not reversed early in the Barack Obama administration and realize that economics and security are intertwined in most of the critical challenges we face. A disillusioned rising power? Four areas in Asia merit particular attention, although so far the current financial crisis has not changed Asia's fundamental strategic picture. China is not replacing the US as regional hegemon, since the leadership in Beijing is too nervous about the political implications of the financial crisis at home to actually play a leading role in solving it internationally. Predictions that the US will be brought to its knees because China is the leading holder of US debt often miss key points. China's currency controls and full employment/export-oriented growth strategy give Beijing few choices other than buying US Treasury bills or harming its own economy. Rather than creating new rules or institutions in international finance, or reorienting the Chinese economy to generate greater long-term consumer demand at home, Chinese leaders are desperately clinging to the status quo (though Beijing deserves credit for short-term efforts to stimulate economic growth). The greater danger with China is not an eclipsing of US leadership, but instead the kind of shift in strategic orientation that happened to Japan after the Great Depression. Japan was arguably not a revisionist power before 1932 and sought instead to converge with the global economy through open trade and adoption of the gold standard. The worldwide depression and protectionism of the 1930s devastated the newly exposed Japanese economy and contributed directly to militaristic and autarkic policies in Asia as the Japanese people reacted against what counted for globalization at the time. China today is similarly converging with the global economy, and many experts believe China needs at least 8% annual growth to sustain social stability. Realistic growth predictions for 2009 are closer to 5%. Veteran China hands were watching closely when millions of migrant workers returned to work after the Lunar New Year holiday last month to find factories closed and jobs gone. There were pockets of protests, but nationwide unrest seems unlikely this year, and Chinese leaders are working around the clock to ensure that it does not happen next year either. However, the economic slowdown has only just begun and nobody is certain how it will impact the social contract in China between the ruling communist party and the 1.3 billion Chinese who have come to see President Hu Jintao's call for "harmonious society" as inextricably linked to his promise of "peaceful development". If the Japanese example is any precedent, a sustained economic slowdown has the potential to open a dangerous path from economic nationalism to strategic revisionism in China too. Dangerous states It is noteworthy that North Korea, Myanmar and Iran have all intensified their defiance in the wake of the financial crisis, which has distracted the world's leading nations, limited their moral authority and sown potential discord. With Beijing worried about the potential impact of North Korean belligerence or instability on Chinese internal stability, and leaders in Japan and South Korea under siege in parliament because of the collapse of their stock markets, leaders in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang have grown increasingly boisterous about their country's claims to great power status as a nuclear weapons state. The junta in Myanmar has chosen this moment to arrest hundreds of political dissidents and thumb its nose at fellow members of the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Iran continues its nuclear program while exploiting differences between the US, UK and France (or the P-3 group) and China and Russia - differences that could become more pronounced if economic friction with Beijing or Russia crowds out cooperation or if Western European governments grow nervous about sanctions as a tool of policy. It is possible that the economic downturn will make these dangerous states more pliable because of falling fuel prices (Iran) and greater need for foreign aid (North Korea and Myanmar), but that may depend on the extent that authoritarian leaders care about the well-being of their people or face internal political pressures linked to the economy. So far, there is little evidence to suggest either and much evidence to suggest these dangerous states see an opportunity to advance their asymmetrical advantages against the international system.

Growth prevents conflicts that lead to nuclear war

Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8

Aaron, professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, Gabriel, Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, The Dangers of a Diminished America, WSJ, 10/21, Proquest

Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions. Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

Economic decline breeds wars

Mead 9

2/4, Walter Russell, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, Only Makes You Stronger: Why the recession bolstered America, The New Republic

None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

### Free Trade Key to Growth

Free trade is key to economic growth – statistics prove

Griswold 4

Daniel. Director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies, Masters in economics from London School of Economics. 1/6/4. <http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-026.pdf>.

Just as important, economic freedom and openness encourage democracy indirectly by raising living standards and expanding the middle class. Economic theory and evidence lean heavily toward the conclusion that open economies tend to grow faster and achieve higher incomes than closed economies. The *Economic Freedom of the World* study by James Gwartney and Robert Lawson found that nations that ranked in the top quintile in terms of economic openness from 1980 to 1998 experienced annual economic growth that was almost five times faster (2.4 percent vs. 0.5 percent) than those nations in the bottom quintile of openness. People living in the most open economies enjoyed far higher annual incomes per capita ($22,306 vs. $2,916) than those living in the most closed economies.5 A study by World Bank economists David Dollar and Aart Kraay found that less developed countries that opened themselves to the global economy grew much faster than those that remained relatively closed.6 Other academic studies have reached similar conclusions

Free trade is key to economic growth

Griswold 8

Daniel. Director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies, Masters in economics from London School of Economics. 6/3/8. <http://www.freetrade.org/node/879>.

Speculation is growing that the U.S. economy may have already slipped into recession. If the past is any guide, politicians on the campaign trail will be tempted to blame trade and globalization for the passing pain of the business cycle. But an analysis of previous recessions and expansions shows that international trade and investment are not to blame for downturns in the economy and may, in fact, be moderating the business cycle. In recent decades, as foreign trade and investment have been rising as a share of the U.S. economy, recessions have actually become milder and less frequent. The softening of the business cycle has become so striking that economists now refer to it as "The Great Moderation." The more benign trend appears to date from the mid-1980s. The Great Moderation means that Americans are spending more of their time earning a living in a growing economy and less in a contracting economy. Our economy has been in recession a total of 16 months in the past 25 years, or 5.3 percent of the time. In comparison, between 1945 and 1983, the nation suffered through nine recessions totaling 96 months, or 21.1 percent of that time period. America's recent experience of a more globalized and less volatile economy has not been unique in the world. Other countries that have opened themselves to global markets have been less vulnerable to financial and economic shocks. Countries that put all their economic eggs in the domestic basket lack the diversification that a more globally integrated economy can fall back on to weather a slowdown. A country that increases trade as a share of its gross domestic product by 10 percentage points is actually about one-third less likely to suffer sudden economic slowdowns or other crises than if it were less open to trade. As the authors of this study concluded: Some may find this counterintuitive: trade protectionism does not "shield" countries from the volatility of world markets as proponents might hope. On the contrary...economies that trade less with other countries are more prone to sudden stops and to currency crises.

# SOLVENCY

### Universal Screening Key

Err on the side of caution – universal screening is necessary

Nadler, Markey and Thompson 6-26-12 – Jerrold L. Nadler, Edward J. Markey and Bennie G. Thompson are Democratic representatives from New York, Massachusetts and Mississippi, respectively (New York Times, Cargo, the Terrorists’ Trojan Horse, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/opinion/the-dangerous-delay-on-port-security.html)

An attack on an American port could cause tens of thousands of deaths and cripple global trade, with losses ranging from $45 billion to more than $1 trillion, according to estimates by the RAND Corporation and the Congressional Research Service. Anyone who doubts these estimates should recall the labor strike that shut down the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach for 11 days in 2002. Economic losses were put at $6.3 billion or more. Homeland Security says it would cost $16 billion or more to meet the mandate, but that projection assumes that the department would pay to acquire, maintain and operate scanning equipment and related operations, without any offsetting fees from companies in the global supply chain. In contrast, Stephen E. Flynn, an expert in terrorism and port security at Northeastern University, has said a scanning system could be implemented in every major container port in the world at a cost of $1.5 billion, and that the costs could largely be absorbed by companies doing business at the ports. Homeland Security says it uses a “layered, risk-based approach” to cargo scanning, which, instead of comprehensive scanning, targets specific cargo thought to be high-risk. But this approach is inadequate. Recent advances in screening technologies have undermined Homeland Security’s contention that the technology is not available to scan all cargo containers without disrupting commerce. An effective high-volume container screening system was installed in the Port of Hong Kong in 2005. Trials of new, American-made technology have demonstrated that scanning all containers would be feasible at many ports. The world’s largest marine terminal operators have offered to work with the department to put the law into effect. Cost and technology have never been the primary obstacles to meeting this mandate. What is missing is a sense of urgency and determination. We recognized that the scanning of 100 percent of all cargo containers in five years could be a challenging deadline to meet. That is why we included the authority to extend the deadline in cases in which Homeland Security certified that there are at least two major obstacles relating to the availability and accuracy of the technology, the logistics of its deployment and use, or impacts to trade. Now Homeland Security is using this authority to simply exempt itself from any meaningful compliance with the law we wrote to close a dangerous loophole in United States security. We have urged the department over the last five years to make the law a reality, to no avail. Our nation can no longer risk such delays.

### Fed Govt Key

Federal government oversight is key capacity building and interagency cooperation

Beisecker 2006 – Research Assistant, Monterey Institute of International Studies (Randall, DP World and U.S. Port Security, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/dp-world-and-us-port-security/)

With Congress calling for increased legislation on port operations and security, it is important to note that, as pointed out by the ILWU, many terminal operators have either failed to absorb new security protocols or rejected the current regulations outright. Even the best legislation is ineffectual if it is not supported by proper monitoring and the funds to support sustained implementation. A coordinated long-term program by the federal government to train and monitor terminal employees would help each terminal operator raise the level of its own capacity to perform security operations on its own property. The good news is that we do not have to start from scratch to improve port security. The federal government already has programs and legislation in place to inspect vessels and containers, develop and approve port security plans, provide worker identification cards, run safety and security drills, develop high-tech solutions for inspecting and sealing containers, and install radiation detectors both domestically and internationally. However, these programs have not been nurtured to fruition. The worst thing that could happen now would be for Congress or the President to feel pressured to introduce a new wave of programs and initiatives when the current set remains woefully unfunded and poorly manned. Instead, the government should search for ways to enhance the capacity of all the instruments already in place.

### DHS Key – AT: States/Privatization

Strong DHS role is necessary – failure to include them undermines US anti-terrorism measures

Berrick 3-8-12 – Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office (Cathleen, House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management Hearing; "Eliminating Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and Duplication in the Department of Homeland Security." Congressional Documents and Publications, Lexis)

Our work at DHS has identified three key themes--leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise, implementing and integrating management functions for results, and strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security efforts--that have impacted the department's progress since it began operations. n4 As these themes have contributed to challenges in the department's management and operations, addressing them can result in increased efficiencies and effectiveness. For example, DHS can help reduce cost overruns and performance shortfalls by strengthening the management of its acquisitions, and reduce inefficiencies and costs for homeland security by improving its RandD management. These themes provide insights that can inform DHS's efforts, moving forward, as it works to implement its missions within a dynamic and evolving homeland security environment. DHS made progress and has had successes in all of these areas, but our work found that these themes have been at the foundation of DHS's implementation challenges, and need to be addressed from a department wide perspective to effectively and efficiently position DHS for the future and enable it to satisfy the expectations set forth by the Congress, the administration, and the country. Leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise. While DHS is one of a number of entities with a role in securing the homeland, it has significant leadership and coordination responsibilities for managing efforts across the homeland security enterprise. To satisfy these responsibilities, it is critically important that DHS develop, maintain, and leverage effective partnerships with its stakeholders, while at the same time addressing DHS-specific responsibilities in satisfying its missions. Before DHS began operations, we reported that the quality and continuity of the new department's leadership would be critical to building and sustaining the long-term effectiveness of DHS and achieving homeland security goals and objectives. n5 We further reported that to secure the nation, DHS must form effective and sustained partnerships between components and also with a range of other entities, including federal agencies, state and local governments, the private and nonprofit sectors, and international partners. n6 DHS has made important strides in providing leadership and coordinating efforts. For example, it has improved coordination and clarified roles with state and local governments for emergency management. DHS also strengthened its partnerships and collaboration with foreign governments to coordinate and standardize security practices for aviation security. However, DHS needs to take additional action to forge effective partnerships and strengthen the sharing and utilization of information, which has affected its ability to effectively satisfy its missions. For example, in July 2010, we reported that the expectations of private-sector stakeholders have not been met by DHS and its federal partners in areas related to sharing information about cyber-based threats to critical infrastructure. n7 In 2005, we designated information-sharing for homeland security as high risk because the federal government faced serious challenges in analyzing information and sharing it among partners in a timely, accurate, and useful way. n8 Gaps in sharing, such as agencies' failure to link information about the individual who attempted to conduct the December 25, 2009, airline bombing, prevented the individual from being included on the federal government's consolidated terrorist watchlist, a tool used by DHS to screen for persons who pose risks to the country. The federal government and DHS have made progress, but more work remains for DHS to streamline its information sharing mechanisms and better meet partners' needs. Moving forward, it will be important that DHS continue to enhance its focus and efforts to strengthen and leverage the broader homeland security enterprise, and build off the important progress that it has made thus far. In addressing ever-changing and complex threats, and with the vast array of partners with whom DHS must coordinate, continued leadership and stewardship will be critical in achieving this end.

# AT: OFF CASE

## TOPICALITY

### T – DHS

Port Security Grant Program proves – DHS security funding is for port infrastructure

Reese 2009 – Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy (Shawn, Department of Homeland Security Assistance to States and Localities: A Summary and Issues for the 111th Congress, CRS Report for Congress)

The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) provides funding for the protection of ports and port infrastructure from terrorism. It is intended to enhance risk management capabilities, maritime domain awareness, training and exercises, and counter-terrorism capabilities. Eligible applicants include owners and operators of federally regulated terminals, facilities, or U.S. inspected passenger vessels; port authorities or state and local agencies that provide security to federally regulated port facilities; and any group (such as port and terminal associations) that provides security for federally regulated ports, terminals, U.S. passenger vessels, or ferries. 23 DHS conducts risk and vulnerability assessments to determine what ports are eligible to apply for funding. Based on these risk and vulnerability assessments, ports are categorized into Tier I, Tier II, Tier III, or “All Other Port Areas.” Tier I and Tier II ports are provided a designated amount of funding; identified Tier III ports and “All Other Port Areas” apply and compete for remaining funding. 24

DHS is T – critical infrastructure is still transportation

Thompson 2010 – Member, House of Representatives (D-Miss.). Representative Thompson has served as Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security since the beginning of the 110th Congress (Bennie G., “A LEGISLATIVE PRESCRIPTION FOR CONFRONTING 21ST-CENTURY RISKS TO THE HOMELAND,” 47 Harv. J. on Legis. 277, Lexis)

The settled definition of "critical infrastructure" was established in the PATRIOT Act, which was signed into law in October 2001. n38 The Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001, part of the PATRIOT Act, describes "critical infrastructure" as "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters." n39 Critical infrastructure includes infrastructure related to our banking and finance system, our water supply, our food supply, and the transportation of goods and people. A "system" or an "asset" is not defined in the statute, thus giving the Executive Branch significant discretion. The statutory definition of "critical infrastructure" affects infrastructure protection policy because it determines which assets and systems the government will attempt to secure. The definition attempts to strike a balance: to not be so vague as to include any infrastructure in the United States (such as a short bridge connecting two small islands of no strategic value), nor so rigid that, as new risks develop or evolve, the definition would become an obstacle to security efforts. n40 [\*285] There is some consensus that the PATRIOT Act's limitation of critical infrastructure to systems and assets "so vital to the United States that ... incapacity or destruction ... would have a debilitating impact" is too narrow, since there are in fact few, if any, assets or systems that meet this requirement. n41 For example, facilities critical to a region--while not of national significance per se--should be included in any definition of critical infrastructure. Accordingly, in the 9/11 Act of 2007, Congress effectively amended this definition, requiring DHS to keep a database of assets and systems that the "Secretary determines would, if destroyed or disrupted, cause national or regional catastrophic effects." n42

### T – Port Security = Infrastructure

The plan is investment in transportation security infrastructure- it’s a more specific type of transportation infrastructure

DHS ‘10, july 2010 update, “progress in implementing 9/11 commission recommendations”

To support transportation infrastructure and security, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provided the following resources to state and local jurisdictions based on risk and threats in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 and through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA): o $403 million for the Transit Security Grant Program to protect critical transit infrastructure from terrorism, including capital projects, such as improvements to high-risk, high-density tunnels, stations, and bridges and law enforcement officers at transit systems across the country. ($150 million ARRA/ $253 million FY2010 funding) o $1.76 billion for state-of-the-art in-line explosive detection systems to streamline checked baggage screening at airports throughout the U.S. ($734 million ARRA/ $1.028 billion FY2010 funding) o $14.5 million for the Freight Rail Security Grant Program to protect critical freight rail systems infrastructure from acts of terrorism resulting from railroad cars transporting toxic inhalation hazardous materials. o $20 million for Intercity Passenger Rail (Amtrak) to protect critical surface transportation infrastructure and the traveling public from terrorism within the Amtrak rail system.

The Coast Guard does port transportation infrastructure programs- they’re topical and the DHS funds their programs

DHS ‘10, july 2010 update, “progress in implementing 9/11 commission recommendations”

In FY 2010, DHS provided $288 million in grants for the Port Security Grant Program—awarded based on risk—to protect critical port infrastructure from terrorism, enhance maritime domain awareness and risk management capabilities, and support the implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential, and an additional $150 million in Recovery Act funding. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) has many risk-based initiatives in place that strengthen maritime transportation security. For example, Operation Neptune Shield, which includes waterborne and aerial patrols as well as armed escorts of hazardous cargos and passenger vessels, helps to reduce the risk of terrorism to the maritime transportation system, critical infrastructure and key resources. The USCG also has developed Advanced Interdiction capabilities in order to interdict identified threats, including chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives threats, before they reach the United States. The USCG conducts intelligence-informed, risk-based Security Boardings to verify the identity of crew members and to ascertain if a vessel poses a threat to the port and whether it should be permitted or denied entry.

### T – MMPDS = Infrastructure

MMPDS is an investment in infrastructure

Decision Sciences 2008 (“Multi-Mode Passive Detection System,” http://www.decisionsciencescorp.com/solutions\_template.aspx?id=36)

Decision Sciences' MMPDS is ideally suited for seamless integration into critical infrastructure, ports, borders, and air and rail operations around the globe where there is an ever-growing need for efficient, accurate detection and deterrence of nuclear terrorist threats. Designed to be embedded within existing infrastructure or as a stand-alone application, Decision Sciences' MMPDS can easily be scaled to fit a wide variety of applications.

## DISADS

### PTX – Plan Popular – National Security

Plan is popular – national security measure

HS Today 7-2-12 (Homeland Security Today, Aviation, Port Security Bills Enjoy Bipartisan Support from House Lawmakers, http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/today-s-news-analysis/single-article/aviation-port-security-bills-enjoy-bipartisan-support-from-house-lawmakers/8774d00b80793d7b125324dc9dad3510.html)

Finally, the GAPS Act would require the Department of Homeland Security to examine gaps in port security and report to Congress with a plan to address those gaps. Rep. Janice Hahn (D-Calif.), who sponsored the bill, hailed its passage, 411-9, Thursday. In a statement, Hahn said, "The loopholes that continue to exist in port security keep me up at night. My first question as a member of the Homeland Security Committee was to Lee Hamilton, vice chair of the 9/11 Commission, on what Congress should be doing to protect our ports. Mr. Hamilton's response that Congress wasn't focused enough on our ports meant we needed to act." US ports receive roughly 50,000 calls from ships annually, with 2 billion tons of freight and 134 million passengers, Hahn reported. The contribution of this cargo to the US economy is staggeringly significant, but only 3 percent or less of cargo undergoes scanning. That low amount opens up opportunities for terrorists to smuggle people or weapons into the United States, she argued. A terrorist attack on the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach would cost billions to the economy of California and displace thousands of port workers, Hahn warned. Geraldine Knatz, executive director of the Port of Los Angeles, praised the GAPS Act as an effort to prevent such a catastrophe. "It's a tribute to both the importance of the issue and Representative Hahn's tenacity that Congress passed her legislation a mere four months after she introduced the bill," Knatz said in a statement. "Trade gateways, like the Port of Los Angeles, are critical pieces of our nation's economic infrastructure. Keeping these gateways safe is a national priority."

Plan has bipartisan support

McCarter 7/2 (Mickey McCarter, homeland security reporter for more than 10 years, “Aviation, Port Security Bills Enjoy Bipartisan Support From House Lawmakers” [http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/today-s-news-analysis/single-article/aviation-port-security-bills-enjoy-bipartisan-support-from-house-lawmakers/8774d00b80793d7b125324dc9dad3510.html DOA 7/2/12](http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/today-s-news-analysis/single-article/aviation-port-security-bills-enjoy-bipartisan-support-from-house-lawmakers/8774d00b80793d7b125324dc9dad3510.html%20DOA%207/2/12))

Democrats applauded last week the passage by the House of several homeland security bills designed to strengthen aviation and port security. The bills, including the Aviation Security Stakeholder Participation Act (HR 1447), the Securing Maritime Activities through Risk–based Targeting (SMART) for Port Security Act (HR 4251) and the Gauging American Port Security (GAPS) Act (HR 4005) enjoyed bipartisan support. None of the bills has companion legislation in the Senate but all three moved there for consideration. The Senate could take up the bills or they could become included in a conference for the homeland security appropriations bill for fiscal year 2013.

## COUNTERPLANS

### AT: States/Privatization

Federal regulation is key – absent uniform standards ports will engage in economic competition with one another undermining solvency

Puentes 2011 – Senior Fellow Metropolitan Policy Program (Robert, Move It: How the U.S. Can Improve Transportation Policy, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/05/23-transportation-policy-puentes)

Clearly, we need a new approach. Transportation needs to be put squarely in the service of the American economy. We must coordinate the efforts of the public and private sectors to make it easier to move freight, find ways to cut carbon emissions, integrate new technologies into daily commutes and connect workers to jobs that are far from their homes. The big question, of course, is how much it will all cost. And that's tough to answer right now. We have a lot of ideas for the types of new investments we want. But little attention is given to figuring out what may not be needed if we can find smarter alternatives, such as rerouting flights instead of building new airports. With that in mind, here's a look at the national goals we want to achieve—and how transportation policy can—no, must—be rethought to achieve them. Boosting Exports The country needs to become more export-oriented for the future health of the economy. But right now there's no way to make sure that the nation's ports, border crossings and roadways are set up to accomplish that goal. For one thing, there's far too little attention paid to making sure that traffic at border crossings moves swiftly. Our crossings into Mexico and Canada are routinely clogged, interrupting the flow of trade. Consider the challenges facing Detroit—part of the largest binational trading corridor on the planet, linking the U.S. and Canadian auto industries and other sectors with highly integrated, transport-dependent, "just in time" supply chains and their smaller, more frequent shipments. Canada is our nation's largest trading partner, and Detroit's Ambassador Bridge is the No. 1 border point for commerce between the two countries. It's a crucial corridor—but there are relatively few border crossings because of the Great Lakes. So traffic piles up at bridges and tunnels, with freight competing with passenger cars to get through tightened security checkpoints. Trucks also clog the roads of Detroit as they shuttle freight between ports and large distribution centers and warehouses. The export problem isn't just a matter of insufficient infrastructure. States and cities routinely compete against one another for shipping activity instead of coming up with joint efforts that might benefit all the terminals in the region. Without an overall strategy, there's a duplication of efforts and a duplication of subsidies that hurts the economy, given scarce resources. Collaboration is needed—between the federal government, states, metro areas, freight industry and shippers. We need to come up with a comprehensive plan that identifies the best ways to help the flow of freight. The plan might identify the most important corridors for freight, for instance, and then target investments to improve safety, relieve bottlenecks and provide better access to ports. That might mean new roads leading to ports or, in some instances, truck-only lanes on existing roads. Similarly, the U.S., Canada, and Mexico should also come together to study infrastructure needs at the land borders and along the corridors that link the two borders together. For now, some states are coming up with innovative solutions on their own—solutions that could and should become widespread under a national transportation policy. Back in Detroit, for instance, the national governments of the U.S. and Canada, along with lawmakers in Michigan and Ontario, are trying to build a new bridge across the Detroit River to help keep trade flowing—a plan that's awaiting final legislative approval. Meanwhile, the World Trade Bridge in Laredo, Texas, has introduced tags for electronic toll collection to speed traffic and reduce wait times. Then, of course, there's the issue of competition between ports for shipping business. One way to ease that problem: Tell states their ports won't get any federal aid unless they work with their neighbors to boost business in the whole region. And those agreements need to be carefully structured and policed to make sure they don't collapse—which happens all too easily. Consider the current mess involving Jasper Ocean Terminal on the Savannah River, the border between South Carolina and Georgia. In 2007, the two states agreed to develop the terminal together, and create a special entity to own and operate it. That's good. But what came later wasn't. After the governors who signed the deal left office, the terminal became a point of contention between the states. What happened? Georgia decided it wanted to deepen another one of its own harbors, a move that South Carolina sees as a challenge to its own facilities. So, South Carolina has stopped funding the Jasper facility unless the Georgia dredging plan is scrapped. Now, I ask you: How does any of this help get us closer to our national goals?

### Fees – CP Links to Politics

International business has a major stake in US ports

Beisecker 2006 – Research Assistant, Monterey Institute of International Studies (Randall, DP World and U.S. Port Security, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/dp-world-and-us-port-security/)

While ports are an array of local concerns, during the past decade the international maritime industry has become both increasingly globalized and concentrated, as major port operators in maritime nations have expanded their business operations by acquiring assets in a number of overseas ports. As an example of this trend, about 30 percent of port operations in the United States are performed by foreign-based firms, including 80 percent of the container terminals at the Port of Los Angeles.[3] This movement toward horizontal integration has increased efficiency in port operations in a number of ways and most maritime industry experts agree global port operations have seen resulting gains in economic performance and the capacity to enhance security.

CP links to politics – seen as ceding national security to foreign terrorism

Beisecker 2006 – Research Assistant, Monterey Institute of International Studies (Randall, DP World and U.S. Port Security, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/dp-world-and-us-port-security/)

Since the uproar began, lawmakers have been voicing concerns about how the control of key national infrastructure such as ports by a UAE state-owned business would threaten U.S. national security, with much of the rhetoric focusing on Dubai and the UAE's questionable role in the war on terror and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, no serious concerns have been raised so far about DP World's own reputation or history. This is not surprising since within the international maritime shipping industry, DP World is widely respected as an efficient, trustworthy firm.[29] While DP World is a commercial enterprise of the UAE, the government is not involved in the daily operations of the corporation.[30] Defenders in both DP World and P&O point out that after acquiring CSX, DP World left the operations and corporate management of its new ports largely unchanged. Leaving aside the political grandstanding of politicians before midterm elections, most of the arguments in opposition to the deal point to problems with capacity and effectiveness of U.S. programs, rather than real concerns related to DP World or its ties with the UAE. For example, some critics argued that as an "Arab" company, DP World may be coerced into providing visas for Al Qaeda operatives to legally enter the United States. This, however, is not a problem specific to DP World or the UAE--and to a large part completely beyond their control--but rather a general concern about weaknesses in the U.S. government's vetting of visa applications. This risk accompanies any foreign company with non-residents doing legitimate business in the United States. Similar hysteria about DP World bypassing manifest checks or radiation detectors to smuggle in WMD technology or Al Qaeda operatives, or compromising port security measures to sabotage port operations, ultimately reflect fears that U.S. Customs and Coast Guard may not have the capacity to be effective at these tasks. Finally, a Coast Guard intelligence report, which has been cited by many of the deal's critics and which noted intelligence gaps in understanding the workings of the companies, referred to both DP World and P&O, implying that the Coast Guard did not have the information to perform a risk assessment on foreign operators already operating at U.S. ports.[31]

### Fees – CP Jacks Industry Confidence

CP crushes central role of the federal government – destroys industry confidence

Beisecker 2006 – Research Assistant, Monterey Institute of International Studies (Randall, DP World and U.S. Port Security, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/dp-world-and-us-port-security/)

Members of Congress should focus their attention on ensuring that the CFIUS review process is effective rather than taking over the authority to monitor acquisitions and mergers themselves. Intelligence failures and the poor response to Hurricane Katrina have fractured the faith in the capabilities of both the intelligence agencies and the Department of Homeland Security. However, these failings should not be used as a justification for lawmakers to enter into the business of risk assessment. Expanded legislative oversight over each case brought before CFIUS will not be welcomed by the private sector. The flap over DP World demonstrates the dangers of allowing political interests too much say in a process that should appear apolitical and predictable. Foreign investment in the United States might slow if companies become concerned about the lack of predictability or that all acquisitions will be subject to politicking. The parochial interests of legislators may sink otherwise beneficial acquisitions and threaten the perception of the United States as a stable destination for foreign direct investment. This could have repercussions on a number of upcoming politically charged deals such as Japan's Toshiba Corp.'s interest in acquiring Westinghouse.

## Kritiks

### **2AC Institutions Good/Reform Good**

#### **Our use of institutions like the state realizes our complicity with power and produces agonism- the alternative is a string of “anti’s” that never produce positive change**

Newman ‘00,

(Saul, Postdoctoral Fellow @ Macquarie University, Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment, muse)

What is the point of this distinction between power and domination? Does this not bring us back to original anarchist position that society and our everyday actions, although oppressed by power, are ontologically separated from it? In other words, why not merely call domination 'power' once again, and revert back to the original, Manichean distinction between social life and power? However the point of this distinction is to show that this essential separation is now impossible. Domination -- oppressive political institutions like the State -- now comes from the same world as power**.** In other words it disrupts the strict Manichean separation of society and power. Anarchism and indeed radical politics generally, cannot remain in this comfortable illusion that we as political subjects, are somehow not complicit in the very regime that oppresses us. According to the Foucauldian definition of power that I have employed, we are all potentially complicit, through our everyday actions, in relations of domination. Our everyday actions, which inevitably involve power, are unstable and can easily form into relations that dominate us. As political subjects we can never relax and hide behind essentialist identities and Manichean structures -- behind a strict separation from the world of power. Rather we must be constantly on our guard against the possibility of domination**.** Foucault says: "My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous...If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism."[[52]](http://208.34.222.250/bin/rdas.dll/RDAS_SVR%3Dmuse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html#fn52) In order to resist domination we must be aware of its risks -- of the possibility that our own actions, even political action ostensibly against domination, can easily give rise to further domination. There is always the possibility, then, of contesting domination, and of minimizing its possibilities and effects. According to Foucault, domination itself is unstable and can give rise to reversals and resistance. Assemblages such as the State are based on unstable power relations that can just as easily turn against the institution they form the basis of. So there is always the possibility of resistance against domination. However resistance can never be in the form of revolution -- a grand dialectical overcoming of power, as the anarchists advocated. To abolish central institutions like the State with one stroke would be to neglect the multiform and diffuse relations of power they are based on, thus allowing new institutions and relations of domination to rise up. It would be to fall into the same reductionist trap as Marxism, and to court domination. Rather, resistance must take the form of what Foucault calls *agonism* -- an ongoing, strategic contestation with power -- based on mutual incitement and provocation -- without any final hope of being free from it.[[53]](http://208.34.222.250/bin/rdas.dll/RDAS_SVR%3Dmuse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html#fn53) One can, as I have argued, never hope to overcome power completely -- because every overcoming is itself the imposition of another regime of power. The best that can be hoped for is a reorganization of power relations -- through struggle and resistance -- in ways that are less oppressive and dominating. Domination can therefore be minimized by acknowledging our inevitable involvement with power, not by attempting to place ourselves impossibly outside the world of power. The classical idea of revolution as a dialectical overthrowing of power -- the image that has haunted the radical political imaginary -- must be abandoned. We must recognize the fact that power can never be overcome entirely, and we must affirm this by working within this world, renegotiating our position to enhance our possibilities of freedom**.**

#### Ressentiment culminates in a loss of value to life and the construction of external enemies

Newman ’00, (Saul, Postdoctoral Fellow @ Macquarie U, Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment, Theory & Event 4:3, muse)

Slave morality is characterized by the attitude of ressentiment -- the resentment and hatred of the powerless for the powerful. Nietzsche sees ressentiment as an entirely negative sentiment -- the attitude of denying what is life-affirming, saying 'no' to what is different, what is 'outside' or 'other'. Ressentiment is characterized by an orientation to the outside, rather than the focus of noble morality, which is on the self.[[7]](http://muse.jhu.edu.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html#fn7) While the master says 'I am good' and adds as an afterthought, 'therefore he is bad'; the slave says the opposite -- 'He (the master) is bad, therefore I am good'. Thus the invention of values comes from a comparison or opposition to that which is outside, other, different. Nietzsche says: "... in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external world, it needs, psychologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act all, -- its action is basically a reaction."[[8]](http://muse.jhu.edu.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html#fn8) This reactive stance, this inability to define anything except in opposition to something else, is the attitude of ressentiment. It is the reactive stance of the weak who define themselves in opposition to the strong. The weak need the existence of this external enemy to identify themselves as 'good'. Thus the slave takes 'imaginary revenge' upon the master, as he cannot act without the existence of the master to oppose. The man of ressentiment hates the noble with an intense spite, a deep-seated, seething hatred and jealousy. It is this ressentiment, according to Nietzsche, that has poisoned the modern consciousness, and finds its expression in ideas of equality and democracy, and in radical political philosophies, like anarchism, that advocate it.

### 2AC Terror Talk

#### The term ‘terrorism’ serves as a unifying concept for traditional scholarship and critical approaches.

Gunning ‘7

(Jeroen, Lecturer in Int’l Politics, University of Wales, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” Government and Opposition 42 (3), Summer)

On the other hand, though, there is no widely agreed concept that can serve as a unifying umbrella. While more scholars have become willing to adopt the term ‘terrorism’, this term is still considered problematic by many, just as the state-centric, military orientation found in much of the ‘terrorism’ literature prevents many from wishing to be identified with ‘terrorism studies’. For many, it is the unproblematic use of the term ‘terrorism’ in ‘traditional’ approaches, and the relative lack of critical reflection on the field's pro-status quo bias that deters them from fruitfully engaging with ‘terrorism studies’. Usage of the term ‘terrorism’ also poses serious practical and security difficulties for those conducting fieldwork among ‘terrorists’ or what Hillyard aptly termed ‘suspect communities’. Because many of these scholars do not use the discourse of ‘terrorism studies’, their contributions often remain unnoticed by those who do. As a result, not only do ‘traditional’ scholars remain unchallenged by these new contributions, but those making these fragmented contributions do not know of each other's existence, or benefit from the insights of ‘traditional terrorism studies’. It is this lack of interaction, and specifically the lack of interaction with ‘traditional terrorism studies’, that has led scholars like Merari to observe that studies from outside the field, however strong in other aspects, are often marred by a lack of familiarity with core insights from the ‘traditional terrorism literature’. Without a central concept like ‘terrorism’, many of these disparate voices are unlikely to converge.

#### Our terror arguments are both epistemologically and methodologically valid – they are self-reflexive.

Boyle and Horgan ‘8

Michael J. Boyle, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1.

Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed 'Orthodox Terrorism Studies9. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problem-solving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be 'a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism "knowledge"". An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological problems. In fact, terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these problems, but also have provided their own searching critiques of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, 'Understanding Terrorism'). Some of those scholars most associated with the critique of empiricism implied in 'Orthodox Terrorism Studies' have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by Schmid and Jongman (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the second edition they point out that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the failure to address persistent conceptual and data problems has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, Silke's (2004) volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.

#### Rejection of the term ‘terrorism’ is a political dead end. Their alternative won’t influence academics, policymakers, or the public.

Gunning ‘7

(Jeroen, Lecturer in Int’l Politics, University of Wales, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” Government and Opposition 42 (3), Summer)

Yet without an explicit acknowledgement of the difficulties of this concept, and of the effects of ‘problem-solving’ approaches on the study of ‘terrorism’, many of those same voices are unlikely to converge under a ‘traditional terrorism studies’ umbrella. It is for this reason that it is necessary to instigate an explicitly ‘critical turn’ in ‘terrorism studies’ since only a field that explicitly problematizes some of the key aspects of ‘traditional terrorism studies’ is likely to facilitate the coming together of all these disparate voices. It is for the same reason that any critically constituted field may have to maintain the term ‘terrorism’ as the central unifying concept, despite its many drawbacks and the lack of an agreed definition, since without it there would be little reason for these fragmented voices to converge. In my own work on Hamas and Hizbollah, most of what I want to understand or explain can be said without reference to the term ‘terrorism’ (unless it concerns the way ‘terrorism’ discourse is used to demonize Hamas and Hizbollah). The decision of these organizations to target civilians can be explained without the term ‘terrorism’, and this is only one aspect of a much larger picture. Where ‘terrorism’ does come into its own is as a delineation of research dealing with similar issues. Without ‘terrorism’ as a conceptual umbrella, it is unlikely that I would have been aware of the model Ross and Gurr developed to explain the demise of political violence in North America, or of the similarities between the dynamics between massmovement, violent organization and state forces in 1970s Italy and 1990s Israel/Palestine. Thus, as a comparative conceptual category, ‘terrorism’ and the research that has been carried out into it is useful. Besides offering a central, organizing concept under which these fragmented voices can converge, there are two further reasons for retaining the term ‘terrorism’. One of the key tasks of a critically constituted field is to investigate the political usage of this term. For that reason alone, it should be retained as a central marker. But, even more compellingly, the term ‘terrorism’ is currently so dominant that a critically constituted field cannot afford to abandon it. Academia does not exist outside the power structures of its day. However problematic the term, it dominates public discourse and as such needs to be engaged with, deconstructed and challenged, rather than abandoned and left to those who use it without problematization or purely for political ends. Using the term also increases the currency and relevance of one's research in both funding and policy circles, as well as among the wider public. It is because of this particular constellation of power structures that a ‘critical’ field cannot afford, either morally or pragmatically, to abandon the term ‘terrorism’.

### 2AC Util/Consequences Good

#### Their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize.

Isaac ‘2—Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington

Jeffery C., Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest.

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### An ethic of consequences enables political responsibility and freedom.

Williams ‘5

(Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales—Aberystwyth, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 174-176)

A commitment to an ethic of consequences reflects a deeper ethic of criticism, of ‘self-clarification’, and thus of reflection upon the values adopted by an individual or a collectivity. It is part of an attempt to make critical evaluation an intrinsic element of responsibility. Responsibility to this more fundamental ethic gives the ethic of consequences meaning. Consequentialism and responsibility are here drawn into what Schluchter, in terms that will be familiar to anyone conversant with constructivism in International Relations, has called a ‘reflexive principle’. In the wilful Realist vision, scepticism and consequentialism are linked in an attempt to construct not just a more substantial vision of political responsibility, but also the kinds of actors who might adopt it, and the kinds of social structures that might support it. A consequentialist ethic is not simply a choice adopted by actors: it is a means of trying to foster particular kinds of selfcritical individuals and societies, and in so doing to encourage a means by which one can justify and foster a politics of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility in wilful Realism thus involves a commitment to both autonomy and limitation, to freedom and restraint, to an acceptance of limits and the criticism of limits. Responsibility clearly involves prudence and an accounting for current structures and their historical evolution; but it is not limited to this, for it seeks ultimately the creation of responsible subjects within a philosophy of limits. Seen in this light, the Realist commitment to objectivity appears quite differently. Objectivity in terms of consequentialist analysis does not simply take the actor or action as given, it is a political practice — an attempt to foster a responsible self, undertaken by an analyst with a commitment to objectivity which is itself based in a desire to foster a politics of responsibility. Objectivity in the sense of coming to terms with the ‘reality’ of contextual conditions and likely outcomes of action is not only necessary for success, it is vital for selfreflection, for sustained engagement with the practical and ethical adequacy of one’s views. The blithe, self-serving, and uncritical stances of abstract moralism or rationalist objectivism avoid self-criticism by refusing to engage with the intractability of the world ‘as it is’. Reducing the world to an expression of their theoretical models, political platforms, or ideological programmes, they fail to engage with this reality, and thus avoid the process of self-reflection at the heart of responsibility. By contrast, Realist objectivity takes an engagement with this intractable ‘object’ that is not reducible to one’s wishes or will as a necessary condition of ethical engagement, self-reflection, and self-creation.7 Objectivity is not a naïve naturalism in the sense of scientific laws or rationalist calculation; it is a necessary engagement with a world that eludes one’s will. A recognition of the limits imposed by ‘reality’ is a condition for a recognition of one’s own limits — that the world is not simply an extension of one’s own will. But it is also a challenge to use that intractability as a source of possibility, as providing a set of openings within which a suitably chastened and yet paradoxically energised will to action can responsibly be pursued. In the wilful Realist tradition, the essential opacity of both the self and the world are taken as limiting principles. Limits upon understanding provide chastening parameters for claims about the world and actions within it. But they also provide challenging and creative openings within which diverse forms of life can be developed: the limited unity of the self and the political order is the precondition for freedom. The ultimate opacity of the world is not to be despaired of: it is a condition of possibility for the wilful, creative construction of selves and social orders which embrace the diverse human potentialities which this lack of essential or intrinsic order makes possible.8 But it is also to be aware of the less salutary possibilities this involves. Indeterminacy is not synonymous with absolute freedom — it is both a condition of, and imperative toward, responsibility.

### 2AC Neolib/Cap Bad K’s

#### Anti-neoliberal alternatives are slow – aff impacts in the interim

Grabel 10-24

Ilene, “Spotlight G20: Speeding From Hopeful to Hopeless,” http://www.truth-out.org/spotlight-g20-speeding-hopeful-hopeless/1319471917

Remember the WTO – the institution that we loved to hate? We haven’t been hearing much from or about the institution since its 2003 meeting in Cancun Mexico. That meeting marked the emergence of open conflict between wealthy and developing nations on a number of issues (such as agricultural protection). The conflict left the institution frozen and irrelevant. It now stands on the sidelines as policymakers crisscross the globe signing bi- and multi-lateral agreements. The G20 seems to be outpacing the WTO in the march toward irrelevance. When it was organized in the early days of the financial meltdown, many progressives (including me) viewed the G20 as an embryo from which new and at least somewhat more inclusive discussions of global economic policy could emerge. In its early days the shock of the global crisis seemed to have engendered a genuine “Keynesian moment.” G20 leaders collectively declared the death of the Washington Consensus, indicted the financial sector for its misdeeds, acknowledged the economic firepower of the rapidly growing developing countries that became new lenders to the IMF, and took tentative steps toward amplification of the voice of developing countries at the IMF and World Bank. But those heady moments passed quickly. Key players in the G20 soon got hold of themselves and repudiated their brief flirtation with Keynes by calling for “fiscal consolidation” around the world. At the same time, serious efforts to deal with global financial reform stalled. Lost was the opportunity to deal effectively with the shadow banking system, derivatives, and commodity market speculation. (For a thorough account of the G20’s accomplishments, failures and missed opportunities, see Eric Helleiner’s excellent op-ed on the subject.) Today, the G20 is approaching irrelevance. It is beset with conflict among members on key issues. And much like its parent body, the G8, it is quickly becoming known for the platitudes in its communiqués and its timidity and sluggishness in the face of crisis. The G20 Finance Ministers concluded their meeting in Paris on Saturday, and the G20 Leaders’ Summit is to take place in Cannes on 3-4 November. It is wise, of course, not to expect too much from any particular meeting. But it is nevertheless notable that as the world economy slides further into crisis, the body appears to have less and less to say. The new cleavages amongst its members have stopped the G20 from taking meaningful stands on problems that threaten the possibility for global recovery. Here are some of the fissures that are playing out within the G20 right now: Europe Germany’s Chancellor Merkel and France’s President Sarkozy have developed a plan to stabilize the Eurozone by recapitalizing the region’s banks, offering further debt relief for Greece via larger lender haircuts, and buttressing the resources of the newly-created European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF). However, in a curious game of “we’re not telling” Merkel and Sarkozy will not be announcing details of that plan until either a European Summit meeting on October 23 or at the G20 Leaders’ Summit next month. Policymakers in G20 countries (especially the USA and the UK) have pressed quite publicly and with unusual directness for specifics to be unveiled at next week’s EU Summit. In the words of the Japanese Finance Minister, “Europe needs to get its act together.” At the same time, the EU and the IMF continue their efforts to squeeze blood out of the stone that is Greece. Tensions over the situation in Greece are taking place against the backdrop of worries that countries like Italy and Spain could overwhelm the EFSF’s resources. Globally there is no consensus regarding whether further austerity is an appropriate response to crisis. The close call in Slovokia last week and the continued mania to cut deficits in the US represent one pole in this debate; the growing protests against austerity in Greece and the globalization of the Occupy Wall Street movement represent the other pole. Truthout doesn't take corporate funding - this lets us do the brave reporting and analysis that makes us unique. Please support this work by making a tax-deductible donation today - click here to donate. Another fissure on Europe within the G20 concerns the question of which body should save the region from itself. Many European governments have pushed for a new infusion of funds to the IMF so that it can play a larger role in regional rescues. China and Brazil endorse this position as well, though only in return for more representation at the IMF and World Bank. (Brazil’s position on the matter is an interesting one: the country’s policymakers have quite publicly urged the other rapidly growing countries in the G20 to find ways to support the Eurozone. However, this position has largely been ignored.) But Germany and the US have rejected calls for the IMF to play a larger role in Europe. In particular, US and German officials have argued that the IMF already has sufficient funds, and that in any case, resolutions must be made in and paid for by an expanded EFSF. And in a curious case of the pot calling the kettle black, US Treasury Secretary Geithner continues to chastise European leaders for moving too slowly and thereby threatening the health of the world economy. China: A currency war makes for strange bedfellows The recent move by the US Senate to take steps against China’s currency manipulation has obviously done nothing to improve the already chilly relations between the two countries. But it is bringing the US and Brazil closer together at least on this one issue. Brazil is pursuing the idea of pressing China on currency manipulation through the WTO. Indeed, the country’s policymakers have suggested that they will retaliate against imports priced in weak currencies in the same manner as it could against goods that are unfairly dumped on its markets. Brazil has also requested that the WTO conduct a study of the interaction of trade and currencies as a weapon of trade. The request has at least given the WTO’s Chief Pascal Lamy something to do. He has been able to use this issue to press the case that the G20’s failure to take on global macroeconomic and currency tensions risks igniting a global trade war. G20 critics of China’s currency policy did score one rhetorical victory at this weekend’s meeting of Finance Ministers. Their communiqué reaffirms “support for more market-determined exchange rates.” In response, China’s representative was firm in his refusal to cede to pressure on its currency. President Wen Jiabao made clear at an exporters’ fair in Gaungzhou on Saturday that the government will not be pressed into liberalizing its currency. The government did agree to deploy expansionary fiscal policy to fuel domestic demand. Controlling capital controls through the IMF The French continue to raise the issue of developing a code of conduct that will govern the use of capital controls by national governments. There is a vague sentence to this effect in the G20 Finance Ministers’ communiqué. But there is little momentum behind this issue in the face of more pressing matters. Advocates of policy space can continue to hope that the fissures among the G20 that have already emerged on this front will continue to be asserted if the issue receives more energetic attention in Cannes or far more likely in 2012 when Mexico takes over leadership of the G20. Taxing the financial sector The G20 continues to discuss the possibility of introducing a tax on financial transactions. (See Edward Barbier’s treatment of this issue.) The EU Commission has put forth a proposal to place an EU-wide tax of 0.1% on trades of bonds and stocks and a tax of 0.01% on derivatives beginning in 2014. The French and German governments are pushing this initiative as a way to recoup some of the revenues that have and will be spent bailing out the financial sector. (This proposal will resonate for advocates of a currency transactions tax, also known as a Tobin tax. Earlier campaigns around a currency transaction tax aimed to use the revenues collected from this tax to provide assistance to developing countries.) But it is unlikely that the measure will be endorsed at the G20 Leaders’ Summit next month insofar as Britain, the US and China have gone on record opposing it. Britain has taken the familiar line used by opponents of any tax scheme — namely, that such taxes will be evaded, and will place any nation(s) imposing it at a competitive disadvantage since a global agreement on the measure is not on the table. These are but some of the fissures that have emerged within the G20. They are unlikely to be resolved in few meetings of Finance Ministers or national leaders. Indeed, the challenges that threaten our globally integrated, highly liberalized, volatile and increasingly broken global economy are deep, enduring and structural. It may be that G20 paralysis reflects the fact that the there are no easy fixes; that the adjustment to a new, non-neoliberal regime is going to be slow, uneven, politically fraught and potentially dangerous as countries continue to look for ways to offload their economic difficulties onto their neighbors. What is missing at the G20 so far is any sense of a common purpose in pursuit of more just, stable and sustainable international economic policy regimes. And that’s something to worry about.

#### Economic rationality is good- provides checks against excessive egocentrism and provides incentives for collective security.

Aasland ‘9

(Dag, Prof. of Economics @ U of Agder, Norway, Ethics and Economy: After Levinas, pgs. 65-66)

Business ethics, in the sense of ethics *for* business, illustrates this: its perspective is that of an ‘enlightened self-interest’ where the constraints that are put on the individual, thanks to the ability to see the unfortunate consequences for oneself, postpone the ‘war’, in a direct or metaphoric sense of the word (*ibid.*: 70-71). This enlightened self-interest forms the base not only of the market economy, but also of a social organization and manifestation of human rights, and even of some ethical theories. It is a calculated and voluntary renunciation of one’s own freedom in order to obtain in return security and other common goals (*ibid.*: 72). The fact that economic, political and legal theories appeal to enlightened self-interest does not imply, however, that we should discard them. Nor should we reject proclamations of human rights, legal constraints of individual freedom and, for that matter, business ethics, even if they are based on an enlightened self-interest. It is rather the opposite: such institutions and knowledge are indispensable because the primary quality of the enlightened self-interest is that it restricts egocentricity. Our *practical reason* (which was Kant’s words for the reason that governs our acts, where the moral law is embedded as a principle) includes the knowledge that it can be rational to lay certain restrictions on individual freedom. In this way practical reason may postpone (for an indefinite time) violence and murder among people. This has primarily been the raison-d’être of politics and the state, but it is today taken over more and more by corporate organizations, as expressed in the new term for business ethics, as *corporate social responsibility* and *corporate citizenship* (see chapter 2). Thanks to this ‘postponement of violence’ provided by politics and economic rationality, people may unfold their freedom within the laws and regulations set up by society (Burggraeve, 2003: 77).

#### No alternatives to sustainable growth-globalized economy is inescapable.

Barnhizer in ‘9

David R. Barnhizer, Emeritus Professor at Cleveland State University’s Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; “Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream": The Decisionmaking Realities of Business and Government.” 2006 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review. 18 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 595 L/N

We face a combination of ecological, social, and economic crises. These crises involve the ability to fund potentially conflicting obligations for the provision of social benefits, health care, education, pensions, and poverty alleviation. They also include the need for massive expenditures to "fix" what we have already broken. n59 Part of the challenge is that in the United States and Europe we have made fiscal promises that we cannot keep. We also have vast economic needs for [\*620] continuing wealth generation as a precondition for achieving social equity on national and global levels. Figuring out how to reduce some of those obligations, eliminate others, and rebuild the core and vitality of our system must become a part of any honest social discourse. Even Pollyanna would be overwhelmed by the choices we face. There will be significant pain and sacrifice in any action we take. But failing to take prompt and effective action will produce even more catastrophic consequences. The scale of social needs, including the need for expanded productive activity, has grown so large that it cannot be shut off at all, and certainly not abruptly. It cannot even be ratcheted down in any significant fashion without producing serious harms to human societies and hundreds of millions of people. Even if it were possible to shift back to systems of local self-sufficiency, the consequences of the transition process would be catastrophic for many people and even deadly to the point of continual conflict, resource wars, increased poverty, and strife. What are needed are concrete, workable, and pragmatic strategies that produce effective and intelligently designed economic activity in specific contexts and, while seeking efficiency and conservation, place economic and social justice high on a list of priorities. n60 The imperative of economic growth applies not only to the needs and expectations of people in economically developed societies but also to people living in nations that are currently economically underdeveloped. Opportunities must be created, jobs must be generated in huge numbers, and economic resources expanded to address the tragedies of poverty and inequality. Unfortunately, natural systems must be exploited to achieve this; we cannot return to Eden. The question is not how to achieve a static state but how to achieve what is needed to advance social justice while avoiding and mitigating the most destructive consequences of our behavior. Many developing country groups involved in efforts to protect the environment and resist the impacts of free trade on their communities have been concerned with the harmful effects of economic change. Part of the concern is the increased scale of economic activity. Some concerns relate to who benefits and who loses in the changing context imposed by globalization. These concerns are legitimate and understandable. So are the other deep currents running beneath their political positions, including those of resistance to change of any kind and a [\*621] rejection of the market approach to economic activities. In the system described inaccurately as free market capitalism, economic activity not only breaks down existing systems, it creates new systems and--as Joseph Schumpeter observed--continually repeats the process through cycles of "creative destruction." n61 This pattern of creative destruction unfolds as necessarily and relentlessly as does the birth-maturation-death-rebirth cycle of the natural environment. This occurs even in a self-sufficient or autarkic market system capable of managing all variables within its closed dominion. But when the system breaks out of its closed environment, the ability of a single national actor to control the system's dynamics erodes and ultimately disappears in the face of differential conditions, needs, priorities, and agendas. Globalization's ability to produce wealth for a particular group simultaneously produces harms to different people and interests and generates unfair resource redistribution within existing cultures. This is an unavoidable consequence of globalization. n62 The problem is that globalization has altered the rules of operation of political, economic, and social activities, and in doing so multiplied greatly our ability to create benefit and harm. n63 While some understandably want the unsettling and often chaotic effects of globalization to go away, it can only be dealt with, not reversed. The system in which we live and work is no longer closed. There are few contexts not connected to the dynamics of some aspect of the extended economic and social systems resulting from globalization. This means the wide ranging and incompatible variables of a global economic, human rights, and social fairness system are resulting in conflicts and unanticipated interpenetrations that no one fully understands, anticipates, or controls. n64 Local [\*622] self-sufficiency is the loser in this process. It can remain a nostalgic dream but rarely a reality. Except for isolated cultures and niche activities, there is very little chance that anyone will be unaffected by this transformational process. Change is the constant, and it will take several generations before we return to a period of relative stasis. Even then it will only be a respite before the pattern once again intensifies.

### 2AC Economic Rationality K

#### Economic growth and analysis are necessary for any impact framework – risk assessment is necessary to avoid catastrophe

Barnhizer, 6

David, Prof of Law, Cleveland State U, ‘Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream”,’ Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev, pg. l/n

The scale of social needs, including the need for expanded productive activity, has grown so large that it cannot be shut off at all, and certainly not abruptly. It cannot even be ratcheted down in any significant fashion without producing serious harms to human societies and hundreds of millions of people. Even if it were possible to shift back to systems of local self-sufficiency, the consequences of the transition process would be catastrophic for many people and even deadly to the point of continual conflict, resource wars, increased poverty, and strife. What are needed are concrete, workable, and pragmatic strategies that produce effective and intelligently designed economic activity in specific contexts and, while seeking efficiency and conservation, place economic and social justice high on a list of priorities. [n60](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n60) The imperative of economic growth applies not only to the needs and expectations of people in economically developed societies but also to people living in nations that are currently economically underdeveloped. Opportunities must be created, jobs must be generated in huge numbers, and economic resources expanded to address the tragedies of poverty and inequality. Unfortunately, natural systems must be exploited to achieve this; we cannot return to Eden. The question is not how to achieve a static state but how to achieve what is needed to advance social justice while avoiding and mitigating the most destructive consequences of our behavior. Many developing country groups involved in efforts to protect the environment and resist the impacts of free trade on their communities have been concerned with the harmful effects of economic change. Part of the concern is the increased scale of economic activity. Some concerns relate to who benefits and who loses in the changing context imposed by globalization. These concerns are legitimate and understandable. So are the other deep currents running beneath their political positions, including those of resistance to change of any kind and a  [\*621]  rejection of the market approach to economic activities. In the system described inaccurately as free market capitalism, economic activity not only breaks down existing systems, it creates new systems and--as Joseph Schumpeter observed--continually repeats the process through cycles of "creative destruction." [n61](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n61) This pattern of creative destruction unfolds as necessarily and relentlessly as does the birth-maturation-death-rebirth cycle of the natural environment. This occurs even in a self-sufficient or autarkic market system capable of managing all variables within its closed dominion. But when the system breaks out of its closed environment, the ability of a single national actor to control the system's dynamics erodes and ultimately disappears in the face of differential conditions, needs, priorities, and agendas. Globalization's ability to produce wealth for a particular group simultaneously produces harms to different people and interests and generates unfair resource redistribution within existing cultures. This is an unavoidable consequence of globalization. [n62](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n62) The problem is that globalization has altered the rules of operation of political, economic, and social activities, and in doing so multiplied greatly our ability to create benefit and harm. [n63](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n63) While some understandably want the unsettling and often chaotic effects of globalization to go away, it can only be dealt with, not reversed. The system in which we live and work is no longer closed. There are few contexts not connected to the dynamics of some aspect of the extended economic and social systems resulting from globalization. This means the wide ranging and incompatible variables of a global economic, human rights, and social fairness system are resulting in conflicts and unanticipated interpenetrations that no one fully understands, anticipates, or controls. [n64](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n64) Local  [\*622]  self-sufficiency is the loser in this process. It can remain a nostalgic dream but rarely a reality. Except for isolated cultures and niche activities, there is very little chance that anyone will be unaffected by this transformational process. Change is the constant, and it will take several generations before we return to a period of relative stasis. Even then it will only be a respite before the pattern once again intensifies.

#### That our predictions might be inaccurate does not justify the aff – their framework is irresponsible and disastrous – economics is necessary for any social discourse.

Barnhizer, 6

David, Prof of Law, Cleveland State U, ‘Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream”,’ Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev, pg. l/n

Grand utopian visions, and even smaller utopias based on an ideal of pastoral communities harmoniously husbanding local resources, simply are not reflective of the reality faced by the vast majority of people. E.F. Schumacher's argument that "small is beautiful" may appear to be an elegant solution for how we can all live comfortable and rewarding lives within enriching community bonds, but it is not going to happen. [n56](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n56) "Small is beautiful" has become an impossible dream for all but a few communities. The process of impossibility is driven by population growth, the breakdown of local communities through migration, the infusion of multicultural diversity, and a materialistic ethos that has altered our sense of what constitutes  [\*619]  quality of life. The most obvious driving forces include increasing urban densities and coastal development requiring massive infrastructures and supportive supply systems, overall population levels, and the distortions of population distribution and age demographics. To these can be added quality of life demands caused by people in economically impoverished countries who can see how material life is led in richer countries and the spread of interdependent economic systems that allow global production and distribution systems to penetrate what had been largely closed economic and cultural systems. These conditions are not reversible. My concern here is related to the speed at which societies are approaching various kinds of large-scale dislocations, injustices, strife, and even disaster. I do not want to resort to doomsday prophecies or set a clear date on which critical resources will be irreversibly depleted, such as was done in the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth report in 1972. [n57](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n57) In addition to being destructive and careless, humans are also adaptive and resilient. Placing hard and fast deadlines on when chaos occurs and the worst effects are generated is unwise and chancy at best. [n58](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n58) But if it is unwise or at least extremely difficult to make accurate and detailed predictions involving "doom and gloom" scenarios, it is equally unwise and foolhardy to ignore that the equivalent of ecological and social tectonic plates with massive disruptive potential are shifting underneath the surface of our national and global systems. Failing to prepare for the most likely consequences reaches the level of gross irresponsibility. We face a combination of ecological, social, and economic crises. These crises involve the ability to fund potentially conflicting obligations for the provision of social benefits, health care, education, pensions, and poverty alleviation. They also include the need for massive expenditures to "fix" what we have already broken. [n59](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n59) Part of the challenge is that in the United States and Europe we have made fiscal promises that we cannot keep. We also have vast economic needs for  [\*620]  continuing wealth generation as a precondition for achieving social equity on national and global levels. Figuring out how to reduce some of those obligations, eliminate others, and rebuild the core and vitality of our system must become a part of any honest social discourse. Even Pollyanna would be overwhelmed by the choices we face. There will be significant pain and sacrifice in any action we take. But failing to take prompt and effective action will produce even more catastrophic consequences.

### 2AC A2: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

#### Self-fulfilling prophecy is backwards – failure to express our fears causes them to occur.

Macy ‘95

Joanna Macy, General Systems Scholar and Deep Ecologist, 1995, Ecopsychology.

There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is of a piece with the notion, popular in New Age circles, that we create our own reality I have had people tell me that “to speak of catastrophe will just make it more likely to happen.” Actually, the contrary is nearer to the truth. Psychoanalytic theory and personal experience show us that it is precisely what we repress that eludes our conscious control and tends to erupt into behavior. As Carl Jung observed, “When an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside as fate.” But ironically, in our current situation, the person who gives warning of a likely ecological holocaust is often made to fee l guilty of contributing to that very fate.